HC Deb 18 November 1997 vol 301 cc151-3W
Mr. Key

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much was paid in compensation to the Ministry of Defence in 1995 by Textron Lycoming in connection with the manufacture and supply of fully automated digital engine control systems for RAF Chinook helicopters. [14782]

Mr. Spellar

The Ministry of Defence had no claim against, and therefore in 1995 received no money in compensation from, Textron Lycoming for the manufacture and supply of fully automated digital engine control systems for RAF Chinook Helicopters.

However, compensation totalling just over $3 million was received from Textron Lycoming in November 1995 in respect of damage caused to an RAF Chinook HC Mk1 aircraft during development testing of a pre-production Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system.

Mr. Key

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the outcome of the case against Boeing brought by the Ministry of Defence in United States courts in connection with the manufacture and supply of fully automated digital engine control systems for RAF Chinook helicopters; and when the case was(a) commenced and (b) concluded. [14783]

Mr. Spellar

The Ministry of Defence brought no case against Boeing in United States courts in connection with the manufacture and supply of fully automated digital engine control systems for RAF Chinook Helicopters.

However, an RAF Chinook HC Mk1 aircraft was damaged in January 1989 during development testing of a pre-production Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system. The Ministry of Defence held that both Boeing and Textron Lycoming were responsible. A settlement was made by Being as a discount on a separate contract placed in September 1993.

Mr. Key

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what independent assessment was made, and by whom, of the performance and reliability of the software used in 1994 on RAF Chinook helicopters including aircraft ZD 576; and what were the conclusions and recommendations. [14779]

Mr. Spellar

FADEC software was subjected to an independent review by EDS Scicon Ltd. in July 1993. This review was commissioned because A&AEE, Boscombe Down (now part of DERA) was concerned with the method of software qualification used by the FADEC Design Authority, Textron Lycoming.

EDS Scicon were contracted to verify the software using a State Code Analysis (SCA) technique recommended by Boscombe Down. However, the contracted software documentation was not amenable to such analysis, so the work stopped after only 17 per cent. of the code had been reviewed; 485 observations were made, but none was considered safety critical and most related to errors in the documentation. The EDS final report did not make recommendations.

In October 1993, EDS Scicon made preliminary proposals to carry out a limited rewrite of the software to make it more compatible with SCA verification. This proposal was not accepted, but to satisfy Boscombe Down's concerns and provide improved maintainability for any future update of the software code, the Ministry of Defence decided to re-document the software to make it suitable for SCA. Textron Lycoming were contracted on a shared cost basis and the software re-documentation work was eventually completed in 1996.

Mr. Key

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the planned introduction of cockpit voice recorders and accident data recorders into all Chinook helicopters commenced; and when it will be completed. [14781]

Mr. Spellar

Cockpit Voice Recorders and Flight Data Recorders will be fitted to all Chinook helicopters as part of the Chinook Health and Usage Monitoring (HUMs) programme. A contract was signed with Smith Industries (UK) Ltd., on 25 October 1996. The equipment will be fitted to the first 6 aircraft by December 1998, and embodied on the rest of the fleet by late Spring 2000.

Mr. Key

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many incident signals have been issued relating to the fully automated digital engine control system on Chinook Mark II aircraft since they were introduced into squadron service with the RAF. [14780]

Mr. Spellar

Incident Signals are raised for both ground and air incidents. Some incidents may be spurious; that is to say a fault is indicated in some way which has not actually occurred; some may occur through use other than as recommended by the Aircraft Design Authority; some will be unconfirmed, which is to say no faults found on a subsequent examination; and some will be due to system faults.

With regard to the Chinook HC Mk2; there have been a total of 519 Incident Signals, of which 70 have been FADEC related. Of those FADEC related signals, seven were spurious, 24 arose through carrying out engine overspeed tests other than as designed, three were unconfirmed, and 36 were attributed to system faults. Of the 36 attributed faults, 14 were due to mechanical failure, five were due to electrical failure and 17 were software faults.