Defence Exports (Hansard, 28 July 1997)

§ Mr. Colvin
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has had with Britain's defence industrial partners about his proposed policy for defence exports. [10643]

§ Mr. Tony Lloyd
We have discussed with several of our partners at ministerial and official level our commitment to work for an EU code of conduct setting high common standards to govern arms exports from all EU member states. We shall be reinforcing these initial contacts in the weeks and months to come with a view to agreeing a code during the UK presidency.
We have also been working to strengthen the UN register of conventional arms, encouraging greater disclosure of information on arms exports and arms transfers by all countries.

§ Mr. Colvin
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on his interim policy on the licensing of defence exports pending the completion of the review of licensing policy. [10640]

§ Mr. Lloyd
During the review of the criteria used in considering licence applications for the export of conventional arms, individual export licence applications have been considered on a case-by-case basis. Officials have been instructed to consult Ministers whenever export licence applications may cause concerns about human rights or international stability.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has today announced the results of the review in his written answer to my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Mr. Timms).

§ Mr. Timms
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what criteria will be used in considering licence applications for the export of conventional arms; and if he will make a statement. [11461]

§ Mr. Robin Cook
The Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence industry which is a strategic part of our industrial base as well as of our defence effort. Defence exports can also contribute to international stability by strengthening bilateral and collective defence relationships in accordance with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN charter, but arms transfers must be managed responsibly, in particular so as to avoid their use for internal repression and international aggression.
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It will be important to avoid a situation in which our policy of seeking to prevent certain regimes from acquiring certain equipment is undermined by foreign competitors supplying them. We will therefore work for the introduction of a European code of conduct, setting high common standards to govern arms exports from all EU member states.
Licences to export strategic goods are issued by the President of the Board of Trade and the export control organisation of the Department of Trade and Industry is the licensing authority. All relevant individual licence applications are circulated by the DTI to other Government Departments with an interest, as determined by them in line with their policy responsibilities. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.
The present Government were not responsible for the decisions on export licences made by the previous Administration. We do not, however, consider that it would be realistic or practical to revoke licences that were valid and in force at the time of our election.
The criteria set out below will be used when considering all future individual applications for licences to export goods entered in part III of schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 and existing licence applications on which a decision has not yet been made. The criteria will also be applied when considering advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence and licence applications for the export of dual-use goods when there are grounds for believing that the end user of such goods will be the armed forces or the internal security forces of the recipient country.
The criteria will constitute broad guidance. They will not be applied mechanistically and judgment will always be required. Individual applications will be considered case by case.
Criteria used in considering conventional arms export licence applications 1. An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, or by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, or by the risks to regional stability, or other considerations as described in these criteria.
The United Kingdom's international obligations 2. An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with:

(a) the UK's international obligations and commitments to enforce United Nations, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union arms embargoes, together with any national embargoes or other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;

(b) the UK's international obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the biological weapons convention and the chemical weapons convention;

(c) the UK's commitments to the international export control regimes—the Australia group, the missile technology control regime, the nuclear suppliers group and the Wassenaar arrangement;

(d) the EU common criteria for arms exports, the guidelines for conventional arms transfers agreed by the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE principles governing conventional arms transfers;
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(e) the UK's commitment not to export all forms of anti-personnel land mines and their components.

The United Kingdom's national interests 3. Full weight should be given to the UK's national interests when considering applications for licences, including:

(a) the potential effect on the UK's defence and security interests and those of allies and EU partners;

(b) the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;

(c) the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country;

(d) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;

(e) the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

Human rights and internal repression 4. The Government:

(a) will take into account respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country;

(b) will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.

5. For these purposes equipment which might be used for internal repression will include:

(a) Equipment where there is clear evidence of the recent use of similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end use or end user and used for internal repression;

(b) Equipment which has obvious application for internal repression, in cases where the recipient country has a significant and continuing record of such repression, unless the end use of the equipment is judged to be legitimate, such as protection of members of security forces from violence.

6. The nature of the equipment proposed for export will also be carefully considered. Certain goods have more obvious potential for use in internal repression than others, such as armoured personnel carriers specifically designed for internal security. In other cases, there may be prima facie reasons for believing that a particular equipment might be used in such roles in certain circumstances. Any proposed export which is to be used by the recipient country for internal security purposes should be considered particularly carefully. 7. Internal repression includes extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, torture, suppression or major violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In some cases, the use of force by a Government within their own borders does not constitute internal repression. The use of such force by Governments is legitimate in some cases, for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals. However, force may be used only in accordance with international human rights standards.
International Aggression 8. The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clearly identifiable risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused. 9. When considering the risk that the country for which arms are destined might use them for international aggression, the Government will take into account:

(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;

(b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
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(c) whether the equipment wold be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient.

Regional stability 10. The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way will also be considered. The balance of forces between neighbouring states, their relative expenditure on defence, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension, will all be taken into account.
Other criteria 11. In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end user, the following will be considered:

(a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or other peacekeeping activity;

(b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;

(c) whether the purchase would seriously undermine the economy of the recipient country, taking into account its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any International Monetary Fund/World bank-sponsored economic reform programme;

(d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to an undesirable end user, including terrorist organisations' anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context.

12. The following factors will also be taken into account:

(a) the risk of use of the goods concerned against UK forces;

(b) the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities;

(c) the potential for the equipment to be a force multiplier in the region;

(d) the risk of reverse engineering or technology transfer.

13. In the application of all the above criteria, account should also be taken of, for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence, and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.
REPORTING TO PARLIAMENT To ensure full transparency and accountability to Parliament, the Government will report annually on the state of strategic export controls and their application, thereby providing for parliamentary consideration of the application of the criteria. The Government will also inform Parliament of any changes to the criteria.