§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General (1) what further assessment he makes of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G13.125, page 1996, in respect of his legal and constitutional responsibility to promote the public interst; and if he will make a statement; [16996]
(2) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusions in G13.106 that the brief to Mr. Moses and his submissions to Judge Smedley were inconsistent with the Deputy Prime Minister's views; and if he will make a statement; [16994]
(3) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G13.123 that he must bear responsibility for inadequate instructions to Mr. Moses. [16993]
§ The Attorney-GeneralThe Treasury Solicitor's Department instructed prosecuting counsel in relation to public interest immunity on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence.
All the Ministers who signed PII certificates in the Matrix Churchill case, including my right hon. Friend the then President of the Board of Trade, were satisfied that there was, in principle, a public interest in non-disclosure of documents within the classes as formulated in the certificates, and that the documents in question fell within those classes.
Having regard to the law as it then stood, in the light of the President's concerns, I advised him on a specially drafted PII certificate which emphasised that he was doing no more than performing his duty to assert PII, and that it was for the court to decide which documents should be disclosed.
In the circumstances, as my evidence to the Scott inquiry made clear, the instructions to counsel in relation to the DTI were inadequate and counsel should have been shown my exchange of letters with the President, but these were not matters for my personal supervision.
721WSir Richard Scott's comments on my role derive from the fact that he takes a fundamentally different view of the law and does not believe that the President was under any such duty. I am satisfied that the advice I gave was correct and that the decision on disclosure was for the court, not Ministers.
Prosecuting counsel, in line with the President's specially drafted PII certificate, emphasised to the court that Ministers were doing no more than performing their duty to assert PII, and that it was for the court to decide which documents should be disclosed. At counsel's invitation the judge read every document covered by all the PII certificates and duly decided which should be disclosed.
The law has now moved on. Following the decision in ex parte Wiley (1994), Ministers are now able to form their own judgment as to whether material should be disclosed. In the light of that decision, submissions to Ministers on PII are now fuller and take into account Ministers' expanded role.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.60 that Government are entitled to authorise the disclosure of its confidential or secret documents; and if he will make a statement. [17005]
§ The Attorney-GeneralPublic interest immunity applies only to disclosure in the context of legal proceedings. Following the decision of the House of Lords in ex parte Wiley, a Minister is entitled to volunteer disclosure where he concludes that this is in the overall public interest. It has always been for Ministers to decide whether disclosure for purposes other than legal proceedings is in the public interest.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.58 in respect of Viscount Simon's judgement in Duncan v. Cammell Laird 1942; and if he will make a statement. [17004]
§ The Attorney-GeneralThe decision in Duncan v. Cammell Laird (1942) was overtaken by the decision of the House of Lords in Conway v. Rimmer (1968), which effected a major change in the law as to the function of Ministers in claiming public interest immunity. The Government's approach to PII in the Matrix Churchill case was fully in accordance with the law as it then stood in the light of Conway v. Rimmer and the later authorities. With the House of Lords decision in ex parte Wiley (1994) there has been a further change.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General (1) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in sections G 18.66 that his advice was without sound legal foundation; and if he will make a statement; [16998]
(2) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.54 that his views on Ministers' legal duties to claim PII were based on a fundamental misconception of PII law; and if he will make a statement. [16997]
§ The Attorney-GeneralThe advice I gave on PII at the time of the Matrix Churchill trial was entirely in accordance with the law as it then stood. It was based on careful, detailed advice from a team of distinguished independent practitioners, was fully supported by the case722W law and has been publicly endorsed by three of the defence counsel and a number of other eminent commentators including the Master of the Rolls.
Since the Matrix Churchill trial the decision of the House of Lords in ex parte Wiley (1994) has brought about a change in the law on PII.
For a full analysis I refer the hon. Member to the document entitled "Public interest immunity: Government response to the Scott Report", copies of which are in the Library.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.104 that the class claims made in the Matrix Churchill trial should have had no place in a criminal trial; and if he will make a statement. [16999]
§ The Attorney-GeneralThe class claims made in the Matrix Churchill trial were of a kind which were well established and recognised by the courts. The trial judge held that they had been properly made. The application of PII to criminal cases has been confirmed by the higher courts. For example, the Court of Appeal upheld class claims for material relating to national security and communications with foreign Governments in Ordtec—Rv. Blackledge and others—(1995).
As to the future, I have announced that the Government are considering carefully the recommendations in the Scott report in relation to PII and are seeking the views of interested parties.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G13.17 that the ability of the prosecution to introduce evidence within a public interest immunity class without making it available to the defence is one-sided. [17324]
§ The Attorney-GeneralPublic interest immunity applies regardless of whether the prosecution or the defence seeks disclosure of the material in question. At the relevant time a Minister was under a duty to claim PII where it applied, except where it was clear that on any view the court was bound to order disclosure—the so-called Makanjuola exception. The Makanjuola exception was not expressly applied to the disclosure of the material referred to in paragraph G13.17 of the Scott report. It is accepted that the prior approval of the Secretary of State for disclosure should have been obtained. However, on the basis that disclosure could in the circumstances have been justified as falling within the scope of the Makanjuola exception, there was no inconsistency between that disclosure and the PII claims that were made in the case.
§ Mr. WinnickTo ask the Attorney-General when he first consulted with other Cabinet Ministers about the contents of the report of the Scott inquiry; and where and when such discussions took place and with whom. [16514]
§ The Attorney-General[holding answer 22 February 1996]: It is not the practice to give details of ministerial meetings.
723W
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General, pursuant to his oral answer of 19 February,Official Report, column 17, (1) when he read the letter from the Deputy Prime Minister dated 11 September; [16990]
(2) pursuant to his oral answer of 19 February, Official Report, column 17, who in his Department read the Deputy Prime Minister's letter dated 11 September; on what date; and on what date their contents were communicated directly to him; [16989]
(3) pursuant to his oral answer of 19 February, Official Report, column 17, if the written comments submitted to Sir Richard Scott on his behalf on 6 November 1995 confirmed that he had not read the Deputy Prime Minister's letter of 11 September prior to commencement of the Matrix Churchill trial on 12 October 1992. [16991]
(4) if he will publish the written comments submitted on his behalf to Sir Richard Scott on 6 November 1995; [16992]
§ The Attorney-GeneralOne of my officials read my right hon. Friend's letter when it was received on 14 September 1992 and immediately sent a copy to the Treasury Solicitor's Department, which was responsible for instructing prosecuting counsel. I was away from my office during the week when the letter arrived.
The letter was a brief one. Its purpose was to thank me for my advice and for the revised draft PII certificate which I had proposed, and which my right hon. Friend had duly signed. I already knew this. In the circumstances there is nothing at all surprising in the fact that, as the Scott inquiry was informed in written comments submitted on 6 November 1995, the letter was not brought to my attention before the Matrix Churchill trial. I have no plans to publish those comments. Sir Richard Scott intends to publish in due course copies of all documents which he considers relevant to the text of his report.
§ Mr. HainTo ask the Attorney-General (1) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in sections G13.113 and 115 that Ministers should inform the court if they have views on disclosure; and if he will make a statement; [17003]
(2) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.101 that it is a waste of public time and money to place the issue of disclosure in respect of trivial documents before the trial judge; and if he will make a statement; [17001]
(3) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G18.101 that judges may make mistakes; and if he will make a statement; [17002]
(4) what assessment he has made of Sir Richard Scott's conclusion in section G13.103 that Ministers were given insufficient guidance to come to a consistent view about the class of documents they were protecting; and if he will make a statement. [17323]
724W
§ The Attorney-GeneralAs the law on public interest immunity stood at the time of Matrix Churchill, it was for Ministers to advance a PII claim where they were satisfied that there was a public interest in not disclosing documents within the relevant classes, and that the documents fell within those classes. It was then the judge's function to weigh the public interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in disclosure for the purposes of doing justice. The judge was best placed to know the issues in the case and hence the degree of relevance of the documents in question.
Following the decision in ex parte Wiley (1994), Ministers can now weigh the competing interests for themselves and volunteer disclosure if they conclude that this is in the overall public interest. But where a Minister is not satisfied that disclosure should be made, the court remains the ultimate decision maker and must balance the competing public interests and rule on disclosure.