§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the reciprocal arrangements between his Department and the Italian authorities concerning RAF low flying training over Italy and Italian air force low flying over the United Kingdom specify(a) the maximum number of sorties and (b) requirements for flight authorisation.
§ Mr. SoamesThere are no formal agreements relating to low flying training by the RAF over Italy or by the Italian air force over the United Kingdom. Requests for use of the low flying systems of Italy and the United Kingdom are considered individually by officials of the Ministry of Defence of the country in which the sorties will be flown. Such requests include details of the numbers of aircraft and the duration of deployment. Approval of such requests, if granted, would be conditional on the aircrews receiving a comprehensive face-to-face briefing on the regulations governing the use of the respective low flying system.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is his policy on conducting Royal Air Force police investigations of alleged breaches of low flying regulations which originate from sources other than witnesses on the ground.
§ Mr. SoamesThe RAF police may be tasked to carry out an investigation in any case where it appears that a breach of low flying regulations may have occurred, regardless of the source of the complaint.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many of the RAF police investigations of alleged breaches of flying regulations during 1993 originated from(a) complaints from members of the public, (b) representations from hon. Members, (c) members of the armed forces and (d) other sources.
§ Mr. SoamesOf the 686 RAF police investigations in 1993, 39 originated from representations from hon. Members. A breakdown of investigations by the other categories listed could be obtained only at disproportionate cost.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the means employed to verify that non-United Kingdom based foreign aircrews conducting low-level flying training over104W the United Kingdom are observing low flying regulations during (a) the planning and (b) the execution of their sorties.
§ Mr. SoamesForeign aircrews using the United Kingdom low flying system are subject to the same monitoring as United Kingdom crews to ensure compliance with low flying regulations.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what sums were paid by the Italian authorities for use of United Kingdom range and low-flying facilities in 1993.
§ Mr. SoamesIt is not my Department's practice to release details of government-to-government payments of this kind.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) pursuant to his answer of 1 December,Official Report, column 907, what is the current radius of the Eshott microlight avoidance area (a) for foreign military aircraft and (b) for British military aircraft; and if the operators of Eshott airfield are provided with information on the dimensions of the avoidance area;
(2) in respect of which avoidance areas the diversions applying to foreign aircraft are different from those applying to British aircraft;
(3) if the radius requirements in respect of the Eshott microlight avoidance area apply equally to all foreign aircraft.
§ Mr. SoamesIt is my Department's policy not to release specific details of flying restrictions in individual areas, although we understand that the operators of Eshott airfield are aware of the dimensions of their avoidance. The dimensions of all avoidances apply equally to both United Kingdom and foreign military aircraft.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence in what circumstances other than official NATO squadron exchanges or exercises he grants permission to foreign aircrew to conduct low flying over the United Kingdom.
§ Mr. SoamesEach request for foreign aircraft to fly in the United Kingdom low flying system is considered on its merits, taking into account the principle of reciprocity, the mutual benefit of such flying to the United Kingdom and our allies and the wider defence interest.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 2 December,Official Report, column 945, what rank of RAF officer authorised the flight by Italian air force aircraft on 14 July.
§ Mr. SoamesUse of the United Kingdom low flying system was authorised by my officials, and the specific sortie concerned was properly booked with the tactical booking cell at RAF West Drayton. There was no requirement for individual flight plans to be authorised by an RAF officer.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the date, number, type and nationality of aircraft involved, and source of the reported breach, for each confirmed breach of the Eshott microlight avoidance area in 1991 and 1992.
105W
§ Mr. SoamesBreaches of Eshott microlight site which were confirmed by RAF police investigations are detailed:
Date Number and type of aircraft Nationality 1991 25 September 4 F16s Royal Netherlands Air Force 26 November 2 Hawks RAF 1992 6 May 1 Buccaneer RAF 9 September 5 Jaguars French Air Force 12 November 1 F15E USAF 8 December 1 Tornado RAF All were reported by staff working at the site.
My answer of 1 December 1994, Official Report, column 907, stated that eight breaches occurred in 1992. Further investigation has, however, revealed that this figure included a number of cases where a breach was suspected but could not be confirmed by RAF investigations. The correct total for 1992 is four.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many low-level passes were conducted over Her Majesty's prison Stocken by an RAF Tornado on 27 September; what was the minimum authorised altitude for the passes; what use was made of reheat; what attack profiles were used; what consideration was given to the environmental effects of the activity on the surrounding population; and what was the sum recovered from the Prison Service in payment for the service.
§ Mr. SoamesAlthough the precise number was not recorded, between six and eight low-level passes were made over Her Majesty's prison Stocken on 27 September 1994 at the request of Her Majesty's Prison Service. The aircraft flew at a height of 1,000 ft in a figure of eight pattern centred on the prison. The pattern was rotated to avoid the undue concentration of environmental effects. On approaching the prison complex the aircraft descended to 250 ft and only used reheat when within the prison boundary for a period of five seconds on each pass. This task was conducted at the end of a normal training flight and no payments have been sought from the Prison Service.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many low-level sorties were conducted by Royal Air Force aircraft over Italy during 1993; and at what minimum altitudes.
§ Mr. SoamesThe information requested is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Low flying by Royal Air Force aircraft in Italy is in general permitted down to 500 ft, although in certain specified areas flying down to 250 ft may be authorised.
§ Mr. RedmondTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the basis of the determination, contained in his Department's evidence to the Defence Select Committee, HC 314 of Session 1993–94, page 37, that the breach of the Dounreay nuclear power station avoidance area by two Portuguese aircraft on 21 September 1993, was inadvertent; and if a copy of the RAF police report on the incident was passed to the commanding officer of the aircrew concerned.
§ Mr. SoamesThe aircraft concerned were carrying out a training sortie which, had the planned route been106W followed, would have taken them no closer than 10 nautical miles to the Dounreay power station. During the sortie the aircraft became lost; to regain its bearings, it flew north to the coast and then east back on to its planned route. In doing so, it inadvertently infringed the Dounreay avoidance area.
A copy of the RAF police report was not sent to the commanding officer of the aircrew concerned as the matter had already been discussed with the senior officer of the Portuguese detachment concerned in a debrief at RAF Lossiemouth immediately after the sortie had been flown.