Nuclear Test Veterans

HC Deb 22 December 1988 vol 144 cc367-72W

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if, following the publication of the NRPB report into the incidence of cancers in British nuclear test veterans, he will take action to investigate test veterans' claims of genetic effects and inherited deformity; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Sainsbury

The findings of the NRPB report give no grounds for investigating the claims by participants in the nuclear test programme that their offspring suffer raised incidence of genetic effects or inherited deformities. I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to a similar question on 26 July 1988 at columns228–30.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will release information relating to the decontamination undertaken to vessels and cargo of the special squadron as part of Operation Hurricane operating under Rear Admiral Torlesse in 1952; if he will give the level and nature of this contamination; and how many personnel were on board HMS Tracker at the time it entered contaminated waters;

(2) where decontamination of HMS Tracker was undertaken, after its contamination in the Pacific; and whether this vessel remained contaminated on entering British waters.

Mr. Sainsbury

The two ships HMS Tracker and HMS Zeebrugge, which experienced low depositions of radioactive material during the Hurricane operation, primarily from fission products, at levels not significant to health, were subject to first stage decontamination and temporary fixative treatment at sea at the scene of the test. Further decontamination and stripping of fixative from the ships and items of cargo was conducted on return to Naval Ports in the United Kingdom. In this operation full decontamination was completed to levels at which no further treatment or precautions were necessary. With its crew and complement of scientists and other visitors, approximately 200 personnel were on board HMS Tracker when she entered mildly contaminated waters during the Hurricane operation. HMS Tracker did not take part in the tests conducted in the Pacific.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (I) if he will provide information on the effectiveness of film badges and personal dosimeters in detecting the ingestion of particles emitting beta radiation when used by British military personnel during British nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1950s;

(2) what methods were used to detect levels of beta radiation during British nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1950s;

(3) how film badges operated as indicators to overall body contamination of all forms of radiation when used by British military personnel during British nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1950s.

Mr. Sainsbury

Information on the effectiveness of personal film badge dosimeters is readily available in standard textbooks on the measurement of radiation. Their purpose was to assess exposure to ionising radiations by measuring the radiation incident on a piece of photographic film, usually contained in a locket which had a number of "windows" of different thicknesses and filter materials. By examining the film density under these "windows" the health physicist can determine the amount and type of radiation reaching the film, whether it be gamma rays, beta rays or slow neutrons. By definition, it cannot detect radiation form ingested material unless the radiation is capable of penetrating the body and reaching the dosimeter. Nevertheless, by using more sophisticated instruments and detectors to determine the dose from other sources of non-penetrating radiation associated with radioactivity present in the environment, a judgment can be reached as to its contribution to the exposure Film badge dosimeters can then be used to monitor exposure and allowance made as necessary for the other contributions.

During the United Kingdom test programmes, because strict control was exercised over entry to, and operation within, areas in which surface deposited radioactive material may have been present, uptake and deposition on skin did not lead to doses sensibly above zero.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of the film badges issued to British personnel were given to military personnel during British nuclear tests in the Pacific during the 1950s.

Mr. Sainsbury

A full account is given in chapter 3 of the NRPB report of all information on the exposure of participants and of the numbers of service and civilian personnel for whom a record of exposure, or a likelihood of exposure exists. Since, as was explained in the answer to the hon. Member on 31 October at column 529, the exact number of badges issued is not known, I cannot provide him with the information he seeks.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what are the implications of the absence of information on the number of film badges issued during British nuclear tests in the Pacific for the accuracy of estimated contamination levels for British military personnel serving in the Pacific during the tests.

Mr. Sainsbury

Lack of information on the precise numbers of film badge dosimeters issued has no implications for the estimated exposures of personnel to ionising radiation. Access to all areas in which the levels of surface deposited radioactive material were such as to require the wearing of film badge dosimeters was strictly controlled and I have no reason to believe that it was not effective(a) in controlling the exposure of personnel to ionising radiation and (b) in ensuring that the uptake of radioactive materials or depositions on skin did not lead to radiation doses sensibly above zero. The accuracy of dose estimation by current or contemporary standards was and remains acceptable for control purposes and for the dose levels experienced throughout the test programme for the few who were exposed.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many British military personnel received war pensions following active service on Christmas Island during British nuclear tests there in the 1950s and 1960s.

Mr. Sainsbury

The information could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if coconuts, posted home by British military personnel serving on Christmas Island during the 1950s and 1960s, were checked for radioactive contaminaton on Christmas Island and on arrival in Britain.

Mr. Sainsbury

The extensive environmental monitoring which was conducted throughout the operations in the Pacific showed that none of the indigenous products could be expected to be affected to a significant extent by deposition of surface radioactivity. No monitoring of coconuts or related products (such as Copra) was conducted.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what precautions were taken to monitor indigenous edible vegetation and other foodstuffs for radioactivity, during British nuclear tests on Christmas Island during the 1950s and 1960s.

Mr. Sainsbury

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to him on 7 November 1988 at columns32–33, which states that fish and sea water were monitored. The bulk of food supplies for service and other personnel were imported to the island and I am not aware that any significant amounts of local produce were used by them. The extensive environmental monitoring which was conducted throughout the operations in the Pacific showed that none of the indigenous products could be expected to be affected to a significant extent by deposition of surface radioactivity.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if water from desalination plants on Christmas Island during British nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s used by British or other personnel on the island as a source of drinking water was monitored for radioactivity.

Mr. Sainsbury

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 7 November 1988 at columns31–32.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the national origin of construction vehicles which were buried and abandoned on Christmas Island after British nuclear tests there.

Mr. Sainsbury

Most of the construction vehicles used on Christmas Island were of British construction, though some vehicles, notably amphibious transport DUKWs, were of United States manufacture. None were buried, but parts of some may have been abandoned or dumped in the sea.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what quantities of foodstuffs were buried by the NAAFI following nuclear tests on Christmas Island in the 1950s.

Mr. Sainsbury

There are no records to suggest that surplus food supplies were buried on Christmas Island.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what role Fanning Island had during British nuclear tests in the Pacific during the 1950s.

Mr. Sainsbury

At the time of the tests, Fanning Island was an important communications point and continued in the same role beyond the date when the test programme was completed.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) whether, on the date of the test for Grapple Y, Mr. Andrew Dickson of Wakefield was among British personnel who were moved nearer to the test site; on how many occasions similar such movements occurred; and how many personnel were involved;

(2) how checks were made to ascertain that service personnel were at a safe location during the Grapple Y test in 1958;

(3) where Mr. Andrew Dickson, service number 22999369, serving with the 12th Independent Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, was located on the date and time of the Grapple Y test on 28 April 1958;

(4) what are the implications for the Ministry's ability to assure ex-Service men on Christmas Island in 1958 that they did not receive a dose of radiation of its inability to ascertain where each individual was at the time of a particular detonation; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Sainsbury

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given on 31 October 1988 at column529 referring to the location of named individuals and to the closest distances at which personnel were located during each of the tests in the Pacific area. I have no information on the precise movements or whereabouts of Mr. Andrew Dickson except to state that he was at a safe location. The means by which the checks to ascertain that all personnel, service and civilian (including the local population) were at a safe location were to conduct a full roll call of all personnel know to be present. The countdown sequence to the firing could not continue until it was established that all personnel were at a safe location. The records which have been kept do not now permit the identification of each individual at the time of each detonation. Nevertheless I am confident that the roll call checks were conducted scrupulously and therefore that all personnel were at safe locations at the time of each detonation.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the present status of the 12th Independent Field Squadron Royal Engineers; and what was its major function during British nuclear tests in the 1950s.

Mr. Sainsbury

The 12th Independent Field Squadron (now known as 12 Field Squadron) is part of 25 Engineer Regiment stationed at Osnabruck, Germany. At the time of the tests its major function was building, construction and related works.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what information he has as to the members of the 12th Independent Field Squadron Royal Engineers who served in British nuclear tests in the 1950s and are still alive.

Mr. Sainsbury

I have no information specific to the present vital status of members of the 12th Independent Field Squadron who served at Christmas Island. The NRPB study includes members of the squadron among the participants.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence why members of the 12th Independent Field Squadron Royal Engineers, previously serving on Christmas Island during British nuclear tests, were later involved in a series of experiments conducted at Porton Down; and what was the nature of these experiments.

Mr. Sainsbury

The nature of the duties involved were, to the best of my knowledge, not such as to warrant their being described as involvement in a series of experiments.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how mortality amongst British nuclear test veterans is identified from general mortality; who has overall responsibility for this investigative procedure; and how the records are collated;

(2) what was the annual level of mortality amongst British military personnel serving on Christmas Island, during British nuclear tests undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s; and what were the causes of these mortality levels.

Mr. Sainsbury

The NRPB together with its consultants from ICRF, Professor Sir Richard Doll and Dr. Sarah Darby, were responsible for analysing the mortality data on participants and a full account of the causes analysed is given in the NRPB report. As for the annual level of mortality in the 1950s and 1960s, I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 31 October 1988 at column529, where he asked for similar information for each year since 1958. The sources of mortality records are described in the NRPB report. The bulk of them came from National Health Service (NHS) and Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) central records, but for those not traced in this way further searches were undertaken.

Mr. Hinchliffe

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if he will release information as to how safe distances were calculated when positioning British military personnel, during British nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1950s;

(2) if he will release the information which led to the calculation of safe distances, beyond which the wearing of film badges was deemed unnecessary, for the Grapple Y test in 1958.

Mr. Sainsbury

The means by which it was established that the locations where personnel were situated at the time of each test were safe were based on standard methods described in textbooks such as "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" published by United States Department of Defence and United States Department of Energy. These calculations took into account the expected maximum yield and altitude and the effect of the intervening air. These yields for the tests in the Pacific were within range given in answer to a question from the hon. Member on 31 October 1988 at columns523–26.

Since the wearing of film badges was not a means of checking the exposure at these locations, they were not necessary for this purpose during any of the tests, including Grapple Y in 1958. What they were provided for was primarily to measure the exposure of personnel who might have access to areas where the radiation levels were high after the detonation.