Merchant Navy (Hansard, 14 February 1983)

§ Mr. Sproat

I am deeply concerned at the decline in the British Merchant Navy—a decline which has resulted from, among other causes, the devastating recession in shipping worldwide, the misconceived and growing protectionism of certain foreign governments, and the loss of commercial competitiveness by the British Merchant Navy.

A list of the main steps I have taken may be divided into two categories, international and domestic.

1. International

(i) We are continuing to mount a firm resistance to UNCTAD proposals directed against the operation of open registries. These proposals would be gravely damaging to the employment and prosperity of United Kingdom shipping, since beneficial ownership of some 45 per cent. of the deadweight tonnage on the United Kingdom register can be attributed to foreign interests.
(ii) I have held Ministerial discussions with the Norwegian Minister of Commerce and Shipping, and we set up a British-Norwegian working group which examined the technical safety standards imposed by Norway and the United Kingdom on supply vessels serving offshore installations in their respective sectors with a view to establishing whether there were any significant differences and, if so, whether such differences were a barrier to Norwegian and United Kingdom supply ships freely operating in both sectors. Following these talks, a British supply vessel was employed, for the first time, in the Norwegian sector late last year—although only on a short contract—and I hope to see more British supply vessels employed there in future.
(iii) We are continuing to participate in a series of Ministerial and official meetings with the Governments of the EC countries, Scandanavian countries, the USA, USSR and Japan to seek to ensure the closest working relationship in our shipping policies at a time of increasing pressure on the open trading system which has always been of such great benefit to United Kingdom shipping.
(iv) I have supported the general thrust of the European Commission proposals designed to introduce greater competition into EC shipping and my officials have introduced proposals for further improvements.
(v) The Government have secured the passage of the Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Act, to enable the United Kingdom to accede to the UN code of conduct for liner conferences. Our accession will be subject to a European Community regulation which this Administration had previously agreed which will ensure that the code cannot lead to discrimination between the shipping lines of member states or between the OECD countries who do not themselves practise discrimination. As a most important result over 75 per cent. of the world's liner shipping will remain free of the code's cargo sharing provisions.
(vi) The Government have lent their full support to a new commercial arrangement to increase the British share of Anglo-Soviet seaborne trade.
(vii) The Government have made it clear that we will not be prepared to see Soviet cruise ships operating out of United Kingdom ports, to an extent which damage British cruise operators, and have now secured the agreement of the Soviet authorities to limit the availability of new berths on Soviet cruise ships.
(viii) We took a lead in negotiating, and then signed, the Paris memorandum on port state control by which one ship in every four that enters the port of 14 European nations will be inspected for safety and, if found to be defective, can be detained until the safety deficiencies are put right. This is a major step forward in enforcing international safety requirements and eliminating sub-standard ships.

2. Domestic I am acutely conscious of the need to help the United Kingdom Merchant Navy become more competitive. 58W

(i) I have therefore set up a working group to consider what can be done to minimise the problems and the costs of applying statutory safety requirements when ships are transferred to the United Kingdom register.
(ii) I have also set up a working group on crew accommodation standards to see whether the present position results in an unreasonable loss of competitiveness.
(iii) I have instructed that certain ships be granted exemptions from the Department's certification regulations which will allow them to trade to a limited extent beyond the near continental trading area with near continental levels of manning and certification. These exemptions are consistent with safety and will help to increase the competitiveness of this part the United Kingdom merchant fleet.
(iv) I asked for written submissions from, and have subsequently held a series of meetings with, the GCBS and seafarers' unions on the lessons of the Falklands conflict for the future of the Merchant Navy. I am currently considering the constructive ideas which arose from these exchanges.
(v) My Department participates in two committees, also including members from the Ministry of Defence and the shipping industry, whose present work includes consideration of the implications of the Falklands campaign for the role of the Merchant Navy in times of emergency and war.

As far as those measures are concerned that have already been implemented, I have no doubt whatsoever that without them the future prospect of the Merchant Navy would be greatly worse. As far as those measures still under consideration are concerned, it is my aim to increase the overall commercial competitiveness of our Merchant Navy, and thus its earnings and its employment, by an aggregate of separate measures of varying importance, without resorting to protectionism and subsidy which, however beguiling in the short-term, would be disastrous to the long-term prospects of our Merchant Navy.