HC Deb 24 March 2004 vol 419 cc280-304WH

2 pm

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam):

We have noHansard reporter in the Chamber at present. However, the debate is being transcribed, so the position is not as bad as people might think.

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab)

I welcome the opportunity to introduce a debate on the nonproliferation treaty and its five-yearly review next year. The PrepCom will take place in April this year. I wish to declare an interest. I joined the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at the age of 16 and I have no plans to resign from it. I do not recant anything that I have done within CND and I am a member of its national council. I am proud to be a member. I thank the CND and the House of Commons Library for their help in preparing for the debate.

Last week, my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Llew Smith) initiated an interesting half-hour Adjournment debate on the acceptance or otherwise of nuclear weapons by the British Government. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr. Rammell), replied to the discussions. I shall set the debate in context. We live in an incredibly dangerous world. Since 1945, there has been a huge number of wars. Many people have died as a result of those conflicts, yet we are still arming ourselves with nuclear weapons. While the purpose of the NPT is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must recognise the heroic efforts of peace campaigners since nuclear weapons were first invented. People have bravely laid down their lives or devoted their whole lives to peace campaigns, such as the Nobel peace prize winner, Joseph Rotblat, who was part of the Manhattan project. There are many others, of course, such as the brave women of Greenham common who did so much to bring home to the world the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a hero, Mordecai Vanunu, who is deserving of the Nobel peace prize and who is shortly to be released from prison. He has spent 14 years in an Israeli prison for having the temerity to tell the world that Israel was illegally developing nuclear weapons.

The case against nuclear weapons is strong. Each year, in Tavistock square in London—as in many other countries throughout the world—we remember Hiroshima day. We commemorate what happened on 6 August 1945 when nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a result of which 60,000 people died immediately. The effects of the cancers at that time are still with us and people are still dying as a result of those explosions. They were no more than fireworks compared with the nuclear weapons that are now available to us. We should reflect for a moment on what has been achieved since 1945 in respect of even more nuclear weapons and greater dangers.

In his speech on 16 March 2004, my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent rightly quoted at column number 293 something that former President Jimmy Carter said about nuclear weapons. I shall repeat the quote because it is very apt. The former President argued: In an all-out nuclear war, more destructive power than in all of World War II would be unleashed every second during the long afternoon it would take for all the missiles and bombs to fall. A World War II every second—more people killed in the first few hours than all the wars of history put together. The survivors, if any, would live in despair amid the poisoned ruins of a civilisation that had committed suicide. My hon. Friend also quoted former Soviet leader Khrushchev, who expressed similar sentiments when he said that the survivors would envy the dead.

Before we go into the minutiae of treaty negotiations and the technicalities of the issue, we must reflect on why we are trying to achieve nuclear disarmament and why many people have dedicated their lives to that end. The review conference in 2005 is important. It is the five-yearly review. When the Minister replies to the debate, I hope that he will give us some idea of what the Government's position will be and how he intends to involve Parliament in discussions about that so that MPs can make known their views on the matter.

The NPT review will take place as a result of the treaty that was first signed in 1970. It involved all the signatory states in the definition of what nuclear weapons were and in how they would get rid of them. The five declared nuclear weapon states undertook to get rid of their own nuclear weapons eventually. There was a commitment to total nuclear disarmament. That commitment remains, but it is a long way from being achieved.

I will list the declared nuclear weapon states. The United States developed nuclear weapons during the second world war in response to the true perception that Nazi Germany was also developing them, and it is the only country to explode them in anger. The Soviet Union followed by developing them in the immediate post-war period. Both the superpowers relied heavily in the development of their programmes on the expertise of Nazi weapons experts captured in 1945. Britain and France followed suit, but they developed smaller weapons. Then, dramatically, in 1964 China declared that it had nuclear weapons and exploded one.

The non-declared states that we know hold nuclear weapons are India, Pakistan and Israel. None of them has signed up to the NPT. That they should do so must remain a central demand of everyone involved in the peace movement. Another country that was well known to have nuclear weapons but was not a declared nuclear power was South Africa. Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress have achieved many great things; we should thank them for revealing to the world the existence of South African nuclear weapons when they took power, and for renouncing their use and abolishing them. That allowed Africa to become a nuclear-free continent. We should remember that it is possible unilaterally to declare oneself to be nuclear disarmed and not to suffer immediate invasion from somewhere else.

Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion) (PC)

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it would be useful if today or in the near future the Government were to make clear their intention not to continue with Trident when it reaches the end of its natural life? That would be a huge step forward in ensuring that the treaty becomes workable and effective throughout the world.

Jeremy Corbyn:

I agree. I was going to mention Trident later. The other countries that are believed to have nuclear weapons—or, at least, the capability of developing them—are Iran, Libya and North Korea. However, it is conceivable that most countries that have access to nuclear power could, in the right circumstances, develop nuclear weapons as well, although considerable technological knowledge would be required to achieve that.

We have NPTs and bans on the export of nuclear material and the technology that goes with it, but the limitations of all of that have been exposed by the statements of Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan, who told the world about the large quantities of nuclear material that he had been involved in exporting to North Korea and other countries and the danger that goes with that.

So far, 188 have signed up to the NPT. The latest three to join are Cuba and East Timor. The only three states that remain outside the NPT process are India, Israel and Pakistan. I appeal to the Government to do everything that they can to persuade those countries to sign up to the NPT and to accept that the world must get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. If we are serious about persuading them to nuclear disarm, we should question why we are providing them with such a vast amount of conventional arms, which can be used in a localised war between India and Pakistan, and in the case of Israel can be, and are, used against the Palestinian people in the continued occupation of Palestine. The 2000 review agreed on 13 steps, all of which led towards a nuclear-free world, but the associated comprehensive test ban treaty has been signed by only 180 countries. Twenty-one countries have not signed it. I urge the Government to do everything that they can to persuade those countries to sign the treaty.

We should remember that the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons that took place routinely during the 1950s and early 1960s caused enormous environmental damage throughout the Pacific and in Australia. People, including British soldiers, are still dying who are nuclear test veterans. That is the reality of nuclear weapons and explosions.

InThe Economist in October 2003, Muhammed El Baradei, the UN nuclear weapons expert, wrote an interesting and long article called "Towards a safer world" as head of the UN's investigation team. I shall quote briefly from it. He wrote that controlling access to nuclear-weapons technology has grown increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to designing weapons and to mastering the processing steps have eroded with time ... Uranium enrichment is sophisticated and expensive, but it is not proscribed under the NPT. Most designs for civilian nuclear-power reactors require fuel that has been 'low-enriched', and many research reactors operate with 'high-enriched' uranium. It is not uncommon, therefore, for non-nuclear-weapon states with developed nuclear infrastructures to seek enrichment capabilities and to possess sizeable amounts of uranium that could, if desired, be enriched to weapons-grade. He continued: In 1970, it was assumed that relatively few countries knew how to acquire nuclear weapons. Now, with 35 to 40 countries in the know by some estimates, the margin of security under the current non-proliferation regime is becoming too slim for comfort. He calls for a new approach and gives three proposals. The first is to limit the processing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes, as well as the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment. His other two proposals are that nuclear-energy systems should be deployed that, by design, avoid the use of materials that may be applied directly to making nuclear weapons and that we should consider multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. More than 50 countries have spent fuel stored in temporary sites, awaiting processing or disposal. Not all countries have the right geology to store waste underground and, for many countries with small nuclear programmes for electricity generation or for research, the cost of facilities is prohibitive. By bringing his considerable expertise to bear on the subject, he has pointed out some of the technical problems and limitations that one hopes that the NPT review conference will address.

The British Government will be participating in the PrepCom in April and May 2004 and in the full review conference next year. There are a number of issues that the British Government must address and I hope that we can discuss them briefly this afternoon. The first issue is that, if we are serious about nuclear disarmament, we must say that we are not prepared to use nuclear weapons. However, the Secretary of State for Defence made a number of statements throughout the run-up to the Iraq war and since—which were repeated by the Minister last week in a debate in the House—that the British Government would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. I find it inconceivable that this country would ever use nuclear weapons. I want to hear the Minister say that, so that we can declare ourselves serious about disarmament and the non-use of nuclear weapons. I know that a number of facilities have been taken out of use and a number of submarines taken off patrol and that the number of active nuclear warheads is much reduced. Nevertheless, it takes only one warhead to go off to set off a nuclear conflict.

The second issue is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which I believe is part and parcel of the US proposals for national missile defence, and Britain's signing up to the initial part of the NMD process. If we are to lecture the rest of the world on the need for nuclear disarmament, it ill behoves us to develop national missile defence, given the danger of proliferation.

The third issue is the one raised by my friend, the hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mr. Thomas), in his intervention concerning the replacement for Trident, which is becoming more or less obsolete, as did Polaris before that. It would be nice to hear that there are no plans to replace that nuclear facility, and that we are committed to the statement to which we readily signed up in 1970 for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

There is also the question of rigorous inspections in Iran, Korea and Libya. Although such inspections are taking place in Libya and, to some extent, Iran, and although negotiations are going on in Korea, one hopes that the NPT conference will be an opportunity to ensure effective inspections. As I pointed out, we should also continue to put pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. In 2000, my old friend, the sadly recently deceased Lord Jenkins of Putney, asked in the House of Lords whether the Government were hoping to make substantial progress towards world nuclear disarmament at the coming United Nations NPT Review Conference in New York"— that is, PrepCom— and how they propose to avoid the procedural discussions which are reported to have nullified the recent Geneva Conference. That was four years ago. In reply, the Minister said: We are looking for the conference to result in a balanced review which takes account of the positive steps which both we and other nuclear weapon states have taken over the past five years and which also sets a realistic agenda for the next five years."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 February 2000; Vol. 610, c. 323 and 324.] Those were nice words well put, but unfortunately the problem remains that that conference, although important in itself, did not achieve the desired breakthrough. One hopes that there will be a breakthrough in the conference this April and May.

I hope that the Minister will answer the points that I—and, no doubt, other hon. Members—will raise this afternoon concerning the existence and use of nuclear weapons and, above all, the possibility of nuclear disarmament that comes from the NPT process. I also hope that he will seriously consult with the many bodies of opinion and expertise in this country, including those in the peace movement and various defence analysts and experts, so that there is popular understanding of what the NPT process is about, and of the possibility of our achieving nuclear disarmament.

The 1970 treaty envisaged that all states would eventually rid themselves completely of all nuclear weapons. In 1998, at the United Nations, the "new agenda" coalition of countries—Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden—proposed that we should get rid of all nuclear weapons, and saw that as a way forward. Why did the United Kingdom vote against the resolution put by those very honourable countries, all of which were very clearly saying something about nuclear weapons? Why was the opportunity of the 1998 strategic defence review not used to allow us to go a little bit further than we did in reducing the number of nuclear weapons on patrol? Why did we not use that opportunity to try to bring about the aspirations of the 1970 treaty?

I conclude—so that others may speak—by saying that the world has the ability to destroy itself many times over. Many people are dying because of conventional weapons, and many more would die if nuclear weapons were used. Many countries want to get hold of nuclear weapons because they see that the five permanent members of the Security Council are members of the nuclear club, and are the people with the power. deciding how the world is run. If the example is set by those five powers, who are expanding their nuclear capability through national missile defence, or a regeneration of Trident, or whatever, that does not make the world a safer place; in fact, it makes it infinitely more dangerous. The non-proliferation treaty debate—the conference next year—is an opportunity to step towards peace and use our skill, expertise and wealth for peaceful purposes, rather than for the development of weapons of mass destruction, which we hold in this country. I have been in the CND all my life, and I am in a party with my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent, who has met many Members who are very committed to nuclear disarmament. This is a live issue in political debate, and I hope that today's debate goes some way towards encouraging further public discussion, with the hope and aspiration that there can be a world completely rid of nuclear weapons and their consequences.

2.19 pm
Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion) (PC)

I should like to begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing this important debate on a subject that we do not spend enough time discussing in Parliament. Although he has used the opportunity of the forthcoming review to hang his ideas on, those ideas flow throughout the security of this country and, more important, they underpin our dealings with other countries. We only have to look to our debate in Prime Minister's—or should I say Deputy Prime Minister's—questions on Libya and our relationship with that country to see how important it is to work on disarmament, rather than armament. I fully support and concur with the hon. Gentleman's ideas.

I want to concentrate first on the concept of a strategic deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons, which it seems that we have in this country at the moment, and secondly, on the proliferation security initiative, about which I should like to ask the Minister a few questions.

I begin with the defence White Paper of December 2003, which reiterated that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security. People tend to get somewhat disheartened on reading such words, because they are a de facto acceptance of a retention of a permanent policy commitment to nuclear weapons, in defiance of the international commitments and treaty obligations that the hon. Member for Islington, North outlined and which, incidentally, are not mentioned in the defence White Paper. In other words, the White Paper does not set out how the Government are setting about meeting their international treaty obligations to disarm and undergo nuclear disarmament, or how we square our treaty obligations with an ongoing commitment to Trident.

The White Paper also states that the UK faces "no major conventional military" threat. I think that that is still so. The threat that is identified, and which we have seen all too clearly over the past couple of weeks, is that of terrorism and of proliferation in terrorist methods. We must ask ourselves, "What possible use is our nuclear deterrent against that real threat to our daily lives in the United Kingdom, which is not in any way related to the issues of proliferation of nuclear weapons?" I shall deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a moment. If we believe that the reliance on nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent is of no relevance in the war on terror, that prompts the question of why we, as a nation, are holding back from moving forward on nuclear disarmament and particularly, why the defence White Paper says: Decisions on whether to replace Trident or not are not decisions to be made in this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next". I regard that as a clear indication that the Government have in mind a timetable for a replacement for Trident. That is why I was grateful to the hon. Member for Islington, North for allowing my intervention and for his remarks. It is clear from the White Paper that the Government have in mind a replacement for Trident. It would be useful if the Minister were able to say something today about any research that may be going on in nuclear installations in this country regarding such a replacement. That situation also underpins the need for parliamentary debate on such matters, to prevent our being bounced, as we were with the strategic defence initiative, into agreement with other countries about their defence and nuclear-based defence capabilities.

We were initially told that there would be upgrading work at Fylingdales for the strategic defence initiative during this month. It would be useful if the Minister said something today at least to confirm what is happening at Fylingdales at the moment and to give us the current state of play of that initiative.

We need to consider where the Government's policy is on this matter. The hon. Member for Islington, North set out clearly the international obligations and the way that he would wish the Government to address them, but we need to consider what they are actually saying on these matters. I reiterate—it is important to say this on the record—that the Government have not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. On 20 March 2002 the Secretary of State for Defence told the Defence Select Committee that in the right conditions the UK would be willing to use our nuclear weapons. There are no right conditions in which to use nuclear weapons—that is the central question. However, we need to know what those right conditions are. Under what conditions do the Government foresee that it would be permissible or allowable to use nuclear weapons? The White Paper dismisses the idea of a major conventional threat to this country and identifies terrorism as the threat to our daily lives. That prompts the question, what are the Government doing about the issue?

On 2 February 2003, I asked the Prime Minister about the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in the context of what was then the forthcoming war on Iraq. Once again, the Prime Minister refused to rule out the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and simply said that there was a traditional British doctrine. However, we do not know what that is because we have no explanation of what the right conditions would be for the use of nuclear weapons.

There was another interesting response in a parliamentary answer to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch). He asked the Defence Secretary about the nuclear weapons programmes and there was the same reply: Under the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China and Russia are legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons."—[Official Report, 30 October 2003; Vol. 412, c. 320 W.] That is not what the treaty says at all; it does not give a legal entitlement to the ongoing possession of nuclear weapons. The purpose of that treaty is to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to facilitate their total elimination. It does not give a legal remit to hold on to nuclear weapons at all. Article VI of the treaty states: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date to a certain extent, the treaty has been successful on that— and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The only conclusion that I can draw from the Minister's reply to the hon. Member for Hereford is that the UK is trying to rewrite ipso facto the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to give the present nuclear weapon states, including the UK, some sort of legal basis on which to own nuclear weapons. I return to what the Secretary of State for Defence told the House of Commons on 5 June 2000. He said that the non-proliferation treaty as an agreement is an aspiration; it is not likely to produce results in the short term."—[Official Report, 5 June 2000; Vol. 351, c. 12.]

I would say that the treaty has produced results. Whatever argument one may use about the history of the arms race, the treaty was useful in introducing effective measures to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and can be effective for the future—this is the important thing for the review—for general and complete disarmament and a strict and effective international control. It is very unfortunate that the Secretary of State seems to have dismissed that as an aspiration when that aspiration has, partly at least, come about. The Government have obviously worked along those lines and I would like to see them work much harder to make the non-proliferation treaty work in that regard.

Finally, I should like to note in passing that the department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that deals with such matters has changed its name from the non-proliferation unit to the proliferation prevention unit. There is a subtlety of meaning there. "Non-proliferation" tied in the work of that department to the treaty, which was not just about non-proliferation but about nuclear disarmament. "Proliferation prevention" ties the department in much more to the current agenda of the nuclear states and the United States in particular. That agenda is about stopping other countries getting the weapons that we have and about keeping the weapons that we have. That is a very basic, rude and crude way of putting it, I know. However, that is what the United States policy is; I should be delighted if the Minister would put some more flesh on that from the United Kingdom policy point of view.

I want to mention the proliferation security initiative. We have not heard much about that in Parliament, and in general the issue has gone quiet during the past few months. However, hon. Members may remember that it was a United States State Department initiative. As it put it, it was set up as a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". We know that such weapons are proliferating in Pakistan and North Korea. They may not be proliferating in Iraq, of course; that is a different matter. The idea was that there could be an international seizure of the trade in weapons of mass destruction, particularly on the high seas. There were attempts just before the Gulf war to seize a shipment of missiles en route to Yemen from the Republic of North Korea. That turned out to be perfectly legal, in general international terms at least.

I remind the Chamber of what the proliferation security initiative says that it intends to achieve. Its interdiction principles state that it intends to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.

I have some brief questions to put to the Minister and I hope that he can respond to some of them. One question is about the relationship between international law and frameworks and the United Nations Security Council. The US State Department has seized on a 1992 presidential statement of the UN Security Council to give it the authority to exercise the use of force to interdict ships on the high seas and check them. It does that in the name of non-proliferation. However, there are some serious questions as to whether that presidential statement gives it legal authority, and as to whether the international law and frameworks of maritime law, which are pretty well developed, run counter to that.

My second question relates to how any cases of such interdiction would be brought before the UN by the participants in the proliferation security initiative. The UK is a core part of that initiative. We also need to note that that initiative is a coalition of the willing—to use a phrase from another context—rather than an organisation based on an international treaty. We must ask ourselves how "states of concern"—that is the wording of the initiative—will be identified. Does the phrase have a legal definition or, as we have seen in the case of Iraq, does it allow one country to decide that another country is of concern and that action must be taken against it?

What mechanism will be adopted in the case of interdiction? Finally, what is to prevent any nation from adopting the same criteria and boarding any ship that it believes to be of concern, thereby thwarting legitimate trade between nations? Such measures could be used to put pressure on countries that do not fit in with the ideals of the nation concerned. We have only to think about what the US State Department thinks about Cuba, which internationally is a perfectly legal and recognised entity, to see how a proliferation security initiative could be misused by one country if it identified a concern in another country and took action on that. I hope that the Minister can bring the House up to date about the proliferation security initiative and how he intends that to work in relation to international legislation and the workings of the UN Security Council.

I conclude with a simple quote that I came across recently. It underlines my feelings on the matter and the conclusions of the hon. Member for Islington, North. It is as follows: We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security—and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use. The United Kingdom is in that situation. We hold weapons of mass destruction. What is more, we continue to develop them and refine their capacities, and we have plans for their use. If the Government say that there are situations in which they would use nuclear weapons, obviously they postulate plans for their use. That quote came from the same person that the hon. Gentleman quoted in a different context: Muhammed El Baradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The quotation was published on 13 February 2004 in theInternational Herald Tribune.

We are talking about the key question for the review of the non-proliferation treaty. How will the Government approach that review? Will they build on the successes of the treaty so far in at least bringing about the cessation of a particular type of horrid arms race, or will they perpetuate the cold war in another guise? It is time for us as a nation to take the step not only of rejecting the use of nuclear weapons, but of saying positively that we will disarm. The replacement for Trident is the ideal opportunity to take that first step. I hope that the Minister will say—I do not think that he will—that we will not have a replacement for Trident and that we will be taking those steps.

Several hon. Members

rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker:

Order. I see two hon. Members rising to speak. We should remember that the purpose of the debate is to enable the hon. Member raising it to get an adequate reply from the Minister. If both hon. Gentlemen are brief, they will be able to speak before the Minister starts his winding-up speech.

2.35 pm
Mr. Kelvin Hopkins (Luton, North) (Lab)

Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I shall speak only for a few minutes. First, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing this debate on a most important issue—arguably the most important that faces us. I entirely agree with the two fine speeches that have already been made so I do not need to repeat them, but some of what I say may reinforce them.

The cold war between the Soviet world and the west is now over. Weapons such as Trident were designed for that situation, but even then, I did not accept the necessity of nuclear weapons. I was a member of CND for many years, I marched all the way from Aldermaston in 1962, and many years later I became chair of Trade Union CND, so I have a record in these matters. It is time to decommission Trident and not to replace it—that point has been made. It was designed for a world in which major powers faced each other, not for a world that is dealing with terrorism carried out by persons unknown working within societies. Trident is out of date, irrelevant, extremely expensive and potentially very dangerous.

I agree entirely that we should decommission Trident and become a non-nuclear power. If we did, we would be seen to be the first major power to be moving in a peaceful direction, rather than a warlike one. We would derive great moral respect in the world, and we would then be in a position to speak about peace to the rest of the world. I am not suggesting that we disarm conventionally, because we have a strong role to play using conventional arms—working under the auspices of the UN for peaceful purposes in various parts of the world is a very fine thing. Indeed, some interventions were not made that I think should have been made. Rwanda is one such case: if the UN had got in quickly, and we had sent troops to stop the genocide in Rwanda, that would have been a humane purpose for military activity, and I would have supported it. However, that has nothing to do with nuclear weapons, which have no role to play.

Britain has another role because we were a colonial power—the colonial power, with a footprint in more parts of the world than anyone else. We have links that can be useful. In my constituency are many thousands of constituents from Kashmir, Pakistan and India. The situation in that part of the world is tense and very delicate. It is starting to improve, but Britain could and should have a role. If we take sides in a strong and aggressive way, as we are at the moment, it is more difficult for us to play a conciliation role in those parts of the world.

In Africa, too, there are serious tensions in many states, and some have become non-states because of appalling internal civil wars and violence. We could play a role in Africa under the auspices of the United Nations, because we understand Africa—we have had a greater presence in Africa than any other colonial power. We could play a positive role for peace across the whole of Africa, but we cannot do that if we have a partisan, militaristic role in the world and retain nuclear weapons. We look like a country that is going to wage war, rather than a country that is going to end wars.

I wanted to make those brief points to support my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North and the other hon. Members who have spoken today. The UK has respect in the world—perhaps more respect than we deserve sometimes. Britain still commands respect from many people in the continent of Europe, and the many people from all over the world who live in my constituency. That could be massively enhanced if we chose to be the first major nation to get rid of its nuclear weapons and start to work for peace.

2.39 pm
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North) (Lab)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing this very timely debate, and on his own excellent and comprehensive speech. I also complement the other speakers and agree with much that has been said.

I believe that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is the basis of a stable future for our world. I praise the work that the United Kingdom Government played in the 2000 negotiations in bringing countries together in a successful negotiation. If we are to have a safe future, it is vital that the treaty be strengthened. It has been much more successful than many people had anticipated. If one examines the forecasts that experts made in past decades, one finds that they predicted that by now far more countries would have nuclear weapons than has turned out to be the case. When we debated this issue in January 2000, we were aware that there was a risk of materials passing from states not only to other states but to terrorists. In the light of 11 September, the awareness has become much stronger. Materials may pass not only from states but from black market or independent agents. There are various concerns about materials remaining in the former Soviet Union and the danger from Pakistan. When we were embarking on the campaign against al-Qaeda, there were fears that it could have obtained personnel or weapons material from Pakistan, through ideological or financial links. The general impression is that, although al-Qaeda attempted to do that, fortunately, it did not succeed. Where terrorism is concerned, we must concentrate on al-Qaeda and related organisations, but we must never forget that the threat is not simply from Islamic fundamentalism. As one can see from the Aum Shinri Kyo sect in Japan, it is possible for other organisations to adopt the sort of extremist terrorism that aims to kill vast numbers of people.

One should be cautious about what one says about Iraq. The present evidence is that Iraq abandoned its nuclear programme, and probably all its weapons of mass destruction, in the 1990s. If that was the case, it suggests that the International Atomic Energy Agency, the NNPT and international pressure were more successful than most of us—myself included—realised. That shows that there are terrible dangers in the neo-conservative concept of resolving such matters through pre-emptive war based on uncertain intelligence. Detestable as it must be to the Prime Minister and many others, I praise his decision to deal with Libya. We have to resolve such matters by negotiation.

On 11 February, President Bush made an important speech on weapons of mass destruction proliferation. I yield to most people in my respect for President Bush, but I admit he said some things that are deserving of special attention. Every civilised nation, he says, has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We could go further and say that the whole of humanity has a stake in that. His statement that we should do everything we can to prevent the criminal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is clearly correct. However, I share the concern that was expressed by the hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mr. Thomas) that such a policy can include intercepting vessels one thinks are carrying materials. Because of the attitude of some members of the Bush administration, I am concerned that such action could become a cause of war if it were carried out in a cavalier fashion.

We should strengthen national laws, and I am pleased that we have been one of the first countries to take on the additional protocol. I am also pleased that President Bush is now talking about strengthening the Nunn-Lugar arrangements to control and reduce nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. It was disappointing that he moved away from it at the start of his presidency, but I am pleased that he has moved it back up his agenda and that the world community has fallen into line behind it. We must recognise that civil nuclear production can be diverted to making nuclear weapons: in particular, processes such as enrichment and reprocessing must be controlled.

Llew Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)

My hon. Friend says that national and international laws must be strengthened, but is it not a fact that the United Kingdom is breaking the current law in nonproliferation treaty articles VI and I, and the United States is breaking another international treaty, the chemical weapons convention? He spoke of the willingness of terrorists to carry out mass killings. It is difficult for us to comprehend the horror of some of those events, but, in response to a question of mine, the Government said that in extreme circumstances they would be willing to press the nuclear button—surely the ultimate act of madness. Does my hon. Friend agree, or can he think of a more extreme act of madness than involvement in nuclear conflict?

Mr. Deputy Speaker:

Order. I remind the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) of the time constraints.

Mr. Savidge:

I believe that all of us would devote ourselves to trying to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again. Having visited Hiroshima, I have no doubt about that.

It is important that the International Atomic Energy Agency be strengthened. Suspected violators should not be on the board and we should strengthen the additional protocol. However, the points made by Mr. El Baradei in response to the President must also be considered. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty should be made binding, and we should treat withdrawal far more seriously. There should be no permission for withdrawal from the treaty or, at least, there should be an immediate report to the United Nations Security Council in such an event. We must also recognise the dangers of diversion from the civil nuclear industry and ask whether the spread of that industry increases the safety of our world.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North said, we must consider the non-signatory powers, including India and Pakistan. Obviously, we are very pleased that Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Musharraf are pursuing a peace process—we hope that it will be successful. Clearly, they should be involved. As has been said, the situation of Israel is a problem, and it is unacceptable for Sharon to say that he is waiting for success in the middle east peace negotiations if he himself is a major block to progress. We should also consider Kofi Annan's proposal for a UN conference on nuclear weapons in which the status of the unofficial nuclear weapons states would be avoided in order to bring them into discussions.

We cannot disregard questions about the nuclear weapons states themselves. I follow the hon. Member for Ceredigion in quoting Mr. El Baradei, who said that we must abandon the notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them". We must follow the 13 steps drawn up in New York. We promised that we would support a comprehensive test ban treaty and stop testing. The US must adhere to its current moratorium and we must press our ally to consider and sign the comprehensive test ban treaty. It is unacceptable that, although we have said that we will have a missile cut-off treaty, China and the US are blocking it over the issue of weapons in space. It is unacceptable that, although we agreed to strengthen the anti-ballistic missile treaty, it is being abandoned. Missile defence is not helpful to the process that we need.

We must realistically reduce nuclear weapons. We need something far stronger than the Moscow treaty—something that includes irreversibility, is binding, and acts much faster to remove the vast quantities of nuclear weapons materials that no one needs. We therefore need a process that moves fast enough to bring in China, Britain and France.

The Bush Administration should cease talking of breaking negative security guarantees and devising programmes to make nuclear weapons useable. It is unthinkable that they should be talking about mini-nukes for bunker-busting, especially if one remembers poor Colin Powell being pushed out to say that the Administration knew about vast underground bunkers and weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and how none has so far been found.

We must work together to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war and create a safe future. There is no future safety in national military invulnerability. There is safety only in the common security of all states.

2.51 pm
Mr. Michael Moore (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)

I, too, pay tribute to the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) for securing a debate on a very important topic. As he pointed out, it is rarely afforded the opportunity of proper discussion in the main Chamber. I also pay tribute to all others who have contributed. They, in their different ways, have long and established campaigning records on these issues, and bring much expertise to the debate.

A recurring theme this afternoon has been the self-evident truth that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is the cornerstone of international arrangements to reduce the threat of nuclear war and keep the world secure. For a period after the end of the cold war, people thought that the dangers had passed. The events of the past few years have indicated that the world is not as safe a place as we hoped. An element of complacency in the 1990s has been replaced with real fears about the spread of nuclear weapons and a new risk that, in time, terrorists or other non-state actors will get hold of the technology and capability for nuclear weapons.

When we examine the context in which the non-proliferation treaty will be reviewed in a year's time—as the hon. Member for Islington, North said, there is an important conference in a few weeks' time—we can see that there has been a mixed set of circumstances on the non-proliferation issue in the past year. There has been a mixture of some delight and a great deal of concern. In Libya, we have seen a real breakthrough. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) commented, there is some difficulty with the concept of dealing with Gaddafi and his regime and never losing sight of the terrible events of Lockerbie. On the other hand, we have seen the rewards of a patient process in which the Government and others have participated, and the events of the past year, with missiles being shipped safely away from Libya, represent real progress.

Equally, there have been real concerns. The good news in Libya stripped away some of the difficulties of seeing the modern nuclear reality. We quickly saw the situation in Pakistan and the revelation of the virtual international bazaar that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was operating, spreading nuclear know-how around the world. We should be very worried to see many of the countries that he was dealing with in the possession of such knowledge. Know-how and technology are moving around, and there are parallel concerns in Pakistan about the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal. As has been mentioned, Pakistan, India and Israel are not members of the non-proliferation treaty regime. Given the new context in which we operate, it would be useful if the Minister told us what steps might be taken to allow Pakistan and others to come closer to membership of and compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Alongside Pakistan, we have concerns about North Korea, which is perhaps the most dangerous situation that is facing us. In the past year there have been threats, counter-threats and many periods of stand-off. Last year's announcement that North Korea was withdrawing from the NPT was worrying, but we must hope that, once again, multi-lateral diplomacy will be successful in drawing it into compliance with the treaty.

Events closer to the domestic political agenda of the past year have put a focus on the middle east. I will not rehearse again the questions and points that have been raised about Iraq. However, the prospect of a nuclear war that is started somewhere in the middle east remains real. It is vital that we get Israel signing up to the non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state, allowing us to move towards the creation of a middle east that is free from such weapons.

Iran, in its own way, has brought itself to the public's attention. I shall return to that in a moment. There has been a series of responses from the world community. One of the key areas that needs further examination is counter-proliferation and the role of our intelligence services; they are the subject of severe scrutiny in the United Kingdom at the moment. We need to see their role in working with other international agencies strengthened. The hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mr. Thomas) mentioned the proliferation security initiative. We would welcome anything that will enhance security, although I recognise some of the dangers to which he alluded. The Foreign Secretary, in his written statement to the House of Commons in February, referred, in the context of the global partnership against nuclear proliferation, about the prospect of establishing a UN Security Council committee along the lines of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Has that particular initiative been taken forward and what progress has been made on it? Similarly, there was mention in that statement of the desirability of a new United Nations Security Council resolution. We would support such an initiative and I hope that the Minister will have something to report to us about it. I mentioned Iran. The peaceful use of a nuclear capability is something that is important to many countries. The agonising about the status of Iran's nuclear capabilities has been causing much concern in the past few months; there must be genuine concerns about the nature of its nuclear programme. Its announcement that it has suspended enrichment activities is welcome, but it is equally worrying that it has been unwilling to agree to the inspections that were requested by the international community. I pay tribute to the Government, who were working in league with France and Germany, for the way in which their diplomatic efforts have made progress in the past few months. I hope that, working in tandem with the United States, we may yet see an early resolution of that issue.

Previous speakers have made contributions about disarmament. I would merely say that we welcome the steps that have been taken. Serious progress has been made since 1997. However, we must hope that there will be further progress under this Government. In particular, we must hope for a recognition that if no further steps are taken by the existing nuclear powers, our credibility with those who have them illegally—in the context of the treaty—or with those who aspire to have them will not be great.

This is a brief debate and many serious issues have yet to be fully discussed, but I hope that the Minister will give a strong signal that the Government remain committed to pressing the non-proliferation agenda and that in the coming review of the treaty they will take a lead in making the world a safe place.

3 pm

Mr. Richard Spring (West Suffolk) (Con)

I also congratulate the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing the debate. He and I may not always agree, but with great passion and conviction he brings to the attention of the House important issues on a variety of subjects and, as a Conservative Member of Parliament, I freely acknowledge that.

I also congratulate all the speakers who have contributed to this afternoon's debate. As others have said, it is important that at this time, in the light of recent revelations about proliferation and a month before the final preparatory committee meeting for the 2005 review, we debate the issue, which is crucial for global security and stability. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a vast issue, so I shall concentrate on the narrower subject before us today in a broader context.

The fact is that some countries possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the apparent inequality of such a situation inevitably generates a desire for others to possess them also, whether to establish their status in a global or regional context or to possess so-called deterrents against other countries already in possession of them. Those are two often-cited factors when considering Iran's nuclear activities.

Recent revelations about the activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan in Pakistan, Libya and North Korea have caused questions to be asked about the suitability of the 1970 non-proliferation treaty for the proliferations challenges of the 21st century. The N PT legitimised the five nuclear powers' arsenals and forbade further proliferation, but does not contain provisions to penalise those who would not sign and who are technically not subject to treaty rules, such as India, Pakistan and Israel. It also allowed any signatory the right to use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, and that is very grey territory because the development of a nuclear capability for some purposes can be transferred to a more aggressive posture in other circumstances.

The objective of the treaty, which was originally agreed for 25 years but was extended indefinitely in 1995, was full nuclear disarmament. That remains its ultimate objective and was reaffirmed in the 1995 review and extension conference, at the 2000 review conference and in preparatory committee sessions for the 2005 review. The NPT was the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and ideas such as nuclear-free or weapons of mass destruction-free regions are being advanced at the moment, particularly in respect of the middle east; they deserve careful consideration.

The NPT has achieved successes and we should not downplay the role that it has played in limiting proliferation. However, while the need to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has always been great, it has never been more important than it is today. Historically, potentially belligerent states in possession of large nuclear arsenals were the main problem; today it is failed states, rogue states run by unaccountable regimes that do not always act rationally, and terrorist groups that represent the most potent threat to global security. The so-called traditional risk has not gone away—witness the near-nuclear conflict in Kashmir only a few years ago—but the treaty must seek effectively to address the new threats as well.

Recent developments in Libya have been alluded to and the decision to reveal and dismantle its programme is welcome although, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) stated, experience teaches us to be wary of Colonel Gaddafi's promises until they are delivered. Many unresolved issues remain between the United Kingdom and Libya. Important facts have been brought to light that highlight the complexity of the global proliferation networks, of which we were unaware, and the ways that the NPT has been circumvented.

The activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan have done a lot of damage to non-proliferation efforts. With a web of contacts and middlemen spreading throughout the middle east, parts of Europe, across the Indian subcontinent and into Asia, it is imperative that we now draw together all the available intelligence so that we can identify and pursue every contact in the web and form an accurate picture of what technology and knowledge has been passed on to which countries, regimes or even terrorist groups. The risks posed by the new proliferators, including those from the former Soviet Union, are real.

Iran's nuclear programme remains a concern to us. It is clear that Iran has breached nuclear safeguards and rules; that has been going on for 18 years. It has also refused to disclose important aspects of its nuclear programme. Those breaches are serious, and it is right that the IAEA passed a resolution reflecting that. However, Iran has now started co-operating with the IAEA, and I hope that that continues and is built upon.

The situation in North Korea has been mentioned. It is arguably the most worrying consequence of proliferation that a totalitarian regime making very bellicose noises should possess nuclear capability. That is beyond the scope of the NPT to remedy. A firm stance coupled with the prospect of talks to remove the problem must be pursued. China's efforts to defuse the situation and tackle North Korea's nuclear status deserve our gratitude and support.

In the light of recent events, many people, including Mr. El Baradei of the IAEA, have begun to raise serious questions about whether the NPT is as effective and well suited to modern needs as it should be. He recently alluded to that in an article inThe Economist. He stated that many countries that signed the NPT have yet to effect the safeguard agreement with the IAEA; fewer than 20 per cent. of them have finalised the 1997 additional protocol allowing for broader inspections and, seemingly. a culture of a reluctance to move first has developed. As he notes, hardware for nuclear energy production is at present often dual-use, which makes monitoring difficult.

With such proliferation of knowledge, does the Minister agree that the current framework for verification and regulation requires updating? Does he also agree that the processing of weapons-usable material, such as separated plutonium, in civilian nuclear programmes should now be restricted? Does he believe that proliferation-resistant energy system technology has been sufficiently developed to be considered for inclusion in all civilian nuclear programmes? Will he be pressing for the development of such processes to be a priority?

Much of what I have said is about how to prevent future proliferation rather than how to tackle proliferation that has already occurred, as this debate focuses on the treaty review. It is not about tackling new, or near, nuclear states, which are subjects in themselves. I hope that the Minister can assure us that the UK will play a full and active role in the 2005 review, as it did in past ones, and that it will give serious consideration to the views expressed here today.

In many ways today's world is more unpredictable than that of the cold war era in which the NPT was conceived. Proliferation is one of the causes of that unpredictability. We must ensure that the NPT adequately addresses the proliferation challenges of today.

3.9 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Bill Rammell)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing the debate; the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Mr. Spring) stole the words that I was going to use in responding to him. What I have to say is not diplomatic flannel, although that is a necessity from time to time for Foreign Office Ministers; although there are disagreements on issues, there is wide regard and respect for the integrity with which my hon. Friend pursues his views on these matters. 1 was struck by the comments that he and other hon. Members made about the appalling horrors that could accompany nuclear configuration, and in that context the important debate is about how we ensure that we avoid that situation. Those judgments are not easy, and that is what divides the debate. It is important that we take this opportunity to discuss those issues, particularly within the context of the non-proliferation treaty, its review and British participation.

We believe that the NPT is the corner-stone of the non-proliferation regime, and we are committed to working towards a world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The NPT has been, is and should be in future a crucial tool for helping us to do that. We remain fully committed to the treaty and look forward to participating in the review.

The NPT is already a strong treaty. As the hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mr. Thomas) said, it already has a good track record in thwarting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has the widest membership of any arms control treaty and it retains the wholehearted support of the United Kingdom and the vast majority of the international community. We are committed to strengthening it in the face of the challenges posed by the new security environment.

I am somewhat younger than I look. I am a child of the cold war and I grew up with the real and constant fear of nuclear war. Some of the challenges that we face today are even more terrifying than those that we faced during that divide between east and west.

We must look to all international instruments and treaties at our disposal. With that in mind, the UK's main goal for the forthcoming 2004 PrepCom and the 2005 review conference will be to emphasise the need for greater efforts in the non-proliferation and compliance areas of the treaty. The events of the past year have shown that several states continue to seek clandestine nuclear weapons programmes and that individuals are willing to assist them in the proliferation of sensitive materials and technology. The treaty must therefore be strengthened and the political will generated to prevent that.

Before I go any further, it is worth putting on the record the considerable progress that we have made in nuclear disarmament. People involved in the debate do not often acknowledge it, but our record is good. We played a key role in achieving international agreement to the final document that was produced at the previous NPT review conference in 2000.

The UK has made considerable progress on the "13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament" set out in the document. For example, we have begun a programme to develop UK expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. At the second meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2005 review conference, held in Geneva during April and May last year, we issued a working paper on the authentication of warheads and their components. At the third meeting of the committee in New York this year, we will present the next part of the study, which looks at verification technologies and their potential use in warhead dismantling. Those are some of the critical areas in which we must make progress.

Llew Smith:

Could the Minister explain how Trident fits into those steps towards nuclear disarmament?

Mr. Rammell:

If my hon. Friend will wait, I will happily address Trident, as I did directly to him in the Chamber last week.

At the 2005 review conference we will summarise the range of technologies and approaches that have been researched over the five-year programme. The work will provide the basis for methodologies that might be used in the verification regime of any future disarmament treaty.

I will address the issues that have been raised by hon. Members before I return to the central thrust of my speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North rightly raised concerns about those states that do not operate in the auspices of the non-proliferation treaty in which there is a concern about nuclear weapons capability. We continue strongly to urge Israel, India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. There is no equivocation about that. It is a view that we constantly put forward.

Both my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Ceredigion raised concerns about national missile defence. It is important to make it abundantly clear what we have, and have not, agreed to. In February 2003, after significant public and parliamentary discussion, the United Kingdom agreed to the United States' request to upgrade and use RAF Fylingdales' early warning radar for missile defence. That upgrade keeps open the prospect of our acquiring missile defence capabilities should we desire such protection in future. However, we have not decided to join the US missile defence programme. That is a decision that is still open to us and there should be ample opportunities for it to continue to be discussed.

There has been significant questioning, which was similar to the questioning from my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Llew Smith), on the issue of the circumstances in which we would be prepared to use the nuclear weapons that we possess. It is important to make it clear that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. That is consistent with what the Secretary of State for Defence said. We would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence and in accordance with our obligations under international law. I think that that is a reassurance that should go forward.

Mr. Simon Thomas:

Can the hon. Gentleman confirm that those circumstances categorically rule out a preemptive use of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Rammell:

We need there to be some uncertainty on the part of those states that might seek to attack us about our disposal in defending ourselves. Nevertheless, as I have made clear, we would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence and strictly in accordance with our obligations under international law.

A question that has been put forward this afternoon concerns our stance on a comprehensive test ban treaty and whether we are in favour of other countries signing up to it. Emphatically, yes that is the case. My noble Friend Baroness Symons spoke at the CTBT conference held in Vienna in September 2003. She took the opportunity to urge all states that had not yet signed and ratified the treaty to do so. That is the position that we maintain today.

The issue of the proliferation security initiative was also raised by the hon. Member for Ceredigion, who asked how that related to existing non-proliferation treaties and regimes. That is an important area for discussion and clarification. There are a number of tools at our disposal to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of the proliferation security initiative is to build on and reinforce those existing tools, not—explicitly—to supplant them. The PSI builds on the 1992 UN Security Council declaration on proliferation of WMD, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation.

The hon. Member for Ceredigion also raised the legal basis of the issue. The statement of interdiction principles that was agreed at the Paris PSI meeting on 4 September 2003 makes it clear that all action will be consistent with existing national legal authorities and the international legal framework. There is a large body of authority for undertaking interdiction operations, such as those involving actions in territorial waters, airspace or land or by flag states against vessels operating under their flags.

To those people who have a strong track record of campaigning against nuclear weapons, I say that I respect their integrity and motives but am sometimes puzzled as to why, given that commitment, there are concerns about initiatives such as the PSI, which is a legitimate and justifiable move to stop the proliferation of nuclear capability and its spread, both to states that could use it extremely irresponsibly and to non-state actors and terrorists who could greatly increase the risks that we face.

Jeremy Corbyn:

I think, if I may say so, that the concerns that many of us have are about unilateral actions by nuclear powers, such as the US intercepting the vessel travelling from Korea to Yemen. We would much prefer an international inspection agency and interception process, and Muhammed El Baradei would confirm that.

Mr. Rammell:

I think that case can be argued. To refer to the comments of the hon. Member for Ceredigion, we are certainly talking about a coalition of the willing who are rightly prepared to move forward on the issue. In time, the matter may well come under the auspices of wider international agreement. However, the fundamental point must be made that the proliferation security initiative is based on the sound principle of trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD capability, and preventing it from getting into the hands of people who would have absolutely no compunction in using it and causing disaster to the whole world in a genuinely horrifying way.

I return to some of the broad issues and the UK's progress on disarmament under NPT article VI. We remain fully committed to all aspects of the NPT, including global and verifiable nuclear disarmament. We have an excellent record in fulfilling our NPT obligations. In some senses, as my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North (Mr. Hopkins) acknowledged, we are the most forward-leaning of the nuclear weapon states.

Specifically. we have undertaken a number of actions, particularly in the past six and a half years, that have made significant progress. First, we have withdrawn and dismantled the RAF's freeform nuclear bomb, so that Trident is now our only nuclear weapons system. We dismantled the last Chevaline warhead in 2002, demonstrating our commitment to irreversibility in the reduction of the UK's nuclear weapons. We have reduced our operationally available stockpile to fewer than 200 warheads. That is a reduction of more than 70 per cent. in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces since the end of the cold war—a significant development, in my view.

We have also rightly reduced the readiness of our nuclear forces. A single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads. The submarine on patrol is normally on several days' "notice to fire", and its missiles are de-targeted. That, too, is a significant de-escalatory move. We have rightly signed and ratified the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. As I said, we continue to promote its early entry into force.

The Government's policy on nuclear weapons remains as it was when it was set out in the 1998 strategic defence review and the 2003 defence White Paper. We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons, and we continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, means that our minimum deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security for the present. Nevertheless, we will continue to support multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons worldwide. When we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made to allow us to include British nuclear weapons in any negotiations without endangering our security interests, we will certainly do so.

We live in an uncertain world, and the NPT certainly faces challenges from states of concern such as Iran. We believe that the global community needs to strengthen the NPT by ensuring full compliance by such states. The UK is continuing to work in collaboration with the international community to ensure that Iran operates within its obligations under the NPT. We have also worked with the United States to secure a significant and historic agreement with Libya to renounce its clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Both those efforts demonstrate our clear commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Let me take up the proposals on strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, which were laid before the House by the Foreign Secretary on 25 February. In addressing these issues I should like to begin by considering the NPT and the IAEA. Non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT are obliged to enter into safeguard agreements with the IAEA to verify that there is no diversion of nuclear activities from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices. States that fail to comply with their safeguard obligations inevitably lose the confidence of the international community—which is a concern for all of us—and the bargain that is at the heart of the treaty is fundamentally called into question. We should consider whether such states should forfeit the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, which are of such proliferation sensitivity. That does not mean that they would be deprived of the possibility of constructing and running civil nuclear power stations, which could still operate with fuel supplied by countries that honoured their safeguard obligations.

Experience in recent years has shown the need for more wide-ranging IAEA inspections of national nuclear industries. The agency's additional protocol provides the basis for carrying out such inspections. It is important that all members of the international community adopt one. Suppliers of nuclear technology should increasingly regard that as a key commitment when they judge export licence applications.

As I said, international security is jeopardised by the risks of the proliferation of nuclear materials and expertise. The recent exposure of the A. Q. Khan network has fundamentally highlighted those serious risks and concerns. We must remain focused on that threat, which is why we are committed to initiatives such as the global partnership, which is an important step forward, and the proliferation security initiative, which was launched in May 2003. That has an important and fundamental role to play in preventing the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and related technology by state and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or criminal networks, through increased interdiction efforts.

I said earlier that those who campaign, rightly, against nuclear weapons should take up the cause of the proliferation security initiative. There is also an argument that can be made in respect of some of those regimes, such as North Korea, that may possess nuclear weapons and are not—or claim that they are not—party to the NPT. I agree with a number of the comments that have been made about the serious concerns that exist within North Korea. I am puzzled sometimes by the way in which anti-nuclear campaigners rightly challenge, criticise and scrutinise this and other Governments, yet when there is an example of a country—such as North Korea in the past 18 months—that is seeking completely to disregard its non-proliferation obligations I do not hear the same voices raised in protest.

Jeremy Corbyn:

I would like the Minister to be fully aware that those who campaign for nuclear disarmament and nuclear peace do so in every country around the world, including North Korea.

Mr. Rammell:

I respect the integrity of my hon. Friend's position, but perhaps he will go back through the record of parliamentary questions, both oral and written, on this issue in the past 18 months. I have not heard the level of concern on proliferation in North Korea that I have heard in other areas of the world. There must be some even-handedness and balance on these issues.

There is a fundamental concern, which is that the UN Security Council has not discussed proliferation since 1992—a period of 12 years, during which these processes have been ongoing. I warmly welcome the debate that is currently taking place about a draft resolution on proliferation, which would seek the adoption of tough national legislation to criminalise the possession, manufacture and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. Our discussion is very timely. I hope that the Security Council will be in a position to pass that resolution very soon.

This has been an exceedingly good debate. We have had an opportunity to air these issues fully. There are real, genuine concerns that we need to continue to address. We need to go forward multilaterally and seek the nuclear disarmament to which every Member of this House aspires.

Mr. Deputy Speaker:

I thank hon. Member for co-operating and enabling every Member who wished to take part in the debate to do so.