§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That the sitting be now adjourned.—[Derek Twigg.]
9.30 am§ Mr. Andrew Dismore (Hendon) (Lab)Perhaps I may say kalimera, Mr. Deputy Speaker. For those who do not know, that is Greek for good morning. I declare an interest by drawing attention to my entry on visits to Cyprus in the Register of Members' Interests. I am also Labour vice-chair of the Friends of Cyprus organisation, which works with both communities. I am pleased to see you in the Chair, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Given your long interest in these matters, I know that you would have liked to participate in the debate.
The debate is timely, given the failure of the referendum on the Annan 5 plan, Cyprus's accession to the European Union and this week's discussions on EU support for Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps most important is the fact that this is, almost to the day, the 30th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which is the root cause of the problems. The immediate context of the debate is the fallout from the referendums. The Turkish Cypriots have been portrayed as the good guys to be rewarded for voting the right way; the Greek Cypriots are seen as the bad guys to be punished for voting the wrong way. That is shown by an article published by Lord Hannay. The title gives the game away: "Greek Cypriots Must Pay the Price of Folly".
The reality is that, in the diplomatic dance leading to Annan 5—which involved pressures from the international community and ill-informed press coverage buying too much anti-Greek Cypriot spin—the basic facts were forgotten. Thirty years ago, hundreds of thousands of Greek Cypriots were driven from their homes by an illegal invasion and cannot return, and the Turkish Cypriots have lived under military occupation, which has denied both Turkish and Greek Cypriots human rights for all that time. There are real stories of human tragedy and loss, and the appalling verbal assaults from people who should know better have left Greek Cypriots bitter and angry—with some justification, in my view.
Let me give an example. During the London mayoral elections, Ken Livingstone came to my constituency to visit Burnt Oak. Coincidentally, the first person we came across was an old Greek Cypriot lady, who said that she was no longer voting Labour, although she had done so all her life, because of the Annan plan. Obviously, I tried to chat her up in my best Greek and persuade her otherwise, and I hope that I made some progress, but there is no doubt that many people in the Greek Cypriot community feel disillusioned with our Government. That view is mistaken, because we have achieved a great deal, not least in securing Cyprus's entry to the EU without preconditions—a position that was not adopted 180WH by the previous Government. In addition, although we have not yet secured a result on reunification and a settlement, there has been progress towards that.
I do not want to dwell on the failure of the Annan plan, but it is important to take stock of where we are and make suggestions for the way forward. First, however, we need to consider some of the realities and myths surrounding that failure. The first myth is that it is all down to the perfidious Greeks breaking promises and a lack of leadership, especially by President Tassos Papadopoulos. I think that that is incorrect, as is perhaps shown by the fact that Mr. Anastasiades, the leader of DISY, the largest party in Cyprus, campaigned for a yes vote. His supporters simply did not follow him. The exit polls also reject the thesis that the failure was all down to lack of leadership.
The second myth is that Greek Cypriots are not prepared to compromise. That ignores the fact that, over 30 years, they have made major concessions already. The proposal of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as a strategic solution is an example. That was banked and forgotten about by Mr. Denktash, in his usual style, and by the international community. The nature of the proposed constitution—described as the Swiss or Belgian model—with power sharing is a further concession. I know from all my discussions and dealings with Greek Cypriots that they were prepared to accept painful concessions, especially on a personal level in relation to private property rights and some of the rights of settlers who had been there for some time.
Myth No. 3 is that Greek Cypriots do not want a settlement because they are sitting pretty in relation to the EU accession. I remind hon. Members that the EU accession process was without preconditions. The decision of the accession negotiations was that the Greek Cypriots should not be punished twice: once for losing to the Turks in the occupation of 30 years ago and again by not being allowed to join the EU because their country is under occupation; 1 May became an artificial deadline—in fact, it became part of the problem, not part of the solution. It was seen by many as imposing a precondition by the back door. However, my experience and knowledge of the community, both here and in Cyprus, is that it definitely wants a settlement, but not at any price, as all the polls show. Greek Cypriots, as well as Turkish Cypriots, want a settlement that is workable and fair. Solution and reunification remain the goal of both communities.
The fourth myth is that the Greek Cypriots want to keep the Turkish Cypriots isolated, but again that is not true. They certainly do not want recognition of the so-called Turkish republic of northern Cyprus, which was acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights as a subordinate organisation of Turkey in the Loizidou case, but they have taken economic and trade measures to ease the position. The Greek Cypriots responded positively to the opening of the green line by Turkish Cypriots, and people cross backwards and forwards visiting their old homes, even under occupation, and making new friends on both sides of the line. The visits by Greek Cypriots to the north have been well respected and reflected by Turkish Cypriot hospitality, even by people occupying their family homes.
181WH The republic of Cyprus has agreed that Turkish Cypriots should receive €259 million of European money to improve administration and infrastructure. It certainly wants trade links to improve.
The fifth myth is that the Turkish army is prepared to keep out and to allow proper and free negotiations, but the analysis that I have seen suggests otherwise. The best example is a monograph by Gregory Copley, president of the International Strategic Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the Defence and Foreign Affairs publishing group. He said in summary:
It was clear that Turkish concerns, beginning in 2002, over the direction of the US-led Coalition war in Iraq, and fears for the impact of the outcome of that war on Turkish security, played the most significant and continuing role in the TGB's"—the general staff's—insistence that the United Nations' Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem be deliberately made to fail. As a result, the Turkish Government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was clearly instructed by the TGB to continue to escalate Turkish demands on the Annan Plan until it was no longer a meaningful document which the Greek Cypriots could accept.That is his basic thesis. The paper is well argued and well researched, and I commend it to hon. Members. The argument is that Turkish strategic concerns require, as the general staff see it, an indefinite military presence in Cyprus because of developments in the region.The general staff pressed Mr. Erdogan to escalate Turkish demands on the Annan plan as unacceptable to the republic of Cyprus. There is mounting evidence of that effect, including the United Kingdom working document that recently fell into the hands of The Cyprus Weekly and was widely reported in the Cypriot press here.
The reality is that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a settlement free of Turkish military interference. That is best exemplified by Harts Sophoclides, the well-respected president of the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood, who said that the two communities voted for the same thing: to get rid of the Turkish military influence over their lives. For the Turkish Cypriots that meant a yes vote and for the Greek Cypriots it meant a no vote. The fundamental objections of the Greek Cypriots were about security and the continued presence of the Turkish army for ever under Annan 5.
The international community bears a lot of responsibility also for the failure of the Annan plan. It got used to focusing on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, and in particular Mr. Denktash, as the obstacles to progress. It finally found a negotiating partner in Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Talat, who were prepared to engage, at least to an extent, but took its eye off the ball because the settlement also needed to be acceptable to the Greek Cypriot community. It accepted Cyprus without preconditions for the European Union, but 1 May, nevertheless, became an artificial deadline. When it was clear that the referendum campaign was not going well in the south, although Mr. Christofias of AKEL, the president of the House of Representatives, 182WH asked for more time so that the arguments could be developed, that was not granted. A progressive party such as AKEL could see what was happening, but the international community could not. The United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Annan, has now acknowledged that more time might have been appropriate.
The pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union was also seen on the island as counter-productive, and that is illustrated in an article by Shlomo Avineri, professor of political science at the Hebrew university in Jerusalem who said that to the
Greek Cypriots in the South … it appeared that the UN and the European Union were bent on legitimising at least some of the consequences of the Turkish invasion of 1974, because the EU wanted to take the Cyprus issue off the table in order to facilitate negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU.There is a real lack of understanding of the Greek Cypriots' position, which is exemplified by Lord Hannay's article, to whose title I have already referred. I do not want to engage in personal attacks, but some of his language is vitriolic towards the Greek Cypriot leadership, so some mild criticism is appropriate. His article is one-sided and lacks appreciation. It is no wonder that the Greek Cypriots have been concerned for years about his involvement. He refers to
every stop being pulled out in an appeal to the emotionsof the Greek Cypriots, but entirely ignores the activities of Mr. Denktash senior, who had lost the Turkish Cypriots, effectively campaigning in the north for a no vote in the south, by, for example, inviting Mr. Ecevit, the architect of the 1974 invasion, to visit at a crucial time. There were also the activities of the Grey Wolves.Looking at the content of the plan, there clearly were some improvements for the Greek Cypriots in Annan 5 compared with earlier versions. Notably, the 30-month period of joint transitional government envisaged by Annan 3 was reduced to two months; the UN was to be involved for a brief period before each tranche of territory was handed back; and there were better financial provisions, replacing earlier provisions that would have bankrupted Cyprus from the first day on which the plan came into force. Of course, there were phased reductions of Turkish troop numbers; the return of just over half of Greek Cypriot refugees to their former homes under Greek Cypriot administration; Turkish de-occupation of some territory, with its return to the future Greek Cypriot constituent state; and a form of federal government loosely linking the two parts of the island. However, there was no guarantee that Turkey would implement the advantages. The Greek Cypriot public feared for their security, and feared that the plan would be unworkable and that Turkey would continually intervene, possibly even militarily. They feared that the collapse of the plan's envisaged arrangements would inevitably be followed by total uncertainty over the future, leaving two entities—the former constituent states—to struggle for international recognition.
Looking at the security fears, whereas the third version of the plan provided that all Turkish troops would leave Cyprus in 21 years or when Turkey joined the EU, whichever came first, the final version stipulated that Turkish troops, ultimately reduced to the levels of the 1960 treaty of guarantee, would remain for ever. The 183WH presence of the settlers is also important. I think that everyone on the Greek Cypriot side accepted that there were human rights issues involved and that long-standing settlers should be allowed to stay in some way, but under Annan 5 all illegal Turkish settlers—between 115,000 and 120,000 people, 13 per cent. of the total Cyprus population—would be able to stay. Provisions permitting a permanent flow of Turkish nationals were inserted into the plan, and the settlers would control the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, becoming a majority of its voters.
There would be limitations on the political rights of Greek Cypriots who chose to resettle in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, who would not have the right to participate in federal elections. The return of refugees was significantly limited under Annan 5 compared with previous versions. Under Annan 5, wherever in Cyprus Greek Cypriots chose to live, those living in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state would be restricted to 18 per cent. of the population, compared with 21 per cent. in Annan 3, for a transitional period of 19 years or until Turkey joined the EU. Even after that, permanent restrictions were envisaged. That change disturbed the balance in the core bargain proposed in earlier versions of the plan between the number of returning Greek Cypriots and the size of the Greek Cypriot constituent state. No additional territory would be placed under Greek Cypriot administration to reflect the reduction in the number of returning refugees.
The provisions on property And compensation, already complex and burdensome in earlier versions, became even more problematic in Annan 5. At Turkey's insistence, only up to one third of the property of individual Greek Cypriots was to be reinstated, the right to keep long-term ownership by entering into 20-year leases was removed, and Greek Cypriot taxpayers were required to guarantee the compensation to Greek Cypriots for property that they had lost. That effectively made the losers pay twice.
Most important, there were no safeguards on the implementation of the plan. Whereas the economic and financial benefits and rights of participation in the government of all of Cyprus would immediately accrue to the Turkish Cypriots when the plan came into force, Turkey's obligations to implement the plan would be phased in over an 18-year period. It contained no safeguards to ensure that Turkey would honour her obligations to remove the troops and de-occupy the island within the terms of Annan 5—still leaving troops—or would allow individual Greek Cypriots to reclaim their property or return, under the strict quotas that I have mentioned, to live in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
The exit poll of Greek Cypriots conducted after the referendum by the Mega TV channel illustrates their concerns: 75 per cent. gave security as their reason for voting no. Only 7 per cent. said they voted no to support the President's position, which gives the lie to the argument that it was all down to Mr. Papadopoulos not working hard enough. Five per cent. of Greek Cypriots cited economic cost as their reason, and only 13 per cent. said that they preferred to live separately—in other words they would reject any solution.
Where do we go from here? The important thing is to build on the positives. The Erdogan Government in Turkey are prepared to discuss Cyprus. and engage with 184WH further Turkish integration into the European Union community. The sidelining of Mr. Denktash is a positive step, which is due to the election of Mr. Talat as the so-called Prime Minister of the TRNC last December. However, he is now head of a minority Government, and there is a risk of further elections. I disagree with the Republic of Cyprus Government that it was wrong of our Government to invite Mr. Talat to Britain. He was invited as leader of the community of Turkish Cypriots, not as the so-called Prime Minister, and it is important that we are seen to support people who represent progressive forces that are working towards a settlement. It is instrumental to note that political pressures in northern Cyprus do not come from those who wish to reject a settlement, but from those who wish to move more quickly, such as defectors from Mr. Talat's own coalition and Mr. Akinci and Mr. Izzet Izcan, both of whom are pushing him to stand up harder to Turkey and the military. Whether there will be future elections depends on a vote in the Assembly of the Turkish Cypriots in two or three weeks' time.
However, the real question is the extent to which the Turkish Cypriots have room to manoeuvre. The fact remains that the Turkish "deep state" is still in operation and has a heavy influence in Turkish Cypriot politics, particularly from the army. The response to the Greek Cypriot proposal for 10 new green line crossing points was instrumental in that respect, but the so-called Government of the north has suggested only two additional crossing points. I note that one of the 10 proposed is at the Paphos gate, and that may well be rejected because it is suggested that the Turkish army have a military base there.
Another positive sign is the way that the green line opened. In my view, there is now no going back to the division of the past or the isolation of the two communities. The good relations at a personal level, which I have already mentioned, show that that is the case. The fact that Turkish Cypriots are increasingly taking up Republic of Cyprus citizenship is also a good indication of progress. A Turkish Cypriot whom we have worked with in Friends of Cyprus got his Cypriot birth certificate recently and is about to get his republic passport. He says that for the first time in 30 years he feels like a real person with an identity. It is welcome that Republic of Cyprus citizenship is being given to children from marriages between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish—that is, settler—families.
We have to acknowledge the democratic voice of the Greek Cypriots. It is not for castigation; it is unjust and counter-productive to blame them for what happened, and for exercising their democratic freedom. We have to understand why they rejected the Annan 5 plan, and note that their fears and aspirations were not addressed. We have to recognise that the proposed Swiss-Belgian constitutional model, which they accepted, would have been rejected by nearly every previous Government of the republic. The achievements of rapprochement between the elected leadership of both sides, and on a personal level, are important.
The plan has significant financial burdens. The International Monetary Fund produced a report for the donors conference, which I am not sure has been published. Perhaps it would be helpful to do so to inform the debate. However, the question of a lack of respect for human rights still remains, which is 185WH illustrated by the suggestion that the European Court of Human Rights should throw out individual cases en bloc if there was a settlement under Annan 5.
We must acknowledge the progress that has been made by both communities. The technical committees did sterling work in laying down the foundations of the detail of the settlement, and those involved were rightly congratulated by the United Nations Secretary-General. The civil society contacts go from strength to strength: all bread-and-butter issues needed to make a future settlement work.
The European Union has a positive role to play in education, for example, helping both sides come to terms with the difficult parts of their past. On security, the EU can provide reassurance to Turkey—while respecting its general staff's concerns—that security can be achieved without having to occupy another member state of the European Union. It can also provide reassurance over their fears about the rapprochement between our Government and Iran, the consequences, concerning the Kurds in particular, of the war in Iraq and Turkey's overall concern about instability in the middle east.
Part of that reassurance must involve giving Turkey a date for accession to the European Union. We must maintain engagement because that is our only hope of any progress, and the Republic of Cyprus supports that position. Equally. however, we must maintain that the Turkish general staff keep out of politics and out of civil society. The recent imprisonment and fining of journalists and newspapers was a retrograde step, and I raised the issue in a parliamentary question with my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe. I know that he feels strongly about it, given his personal background.
We should help the Turkish Cypriots, but we should not act precipitately or in a way that is likely to make things worse. We should work with, not against the Republic of Cyprus Government, who are supportive of efforts to help the Turkish Cypriots. It is not just a question of the recognition of the TRNC, which is one fear of course; there are practical implications, too.
The conclusions of the 26 April General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting provided for the end of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots by facilitating the reunification of Cyprus through the encouragement of the Turkish Cypriot community's economic development, an emphasis on the economic integration of the island and the improvement of contact between the two communities and the European Union. The only two specific measures referred to were the use of the €259 million grant and the adoption of the green line regulation. During the consultation leading to its adoption, it was always understood that the movement to the EU of goods of Turkish Cypriot origin would have taken place through points under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. It was an explicitly shared assumption between the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Commission during the drafting of the resolution.
The conduct of direct trade from the northern part of the island is not a measure that serves reunification, the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 186WH community or the economic integration of the island; on the contrary, such a measure would help to solidify and deepen the divisions. The same goes for direct flights.
We should allow adequate time to see whether the green line regulation can work. Time and again, we have seen proposals from the Government of Cyprus to try to make it work, and it would give them the opportunity to demonstrate their readiness to work with the Turkish Cypriots to facilitate trade from Cyprus with EU countries through the green line and legal ports of entry. It would build the necessary confidence that would contribute to reunification. I float the possibility of opening the port of Famagusta with Varosha as the jointly controlled port between the two communities. It could build confidence and help both communities.
§ Mr. Andrew George (St. Ives)Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
§ Mr. DismoreI am about to conclude my remarks.
We must also consider the position of Turkey vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise Cyprus as a state, let alone as a member state of the European Union, yet Turkey wants to join the European Union. There are real contradictions there. The customs union extends to the 10 accession states, but so far not by Turkey to Cyprus.
Under the Annan plan, the exclusion of the Montreux treaty effectively meant that Cyprus ships would not be allowed to use the Bosphorus. The reservation on the Cyprus/Egypt economic zone treaty could prevent mineral exploitation, and the Annan 5 removal of any provision for a continental shelf for Cyprus could deepen the problems between Turkey and Greece and export them to the European Union. Working with Turkey and the communities through the European Union, there is a lot that we can do to make progress.
On Sunday night, we saw Greece's magnificent victory, winning the European championships 1–0. Cyprus feels that it has lost the European Union 23–2. The Cypriots feel as let down and cheated by the reaction of the international community as England supporters do by the decision of the Swiss referee—a decision and reaction made too far from the action and with a blind lack of understanding of what was happening on the ground.
However, like England's footballers, all those who care for Cyprus—Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike and their many friends throughout Europe and the rest of the world—must take stock and accept what happened. We must look to the future and devise a way to win the prize of a just and fair settlement that reunites the island and provides a home for all Cypriots to live together in harmony.
§ Sir Sydney Chapman (Chipping Barnet) (Con)Mr. Deputy Speaker, like you, the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) speaks Greek fluently. I well recall addressing a public meeting in this very Room some time ago. The person speaking before me was the hon. Gentleman, who spoke in fluent Greek. I was then called on to comment on what the hon. Gentleman had said. I had not understood a word of it, but I made a judgment that turned out to be correct. I looked at the body 187WH language of those in the audience and it was clear that they were full of approbation for what the hon. Gentleman told them.
I wish to make a brief contribution and I can do so because I agree almost entirely with everything that the hon. Gentleman said. I pick him up on one point, which is minor but, I think, important. I may have misunderstood him. I pay tribute to the present British Government for facilitating the accession of Cyprus to the European Union in every way possible, but that long path was triggered by the previous Conservative Government. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and the Minister will acknowledge that.
This is an issue that transcends petty party politics. When I read the Annan 5 proposals, I was greatly surprised. Of course those proposals demand give and take on both sides but I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who said that the Greek Cypriots had already given much to get the Turkish Cypriots and their representatives to the negotiating table.
This is subjective, but I think that there were two reasons why the Greek Cypriots felt that they had to vote no in the referendum. Incidentally, while two thirds of Turkish Cypriots voted yes in the referendum and three quarters of Greek Cypriots voted no, it is worth putting on the record that two thirds of all Cypriots voted no. I think that those two sticking points were Greek Cypriot doubt as to whether the Turkish Cypriots could hold to what they were agreeing to and the vexed question of the continued presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus.
On the first point, I say simply this: when one considers the politics and the problems of Cyprus since the illegal invasion of that island—now almost 30 years past—the Turkish Cypriot leadership performed a Damascene conversion at almost the 59th minute of the 11th hour. It is understandable that the Greek Cypriots said, "Well, they were saying almost the opposite until very recently. Can we be satisfied that they will keep their word?" I am sure that the Turkish Cypriots will keep their word but I think that the doubt of the Greek Cypriots was perfectly understandable. After all, Mr. Denktash and Mr. Talat were, to use the modern jargon, not singing from the same hymn sheet.
The question of the Turkish troops greatly surprised me. I accept that the number would be reduced in time but, having read Annan 5, my understanding is that there would always be a permanent brigade of about 600 or so on the island. I question why that is necessary and why it had to be included in the plan because there are already United Nations personnel on the island—put aside the two sovereign British bases that contain a number of British armed personnel. If there is a yes to a referendum, or successful negotiations, and the island is reunited, all of it will be an integral part of the European Union. I have grave doubts about setting up a European security and defence policy and the impact that it would have on NATO, but if ever there were a case for an ESDP presence on the island, that would be it. I hope that when negotiations begin again, Turkish Cypriots will consider that point and be reassured by the safeguards that at least the EU, if not the British Government, would be able to give.
I share the hon. Gentleman's view that a reason for the no vote in the referendum was that the question was put to the Cypriot people far too hastily. As he said, 188WH there was obviously an attempt to beat the 1 May deadline for the main part of Cyprus—the legal part—joining the EU.
The illegal occupation of Cyprus took place four years after I was first elected to this House. I have announced that I am not standing at the next elections.
§ Sir Sydney ChapmanThe Minister may be able to help me, as I would like to know the date of the next election. He might like to take this opportunity to confirm that it will be held on Thursday 5 May next year. It is still my dearest hope that the beautiful, wonderful island of Cyprus will be reunited before I depart the Westminster stage.
§ 10.2 am
§ Mr. Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op)I add my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), not only on securing the debate but on giving an honest and accurate summing up of the current situation. Like the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman), I agreed with everything that he said, particularly his congratulations to Greece's national football team on its excellent victory on Sunday night. Many of my constituents and, I suspect, those of the other two Members who have contributed to the debate, shared in that victory. I refer to my entry in the register in respect of my membership of Friends of Cyprus and my frequent visits to Cyprus at the invitation of various organisations.
This is a timely debate, as it comes almost immediately after the referendums' results. Sadly, a considerable number of people predicted this aftermath, given what happened during the period leading to the referendums. We failed to see the likely reaction—or perhaps overreaction—to the results of the referendums. I believe that most informed opinion, certainly on the Greek Cypriot side, predicted for a considerable period prior to the referendums, on the basis of the negotiations and the likely outcome of the negotiations in Switzerland, that it was very unlikely that the Greek Cypriot community could be persuaded to support that outcome.
I was saddened not only by the fact that after such a long time and such intense negotiations we were unable to find a resolution that met with the approval of both communities, but by the hard criticisms—indeed, some would say the condemnation—with which the outcome of the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community has been met. I also refer to the article by Sir David Hannay, a noted expert on such matters, and some of the injudicious language that he used in it.
I make that suggestion because if we consider the history, we will find that in the 30 years that have elapsed since 1974 it has been the Cyprus Government and Greek Cypriot community that have kept Cyprus on the international agenda. They have insisted that all the international institutions—from the United Nations through the European Union to various other bodies—address the continuing division of the island and find a solution. To condemn the Cyprus Government when they were trying their hardest to find a solution is a criticism too far.
189WH During those 30 years, the Cyprus Government have made significant concessions to reach an agreement. I can look back to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, in which the Cyprus Government accepted the bi-communal and bi-zonal nature of a future Cyprus. That was a major concession at the time. The UN Ghali plan in the mid-1980s also saw similar concessions to try to reach agreement, and the various versions of the Annan plan, from 1 to 5, show how the Cyprus Government were asked to make further concessions.
When we look back at the referendums and at what went right and wrong, we must recognise that for the past 30 years, it had been an unwritten assumption that Mr. Denktash and the Turkish Cypriot community were the major obstacles to finding a solution while the Greek Cypriot community and the Cyprus Government were the major proponents of finding a solution. It seems somewhat at odds with the reality to find ourselves now criticising the Cyprus Government and lauding the Turkish Cypriot community.
Part of the reason why the negotiation process and referendums were ultimately unsuccessful is the psychology of how we reached the point at which they took place. I do not believe that the problem lies within the Annan plan. In the early part of the negotiations in New York, there seemed to be bipartisan agreement to move on to the second stage of the process. The statements made by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their leaderships show that the outlines of the Annan plan were supported by both communities.
It all seemed to go wrong in the final stage of negotiations in Switzerland. We can examine the various additional requests and demands—or whatever we call them—made by the Turkish Government in those negotiations to find where the agreements began to unravel. That unravelling can be put down not to one cause but to the psychology of concession followed by concession and the idea that the Greek Cypriot community had reached the stage of a concession too far. It was the psychological impact of Switzerland on the Greek Cypriot community that led ultimately to the failure of the referendums.
How do we move forward from here? We have done enough navel gazing since the referendum results, and we need now to look forward rather than continue to look back and recriminate with each other. We must first all recognise that the dust must settle on this stage of the negotiating process. The referendums have been held, the results have been announced and we must now let the situation settle. We can do that, first, by ensuring that all the abuse and criticism ends. It is not helpful to the process and certainly not helpful in getting the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities to start to build a consensus that will ultimately lead to a solution. Secondly, we must respect the democratic result. I have been pleased that representatives of the Government, the Opposition and the international community are now coming round to recognising that the referendums were democratically held and that the results must be respected.
Thirdly, we must all recognise the significant progress in the Turkish Cypriot community and, most important, in Turkey, towards finding a solution. For the first time 190WH in the past 30 years, the Turkish Government have been positively engaged in finding a solution, and we must build on that. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot community has elected its representatives to those negotiations. Its sidelining of Mr. Denktash is a recognition that the Turkish Cypriot community is ready to find a solution. That is borne out by all the studies that have been carried out in the community; they were very much in favour of the referendums. We must maintain that momentum, and that is one of the critical, salient issues that we must now consider. Once the dust has settled. we must move on to a positive agenda.
The accession of Cyprus to the European Union is a positive step. I pay tribute to the British Government's actions since 1997, when it became official Government policy to sponsor and support Cyprus's accession to the EU. Nobody at the time thought that an island that continued to be divided could become a member state. We have seen that through, with the full support of other EU members, and the sceptical and somewhat less than 100 per cent. support of others. We kept to the task, and the international community must recognise that Britain and Greece played significant roles in ensuring that Cyprus acceded to the EU. That provides a major opportunity, and the EU now has a major role in carrying the issue forward.
There is continuing pressure on the EU: in its membership, there is now an island that remains divided, which cannot be acceptable in the medium to long term for the EU, It was instrumental in moving the process this far along the road, and it is incumbent on it to continue with that process. It must keep Turkey involved. We are leading up to the decision in December, and I am pleased that the Government have been positive about entering accession negotiations with Turkey. That will maintain their interest not only in Europe but in finding a solution to Cyprus. We must do everything possible to ensure that that happens.
We must also assist the economic development of the island. Over the past 30 years, the economy of the northern part of the island has undoubtedly suffered significantly from its exclusion from the international community and world markets. Living standards in the north are significantly below the EU average and those of the Greek Cypriot community. We have to assist that process, not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it will be a signal to the Turkish Cypriot community that positive benefits will arise from membership of the EU, and that membership can be guaranteed if we can find a solution to the division of the island.
Although we have to accept that the dust will settle on what has gone before, we must also accept that time will be of the essence. To use an engineering metaphor, centrifugal forces are at work in the current situation, and if nothing happens in the medium term, we will move further away from, rather than closer to, a solution. We cannot allow that to happen.
I suggest that it is a priority for the EU and for Britain, as a leading member of the EU and a country with a strong and long-term historical relationship with Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean region, to try to find the elusive consensus that will be the way forward. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will respond to 191WH that point in his summing up of the debate. Such consensus cannot be achieved by those involved not talking to each other. It must therefore be recognised that the first and most important thing is for dialogue to start, with the involvement of both communities, the Government of Cyprus through the EU and the United Nations. I accept that the UN is less than enamoured of the process as it was concluded with the referendums, but it would be a negation of its obligation as the primary international body to walk away from the current situation.
We need to get down to the hard act of establishing the dialogue and the framework on which we can make progress. That framework remains the Annan plan, with all the compromises that have gone into it, and with all the concerns about the outline that have been raised subsequent to the referendums. However, it was accepted at New York, and we must recognise that it is the only acceptable starting point on which to base a consensus.
I hope that dialogue can be established—not immediately, but in the short term—and that we can get the communities to focus on and build on the areas of agreement rather than disagreement. I also hope that we can introduce the sorts of confidence-building measures outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, which have been well-established for a long time but not implemented. I believe that, with the support of the EU and the UN, there is the good will in the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Cypriot community and in the Cyprus Government to move the current negative situation in a positive direction. I therefore hope that in a future debate we will be able to start talking about the terms on which a final settlement will be agreed.
§ Mr. David Chidgey (Eastleigh) (LD)I congratulate the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) on securing this debate on a topic that is important in terms of Britain's relationships within and outside the EU. I also congratulate the hon. Members for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) and for Edmonton (Mr. Love) on their mature, thoughtful and constructive contributions to the debate.
The UK has a special relationship with both communities on the island of Cyprus, and it is therefore right that we in Parliament take a close interest in its affairs and in the efforts made to try to resolve the differences between the two communities.
I shall refer to the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which I am a member. Only two years ago, as part of the inquiry into relations with Turkey, we had to examine the situation in Cyprus and visited the island. It is perhaps worth recalling our report's concluding remarks, published in April 2002, which state on page 27 that
after so many frustrating years there is at last a possibility that a settlement can be reached between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, bolstered by a certain urgency on both sides. A settlement is very much in the best interests of all concerned, and the obstacles that remain seem, from the outside at least, eminently surmountable.It was suggested to us in our inquiries that the perception by Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriots had no need to compromise because they would benefit from the unilateral accession to the European Union anyway was misplaced.192WH Similarly, it was suggested that fears among Greek Cypriots that Mr. Denktash would not act without permission from Turkey were also misplaced. Progress on Cyprus at that time was seen as essential to overcoming objections to Turkish accession to the EU. It was thought that if Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island it would be a serious setback to Turkey's hopes of accession. In his evidence to the Committee, Mr. David Barchard told us that
if southern Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, is admitted into the European Union in 2003/2004 before negotiations are opened with Turkey, it will certainly use a vote of veto for the foreseeable future to prevent Turkish negotiations being opened.Recent events, particularly the outcome of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot referendums on the Kofi Annan plan, have done little to lighten that somewhat gloomy perspective.I shall comment on the work done by the Robert Schumann centre at the European Institute, and on the possible outcomes beyond the results of the referendums. We must remember that the Greek Cypriots rejected the Kofi Annan plan, 75 per cent. being against it, but the question is why. Perhaps it is because the Greek Cypriots' perception is that the plan would legitimise the consequences of the Turkish invasion. They are concerned that only about half of the 200,000 former Greek Cypriot refugees will be able to return to their former homes. They are worried, as we all are, that Turkish forces would remain in the north, perhaps until accession to the EU or beyond. Many see that as an infringement of Cypriot sovereignty. Greek Cypriots are not free to move or settle in the north, which conflicts with the EU principles of freedom of movement. It was feared that Turkish Cypriots would not deliver on the commitments that they would have accepted under the Kofi Annan plan.
There is also the issue of higher living standards and, possibly, unconditional accession for the Republic of Cyprus, lessening the need to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots. There is a perception that a better plan might be available, especially if the Greek Cypriots could use EU membership to negotiate over Turkish accession. In that regard, there is a longstanding belief in the moral and legal superiority of the Greek Cypriot cause. However, Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan against the advice of their political leader; such is the way of politics. It contrasts with the previous negotiations, in which Turkish Cypriots were traditionally seen as the obstacle to a settlement, especially when Mr. Denktash was in control.
Changes in Turkish Cypriot attitudes have been attributed primarily to the deteriorating economic situation in the north of Cyprus. That is creating the desire for EU-generated prosperity and for help to stop migration from the island, which is a serious problem for the Turkish Cypriots, who fear that migration from the island will eventually lead to the disappearance of their community. It is estimated that there are more Turkish Cypriots in London than there are in Cyprus because of migration—caused, stoked and fuelled by economic failure.
The present situation has led to an increasing reliance on Turkey, which has created fears that the Turkish Cypriots' independence in the island of Cyprus is also being compromised. Overall, the Turkish Cypriots felt that the Annan plan would provide a satisfactory 193WH solution. There is also a need to acknowledge in this view of Cyprus's future the important changes that have taken place in Turkish attitudes, which began in the run-up to the referendums. There is no doubt that the policy shift, which was due to the change in Government and an acceptance that the continued division was no longer acceptable, was an important milestone in the process.
The stick, which is that Cypriot accession to the EU without a solution to the division is likely to be seen as an obstacle to Turkish EU membership, is balanced by the carrot, which is that Turkish EU membership became more likely with a change in its position towards Cyprus. The irony is that although Greece was committed to the yes vote for the Annan plan as part of its commitment to improving relations with Turkey, it became increasingly more hands-off in the run-up to the Greek Cypriot referendum and, consequently, had less influence over the outcome of that vote.
It is clear that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan for reunification meant that Turkish Cypriots were excluded from accession to the EU. However, we should place on record and acknowledge the fact that the EU has sought to reward the Turkish Cypriot community in a number of ways. In particular, I am sure that the Minister will want to comment on the fact that the EU has agreed a number of greenline measures, which I believe the United Kingdom Government played a major part in securing. Those measures allow Turkish Cypriot goods to be exported into the EU in order to end the north of the island's economic isolation, which fulfils a promise that was part of the recognition of its support for the Annan plan.
We have started discussions in the EU about introducing direct flights to the north of the island. I believe—I am sure that the Minister will confirm this—that EU Foreign Ministers have recommended that the £172 million that was intended for the reconstruction of the north, which was dependent on the Annan plan, be disbursed in any event, which is of course good news. However, I understand that the EU's efforts to end the isolation of northern Cyprus have run into fierce resistance from the Greek Cypriots, as reported in the Financial Times on 2 July this year. Will the Minister give us the latest position of the Greek Cypriot Government on the situation of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiations that he and others are having?
The Minister will recall the issues that have been raised about access and travel across the green line from the north of Cyprus. He will remember responding to a letter that I sent him on 16 June about a complaint that I received from Mrs. Gill Allis, one of my constituents, who was arrested last year when she crossed the green line from the north of the island. The Minister pointed out in his response that the Greek Cypriots, or the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, have continued to consider it illegal for EU nationals to enter the southern part of the island from the north and have reserved their right to penalise EU and British nationals by fining them should they so do.
I am sure that the Minister can assure us that he is continuing to negotiate with his counterparts in the Republic of Cyprus to remove that offensive restriction on EU nationals. The Minister will remember that the Greek Cypriots made a ruling in May that Turkish 194WH Cypriots would have to cross the green line to register a vote in the European elections. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have in effect been barred from taking part in the elections. He will remember also that six seats were up for election to the European Parliament, two of which were to be reserved for Turkish Cypriots. That has not happened. It is reasonable to ask the Minister what has been the outcome in the European Parliament of what is in effect gerrymandering of the MEP seats in Cyprus. What are his views on that?
I am coming to the end of my remarks and I would like to consider the reactions that there have been since the referendum results. The Foreign Secretary recognised that we will respect the choice that the Greek Cypriots made, but we hope that they will continue to reflect on whether it is the best choice. The Minister has said that the Annan plan remains the best way forward for a united Cyprus in the EU, so will he tell us specifically what the Government are doing to re-engage the two sides, recognising our special relationship with and responsibilities to the island of Cyprus?
Similarly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has made the point that we must respect the outcomes of the two referendums, but he rightly says that an historic and unique chance to resolve Cyprus's problem has been missed. He applauds the Turkish Cypriots for approving the plan, notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it would have entailed for many of them, and he regrets that they will not enjoy the benefits of EU membership. What discussions are the Government holding with the Secretary-General in their attempts to persuade the Greek Cypriots to re-engage with the unification process?
The Liberal Democrats recognise that the Turkish Cypriots should be praised for their commitment to peace and for the way that they have campaigned for the issue. We fully support UN and international efforts to resolve the differences between the two communities, especially the Annan plan, which we see as the best such resolution. There is no doubt that it is in the interests of both communities that the whole island should achieve membership of the EU. Will the Minister tell us how the United Kingdom can take the measures forward?
§ Mr. Richard Spring (West Suffolk) (Con)I warmly congratulate the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) on an extremely comprehensive speech. It was well put together, detailed and it added to our knowledge of the situation in Cyprus. I also congratulate the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love) on his speech, which reflected considerable knowledge of the subject. It is greatly appreciated that both of them contribute to these debates.
It goes without saying that my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) has had experience and expertise of the situation in Cyprus for many years. He made a measured and sensible contribution and will be greatly missed when he leaves the House. We have various ways of recognising people for their service in this country and he has justifiably received a knighthood. I would like to think that if we were living in Japan, he could be appropriately described as a national living treasure.
195WH Earlier this year we celebrated the accession to the European Union of Cyprus and nine other countries. In the case of Cyprus—a valued Commonwealth member—the accession was particularly warmly felt in this country. However, amid the celebrations of enlargement there was a note of sadness. As other hon. Members have said, it is a shame that it proved impossible for Cyprus to enter the European Union on 1 May as a united island.
The Annan plan, drawn up after tortuous and painstaking negotiations by the UN Secretary-General and his team, offered a way to move matters forward. In essence, it advocated a loose federated structure for a united island. The plan was put to the people of Cyprus on 24 April and we know the result. In "The Case Against the Annan Plan", a publication by two academics, Dr. Kyriakides of the university of Hertfordshire tellingly points out that the
final version of the Annan Plan did not see the light of day until the day before the referendum.Despite the fact that much of the plan was in the public domain, that was not satisfactory.While we all hope that a settlement to the division of the island can be found sooner rather than later, the many attempts to date, including the latest one, serve as testimony to the complexity of the dispute and the strongly held views and concerns of both communities. However, what comes through from this morning's debate is that the door must be left open; everyone has said that we must move forward positively from this point. Now is a time to reflect on the issues and the situation and not to proceed with too much haste.
The areas of contention and concerns, particularly among the Greek Cypriot community, need to be thrashed out and addressed before a long-term solution can be found. The Greek Cypriot community voted in a certain way for reasons of which we are aware, but their concerns need to be addressed. The roots of the problem are to be found in the history of the island. It has special links with Britain and we have a particular responsibility, as a guarantor power and with our military bases on the island, to assist the people of the island to resolve the dispute. It is also evident in the vibrant and thriving Cypriot communities, both Greek and Turkish, which enrich our national life and our towns and cities with their culture and enterprise. They are cultures that can co-exist successfully here and provide our country with the added links of kinship to the island of Cyprus.
Only 14 years after independence in 1960, Turkish troops invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied the northern part of the island, their stated reason being the protection of the Turkish minority. It is worth recalling that the 1983 declaration of independence by Turkish north Cyprus went unrecognised by the international community and the dispute has given rise to many UN resolutions condemning the island's division. Talks between the island's divided communities have occurred on and off since 1980, but the fundamental sticking points remain.
The problems relate to the Turkish settlers from mainland Turkey, who now occupy land and property in northern Cyprus; to the right of return to their former lands claimed by Greek Cypriots who fled in 1974; and, for obvious historic reasons, and most important for 196WH Greek Cypriots, to the permanent presence of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus. That is an emotional and practical issue, which must be resolved if a solution to the situation is to be found.
There is, however, hope. Although the Annan plan may not have proved acceptable to some on the island, it came closer than before to offering a solution. What is clear is that the final solution of the dispute can come about only from the two communities on the island themselves, although—without hindering a process of reconciliation—other countries can and must play important roles. I have already touched on our own special link with Cyprus and its people. Can the Minister set out the steps that the Government are taking to help to restart the peace process and to work with the two communities to evolve a further plan that will lead to a resolution?
Turkey has been mentioned several times this morning and, of course, it is another key player. It deserves due credit for the progress that it has made, what it has done to try to resolve the matter, and the changes that it has made in its stance. The prospect of EU membership, which I very much support, for Turkey, has undoubtedly served as an important spur to change and to its attitudes to the Administration in north Cyprus.
The poor economic circumstances faced by the Turkish Cypriot community, and their poor communications links, undoubtedly foster resentment, both on the island and in Ankara. Many countries have ended their economic embargoes of northern Cyprus since the Turkish community declared its support for the Annan plan. The EU has pledged to release some £170 million to northern Cyprus to end its economic isolation and to allow development to take place to raise living standards, improve the economy and foster a continued desire to work towards a long-term solution, rather than seeing such assistance as any sort of incentive to postpone a settlement. That is an important point. Undoubtedly and understandably, the cost of upgrading the north is also a concern for the Republic of Cyprus, which is prosperous and successful. There is an echo in the minds of many Cypriots of the economic circumstances that arose after the Berlin wall came down. Can the Minister elaborate on the Government's policy on the Turkish Cypriot community in northern Cyprus, and set out what steps the UK is taking to aid northern Cyprus's economic prospects and growth?
I should like to raise one further question here today—that of missing people from both sides of the green line; Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. The problem has been with us for 30 years, which causes understandably huge anguish to the families and friends of the missing. Although I appreciate the reasons for tackling the issue on a parallel but separate track, what progress has been made, to the Minister's knowledge, since the most recent talks began in 2002? I recall that, when we last debated the subject in November 2002, I had found a statement on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website to the effect that our high commission in Nicosia was working with both communities on the matter. Is that still the case? What steps are the Government taking to help end the pain of those families who want to know what happened to their loved ones?
197WH A solution to the long-running dispute is in everybody's interests, most obviously in the interests of the two communities in Cyprus. Such a solution should focus on the concept of a bi-zonal or bi-communal federation. It must grow from a sense of shared purpose and trust on the island, something that can be aided from outside but must begin and end on the island. We must play our part in restarting talks and in doing anything we can to facilitate their progress.
Having come close on this occasion, none of us can give up. I look forward to a united Cyprus, at ease with itself and its neighbours in the future. That beautiful, friendly island deserves no less, not least the spread of prosperity to all parts of it.
§ The Minister for Europe (Mr. Denis MacShane)I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) for raising this important Adjournment debate because it allows me to set out the Government's position on Cyprus. It is a country that is dear to many in the United Kingdom and of great concern to many hon. Members, as we heard in the fine speeches, including that of the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman). It will not, I hope, be his last distinguished contribution to the House before the general election, whenever that may be. It will certainly be before July 2006.
I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love), who is a great champion of the rights and needs of all the people of Cyprus and very popular in his constituency as a result, and the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. Chidgey), who drew attention to the important Foreign Affairs Committee report on Cyprus. Finally, my opposite number, the shadow Minister for Europe, the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Mr. Spring), made some important points and asked questions that I hope I can reply to because, as has been said in the debate, there are not sharp party political divides on the issue.
We are enjoying a wonderful year for both Greece and Turkey, highlighted by the victory of the Greek football team in Lisbon—one of the Greek players was rejected by Sheffield United, but, there we are, Sheffield's loss is Greece's gain—and we all look forward to what we hope will be a positive vote in Turkey's bid to start EU membership negotiations. On those vital issues, there is no party political divide.
I take the opportunity to place on record the Government's—and, I am sure, the House's—thanks to the great work of Her Excellency, the Cyprus high commissioner, Myrna Kleopas, who has served her country and her island with great distinction in London for the past four years. We wish her well. Let it be noted that, under the Annan 5 plan, two of the five major diplomatic posts that the Cypriot Government would have to send representatives to—Ankara, Greece, London, Washington and Brussels, I believe—would be reserved for a Turkish Cypriot diplomat. So, one of these days, her successor may be a Turkish Cypriot.
I debated the Cypriot referendum result in another Adjournment debate on 26 May 2004, when the issue was raised by the hon. Member for Congleton (Ann 198WH Winterton). I commend the hon. Lady's passionate and vivid speech to all hon. Members. She made a great case about the wrongs done to Turkish Cypriots over the years. To an extent, she reflected the absent voice that was not represented in this morning's debate. When replying to her, I noticed that none of the hon. Members who raised the case from the Greek Cypriot point of view was present in the House. One of the difficulties is that we do not put the partisans of both points of view together in the House to exchange their views.
I will refer to just one quote that the hon. Member for Congleton gave. She quoted Mr. Nicos Sampson on 26 February 1981, a propos the events of summer 1974 when he led a fascistic coup to install an authoritarian Government in Nicosia, as saying:
Had Turkey not intervened, I would not only have proclaimed Enosis, but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus".— [Official Report, 26 May 2004; Vol. 421, c. 1689.]I give that quote not to enter into the rights and wrongs of the different positions on the island but to try to convey to the House the deep passions that exist. It has been said, perhaps rightly, perhaps wrongly, that no Turkish Cypriot remembers what happened after 1974 and that no Greek Cypriot recalls what happened before 1974.In a sense, our task as a Government and as a House is to try to invite all Cypriots and their friends in Greece and Turkey to look to the future, and to build a Cyprus for the 21st century rather than settle the wrongs of the 20th, although there have been deep wrongs, and reference has rightly been made to the 1974 invasion. Churchill put it well when he said that if we want to live in the past, and allow the present to be conditioned by the past, we will build no future. Right across Europe, particularly in the new united Europe, there are many communities and groups that, while looking to lands, properties or power that they once had, now accept that they will not return on similar terms to those that caused great distress when their countries were separated or divided.
I shall try to answer some of the points and questions that have been put. Much reference has been made to the number of Turkish troops on the island, but under Annan 5 the Turkish troops at the end of the process will be reduced to the number that they are entitled to be under the treaty of guarantee: 650. That is hardly more than those of our troops who march out to do the changing of the guard every morning in front of Buckingham palace. That is a solemn treaty, which will not be superseded by any settlement. Pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be obeyed. Under all possible Annan proposals, unless we have a complete rewrite of the international treaty of guarantee, those troops will be able to be there. In flying time, Turkey is only four minutes from the island of Cyprus, and the need to meet its perceived security concerns for Turkish Cypriots can be sustained in my view without anything like the present number of troops. However, we should not make that a key issue.
I believe that the Turkish Government and Mr. Erdogan have made that clear to the Turkish general staff, because part of the terms for any Turkish accession to the EU will have to be that the military is 100 per cent. under the control of the civilian 199WH authorities. As I said, the Government hope that membership talks can begin once a date has been agreed later this year.
§ Sir Sydney ChapmanIn fairness, the Minister makes an extremely good point about the brigade strength that will eventually be left. However, what concerns many people is the time span for reducing the 40,000 or so Turkish soldiers now present to—at a rather distant date—the brigade that he has mentioned.
§ Mr. MacShaneI have to deal with European Union politics in which five years is a nanosecond and 10 years merely a slip of the tongue. The idea that the island should have just the 650 troops at the point at which Turkey would join the European Union—in some 10, 15 or more years—should not be a breaking point. I accept that Turkey could have offered to have fewer troops on the island as part of the negotiations, but I am not convinced that change on that single issue would have moved the Greek Cypriot leadership to offer to their people a decisive and clear lead in urging a yes vote.
I was asked about the resumption of talks. I deliberately chose not to visit Cyprus as Minister for Europe with responsibility in the Foreign Office for the island during the Annan discussions. Contrary to what my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton said, I believe that Lord Hannay and the distinguished team of facilitators from the Foreign Office have worked tirelessly to achieve a settlement. They are friends of Cyprus, and it is wrong to criticise them. I have also heard from other hon. Members unworthy ad hominem remarks about British diplomats.
I am happy to inform the Chamber that I intend shortly to visit the island, and I will seek to ascertain what the Government can do to move the situation forward. However, the United Nations has said that it will not resume talks until both sides demonstrate the necessary political will, and so far the Government of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community have not approached the UN to seek resumption of the talks. Alas, the last word is still the no of the referendum in the south.
The British high commission in the island is active in conjunction with the British Council in building civil society on both sides of the island, and we seek to bring them together at every opportunity. The Foreign Secretary and I have had positive discussions with Mr. Talat, and we stressed to him that the way forward is not to set up new demands but to work constructively.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for West Suffolk for mentioning the tragedy of the disappeared people dating from the 1970s. Let me assure him that I am ready to place technical help at the disposal of the communities on both sides of the green line, particularly in connection with non-governmental organisations that work on DNA identification. We have seen forensic pathologists at work in Guatemala and the western Balkans—the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Portillo) has considerable knowledge of that—and it is increasingly possible to identify through DNA testing the remains of buried people and who is responsible for their killing.
It is vital that the concept of habeas corpus—that nobody can be detained without the knowledge of their nearest and dearest—also applies to the dead. Their 200WH relatives should be allowed the dignity of knowing when they were killed, under what terms and who lies in the many graves. If the expertise that our non-governmental organisations have built up in DNA testing can be of service in the island, I will be happy to help with that.
The hon. Member for West Suffolk referred to the fact that the final version of the Annan plan was published only just before the vote, but that version had been tweaked only slightly. To draw a rough comparison, we now have the final version of the EU constitutional treaty, but a linguis juris version will be published in November just before the treaty is signed. Everyone in Cyprus knew where they were and had done so for many years—the version was Annan 5. Hon. Members may feel that just around the corner there may be a perfect Annan 6, 7 or 8 that satisfies both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. I have to disabuse them of that view.
The current situation leaves the Turkish Cypriots disfranchised. Hon. Members asked me about the representation in the European Parliament. I assure them that when a solution is reached, under Annan 5, two of those MEP seats will be reserved for Turkish Cypriots. It is not fair that all five—I believe it will soon be six—seats for Cyprus are occupied exclusively by one community on the island.
I was also asked about entry from the north. It is true that the sovereign Government of the Republic of Cyprus—let us be clear that it is the sovereign Government recognised by the UN and by Britain—have said that they must have some regard for people who cross into the territory under their control from territory that they regard as occupied.
§ Mr. ChidgeyI accept the point that the Minister makes about the right of a sovereign nation to protect its borders, but I specifically refer to EU nationals—citizens of the EU and the UK, who carry passports to that effect—who should be treated with the normal courtesies given to residents and citizens travelling throughout the EU. Cyprus is an EU country.
§ Mr. MacShaneI made that point in the House. The Government of Cyprus have made it clear that they will not seek to delay or hinder the passage of EU nationals. If they were to do so, that would not be a problem for Britain alone, but would affect all 24 member states.
On 26 April, in response to the referendum, the General Affairs and External Relations Council stated:
The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.The council recommended that the €259 million already earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of a settlement should now be used for that purpose. The council invited the Commission to put forward comprehensive proposals to that end, with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island and on improving contact between the two communities and with the EU. The Commission's proposals are expected today and will go to the college—the collective Commission—tomorrow, so we will soon know what 201WH those recommendations are. The British Government's view is that we must now seek to facilitate economic, trade, travel and tourist links with northern Cyprus.I was asked whether the Government of Cyprus might interfere with Turkey's ambition to join the EU. We have received solemn assurances from the Cyprus Government—I, personally, have received such assurances from the Foreign Minister, Mr. Iacovou—that Cyprus will not place any obstacle in the way of Turkey being given a start date for negotiations on EU membership. I accept those assurances, and hope that hon. Members will be reassured on that point.
Our approach to Cyprus continues to be governed by two principles: we want the reunification of the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Having lived and worked for some years in Switzerland, I can think of worse fates for Cyprus than to become as rich and successful as the Swiss confederation. With that in mind, we will maintain our policy of not recognising the north of Cyprus as a separate, independent state, but we will maintain good contact with the leaders of its community.
I have no solution to hand. Such a solution will require leadership from both communities. There is no Annan 6—no magic solution from Her Majesty's Government or from Brussels. It is up to all the people of Cyprus to say yes to the unity of their island. The best way forward will be to return to the negotiating table and to vote for Annan 5 or Annan 5.5.