Westminster Hall Sitting of 6 July 2004

Preamble
[MR. EDWARD O'HARA in the Chair]

Cyprus
Motion made, and Question proposed, That the sitting be now adjourned.—[Derek Twigg.]
9.30 am
Mr. Andrew Dismore: Perhaps I may say kalimera, Mr. Deputy Speaker. For those who do not know, that is Greek for good morning. I declare an interest by drawing attention to my entry on visits to Cyprus in the Register of Members' Interests. I am also Labour vice-chair of the Friends of Cyprus organisation, which works with both communities. I am pleased to see you in the Chair, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Given your long interest in these matters, I know that you would have liked to participate in the debate.
The debate is timely, given the failure of the referendum on the Annan 5 plan, Cyprus's accession to the European Union and this week's discussions on EU support for Turkish Cypriots. Perhaps most important is the fact that this is, almost to the day, the 30th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which is the root cause of the problems. The immediate context of the debate is the fallout from the referendums. The Turkish Cypriots have been portrayed as the good guys to be rewarded for voting the right way; the Greek Cypriots are seen as the bad guys to be punished for voting the wrong way. That is shown by an article published by Lord Hannay. The title gives the game away: "Greek Cypriots Must Pay the Price of Folly".
The reality is that, in the diplomatic dance leading to Annan 5—which involved pressures from the international community and ill-informed press coverage buying too much anti-Greek Cypriot spin—the basic facts were forgotten. Thirty years ago, hundreds of thousands of Greek Cypriots were driven from their homes by an illegal invasion and cannot return, and the Turkish Cypriots have lived under military occupation, which has denied both Turkish and Greek Cypriots human rights for all that time. There are real stories of human tragedy and loss, and the appalling verbal assaults from people who should know better have left Greek Cypriots bitter and angry—with some justification, in my view.
Let me give an example. During the London mayoral elections, Ken Livingstone came to my constituency to visit Burnt Oak. Coincidentally, the first person we came across was an old Greek Cypriot lady, who said that she was no longer voting Labour, although she had done so all her life, because of the Annan plan. Obviously, I tried to chat her up in my best Greek and persuade her otherwise, and I hope that I made some progress, but there is no doubt that many people in the Greek Cypriot community feel disillusioned with our Government. That view is mistaken, because we have achieved a great deal, not least in securing Cyprus's entry to the EU without preconditions—a position that was not adopted
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by the previous Government. In addition, although we have not yet secured a result on reunification and a settlement, there has been progress towards that.
I do not want to dwell on the failure of the Annan plan, but it is important to take stock of where we are and make suggestions for the way forward. First, however, we need to consider some of the realities and myths surrounding that failure. The first myth is that it is all down to the perfidious Greeks breaking promises and a lack of leadership, especially by President Tassos Papadopoulos. I think that that is incorrect, as is perhaps shown by the fact that Mr. Anastasiades, the leader of DISY, the largest party in Cyprus, campaigned for a yes vote. His supporters simply did not follow him. The exit polls also reject the thesis that the failure was all down to lack of leadership.
The second myth is that Greek Cypriots are not prepared to compromise. That ignores the fact that, over 30 years, they have made major concessions already. The proposal of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as a strategic solution is an example. That was banked and forgotten about by Mr. Denktash, in his usual style, and by the international community. The nature of the proposed constitution—described as the Swiss or Belgian model—with power sharing is a further concession. I know from all my discussions and dealings with Greek Cypriots that they were prepared to accept painful concessions, especially on a personal level in relation to private property rights and some of the rights of settlers who had been there for some time.
Myth No. 3 is that Greek Cypriots do not want a settlement because they are sitting pretty in relation to the EU accession. I remind hon. Members that the EU accession process was without preconditions. The decision of the accession negotiations was that the Greek Cypriots should not be punished twice: once for losing to the Turks in the occupation of 30 years ago and again by not being allowed to join the EU because their country is under occupation; 1 May became an artificial deadline—in fact, it became part of the problem, not part of the solution. It was seen by many as imposing a precondition by the back door. However, my experience and knowledge of the community, both here and in Cyprus, is that it definitely wants a settlement, but not at any price, as all the polls show. Greek Cypriots, as well as Turkish Cypriots, want a settlement that is workable and fair. Solution and reunification remain the goal of both communities.
The fourth myth is that the Greek Cypriots want to keep the Turkish Cypriots isolated, but again that is not true. They certainly do not want recognition of the so-called Turkish republic of northern Cyprus, which was acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights as a subordinate organisation of Turkey in the Loizidou case, but they have taken economic and trade measures to ease the position. The Greek Cypriots responded positively to the opening of the green line by Turkish Cypriots, and people cross backwards and forwards visiting their old homes, even under occupation, and making new friends on both sides of the line. The visits by Greek Cypriots to the north have been well respected and reflected by Turkish Cypriot hospitality, even by people occupying their family homes.

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The republic of Cyprus has agreed that Turkish Cypriots should receive €259 million of European money to improve administration and infrastructure. It certainly wants trade links to improve.
The fifth myth is that the Turkish army is prepared to keep out and to allow proper and free negotiations, but the analysis that I have seen suggests otherwise. The best example is a monograph by Gregory Copley, president of the International Strategic Studies Association and editor-in-chief of the Defence and Foreign Affairs publishing group. He said in summary:
"It was clear that Turkish concerns, beginning in 2002, over the direction of the US-led Coalition war in Iraq, and fears for the impact of the outcome of that war on Turkish security, played the most significant and continuing role in the TGB's"—
the general staff's—
"insistence that the United Nations' Annan Plan for the resolution of the Cyprus problem be deliberately made to fail. As a result, the Turkish Government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was clearly instructed by the TGB to continue to escalate Turkish demands on the Annan Plan until it was no longer a meaningful document which the Greek Cypriots could accept."
That is his basic thesis. The paper is well argued and well researched, and I commend it to hon. Members. The argument is that Turkish strategic concerns require, as the general staff see it, an indefinite military presence in Cyprus because of developments in the region.
The general staff pressed Mr. Erdogan to escalate Turkish demands on the Annan plan as unacceptable to the republic of Cyprus. There is mounting evidence of that effect, including the United Kingdom working document that recently fell into the hands of The Cyprus Weekly and was widely reported in the Cypriot press here.
The reality is that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want a settlement free of Turkish military interference. That is best exemplified by Harts Sophoclides, the well-respected president of the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood, who said that the two communities voted for the same thing: to get rid of the Turkish military influence over their lives. For the Turkish Cypriots that meant a yes vote and for the Greek Cypriots it meant a no vote. The fundamental objections of the Greek Cypriots were about security and the continued presence of the Turkish army for ever under Annan 5.
The international community bears a lot of responsibility also for the failure of the Annan plan. It got used to focusing on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, and in particular Mr. Denktash, as the obstacles to progress. It finally found a negotiating partner in Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Talat, who were prepared to engage, at least to an extent, but took its eye off the ball because the settlement also needed to be acceptable to the Greek Cypriot community. It accepted Cyprus without preconditions for the European Union, but 1 May, nevertheless, became an artificial deadline. When it was clear that the referendum campaign was not going well in the south, although Mr. Christofias of AKEL, the president of the House of Representatives,
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asked for more time so that the arguments could be developed, that was not granted. A progressive party such as AKEL could see what was happening, but the international community could not. The United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Annan, has now acknowledged that more time might have been appropriate.
The pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union was also seen on the island as counter-productive, and that is illustrated in an article by Shlomo Avineri, professor of political science at the Hebrew university in Jerusalem who said that to the
"Greek Cypriots in the South … it appeared that the UN and the European Union were bent on legitimising at least some of the consequences of the Turkish invasion of 1974, because the EU wanted to take the Cyprus issue off the table in order to facilitate negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU."
There is a real lack of understanding of the Greek Cypriots' position, which is exemplified by Lord Hannay's article, to whose title I have already referred. I do not want to engage in personal attacks, but some of his language is vitriolic towards the Greek Cypriot leadership, so some mild criticism is appropriate. His article is one-sided and lacks appreciation. It is no wonder that the Greek Cypriots have been concerned for years about his involvement. He refers to
"every stop being pulled out in an appeal to the emotions"
of the Greek Cypriots, but entirely ignores the activities of Mr. Denktash senior, who had lost the Turkish Cypriots, effectively campaigning in the north for a no vote in the south, by, for example, inviting Mr. Ecevit, the architect of the 1974 invasion, to visit at a crucial time. There were also the activities of the Grey Wolves.
Looking at the content of the plan, there clearly were some improvements for the Greek Cypriots in Annan 5 compared with earlier versions. Notably, the 30-month period of joint transitional government envisaged by Annan 3 was reduced to two months; the UN was to be involved for a brief period before each tranche of territory was handed back; and there were better financial provisions, replacing earlier provisions that would have bankrupted Cyprus from the first day on which the plan came into force. Of course, there were phased reductions of Turkish troop numbers; the return of just over half of Greek Cypriot refugees to their former homes under Greek Cypriot administration; Turkish de-occupation of some territory, with its return to the future Greek Cypriot constituent state; and a form of federal government loosely linking the two parts of the island. However, there was no guarantee that Turkey would implement the advantages. The Greek Cypriot public feared for their security, and feared that the plan would be unworkable and that Turkey would continually intervene, possibly even militarily. They feared that the collapse of the plan's envisaged arrangements would inevitably be followed by total uncertainty over the future, leaving two entities—the former constituent states—to struggle for international recognition.
Looking at the security fears, whereas the third version of the plan provided that all Turkish troops would leave Cyprus in 21 years or when Turkey joined the EU, whichever came first, the final version stipulated that Turkish troops, ultimately reduced to the levels of the 1960 treaty of guarantee, would remain for ever. The

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presence of the settlers is also important. I think that everyone on the Greek Cypriot side accepted that there were human rights issues involved and that long-standing settlers should be allowed to stay in some way, but under Annan 5 all illegal Turkish settlers—between 115,000 and 120,000 people, 13 per cent. of the total Cyprus population—would be able to stay. Provisions permitting a permanent flow of Turkish nationals were inserted into the plan, and the settlers would control the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, becoming a majority of its voters.
There would be limitations on the political rights of Greek Cypriots who chose to resettle in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, who would not have the right to participate in federal elections. The return of refugees was significantly limited under Annan 5 compared with previous versions. Under Annan 5, wherever in Cyprus Greek Cypriots chose to live, those living in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state would be restricted to 18 per cent. of the population, compared with 21 per cent. in Annan 3, for a transitional period of 19 years or until Turkey joined the EU. Even after that, permanent restrictions were envisaged. That change disturbed the balance in the core bargain proposed in earlier versions of the plan between the number of returning Greek Cypriots and the size of the Greek Cypriot constituent state. No additional territory would be placed under Greek Cypriot administration to reflect the reduction in the number of returning refugees.
The provisions on property And compensation, already complex and burdensome in earlier versions, became even more problematic in Annan 5. At Turkey's insistence, only up to one third of the property of individual Greek Cypriots was to be reinstated, the right to keep long-term ownership by entering into 20-year leases was removed, and Greek Cypriot taxpayers were required to guarantee the compensation to Greek Cypriots for property that they had lost. That effectively made the losers pay twice.
Most important, there were no safeguards on the implementation of the plan. Whereas the economic and financial benefits and rights of participation in the government of all of Cyprus would immediately accrue to the Turkish Cypriots when the plan came into force, Turkey's obligations to implement the plan would be phased in over an 18-year period. It contained no safeguards to ensure that Turkey would honour her obligations to remove the troops and de-occupy the island within the terms of Annan 5—still leaving troops—or would allow individual Greek Cypriots to reclaim their property or return, under the strict quotas that I have mentioned, to live in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
The exit poll of Greek Cypriots conducted after the referendum by the Mega TV channel illustrates their concerns: 75 per cent. gave security as their reason for voting no. Only 7 per cent. said they voted no to support the President's position, which gives the lie to the argument that it was all down to Mr. Papadopoulos not working hard enough. Five per cent. of Greek Cypriots cited economic cost as their reason, and only 13 per cent. said that they preferred to live separately—in other words they would reject any solution.
Where do we go from here? The important thing is to build on the positives. The Erdogan Government in Turkey are prepared to discuss Cyprus. and engage with
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further Turkish integration into the European Union community. The sidelining of Mr. Denktash is a positive step, which is due to the election of Mr. Talat as the so-called Prime Minister of the TRNC last December. However, he is now head of a minority Government, and there is a risk of further elections. I disagree with the Republic of Cyprus Government that it was wrong of our Government to invite Mr. Talat to Britain. He was invited as leader of the community of Turkish Cypriots, not as the so-called Prime Minister, and it is important that we are seen to support people who represent progressive forces that are working towards a settlement. It is instrumental to note that political pressures in northern Cyprus do not come from those who wish to reject a settlement, but from those who wish to move more quickly, such as defectors from Mr. Talat's own coalition and Mr. Akinci and Mr. Izzet Izcan, both of whom are pushing him to stand up harder to Turkey and the military. Whether there will be future elections depends on a vote in the Assembly of the Turkish Cypriots in two or three weeks' time.
However, the real question is the extent to which the Turkish Cypriots have room to manoeuvre. The fact remains that the Turkish "deep state" is still in operation and has a heavy influence in Turkish Cypriot politics, particularly from the army. The response to the Greek Cypriot proposal for 10 new green line crossing points was instrumental in that respect, but the so-called Government of the north has suggested only two additional crossing points. I note that one of the 10 proposed is at the Paphos gate, and that may well be rejected because it is suggested that the Turkish army have a military base there.
Another positive sign is the way that the green line opened. In my view, there is now no going back to the division of the past or the isolation of the two communities. The good relations at a personal level, which I have already mentioned, show that that is the case. The fact that Turkish Cypriots are increasingly taking up Republic of Cyprus citizenship is also a good indication of progress. A Turkish Cypriot whom we have worked with in Friends of Cyprus got his Cypriot birth certificate recently and is about to get his republic passport. He says that for the first time in 30 years he feels like a real person with an identity. It is welcome that Republic of Cyprus citizenship is being given to children from marriages between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish—that is, settler—families.
We have to acknowledge the democratic voice of the Greek Cypriots. It is not for castigation; it is unjust and counter-productive to blame them for what happened, and for exercising their democratic freedom. We have to understand why they rejected the Annan 5 plan, and note that their fears and aspirations were not addressed. We have to recognise that the proposed Swiss-Belgian constitutional model, which they accepted, would have been rejected by nearly every previous Government of the republic. The achievements of rapprochement between the elected leadership of both sides, and on a personal level, are important.
The plan has significant financial burdens. The International Monetary Fund produced a report for the donors conference, which I am not sure has been published. Perhaps it would be helpful to do so to inform the debate. However, the question of a lack of respect for human rights still remains, which is

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illustrated by the suggestion that the European Court of Human Rights should throw out individual cases en bloc if there was a settlement under Annan 5.
We must acknowledge the progress that has been made by both communities. The technical committees did sterling work in laying down the foundations of the detail of the settlement, and those involved were rightly congratulated by the United Nations Secretary-General. The civil society contacts go from strength to strength: all bread-and-butter issues needed to make a future settlement work.
The European Union has a positive role to play in education, for example, helping both sides come to terms with the difficult parts of their past. On security, the EU can provide reassurance to Turkey—while respecting its general staff's concerns—that security can be achieved without having to occupy another member state of the European Union. It can also provide reassurance over their fears about the rapprochement between our Government and Iran, the consequences, concerning the Kurds in particular, of the war in Iraq and Turkey's overall concern about instability in the middle east.
Part of that reassurance must involve giving Turkey a date for accession to the European Union. We must maintain engagement because that is our only hope of any progress, and the Republic of Cyprus supports that position. Equally. however, we must maintain that the Turkish general staff keep out of politics and out of civil society. The recent imprisonment and fining of journalists and newspapers was a retrograde step, and I raised the issue in a parliamentary question with my hon. Friend the Minister for Europe. I know that he feels strongly about it, given his personal background.
We should help the Turkish Cypriots, but we should not act precipitately or in a way that is likely to make things worse. We should work with, not against the Republic of Cyprus Government, who are supportive of efforts to help the Turkish Cypriots. It is not just a question of the recognition of the TRNC, which is one fear of course; there are practical implications, too.
The conclusions of the 26 April General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting provided for the end of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots by facilitating the reunification of Cyprus through the encouragement of the Turkish Cypriot community's economic development, an emphasis on the economic integration of the island and the improvement of contact between the two communities and the European Union. The only two specific measures referred to were the use of the €259 million grant and the adoption of the green line regulation. During the consultation leading to its adoption, it was always understood that the movement to the EU of goods of Turkish Cypriot origin would have taken place through points under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. It was an explicitly shared assumption between the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and the European Commission during the drafting of the resolution.
The conduct of direct trade from the northern part of the island is not a measure that serves reunification, the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot
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community or the economic integration of the island; on the contrary, such a measure would help to solidify and deepen the divisions. The same goes for direct flights.
We should allow adequate time to see whether the green line regulation can work. Time and again, we have seen proposals from the Government of Cyprus to try to make it work, and it would give them the opportunity to demonstrate their readiness to work with the Turkish Cypriots to facilitate trade from Cyprus with EU countries through the green line and legal ports of entry. It would build the necessary confidence that would contribute to reunification. I float the possibility of opening the port of Famagusta with Varosha as the jointly controlled port between the two communities. It could build confidence and help both communities.
Mr. Andrew George: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Dismore: I am about to conclude my remarks.
We must also consider the position of Turkey vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey still does not recognise Cyprus as a state, let alone as a member state of the European Union, yet Turkey wants to join the European Union. There are real contradictions there. The customs union extends to the 10 accession states, but so far not by Turkey to Cyprus.
Under the Annan plan, the exclusion of the Montreux treaty effectively meant that Cyprus ships would not be allowed to use the Bosphorus. The reservation on the Cyprus/Egypt economic zone treaty could prevent mineral exploitation, and the Annan 5 removal of any provision for a continental shelf for Cyprus could deepen the problems between Turkey and Greece and export them to the European Union. Working with Turkey and the communities through the European Union, there is a lot that we can do to make progress.
On Sunday night, we saw Greece's magnificent victory, winning the European championships 1–0. Cyprus feels that it has lost the European Union 23–2. The Cypriots feel as let down and cheated by the reaction of the international community as England supporters do by the decision of the Swiss referee—a decision and reaction made too far from the action and with a blind lack of understanding of what was happening on the ground.
However, like England's footballers, all those who care for Cyprus—Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike and their many friends throughout Europe and the rest of the world—must take stock and accept what happened. We must look to the future and devise a way to win the prize of a just and fair settlement that reunites the island and provides a home for all Cypriots to live together in harmony.
9.55 am
Sir Sydney Chapman: Mr. Deputy Speaker, like you, the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) speaks Greek fluently. I well recall addressing a public meeting in this very Room some time ago. The person speaking before me was the hon. Gentleman, who spoke in fluent Greek. I was then called on to comment on what the hon. Gentleman had said. I had not understood a word of it, but I made a judgment that turned out to be correct. I looked at the body

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language of those in the audience and it was clear that they were full of approbation for what the hon. Gentleman told them.
I wish to make a brief contribution and I can do so because I agree almost entirely with everything that the hon. Gentleman said. I pick him up on one point, which is minor but, I think, important. I may have misunderstood him. I pay tribute to the present British Government for facilitating the accession of Cyprus to the European Union in every way possible, but that long path was triggered by the previous Conservative Government. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman and the Minister will acknowledge that.
This is an issue that transcends petty party politics. When I read the Annan 5 proposals, I was greatly surprised. Of course those proposals demand give and take on both sides but I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who said that the Greek Cypriots had already given much to get the Turkish Cypriots and their representatives to the negotiating table.
This is subjective, but I think that there were two reasons why the Greek Cypriots felt that they had to vote no in the referendum. Incidentally, while two thirds of Turkish Cypriots voted yes in the referendum and three quarters of Greek Cypriots voted no, it is worth putting on the record that two thirds of all Cypriots voted no. I think that those two sticking points were Greek Cypriot doubt as to whether the Turkish Cypriots could hold to what they were agreeing to and the vexed question of the continued presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus.
On the first point, I say simply this: when one considers the politics and the problems of Cyprus since the illegal invasion of that island—now almost 30 years past—the Turkish Cypriot leadership performed a Damascene conversion at almost the 59th minute of the 11th hour. It is understandable that the Greek Cypriots said, "Well, they were saying almost the opposite until very recently. Can we be satisfied that they will keep their word?" I am sure that the Turkish Cypriots will keep their word but I think that the doubt of the Greek Cypriots was perfectly understandable. After all, Mr. Denktash and Mr. Talat were, to use the modern jargon, not singing from the same hymn sheet.
The question of the Turkish troops greatly surprised me. I accept that the number would be reduced in time but, having read Annan 5, my understanding is that there would always be a permanent brigade of about 600 or so on the island. I question why that is necessary and why it had to be included in the plan because there are already United Nations personnel on the island—put aside the two sovereign British bases that contain a number of British armed personnel. If there is a yes to a referendum, or successful negotiations, and the island is reunited, all of it will be an integral part of the European Union. I have grave doubts about setting up a European security and defence policy and the impact that it would have on NATO, but if ever there were a case for an ESDP presence on the island, that would be it. I hope that when negotiations begin again, Turkish Cypriots will consider that point and be reassured by the safeguards that at least the EU, if not the British Government, would be able to give.
I share the hon. Gentleman's view that a reason for the no vote in the referendum was that the question was put to the Cypriot people far too hastily. As he said,
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there was obviously an attempt to beat the 1 May deadline for the main part of Cyprus—the legal part—joining the EU.
The illegal occupation of Cyprus took place four years after I was first elected to this House. I have announced that I am not standing at the next elections.
The Minister for Europe (Mr. Denis MacShane): Shame.
Sir Sydney Chapman: The Minister may be able to help me, as I would like to know the date of the next election. He might like to take this opportunity to confirm that it will be held on Thursday 5 May next year. It is still my dearest hope that the beautiful, wonderful island of Cyprus will be reunited before I depart the Westminster stage.
10.2 am
Mr. Andrew Love (Edmonton) (Lab/Co-op): I add my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), not only on securing the debate but on giving an honest and accurate summing up of the current situation. Like the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman), I agreed with everything that he said, particularly his congratulations to Greece's national football team on its excellent victory on Sunday night. Many of my constituents and, I suspect, those of the other two Members who have contributed to the debate, shared in that victory. I refer to my entry in the register in respect of my membership of Friends of Cyprus and my frequent visits to Cyprus at the invitation of various organisations.
This is a timely debate, as it comes almost immediately after the referendums' results. Sadly, a considerable number of people predicted this aftermath, given what happened during the period leading to the referendums. We failed to see the likely reaction—or perhaps overreaction—to the results of the referendums. I believe that most informed opinion, certainly on the Greek Cypriot side, predicted for a considerable period prior to the referendums, on the basis of the negotiations and the likely outcome of the negotiations in Switzerland, that it was very unlikely that the Greek Cypriot community could be persuaded to support that outcome.
I was saddened not only by the fact that after such a long time and such intense negotiations we were unable to find a resolution that met with the approval of both communities, but by the hard criticisms—indeed, some would say the condemnation—with which the outcome of the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community has been met. I also refer to the article by Sir David Hannay, a noted expert on such matters, and some of the injudicious language that he used in it.
I make that suggestion because if we consider the history, we will find that in the 30 years that have elapsed since 1974 it has been the Cyprus Government and Greek Cypriot community that have kept Cyprus on the international agenda. They have insisted that all the international institutions—from the United Nations through the European Union to various other bodies—address the continuing division of the island and find a solution. To condemn the Cyprus Government when they were trying their hardest to find a solution is a criticism too far.

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During those 30 years, the Cyprus Government have made significant concessions to reach an agreement. I can look back to the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, in which the Cyprus Government accepted the bi-communal and bi-zonal nature of a future Cyprus. That was a major concession at the time. The UN Ghali plan in the mid-1980s also saw similar concessions to try to reach agreement, and the various versions of the Annan plan, from 1 to 5, show how the Cyprus Government were asked to make further concessions.
When we look back at the referendums and at what went right and wrong, we must recognise that for the past 30 years, it had been an unwritten assumption that Mr. Denktash and the Turkish Cypriot community were the major obstacles to finding a solution while the Greek Cypriot community and the Cyprus Government were the major proponents of finding a solution. It seems somewhat at odds with the reality to find ourselves now criticising the Cyprus Government and lauding the Turkish Cypriot community.
Part of the reason why the negotiation process and referendums were ultimately unsuccessful is the psychology of how we reached the point at which they took place. I do not believe that the problem lies within the Annan plan. In the early part of the negotiations in New York, there seemed to be bipartisan agreement to move on to the second stage of the process. The statements made by both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their leaderships show that the outlines of the Annan plan were supported by both communities.
It all seemed to go wrong in the final stage of negotiations in Switzerland. We can examine the various additional requests and demands—or whatever we call them—made by the Turkish Government in those negotiations to find where the agreements began to unravel. That unravelling can be put down not to one cause but to the psychology of concession followed by concession and the idea that the Greek Cypriot community had reached the stage of a concession too far. It was the psychological impact of Switzerland on the Greek Cypriot community that led ultimately to the failure of the referendums.
How do we move forward from here? We have done enough navel gazing since the referendum results, and we need now to look forward rather than continue to look back and recriminate with each other. We must first all recognise that the dust must settle on this stage of the negotiating process. The referendums have been held, the results have been announced and we must now let the situation settle. We can do that, first, by ensuring that all the abuse and criticism ends. It is not helpful to the process and certainly not helpful in getting the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities to start to build a consensus that will ultimately lead to a solution. Secondly, we must respect the democratic result. I have been pleased that representatives of the Government, the Opposition and the international community are now coming round to recognising that the referendums were democratically held and that the results must be respected.
Thirdly, we must all recognise the significant progress in the Turkish Cypriot community and, most important, in Turkey, towards finding a solution. For the first time
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in the past 30 years, the Turkish Government have been positively engaged in finding a solution, and we must build on that. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot community has elected its representatives to those negotiations. Its sidelining of Mr. Denktash is a recognition that the Turkish Cypriot community is ready to find a solution. That is borne out by all the studies that have been carried out in the community; they were very much in favour of the referendums. We must maintain that momentum, and that is one of the critical, salient issues that we must now consider. Once the dust has settled. we must move on to a positive agenda.
The accession of Cyprus to the European Union is a positive step. I pay tribute to the British Government's actions since 1997, when it became official Government policy to sponsor and support Cyprus's accession to the EU. Nobody at the time thought that an island that continued to be divided could become a member state. We have seen that through, with the full support of other EU members, and the sceptical and somewhat less than 100 per cent. support of others. We kept to the task, and the international community must recognise that Britain and Greece played significant roles in ensuring that Cyprus acceded to the EU. That provides a major opportunity, and the EU now has a major role in carrying the issue forward.
There is continuing pressure on the EU: in its membership, there is now an island that remains divided, which cannot be acceptable in the medium to long term for the EU, It was instrumental in moving the process this far along the road, and it is incumbent on it to continue with that process. It must keep Turkey involved. We are leading up to the decision in December, and I am pleased that the Government have been positive about entering accession negotiations with Turkey. That will maintain their interest not only in Europe but in finding a solution to Cyprus. We must do everything possible to ensure that that happens.
We must also assist the economic development of the island. Over the past 30 years, the economy of the northern part of the island has undoubtedly suffered significantly from its exclusion from the international community and world markets. Living standards in the north are significantly below the EU average and those of the Greek Cypriot community. We have to assist that process, not just because it is the right thing to do, but because it will be a signal to the Turkish Cypriot community that positive benefits will arise from membership of the EU, and that membership can be guaranteed if we can find a solution to the division of the island.
Although we have to accept that the dust will settle on what has gone before, we must also accept that time will be of the essence. To use an engineering metaphor, centrifugal forces are at work in the current situation, and if nothing happens in the medium term, we will move further away from, rather than closer to, a solution. We cannot allow that to happen.
I suggest that it is a priority for the EU and for Britain, as a leading member of the EU and a country with a strong and long-term historical relationship with Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean region, to try to find the elusive consensus that will be the way forward. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will respond to

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that point in his summing up of the debate. Such consensus cannot be achieved by those involved not talking to each other. It must therefore be recognised that the first and most important thing is for dialogue to start, with the involvement of both communities, the Government of Cyprus through the EU and the United Nations. I accept that the UN is less than enamoured of the process as it was concluded with the referendums, but it would be a negation of its obligation as the primary international body to walk away from the current situation.
We need to get down to the hard act of establishing the dialogue and the framework on which we can make progress. That framework remains the Annan plan, with all the compromises that have gone into it, and with all the concerns about the outline that have been raised subsequent to the referendums. However, it was accepted at New York, and we must recognise that it is the only acceptable starting point on which to base a consensus.
I hope that dialogue can be established—not immediately, but in the short term—and that we can get the communities to focus on and build on the areas of agreement rather than disagreement. I also hope that we can introduce the sorts of confidence-building measures outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, which have been well-established for a long time but not implemented. I believe that, with the support of the EU and the UN, there is the good will in the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Cypriot community and in the Cyprus Government to move the current negative situation in a positive direction. I therefore hope that in a future debate we will be able to start talking about the terms on which a final settlement will be agreed.
10.19 am
Mr. David Chidgey: I congratulate the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) on securing this debate on a topic that is important in terms of Britain's relationships within and outside the EU. I also congratulate the hon. Members for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) and for Edmonton (Mr. Love) on their mature, thoughtful and constructive contributions to the debate.
The UK has a special relationship with both communities on the island of Cyprus, and it is therefore right that we in Parliament take a close interest in its affairs and in the efforts made to try to resolve the differences between the two communities.
I shall refer to the work of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which I am a member. Only two years ago, as part of the inquiry into relations with Turkey, we had to examine the situation in Cyprus and visited the island. It is perhaps worth recalling our report's concluding remarks, published in April 2002, which state on page 27 that
"after so many frustrating years there is at last a possibility that a settlement can be reached between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, bolstered by a certain urgency on both sides. A settlement is very much in the best interests of all concerned, and the obstacles that remain seem, from the outside at least, eminently surmountable."
It was suggested to us in our inquiries that the perception by Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriots had no need to compromise because they would benefit from the unilateral accession to the European Union anyway was misplaced.
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Similarly, it was suggested that fears among Greek Cypriots that Mr. Denktash would not act without permission from Turkey were also misplaced. Progress on Cyprus at that time was seen as essential to overcoming objections to Turkish accession to the EU. It was thought that if Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island it would be a serious setback to Turkey's hopes of accession. In his evidence to the Committee, Mr. David Barchard told us that
"if southern Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, is admitted into the European Union in 2003/2004 before negotiations are opened with Turkey, it will certainly use a vote of veto for the foreseeable future to prevent Turkish negotiations being opened."
Recent events, particularly the outcome of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot referendums on the Kofi Annan plan, have done little to lighten that somewhat gloomy perspective.
I shall comment on the work done by the Robert Schumann centre at the European Institute, and on the possible outcomes beyond the results of the referendums. We must remember that the Greek Cypriots rejected the Kofi Annan plan, 75 per cent. being against it, but the question is why. Perhaps it is because the Greek Cypriots' perception is that the plan would legitimise the consequences of the Turkish invasion. They are concerned that only about half of the 200,000 former Greek Cypriot refugees will be able to return to their former homes. They are worried, as we all are, that Turkish forces would remain in the north, perhaps until accession to the EU or beyond. Many see that as an infringement of Cypriot sovereignty. Greek Cypriots are not free to move or settle in the north, which conflicts with the EU principles of freedom of movement. It was feared that Turkish Cypriots would not deliver on the commitments that they would have accepted under the Kofi Annan plan.
There is also the issue of higher living standards and, possibly, unconditional accession for the Republic of Cyprus, lessening the need to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots. There is a perception that a better plan might be available, especially if the Greek Cypriots could use EU membership to negotiate over Turkish accession. In that regard, there is a longstanding belief in the moral and legal superiority of the Greek Cypriot cause. However, Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan against the advice of their political leader; such is the way of politics. It contrasts with the previous negotiations, in which Turkish Cypriots were traditionally seen as the obstacle to a settlement, especially when Mr. Denktash was in control.
Changes in Turkish Cypriot attitudes have been attributed primarily to the deteriorating economic situation in the north of Cyprus. That is creating the desire for EU-generated prosperity and for help to stop migration from the island, which is a serious problem for the Turkish Cypriots, who fear that migration from the island will eventually lead to the disappearance of their community. It is estimated that there are more Turkish Cypriots in London than there are in Cyprus because of migration—caused, stoked and fuelled by economic failure.
The present situation has led to an increasing reliance on Turkey, which has created fears that the Turkish Cypriots' independence in the island of Cyprus is also being compromised. Overall, the Turkish Cypriots felt that the Annan plan would provide a satisfactory

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solution. There is also a need to acknowledge in this view of Cyprus's future the important changes that have taken place in Turkish attitudes, which began in the run-up to the referendums. There is no doubt that the policy shift, which was due to the change in Government and an acceptance that the continued division was no longer acceptable, was an important milestone in the process.
The stick, which is that Cypriot accession to the EU without a solution to the division is likely to be seen as an obstacle to Turkish EU membership, is balanced by the carrot, which is that Turkish EU membership became more likely with a change in its position towards Cyprus. The irony is that although Greece was committed to the yes vote for the Annan plan as part of its commitment to improving relations with Turkey, it became increasingly more hands-off in the run-up to the Greek Cypriot referendum and, consequently, had less influence over the outcome of that vote.
It is clear that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan for reunification meant that Turkish Cypriots were excluded from accession to the EU. However, we should place on record and acknowledge the fact that the EU has sought to reward the Turkish Cypriot community in a number of ways. In particular, I am sure that the Minister will want to comment on the fact that the EU has agreed a number of greenline measures, which I believe the United Kingdom Government played a major part in securing. Those measures allow Turkish Cypriot goods to be exported into the EU in order to end the north of the island's economic isolation, which fulfils a promise that was part of the recognition of its support for the Annan plan.
We have started discussions in the EU about introducing direct flights to the north of the island. I believe—I am sure that the Minister will confirm this—that EU Foreign Ministers have recommended that the £172 million that was intended for the reconstruction of the north, which was dependent on the Annan plan, be disbursed in any event, which is of course good news. However, I understand that the EU's efforts to end the isolation of northern Cyprus have run into fierce resistance from the Greek Cypriots, as reported in the Financial Times on 2 July this year. Will the Minister give us the latest position of the Greek Cypriot Government on the situation of the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiations that he and others are having?
The Minister will recall the issues that have been raised about access and travel across the green line from the north of Cyprus. He will remember responding to a letter that I sent him on 16 June about a complaint that I received from Mrs. Gill Allis, one of my constituents, who was arrested last year when she crossed the green line from the north of the island. The Minister pointed out in his response that the Greek Cypriots, or the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, have continued to consider it illegal for EU nationals to enter the southern part of the island from the north and have reserved their right to penalise EU and British nationals by fining them should they so do.
I am sure that the Minister can assure us that he is continuing to negotiate with his counterparts in the Republic of Cyprus to remove that offensive restriction on EU nationals. The Minister will remember that the Greek Cypriots made a ruling in May that Turkish
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Cypriots would have to cross the green line to register a vote in the European elections. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have in effect been barred from taking part in the elections. He will remember also that six seats were up for election to the European Parliament, two of which were to be reserved for Turkish Cypriots. That has not happened. It is reasonable to ask the Minister what has been the outcome in the European Parliament of what is in effect gerrymandering of the MEP seats in Cyprus. What are his views on that?
I am coming to the end of my remarks and I would like to consider the reactions that there have been since the referendum results. The Foreign Secretary recognised that we will respect the choice that the Greek Cypriots made, but we hope that they will continue to reflect on whether it is the best choice. The Minister has said that the Annan plan remains the best way forward for a united Cyprus in the EU, so will he tell us specifically what the Government are doing to re-engage the two sides, recognising our special relationship with and responsibilities to the island of Cyprus?
Similarly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has made the point that we must respect the outcomes of the two referendums, but he rightly says that an historic and unique chance to resolve Cyprus's problem has been missed. He applauds the Turkish Cypriots for approving the plan, notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it would have entailed for many of them, and he regrets that they will not enjoy the benefits of EU membership. What discussions are the Government holding with the Secretary-General in their attempts to persuade the Greek Cypriots to re-engage with the unification process?
The Liberal Democrats recognise that the Turkish Cypriots should be praised for their commitment to peace and for the way that they have campaigned for the issue. We fully support UN and international efforts to resolve the differences between the two communities, especially the Annan plan, which we see as the best such resolution. There is no doubt that it is in the interests of both communities that the whole island should achieve membership of the EU. Will the Minister tell us how the United Kingdom can take the measures forward?
10.32 am
Mr. Richard Spring: I warmly congratulate the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) on an extremely comprehensive speech. It was well put together, detailed and it added to our knowledge of the situation in Cyprus. I also congratulate the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love) on his speech, which reflected considerable knowledge of the subject. It is greatly appreciated that both of them contribute to these debates.
It goes without saying that my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) has had experience and expertise of the situation in Cyprus for many years. He made a measured and sensible contribution and will be greatly missed when he leaves the House. We have various ways of recognising people for their service in this country and he has justifiably received a knighthood. I would like to think that if we were living in Japan, he could be appropriately described as a national living treasure.

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Earlier this year we celebrated the accession to the European Union of Cyprus and nine other countries. In the case of Cyprus—a valued Commonwealth member—the accession was particularly warmly felt in this country. However, amid the celebrations of enlargement there was a note of sadness. As other hon. Members have said, it is a shame that it proved impossible for Cyprus to enter the European Union on 1 May as a united island.
The Annan plan, drawn up after tortuous and painstaking negotiations by the UN Secretary-General and his team, offered a way to move matters forward. In essence, it advocated a loose federated structure for a united island. The plan was put to the people of Cyprus on 24 April and we know the result. In "The Case Against the Annan Plan", a publication by two academics, Dr. Kyriakides of the university of Hertfordshire tellingly points out that the
"final version of the Annan Plan did not see the light of day until the day before the referendum."
Despite the fact that much of the plan was in the public domain, that was not satisfactory.
While we all hope that a settlement to the division of the island can be found sooner rather than later, the many attempts to date, including the latest one, serve as testimony to the complexity of the dispute and the strongly held views and concerns of both communities. However, what comes through from this morning's debate is that the door must be left open; everyone has said that we must move forward positively from this point. Now is a time to reflect on the issues and the situation and not to proceed with too much haste.
The areas of contention and concerns, particularly among the Greek Cypriot community, need to be thrashed out and addressed before a long-term solution can be found. The Greek Cypriot community voted in a certain way for reasons of which we are aware, but their concerns need to be addressed. The roots of the problem are to be found in the history of the island. It has special links with Britain and we have a particular responsibility, as a guarantor power and with our military bases on the island, to assist the people of the island to resolve the dispute. It is also evident in the vibrant and thriving Cypriot communities, both Greek and Turkish, which enrich our national life and our towns and cities with their culture and enterprise. They are cultures that can co-exist successfully here and provide our country with the added links of kinship to the island of Cyprus.
Only 14 years after independence in 1960, Turkish troops invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied the northern part of the island, their stated reason being the protection of the Turkish minority. It is worth recalling that the 1983 declaration of independence by Turkish north Cyprus went unrecognised by the international community and the dispute has given rise to many UN resolutions condemning the island's division. Talks between the island's divided communities have occurred on and off since 1980, but the fundamental sticking points remain.
The problems relate to the Turkish settlers from mainland Turkey, who now occupy land and property in northern Cyprus; to the right of return to their former lands claimed by Greek Cypriots who fled in 1974; and, for obvious historic reasons, and most important for
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Greek Cypriots, to the permanent presence of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus. That is an emotional and practical issue, which must be resolved if a solution to the situation is to be found.
There is, however, hope. Although the Annan plan may not have proved acceptable to some on the island, it came closer than before to offering a solution. What is clear is that the final solution of the dispute can come about only from the two communities on the island themselves, although—without hindering a process of reconciliation—other countries can and must play important roles. I have already touched on our own special link with Cyprus and its people. Can the Minister set out the steps that the Government are taking to help to restart the peace process and to work with the two communities to evolve a further plan that will lead to a resolution?
Turkey has been mentioned several times this morning and, of course, it is another key player. It deserves due credit for the progress that it has made, what it has done to try to resolve the matter, and the changes that it has made in its stance. The prospect of EU membership, which I very much support, for Turkey, has undoubtedly served as an important spur to change and to its attitudes to the Administration in north Cyprus.
The poor economic circumstances faced by the Turkish Cypriot community, and their poor communications links, undoubtedly foster resentment, both on the island and in Ankara. Many countries have ended their economic embargoes of northern Cyprus since the Turkish community declared its support for the Annan plan. The EU has pledged to release some £170 million to northern Cyprus to end its economic isolation and to allow development to take place to raise living standards, improve the economy and foster a continued desire to work towards a long-term solution, rather than seeing such assistance as any sort of incentive to postpone a settlement. That is an important point. Undoubtedly and understandably, the cost of upgrading the north is also a concern for the Republic of Cyprus, which is prosperous and successful. There is an echo in the minds of many Cypriots of the economic circumstances that arose after the Berlin wall came down. Can the Minister elaborate on the Government's policy on the Turkish Cypriot community in northern Cyprus, and set out what steps the UK is taking to aid northern Cyprus's economic prospects and growth?
I should like to raise one further question here today—that of missing people from both sides of the green line; Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. The problem has been with us for 30 years, which causes understandably huge anguish to the families and friends of the missing. Although I appreciate the reasons for tackling the issue on a parallel but separate track, what progress has been made, to the Minister's knowledge, since the most recent talks began in 2002? I recall that, when we last debated the subject in November 2002, I had found a statement on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website to the effect that our high commission in Nicosia was working with both communities on the matter. Is that still the case? What steps are the Government taking to help end the pain of those families who want to know what happened to their loved ones?

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A solution to the long-running dispute is in everybody's interests, most obviously in the interests of the two communities in Cyprus. Such a solution should focus on the concept of a bi-zonal or bi-communal federation. It must grow from a sense of shared purpose and trust on the island, something that can be aided from outside but must begin and end on the island. We must play our part in restarting talks and in doing anything we can to facilitate their progress.
Having come close on this occasion, none of us can give up. I look forward to a united Cyprus, at ease with itself and its neighbours in the future. That beautiful, friendly island deserves no less, not least the spread of prosperity to all parts of it.
10.41 am
The Minister for Europe (Mr. Denis MacShane): I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) for raising this important Adjournment debate because it allows me to set out the Government's position on Cyprus. It is a country that is dear to many in the United Kingdom and of great concern to many hon. Members, as we heard in the fine speeches, including that of the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman). It will not, I hope, be his last distinguished contribution to the House before the general election, whenever that may be. It will certainly be before July 2006.
I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love), who is a great champion of the rights and needs of all the people of Cyprus and very popular in his constituency as a result, and the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. Chidgey), who drew attention to the important Foreign Affairs Committee report on Cyprus. Finally, my opposite number, the shadow Minister for Europe, the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Mr. Spring), made some important points and asked questions that I hope I can reply to because, as has been said in the debate, there are not sharp party political divides on the issue.
We are enjoying a wonderful year for both Greece and Turkey, highlighted by the victory of the Greek football team in Lisbon—one of the Greek players was rejected by Sheffield United, but, there we are, Sheffield's loss is Greece's gain—and we all look forward to what we hope will be a positive vote in Turkey's bid to start EU membership negotiations. On those vital issues, there is no party political divide.
I take the opportunity to place on record the Government's—and, I am sure, the House's—thanks to the great work of Her Excellency, the Cyprus high commissioner, Myrna Kleopas, who has served her country and her island with great distinction in London for the past four years. We wish her well. Let it be noted that, under the Annan 5 plan, two of the five major diplomatic posts that the Cypriot Government would have to send representatives to—Ankara, Greece, London, Washington and Brussels, I believe—would be reserved for a Turkish Cypriot diplomat. So, one of these days, her successor may be a Turkish Cypriot.
I debated the Cypriot referendum result in another Adjournment debate on 26 May 2004, when the issue was raised by the hon. Member for Congleton (Ann
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Winterton). I commend the hon. Lady's passionate and vivid speech to all hon. Members. She made a great case about the wrongs done to Turkish Cypriots over the years. To an extent, she reflected the absent voice that was not represented in this morning's debate. When replying to her, I noticed that none of the hon. Members who raised the case from the Greek Cypriot point of view was present in the House. One of the difficulties is that we do not put the partisans of both points of view together in the House to exchange their views.
I will refer to just one quote that the hon. Member for Congleton gave. She quoted Mr. Nicos Sampson on 26 February 1981, a propos the events of summer 1974 when he led a fascistic coup to install an authoritarian Government in Nicosia, as saying:
"Had Turkey not intervened, I would not only have proclaimed Enosis, but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus".— [Official Report, 26 May 2004; Vol. 421, c. 1689.]
I give that quote not to enter into the rights and wrongs of the different positions on the island but to try to convey to the House the deep passions that exist. It has been said, perhaps rightly, perhaps wrongly, that no Turkish Cypriot remembers what happened after 1974 and that no Greek Cypriot recalls what happened before 1974.
In a sense, our task as a Government and as a House is to try to invite all Cypriots and their friends in Greece and Turkey to look to the future, and to build a Cyprus for the 21st century rather than settle the wrongs of the 20th, although there have been deep wrongs, and reference has rightly been made to the 1974 invasion. Churchill put it well when he said that if we want to live in the past, and allow the present to be conditioned by the past, we will build no future. Right across Europe, particularly in the new united Europe, there are many communities and groups that, while looking to lands, properties or power that they once had, now accept that they will not return on similar terms to those that caused great distress when their countries were separated or divided.
I shall try to answer some of the points and questions that have been put. Much reference has been made to the number of Turkish troops on the island, but under Annan 5 the Turkish troops at the end of the process will be reduced to the number that they are entitled to be under the treaty of guarantee: 650. That is hardly more than those of our troops who march out to do the changing of the guard every morning in front of Buckingham palace. That is a solemn treaty, which will not be superseded by any settlement. Pacta sunt servanda—treaties must be obeyed. Under all possible Annan proposals, unless we have a complete rewrite of the international treaty of guarantee, those troops will be able to be there. In flying time, Turkey is only four minutes from the island of Cyprus, and the need to meet its perceived security concerns for Turkish Cypriots can be sustained in my view without anything like the present number of troops. However, we should not make that a key issue.
I believe that the Turkish Government and Mr. Erdogan have made that clear to the Turkish general staff, because part of the terms for any Turkish accession to the EU will have to be that the military is 100 per cent. under the control of the civilian

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authorities. As I said, the Government hope that membership talks can begin once a date has been agreed later this year.
Sir Sydney Chapman: In fairness, the Minister makes an extremely good point about the brigade strength that will eventually be left. However, what concerns many people is the time span for reducing the 40,000 or so Turkish soldiers now present to—at a rather distant date—the brigade that he has mentioned.
Mr. MacShane: I have to deal with European Union politics in which five years is a nanosecond and 10 years merely a slip of the tongue. The idea that the island should have just the 650 troops at the point at which Turkey would join the European Union—in some 10, 15 or more years—should not be a breaking point. I accept that Turkey could have offered to have fewer troops on the island as part of the negotiations, but I am not convinced that change on that single issue would have moved the Greek Cypriot leadership to offer to their people a decisive and clear lead in urging a yes vote.
I was asked about the resumption of talks. I deliberately chose not to visit Cyprus as Minister for Europe with responsibility in the Foreign Office for the island during the Annan discussions. Contrary to what my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton said, I believe that Lord Hannay and the distinguished team of facilitators from the Foreign Office have worked tirelessly to achieve a settlement. They are friends of Cyprus, and it is wrong to criticise them. I have also heard from other hon. Members unworthy ad hominem remarks about British diplomats.
I am happy to inform the Chamber that I intend shortly to visit the island, and I will seek to ascertain what the Government can do to move the situation forward. However, the United Nations has said that it will not resume talks until both sides demonstrate the necessary political will, and so far the Government of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community have not approached the UN to seek resumption of the talks. Alas, the last word is still the no of the referendum in the south.
The British high commission in the island is active in conjunction with the British Council in building civil society on both sides of the island, and we seek to bring them together at every opportunity. The Foreign Secretary and I have had positive discussions with Mr. Talat, and we stressed to him that the way forward is not to set up new demands but to work constructively.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for West Suffolk for mentioning the tragedy of the disappeared people dating from the 1970s. Let me assure him that I am ready to place technical help at the disposal of the communities on both sides of the green line, particularly in connection with non-governmental organisations that work on DNA identification. We have seen forensic pathologists at work in Guatemala and the western Balkans—the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Portillo) has considerable knowledge of that—and it is increasingly possible to identify through DNA testing the remains of buried people and who is responsible for their killing.
It is vital that the concept of habeas corpus—that nobody can be detained without the knowledge of their nearest and dearest—also applies to the dead. Their
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relatives should be allowed the dignity of knowing when they were killed, under what terms and who lies in the many graves. If the expertise that our non-governmental organisations have built up in DNA testing can be of service in the island, I will be happy to help with that.
The hon. Member for West Suffolk referred to the fact that the final version of the Annan plan was published only just before the vote, but that version had been tweaked only slightly. To draw a rough comparison, we now have the final version of the EU constitutional treaty, but a linguis juris version will be published in November just before the treaty is signed. Everyone in Cyprus knew where they were and had done so for many years—the version was Annan 5. Hon. Members may feel that just around the corner there may be a perfect Annan 6, 7 or 8 that satisfies both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. I have to disabuse them of that view.
The current situation leaves the Turkish Cypriots disfranchised. Hon. Members asked me about the representation in the European Parliament. I assure them that when a solution is reached, under Annan 5, two of those MEP seats will be reserved for Turkish Cypriots. It is not fair that all five—I believe it will soon be six—seats for Cyprus are occupied exclusively by one community on the island.
I was also asked about entry from the north. It is true that the sovereign Government of the Republic of Cyprus—let us be clear that it is the sovereign Government recognised by the UN and by Britain—have said that they must have some regard for people who cross into the territory under their control from territory that they regard as occupied.
Mr. Chidgey: I accept the point that the Minister makes about the right of a sovereign nation to protect its borders, but I specifically refer to EU nationals—citizens of the EU and the UK, who carry passports to that effect—who should be treated with the normal courtesies given to residents and citizens travelling throughout the EU. Cyprus is an EU country.
Mr. MacShane: I made that point in the House. The Government of Cyprus have made it clear that they will not seek to delay or hinder the passage of EU nationals. If they were to do so, that would not be a problem for Britain alone, but would affect all 24 member states.
On 26 April, in response to the referendum, the General Affairs and External Relations Council stated:
"The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community."
The council recommended that the €259 million already earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus in the event of a settlement should now be used for that purpose. The council invited the Commission to put forward comprehensive proposals to that end, with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island and on improving contact between the two communities and with the EU. The Commission's proposals are expected today and will go to the college—the collective Commission—tomorrow, so we will soon know what

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those recommendations are. The British Government's view is that we must now seek to facilitate economic, trade, travel and tourist links with northern Cyprus.
I was asked whether the Government of Cyprus might interfere with Turkey's ambition to join the EU. We have received solemn assurances from the Cyprus Government—I, personally, have received such assurances from the Foreign Minister, Mr. Iacovou—that Cyprus will not place any obstacle in the way of Turkey being given a start date for negotiations on EU membership. I accept those assurances, and hope that hon. Members will be reassured on that point.
Our approach to Cyprus continues to be governed by two principles: we want the reunification of the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Having lived and worked for some years in Switzerland, I can think of worse fates for Cyprus than to become as rich and successful as the Swiss confederation. With that in mind, we will maintain our policy of not recognising the north of Cyprus as a separate, independent state, but we will maintain good contact with the leaders of its community.
I have no solution to hand. Such a solution will require leadership from both communities. There is no Annan 6—no magic solution from Her Majesty's Government or from Brussels. It is up to all the people of Cyprus to say yes to the unity of their island. The best way forward will be to return to the negotiating table and to vote for Annan 5 or Annan 5.5.

Assyrian Christian Minority (Iraq)
11 am
Mr. Stephen Pound: It is a pleasure and an honour to appear before you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and also a delight, as you are one of the few hon. Members who speak fluent demotic and classical Greek and, for all I know, Akkadian Aramaic, too. If I occasionally lapse into Aramaic, it is not as a result of watching Mel Gibson films, but a tribute to your learning, Sir.
One purpose of he debate is to place on the record some facts about the Assyrian community as it is now and will be in the future, and about its extraordinary past. It is not just as old as civilisation, it has measured civilisation. The Assyrian community may be known from the unfortunate Biblical reference to the Assyrian coming down like a wolf on the fold, but as we are in the year 6754 in the Assyrian calendar, it gives us some idea of its longevity.
Who knows when the Assyrian civilisation began, but 2400 BC was the beginning of the first golden age of Assyria, which lasted until 612 BC, followed by a dark age from 612 BC to 33 AD, a second golden age from 33 AD to 1300, a second dark age from 1300 to 1918, and then the diaspora from 1918, which is why I have raised the matter today.
People in this country know little of Assyrian culture, language and history, although we may recognise the names Sargon II. Sennacherib, Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal, but are we aware that the Assyrian empire at its peak stretched from the Caspian to Cyprus, from Anatolia to Egypt? It was a vast civilisation, not just the cradle of the modern world and modern civilisation, but the exemplar of how a state and an empire could be run, with learning, culture and an indigenous language that survived the vicissitudes to which I have referred.
The early Assyrian civilisation gave us, today, in this country, an enormous number of gifts: its people invented locks, keys and the measurement of time—the sexagesimal system was an Assyrian invention. They were responsible for the first postal system, the first paved roads, the first use of iron, the magnifying glass, the first libraries and, more prosaically, but equally usefully, the first plumbing and flush toilets. They invented the first electric battery, the first guitars, the first aqueducts and the first arches, although they are perhaps best known for two of their most famous inventions, both of which have made a great difference to my life: the wheel and lager. Those are the extraordinary achievements of a group of people from a country that is recognised in the epic of Gilgamesh; it is the site of Noah's flood, and its civilisation is inextricably linked with our own.
For the purposes of this debate I want briefly to mention the defining moment in Assyrian history: 33 AD, when the apostle Thomas, with Thaddeus and Bartholomew, converted the Assyrian nation to Christianity; the Assyrian Church of the East is the first and oldest Christian Church. Many hundreds of years later, when Marco Polo arrived in China, he found Assyrian Christian missionaries, which had followed the silk road. The entire Assyrian nation converted to Christianity in 33 AD, held true to its tenets and beliefs, and suffered grievously for it.

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At the height of the golden age from 33 AD to 1300, Assyrians founded the world's first university, with departments of theology, philosophy and medicine. The school of Nisibis became the model on which early Italian universities were founded.
Rather than go through Assyria's entire history, tempting thought that may be, I shall rush forward to 1918—the age of the diaspora. From 1300 to 1918, the Assyrian Christian community in Iraq, and those in Lebanon, Turkey, Syria and surrounding areas were viciously persecuted. Genocide was a regular feature. The Islamic conquerors of that part of the world imposed a tax, and many families had no alternative but to convert to Islam out of sheer financial necessity, regardless of their own theological beliefs.
The Assyrian diaspora has spread throughout the world. Switzerland was mentioned earlier; it has 10,000 Assyrians. There are 80,000 in Brazil, 100,000 in Lebanon, 50,000 in Iran, 23,000 in Canada, 20,000 in Holland, 2,000 in Mexico and 8,000 in Greece, which was the subject of the previous debate. Particularly dear to my heart and to the business of the House is the 8,000-strong Assyrian Christian community living in this country, many of whom I am privileged to welcome to my own community in west London. It is a long way from Nineveh to north-west London, but the Assyrian culture and the belief in the language have been constant throughout.
Earlier this year, I celebrated the Assyrian new year at the Assyrian centre in South Ealing road with one of the Minister's colleagues, who was extremely well received—he is always welcome, should he wish to return. We were delighted to see evidence of the strength of this community in our part of the world—a community that has thrived and given us a great deal.
One reason why the community is so well integrated in the UK is the long tradition of service for the British, predominantly in what we call modern Iraq. I am delighted that with us in Parliament today is Awiya Khamo, the son of Rab Emma Nimrud Khamo—Rab Emma is a title roughly translatable as flight lieutenant—who served in the Royal Air Force Levies in Habbaniyah. I could happily speak for hours on the history of the Levies' contribution and the Assyrians' participation, but I doubt whether people could happily listen for hours. I will say only that during the last war, 40,000 Assyrians fought in the Levies, and the Assyrian Parachute Regiment fought hand to hand with German forces in Crete, Greece, Albania and Italy.
I am delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Khabra), my constituency neighbour, in whose constituency the Assyrian centre is located, is here to support the debate. We speak as one on this matter. Although the centre is in his constituency, I do not begrudge him that; I welcome it.
Today, we have a desperately unhappy and tragic situation. I am referring specifically to the situation in Iraq, to which the title of this brief debate refers. Article 7 of the constitution of Iraq states that Islam shall be the official religion of the state. One consequence of that and of the large amount of Islamic cultural and social material that is played on radio stations and is in the newspapers has been a marginalisation of the Christian community. In addition—I do not say that this is a result of article 7, because it has lasted for many
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thousands of years—there is a campaign of murder and harassment against Christians in Iraq, which I deeply regret. An exodus on the scale of the 1918 diaspora is taking place. A recent message from a deacon at a church in Iraq states that its people are spending more time filling out the baptismal forms needed to leave the country than on arranging Christian services.
It is a desperately difficult situation, and harassment of Assyrians, principally—but not solely—by Muslims is now so serious that people are talking about whether article 54 of the transitional administrative law could include some sort of protected homeland for the Assyrian Christian minority. I shall mention that again in a moment.
Last month, two Assyrian sisters, Janet and Shatha, who were working for Bechtel, were killed just outside Basra in a drive-by shooting. They were identifiable Assyrian Christians, slaughtered for no discernible reason. Why would two young women be killed on the streets in that way? The family are quite convinced that the murder took place because of their religion. In the new year, several bombs exploded specifically in Christian areas.
The loss of Bashir Toma Elias, who was slaughtered on Christmas eve, just outside Basra, is a matter of grave concern to many people in the Christian community. Bombs exploded outside Christian churches and in the Christian district of Baghdad, and it is felt that some of the militia groups, who have names like "God's Vengeance", have stated that they will not rest until all Christians have left Basra or converted to Islam—that information comes from the well-authenticated and respected Barnabas Fund—and 2,000 Christian families have already fled.
On 7 June, four masked men drove into the Christian Assyrian quarter—Hay Al-Athuryeen—of the Dora district of Baghdad and opened fire on Assyrians on their way to work. Three men and one woman were killed immediately. It was a specifically targeted attack by masked gangsters on the Assyrian Christian community. We have now reached the stage where the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church of the East, in the form of the Diocesan Bishop of Europe, Mar Odisho Oraham, has actually written to the Foreign Office, calling attention to the present plight of the Assyrian Christians. With the charity for which he is known, he recognises that the previous dictatorial regime in Iraq has gone, but he asserts that security and stability have not yet been established.
For many Assyrian Christians, the UK is a country for which their fathers and their families have fought. It has welcomed them and seen them grow into a stable, hard-working, law-abiding community, which has made an enormous contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall and I can point to many examples of the contribution that it has made locally. The concern is that many of the Assyrian Christian community who have followed a well-trodden path to the United Kingdom will be forcibly repatriated to Iraq without the specific pressures and the condition of the Christian community in Iraq being considered.
Mar Odisho Oraham has urged the Foreign Office, not to give a blanket exemption to all Assyrian Christian asylum seekers from Iraq from any repatriation—that would be unreasonable—but to take into account their

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specific circumstances. I ask for that today. When decisions are made, the long history of genocide against the Assyrian people—the continuing and contemporary slaughter of Assyrians for no other reason than their Christianity—should be taken into consideration. I have spoken this morning to one of the leading members of the community, Andy Darmoo, whose father served for 31 years in the RAF. Speaking for the Assyrian community in the UK, he lists a long, bloody and heartbreaking catalogue of murders, attacks, assaults, land confiscation and denial of human rights currently taking place.
Andy Darmoo said to me this morning that, in addition to the historical linkage between the Assyrian Christian community and the United Kingdom, there has been a long-lasting relationship of mutual respect and support. He referred to the participation of the British forces after the great war and how virtually everyone in the Assyrian centre has some relationship with the British armed forces. He also referred to the positive contribution that they have made to this country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall can speak for himself, but I hope that he will allow me to say that he and I come from a part of north-west London that has many communities. Many different streams of people come together to make up what we relish and cherish as our multiracial and multicultural community. One cannot say that one community is better, stronger or weaker than another, but of all the dozens, if not scores, of communities among whom I live and work, few have made as great a contribution in such a positive, community-conscious and law-abiding way as the Assyrian Christian community. The fact that half the referees in the Middlesex FA are Assyrians is neither here nor there—I can forgive them for that. That community makes an enormous contribution.
I asked for this debate because I am concerned about the fear in the Iraqi Christian community of the consequences of article 7 of the constitution for the temporary administration in Iraq and of the possibility of forced repatriation, and about the effect that that is having on that community, which, to coin a phrase, has stood shoulder to shoulder with us for many centuries. While we cannot repay such loyalty, we can acknowledge and respect it.
I call on my hon. Friend the Minister, who is well known and widely respected in the Assyrian community, simply to accept the realities of life in Iraq when any decision is made. I am sure that he will do so. If I apologise for placing this matter on the record and for taking parliamentary time to do it, I do so in recognition of the fact that it is important that the voice of our Assyrian brothers and sisters is heard in this place, that some of their history is placed on the record and, more importantly, that their present and future are made safer and more secure by the actions of this House.
11.18 am
The Minister for Trade and Investment (Mr. Mike O'Brien): I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Pound) for raising this subject for debate today. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Khabra) for coming along to listen to the debate.
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I begin by assuring my hon. Friends that the Government intend to take into account the circumstances of the Assyrian Christians in Iraq when we make asylum decisions. I shall pass on their concerns to the Home Office and the Foreign Office.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, North is right to say that the roots of the Assyrian Christians in the region perhaps go deeper than those of any other community in the middle east. They are rightly proud of their history and culture. However, like all the people of Iraq, the latest chapter of their history has been one of misery. They have endured decades of oppression under Saddam's regime. Many were forced into exile, as were many others during the great Assyrian diaspora of decades before. I know that many Assyrians live in my hon. Friend's constituency and that he has worked hard during his years as a Member of this House to highlight their cause, and it is right that he should do so.
There are also thousands of internally displaced Assyrians still living in Iraq, driven from their homes during Saddam's "Arabisation" scheme. The forced movement of Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians is one of the worst legacies of Saddam's regime. An Iraqi Property Claims Commission has been set up to deal with the way in which people were forced out of their homes and to examine whether the disputes over property can be resolved in a legal and controlled fashion. Offices arc now open throughout Iraq, with particular emphasis on the Kirkuk district, which saw the worst cases of forced displacement.
The British Government have worked tirelessly over the past year to secure basic human rights for all of Iraq's minorities—rights that Saddam denied. Iraq now has human rights legislation encapsulated in chapter 2 of the transitional administrative law, agreed by the Iraqi governing council in March. This legislation provides a legal framework for Iraq during the transitional period. It states that all Iraqis are equal before the law and that discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, religion or gender is illegal. It states that torture in all its forms is prohibited in all circumstances and it guarantees the right of all Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, including Syriac, the language of the Assyrian people.
It is the first time in Iraq's history that such an impressive package of human rights legislation has been passed, and Iraq's different communities have universally welcomed it. I know that the Assyrian community in particular were pleased with article 53 of the law, which guarantees their administrative, cultural and political rights, although of course they would have liked more.
The British Government will continue to keep in touch with the full spectrum of different ethnic, religious and tribal groups that make up Iraq's rich tapestry. Foreign Office officials regularly meet representatives from Iraq's Assyrian community, both in London and in Iraq. We will actively continue with such engagement. We are very aware of the Assyrians' unique place in Iraq's history. Appropriately, they have a representative in the new Iraqi Government, Ms Pascale Isho Warda, who is Minister for Displacement and Migration.
All indications from the new Iraqi Government are that they will continue to further minority rights. That is not surprising—after so many years of suffering the

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Iraqi people crave a Government who will further their collective and individual rights. Many individuals in the interim Government have personal and direct experience of human rights violations under the former regime.
Of course, the drafting of human rights legislation in Iraq is only part of the battle. Respect for human rights must be seen in action, too. We have a moral duty to support the Iraqis in the implementation of the laws that they have passed. As my hon. Friend said, there have been reports of attacks against the Christian community in Iraq, including kidnappings, assassinations and intimidation of practising Christians. It is not just Christians who are affected. Shias in Sunni areas, Sunnis in Shia areas, Kurds and Arabs—men and women—have all been affected by terrorist attacks. A small minority who aspire to provoke and exploit divisions between religions and ethnic communities carry out the attacks.
The British troops currently serving in Iraq are working with the Iraqi security forces to prevent those attacks and create stability in the country. It is only by building up the Iraqi security forces and ensuring that they enforce the human rights laws that their Government have decreed that we can create the conditions in which the most basic human rights—security, stability and democracy—can be implemented.
The handover of authority on 28 June was a milestone that has profound importance for the Iraqi people. It has been welcomed throughout Iraq, regionally, and worldwide. With the support of the United Nations, Iraqis are preparing for the next steps in the political transition—elections to a Transitional National Assembly and Transitional Government by the end of January, followed by the drafting of a permanent constitution, a referendum and then elections on the basis of the new constitution.
We hope that the elections will give Iraq's minority groups an opportunity to be represented at all levels of government in Iraq. Furthermore, it is the elected representatives to the Transitional National Assembly who will draft the permanent constitution in 2005, so all Iraqis, including the Assyrians, will be able to identify with the values and institutions enshrined in that new constitution.
There is a long way still to go. There are obviously difficulties in dealing with terrorism, reducing the level of violence, and ensuring proper respect for human rights. It is also clear that the hatred that is building up among some in Iraq is targeted not only at coalition forces but at various minority groups, including the Assyrians. We must ensure that the security forces are strong enough to deal with the problems, and that respect for human rights is embedded in a new Iraqi
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constitution so that the duly elected Government respect those rights. To some extent the coalition can help, but it is up to the Iraqi people how they vote in elections.
Mr. Piara S. Khabra: Under a constitution, or whatever political system is set up in a country, there is a guarantee of civil liberties and rights to the minorities. However, despite the fact that the law may not allow it, religious fundamentalists in many countries behave as they want to, as has been experienced by Christians in Pakistan. How can the difficult situation in Iraq be resolved if the authorities are unable to control the fanatics, who like to intimidate and persecute minorities in a country that is predominantly made up of one religion?
Mr. O'Brien: My hon. Friend is right: we have seen the growth of fanaticism in a number of countries in and beyond the middle east. There have been attacks based on religious hatred in Pakistan, India and many other countries. The Governments of those countries must deal with that level of fanaticism, the teaching of hatred and the fact that some people seem to think that they have a God-given right to murder others because of their different beliefs.
Iraq presents us with particular problems because of the aftermath of the war and the creation of the new Government. There has been a concerted attack not only by outside extremists—some no doubt influenced by al-Qaeda—but by those involved with Saddam Hussein in the past. Others, for various tribal and domestic reasons, have also become involved in terrorist action and violence. The religious hatreds that my hon. Friend identified have fed into that situation.
Over the coming months, we shall seek to embed the idea of respect for human and individual rights into the operation of the Iraqi Government. I repeat that it will be up to the Iraqis what sort of Government they create. We can help and encourage them, and show that we believe that respect for minority religions is enormously important. We will continue to lobby the Iraqi Government to implement human rights legislation and we will continue to provide troops for the multinational force in line with Prime Minister Allawi's request. We will also continue to lobby the new sovereign Iraqi Government after the implementation of the constitution to ensure that human rights are firmly anchored in their permanent way of dealing with people. We want to see a free, democratic, stable Iraq, at peace with herself and her neighbours, and with respect for all religious minorities, including the Assyrians.
11.30 am
Sitting suspended until Two o'clock.

European Constitution
2 pm
Mr. William Cash: I want to dispose of one myth about the European constitution straight away—that is, its length. I have seen repeated references to the length of the treaty, but, having got the full text, to my considerable astonishment I discovered that, far from being 331 pages, which is in itself excessive, the figure, including protocols, is 676 pages. I have the documents here—I got them from the Library this morning—and the two together come to that extraordinary total. That is an indication of its scale.
The Minister for Europe (Mr. Denis MacShane): This is a friendly debate and I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I have the official Foreign Office draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe here. It is 248 pages. Can we swap, because we must decide on the number of pages? This is the official Government version; perhaps he is referring to some other treaty.
Mr. Cash: No. I can only refer the Minister to the documents that were given to me this morning by the Library. One is dated 25 June 2004 and the other, which is described as an addendum, contains the other provisions. It may be that the Library is mistaken, in which case we will be required to produce further and better particulars.
I do not have a copy of the document that the Minister referred to, and I would be glad to have one, but there are so many such documents and, in any case, we are told repeatedly that the whole thing is subject to the expression "toilletáge", so we will not have a final text until much later in the year.
The important point is that this is one of the most important documents to have been presented to the people of Europe and, in the European elections only the other day, we discovered exactly how little genuine interest there is in certain countries. That was described as apathy, but I prefer the word "rejection". When people are given an opportunity to take part in a debate on the scale of the one that took place during the European elections, I would expect a much larger turnout if people are properly informed. The problem is that the information that has been made available has simply not excited people's attention.
To start with, I will identify exactly what the provisions before us represent in terms of the text that we had beforehand. I think that that is a convenient starting point. It is a myth that the European constitution has been put to sleep until after the next general election. The reality is that it is already being implemented. That stage was reached even before the Prime Minister signed the final agreement on 18 June.
On 14 June 2004, the European Defence Agency, which is referred to in article III-212 of the constitution, was established. Indeed, preparations for the European Union diplomatic corps—the so-called external action service—should be taking place even as I speak under a declaration annexed to the relevant article of the treaty establishing the constitution and requiring the member states to get going as soon as the text is signed.
Furthermore, despite the assurances of the Prime Minister about an opt-out on asylum and immigration policy, several building blocks for the common
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European asylum system have been put in place, including the Dublin II regulation on responsibility for asylum claims. Furthermore, there is a directive on reception conditions for asylum seekers and a directive on temporary protection in the event of a large influx.
Directives on the definition of a refugee and on common asylum procedures are already well advanced. Indeed, the longer the delay in holding a referendum, the more of the 25 per cent. of the treaty establishing a constitution that the Prime Minister admits is not contained in previous treaties will have been implemented. That will make it even easier for the Government to press their false claim that a no vote is really a vote to leave the European Union—another underhand tactic from an underhand Government.
An honest Government would hold a referendum immediately. The British people could then reject this predatory, jargon-ridden, dirigiste constitution before it took hold. The constitution is a victory not for the Prime Minister or for the new Europe, as he suggests, but for the corporatist, Franco-German placemen who drafted it. It is the wrong prescription for an ailing Europe and it will not serve its interests. It should be torn up and thrown away.
The leader in The Economist of 26 June, "The right verdict", states:
"That lack of subsidiarity, of control, above all of any real sense of constitutional stability are the fundamental flaws of this treaty. The European Union does need a smoother, more efficient decision-making process, both for its own sake and so that it can enlarge itself even more in future … But if voters are to feel comfortable both with that efficiency and that enlargement, they need a constitution"—
I question whether we need a constitution in any event, but that is the view of The Economist, and this is what it prefers—
"that stabilises and controls the process properly."
It goes on:
"It needs to be demanded by voters. That is why the best result in all the ten referendums would be a resounding no vote."
That is the view of a journal that, going back only a few years, was positively advocating the accumulation of treaties, but which has come to the conclusion that the constitution is a disaster area.
The Prime Minister, in accordance with his habit, has defended this monstrosity, which I think he has never believed in, with posturing and windy generalities. What he likes to call myths are most often real dangers that have been averted, and the aversion often owes more to lobbying than to the efforts of his Government. I am not talking about straight bananas, but things such as oil supplies. It should be noted that energy remains a new competence of the Union under the agreed text of the constitution, despite the best efforts of those in the oil business.
The real myths are the claims the Prime Minister makes about the constitution, which he dare not call a constitution because he knows that the British people are opposed to the imposition of a constitution in principle. He says that the constitution makes clear where the EU can and cannot act. What it does in fact is divide up the Union's expanded powers into exclusive, shared and complementary competences. A shared competence is one where the member states retain their powers in so far as the Union has not exercised, or ceases

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exercising, legislative power. This is, therefore, not a matter of equal sharing. There is a list of exclusive Union competences, but no list of competences expressly reserved to member states.
That issue was dealt with by the House of Lords European Union Committee when considering the role of the European Court of Justice, which led to a debate in the House of Lords on 21 May. I intend to refer briefly to a number of matters that arose in that debate because they go to the very heart of the fundamental question facing the people of this country, which is, who in fact is to call the final shots? Is it to be the voters in the general election or the European Court of Justice, adjudicating in areas that one would have assumed in a democracy to be the province and the right of the voters of this country? It is precisely because the European Court of Justice is given such overarching powers over matters of government that I oppose the constitution as a violation of our democracy.
The change in the nature of competences creates myriad grey areas that will be subject to the rulings of the European Court of Justice, which itself is not an impartial tribunal, but an integrating institution of the European Union. We already know about the political influences within the European Court. Almost as soon as the texts had been agreed, one of its most senior judges made it abundantly clear that the treaty would expand their powers at the expense—although he did not say this—of the voters of this country and of the whole of Europe.
One of the fundamental objections that we all should legitimately have to the constitution is the structure that it creates throughout Europe. Far from improving stability, it will generate tension but—with the low growth and high unemployment that are characteristic of the European, or certainly the French and German, landscape—not prosperity of the sort that has been claimed for the new proposals.
This morning, I heard on the "Today" programme an interesting altercation between Derek Simpson of the TUC and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. Mr. Simpson complained about unfairness in the European Union because of the state aids that are prevalent in France and Germany, and about the fact that we are now getting a diet of temporary workers and low-quality manufacturing. As far as he—and I take it, therefore, the TUC itself—is concerned, the TUC is inverting the attitudes that prevailed under John Monks, his predecessor, because it recognises that the way in which the European Union is moving is not in the interests of the social Europe to which the Minister referred in a speech a few days ago.
This Europe is not working; it is not successful. As I said a few days ago in an exchange with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the European Scrutiny Committee, there are features of the British economy outside the present arrangements that have benefited this country. There is no doubt about that. However, the manner in which the economy has been constructed is despite, not because, of the arrangements that the Government have entered into.
The Government's commitments in principle to the single currency and the European constitution are not just theoretical abstractions; they involve essentially practical matters. When one finds that the Labour
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heartlands and the TUC turning against the way this European Union is functioning, one can understand why, when compared with the previous European parliamentary elections, the Labour party lost a 19 per cent. share of its vote in the most recent elections.
When the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry replied to the interviewer on the programme this morning, she described herself as being passionate for manufacturing and said that 3 million to 4 million manufacturing jobs had been created under this Government. Unfortunately, however, the problems relating to the new constitution that are now becoming clear will further diminish the effectiveness of that Government policy, which exists despite, not because of, their policy on the European issue.
Together with other colleagues on the European Scrutiny Committee, I cross-examined the Secretary of State on competition policy on 16 June. It is important to bear it in mind that competition policy is absolutely essential to the potential effectiveness of enterprise and productivity in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe. It may come as a surprise that the Government's original intention, as expressed by the Leader of the House when he was playing a role in the prospective treaty and by others, was to insist that competition activity would be at most a shared, but not an exclusive, competence.
The exchange that took place in the European Scrutiny Committee included this astonishing remark on competition policy by the Secretary of State:
"As far as the IGC is concerned, it did come up though I could not tell you at exactly what date, I am afraid. This, as I have said earlier, was not one of our first order issues. It was one of my Department's many concerns about the original proposals and earlier drafts of the Convention but it was not a first order priority and, certainly once into detailed ministerial meetings, there simply was not time to worry about second order priorities".
That demonstrates the Government's complete lack of comprehension and perspective on something so fundamental as how we as a nation are to be absorbed into the European Union and the inevitable effect on our jobs, our competitiveness, our productivity and our growth if we are locked into an arrangement in the European Union by which it has so much control over how questions of competition are to be defined.
As I and other Committee members from both sides said to the Secretary of State, we were simply not convinced by her arguments on why we ended up with competition policy being in effect an exclusive competence. I also asked her how she would deal with the avowed policy of France and Germany, which has recently been announced, to establish industrial champions. Quite clearly, that will be a highly protective measure, taking us back to the 1970s, which will be counter-productive and generate more problems internationally than one would possibly have imagined only a few years ago when all that talk was abandoned.
Having just been to Birmingham, Hodge Hill, where the by-election is to be held, I note that GEC Alsthom at Washwood Heath in that constituency has been closed. There was a discussion on the "Today" programme this morning about the problem of making trains. The GEC Alsthom experience, which I witnessed when I was the Member of Parliament for Stafford, was part and parcel of the failure to control the industrial champions policies that have had such disastrous effects on British

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manufacturing and employment. The French and Germans, for example, will be pursuing their industrial champions policy in the face of international competition from the world as a whole, as I told the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. There is a fundamental flaw in that aspect alone of the direction in which the European Union is going. The difficulty facing us is also tied up with the extent to which the treaty provides for economic co-ordination.
I want to return to the question of the European Court of Justice. Lord Scott of Foscote, who is a Law Lord and chairs the European Union Committee, had some important things to say during the debate, and as far as I can see, the Government are not succeeding in or even attempting to repudiate the points that he made. He said:
"There is very little said in the proposed treaty about the role of the"
European Court of Justice. He said that in their response to the Committee's report, the Government said:
"'The court's jurisdiction and role will remain essentially the same as under the European Community Treaty although the scope of the Constitutional Treaty itself will, of course, be different'."
I do not know what you make of that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but it suggests that they are trying to have it both ways. Lord Scott then said:
"This statement … gives inadequate recognition to the increase in importance of the role of the ECJ".
The Government are extremely anxious to avoid the issue of the role of the European Court because they know that the ultimate question will be the exchange of voters' rights for decisions in relation to matters of fundamental importance in Government and governance of the United Kingdom and standing here in Westminster Hall in the British Parliament observing the history of this place in the fight for democracy and having to take part in a debate on a treaty that fatally undermines the democratic rights of the people who return us to Parliament and have done for generations, if not centuries.
The noble Lord then referred to what he described as
"perhaps the most important issue of all"—
the jurisdiction of the Court. He pointed out that the European Court
"does not at present have jurisdiction in respect of second or third pillar matters. The second pillar is common foreign and security matters; the third pillar is police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. Under the new constitution"—
as I pointed out in previous debates—
"the three pillars will be collapsed. There will simply be European Union law which, according to Article 10/"—
the number has changed to 10.5—
of the proposed constitution, will have primacy over domestic, national law."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 May 2004; Vol. 661, c. 1001-02.]
The issue of primacy is fundamental and in the Prime Minister's statement to the House on his return from the European Council, he attempted to gloss over it. Eurorealists such as myself allege that primacy has substantially and fundamentally changed the nature of
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the relationship between the European Union and the member states. In a nutshell, his response is that that is nonsense. However, he cannot repudiate the point that I put to him during Prime Minister's questions a few weeks ago that the constitution revokes all existing treaties and the laws that go with them.
The bottom line is that there is a fundamental change. The division of competencies, to which Lord Scott of Foscote referred in his report on the treaty, is not a mere drafting exercise. In recognition of that, and because the Government could not continue to hold the ring on the argument, the Prime Minister agreed to a referendum. He did not do so lightly and he has not given a satisfactory explanation of his change of mind. I am convinced that as we got deeper into the question, the position of the Government and of the Minister replying to this debate became both transparently absurd and increasingly impossible to maintain.
Mr. Richard Spring: May I return to the question of the primacy of EU law? The Government's approach is absurd given that the Leader of the House sought to amend exactly that point during the Convention on the Future of Europe. While the Government are saying one thing now, in practice they unsuccessfully tried to reverse the constitutional enshrining of the primacy of EU law.
Mr. Cash: Absolutely. That was precisely why the Prime Minister originally resisted the idea of a constitution and said that it was not desirable or necessary. The Government know exactly the impact it will have and how invasive it will be on the democratic rights of the electorate.
I held a debate in this very Hall a few weeks ago about my Sovereignty of Parliament (European Communities) Bill, in which I have proposed a solution to the problem of primacy. There is ongoing dispute here and in other countries about whether the European Court or the highest domestic court in the land has the last word. However, the passage of a Bill that unambiguously states that enactments that include the words,
"notwithstanding the provisions of the European Communities Act 1972",
are inconsistent with that Act would impose an obligation on our judges to give effect to that. It would strike at the heart of the manner in which the European Court asserts its jurisdiction over our constitution and, as expressed in the relevant articles of the European constitution, takes primacy over our constitution and laws.
This is in fact a new situation, not a repetition of the existing one. Where the constitution refers to the conferral of powers through the member states, that applies only to the act of putting together the proposals for the constitution. Once the constitution has gone through, the European Court will exercise its jurisdiction over our constitutional arrangements unless we have a provision that reaffirms the sovereignty of this Parliament. It is simply not good enough for hon. Members and the Government to assert that it is nonsense that the constitution has an adverse impact on the manner in which we exercise our sovereignty in this place. There will be a substantial difference. In the evidence given to the House of Lords European Union

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Committee, a number of distinguished legal experts made it clear that that would be the case. One went so far as to say that he would prefer the word "supremacy" to be used rather than the word "primacy", for obvious reasons.
The Government will continue to protest their case, but it is a sham. If anyone considers the history of the European Union in the past decades, they will see clearly that the endless list of assertions that have been made, for example in the 1970 White Paper that we would not lose the veto, have all proved completely unsubstantiated. The reason for that is that those who are driving forward the process and have established the idea of a European constitution by agreement between Governments—but not people—have done so with one objective: the political union of Europe.
For all the arguments, dancing on the head of a pin and analysis of individual provisions the totality of the exercise is as clear as daylight. It is intended to create one state and a political union, and the constitution is the culmination of that work. Considering the continued ingenuity of those pursuing that objective, they will undoubtedly find other ways of bringing more effectively into account matters such as national taxation. After all, whether we are dealing with taxation, defence or foreign policy, it is clear from the pattern of established movement towards integration that that is what is intended and that is what will happen.
It is simply a massive deception on the people of Europe and this country to suppose that that is not in the making. In fact, I would go further to say that all the essential ingredients already exist. Although the European Court of Justice does not get an enormous amount of publicity—which is highly regrettable— it already adjudicates on matters of national taxation in relation to corporate tax. The boundaries are being pushed back all the time, and the same applies to defence and foreign policy. Even if the barriers—the so-called red lines laid down by the Prime Minister—were construed as having had a partial success, they will not withstand the overriding tidal wave of determination to take over other functions in the short term.
In a House of Lords debate, Lord Scott listed the areas that were outside ECJ jurisdiction, including
"common foreign and security policy matters … police and law enforcement matters, and matters relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of national security — Outside these specifically excluded areas, the ECJ will have jurisdiction."
However, he pointed out:
"Even in the areas from which ECJ jurisdiction is excluded, European law will have primacy — It is an oddity that European law will have primacy over member states' domestic law, even in the areas where the ECJ does not have jurisdiction."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 May 2004; Vol. 661, c. 1002.]
That point was not answered in the House of Lords, so I hope that the Minister will answer it now. It is not only an oddity, as Lord Scott said; it is an absurdity. However, the key point is that it should not be within the competence of the European Union in the first place.
Where the treaty refers to the fact that the
"limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral",
it is implied that, somehow or other, that prevents the European Union from acquiring the degree of control that I assert it attains. Once the constitution has been
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ratified, conferral will give way to the consequences and the European Court will ultimately have the last word through its control and ultimate say over competences.
Lord Scott went on to ask which courts would have the final word on such issues as and when they arise. Without going into the detail of that, the bottom line is that he says that the European Court must have the final say, and Lord Slynn, who spoke earlier in the same debate, said that that was absolutely fundamental to the workings of the European Union. Above all else, the bottom line is the insistence that we get over and again that the European Court must have the last say. I argue strongly that that is an undemocratic way to run the European Union and is in itself a reason why it is essential that the constitution be rejected.
Indeed, as the Prime Minister said in his statement on 21 June,
"of course, European law only takes precedence where member states have agreed that Europe should have a competence."—[Official Report, 21 June 2004; Vol. 422, c. 1080.]
However, it is the European Court and not our courts that will decide which competences we have given to Europe as Lord Scott noted. At present, the doctrine of primacy remains an invention of the European Court of Justice and member states can set their own limits on it. However, once it becomes the founding principle of a European constitution, there can be no argument, only obedience. The Prime Minister says that the new treaty provides for qualified majority voting "where we need it". He did not say that we needed more qualified majority voting before. That is because we do not need more of it, and certainly not in the 40 extra areas that the European constitution provides for.
The Prime Minister says that the UK will retain a veto over tax, but as I pointed out, the European Court has been harmonising corporation tax for years, and there is nothing in this constitution that would prevent it from continuing to do so. He has spoken of safeguarding the areas of social security and criminal law procedures, but the so-called emergency brake on new European legislation in all those areas can be overridden by the European Council. He talked about national Parliaments being given the power to send legislation back to Brussels, but all they can do under the protocol is send a reasoned opinion on whether the draft legislation complies with the principle of subsidiarity, which, as we all know, has never worked. When it was first announced back in 1990, I described it as a con trick. It has never worked, and there is no intention that it should.
The Prime Minster seeks to present the so-called explanations added to the charter of fundamental rights as a victory that will neuter the charter, but the Minister's predecessor, the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz), originally told us that the charter would have no more legal force than the Beano, and now it is an integral part of the constitution. Many European lawyers doubt that the much more vaunted so-called explanations will have the effect that the Prime Minister claims for them. Indeed, the president of the European Court of Justice is not willing to say that the charter's provisions will not apply directly to the United Kingdom.

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The reality is that the Prime Minister's claims about the charter, such as those relating to labour laws, do not look at the threats in the round. A declaration annexed to the treaty drops a hint, saying:
"The guarantees and practices existing in each Member State as regards the responsibility of the social partners"—
the representatives of workers and management respectively—
"will not be affected. This declaration is without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution conferring competence of the Union, including in social matters."
In other words, the constitution is purely rhetorical, and social policy provisions may ignore it.
The Prime Minister's statement was suspiciously silent on the subject of economic co-ordination. I touched on that in my exchanges with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it came up on the "Today" programme this morning. Fundamentally, the question whether we shall continue to benefit from being outside the eurozone will be vitiated by the provisions relating to economic co-ordination. The third paragraph of article I-11 states:
"The Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within arrangements as determined by Part III, which the Union shall have competence to provide."
The first paragraph of article I-14 now states, in respect of economic policy co-ordination, that
"the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for these policies."
Furthermore, a declaration on the discredited stability and growth pact states:
"The Member States will take all necessary measures to raise the growth potential of their economies."
Honestly, what a joke. It goes on:
"Improved economic policy coordination could support this objective."
Weasel words, if ever there were.
The member states should never have entered in to the stability and growth pact in the first place. I was deeply opposed to it at the time, and made it quite clear, in a response that I gave to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke). He wrote to all Members of Parliament explaining the virtues of the stability and growth pact, and I replied in a letter, explaining why I did not think that it would work. People can judge for themselves.
Since the December intergovernmental conference, there has been a drift back towards greater economic and employment policy co-ordination at EU level, which represents a major reverse for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury and is, prospectively, a threat to Britain's economic future. Furthermore, although the constitution may not force Britain to join the euro, it certainly turns the screw.
Under article III-91, non-euro member states, such as the UK, are to lose their voting rights in a number of areas, including recommendations made on the basis of "multilateral surveillance", and
"measures relating to excessive deficits".
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That is a fundamental question. Voting rights are also to be lost in respect of
"decisions establishing common positions on issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union within international financial institutions and conferences"
That clearly identifies problems that will arise as a result of the EU being given legal personality—another offensive part of the constitution. There will also be
"measures to ensure unified representation within the international financial institutions and conferences".
That is another reflection of the creation of a legal personality.
Eurozone countries will thus be acting as more of an exclusive bloc, even as the economic aspects of economic and monetary union are tightened for all member states, including the UK. Indeed, the greatest myth of all—the people of this country have been fed a diet of myth by the Prime Minister—is that we face disaster unless they vote as the Prime Minister tells them to. I have just come back from the by-election campaign in Hodge Hill, and can assure hon. Members that, as we went round, it became quite apparent that the issue of the European constitution—not just Europe as a whole, but the constitution in particular—was causing a great deal of anxiety to people in that constituency. If this constitution fails, the result will not be a new European war, nor millions of British job losses, nor even the expulsion of Britain from the European Union. Rather, the whole matter would be referred back to the European Council.
The reality is that negotiations would then have to start afresh, not on the basis of making limited amendments to a huge, detailed text drafted in advance, but on the basis of a blue-skies reappraisal, which is what is needed. That is no myth but a genuine prospect, to be welcomed by all those who have the true interests of the British at heart.
That is the key point. We are tampering with the real emotions of the British people, and the constitution is a disgrace for that reason alone. No proper explanation has been given and no proper information is being provided. We see from statements made by the Government in the past few days, for example from Baroness Symons in the House of Lords yesterday, that there is a need for more information to be made available. The bottom line, however, is that the Government will not do that on a fair and reasonable basis.
What are we to do in such a situation? In a nutshell, we will have to repudiate the constitution, and we will have the opportunity to do so in the coming referendum. The European elections also demonstrated a reality, not only in the United Kingdom but across Europe as a whole, in line with the persistent arguments and campaigns that have been going on for the past 30-odd years. The reality is that the arguments have now settled into the minds of the voters not only in this country but across Europe.
A further problem, which we will have to deal with, is that the Conservative party will have to engage in a policy of fundamental renegotiation combined with rejection of the European constitution. If we do that, we will gain the support of the people of this country not only in the referendum but in the forthcoming general election. It would be a monumental mistake for anyone

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to believe that the vote of the United Kingdom Independence party in general, and in specific marginal seats in particular, will evaporate. In certain parts of the country, the Conservative party was overtaken by UKIP in the European elections, and in the East Midlands region, the difference between the Conservative share of the vote and an outright win for UKIP was a mere 4,000 votes.
We must recognise the need for fundamental change, and recognise, on the principle of mutual assured destruction, that the UKIP vote will not achieve its objectives on its own terms precisely because it cannot do so without the Conservative party being in power, while equally, the Conservative party will not be able to get the number of votes needed to achieve power unless it reclaims votes from UKIP. We are locked into a situation from which we shall have to move forward with a more constructive, more convincing argument. Fundamental renegotiation, combined with rejection of the European constitution in principle, is the right way forward.
2.49 pm
Mr. Richard Shepherd: I think it was Cicero who said:
"Those who know nothing of the time before they were born will remain forever a child".
The history of the constitutional development of the European Union has depended on that. The present Government have always employed the technique of asserting that what they are doing is merely an accepted conclusion to a long process, but many of us who in 1975 voted to remain members of what was then considered a common market have watched as that, under successive Governments, has developed into something very different. That is important, and it is similarly important that the Government have at last—contrary to their initial instincts and the Minister's own views—conceded that a referendum is appropriate.
The circumstances in which that decision was made are curious. Just three weeks before the Prime Minister accepted that there should be a referendum, the Whips drummed 237 Members into the Lobby to vote down that very concept. Most of us have watched over 30 years the development of something different from the Common Market. We have had the Single European Act and the treaties of Maastricht, Nice and Amsterdam. Now there is the prospect of the new constitutional treaty, which is very important and contrary to what most of us initially understood.
The results of the recent election demonstrated something. Out there, without understanding the subtle nuances that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) has been enunciating, the people know that this is a constitutional settlement. They have seen British Governments discharge obligations that they never knew had been entered into. They have watched a European Court of Justice, prior to our entry to the Common Market, take upon itself a primacy in law that no country had agreed to within the treaty. That was one of the essential arguments of my hon. Friend concerning the primacy of law in the Community, and it is now to be institutionalised in the constitution.
This is called a constitutional treaty because it is a lock on our own constitutional arrangements. I say "constitutional" because my alarm over the years
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particularly concentrated on the Maastricht treaty, which first revealed to me the wider vision. Where was this European demos? Where was this European polity? The old language had secured for this country a constitutional harmony and peace beyond that of any other western European country, yet we are so casual about it.
Who is the sovereign? That is the oldest question in politics. As Churchill said, in our modern constitution, the people are sovereign. The treaty is designed to remove the sovereignty from the people of this polity—from the demos of this polity—and transfer it absolutely and until the end of time to institutions beyond their reach. That is what it is about, and that is the choice that we shall be arguing about.
I believe that British public opinion is more settled about the constitution. The people profoundly reject it. They no longer trust the politicians of my party or those in government when they assert their understanding of the articles and details of the constitution. They are right to distrust it. Even with the best intentions in the world, I have listened to Ministers of both parties pronounce their understanding of what a policy, position or competence of the UK Government is, only to see it overturned.
Who is the sovereign? In this constitution, the sovereign will be the European Court of Justice. That is alien to our concept of government and our concept of accountability. That the whole of this country can profoundly object to a measure or a policy—profoundly, destabilisingly object to it—means nothing within the terms of the treaty. I give a cheer because the great divide that arises over the constitution will show that this country has not lost a sense of itself, its constitutional heritage or what democratic and accountable government means.
2.55 pm
Sir Menzies Campbell: I disagree with almost everything said by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash), but I have a grudging admiration for him because he brings to these occasions an admirable political, if not intellectual, consistency.
I claim a certain moral rectitude in these matters because my party was the only one to face the electorate at the previous general election with a proposal for a European constitution as one of its manifesto commitments. I am pleased that a document has emerged. Had I been given the opportunity, however, I would have written parts of it differently. Parts of the proposals are not as ideally expressed or as ideally founded on principles that I regard as important as they might be, and the document is not necessarily as accessible yet as it might be, but it is in an understandable form. It sets forth the competences of the European Union and provides the framework for administering a Union that has grown from the six countries that first formed the European Coal and Steel Community to the 25 that now constitute the EU's membership.
The primacy of European law is part of our constitution by virtue not of anything done in Europe, but of the Act of Accession, which led us to join the EU in 1973. Therefore, it has been a constitutional provision to which our courts have had to defer and which has

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allowed access to the European Court of Justice for people in this country who are dissatisfied with the application of EU law by our domestic courts. The primacy of European law is, in my judgment, part of our constitutional arrangements and therefore does not deserve the description of novelty advanced with such enthusiasm by the hon. Member for Stone.
One fact to which the hon. Gentleman failed to refer, but which I thought would have given him limited comfort, is that whereas the provisions with regard to the withdrawal of any country from the Coal and Steel Community, or the European Economic Community as it became, were to some extent ambiguous, the new document provides for an express right of withdrawal, which some argue never previously existed. Therefore if we reach a point at which a constitutional absurdity, in the hon. Gentleman's terms, arises, we have an obvious remedy and one which, exercised by a country as significant in the EU as the United Kingdom, would undoubtedly have not only legal but enormous political significance.
Mr. Cash: I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman accepts that the withdrawal provisions are hedged with conditions that could make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to operate effectively. Does the Liberal Democrat party in principle rule out there being any circumstances in which it would invite the UK Parliament to legislate unambiguously contrary to any European treaties, laws or European Court rulings?
Sir Menzies Campbell: If one legislated in that form, as the hon. Gentleman suggests and as I think the leader of his party has suggested in respect of the common fisheries policy, it would be the first time in the constitutional history of the UK that the UK Parliament had passed, or even sought to pass, legislation contrary to its international treaty obligations. That would be a major constitutional step and an extraordinary precedent, and one should be extremely reluctant to embark on those unless one is clear in one's own mind as to what the consequences of such a remarkable event would be.
If one enters into treaties—such as the Maastricht treaty, which the House passed when the hon. Gentleman's party was in government, or the Single European Act, which the House also passed when his party was in government, or the Amsterdam treaty, which was passed when this Government took office, or Nice, which was later still—one undertakes certain obligations. So far as I know, never in the history of the United Kingdom have we passed domestic legislation that is inconsistent with treaty obligations.
On the matter of a referendum, during the Maastricht treaty proceedings I voted for a referendum proposed in a new clause that was tabled by a Labour Member who has now returned to his homeland of New Zealand.
Mr. Cash: Bryan Gould.
Sir Menzies Campbell: Yes, Mr. Bryan Gould. As I remember, on that occasion we were not
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overwhelmingly supported in the Lobby by those Conservatives who now argue for a referendum with such vehemence.
However, those people are right to argue for a referendum because the document, if approved, would change the nature of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Brussels. In my judgment—as I have said on the Floor of the House on many occasions—in those circumstances the endorsement of the people of the United Kingdom is necessary, just as, if we were to join the single European currency, a similar endorsement would be required. Indeed, Lord Ashdown of Norton-Sub-Hamdon, then leader of the Liberal Democrats, was the first to say that joining the single currency raised not only economic but political and constitutional issues that require endorsement. So, I have little difficulty with the concept of a referendum.
However, I say to the Government that, if the referendum is to be won, it cannot be put off until after a general election. The case for Europe must be made now. If there is a legitimate criticism of the Government, it is that, far too often. that case has gone by default. Far too often the Prime Minister has repeated the mantra that he wishes Britain to be at the heart of Europe—something with which many of us agree—but his practical implementation of that obligation appears to be the occasional speech made in Warsaw. If the referendum campaign is to be successful, it must begin now.
Be assured that the campaign for a no vote has begun. The speech of the hon. Member for Stone made that clear beyond question. He says that the document seeks to achieve one state. In opposition to that conclusion, one has to point to the fact that the Government succeeded in preserving the so-called red line issues.
One also has to ask whether one can imagine the Government of President Chirac—perhaps notorious for their individuality—being anxious to submerge that individuality in one state. I see little evidence of that. Can one imagine that those countries that lived under Nazism and then communism, which have but recently broken out into the opportunity of democratic institutions, will voluntarily give up their hard-won independence after—for many of them—so many sacrifices to be submerged in one state? I simply do not see it.
The hon. Gentleman is right to point to the fact that not enough people in those countries voted in the European elections, but those who required the mechanism of a referendum to justify their application to the European Union certainly voted in sufficient numbers. I simply say to him that his notion that the constitution is some creeping conspiracy is not recognised outside the United Kingdom. His notion that there can be a renegotiation of the United Kingdom position is not one that I understand to be supported by any other Government among the 25 members of the European Union. Nor—I believe I am right to say—is it an idea that is supported by the European People's party, to which his party is affiliated in the European Parliament. It would be a very solitary road to try to hoe—to put it at is mildest. I do not doubt his determination, but he needs rather better prospects of success before embarking on what would inevitably be constitutional and political turmoil.

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Supposing the negotiation is turned down. What then? Supposing it proceeds but fails because there can be no agreement. What then? What would be the position of the people of the United Kingdom? If Mr. Kilroy-Silk MEP were here, he would say, "Hooray! I have managed in a limited way to wreck the European Union, in so far as it applies to the United Kingdom." However, if negotiation were refused or failed, what would be the position of those such as the hon. Gentleman who say that they wish Britain to remain in the European Union but on a different basis? What then?
Mr. Cash: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman answer a simple question? He advocates a referendum, as he knows I did on the Maastricht treaty. If the answer was no, where would that leave the Liberal Democrats? What would they do about it?
Sir Menzies Campbell: If the answer is no, that will put us precisely in the position in which the hon. Gentleman wants us to be. It will leave us seeking a renegotiation to which we cannot be confident any other Government will be willing to accede. Therefore, we cannot be confident that renegotiation will be successful. The consequences of a no vote will be extremely serious. He must—I hope—grasp that nettle as much as anyone else.
Mr. Shepherd: I am not certain where that argument lies, inasmuch as that, if the referendum rejected the constitution, under the present arrangements of the European Union the constitution would be dead and we would retain the existing treaty pattern.
Sir Menzies Campbell: The hon. Gentleman is quite right. We would have to find our way through the Maastricht, Nice and Amsterdam treaties, all of which contain provisions to which he objected in his speech. I do not wish to put him in a corner that he would not wish to occupy, but there is a sense in which the logic of his position leads him more towards the position of the United Kingdom Independence party than staying in Europe and finding some form of renegotiation.
Our position is well known. The constitution is an acceptable document, and we want it to be endorsed by the people of the United Kingdom. This is a time when it is essential to our security and prosperity that we are in the European Union, not least so that we may have, together with our partners in Europe, a rather less subordinate relationship with the United States than we appear to have enjoyed in the past two years.
3.9 pm
Mr. Richard Spring: It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who brings a refreshing honesty to such debates. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) for introducing the debate and for putting forward his arguments in a comprehensive and informed way. Also, it is always a particular parliamentary delight to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd), who is one of the most principled parliamentarians in the House.
We must debate the matter because it has the most profound impact on our country's future and, frankly, it is one that the Prime Minister has been unwilling to
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engage with. When he finally engaged his famous reverse gear and gave the country the referendum a matter of days after the Minister for Europe had been pirouetting in the opposite direction, he said:
"Let the issue be put and let the battle be joined."
It is worth noting that, since then, the Prime Minister has failed to make one speech on Europe. If that represents the strength of the Government's argument and commitment to the whole issue of the EU constitution, I cannot wait for the referendum.
Even if the Government are frightened of talking about the constitution, that does not mean that its implications should not be discussed. We are at a turning point for the European Union. We can either try to become an ever more integrated structure, moving towards a politically integrated state, which is certainly the ambition of many—one size fits all for a Europe of 25 very different countries—or we can be much more flexible.
Everyone agrees that the EU needs to change. There is a deep and spreading alienation of the peoples of Europe from the institutions of the EU. We saw that illustrated by the very poor turnout in the European elections.
The Laeken declaration was right to state that
"the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens."
The trouble is that the European constitution fails to do that—it does entirely the opposite. It rests on misplaced assumptions that the old European social model is working and that not one material power should be returned to the member states. Indeed, no power has been returned to the member states under this Government.
I want the European Union to succeed, but my party is opposed to the constitution—indeed, any constitution. The Economist has taken the view that
"European voters should reject the new constitutional treaty and demand something better."
The constitution would be bad for Britain and bad for Europe. It is interesting that at one time the Labour Government would have agreed with us.
The story of Britain and the proposed constitution is clear: the fact that this constitution exists at all is a major strategic defeat for this Government. Ever since they gave in on the principle of a European constitution, they have been engaged in an increasingly desperate damage-limitation exercise, as we saw in the Convention on the Future of Europe.
Let us look back at the changing positions that the Government have taken. Five years ago, the then Foreign Secretary told the House, in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone:
"For the record, we are not proposing a constitution of Europe."— [Official Report, 25 May 1999; Vol. 332, c. 184.]
Less than four years ago, the Prime Minister told us that we did not need a European constitution, and then the current Foreign Secretary told us that we should have an EU constitution, and that he wanted it to fit into his back pocket.
Once the Government had given in, they were admirably frank about what the constitution meant. The Leader of the House said:

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"Our task is nothing less than the creation of a new constitutional order for a new united Europe."
However, the Government then became rather nervous and started talking fatuously about a "tidying-up operation".
In summary, first the Labour Government said that there would not be a constitution, then that some people wanted one but that the Government were against it, then that there would be one and that it was a good thing, and finally that there would be one but that we had nothing to worry about in terms of its importance. I do not believe that Europe should have a constitution, because that would lock it into a frozen-in-time mindset born in the 1950s and irrelevant to the needs of Europe today.
The Government have made a fatuous defence of the constitution. The Foreign Secretary has often argued that giving the EU a constitution is nothing to concern ourselves about because golf clubs have them. Such a comparison is demeaning and absurd. Golf clubs do not have Foreign Ministers or make binding laws.
Rather than the Foreign Secretary's fulminations, I find Professor McEldowney's evidence to the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords more convincing:
"While the Constitution may constitute the sum total of the existing Treaties, revised and refined, it is also endowed with a status of a Constitution—even though this status is not well defined or explained. Inevitably the status of a Constitution invites interpretation by the courts and this adds an additional dimension of how judges might interpret the terms of the Constitution. There is plenty of room for interpretation, particularly as there is such unnecessary vagueness."
Therein lies the rub—a point that was tellingly made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone.
Over time, the constitution will inevitably diminish Britain's independence and increase the EU's powers over our laws, our way of life and how we do business. In particular, it will strengthen the European Court of Justice's power as it weakens that of Parliament. That is the key. The constitution favours the increased jurisprudence of the European Union at the expense of national Parliaments.
The Prime Minister said that the charter of fundamental rights would be a political declaration without any legal force, but it already has legal force and will extend what is known as judge-led law in our national life. The Government's assurances that this will be confined to European law and that the Court will not overturn national laws are more statements of hope than certainty. The president of the European Court of Justice could not give that assurance; the Government's own expert, the widely respected Professor Dashwood, feels unable to give it. More recently, the TUC was confident that it could get round the Government's restrictions in respect of the charter's effects.
The constitution increases the EU's power over energy policy, competition policy, asylum and immigration, and criminal law. New powers for Eurojust and allowing the creation of a European public prosecutor are the embryonic beginnings of a European Union FBI.
The constitution is an astonishing failure of British diplomacy. We heard about the red lines, but they were not met. The Government said that there would be
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unanimity in respect of the criminal justice system and social security, but there is now the so-called emergency brake. I do not understand why the Government feel such a need to defend a document whose form and content they used to oppose. That is not leadership in Europe; it is a dismal failure of a modern European agenda, which we need.
The simple tragedy is that if the Government had stood up like the boy who pointed out that the emperor had no clothes and said that the constitution was a bad project and rejected it, they would have been celebrated in many quarters of the European Union.
As I have discovered in myriad conversations, enthusiasm for the constitution is confined to the political leaders of a few countries. Yes, some countries want deeper integration, but others do not and there is no reason why those who want deeper integration should be hindered from going ahead. We want the EU to be reformed so that all 25 countries can feel comfortable in it. It will be up to the British people to decide what kind of Europe they want.
The battle lines are drawn and clear, but the constitution's proponents do not seem to want to fight. Why is the referendum being delayed for so long? The Dutch have indicated that they will hold their referendum in December during their presidency. Why should not we do so, too? Why are the Government running scared of the debate? The Minister is such a bold believer in more power for the EU, and he even signed a document advocating EU taxes and giving our United Nations seat to the EU. Why is he determined to kick the referendum into the long grass? Why will the British people not be allowed to take a decision very quickly indeed?
When the history books are written, the Government's failure to have a material impact on the constitutional architecture that they signed up to will be their epitaph. For those of us who want the EU to succeed, the tragedy is that this is a recipe for the further alienation of the people of Europe from Brussels, with all that that might mean.
3.18 pm
The Minister for Europe (Mr. Denis MacShane): I know that the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Mr. Spring) would not want unintentionally to mislead the House, so I put it on the record that in the document he referred to, to which I and many others associated with centre-left parties in Europe attached their names, there is no reference to the EU replacing the United Kingdom or France in a single seat at the United Nations.
This has been a good debate, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) for securing it, as it allows me to give the lie to the lies and myths that are so sedulously spread about the constitutional treaty. Let us be quite clear and honest: were it not to exist, we would be having the same debate on the existing constitution. The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) have been utterly consistent over the years, certainly as long as I have been a Member of Parliament, in being opposed to any constitutional arrangements for the European Union that do not conform to their satisfaction.
The hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills quoted that great orator Cicero, but the hon. Gentleman is rather more like Cato in the Roman Senate, who, no

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matter what the subject, finished his speech by stating delenda est Carthago, but the hon. Gentleman says eternally delenda est Europa. The plain fact is that Europe is not about to have the salt of a United Kingdom Independence party and an anti-European Conservative party spread about it. Europe has problems, but it is alive and well with 450 million citizens, great cities and a new middle class arising from the prison of Soviet tyranny—all associating themselves voluntarily, freely and independently with our great country in a project that will allots all our nations to grow in freedom.
This country of ours has always sought to operate on the basis of international law. If I may be allowed three more words of Latin, Mr. Deputy Speaker, pacta sunt servanda—we honour our treaties. We honour them in the World Trade Organisation, which exercises a swathe of power over British commerce, and in NATO, which exercises a swathe of power over British defence and foreign policy, and rightly so.
When the Leader of the Opposition makes a solemn pledge to his fisheries and agriculture spokesman that if he is unable to obtain the agreement of 24 other member states to a renegotiation of the common fisheries policy he will pass national law in this House of Commons to exercise national control of it, there is only one consequence: under the Conservative party, pacta sunt non servanda. I do not propose to put that into English. I leave it in the obscurity of a dead language to hide from the British people the full horror, disgrace and shame that the leader of the Conservative party proposes to bring on the British people by solemnly tearing up a treaty obligation.
Mr. Cash: Will the Minister give way?
Mr. MacShane: No, because the hon. Gentleman in his speech—I counted every word—took up what amounts to approximately 13 per cent. of the entire length of the new constitutional treaty. He needs to make only seven more speeches to have read it all into the record.
We on this side of the Chamber, the British people, the Liberal Democrat party and decent Conservatives will defend our membership of the European Union and win the case for Britain to be engaged in Europe. This is a battle like the one fought on the corn laws when some members of the Conservative party did not follow their great leader, Sir Robert Peel, but preferred to remain a protectionist party. At the beginning of the last century, the Conservative party opted for imperial preference and isolationist protectionism. That drove Winston Churchill from among its ranks to become a Liberal MP for 20 years, so horrified was he by the protectionist, anti-internationalist turn of the Conservative party.
Finally, the Chamberlain policy of isolation from Europe in the 1930s is now perfectly replicated by the leader of Conservative party. During the 1930s, Chamberlain had the support of the Daily Mail and today the leader of the Conservative party has the support of the Daily Mail. The Conservative party can dance its isolationist, withdrawal jig with UKIP and Lord Rothermere. This party and this Government will
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defend British interests, which have always been based on being an open, trading nation entering into as many arrangements as possible to defend our interests.
Mr. Spring: What about the 1980s manifestos?
Mr. MacShane: From a sedentary position, the hon. Gentleman refers to the 1983 Labour party manifesto. He is quite right—look what it did to us. I am delighted, because I do not think that he, unlike the withdrawalists and isolationists sitting behind him, believes a word of what he says, but let him keep saying it because I know what the verdict of the British people will be. They may have enjoyed voting UKIP in the European parliamentary election, but it should be placed on the record that we, as the incumbent Government, suffered a voting loss, but they, as the incumbent Opposition, suffered a greater loss in terms of share of the vote than did that incumbent Government. That happened nowhere else in Europe.
The more the Conservative party becomes anti-European and the more it goes down the isolationist, xenophobic road where UKIP wants to take British politics, the better it will be for those decent, patriotic parties that support Britain's international engagement. Let us look at the UKIP manifesto. The second line of the leaflet that came through my door was about opposition to immigration. That is the second UKIP agenda, which, like that of the Front National in France and Vlaams Blok in Belgium, involves not just hatred of Europe, but hatred of the other and hatred of people who they do not want in their country.
Mr. John Gummer rose—
Mr. MacShane: I give way to my right hon. Friend.
Mr. Gummer: Does not the Minister agree that the least patriotic stance is the policy of a party that believes that Britain has so little to offer to the world that it should withdraw from its association with its nearest neighbours—an association so attractive that countries that have hitherto been under the heel of dictatorships want to join it—and that the least patriotic party in Britain is that which calls itself the United Kingdom Independence party?
Mr. MacShane: My right hon. Friend is perfectly right. Frankly, I feel quite ashamed when I look at some of the literature of that party, not because of its views on Europe—there are passionate views about Europe all over the place—but because of the language of xenophobia and hatred of people from other countries who live in our midst, which are shaming and repellent.
In the few minutes remaining, I want to refer to comments about the new constitutional treaty, since I do not believe that the House wants to hear from me. The Irish Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern, said that the EU
"is not a super state; it's not a federal state. It's about a group of nations, a group of peoples working to a Constitution".
Mr. Jose Luis Zapatero stated in a speech in the Spanish Cortes on 15 June:
"Europe is and will be a Union of States".

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The new president of Germany was quoted in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 12 May:
"I do not believe that current developments are going to give rise to a European Federal state … [I see] a revival of the nation-state principle again."
The president of Poland, Alexander Kwasniewski, said on "Newsnight" in May:
"The Treaty doesn't mean we create a new state of Europe or something like a European federation".
Le Monde, the French newspaper, stated on 26 June:
"Whatever people say, this text remains a British victory".
The Spanish daily, ABC, said on 20 June that
"it isn't a Constitution of a state that already exists … the backbone of Europe is nations with a long and shining tradition".
Mr. Stoiber, leader of the Christian Social Union in Germany, which is the Conservatives' sister party, was quoted in Welt am Sonntag on 20 June:
"The EU will not have the right to set taxes and Europe is not going to be a federal state."
Le Figaro said in April that the constitution
"will seal the victory of the nation-states over the European 'super-state'".
El Mundo, the Spanish paper, stated on 20 June:
"Blair, the big winner of the Summit, achieved everything he wanted. Blair managed to protect all his red lines in the text".
Le Soir from Belgium, the very heart of European federalism—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Edward O'Hara): Order. Generally, contributions should consist of more than a compendium of quotations.
Mr. MacShane: I am trying to deal with the compendium of nonsense, distortions and myths that has come from the Conservatives. As I continually make these arguments in this Chamber and on the Floor of the House, but they seem to have so little impact on Opposition Members, I thought that I would pray in aid other distinguished world statesmen. Of course, I bow to your entreaty, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and in the remaining minutes I shall seek to deal with some points that were made.
The European Court ruled in 1964 that Community law has primacy over national law. When we joined the European Community, section 3(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 stated:
"Judicial notice shall be taken of the Treaties … and of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court".
In other words, we accepted primacy because it is possible to have a set of international rules only if someone is the umpire or referee.
The constitution is good for Britain and good for Europe. I commend it to the House and invite all hon. Members to join me in ensuring that Britain remains a wholehearted member of the European Union so as to serve the interests of our British people and to defeat the reactionary, isolationist, withdrawalist arguments that we have heard this afternoon.

Daniel Morgan
3.30 pm
Mr. Roger Williams: With your permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if the right hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith), who is anxious to participate in this debate, should catch your eye, he does so with my full agreement and that of the Minister.
I am grateful to have obtained this debate on an issue of crucial public interest and concern. The Minster understands that today I will criticise the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police Service, other police authorities and the whole criminal justice system, which has failed my constituent Mrs. Isobel Hulsmann and failed to root out incompetence and corruption. The Minister will also know that the criticism is not directed towards her, because she has only recently taken up her post. Today, however, she has the opportunity to make a name for herself, to right an injustice and to reinforce the Government's reputation for standing up for the victims of crime and for prosecuting offenders.
Daniel Morgan was murdered 17 years ago. He was found with an axe embedded in his face in the car park of a south London pub shortly after his murder. Detective Sergeant Sid Fillery conducted the first four so-called "golden days" of the murder inquiry but was removed from the murder squad when his relationship with Jonathan Rees, Daniel Morgan's partner in Southern Investigations, was revealed. Sid Fillery went on to take up joint ownership of Southern Investigations, and therefore benefited from Daniel Morgan's death.
The circumstances surrounding Daniel Morgan's death in March 1987 are complex and far-reaching, yet my constituent Isobel Hulsmann, the deceased's mother, is left with not only the immeasurable grief of having lost a son in the most brutal of murders but the spectacle of the criminal justice system's having failed again and again to bring those responsible for that murder to answer for their actions.
Why did our criminal justice system fail? The answer is unknown to my constituent, but during the past 17 years she has sought to place her confidence in four separate police investigations, only to find that each one has come to nothing. On the conclusion of the fourth and final investigation last year, the senior officers in charge expressed their strong view that the evidence that they had gathered called out for a prosecution of the primary actors in the murder. Nevertheless, the Crown Prosecution Service declined to bring any such prosecution, forcing the officers to accept that decision, while insisting that they disagreed with it.
In the event, the officers, like the Crown Prosecution Service, have confirmed to my constituent that she has reached the end of the road as far as the criminal justice system is concerned and that she cannot look for any further progress in that direction. They also explained to her their view that the case represented
"the worst mess they had ever seen";
that the real mischief in the case lay in the initial investigation of 1987—88; that the role of ex-Detective Sergeant Sid Fillery in that investigation lay at the heart of the mischief; that a number of other police officers around him had sought to protect him; and that their

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reinvestigation had therefore been an endeavour to build on what they had inherited from previous investigations, understandably focusing on the immediate actors in the murder, within the parameters set by the damage that had already been done. Those officers sought in vain to respond to suspicions about the mischief that had taken place in the initial investigation, particularly with regard to the roles and identities of the police officers who may have had a lot to gain from protecting Sid Fillery.
In other words, my constituent has heard from the Metropolitan Police Service confirmation of her long-held suspicion that the apparent unwillingness or inability of the criminal justice system to deal with the case may have a lot to do with Sid Fillery and other officers, serving or retired, who may have much to gain from protecting him. In that light, I am asking the Minister today to make use of her parliamentary prerogative to institute a full judicial inquiry under section 49 of the Police Act 1996, which is the only way of obtaining fresh and independent scrutiny of the murder and of the circumstances in which successive investigations into it have come to nothing.
The only form of public scrutiny that the murder has received in the past 17 years has been at an inquest in April 1988, which culminated in a verdict of unlawful killing. In the course of evidence at that inquest, allegations were made on oath of involvement by Metropolitan police officers in the murder and in covering up that involvement. It emerged that Jonathan Rees, Daniel Morgan's business partner in their private detective company, Southern Investigations Ltd., had talked about having Daniel killed and arranging for police officers at Catford CID to be involved in the murder and its subsequent cover-up. That was according to the company bookkeeper, Kevin Lennon.
It also emerged that not only was Sid Fillery among those officers but he played a key role in the initial murder inquiry during the so-called first four "golden days" before he was required to withdraw from the murder squad for reasons of personal involvement with the primary suspect, Jonathan Rees. During those four days, Fillery was given the opportunity to manage the first interview under caution with Rees, and to take possession of key incriminating files from the premises of Southern Investigations Ltd., including Daniel's diary, which has never since been found. Kevin Lennon also spoke of Fillery's intentions to retire from the Metropolitan police force on grounds of ill health and take up the vacant seat in Southern Investigations Ltd. left by Daniel's death. That is exactly what happened, and to this day Fillery and Rees remain business partners in what was Daniel's private detective company.
More than 17 years after the murder, my constituent, Mrs. Hulsmann, is confronted with the plain fact that she, like her son, has been failed by the system. Despite her best efforts, those who committed this gruesome act have never been brought to justice and she has had to accept that they may never be brought to justice. She should not be burdened with the responsibility of ascertaining the reasons behind the criminal justice system's failure to bring her son's murderers to book. That is the responsibility of the Government on behalf of us all. That is why she now seeks a full judicial inquiry into the murder and the subsequent police
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investigations. Like many other Members of this House and the other place, I strongly support her case, together with that of Alastair Morgan, the brother of the deceased, who has devoted his life to this campaign.
It seems to me and my constituent that the Government have a particular duty to bring public scrutiny to bear on the case. The refusal with which we have been met is not becoming of a Government who pride themselves in looking after the interests of victims of crime. This is not a case of the Government being unable to help, but of their being unwilling to accept their responsibility, and we are compelled to seek answers for this apparent lack of will. Is it because they have something to hide, or is it because the implications of bringing the matter to a head are so far-reaching that they may make life uncomfortable for many in the Metropolitan police and the Home Office? The Government's attitude towards the murder of Daniel Morgan so far has been one not of openness, collaboration and firm fair action, but of sustained damage limitation.
Public inquiries serve the cause of public accountability. They also serve to eliminate in the public's mind any doubt about the possible involvement of the person or Department that institutes them. Unfortunately, the Home Office does not have an entirely innocent record. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 commanded several structural changes to the constitutional arrangements of our police forces, not least with respect to the independent police authorities to which forces are accountable.
For the record, the Metropolitan Police Service was directly accountable to the Home Office at the time of the murder and of all police investigations into the case except the fourth and final one. Similarly, the Home Office was also responsible for the Police Complaints Authority, which supervised a 1988–89 investigation into the case by Hampshire police, which is said to have looked into and eliminated the possibility of police involvement in the murder or its aftermath. Therefore, it was on the watch of the Home Office that the terms of reference of that Hampshire investigation were changed, secretly and without the knowledge of the family, midway through the inquiry. Having started out
"to investigate allegations that the police were involved in the murder of Daniel Morgan and matters arising there from",
the inquiry was required after the change to proceed
"in the furtherance of prosecuting the suspects Rees, Goodridge (an associate of Rees), Wisden (Goodridge's girlfriend) and anyone else for the murder of Daniel Morgan",
without any reference to police involvement.
The very fact that the terms of reference of a so-called independent inquiry carried out by an outside police force were changed during the course of that inquiry is cause for great concern, and almost of itself warrants a judicial inquiry. However, it is also inconceivable that those changes would have been allowed without the consent of the Home Office at a senior level, to which the all concerned were answerable at the time. It therefore lies particularly ill in the mouth of the Home Office to seek to rely on that very investigation in order to refute the continuing suspicions of police involvement in the murder.
We have called for a public judicial inquiry under section 49 of the Police Act 1996, and we point to the moral and legal obligations of the Government to hold

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such an inquiry. It is not open to the Government to hide behind some obscure case law in their attempt to evade those obligations, as they appear to do in the letter of 10 June from the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety. It is unbecoming of the Government to suggest that they have no obligations because of a mere accident of timing—the fact that the murder took place before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the incorporation of the European convention on human rights into domestic law.
It is significant that support for that dishonourable proposition is sought from the recent judgment in the House of Lords in the case of McKerr, which arose out of the shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland. Apart from any legal considerations, that is clearly a unique political situation. Instead, we invite the Government to look at other decisions of the House of Lords in cases where the political context has been less inhibiting, which serve to establish the obligations of the Government to ensure an effective official inquiry with the benefit of public scrutiny and participation.
As for the purpose of such an inquiry, we can do no better than to point to the words of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the case of Amin last year:
"The purposes … are clear: to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others."
On behalf of my constituent and her family, I am calling for a full public judicial inquiry.
3.42 pm
Mr. Chris Smith: I am very grateful to the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire (Mr. Williams) for enabling me to contribute to this debate. The case is one that I have pursued for well over 10 years on behalf of my constituent, who is Daniel Morgan's brother, Alastair.
The facts of the case are indisputable. Daniel Morgan was murdered more than 17 years ago. It was a particularly hideous and brutal murder, for which no one has yet been convicted. There have been four police inquiries into what happened, into the murder and the issues surrounding it, and those inquiries have yielded no prosecutions. The Morgan family have lived through more than 17 years of anguish, distress and considerable frustration in their attempts to get the case properly investigated, and to secure information and sight of the investigations that have taken place.
I support the call that has been made by the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire. Two things are required, and I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to consider them carefully. First, in the letter from the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety to myself and others on 10 June, she stated that she would be willing to consider meeting the family, myself, the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire and Lord Livsey—who has also been pursuing the case—once the family had seen the conclusions of the fourth inquiry. The family have now
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seen those conclusions. They are as distressing as the conclusions of the three previous inquiries. The family would welcome the Opportunity to meet the Minister of State, and I hope that the Minister will, on her behalf, agree in principle to such a meeting.
The second thing that is required is a proper judicial inquiry. When the Minister of State wrote to me on 10 June, she explained that judicial inquiries are established only in the most exceptional circumstances. She explained that, where there has been a public disorder or general issues need to be considered, a public inquiry is, on rare occasions, contemplated as a way to resolve that issue.
Partly because of the case's longevity, partly because of the number of failed investigations that have led nowhere, and particularly because there have been serious question marks right from the word go about the possible involvement of police officers in either the murder or the frustration of subsequent investigations—those serious question marks reflect not just on the particularities of the case but on the good name and standing of the Metropolitan Police Service as a whole—I argue that a public inquiry is the right way to try to resolve the issues surrounding the murder once and for all.
Notwithstanding the Minister of State's suggestion in her letter to me and to others that she was not prepared to contemplate holding an inquiry at this stage, I hope that she will listen carefully to the points that have been made by the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire. The central point about the remaining questions that hang in the air over the murder, and that will continue to hang in the air over the murder if it remains unresolved, is that an inquiry is the right way to proceed.
The brutal murder has remained unsolved for far too long. The police investigation route appears to have been thoroughly exhausted. It is important to find new ways of ensuring that the case can be resolved, because simply to wash our hands of it and say that nothing more can be done is not an adequate response.
3.48 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Caroline Flint): I commend the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire (Mr. Williams) and, in support, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) for bringing the issue to our attention. As they both rightly said, Mr. Morgan's death was particularly horrific and it remains troubling to them, as Members of Parliament, and to the family of Daniel Morgan. To be honest, I cannot imagine the trauma and frustration of not having an answer about who killed Mr. Morgan 17 years ago.
As my right hon. Friend said, my hon. Friend the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety has written to him and to others about the case. She said in her letter of response to him that if, after receiving the information from the Metropolitan Police Service, people felt it was appropriate to seek a meeting, she was open to that. I will pass that back to her today, and I apologise that she cannot be here to respond to the debate herself.
I think that it will be helpful if I set out the role of the Home Office in cases such as this. The Secretary of State is rightly accountable to Parliament for questions

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relating to the police. However. it is often not appropriate to offer comment or make a judgment on the professional decisions taken by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or the Police Complaints Authority.
As in the past, the issue of a judicial inquiry has been raised. I want to be clear that the Government's reason for not holding an inquiry is not a legal technicality. There is no legal obligation to hold an inquiry, but that is not the reason for the decision. The primary considerations, as my hon. Friend the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety said, were whether an inquiry would be proportionate or in the wider public interest. In coming to our decision, we had to consider the investigations that have taken place over the past 17 years and the level of independent scrutiny.
I would like to set out the reasons for not pursuing an inquiry. First, inquiries have been used when there has been serious public disorder or similar circumstances in which wide-ranging and serious disquiet is felt about an event or issue affecting a large proportion of a police force. Successive Home Secretaries have reserved that power for such matters, and at this stage it is not appropriate to go beyond that. I appreciate that Daniel Morgan's family are frustrated, disappointed and angry that no one has been prosecuted for his murder, and that there are lingering concerns about police officer involvement in the killing. Nevertheless, the Government do not consider that that in itself is sufficient to warrant an inquiry.
The second reason for the decision is that, after four investigations and a coroner's inquest, the Government do not consider there to be a realistic prospect of uncovering new evidence. I believe that the efforts of the Metropolitan police to pursue the case to a successful conclusion, despite not having done so, have been extraordinary, and to their credit they have been prepared to look again and again at what happened 17 years ago. As my right hon. and hon. Friends know, following the initial investigation to find the perpetrator of the terrible crime against Daniel Morgan and the coroner's inquest into his killing, the Metropolitan police set up an independent investigation into their handling of the initial investigation. That second investigation was carried out by Hampshire police and supervised by the Police Complaints Authority. Although I recognise that there were concerns about the first Metropolitan police investigation, they have undertaken subsequent investigations in an effort to conclude the case.
A third police investigation was carried out as an intelligence-led, covert investigation for the purpose of gathering evidence about the murder of Daniel Morgan as well as allegations of police corruption. However, no charges were brought against any person for an offence in connection with the murder, although charges were brought against individuals for unrelated matters. That was not the end, however. Nine months later, the Metropolitan police murder review group considered afresh whether all reasonable investigative leads had been exhausted, and considered the possibility of uncovering new evidence because of the existence of new investigative techniques. The review identified a number of overt and covert investigative opportunities that were available, and the fourth investigation was launched.
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At the end of the fourth investigation, the Metropolitan police made recommendations about a number of individuals in respect of offences relating to the murder. However, after reviewing the available evidence, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to bring any charges against those individuals for the murder of Daniel Morgan. I am afraid that it is not for me to offer a judgment on the decisions taken by the Metropolitan police or the CPS in this case. Because of the four investigations and the coroner's inquest, we remain of the opinion that a further inquiry would be highly unlikely to uncover any further evidence that would lead to a different outcome.
The third reason for the decision is that, although we understand the lingering suspicion of the hon. Member for Brecon and Radnorshire and the family about the involvement of a police officer or police officers in the killing, that cannot of itself warrant an inquiry. There have been two independent scrutinies of the incident, and in coming to our decision we could not ignore the fact that there was nothing to suggest police involvement in the murder. The first instance of scrutiny was the coroner's inquest. When delivering his verdict of unlawful killing, he remarked that there was
"no evidence whatsoever in this inquest to point to any police involvement in this killing".
The second instance followed the Hampshire investigation on behalf of the Metropolitan police into the allegations of police involvement in the killing. The independent Police Complaints Authority supervised that investigation. The PCA said that it was satisfied with how the investigation was conducted and it concluded that there was no evidence of any involvement by a police officer in the murder, or evidence to suggest that a member of the murder investigation team had taken deliberate action to prevent the murder from being properly detected.
I know that the family are not happy with the PCA's conclusion, but the PCA has confirmed to the Home Office that it considered the case rigorously and was satisfied with the conduct of the investigation and the findings. The family believes that the call for an inquiry is strengthened by the views, which have been mentioned today, that were expressed to them by the police officers who led the fourth investigation. I cannot comment on the circumstances in which those views were expressed, but I am aware that the Metropolitan police do not view the account of the conversation in the same way as the family and their solicitors. I am informed that the Metropolitan police accept that the original investigation falls below current investigative standards, but that it was consistent with the standards of the day. However, I am also informed that the Metropolitan police's official view is that its fourth investigation found no evidence to support the assertion that any police officer had been protected, or that any corruption existed.
I understand that the Crown Prosecution Service has offered a meeting, but that it unfortunately had to be postponed. I would encourage the family to take up the opportunity if possible to discuss further the outstanding questions that they have with the CPS, and in particular its refusal to pursue charges and take the matter to court.
Mr. Williams: I thank the Minister for the fullness of her replies, which we shall obviously consider. However,

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would she consider why the terms of reference of the first inquiry were changed? Presumably, that prejudiced the decision as to whether police were involved, as its terms were changed from the consideration of the police's involvement to that of other people who were accused of the murder.
Caroline Flint: My understanding is that the terms of reference of the second investigation were to investigate allegations that police were involved in the murder of Daniel Morgan, and matters arising. That investigation was carried out under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority. I understood that that was the point of the second investigation, and that the PCA considered the matter and came to conclusions. I cannot comment any more on changes to the terms of reference; those were the terms of reference and that was the basis on which Hampshire police and the PCA carried out their investigation.
In terms of the Home Office's specific responsibility, the Met was accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament. However, the force's operational decisions, and those of the PCA, are independent of Government, and it is not for Ministers or the Home Office to interfere with them. Parliament has not given such powers to Ministers.
Finally, for what it is worth, I should like to offer my sincere sympathy to Daniel Morgan's family. It is clear that Daniel was tragically murdered, and the family's searches for answers over the years have been, I am sure, traumatic, and continue to be frustrating. I know that my response today may be a disappointment to the family; I am sure that it will be, based on the representations of my two colleagues who are here on their behalf today. Of course, the case is still considered by the Met to be open. There seem to be many instances where Members of Parliament and the family have views that are opposed to those of the Metropolitan police, the Police Complaints Authority and the Crown Prosecution Service.
As I said at the outset, I shall tell my hon. Friend, the Minister for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety that a meeting would be beneficial to the family and colleagues here, and I hope that they will take up the opportunity to meet the Crown Prosecution Service as well. I hope that the recent openness shown by the Metropolitan police and the CPS in seeking to provide an open explanation to the family has helped in some way. If it is felt that that provides the basis for a meeting with the Minister, I shall relay that to her, and I am sure that she will listen sympathetically.

Niger Delta
3.59 pm
Mr. Bill Tynan: I welcome the opportunity to raise the issue of stability in the Niger delta. Throughout Africa, abject poverty, malnutrition, clean drinking water, education and medical care are important issues, which we must address if we are to resolve Africa's problems. Poverty and terror are linked in a complex process, leading from poverty to frustration, a sense of injustice and bitterness, division and conflict. The Niger delta has experienced all those issues. A stable Niger delta is vital to the stability of Nigeria, just as a stable Nigeria is vital to that of west Africa. Nigeria is an important member of the Commonwealth and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and in past decades Nigerian troops have been in action in Sierra Leone and Liberia as part of African peacekeeping forces. Nigeria is also likely to be an important contributor to the African peacekeeping initiative announced at the G8 Sea Island summit.
The development and democratisation of the country over the past decade must be applauded. The election of President Obasanjo in 1999, followed by his re-election in 2003, should mark the end of military rule in that country. The beginnings of political stability can be sustained only if ordinary Nigerians see real economic benefits, a reduction in corruption and an end to the violence that has struck many areas of the country.
Nigeria is well placed to act as a stabilising power in the region, and the presidential elections in 2007 will be a further test of the trends. Oil accounts for 80 per cent. of Nigeria's revenues and 98 per cent. of its exports. The Niger delta accounts for 40 per cent. of that oil production, and considerable unexploited gas and hydrocarbon reserves exist. The Nigerian Government rely heavily on the oil industry, and all budgets are linked to its viability. If the oil installations were forced to close or reduce production, for whatever reason, that would have devastating consequences for Nigeria's economy and political and social structure, as well as its very existence as a state and west Africa as a whole.
The current instability in the Niger delta must concern us all in the UK, as an humanitarian concern for the people of Nigeria, as a concern for the development of their country and as a concern for the security of world energy supplies. Nigeria is the sixth largest oil producer in the world, and the decision of Chevron to suspend production following attacks on its workers in the delta earlier this year was partly responsible for the recent hike in oil prices.
Of greater concern to us all should be the report that WAC Global Services prepared for Shell, which accounts for half of oil production in the delta. The report was leaked in mid-June. I discussed the report directly with Shell yesterday, and although it rejects many of the conclusions, and even if the report presents a pessimistic worst-case scenario, we must take it seriously. It pointed to a vicious cycle of violence and corruption, caused by the exploitation of oil in the delta and fed by the theft of crude oil. It indicated that such increasing criminalisation in the region could force an end to onshore production in the delta by 2008. Following my discussions yesterday, I can say that Shell rejects that scenario completely. However, we must

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register our concern. As I said earlier, the consequences of an end to production would be catastrophic for the Niger delta, Nigeria, west Africa and possibly the UK.
It is worth detailing where the threats to stability come from. Oil has been beneficial to Nigeria as a whole but responsible for many of the problems in the delta. Many residents of the delta feel excluded, marginalised and disfranchised, and youth militia regularly sabotage oil company installations, kidnap personnel and steal vast amounts of oil. Competition for control of wealth and the lucrative relationships with oil companies is fierce, fuelling often dormant anti or inter-ethnic tensions. Military taskforces sent to quell unrest often serve to increase resentment, and actions that have included destruction of whole villages are frequently condemned by international human rights organisations.
The oil industry generates substantial sums of money. According to Shell representatives, the company employs about 5,500 people directly with a further 20,000 employed by contractors. Comparing that employment level with a delta population of between 10 million and 12 million, we can understand that although there are benefits from oil production, mass unemployment creates enormous problems. It is felt that oil money spent locally has had a negative effect, worsening tensions and highlighting differences in wealth. More alarming are the allegations that a lack of transparency in awarding contracts and the use of cash payments have made corruption worse.
As I have said, a particular problem in the Niger delta is that of "bunkering"—the theft of oil. That ranges from local tapping to much more organised systematic theft of oil in bulk. Some industry analysts estimate that up to 100,000 barrels of oil a day are stolen. That oil is sold for approximately $15 a barrel and generates a large amount of cash. Some allege that it may even undermine the whole Nigerian political system. At a local level, one day's worth of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger delta can buy quality weapons for, and sustain, a group of approximately 1,500 youths for two months.
The exploitation of the oil in the Niger delta has also had serious environmental consequences. The flaring of gas, which accompanies oil extraction, occurs for 24 hours a day. I understand from Shell that the oil companies have recently agreed with the Government that that practice will cease by 2008, but I believe that that is more of a hope and a prayer. Avoidance of the flaring is dependent on the Government and private sector investment.
Official figures also show that an average of 300 incidents occur annually, with oil leaks from pipelines releasing on average 2,300 cu m of oil each year. However, unofficial figures indicate that there are many more oil spills than that, which has severe environmental consequences for the region. It is further estimated that bridge and dam building in the region to support the oil industry could lead to the loss of 40 per cent. of the inhabited land of the delta within 30 years.
It is also sad, but true, that the presence of the oil industry has served to worsen ethnic tensions; it has fuelled competition for control of resources. The ethnic groups found in the delta are not those that hold sway in the rest of Nigeria, and therefore oil has given a new side to feelings of exclusion from the political process.
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The presence of armed youth militias has led to increased violence and instability, and the response of the Nigerian armed forces is regarded as having worsened the situation.
I understand that 13 per cent. of oil revenues are supposed to be redistributed by the Government to local communities. However, at present, the local population sees little benefit from the oil industry. Figures that I have seen show that in the delta only 27 per cent. of households have access to safe drinking water and that there is only one doctor per 130,000 people. Local people strongly believe that they are not sharing in the wealth that is being created from oil production.
I accept that the situation in the Niger delta is complex, with many interlinked problems and no easy solutions. I have spent most of my remarks highlighting the problems, which must be done, but I hope that I have not been too pessimistic. This is one of the first Adjournment debates on the Niger delta, so it is important for us to understand the problems.
I accept that much is being done to bring stability to the region, by the Government, by UK companies and in particular by NGOs such as the International Centre for Reconciliation at Coventry cathedral. As I have said, instability in the Niger delta will have consequences for Africa and for the UK. I hope that our high commission in Nigeria will monitor the situation and examine how best we can assist in resolving some of the problems in the area.
The continuing growth in the UK's overseas aid budget, which is one of this Government's most significant achievements, and the commitments made through the G8 Africa action plan, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the millennium development goals, give us a real opportunity to have some influence in the delta and to support beneficial work there.
The International Centre for Reconciliation was helpful in briefing me on its work in Nigeria in preparation for this debate. It was quick to contact me once I had secured the debate and provided me with much useful background information.
However, there is much more that can be done. If we are to ensure stability in the delta, the Department for International Development must be involved. I know that it assisted the Nigerian presidency in producing a strategic assessment of the conflict in the delta in October 2002, which made many recommendations, and DFID has recently published its draft country action plan for Nigeria. However, I am slightly disappointed that that does not seem to define a strong role for DFID in the delta. The Foreign Office has sponsored courses for those engaged in civil society projects in the area, which has obviously been helpful and is welcome. As well as the opportunities for direct development aid, the UK should support local development that could bring stability. I hope that the Foreign Office and DFID will look to support more work like that undertaken by the International Centre for Reconciliation. Simply making more money available is not the answer, as Shell agrees. Without tackling the problems caused by the oil industry and breaking down the ethnic tensions, we will not solve the problems in the delta.

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To support further work in the region, I hope that there will be better co-ordination between DFID and the Foreign Office. That could be best achieved by having a member of staff at the high commission in Nigeria with special responsibility for monitoring what is happening in the delta and considering how best we can assist. We should also look to implement the recommendations of the 2002 report, which called for greater controls on the transfer of small arms to Nigeria, and consider how greater export controls and the UN small arms survey might play a role in the area.
We also need to consider how to tackle the profits of bunkering and the oil-related kickbacks. I welcome the agreement at the Sea Island summit on a G8-Nigeria compact on transparency and tackling corruption. However, we need to look at what more we can do to tackle money laundering at the UK end, and ensure that there is transparency and that the sources of large sums of money that enter the UK are disclosed. That is a matter on which the UK banks have been particularly weak. When we consider the ․1.3 billion channelled through 15 UK banks by the late military dictator General Abacha, we can realise the depth of the problem of money laundering. That has had a significant effect on Nigeria. In 2001, the Financial Services Authority identified banks' reporting mechanisms as the weakest point in the system to prevent money laundering, and it worries me that despite the new regulations passed last year, our system remains heavily dependent on banks reporting any suspect transactions. We must try to strengthen that system.
The UK also needs to look at how we regulate the operation of oil companies based in the UK through international codes of conduct that praise those that are performing well and condemn and crack down on those that are performing poorly. We should discuss with the Nigerian Government what support the UK can provide to the Nigerian armed forces to ensure that they will be a force for good in the delta. That must, however, be balanced by pressure to ensure that the military personnel who have engaged in human rights abuses in the area are brought to justice. At minimum, charges should be sought against those responsible for events in Benue state in 2001 and in Odi in Bayelsa state in 1999. There seems little point in training Nigerian troops to serve as peacekeepers when the situation in the delta is so unstable and the troops there at present seem to have such an extremely bad reputation. We should also consider how that support for the armed forces will work alongside our wider support for security sector reform through the G8 Africa action plan.
I have talked mainly about the Government's role, but I shall briefly touch on the role that UK companies can play alongside that. As I have said, I yesterday met representatives from Shell who briefed me on the work that they are doing to limit the consequences of oil exploration. I was encouraged by the range of projects that they are helping with and their real interest in assisting the communities in the delta. I understand that they have built 29 cottage hospitals, which must be a wonderful boost for the people there. That said, all companies that operate in the region could do more.
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I shall highlight three fields in which that is the case. First, companies should introduce tougher environmental standards. Secondly, they should provide greater transparency over payments to local contractors and other local payments made, although Shell has said that it is working on that at present. Thirdly, all companies need to consider the ways in which they can funnel money into the region to assist both traditional aid and development projects, and to support civil society and capacity building projects such as the work of the International Centre for Reconciliation, is absolutely vital. I hope that the Government will find opportunities to encourage and work alongside business in that way.
Overall, much work is being done that can be applauded. However, there is still much more that can be done. I have outlined the problems, but I am optimistic that solutions can be found. I hope that the debate has been constructive and helpful; I hope something has been achieved simply by highlighting the issue. None of us wants the Niger delta to become more unstable; I am sure the Minister will share many of my concerns and respond positively to these proposals.
4.15 pm
The Minister for Trade and Investment (Mr. Mike O'Brien): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton. South (Mr. Tynan) on raising this important issue. I apologise on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) who is the Foreign Office Minister responsible for Africa. He would have replied to this debate had he not been in Ethiopia.
I begin by explaining why Nigeria matters so much to Britain, and why the British people should care about the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton, South. Twenty-five per cent. of all African people live in Nigeria; it is estimated that 180 million will live there by 2015, a figure that is projected to rise to 250 million by 2030. If Nigeria does not meet its millennium development goals, Africa cannot meet them.
Nigeria is a functioning democracy, however imperfect, indeed sometimes corrupt, the process. Success for Africa's largest democracy sends a message to the other democracies in the developing world, and failure for Nigeria sands them a bad message. Britain has substantial commercial interests in Nigeria, and is the major holder of Nigerian debt. Nigeria is a force for stability in west Africa, both through its extensive peacekeeping efforts and its economic standing as a magnet for economic activity in the region, and in terms of its own relative political stability.
It is stability that concerns us today, for stability in the Niger delta has an impact on stability across Nigeria, and a direct impact on the wealth and economic development of the country as a whole. The delta is an oil-rich zone on the south coast of Nigeria. It is large—about 70,000 sq km, the size of Scotland—and is home to 20 million people, but they are a complex mix of at least 40 different ethnic groups, speaking 250 dialects, across 3,000 different communities.
The problems of the delta are a microcosm of the many problems that Nigeria faces. It has high levels of poverty—75 per cent. of Nigerians subsist on less than a dollar a day—high unemployment, and a lack of access to

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basic needs; and the 3,000 different communities often mean a rash of ethnic strife. Added to that is the endemic corruption in the area, which is a problem that Nigeria as a whole faces. I take no pleasure in noting that Nigeria came 132nd out of the 133 countries in the 2003 Transparency International corruption perception index.
The Niger delta adds to that cocktail some specific problems of its own. It is without doubt the most unstable region in Nigeria. As my hon. Friend said, the vast oil reserves have led to equally vast oil thefts. There are no accurate statistics, for obvious reasons, but relatively reliable figures suggest that an average of 100,000 barrels a day are stolen, which is an enormous quantity. Again, we guess that that theft makes the thieves and those who support them very rich indeed. We guess that the profit from oil theft is about half a billion—yes, billion—dollars a year. Theft and corruption mean that those involved in ethnic clashes can gain access to more than just sticks and stones.
Mr. Tom Clarke: The Minister will agree that my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton, South (Mr. Tynan) made an excellent speech. He was able to focus on a point that I trust will be considered by the Commission for Africa, which is that, alongside poverty, malnutrition, HIV/AIDS and other scourges, there is rich mineral wealth. If that were properly shared with the many and not the few, many of those terrible problems that people experience could be removed. I trust, too, that that is very much in the Minister's mind.
Mr. O'Brien: My right hon. Friend is right. Wealth in the midst of poverty is a real problem in that part of Africa. It is one issue that no doubt the Commission for Africa will examine.
We must also examine the fact that such wealth, because of its unequal distribution, sometimes falls into the hands of rich and corrupt people who use poorer people in order to access weapons to get involved in ethnic strife. Small arms are proliferating across the region and they are increasingly sophisticated and available. Unemployed youngsters are easy to hire.
The picture, as my hon. Friend has painted it, is very challenging. It would be easy to conclude that there is no solution, but the delta matters to the UK. It is the engine of the Nigerian economy, producing 75 per cent. of Nigeria's crude oil production, 90 per cent. of its oil export revenue and more than 50 per cent. of its Government's own revenue. It is specifically vital to British commercial interests. As my hon. Friend said, the delta has been described as the jewel in Shell's upstream crown. The Shell Nigeria joint venture produces 1.3 million barrels per day.
There is also the British interest at a purely human level. We have about 1,000 UK nationals resident and working in the Niger delta at any one time, and we have a responsibility to do all we can to ensure their safety. Delta violence makes life even more difficult for them, and we have been involved in several kidnapping cases over the past 18 months—each of which, I am pleased to say, has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
It is estimated that Shell's operations cover about half of Nigeria's onshore and offshore oil reserves. Its operations in the Niger delta are widespread and
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complex. Shell has always recognised the need to be involved in community development programmes. My hon. Friend has already praised them. Those programmes have made some difference, though Shell would be the first to accept that to date the programmes have not made enough of a lasting impact on the ground.
Shell is searching for ways in which to promote stability and increase opportunity. For example, it is co-funding projects with the World Bank, Africare, the United Nations Development Programme and the United States Agency for International Development at community level in the delta. I would like to commend, as my hon. Friend has, the work of Coventry cathedral's International Centre for Reconciliation. He was right to identify its work as a model for other work. The centre has undertaken work deserving of great praise in Nembe.
The prime responsibility for the delta, however, lies of course with the Nigerian Government at state and national level. I recognise the efforts of the Nigerian Government's Operation Restore Hope—a joint navy, army and mobile police operation with the aim of cracking down on armed militancy. Nigeria's resources are limited, however, and there have been examples of armed gangs outgunning Nigerian forces. We are also conscious of allegations of human rights abuses by some in the Nigerian forces in the delta in the past. They have a fine balance to strike between establishing effective law and order in the delta and behaving in a way that is appropriate to Africa's biggest democracy. Sometimes that balance is struck well; sometimes, regrettably, it is not.
Could the British Government do more? Our starting point is that there is no quick fix. We need to build consensus with other Governments working closely in the delta—for example the US and the Dutch—and with the broader donor community, the oil majors, and the Nigerian Government themselves, at both state and federal level. Our current efforts concentrate on a number of strands. President Obasanjo's endorsement of a home-grown extractive industry transparency initiative, or EITI, offers an opportunity to increase the transparency and accountability of Government at all levels on the flow and use of oil revenue. The Nigerian Government have made a commitment to include back accounting of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company account. If undertaken effectively, that will be a major step towards tracing the somewhat opaque trail of oil revenue.
We have been working with major oil companies engaged in the delta, as well as NGOs, to try to ensure that measures to protect the security of oil companies do not give rise to human rights abuses. They have adopted a set of voluntary principles on human rights and security, which are now core to the working practices of many of the companies concerned, although more needs to be done to strengthen their effectiveness in the Niger delta.
We are using our position with both the federal and state Governments and the oil majors to press for effective and comprehensive measures to re-establish stability in the region. We are further strengthening our

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consular protection and response to incidents involving British nationals in the delta, such as kidnappings. We have appointed an honorary consul in Warri and maintain our full-time consular office in Port Harcourt. We have overhauled our consular links with the oil majors and the British community and set up a rapid response team under the direction of the deputy high commissioner in Lagos to deal with problems as they arise.
We are considering how we can best help build NGO and civil society capacity to engage on energy and governance issues with the Nigerian authorities. We aim to support NGOs, academics, the media, faith-based organisations and the national and state assemblies to improve accountability, deal with corruption and make effective use of resources. We are also strengthening the hand of Nigeria's anti-corruption agencies. In particular, we are providing equipment for the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and we are exploring support for the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission.
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I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising what is an enormously important issue not only for Nigeria but for Britain and the wider international community. It has given us an opportunity to focus on a problem that is, as he said, important for the future prosperity of Nigeria and for the future health of British interests there. There is no silver bullet, but the Government are committed to long and patient consensus building to reverse the terrible waste of resources and human effort in the delta region.
The problem of oil wealth among poor regions can be addressed if we bring together the various groups—oil majors, Governments and NGOs—that are interested in helping the delta to revive. In that way we can start to improve the situation. The British Government are committed to our part in the process, but success is dependent on others playing their part. We hope and believe that it is possible for them to do so, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising the matter.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Four o'clock.