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§ Mr. Frank Doran (Aberdeen, Central)I am delighted to introduce today's debate but the circumstances, as ever, are difficult. This is the first opportunity we have had to acknowledge the 15th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster. On 6 July 1988, there was a massive explosion on the Piper Alpha platform. A gas processor had exploded and set off a chain reaction that destroyed the platform and killed 167 men. The 15th anniversary was last Sunday. I wish to express in the strongest possible terms my sympathy for relatives who lost loved ones and for those survivors whose lives were so tragically affected by the Piper Alpha disaster.
It is also appropriate to remember other workers who died or who were seriously injured in offshore accidents. In a little more than 20 years, from 1980 to 2001, there were 1,377 serious injuries and fatalities; there were 376 deaths, including the Piper victims, and 104 people were killed in helicopter incidents. So far this year, there has been one death, which is tragic enough. An oil worker died on an Ensco rig in Morecambe bay.
The oil and gas extraction industry is very dangerous. At the time of the disaster in 1988, I was a young and inexperienced Member of Parliament. I was overwhelmed by the impact of the disaster, which had happened more or less on my doorstep. I met many relatives and survivors repeatedly, all of whom live each day with the painful memory of their loss. Everyone responded differently to the disaster. Some were angry, many people became involved in long-term campaigns for changes in offshore safety, while many others campaigned for prosecutions for unlawful killing. Many people did not want to be reminded of the disaster, however, and kept their feelings to themselves. It is important to respect that.
Such matters highlight our difficult job as parliamentarians. We need to analyse the errors that led to the Piper Alpha disaster and ensure that systems are in place to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. I want to reflect a little on what led to the disaster, the disaster itself, the response and some contemporary issues that have a bearing on safety in the North sea today.
Long before I had heard of Piper Alpha, I was well aware of the safety problems of the oil and gas industry. Before I became a Member of Parliament, I was a practising solicitor in north-east Scotland. I dealt with many personal injury cases that arose from offshore work. For lawyers, the injuries were not that different from injuries in an industrial environment. What was different, however, was the apparent lack of an offshore safety culture. I heard many times about a pressured working environment in which tight deadlines were imposed, risks were taken constantly and access to proper medical facilities was limited. The industry had a frontier mentality. Huge investment in platform construction and infrastructure meant that the race to begin and maintain production was intense.
I discussed regularly with insurance companies the appalling tales that I had heard about the industry. I remember vividly one specific discussion. My client had been working on a drill floor and was badly burned by 273WH acid. He was taken for a shower and then to his bunk. The drilling did not stop and the offshore installation manager refused to arrange for a helicopter to take him ashore for medical treatment. He had to wait for the next scheduled flight. When I asked the insurance company representative why there was no pressure on the industry to improve its safety procedure, he was blunt. He said, "They don't want anything to interfere with production. They will pay the higher premiums— it's much cheaper for them." That was the approach of the industry in those days. That cynical view suggested that the many injuries and fatalities that occurred in those early years were accepted by the industry as inevitable.
If the Government had been more vigilant, things might have been different. Safety inspections at that time were carried out by officials at the Department of Energy. Ten months before the tragedy on the Piper Alpha there was another death on the platform—a Mr. Sutherland was killed. There were inspections following his death and later that year, in June 1988, there was a further inspection. Apparently, the inspector noticed a few points, but none of the serious problems that led to the disaster. Paragraph 15.48 of the report of Lord Cullen's inquiry stated:
Even after making allowances for the fact that the inspection in June 1988 proceeded on the basis of sampling, it is clear to me that it was superficial to the point of being of little use as a test of safety on the platform. It did not reveal any of the clear cut and readily ascertainable deficiencies.What Lord Cullen said about the inspection on the Piper Alpha could have been said about any number of offshore platforms. There was no effective control of safety standards offshore. I firmly believe that if the accident had not happened on the Piper Alpha, it would have happened elsewhere in the North sea. The substantial change and improvement and investment in health and safety that the industry so desperately needed, were forced on it by the scale and impact of the Piper Alpha disaster. It was also the first major event to expose to the Government the weakness in the industry's approach.Basically, the industry's view was that, as long as it was close to Government, and they approved of what it was doing or at least were prepared to turn a blind eye, everything was okay. That showed that the policy of engaging with the Government was working and delivering for the industry. The fact that the approach to health and safety was fundamentally wrong and that the operators were taking massive and potentially very expensive risks in pursuing the policies never seemed to occur to anyone in the industry or in the Government.
There are many reasons why the Piper Alpha disaster happened. Lord Cullen's inquiry picked up most of them but steered clear of some of the more controversial reasons. For example, he highlighted the strategic issues, which applied to the industry as a whole—the lack of a safety culture offshore, the inadequacy of safety training, the poor inter-platform communication and the poor communication between land-based emergency services and the platforms. He also recognised the conflict of interest between the Department of Energy's departmental responsibilities for production and for safety.
274WH As for the Piper Alpha, Cullen highlighted a number of problems, such as the failures of the safety audit and risk assessment system, the failure of the permit-to-work system, the fact that there were no adequate firewalls or explosion barriers, the failure to maintain the deluge system and the common practice of switching off the system. In the inspection that took place in June 1988, just days before the disaster, none of those items was picked up, which is a major criticism of the safety system at that time.
However, the matter that Lord Cullen spent less time considering was the immense economic pressure on operators at that time and the culture that existed in the offshore industry. The North sea was a relatively new oil province and the cost of exploiting our oil and gas resources was enormous. The Piper Alpha platform cost more than $1 billion. There was enormous pressure to recover the financial outlay. The Government were also under pressure. They wanted to start collecting the revenues. In the financial year 1988–89, when the Piper Alpha exploded, a total of £3.6 billion was paid to the Exchequer in oil taxation and gas levy. That was a fairly low take from the North sea.
A couple of years previously, the Exchequer received more than £12 billion, so it was a huge investment for the Government. The take was low in 1988 because of a collapse in oil prices and many thought that the price collapse in 1985–86 contributed to the disaster. Neither the oil industry nor the Government had any incentive to pay proper attention to safety offshore. As I said, there was a frontier mentality. Employment in the offshore oil and gas industry was like no other employment in the United Kingdom.
All Lord Cullen's recommendations were implemented. In particular, health and safety was transferred from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive, and a new offshore safety division was established. Every installation was required to produce a safety plan. They were based on a goal-setting approach with proper risk assessment and involvement of the work force. Cullen's findings fundamentally changed the approach to health and safety offshore. They also had a major impact on every other area of health and safety in the UK and other parts of the world.
There is no doubt that Lord Cullen's recommendations have led to huge improvements in safety offshore, but the situation is not perfect. There are still serious accidents and deaths. Available figures show that, between the Piper Alpha disaster and 2001, there have been a further 68 deaths. Subsequent to the 2001 published figures, there have been other deaths; I mentioned one that occurred earlier this year on the Ensco rig at Morecambe bay. There has been a combined total of 780 deaths and serious injuries offshore in that time. The figures are still far too high. It is important to recognise that the oil industry has made tremendous efforts to improve the safety system offshore since Piper Alpha. The relations between the Government and the oil industry in respect of safety are now encompassed in Pilot, which was created by the Government to be their point of liaison with the oil industry for several reasons, particularly safety.
The initiative that is now being led by Pilot is the step change limit safety strategy. The step change initiative was launched at the 1997 Offshore Europe conference. It 275WH set a target of a 50 per cent. improvement in safety. The success of the initiative is monitored by the HSE's safety statistics. Statistics published in March 2001 showed that the all-injury rate had improved by 35 per cent., and the fatal and major injury rate by 16 per cent.
Those statistics are significant. They note the positive results due to the implementation of step change and highlight the fact that much remains to be accomplished. The programme has set out objectives for 2003, which include a common emergency telephone number, a drive for personal responsibility—always difficult in an environment such as the North sea—and a review of incidents with a high potential for serious injury or damage. I strongly support those efforts. They have led to positive improvements in the safety regime, but it is obvious that the industry needs to do more. Having said that, I recognise how stubborn a problem that is, and how difficult it is to move forward in the environment of the North sea.
That outline of the background and history of the matter takes us at a swift canter to where we are today. I mentioned the progress that has been made on safety, and it is a tragedy that it took the Piper Alpha disaster to change some of the fundamentals of the industry. At the same time, we have to recognise the progress that has been made. There are a number of issues that have a bearing on safety that need to be considered.
The momentum towards introducing an offence of corporate killing arose in 1988. It is interesting to look back at that period, because at that time there were a number of high profile disasters, including Piper Alpha, the Zeebrugge ferry, the Marchioness on the Thames and the Clapham rail disaster. All those led to a demand for the creation of a new offence, corporate killing. The Law Commission considered that matter in 1996 and made positive recommendations. They have not yet been implemented, but I was pleased when the Home Secretary announced two months ago that he would introduce such an offence. It is an urgent issue that represents unfinished business from Piper Alpha. It is important that it is implemented.
Another major issue arises from the fact that the North sea oil and gas industry is now mature. Some will say it is in decline—I prefer to be more optimistic. Records show that we have produced about half the oil that has been, or is likely to be, discovered. It is a mature province. Things are changing. There is more economic pressure in the North sea and many of the older-established companies are moving away or, in most cases, disposing of their assets. New entrants are coming into the North sea. That raises the potential for some exciting opportunities, but risks are attached to them.
Many of the new entrants do not come into the area with the same culture as those who lived through the period of the Piper Alpha. I am not making any allegations against, or suggestions about, those companies, but I sound a warning that, as we go through a period of change and new entrants take up their places in the North sea oil industry, all sides should work to ensure that there is no slippage of safety as a result of that changeover. It is important that they are in tune with the North sea safety culture.
§ Mr. Oliver Heald (North-East Hertfordshire)Is the hon. Gentleman concerned that the new generation of 276WH independents that is coming in is taking over equipment that is 20 years old or more? How does he think that that should be addressed? Some of the large companies that owned that equipment for many years have been able to put in considerable resources.
§ Mr. DoranThat is an important point. I am fairly sure that that will be the least of our worries; it should not be a problem if the safety inspectorate is doing its job. It is also unlikely to be a problem because there was massive investment in the North sea industry's infrastructure and platforms, particularly following the Piper Alpha disaster: throughout the 1990s, there was substantial expenditure on safety equipment and safety measures by the North sea oil and gas industry. However, it will be a problem if there is not sufficient investment to maintain that infrastructure. That is where monitoring is needed.
It is important to recognise some of the problems that affect the offshore work force. It is clear that there is a decline in that work force. Major companies have announced substantial redundancies in the past few months. Some are a result of the change in ownership of platforms, but all have an effect on morale. Those redundancies do not only affect the people in those companies, because—this may sound like a foolish thing to say—the North sea is a small village and news travels fast. If one company is affected, people begin to worry about how their company's business will be affected. There is a knock-on effect that must be recognised.
It must also be recognised that the oil industry is not very good at communicating, particularly with its own work force. I have recently had discussions with several companies about their failure to communicate properly with their work force about changes in the business that affect that work force directly. I hope that the Government's information and consultation proposals announced earlier this week will take root in the North sea and that if the industry will not provide its own means of communicating directly with its work force, the work force will take advantage of the facilities in the legislation that will be introduced, to establish its own processes with management. It must be emphasised that this is about maintaining morale. If anyone who works in the environment of the North sea industry feels that their job is under threat, that has an impact. If they feel that the future of the industry as a whole is under threat, that is even more devastating.
Also on communication, there has been considerable recent discussion—and concern—about proposed changes in safety systems. BP has pressed ahead with what it calls its jigsaw proposals. Basically, they are an examination of its safety systems. The original proposal was to replace stand-by vessels with helicopters. The situation has now moved on, and we have a proposal for a mix of helicopters, stand-by vessels and other emergency response vessels. I have supported BP's approach on the simple basis that if a company is prepared to spend £10 million just on examining its safety system, that is welcome expenditure and we need to learn the lessons that come from it. At the same time, what is proposed needs to be properly attested by the Health and Safety Executive to ensure that it meets North sea safety requirements.
It must also be recognised that those proposals do not only affect BP employees and the people who work on BP platforms. There is concern that that safety system 277WH might be rolled out across the North sea: BP is in discussion with other companies. That has an effect on employees whose employers have not yet taken the opportunity to explain what this is all about. Any threat to safety—that is how it will be seen by some employees—will cause concern.
I am conscious of the clock, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I want to raise the issue of the working time regulations. The Minister will know that last week the Department of Trade and Industry made an announcement introducing regulations that will implement the horizontal amending directive, which will affect a number of industries including the North sea industry. There is some uncertainty about the regulations. I was heavily involved in negotiations and discussions with the industry and trade unions, and I frequently spoke about them to the Minister responsible for employment. I therefore know most of the background.
The expectation of the offshore work force was that there would be changes to the holidays. However, the unions" interpretation of the regulations is that the work force will not get any extra holidays as a result of the published regulations. That is not my interpretation, and I know that the Minister with responsibility for employment is to write to the oil industry to say that his interpretation is that there will be two weeks extra holiday for workers. Doubts need to be cleared up. If the expectations of the offshore work force are not met, when they have been led to expect additional holidays, it will affect morale, which could affect safety. Any uncertainty needs to be cleared up quickly.
Finally, safety representatives are one of the key elements of the offshore safety system. I raised a worry with the Minister's predecessor that had been raised by one of the trade unions. I will not go into it in detail because of time. However, I received a letter from the Minister just half an hour ago setting out his position. I had referred to the employment tribunal case of Mr. Stephen Hayward v. Eurest and Maersk Company Ltd., which prompted major concern for the unions about working practices offshore. The case revolves around the protection that a health and safety representative has when he or she raises safety issues on an installation. Mr. Hayward was an employee of Eurest and Maersk Company Ltd. decided that it wanted him off the platform, and the tribunal decided that because Maersk was not his employer, part of his case could be found against him. The unions are worried because it was always understood that the health and safety representative regulations would give protection against any detriment, and Mr. Hayward regards being removed from his platform as a detriment. His employers had no control over where he was.
Every offshore installation is regarded as being in the same legal position as a vessel, where the master is in control. The offshore installation manager—the OIM—on that platform, who was a Maersk employer, could therefore decide that someone whom he did not employ should leave the ship. That undermines the protection of safety representatives. The unions raised that issue with me in the context of the review that is being conducted of the health and safety representative regulations. It has been a long-standing grievance of the offshore 278WH unions that union-appointed representatives do not have the same rights as those of unions onshore do. In the unions view, they need more protection.
I should close, as I have spoken for longer than I anticipated, for which I apologise. The Piper Alpha disaster changed the fundamentals of the oil industry, not just in the North sea but around the world. It taught us never to relax on safety issues. There have been massive improvements in safety since the disaster, but the accidents continue. I have expressed some concerns today, but I know that not all of them fall within the Minister's brief; I do not expect him to respond to all my points. However, with the will of the oil industry and the Government, and the proper involvement of the work force, we can continue the improvement.
§ Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam)Order. Before I call the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond), I remind Members that the object of an Adjournment debate is to enable the Member who secured it to hear what the Minister has to say. I have no power to impose limits on speeches, but I ask Members to be brief so that we can do that.
§ Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan)Thank you very much, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I shall be brief. I warmly congratulate the hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central (Mr. Doran) on securing the debate. It is highly appropriate that it is being held around the 15th anniversary of Piper Alpha. I apologise in advance to hon. Members for the fact that, due to a medical appointment, I cannot stay until the end of the debate. No discourtesy is intended.
I feel strongly about what the hon. Gentleman said about the impact on young MPs. I was a young MP when the Piper Alpha disaster happened. It had a huge impact on how we regarded things and there was a sea change in attitudes to the oil industry. I was involved with the Energy Committee and ensuring that the Cullen recommendations were implemented. However, the impact on us as Members of Parliament is nothing compared with the enormous impact that the disaster had on the relatives of those who died and the survivors, who were greatly affected and have lived with it for the past 15 years. On the 10th anniversary a powerful, moving film by Ed Punchard, one of the survivors, was shown in the precincts of the House.
Looking back at what was said in the debates and questions that surrounded the 10th anniversary, it is disappointing that one issue is, as the hon. Gentleman described it, unfinished business that has yet to be resolved. Five years ago there was some optimism and belief that corporate killing would be dealt with properly—that was not the case throughout the 1990s. Despite the welcome indications that action is about to take place, I am disappointed that, even on the 15th anniversary of that horrendous disaster, that issue has not been dealt with properly. I hope that the Minister will give us some information about a timetable for dealing with it. That is not the only thing outstanding from Piper Alpha, but it is probably one of the most important.
279WH I endorse just about everything that the hon. Gentleman said. I also agree that the importance of the step change initiative launched in 1997 cannot be underestimated. Two aspects of that initiative made it particularly important and successful. First, it was carried forward at a high level in the oil industry. The chairman of the initiative was George Watkins, the managing director of Conoco in the North sea at the time. George has recently retired and we should all compliment him on his career generally and on the step change initiative in particular.
Secondly, Rab Wilson, who as many of us know is a union official with long experience in North sea matters, a couple of years ago said:
Step Change is a breath of fresh air. It has created an open, transparent and inclusive mechanism for dealing with safety issues in the offshore sector. We are now all very much partners in developing a new safety culture for our industry.That endorsement is welcome, because such things were absent in the years before Piper Alpha. That is the single most important lesson that the industry learned from those horrendous events.The hon. Gentleman put his finger on a matter of current concern, which is that the change in the ownership structure of the North sea brings with it a fresh challenge. I, too, welcome the introduction of new, aggressive exploring companies into the North sea, not least because the track record of the older, more established companies in the development and appraisal of exploration wells has not been good of late. In fact, they have been drilling next to no wells. When the cross-party energy group met last week it discussed the number of new companies coming in. All hon. Members who are concerned about offshore employment, and those who have many constituency and wider economic interests, welcomed the optimism of such companies about the opportunities that undoubtedly still exist in the North sea and will, in my view, continue to do so for the next half century. The implications for safety are important. The hon. Gentleman was correct to stress that in his remarks.
I do not claim that the Health and Safety Executive is not apprised of that process. On the contrary, it released a statement a few weeks ago saying that it would launch a specific campaign on that issue. The Financial Times said:
The HSE's growing concern at the delays comes 15 years after the explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform killed 167 people and on the 10th anniversary of offshore safety regulations introduced as a result. It also comes as larger companies shift their attention from the maturing North Sea, with its ageing infrastructure, to promising new regions, and as a new generation of independents takes their place. Many operators are also seeking efficiencies as production declines.So the Health and Safety Executive seems to have been apprised of the changing ownership environment. The Minister might want to say more about that concern.I also want to allude to another Financial Times article, which had the headline, "Spectre of Piper Alpha haunts North Sea" and was published on 3 May. It pointed to a number of trends and factors that could affect safety, including the tendency for tighter margins to allow routine maintenance schedules to slip, and the fact that oil production is now less labour-intensive per barrel, so maintenance staff may also be sacrificed in the drive to be more efficient. In addition, as has already 280WH been said, despite technological innovations and new preventive measures, much older equipment—some of which has been in use in the field for many years—has a tendency to break down more regularly. Other faults can lie hidden unless specialist testing is used to reveal corrosion and other fractures.
The article raised a substantial concern: it claimed that there was under-reporting of injuries, which could mask the true extent of safety regime failure in the North sea. It cited the example of staff being moved to office work onshore rather than being reported off work for extended periods. I am not claiming that that practice is widespread; none the less, that article, in a reputable newspaper, caused me some concern. I hope that the Minister can address not only that point but the wider issue of how the Government regard the changing ownership structure of the North sea and the ramifications that that will have on safety.
The concern that many of us have about these issues is long-standing, and the hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central was absolutely right to seek the debate. We should not take the fact that only a few hon. Members are present as an indication of lack of concern. However, it is important that we, as representatives, do not allow a culture to come about in which it takes another major incident or disaster for everyone to demonstrate how concerned they have always been. There is a responsibility—it has been discharged by the hon. Gentleman and all of us—to ensure that concerns are raised and questions asked, not necessarily because we believe that wrongful actions are taking place, but because we want everyone to know that their representatives are vigilantly monitoring what is going on. I know that the new Minister will take the opportunity to demonstrate that the Government are apprised of the issues and intend to take effective action.
§ Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North)I add my congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central (Mr. Doran) on securing the debate at this appropriate time. I apologise, not for being unable to stay until the end of the debate, but for missing the start because, as I explained to my hon. Friend, I had an engagement elsewhere. I add the apologies of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Miss Begg) who, because of her responsibilities as a member of the Chairmen's Panel, is chairing a meeting elsewhere; otherwise, she would have been here too.
I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central on his comprehensive speech. I shall try to keep my remarks fairly brief, because I shall cover similar areas. It is wholly appropriate that we commemorate Piper Alpha and the victims—those who tragically lost their lives and those who were physically or mentally scarred but survived the terrible tragedy. We should also remember the suffering of friends, families and relatives. Also, because it was one of the greatest disasters of its kind, we should commemorate all others who have been victims or relatives, or who have been scarred, in other tragedies in the North sea offshore sector.
In Aberdeen city there are memorials both to Piper Alpha and to offshore workers more generally, but surely the best memorial of all must be the fact that we 281WH are trying to improve safety and to reduce the risks of other large-scale disasters occurring, and trying to reduce accidents in general, be they fatal or serious, or minor. In building a safety culture, it is crucial that one is concerned about all levels of accident.
My hon. Friend mentioned the work of Lord Cullen. We all pay tribute to what he did and the way in which that helped to effect a fundamental change in the ethos of the industry. I pay tribute to the decision of a previous Government to bring a section of the Health and Safety Executive up to Aberdeen. Many of us campaigned for such a decision and it has helped to improve safety. I add my voice to those that we have already heard on that.
The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) mentioned the work of the oil and gas industry taskforce, which became Pilot, through the step change programme. That was an excellent example of Government, management, oil companies, industry organisations, trade unions and the work force working together. Indeed, that has applied generally in Pilot. The step change work on improving safety has been very valuable.
My next point may be slightly biased, but justifiably so. As a former governor and a current fellow of Robert Gordon university, I pay tribute to all the work that it has done—for example, on initiatives such as the offshore survival centre. We also pay tribute to many other groups.
The atmosphere has changed enormously. In the early days of the offshore industry, there were many more divers than there are now. One heard stories of people who had had only a short period of training being asked to dive to depths to which trained military divers would not go. Those people were a danger to themselves and everyone diving with them. The enormous change in the industry's attitude to that most hazardous of activities is very welcome.
My hon. Friend referred to the situation in which one company was looking at changing from support vessels to helicopters. There was a lot of concern about that, and I am glad that it was fully discussed. The decision was that there would be a general shift to helicopters, but support vessels would be kept That was a good example of people working towards consensus. The greater the diversification in the different forms of safety support, the better one can cope with different forms of tragedy or disaster. That makes every sort of sense and I welcome it.
I also welcome the ingenuity and inventiveness that the industry has shown in trying to find new methods of improving safety. I am thinking of positioning watches and the global positioning system, whereby people who go overboard can be easily and quickly located. There are also lightweight survival suits, so that people will work in the suits, rather than being tempted not to use them. My hon. Friends the Members for Aberdeen, Central and for Aberdeen, South and I feel that it might be helpful for other industries, such as the fishing industry, to consider whether they would be wise to adopt similar safety measures.
The whole ethos and attitude has improved. It is good to go to different places and see the chart showing how long it has been since there was an accident. There can 282WH be a slight reporting problem, in that if the installation claims that it has not had an accident for 120 days, there can be the temptation not to register something because it would spoil the record. However, I think that everyone realises the seriousness of the issues and I welcome the change in ethos and attitude.
Sleep and rest are an important part of safety offshore. In the tragic case that was before the courts last year, in which a driver had fallen asleep at the wheel and caused a major rail disaster, the judge said that shortage of sleep could be a greater danger than drink or drugs. It is therefore important for people to have proper rest times. As has already been mentioned, constituents and trade unions have expressed great concern to me and my hon. Friends about the horizontal amending directive—sometimes called the working time directive. I notice from the Government's response to the public consultation that widespread concern has also been expressed to the Government about it.
The Government have indicated in that response that they will accept the 52-week reference period—the longer of the periods that might have been adopted—and that guidance will be sought from Europe on working time and the definition of working time. There was great effort to try to reach some form of consensus in relation to the four weeks, and it is unfortunate that that was not possible. Great concern has been expressed about that. I understand that the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Sutcliffe), will be putting out a letter strongly recommending that, at the very least, a two-week period of additional holiday should be given in relation to the general agreement on four weeks" holiday.
I urge the oil industry to view that recommendation sympathetically, for two reasons in particular: first, because of the importance of co-operation with the industry in relation to safety, and the importance of morale and other issues mentioned by the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan, and secondly, because I am gravely concerned by the reports in our local newspapers today that safety representatives have been resigning in quite large numbers because they feel that there has not been a proper response from the industry. If that is the case, it would be the cause of grave concern—it could undermine the safety forums, which have been an important part of offshore safety. I join the trade unions in urging safety reps not to resign, but I also urge the industry to think very carefully about how it should respond, and to take the general safety implications into account.
There are difficulties in the industry, and at times that means that people have to work abnormally long shifts—sometimes several close together. However, taking the rail disaster as an example, we must never permit commercial considerations to come above safety considerations in the dangerous environment of the North sea, and in a dangerous industry such as offshore oil.
I believe that most good employers will say that good safety practice and the welfare of their staff is their top priority. Sadly, even in an industry such as the offshore oil industry, there are some bad employers. That is why, a few years ago, I tabled a private Member's Bill in which I sought to update the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974. That Act was originally passed under both 283WH Labour and Conservative Governments, with cross-party support, but the fines that it imposes are now out of date, and it does not permit the possibility of imprisonment where there has been criminal negligence. That has been criticised by judges in a number of cases.
I welcome the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Lawrie Quinn) reintroduced that Bill this year. Sadly, because these things sometimes get tied up between the usual channels, it again does not look as if it will progress. It is vital for that Bill to pass. There should be realistic fines for those who demonstrate bad practice, either in relation to health and safety or in not providing properly for the insurance of their staff.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central mentioned corporate manslaughter; he has raised the issue over many years. Like him, I welcome the fact that the Government intend to make progress on it. That is vital.
I want to finish on a positive note. As regards safety, there has been an important improvement in attitudes, performance and co-operation. Much has been achieved, but we need to achieve much more. To repeat, improving safety offshore is the best possible memorial not only for the victims of the Piper Alpha disaster but for all victims.
§ Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine)Before I start, I must mention my entry in the Register of Members" Interests. First, I benefit from shares in Shell. Secondly, as one of the vice-chairmen of the all-party group on the offshore oil and gas industry, I went to the offshore Norwegian sector conference in Stavanger last autumn. The visit was organised by the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, and supported by several oil companies. My main interest in the debate, however, relates to my constituency, which is another north-east constituency. Many people there work in the industry or are otherwise involved in it.
Like other hon. Members, I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central (Mr. Doran) on taking this opportunity to mark the 15th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster. I certainly remember the night of 6 July, because I was living in Aberdeen at the time. At about midnight, there was a report on the BBC news. It was in that classic style that the BBC has when it knows that there has been a major disaster but does not have enough information to give the full story. However, one could read between the lines that something had gone dramatically wrong in the North sea that night. Indeed, if one lives in Aberdeen, one knows very well when something has gone wrong, because helicopters start flying over the city. As one lay in one's bed, having heard the news, hearing the helicopter traffic in the middle of the night, one knew that other people were suffering quite badly. The next day, we realised the full impact of what had happened: 167 people died.
Piper Alpha was a major tragedy for everyone involved—the families, the relatives, the friends and those who survived. Furthermore, the North sea is a big village, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central said, and the tragedy must have hit everyone working in the sector. They had to go to work the next day, while families and friends stayed at home. That must have put 284WH everyone under great stress. The disaster really was a dramatic moment in the life of the North sea and of those affected.
As others have said, such events should not make us lose sight of the fact that every death and serious injury has a major impact on the individuals involved. Every incident is one too many, and we must prevent people from losing their livelihoods as a result of unnecessary accidents offshore. That is why we must pay tribute to the work of Lord Cullen. Often, when there are calls for major judicial inquiries, people say, "It's going to take a lot of time, money and effort." However, we can be proud of what Lord Cullen did. He focused minds on how to improve safety by thinking of it in terms not of a box-ticking exercise but of safety at each installation. That was a real sea change in improving the safety culture.
Like others who have visited offshore installations—the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) mentioned this—I have seen the safety on board and the pride that people take in the safety culture. Obviously, when one goes on a day visit, one may simply be getting the best impression from people, and things may sometimes be different. The hon. Gentleman was right to say that people must resist the temptation not to report something.
There is also a temptation for people to say, "We"ve been safe for so long. This is a safe environment." However, the North sea is still a very hostile environment. When safety is managed and there are no accidents, the day-to-day reminders of the danger are not there. That should not, however, take away the recognition of how hostile the environment is.
I went on an interesting visit to a construction yard, where I saw the benefits of bringing the safety culture onshore. Safety has been improved offshore, and the same language has now started to be used onshore. At one time, people offshore used to say, "It's a very hostile environment, and we, have to accept risks." In the same way, people onshore said, "We can sort out safety offshore, but construction is inherently dangerous." Bringing the offshore permit-to-work regime onshore and into the construction yard could improve safety there, too.
Even more positive encouragement for accepting such a safety regime and understanding its processes came about when people started to discover the economic benefits of being safer. Not only were they not incurring losses because there were fewer accidents, but the safety regime resulted in an increased understanding of industrial processes. There is much to be said in favour of positive offshore experiences.
It is a time of change in the North sea, and change can be dangerous if it is not handled carefully. I hope that the Minister will give us some idea of how that safety culture will be continued by the new operators in the North sea, and how those who have not experienced what we have been through will be taking on board not only the letter of what is involved but the full culture behind it.
The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) touched on the attempt to improve the maintenance regime, and the concerns of the Health and Safety Executive about slippage on maintenance. In April 2004, it will be starting a campaign. Even now, if 285WH progress has been made, an update and feedback on the campaign to improve maintenance and to ensure that there is no slippage would be useful.
It would be helpful also to hear about the maturity of some of the platforms, a subject raised by others. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central was right to say that much has been invested in those platforms and their maintenance. However, the HSE has expressed concerns about attempts to suppress and to control leaks of hydrocarbons, because they could be the precursor to something major. I wonder whether information on the leaks has been broken down, so that we can say whether they occur in older installations or equipment, or whether they occur across the board in the North sea.
Progressing those matters is important. People lobbied BP and its jigsaw project because it represented change and there was concern that it made matters more dangerous. The lobbying helped to trigger more communication, so that both sides understood what was going on. None the less, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North said, the location wristwatches that he is keen to see, and the new lightweight survival gear, were the result of the thinking behind the jigsaw project. They were part of the package to make jigsaw work.
I welcome that initiative and the thought that is going on. However, concern is sometimes expressed about the changing nature of some of the training. Because of a greater analysis of safety matters, attempts have been made to narrow down who should receive specialist training on some safety aspects offshore and survival training.
A friend's wife telephoned me to say that she had just heard from his company that the helicopter in which he was travelling had ditched in the North sea. It was a traumatic moment for everyone. The helicopter turned over. My friend said afterwards that the survival training gave him all the necessary instincts, but he was not sure that a video would have got him through it. The fact that people go through the more risky aspects of surviving offshore and experience them first hand helps.
When I was forced by the air cadets from Portlethen to take part in a safety training exercise at RGIT Montrose's former facility at King street, we had to jump into a pool with a wave machine. I understand that the wave machine is not used any more because of the safety risks. People are concerned that the training could be more dangerous than the benefits to be gained from it. It now takes place in a calmer pool. However, those who work offshore are worried that the loss of some of that training is not being carefully thought out. Perhaps the Minister could deal with that point.
Concern has already been expressed about the working time directive. If benefits are to be gained from the aspects of the directive that could impose costs on the industry, the Minister's role in Pilot and in negotiations with the Treasury is important. There is an overall economic cost of operating in the North sea and there is an overall world price for the product that comes out. If investment is to go in, the bottom line has to be balanced. If we, as a society, want to make regulations to benefit the quality of life of those working in the North sea, and if they involve costs, the Treasury must 286WH understand that in negotiations about the tax regime. The regime must remain competitive for future financial investment.
The other development that could improve safety is the work being done with Norway to try to improve understanding of regulations across the border. Norway's safety regime is very different from ours, and many of the developments that we want to encourage transcend the border. People face an added risk if they are operating in two safety regimes at once or trying to understand a box-ticking safety regime and a safety case culture. I hope that the Minister can update us on the attempts of the partnership with Norway to clarify regulations as they apply across the border.
Finally, I welcome the introduction of an offence of corporate killing. It is long overdue. It is easy to say that it should have come sooner. There is a sense of injustice that, out of 8,000 serious injury prosecutions, only four have been against senior management, and of 900 prosecutions for deaths—not in the North sea; these are general prosecutions to do with safety—only nine have been against senior management. The treatment of senior management must be seen to be part of the just resolution of an incident, and of any steps to prevent problems from occurring.
Like others, I welcome this timely reminder of what we went through at the time of Piper Alpha. We all wish that we had never had to go through it, but perhaps we can derive some benefit from the experience if we realise that, although it is safe now, it will not always be so. We should remember the lessons and continue with a dynamic learning process as we find new ways of being safe.
The North sea is of major benefit to our economy and can provide many jobs in the constituencies of those who have spoken and in other constituencies across the United Kingdom, but not at any price. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North said, the best memorial to the lives of those lost on Piper Alpha will be to maintain vigilance and to ensure that our safety regime is the best in the world, so that we will never again pay such a high price.
§ Mr. Oliver Heald (North-East Hertfordshire)I join those who have congratulated the hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central (Mr. Doran) on securing the debate in such a timely fashion. It is excellent that it is possible to debate issues such as the future of health and safety almost exactly 15 years after the Piper Alpha disaster. It is right that we should remember the 167 people who lost their lives on that terrible evening. Thankfully, 62 people were saved, many of them from the cold North sea. Ironically, many of them had abandoned the emergency procedures that they had been given and had simply run for their lives and jumped into the sea. It must be a terrible time both for the bereaved families and for the lucky ones who are thinking back to those terrible events. I join in the comments that have been made by the hon. Gentleman and by the hon. Members for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond), for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith). It is good that we are able to audit how far we have come and how far there is to go.
287WH The hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine spoke about training and the need to look at modern technology with a view to improving safety. I would agree with that. He was also right to pay tribute to the Cullen inquiry, set up to investigate the causes and circumstances of the disaster. As has been said, it pinpointed three areas in which progress was needed. Workers on the platform that night were not adequately trained in emergency procedures, and the management were not really trained to provide leadership during a crisis. We should consider how far we have come in that regard, and how far we should go. There had been a relaxation of the approved maintenance paperwork system and a reliance on informal communication, which Lord Cullen believed to be quite wrong—another important area. Measures that had been identified in previous risk assessment audits were simply not implemented.
The inquiry concluded that there were significant flaws in the health and safety measures on Piper Alpha, which were the cause of the tragic accident. Lord Cullen made 106 detailed recommendations, all of which were implemented. The four sets of regulations that followed were widely welcomed. I believe that it was the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North who made the important point that the old Department of Energy was not the right place for dealing with the whole question of safety. The transfer of those regulations to the Offshore Safety Act 1992 was therefore an important moment because it created a much clearer and more transparent safety system and put the matter in the hands of the experts in the Health and Safety Executive. I echo the praise given to the step change in safety campaign.
Several other regulations have built on health and safety legislation's beneficial effect. In the 10 years since the disaster, the number and rate of fatalities and serious accidents have declined. However, I am concerned that these trends may not be continuing as we would all wish, and I want to ask the Minister some questions to see what reassurances can be given.
The most recent figures from the offshore safety statistics bulletin show that the combined injury and fatality rate has increased from 240 per 1,000 workers in 2000–01 to 249.9 per 1,000 workers in 2001–02, which is obviously a move in the wrong direction. Moreover, there was a 4 per cent. increase in major injuries in 2002 compared with the previous year.
The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan and other hon. Members referred to recent articles in the press that questioned whether the lessons that were quickly learned after the Piper Alpha disaster are now being forgotten and whether there is some slippage. What is the Minister's view of comments such as those of the general secretary of the offshore industry liaison committee, which were reported in the Financial Times?
All the elements that were there in 1986–87 and led up to Piper Alpha are there now.Is that unduly alarmist? That is a much more forceful comment than that of the head of the HSE, who said:There is a slight decrease over time but the fatal and major accidents clearly are worryingly high and stubbornly flat.He gives the impression that there has been an improvement, and that there is a problem that needs further work to address it, whereas the comments of the OILC seem to go much further. What is the Minister's view?288WH A key concern has emerged, which hon. Members have mentioned, that the large companies are moving on and a new generation of independents is establishing itself. As the hon. Members for Aberdeen, Central and for Banff and Buchan said, adventurous companies moving into the sector may be a very good thing and may provide employment for many years to come. However, there is a concern, to which hon. Members have obliquely referred and which has been expressed in newspaper articles, that there is a danger that corners may be cut in health and safety to control costs. That would be a concern in the North sea, especially as much of the equipment is ageing. What does the Minister think will be the effect of the change in ownership on safety in this sector?
I am also concerned about the health and safety statistics, which are criticised. Under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995, employers, both onshore and offshore, and responsible persons who have control over employees and work premises, are required to notify and report to the relevant enforcing authority fatal and non-fatal accidents causing injuries, and all occupational diseases and dangerous occurrences even when there is no injury.
A forthcoming book by Dr. Charles Woolfsen and Professor Matthias Beck, "Corporate Social Responsibility: Failures in the Oil Industry", will argue that there is widespread under-reporting of lost-time incidents in the North sea and that there has been no significant improvement in the past five years. I should be grateful if the Minister would address the issue so that we may judge how well the reporting systems are working.
There have been some press reports about the HSE, and I want to give the Minister an opportunity to discuss them. I have received a letter from Prospect, the union involved, about cuts in HSE funding and fewer inspectors. That is worrying, as the HSE must recoup the £1.3 million that it was encouraged to overspend in the past year and the Minister will be aware that there is an early-day motion on the subject. Press reports say that Ministers do not agree with that analysis; it would therefore help if the hon. Gentleman would place on the record exactly what is happening in the HSE and reassure us that the programme for the North sea that is due to start in 2004 will go ahead, with enough inspectors for an effective campaign.
Will the Minister comment on the progress that has been made to reduce the number of hydrocarbon releases? During 2001–02, there were 241 reported offshore hydrocarbon releases—11 per cent. fewer than the previous year. That is welcome news, but the HSE's stated aim is to reduce the number of releases to 50 per cent. of the 1999–2000 baseline figure by 2004. Progress has been made, but is the Minister confident that it is a realistic target that can be met?
There have been significant improvements since 1988. However, just because 15 years have elapsed since the dreadful disaster, the industry must not let itself believe that such an accident could never happen again, as it was complacency as well as poor practice that caused the accident. It is extremely important that improvements continue. More than 23,000 people work offshore, so the health and safety issue has not diminished in importance. Many lessons were learned from the Piper 289WH Alpha disaster, and we must never let them be forgotten. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, Central, who secured the debate, has spent 15 years bringing these issues to the attention of the House and I pay tribute to him for all that he has done.
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§ The Minister for Work (Mr. Desmond Browne)I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central (Mr. Doran) for securing this important and timely debate, and for his sustained support over the years for the survivors and bereaved families of the Piper Alpha disaster, in the House and elsewhere. His support for those families and his consistent campaigning on the issues, which he brings to the attention of the House today, are well known. It is a responsibility he shares with other hon. Members, many of whom are present for the debate and some of whom could not attend. The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) said that people should not be misled by the number of Members present: it is not the number but the quality of those present that is important, given their collective knowledge of the issue.
I hope I am not being too unctuous in congratulating my hon. Friend on setting out in his introductory remarks the historical and current circumstances that inform the debate, which comes almost 15 years to the day after the most appalling industrial accident in this country's recent history. Even now the events of that day in July 1988 remain vividly in the minds of those who were present and survived and those who lost loved ones. I extend my sympathies to all of them.
Despite my accent, I do not have a significant proportion of constituents who have connections with the North sea. At one stage quite a few people from the west of Scotland worked there, but less so now. During my two years in the Northern Ireland Office, I was the Minister with responsibility for victims. I spent a lot of time with people who lived through the trauma and tragedy of bereavement, which they carried with them for 30 years. I will never underestimate the effect that the loss of a loved one can have on a family, particularly when that life should not have beer lost.
The Piper Alpha disaster was a wake-up call for both the offshore oil and gas industry and the Government of the day. The costs were huge: 167 lives lost and over £2 billion in damage and lost production. Those figures emphasise in the starkest possible fashion the importance of safety to the well-being of what was and remains one of the key sectors of the UK economy. The industry today employs up to 25,000 people offshore and supports up to 300,000 jobs onshore. Offshore investment was about £8 billion in 2002.
The disaster, which was by no means the first in the North sea as my hon. Friend reminded us, led to one of the most radical reforms ever made of a regulatory regime. Lord Cullen's public inquiry and his contribution in this area, as in other areas of public safety since then, should never be underestimated. His report, published in 1990, produced 106 far-reaching recommendations. All were implemented, some by the Government and others by the industry.
A great deal has been achieved since the report. It is worth taking some time to record those achievements and the step change—I will use that term again later— 290WH in health and safety in the North sea. Responsibility for regulating health and safety in the offshore oil and gas industry was transferred to the Health and Safety Commission and the Health and Safety Executive in 1991. The earlier prescriptive health and safety regime was replaced by a new goal-setting series of regulations made under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974.
Lest it be misunderstood, I should point out that that regulatory regime, although it has to be constantly reviewed, has served industry and the people in the UK very well since then. It includes a mechanism to update the fines to ensure that they reflect current money values. Some of the concerns that have been expressed about the level of fines imposed have more to do with the failure of judicial authorities to exercise their maximum powers. That matter has been recognised.
The cornerstone of the new regime are the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, which came into force in 1993. They implemented Lord Cullen's key recommendation that offshore duty holders should systematically identify major hazards, assess the risks and set out the necessary controls in a safety case submitted to the HSE. No installation can operate in UK waters unless the HSE formally accepts a safety case for it. It is not just a matter of legislation; the industry's whole approach to health and safety was galvanised by the Piper Alpha disaster and the subsequent report. The offshore industry spent more than £2 billion on health and safety improvements between 1988 and 1998.
There is no doubt that the offshore industry is now safer than it was 15 years ago, or even 10 years ago. The latest figures show a drop in annual injuries overall from 595 10 years ago to 181 today. Figures for major and significant hydrocarbon releases—events with a potential for major accidents—show an encouraging reduction of 44 per cent. from the 2000 benchmark.
We cannot be complacent. As the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir Robert Smith) reminded us, the North sea and other offshore areas remain hazardous places in which to work. There are hazards from the hostile environment and from the possibility of helicopter crashes, ship collisions and structural collapse as well as from explosion, fire and well blow-outs. The potential for a major accident remains. There is evidence of that from other offshore provinces, such as the complete loss in 2001 of the giant production installation, P36, off the coast of Brazil, on which 11 people died. To control that potential demands constant and close attention from duty holders and the Health and Safety Executive, as the industry's health and safety regulator.
The changing offshore environment continues to produce new challenges for health and safety. The most important of them have been mentioned in the debate, and I shall deal with some of them. I refer first to ageing infrastructure. Much offshore equipment is now past its originally intended design life. Informed decisions must be made about its continued suitability. North sea platforms are large and complex, and the backlog of maintenance to older platforms has been growing. Maintenance programmes must ensure that safety-critical equipment remains fit for the purpose, irrespective of whether the field is up for sale by its owners or close to decommissioning.
291WH I come now to staff reductions. The UK continental shelf is a mature oil and gas province. That puts pressure on operators to cut costs, especially staffing costs, but that must not compromise safety. New players are entering the UK continental shelf to take over acreage and some assets from the more established oil companies. They are new to North sea conditions and to the Health and Safety Executive. They bring new ideas and approaches, some of which it is now appropriate to welcome. Early signs are that safety is a high priority for the new operators. The challenge will be to ensure that their commitment is maintained.
Questions have been asked about how the health and safety regulator and others meet the challenges. The main responsibility for ensuring health and safety rests with those who create the risks, such as the offshore operators, owners and other employers. However, everyone in the industry has a part to play—by that I mean duty holders, the work force and the regulator. The industry has recognised that the way ahead lies in everyone working in partnership. The industry's step change programme has been welcomed by all parties. It is based on a partnership between duty holders and the work force. That partnership now extends to the Health and Safety Executive.
The work force have a key role to play. They are closest to the hazards and are often best placed to alert managers to problems and to ways to improve safe practice. They have the benefit of an excellent network of safety representatives and safety committees covering all staffed installations. I commend their commitment and initiative, but the network can only work effectively in an atmosphere in which everyone encourages open discussion of health and safety problems and solutions. Evidence suggests that there is still some way to go to ensure a fully effective safety culture in all companies that work offshore.
I have spoken mainly about activities aimed at preventing another Piper Alpha. Indeed, helping industry to reduce the risk of catastrophic accidents in all industries, not only offshore, is a key part of the Health and Safety Executive's functions and absorbs a significant proportion of resources.The commission and the executive also evaluate the impact of the offshore regime, and are considering changes that may be needed to ensure that it remains fit for the purpose. An independent evaluation of the offshore regime in 1999 showed that most stakeholders felt that the new regime helped them to manage the risks effectively. More work is needed in that area, but it is telling that the concept of the safety case has been widely accepted throughout the world as a risk management tool. Countries such as Australia and Brazil have incorporated safety cases into their regulatory regimes, after seeking advice from the United Kingdom. Several of the world's largest oilfield companies have extended voluntarily the safety case approach to their global operations.
Offshore health and safety is not only about major hazards: occupational health and safety is equally important. Although injury rates have improved since Piper Alpha, they have not improved fast enough recently, as the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) pointed out, and not as well as in some other offshore provinces. Sadly, seven people died on the UK continental shelf in the two years 292WH between 2000 and 2002, all but one in drilling and drilling-related accidents. There was a further drilling-related fatality as recently as May 2003.
To ensure that I have achieved the objective that you have set for the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, it may be better if I turn now to some of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central and others. If I fail to answer any of them in the time available, I undertake to write to hon. Members. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central, the hon. Members for Banff and Buchan and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) and, last night in the Lobby, my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Miss Begg), raised the issue of corporate manslaughter. As a Scottish lawyer, like my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central, I think that we should call it corporate culpable homicide but, to be inclusive, we shall call it corporate killing—the phrase that has entered common usage.
§ Mr. Deputy SpeakerOrder. As a Scottish Justice of the Peace, I understood exactly what the hon. Gentleman meant in the first place.
§ Mr. BrowneI am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Perhaps we can run a seminar for the other hon. Members present when we have concluded the debate.
The issue of corporate killing is a manifesto commitment. I was pleased that the Home Office announced in May of this year that it would publish a draft Bill on corporate manslaughter. A timetable for the legislation and further details are to be announced this autumn. I look forward to the proposals for a change in the law. Those of us who recognise the challenges posed by a change in the law do not underestimate the difficulties of producing legislation that will attack the problem. It will have to be discussed with some care and consultatively with all parties in the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central referred to the importance of communication between employers and employees. I have already made some remarks about that in the context of health and safety. Everyone who works in an offshore installation or is associated with its activities has a role to play in ensuring health and safety. We can never underestimate how important it is for operators, employers, workers and their representatives to work collaboratively. I endorse fully what my hon. Friend said about the need for communication between employers and employees.
Such communication has been reflected in the discussion about the BP jigsaw project, which was referred to by my hon. Friends the Members for Aberdeen, Central and for Aberdeen, North. All hon. Members should be reminded that offshore duty holders are required, through regulations made under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974, to make arrangements that provide a good prospect of rescuing and recovering persons who have to evacuate or escape from their installation or enter the sea close to their installation, and taking them to a place of safety.
The BP jigsaw project represents a radical new approach to providing rescue and recovery of persons who have had to evacuate or escape from offshore 293WH installations. Of course, the Government and the Health and Safety Executive are aware of the concerns of those who work offshore. I confirm that BP will be able to proceed only if it can demonstrate to the Health and Safety Executive, through a revised safety case submission for each of the affected installations, that the legal requirements for rescue and recovery are satisfied and that the current standards of performance are equalled or bettered.
I turn now to the working time directive. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central is right that in June 2000 it was extended to include those working offshore. Member states have until 1 August 2003 to implement the directive and, like other hon. Members, I welcomed the laying of amending regulations on 4 July to extend the working time regulations to cover offshore workers. As my hon. Friend said, the DTI and the Health and Safety Commission are discussing arrangements for the Health and Safety Executive to enforce the regulations offshore, subject to the provision of additional resources.
I share everyone's concern about fatigue and its cumulative effect on health and safety offshore. The Health and Safety Executive has published guidance on the topic. It has sufficient powers under health and safety legislation to deal with any perceived risk to the offshore work force from staff working when over-tired. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North about the importance of safety representatives.
We want to encourage more people to act as safety representatives, and I join my hon. Friend in urging people not to resign if they are thinking of doing so. I was also aware of reports in the press this morning on that subject. My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South raised that issue with me last night when I was speaking to her in the Lobby. I was aware of those deep concerns. If the reports turn out to be true, we have a duty and responsibility to urge people not to resign from their positions, but to continue to engage in dialogue.
The hon. Members for Banff and Buchan and for North-East Hertfordshire referred to under-reporting. The Health and Safety Executive takes claims of under-reporting seriously, because they grossly undermine the health and safety regime. All such reports are investigated thoroughly. It believes that there is no evidence of significant under-reporting—although I await publication of the book to which reference was made. It takes the view that such allegations are mostly hearsay. If there is evidence of under-reporting, it should be brought to the attention of the Health and Safety Executive, which will carry out serious investigations.
294WH My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central wrote to my predecessor and other Ministers about the lessons to be learned from the issues raised by the case of Stephen Hayward at the employment tribunal. I wrote to my hon. Friend, stating that I recognised his concern that the absence of appropriate protection for offshore safety representatives may provide a means for unscrupulous operators to obstruct their work. That would be detrimental not only to individual safety—as occurred in that case—but to offshore safety.
Since I became Minister, I have taken a personal interest in the case and have reviewed all the paperwork relating to it, including Mr. Hayward's earlier correspondence with other Ministers, and with me when I was in another Department. I have written to my hon. Friend. I will not go into the detail of the case during the debate today, but dialogue will continue between us. I will continue to maintain the level of vigilance on that issue that he expects of me as a Minister. If there are issues and lessons to be learned from that case, I will ensure that I respond to them appropriately.
I may have time to deal with the problem of ageing installation structures to which a number of hon. Members referred. The effect of the ageing of offshore installations is a key issue for those considering safety of offshore operations. It will become more significant as installations become older, and as many continue in service beyond their original intended design life. As currently advised, the Health and Safety Executive sees no reason why older installations should not remain in service, provided that adequate safeguards exist to ensure that inspection, maintenance and assessment arrangements are appropriate and carried out conscientiously by operators. The executive is acting on such concern and implementing a key programme for this year that will specifically look at how companies ensure the integrity of the safety-critical elements of their installations.
The hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine asked for details about the key programme. It is a three-year programme that will focus on inspections of the status quo, increased investigations and reports on incidents, sharing best practice.
These are early days for me as the Minister with responsibility for health and safety in the North sea and other places, and I have found this debate most instructive. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, Central for providing me with an opportunity to make a contribution to it. I accept that the Government have a key role in helping to secure a safe and clean offshore industry, but there is no reason why it should not enjoy a long and safe future.
§ Sitting suspended.