Sitting of 24 September 2002

Preamble
The House met at half-past Eleven o'clock, notice having been given by MR. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Earlier meeting of the House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. Speaker: Statement by the Prime Minister.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: On a point of order on procedure, Mr. Speaker—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I will take points of order after the statement.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): Mr. Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.
Today we published a 50-page dossier, detailing the history of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme, its breach of United Nations resolutions, and its attempts to rebuild that illegal programme. I have placed a copy in the Library.
At the end of the Gulf war, the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes became clear. As a result, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions, demanding that Iraq disarm itself of such weapons and establishing a regime of weapons inspections and monitoring to do the task. The inspectors were to be given unconditional and unrestricted access to all and any Iraqi sites.
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All this is accepted fact. In addition, it is fact, documented by UN inspectors, that Iraq almost immediately began to obstruct the inspections. Visits were delayed; on occasions, inspectors threatened; matériel was moved; special sites, shut to the inspectors, were unilaterally designated by Iraq. The work of the inspectors continued, but against a background of increasing obstruction and non-compliance. Indeed. Iraq denied that its biological weapons programme existed until forced to acknowledge it after high-ranking defectors disclosed its existence in 1995.
Eventually, in 1997, the UN inspectors declared that they were unable to fulfil their task. A year of negotiation and further obstruction occurred until finally, in late 1998, the UN team was forced to withdraw.
As the dossier sets out, we estimate on the basis of the UN's work that there were up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. All of this was missing and unaccounted for.
Military action by the United States and United Kingdom followed and a certain amount of infrastructure for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missile capability was destroyed, setting the Iraqi programme back, but not ending it.
From late 1998 onwards, therefore, the sole inhibition on Saddam's WMD programme was the sanctions regime. Iraq was forbidden to use the revenue from its oil except for certain specified non-military purposes. The sanctions regime, however, was also subject to illegal trading and abuse. Because of concerns about its inadequacy—and the impact on the Iraqi people—we made several attempts to refine it, culminating in a new UN resolution in May of this year. But it was only partially effective. Around ․3 billion of money is illegally taken by Saddam every year now, double the figure for the year 2000. Self-evidently, there is no proper accounting for this money.

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Because of concerns that a containment policy based on sanctions alone could not sufficiently inhibit Saddam's weapons programme, negotiations continued, even after 1998, to gain readmission for the UN inspectors. In 1999, a new UN resolution demanding their re-entry was passed and ignored. Further negotiations continued. Finally, after several months of discussion with Saddam's regime, in July this year, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, concluded that Saddam was not serious about readmitting the inspectors and ended the negotiations.
All this is established fact. I set out the history in some detail because occasionally debate on this issue seems to treat it almost as if it had suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim in the last few months of 2002. It is actually an 11-year history: a history of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about the existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, and of obstruction, defiance and denial.
There is one common, consistent theme, however: the total determination of Saddam to maintain that programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions and the isolation of the Iraqi economy to keep it. At any time, he could have let the inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any time, he could have co-operated with the United Nations. Ten days ago, he made the offer unconditionally under threat of war. He could have done it at any time in the last 11 years, but he did not. Why?
The dossier that we publish gives the answer. The reason is that his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic left-over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now.
The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. For over 60 years, beginning just before world war two, the JIC has provided intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally, its work is obviously secret. Unusually, because it is important that we explain our concerns about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose its assessments.
I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all of it well funded.
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In respect of biological weapons, again, production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a programme; and again, Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it prior to 1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities, which of course are easier to conceal. Present intelligence confirms that it has now got such facilities. The biological agents that we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin—all eventually result in excruciatingly painful death.
As for nuclear weapons, Saddam's previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
But we now know the following: since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual-use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and he has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls owing to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.
In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful. Again, key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that that is for a civil nuclear power programme, but I would point out that it has no nuclear power plants.
So that is the position in respect of the weapons—but of course, the weapons require ballistic missile capability. That, again, is subject to UN resolutions. Iraq is supposed only to have missile capability up to 150 km for conventional weaponry. Pages 27 to 31 of the dossier detail the evidence on that issue. It is clear that a significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended-range Scud missiles; that in mid-2001 there was a step change in the programme and, by this year, Iraq's development of weapons with a range of more than 1,000 km was well under way; and that hundreds of people are employed in that programme, facilities are being built and equipment procured—usually clandestinely. Sanctions and import controls have hindered the programme, but only slowed its progress. The capability being developed, incidentally, is for multi-purpose use, including with WMD warheads.
That is the assessment, given to me, of the Joint Intelligence Committee. In addition, we have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival and as a demonstration of his power and influence in the region.
There will be some who will dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of the material, there might be innocent explanations. There will be others

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who say rightly that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before Saddam acquires a usable nuclear weapon—though if he were able to purchase fissile matériel illegally, it would be only a year or two. But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11-year history; with this man Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate, would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed—to say that, despite 14 separate UN demands on the issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do nothing, and to conclude that we should trust, not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors, but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime? I do not believe that that would be a responsible course to follow.
Our case is simply this: not that we take military action come what may, but that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament, as the UN itself has stipulated, is overwhelming. I defy anyone, on the basis of this evidence, to say that that is an unreasonable demand for the international community to make when, after all, it is only the same demand that we have made for 11 years and that Saddam has rejected.
People say, "But why Saddam?" I do not in the least dispute that there are other causes of concern on weapons of mass destruction. I said as much in this House on 14 September last year. However, two things about Saddam stand out. He has used these weapons in Iraq itself—thousands dying in those chemical weapons attacks—and in the Iran-Iraq war, started by him, in which 1 million people died; and his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to.
Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights in this dossier. Read not just about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq, not just about the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq, and not just about the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 that led to the Gulf war. I say, "Read also about the routine butchering of political opponents, the prison 'cleansing' regimes in which thousands die, the torture chambers and the hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty International." Read it all and, again, I defy anyone to say that this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of getting his hands on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.
"Why now?", people ask. I agree that I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made the call for disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion that dictators faced with a weakening will always draw: that the international community will talk but not act, will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will.
If we take this course and if we refuse to implement the will of the international community, Saddam will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence will grow and, at some point in a future not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real.
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If people say, "Why should Britain care?", I answer, "Because there is no way this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world, including this country." That, after all, is the reason the UN passed its resolutions. That is why it is right that the UN Security Council again makes its will and its unity clear and lays down a strong new UN resolution and mandate. Then Saddam will have the choice: comply willingly or be forced to comply. That is why, alongside the diplomacy, there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action if diplomacy fails.
Let me he plain about our purpose. Of course there is no doubt that Iraq, the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam. Iraq deserves to be led by someone who can abide by international law, not a murderous dictator; by someone who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not leave it languishing as a pariah; by someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by Saddam's personal greed; and by someone who can lead a Government more representative of the country as a whole while maintaining absolutely Iraq's territorial integrity.
We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the middle east. So the ending of this regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than Saddam. But our purpose is disarmament. No one wants military conflict. The whole purpose of putting this before the UN is to demonstrate the united determination of the international community to resolve this in the way it should have been resolved years ago: through a proper process of disarmament under the UN. Disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction is the demand. One way or another, it must be acceded to.
There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal with. First, Afghanistan is a country now freed from the Taliban but still suffering. This is a regime we changed, rightly. I want to make it clear, once again, that we are entirely committed to its reconstruction. We will not desert the Afghan people. We will stick with them until the job of reconstruction is done.
Secondly, I have no doubt that the Arab world knows that it would be better off without Saddam. Equally, I know that there is genuine resentment at the state of the middle east peace process, which people want to see the international community pursue with the same vigour. Israel will defend its people against these savage acts of terrorism, but the very purpose of this terrorism is to prevent any chance for peace. Meanwhile, the Palestinians are suffering in the most appalling and unacceptable way.
We need therefore urgent action to build a security infrastructure that gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for the Palestinian Authority, and we need a new conference on the middle east peace process, based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state. We can condemn the terrorism and the reaction to it. As I have said many times in the House, frankly, that gets us nowhere. What we need is a firm commitment to action

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and a massive mobilisation of energy to get the peace process moving again, and we in Britain will play our part in that in any way we can.
Finally, there are many acts of this drama still to be played out. I have always said that Parliament should be kept in touch with all developments, in particular those that would lead us to military action. That remains the case, and to those who doubt it I say: look at Kosovo and Afghanistan. We proceeded with care, with full debate in this House, and when we took military action, we did so as a last resort. We shall act in the same way now, but I hope we can do so secure in the knowledge that should Saddam continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it has in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is necessary and what is right.
Mr. Iain Duncan Smith: Let me start by thanking the Prime Minister for providing me with a copy of his statement and the Government dossier in advance of today's debate. I am relieved that this evidence has finally been made public and hope that hon. Members will have time to digest it before taking part in the debate.
Many will want to argue today about the conduct of American foreign policy, the degree of influence that the UK Government have with the Bush Administration, and whether Britain is simply following the United States. That is not, I believe, what this debate should be about in any way. The key question is whether Saddam Hussein has the means, the mentality and the motive to pose a threat to Britain's national security and the wider international order.
As to the means, we know that Saddam used chemical weapons during the 1980s and developed biological weapons at the same time. David Hannay, our former ambassador to the United Nations, has stated openly that Iraq would have been a nuclear power by the mid-1990s had the Gulf war not intervened. The evidence produced in the Government's report shows clearly that Iraq is still pursuing its weapons of mass destruction programme. As the Prime Minister says, the policy of containment is not working. The ex-head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, said that the UN was unable to destroy Saddam's biological and chemical weapons capabilities.
The Government dossier confirms that Iraq is self-sufficient in biological weapons and that the Iraqi military is ready to deploy those, and chemical weapons, at some 45 minutes' notice. We also know that three years ago Iraq attempted to get enriched uranium from Serbia in the dying days of the Milosevic regime—evidenced and documented. Today, the report says that Iraq has sought to acquire uranium from Africa and is trying to turn it into weapons-grade material. No doubt during this debate some will want to quote the former UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, who apparently said last week:
"Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated".
Let me give them this warning. That was not Mr. Ritter's assessment four years ago when he was inspecting the very sites that he now talks about.
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He said then:
"The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed".
It
"has lied to the special commission and the world since day one."
He went on to say:
"This lie has been perpetuated … through systematic acts of concealment."
So Saddam has the means. There should be no doubt about his mentality. He has fought a protracted war with Iran costing at least a million lives, gassed his own Kurdish population, persecuted the Marsh Arabs, invaded and occupied Kuwait, and launched missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. He has been willing to defy the world order and terrorise and starve his own people in order to continue his weapons programme. He has diverted ․3 billion in the last year alone for that very purpose; money that could have gone to feeding his own population.
So the only question remaining is whether Saddam has the motive to strike against Britain, and I believe that it is fair to assume that he has. We have repeatedly supported Security Council resolutions against Iraq, we were a major component of the allied coalition during the Gulf war, and today British forces are still engaged in Iraq policing the no-fly zones to protect Kurds in the north of the country and Shi'ite Muslims in the south.
The report shows that Saddam has illegally retained at least 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650 km, capable of carrying the various warheads that he needs, and that he is also developing new ones.
I remind the House that there are more than 3,000 British service men and women in Cyprus, 200 in Turkey, 300 in Saudi Arabia and 400 in Kuwait, all of whom are in range of the missiles that Saddam possesses today.
Notwithstanding that evidence, there are still a number of important questions that I should like to ask the Prime Minister.
Will the Prime Minister confirm that any new Security Council resolution must set out the precise terms under which Iraq is to dismantle and destroy its weapons? Will he give a clear timetable for that and an unequivocal declaration that failure to comply will trigger military action?
Given that the Prime Minister has said that Saddam is already in breach of nine existing resolutions, can he confirm the legal advice that he has received and whether we need a new Security Council resolution to take military action under international law?
I am reminded of the words of the Prime Minister's then Foreign Secretary, the current Leader of the House, who, in December 1998, said that we had
"clear backing in UN resolutions"
to take military action against Iraq, and that those resolutions had warned Saddam of
"the severest consequences if he broke his undertakings".
to stop his weapons of mass destruction programme.
Will the Prime Minister also say what resources Britain would be likely to contribute in the event of any military action? Will he tell us what plans the Government are making should Saddam be removed from power, as he indicated earlier, and whom he has met from many of those Iraqi opposition groups that now seek to take Saddam's place?

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No one wants to see British troops or any other troops engaged in war. War should be the last resort when all other efforts have failed, but Britain should never shy away from its responsibilities in a time of international crisis. As King Abdullah of Jordan only a few days ago said:
"the decision in the end is that of the Iraqi leadership, they bear the responsibility before their people, nation and the world".
Those who refuse to contemplate military action at any price must ask themselves how we are to force Saddam to comply with UN resolutions that he has flouted for a decade. They must also ask themselves why only now, under the threat of military intervention, has he talked about letting the UN weapons inspectors back.
History is littered with the desire of decent people to give the likes of Saddam Hussein a second chance, but he has had 10 years of second chances. Now, surely, is the time to act. This matter is now in Saddam Hussein's hands.
The Prime Minister: I think that I can reply to the right hon. Gentleman very briefly, and I thank him for the general support that he has given in his response to my statement.
I want to emphasise these points. First, it is important to remember that we do not merely have British service men in that region; our planes and our pilots are involved in policing the no-fly zone the entire time. It is not something that gets into the news every day, but British service men and women are already out in that area performing a vital task in relation to the Iraqi regime.
In respect of the new UN Security Council resolution, its precise terms are obviously a matter of discussion but we should be absolutely clear and unambiguous about what is expected from Saddam and about what will follow if he does not comply. In respect of the legal advice, we do not disclose such advice but, of course, we will always act in accordance with international law.
In respect of any military options, we are not at the stage of deciding those options but, of course, it is important—should we get to that point—that we have the fullest possible discussion of those options and of how we ensure that we enforce the will of the international community. I have not personally seen the opposition Iraqi groups but I know that the Government are in touch with them.
It is worth emphasising that the purpose is the disarmament of Iraq, and that decision—as the right hon. Gentleman mentioned a moment ago—is for Saddam. I do not think, however, that people should be in any doubt or have any illusions about this. The people who would rejoice the most at getting rid of Saddam are the Iraqi people.
Mr. Charles Kennedy: This important opportunity provided by the Prime Minister's statement, the publication of the accompanying dossier and the debate that will follow gives all of us a chance, after the long summer recess, to reflect the legitimate anxieties of our constituents and, in particular, the representations that many of us have received from the Muslim community in this country. This also gives us the opportunity to raise legitimate questions, a number of which have not yet been adequately answered for many of us, either by the Prime Minister's statement or by the dossier.
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There is, of course, general consensus that Iraq constitutes a grotesque, amoral regime, and that that must be dealt with. I say to the Prime Minister, however, as I did when I questioned him in the House just before the summer recess, that there are two important issues involving founding principles. The first is the role of the House of Commons. There is no specific proposal before the House today, but, if and when there is one, there must be an absolute, up-front opportunity for the House to vote on any proposal involving the possible use of British forces. In his statement today, the Prime Minister said that the House would be kept fully "in touch". Does "in touch" mean a democratic Division in the Lobby of the House?
The second consideration is the overriding supremacy of the United Nations. In the penultimate paragraph of the preface to the dossier, the Prime Minister states:

"The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD"—
weapons of mass destruction—
"programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act."
That stands, at least rhetorically, in contrast to some of the recent statements that we have heard, this week alone, from the American Administration.
I do not believe that the Prime Minister has been subject to fair criticism over the intensive international effort that he has made since the events of 11 September, or the efforts that he has made to invest the United Nations with its proper authority. I urge him, however, to continue to resist calls—whether they come from certain people in this country or from others in the United States—for precipitate action. In that context, he is surely right to lay emphasis on the fundamental need to restart the middle east peace process.
Those of us who have never subscribed to British unilateralism are not about to sign up to American unilateralism now, either.
What we must be clear about—the Prime Minister touched on this at some length—is the notion of regime change, which is ill-defined, and remains so today. It would set a dangerous precedent in international affairs. We have to be clear about the possible consequences of a regime change. What will the reaction be in the rest of the Arab world? If Saddam's regime falls, what kind of government system is envisaged as a replacement?
In his statement, the Prime Minister spoke about the need for Iraq to be led by someone who variously can abide by international law, bring Iraq back into the international community, make the country rich and successful, and make its Government more representative of the country. However, he was silent on the question of who or where that person or set of people is. The Prime Minister, quite rightly, with our support and that of others, was able to point to the mobilisation of forces in Afghanistan, which could lead to an alternative, more acceptable Government there. Is there the capacity or potential for a similar mobilisation to take place within Iraq?
In the context of Afghanistan, the Prime Minister made it clear that, if such a course of action proved successful—which it did—this country and the international community would then not walk away. Is a similar

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approach being identified for Iraq? Does such an approach encompass the mindset of the present American Administration? If we were not to walk away following the toppling of Saddam, who would provide the necessary presence to police and create the ongoing stability in Iraq that would be essential because of the shell-shocked nature of that country?
When the American Defence Secretary speaks of a "decapitation strategy" with a view to Iraq does he reflect the mind processes of the British Government? Should we not instead be talking about the longer-term need for a rehabilitation strategy for Iraq, not least for its innocent, oppressed people with whom none of us has any argument whatever?
On the question of the UN weapons inspectors, the report makes it clear that, despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, they have
"valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme."
They are therefore best placed to assess the situation, and that is why the political emphasis must be on getting the UN inspectors back in. The worry from this side of the Atlantic has to be that, even if that were conceded, it is no longer of primary interest to the United States Government. That must be a deep concern, which we in this House are correct to reflect.
Finally—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am only asking questions unasked by the leader of the Conservative party. Does the Prime Minister truly believe that, on the evidence published today, a sufficient case has now been made that both clarifies Iraq's present capacity, as well as its intent?
There is much that will unfold, but it is vital that the British Government maintain their moral authority, the authority of this House and of the United Nations, and do not at any stage in the weeks and months ahead overlook the decent moral instincts of our country, which deserve to be heard here today.
The Prime Minister: The answer to the right hon. Gentleman's last question is yes. I do believe that the information we published today shows that there is a continuing chemical and biological weapons programme, and an attempt by Saddam Hussein to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. That is what I believe, and that is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee—and, frankly, I prefer its assessment to the assessment of the Iraqi regime, which, let us say on the basis of experience, is not one that should carry a lot of credibility.
In relation to the House of Commons, let me say to Members in all parts of the House—as I said in my statement—that in the cases of Kosovo and of Afghanistan we gave the House ample opportunity not only to debate, but to declare and express its view. I am sure that we will do so again, in accordance with the normal tradition of the House. We are not actually at the stage of military action yet; I simply emphasise that point.
Yes, it is very important that we mobilise international opinion through the United Nations. But, as President Bush rightly said to the UN General Assembly, this is a challenge for the United Nations too. Although there are
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many difficult questions that I have to answer, there is one difficult question that I think everyone has to answer: if the will of the UN continues to be ignored and flouted by Saddam, what then? Unless people have an answer to that question, we cannot really proceed in a way that fully reflects the reality of the situation with which we are dealing.
As for precipitate action, I do not believe that the United States, any more than ourselves, is interested in that. One of my purposes in setting out the history of this affair, however, is to show that the issue has not been dormant for 11 years, but has always been there. At some times it is thrown into sharper relief than at others, but it has always been there—and it has always been there for the very reason why the UN passed the original resolutions at the end of the Gulf war. People were astounded at the extent of the chemical-biological weapons programme. They did not know the full extent of the nuclear weapons programme. They considered, on the basis of the evidence—how could they consider otherwise?—that Saddam was not a fit person to have control of those weapons.
Throughout the past 11 years we have been trying to find different ways of dealing with this: weapons inspections, sanctions, these negotiations, more negotiations with the Iraqis. What I would say to the right hon. Gentleman—this is why I think all of us who believe that the issue has to be dealt with must choose our language carefully—is that the one thing I am sure of is that there is no prospect of a proper weapons inspection regime going back in there and doing its job properly unless Saddam knows that the alternative is his being forced to comply with the UN will.
In relation to regime change, incidentally, I would say that whatever the difficulties in Afghanistan, anyone who actually went and talked to ordinary people there would find that they much prefer the current situation to the situation that they experienced under the Taliban.
As for not walking away, we should not walk away from the situation in Afghanistan, and the US Administration themselves have made clear that should it come to regime change in Iraq they will not walk away from that either. I simply emphasise this point. Of course all sorts of issues still have to be resolved, but the fact is, as I said a few weeks ago, that the first decision we must make is this: do we allow the situation to continue, with this weapons of mass destruction programme? If we say no to that, do we try to mobilise international support? Answer, yes—that is what we are trying to do. But if the international support is not adhered to, then we must have the courage and determination to take action. Otherwise, in the end, all those expressions of international will are going to count for nothing.
Mr. Gerald Kaufman: In his speech to the TUC two weeks ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said:
"I believe it is right to deal with Saddam through the United Nations."
Having today made what is an incontrovertible case against Saddam, will my right hon. Friend confirm that any action taken by our Government will be solely for the implementation and pursuit of United Nations Security Council policy?

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Also in his speech to the TUC, my right hon. Friend said
"We must restart the Middle East peace process. We must work with all concerned"
so that terrorism could end, and the Palestinians have their rights. Can he explain—if not today, as soon as possible—what action he and the Government will take to restart and advance the middle east peace process?
Has my right hon. Friend noted that, following the terrible murder of the Glasgow student, Yoni Jesner, by Palestinian terrorists last week, one of his kidneys was used to save the life of a seven-year-old Palestinian girl—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The question is far too long.
The Prime Minister: Let me respond to the two points that my right hon. Friend very fairly made. The first answer is yes: the action that we need to take is to ensure that the UN resolutions are properly implemented—that is the clear purpose. Secondly, I entirely agree that it is important for the middle east to restart the process. What are we doing on that? We are working with the Americans and others to try to put together a proper conference on the issue to get the peace process restarted. We stand ready to help, in any way we can, on issues of both security and political reform, which are important prerequisites to getting that peace process under way.
My right hon. Friend will know of the UN Security Council resolution that was passed last night, which is an important indication that the world should deal with this. The only point that I make about this is that I am always in one sense nervous of talking about the middle east peace process, either in the context of Afghanistan last year or in that of Iraq this year, because quite apart from the specific issues of Afghanistan and now Iraq, it is important to restart the process. It is important to reflect that, because it is my judgment, having talked to the leaders of the Arab world, that they do not hold any brief for Saddam Hussein but feel that we should pursue with equal vigour a just resolution in the middle east. As I point out to them, that just resolution must involve security for Israel as well as a viable Palestinian state.
Mr. William Hague: Does the Prime Minister recollect that, in the half-century history of various states acquiring nuclear capabilities, in almost every case—from the Soviet Union in 1949 to Pakistan in 1998—their ability to do so has been greatly underestimated and understated by intelligence sources at the time? Estimates today of Iraq taking several years to acquire a nuclear device should be seen in that context, and within that margin of error. Given that, and the information from defectors five years after the Gulf war, that 400 nuclear sites and installations had been concealed in farmhouses and even schools in Iraq, is there not at least a significant risk of the utter catastrophe of Iraq possessing a nuclear device without warning, some time in the next couple of years? In that case, does not the risk of leaving the regime on its course today far outweigh the risk of taking action quite soon?
The Prime Minister: I entirely agree, and I would just add two points to what the right hon. Gentleman said. His point about intelligence is an interesting one, and it is right. For the preparation of the dossier we had a real
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concern not to exaggerate the intelligence that we had received. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to reflect the credibility of the information, and we rate the credibility of what we have very highly. I say no more than that.
The right hon. Gentleman is also right about the obstruction. An example is the presidential sites—so-called presidential palaces that are in fact vast compounds covering the area of a reasonably large town—in which the Iraqis conceal documentation and evidence in relation to their weapons programme.
For all those reasons, I entirely agree that the danger of inaction, in my view, far outweighs the danger of action.
Mr. Barry Gardiner: The Prime Minister knows that action against Iraq that is supported by the authority of the United Nations would be acceptable to the vast majority of Members of Parliament across the House. Does he agree that those MPs who oppose independent action must explain why something that they believe to be right and justified when undertaken by many nations together becomes wrong and unjustified if we should act alone?
The Prime Minister: The point that my hon. Friend makes is exactly why the United Nations must be the way of resolving the issue. That is why I think that it was right that President Bush made it clear to the UN General Assembly that the United Nations was faced with a challenge. That is why it is important that that challenge is met and the UN resolutions are implemented.
Sir John Stanley: Given that key elements of al-Qaeda remain at large and given the proven murderous intent of al-Qaeda against the United States and its allies, can the Prime Minister assure the House—notwithstanding everything that he has said about the importance of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with which I entirely agree—that he continues to give the utmost priority to the detection and elimination of al-Qaeda?
The Prime Minister: Yes, indeed we do. There is a continuing threat from al-Qaeda, not only in this country but in others. Although the hub of its operations has been effectively shut down in Afghanistan, none the less it still has tentacles around the world and it is important that we go after those too.
Mr. Khalid Mahmood: I welcome my right hon. Friend's commitment to the enforcement of the UN resolutions on weapons inspections in Iraq. Will he affirm his belief that all UN resolutions should be respected, particularly resolutions 242 and 338 concerning Israel and Palestine, which, if implemented with a time scale, would have a far-reaching impact on the stability of the whole region?
The Prime Minister: I believe that it is important that the UN's will is implemented fully. That is why I said what I did about the middle east peace process. I think that one thing, however, must be stated clearly: the UN resolutions in respect of the middle east impose obligations on both sides. They impose obligations in respect of support for terrorism and recognition of Israel as well as withdrawal from the occupied territories. That is why, in the end, the only way of making progress in

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the middle east is for all the aspects of the UN's will to be implemented in relation to the middle east. My hon. Friend did not do this, but sometimes people are selective and look simply at Israel's obligations without recognising that those obligations cover all the states in the region.
Mr. Elfyn Llwyd: The Prime Minister said earlier that there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action if diplomacy fails. Has he given the United States any commitment that the United Kingdom would support unilateral action against Iraq?
The Prime Minister: As I said a moment ago, we are not at the stage of taking decisions about military action. However, it is important to recognise that in the event of the UN's will not being complied with we must be prepared to take that action. We are not at the point of decision yet, but no one should be in any doubt that it is important to express very clearly that should the UN's will not be resolved through weapons inspections and monitoring, it has to be resolved in a different way.
John McDonnell: The Prime Minister refers, in detail at times, to the report published today and has just made a reference to the inspection of presidential establishments. The report says that Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of the eight presidential palaces. Yet on 15 April 1998, a report was prepared by UNSCOM inspectors on the inspections of the presidential sites, which were conducted on the 10 days running up to 15 April. If we are to rely on the Joint Intelligence Committee, should not our intelligence be more accurate than it is in this report?
The Prime Minister: I will say exactly what happened; my hon. Friend may recall it from the time. The Iraqis began what was clearly a ploy to prevent the inspectors from doing their job by designating certain sites presidential palaces. After massive pressure, the inspectors were allowed in to certain of those presidential compounds. However, the inspectors said later that because of all the obfuscation, prevarication and delay, they had no real belief that they had been able to inspect the sites properly.
I can understand people's hesitations about military action in these circumstances, because of course any sensible person has to hesitate before taking such a strong step. However, I find it hard to credit that anybody could look at the behaviour of Iraq over the past 10 or 11 years and say that the regime had co-operated with the UN inspectors. It did not and one might think that the reason for that is that it wanted to keep the weapons of mass destruction it should not have had in the first place.
Sir Brian Mawhinney: Does the Prime Minister accept that those of us who believe in the concept of evil support his cautious but tough analysis and approach? Does he also accept that, given the 11-year history of this problem, it would help the House and the country to form a judgment if we had
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some idea of how long he was prepared to allow the United Nations to reassert its authority before looking at alternative strategies?
The Prime Minister: We are at the stage of discussing with our partners in the Security Council the form of a new resolution and what demands we might make. At this stage, therefore, I am not in a position to say that it will be so many weeks or that it will be done in a particular way. Let us be clear: there is no point in the UN taking charge of this again unless we are precise and clear about what we expect the Iraqi regime to do. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), we know from experience that it will try to avoid weapons inspections. We know from current intelligence that that is its intention. So, there will have to be a tough and clear mandate, but the precise terms of that are under discussion.
Mr. Michael Connarty: May I put on record my thanks to my right hon. Friend for honouring the tradition of the House and calling this recall? Can he give me a clear and simple answer as to whether he thinks that UN resolution 1999 is adequate for the UN to enforce the weapons inspectors' return and any programme of disarmament, or is he thinking about using another resolution on behalf of the United Kingdom? Also, will that resolution deal only with the return of the UN inspectors and not be a fig leaf for the American intention to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein?
The Prime Minister: We do need a new resolution and it should focus on the disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. That is what I believe we should do. It is important to have a fresh resolution because the international community needs to reassert its will very clearly and because we need to make sure that any new inspection and monitoring system is not subject to the same problems as the old one because, in the end, that was not able to do its job.
The only thing that I would say to my hon. Friends about the intentions of the United States is that, if we look at the history of this Iraqi regime over the past 10 or 11 years or throughout its time, we can see that the Americans are right to be cautious about believing that it intends to comply. In fact, I am sure that the regime does not intend to comply at all, although it may be forced to do so. Therefore, it is important that we make it clear that the pressure is there all the time. The purpose of any new UN resolution should be focused on disarmament because that is where the UN has expressed its will clearly.
Mr. John Maples: I am sure that the Prime Minister will agree that there are many threats to our security that emanate from countries in the middle east and that while those posed by Iraq may be amenable to a military solution, others are not. What I want to hear from the Prime Minister is that our policy towards Iraq is part of a coherent policy for the region and for dealing with security threats and the Islamic terrorist threats that emanate from other countries. I hope that our policy towards Iraq will be part of that.
The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman has made a good point. I raised the issue of weapons of mass destruction three days after 11 September and before my

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first meeting with President Bush in the February before that, when international terrorism was not the issue that it is today. I said that we had to have a coherent approach to weapons of mass destruction. That will mean different things in relation to different countries. I fully accept that Iraq is not the only concern. There are other countries in that region and elsewhere that are trying to develop such weapons and we need a differential strategy in respect of each of them.
I want to make it clear that, in my judgment, if we do not deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their retention by highly unstable states, often with dictatorial regimes, then perhaps not this year or next year, but in the not too distant future, that problem will explode on to the consciousness of the world. I believe that passionately, which is why, whatever the issues in relation to Iraq and apart from anything else in relation to it, it is important to take a stand now and say that, where we have made determinations on behalf of the international community, we will see them through. If we do not, the message to Saddam and anyone else will be that they can develop these weapons with impunity and that the international community lacks the will to deal with them.
David Winnick: Most of us hope that military action can be avoided, but does not the responsibility lie fully with the Iraqi regime? Whether we go to war or not surely depends on whether it is willing to comply with all the resolutions. Would not it be helpful if the UN Security Council showed a united front and did not allow itself to be divided time and again by a criminal dictator?
The Prime Minister: I totally agree, and I hope that the UN Security Council will be so united.
Mr. Paul Marsden: Ignoring the mini-me performance by the leader of the Tory party, may I ask the Prime Minister a simple question to which yes or no will suffice? Does he support regime change without UN authorisation—yes or no?
The Prime Minister: I have made it clear that the purpose of any action should be the disarmament of Iraq. Whether that involves regime change is in a sense a question for Saddam as to whether he is prepared to comply with the UN resolution. I consider it odd that people can find the notion of regime change in Iraq somehow distasteful. Regime change in Iraq would be a wonderful thing. That is not the purpose of our action; our purpose is to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that if he studies the Iraqi regime carefully, he will find that it is not very redolent of anything to do with the Liberal Democrats.
Mr. Mohammad Sarwar: The Prime Minister will be aware that when Saddam Hussein waged a war against Iran and used chemical weapons against his own people, Britain and the United States supported him. By promoting Ariel Sharon as a man of peace, President Bush has lost his credibility in the Arab world as an honest broker. Does my right hon. Friend
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agree with me that war on terrorism cannot be won unless the conflict in the middle east reaches a peaceful resolution and we tackle poverty?
The Prime Minister: I understand exactly why my hon. Friend feels as strongly as he does on this issue, but I want to say two things. First, it is not for me to defend the actions of the previous Government in the 1980s, but it is simply not true to say that when Saddam used chemical weapons against his own people or against the Iranians the international community endorsed it. It did not. It condemned it very strongly in a presidential statement from the UN Security Council at the time.
Secondly, in relation to Israel I think it is right that we have relaunched the middle east peace process, but if we are to get the middle east peace process back on track again, three things need to happen. The trouble is that people select one or other of them, but they all have to happen. First, the right of Israel to exist and its security have to be recognised by the whole Arab world, as indeed the UN wants. Secondly, there has to he a viable Palestinian state; and thirdly, there has to be a proper security infrastructure built within the Palestinian Authority. Otherwise, my fear is that the moment the process gets going again, it will be wrecked by a suicide bomber or a terrorist. We have to have the indemnity against that of a proper security infrastructure. All three of those things will have to happen before the process is back on track.
Mr. David Trimble: It is a reasonable conclusion that it was only the threat of force that led Saddam Hussein to offer to admit inspectors. There must therefore be hope that a reinvigorated inspection and containment regime will work, but if it does not and other measures become necessary, will the Prime Minister please bear it in mind that, looking at the middle east as a whole, there is probably a greater threat from the militancy that we saw in al-Qaeda and the Taliban? That militancy is not limited to Afghanistan; it grows out of Wahhahism, the state religion of Saudi Arabia, and it will be exploited by Saddam Hussein to try to destabilise other areas. Can we please have some policies that will be directed towards the instability that comes out of Saudi Arabia, as without such policies there will be no lasting peace anywhere in the middle east?
Finally, while many people applaud the clarity and the vigour with which the Prime Minister is pursuing this matter, many people feel that there are similar problems nearer home that would benefit from the same approach.
The Prime Minister: On the right hon. Gentleman's last point, which I thought he might make and which he is entitled to make, I still believe that the peace process in Northern Ireland offers a better opportunity for a peaceful future than does any other alternative.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that fundamentalism is a real and serious issue. We must deal with it in two ways. First, we must make it clear yet again, as we had to in respect of action in Afghanistan, that this has nothing to do with the religious complexion of the particular regime. Indeed, Saddam's victims are Muslims. The idea that we should pursue Saddam because he is a Muslim is as absurd as saying that we should have pursued Milosevic because he was an Orthodox Christian. This has to do with the nature of the regime. That is what is important.

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Secondly, we must give thought to how we engage with the Arab world. In that context it is important that we try to push forward the middle east peace process without apportioning blame on either side: we can blame one side or the other for a long time and get nowhere. We need a huge mobilisation of energy to get that process going. It is not simply the state of the process itself that concerns Arab opinion; it is the sense that we lack the will to push this forward. We must show that we do, provided that it is on a basis that is just for the security of Israel and for the rights and needs of the Palestinian people.
Mrs. Louise Ellman: Will the Prime Minister confirm that Iraq stands uniquely condemned for violation of Security Council resolutions based on chapter 7 of the United Nations charter? What assessment has been made of Iraq's potential for supporting terrorist groups whose aim is to undermine international peace?
The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the unique status of Iraq in relation to weapons of mass destruction. Although we did not deal with this in the dossier, there is no doubt, for example, that certain forms of terrorism in the middle east are supported by Iraq. That is another indication of the nature of the regime.
Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory: Will the Prime Minister be explicit about his aims regarding the Government of Iraq? Ambiguity on that point will cause immense confusion later as this drama unfolds. Specifically, would he and the Government be satisfied if Iraq accepted or could be made to accept verifiable, unconditional and unrestricted access by weapons inspectors, leading to verifiable disarmament of Iraq's international weapons? If that were successfully concluded, is it not his aim in addition to seek to change the Government of Iraq or its leader?
The Prime Minister: It is precisely our aim to make sure that the United Nations will is implemented. That has to do with the disarmament of Iraq and the proper verification, inspection and monitoring regime that is able to do its job properly. We are in the present position in order to enforce exactly that. We have not been able to enforce that. For 11 years Iraq has refused to comply with that demand. I have no doubt that if the weapons inspectors are able to do their job and we are effectively able to disarm Iraq, that will indeed change the whole nature of the regime. Our ability to do so has to depend on the United Nations being prepared to assert its will firmly and to back it by the threat of force, which is the only thing that will work.
Whether I would like to see the regime of Saddam Hussein change is another matter. Personally, I think it would be wonderful for the Iraqi people and for that region of the world. Our process is fixed on the issue of disarmament because that is the UN demand that has been made. I do, however, think—this is one of the reasons why for 11 years Saddam has ducked the issue of proper inspection—that that would have a huge bearing on the
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regime, but that is, if you like, an incidental consequence of having a proper weapons inspection regime there, able to do its work properly.
Mr. Jon Owen Jones: What few in the House or outside would disagree with in the document is the statement that Saddam Hussein's regime represents a threat, although we may have arguments about the extent of the threat, but the document is silent on what happens in the event of the Iraqi regime's being replaced by force of arms. What threats would ensue? How do we take a decision if we are not allowed to compare the threats to the area that would result from replacing the Iraqi regime by force with the threat of the Iraqi regime's being allowed to continue?
The Prime Minister: Although some of these questions—if we get to the stage of military options, what are the right options, and if we get to the stage of regime change, what replaces Saddam—do not arise for decision now, as I have said throughout I of course agree that they are very serious questions, which we need to look at. The only thing that I would say to my hon. Friend about regime change is that it is hard to think of an Iraqi regime that would be worse than Saddam, but that said, it is obviously important that we deal with all these issues, including making it quite clear to the people of Iraq that should it come to the point of regime change, that has to be done while protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq. That is an important point.
Sir Michael Spicer: It is still not clear to me what happens if the Prime Minister does not get the UN resolution that he is seeking.
The Prime Minister: If we cannot get the UN resolution—I believe that we can—we have to find a way of dealing with this. As I said in my Trades Union Congress speech some time ago, the international community must be the way of dealing with this, not the way of avoiding dealing with it, but I am confident that the international community will respond to what President Bush has said, what I have said and what others have said and will recognise that it is important that we lay down a very clear mandate for the UN.
Mrs. Claire Curtis-Thomas: Recently I met Professor Christine Gosden, who is professor of genetic medicine at Liverpool and also a doctor who has extensive knowledge of the health of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. She is desperately concerned that after the bombing of Halabja, significant numbers of people have cancer and there is high infant mortality. She and her team have recently put a proposal to the Department for International Development to construct a cancer hospital in Kurdistan, where there are absolutely no medical facilities. That proposal has been turned down, and I would ask my right hon. Friend to ask the Secretary of State for International Development to reconsider that decision.
The Prime Minister: I am not aware of that proposal; I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Development has heard what my hon. Friend has said. My hon. Friend is of course right to draw attention to the appalling consequences of the attack on Halabja, in which thousands of people died in a chemical

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weapons attack by Saddam, which is one very good reason why he should be disarmed of these weapons in their entirety.
Mr. Ian Taylor: The Prime Minister has been very convincing about the need to take action against Iraq, but slightly less convincing about how to handle the knock-on effect of even a successful elimination of Saddam Hussein. That is why, surely, the international community needs to be galvanised behind this effort, and why many people in this country really do have concerns about the apparent American policy, which is to go for Saddam Hussein and damn the consequences. Can the Prime Minister reassure us that he has had deep conversations with President Bush on how we handle what will be a very uncertain situation in the middle east, even if Saddam Hussein is removed?
The Prime Minister: I would respond to the hon. Gentleman in this way. First, in relation to some of the concerns expressed from America, it is perfectly natural to look at the history of Saddam Hussein and what he has done and to be sceptical about whether we shall be able to get a weapons inspection regime back in there that will be able to do its job properly. That is what they are saying, and they are perfectly right in saying it. But the very reason we have gone down the road of saying, "Let the UN Security Council pass a resolution and have it implemented" is to enable us to take this step by step. We are at the stage of discussing and ensuring that we get a strong and proper mandate laid down, and then seeing that it is implemented. Later, should Saddam not comply, some of these other questions will have to be answered, and they are obviously very important questions, to which we should give careful thought.
The only thing that I would say in relation to regime change is that it is very difficult to think of a situation where the Iraqi people most of all would not be better off without Saddam. I agree that that is not an answer to the question; it is not, but I do not think we should start from the presumption that it is an impossible question to answer. I think that we will find the answer to it, but we are not at that stage yet; we are at the stage of saying, "This is the UN's will; the UN's will has to be implemented."
Tony Wright: If a strategic choice opens up between international action to keep Saddam in his box and unilateral American action to destroy that box, which choice should we make?
The Prime Minister: We should make sure—I hope that this is what we have been trying to do—that the United States and the international community are working to the same agenda, and I believe that they are. I say to my hon. Friend and other hon. Members that I have seen a lot about the American relationship and criticisms of it. I believed this before I became Prime Minister, but I believe it even more strongly—in fact, very strongly; it is an article of faith with me—the American relationship and our ability to partner America in these difficult issues is of fundamental importance, not just to this country but to the wider world. Those people who want to pull apart the transatlantic relationship—my hon. Friend is not in this category, incidentally—or who can
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sneer about the American relationship that we have, may get some short-term benefit, but, long term, that is very dangerous to the people of this country.
Lembit Öpik: Is the Prime Minister really saying that countries already in possession of weapons of mass destruction attacking those that have not is an acceptable form of preventing weapons proliferation around the world? If he is saying that, how on earth can he convince us that this approach will make the world order more stable, rather than less stable?
The Prime Minister: I am not sure that I totally followed that, but if the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] Well, I am sorry, so forgive me if I am not answering his question. Surely the point is that if we know that someone has weapons of mass destruction, if they have used them before and if, as a result, the international community has said that they must be disarmed of those weapons, surely the greatest risk is letting them carry on developing those weapons and not doing anything about it.
Jim Sheridan: History tells us that there are hidden agendas in every war. On that basis, does my right hon. Friend share my concern about the timing of the proposed conflict with Iraq, particularly when the US economy is in free fall and there is evidence of corporate corruption in America involving some senior American politicians? If he is to lead us into conflict with Iraq, it should be for the right reasons, not clearly as a diversion from domestic politics in America.
The Prime Minister: No, I am afraid that I do not agree with that, but I just want to say to my hon. Friend that it is important to realise that, yes, I think it would be true to say that 11 September has made a difference to the way that America views such things. I cannot think that any country subject to that type of terrorist attack would not view the world differently as a result, and it has made the Americans anxious to ensure that the threats that they can see do not materialise and become reality, as indeed happened with the threat that was posed by al-Qaeda.
Apart from that, what is really important is that it is often difficult when things are not in the news the whole time because people think that they have not really been an issue, but I can tell my hon. Friend that in the past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapons inspections and what we do about that regime has come over my desk pretty much week after week. It is true that the issue has not been in the news in the way that it has been in the past six months, but it has been there as an issue the whole time because people know that there is something deeply rotten in that regime. What we know now from the assessment given by our Joint Intelligence Committee is that the very thing that we feared is the very thing that the Iraqi regime is working on.
As I said earlier, I cannot say that that has to be dealt with this month, or even next month—or even, frankly, within the next six months or so. We cannot be that specific, but we can say that it would be foolish to let that regime carry on developing in the way that it is and for the world community to do nothing. What has happened—this is the point that I would make to people—is that, whether we like it or not, now is the point of decision. Occasionally, that happens in politics whenever there are time lines.

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One of the reasons why, when I came back a few weeks ago, I realised that I would have to go out and really explain to people why the issue was of concern was that suddenly such things come to the point of decision. That is where we are at in the international community; we are at the point of decision for Iraq. We have to be clear that the consequences of saying now to Iraq that we are not going to do anything will be really, really serious.
As I say, perhaps it would be better for everyone's sake if this issue was not on the agenda, but it is on the agenda, and it is inevitable that it is. Therefore, we have to make the decision, and I do not think that we can duck the consequences of that decision.
Peter Bottomley: Many of our constituents are aware that our military forces are in action over Iraq, as the Prime Minister has said. Whether further action will be necessary if Saddam does not comply depends on whether it is right, whether it is necessary, whether it will work and whether we care. The dossier spells out the consequences if we do not care.
May I pass to the Prime Minister a view of some of my constituents? If we go from saying "No" to Saddam to saying "Action now", not everybody in this House will think that we should have a debate before a surprise attack.
The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is right in saying that the position of our armed forces and their security would have to be uppermost in our minds as we choose how to deal with that issue. He is also right—I hope that his constituents are right as well—that, looking back, when Saddam annexed Kuwait there was no way we could stand aside. People ask why it matters to Britain. It does not matter because I am standing here saying that tomorrow Saddam is going to launch an attack on Britain. That is not the threat; the threat is that within his own region, or outside it given the missile capability that he is trying to develop, he launches an attack that threatens the stability of that region and then the wider world. All the evidence that we have is that if there is such a conflict in that region, we will not be able to stand apart from it.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We will now move on.

Points of Order
12.57 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I rise to seek your help about the procedure in today's debate. I understand that the Government will open the debate by moving a motion that this House do now adjourn. Such a motion is debatable and allows a vote so that hon. Members who believe that the House should continue to sit can express that view in the Lobby. However, such a vote does not permit those who will be voting to give their reasons, and it is on that point that I seek your help.
As you will know, many Members of all parties are opposed on various grounds to military action against Iraq, and many others who represent service men and women in their constituencies who may be called to fight in such a war have anxieties on behalf of them and their families. Therefore, I am asking you to accept a manuscript motion worded as follows:
"That this House declines to support a war against Iraq using the royal prerogative unless it has been authorised by both the United Nations Security Council and a motion carried in this House."
Only in that way can hon. Members discharge their responsibilities to their constituents. Such a motion would not preclude a motion to adjourn, which would follow at the end of the day's business in the usual way.
I know of no ruling by previous Speakers that would bind you to rejecting this request, and submit that your responsibility is to the House as a whole and that your authority on procedure is unchallengeable by anyone. For those reasons, I appeal to you to allow my motion to be moved, debated and voted on in parallel to the motion to adjourn.
Mr. Gerald Kaufman: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Before you rule on the point of order made by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), would you look at the precedents and precisely those related to Iraq? Will you bear it in mind that when the House was recalled on 6 September 1990 when Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait, the debate was on a motion for the Adjournment moved by the Government of the day? Will you further note that, when a second debate was held on this issue on 11 December 1990, it once again took place on a motion for the Adjournment moved by the Government of the day? Will you also note that, when another debate was held on 15 January 1991, it again took place on a motion for the Adjournment of the House? No manuscript amendment was moved or accepted and those debates on the Adjournment did not prevent the official Opposition from voting alongside the Government, as the official Opposition are not doing today, and did not prevent my hon. Friend from voting against his own party on every occasion?
Paul Flynn rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Please sit down.
The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) would make a good Clerk of the House, but there are no vacancies.
I am grateful to the Father of the House for giving me notice of his point of order. He is seeking a debate on his proposed manuscript motion before the House begins a

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debate on the motion on the Order Paper. Our rules do not allow this to happen. Under Standing Order No. 14, Government business has precedence over other business except in certain defined circumstances. This is not one of those circumstances. When the House is recalled under Standing Order No. 13, the only business to be debated is that of which the Government have given notice. In this case, that is the motion for the Adjournment of the House which is set out on the Order Paper.
If the hon. Member for Newport, West (Paul Flynn) wishes to raise another point of order, I must advise him that he will take time out of the debate in which many Members wish to speak.
Paul Flynn: I shall be extremely brief. My point of order is that my constituents—and many of them have spoken to me—will not understand why I cannot vote today against following the Bush agenda.
Mr. Alex Salmond: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. It may interest Members to learn that the applicant for Clerk of the House has a faulty memory. Two substantive debates on the Gulf war were held on 21 January 1991 and on 21 February 1991. One took place under a Government motion and the other under a Scottish National party motion. In television and radio interviews, the Leader of the House has indicated sympathy for the idea of a substantive motion, so would it be in order for him to make a statement to tell us when that might be?
Mr. Speaker: We must move on.

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 25 (Period adjournments),
That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Tuesday 15th October.—[Mr. Caplin.]
Question agreed to.

Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Caplin.]
Mr. Speaker: We now come to the Adjournment debate. As I have already said, many Members wish to speak so I have put a 10-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches. Furthermore, it would not be appreciated if any hon. Member were to approach the Chair while I or any of the Deputy Speakers are in it. That would be most inconsiderate.
1.4 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw): My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke for an hour and a half and took 25 interventions about the case that we make for effective action in respect of the threat posed by Iraq. In view of that, I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible.
I suggest to the House that the issues before us come down to four. First, is the Iraqi regime the threat that we say it is? Secondly, are there not other countries that have developed equally dangerous arsenals of weapons of mass destruction? Thirdly, is not the international community guilty of double standards? Fourthly, even if Iraq is the danger that we claim, is the threat of force, or its use, justified? Let me deal with each of these questions in turn.
First, how much of a threat is the Iraqi regime? My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out very clearly the nature of the threat, and that was well endorsed by the House as a whole. The dossier that we have published today sets out a forensically argued case about the nature of the regime.
The main focus of the questions to my right hon. Friend was about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, but I want to detain the House briefly on another aspect of the Iraqi regime—its record on human rights. That record speaks volumes not only about the way in which the regime deals directly with its own people, but with the way in which it would seek to operate in respect of other countries and territories beyond its borders. Taking both the threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its human rights record, Iraq is in a league of its own—uniquely evil and uniquely dangerous.
On human rights, no other regime now in power anywhere in the world has Saddam's record for brutality, torture and execution as a routine way of life and as the principal means by which the elite stays in power.
Ann Clwyd: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Straw: I will in a second.
Page 48 of the dossier spells out starkly the number of Iraqis recently executed under Saddam Hussein. However, individual human stories sometimes better bring home the true bestiality of this regime. For example, in October 2000, Amnesty International reported the beheading of dozens of women by the Saddam regime allegedly for prostitution. The victims were executed in front of their homes by a militia created by Saddam's son, Uday. Among those executed for "prostitution" was Dr. Najat

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Mohammed Haydar, an obstetrician in Baghdad's leading hospital whose only alleged crime apart from prostitution was to be critical of corruption in the Iraqi health services.
As the dossier shows, the Iraqi security apparatus and weaponry are not incidental extras to be used in extremis. They are fundamental to the regime's exercise of power. The Iraqi regime has systematically persecuted and oppressed ethnic and religious groups. No group has suffered more than the Iraqi Kurds. In one year, Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds disappeared or were killed. The world had a glimpse of the genocide in 1988 when Iraqi planes used poison gas to kill 5,000 Kurds in Halabja. By then, Saddam had already shown his appetite for chemical weapons in the war with Iran. Halabja confirmed that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction would be turned against his own people as well as the outside world.
Mr. Tam Dalyell rose—
Ann Clwyd rose—
Mr. Straw: I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd).
Ann Clwyd: Given the awful atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime, will my right hon. Friend consider a non-violent option for dealing with it? It would involve bringing indictments against leading members of the regime for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I believe that such an approach should be considered. In Norway this week, we talked to the Attorney-General there about Uday Hussein, whom my right hon. Friend has just mentioned. We took a complaint about Uday Hussein to Norway, because some of his victims are there. There are also victims in the United Kingdom, so why are we not following this approach?
Mr. Straw: Let me first pay tribute to my hon. Friend's tireless efforts on behalf of the Kurds against the Iraqi regime. She makes an important point—one which I have often discussed with her. She heads up the Anglo-American organisation Indict, which has the aim of bringing to proper justice leaders of the Iraqi regime among others. I support her efforts. Indeed, I was discussing her concerns about the pursuit of the leaders of the Iraqi regime in the manner in which we wish with the Attorney-General only yesterday. But in the world in which we live the possibility of being able to extract Saddam so that he can stand trial in The Hague is, to put it mildly, fairly limited, so we must pursue other means.
However, going back to my hon. Friend's first point, I do not believe that there is anyone in the House or beyond represented on the Security Council who does not wish for a peaceful resolution of the matter. Above all, the responsibility for ensuring a peaceful resolution of the issue of disarming Iraq rests with Saddam Hussein alone. Iraq has fought wars of aggression against two neighbours, and launched missile attacks against three others.
Mr. Alex Salmond: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?
Mr. Straw: I shall when I have made some progress.
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In 1991, following the Gulf war, the United Nations Security Council required inspectors to remove the threat and disarm Iraq. The inspectors did some heroic work during their seven years, as we heard earlier, notwithstanding continued intimidation and harassment. Their achievements are spelt out on page 40 of the dossier. But in 1998, as they closed in on the most vital secrets at the heart of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes, they were forced to leave. As the Prime Minister spelt out, and as page 16 of the dossier reveals, in 1998, the regime still retained an arsenal of materiel for chemical and biological weapons. Since then, Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological agents and their means of delivery, and to make other attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
Let me turn to my second question, which is implicit in those asked by the hon. Members for Stratford—on—Avon (Mr. Maples) and for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik): what about the other countries that may have amassed equally dangerous stockpiles of weapons? What are we doing about them? As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House on 14 September last year in the first debate following 11 September, we in the United Kingdom are greatly concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in several countries. In tackling the problem, we engage the relevant Governments, both bilaterally and through the United Nations and other international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to persuade them to comply with their international non-proliferation obligations. We also exert pressure on them through our efforts nationally and with partners in various international export control regimes to block their access to sensitive materials and technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. It is our hard-headed judgment that we can best prevent the use of their weaponry through diplomacy, but that is simply not the case with Iraq.
With Saddam Hussein, the diplomatic route has been constantly and consistently obstructed by his intransigence and duplicity. It has been blocked altogether since December 1998, leaving us no alternative but to consider other options. Iraq, not the UN, has chosen the path of confrontation.
Mr. Salmond: A few seconds ago, the Prime Minister set great store by the American relationship, but might there not be a difference between that and agreement with the United States Administration? Has the Foreign Secretary seen the speech made by former Vice-President Gore in the early hours of this morning in which he argued that by being willing to countenance action outwith the United Nations the Administration were, as he put it, exhausting the reservoir of support built up after 11 September? Does the Foreign Secretary have any sympathy with that view or did the Government agree with Vice-President Gore only when he was in office?
Mr. Straw: The hon. Gentleman is quoting Mr. Gore with great selectivity. I listened carefully in the General Assembly to the speech made by President Bush of the United States which, as a leading diplomat in the United Nations said to me afterwards, was one of the most positive pro-UN speeches to be made by an American President in many decades. I invite the hon. Gentleman to look at that speech. President Bush was saying that this is

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a real problem for the world and the world's international institutions need to deal with it—that is exactly what we are doing.
Mrs. Alice Mahon: If that speech was so positive about the United Nations, can the Foreign Secretary explain to the House why last Friday we got the Bush doctrine that virtually bypasses the UN and tears up international law because it supports pre-emptive strikes anywhere and at any time that President Bush sees a threat?
Mr. Straw: If my hon. Friend read the text of the national security strategy that President Bush and Secretary Powell published, she would see that the gloss put on it is not justified. I shall give the House two quotations. First, it states:
"In keeping with our"
the United States'—
"heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage."
Secondly, it states:
"The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States … In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously."
Jeremy Corbyn: In the 1980s, Britain, along with many other western countries, was a major arms supplier to Iraq. We continued to supply weapons until the 1989 Baghdad arms fair, more than a year after the atrocity at Halabja. During that time, many thousands of people died in the Iran-Iraq war. Since then, we have supplied countless weapons to Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries in the region. I understand that we are now supplying highly selective and sensitive military equipment to Iran. Does the Foreign Secretary not think that it is time to reassess the whole arms export strategy? Does he not think for a moment that what goes around comes around, that Iran has developed a nuclear weapons capability just as Iraq may wish to do, and other countries in the region have massive capabilities?
Mr. Straw: Britain has one of the most effective and rigorous systems of arms export control anywhere in the world—more effective than any of our European partners and on a par with that operated by the United States—[Interruption.] Yes, of course, that is exactly the point I have been dealing with. Other countries have weapons of mass destruction, but the difference is that we are seeking to deal with the threat that they pose by diplomatic means. That process and possibility has been wholly rejected by Iraq, not the international community.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Straw: Let me make some progress.
What further distinguishes Iraq from other proliferators is the nature of its intent. It is not just the fact that it has weapons of mass destruction, but that it has much greater intent to use them. Saddam's is the only regime in recent history to have used chemical weapons, the only regime to have been declared in breach of the Geneva protocol on chemical weapons and the only regime that sees those weapons of mass destruction as an active tool of regional
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and internal dominance. As page 19 of the dossier sets out, Saddam is prepared to use those weapons—they are by no means a last resort.
Paul Flynn: Would the Foreign Secretary tell us under what circumstances people believe Saddam Hussein would now use his weapons of mass destruction? Is not the most likely circumstance—in fact the only likely one—one in which he was desperate, cornered or beaten and used them as a suicidal gesture? Containment has kept the peace for 11 years. Is it not possible that a military invasion—the Bush agenda—would be likely to bring about the horror that we all fear, which is the use of those weapons and unimaginable consequences for the region and the world?
Mr. Straw: My hon. Friend has come to the nub of the matter. He believes that Iraq poses no significant threat, and is no different from any other country that has weapons of mass destruction. Our view is very different. Not only does Iraq possess those weapons but, unlike other countries, it has a much greater intent to use them.
Paul Flynn: Why?
Mr. Straw: There is no need to look in the crystal ball for the reason why—look in the book at Saddam Hussein's record. Look at the fact that he has not only sought to gas people in Iran, an alleged enemy, but has used those biological and chemical weapons against his own people. He has done it once; he has done it twice; he can easily do it again.
Dr. Jenny Tonge: I agree that evidence that Saddam Hussein is building up weapons of mass destruction is crucial, but could the Foreign Secretary explain why, in the US Department of State's annual report on patterns of global terrorism, which was put on the website and presented to Congress in May this year, there was no mention under the Iraq heading of any build-up of weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Straw: I cannot explain the contents of one document published in the United States, but I can say that the United States Administration have hardly been slow in coming forward in expressing their concern about Iraq.
Mr. John Redwood: Today has shown how important it was that Parliament was recalled. It has enabled the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to set out their case with great clarity to a sceptical House. How much progress have the US and UK Governments made in bringing together a mighty coalition of the western democracies and the Arab states? Does he not agree that the more members of the coalition there are the better will be the chances to increase the pressure and of a favourable outcome?
Mr. Straw: We have devoted a great deal of work to that and I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his question. While I was at the United Nations General Assembly last week for a week, as was Secretary of State Colin Powell, we both met a large number of Foreign Ministers from Arab and Islamic states to discuss, among many other things, the threat posed by Iraq. Not one of

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the Foreign Ministers to whom I spoke has anything but contempt for and concern about the Iraqi regime, and they are, above all, praying that the action that we all hope and believe that the international community will now take, will relieve the region of the threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam has.
Mr. David Curry rose—
Mr. Straw: I should like to make some progress. I have taken a number of interventions.
The third question that the House needs me to deal with is whether, in its approach, the international community has been guilty of using double standards, especially with regard to Israel/Palestine. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister dealt with that at some length, but let me explain why we do not accept the argument.
As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain wants to see the full implementation of all UN resolutions in the middle east and elsewhere. The current situation in Israel and in the occupied territories is dreadful. Our condemnation of suicide bombers and those who organise them is absolute. But despicable though they were at the weekend, the latest terrorist outrages do not justify the latest incursions by the Israeli defence force into Ramallah or Gaza.
I said at the weekend that those forces must be withdrawn. Working with our international partners in the United Nations, in the small hours of this morning, Security Council resolution 1435 was passed with our full support. It demands that Israel immediately cease measures in and around Ramallah, including the destruction of Palestinian security and civilian infrastructure; demands the expeditious withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from Palestinian cities towards a return to the positions held prior to September 2000; and calls on the Palestinian Authority to meet its express commitments to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts are brought to justice.
Mr. George Galloway: Will the Foreign Secretary give way on that point?
Mr. Straw: I should like to make some more progress.
United Nations Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1402 set out the steps that all parties in the region must take to secure lasting peace. They impose requirements on Israel, on the Palestinians and on every Arab state. Despite the horrendous violence, there has been some progress in the region. Exactly a year ago, as I have particular reason to recall, even uttering the word "Palestine" caused controversy in some quarters. Now a commitment to a viable state of Palestine alongside a secure state of Israel is the official policy of the UN, provided by resolution 1397, with the full support of the US.
One other aspect of the double standards argument is that the military action taken by the UK and the US during the past decade has been directed against Muslims. Such claims are palpably untrue. The facts speak for themselves. The four major military campaigns that Britain has fought during the past decade have each had
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the effect of helping oppressed Muslims—Kuwait in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001.
In the case of Iraq, our differences are emphatically not with the long-suffering people of Iraq. With the United States, Britain sponsored a new UN resolution earlier this year to increase the flow of civilian goods to Iraq. But our efforts to soften the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people have been frustrated by the Iraqi regime, which prefers to spend oil revenues on weapons. Saddam has done nothing to meet the UN's conditions for the lifting of sanctions, condemning the Iraqi people to a life of penury.
Mr. Galloway: Will Israel react to last night's Security Council resolution in the way that it reacted to the one after its rampage through the holy land at Easter when the UN unanimously demanded that Israel accept inspectors from the UN to check reports of mass destruction of refugees in the camp at Jenin? Israel told the inspectors to get stuffed, they got stuffed and not another word has been said about the resolution since.
Mr. Straw: I hope that the resolution is implemented. I am pleased to note that my hon. Friend is calling for the full implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions. There is a hierarchy of resolutions, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs. Ellman) referred. Chapter 6, under which all resolutions relating to the middle east have been issued, relates to the pacific resolution of disputes. Above that, there are the mandatory chapter 7 resolutions, which impose the clearest possible obligations, usually on a single state rather than on two or three states, which is what chapter 6 is there for. Chapter 7 imposes mandatory obligations on states that are completely out of line with international law and policy, and the United Nations has decided in its charter that the failure to meet those obligations may be met by the use of force.
I look forward to my hon. Friend saying that he supports chapter 6 and chapter 7 resolutions, and that he wants all the chapter 7 resolutions, which all relate to Iraq, implemented in full.
The fourth question is whether even if Saddam is as great a threat as we say, it is justifiable to use force to deal with the threat. The short answer to that question is yes, provided force is a last resort and its use is consistent with international law.
Law, whether domestic or international, fundamentally depends for its legitimacy on the values it reflects. Law without values is no law at all. But while the moral legitimacy of any law will strengthen the natural consent for that law, there will always be some who reject or despise the values on which the law is based. Against them, the law has to be enforced, ultimately, by the force of arms. But the force which is used has itself to be consistent with the moral and legal framework it seeks to defend. Law without force is no law. Force without law is no law.
Mr. Dalyell: Will the Secretary of State give way?
Mr. Straw: I shall not give way.
Those realities about the nature of law have long been recognised within states. The painful experience of the 20th century made us recognise them too in respect of

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regulation between states. The League of Nations was shown by its specific failure over Abyssinia literally to be powerless. When exhortation ran out, the world community had nothing. The subsequent collapse of the League gave the green light to the tyrannical excesses of Hitler, and in the end, much more force had to be used, and much more blood shed, than if both the system and the world's then leaders had been capable of acting to enforce international norms of behaviour.
The architects of the United Nations learned those lessons.
Mr. Dalyell rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Foreign Secretary has indicated that he wishes to proceed.
Mr. Straw: I know that many hon. Members wish to speak, and I have taken many interventions.
The architects of the United Nations learned the lessons of what happened in the pre-war years. The UN declaration of human rights and the UN charter are the most powerful invocations I know of the moral imperatives behind international law
"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".
But the declaration and the charter skilfully combined high idealism with hard-headed realism and, above all, recognised that, as with domestic law, the ultimate enforcement of the rule of international law had to be by force of arms.
David Winnick: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Straw: If my hon. Friend will permit me, I will carry on.
Diplomacy, of course, should always be tried first, but the paradox of some situations—Iraq is pre-eminently one—is that diplomacy has a chance of success only if it is combined with the clearest possible prospect that force of arms will be used if diplomacy fails. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has said,
"We have learned that sensitive diplomacy must be backed by the threat of military force if it is to succeed."
We have used all the diplomatic instruments at the disposal of the United Nations, but, so far, Saddam has rendered them unworkable.
The recent sequence of events has been a re-enactment of the past 12 years. Only two weeks ago, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, said that Iraq would never readmit weapons inspectors. Then President Bush made his powerful speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September, and a new international consensus started to come together. Saddam's alibis started to run out. Just a week ago, we were suddenly told that Iraq would readmit the inspectors without condition, after all. Some of us were a little sceptical about that offer—quite rightly. Two days later, the Iraqi Foreign Minister began to re-impose conditions on his previously unconditional offer. This is a pretence at co-operation, but even this has come about only because Saddam has at last realised that he faces a clear choice: willing compliance or, I am sorry to say, compliance by the use of force.
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Some assert that the policy of containment has worked. My answer is that containment, backed by the potential use of force, was broadly working while the inspectors were able to do their job and the Security Council's resolve remained firm. But all the evidence suggests that Saddam has used the past four years, without inspectors, to break out of his containment and to seek to re-establish his power. Only free and unfettered inspections, backed by a Security Council united in its determination to disarm Iraq, offer the prospect of dealing with the threat by peaceful means.
A peaceful conclusion is the outcome that is desired on both sides of the Atlantic, both by Her Majesty's Government and by the United States Administration. We should applaud the efforts of President Bush to secure that end. We are now pressing for a new resolution, setting out the case for a tough and intrusive weapons inspection regime. Detailed discussions are taking place as I speak between ourselves and our key permanent five partners.
Mr. Hilton Dawson: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Straw: I am just coming to a conclusion, if my hon. Friend will allow me.
This resolution—if we get it through, as we believe we should—should allow for an early test of whether the latest Iraqi offer is genuine. But if it is to have any effect on Iraq, it must, under chapter 7, carry the implicit threat of force.
We should all be gravely exercised by the potential use of force, because innocent people are killed by the use of force and because we in government expect our troops to go into action and put their lives, and their futures and those of their families, on the line. I hope and pray that it will not come to a use of force. If there is military action, any participation in it by Her Majesty's Government would be strictly in accordance with our obligations in international law, and its purpose would be the disarmament of the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and an end to its deliberate and persistent flouting of the will of the United Nations.
The choice is Saddam's. He has flouted international law and poses a serious and significant threat to the region and beyond, yet this threat can be resolved without force, by full disarmament verified by the inspectors. I hope that he makes the right choice. It is true that we, too, face some uncomfortable choices. But if Saddam continues to defy the international community, the alternative—us doing nothing—will be much worse. We will have re-empowered a monster.
We faced difficult choices over Kosovo, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, but does anyone now say that we should not have taken action in respect of those countries? Eleven years ago, we faced difficult choices over Iraq, but to have stood by, then, and allowed Saddam free rein across the Arab world would have had dire and incalculable consequences for the region and for international security.
Abdication of responsibility, and equivocation in the face of evil, led Europe down a desperate path in the late 1930s. From the ashes was born the United Nations, and a new international order. But this international order requires law, and law requires enforcement. That is the issue before us today.
1.36 pm
Mr. Michael Ancram: It is right that Parliament has been recalled to debate the serious and unfolding situation with regard to Iraq. It is also right that it does so in the light of the dossier published earlier today. I have to say, though, that it is regrettable that we have not been given more time fully to absorb the contents of that dossier before beginning this debate.
Over the past few weeks, there has been much discussion of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, of the evil intentions and history of Saddam Hussein and of the prospect of war. As a result, there has also been much concern, some of which I suspect we will hear forcefully and sincerely expressed today. I hope that all of us in the House will listen to those views with respect.
We support the Prime Minister's stance today. We share his analysis of the threat. We support the Government's attempts to secure a firm resolution from the United Nations Security Council. We, too, would like to see this issue resolved without recourse to armed intervention but, like the Government, we accept that military action may well in the end be necessary; and if it is, we will support it.
I want to set out our position on this issue as concisely and clearly as I can. I, too, have questions to ask and I will be seeking clarifications. We on the Opposition Benches are not pressing for war. We do not want war, and we do not seek it. I have spent a significant part of my political life working for peace, but not peace at any price: not peace at the cost of evil and destruction; not peace at the expense of the overriding duty to protect our citizens; and certainly not an uneasy peace for the short term leading to a greater violation of real peace in the longer term. If there is to be war, it must be because there is no other effective or lasting way of achieving our prime objective. That objective—as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have said—has always been and must continue to be the elimination of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
We now know from the dossier that the weapons exist or, at the very least, are in the course of development. We know that they will pose an increasing threat if their development is allowed to continue. The truth is simple. Biological and chemical weapons are lethal and they know no boundaries in the hands of wicked and unscrupulous men. We know that the next generation of delivery systems that Iraq is trying to obtain from North Korea will bring Europe within the range of these weapons. We know that nuclear capability is not far off, and we know that all this is in the hands of a megalomaniac who will have no scruples about using it to achieve his ends. There is no question but that the threat is there, and that it is real.
Paul Flynn: On the question of the perpetual nature of the Opposition's dealing with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, will the right hon. Gentleman look up a question asked in April 1990, in which the then Conservative Government were asked to beef up the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspections of Iraq to see whether it had a nuclear weapons programme? The answer given by the then Member for Bristol, West—the Minister at the time—was that the Government had full confidence that Iraq, as a signatory to the non-proliferation programme, would not develop nuclear
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weapons, and that they did not intend to take the action urged by the hon. Member in question relating to inspections. Will not the right hon. Gentleman offer at least one mea culpa—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): Order. The hon. Gentleman is making a speech.
Mr. Ancram: I would need notice of the hon. Gentleman's specific question, as I was not a Member of the House at that time. Let me say to him seriously that this shows how important it is to have the intelligence to know what is going on, and to have inspectors on the ground. He makes the case for the stance that the Prime Minister has taken today, which the Conservative party supports.
Llew Smith: On the question of biological weapons, does the right hon. Gentleman accept that it was the United States that supplied Saddam Hussein with much of the material necessary to build up his biological weapons programme? Does he also accept the findings of the Scott report, which confirm that the Tory Government of the 1980s were willing and prepared to supply Saddam with military equipment, including plutonium, and that the export licences were signed to allow that to happen?
Mr. Ancram: If the hon. Gentleman were to check what was going on then, he would find that material was made available also by the Soviet Union and other countries in Europe—[Interruption.] The point is simple: the lesson is that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction today; he is developing them, and they are a threat to the international community. Given what the hon. Gentleman has said about his concerns, I am surprised that he is not supporting the stance taken by his Prime Minister today.
Mr. Redwood: Given the importance of producing the strongest possible coalition against that evil regime, what advice would my right hon. Friend offer the Prime Minister for his forthcoming discussions with the German Chancellor, who seems to be undermining the attempt to put pressure on Iraq?
Mr. Ancram: I hope that when the Prime Minister meets the German Chancellor, he will show leadership and suggest to him that he was wrong in the stance that he took in his campaign. The Prime Minister might also remind the Chancellor of the German Republic that, if he is serious about a common foreign and security policy, what we have heard from him over the past few weeks is the complete antithesis of that.
Let me return to my remarks—
Mr. Frank Cook: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Ancram: No. I shall make some progress because a lot of people want to speak. I shall see how I go; I may well come back to the hon. Gentleman in due course.
We must accept that achieving the objective of eliminating the weapons of mass destruction will almost certainly mean, one way or the other, the end of Saddam

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Hussein's regime. That is not a self-standing objective, nor should it be. It will, however, almost certainly he an inevitable consequence—or, indeed, even the sole means, in certain circumstances—of achieving our objective of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. That must remain the key objective. We have a responsibility first to pursue with vigour non-violent means of achieving it, but we must face the fact, as the Foreign Secretary did at the end of his remarks, that in the end this may require pre-emptive military action.
So long as and so far as the Government determinedly pursue that objective in those terms, they will have the support of the official Opposition. However, let me put our support in perspective. Our support is not unconditional and it will not give carte blanche to any action the Government might decide to take in the future. The objective of eliminating the weapons of mass destruction is crucial, but it must be done in the right way. There will undoubtedly be temptations to cut corners, and I say that there must be no cutting of corners. The stakes are enormous and go far beyond a limited campaign in Iraq.
The prize for getting it right is significant: it is the removal of a real and growing threat to our security from the continued development of WMD. But the prize is far more than that. The prize is a more stable middle east, no longer threatened by the dangerous ambitions of Saddam Hussein. The prize is a free democratic Iraq. The prize is a world in which dictators and terrorists who want to get their hands on, or to develop, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction will know that the international community will act with resolution to stop them if they try.
If we get it wrong, however, the cost is also significant. We cannot let Saddam get the better of us, once again running diplomatic rings round the international community as he continues to build up his arsenals. Nor can we afford to let the Islamic world believe, as it is inclined to do, that this is somehow about Islam. We cannot allow Iraq to descend into anarchy, or let the brutality of Saddam's regime be replaced by just another dictator or another reign of terror. That is why the way forward must be clearly drawn and the parameters unmistakably set out.
Essentially, that means four things: we must act to the greatest extent with the rest of the international community, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) made clear. We must act legally—the Conservative party puts great store by the rule of law and will want to be assured throughout this process that international law is being pursued. If and when we have to act militarily, we must act with overwhelming and totally effective force. Before we start any such action, we should have a clear vision of the new Iraq that must replace the old and a comprehensive plan for realising it. I shall return to those points, but first I shall give way to the hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook).
Mr. Frank Cook: The right hon. Gentleman has emphasised the fact that we must not get it wrong. The Prime Minister told us with great firmness today that Iraq has biological and chemical weapons that can be ready in 45 minutes, which is a fraction of the time that we have been discussing this issue. Does the right hon. Gentleman
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believe that we shall be able to prevent Saddam from launching those weapons and making matters infinitely worse in the time when we are launching our first attack?
Mr. Ancram: If we do nothing and do not deal with the weapons of mass destruction, the threat will be far greater next month and in the months ahead. As I shall make clear later, one comes to a stage in the development of those weapons where it is even more difficult to secure their removal and decommissioning.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Ancram: I want to look at the four essentials that I have set out, and to make some progress.
First, we must, alongside the United States, vigorously pursue the UN resolution route set out by President Bush in his address to the United Nations. That important speech set out a course within which many international doubters have found reassurance. I know that because I was in Pakistan when that speech was made, and I addressed serious concerns there before and after the speech was made.
We must not, however, invest too much hope in the United Nations. We must recognise that Saddam Hussein sees the United Nations route as some kind of bazaar—one in which, as he has demonstrated over the past 10 years, he is adept at haggling. His price is never constant. He is always seeking to shift it further in his favour, and too often he has been allowed to get away with it. That must stop now.
The first way in which to stop that is by securing the right kind of resolution from the United Nations. That resolution will be a test of the United Nations' will to match up to the standards of its charter: it must be robust; it must contain three unambiguously stated elements; it must set out clearly the requirements that Iraq must meet, including unchallengeable obligations to the weapons inspectorate; it must have a firm and immutable time frame, within which the requirements must be met and the obligations fulfilled; and it must make it clear in unequivocal terms that failure to comply will, with the backing of the UN, immediately open the way for whatever effective action is appropriate to secure the objective of eliminating the weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Jon Owen Jones: In describing his party's objectives, the right hon. Gentleman used the phrase "free and democratic Iraq". The Prime Minister did not use that phrase; he used the phrase "the integrity of Iraq". What happens if it is not possible to have both a free and democratic Iraq and the integrity of Iraq? Which is the more important: democracy or the integrity of Iraq?
Mr. Ancram: We first have to achieve the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction. I shall come a little later to what I believe the Government should be addressing in terms of the future of Iraq.
So far as the UN resolution is concerned, there must be no qualifications, no escape hatches and no room for haggling. The message must be clear to Saddam Hussein: one way or other, the game is up, and it is up for ever.
Any action that we take cannot go off at half cock. We must be prepared to contribute to the US initiative all the force and capability required to succeed and succeed

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quickly. If military action begins in Iraq we must, with our allies, pursue it with overwhelming force and single purpose. Our engagement must be swift and effective.
Our forces are already stretched from Sierra Leone through the Balkans to Afghanistan. Can the Foreign Secretary or the Minister of State reassure the House that the Government will ensure that whatever resources are needed will be made available? Are manpower, equipment and ordnance available and ready for the task that may lie ahead?
Mr. Dalyell: The right hon. Gentleman has used the words "overwhelming force" three times already. Does "overwhelming force" include the use of B61–11s? Those are the earth-penetrating nuclear weapons which, we are told, are based in the British Indian ocean territory of Diego Garcia. If there is to be overwhelming force, and if it is to involve nuclear weapons, with the B2 bombers that are based in the hangars at Diego Garcia, ought not the House of Commons to be told about it?
Mr. Ancram: The force that will be required is that which is appropriate and most effective in achieving the objective. I am certainly not going to speculate at this stage on what that force will be. Indeed, at this particular stage we need to make it clear that the United Nations resolution is the first objective to be fulfilled: only if Saddam breaches that will we consider the second option.
Mr. Michael Mates: Does my right hon. Friend agree that if diplomacy fails and force has to be used, we must do all that we can to ensure the safety of any service men whom we commit to that force, given the threat of biological or chemical weapons? Does he also agree that this time there must not be the haphazard method of immunisation and vaccination that caused so much distress and grief after the Gulf war? If a Defence Minister is to respond to the debate, will my right hon. Friend ask him to give us a substantial assurance that plans now exist to ensure the safety of our troops if they should be committed?
Mr. Ancram: I thank my hon. Friend for that important question. I am sure that the Minister of State for Defence heard what he had to say. We must learn the lessons of some of the problems that have arisen in the past, and I hope that the Minister will reassure us that that is now being done.
We must have a clear vision of the Iraq that we want to see emerge from any conflict, and that we shall need to stand ready to help to build. It is not enough simply to stop Saddam achieving a nuclear arsenal; it is not enough simply to stop his brutal reign of fear. We need to know what comes next. We need to hear from the Government that there is a blueprint—that there are plans and resources—so that a democratic, prosperous and renewed Iraq can quickly enter the family of nations and the global economy.
If we can persuade the world that we are genuinely looking beyond Saddam and that we have worked out the detail of what must come after him, we will be that much more likely to bring the world with us. If we can convey powerfully enough a vibrant vision of the new Iraq, we will be that much more likely to bring the people of Iraq with us as well.
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All this will also have important implications in the middle east and the Arab world. I heard what the Prime Minister had to say about the middle east, and I support his call for renewed dialogue to achieve the two-state solution. We must also be aware of the potential knock-on effects in other Arab countries in the region, and of the dangers of destabilisation. The last thing we want is the destabilisation of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states in general. We need a clear, positive and saleable picture of a post-Saddam middle east that creates stability and encourages prosperity. How much diplomatic consultation—I ask this of the Foreign Secretary—is taking place to ensure that that happens? How much work is being done to ensure that, post-Saddam, international oil prices, for example, will be objectively balanced rather than politically skewed?
The threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is there, and it is growing. International terrorism and its potential involvement in the use of such weapons compound that threat. But the key question will still be asked, and has been asked today: is all this enough to justify war? I believe that if the robust UN resolution route fails to materialise, or if Saddam Hussein treats it with his usual contempt, the justification for military action exists. The weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated before they can be developed to a level at which they become their own deterrent against their elimination, and an even greater threat as a result.
Then there will remain the question "Why now?" When is the time ever absolutely right for action, and how often has inaction or postponed action led to an even worse threat and greater attrition? There are certain defining moments in history which are either seized or missed irrevocably. The cost of missing them is always high, almost invariably in terms of human suffering and destruction. I believe that we are facing a defining moment now. If we fail to seize it, our responsibility for what could follow will be grave indeed.
We need to ask whether, if between 1933 and 1936 the international community had managed to mobilise the determination and action to prevent German rearmament, the horrors of the second world war might have been avoided. On that occasion timidity and caution, and the principle of avoiding conflict, triumphed. Of course history never repeats itself, but the lessons are there to be learned.
The House is rightly anxious—it would be extraordinary if it were not—but I believe that the worst thing we could do now would be to show uncertainty in the face of what is an undeniably serious and mounting threat to us all. We are all searching for peace—a peace that these weapons of mass destruction threaten. Peace can never be bought cheaply; often it can be found only in grave decisions and in readiness for war. None of us rejoices in the prospect of military conflict, but we know that peace can never sit quietly alongside the horrific development of Saddam Hussein's germs, gas and, eventually, nuclear weapons. That would be the peace of the deliberately averted gaze, and it would end in tears.
Our message to Saddam Hussein today is blunt and simple. "You have reached the end of the road; destroy your weapons or we will do it for you."
History has demonstrated that when the House shows its courage and united determination, it can turn the tide of events. I hope that today we can find that courage and

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that determination, and send the message across the world that here in Britain the despot and the terrorist will never be allowed to win—and that if we have to fight to achieve that, we will.
1.57 pm
Donald Anderson: This has been a vigorous and questioning debate, as befits a matter of peace and war. I hope that it will be the start of a process involving further debates on the Floor of the House, in Committees and elsewhere, so that a real dialogue can take place between the Government and the public—and, of course, here in Parliament.
We might ask ourselves what would have been different had the debate been held eight days ago, before Saddam Hussein's offer of unconditional entry by weapons inspectors. Before that, the course appeared fairly clear, pointing towards two resolutions—probably United Nations resolutions—the second being tabled in the event of further defiance. Have any of the essentials changed since last Monday?
Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, argues that there can now be an unconditional return of weapons inspectors. Are sanctions to be lifted? Saddam Hussein himself has given a firm assurance that
"Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons".
I hope that no one in the House believes that, and that we shall proceed in a spirit of total scepticism in regard to anything said in that respect. Now, however, the unconditional acceptance of weapons inspectors has been qualified by questions of national sovereignty, and the issue of the palaces looms.
The United States may also be in danger of making fresh demands. Certainly many key figures have considered weapons inspections irrelevant in the past. The President was prepared to allow the Vice-President to make spine-chilling speeches about the irrelevance of weapons inspectors and about what may be a total illusion—that people would be dancing in the streets at the time of regime change. He appeared to be boxing the President in, the only way out of the box being, possibly, military action. The Administration are of course, not noted for their multilateralism.
The essential facts remain, and most of us find them troubling. There are unanswered questions. Has the policy shift from containment to regime change been mainly the result of the change in the US Administration? Would President Gore have followed a different policy? Are the consequences of military action likely to be more positive than negative?
Everyone in the House would have to concede that a powerful case could be made against any form of military action. There is no immediate casus belli as there was in Kuwait or Afghanistan. Serious concerns include the extent of civilian casualties and the fact that unilateral action would be a bad precedent.
We do not want a law of pre-emptive self-defence to be developed, as it could be highly dangerous. How long would the western powers retain the support of their electorates for military action? There is a danger of regional destabilisation, and might not chemical and biological weapons be used against Israel in an attempt to inflame the whole area? There is a danger of Iraq fragmenting. How long would the US be committed?
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Is there an exit strategy? Any successor regime that is seen to be a client regime of the USA could be unstable. There is also the possibility of long-term damage to relations between Arab states and the west: more terrorism, more hatred, more humiliation.
Equally, there are compelling arguments against inaction. As the Prime Minister cogently said, there is a threat and it has to be dealt with, and that may ultimately require military action. With all the doubts and uncertainties, Saddam Hussein remains a major problem. He is a master of deceit and delay. The claim that Iraq stopped the production of weapons of mass destruction after December 1998 is totally unrealistic, as the dossier shows.
How, then, do we respond? Any steps taken must clearly be through the United Nations. We need a new resolution with a stringent timetable. The credibility of the United Nations is clearly at stake.
Saddam Hussein has, as a criminal lawyer would say, form as long as your arm. Scepticism is amply justified. We can point to a long list of his previous acts of deception, and it seems that the game of cat and mouse is about to begin again. Already, he is apparently qualifying the "unconditional" offer of acceptance, and the dossier shows very clearly that he is already attempting to hide weapons and information from future inspectors. "Unconditional" should be non-negotiable. The goal is not just inspections but practical disarmament. We should keep our eye on the ball: disarmament and the removal of weapons of mass destruction, not regime change. That is a key difference between ourselves and our US team-mates.
There is of course concern about the US approach and the new doctrine of pre-emption. Is the US serious about dealing with weapons of mass destruction? If so, it would co-operate more with international arms control treaties. For example, we would like to see a more constructive attitude towards the protocol to the biological weapons convention. Is there a broad US strategy for the middle east?
On our own Government's role, the evidence is clear that the Prime Minister has been a key and positive influence—along with others, including Baker, Scowcroft and Secretary of State Powell—on the US President, persuading him to take the UN route, against considerable pressure from others in his entourage, even though it effectively means the President vacating the driving seat, and bringing him round to linking this with the middle east peace process, which he was not initially prepared to do.
The Government have a key role to play at the UN, drafting a resolution and building an international coalition. We must pursue the UN route realistically. I commend the Government on providing the dossier, which is a very British document, low-key and with no hyperbole, but sober and chilling. I also commend today's recall. Parliament and the public, especially given their considerable scepticism, must be very much a part of the debate. I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary is to appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee tomorrow, and that the Prime Minister is following the precedent of last September and is prepared to see—regularly, I hope—representatives of all the Select Committees.
This is a continuing process, and no action is immediately in contemplation. It is a dynamic situation, with many unknowns. We hope that some of those will

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be clarified in the process. There is likely to be a considerable time before key questions on the military option arise. In the meantime, we should certainly concentrate on the UN route, with deliberation and with firm resolve, and we must ensure, as far as we can through diplomacy and the UN, that Saddam Hussein disarms.
2.6 pm
Mr. Menzies Campbell: Towards the end of his statement, the Prime Minister robustly asserted the value of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. There was much in what he said with which I agreed, but when the lives of British service men and women may be put at risk, it is neither anti-American to question the policies of the Bush Administration nor unpatriotic to question those of our own Government. Our ultimate duty is to those who send us to Parliament, not to the foreign policy of our allies, however sympathetic we may feel and however close our relations, both personal and strategic, may be.
These are complex matters, so I want to set out some of the principles that I shall try to use as a guide. No country should ever exclude the use of military force if that is the only way to protect the security and safety of its citizens, but as both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have already confirmed today, to be consistent with the principles of international law, war must be a last resort, after all other diplomatic and political alternatives have failed. There is no principle of international law that authorises regime change by means of military force. Indeed, article 2 of the UN charter expressly prohibits it.
All UN Security Council resolutions should carry equal weight, whether they impose unilateral or bilateral obligations. All members of the Security Council have a duty to see that those resolutions are carried out, and permanent members have a particular responsibility in that regard.
We can all agree—it has already been a measure of the debate—that Saddam Hussein is an evil tyrant with no regard for the sanctity of human life, for either his own citizens or the people of other countries. We all agree that he is in flagrant breach of a series of UN resolutions, and in particular those relating to his duty to allow the inspection, and indeed participate in the destruction, of his weapons of mass destruction. We can also agree that he most certainly has chemical and biological weapons and is working towards a nuclear capability. The dossier contains confirmation of information that we either knew or most certainly should have been willing to assume.
I hope that we can also agree that we have a moral and a legal obligation to test the validity of the stated unconditional offer of 16 September to allow the resumption of inspections. If I am correct in understanding the second to last paragraph of the foreword to the dossier, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Inverness, West (Mr. Kennedy) referred earlier, that, at least, is accepted by implication by Her Majesty's Government.
It may well be true that, legally, no new Security Council resolutions are required for the resumption of inspections. It may well be true that, legally, no new resolution is required for the use of force to implement resolution 687. Indeed, the existence of that authority was
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the only possible legal foundation for the actions taken in December 1998. However, I have no doubt that, from a political and a diplomatic point of view, a new United Nations resolution is essential.
Dr. Nick Palmer: I fully agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that we must explore the apparent offer of inspections. We cannot be in the position of not taking yes for an answer. However, does he agree that if some kind of military enforcement is needed, the choice is not necessarily between doing nothing and a full-scale invasion and regime change, and that it might be possible to threaten the destruction of specific sites to which we are not given access and where we believe weapons to be?
Mr. Campbell: As the hon. Gentleman remembers, the military action taken in December 1998 consisted of a sustained bombing campaign against those installations from which the inspectors had been excluded. That was thought to be appropriate and sufficient at the time. If we are driven to military action, a range of options is always possible.
Against the legal and factual background that I have set out, I believe that we are entitled to test Government policy and to ask questions to which the House and the public are entitled to have answers. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm what he has been reported to have said—that if unconditional, unfettered and effective inspections take place, military action will recede to the point of invisibility?
Where is the evidence that containment and deterrence have failed to the point at which military action is deemed necessary? Do the Government and the House agree that if a fraction of the resources that would be spent on military action had been spent on containment, containment might have been much more effective than it has been? On deterrence, where is the evidence that someone who has devoted his whole life to self-preservation would take action that would result in massive and inevitably fatal retaliation? Where is the evidence that Saddam Hussein now rejects the unequivocal assertion made by James Baker to Tariq Aziz on the eve of the Gulf war that if weapons of mass destruction were used, the response would be disproportionate?
What are the answers to those lethally eloquent questions of Mr. John Major last week, which, surprisingly, were not taken up today by the Leader of the Opposition? What is the exit strategy? Who will replace Saddam Hussein? How long would coalition troops be required to remain in Iraq? Will Iraq split up?
If, as is eloquently demonstrated by the dossier and if, as we are entitled to assume, Saddam Hussein has chemical and biological weapons, what assessment is being made of the likelihood that he would use them against attacking forces? What assessment is being made of the likelihood that he would use them against Israel? What would be the consequences for the stability of the middle east if Israel were attacked and felt compelled to respond with nuclear weapons?

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These are not fanciful questions, nor are the anxieties that they convey confined to one party. They are felt by many of our constituents, as the correspondence that we have received in our postbags in the past few weeks confirms beyond any question.
Mr. Iain Duncan Smith: As we are in the game of asking questions for answers, perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman would answer a specific question. When the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Inverness, West (Mr. Kennedy) first made his position clear on the "Today" programme, he was pressed on a number of occasions to say whether he thought that military action was conceivable if Saddam Hussein did not comply fully with the UN resolutions. He refused point blank to accept such a prospect and kept saying that the only action was diplomatic. Today we hear from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that somehow the Liberal Democrats have slid across a position that they held earlier. Is not the real question the position of the Liberal Democrats with regard to military action?
Mr. Campbell: The transcripts of interviews on the "Today" programme speak for themselves. There is no doubt whatever about the position of the Liberal Democrats on this matter. If there is any question of military action, it is a matter of last resort when other diplomatic and political initiatives are removed.
If the right hon. Gentleman is now concerned about a willingness to commit British troops, let me remind him of the occasions when Lord Ashdown challenged the Government from the Liberal Democrat Benches to commit troops to Bosnia, to support the so-called safe havens of Srebrenica and was shouted down by the serried ranks of Conservative Members, most of whom are no longer in the House. Let me remind the right hon. Gentleman that when he and I were covering similar responsibilities, there was, shall we say, a certain reluctance on his part about Kosovo. Let me remind him that his Conservative spokesman said that we should not send a battalion of Gurkhas to East Timor.
When it comes to committing military force for clear political objectives, we will take no lessons from the right hon. Gentleman. [Interruption.] If he is so anxious about the anxieties that I have expressed, I suggest that he takes them up with the hon. Member for East Surrey (Mr. Ainsworth) who, in an eloquent article in The Spectator last week, spoke, I suspect, for many in the House and in the country. The right hon. Gentleman might also discuss these anxieties with Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Hurd, two distinguished former Conservative Foreign Secretaries. There will be some in the House and outside who, for strong moral reasons, are opposed to military action. We should recognise and respect that.
We must remember that the United Nations is not some third party to whom we have subcontracted our security responsibilities. It is no more and no less than the sum of its members.
We should also never forget that after Halabja in March 1998 and after the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war in August 1998, in which Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons, the United Kingdom continued to allow credit facilities to Iraq for the purpose of arms-related equipment. If right hon. and hon. Members need any text or any foundation
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for that, I recommend that they read page 462 of volume I of the report of the inquiry conducted by Sir Richard Scott, as he then was.
Geraint Davies: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Mr. Campbell: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will try to make progress.
It is not enough to question; one has an obligation on these occasions to set out the course of action that one would follow oneself. I believe that the stated willingness to admit inspectors must be tested, and in good faith. I believe that the Government should do everything in their power to see that inspection, destruction and disarmament can be made to work. However, I also believe that any new United Nations resolution must be framed in terms that are not deliberately designed to provoke. A new resolution should set deadlines for stages of inspection that are realistic and consistent with the technical programme of Hans Blix. If there is to be a new resolution, it must be in terms strong enough to allow the inspectors to go into every nook and cranny in Iraq, including the so-called presidential palaces. If, having fulfilled all those obligations and responsibilities, we have sought to implement Saddam's offer and he fails to meet deadlines or thwarts or obstructs inspections, military action may be necessary. If he repeats the previous pattern of behaviour, he will have lost the last shreds of any defence that he might have had against military action.
The Prime Minister was at pains not to link directly the middle east peace process with Iraq, but one does not have to go very far in Arab capitals before senior Government members raise the issue of the middle east peace process and link it to Iraq. The Prime Minister was right to say that the need for progress in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians is vital for its own intrinsic worth, but we cannot escape the fact that, in the minds of many in the middle east, our failure to develop sufficient impetus behind that undermines any claim that we might have to sincerity over the matter of Iraq.
Mr. Salmond: I have followed the right hon. and learned Gentleman's comments closely and agree with much of what he has said. However, on his point about Iraqi non-compliance and military action being necessary, can he say who should decide at that point whether such action should be taken?
Mr. Campbell: It must be the United Nations, under its resolution. It must be responsible for determining whether the resolution has been breached and whether, in those circumstances, military action will be required. I am sorry that I did not spell that out, I thought it was implicit in what I had said.
Mr. Frank Cook: Would not that condition require the chief of the inspectors to report to the United Nations on this occasion, rather than to the United States?
Mr. Campbell: I thought that I had gone to some lengths to say that the question of whether deadlines were being met or whether inspections were free and unfettered must be for the technical judgment of Mr. Hans Blix, not the political judgment of others, who might have a different approach.

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I make my next point with a certain amount of reticence, but it is important to say that Mr. Sharon must be advised that any attempt to use the focus on Iraq as cover for illegitimate action against the Palestinians will not be tolerated. I believe that military action involving the United Kingdom should be endorsed by a substantive vote in the House of Commons before any of our forces are committed. In some senses it would be a constitutional innovation, leaving aside the Scottish National party's motion of some 10 years ago, but were I in the Prime Minister's position, I would welcome such a vote.
I do not shrink from the conclusion that military action may be required, but I am firmly of the view that it must be the last resort. It must be consistent with international law and must be authorised by the United Nations and endorsed by the House of Commons.
2.23 pm
Mr. Bruce George: I am sure that the Government will welcome the official Opposition's robust abstentions later today. Despite the rhetoric, there does appear to be, if not a consensus, a great deal of agreement on the basic principles on which the Government should proceed in the next few weeks or months or perhaps even early into next year.
In the many years that I have been in the House, there have been grave debates, usually at 10-year intervals—about the same as earthquakes in the west midlands. We had the Falklands in 1982, the Gulf war in 1991 and a cluster of wars around 2000. In almost every case there has been fundamental support from all political parties. There have been dissenters, and I wish to endorse the view that one should not disparage the opinions of those whose views differ from those of the official party leaderships, just as I hope that they will exercise the same acceptance of those who take a different view and interpret evidence in a different way.
I welcome today's document because it goes some way towards convincing the doubters—there are many—that there appear to be substantial grounds for taking firm action, whatever form that might take. I would prefer to proceed along the diplomatic route with the United Nations.
If we vote tonight, we will not be voting to endorse war. It would be a foolish person who would endorse a call to arms without proper discussion and rational consideration. It would be equally foolish to endorse the view that there should be no military action in any circumstances, unless one were a pacifist and deeply religious.
Conflict, if it takes place, is many months away. The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) mentioned a number of principles that he would wish to examine, and any rational politician would do likewise. When the furore erupted five or six weeks ago I wanted to establish the criteria that I would look at closely, not because I had any particular influence but because I wanted to be satisfied about my view before being called on to say whether this country should go to war.
The first and most obvious criterion is that evidence must be presented that is sufficiently coherent and based on a wide variety of sources to prove that there is a threat,
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that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, that he is acquiring more of them and that he has the intention of using them. I have gone some way towards being convinced of that, but there is still some way to go.
Mr. Andrew Turner: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. George: I am sorry, but I do not have the time.
It is important that the Security Council expresses its view. I hope that it will be in favour of the argument that there must be strong and intrusive inspections. We must not see the Security Council as a bunch of platonic philosopher kings or a dozen Henry Fondas, who weigh up arguments rationally and perfectly and then deliver a judicially perfect judgment. Each country has its own agenda and will be motivated, through its representatives, to take a view that is more likely to reflect what its leadership requires than what is necessary for the international community. I hope that the United States is not simply pretending to go down the route of diplomacy and that it has a dual policy of putting pressure on Iraq by military mobilisation alongside persuasion through the United Nations.
Secondly, I hope that there will be a new resolution that will give the United Nations the authority that it requires for proper inspections by as many inspectors as are required. There should be no restriction on the inspectors' country of origin and they should have the right to roam anywhere they wish at any time. There must be an insistence that the inspectors will not be subverted while trying to carry out their instructions.
One has only to talk to inspectors or read their biographies or read the report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies or the report we have seen today to know that the inspectors were deceived, lied to and spied on. We know that evidence was concealed and redeployed, visits were blocked and documents were forged and that the inspectors were excluded and prevented from doing the job that they were instructed to undertake. Yet, despite that obstruction, they were able to do a reasonably good job. Surely we do not want the UN returning because Saddam Hussein said last week or his spokesman said a week ago, "Yes, come along and inspect", as subsequently he has laid down a number of caveats that show every sign of providing the kind of fatal obstacles that UN inspectors were forced to work around before they were unceremoniously booted out.
My third criterion was that there should be a credible military strategy with considerable thought given to what the consequences would be if war were undertaken and strong consideration given to post-operation peace support.
My fourth criterion was satisfied by what my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary said. Action must be taken to address and, we hope, resolve the crisis in Palestine and Israel. Although it is easy for people to say that there is no linkage between the two issues, in my opinion they are umbilically linked. Unless progress is made on that front, not only will it be wrong not to knock heads together diplomatically and politically, but there will be no likelihood of the middle east giving substantial or even modest support to any action that is taken. I believe that the Government have moved very strongly on that front.

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Fifthly, I said six weeks ago that there should be a parliamentary debate and I am certainly satisfied in that respect. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said that there will be further debates and I am inclined to the view that some consideration should be given to providing more than simply a broad debate.
My sixth criterion was that George Bush Jr. should succeed his father in developing a formal and informal alliance. Not only is that desirable, but the alliance formed during the last Gulf war was imperative in providing legitimacy for military action as well as indicating that it was a world response.
We know that Saddam is hiding an arsenal of potentially lethal weapons. UNSCOM was unable to confirm the destruction of many biological and chemical armaments as inspectors were constantly blocked from entering sites, so now is the time for Saddam Hussein to prove once and for all to the international community that he is willing to work within the UN and to allow inspectors in soon, free from harassment. If that happens, and if he fears there will be rather stronger action if he does not accede, that will improve the likelihood of inspectors being allowed in and of weapons of mass destruction being identified and destroyed and—as I and most right hon. and hon. Members hope sincerely—that will be sufficient to justify the end of the game and there will be no requirement for military action. If it fails however, as the spokesman for the Opposition—or rather the third Opposition said—I fear that military action will be inevitable.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order.
2.34 pm
Mr. Douglas Hogg: As my right hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) said, the central question that the House has to face is whether we are prepared to authorise war or a course of action likely to lead to war. I recognise that we can only make a judgment on the facts as they are known today. Those facts may change, and if they do, as individuals we must be ready to change our conclusions.
Facing the facts as they are known to the House today, I have come to the conclusion that war is not justified. My principal conclusion and the reason for that conclusion is that I do not think the threat we face is either sufficiently grave or sufficiently imminent to provide the moral basis for war. I shall develop that argument in a moment, but first let me say that I believe there are a number of practical, military, political and diplomatic objections to war, many of which were touched on by my right hon. Friend the Member for Devizes in the questions that he posed.
I would like to illustrate the nature of those problems by raising a number of questions that I do not purport to be able to answer today. First, what is the military strategy, how many troops will be engaged, where are the bases and what are the military risks? Secondly, will the Arab states rally behind the purpose and provide bases for a coalition? Thirdly, what will Prime Minister Sharon do if Iraq attacks Israel? Fourthly, would Iraq survive as a unitary state, and if it seemed likely that Iraq would collapse, what would be the impact on regional stability in the middle east? How long would coalition forces have to remain in Iraq after an attack and, perhaps most
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profound of all, what is the likely impact on middle eastern opinion or perhaps on our wider relationship with the Islamic world if we commit ourselves to war?
I do not know the answers to those questions, but the probable answer to most of them raises a powerful case against war which only the most powerful arguments in a contrary sense would surely displace.
My real objection to war is a moral one. I do not believe now, looking at the evidence that we have, that there exists a moral justification for war and I do not wish to sanction a range of policies likely to lead to that event.
I am not a pacifist. I am a strong supporter of American engagement in world defence. I accept too that war, even pre-emptive war, can be justified. Proportionate self-defence accords with one's notions of international and national law, personal morality, and indeed, common sense.
For obvious reasons, I have to concede that at the time of the last Gulf war I was the Foreign Office Minister of State immediately responsible for departmental decisions concerning the middle east. In that capacity, I supported and participated in decisions that resulted in war. However, we must always keep in mind how terrible war can be. We have been extremely lucky in the conflicts of the past 20 years. In the Falklands, in the Gulf, in Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan the costs have been remarkably low, but when we authorise war we sanction action that may result in the deaths of thousands or in injury to many thousands of our own troops and citizens, but also to the Iraqis, in this case, many or perhaps even most of whom will be wholly innocent of blame.
If the concept of self-defence is to provide a moral justification for the giving of such authority, either the state against which that military action is being taken must have embarked on an act of aggression or there must be compelling evidence that such a state poses a grave and imminent threat of aggression either within its region, to its neighbours or to ourselves and our friends and allies.
We had to fight the second world war because of the German acts of aggression. The attack by what is now North Korea justified the action in Korea. We were right to use force in the Falklands, Kuwait and Afghanistan. To use another example, had the United States been aware of the Japanese carrier fleet sailing towards Pearl Harbour a pre-emptive strike would have been justified. Surely the nature of those illustrations where self-defence was invoked indicates how rare the cases really are. Surely we have to adhere closely to the proposition that we can invoke self-defence only when we face an act of aggression or it seems likely that one is imminent. Here we have to make a judgment and I am the first to admit that judgments in this sphere are extraordinarily difficult.
Saddam, as the dossier makes plain, is an evil, wicked man, an aggressor and a killer who has acquired weapons of mass destruction and has no moral inhibitions about using them. However, I do not think that he is irrational. He must know, and I believe that he does know, and he must understand, and I believe that he understands, the consequences to Iraq, himself and his regime if he uses force against his neighbours or the western alliance. Throughout the cold war we based our security on the concept of deterrence. Ultimately the Soviet Union collapsed. In this case, too, we should base our security on a concept of deterrence, not on a pre-emptive strike.

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I have two final points to make. First, in a democracy public opinion will sustain a war only if the justification for it is overwhelmingly clear—so clear that the public will view the horror shown on their television screens being done in their name and comment, "It has to be done." I do not believe that public opinion will be satisfied that war in Iraq is justified. To lead a country into war without overwhelming public support seems not just wrong, but profoundly dangerous.
Secondly—this point follows on from what the Father of the House said and from what I have articulated here previously—in a democracy no Government should commit forces to war without the authority of this House expressed on a substantive motion, so that those who oppose war can seek to change the policy by their vote. To commit Britain to war relying on the royal prerogative and without the explicit authority of this House seems to be an affront to democracy.
2.43 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell: I echo what the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said about the affront to democracy. I shall set an example by making a speech which is much shorter than 10 minutes. It is in the form of a question, and it is apposite that a Minister from the Ministry of Defence should be answering this debate.
My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) and I have been much involved in the case of the Chagos islanders. Their lawyers told us of a problem with the Ilois returning to Diego Garcia because of the building of six huge temperature-controlled hangars. We were asked what we would do to protest to the Government about that. We asked what the hangars were for. Apparently they are for B52 bombers and, particularly, B2 bombers that have to be repaired and maintained in a particular temperature. Why does one have B2 bombers? It is particularly to carry earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, specifically the B61–11.
My question, which I hope will be addressed in the reply, is this: we are talking about a British base, the British Indian Ocean Territory, of which Diego Garcia is a part and which is a House of Commons responsibility. The House of Commons should be told if nuclear weapons, albeit tactical, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy bunkers—one can understand why the American air force may wish to have this particular weapon in relation to Iraq—are to be launched from British soil, with or without agreement by the United States air force. We should be told in the winding-up speech tonight.
2.45 pm
Mr. Francis Maude: I have only a few points to make and I shall endeavour to be brief.
First, the issue is not about human rights in Iraq. The Foreign Secretary made great play of them and the dossier covers them. We need no persuading that Saddam Hussein's regime is about the most evil in the world today. It has committed atrocities on a scale unseen almost anywhere else, but that does not justify armed intervention
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in Iraq. If I may say so, it is something of a red herring. The debate is about something wider, more important and of greater application to the world outside Iraq.
Secondly, there can be no controversy about the evidence that Saddam Hussein has developed, and is continuing to develop apace, weapons of mass destruction. The dossier, which puts forward the evidence in a calm and measured way, makes the case conclusively. Surely that can no longer be a matter of dispute.
Thirdly, does Saddam having and developing such weapons amount to a threat sufficient in immediacy and gravity to justify armed military intervention, even as a last resort? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said in a powerful, lucid and cogent speech—I am afraid that I did not agree with much of it—the threat issue is a matter of judgment. Everyone has to make their judgment about the gravity and immediacy of that threat.
We must look at other countries that have developed weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and ask ourselves what it is that distinguishes Iraq from, for example, India, Pakistan or even Iran. The answer is that there is clear evidence from the history of the Saddam Hussein regime that it is fundamentally an aggressive regime. He has developed these weapons, not as an instrument of deterrence to deter attacks on Iraq, but as weapons of aggression. In the past 20 years, the regime has twice invaded its neighbours. On a number of occasions, it has launched ballistic missiles against neighbouring states. It is not a regime under external threat that has developed these weapons to create a mutual deterrence, as is the case with India and Pakistan—regrettably, perhaps, but one can understand the reason for them doing so. Those considerations do not apply to Iraq.
In my judgment, this threat is clear, serious and present enough to justify decisive intervention by the international community in whatever shape that takes to enforce a disarmament of the regime.
My fourth point is about the threat to the stability of the middle east and was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend and others. We should be very clear about this: the greatest threat to the stability of the middle east is Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Quite apart from the actual attacks that he has mounted against his neighbours in the past 20 years, the fact that he consistently sponsors suicide attacks by Palestinians helps to prevent the peace process that we all yearn to be restarted from resuming. It is hard to see how the successful disarming and removal of Saddam Hussein can do anything other than contribute to the stability of the middle east.
Of course, the same concerns were expressed before the Gulf war, 12 years ago, but in fact the successful conclusion of the Gulf war was the trigger for the start of the Oslo process—
Mr. Galloway: Where is it now?
Mr. Maude: Sadly, it has come to a halt, but there has been massive progress in that time. There is not the chasm that existed between the positions of Israelis and Palestinians at that time. Unfortunately, the movement has, been insufficient, but there has been movement and that has created greater stability in the region.

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My fifth point relates to the legitimacy of potential military intervention. I earnestly hope that there will be a further Security Council resolution, to test out the offer—if we can call it such—that Saddam Hussein has made to allow in inspectors without conditions, but such a resolution is worth while only if it allows the sincerity of that offer to be tested very quickly indeed, with very specific conditions. It must set out specific locations, which must be open to inspection in a completely unfettered way, very quickly—in a matter of weeks rather than months, or at most of very, very few months. A Security Council resolution that permitted Saddam Hussein a prolonged period in which he could exercise his undoubted skills of procrastination, which diffused and dissipated the will in the international community to enforce the already settled resolutions of the United Nations, would be a grave mistake. If no such resolution can be procured, I believe that the existing resolutions, if they are further ignored and obstructed, would legitimise military enforcement by the international community. That international community may, I concede, consist of no more than the United States and the United Kingdom, but it would be acting not in the interests of American imperialism, as was rather offensively suggested yesterday, but genuinely in the interests of upholding the will of the international community as already expressed in United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Mr. Salmond: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Maude: I have only a moment left and I have another point to make, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
My final point is about that relationship with the United States. I do not believe that British foreign policy should be a pale reflection of American foreign policy, I do not believe that the Prime Minister should be, in that rather offensive phrase, a poodle of the American President, and I do not believe that the current Prime Minister is behaving in that way. But I do believe that it is a completely legitimate aim of British foreign policy to uphold and support what has been the most important relationship for security and peace in the modern world. Unhelpful references to imperialism—particularly coming, as they did, from people who only recently were lamenting American isolationism—gravely damage that relationship.
I hope, as everyone does, that it will be possible for military intervention to be avoided, but I believe that if the will of the international community, through the Security Council resolutions, continues to be ignored and obstructed, the House should steel itself to do what it has always been ready to do in such circumstances, which is to accept the use of military force to enforce those resolutions.
2.55 pm
Mr. George Foulkes: Looking around the House today, I see relatively few Members who were present when I spoke in a previous debate resulting from the recall of Parliament. I see my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush (Mr. Soley), who at the time represented Hammersmith, and my hon. Friend the Member for
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Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), who were there. That was on Saturday 3 April 1982, as my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow will recall.
On that occasion we were debating the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and the then Tory Government's decision to use military force to regain them. I was one of the very few Members, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, who then opposed sending the taskforce. In the debate, I said:
"I am against the military action for which so many have asked because I dread the consequences that will befall the people of our country and the people of the Falkland Islands."—[Official Report, 3 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 661.]
I think that my hon. Friend will recall that some years later, when I was an Opposition foreign affairs spokesperson, I vigorously opposed the United States' invasion of Grenada. Given the same circumstances, I would do exactly the same on both occasions again. Therefore my predisposition has been, and still is, to oppose military force unless there remains no alternative, and I have not been uncritical of the United States on a number of occasions when I thought it justified.
I also recognise, however, that we need to learn from experience. It can be argued that in both Argentina and Grenada the return of multi-party democracy was at least in part due to the military intervention. I wish that some of my hon. Friends had the humility to enable them to learn from the past. For example, as my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (David Winnick) said so eloquently in a previous debate, my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow was spectacularly wrong in his dire predictions on Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan, so why is he more likely to be right now in his judgment on Iraq? A few—I am glad that it is just a few—of my hon. Friends seem more willing to accept the word of a dictator, who has twice invaded his neighbours and who has gassed to death thousands of his own people, than that of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the leader of our party. I find it astonishing, and it smacks of ulterior motives.
I accept, however, that there are genuine concerns, which have been expressed by, among others, my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short), the Secretary of State for International Development.
I came to this debate with four specific concerns. First, I share the view that the United Nations Security Council should be centrally involved in the debate on action against Saddam. But, as we heard earlier, that is exactly what our Government have been in the forefront of ensuring. Secondly, I believe that an all-out military invasion must he seen as a last resort. Incidentally, there are many ways in which our forces can be mobilised short of an all-out military invasion. The mere hint of the threat of force has already resulted in Saddam's first concession. To keep the dictator to his word and to move him forward, that pressure must be maintained, not withdrawn.
Thirdly, I hope that the Government will take a further initiative to prepare for the situation in Iraq when Saddam finally goes, by whatever means. The Iraqi people have suffered too much already, and they deserve at least a chance of a decent Government when the dictator goes.
My final concern, which has been expressed by others, is that we give as much attention to bringing justice to the Palestinians as we are now devoting to Iraq. I know, from

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my visit to the Israeli Labour party conference, and from my discussions with the Prime Minister—he also said so again today—that there is greater determination in both to achieve a peaceful solution in the middle east than they are often given credit for. We shall all be able to give more time and greater attention to that when we are rid of the Iraqi dictator and his threat to us all.
As my four concerns have been met by the Foreign Secretary and by the Prime Minister today, I give my full, wholehearted support to the Government.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Foulkes: I have not finished yet; I have got a few more minutes.
My support is certainly more wholehearted than the Opposition's, but I want to say one last word about media coverage. After my premature exit from the Government in May, I was approached on two or three occasions by the "Today" programme. When those involved found out that I was not critical of the Government, like some other ex-Ministers, I heard no more from them. Last week, the Financial Times asked my view on Iraq, but it never appeared in its report—too supportive of the Government, no doubt.
No doubt, once again, it will be the usual suspects who hit the headlines and, no doubt, that will delight them. Whether it is innate anti-Americanism—there is some—whether it is a grievance against the Government because of ambitions thwarted or cut short, or whether it is a love of the limelight, there is no excuse for giving comfort to the dictator and making it more likely that he uses the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. If, by their action, they halt or even delay action to stop Saddam and, as a result, he causes death and destruction once again, it must be on their consciences.
3.1 pm
Mr. Alex Salmond: I sympathise with the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) about his blackout from the "Today" programme. I also thought that his departure from the Government was premature, although I am not sure about that after his speech. May I tell him that there would be no dissent across the House if this debate were about Saddam Hussein's being a vile and murderous dictator? There would be complete agreement on that, and that is true across all the parties among those who have real concerns about the direction in which the Prime Minister seems to be going.
Some of us opposed Saddam Hussein's vile regime when he was the blue-eyed boy of successive United State's Administrations, supported, armed and financed in pursuing his assault on Iran. The House may also recall that British Ministers and companies did not have clean hands either. The United States may have provided Saddam Hussein with weapons, hardware and military intelligence, but as Sir Richard Scott reminded us, previous Conservative Governments misled the House about the United Kingdom's dubious record on arms sales to Iraq. Nor is the debate for most people about whether Saddam Hussein should be persuaded or forced to give up weapons of mass destruction.
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The Prime Minister's much delayed dossier describes evidence of wish, intent and enormous cruelty, although not of immediate capability in nuclear weapons or, indeed, of links with international terrorism, even though at least some people in the United States said initially that that was the pretext for action. However, the real debate in my view turns on what does or what does not constitute a United Nations mandate or sanction for action. That is why this crisis is not only hugely important for every one of us in itself, but for the future.
Those who flout the will of the international community—whether Israel in Palestine, India in Kashmir, or even the United States itself in relation to the International Criminal Court—often have recourse to the idea that international agreements, even those involving the United Nations itself, are not really worth the paper they are written on. That is a totally cynical attitude.
Unfortunately, the Prime Minister came close to describing the UN as such during his Sedgefield news conference on 3 September, when he said, rightly in my view, that it is better to take action with the broadest possible base of international support. However, he then went on to say that military action could be taken anyway. As the hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) has said, those are dangerous words. That was boiled down to its essence by the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude) a few minutes ago, when he explicitly said that the international community could comprise the United States and the United Kingdom. I have absolutely no doubt that that is also the Prime Minister's view, but it is highly significant that he did not make that explicit in his statement earlier today.
In many ways a gung-ho campaign of regime change in Iraq, without the explicit sanction of the Security Council, would be just as foolish and just as damaging in its consequences as the west's covert but extensive support for Saddam Hussein some 20 years ago. I do not think that we should rest on the murky and self-defeating doctrine of "my enemy's enemy is my friend". For many of us, the UN still possesses real potential to give order to international affairs.
The shadow Foreign Secretary said that we must not place too much faith in the UN. Well, some of us—not just in the House, but across the world—still place enormous faith in the UN's capability. There is no reason since the end of the cold war why UN action cannot be effective, as indeed it was 12 years ago in the first Gulf war. Indeed, if the US had not taken action under article 51 last year—it was entitled to do so because its nation was under attack—but had opted for an explicit Security Council motion in relation to defeating international terrorism, I have absolutely no doubt that the international community would have given its assent to pursuing the campaign.
There is no evidence that the UN is permanently immobilised; nor does the UN Security Council consist of the five permanent members, something that I sometimes read in the press. There are 15 nations on the UN Security Council, currently including the small European nations of Ireland and Norway. Before I came to the House today, I had a quick scan through the press comments in those Security Council nations, and I should like to inform the House of what has been said in those countries and how distant it is from some of the attitudes of the United States Administration—and, indeed, some of those in the United Kingdom Cabinet.

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There is an expectation in those countries that arms inspectors will return to Iraq. There is no assumption that access will be unfettered initially or that it is all going to be easy, but there is a determination and expectation that further action will be required if that access is denied. There is, however, widespread disbelief that, even while we are going through that process, there may be the risk of unilateral action by the United States, supported by the Prime Minister, to enforce UN resolutions when the UN itself has not sanctioned that action.
In this debate so far, the issue was best expressed by the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell), who spoke for the Liberal Democrat party. He went through the process of legality and, in particular, unveiled the fudge, which I detected from those on the Government Benches earlier, about who should suggest the use of force if all else failed. The right hon. and learned Gentleman's answer was clear: it should be the UN Security Council. Only it can act on behalf of the international community—the real international community, not the bilateral international community.
The worst-case scenario if that is not done is a near armageddon, unrest in the Arab world, the disruption of Saudi oil supplies and the entire world economy, and the possible extension of the conflicts in Israel and perhaps Pakistan. Even if that were avoided, on a best-case scenario, such action would be problematic, costly in human life—Iraqi civilians and our armed forces—and the stability of the world economy.
Dr. Palmer: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Salmond: I am sorry, but I do not have time to give way now.
Presumably, the Prime Minister has an eye on the stock market, the oil markets, and people's concerns about their pensions, their jobs and the lives of their sons and daughters in the armed forces.
Of course genuine multilateral action, sanctioned by the UN Security Council, also carries risks and costs in human life, but it is inherently more containable, and upholding the rule of international law has long-term dividends.
Of course it is possible that the Prime Minister and the American President are playing a game of brinkmanship—talking tough to ensure a peaceful solution. The trouble is that they could just topple over the edge, and take us all with them. The House had better acknowledge that there is substantial public scepticism and distrust of the American President's motivations—indeed even of those of the British Prime Minister. I hope that some of the base motives, some of which were referred to earlier by Labour Members, are not the real reason for the countenancing of unilateral, as opposed to genuinely international, action. However, I wish to offer another thought to the House. Might it be that in the aftermath of last year's attack on the twin towers—the atrocity—much of American opinion, but by no means all of it, is still in shock because of that atrocity? Might not many people across the world still be desperately anxious to support America, as our solidarity last year demonstrated?
I note that yesterday Mr. Rumsfeld said that Chancellor Schroeder's comments were poisoning the relationship between Germany and the United States. Is it not rather
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more possible that some of Mr. Rumsfeld's comments are poisoning the relationship between America and the rest of the world?
Might it not be true that, at this particular moment, with so much at stake for all of us, what America desperately needs is a candid friend to tell the truth, not a cheerleader willing to pay a "blood price"?
3.10 pm
Mr. Terry Davis: I share the scepticism expressed about the motives of President Bush, but we have been asked in this debate to focus on the Prime Minister's belief that Saddam Hussein has developed weapons of mass destruction and what should be done about it.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have made it clear that the Government have two aims: first, to ensure the return of United Nations inspectors to Iraq; and secondly, to ensure the destruction of any weapons of mass destruction discovered by the inspectors. They have also made it clear that they believe that the threat of military action should be used to achieve those aims, but those aims and that threat raise two questions which the Government have yet to answer in this debate. First, when should the decision to use military action be taken? Secondly, who should take the decision that military action is necessary?
The answer to the first question must be that no decision can or should be taken until we know the response of Saddam Hussein to United Nations' insistence, expressed in a new resolution, on the return of UN inspectors—or, if they return, until we know the results of those inspections. A decision cannot and must not be taken in advance. We should take care—the Government should take care—that any new UN resolution does not contain any loose words or phraseology that could be used or abused at some time in the future and without any reference to the UN to authorise or to claim authority for military action that was not intended by the UN.
As for who should authorise military action, I share the view expressed by several Members in this debate that the decision to do so should be taken by the Security Council of the United Nations. It is not enough for the decision to be taken by one man—not even President Bush, or perhaps especially President Bush. The United Nations should decide whether the inspectors' findings, and Iraq's response or lack of it to them, justify the use of military action. Of course United Nations resolutions should be enforced, but the method of enforcement should be specifically authorised by the UN Security Council and not determined by a self-appointed vigilante.
This question and the answer to it are important because President Bush made it clear in his speech to the United Nations—and those authorised to speak on behalf of his Administration have also made it clear in their statements—that he believes that the President of the United States, with at most the authority of the US Congress, is entitled to take the decision to enforce UN resolutions. I do not agree; I think that a lot of Members do not agree with President Bush's position. I hope that our Government do not agree either and will make it clear to the United States that it is not acceptable to many of us that it should take such decisions alone and without the authority of the United Nations.
3.14 pm
Mr. Nicholas Soames: I wholeheartedly support the position taken from the Front Bench by my right hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram). I particularly pay tribute to the brave speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who spoke so powerfully about his objections to going to war. I should add that many of us in the House would profoundly agree with the admirable speech of the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes).
The House should have been recalled some time ago in order to discuss these matters. Britain is not a country lost in some futile pacifist dream. This is a mature democracy, whose people have every right to be told in a timely manner the truth about the reality of the great issues that must be dealt with, and whose long history, fortified and sustained over many years by the experiences of many similar hard and difficult days, should have absolutely required the Government of the day to have had the confidence to produce all the information at least six weeks ago, as well as to recall Parliament earlier.
Many of my constituents and my friends are truly affronted by the Government's patronising impertinence in not coming before Parliament much earlier to make a perfectly good, sound case, as the Prime Minister did this afternoon. That task has been made much harder by their ineptness and by the bellicose rumblings of our allies, which are now mercifully more suitably directed.
However, I congratulate the Prime Minister, the Government and British diplomacy on the role that they have together played in persuading our allies of the essential requirement to obtain United Nations backing to deal with this matter. Indeed, President Bush was—admirably—right in his speech to the United Nations when he asked whether it was truly prepared to see the UN's will flouted and wronged and cast aside, and whether the authority and credibility of the UN were to be trampled in the dust or upheld. If that authority and credibility is not upheld, there will be anarchy and the UN's credibility will be destroyed for ever.
Ultimately, any foreign policy or established international order that allows a country such as Iraq to acquire and retain weapons of mass destruction while violating solemn UN and other guarantees and agreements is in breach of all its obligations and is a guarantee of a world on the edge of greater terrors to come. This matter must now be brought to a conclusion in order to prevent what President Bush rightly called the gravest possible danger to our freedom, which lies at the crossroads of terrorism and technology. We must have a clear and unequivocal new UN resolution, containing obligations of absolute crystal clarity, fortified by a non-negotiable timeline and with the clear message that, if Iraq defaults, steps will immediately and effectively be taken to force it to remove and destroy all illegal weapons.
As we all know, however, there will be the most tremendous consequences to all this. There will be the welcome liberation of the people of Iraq from an appalling and cruel regime. Huge effort will be required to bring stability to that country. There will be the unavoidable requirement—I welcome the fact that it has been much echoed in this debate—for the United States, Europe and all nations of good will to press ahead with resolving the Palestinian question and seeing to the future security of
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Israel. There will have to be a commitment from all involved to a new strand of policy to start achieving democratisation, greater freedom and prosperity throughout the Muslim world and in particular stability among our friends in the Gulf.
What the Arab world needs particularly—and if there is indeed as a result of these actions to be regime change in Iraq—is a model that works: a progressive Arab regime that by its very existence would create pressure and inspiration for a gradual democratisation and modernisation around the whole region. That would provide an engine to deal with the widespread poverty, ignorance, repression and humiliation that form the lethal cocktail driving Islamic extremism, especially among the young, and whose consequences remain such a terrible danger to us all.
We are living at a time when we cannot predict, as we did in the cold war, how the enemy will react or behave. We face a number of undetectable threats for which we will have no warning. Given what we know of the Iraqi regime and its weapons, and given the necessity to uphold the authority of the United Nations, we must press on and deal with this issue by acting and operating, as Britain always has, within the full authority of international law. This is no time for us to avoid the hard choices that have always placed Britain alongside her allies in doing what is right and necessary.
3.20 pm
Mr. George Galloway: It is a pity that the House was not recalled earlier and it is a bigger pity that we will not be permitted a vote on a substantive motion today.
The biggest pity of all is that the dossier—the dance of the seven veils—finally came to light just a couple of hours before this debate began. Many of us would have liked the opportunity to check with our sources many of the claims that are in the Prime Minister's dossier. I have just done that with that well-known Saddamist organ, The Daily Telegraph whose foreign correspondent was awaiting my call so that I could read him the places mentioned in the dossier. He and other British correspondents then climbed into a waiting car and proceeded immediately to the very venues mentioned in the dossier. Therefore, we perhaps will not have to wait for at least a preliminary report or for the inspectors to go back in a couple of weeks. The Daily Telegraph will tell us tomorrow and give us at least a preliminary idea whether the statements made in the dossier are pulp fiction or have some validity. I hope that we will not get into the situation in which Groucho Marx found himself in that great movie "A Day at the Races". As a horse doctor posing as a top physician, he was finally debunked and forced to fall back on the phrase, "Who are you going to believe—me or those crooked X-rays?"
The truth is that the inspectors—not people with a propaganda interest in drawing up dossiers—are the only people who can be trusted with this information. We will have the inspectors back soon enough unless President Bush makes good on his threat last Thursday to block their return unless the Security Council toes his line.
However, if this were really about the return of the inspectors and weapons of mass destruction, we could all go home and we would not have to divide the House this evening when many Members will vote for us and many

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more will abstain. However, everyone knows that the issue is not whether the inspectors are going back and whether disarmament can proceed. The issue is whether this Government are prepared to join a pre-emptive attack on Iraq by the United States that is not sanctioned by the UN Security Council.
I tell the Government that there are two problems with that approach. The first is the leadership qualities of George W. Bush. The Prime Minister tells us, as George Bush himself might put it, that we have been misunderestimating the President. The problem with that view is that the British people have seen and heard the President and they think they are estimating him just about right as not a man whom we would want to be at the wheel of the car as we drive along the edge of a cliff with ourselves sitting in the back seat.
Are we misunderestimating the President's friends? Are we misunderestimating Donald Rumsfeld whose picture appeared in The Guardian the other day shaking hands with Saddam Hussein in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war after he had just handed over the latest American satellite surveillance equipment so that the Iraqi regime could better target the Iranians who were our foes in that war? Are we misunderestimating Paul Wolfowitz, a man who used to make even Ronald Reagan's blood run cold? Are we misunderestimating the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, a man who voted in the United States Congress against the resolution for the release of Nelson Mandela from prison?
I am principally speaking to my friends and I have to tell them how much more comforting it is to be on the side of Nelson Mandela in this argument than it is for some of them to be on the side of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and George W. Bush. I ask Labour Members how we ended up on George Bush's side of an argument with Al Gore, the Democrats' presidential candidate. Would it not have been better if new Labour had strengthened the new Democrats or even the peace party within the Republicans rather than siding with Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush?
Mr. Mark Hendrick: Will my hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Galloway: No. How do my friends feel having to say that Al Gore is wrong and that George W. Bush is correct? [HON. MEMBERS: "Give way."] I do not have time to give way in a time-limited speech.
My friends have to answer why they are on George W. Bush's side of the argument and not on the side of Gerhard Schröder, the leader of the German Social Democrats, our sister party in the Socialist International.
Mr. Hendrick rose—
Mr. Galloway: The second problem is even more substantial. The British people instinctively know that adding another war to the middle east where there are quite enough wars already does not seem like a sensible idea. People see the Israel that the Foreign Secretary told us had received new instructions from the Security Council last night demolishing brick by brick the solemn commitments in the Oslo agreement. They see the bulldozers, like some prehistoric animal, tearing down President Arafat's compound.
Mrs. Louise Ellman rose—
Mr. Galloway: The British people saw on the news this morning that nine Palestinians were killed just last
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night in just one city in Gaza. They see the devastation and the flames in Palestine, the unresolved conflicts in Afghanistan and the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism and hatred against the west and they instinctively know that it is extremely unlikely that the world can be made a safer place by launching yet another war in that region—a war of 60 days and nights of intensive carpet bombardment followed by 250,000 western soldiers invading and occupying an Arab Muslim country. The British people instinctively know that that does not sound like a recipe for security and peace in the world or like a recipe for the diminution of terrorism.
The Prime Minister used a rather chilling phrase in his introduction. He talked about chemical weapons causing a painful and excruciating death, as indeed they do. That is why some of us were outside the Iraqi embassy demonstrating against the brutality of the Iraqi regime when British Ministers—the previous Government's Minister's—and business men were inside the embassy selling the Iraqi regime guns and gas.
Mr. Peter Lilley: Untrue.
Mr. Galloway: If Members read the Scott report, they will see just how true that is.
The fact is that innocent Iraqi civilians will die in their thousands if this war goes ahead. They include the children who are even now terrified every night before they go to sleep about when the dive bombers will come. Siamese twins were born at the weekend in Baghdad. Usually when Siamese twins are born we start discussing which of the two unfortunates is going to have to die so that the other one may live. Pretty soon, George Bush, in a bizarre King Solomon-like decision, may well decide that both of them have to die. The question is, is Britain going to be with them?
3.30 pm
Rev. Martin Smyth: We have just heard a vintage speech which has raised the temperature of the House—it may have been more of a rant than a logical argument.
We may have forgotten that while a high percentage of people in Iraq may be from the Muslim community, the Iraqi Government are not—they were recently described to me as a secular socialist Government—so I believe that many people in the region would be glad to see them changed. How that change comes about only time will tell. We are fortunate to be able to debate those issues here and express diverse views knowing that none of us will be taken away afterwards to the Tower of London to await trial. Unfortunately, dissidents in Iraq face an immediate sentence from a man who gave permission to his in-laws to return, apparently granting them safe conduct, only to execute them himself. We in Northern Ireland have faced a similar situation. A distinguished politician gave permission to a woman to bring her son back to Londonderry, then ordered his execution. That is the world we are living in.
None of us should take the moral high ground because we are all culpable. People point a finger at one another, but we must face the fact that Governments have very few friends—they have only interests. Some people have spent a long time attacking the Americans and George Bush but we would do well to remember that we are in this state

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today because in the Gulf war the armed forces followed the United Nations resolution, and ceased to pursue the republican guard and others and complete their campaign. The UN resolution was just to liberate Kuwait.
I know something of the problems because my Kurdish friends have concerns, which have been expressed this afternoon, about what happens if Saddam Hussein is deposed. Bearing in mind that the main purpose of action is to destroy weapons of mass destruction, his deposal is another matter, but it will be up to his own people sooner or later. I remember the Kurds telling me that they were concerned about what might happen after his deposal, so we should think ahead to the end, and not just the beginning, of a campaign. Most of us would be happy if the UN reached a security agreement that allowed things to be done lawfully, but it has been argued here today that the law regularly requires force for its implementation. If it cannot be enforced, we will be in a situation I have often described. A Belfast housewife is annoyed because she sees her child misbehaving in front of people in the street and says, "Wait until I get you home—I'll murder you." The youngster just smiles because he knows that getting home is all that will happen—there will not even be a rebuke.
None of us should therefore pride ourselves on the use of force. The nub of the argument is who will use it. When the UN makes such a declaration, it relies to a large extent on the British-United States axis and allies to form an enforcement body. We would be delighted if others joined us, but the hard core will be composed of those of us who espouse and enjoy democracy. Yes, we have made mistakes. Early in the debate, the right hon. Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Sir Brian Mawhinney) said that we who believe in the force of evil may take a certain line. There was some laughter, as if it was strange to discuss that concept in a political arena. The tragedy is that because the evil in all of us is not under control at times, the Saddams of the world arise. Frankly, I cannot understand how we can attain moral authority if we shilly-shally about the way in which world Governments work together to deal with that problem.
In that context, let me pose a question. Perhaps because I am a child of the 1930s, I remember the debates in the old Chamber which was destroyed by Hitler's bombing. I remember British statesmen and politicians travelling the world saying that we should not deal with him—some even took that line during the war. We should be honest. Some of our American friends say that they declared war on Germany, but they did not. Certainly, some of them helped us freely and voluntarily at the outset, but the United States only entered the conflict when Germany declared war on it after Pearl Harbour.
When do the members of the free world, with their undertakings to help one another, begin to act? Do we wait until another 1 million people perish, as happened in Poland, before we accept that we have international obligations? None of us want war—only fools do—but sooner or later we may have to face that possibility. The House should at least give the Government its blessing as they co-operate with their allies in the UN and elsewhere to try to do something positive to free the world from the menace of weapons of mass destruction and, perhaps, the madman who will use them.
3.37 pm
Mr. Chris Smith: There are two things that we know for certain in our debate. First, a common theme in many speeches has been that Saddam Hussein is a repressive, inhumane dictator dedicated to retaining and expanding his own power. Secondly, we know that he has been, and may well still be, developing chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons.
Precisely at what stage that development is remains unclear. Today's dossier helps a little, but it does not resolve the issue. We should, however, accept that there is a desire to attain such weapons. It is undoubtedly true that the world would he a safer place—we would all be safer—if we could ensure that Saddam Hussein, with his history, track record, ambitions and grip on internal power, did not have access to weapons of mass destruction. That much is incontestable, but how best do we, the international community, secure that aim? That is the question that we need to address and discuss, and it should be the focus of our debate.
Two choices immediately follow that question. First, is our aim the eradication and decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction, or is it what has become known as regime change? One thing that has emerged from today's discussions—probably the most valuable thing to emerge so far—has been a crystal clear statement from the Prime Minister that the focus of our activity is weapons of mass destruction, not regime change. I very much welcome that statement.
The second choice is whether the process of securing the decommissioning and destruction of weapons of mass destruction will be carried out through the United Nations and with international agreement, or will be a United States-led exercise alone.
It has been absolutely right to take the issue to the UN, and for any role that our Prime Minister has played—as I believe that he almost certainly has—in persuading the United States to do so he deserves the gratitude of us all. But do not we hear many voices in the United States Administration saying that they will take military action anyway? Here lies the great danger.
Going to the UN means doing this properly. It means building step by step, with care but with determination, an international consensus, using that to bring pressure, drawing support from the Arab states across the region—not assuming the right to take action, announcing the intention to do so and then seeking UN approval as a cipher for something already decided.
America is a great nation. Its willingness to use force at times in the past 100 years, not just in its own defence but in the cause of humanity, has served us all across the globe. Where would the people of Bosnia, the people of Kosovo, or, now, the people of Afghanistan be without it? But that does not mean that every decision made by this American President, and every goal announced by his Secretary of Defence, is necessarily right.
Let us grieve with the people of the United States for the losses that it suffered just over a year ago. Let us thank the United States for its engagement with causes of justice around the world, let us be resolute with it to bring an end to terrorism wherever it may be, but let us test this proposition about Iraq against the evidence, against the shared aims of the international community, and against the need for a stable world.

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I say to my own Government, in all candour, if, as it may well do, it comes down to a choice between a UN-led, UN-decided process and a decision to deploy force inspired by the US President alone, our cause must surely lie with the international community and the UN.
Let us remember what the consequences might be of a US-led, US-inspired attack on Iraq with perhaps only Britain and one or two others alongside. First, there is the sheer military difficulty of the operation. This is not an easy "drop a few bombs and then walk away" exercise. It is difficult, dangerous and risky.
Secondly, there are the humanitarian consequences. The loss of innocent civilian life in any serious conflict is likely to be huge. Indeed, it may be deliberately engineered to be so by Saddam Hussein himself, but that does not negate the point.
Thirdly, there are the real dangers of regional instability, what might happen in such an event—an attack on Israel by Saddam Hussein followed by reprisals; an end to any remnants of hope for a new peace process between Israel and Palestine; uprisings in other Arab states where Governments are perceived to be too pro-American in their attitude; new repression in others; the turning of Saddam Hussein, bizarrely, into a hero for millions across the Arab world; the fracturing—undoubtedly—of the coalition against terrorism so painstakingly built up a year ago, including by our own Prime Minister?
All of those are potential—indeed probable—consequences of an American go-it-alone decision to attack without the broadest possible international agreement and specific endorsement of the UN.
Again, I say to my own Government, with all the sincerity that I can:
"Do not go gentle into that good night".
3.46 pm
Malcolm Bruce: In the 19 years that I have been a Member of the House, I have not sought to speak in the debates that have preceded this country's military excursions. That is mostly because, like everybody else, I have a great reluctance to support causes of war, but I am sometimes persuaded that war is necessary in order to achieve peace, stability and the liberation of oppressed peoples. I hope that I remain somebody who listens to the argument and wants to hear a persuasive case.
The dossier produced and sincerely presented by the Prime Minister makes a persuasive case for the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I share the view that we, the international community, must confront that threat, not pretend that it is not there. However, I would have grave concerns if we were drawn into a situation where the rule of international law was brought into question.
We are moving into a new era where the doctrine of deterrence is being changed to the legitimisation of pre-emptive strikes, possibly even pre-emptive nuclear strikes. At no time since the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has any of us in the western alliance ever supported pre-emptive strikes. This is a massive change of tactic and one that I reject but that, in any case, cannot be taken on the instigation of one politician in one country, however powerful that country is. That is something that we must address.
I was one of a number of British politicians—not only Ministers but members of all political parties—who attended the earth summit in Johannesburg. It is important
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to share with the House the feeling of anger and resentment felt by the 21,500 people at that summit who were trying to find ways to give the poorest people on earth the possibility of real improvements in their quality of life by the developed world agreeing to create space for them to do so. That anger was the result of the American President not being there while his civil servants were specifically there to block agreements and were successful in doing so. Not only that, but the media daily broadcast speeches from the American Administration making the case for a war against Iraq at a time when 109 nations and their Heads of Government were gathered to try to create a platform for peaceful development in the future. The juxtaposition was ironic in the extreme.
The hon. Members for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) and for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) referred to the fact that the former Vice-President and presidential candidate of the United States, Al Gore, made a powerful speech yesterday, in which he said that he feared that America was squandering the good will that had been built up around the world since 11 September to defeat terrorism and the threat of terrorism, by treating the United Nations with a degree of contempt.
I give credit to the Prime Minister for the influence that he has apparently exerted on the President to go to the United Nations. I also believe that the President made an effective speech there, but it has been seriously undermined by what has been said since by other members of his Administration, using the language of a John Wayne wild west movie: "We're going to hunt him down and we're going to get him, regardless of what the United Nations does." Certain people are also apparently putting pressure on the United Nations to agree to a specific American-inspired resolution, without which they will not allow the inspectors to go back in. Clearly, there is a general view that the inspectors must be given the chance to prove that Saddam Hussein is now responding to the pressure that has been put on him.
In one of his answers, the Prime Minister really put his finger on a genuine and sincere concern of mine. He said that it was an article of faith for him that there should be the closest possible relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. I have many friends in America—I have visited the United States many times—and I completely accept that, on many occasions, American intervention has been essential for freedom and liberty. We are grateful to the Americans for that, for the resources and, indeed, for the American lives that have been laid down to secure that.
I do not believe, however, that we can accept a situation in which America is able to write its own version of international law. Nor do I believe that the United Kingdom's national interest is built solely on an article of faith about British-American relations. We also happen to have serious relationships with Europe and with the Commonwealth. My concern is that, if we found ourselves the lone supporter of the United States in pursuing international action without the sanction of the international community, not only would we have failed to stand up for the rule of international law—the point that Al Gore was making—but we would have deeply

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damaged Britain's national interests vis-a-vis the rest of the world. That is a matter to which we must give serious consideration.
Hugh Bayley: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Malcolm Bruce: I do not have time.
I am a member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly—I shall be visiting it during the rest of this week—of which there are 44 member countries. I am frequently asked by MPs from other countries exactly what the British gain from their unequivocal and totally supportive relationship with the United States. I am also sometimes asked why our Prime Minister does not use the influence that he clearly has to persuade America that, if it wants to give moral leadership and authority to the world, it should engage with the world as a partner in international enterprises. For example, it is specifically suggested that America should support the International Criminal Court and engage in the ratification of Kyoto, and that it should not send its civil servants to world summits to block agreements on how to defeat poverty.
The point that we wish to get across to our American friends is that they risk squandering the very real reservoir of good will that exists if they treat international organisations on a pick-and-mix basis—using them if they support their interests but reviling them if they do not—and if they alone decide to write the rules in a different way from any other participant. The Prime Minister has a unique opportunity to ensure that America recognises its responsibility in that regard.
The Prime Minister also has a duty to British interests to ensure that the United Kingdom is clearly standing up for the right kind of relationship with the United States. It should not be a relationship in which there is not a cigarette paper between our Prime Minister and the President, but one in which support is based on a coherent public debate about international interests, and on the coherent application of international agreements. In that way, the Prime Minister would earn a great deal of respect and gratitude, as well as showing strong support for the interests of the United Kingdom's long-term influence in the world. People see this country as having a contribution to make, but if we are indistinguishable from America—if we are just its proxy, its surrogate—the very leadership that we can give is undermined and qualified.
We shall not have a substantive vote at the end of this debate. We shall, however, have established a recognition—I detect it right across the House—that there is very little support for the British Government to engage in American-led unilateral action that does not have the clear, unequivocal legal backing of the Security Council of the United Nations. If the Government have not got that message, they really have not been listening.
3.56 pm
Ann Clwyd: Probably no hon. Member's life has been more affected by Iraq than mine. In 1995, I was sacked by my right hon. Friend, now the Prime Minister, for going to northern Iraq, which changed my life in the House somewhat. I have also been involved with the Iraqi opposition since 1979. Iraqi students were
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present at Cardiff university at that time, and they used to tell me about the atrocities that were going on in their country. I did not believe them—their allegations sounded so outrageous—but I found out subsequently that what they said was true, and that the situation was even worse than they had described.
Since 1984, I have chaired CARDRI—the campaign against repression and for democratic rights in Iraq—an organisation that has published several books on Iraq and puts out regular newsletters. During the last five years, I have chaired Indict, a campaign that started here in the House of Commons, backed by John Major—the then Prime Minister—Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton, President Mitterrand, as well as the present Prime Minister, and the great and the good from all over the world.
The aim of Indict was to collect evidence on Iraqi war crimes. There is no ad hoc tribunal on Iraq, as there is on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There ought to be, and even now I believe that the United Nations Security Council should agree to set one up. The atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime are horrific. There is not time to give details today but many are described in the Government's report and others in that produced by the American Administration.
Indict ran for two years without any funding. Everybody said that they supported us, but no one gave us any money until the US Congress gave us some. It did so because it is possible, in Europe, for individual countries to bring indictments against leading members of the Iraqi regime. Some people have scoffed at that and think that it sounds impossible. Even the Foreign Secretary told me today, in reply to my intervention, that we could not indict Saddam Hussein because it was not possible to get hold of him.
That response is incredible, given that, two years ago, on behalf of Indict, I took to the Attorney-General detailed evidence against Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz relating to the taking of hostages in Kuwait. They included more than 1,000 British hostages, some of whom were killed and some raped. Many still suffer from the trauma of their ordeal. They were British hostages, yet we are saying that we cannot indict Saddam Hussein because it is physically impossible to get hold of him. Let me remind colleagues that Milosevic was indicted while he was still head of state and, a year later, that helped to bring about the fall of his regime. He is now standing trial in The Hague. Nobody can tell me that it is impossible to indict one of the Iraqi war criminals because that simply is not true.
We have now taken evidence to five other countries. Last week, I was in Norway, where I met the Norwegian Attorney-General's staff. We took them evidence about Iraqi victims who now live in Norway, who were tortured by Uday Hussein, Saddam's eldest son. That information has now been passed to the Norwegian Attorney-General. The response of the his office, his staff and other members of the Government was totally different from that which we have had in the United Kingdom. I have to ask why we are not prepared, on the evidence that has been presented, to indict Iraqi war criminals.
Perhaps one answer comes from the former American ambassador for war crimes under the Clinton

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Administration, with whom I have had a lot of dealings over the years. Just a few weeks ago, he wrote in the New York Times:
"Yet no Iraqi official (at least 10 are of extreme interest) has ever been indicted for some of the worst crimes of the 20th century. My efforts to obtain UN Security Council approval for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal encountered one obstacle after another in foreign capitals, in New York and even within the Clinton administration. The usual excuse was that a tribunal would jeopardise either the United Nations' inspections regime or its sanctions regime. We needed Hussein's co-operation, which a criminal indictment might discourage."
The ambassador went on to say:
"We know from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and now for Sierra Leone, that indictments of alleged war criminals who lead tyrannical and genocidal regimes can destroy their political careers, isolate them internationally, end their regimes and even achieve justice. Whether or not the Security Council authorizes use of force against Iraq if credible inspections collapse, the world should build an anti-Hussein coalition through old-fashioned law enforcement."
My message to the House is that that is another option. It is an option that can be considered alongside the other options. And this option is backed by international law.
I find it incredible in this country, which I thought would lead the world on this issue, how often we have heard from our leaders on the Front Bench that war criminals can no longer hide in safety anywhere in the world. Lawyers say that if other countries took the same approach as the UK, no effective prosecution would ever be mounted and the hundreds of thousands of international victims would be left without redress.
Indict's lawyer, one of the top human rights lawyers in Britain, says that, short of a confession signed in blood, it is hard to think of what else is required by the Attorney-General.
Mr. Brian Sedgemore: Sack him.
Ann Clwyd: That was not a helpful contribution at this point.
Indict is concerned about the continued suffering of hostages, whose lives have been ruined by those crimes. We have interviewed hundreds of victims. I shall not begin to describe to the House the circumstances that they endured. They deserve redress, apart from any other consideration. If the best efforts of the UK Government and Indict cannot secure a prosecution, the fact should be openly acknowledged and debated, because I believe that that debate might also provide an impetus for an international tribunal.
I cannot believe that, once it knows the facts, this House will not add its support to the call that I am making. Hostage-taking is a grave breach of the Geneva convention. All signatory states, including the United Kingdom, have not only a right but an obligation under international law to prosecute or extradite offenders. If Tariq Aziz were to visit a country that had signed the Geneva convention, that country would have an obligation to arrest or extradite him if a UK arrest warrant were sent to it.
Given that there is a war on terror, why would not the UK wish to arrest a war criminal, or at least send a message to the world that war criminals and those who perpetrate acts of terror should no longer be allowed free movement internationally?
4.5 pm
Rev. Ian Paisley: The House will be amazed at some of the issues taken up by the hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd). I am sure that we are all concerned about them and will play our necessary part in putting pressure on the people who can act in these matters.
Today we have a very serious issue before us—whether the threat from Iraq is of such a nature as to warrant the intervention of British armed forces. However, the debate takes on a greater significance: we must determine whether, as a free and democratic nation, we are prepared to face up to the threat of international terror and violence emanating from Saddam Hussein.
William Tyndale, a great martyred reformer of Reformation days, who gave our nation the priceless gift of the Holy Scripture in our mother tongue, stated a basic principle:
"No king, no lord, no master or whatever ruler he be hath an absolute power in the world. His power is limited."
His power has to be limited.
We have to say today how far we shall allow terrorism and Saddam Hussein to go. It is all right to put up reasons and to worry about the future, but what will the future be if he gets his way and can release on the world what he no doubt has in his mind?
I was amazed by the statement of the Prime Minister, who said that we should read not just about the 1 million dead in the war against Iran. Our country was not without blame in that war. There was substantial backing from the United States and our own country in that war, so we are responsible for a degree of the blood-shedding.
Today, we come up against the great problem of credibility. If this House, our Government and the Governments of other countries are not consistent in the war against terrorism and choose whom they want to prosecute and with whom they want to enter into agreements, the other countries of the world will say, when we take a stand against Iraq, "What business is it of yours? You are not even consistent. When certain decisions suit your policies you enter into judgment, but when they do not suit your policies you do not enter into judgment."
Iraq must not be allowed to continue to conceal weapons of mass destruction. It must not be allowed to continue to stockpile such weapons and prepare for their use. When, four years ago, the Iraqi weapons arsenal was investigated to a degree, the inspectors had to withdraw. Would any of us like to put a figure on the immense gathering of arms that has now gone into that arsenal? How much power has Saddam in his hands today, as we meet here?
In those circumstances, I welcome the fact that the British Government are facing up to their international responsibilities. It saddens me, however, to have to say that the Prime Minister appears ready to challenge terrorism in the middle east—and rightly so—but refuses to challenge the activities of terrorists who are operating in a part of this United Kingdom. It is hypocrisy to join President Bush in upholding the causes of freedom and democracy, while continuing to support the retention of IRA-Sinn Fein in the Government of Northern Ireland.
I have raised the matter personally with the President of the United States. He was dumb when I said to him, "What if I suggested that you invite the bombers of

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Oklahoma to the White House and give them tea and buns and jam, because they were not really bad men?" But I, a democratically elected person, am being told that I must sit down and enter into government with the very person mentioned today by my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, South (Rev. Martin Smyth)—a man who brought one of the aliens put out of our country home to Londonderry and told his mother "Nothing will happen to the boy." When the boy came home he was sent for by the allies of that same gentleman, and murdered.
We must be consistent. The world is looking for consistency, and the Prime Minister can only strengthen his hand by being consistent.
The House should know that IRA-Sinn Fein Members who refuse to take their seats, although they have offices here, are keen supporters of Iraq. Repeatedly, day after day, facts are leaked concerning the alignment of IRA-Sinn Fein with world terrorist organisations in, for instance, Colombia. Yet we say that these people are fit to be members of the Government of part of the United Kingdom.
I welcome every step that has been taken. I welcome what the Prime Minister has done. I welcome the fact that tonight we have at least an opportunity to put our feelings on record. I believe that the Prime Minister needs to be encouraged; but I say to him and to President Bush, "Until you be of one mind and, without expediency, consistent in your opposition to terrorism throughout the world, the world will not turn and listen to you when you want to put up a coalition to fight terrorism."
All terrorism does the same thing. I have attended too many funerals in my own country, of both Protestants and Roman Catholics, not to know what terrorism has done. I also know the dread of people who cannot leave their homes in the morning certain that they will return in the evening, because of terrorist strikes. All terrorism is wicked, and it has to be dealt with. When a man like Saddam gets arms together, we can only have a terrible nightmare about what could happen if he unleashed those weapons on innocent people. We have a duty to take a stand in the House today, and I trust that we will take that stand.
4.14 pm
Mr. Stuart Bell: I can at least thank the hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) for allowing us to return to the essence of the debate. We have travelled a long way from this morning's statement by the Prime Minister, and the opening speeches of the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram). We are talking about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction—about Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons, and the possibility of nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister made it clear that those weapons could pose a threat not just to the region but to our own interests.
Many years ago, in the 1930s, Winston Churchill complained—on a very cold and quiet night in the House—that the Government were putting the cart before the horse. He made gestures depicting the cart and the horse, and he was so eloquent that those present could see them proceeding through the Chamber. We have done a lot of putting the cart before the horse today. We are
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talking about the prospect of a new United Nations resolution, not about a declaration of war. A declaration of war is not imminent. It is not the policy of either Her Majesty's Government or the Government of the United States of America. There is no point in our discussing numerous possible scenarios that do not yet exist.
The hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce) said, very pertinently, that there had been a policy change in the United States. There has been such a change. Until 1941, the policy of the United States was one of isolation; between 1945 and the fall of the Berlin wall, it was a policy of containment and deterrence. There was no clear policy between the fall of the wall and the events of 11 September. Those are what Condoleezza Rice calls the bookends of American foreign policy. Now the United States has a new foreign policy, enunciated by its President and supported by its Congress: the policy of the pre-emptive strike, based simply on the fact—the lethal fact—that 3,000 individuals died on 11 September. Incidentally, they came from 50 nations, not just America, and 100 British people died. That brought about a policy change in the United States, and the focus of the change is Iraq.
I agree with the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond). No one here will say that Saddam Hussein is other than an evil man. No one will say that he does not possess biological and chemical weapons, or that he is not on the way to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) said that this was not a debate about human rights, but I think that it is: it is about the human rights of those who live in Iraq.
To my right hon. and hon. Friends who seem somehow to think that President Bush might be more evil than Saddam Hussein, I say that international socialism does not stop at the borders of Iraq. We have an interest in the people of Iraq. We have an interest in the 60 per cent. of the Iraqi population who are Shi'ite Muslims. They have suffered terrible oppression during the years of Saddam Hussein, and they are still being oppressed, in the south and in the north. How many Members have mentioned the no-fly zone today? How many have mentioned that British airmen fly over those zones every day to protect Marsh Arabs in the south or Iraqi Kurds in the north?
Why should the population of Iraq suffer under sanctions when, as the Prime Minister said, ․3 billion worth of oil a year is being exported on the black market and is illegally going into the pocket of Saddam Hussein, who does nothing to relieve the poverty of his own people? Why should those people have to suffer for ever under a regime of sanctions?
In the speeches of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I detected no confidence whatsoever in the United Nations. The Foreign Secretary spoke of the failure of the League of Nations to act at the time of Abyssinia. We saw the consequences of that, in the form of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler. As the Foreign Secretary said, the United Nations was built on the ashes of the second world war, and to prevent a failure similar to that of the League of Nations, a Security Council was created. According to my reckoning, it has passed 16 resolutions on Iraq since resolution 1901, nine of which—according to the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram)—have not been respected.

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The first resolution, the ceasefire resolution, called for not just the sending in of weapons inspectors but the repatriation of Kuwaiti and Arab prisoners of war. That has not happened to this day. It also called for the return of confiscated Kuwaiti property, which has not happened either. There has been no respect for any UN resolution up to now.
We have had six crises concerning Iraq in recent years. The Foreign Secretary said that a new UN resolution would he tabled in the next few days. That resolution should be clear and precise and should come under chapter 7, making it mandatory on the Iraqi regime. All the earlier resolutions, including those on the confiscation of Kuwaiti assets, on the return of Kuwaiti prisoners of war and on giving the inspectors totally unrestricted access, should be rolled into the new resolution, which should have a strict term of compliance with a fixed deadline.
Why should such a resolution not be accepted by the Security Council, which exists under a mandate from the United Nations, which itself exists to promote international peace and security? Why should we be pessimistic and assume that the UN will not do its duty? Some Labour Back Benchers think that the focus of the debate will go to the Labour party conference next week, but it will not: it will go to the Security Council. If the Security Council wants to uphold international order, peace and security, it will roll the resolutions of the past 11 years into one and force Iraq to comply.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary said that we, as a nation state, will not act outside international law, so let us have more confidence in the UN than has been demonstrated today and let us not put the cart before the horse, talking about military action and what will happen after it. Let us stick with the UN and see what the resolution is and how Saddam Hussein responds. Whatever action takes place will follow a UN resolution, not a resolution of the House.
If I were a pilot patrolling the no-fly zone or a soldier going into action on behalf of the British Government, I wonder how I would feel about sitting around waiting to see which Members voted in which way. Many young men from Middlesbrough join up. They go into the armed forces voluntarily. Their parents have an interest in them, and so do we. Why should they sit around waiting for a vote in the House? It is for the Government, acting with the United States of America on the back of Security Council resolutions, to tell the House what action is to be taken if the resolutions are not complied with.
Let us not get carried away with matters of organisation, administration or procedure. These are major issues. As the right hon. Member for Devizes said, the House can rise to the occasion when it has to. The time may come for that, but for now we should send the focus to the United Nations and see what the Security Council has to say next week.
Andrew Selous: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The last two contributors to this debate have had to contend with a
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continual low chatter throughout the Chamber, which is extremely insulting to them. I look to you for a ruling on the matter.
Madam Deputy Speaker (sylvia Heal): The Chamber is rather full this afternoon, to say the least, but I think that what the hon. Gentleman says will be noted and hon. Members will listen to the speeches.
4.23 pm
Mr. Edward Leigh: This has been an interesting debate so far. I hope that I am not overstating the case in saying that there has been a clear difference of view, as exemplified in the speeches of the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) and the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway).
The hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) mentioned Churchill. In another famous debate on whether to go to war, in 1940 on the Norwegian campaign, somebody—Lloyd George, I think—said that Churchill should not allow himself to become an air raid shelter for the shortcomings of the Treasury Bench. I hope that the right hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley will not become an air raid shelter. It is up to the Prime Minister now. Whatever the sensitivities in his own party, he must speak directly to the British people and make a justification for war. He started to do that today, and we need more of that and a more serious debate on the issue.
We need a real debate on whether we are talking about acting alone or under the auspices of the UN, and whether we are talking about regime change or the removal or weapons of mass destruction. We have started to make progress. Our constituents are worried and look to the House for answers to these questions.
I want to make a stab, in my own inadequate way, at answering some of the questions. I do not believe that it is the job of the UN—or, even more problematically, of the US backed by the UK—to change a regime in the middle east. Leaving aside questions of international law, what are the practicalities? There are nearly 30 Arab nations, and not one is a democracy. Trying to impose our ideas of democracy on Iraq may unleash democratic Kurdish and Shia movements that could lead to the dissolution of the country. It would be wrong to believe that, from the Arab point of view, our system is necessarily superior to theirs.
This may not be the view of everybody in my party, but personally I reject the idea of regime change. If Saddam is in breach of UN resolutions, in my view it is right for the UN to use force, and I accept that without its use he is unlikely to make any movement at all. He would be extremely stupid to refuse to co-operate, but he has already proved himself a master of prevarication and brinkmanship, so we can look forward to weeks and months of frustration.
We have not really heard from the Treasury Bench whether this nation and this Parliament are prepared to act alone, with the US, to force the issue. US policy makers may be worried that the components of a nuclear weapons capability are so easy to disperse and hide that it would be necessary for the US to take over the country for a time. That may be their real aim, even if they have little confidence in restoring democracy in the long term.

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An attack, or the threat of an attack, may be justified on the basis of the breaking of UN resolutions, but I suspect that that will not be the real trigger—many countries are in breach of UN resolutions. Let us be serious. There are three sides of a triangle to justify a war: capability, means and intent. Does Saddam have the capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction? We have the dossier, and I am prepared to accept that he does, but I would like to hear more about the weapons of mass destruction held by other countries in the region—Iran, Syria and Israel—and by other rogue states, notably North Korea.
Does Saddam have the means to deliver those weapons of mass destruction to the west? Nobody seriously suggests that he can do so militarily: he does not have the long-range missiles, and he would be met by an overwhelming, annihilatory response. We know from John Major that Saddam was given an explicit private warning before the Gulf war that any use of chemical or biological weapons would meet with immediate devastating retaliation. We know that Sir Michael Quinlan, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, takes the view that deterrence has worked, and will work in the future.
The suggestion, then, is that Saddam will deliver the weapons not by conventional military means but by clandestine means. Where is the evidence of his links to al-Qaeda? What would he gain by such links? Are there terrorists already capable of inflicting devastating damage on our economy? Would not our acting alone make us a more likely target for Muslim fundamentalists? Are we not uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as an open society with no identification cards, and with the London underground, Heathrow and the channel tunnel? Means of delivery—the second side of the triangle—is problematical, not proven.
The most difficult of the three factors is intent. What would Saddam gain by attacking the west, apart from his own immediate destruction? Has he not outlived all his foreign and domestic opponents by being at least rational and not suicidal? I do not think that anyone seriously suggests that he intends to attack the west. Would he attack Israel, which already has a nuclear deterrent?
A correspondent posed two questions to me: is it Saddam's intention to obtain atomic weapons and, were he to do so, would he use them, either physically or as a means to blackmail other countries? My correspondent says that if the answer to those two questions is yes, an attack is justified. I suspect that that is behind US thinking. We are frightened that possession of such weapons would give Saddam an ability to blackmail other countries in the region. That is a justifiable point of view. However, I suggest that other countries in the region which Saddam might wish to blackmail are under, or could be under, the American nuclear and military umbrella.
Is the proposed attack really about a new concept of global thinking? That is the issue. Is the Truman doctrine—the concept of deterrence that has preserved peace and stability for more than 50 years—to be replaced by a new Bush doctrine of using a pre-emptive strike to overthrow dangerous regimes that could pose a threat? Truman coined his readiness to use force to protect
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existing democratic regimes from communist takeover. He was obviously thinking in the context of 1947 and the defence of western Europe. We pay tribute to the foundation of NATO.
I believe that the Bush doctrine, if there is one, is very much more dangerous. I am strongly pro-American, and to equate their love of liberty with the regimes they oppose is ridiculous. However, the United States is a superpower, and with ultimate power comes great risks. With hundreds of billions of dollars of defence expenditure, it can crush any enemy in the world. I do not believe that absolute power will corrupt the US, but there are risks. Like all other superpowers in history, it will come to realise the limits of force. We already know that overwhelming military power cannot, for instance, defeat suicide bombers.
Yesterday I received a letter from some Iraqi exiles. They oppose war with Iraq because they believe that it will bolster Saddam's claim that he is a champion of the Palestinian cause. We can destroy Saddam, but can we destroy his adopted cause of Palestinian autonomy? The best way in which to deal with Muslim terrorism is for America—and only America can do this—to put pressure on Israel to abide by UN resolutions and withdraw completely from the west bank.
Where will the Bush doctrine take us? Where will it stop? What are the tests? A military junta is allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon in Pakistan but not in Iraq and, presumably, not in North Korea or Iran. Pakistan was only righting the balance with India, and Saddam would claim that he was righting the balance with Israel.
I do not believe that the case for attacking Iraq unilaterally, without the UN, has yet been made. That is not to say that it is wrong to threaten force—that is the only language that Saddam understands. No doubt there will be weeks of frustration. No doubt when the UN teams go in there will be more frustration and delays. However, the fact remains that after 1998, the UN contained Saddam and kept him on some sort of leash.
Finally, I remain of the belief that it is safe to contain rather than to threaten destruction of Saddam's regime. If he is threatened with destruction, he could act irrationally, with incalculable consequences for the world community. Let us march in step with fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council and insist on weapons inspections, backed by the use of international force if they are not complied with. That is the right path to take.
4.33 pm
Dr. Gavin Strang: The House of Commons is at its best on occasions such as this, and so it should be, because there is nothing more important than war and peace. There is no more important debate than that about whether the Government will send our forces to war. We know what war means—the killing of civilians and our service men and women.
There is agreement across the House about a satisfactory outcome to the problem. It would be the reintroduction of the United Nations inspectors on a basis that enabled them to do their work properly. It would be the identification of the locations of all weapons of mass destruction, the facilities for manufacturing them and their destruction. The achievement of that outcome without the use of military force is surely what everyone in the House of Commons wants.

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I believe that the document published by the Government today is an intelligence assessment which we should accept. I accept the document's basis that since the UN inspectors left Iraq, the regime has produced chemical and biological weapons, tried to further its attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, and extended the range of its ballistic missile programme. In so doing, the Iraqi regime is flouting the authority of the United Nations. That is an important point. We are not talking about India or Pakistan. The Iraqi regime is supposed to be complying with the successive UN Security Council resolutions to which many right hon. and hon. Members have referred.
What is to be done? In the final analysis, can force be justified in these circumstances with United Nations authority? There is an overwhelming consensus on this side of the House that any use of force to achieve the objectives must be authorised by the United Nations Security Council. However, I think that no one in their right mind would want force to be used.
The importance of the United Nations cannot be underestimated. I welcome the fact that a considerable number of speakers, including my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) and my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell), have referred to the importance of the United Nations. When the institution was born in 1945 in San Francisco, in the aftermath of the second world war, there were hopes that it would enable us to develop a world in which we did not go to war on the scale that we had in the past, and that we would rise to the challenge posed by man's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction which, if ever they were used, would make the planet uninhabitable for the majority of the human population.
Giving the Security Council the power to enforce resolutions was deliberate. That was the basic structure of the UN. Once the resolutions were passed and the decisions taken democratically by the community of states throughout the world, the Security Council would be the marshal and have the responsibility of ensuring that there was no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In those days, the focus was on nuclear weapons, following Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but today, rightly, there is an increasing focus on and concern about chemical and biological weapons—all weapons of mass destruction.
Reference has been made to the important change in the US military doctrine, which was confirmed last week. I see many people today in the House who took part in debates during the cold war. Indeed, the bulk of my political life took place during the cold war. We did not agree on a lot of matters but, funnily enough, we are beginning to agree more now. Cold war policy was based on mutually assured destruction—a willingness actually to use nuclear weapons. It was a dangerous situation and the world was a dangerous place.
The national security strategy document published last week by the United States is very important. In it we can see the effects of two great changes in the military and security landscape that have taken place in the past two decades. There was genuine concern that the cold war would become a real, hot war between NATO and the USSR, with both sides armed to the teeth with nuclear warheads. The cold war came to an end and it is true to say that the world was a safer place for it. However, it is far harder to say that the world remains a safer place now.
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Since the atrocities of 11 September last year, the focus of the US has shifted to rogue states and international terrorism.
The US strategy paper states:
"None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous."
The development of the policy of pre-emption, as my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough rightly called it, is important. I am sure that the House will want to return to it in the weeks ahead.
When the House debated the annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee last July—a Committee of which I am pleased to be a member—I set out my concerns about the threat of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. International terrorism is many years old and nations have been developing weapon of mass destruction for decades, but together they pose a terrifying combination. The risk of hostile nations giving international terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction is a real issue that needs to be addressed. It is no secret that international measures to contain the development of weapons of mass destruction leave a lot to be desired. We must make greater progress towards blocking such access.
We should all be concerned at the build-up towards a new military operation in Iraq and the United States' apparent disregard for the international community and the United Nations—that has been referred to by Labour members. There is widespread concern in the country, which has been provoked by some of the statements from Rumsfeld and Cheney. The United States is the only superpower and we want to see it support the United Nations; and if it takes action, we want that action to be authorised by the United Nations. A particular cause for alarm is the impact that a unilateral attack would have on the stability of the middle east and on the coalition against international terrorism that has been pieced together since 11 September last year.
The situation is fast changing and there is scope for a UN mandate to tackle it, avoiding fresh military action. Weapons inspections to enforce Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions must be effective, and the inspectors must be allowed to do their work without limits.
It remains my sincere hope that this situation will be resolved without the use of fresh military action against Iraq. The enforcement of UN resolutions must be strict and effective. I am sure that I join many of my colleagues in urging the Government to do what they can to pursue a resolution to this crisis within the international community and without recourse to war.
4.42 pm
Mrs. Angela Browning: Although I did not agree with everything that he said, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) made some important points, one of which was that, if we are ultimately forced to go to war, it is extremely important that the population of this country feel that what we are embarking on is the

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right thing to do, and that they have a clear understanding of the situation and what the consequences are likely to be. Despite some extremely informative Back-Bench contributions today and after listening to the Front-Bench spokesmen, I still feel that there will be some confusion, particularly when I think of the letters that I have received from some of my constituents. I hope that today is a beginning and that the Prime Minister will take further opportunities to spell out the Government's view and to put information in the public domain through this House.
It has been a confusing six or seven months. In December last year, when the Anglo-French summit took place in London, it was reported that the Prime Minister had given the strongest signal yet of his opposition to any prospect of widening the military campaign against terrorism to include Iraq. It was reported that he stood shoulder to shoulder with Mr. Chirac outside No. 10, both of them taking that view. Therefore the public are right to ask, as I have, what has led to this escalation over the past few months, to the point where American politicians are talking about pre-emptive action. It is important to get the chronology of events right and to get all the evidence into the public domain.
I have no doubt—I had no doubt even before seeing the dossier this morning—that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous and evil man. That has been shown by his attitude to the weapons inspectors and his cavalier attitude to the UN resolutions. I believe that, unlike the old guard in the Kremlin during the cold war, he would be willing to use weapons of mass destruction. During the cold war I always argued, sometimes with Labour Members, that I believed that the weapons of mass destruction held by the Soviet Union were in the hands of people who were extremely cautious and understood the consequences of their use. I do not think that Saddam Hussein is like that, and I suspect that he is not unique. If we as a nation really believe that he will use such weapons and that he is in the process of acquiring nuclear capability, we have to deal with it. The question is how we do that. How can we take it to the nth degree to try to ensure that we can remove these weapons without having to commit our troops to war?
I agree with my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench and with the Prime Minister that we must deal with this through the United Nations. There must be succinct resolutions that are unambiguous in content and in the timetable set out. Clearly, time is not on our side. Another year, 18 months or two years might go by if Saddam Hussein is allowed to prevaricate, as he has in the past. I am totally behind the plan that has been set out today to try to use all possible legitimate means to ensure that we remove the weapons from him. If one of the consequences of that removal is a change of regime, which seems likely under such circumstances, so be it. I believe that that is all to the better. Removing those weapons and ensuring that there is no possibility of their being transferred to third parties—another important issue—must be our priority.
Over the past few weeks we have heard from American politicians—our friends and allies who are seeking our support—statements that give cause for concern. Like other hon. Members who approach this from different positions, I can quote Mr. Cheney, who said that even if inspectors went in, it would provide no assurance at all,
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and other such comments. It is therefore imperative that the Prime Minister use every ounce of his influence with the American Government to ensure that they fully understand that, although we are their friends, it is not a love that asks no questions. Sometimes friends are the only ones who can say what the problem is and how they should behave. If they will not take it from their friends, they will take it from no one else. It is critical that, over the next few weeks, the Government use that friendship and influence to ensure that the American Government fully understand that we are here to support them, but that actions must be taken in a structured way to try to achieve the best outcome.
The big question is: if the UN's activities do not work and there is no clear UN mandate to take action, what should be done then? That is something that we as Members of Parliament will have to ask ourselves. Each of us will have to ask that question if there is a vote. I truly believe that this crosses party lines. We answer to our consciences on this matter as well as to the people outside and to those whom we might deploy in the battlefield. In considering what the consequences will be if the UN resolutions are not successful, it is important that we ask ourselves whether we believe that military action is in the British interest, whether the British interest is threatened by weapons of mass destruction, and whether, even without a UN mandate, it is incumbent upon us to accept and support military action. The answers will depend upon how, in the next few weeks, the Government develop their argument and upon the information that they have started to put in front of us today in order to persuade Members of Parliament, and more particularly the wider public, of the facts that they have to prove that this situation is a threat to us.
We must be quite clear. We may believe that the situation is not a threat to the British interest, but is a threat to the wider international community so we must be quite up front and say that, although it may not be British subjects who will be attacked, we believe that it is our duty—and it is our wish—to support the wider international community and on that basis we will join forces with the Americans and any other allies who want to take a stand on this. Alternatively, if we believe that Britain is under threat, we must identify what that threat is.
On 8 September The Sunday Telegraph reported that the Prime Minister
"warned last night that Saddam Hussein was a 'very real threat to Britain'".
If that is true and if it is the Prime Minister's belief and that of the people out there that it is imperative that we support a war in order to protect Britain, we shall need a little more information than what is before us today.
I am old enough to remember the cold war, when Governments of all persuasions believed that we could be subject to a nuclear attack. There were regular briefings and information on civil defence—I remember having them at school. There are certainly important questions to he asked about what provision is being made in terms of vaccines if we are at risk from chemical attacks—
Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady's time is up.
4.53 pm
Alan Simpson: It is not often in a debate of this nature that I begin by congratulating an Opposition Member, but today I commend the speech by the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) for drawing attention to the really big issues that the House will have to address sooner rather than later. If the world is being asked to move away from a doctrine of containment and deterrence and towards a different doctrine of pre-emptive strikes, regime change, attacks and displacements of potential enemies or unsympathetic regimes, the implications for the planet are enormous.
We have to begin the process by at least engaging with the notion presented to us today that we face a choice between greater or lesser threats from Saddam Hussein, who would seek to exploit a dishonest peace, or from George Bush, who would wish to pursue a disreputable war. My belief is that we may not be in a position to stop the United States waging such a war. If there is a war, it will have very little to do with the pursuit of human rights and everything to do with the redistribution of oil rights. We have to recognise that the international threat that we face relates to the potential collapse of the existing global order of rules-based systems.
We also have to recognise the relevance of the dossier that has been presented to the House this morning, albeit at very short notice. On the positive side, the best one can say is that the dossier can at least allow us to move on from the pursuit of press rumours and to present a document for the weapons inspectors to address, scrutinise and evaluate. However, in reality there is no smoking gun to be found in this dossier. At best it is a deeply flawed, partial and superficial document. It is heavy on supposition and light on fact. It is closer to propaganda than it is to scrutiny. If it had been produced by those on the Opposition Front Bench, I suspect that the only difference would have been that it would have appeared under the title "Saddam's Evil Eyes".
As my hon. Friends take away the document and subject it to scrutiny, they should look at some of the contradictions and flaws that scream out from its pages. A great deal is mentioned about the conduct of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and the wretched use of chemical weapons in that war and against the Kurds, but there is not a single reference to our own involvement in that process, or that of the United States. There is no mention of the fact that the United States continued to supply crop-spraying helicopters to the Iraqi regime during that period and provided technical assistance and advisers to assist with the targeting of bombings. There is reference to the fact that the UN made a presidential statement criticising Iraq, but it had to do so in default of the fact that Britain refused to support any of the resolutions that were before the UN at that time, seeking to criticise Iraq, and that America vetoed those resolutions. We ought to put ourselves accurately in the frame.
The dossier treats us to a long list of the weapons of mass destruction that we are told Saddam Hussein is in the process of acquiring. We are also told that he has been on a shopping tour in Africa. That is very interesting but it needs to be set against the fact that Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, has said within the past two weeks that he has received no evidence of Iraq acquiring new weapons of mass destruction. Had he received any such evidence, he would have brought it to the attention of the
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Security Council. So we have to move from allegations to evidence and put that evidence in the hands of the inspectors.
Great play is made of Saddam Hussein's search for weapons of mass destruction in the form of long-range missiles, but no reference made to the part of the UNSCOM inspectorate report stating that by the end of 1997, 817 out of 819 long-range weapons held by Iraq had been destroyed.
There is also talk of the inspections regime having been disrupted and a great deal on page 34 about non-co-operation and sensitive sites, but there is no mention of the specific agreements negotiated by Richard Butler and then by Kofi Annan for more extensive inspection regimes which allowed full inspection of those sites. We have to be very careful not to write those out of history as it would be very easy for the United States to demand a new inspections regime that no longer had to adhere to the memoranda of understanding negotiated by the UN.
We are also told that a compelling case for preparing for war is to be found in Iraq's intentions. This part of the dossier takes a Mystic Meg approach to international planning. There is no basis on which weapons inspectors—or even the United Nations until the beginning of this year—could say that Iraq presents a clear and present danger, or a threat internationally or to the middle east. Instead we are presented with the clear knowledge that there has been no threat from Iraq to the United States, the UK, Europe or anyone else during the past 10 years, throughout which we have systematically bombed Iraq on a daily or weekly basis during this strange, bizarre peace.
We have to ask ourselves what has changed in a year. Last year we said that this imperfect peace was not a problem, but we are now saying that it is a very real problem. Logically, we have to address the point raised by the hon. Member for Gainsborough by asking what on earth would prompt Saddam—who may be a tyrant, but who is a calculating, surviving tyrant—to change his mind and say that he now feels obliged to acquire weapons of mass destruction and threaten to use them knowing that he would be destroyed as a consequence. Iraq's crime has not been to threaten anyone, but to renegotiate oil contracts; not with American companies, but with Russia and France. That is why the American Administration are demanding not just the return of the weapons inspectors, but regime change. That will mean the reallocation of oil contracts to those who support American bombing.
The Bush agenda of a pre-emptive strike would lead us into a new era of adventurism. It would be the imposition of a new set of international values; not the values of the west, but the values of the wild west. It would justify all the presumptions made by terrorist organisations about the right to take unilateral action against anyone with whom they disagree. Sadly, Bush will hit Iraq in much the same way that a drunk will hit a bottle. He needs to do that to satisfy his thirst for power and oil.
I must tell the Prime Minister that the role of a friend in such circumstances is not to pass the drunk the bottle; rather it is to divert the drunk from a path which would be as destructive to their own interests as it would be to everyone in their path. The Prime Minister must also understand that it would be perilous to take Parliament and the country down this path. Once the British public

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understood exactly what the war was about they would not support it. The Prime Minister may be able to command the support of his Cabinet in such circumstances, but not that of his country. He may even be able to get the support of Parliament, but not that of the public.
It is the duty of this House to remind the Government that there is no moral mandate to follow this path. It cannot and will not be acceptable to suggest that Britain is willing to pay a blood price for an oil contract.
5.2 pm
Mr. Robert Key: After five and a half hours of debate, there is still a great deal to be said. The speeches with which I identify most closely have been those of my right hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude) and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) and the remarkable speech of the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell), which was brimming with common sense.
Some 12,000 of my constituents are working at the sharp end of this debate. Hundreds of them are world-class scientists, technologists and engineers, thousands of them are members of Her Majesty's forces who are prepared to die for their country and thousands more are civil servants and private sector support staff. All of them are just as much citizens of our country as you or I, Mr. Deputy Speaker. They and their families are part of our community. They go to work, come home, go to the pub, play sport and share our values and aspirations for our country and the world. I salute them and their families. Too often we either take them for granted or assume that the people who will do the Government's bidding are a separate group of people. They are a part of us.
Perhaps it is because for nearly 20 years I have represented so much of the British Army in and around Salisbury Plain that I found were few surprises in the dossier published today. Perhaps it is because I represent the people who work at the Centre For Applied Microbiology and Research at Porton Down who develop the vaccines. Perhaps it is because I have learned so much from the people who work at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down whose job it is to find detection systems and develop systems for protecting our military personnel, vehicles, ships and aircraft, or because I represent so many people who work at the Nuclear Biological and Chemical Centre at Winterbourne Gunner, who are responsible for training, not just British forces, but other forces to protect themselves against chemical, biological and nuclear attack.
Of course the Government should not give us raw intelligence—their most secret intelligence—but they must tell the British people enough to gain their trust. I believe that the Government have achieved that. It may be a cliché to say that the world changed on 9/11 last year, but many people have not got that message yet. We have to face the fact that when we are dealing with regimes like Saddam's or terrorist movements, the old cold war concept of deterrence simply will not work any more. Saddam Hussein does not see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of last resort; he sees them as tools of current policy to be used as he has already used them
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and, I am confident, will use them again. Consequently, we must recognise that the traditional interpretation of the United Nations charter may need to be rethought. We have to be realistic about the definition of "immediate threat" as a justification for pre-emptive action. The old thinking of the cold war simply will not do, and Saddam knows that.
For 10 years, the west has not been prepared to defend its values. The United States—it has no greater admirer than myself—was weak through the Clinton years in failing to respond to the earlier attacks on the World Trade Centre, failing to respond adequately to attacks on its embassies in Africa, and failing to respond to the attack on the USS Cole and to the expulsion of the UN weapons inspectors. The USA has now thrown down the gauntlet to the United Nations to test its authority. That is a crucial point. Our objective must be to find a new United Nations resolution which is focused on the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) for laying that out so clearly as the Opposition's policy.
Regime change may be a consequence of that and we should not recoil from that concept. The rules have changed and we must think this through maturely, not least because Saddam Hussein is making it harder to make progress in resolving the Israel-Palestine crisis. After all, he is also causing untold suffering to his own people, especially children. The impact on the neighbouring states, particularly our brave ally in NATO, Turkey, but also Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, will be great.
We underestimate the reasons why the Arab and Islamic world has been so united in its opposition to military action against Saddam to date. It has been partly out of fear—win or lose, anyone who thwarts Saddam is in trouble. It is partly out of the recognition that he and al-Qaeda provide a focus for millions of disaffected people who either have nothing to lose in their miserable lives of poverty and hopelessness or who resent our affluence and the domination of the world by the nations of the west. This group includes a large number of people who live in the United Kingdom, so this is nothing like the Gulf war and we should realise that.
I hope and pray that we will not go to war, but if we do I believe that our cause is just. War would be a last resort, but we would win. The evil and damage that war necessarily entails would be proportionate to the evil and damage prevented. It would, then, be a just war in terms of the western, Christian, ethical tradition. I listen with respect to Christian leaders whose job it is to promote peace. They are right to do so for the greater the risks and the more devastating the impact of conflict on military personnel and civilians alike, the more cautious we should be. Such caution is a strength of western civilization. It underlines the weakness of terrorists and tyrants alike who have always exploited our preference for peace and our reluctance to do battle.
How long do we watch and wait until a judgment has to be made? I trust our Prime Minister in this matter. I agree with him that knowing what we know about Saddam I would not want it on my conscience that we let him carry on unhindered.
Many of us today will have received briefing documents from organisations, particularly charities, and none more important than the Save the Children

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document. I read it carefully. The briefing note which points out what is happening in Iraq is the best argument yet for quick intervention against Saddam. It is outrageous that he is allowed to get away with such actions in his own country. That briefing note had the opposite effect on me to that which was intended.
Looking beyond this crisis, I think that it is extremely important that we, as a nation and as an ally of the strongest nation on earth, should ensure that a new world order includes a deliberate policy of ensuring that the rich and powerful nations of the world do very much more to assist, and sometimes to persuade, the poorer nations to reduce poverty and invest in health, food, education and water. I ask the Government, whether or not we go to war, what is their intention when it comes to reconstruction—to building the confidence not only of Iraq but of other countries in future? We must harness our science and technology in their interests as well as our own, because poverty breeds fear and instability. That suits Saddam fine, even in his own country, where he deliberately starves children of food and medicine.
In my view, physical and intellectual prosperity is the enemy of dictatorship. That is why, if we do not get the United Nations resolution, and if we do not get the inspectors back and the removal of the weapons of mass destruction, in my judgment regime change would indeed be justified—if necessary, by military means.
Mr. Barry Gardiner: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Because hon. Members have today rightly focused their attention on the debate in the House, they may be unaware of the fact that earlier today there took place a devastating terrorist attack on worshippers at one of the largest Hindu temples in the world, the Swaminarayan Akshardham Mandir in Gandhinagar, in which I understand that 28 people have been shot. Would it be in order to advise Members of this, so that they might express their horror and sympathy?
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): That is not, strictly speaking, a point of order for the Chair, but the House will have heard the points that the hon. Gentleman has made, and Members will make their own judgments and have their own thoughts about them.
5.11 pm
Mr. Ernie Ross: I suppose that it is far too early to try to reflect on who could have been responsible for this atrocity, but I think that the whole House will share in the shock and dismay at this news, and would want to express sympathy for all those who have been injured and their families.
I suppose that the news also tempers some of the comments that we might want to make in the debate. We have been trying to respond as a group of parliamentarians to a threat that we know exists—a threat that we have seen demonstrated. The continuing failure of the international community to respond to the various problems that exist in all parts of the world will put even more pressure on all of us who take part in the debate to measure the words that we use in this Chamber and to ensure that we do not ourselves inflame any of those organisations or individuals who feel at the moment that they are not being listened to.
The news also demands from us that we send a clear message to those who have used this method of raising their particular grievance—shooting innocent people at a
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place of worship is no way to resolve a grievance. People should be able to go to such a place to join with others to celebrate or commemorate, or just to exercise their free will as far as their religious beliefs are concerned. They should be able to trust that they can do so without fear that it will bring their life to an end. We need to send a clear message that, whether it is in India, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the middle east, New York or anywhere else, democracy will respond by ensuring that those who use terrorisim to highlight their grievances will not win. If that message goes out from this Parliament today, although it will not reduce the pain of people who are suffering, it will at least assure them not only that our thoughts are with them but that we are determined to build a better world in which some of these problems might well be resolved.
Before the recall of Parliament, many people expressed an initial scepticism that any evidence existed of anything except the fact that some people believed that we had a United States President who had a hit list of two or three countries and was determined to finish some unfinished business that his father had not managed to secure some 10 or 11 years ago. I believe that all of us, whichever side of the debate we are on today or tomorrow, were anxious to ensure that our Parliament, our political processes, would not be directed into that scenario. We were looking forward to finding some way of coming together as a group of elected politicians in a democratic forum and having a meaningful discussion about any evidence that might exist.
The document that was produced today does not prove or disprove any side of the argument. It re-emphasises some things that we knew. It re-emphasises the fact that we knew that Saddam Hussein's regime was uniquely evil—we knew that it had used weapons of mass destruction against its own population. In that sense, the document did not provide any new and telling evidence, but it did assemble in one place enough evidence to suggest, I would hope, to most reasonable people that there was a need to deal with the issue now.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, I was discussing with my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), who was then a shadow foreign affairs spokesperson, what our reaction should be as an Opposition. I think that we took the right decision. Although we were concerned about other issues—I was particularly concerned about the middle east peace process, as I am now—we were convinced that the latest intervention should be dealt with there and then. We now need to answer the questions whether the regime needs to be dealt with and how should we deal with it.
The way in which the Government have suggested that we move forward—the way the Government have used their best influence on the American Administration, who were quite clearly split and probably still are quite split, as to how to resolve this issue—has been a lesson for us all.
I welcome the fact that we have been able to hear our Prime Minister tell us the role that the United Kingdom has played. It is clear that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been able to help those in the American Administration who regarded international law as the way forward, in preference to the approach of drawing up a select hit list, followed by removal.

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Those of us who have argued in the Chamber, on many different occasions, for the supremacy and legitimacy of international law and who wish to see it implemented much more rigorously all over the world should be heartened by the fact that we have been determined to help the United States of America to get in line with international law—to bring the matter back to the United Nations.
I should have hoped that my right hon. and hon. Friends who have disagreed with actions that have been taken in the past, and who have argued that the Security Council resolutions were ambivalent here or there, would welcome our determination to go back and obtain a new Security Council resolution. I have doubts as to whether it can be as specific as it needs to be—I have yet to read a UN Security Council resolution that was so specific that it did not allow someone to point to some ambiguity in it. However, I hope that our determination to go back and secure a new Security Council resolution will be enough to allow my hon. Friends who feel that they want to have some other debate to stay with us tonight and allow us to go to the United Nations Security Council and introduce that resolution.
Mr. Dawson: Does my hon. Friend agree that a large part of that resolution should be about the removal of sanctions in the event of Iraq's compliance with a UN resolution to allow UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to destroy weapons?
Mr. Ross: That is exactly what the resolutions say, and we might have had that debate today if Saddam Hussein had complied with those Security Council resolutions. I would have hoped that all my hon. Friends would be with us tonight in our determination.
I want to make one last comment. Many hon. Members have referred to the role of international law. I am someone who has specifically argued that it is a failure of the international community and the United States to allow international law to apply to the Israel-Palestine question that has got us into the situation that we are in today in the middle east.
The action of the Israeli defence forces in Ramallah was proof positive that unless we insist that international law is brought into the middle east peace process, we will not see an end to the way in which Israel treats its neighbour. The actions of the Israeli defence forces during the weekend in pulling down the Palestinian flag and raising the Israeli flag at the centre of the Palestinian presidential compound sent a simple message to the Palestinians: they do not exist. We need to remind Israel that, if there is to be peace, it has to have a partner, and that partner has to be a Palestinian community with rights equal to those of Israel.
5.21 pm
Norman Baker: When we are in an internationally dangerous situation, our first reaction should be to hold on tightly to international law. I was therefore pleased when the Prime Minister made his remarks earlier today to hear that he is clearly grounded in respect for the UN and reference to UN resolutions. However, the same cannot be said, unfortunately, about President Bush.
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President Bush has continually said that Iraq must adhere to UN resolutions, but he has also said, without any sense of irony, that the US retains the right to take action unilaterally without UN approval if Iraq does not adhere to those resolutions. That somewhat weakens his case for enforcing resolutions on other countries. There is a further irony perhaps: if the US were able to mobilise the kind of coalition that was mobilised before the events in Afghanistan, the President may have more support around the world today, but very little effort has been made to do that.
Instead, President Bush has sought to dictate to the world what has to be done and has held a pistol to the UN, as we heard earlier, saying that unless the UN resolution is in the terms that the US wishes to have, it will block the return of weapons inspectors. That is not the behaviour of a multilateral partner in the international world today; it is the behaviour of the playground bully. It believes that it can dictate to the rest of the world because it is the only superpower. We have seen that behaviour in the contempt shown for the International Criminal Court, for Kyoto and, most recently, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce) said, at the Johannesburg summit.
There is a widespread perception—in a way it does not matter whether it is a perception or a reality—that the US motives in this episode are far from pure. They are not altruistic and intended to defend; they are in the self-interest of the US. The hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson) referred to oil. I should like to refer to a piece published in The Daily Telegraph on 17 September, which said:
"Larry Lindsey, President George W Bush's economic adviser, said increased oil production in a free Iraq could drive down oil prices."
I quote directly from the White House. He said:
"When there is a regime change in Iraq"—
when there is—
"you could add three million to five million barrels [per day] of production to world supply. The successful prosecution of the war would be good for the economy."
In other words, if we are able to deal with Saddam Hussein—no doubt, killing a few people in the process—we can keep down the price of petrol. Those are not my words; they are those of the White House, and it has set out those intentions quite openly.
There is a widespread perception—again, it is not important whether it is a perception or a reality—that the mid-term elections are a factor. There is also a widespread perception that because President Bush has sadly failed—along with coalition allies across the world, including this country—to deal with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda that he is looking for an alternative focus for military action. So we have a choice.
Sir Patrick Cormack rose—
Norman Baker: I apologise for not giving way; I must make progress.
The most important message that we must send out is to adhere rigidly, to stick limpet-like, to the UN and its resolutions. I want the UN to deal with Iraq, and I want it to deal with a lot of other resolutions across the world that have not been dealt with. For example, the resolutions on Tibet have been gathering dust for 42 years in the UN

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and no one has bothered about enforcing them against China. The resolutions on Israel and Palestine seem to be rather further down the agenda. So, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) said earlier, let us deal with the resolutions and give them equal weight, not simply pick one out, as the Americans have done.
I am extremely worried by the concept of a pre-emptive strike—a matter raised by hon. Members on both sides of the House. A pre-emptive strike is not allowed under the UN charter. There may be a case, as the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) put it, for saying that we would have wanted to take action if we had learned about Pearl Harbor 30 minutes in advance and that such action could have been justified, but that is an exception rather than the rule. There must be a very good reason indeed to take pre-emptive strikes. They are acts of aggression in international law, so what is the justification for such an act on this occasion?
It is certainly the case—the Prime Minister has made this very clear and I accept the evidence that he has put forward—that Saddam Hussein is accumulating really unpleasant and quite dangerous weapons of mass destruction. That is clear, but it is not clear who he is threatening or what his intentions are in respect of those weapons. I have no wish to defend him at all—he is a deeply unpleasant person—but so far as I am aware he has never threatened the United Kingdom, the European Union or the US. He has been in power for some time, which shows his political skills. He is not an irrational man. He is able to stay in power, and the last thing that he would do is to pick a fight with someone if he would lose, so I do not perceive a threat in that way to the UK at present.
I also query why we have moved away from the theory of deterrence. For 50 years, we have been told that this country has to have nuclear weapons because they are a deterrent and that, otherwise, we would be more open to attack. We are now being told that we are still open to attack from someone, even though we could respond in kind and obliterate him. Does Saddam want to be obliterated? He is a coward, who will pick on his own people and on Kuwait, but I suggest that he will not pick on the United States or the United Kingdom in that way.
Mr. Andrew Turner: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Norman Baker: I have only three minutes left.
We have to consider the risks of action, which were eloquently set out earlier by the right hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith), such as the humanitarian consequences and the breakdown of international law. International law is not, as the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude) suggested, the UK and the US acting together. That is a ridiculous definition of international law.
We must consider the fact that there is no obvious endgame. Who will replace Saddam Hussein? We must also consider the fact that the region will be destabilised, affecting our allies and those of the US, such as Saudi Arabia; that it will give Israel carte blanche to intensify its actions against the Palestinians while US attention is turned elsewhere; and that the Muslim world will be
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united and will regard Saddam as a hero. Those who saw the reports of the Johannesburg summit will know that evidence of that is already in place, unfortunately.
We must consider the fact that oil supplies and international markets will be disrupted and, perhaps most important, that such action will provide a recruiting ground for tourism—[Interruption.] Sorry, not for tourism; I have a south-coast seat. It will provide a recruiting ground for terrorism.
The way forward is that our Prime Minister has to make a choice. He said earlier that he regards the relations between this country and the US as a bedrock and vital, and I understand exactly why he does so. He also recognises the value of the UN, and he has made that very clear in his contributions today and on other occasions. However, he may not be able to bridge the gap. He may have to jump at some point and choose either to support unilateral action by the US or to support the UN and let the US go it alone. I think that the US will go it alone whether we agree with it or not. If that happens, we should be on the side of the UN, not on that of the US.
My final point is that we should not be involved in any military action unless there is an explicit UN mandate for it. That is one bottom line. The second bottom line is that we should not be involved in any military action unless the House of Commons has seen the terms and has voted on it.
5.30 pm
Mr. Peter Mandelson: A number of those who have spoken and who have expressed doubts about the Americans' approach to this crisis have called on the Prime Minister to use his friendship with President Bush to influence American policy. It is worth my saying at the outset that that is precisely what the Prime Minister has done. I have no doubt that if he had not done so, this matter would not be as it is today—the United Nations Security Council being determined in the way that I believe that it will be.
That is important because it is the responsibility of the whole international community to build up the United Nations and to make it into the hard instrument of collective international action that it was originally designed to be. If we see this business through and play it properly, as I believe that the Government are, the United Nations will be strengthened in precisely the direction that we on the Labour Benches, who are passionate internationalists, want it to evolve.
Mr. Andrew Tyrie: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Mandelson: I will not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
Dealing with Saddam is now a very challenging test for the United Nations—its greatest in recent memory, and one that I passionately believe it must not fail for the sake of the organisation's future credibility. Acting toughly and decisively through the UN, with its use of diplomacy backed by the threat of coercive action if necessary, offers the only possibility in this crisis of both avoiding war and removing the danger posed by Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear programmes. That should be our compass. However, that will be achieved only if the UN Security Council stands resolute and united in any action

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that it undertakes. Diplomacy alone, as we all know, will easily be brushed aside by Saddam. Knowing that this time the international community means what it says is the only way to make him see sense and decide to disarm.
We are not talking about some old grenades, a few rusty rifles and a couple of bags of Semtex. We are talking about weapons with a capability that threatens Iraq's neighbours, destabilises the region and can be transferred only too easily to international terrorist networks. We should base our actions on a judgment of capability not of intent. Having said that, I ask Members why Saddam should wish to retain these weapons if he does not intend or wish to retain the ability to use them.
Of course people want to avoid war, especially action that will harm innocent people. I share that aim, but the way to avoid war is to make the UN route work effectively—confronting Saddam by that means in the expectation that, if the international community is genuinely united, tough and determined enough, Saddam will give way to the UN and disarm. The UN Security Council therefore needs to agree a clear, fresh statement of its views so that there is absolutely no ambiguity about where the international community stands on the matter.
The last thing that we should do now is lift the pressure on Saddam. He is at last listening to what the United Nations is saying, even though he still refuses at this stage to come into line. We must maintain and increase the pressure on him so that he complies with UN demands, and not allow disagreement in the Security Council to continue to paralyse the UN's essential role, as we have seen during the past decade and before.
We should not allow our resolve to be shaken in any way by Saddam's recent ploy of purporting to invite the weapons inspectors to resume their work—reverting to the relatively weak three-year-old set of inspection arrangements that got us absolutely nowhere before. Saddam wants the evasion and obfuscation to start again. I became familiar with that dynamic—rather, an undynamic—in dealing with arms in Northern Ireland, but in this case it is so much more serious because of the nature of the weapons involved.
We must be clear what it would mean to indulge Saddam's tactics, as I am afraid some of those who have spoken seem to want to do, and to permit the weapons inspection regime to be compromised. It would mean without doubt leaving Saddam's weapons programmes in place. Those who criticise the Government's more assertive approach must be honest. They have to say candidly that they are prepared to leave Saddam's weapons in place because they do not like the risk or the unattractiveness of the alternative course of action. Judging by the performance today of the leader of the Liberal Democrat party and his speeches and past radio comments, he must face up to that and be clear about it. At the moment, his lack of consistency and his incoherence mean that he is trying to have this all ways and will have it no way.
If we do not take the decisive action that needs to be taken by the UN Security Council, we will not only leave the unique danger of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction in place but reinforce in the United States precisely the trend that America's critics say that they deplore. If the UN does not follow through, if the Security
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Council does not stay firm and bring forward the clear resolution that it needs to, American confidence in the United Nations, such as it is, will simply collapse. The Americans would conclude that they were right to question going along the UN route in the first place, and American unilateralism would be boosted, with all the dangers that that would hold for the world.
Some in Europe seem to fear American unilateralism more than they fear Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, but if they do not stand up to Saddam this time, American unilateralism will be strengthened. It will not be forced into retreat. Is the collapse of the UN, which would only strengthen and boost the hawks in the American Administration, really what such critics want? Does anyone imagine that that would hold out anything that is good for the world? We must follow a policy that avoids both Saddam retaining his weapons and American hawks being strengthened in the process.
The bargain that we want to strike with the United States is that it temper its unilateralist approach to international affairs in return for the rest of the world making multilateralism work as it should and needs to in the United Nations. It is above all Europe's responsibility to make that happen. It must use its weight and skill to partner the United States in international affairs in order to strengthen the multilateralist approach in the American Administration as we want. The consequences of the failure to do that were brought home to me on a recent visit to south-east Asia where I met and addressed Muslim organisations in a number of countries. It would be a recipe for polarisation between the world's peoples—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order.
5.40 pm
Mr. Ian Taylor: It is because I think that we will have to take action against Saddam Hussein's regime that I am so concerned by the way in which the debate has been going in this country and in the United States. It is precisely because we have to face up to the threat of Saddam Hussein that we must be careful that we do not allow the debate in the west to continue in the way that it has. If it continues in that way, I do not believe that public opinion will be firmly behind any action. It will be extremely dangerous even for America, with all its military might, to take action with a fragmented international coalition.
Just under a year ago, we had a debate in the Chamber on the consequences of the disaster on 11 September. At that point, I said that it was the role of the British Government to do their best to influence people in Washington who understood that America's strength would be greater if there were an international coalition working with it. America has lost that understanding, and it is not the fault of the British Prime Minister that it has done so. I think—I certainly hope—that the influence that he has tried to use in Washington has drawn attention to the importance of wider international issues and of the United Nations.
America has taken the more unilateral route that I was worried about a year ago. It has done so not just in the military sphere but, for example, in the way in which it introduced subsidies for farmers, in how it almost swept aside the international environmental treaties and in its reaction to the International Criminal Court. Those are worrying signs.

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The United States and, certainly, the Bush Administration have decided that they are at war. America has failed to find Osama bin Laden, so one has the feeling that it has decided that it has to find someone else to be at war with. It happens to be Iraq. Do not misunderstand me. The evidence in the dossier is credible and probably understated. However, if we are to take action on that, we must believe that it is the real focus for international attention and not compensation for the fact that the Americans cannot tell their electorate before the elections on 5 November that they have failed to find Osama bin Laden. It was not long ago that the United States tried to say to the world that Iraq was a danger because of its link with al-Qaeda. Now that does not appear to be a credible part of the evidence against Saddam Hussein. The confusion is worrying people who are not against military action. They want to know why it is necessary and why now.
America has recently announced its new security strategy. Some of the things in it are very worrying. It says:
"We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists."
I have to say to my American friends that if they are not careful, the very action that they take in the international arena will provoke far more terrorism than we have yet seen. Incautious action against the evil regime in Iraq could well destabilise neighbouring countries in the middle east and send a message to Muslim and other terrorists worldwide that America is now fair game.
American cloaks its strategy with words from a sort of gospel, saying:
"In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life."
I understand that, and the strategy later says:
"The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty."
I happen to agree with that. However, if that is the rallying call that the United States is using, it is being insensitive to the reality of the rest of the world, which does not necessarily share those values.
The shrewd American commentator Joseph S. Nye, in the book "The Paradox of American Power", drew attention to precisely the fact that, at the point at which America is most capable militarily of conquering any other nation, it might misunderstand the fact that that very power will alienate other people to the extent that they decide to take terrorist action against the United States. It is incumbent on the most powerful nation in the world to use the other machinery that it has available—the soft policy that Joseph S. Nye mentions. It should have the ability to persuade the rest of the world that American culture is not something that it should be alienated by but something that is there to help the lives of people throughout the world.
America should also try to articulate with us what sort of future the people of Iraq will have without Saddam Hussein. In many people's minds, there is still the danger that Iraq may end up with a more fundamentalist regime that could cause other problems. We have not articulated those issues. Indeed, until today, I had not heard Opposition Front Benchers articulate the questions so ably put by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr.
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Leigh). They are essential if we are to engage the British public. Unless we engage them, no amount of dossiers on the threat that Saddam Hussein poses will be convincing.
We must also re-engage and reanimate the United Nations, an organisation that admittedly from time to time becomes flabby and concerned merely with its own structure. It has to take the threats seriously, but we must make it equally clear to the UN and to our fellow members of the Security Council that the UN, and not the American President alone, must start to worry about the world order and where terrorism is most likely to have a disruptive effect. If we can do that, we can at least begin to engage other people. For example, we are not engaging President Putin of Russia, a country that was much mentioned in our debates after 11 September but that has not been mentioned until this moment today.
If we are not careful, the fragmented international coalition will start to create other problems that will ultimately affect the United States and we will be swept along somewhere in the middle, powerless to intervene. We must not allow a discontinuity of interest between Moscow and Washington to occur, and nor must we allow—a point that the right hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson) made—Europe to become fragmented. Schröder was far too opportunistic in the way that he used the issue of Iraq in German politics, but we should use our influence, with the Prime Minister meeting him, to try to rebuild a more common policy in Europe that will have its own influence in the UN so that its will is strengthened and so that it will not be brushed away by regimes such as that run by Saddam Hussein.
I believe that there will be a great danger to world stability if we take action that is not channelled through and endorsed by the United Nations. I do not believe that it is even in America's best interest to take pre-emptive or unilateral action. If we in the House can raise our voices loud enough to be heard not only in Washington but around this country, and make it clear that we are not simply acceding to American leadership but attempting to ensure that American military power can be used for good in the world, we will have achieved something by the recall of Parliament. We will be playing our proper role in the democratic process, and we might even achieve a greater prospect of peace.
5.49 pm
Glenda Jackson: I congratulate the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor) on a speech that crystallised the central and essential concerns of the British people. I have heard those concerns directly from my constituents and via my postbag, to which my constituents and people from the wider United Kingdom contribute.
The hon. Gentleman spoke of the paradox of American power. My constituents are confused by what they perceive as the paradoxical attitude of the United States Administration to the United Nations. They are equally bemused by their own Government's perceived attachment to what they define as an abuse of the United Nations, which came into being at the end of the second world war with a very simple idea—that there was a better way for nation states to solve their problems than going to war. My constituents are confused, as I am up to a point, by the way in which Saddam Hussein, for whom neither they nor I hold any brief, has become the

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quintessence of evil when, not long ago, he was actively supported, maintained and financed by, for example, the United States. How has he has become a greater danger in the past year than he has been in the previous 11 on the issue of weapons of mass destruction?
I was grateful that the Government responded to concerns and agreed to the recall of Parliament. I am less happy about the fact that in some cases being able to voice our constituents' concerns has been presented as a privilege for the House, not a right. I am not particularly pleased that the dossier was published only at 8 o'clock this morning. However, to be honest, I did not expect, as has already been said, to find a smoking gun within its pages—there is no such gun.
The hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) highlighted concerns felt across the United Kingdom—what is the desirable outcome if we go to war against Iraq? I feel strongly about any kind of military action being entered into without the validation of the UN, and I know that my constituents do too. I feel equally strongly about the fact that at one point we were being told that it was imperative that we go to war against Iraq because it had the temerity to ignore UN resolutions. It is not the only nation state to ignore UN resolutions, so are we setting a pattern for the future? Having flattened Iraq, will we go into Israel, Pakistan, India and Turkey?
More than once this afternoon the argument has been made that Saddam Hussein is the quintessence of evil because he has an appalling record on human rights—no one would contest that—but if the argument is that the way in which nation states treat their citizens can warrant military action, what about Burma? I cite Burma because my constituents and I feel strongly about the issue, but should the abuse of human rights become an immediate argument for a pre-emptive strike against a nation state the list of such states would be endless. The idea that we are in real and present danger from one rogue state has yet to be proved to the satisfaction of myself and my constituents, who are concerned that we could dragged along on the coat-tails of the American Administration. I use the word "Administration" advisedly as "America" and "Americans" have sometimes been used too loosely in this afternoon's debate. I have many American friends and have always been treated with great generosity and courtesy by America and Americans. There is a powerful body of opinion in the nation state of America that is appalled by its own Government's proposals and the way in which they keep pushing for some form of validation for an attack on Iraq.
As I have said, I hold no brief for Saddam Hussein or his regime, but I am extremely concerned about the fact that we may act without proper examination or without calling his bluff. It is as simple as that—call his bluff. He has said that he will allow UN inspectors in, so they should go—let us see whether he affords them open access to all the areas they wish to examine. Heaven knows, they know which areas they wish to examine. If, indeed, he puts barriers in their way, the UN should act, but we should delay for quite a long time before we risk military action against Iraq.
There is no question but that the war would be won by the most powerful nation in the world, but I am concerned about who will win the peace. We have had quite a few history lessons this afternoon and the second world war
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has been cited on more than one occasion. At the end of that war, the world was almost destroyed and the two major aggressive nations were put into a process that transformed not only their political basis but their cultural attitude to politics and what a nation state should be. I am obviously thinking about Japan and Germany. In Japan, that task was almost exclusively the preserve of the United States, but in Germany it required co-operation between four countries that have since become permanent members of the UN Security Council. A great deal more was required—these nation states were clearly committed to staying in Germany for a considerable period. Year after year, there was a massive commitment of money, materials and personnel to bring about change.
Are we prepared to commit ourselves to that in Iraq? As hon. Members have said, the idea that regime change will automatically bring in an infinitely better Government is absurd. The three Opposition parties in Iraq cannot agree with one another and it is highly unlikely that they could create any kind of Government who would receive a modicum of respect or loyalty from the Iraqi people. Do we really think that Saddam Hussein and his cohorts will sit quietly in one of his palaces until they are killed or captured? Of course not. Women, children, the elderly and the sick will, as always, be victims of attack, but Saddam Hussein and his cohorts will be outside the country, plotting and acting as a focus for opposition to any Government who are imposed on Iraq. As hon. Members have said, they will act as the best kind of recruiting sergeant for extremist fanatics from any religion the like of which the world has not seen before.
The argument for a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq has not been thought through sufficiently by the main protagonists. There should be an immediate return to the United Nations. If we need another mandate, we should not make it impossible for Saddam Hussein to acknowledge its time scales. I have heard it said that the American Administration are pushing for military action by the new year because if they leave it any later it will be too hot and dangerous for their troops and any others who may be engaged in fighting in the desert.
The weapons inspectors are ready to go back in. They have made it clear that it will take time for them to get there and examine the areas that they believe could be dangerous. It should be in the interests not only of this country and the United States but the whole free world and that vast stretch of the world that longs to be free to afford those inspectors the time to make a genuine inspection and report. Only then should we seriously consider some kind of military action against Iraq.
5.59 pm
Mr. Edward Garnier: I shall not follow the points made by the hon. Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson) in her powerful speech, save to say that I prefer the advice given to the House by the right hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson). We are not about to go to war either this week, next week or next month, and some of the points made by the hon. Lady are based upon a misunderstanding, perhaps an exaggerated misunderstanding, of the situation.
It is never easy to take part in debates such as this because, despite the publication of the dossier of information before us today, only a few people in government can know the whole truth. What we have

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today is what they want us to have, and I welcome what we have been given, but we are arguing this matter from a position of some ignorance. We do not have the detailed intelligence reports, and we do not have access to the signals traffic or the material that the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary have from people on the ground or from their discussions with the United States Government.
It would have been helpful to our deliberations had the dossier been published some time before this morning. I am sure that there is nothing in it that was not available last week, and if it is right to let us have the information today it was surely right to let us have it last week or even earlier.
Equally, this debate is taking place too late. Had it been open to us to question the Government, and in particular the Prime Minister, earlier about their plans, their policy, their hopes and their fears about the worsening situation in Iraq and in our relations with that country's regime, and their discussions with the President and Administration of the United States, much good, I suspect, would have flowed from that and far less of comfort to Saddam Hussein. The delay has allowed frustrations to grow, and, unwittingly no doubt, has allowed the impression to be gained in Iraq that we are not resolved to do anything, that we do not have the political will as a country to shoulder the responsibilities of which the Prime Minister has spoken.
If it is said that we had nothing of substance to debate earlier than today, I fundamentally disagree. The prospect of war is substantial enough for Members of this House to want to express their collective or individual views, and if information of the kind that can be shared by the Prime Minister becomes available subsequently, the House can be recalled once more if necessary. This is not an argument between Parliament and the Executive, or about the prerogative powers of the Crown in matters of foreign policy. It is a matter of common sense not to allow tempers to remain too hot for too long as elected Members of this House accumulate their frustration and anger at being apparently ignored while events outside the House that concern us continue.
I welcome the recall of Parliament, but at this time of crisis we need to see the Prime Minister metaphorically, if not literally, chained by one wrist to the Dispatch Box, so that he and the Government are reminded of their relationship with the electorate. At this time of crisis we should not only do our duty to the electorate and our country in standing up for the rights of Parliament, but show the regime in Iraq that parliamentary democracy matters and that parliamentary democracy can play its part in vanquishing terror. That does not mean that Parliament should listen only to the electorate. It also means that Parliament and Members of it have a role in shaping and leading public opinion.
On 19 November last year during the debate on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, I admitted that the decisions that have to be taken by the Prime Minister at times like this are truly awful. He is in the lonely position of having to make the final decision about whether we should commit troops to theatres of war, to places of actual or potential danger. All of us, no matter whether we are Government or Opposition Members of Parliament, have our responsibilities at this time, to our constituents, to our families, to our country, to our allies,
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and, of course, to our consciences, but we cannot shirk from our duty to take difficult decisions if that is what we must do.
The burden on a national leader at times like this is great. I sympathise with the Prime Minister. Indeed I do more than that. I support him and the stance that he is taking in being prepared to face head on the issues that a man such as Saddam Hussein puts before us. The right hon. Gentleman has been derided for behaving as though he were no more than President Bush's poodle, jumping to his every wish and command in order to increase his standing as a world leader at home at a time when domestic politics are proving less inviting. He is accused of being out of step with the majority of the parliamentary Labour party and the party's membership outside.
The Prime Minister's behaviour is made all the worse, his critics say, because the United States Government are headed by a President with an eccentric command of the English language, a man on a personal mission to finish off what his father failed to complete in 1991, and a man who heads an Administration staffed by men and women with no real understanding of the delicate state of the political world in the middle east. Indeed, it is fashionable in some quarters here to belittle the imagination, the sophistication, the ability to think strategically and the generosity of spirit of the American people, their President and his close advisers. If the Prime Minister is on side with them, say his critics, he must be badly awry.
Those critics may be sincere, they may be reflecting the views of many others in this country and for all I know they may represent the majority. But they are wrong and they are giving the cause of peace in the middle east and in the wider world no assistance, either by the style of their criticism or by its content. The caricature that they paint of the President and his advisers, and thus of the Prime Minister, is inaccurate and is, in my view, at the very lowest, unhelpful in bringing Saddam Hussein to see reason. No one who has sent troops to war can be unaware of what that could mean for the individual service men and women involved or for their families. But if we avoided preparing for war because we knew that it would bring casualties, we would not have a Government worthy of the name, nor a country or a way of life worth living in or protecting.
No President of the United States will lightly decide to commit forces overseas just because he has almost unlimited military might at his disposal. A wrong decision by the world's only superpower has repercussions for it as well as for the rest of the world and I find it unbelievable that President Bush is mindlessly about to set off on an adventure for the sheer bravado of it. Any operation against Iraq—if it comes to that, and we are a long way from that—will be considered with great care and, I have no doubt, with advice and warnings from his own staff, Congress, the press, the academic world, members of the United Nations Security Council and other opinion formers, as well as, and this is not an insignificant factor, from the British Government.
While other countries who stand to benefit from what the United States and Britain are having to contemplate shuffle uneasily from one side of the argument to the other, it is reassuring to find that the United Kingdom Government is not proving so pusillanimous. The United Kingdom has a long-standing and high reputation for persuasive diplomacy and resolution drafting at the United

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Nations, and now is the time that our Government must urge those who are working for us in New York to demonstrate those skills quickly and effectively.
Hussein is a murderous tyrant who unfortunately survived the Gulf war to continue his regime of terror, torture, assassination and extermination of racial groups and individuals who have inconvenienced him. We know from his pre-1991 behaviour that he is not a man to be trusted and that his military and political subordinates are either as bad as him or terrified into obedience. We know that since 1991, despite the best efforts of the United Nations weapons inspectors, he has been producing chemical and biological weapons and attempting to produce nuclear weapons with long-range delivery systems. We know that his interest in their manufacture is not merely academic. A man who is prepared to use chemical weapons on his own citizens is hardly likely to be too scrupulous to use them on the citizens of other countries. A man who was prepared to fire missiles at Israel and risk another regional war between Israel and the Arab world with the chance that it might lead to war on a far wider scale will not now shrink from doing so again if that is what he thinks will achieve his ends.
I said on 4 October last year in the post-11 September debate at column 724 that I accept that in times of crisis any Prime Minister must be provided with the freedom to act quickly and effectively to protect the integrity of the country and its institutions and to safeguard its people. I applaud what the Prime Minister has said and done so far. I accept that not every decision that has to be taken can be taken following lengthy deliberations in the House or consultations with every interested party. I accept without question that if the Prime Minister says that he has evidence against Saddam Hussein that he cannot share with us in full, he is speaking the truth.
But the threat to this country may not come from warships or aircraft, from nuclear missiles sent from Baghdad or a land army invading one of our allies. The modern adversary may well travel by bus, with a belt loaded with explosives or a briefcase full of germs in one hand and a laptop computer in the other. He will not wear a uniform, he will not announce his coming and he will not share his plans. But what he may well be is a person trained, funded and armed by Saddam Hussein, prepared to kill himself and many others so that Saddam's murderous aims can be fulfilled. It is that sort of threat that Iraq poses and it is that sort of threat that we must compel the United Nations to take on board.
It is no good us asking the Security Council to pass further resolutions unless we and it are prepared to take action when they are ignored or broken. The new Security Council resolution that has been spoken of today will be ignored or broken by Saddam Hussein, just like the others since 1991, unless he knows that he is faced with countries and leaders with the determination, the resolve, the political will and the military might to deal with him swiftly and decisively in the event of default. That means—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman's time is up.
6.9 pm
Mrs. Alice Mahon: I welcome today's debate on Iraq. It is about time Parliament had the opportunity to discuss the Government's position. Everybody else in the world seems to have been doing so for months.
I want to make two points. The first concerns the dossier that the Government have finally managed to publish after all this time—we have been asking for its publication since March. The second concerns the wider significance of the issues before us.
The Government have done their very best in today's debate narrowly to cast around for the evidence—or otherwise—of Iraq's capability of developing weapons of mass destruction. The contents of the dossier have been trailed in the press and on the air for days, but Members of the House received it only a few hours before the debate and have had little time to read or digest it. If I were being cynical, I might say that that was deliberate, so that anyone who is a sceptic, like me, might have less time to expose all the holes in the Government's case. There are many others who are sceptical about the Government's position.
I believe that this is an attempt to put an official seal of approval on speculation. The fact that all of us in the House believe that Saddam Hussein is a very bad man does not make a case for war. Indeed, some of us have a more honourable record of opposition to his antics, going back many years, than some who have spoken today. Indeed, I remember my hon. Friends the Members for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) and for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) leading campaign after campaign to highlight the wickedness of this particular regime.
The Government are doing their best to confuse two issues, and we have to ask ourselves why. I could not disagree more with hon. Members who have said that all the evidence is here in the dossier. Because I have been sitting here for eight hours, I have now had the chance to read it three or four times. It is light on fact, and heavy on conjecture. It is also light on argument and heavy on emotion. In fact, if it were an A-level answer, the examiners would downgrade it with no hesitation whatever.
Speculation is no longer necessary, because the United Nations weapons inspectors are due to return in a few weeks. We have to ask ourselves why, after having procrastinated for half a year, the Government have rushed the dossier out now, at the very point when the situation is poised to be resolved without recourse to war, and when a non-military solution is practical, possible and immediately on the agenda. Why should we bother to speculate, when the United Nations is on the point of being able to observe the situation for itself, and when Hans Blix has told us that he can have the inspectors in, and up and running, by the middle of October?
Why move the goalposts now? It could not be—could it?—that the Prime Minister is hunting for a way to support President Bush and the United States in going to war. I think that that is their intention, with or without UN approval, regardless of whether weapons monitoring is re-established. The Prime Minister has already said, when he addressed the press in Sedgefield, that he would support the United States. A lot of Members of this House think that the Prime Minister wants to support the United States regardless of the UN, and I agree with them. What other reason is there for the Government to publish a

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dossier that we have all been clamouring for since the beginning of the year, allowing it to be leaked and speculated on in the press for days, but withholding it from this country's elected representatives until three hours before the debate in this Chamber?
I want to turn briefly to the broader issues—issues that the Government are seeking to obscure in the flurry of speculation about this redundant document. Saddam Hussein has not used these so-called weapons of mass destruction. He did not use them in 1991, when we were flattening his country and killing his people. He has not used them for 12 years, and he would invite annihilation if he used them now. I go along with the annihilation argument. I think that he is rational, even if he is wicked, and I do not think that he would invite his own annihilation.
It is clear that George Bush has decided to go to war against Iraq, regardless of the matters before us in the Government's dossier. It has been said that the Prime Minister was instrumental in getting President Bush to go to the United Nations, where he made his speech. Well, if he was, President Bush has betrayed him, because just a few days later, we got the Bush doctrine. We found out that President Bush was taking it upon himself and America to launch pre-emptive strikes if he came across anybody he thought was against America's interests. Colin Powell announced that months ago, when he said on American television:
"US policy is that, regardless of what the inspectors do, the people of Iraq and the people of the region would be better off with a different regime in Baghdad. The United States reserves its option to do whatever it believes might be appropriate to see if there can be a regime change."
That is the United States' case, and it has betrayed the Prime Minister if he was intent on persuading it to go down the United Nations route.
It is clear that President Bush is set on regime change, not because Saddam Hussein has, or is capable of developing, weapons of mass destruction—the United States bears considerable responsibility for encouraging Iraq to acquire them in the first place—but because George Bush wants a different Government. We have to ask ourselves why. It is because Iraq is sitting on top of huge oil reserves, and the United States—the world's biggest oil consumer—wants to make sure it can get its hands on them.
Before we are prepared to participate in what the United States is doing, we should ask ourselves an important question—particularly in the light of the Bush doctrine revealed last Friday. Who is next? Will it be Syria, Iran, North Korea, Yemen? The list is endless. Who will be next if we allow ourselves to go down this route?
The Bush Administration are taking upon themselves the power to decide which country is likely to pose a challenge to United States interests in future, and to act in advance to stop that happening—by force, if need be. Who made George Bush the judge and jury of the world? Who gave him that absolute right? If this is allowed to happen, we can kiss the rule of international law goodbye. We can kiss goodbye to arms limitation treaties and arms inspections as well. More countries will be looking for access to weapons of mass destruction, seeing them as their only means of counterbalancing a rampant United States. The Bush security doctrine represents the militarisation of American foreign policy. It makes me
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shudder to think about the kind of future my children and grandchildren have in store, and it should make every sensible Member in this Chamber shudder too.
The matters that we are considering today could end in the Government following the United States to war against Iraq. They would be doing so without the support of the majority of the British electorate. Although some of us have been able to speak today, many have not; many are still hoping to be called. It is a travesty of democracy that we have not been allowed a proper vote on this matter. The only option for those who want to show our disgust that we might be dragged down this route to war is to vote against the motion on the Adjournment tonight. The public are expecting that. It is a betrayal of public trust that we have not been given a vote.
I was born into a party in which a Prime Minister crossed the Atlantic to prevent his friends from using nuclear weapons in Korea. Another Prime Minister kept us out of the Vietnam war, with all the horrors that that involved, when the United States used chemical weapons and killed 2 million Vietnamese and 55,000 of its own young people. I want my Prime Minister to pursue pathways to peace, and to pursue non-military solutions to what is a very difficult problem for us all.
6.18 pm
Dr. Julian Lewis: I have just returned this morning from the United States of America, having flown out there on 11 September. Subjective as it is, my impression of the mood in America is very different from some that we have heard in the Chamber today. My impression of that mood is that it is one of grief, reflectiveness and a steady determination not to suffer the sort of horror that they suffered 12 months ago.
On my return today, I am therefore disappointed—although not entirely surprised—to find comments being reported in the press from the Liberal Democrat conference in Brighton, in which their leader stated there that there was
"more than a hint of imperialism"
about what America was doing. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"] I hope that the record will show Liberal Democrats cheering those remarks. Another Liberal Democrat Front-Bench spokesman is similarly reported as having described the United States' democratically elected Government as a "regime"—[Interruption.] I hope that the record will show Liberal Democrats laughing and sneering in support of those remarks in today's debate.
We heard today the Liberal Democrat hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) describe the United States, after all that it has been through in the past year, as nothing better than a "playground bully". A little more surprising than the facile and hostile comments of the Liberal Democrats are the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor), who seems to think that the United States has not had significant success in the war against al-Qaeda. I beg to differ. Any look at the recent record of what has been happening in the war against al-Qaeda bears out the interpretation that the United States has been doing very well indeed.
On 11 September this year, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested in Pakistan as a result of American intelligence tip-offs. That follows a successfully established pattern of reeling in key terrorists one by one. It may well be that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is believed to have been

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the military head of al-Qaeda and who boasted in a recent broadcast that he had first conceived the idea of flying aircraft into American buildings, may have been captured or killed in the same raid. We know about the previous capture of Abu Zubeida, al-Qaeda's chief of operations. So it is stretching the imagination to suggest that America's concern with Iraq is based on nothing more than a diversionary need to compensate for as yet inadequate action against al-Qaeda.
It has been asked today whether a state can act without United Nations' authority. I suggest to the House that there is at least one set of circumstances in which a state can do so: when the United Nations fails to enforce its own resolutions if those have been flagrantly disregarded. I have in mind the letter that was quoted in part during the Prime Minister's statement earlier today by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. The letter was sent by the weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, at the time of his resignation in 1998, before he suddenly decided, years later, that Saddam Hussein did not pose a threat from mass destruction weapons after all. The letter stated:
"The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed anywhere near the level required by Security Council resolutions … Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since day one … the Commission has uncovered indisputable proof of a systematic concealment mechanism run by the Presidency of Iraq and protected by Iraqi security forces."
Mr. Ritter concluded:
"The issue of immediate, unrestricted access is, in my opinion, an issue worth fighting for."
If even Scott Ritter, who has become something of a hero to Labour Members who are against war, felt at the time when he had adequate knowledge that the enforcement of those resolutions was worth fighting for, perhaps the Prime Minister is not too far adrift in expressing a similar opinion in the light of his up-to-date knowledge—his full knowledge, awareness and concern, which we as a loyal Opposition have supported consistently—about what Saddam Hussein may well try to do.
When is pre-emption justified? I suggest it is when someone with evil intent seeks to acquire devastating capability. It would be very hard to justify overthrowing Saddam if he were seeking mass destruction weapons for deterrent purposes, but that man's record is not one of deterrence; rather, it is a record of aggression, invasion and mass murder.
When Afghanistan was attacked and the Taliban were overthrown, far fewer voices were raised against Anglo-US action than are being raised in today's debate. Why is that? It is because the attacks against the United States had already taken place out of the blue. I was impressed by the Prime Minister's argument, used in his earlier press conference although not in the House today, about pre-emption. He pointed out that had he or President Bush come to their electorates on 9 or 10 September 2001 and said, "We have intelligence information that makes us believe with a reasonably secure level of assuredness that al-Qaeda is about to launch an horrific attack; we do not know the details, the precise timing, or the location, but we wish to take pre-emptive action against this group," the reaction would have been similar to that being shown by Members on the left of the Labour party and
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by the Liberal Democrats as a whole to the suggestion that pre-emptive action may be necessary against Saddam Hussein.
The difference between those two situations is this: it is one thing for a terrorist group to kill 3,000 innocent people without warning out of the blue, but it is quite another for a mass murderer, a dictator and a tyrant to be able to launch out of the blue an attack with mass destruction weapons, especially when—I was delighted when my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) brought this out in his speech—it may be done by proxy. It may be done by means of supplying the weapons of mass destruction to third parties, while Saddam Hussein sits back, washes his hands and says, "It's nothing to do with me."
The Arab world has a pretty good idea of what Saddam Hussein is like and is unlikely to be set ablaze in the cause of protecting him. I remember well when, in 1991, Saddam tried to declare a holy war and claim that his aggression was part of a jihad. In reality, the Arab world took little notice.
I conclude on a hopeful note. A recent report of the comments of the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, shows that perhaps after all Saudi Arabia will allow the US to strike Iraq from Saudi bases. That is against what the Saudis were saying previously, but they know that ultimately Saddam Hussein is no friend of the Arab cause any more than he is a friend of democracy or of the Iraqi people.
6.28 pm
Mr. Frank Cook: I went to the United States 10 days ago. It is the fifth time that I have visited it this year and the seventh time since 9/11, as the Americans say. I was scheduled to return on 6 October, but I had to start coming back last Wednesday because that was the latest that I could leave in order to get here on time for this debate. I am pleased that I made it because, having sat in the Chamber throughout the day, I have heard many of the arguments that I would have made myself.
The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) made a remarkable statement. It is astonishing for me to make that admission in here, as it is for me to commend the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), who also made a thoroughly good contribution. The defence spokesman for the second Opposition party also made a contribution with which I could agree in great measure. I should, however, give the real credit to colleagues such as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr. Davis), who delivered a characteristically sharp analysis of the situation in which we have been placed. My hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) did fairly well too, although she is not present to hear me say so. So did my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and whatever the other part of the constituency is. [HON. MEMBERS: "Highgate."] Yes, my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson).
I was not very pleased about the sniggers and smirks that were evident in some quarters during the speeches of my hon. Friends the Members for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson) and for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway). Although I might not have used the same emphasis or the same forms of expression, I feel that much of what they said deserves careful consideration.

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A good deal of what I wanted to say has already been said, so I will not repeat it. I will concentrate on the attitude that I left in the United States. I know the United States quite well, because we have a house there. Every time I walk the dog, I see "America At War". I see that on every newscast, every day and throughout the day. It has continued for 12 months. The only way of gaining a balanced view of what is happening in the world is to tune in to the Canadian Newsline International, which transmits excerpts from various national programmes with a voice-over interpretation. We must, of course, trust the Canadians to interpret the situation correctly. They do not always interpret accurately, as we well know from our experience of the NATO parliamentary assembly. Anyway, Newsline International is good.
Last week the Pax channel broadcast a programme putting together the words of St. Malachy, 1,000 years old, and those of Nostradamus, 600 years less old. The combined prophecies identified the Islam of today, and their predictions included the European Union, which would join Islam to bring about Armageddon. Armageddon would mean the destruction of the world—but there was something to stop that: President Bush.
Anyone who believes in predictions—and I suppose that someone who quotes St. Malachy and Nostradamus must have some faith in them—is hardly going to believe that a President of the United States will be able to withstand the onslaught of Armageddon. If the predictions are so reliable, how come Armageddon will be so uncertain that Bush will be able to overturn it?
Why should America be so keen to whip up the crazy state of mind that suggests there is no alternative to the attack on Iraq that is described so incessantly and in such detail? Could it have anything to do with Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and a number of other court actions currently in train? Could it have anything to do with the fact that in less than two months a major election process will take place in the United States? For some time there have been predictions that Bush will lose support in both Houses. Could it be that this is a means of distracting attention from such serious considerations? I suggest that there is probably a connection.
What, though, is the real danger of pursuing this folly? Members should consider today's press reports about Mr. Rumsfeld. Apparently, he is seeking support in NATO for a NATO pursuit of rogue states. We must assume that by "rogue states" he means Iraq. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate said, if we pursue Iraq and sort it out, who will be next?
We have talked about human rights, and about UN resolutions that have been ignored. We have talked about the possession of weapons of mass destruction. I suppose that must mean that the next candidate will be China. Can we seriously consider that China might even begin to enter the list of probabilities? Obviously not.
The simple truth is that Iraq poses no risk to the United Kingdom, or to the United States. If, as is stated on the front page of today's Evening Standard, Iraq has the capacity to strike within 45 minutes, as soon as we launch an attack it can launch a reactive, rather than pre-emptive, attack on us—and then the whole world will go crazy. Is there any sense at all in this? I suggest that there is not.
We are friends of America. We always have been, and I hope we will always stay that way. As I have confessed, I have a vested interest. I think that, as friends, we ought
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to tell the Americans that it is not the emperor but the President who has no clothes. He is displaying himself as, sadly, somewhat less than well informed. Perhaps, with the election in mind, he will drop the idea once his campaign is over—for that is, I think, his main motivation.
6.36 pm
Mr. David Heath: Like, I am sure, many colleagues, I have spent part of the recess seeing rather more of my constituents than is usually possible. I have toured my constituency, visiting about 100 villages. I was astonished to find that the one topic they all wanted to discuss with me was precisely the topic we are discussing today. I was also surprised by the fact that they wanted to make almost identical points.
There were three issues. First, my constituents were astonished that the House had not been recalled yet, and that the Government were showing every sign of reluctance to allow a recall. Secondly, they were astonished that I, as their Member of Parliament, would not have an opportunity to vote—on a substantive motion—for or against the action that the Government proposed to take. Thirdly, they wanted to express deep concern. What surprised me about that was that the sentiment applied across the political spectrum, from people whom I knew to be convinced Conservatives to those of quite different political persuasions. It included retired military personnel, and people connected with the present military. I think we have a duty to express such views today, as many Members have.
The danger today was first that we would be subject to a distraction, and secondly that we would be subject to caricatures. The distraction would have been a discussion of the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. We do not need to discuss how appalling Saddam Hussein's regime is; we know that from past evidence. We did not need the dossier to tell us. We are convinced, and there is no dissent in the Chamber.
As for the caricatures, some portray those with doubts about military action as either wishing to support the Iraqi regime or being engaged in a pacifism that does not take account of circumstances. I think a great deal of respect is owed to those who have deeply pacifist views, but many, myself included, do not have such views, and are quite prepared to see British military forces used in the right circumstances. We would argue, however, that these are not the right circumstances.
Another caricature is the suggestion that those opposed to military action are engaging in a crude anti-Americanism. I reject that caricature, but I reject equally the caricature suggesting that the Prime Minister is engaged in this process simply because he wishes to curry favour with the Administration in the White House. I think that those who heard the Prime Minister's statement today accept that he sincerely believes that there is a threat to British interests, and wants to address it. I am prepared to accept that at face value, and to accept that his discussions with the US Administration may have had a beneficial effect, but I find it hard to accept that we should offer a blank cheque, before any negotiations, saying that we will support any American position unconditionally. That supine position is unworthy of any politician or party in this country. When parties' policies change with a change of policy in America, we have to ask whether the British interest is being properly taken into account.

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There are dissenting voices in America, too. I was there on holiday a few weeks ago and I heard a vigorous debate going on. I heard real doubts expressed not only by Democrats but by leading Republicans about the wisdom of the course that the Administration were taking. Doubts were being expressed even within the Administration, and I think that those are at the core of President Bush's renewed attempts to seek United Nations approval.
We must ask not whether we support an action through the United Nations to remove weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi arsenal but what happens next, if the action fails. What concerns many hon. Members and our constituents is that we hear warlike noises and an apparent unilateralism from across the Atlantic, seeming to signal a determination to take action irrespective of the views of the United Nations and the actions that may be taken by the Security Council and the inspection regime that we want. We hear a doctrine of pre-emptive strikes, and many of us find it hard to equate that with international legality and a coalition for action.
The Prime Minister's statement made no mention of the United States, which is odd, given that there cannot be any lack of understanding of the central role that the US plays, and we have had no analysis of the future intentions of the American Administration or of our priorities as we, quite rightly, to use the cant phrase, stand shoulder to shoulder with the US in fighting terrorism. Those of us who were in Washington on 11 September last year can certainly identify with the feelings of the American public, but we do not understand why the priorities should have changed.
We have had no analysis of the military consequences of any conflict. I have no doubt that the military strength of the US and the UK can defeat Saddam's forces, although not without difficulty—there are certainly logistical difficulties along the way. The Prime Minister said:
"there is no way that this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world."
I accept that view, but what does it matter who starts the conflict? If that is the situation, where is the analysis of the consequences for the region and the world? He made no analysis of the effects on the Kurdish population and the knock-on effects on Turkey, or the effects on the Shi'ite population or Iran, not to mention the wider Muslim world and the potential increase in extremism and terrorism in central Asia, for instance—in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, perhaps. Do we want to create new Afghanistans, harbouring more terrorists?
Setting aside any consideration of the benefits of legality, it is in British and American interests to work within international law. The argument for taking preventive action alone is the argument of the vigilante. We reject that in domestic law, and we should do the same internationally. We cannot take the law into our own hands. The President of the United States is not the law west of the Pecos.
Everything that we do in the House, in the Government or in our diplomatic relations with others should be based on the overwhelming principle that we must take an international legal view that encompasses the United Nations, exerting the greatest pressure possible to
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persuade the Iraqi Government to conform. Any action must be within that compass, but the Prime Minister has not persuaded me or, I suspect, many of our colleagues that he is necessarily committed to pursuing that line in the coming months.
6.46 pm
Mr. Peter Kilfoyle: Like one or two other Labour Members, I am strangely in agreement with sentiments expressed by the hon. Members for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor) and for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh). I find more resonance in what they said than in the Prime Minister's statement or the Foreign Secretary's speech.
I certainly did not understand the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson), who seemed to be saying that it was the rest of the world that was out of step with the United Nations, and that we should get in step with the United States because that is the realpolitik of the world today. I remind him that it was not the rest of the world that stopped making its contributions to the UN or that set out to scupper the UN and its agencies. It certainly was not the leader of the rest of the world, whoever that may be—although perhaps that, too, is George Bush twice over—who went to the UN and said that it should back him in what he wanted to do, or he would do it anyway. That is the rub.
I have listened carefully to what has been said today, and of course I read the dossier. I share the reservations expressed by Government and Opposition Members about that. I do not think that it adds anything to the sum total of our knowledge of what a nasty regime there is in Iraq and what a nasty man Saddam Hussein is. I wonder about the timing of the document, and why it came into being at all. As I recall, it was promised in lieu of the kind of debate that we are having today, and it was only because of the pressure of the House and of public opinion that we have had the document and are having this debate. Without that pressure, and similar pressure from like-minded people in the United States, I do not believe that the US would have gone to the United Nations at all.
Let me sound a note of caution about the Joint Intelligence Committee. Anyone who knows anything about these matters knows that the quid pro quo for military co-operation with the US is that it shares intelligence with us. I hazard a guess that many of the dossier's allegations are based on American-led intelligence. They may be true—I do not know—but let us remember that these are the same intelligence services that misled Congress at the outbreak of the first Gulf war, when they said that 350,000 Iraqi troops were massed on the Kuwaiti border. It was Congress, not I, that declared that it had been misled.
It was the same intelligence services that said that a chemical factory in Khartoum was manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, which has since been found not to be true. They were the ones who failed to analyse the information that they had before the dreadful events of 11 September last year.
My second point is about the confusion between the British and American Governments. Is this about eradicating weapons of mass destruction or regime change? I distinctly heard the Foreign Secretary emphasise that the objective was to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. Before we place too much faith in Hans

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Blix, let us remember that in April this year, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, ordered a CIA investigation into Hans Blix, presumably because it was felt that he could not be relied upon to deliver the goods.
If this is not about eradicating the weapons of mass destruction, it is about regime change. Senior members of the US Administration have a long record of advocating this. On 26 January 1998. a letter was written to President Clinton which said:
"In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy."
I am sure that many lunatics write to Presidents, as they do to Prime Ministers. However, the signatories included Donald Rumsfeld, now Defence Secretary, the aforementioned Paul Wolfowitz, now Deputy Secretary of Defence, and John Bolton, Richard Perle and Richard Armitage, all luminaries of the current US Administration. We know exactly what their objective is.
It is certainly true that on that dreadful day of 11 September, it was reported in the American media that a meeting was held by the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, at 2.40 that afternoon, at which he allegedly ordered his staff to see whether there was good enough information to hit Saddam Hussein. They were already considering applying a long-standing agenda about regime change. If right hon. and hon. Members want any further confirmation, they need only cast their mind back to the BBC's blanket coverage on the night of 11 September when Richard Perle, chairman of the Defence Policy Board in the Pentagon, trotted out the regimes that had to be removed.
In this debate, we must contextualise what is going on. There is no doubt in my mind that the US Administration have set themselves certain strategic targets. They have effected a change to their national security policy in which pre-emption, not deterrence, is the order of the day. They have revisited their nuclear policy so that they can use tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive way but also against non-nuclear powers. They have also adopted a military strategy—joint vision 20:20—that states quite explicitly that their aim is full-spectrum dominance in air, sea, land, space and information.
There is no secret about this; it has been discussed in right-wing circles in the USA for many years. It has been adopted by the Administration—that is their right as an Administration, whether we like it and approve of it or not. We must decide whether the path that we are taking best serves the interests of this country and best reflects public opinion and, more important, fears about the direction in which the US Administration are taking America.
I share the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson) and others that we make a distinction between the Administration and the people of America. I receive a huge number of e-mails from concerned people in America and they go right across the spectrum. They are as concerned as we are, but their national situation is different, as is the way that their media operate.
My particular concern is that if we are not careful and it is Iraq today, I am sure that it will be Iran tomorrow and Syria the day after. I am sure that Donald Rumsfeld's prediction last year that China is the ultimate enemy will
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come to pass. I hate to say it, but we have a group of people in key positions driving an Administration who, in my view, are almost paranoid. I describe these cold war warriors not as hawks but as pterodactyls because they mix views of a dim and distant past with the new technologies and realpolitik of the 21st century.
We must be very careful about understanding where we might go. I hope to goodness that we do not go in that direction; I hope that the attempts at diplomacy are successful. However, we must be careful not to tie ourselves to a strategy that most people do not begin to understand, much less appreciate, once they know about it.
6.55 pm
Mr. Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I am delighted to catch your eye in this important debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to follow the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Kilfoyle). He is one of the true independent voices in the House and speaks a great deal of common sense.
I am grateful to the Prime Minister for, rather belatedly, acceding to the request of my right hon. and hon. Friends to hold a debate on this important subject. He should have published the dossier before 8 o'clock this morning to allow right hon. and hon. Members time in which to digest it prior to the debate. I hope that the House will be immediately recalled to debate any future developments. The number of people here shows how important the debate is.
I have had scores of letters from constituents on this subject. People are very concerned about the prospect of going to war with Saddam Hussein. They are right to be so because the basis and the evidence need to be absolutely clear before we take such a step.
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is one of the most evil dictators the world has ever seen. We know that more than 1 million people were killed in the Iran-Iraq war. We know that he launched mustard gas attacks against Iran and against his own people. In the Gulf war not only did he annex Kuwait but he launched Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia. We know that his is an extremely evil regime. However, those who really suffer are the people of Iraq. Those 22 million people live in a country that has the world's second largest proven oil reserves, yet in 1996 they had a gross domestic product income per head of just under ․600.
Iraq has a highly educated middle class. Some 54 per cent. of people in the urban population are middle class and educated, yet they still have an appalling standard of living. In the 1990s, the number of child deaths from water pollution either doubled or trebled, according to which source one believes.
This is an evil regime, yet we must deal with it properly, otherwise we will not take the world coalition of front-line Arab and other states with us. We had that coalition in the Gulf war; it is essential to maintain it again, whatever action we take against Saddam Hussein.
This is a very important debate. It comes at a time when the United Nations is deciding what sort of resolution it might draw up and pass. People seem to have forgotten the history of the matter. In 1998, UNSCOM, the weapons inspectors, finally had to leave Iraq. Britain and the United States have tried repeatedly to get strong

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resolutions so that they could go back but they have been thwarted by other nations on the Security Council. I hope that this debate will form part of the process so that we can get a strong and clear renewed UN mandate. That mandate must set clear goals and a clear timetable. That must be followed, if there is still non-compliance by Saddam Hussein, by a proper ultimatum. Only then should we consider committing our troops and forces to war.
Using the royal prerogative and committing troops to war is one of the most serious things that any Prime Minister can do. The right hon. Gentleman needs the support and backing of this Parliament. That is why I urge him to recall Parliament quickly in all future developments.
It is essential to consider what sort of regime could come after any action is taken against Saddam Hussein. Surely, before we go to war, the ultimate aim must be to get the weapons inspectors back. I do not believe that the dossier published this morning contains much new evidence that is not known by the international community. Let us get the weapons inspectors back into Iraq, backed up by force if necessary. If they have unfettered and unhindered access to the whole of Iraq, including the presidential palaces, we will know for certain what facilities Iraq has. If Saddam Hussein does not comply with a tough UN resolution, we must back it up by force, but I hope that we are some way off that yet.
We need to consider the effect of any action on what might come afterwards. It did not happen in the Gulf war, but it might be that f Saddam Hussein and his regime were no longer in power, the fragile coalition that exists there might break up. If Iraq breaks up, stability in the region could be in serious jeopardy. The old doctrine used to be that Iraq and Iran should be roughly equal. We are postulating taking action against Iraq, which might have nuclear capability, but we know for certain that its neighbour, Iran, does have such capability.
We must also be careful about stability in the region because of Islamic fundamentalism within Arab countries and within countries that have large Arab populations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. We do not wish to inflame Arab temperaments by taking action that is pejorative. That is why we need UN resolutions.
If we take action against Saddam Hussein, we will be calling for restraint from the Israelis, particularly the Israeli Prime Minister. They behaved with great restraint during the Gulf war when Scud missiles were being launched at them and I appeal to them, as will the international community, to show the same restraint if we have to take action against Saddam Hussein.
We need to look at what will happen to international oil supplies. I have already said that Iraq has the world's second largest proven oil reserves, but it is not just Iraq's potential 3.5 billion barrels a day that must concern us, but the production of oil in the entire middle east. We must take steps to minimise any disruption to oil supplies to the west. We all know that the three-day war in 1973 was followed by a huge period of inflation.
I will not use up all my allotted time because I know that many others wish to speak. This is an important debate and is a possible precursor to our country going to
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war. I ask the House to consider the most important question, which is whether action is more risky than inaction. I suggest that since 11 September last year terrorism has become a permanent fixture on the world stage and that international norms of behaviour will never be the same again. It is better to act with consensus and diplomacy and within the rule of law than to take pre-emptive action. If we take pre-emptive action, who knows whether other countries might think that it is right for them to do the same?
7.3 pm
Mr. Doug Henderson: I want to make only one main point. This has been a useful debate, but we all know that we will be back here again in a few weeks. There will be a crunch time when the United Nations tries to put together a resolution that will be acceptable to the middle east countries and to other members of the Security Council. If we do not get that resolution, we will be back here to decide how to respond. If we do get that resolution, we will be back here either to accept the inspector's report showing that certain things have been found and certain things have been done and that it is acceptable to the Security Council or because the inspectors have been obstructed or have found things to which the Iraqi Government are not prepared to respond. The United Nations and the British Government would then have to decide what to do.
I have read the document published by the Government this morning but it does not take us much further along the road. Presumably, its contents are the intelligence community's best belief about the situation in Iraq. I do not know whether that is so, but when the public here and in other countries are deciding whether they believe what is being said by our Government, they will not be persuaded by what the Joint Intelligence Committee has said. I am not saying that the committee is wrong, just that the public will not be persuaded.
I believe that people will be persuaded—certainly those in my constituency who have been lobbying me—only if there is a just cause that must be addressed by the international community. When people are making up their minds about whether there is a just cause, they will ask themselves whether the United Nations backs what has been suggested. Any diplomatic and political strategy should be carried out through the United Nations, and I am glad that our Government are committed to taking forward the strategy in that way.
The Government must also say that, if we get into difficulties with diplomacy and need to take things further, it will also be done through the United Nations. It would be extremely dangerous for Britain and America to go ahead on their own with some military adventure in Iraq. It would cause more problems than it would solve. There is no doubt that Britain and America have the military power to destroy whatever they want to destroy in Iraq, but what happens afterwards? If we do not start with a coalition of public support, it will be impossible to build any stable society in Iraq and neighbouring countries afterwards.
I was in the middle east about 10 days ago and I spoke to many people in both the political and commercial sectors. They all believed that, ultimately, it was about oil and that that was why there was such focus from the international community. They also believed that without

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an international coalition, the instability caused by any action would cause huge problems for oil supplies. I do not believe that the Government will have public support unless there is a coalition through the UN from the beginning.
We cannot get such a coalition without persuading Iraq's neighbours that they must support whatever action is being proposed. It is not good enough for the dossier simply to say that there is a problem. The people in the neighbouring countries have to believe that there is a problem and want the support of the international community, just as the Kuwaiti community did during the Gulf war. We must not ignore that issue.
I do not want to say any more other than that it would be wrong for our nation and Government to enter into action in Iraq, either political or military, without international support. Any action must be through the United Nations and there must be support from other members of the Security Council and other Arab and Islamic states in the region that might be threatened.
7.9 pm
Mr. Andrew Tyrie: I should like to say a few words about Iraq, the threat of terrorism and descriptions of a new world order that are now being articulated to justify military action.
On Iraq, my reservations have already been voiced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh). I will not rehearse those arguments again. Like them, I am not convinced by the evidence so far provided that Saddam has the capability and the intention to attack the west. I think that the biggest single risk from current developments is that if we engage in military action and Saddam is cornered, he may attack Israel and provoke it to the point of triggering a general middle east conflagration.
It is, of course, right that the UN should try to resolve the crisis through a resumption of weapons inspections. However, I differ from my colleagues in one important respect. In a crisis such as this, so much depends on intelligence information, which, except in general terms, Prime Ministers cannot share with us. Only the Prime Minister can judge the scale of this threat. He says that he is convinced that it is very serious and very real. Ultimately, I will have to trust his reasons for forming that judgment, but in the coming weeks I hope that he will go far further than he has so far today in explaining the need for war.
The crisis now developing has its roots in the terrorist atrocity of 9/11. Britain can make a significant contribution to reducing the risk of further terrorist threats. The most important thing that we can do is to get the Americans to grasp the full implications of the fact that terrorism cannot be overcome solely by military means. They must grasp that the level of anti-western terrorism from the Islamic world will be determined partly by the battle for the hearts and minds of moderate Muslim opinion, and that must mean addressing the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.
The Prime Minister has implied, and briefed the press, that he has a lot of influence behind the scenes with the United States. Publicly, he backs almost everything that the Americans say. If he really has a unique and special relationship with President Bush, the acid test must surely
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be whether the Prime Minister can persuade him to moderate Israeli military action in Palestine. That is not only morally right, but it is in the security interests of Britain and the west. It would do more to reduce the threat of Islamic terrorism in the west than any number of military operations.
Mrs. Ellman: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Tyrie: No. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I have only 10 minutes to make my speech.
Let me say a few words about the rhetoric of new world orders that has been put around recently. Over the past year, the Prime Minister has made speeches calling for a new world order in which the west should be justified in intervening to prevent abuses of human rights. However, there is a gap between that rhetoric and the hard reality of the campaign against terrorism. If we are to tackle terrorism, we must be prepared to accept that we will have to do business with many countries whose human rights records make us feel uncomfortable to say the least. The list includes Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Malaysia, China and Egypt. We have been dealing with all those countries to try to break down the al-Qaeda network. We do so because they have repudiated terrorism even though their human rights records are awful. That is the contradiction at the heart of the Prime Minister's new order. His attempt today to justify action against Saddam partly on the ground of human rights abuses in Iraq is at best disingenuous. We are not launching a humanitarian expedition.
Some of the rhetoric coming from the Bush Administration is even more worrying. The Prime Minister will discover that his new world order is very different from that espoused by the American President. The Prime Minister's new world order is internationalist and based on human rights; America's is unilateralist and designed to facilitate the expression of US power. It is underpinned by two new doctrines. The first is the doctrine of regime change: the removal by force, if necessary, of the leaders of rogue states. The second is the doctrine of pre-emptive military action: the view that in the case of rogue and failed states, military action may he taken even in the absence of a clear and imminent threat from those countries to America's interests.
Those doctrines are inherently destabilising of international relations. The notion that pre-emptive action may be taken without clear evidence of an imminent attack undermines the most basic principle of the relations between states—that military action can be justified only by self-defence. The doctrine of regime change is equally corrosive. Who should decide when a country's leadership should be changed?
Those doctrines could all too easily be used by other countries to justify their actions and secure their objectives. Vladimir Putin has already articulated President Bush's rhetoric in a speech to justify recent bombing in Georgia. Such arguments will not be lost on the Chinese or Prime Minister Sharon, among others.
America and the west will not be able to prevent that. Preponderant though the US is, she is not strong enough to impose her will on the whole world; she must seek allies and balance forces, as all previous superpowers have done, and do that within the existing system of states.

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The stability of the international system has at its core a mutual recognition of the legitimacy of other states to exist, to secure their frontiers and to maintain law and order. I am not making a narrow point about international law, nor do I think that no action can ever be taken unless the UN sanctions it. I believe that it is simply a common-sense principle. It is what the US was building on when Truman and Acheson developed the doctrine of containment after the second world war as a means of managing Soviet expansionism. It was Henry Kissinger's achievement, through detente, to engage with the Soviet Union to the point where the Soviet Union had a greater interest in recognising the rights of other states to exist than it did in seeking to undermine them.
The multilateralism of the US in the post-war era has done the world a huge service, not only by keeping the peace, but by providing the necessary stability to enable European recovery and lay the foundations for western prosperity. We owe the Americans a great debt, but those parts of the US policy-making machine that now want to create a new international order need to know—and to be told by our Government—that they are shaking that system to its foundations.
If an attack on Iraq is justified on the grounds of the new doctrines of regime change and pre-emptive action, there is far more at stake than the uncertainty that inevitably comes with large-scale military action, the possible disintegration of Iraq or even the destabilisation of the whole middle east. If action is justified by the doctrine of regime change and pre-emptive action, the overthrow of Saddam will provide many states with the opportunity to take action using the same rhetoric in breach of the traditional restraints on the use of force. It will cut at the roots of international order and in the long run it will make us less secure, not more secure.
The greatest contribution that the Prime Minister can make now is not just to drop some of his own rhetoric about a new international order, but to persuade George Bush of the dangers of his own.
7.17 pm
Richard Burden: Earlier today, the Prime Minister gave us a powerful description of the nature of the regime in Iraq. Nobody on either side of the debate or on either side of the House has disagreed with it. Partly because of that description, I wonder why the call by my hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) for a proper indictment of Saddam Hussein has not been taken up with greater vigour.
I also think that the emphasis that my hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary placed on the context in which they may be considering military action made some sense although I have some questions. It was couched very much in terms of maintaining pressure on Saddam in order to avoid that action. However, I have great difficulty reconciling what was said in the Chamber today about using threats to pressure Saddam with the messages that have been coming rather more consistently from the White House and the United States. They do not appear to be arguing that if international law and UN resolutions are to be obeyed, it is not enough to exhort and set processes in train and that it is necessary to ensure that there is the will and the ability to enforce them.
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Rather, the message is that a conclusion has already been reached and that the procedures of arguing the case in the United Nations and winning international support are stages on the way to reaching that conclusion rather than means of avoiding that conclusion and trying to ensure a peaceful resolution to the problem that we face. That is worrying and profoundly troubling. If we are to play a role in international affairs which maximises our leverage and influence over the United States, we need to draw out some of those distinctions, say that the conclusions have not yet been reached and act accordingly.
Although it is to be welcomed that President Bush went to the United Nations, I find it troubling that that was rapidly followed by an enunciation of the new doctrines to which many hon. Members have already referred: the doctrines in the US national security strategy of pre-emptive strikes. The United States appears to take to itself the power and the responsibility of acting as some kind of global emperor—of deciding which states and actions are legitimate, which states and regimes may remain in place and which will not be allowed to remain. As many hon. Members have said, that is not only profoundly destabilising of the reality of international politics, but undermines the very principles on which the United Nations was based. There can be no shortcuts round the United Nations. No state can set itself above the United Nations as the arbiter of international affairs.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, North (Mr. Henderson) said, if the United States and perhaps Britain launched military action against Iraq in support of those doctrines, it is true that in the short term and the narrow military sense a victory could be secured. But we must ask what the consequences of that would be for the region and the wider world. I have travelled to the middle east many times and the allegation there from both the Governments and the people in the street is of double standards. Their perception is that somehow international law and United Nations resolutions are more precious in one part of the world than they are in another.
I welcome the fact that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have sponsored a new United Nations resolution on the middle east and I welcome their support for a new initiative to get the peace process going. If for Iraq we say that it is not enough to exhort and set processes in train and that we must ensure that the will of the United Nations and of the international community is upheld, that applies equally to Israel. We need to say that.
Mrs. Ellman: Will my hon. Friend give way?
Richard Burden: No, I have not got time. There is only 10 minutes for my speech. The intervention was perhaps predictable.
If we are to overcome those allegations of double standards, we have to demonstrate by our actions that we do not take that approach. We must put ourselves in the position of a refugee in Gaza who is not allowed to go from one part of Gaza to another because it has been closed off, and whose home may have been destroyed by an Israeli aircraft supplied by the United States and perhaps with components made here in Great Britain. It is not enough to say to that person, "There is a difference because for your situation the UN resolution is covered by chapter 6 rather than chapter 7." The reality is the

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same. We must show by our actions that we are serious about those matters. We must show that simply exhortation and setting processes in train is no more sufficient for the middle east crisis than it is for Iraq.
I say that not just from the point of view of justice; I say it because it is vital for our credibility in making any challenges to the threats posed by Saddam Hussein. In the Gulf war in the early 1990s Saddam responded entirely predictably. He is no friend of the Palestinians, but he poses as one. He launched Scud missiles against Israel. Fortunately, Israel did not respond. Do we honestly think that Saddam Hussein would behave differently this time? I do not think so. There may be a key difference in that there is a different kind of Government in Israel. In the aftermath of 11 September Sharon described Arafat as Israel's bin Laden. We know that to be nonsense. Would it not appeal to a hawk like Sharon to try to get those issues mixed up once again and to say that his actions against the Palestinians and his refusal to abide by the obligations of UN resolutions 242 and 338 were somehow about confronting any threat posed by Saddam? Would there not be a temptation for Israel either to respond to attacks from Iraq or even to launch a pre-emptive strike of its own? If we got into that spiral, the consequences for the region and the wider world would be dangerous.
It is right to take this issue seriously. It is right that we meet the threat posed by Saddam's nuclear weapons programme and his acquisition of other weapons of mass destruction. But we need to be absolutely clear that that can be done only in the context of international law. The instrument that we have fashioned to uphold international law is the United Nations and there can be no shortcuts or ways round it. If we are to ensure that that instrument can be fashioned to deal with Saddam and Iraq, we have to show by our actions, and America must accept, that international law and United Nations resolutions are indivisible. They are as important in their application to the Palestinian in Gaza as in dealing with the threat posed by Saddam.
7.27 pm
Mr. Andrew Robathan"In war, whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers."
As some Members may know, that is a quote from Neville Chamberlain in July 1938. While history has not been kind to him, it would be astonishing if we did not all sympathise, although perhaps not agree, with those sentiments.
As we discuss war or military action tonight we should remember how ghastly it is. There is always death and every soldier, British, Iraqi, Serb or Afghan, is some mother's son. Nobody who has seen war will relish seeing it again. Chamberlain's sentiments were based on experiences of the first world war.
War may be the lesser of two evils. If Saddam Hussein would comply completely with all UN resolutions, there would be no need for this debate or, for any military action and certainly no need for war. I come to this debate with a slightly different perspective. Excellent speeches have been made, but I should like to discuss the issue from my minor experiences of the Gulf war in 1991 when I rejoined as the chief of staff of the prisoner-of-war guard force in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It is only limited experience, but I saw something from ground level.
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First, the Iraqi army—we captured some 8,000 prisoners of war—was not well motivated. Almost as soon as British troops appeared morale collapsed and they surrendered. I am not suggesting that we should be complacent about any Iraqi troops now, but we should know that there was no morale and no motivation. The soldiers were not well equipped. Far from it. Most of their tanks were T55s built in 1955. They were all Soviet tanks and by 1991 Soviet tanks had progressed to T82s, as I recall. It was old, obsolete equipment. Their kit was dreadful.
In field hospitals I saw soldiers that we were treating who had been shot by their own side when they tried to surrender, because that was how they made people serve. We saved many Iraqis from starvation, from dehydration and from dying of cold. The first Iraqis that I encountered on the first day of the war were all very swarthy, dressed in British NBC—nuclear, biological and chemical protection kit. I wondered why they were all dressed like that. The answer was that they were dying of exposure and we saved them. We put in a special Chinook helicopter filled with water, because we took so many prisoners who were dying of thirst because their side had not tried, or not been able, to feed or water them.
When these conscripts saw that they were not in danger, and that they were in a prisoner-of-war camp being well treated and fed, it became like a school outing because they were so happy. Imagine British soldiers with bayonets fixed—18-year-old boys wondering what to do when these unarmed Iraqis would crawl under the fences between the cages to get a second meal. They did not want to shoot or bayonet them, so in the end the Iraqis just got two meals. They were very happy to be under our protection; there was no question about that.
The prisoners were not in any way pro Saddam Hussein. Some of them had literally been rounded up in the fields or in factories. They had been taken away and press ganged; that is well documented from the Iran-Iraq war. They were certainly not in favour of the war and, like all conscripts, they wanted to go home to their families. They wanted peace. They were terrified of informers—Iraq was a police state then as it is now—but I spoke to many in private who were willing to say how desperately they wanted to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. That was not true of the Republican Guard—they were a different matter—but it must be said that they also surrendered when they were confronted by superior force.
The huge majority of these people wanted the end of Saddam Hussein and we let them down. I was told that many, when they were finally taken back some six months later by the Iraqi regime, were murdered or imprisoned by the regime.
A lot of nonsense is talked about the end of the war in 1991—about how we could not go on and occupy Baghdad. All that we had to do was fight on for about another two days. It was not easy; we were coming to the end of our supply chain and lines of communication were very stretched, but if we had moved on at the same pace for another two days we would have cut off the bulk of the Republican Guard, who were north-east of Basra, and if we had done so we would have cut off Saddam Hussein's support.
I hear people say that we had to stop the war because of the coalition. It seemed to me that all members of the coalition were astonished that we stopped, and indeed the

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Arab leaders were very distressed that we had not deposed their enemy, Saddam Hussein. We read self-justification in the papers now, but I remember being told, when I was woken in my basha on the Iraqi sand, that there was a ceasefire coming, which would be exactly 100 hours after the invasion started, because they wanted a 100-hour war. That decision was taken by George Bush Sr. There was no consultation. Douglas Hurd—he can correct me if I am wrong—now Lord Hurd, who was Foreign Secretary, was in Washington DC and he was not consulted. I remember seeing James Baker, then the Secretary of State, standing on the steps of the White House saying, "We have taught Saddam Hussein a lesson." I believe that he misjudged the situation terribly. Now, 11 and a half years on, Saddam Hussein is still a bloody tyrant who terrorises his own people.
I will not dwell on the million people killed in the Iran-Iraq war, or the fact that 600-odd Kuwaiti prisoners of war and deportees who were taken to Iraq have still not been accounted for. Although I will not dwell on it, we should remember that the Iraqis set light to all those oil wells, creating ghastly pollution in the Persian gulf in 1991, and that Saddam killed 5,000 people in Halabja. I will mention the fact that Saddam butchered his own sons-in-law in 1996, having given them a guarantee of safety, and that he has butchered thousands of others. Since 1991, he has defied endless UN resolutions.
Saddam has been compared to Hitler, which people say is completely inappropriate, but I do not think that it is. It is much more appropriate than comparing the foreign policy of George Bush to that of Hitler. I do not believe that Saddam's brutality and his actions against Iraqis are enough to force a war because, with my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie), I do not believe that it is our right to impose regime change on Iraq—although I think that it may occur.
However, Saddam Hussein continues to work to threaten us, and we see that in the dossier. Nothing much in it is new, but it does show that he has the intent to threaten other people. He is a threat to his own poor people and, I believe, a threat to the peace of the world, the region and the middle east. Those who dismiss that assertion should judge him by his past actions.
Saddam launched Scuds against Israel in 1991. Would he launch a nuclear missile against Israel now if he had one? I do not know, but I think that it is a possibility because, as people have identified, it would bring all the Arabs to his side. Perhaps he might.
We should have learned from the experience of the past 12 years, or indeed the 23 years that Saddam has been in power, that we cannot trust him. We cannot negotiate with him. We cannot ride this crocodile.
War is never easy and always ghastly. We have heard some navel-gazing from the Liberal Democrats in particular, asking, "What if this? What if that?" It is very fair that these questions should be asked, but could the result of, for example, Iraq's breaking up be worse for the Iraqi Kurds or the Iraqi Marsh Arabs or the Shi'ites than it is now? They have lived a ghastly life under this regime. If the Iraqi Kurds want self-determination, is not that to a very large extent up to them? It seems to me that it should be, within the United Nations.
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Saddam Hussein has flouted the United Nations for well over 12 years. He is certainly a threat to his old enemies, such as Iran, and perhaps also Saudi Arabia. I think that he is a threat to us in the United Kingdom and the United States, who are also his old enemies. However, the legal position, which has been addressed, is very important. United Nations resolutions are very important. We should remember that Saddam Hussein has no legitimacy himself. He got there by force; he keeps himself there by force. He oppresses, tortures and executes his people. The greatest beneficiaries if, God forbid, we should have to go to war, of his defeat and—I believe it should be an object also—his subsequent removal from power would be the poor, oppressed, benighted people of Iraq.
7.36 pm
Joan Ruddock: I thank my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary for so clearly stating today the case for the rule of international law, the return of the UN weapons inspectors and the necessity of destroying the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
I too believe that doing nothing is not an option. But as the Prime Minister said today, we have not been doing nothing. Our right hon. Friends have said that the policy of containment has not worked. Well, perhaps not. But we need to ask, could we have done more and differently? Could the threat of war have been avoided, and can actual war now be averted? I believe that the answer to all three questions is yes.
Last year my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke movingly of a new world order—the primacy of multilateral agreements, not just in tackling terrorism but in poverty alleviation, development and reconstruction. Since that time, by contrast with the exemplary behaviour of our own Government, the United States has opted out of effective multilateral co-operation and developed an increasingly unilateralist and pre-emptive military stance. Furthermore, I believe that President Bush has sought to use international support for the war against terrorism to justify regime change in Iraq. That connection deserves examination.
A year ago, the United Kingdom was committed to military action against al-Qaeda. I supported that action, as I did the military action in the Gulf. I accepted the justification of self-defence under international law, but I do not believe that at present we have the same justification of self-defence in respect of the Iraqi regime. I do believe that the risks involved in war against Iraq are greater than the risks of pursuing the alternative strategy of diplomacy and UN inspections, and I do not underestimate how difficult, time-consuming and frustrating that will be.
I have just returned from a conference in Egypt, hosted by the first lady, Suzanne Mubarak. Immediately before that I was in Afghanistan. I believe that both experiences are relevant to today's debate.
The year-long war against terrorism in Afghanistan has been waged by 10,000 combat and support troops but, despite the disruption of the al-Qaeda operation in that country, very few al-Qaeda militia have been captured and US intelligence believes that their leadership largely remains intact. It is commonly acknowledged that al-Qaeda's threat to the west derives from its primary aim

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of replacing the house of Saud, establishing an Islamist state and ridding Saudi Arabia and the middle east of American bases and influence. Nothing, I suggest, could provide al-Qaeda with more ready recruits and the pretext for further attacks on the west than Saudi support for a US strike on Baghdad.
Even more of a paradox in the prosecution of this war against terrorism is the deterioration in the security situation in Israel and the occupied territories. Despite the constant cycle of violence, the suicide bombings, assassinations, detention, punishments and the horrific events of the past few days, the US Administration continues to arm and support Israel unconditionally. So where is the justice? Where is the security? Where is the new world order?
We have to ask ourselves whether a military attack on Iraq would enhance or undermine justice and security in the middle east and whether a military attack would increase or decrease the threat of terrorist attack against the west. I believe that such a war risks huge loss of life, massive environmental damage and the possible destabilisation of the very states in the middle east that the US says it seeks to protect from Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Surely a strategy of regime change by military means, as other hon. Members have said today, risks Saddam using the very weapons of mass destruction that we so fear.
During the past few days in Egypt, I have talked extensively to women from a number of Arab states. Without exception, they are opposed to the Iraqi regime and, without exception, they are opposed to military action. Each confessed to being afraid—afraid for their own countries, for their economies and for their environments, and deeply angry at the prospect of the Iraqi people having to suffer more pain. Being there in Egypt gave me a profound sense of being one of them, looking at us and wondering how we could contemplate such a war—a feeling which is further reinforced by talking to women from the United Nations, who are quietly preparing the camps, transport and food sources for the anticipated humanitarian crisis.
That brings me to Afghanistan. I was there on 11 September. Just before I arrived, 25 people had been killed in the street and President Karzai had just escaped an assassination attempt. I went to see how the international community was fulfilling its promises to the Afghan people, and I saw much that was very positive. I was proud of the role that the UK Government have played and are playing in support of reconstruction, but in the context of Iraq and the new world order, we should consider not what has been achieved since regime change, but what remains to be done.
The transitional Government are vulnerable, with a serious ethnic imbalance. There is as yet no trained police force and no army loyal to the central Government. Nearly 2 million refugees have returned to Kabul, yet not a single home has been built by the transitional authority. All calls for an extension of ISAF have failed to get results, and warlords continue to rampage through the rest of the country. Many of the financial promises made in Tokyo have yet to materialise, and the World Food Programme has just put out an appeal for funds because it does not have the money to buy the wheat for the essential winter feeding programmes.
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My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister rightly reminded the House today that the international community made a solemn promise not to walk away. I have no doubt about his sincerity, but I tell the House that in Afghanistan people believe that the United States is about to move on. We cannot make promises to the people of Iraq unless we are absolutely certain that we will honour those that we have already made elsewhere.
In conclusion, I urge my right hon. Friends to continue vigorously to pursue their efforts to secure the peaceful re-entry of the UN inspectors, to build more effective alliances in the region and to reinvigorate the middle east peace process. Only with greater justice do I believe that war can be avoided and that the goal that unites us all—the destruction of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—can be realised.
7.44 pm
Mr. Robert Walter: The decision to go to war is not one taken lightly by any democratic Government. I believe that the job of a Member of Parliament is often to question that decision, preferably before British troops have been committed. Neither I nor, as I know from today's debate, anyone else in the Chamber has any sympathy with Saddam Hussein or with the excesses of Islamic fundamentalism, or any other kind of fundamentalist or oppressive dictator for that matter. I do not believe that responsible nations should stand idly by while others suffer or die from oppression, invasion or hunger.
I will be the first to support, albeit reluctantly, the pursuit of evil dictators who pose a threat to my own people and to others who should otherwise live in freedom, but I will not blindly concur with decisions to commit the lives of British service men and women, unless I am convinced of both the justice and the sense of that action.
The United States seems determined to force a regime change on the people of Iraq, and we all know, given the current state of Iraqi politics, that that cannot happen democratically. We all know that the devastation of the Gulf war, the imposition of no-fly zones, the economic sanctions and the general hatred of Saddam have done nothing to weaken his regime.
The Iraqi regime has a record of human rights abuse and genocide that would be defended by no one. Its record is, however, by no means unique; other nations in history have perpetrated equally indefensible acts that have gone unchecked.
The real question now is about Saddam Hussein's current capabilities and his future intentions. The question is not just whether Saddam Hussein has chemical, biological and nuclear technology, for that is all in the dossier that we saw this morning, but whether he has the weapons, the delivery mechanism and, most importantly, the intention of using that capability in an aggressive manner. If I were particularly inward-looking, I could further ask: if he has all that, is he likely to use it against Britain or British interests?
As an elected representative of the British people, the question that I ask our Government is simple: does Saddam Hussein present such a threat that I should be prepared to sanction and support military action that would lead to the loss of British service men and women? Such action would also lead to the deaths of many

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hundreds of innocent Iraqi men, women and children. Such action might lead to the destabilisation of the near and middle east, including ethnic conflict in our NATO ally, Turkey, and an escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
This is not a debate about pacifism, as was so bravely put by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), and many of his sentiments were also expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) and for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor). Nor is this a question of nimbyism. This is a simple question about political and military right.
Can George Bush convince the United Nations, including the Arab world, that Saddam Hussein has the capability and the intention to destroy the world order? Can the Prime Minister convince me and other hon. Members that that man poses a threat to Britain of such magnitude that we have to go to war?
The dossier that we saw today still has many unanswered questions in it and much speculation. Saddam's record is not in question, but as of today, he is not at war with Iran and he is not in occupation of Kuwait. There is a peace, however imperfect, which has been secured by UN resolutions, no-fly zones and economic sanctions. If we launch an attack, we will destroy that peace. We will have launched the first strike.
The second question, if the catalogue of weapons of mass destruction in the dossier is correct—I have no reason to doubt it—and if such capability can be put into action in just 45 minutes, is: what steps can we take to protect our troops, the people of Iraq and our friends in the region from that horror?
There are many other questions, but my final one in this debate is: what will the region look like after Saddam Hussein? I talk not just of Iraq, but of Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and our NATO ally Turkey—not to mention Israel and Palestine. For this is not Afghanistan; this is a much more complex ethnic and political jigsaw.
We must have an endgame before we start. If in the end I can be convinced that this crusade is justified, I will with all my might seek to convince my electors that their sons and daughters should join the crusade so that we can rid the world of this evil regime. I will do that with great reluctance—my own children could see action in that conflict—but I will do it because I believe that, once the decision is taken, we must give our wholehearted support to the thousands of British service men and women who will risk their lives for what will be the most just of causes.
7.51 pm
Mr. Tony Lloyd: The Prime Minister helpfully set out in his statement this morning that, first, the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq was high on his list of priorities, and secondly that for him the objective was the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction held by Iraq. Although that was very helpful, the Prime Minister's case has been massively undermined by the confusion that has arisen as a result of very senior sources in the American Administration talking consistently about regime change and very different objectives.
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That voice, heard in this House and throughout Britain, has led to an extraordinary degree of cynicism about the American Administration's real objectives. I share that cynicism because I know of no way that this Government would be in a position in the end to constrain the actions of the United States Administration. The United States most certainly has the capacity to make war unilaterally and to win that war in military terms if it chooses to do so.
The most bizarre thing about the recent announcement of the new American doctrine of pre-emptive strikes and unilateralism is that it flies so much in the face of what we thought that the Americans and the world had learned when this House met just 12 months ago in the aftermath of the events of 11 September and talked of the recognition of the fact that the coalition against terrorism was not just a military one but operated at every level. It was a coalition in which the United States was a very important partner, but only a partner. I was one of those who supported military action against Afghanistan and al-Qaeda because I believed in building that coalition. At the moment, the United States is risking the destruction of that concept of coalition. Indeed, as partners in the venture, we risk such destruction too if we get it wrong.
The odd thing at the moment is that, as one of my hon. Friends said, we should be calling Saddam Hussein's bluff. We should be saying, "Look, if you accept weapons inspectors into Iraq again, we will ensure that we get them in and that existing and, indeed, new UN Security Council resolutions will be a basis for that." Like others, I call strongly for a resolution to make clear at every stage the expectations of Saddam Hussein and—this is important—of the world community, including Great Britain and the United States. It is important that there is no room for doubt over where the world goes from here.
It is important, for example, that if the weapons inspectors return to Iraq and discover default, obfuscation or deliberate attempts on the part of Saddam to prevent them from carrying out their activities, that it is reported not by politicians but by the inspectors themselves. Then it would be for the world community to make a decision. Under those circumstances, with UN support, I would support military action to enforce the UN resolutions, as at that point it would be clear that Saddam Hussein was intending to flout them. Long before that, however, we must get those inspectors into the country and call Saddam's bluff. That would give us the opportunity of a peaceful resolution.
I must say iconoclastically that no one has answered the question about what happened to the policy of deterrence. Perhaps the deterrence argument has disappeared, yet such an argument still exists and my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) made it. There is no doubt that Saddam is an evil man. He has done some horrendous things to his own people and his neighbours. I watched him over many years when Saddam-watching was not a high priority in the House, but I do not think that he is suicidal. I do not agree that he would resist the concept of deterrence if it were clear that he would meet overwhelming force from the United States and, indeed, Great Britain in the event of use of weapons of mass destruction against ourselves or his neighbours.
Although the concept of deterrence is still important, the argument has gone beyond it. We are now committed either to weapons inspectors or to war. Therefore, I must

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say that the deployment of weapons inspectors is massively cheaper in global terms than the alternative of a conflict.
Various Members on both sides of the House have drawn parallels with past events, 1991, and so on. We most certainly take on board the fact that there is a fragile world opinion, especially in the Arab world, which sees itself as having been humiliated over recent years. We must consider not just what the house of Saud thinks but what is thought by 15 and 16-year-olds growing up in Saudi Arabia and by people throughout the middle east. We must disabuse ourselves of the perception that Saddam is always seen as the villain. Although he most certainly is a villain, we would be very stupid if we did not recognise that we have allowed him to paint himself as the hero of the dispossessed and of those who feel that there is no justice on this planet for them and their condition.
That brings us to the situation in the context of Israel and Palestine. I disagree with my hon. Friends who say that Iraq is only as important as Burma. That is not true. Iraq probably possesses weapons of extraordinary capacity, unlike Burma, and could threaten peace in the middle east and the world. However, the one situation that threatens that even more is that between Palestine and Israel. I ask our Government and the American Government to put just one tenth of the effort directed towards Iraq into resolving that situation. Then we could begin to transform this world and opinion in favour of action against those such as Saddam. We must say clearly to the present Government in Israel that their actions are now so far beyond any level of acceptability that they are part of the whole problem and most certainly not a separate issue that can be dealt with later.
The stakes that we are playing for are quite extraordinary. There are circumstances where, under proper UN mandate, Saddam would legitimately face military action of which Britain should be part if he continued to default on his obligations. We should certainly be part of building such a coalition around the world in the event that we find ourselves in that unhappy position. but at the moment we should be building a coalition to ensure that weapons inspectors return to Iraq, maximum diplomatic pressure is brought to bear on Saddam and that the message is conveyed to a world ready for such action that the UN, as the Prime Minister pointed out, faces a challenge. Its challenge is not to conform to United States doctrine. Quite rightly, it is under the challenge of ensuring that previous UN resolutions come to fruition. That is a challenge for us all, because those of us who believe in the UN have to see its resolutions backed. The way to do that now is to call Saddam's bluff, get the inspectors in and begin that process. If we do that, there will be huge agreement across the House and it will be possible to move forward on that agenda. The challenge to our Government is to say to the Americans that there are no circumstances under which we would now accept pre-emptive military action, because such military action would destroy the fragile balance that exists. It would not be part of making peace for the long-term future.
8 pm
Mr. Andrew Turner: I fear that the Government's behaviour shows that they underestimate the cynicism and detachment that affect politics in this
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country and the hard work that they will have to do if they are to persuade the British people to back the action that the Prime Minister proposes. This dossier makes a strong case, but it is evident from remarks made by Members on both sides of the House that it has not persuaded all of us of the justification for that action. However, it is not us but the public at large—both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere—who need to be persuaded.
The Prime Minister has not merely delayed for six weeks, as the right hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) suggested. The Prime Minister has delayed for six months or more. That delay has created in the eyes of many people a serious leadership gap. Six months ago in the debate on 6 March, I spoke of the need for the Government to forge a chain of trust. The failure of any link in that chain weakens our country's ability to commit our forces overseas with the wholehearted support of the British people. However, that chain of trust is being weakened by the many members of the public who do not believe that the Government are right. It has also been weakened for me and many of my hon. Friends by the regular failure of the Prime Minister and his colleagues to answer honest questions about this subject and some others fully and expeditiously.
On many occasions since 6 March, the Prime Minister has missed opportunities to reinforce the chain of trust. In March and April alone, at least six occasions arose for Ministers to prepare the British people, but on too many occasions they have restricted their remarks to formulaic statements. For example, the Prime Minister said:
"When judgments are made, I shall ensure that the House has a full opportunity to debate them."—[Official Report, 10 April 2002; Vol. 382, c. 23.]
That was the formula virtually throughout.
The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane), was unusually specific for a Minister when he said:
"Instead of focusing on Washington, we should be mobilising public opinion to support the UN, and uniting to apply pressure to Saddam Hussein".—[Official Report. Westminster Hall, 25 April 2002; Vol. 384, c. 175WH.]
What is the evidence of the Government's success in meeting that ambition? The Prime Minister said in his statement earlier today that the issue of Iraq has come over his desk every week in the past year. Yet he also told us that he came back a few weeks ago and realised that he had to go out to explain the issue to people. That has been his failure. He held a conference in Sedgefield and he spoke to the TUC, but until then he had shown disregard for the British people. The Prime Minister's failure to recall the House until now has again shown his disregard not for us but for the British people whom we represent. In his failure to produce this dossier until a few hours before this debate, he showed his disregard for the British people.
Because of that disregard, the Prime Minister has yet to earn our people's support for the course of action on which he is set. That failure will have a price both at home and abroad. At home, there is great distress and great cynicism among many of our constituents. That has been shown to me by my constituents of all parties and of none. Some of them are robust—retired army officers and their wives—and they are not habitually weak kneed

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in the face of a real threat. However, they say, "Why stir up a hornet's nest in the middle east, which has nothing to do with us?" Some are cynical, and believe that the Prime Minister needs to explain the issue better than he has done so far. They have no belief in the Prime Minister or many other politicians and they use words like "poodle" and "pocket handkerchief Churchill". Some are frankly frightened. A former Labour voter came to me in tears and said, "I fear for the innocent Iraqi women and children. I fear even more for my friends in this country and especially those who live or work in London. But I am angry at my Prime Minister who places his friendship with George W. Bush above the interests of the British people." Those are the sentiments that are expressed to me and it is the Prime Minister's job to answer them.
Many people—it may be news to Labour Members—do not trust the Prime Minister. They did once and they could do so again, but he has to re-earn that trust. He needs to address the issues relating to this conflict that matter to our constituents. International law and the interpretation of UN resolutions, which have taken so much of our attention, are not high on that list of interests.
Dr. Palmer: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that he gives the impression that he is much more interested in bashing the Prime Minister than he is in the subject of the debate?
Mr. Turner: I am sorry if that is the hon. Gentleman's impression, but those are the sentiments expressed to me by people of all parties, including the Labour party, and of none. For example, people ask whether the Muslim world will see an attack on Iraq as an attack on it. Will it not see it as an extension of United States support for Israel in Palestine? What about the Muslims in this country? On 6 November, the Prime Minister declined to tell me in a written answer which Muslim organisations in this country had supported our action in Afghanistan. What about the threat to people in this country, for example, from biological weapons released in the underground?
This debate has been too much about international law and too little about domestic peace of mind. If the Prime Minister wants the British people's assent to the commitment of British troops, he has a duty to get them on his side. He has a duty to secure their peace of mind; he has a duty to fill the leadership gap. It would grieve me not to be able to support the United States—our best and truest friend as a nation—but the case has still to be made.
8.7 pm
Mr. Roger Godsiff: As other Members have said, the dossier that we received this morning shows conclusively that Saddam Hussein is an evil man. We already knew that. He is a brutal dictator, and he has been a brutal dictator for many years. He has used genocide and poison gas against his own people. He launched a war against Iran albeit with some support from the west, and that resulted in more than 1 million people being killed. He invaded Kuwait, and when he left he caused an environmental disaster by torching the oilfields.
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I have no doubt whatever that Saddam Hussein is engaged in making chemical weapons and is seeking to acquire a nuclear capability. Based on his past behaviour, I have no doubt that he will play games with the UN weapons inspectors when they go to Iraq. The world and the people of Iraq will be well rid of him. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan) said, if George Bush had allowed Desert Storm to continue for a little while longer, the allies would have been at the gates of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein might well have been deposed by now.
Andrew Selous: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Godsiff: I am sorry, but I have only a short time.
I want to make it clear that, although I fully support the United Kingdom working through the UN, I can envisage situations in which either the United Kingdom or America take unilateral action because they feel that their national interests are under threat. However, having said that, I cannot understand the political logic behind an attack on Iraq.
After the events of 9/11, the civilised world united in its determination to combat and root out international terrorism. We rightly supported action against the Taliban in Afghanistan who were harbouring the al-Qaeda organisation. However, because we were unable completely to destroy al-Qaeda at a stroke we seem to have changed our emphasis and are now considering an attack on what George Bush called part of the "axis of evil". That could have serious consequences, not least because if we attack Iraq on the basis that it is ruled by an evil and brutal man, what are we to do about Iran and North Korea, which are also part of the axis of evil?
I represent a constituency in which almost 50 per cent. of the electors are Muslim. When I tell them that I am a strong supporter of the American ethos and of America, I am not always popular. I do, however, support America and believe that overall it has done much more good than evil in the world, but I must tell my friends in America that their country does not understand Islam or the Muslim world. That was demonstrated when President Bush called the war against terrorism a crusade. Everyone knows that one does not use that word in the context of an attack on international terrorism. One can talk about evil people, but talking about crusades resurrects centuries-old enmity between Muslims and non-Muslims. That was not a clever thing to do, but it was done out of ignorance. As I said, the Americans do not understand the Muslim world or Islam.
If America, with the support of the United Kingdom, launches a pre-emptive strike against Saddam Hussein, he will become a hero throughout the Muslim world, creating, as others have said, enormous problems for countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, neither of which could be described as the most democratic countries on earth. They are, however, pro-western, and Saudi Arabia is the greatest oil producer in the world. It would not be in the interests of the west or the economies of the United Kingdom or America for Saudi Arabia or Egypt to fall under the control of Iranian fanatics—there would be enormous consequences for all of us.
How would such an attack help the war against international terrorism, bearing in mind the fact that many al-Qaeda operatives captured in Afghanistan were

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dissidents from Saudi Arabia and Egypt? As has been said, they would love to displace the house of Saud and the present Egyptian Government. I always thought that one of the perks of being a tyrannical dictator was having absolute power to do what one wants, bleed one's country dry and appoint all one's friends to top positions. I cannot believe that Saddam Hussein would want to put that at risk by attempting or threatening to carry out a pre-emptive strike against America or Israel. He knows perfectly well that the consequences would be nuclear annihilation. I do not think that Saddam Hussein is an idiot. I do not believe that he wants to be the dictator of a pile of rubble in Baghdad. Saddam Hussein has probably caused more suffering and deaths, particularly of Muslims, than anyone else alive today, but the British Government's priorities and those of the Americans should be to pursue international terrorism and the al-Qaeda organisation. I cannot see the political logic or sense of embarking on an adventurist campaign against Iraq, with all the inherent consequences and dangers.
Finally, America, Britain and the western world must pay attention to the reasons why international terrorists emerge. International terrorists are born in the refugee camps in Palestine because they latch on to the issues that they use to justify their terrorist acts. The two biggest issues in the Muslim world used to justify international terrorism are Palestine and Kashmir. Until the western world takes those issues seriously and works to redouble its efforts to resolve them, those refugee camps, whether along the Kashmir border or in Palestine, will continue to be a breeding ground for people who believe that they have God on their side when they fight, as they see it, for the liberation of their people. We must address those issues—if we ignore them, we do so at our peril.
8.16 pm
Andrew Selous: All Members would agree that the House of Commons has been at its best today, with thoughtful and independent-minded speeches from Members on both sides of the House. It is a source of great regret to me and, I am sure, many hon. Members that it has taken so long for the House to be recalled. The ability to recall the House should lie with hon. Members. If a majority want a recall, that should be the case.
I was rather surprised by the expression in the Prime Minister's otherwise extremely thoughtful and well-argued speech this morning about the Chamber being kept "in touch" with the situation, which is reminiscent of a phrase I might use about a relationship with a distant relative. The House of Commons deserves considerably more than that. I echo the anger and frustration of many hon. Members in saying that we had but three and a half hours this morning to look at the dossier. I did not want to read it in the Chamber—I wanted to listen to hon. Members—so that was a discourtesy to the House which, I hope, will not be repeated.
I speak today with some personal feeling because my brother, his wife and two young children were living in Kuwait when it was invaded by Saddam Hussein many years ago. My brother told me how he looked out of his apartment window and saw Kuwaiti soldiers and civilians being shot and mown down in cold blood. As a family we have been affected by what Saddam Hussein has done. I completely accept—there has been agreement on both sides of the House about this—that our overwhelming
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purpose is to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We must do so through the only organisation able to achieve that—the United Nations. Incidentally, why are the inspectors not being sent in now, as we are being told that evidence is being destroyed? Why must they wait until mid-October? Surely there is an urgent need to get them in as soon as possible. We must, however, use the UN, and there is agreement on both sides of the House about that. It is vital that we stick within the confines of international law and act legally—there is widespread agreement on that.
I support indicting Saddam Hussein. We have seen Milosevic being tried in The Hague. There may be huge practical difficulties in getting Saddam Hussein there, but we should subject him too to the process of international law. Regime change is not and should not be the objective, but I think that we all know in our hearts that it may be and could well be a consequence of what we are talking about.
Why has the issue become so urgent and why are we discussing it now? Has not the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, which we have had for many years, kept the peace? What has changed? The answer could be that since 11 September 2001 we are looking at a different world. For example, let us picture the scenario of a terrorist group getting some of these weapons from Iraq by ship or other means, secreting them on the plains of North Africa and launching an attack against a third-party country. That is the sort of scenario that we are considering, but the dossier is somewhat silent on the Government's assessment of such a risk and the UK's preparedness in terms of civil defence. Middle eastern countries are much better prepared than we are. I ask the Minister to reply specifically to those two points.
We have heard that UN authority has been flouted for
11 or so years with regard to Iraq. Many UN resolutions have not been implemented and should be, but it is no argument to say that because they have not all been implemented, some cannot be. We were right to provide humanitarian help in Rwanda. It was not argued that we should not do so there because we were not doing so elsewhere, and the same logic applies now.
We have heard a lot today about the international community, and I support what has been said. Is not the tragedy the fact that so often America and Britain have had to stand alone? We must remember that it was not, as some might have thought, the rather more suave and sophisticated President Clinton who patiently assembled an alliance of many, many nations before advancing against Afghanistan after 11 September but President Bush. Let us wait and see what he does. Let us judge him on what he has done, not on his recent words. Surely it is important that the UN should be able to call on the military support of many countries, not just be left with UK and US forces. We need to consider seriously what voluntary commitment can be given to the UN so that all the resolutions can be enforced. Of course, those relating to Israel and Palestine are supremely important to what we are discussing.
We must also remember our history. We have heard today about the League of Nations and Abyssinia in 1935. We have heard about German rearmament between 1933 and 1936. I commend the film "The Gathering Storm" to those who have not seen it. We should think of what the House went through in that period, and how its opinion changed over time. We need to reflect on that. We have

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heard more recently about Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, about which some people here had doubts who perhaps later felt that the action taken had been justified.
In the foreword to the dossier the Prime Minister says:
"I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest."
That may well be the case but the reasons for that do not spring out from the pages before us. Is it because we are worried that Iraq is about to buy missile systems from North Korea which would reach these shores? What is the risk assessment on that? Are the Government concerned about that? Or is it because we are concerned about the release of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq to a terrorist group that will come to this country, or because we are concerned about agents coming to this country and releasing poison in the underground, as happened in Tokyo? We need a much more detailed assessment. The document does not contain sufficient answers. The British people will need that explained to them by the Government. We know that, for security reasons, the Government cannot share all that they know with us, but we need to have the threat explained much more clearly.
The Iraqi opposition e-mailed many Members yesterday with the proposals that the no-fly zone be extended; that Iraqi assets be unfrozen and given to opposition groups; and that Iraqi foreign representation around the world in embassies and so on be changed to reflect the opposition in Iraq. I do not know how practical those proposals are, but we have a duty to examine every option. Again, I should like to hear the Minister's response to that point.
We have to bear it in mind that there will be dictators all over the world looking at the international community. This is a defining moment and we have to believe that what we do here will be looked at. If Saddam Hussein is allowed to get away with his behaviour, he may well be copied by other dictators. That is a serious and onerous responsibility that rests on all hon. Members.
8.25 pm
Llew Smith: If we should decide to go to war with Iraq, it will not be a war against Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, or terrorism. Nor will it be a war about liberty, democracy, human rights, or the defence of the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs. As is often the case in war, this war will be about money and power, who controls the Gulf, and setting up a puppet Government in the middle east. Linked to all that, it will be about oil.
We are told that the war will be about weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's threat to use such weapons against the world. That is an ironic claim coming from the United States, which has 25,000 nuclear weapons and warheads, and from the United Kingdom, which has a massive nuclear arsenal. Not even Iraq's neighbours believe that such weapons are a threat to them or the rest of the world.
That claim has been made by the United States, a country that bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing hundreds of thousands of Japanese citizens with atomic bombs—weapons of mass destruction. It has been made by the very same country that carpet-bombed Vietnam with napalm, destroying its crops, environment and the
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lives of millions of its citizens, once again with weapons of mass destruction, weapons which in theory the United States and the United Kingdom are opposed to. The irony and hypocrisy of America's warning against rogue states, and, in particular, Iraq, having weapons of mass destruction, is also highlighted by its continued economic and military support for Israel—a nuclear weapons state.
Mordecai Vanunu is rotting in an Israeli prison when his only crime was to tell the truth about Israel's nuclear capability when all around him were lying. If this war is about liberty, what have the UK and the US done about Vanunu's liberty? I am ashamed to say that we have done nothing.
We are not simply concerned about nuclear weapons because, as former President Clinton declared in a state of the union address, in the context of Iraq, there is a need to
"confront the new hazards of chemical and biological weapons and the outlaw states, terrorists and organised criminals seeking to acquire them."
The hypocrisy knows no limits. It was the United States who supplied Iraq with much of the matériel required for it to build its biological weapons programme. Those exports continued at least until 1989, despite the fact that Iraq had been reported to be engaged in chemical, and possibly biological, warfare against the Iranians, the Kurds and the Shi'ites since the early 1980s. Yet we are now informed that one of the reasons for war is to protect those very same people.
During the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, the United States gave military aid and intelligence information not only to Iraq but to both sides. Saddam Hussein was then, as now, an evil psychopath—but then he was the west's evil psychopath and a favoured recipient of weapons and of export credits to subsidise them. Even the Tory Government were prepared to sell him military equipment, including—would you believe it?—plutonium. They actually agreed to the export licence that allowed that to happen.
The United States and the UK also tell us that the war is necessary because of the refusal of Saddam Hussein to allow in the weapons inspectors. Or, at least, they said that before Saddam had agreed to those inspectors going into Iraq. Now that he has agreed, they give the impression that that was not the most important issue. It must also be remembered that the weapons inspectors were in Iraq for about six years after the last war.
For the United States to consider going to war to pursue the goal of weapons inspectors is hypocrisy. Less than a year after the United States Congress passed an Act to implement the chemical weapons convention, the US Senate allowed it to ignore the convention and deny weapons inspections at US facilities. It was agreed that, if there were to be such inspections, the United States could decide who the inspectors would be.
Never short of reasons to go to war, the United States also tells us that this is a punishment for Iraq intervening in or attacking other countries. By that logic, we should also attack Israel, which is invading Palestine and breaking UN resolutions on a daily basis. Will the Government also answer the question posed by Mo Mowlam, when she asked:
"Can you imagine if President Putin had made a similar speech to President Bush"

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but had argued that
"Russian forces should be used to enforce UN resolutions against Israel?"
Putting aside that point, it is still hypocritical for the United States to justify war on the ground of one country attacking or intervening in another, when we consider its own record. We should not forget that, since 1945, the United States has intervened in or invaded Albania, Angola, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Chile, Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Panama, South Korea, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Uruguay, Vietnam and Zaire. The list goes on, yet little or nothing has been done in response to those acts of aggression or intervention.
We are also led to believe that the war is a crusade against terrorism. Bush uses the tragedy of 11 September to support this claim, yet there has been no evidence that Iraq was involved. President Bush told the United Nations:
"the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it."
But if the UK and United States bomb Iraq, the liberty of many Iraqi people will be achieved only by their death. Is that the kind of victory President Bush and our Prime Minister are seeking? Have not the people of Iraq suffered enough in the last war and from the ensuing sanctions, which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens?
Some years ago Madeleine Albright, then UN ambassador, was reminded of the tragic death of so many people in Iraq as a result of the war and the sanctions, and was asked whether the price was worth it. She replied:
"I think this is a very hard choice, but we think the price is worth it".
I do not, and that is why I will be joining the demonstration against the war on Saturday in London, and why I will use every opportunity not only to protest but to use my vote against the possibility of such a war.
8.33 pm
Mr. Richard Allan: It is somewhat daunting to speak at this stage of the debate, when so many good speeches from both sides of the Chamber have included points with which I agree, but I feel strongly moved to exercise my privilege to speak up, both on my behalf and on behalf of the many constituents who have contacted me about the current military situation.
My resolve was, in many ways, motivated by the words of the Prime Minister, who said that he would not like to have it on his conscience that he had foreseen something awful happening yet done nothing to stop it. As I came to feel increasingly strongly that the prospect of unilateral action against Iraq would cause an appalling international catastrophe, as well as death and destruction for many people, I did not want to have on my conscience the fact that I had not used opportunities available to me to speak up against that unilateral military action.
I am disappointed that there is no substantive motion before us today. I hope that people outside this House will have heard the message from the Chair that it was entirely in the Government's hands as to whether we would have a substantive motion. People outside ask questions.
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Ordinary people ask, "Why aren't you in Parliament speaking on our behalf? What's the point in electing you lot if you can't debate the issues of the day on substantive motions and express your democratic views by voting in the Division Lobbies?" They do not understand parliamentary procedure.
I hope that two messages have got through: that parliamentary recall and whether we debate substantive motions on such days are utterly dependent on the will of the Government. I commend the work of the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) in trying to stir up some debate on procedure, because none of our procedures should be set in stone. I have felt muzzled in exercising my duty to speak up for my constituents.
In the few moments available to me, I want to concentrate on what should have been the fifth condition set out by the Foreign Secretary. He set out four conditions for judging whether military action would be appropriate. The fifth condition, to which many Members have referred, is an assessment of whether military action against Iraq undertaken without the UN's authority—the freely given authority of the UN—would result in the world's being a safer or a less safe place. My concern is that regime change in Iraq may result in "all change" across the middle east, and that we would end up with a very uncertain world that would be considerably less safe than would be the case without military action.
I am disappointed when the spectre of appeasement is raised, as it has been several times. Those of us with concerns are told about appeasement and Germany in the 1930s. The situations of Iraq in 2002 and Germany in the 1930s are totally different. According to the Government's own dossier, Iraq is a country of 23 million people, who mostly live in poverty, not a major military power in the sense that Germany, in the European context, was in the 1930s.
Furthermore, Iraq will never be left alone. Since the invasion of Kuwait, it has been contained more or less successfully, and there is no prospect of its being left entirely alone. Whatever judgment we come to, whether it is in favour or military action, diplomatic or other means, nobody suggests that we just walk away and leave Iraq alone. Had we decided to take action against Germany in the 1930s, which would have been a good idea, we may have taken precisely the kind of measures that we are trying to take against Iraq. There should be no presumption that the only way to deal with a threat is by military action. There are other means, and sometimes those are more appropriate. Sometimes, those other means may avoid pouring petrol on the fires that, as we have been reminded again today, are already burning in the middle east.
My real fear is that a hawkish approach could lead to precisely the kind of west versus Islam war that the terrorists of 11 September wanted—that was their agenda—and that we have all been desperately trying to avoid. Reference has also been made to the huge boost to recruitment for radical terrorist groups if action against Iraq were not seen to be justified. It is no good us saying, "We have the dossiers; we can prove that action is justified." The people on the streets of the countries affected—the streets where recruitment takes place—must also believe that it is justified.
The United Kingdom has seen some of the outcomes in Northern Ireland, where certain actions were taken that resulted in a breeding ground for terrorist recruits. It is

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often the brothers of the victims who sign up and take forward the terrorist banner. Although we may believe and can demonstrate that they are guilty, they believe that they are innocent or were somehow justified in their actions. I can see that military action could give us a lull, but a lull in terrorist activity will be no good whatsoever if the activity returns with a vengeance some years from now.
I was brought up in the context of constant fear of an attack by the Soviet Union. That is what motivated me to become engaged in politics. Lady Thatcher was Prime Minister, and I had no confidence in her ability to protect me and mine from the prospect of nuclear attack. It was literally at that point that I decided that I must sell my soul, join a political party and engage in the regular partisan process.
I do not want another generation of children to grow up with the fears that I had. If I woke up at night during a thunderstorm, I would wait for the crash to come and for the blast wave to roll through. I am making a serious point about the way in which we were brought up. Living in fear is not a pretty prospect, and people are speaking out against it now. We do not want to be in a permanent state of war.
I am afraid of what Saddam Hussein and Iraq may do; anyone would be right to be afraid of that. But we have another fear that I think is very justified: the fear that in seeking to remove one obstacle we shall end up creating a structure of permanent war. If the wrong judgment is made, there is a real prospect of a war that will roll on for years.
I wish that a motion were before us today that allowed the expression of what I consider to be a broad consensus. I refer to those who say, "We are happy for the Government to negotiate and work in our name under the auspices of the UN, but not outwith those auspices. If they want to do that, they should come back later and seek authorisation." Regrettably no such motion is before us, but I think there has been a strong expression of will from the House making it clear that war should be the route of last resort and that it is the UN route with which people feel comfortable.
I believe that any presumption that the United Kingdom should sign up to a United States policy that seeks to make weapons inspections fail in order to justify military action that the US already wants, and to which it is already committed, would receive no support in the House or the country.
8.42 pm
Mr. George Howarth: I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) for confirming what many of us have long believed—that joining the Liberal Democrats involves a Faustian bargain.
Let me say at the outset that I support the way in which the Government have handled this situation in recent months, in terms both of the objectives they have pursued and the manner in which they have pursued those objectives. They have been strengthened in their resolve by the speech the Prime Minister made to the TUC a few weeks ago, and by today's publication, albeit necessarily
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limited, of the dossier. They have also been heartened—I shall return to this shortly—by the speech made by President Bush to the United Nations.
I feel that today the House may, to an extent, have been in danger of overstating the role and capability of the United Nations. Let me make it clear that I am not against the United Nations; along with, presumably, every other MP, I am a strong supporter of it. I believe that the UN is all that we have, and that we need to work with it as vigorously and constructively as possible. Nevertheless, while the United Nations has power to wish for the ends, it often has no power to deliver them. That is a difficulty that we have seen repeatedly over many years, not least in respect of world opinion on Iraq.
How do we resolve the difficulty? It is not easy. My hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Glenda Jackson) and, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central (Mr. Lloyd) said that we should call Saddam's bluff. I agree with that, but we cannot do it simply by passing another Security Council resolution, important though that is. I hope that the Security Council will pass a resolution stating what should happen, with a deadline for various stages of arms inspection, but we know from experience that Saddam is likely simply to ignore it.
If we are to call Saddam's bluff, it is first necessary that he believes that if he flouts a further Security Council resolution there will be action. For him to believe that, he must believe that we believe it. If he believes that debates here and in other forums are all about words and not about actions, he will carry on in his own sweet way, as he has in the past, because he knows that he can get away with it.
I want to touch on two further issues. First, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Kilfoyle) was the most coherent exponent of a view echoed by many others, and he gave detailed evidence to support his contention that the American Administration want to go far further than most hon. Members, and perhaps even our own Government, would want to go over Iraq and perhaps other issues. It is difficult to respond to that. He gave detailed quotations and named names, quoting what people had said not only in office but before they were elected.
Clearly, there is cause for concern, but we are not responsible for the American Administration. My right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have some influence in that direction, but we cannot accept responsibility for what may at any time be in the mind of people in the American Administration. What we have to go on is what President Bush said on his most recent visit to the United Nations, which I believe was perfectly reasonable, even if I am not entirely happy with elements of his argument. His general thrust and policy direction were clear, and they are certainly not as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton and others portrayed them.
I do not know precisely what is in President Bush's mind—I certainly do not know what is in the mind of the many advisers who have been referred to today—so all I have to go on are the words that he used in a very important international forum. We should accept those words for what they are: they were sensibly measured and on the whole a reasonable statement of America's position, although I have some reservations, and not a thousand miles from the sentiments expressed by our Government over recent months.

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The second issue was referred to by the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor): the question of where Russia fits into all this. Courtesy of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central and I, along with others, were invited to speak to Members of the Duma in Moscow, in an effort to forge better relationships and better understanding there. I was grateful for that interesting experience, even though it was minus 20 degrees there at the time. I make a plea to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane), who is sitting on the Treasury Bench: if the Government want me to go on any such ventures in future, I would rather that it was somewhere slightly warmer than Moscow in December.
It became clear to us on that visit that President Putin and those in the political system in Russia want to do the right thing. They want to play the full part that they are entitled to play, given their status on the world stage, but they feel on occasion that they are pulled in certain directions without there being any proper understanding of their own problems. I am not talking about a quid pro quo situation, with Russia getting something that it wants in return for supporting action in Iraq. However, Russia has concerns about terrorism in Chechnya, its developing role in NATO and its continuing and growing relationship with the European Union, particularly in the light of enlargement. I believe that greater regard needs to be paid to Russia's concerns. Whatever happens in the coming months, Russia will clearly play a part.
In conclusion, I believe that until now we have done the right thing. What is proposed—the actual words spoken by the Government and others—is supportable. I also believe that the alternative of words without the threat of action would mean that Saddam Hussein had won. Iraq would pose a continuous threat in the middle east and, above all, the people of Iraq would have no hope for the future.
8.52 pm
Sue Doughty: It seems sad that in a debate in which we are contemplating the quality of life for families in the middle east and the worry and anxiety of people across the world, so few women have spoken.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan), I wish to express my concerns about the debate and where we will go as a result of what we have heard today. I am sure that no Member remained unmoved on 11 September this year as we listened to the roll call of the people who died last year. They were clearly family members; some families lost one, two or even three people. We pondered on the impact of such a loss of life on individual members of many families from America and from other parts of the world, including the United Kingdom. We grieved once more with those people, but unilateral action would not have brought back those lives or prevented what happened.
Like many others, I have had masses of letters, e-mails, telephone calls and messages from my constituents, all asking me to reflect their opposition to war and to action in Iraq. I am glad that Parliament has been recalled; I am grateful to the Prime Minister for recognising the depth of concern that is felt. However, it is still late, and I am concerned that if we do not obtain satisfaction from Iraq, we will send troops into Iraq pell-mell without having the opportunity to vote on such action. I sincerely hope that we will he given that chance.
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In considering the possibility of military action, I ask myself why we are going. What will we do there? What do we hope to achieve? How will we know when we have achieved it? What will the damage be along the way, and is that damage and loss of life justified? I do not believe that the dossier has given us sufficient information to go back into Iraq at this stage. It does not provide proof that Iraq is a threat to the United States. The map does not show missiles that are coming in the direction of the United Kingdom. It does not show us much of which we are not already aware.
We are aware that Iraq is trying to rebuild its biological and nuclear weapons programmes and we are aware of the risk of weapons of mass destruction, but such weapons are held by many other countries including Israel, Pakistan, India and Brazil. Israel has refused to comply with UN resolutions and I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister announce today that there will be much more effort towards securing the long overdue peace in the middle east. It should have been a greater focus of our attention in the past.
Iraq oppresses its people and its human rights record is appalling. We cannot support that. There is no support for war from the Iraqi people, either those living in Iraq or the critics of the regime who have sought sanctuary in other countries. The support comes from those in the United States who are looking to put in place an alternative to the current regime. Is there a natural replacement for Saddam Hussein, despicable as he might be? We do not see an obvious replacement and we are looking at the prospect of civil war in Iraq and in that region for years to come.
A civil war would mean enormous loss of life, particularly of children and families because we know that Saddam has deployed armaments in schools and in the suburbs, but that does not make it acceptable for us to take military action.
Many have said—I agree with them—that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to launch a pre-emptive strike on his neighbours. He knows what it would bring. However, if we were to launch a pre-emptive strike on Saddam, we know that it would involve his neighbours. We know that Israel is capable of launching an immediate further attack and that it is likely that there would be proliferation across the middle east with untold damage and destruction and no way of putting the genie back in the bottle. I do not want that to happen in my name and that is why we are here today.
We need firm evidence that any attempt by Iraq to rebuild its military has a more menacing aim than defending its own security. Our prime concern must be what will happen to the Iraqi people. The Government have said very little about that, although we know that the Secretary of State for International Development is unhappy.
Any action would mean a massive loss of civilian lives and, as in the Gulf war, would involve tens of thousands of Iraqi conscripts. Also, there is no doubt that the battle would be drawn into populated urban areas. War would inevitably interrupt the supply of food and medicine. A total of 60 per cent. of northern Iraqis are already dependent on food rations. There would be a huge displacement of people. There are already between 700,000 and 1 million displaced people in Iraq. Many would flee areas in which fighting was taking place and there would undoubtedly be a humanitarian disaster.

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I have talked about regional stability and mentioned the problems for some of the countries of the middle east such as Saudi Arabia, but what would happen to Turkey with its ailing Prime Minister? Would it continue to be a western-facing secular state? What would happen to the Turkish Kurds if the Iraqi Kurds attempted to declare an independent Kurdistan? We would also see the collapse of the coalition against terrorism, which has had support from the Arab nations.
There is much more that we can do on the diplomatic front. We need the inspectors to go in as soon as possible. We do not want them to go in in two or three weeks, we need them to go in now. However imperfect the arrangements might be, they must be more perfect than plans for a possible war. We must give inspectors the opportunity to continue their work so that they can identify the problems. We must allow them to produce their reports so that they can be taken back to the Security Council of the United Nations.
We have to examine our role in the arms trade and the stability of the middle east. We have to find out who is supplying arms and lean on them. We also have to consider future efforts to encourage stability by restricting arms exports. There is much more that we can do.
This is an issue for the UN. It also requires increased diplomatic work with our partners in Muslim states, asking them what pressure they can bring to bear. It is certainly not an issue for unilateral action. Instead, we have to do all that we can to bring peace to a most troubled part of the world, remembering that if we take action it will not be just us who suffer, but many people in the middle east. We will have to accept our part in any action that takes place.
9.1 pm
Mr. Calum MacDonald: This has been a good debate. I shall concentrate on some of the points that have been made, particularly by those who have expressed scepticism or opposition to the course of action outlined by the Prime Minister in his statement this morning.
A number of hon. Members have mentioned the doctrine of pre-emptive strike or attack. Most hon. Members who have expressed some scepticism about the British and American positions have mentioned this notion. I agree that the notion of a pre-emptive strike is a problematic doctrine that most of us would not rush to embrace. I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Kilfoyle) that it is important to look at the wider context. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the concept of pre-emptive action has obscured what is at the heart of the issue.
Nobody is suggesting a Pearl Harbour—a pre-emptive attack upon Iraq completely out of the blue. The issue is not pre-emptive action; it is long delayed and long overdue enforcement of UN resolutions which cover the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and which Iraq has been flouting for more than 10 years. Moreover, it has not been emphasised strongly enough during the debate that the terms of these resolutions, particularly 687, were part of the conditions of the ceasefire agreement at the end of the Gulf war in 1991. So by refusing to
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implement those resolutions from 1991 until today, Iraq is in breach of the ceasefire agreement that it signed in 1991 as well as of numerous UN resolutions since.
In our efforts to get Iraq to comply with the resolutions, we have been grappling politically and militarily with the Iraqi regime for a decade. We have made regular bombing attacks to enforce the no-fly zones and international sanctions have crippled the Iraqi economy. All this has been done at a cost in lives and in misery for the Iraqi population. It has also been done at considerable diplomatic and political cost for western countries, particularly in respect of their perception by the Arab world.
That is the background against which we have to weigh up the course of action before us and decide between the various options. One option that has been advocated today is simply to continue this pattern of bombing and sanctions year in, year out, into the future. Nobody has said how long it might be necessary to continue that mix of bombing and sanctions. Would it be another five years, 10 years, 20 years or whenever Saddam's son, who is even more unstable, succeeds him? If we pursue that option Saddam will continue to defy the United Nations, to develop his weapons of mass destruction and to keep the Iraqi people in the grip of poverty and tyranny. Under the status quo option the credibility of the UN will continue to erode and crumble.
Let us recall the terms of resolution 1154 of March 1998 which said that non-compliance by Iraq would lead to "the severest consequences". Iraq did not comply, but there were no consequences. That has been the pattern for the last 10 years. The result has been a steady but critical erosion of the credibility of the UN and an erosion, too, of the willingness of the international community to see the resolution enforced.
Another option, which has been mentioned in previous debates on the topic but which has not been suggested today, is to lift the sanctions and stop policing the no-fly zones. If we follow that course, it will give Saddam all the revenue he needs to accelerate his weapons programmes, and allow him to take revenge at a time of his choosing upon the Kurds and others who have defied him, and it would in effect reward the Iraqi Government for 10 years of persistent and flagrant breaching of UN resolutions. The Security Council would be shown to be toothless.
Caught between those two alternatives, the international community is right to try a new approach. The UN must make it absolutely clear to Saddam that he must uphold UN resolutions and disarm without any preconditions. There not being any preconditions is an important part of these resolutions. The UN must make it absolutely clear to Saddam that he must comply or else risk the end of his regime.
Of course that means a return of inspectors and allowing those inspectors time to carry out their task. Those who call so strongly for the return of the inspectors as the necessary way forward out of the current impasse must accept the consequence of the inspectors coming back to the UN and reporting, as they did over the last decade, that they have not been allowed to carry out their task.
This must genuinely be the last warning. If Saddam resists or tries to get round the UN disarmament requirements in any way whatsoever, the international

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community must make him comply by force. There must be no more last chances. The UN must not shrink from enforcing its clear and repeated resolutions.
Those who worry about the consequences of a confrontation express genuine concerns, but we should not overstate the strength of the Iraqi regime. Where a Government lack popular support and where they are no longer able to enforce their will through terror, recent precedent shows that they can quickly collapse.
I want to emphasise what is for me the central point. For 10 years the UN has been trying to get the Iraqi Government to comply with its resolutions on weapons of mass destruction. For 10 years the Iraqi Government have defied the UN. Sanctions have been only partially successful and at considerable cost. Earlier, somebody suggested offering to lift sanctions in return for disarmament. That offer has already been made. It was made in resolution 1284 in 1999, which laid out a timetable for lifting sanctions, but that too was rejected by the Iraqi Government.
Some argue that Saddam is at bottom rational, so presents no threat to the west. Those who argue that Saddam is rational must explain why, over those 10 years, instead of giving up his weapons programme, he has preferred his country to be a diplomatic pariah and an economic cripple. If he is rational, he must have a truly frightening use in mind for these weapons to risk so much to hold on to them.
Others have asked why deterrence cannot work in the way that it supposedly has for the past number of years. Deterrence cuts both ways. If Iraq would hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction because of the danger of massive response from us, the same would apply to us if Iraq possessed an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam would also make us hesitate in future about how we chose to confront him, and that would change the regional balance critically.
Sanctions have been tried. Diplomacy has been tried. The waiting game has been tried. Ten years is long enough. It is time for the UN to enforce its will.
9.11 pm
Mr. Paul Keetch: It is more than appropriate that this issue is at last being discussed here, in the House of Commons. After all, this Chamber where we, the elected Members of Parliament of this country, sit should be the fulcrum of our national debate. It is more than absurd that the possible further deployment of British armed forces has been the subject of debate everywhere, but has only now been brought to the House for discussion.
It has been an excellent debate and I particularly want to comment on some of the wonderful speeches that we have heard from the Back Benches. The speeches by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) and by the hon. Members for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) and for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor) were truly remarkable. They questioned the Government in a way that Members on the Conservative Front Bench have not done. Indeed, the only questioning of the Government has come from Conservative and Labour Back Benchers, and indeed from the Liberal Democrats.
I remind the House that it was not the leader of the Conservative party who first called for this Chamber to be recalled; it was actually the leader of the Liberal
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Democrats. I would suggest to those Conservatives who have questioned our resolve, in the final analysis, to take military action that they read the Official Report tomorrow and see the response of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) when he was intervened on by the Leader of the Opposition. I am afraid that his response to the Leader of the Opposition was not proportionate: it was overwhelming.
The publication of the dossier today has been welcomed, although it could have been published earlier. However, I am not convinced that this publication has thrown any light on the issues that we are discussing. The objectives of a course of action remain unclear. Yes, Saddam Hussein must give up his weapons of mass destruction. Yes, he must not seek to develop them and yes, disarmament should be the first objective of international action. But if Britain is to join with others in ensuring that Iraq complies with its obligations to disarm, are we clear in our mind about what the role of any military force may be?
The Foreign Secretary has claimed that regime change is not the policy of the Government, nor will it be an objective of military action; so how do the Government propose to enforce Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, should that be necessary? Would it be by bombing Baghdad? Would it be by invading Baghdad with ground troops?
Regime change appears to many to be outside international law, so how do the Government and our US allies intend to conduct a military campaign that does not have regime change as an objective? In short, what exactly is it that we are threatening Saddam with?
Mr. Keith Simpson: The Liberals.
Mr. Keetch: It is quite clear that the anti-Liberal Democrat unit set up by the Conservative Opposition has gone into overdrive because they are concerned that Liberal Democrat Members are asking these questions.
If diplomacy fails, would the Prime Minister be willing to support military action that is not supported by the United Nations or even by some of our NATO allies? I hope not. Has he considered the consequences for our other joint military operations? I hope so. Will there be, as has been called for on both sides of the House, a further debate, with a full vote, before more of our armed forces are committed to further military operations? There ought to be such a vote, because President Bush is prepared to give one to the US Congress, and the British people would find it hard to understand why a British Prime Minister, with a majority the size of the current one and the unflinching support of the official Opposition, would not be prepared to allow such a vote in the House.
Some hon. Members have said that we are about to start military action, but of course we are already engaged in military action above Iraq in the no-fly zones. I should like to reiterate that the Liberal Democrats believe that further military action should be a last resort; it should be considered only if Iraq's recent offer to re-admit inspectors is violated, if clear and incontrovertible evidence is presented to the international community to show that disarmament cannot proceed in any other way, if all possible steps have been taken to obtain a new UN resolution, if there are clear military objectives, and if the military action carried out is designed so far as possible to avoid civilian casualties.

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Moreover, we should also consider the implications for the wider middle east and the complications for the so-called campaign against terrorism. Where will that leave us? The Government should consider carefully and prepare for the humanitarian consequences of any action that takes place.
It has been said that our quarrel is not with the ordinary people of Iraq. That is true. Yet again, this crisis shows that occasionally our armed forces will be called upon to fulfil war-fighting as well as peacekeeping roles. If we ask them to defend us, we have a duty to ensure that they have the best equipment and resources to do the job.
As the Minister of State will know, the recent British exercise, Saif Sareea II, in Oman highlighted many technical shortcomings in our military equipment in the desert. I need not remind him about the concerns that have been expressed about the SA80 rifle, the boots that melt in the sun and the tanks that jam in the sand. If there is to be action, will our troops be properly equipped?
We all know that Saddam Hussein is adept at exploiting divisions in the international community to buy time, so the Liberal Democrats believe that we should keep up the pressure on Iraq, but at the same time we must keep the door to diplomacy open. So I say again that the Liberal Democrats are united—[Interruption]—unlike the Conservative party, in our scepticism of the Government's strategy.
We remain unconvinced that the case for war has as yet been made. We believe that a diplomatic approach could still work and in the priority of ensuring the return of weapons inspectors. We are firm in our resolve that Saddam Hussein should know that prevarication has consequences, and we speak for many people beyond the House in saying that, if military action is to be considered, there should be a substantive vote in the House of Commons.
9.18 pm
Linda Gilroy: There can be no hon. Member who does not have some constituents in the armed services, but some of us have thousands, as has been mentioned, and early in the career of any such Member comes the constant preoccupation—if it is not already there—to monitor and consider such issues, the scale of the threat and the proportionate action to that threat.
In addition to that consideration, my constituency has been host to a small community of Iraqi asylum seekers during the past two years, and their concerns and those of the volunteers and religious communities who help them with their legal, health and education services are a constant reminder of just how vile the regime that we talking about is. It is also a reminder of the strength of longing and the preparedness of the Iraqi community in exile in this country to return and to try to build a better country when they may be given the chance to do so.
Many hon. Members have mentioned their constituents' concerns, and I am a great believer in not just waiting for people to come to me with their concerns because that very often gives a slanted and skewed version of the range of our constituents' concerns. So, over the past month, I have been trying to be proactive—ringing my constituents
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and party members to ask them what they make of the present situation. I have been asking not the sort of closed question that is so often put to people, "Are you in favour of war?" but the more open question, "What do you make of the current situation?" Many have expressed much more thoughtful and considered views than the natural response to the closed question, which, inevitably, is "No" in about 90 or 95 per cent. of cases.
People have expressed concern mainly by saying, "Well I'm not sure; I don't think there is a threat that warrants the sort of action that people are talking about," or, "I just don't know enough about it. There ought to be some more information available to us to help us share the problems that are surrounding us." There are others who say, "Yes, I do believe that there is a scale of threat that warrants some action, but nevertheless I feel that I need some more information."
Those of us for whom the issue is a preoccupation know that much of that information has been present for a long time. It is evident in the hooks that have been written by the weapons inspectors—by Butler, Ritter and Tim Evan among others. It is there on the United Nations website, and in the reports of UNSCOM and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. It is there in the dossier of the International Institute for Strategic Studies that was published last week. We also receive a host of briefings from the House of Commons Library and, indeed, I am not sure that I heard any Member make particular reference to an excellent briefing from the Library which was published on 20 September.
The report that we have received today does not add that much more information to what is available from all those sources, but it serves a very useful purpose by bringing the information together and by putting into language that is accessible to our constituents the breadth and depth of the suspicions that many of us have shared, that thousands of scientists in Iraq have been very busy.
The dossier has made such information more accessible, but sadly it confirms that the devil has found work to ensure that those scientists have not been idle. It is clear that there are now greater and growing resources of weapons, matérials, know-how and, indeed, means of their delivery. Doing nothing to stem that growth is no longer an option—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. There are far too many conversations going on in the Chamber. That is impolite and unfair to the hon. Lady who is addressing the House.
Linda Gilroy: The emphasis on the role of the United Nations, which has emerged more clearly over the past week and today, is very welcome. The likelihood of weapons inspectors standing any chance of being allowed to do their job quickly, fully and effectively, bringing to an end the 11-year cat and mouse game, which one commentator has called cheat-and-retreat flouting of the UN resolutions, has been one of the big worries for my constituents and myself. I must say to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) that to think that journalists can rush around Iraq verifying something that stretched and challenged highly skilled, equipped and trained weapons inspectors is laughable.
Like most in this House and in my constituency, I have attached great importance to doing everything possible to work through the United Nations as the international body

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that fulfils the capacity to meet our aspirations of a more stable world, rather than failing our aspirations and leaving us hopeless. To achieve that, when dealing with someone of Saddam's character and track record, we must face him with a credible threat of force that will have the certainty of removing what he so assiduously seeks to retain in building up his lethal armoury in the way that today's assessment makes clear that he is doing. I have a very strong preference for making sure that every effort is made to do that through the UN. That policy would underline the point about its importance, as it is the best available way of building the broad coalition of interests that, in the long term, will stand us in the strongest stead in meeting the challenges that this century is clearly going to hold for us.
Two years ago, four or five of us went to the UN with a delegation to look at how the body could work to bring peace and stability to the world. As a first time visitor to New York as well as to the UN, I was struck by the labyrinthine nature of the UN and the huge challenges of trying to make the body work in all our interests. It is now under the leadership of Kofi Annan and he has gone a long way to making the body more workable. However, we should not underestimate the grave difficulties that lie right at the heart of it in the Security Council to bring about the effective leadership that can make the task that we face in Iraq work. One has only to read the accounts of what happened in 1998 and 1999 to understand that there was ambivalence right at the heart of the UN about the work of the weapons inspectors. That shows what a difficult task they will face when they return to Iraq.
Two years ago when I was on that delegation, I bought in the bookshop at the UN a copy of Dag Hammarskjöld's meditations "Markings". I cannot remember the exact quotation so I paraphrase one of his earliest meditations. He said that, to find the right road, we should not look down at every next step but keep our eye on the far horizon. In fact, we will need to do both in the months ahead. However, like most people in the House and in my constituency, I strongly believe that the best chance of stability, security and sanity in the world must have the UN firmly at its compass.
Mr. Galloway: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. There is an extraordinary rumour sweeping the Palace that, having failed to table a substantive motion, the Government will not even have the courage to vote for the Adjournment at 10 o'clock. So afraid are they of the large number of Labour Members of Parliament who would not be with them in the Lobby. They are frightened to face—
Mr. Speaker: Order. There are always rumours in the Palace of Westminster.
9.28 pm
Mr. Bernard Jenkin: It has been a long day but an important and interesting debate for the House to have held. I follow the speech of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Linda Gilroy). Many of us have service men in our constituencies, and I put it to her that every Member of the House takes seriously the responsibility to our service men. Of course, it is the loneliest and hardest decision for Ministers to make when they determine whether to commit our service men to military action. We share that serious responsibility with them.
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The hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch) made a different speech from most others in the Chamber. We perhaps heard today the third position from the Liberal Democrats. [Interruption.] Yes, from those on the Front Bench. We originally heard the leader of the Liberal Democrats, who would not comment on whether military action should be contemplated, but I am pleased that those on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench have come in our direction on that question. His colleague the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) made it clear that military action could not be contemplated without another UN resolution, which he regarded as "essential". However, the hon. Member for Hereford used an altogether different form of words and said that action should not be considered unless
"all possible steps have been taken to obtain a new UN resolution",
not making it clear whether it had to be obtained or not. I leave it to hon. Members on both sides of the House to try to work out the Liberal Democrats' position.
The main purpose of our debate has been to allow the Government to set out their case for the policy that they have adopted in recent weeks on Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction. Not only was the Prime Minister broadly supported by the Leader of the Opposition, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) supported the Foreign Secretary. I commend in particular two speeches, that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude), who set out clearly five points in support of the Government's policy, and that of the right hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson), which Labour Members should take seriously.
Our debate is both necessary and long overdue. It was essential to publish the dossier, for which we have been calling for a considerable time. I join my hon. Friends the Members for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames), for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner) and for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), who all said that the dossier should have come much sooner. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Mrs. Browning) for pointing out that only a few months ago the Government were trying to shut down discussion of the prospect of military action against Iraq, which has made it more difficult for them to make a clear and unambiguous case.
A broad consensus has emerged on the dossier and the evidence, which is broadly accepted by Members on both sides of the House. The nature of the regime is accepted on both sides of the House and I would even go so far as to say that its mentality and intentions, as well as the potential threat that it poses, are broadly accepted by the House. Differences have emerged about two substantial issues, the first of which is regime change. I shall deal with that briefly as the argument is in danger of becoming one about angels on a pinhead. Obviously, to set out to change a regime as a policy objective is questionable in international law—we agree with the Government's position. To deny, however, that that might be a consequence of one's actions is a completely different matter. I put it to people who cavil about regime change that forcing Saddam Hussein to dismantle his weapons of mass destruction and the means of their production, research and concealment is unlikely to be achieved without regime change. People who talk openly about regime change, like the Prime Minister, are only being realistic. To put it in perspective, President Clinton declared himself in favour of regime change on 15 November 1998.

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The other outstanding difference concerns the role of the UN. The main question is whether a further resolution is required to legitimise military action if Saddam Hussein refuses to comply. It was clear from questions put to the Prime Minister this morning that he is keeping that option open. He is not ruling out moving to military action even if we run into difficulties and are unable to secure unanimity on a UN resolution. The Opposition have no doubt that the Prime Minister is right to make that clear in his military and strategic point of view.
There has been much complaint about the United States attitude and its new strategic doctrine, but it is as incumbent upon the House to try to understand the United States as it is upon the United States to understand attitudes in Europe. One of the most dangerous features of the international scene since September 2001 has been the drifting apart of Europe and the United States.
The United States understands perhaps better than we in Europe do how the strategic environment has changed. That is the link that exists between 11 September and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. We live in a much more dangerous and unpredictable world than we thought we did and unless we are prepared to respond to those new and clear dangers, we are playing into the hands of those who would carry out further terrorist atrocities.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said that surely Saddam Hussein would have to be irrational to use his weapons of mass destruction. [Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. There are too many conversations going on in the Chamber and that is unfair to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Jenkin: I am grateful, Mr. Speaker.
Every dictator in history has acted irrationally—Hitler acted irrationally, Galtieri clearly acted irrationally, and Saddam Hussein acted irrationally when he invaded Kuwait. Given how irrational Saddam Hussein can be, he may well choose to deliver his weapons of mass destruction himself or through some proxy terrorist organisation, as my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) made clear in his speech.
There has been much talk in the Chamber this evening about the relevance of deterrence, but deterrence no longer works. It is rather ironic that throughout the cold war many Labour Members said that deterrence—mutually assured destruction—was a crazy concept, but now that it no longer works, they all support the doctrine of deterrence. History has moved on.
Mr. Malcolm Savidge rose—
Mr. Jenkin: I have little time. I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon. I shall be as quick as I can.
Let us study the new Bush doctrine. I beg the House to bear with me while I read out a short part of President Bush's national security strategy. It states:
"For centuries, international law recognised that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
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legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack."
It continues:
"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."
Those who are unable to embrace a new strategic doctrine for the defence of our own countries are people who are unable to adapt to the reality and objectives of today's adversaries.
The Government are showing every evidence of fully understanding that reality, and although no defence policy document has been produced they are adopting the same policy of pre-emption by supporting President Bush in his attitude towards Iraq. Is that dangerous or is it just common sense? I put it to the House that it is common sense.
How would it be if the Prime Minister came to the House in a year or two's time after a terrible terrorist atrocity had been committed against our own country and said that it was known that there was a threat but the Government did not think that they could take any action because of the state of international law. Of course, that is not the state of international law. International law would never be such an ass.
Are the Government prepared to show the courage expressly to embrace the Bush doctrine on pre-emption? They behave as though they are, and it is incumbent on them to explain the legal basis of it in international law. In 1998, the right hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) expressly stated:
"As to the United Nations, we are absolutely clear that we have thorough clear backing in UN resolutions"
for military action. He went on to say that
"the resolutions … give us clear United Nations authority."
The right hon. Gentleman said that in 1998, but we need to know what is the legal basis of such a statement today. That is why we have been asking the Government to produce their legal opinion for the House. That is not unprecedented; it not an unreasonable request. There are other opinions, such as that produced by Rabinder Singh QC and Alison Macdonald, who make it clear that, in their view, any attack against Iraq
"would not be justified under international law unless: Iraq mounted a direct attack"
or it could be demonstrated that an attack
"was imminent",
or
"the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of force in clear terms."
The Government have clearly not accepted this particular legal advice. What legal advice have they accepted?
Huw Irranca-Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Jenkin: I am not going to give way because there is so little time.
We clearly cannot rule out the prospect of military action after so many years of defiance from Saddam Hussein. It is too early to say what kind of military action may be involved, or to ask the Government what sort of preparations are being made for such action. It is fair to

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say, however, that we will be asking many questions about the preparedness of the United Kingdom's armed forces to contribute meaningfully to any military action.
The one point on which I agree with the hon. Member for Hereford is that we have to clear up the question of the SA80 rifle before we send our troops into action. We must also learn the lessons of Saif Sareea that were so ably set out in the Public Accounts Committee report under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh). I endorse very strongly the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates), who asked what preparations were being made for the inoculation of our troops to prepare for the possibility of exposure to chemical and biological attack. I ask the Minister expressly to address this point, because we do not want to go through what we went through in the aftermath of the Gulf war.
There has also not been enough preparation from the Government for the consequences of military action. Given that regime change is the most likely outcome of such action, we must be prepared to envisage the post-Saddam scenario to make the threat of military action credible. What talks have the Government had with opposition groups in Iraq? I know that the United States Administration are in constant dialogue with a number of such groups. What discussions are we having? What preparations are we making for humanitarian relief, police training, military training and all the other necessary building blocks to ensure that a new interim Administration can quickly become established?
Nothing can conceal the challenge that faces our country, the international community and the House. We have to face the fact that, even if nobody wants war—and nobody does—we cannot rule out the use of military force. We must stay within the rule of international law, pursue the widest possible international co-operation through the United Nations to achieve the best possible coalition, and be prepared to take the necessary action when the time comes.
Our obligation is fundamentally to future generations, who would not thank us for ducking these challenges. Like other hon. Members, I have been to Kabul and seen the result of the military action that we took in Afghanistan. I have no doubt that the people of Iraq would welcome such military action when it finally came to be made.
9.45 pm
The Minister of State for Defence (Mr. Adam Ingram): Let me begin—
Mr. Salmond: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The House is becoming crowded around the Division Lobby Doors. Is there any chance that they will be free by the time we get to a Division, if we do so?
Mr. Speaker: The problem will be resolved.
Mr. Ingram: Let me begin again by thanking all right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions to the debate, which has been passionate, wide-ranging and thorough. The number of interventions on the Prime Minister was 25, the Foreign Secretary took eight and there have been 50 Back-Bench speakers. A range of opinions has been expressed. The people of this country
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can take confidence from the fact that their fundamental concerns, fears and wishes in respect of how we deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein have been comprehensively aired during the debate.
My right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary set out two critical questions that we had to address in this debate: has the threat from Saddam Hussein increased; and should we take action to address that threat and, if so, what action?
It is clear that there is unanimity in this House on the central fact that Saddam Hussein's regime is barbaric and evil. The dossier published today sets out in graphic detail the extent of the horrors that Saddam Hussein has imposed on his own people month in, month out, year in, year out. The deaths and deprivation that he has imposed have been rightly condemned across the House by all who have contributed to the debate, from those who accept the Government's case to those who retain doubts and those who will probably never be convinced of the present course of action on which the Government are embarked.
I cannot possibly answer all the points that have been raised in the debate in the time available, but let me deal with a few of the contributions made. The right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) and the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) asked about the health and welfare of our troops and what action we have taken since the 1990–91 Gulf conflict. The well-being of the personnel we deploy is of the greatest importance to us, and we have made some important improvements based on that experience. We have put in place a range of measures. We now ensure that all troops are immunised routinely with the standard service immunisations. We commission up-to-date medical intelligence briefings for parts of the world where UK troops may operate, and force health protection plans are then prepared for specific operations.
New equipment for the detection and the hazard management of chemical and biological warfare threats has been introduced. We have introduced a new operational medical record form intended to ensure that health events while on deployment are more systematically recorded than in the past. We cannot of course guarantee that deployed forces will not suffer ill health, but we are doing everything we can to minimise the risks.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Donald Anderson) made a thought-provoking speech. He raised a number of vital questions, all of them pointing to the complexity of the problems that we face, now and in the future. He rightly pointed to the preference for a stringent UN resolution with a strict timetable. Other right hon. and hon. Members made the same point. The Government agree with that.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) seemed to support the main thrust of the Government's approach, and echoed the views of my right hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East. However, I have one point of difference with him: I do not wholly go along with his assertion that the problem of Iraq can be solved only once the problem of the middle east is resolved. I would suggest to him that dealing with Saddam Hussein as we propose could greatly assist the peace process in the middle east.

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The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) asked whether the Foreign Secretary stood by his commitment to the primacy of the United Nations. Let me read again what the Foreign Secretary said in opening this debate. He said:
"only free and unfettered inspections, backed by a Security Council united in its determination to disarm Iraq, offer the prospect of dealing with the threat by peaceful means."
A peaceful conclusion is the outcome desired on both sides of the Atlantic, by Her Majesty's Government and by the United States Administration.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) asked whether United States air force aircraft at Diego Garcia carried nuclear weapons. As he knows, it has been the practice of successive Governments never to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any particular location or at any particular time. I have no intention of deviating from that line—unless I end up, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes), with a premature end to my career.
My right hon. Friend asked about the situation in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, as did others. If and when Saddam Hussein leaves power, whenever that is, it will be for the Iraqi people to determine their future government. I suggest that such discussions are premature. The task facing us now is the disarming of Saddam Hussein: that is our aim on which we are focused.
The hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) reminded the House that in the 1980s he was outside the Iraqi embassy protesting about the atrocities being committed in Iraq. Let me point out to him that most of us are still outside the Iraqi embassy, because the atrocities and the barbarism have continued. We need to tackle Saddam Hussein with resolve, rather than offering encouragement by directing our criticisms elsewhere.
The hon. Gentleman asked whose side we were on. Perhaps he should ask himself whose side he is on.
Mr. Galloway rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister is not going to give way.
Mr. Galloway rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman will have to make a point of order.
Mr. Galloway: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The Minister has attacked me specifically by name, and does not have the guts to give way.
Mr. Speaker: We have kept the debate calm throughout the day, and we want to keep it that way.
Mr. Ingram: Let me say in passing that the hon. Gentleman did not give way to Members seeking to intervene on his speech.
Mr. Galloway rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I am reluctant to speak to the hon. Gentleman again, but the Minister is clearly not going to give way. The hon. Gentleman would do better to remain in his seat.
Mr. Galloway: Coward.
Mr. Speaker: Order. Sadly, I heard that remark. The hon. Gentleman must withdraw it. I strongly advise him to do so.
Mr. Galloway: Is it not the case, Mr. Speaker—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I say to the hon. Gentleman that he must withdraw that remark. I will listen to a point of order, but he must withdraw that remark.
Mr. Galloway: I do withdraw that remark.
Mr. Speaker: Has the hon. Gentleman a point of order?
Mr. Galloway: My point of order is this, Mr. Speaker. Is it not custom and practice for a Member who is attacked by another, by name, to be allowed to rise and answer the point?
Mr. Speaker: That is not a matter for the Chair. I call the Minister.
Mr. Ingram: The British Government have long made clear their firm commitment to containing the very real threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime to the stability of the middle east and, potentially, the wider international community. That is not a new stance.
As I have said, there is unanimity in the House on the brutal nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. What we must now ask ourselves is whether the threat has increased in recent times. As the dossier demonstrates, we have significant evidence that Saddam Hussein has brazenly flouted United Nations resolutions—resolutions to which he agreed to adhere after the Gulf war in 1991. He has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons; tried covertly to acquire technology and matérials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear programme that would require it; recalled specialists to work on his nuclear programme; commenced a comprehensive weapons development programme across a range of capabilities to deliver his future and current weapons of mass destruction; and there is clear evidence that he has used his experience of previous UN weapons inspections and already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the inspectors' return.
With such evidence, I am surprised that there are hon. Members who continue to argue that Saddam Hussein does not now pose an increased threat both to the stability of the middle east and on a wider international scale. I fear their opinion is based more on an entrenched position than on a cool analysis of the facts.
Of course, how we deal with the new threat level remains at the heart of today's debate. The Prime Minister made clear in his opening statement the Government's approach to the way forward. Over the years, we have consistently supported the various UN resolutions targeted at the removal of Saddam's WMD capability, which if implemented could have helped in bringing Iraq back into the international fold. Year on year, Saddam Hussein has ignored each of those constructive approaches. There are 14 different UN demands on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein is in breach of all of them.
I have no doubt that the country at large will recognise why we have to confront this issue with a new determination. By all means every effort must be made to achieve a diplomatic solution—indeed, that must be our

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prime driver—but, as the Prime Minister made clear, the choice is Saddam's: he can comply willingly or be forced to comply. There is no middle way. The threat has to be removed or it will continue to grow.
Several hon. Members have expressed doubts about our course of action. They should ask themselves this: if there is a new UN resolution and mandate, will they support it or will they find some other reason, some other excuse, to oppose the international resolve to deal with Saddam Hussein? If they support it, how do they envisage its being effectively enforced?
Those are fundamental questions, and I have heard nothing in the debate from the doubters to suggest that they have faced up to the answers.
Mr. Dalyell rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
Main Question put accordingly:—
The House proceeded to a Division.
Mr. Kevin Hughes: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the Tellers for the ayes to be counting out the Aye Lobby and for the Tellers for the noes to be counting out the No Lobby?
Mr. Speaker: It is not quite in order, but I wonder why the hon. Gentleman has raised the point of order.
Mr. Hughes: As a former Whip, it is not difficult for me to notice that both the no Tellers are counting out the No Lobby and that both the aye Tellers are counting out the Aye Lobby.
Mr. Speaker: Given that the Tellers are rather new and inexperienced, I suggest that the hon. Gentleman let me use my discretion in this matter. Accuracy is what is most important.
Mr. Hughes: Can we rely on the fact that the figures declared will be accurate?
Mr. Speaker: I am sure that we can.
Mr. Eric Forth: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman should come closer to the Chair.
Mr. Forth: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You are aware, as we all are, of the matter of precedents in the House. Although I am sure that, on this occasion, you and the House may be prepared to accept the integrity of the process, even though our normal procedure for counting votes is not being adhered to, you may wish to give some thought to whether this creates a precedent. You may wish to give the House some guidance about the fact that, should this happen again, you might not be prepared to accept the outcome.
On this occasion you have said that you believe that there can be no querying of the Vote, despite the fact that our normal procedures are not being adhered to.
Mr. Speaker: Let me put it to the right hon. Gentleman that this evening I am worried about accuracy. There are
154
Clerks in the Lobbies, so I am in a position to check the vote against the numbers reported by the tellers. Of course, I always have the opportunity when the House returns to clarify whether there has been accuracy in this matter.
Alan Simpson: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. You have already made reference to the interesting configuration of those doing the counting on this vote. You will be aware that the tellers for the Ayes wanted to vote in the No Lobby, but agreed to do the telling for the Ayes in order to secure a vote. Given that many Members were uneasy about not being able to vote on a substantive motion, can you advise the House as to how we can ensure that in future at the very least we are able to vote on a technical motion?
Mr. Speaker: I am just trying to get through this evening. I am not too worried about the future.
Mr. Clifton-Brown: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would not the best way to resolve the matter be to have the vote again and organise the tellers in the correct place, with an Aye and a No teller together so that there would be no doubt about the vote? Could it be that this is a secret Government plot to make sure that the House does not adjourn?
Mr. Speaker: As I said in reply to the hon. Member for Doncaster, North (Mr. Hughes), the House should let me use my discretion in this matter. Will the tellers now come to the Table?
The House having divided: Ayes 6, Noes 64.

Division No. 319]

[9.58 pm

AYES

Beggs, Roy

Trimble, Rt Hon David

Bumside, David

Donaldson, Jeffrey M

Tellers for the Ayes:

Paisley, Rev Ian

Mr. Kelvin Hopkins and

Smyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)

Mr. Paul Marsden.

NOES

Abbott, Ms Diane

Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)

Allan, Richard

Jackson, Glenda (Hampstead)

Austin, John

Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)

Banks, Tony

Jones, Lynne (Selly Oak)

Bames, Harry

Lewis, Terry (Worsley)

Bennett, Andrew

Llwyd, Elfyn

Berry, Roger

Luke, Iain

Best, Harold

Lyons, John

Buck, Ms Karen

McCafferty, Chris

Campbell, Ronnie (Blyth V)

McDonnell, John

Cohen, Harry

McWalter, Tony

Coleman, Iain

Mahon, Mrs Alice

Connarty, Michael

Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)

Corbyn, Jeremy

Marshall—Andrews, Robert

Cox, Tom

Morgan, Julie

Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)

Perham, Linda

Cryer, John (Homchurch)

Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)

Dalyell, Tam

Price, Adam

Doughty, Sue

Robertson, Angus (Moray)

Drew, David

Salmond, Alex

Ewing, Annabelle

Sarwar, Mohammad

Flynn, Paul

Savidge, Malcolm

Galloway, George

Sedgemore, Brian

Gerrard, Neil

Shipley, Ms Debra

Gibson, Dr Ian

Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)

Hamilton, David (Midlothian)

Skinner, Dennis

155

Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)

Weir, Michael

Taylor, David (NW Leics)

Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)

Thomas, Simon (Ceredigion)

Williams, Hywel (Caemarfon)

Trickett, Jon

Wishart, Pete

Truswell, Paul

Tumer, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)

Tellers for the Noes:

Walley, Ms Joan

Mr. Mike Wood and

Wareing, Robert N

Mr. Kerry Pollard.

Question accordingly negatived.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I have a statement to make. That vote has served its intended purpose, demonstrating the
156
strength of feeling in some quarters of the House on this difficult issue, but because of the rules of the House it does not have any procedural effect. As it is now past 10 o'clock, the debate on Iraq has concluded. It is now the duty of the Government Whip to move formally that this House do now adjourn to bring the sitting to a conclusion, and I must put the Question forthwith.

ADJOURNMENT
Resolved,
That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Woolas.]
Adjourned at fourteen minutes past Ten o'clock.

HOME DEPARTMENT

  Written Questions
  Mr. Yeo
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list the written questions asked of him between(a) 1 to 30 June 2001, (b) 1 to 31 July 2001, (c) 1 to 30 September 2001, (d) 1 to 31 October 2001, (e) 1 to 30 November 2001, (f) 1 to 31 December 2001, (g) 1 to 31 January 2002, (h) 1 to 28 February 2002, (i) 1 to 31 March 2002 and (j) 1 to 30 April 2002 that had not received a substantive answer by 30 April: and if he will state (i) the name of the hon. Member asking the question and (ii) the reasons the question had not received a substantive answer. [54081]

  Mr. Blunkett
  [holding answer 2 May 2002]I refer the hon. Member to the reply given by my right hon. Friend, Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Cook) on 2 May 2002. For the Home Office, the number of outstanding questions for each month between June 2001 and April 2002 as at 30 April 2002 is shown in the table. The table also shows those that were still outstanding on 12 September 2002.

  Outstanding PQs

  Month

  Total PQs

  At 30 April 2002

  At 12 September 2002

  1–30 June 2001

  136

  0

  0

  1–31 July 2001

  495

  0

  0

  1–30 September 2001

  0

  0

  0

  1–31 October 2001

  427

  4

  0

  1–30 November 2001

  641

  9

  4

  1–31 December 2001

  343

  13

  7

  1–31 January 2002

  661

  42

  13

  1–28 February 2002

  555

  53

  13

  1–31 March 2002

  512

  106

  19

  1–30 April 2002

  705

  421

  13

  We recognise that our performance in answering Parliamentary Questions needs to be improved and we are working closely with directorates and our business change and Information Technology (IT) partners to improve the situation.

  Departmental Secondments
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many staff in his Department have been seconded to jobs in the(a) private and (b) public sector in each of the last four years. [31783]

  Hilary Benn
  Secondments are part of the Interchange initiative, which promotes the exchange of people and good practice between the Civil Service and other organisations. All sectors of the economy are 442W
  involved: Voluntary, Education, Health, Public and Private. Interchange provides opportunities for civil servants to learn new skills, widen their experience and develop ideas. It also brings in skills and experiences from other sectors.

  The number of Home Office staff seconded out to private and public sector organisations is set out in the table. Information for 2001–02 is not yet available.

  1998–99

  1999–2000

  2000–01

  2001–02

  Private sector

  2

  3

  11

  —

  Public sector

  *162

  *80

  *94

  —

  *The figures given for Home Office staff seconded to the public sector include posts overseas.

  IT Contracts
  Richard Younger-Ross
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what has been the total expenditure of his Department on IT systems and support in each year from May 1997 to date; how many IT contracts have been let in each of those years; of the other main contracting party in each of those contracts, how many have been(a) companies whose registered office is in (i) England and Wales, (ii) Scotland and (iii) Northern Ireland and (b) foreign companies; and what are the names of the companies falling within category (a). [33676]

  Hilary Benn
  To obtain information on the total Information Technology spend for the years requested would involve disproportionate cost. However, the following information on high value Information Technology Information Systems (IT)/(IS) expenditure is available.

  1. Total expenditure (at £10 million and only)

  Year

  Expenditure

  1997

  23,599,999

  1998

  25,000,000

  1999

  29,000,000

  2000

  25,666,666

  2001

  66,466,666

  The significant increase in expenditure in 2001 was due to the letting of the Sirius contract at £25 million and the letting of a contract to Bull for IT hardware and infrastructure support for over £10 million.

  2. Contracts let/year (at £10 million and only)

  Year

  Contracts let

  1997

  0

  1998

  1

  1999

  2

  2000

  1

  2001

  2

  3. How many suppliers have been registered in:

  England and Wales

  3

  Scotland

  0

  Northern Ireland

  0

  Foreign Companies

  1

  443W
  4. What are the names of the suppliers registered in England and Wales:
  Sirius Consortium (ICL/Global Crossing/PricewaterhouseCoopers
  CMG
  Bull/Integris (now Steria))

  Disclosure of Interests
  Mr. Paul Marsden
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what rules apply to the disclosure

  Name of body

  Code of Practice

  Where available

  Executive NDPBs

  Central Police Training and Development Authority CENTREX)

  Yes. A register of interests is being established which will be open to public scrutiny.

  Available on request from Central Police Training and Development Authority, Bramshill, Hook, Hampshire RG27 0JW.

  Commission for Racial Equality (CRE)

  Yes with a register of interests.

  Available for inspection on request at the CRE's London office.

  Community Development Foundation

  Yes with a register of interests. Policy on disclosing interests also contained in Standing Orders.

  Standing Orders available on request from Community Development Foundation.

  Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC)

  Yes entitled Code of Best Practice and Rules of Conduct.

  By appointment at the CCRC's office in Birmingham.

  Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority

  Not applicable—no public appointments.

  Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner

  No. The two Public Appointees, (the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner) have been invited to confirm in writing adherence to the Cabinet Office code of practice and terms stating adherence will be written into future appointees' terms of apointment. Preparation for a register of interests in hand.

  Parole Board

  Yes with register of interests.

  The Code as set out in "The Parole Board for England and Wales—Policy and Procedures" is available on request from the Parole Board. The register may be inspected on request, by writing to the Chief Executive of the Parole Board.

  Police Complaints Authority (PCA)

  Yes with register of interests.

  Available for inspection by appointment at the PCA's offices at 10 Great George Street, London SWIP 2AE.

  Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO)

  Yes with register of interests. Currently under review.

  Code available from PITO committee services. Register of interests published in the annual report (see www.pito.org.uk).

  The Natonal Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad

  Bodies established on 1 April 2002. Policy on disclosing interests contained in standing orders. Code of practice to be drawn up.

  Standing orders available on request from the Service Authorities.

  Youth Justice Board (YJB) England and Wales

  Yes.

  Available on request from the YJB.

  Advisory NDPBs

  Advisory Board on Restricted Patients (ABRP)

  Yes.

  Available from ABRP in paper form.

  Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs

  No. Preparation in hand.

  Animal Procedures Committee (APC)

  Yes with register of interests.

  www.apc.gov.uk. Also published in the APC annual report, a copy of which is placed in the Library of the House.

  444W
  of interests on the part of those serving on public bodies which are responsible to his Department.[56464]

  Beverley Hughes
  All executive and advisory non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) are required to adopt a board members' code, based on guidance produced by the Cabinet Office, and they should have a register of interests.

  The following table lists the NDPBs sponsored by the Home Office and in each case indicates what the relevant Code of Practice is and where it is available.
  445W

  Name of body

  Code of Practice

  Where available

  Firearms Consultative Committee (FCC)

  No. Declaration of interests is published in Annual Report. Membership of the FCC expired in January 2002 and its future is under review.

  Poisons Board

  The membership of the Poisons Board has been recently reconstituted after a lapse of 11 years. A new code of practice will be developed in due course.

  Police Negotiating Board

  No. Preparation in hand.

  Prison/Probation Accreditation Panel

  Yes. Uses Cabinet Office's model code of practice.

  Race Relations Forum

  Membership expired November 2001. The future of the Forum is under review.

  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Technical Advisory Body

  This body was established in April 2002. The code of practice is in preparation.

  Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP)

  Yes with register of interests.

  Copies of code of Practice are available from the SAP. Members' interests are published in its Annual Report.

  Tribunal NDPBs

  Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel

  Yes. Uses Cabinet Office's model code of practice.

  Investigatory Powers Tribunal

  No

  Misuse of Drugs Advisory Body

  No. Currently in abeyance.

  Misuse of Drugs Professional Panel

  No. Currently in abeyance.

  Misuse of Drugs Tribunal

  No. Currently in abeyance.

  Office of the Surveillance Commissioners

  No.

  Police Arbitration Tribunal

  No.

  Police Discipline Appeals Tribunal

  No.

  Other NDPBs

  Boards of Visitors to Penal Establishments

  No. Members abide by the Prison rules, which contain provisions for disqualifying from membership, any person interested in any contract for the supply of goods or services to a prison.

  Immigration
  Mr. Gummer
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many full time immigration officers will be working at the Port of Felixstowe after 1 July. [69983]

  Beverley Hughes
  The port of Felixstowe will not close, from an immigration point of view, until a new office at or near Ipswich has been established. The four immigration officers currently employed at Felixstowe have been transferred to Harwich on 14 July 2002. Asylum screening will continue to be carried out at Felixstowe until the new facility at Ipswich is operational. Whilst screening is conducted one immigration officer per day will attend Felixstowe from Harwich.

  Mr. Gummer
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department which immigration office will administer the Port of Felixstowe after 1 July. [69982]
  446W
  Beverly Hughes
  Felixstone has always been administered from the East Anglia Headquarters at Harwich and this will continue to be the case.

  Mr. Gummer
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if immigration officers will provide a 24-hour presence at the Port of Felixstowe after 1 July. [69972]

  Beverley Hughes
  Felixstowe staff did not provide a 24-hour service at the Port. The period from 2100 to 0700 was covered by officers based at Harwich. Staff from Harwich will now provide remote cover for the full 24-hours attending when required.

  UK Nationals (Zimbabwe)
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many United Kingdom nationals resident in Zimbabwe have returned to the United Kingdom to settle in each year since 1997; and if he will make a statement. [69789]
  447W
  Beverley Hughes
  The requested information is not available.

  It is not possible to measure how many United Kingdom nationals resident in Zimbabwe have returned to the United Kingdom to settle. As holders of British passports, United Kingdom nationals are free to enter, and to remain in, the United Kingdom without requiring leave to do so they are not subject to immigration controls.

  Immigration and Nationality Directorate
  Ann McKechin
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans his Department has to improve the service offered by the Public Inquiry Office of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate at Croydon. [72009]

  Beverley Hughes
  The aim is to improve substantially the service to the Public Enquiry Office callers and as far as possible reduce the waiting time and long queues.

  The Public Enquiry Office Croydon is currently in the process of recruiting an additional team of 17 staff, increasing its same day service capabilities. There are plans to rebuilt the entrance into Lunar House to provide better access to all of those who need to come to Croydon. It is hoped that building work may commence towards the end of this year. Moreover the Public Enqiry Office has improved its signage and website information so that callers are more informed of the service provided and all of the other options available to them.

  Asylum
  Sir Teddy Taylor
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department for what reason Mr. Mohammed Mahmood of Southend, reference M1051379, has not been notified of the outcome of his asylum application; and if he will make a statement.[72157]

  Beverley Hughes
  I regret that remedial action following the discovery of the existence of a double file has delayed formal notification of the decision in this case. I will write to the hon. Member to explain the present position.

  Foreign Students
  Mr. Weir
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has to review regulations relating to the employment of foreign students as seasonal workers in agriculture. [73054]

  Beverley Hughes
  Paragraphs 104–09 of the Immigration Rules (HC395) provide for the entry and employment of foreign students under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS). The recent Home Office White Paper "Secure Borders, Safe Haven" signalled, in paragraph 3.25, our intention to review the operation of this scheme. A consultation document was published on 29 May 2002, is available on the Home Office website and has been sent to a wide range of organisations with an interest in the scheme. In addition, officials have held meetings with key stakeholder groups. The consultation ended on 23 August 2002. Any changes to the scheme resulting from the consultation will be announced in due course.
  448W
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, how much and what proportion of his 2002–03 Departmental Expenditure Limit had been spent by 31 May; what the figures were for 2001–02; and if he will make a statement.[61753]

  Beverley Hughes
  I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to him on 11 July 2002,Official Report, column 1197W.

SOLICITOR-GENERAL

  Rape
  Mr. Gale
  To ask the Solicitor-General what proportion of allegations of rape made to the police were brought to trial by the Crown Prosecution Service in each of the last five years.[68798]

  The Solicitor-General
  [holding answer 15 July 2002]There are no wholly reliable or national figures which touch on the precise statistics that the hon. Member seeks.

  Some information about the extent to which reported cases reach trial may be found in the Report on the Joint Inspection into the Investigation and prosecution of cases involving Allegations of rape, published in April 2002 by HMCPSI and HMIC. The Inspection included examination of a sample of 1,741 reported complaints of rape. The offender was charged in 467 of these cases. Therefore, of the 1,741 reports of rape, some 26 per cent. resulted in a charge or summons.

  The Inspectorates' analysis does not show how many of those 467 prosecutions proceeded to trial or to guilty plea. However, the Inspectorates' Report also analysed 88 rape cases that did proceed to court. Of these 88, approximately 56 per cent. proceeded to trial (35 defendants were found not guilty after a trial and 14 were convicted after a trial). A further 39 defendants, or approximately 44 per cent. pleaded guilty without the need for a trial, which amounts to a conviction rate (including guilty pleas and those convicted after a trial) of 60.8 per cent.

  The 1,741 crime reports were drawn from ten Police Forces, and the 88 rape cases that proceeded to court were drawn from nine of these ten Police Forces. The cases were initially recorded as rape for the period 31 December 2000 or before (each Police Force was asked to provide up to a specified number of cases). In view of the limited nature of the file sample, it would be unwise to extrapolate national statistics from these figures.

  I take very seriously the need to ensure that all parts of the criminal justice system adopt best practice when dealing with rape cases. In response to the Thematic Review, the Crown Prosecution Service, Home Office and Court Service have drawn up an Action Plan to improve practice in the investigation and prosecution of offenders, and to ensure better treatment of victims and witnesses. The Plan was published on 22 July.

  Mr. Gale
  To ask the Solicitor-General what proportion of rape cases brought to trial by the Crown Prosecution Service resulted in the conviction of the accused in each of the last five years. [68799]
  449W
  The Solicitor-General
  [holding answer 15 July 2002]The answer is set out at the table attached. The figures include guilty pleas and convictions after trial. The data for 2001 will not be available until Autumn this year.

  Persons1 tried for rape2 at the Crown and numbers and proportion found guilty

  England and Wales, 1996 to 2000

  Persons tried1

  Persons found guilty

  Proportion found guilty

  1996

  1,125

  575

  51%

  1997

  1,249

  615

  49%

  1998

  1,518

  674

  44%

  1999

  1,464

  654

  45%

  2000

  1,373

  593

  43%

  1Principal offence basis.

  2Rape of a female and rape of a male.

  3Persons for trial excluding those not tried.

  Source:

  Home Office.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

  EU Committees (Scottish Executive Representation)
  Angus Robertson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry when the EU Committee on economic outward-processing arrangements for textiles is next due to meet; whether representatives of the Scottish Executive(a) have been and (b) are members of it; and if she will make a statement. [70916]

  Stephen Timms
  There are currently no plans for this Committee to meet. There have been no representatives of the Scottish Executive on this Committee in the past. A Department of Trade and Industry Official has represented the UK.

  Somalia
  John Barrett
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if she will make a statement on the supply of military equipment to Somalia from the UK. [68820]

  Nigel Griffiths
  Companies exporting arms and other items controlled for strategic reasons from the UK to Somalia require an export licence from the Department of Trade and Industry's Export Control Organisation.

  In line with United Nations (UN) sanctions, no exports of military equipment to Somalia are permitted apart from items of humanitarian end-use approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. UNSCR 733 (1992) imposed an arms embargo on Somalia covering "all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise". UNSCR 1356 (2001) amended the scope of the embargo to allow the export of humanitarian exports and protective clothing approved by

  Number of jobs that come under the remit of the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

  Scotland

  (excluding Greater London)

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent (C)

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Core department

  943

  889.50

  0.59

  18,722

  17,356.90

  11.69

  Non-departmental public bodies

  936

  913.5

  0.58

  6,293

  6,136.85

  3.93

  Executive agencies

  13,947

  12,987.22

  8.71

  88,705

  80,627.05

  55.41

  Independent statutory bodies

  0

  0

  0

  239.2

  228.58

  0.15

  450W
  the UN Sanctions Committee. UNSCR 1425 (2002) widened the scope of the embargo to prohibit "the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities."

  All relevant export licence applications for Somalia are rigorously assessed on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria and the UN arms embargo; taking into account the particular circumstances prevailing at the time and other relevant previously announced Government policies.

  Overseas Visits
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if she will list the overseas trips on departmental business that have been undertaken in each of the last five years by officials in her Department; and what the(a) cost, (b) purpose and (c) result was in each case. [68731]

  Ms Hewitt
  All overseas travel by officials in the Department is undertaken in accordance with principles set in Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Management Code and the detailed rules and guidance set out in the Department's Guide to officials. The detailed information requested about individual trips is not held centrally and could only be obtained at disproportionate cost.

  Female Staff
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what percentage of the staff of her Department are women; and what the percentage was in June 1997. [66904]

  Ms Hewitt
  I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to him by the Minister of State, Cabinet Office, on 5 July 2002,Official Report, column 622W.

WORK AND PENSIONS

  Job Location
  Annabelle Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, how many jobs under the remit of his Department in(a) the core department, (b) non-departmental public bodies, (c) executive agencies and (d) independent statutory bodies, organisations and bodies financially sponsored by his Department and other such organisations, are located in (i) Scotland, (ii) England, excluding Greater London, (iii) Greater London, (iv) Wales, (v) Northern Ireland and (vi) overseas broken down by (A) whole-time equivalent jobs and (B) the percentage per individual department, body or organisation.

  Mr. McCartney
  [pursuant to the Written Answer on 24 July 2002, Official Report, vol. 389, col. 1589–90W]The information is in the table.
  451W

  Greater London

  Wales

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Core department

  2,778

  2,644.97

  1.74

  461

  425.6

  0.29

  Non-departmental public bodies

  4,409

  4,253.24

  2.75

  1,308

  1,286.82

  0.82

  Executive agencies

  14,520

  13,570.08

  9.07

  6,801

  6,292.28

  4.25

  Independent statutory bodies

  29

  29

  0.02

  0

  0

  0

  Column (A) is the number of posts

  Column (B) is the Whole Time Equivalent posts taking into account staff who work part time

  Column (C) is the per cent. of posts in (A) against the total number of posts in the Department.

  [Changes made to original answer are in bold]

  Scotland

  (excluding Greater London

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Core department

  943

  889.50

  0.64

  18,722

  17,356.90

  12.74

  0.59

  11.69

  Non-departmental public bodies

  0

  0

  56

  56.00

  936

  913.5

  0.58

  6,293

  6,136.85

  3.93

  Executive agencies

  13,808

  12,853.22

  9.40

  88,028

  79,997.05

  59.91

  13,947

  12,987.22

  8.71

  88,705

  80,627.05

  55.41

  Independent statutory bodies

  139

  134.00

  0.1

  677.0

  630.00

  0.46

  0

  0

  0

  239.2

  228.58

  0.15

  Greater London

  Wales

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Posts (A)

  WTE (B)

  Per cent. (C)

  Core department

  2,778

  2,644.97

  1.89

  461

  425.6

  0.32

  1.74

  0.29

  Non-departmental public bodies

  0

  0

  0

  0

  4,409

  4,253.24

  2.75

  1,308

  1,286.82

  0.82

  Executive agencies

  14,376

  13,437.28

  9.78

  6,674

  6,174.58

  4.55

  14,520

  13,570.08

  9.07

  6,801

  6,292.28

  4.25

  Independent statutory bodies

  144

  132.8

  0.11

  127

  117.70

  0.1

  29

  29

  0.02

  0

  0

  0

  Column (A) is the number of posts

  Column (B) is the Whole Time Equivalent posts taking into account staff who work part time

  Column (C) is the per cent. of posts in (A) against the total number of posts in the Department.

DEFENCE

  Iraq
  Alan Simpson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence in respect of the attack by allied aircraft on 19 July in the Qadissiya province of Iraq, how many salvos were fired during the mission, what hostile acts the target area had been responsible for in provoking the attack and how many of the people injured and killed were deemed to be military personnel. [73684]

  Mr. Ingram
  On the night of 18 July, when the incident in question occurred, coalition aircraft responded to multiple attacks on them by Iraqi air defence weapons, including anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, by releasing precision guided munitions.

  Coalition aircraft conduct patrols of the Iraqi no fly zones in support of UN SCR 688 which demanded that Saddam Hussein end the brutal repression of his own people. The pilots conducting these wholly legitimate patrols are regularly shot at by Iraqi air defences. They are authorised to respond in self-defence to efforts to shoot them down. This is the only basis on which weapons have been released over Iraq since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.
  452W
  The coalition targets Iraqi air defence facilities that pose a threat to its forces patrolling the no fly zones. Exceptional lengths are taken to ensure civilian casualties are kept to the absolute minimum possible, including the employment of very carefully controlled targeting procedures and precision guided munitions. It is in Saddam's interests to distort the truth in his attempts to convince the world that the coalition is responsible for causing widespread suffering to the Iraqi civilian populace. Saddam would readily persecute these people, as he has done in the past, if we did not patrol the no fly zones. We are not prepared to abandon these people.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT

  Area-based Initiatives
  Mr. Don Foster
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department if he will list for each area-based initiative for which his Department is responsible the amount originally budgeted for in(a) 2000–01 and (b) 2001–02, stating in each year what funds budgeted for were not spent and if they were carried forward. [71463]
  453W
  Ms Rosie Winterton
  The Lord Chancellor's Department is responsible for one designated Area Based Initiative; the roll out of Community Legal Services Partnerships (CLSPs). CLSPs are voluntary groupings made up of providers and funders of advice and help services and are not funded by the Lord Chancellor's Department. However, CLSPs are supported by regional staff of the Legal Services Commission. The total cost of these staff has been £3.5 million for each of the two years, 2000–01 and 2001–02. As this support varies according to need between CLSPs it is not possible to answer the question precisely for each local area.

  Immigration Appellate Tribunal
  Keith Vaz
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what plans he has to open additional IATs. [73048]

  Ms Rosie Winterton
  Currently there are no plans to open new Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) premises. At present all IAT hearings are conducted from Field House in London. However, there are extensive plans to open new Adjudicator hearing centres as part of the Immigration Appellate Authorities' (IAA) expansion programme. The IAA has been tasked with increasing its capacity from the current 4,500 asylum appeals per month to 6,000 cases per month from November 2002.

  Centres are planned for Newport, Stoke-on-Trent, North Shields, Bradford and Manchester, opening between November 2002 and June 2003. In addition to the new locations, the hearing capacities of existing centres in Birmingham and Hatton Cross are being increased. The precise timescales for the expansion programme remain subject to lease and planning considerations.

  The capacity of the IAT will also need to increase, but this will not require accommodation outside its London base.

  Keith Vaz
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department when he proposes to open the new IAT in Leicester. [73047]

  Ms Rosie Winterton
  Currently there are no plans to open new Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) premises. At present all IAT hearings are conducted from Field House in London.
  454W
  However, as part of the Immigration Appellate Authorities' (IAA) programme of expansion, a new administrative support centre is to open in Arnhem House in Leicester during November 2002. The IAA has been tasked with increasing its capacity from the current 4,500 asylum appeals per month to 6,000 cases per month from November 2002.

  The centre will operate in tandem with the existing Loughborough centre, providing back office functions in support of the expanded network of IAA hearing centres.

  Fines (Enforcement)
  Simon Hughes
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what plans he has to improve the enforcement of fines imposed by the courts. [73228]

  Yvette Cooper
  The Government are committed to improving the enforcement of financial penalties. Following the transfer of lead responsibility of warrant execution from the police to Magistrates' Courts Committees in April 2001, my Department has been taking forward a programme of work aimed at improving enforcement. Magistrates' Courts Committees have also been given nearly £10 million extra from April 2002, ring-fenced for enforcement purposes.

  The White Paper, "Justice for All", published in July, heralded new legislative proposals aimed at improving enforcement rates. The proposals could include giving court staff a range of discretionary powers to manage the collection of fines on behalf of the court. While those facing genuine difficulties should have access to support and advice, defaulters who refuse to co-operate with the court would face greater sanctions, including for example increasing the fine if the offender fails to pay on time.

  Meetings
  Keith Vaz
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department when he next plans to meet Mr. Duncan Webster and Mr. David Wilkinson. [73050]

  Yvette Cooper
  I met Mr. Duncan Webster and Mr. David Wilkinson on 4 September 2002. I have no current plans to meet them again, but I would be happy to do so.

Preamble
The House met at half-past eleven of the clock, pursuant to Standing Order 16: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Derby.

Tributes to the late Lady Young
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Williams of Mostyn): My Lords, Janet Young died on 6th September. Although we knew of her serious illness, the news came as a deep shock to all of us. She was a great woman. A moral crusader, a distinguished Member of this House for over 30 years, Lady Young was born in Oxford and retained the Oxford links throughout her life. She took a Master's degree at St Anne's and married a Fellow of Jesus College, Dr Geoffrey Tyndale Young, in 1950. They had three daughters, to whom Janet was a loving and devoted mother.
She joined Oxford City Council, as a Conservative, in 1957. Some 10 years later, she was leader. In 1970, she became a life Peer.
Life in the Lords suited her; and it suited us too. She became the first woman Leader of this House under the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, whom we are all pleased to see in her place today. Indeed, I think I am right in recalling that Lady Young was the only other female member of any Thatcher Cabinet. She was a much respected Leader of this House. She was devoted to this place, while recognising the need to adapt to changing times. Apart from her long career in government, she enjoyed success as a director of several public companies.
The focused energy with which she fought for her convictions was remarkable. She was a doughty crusader, but also a consummate politician. She knew how to organise, as we on this side had cause to know and regret. She often used to come to see me at the Home Office, or when I was Attorney-General, and invariably left our meetings saying that she would be very disappointed in me if I failed to adopt her amendments and point of view. I am very sorry, I was a serious and serial disappointment to her.
She and the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, gave many of us innocent merriment when newspapers frequently—I believe maliciously—printed the wrong photograph of the wrong Baroness Young. We often used to wonder which of the two would sue first, and on what grounds.
Janet was a staunch Christian believer. That faith sustained, supported and comforted her, not least during her long illness. She and I corresponded regularly in those last months. The last letter I had from her was an invitation to join her and Geoffrey for a glass of wine at their home in Oxford. But that was not to be.
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When we still had an imperial Navy, there was a class of heavy battleship called Dreadnought. I always think of her as "the last of the Dreadnoughts", because she was fearless and determined in what she believed to be right. I know that the whole House will wish to send condolences to her family in affectionate and grateful remembrance.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord the Leader of the House for his kind words of tribute to Lady Young. I do not think that there is anyone in this House, whatever their differences with her, who would not turn to her accustomed place today and feel a deep sense of emptiness—for a great parliamentarian has passed on.
She became known to millions outside this House for the battles that she fought on many issues. She was truly a public figure in a way that few of us are or ever will be. But above all, she was a House of Lords person. She never sat in the other place. She gave her counsel to us for over 30 years. She loved and honoured this House, and in all the stances that she took she embodied the independence of mind and the essence of this place.
She made up her mind on the merits of a matter as she saw them, without fear or favour to those in her own party, or indeed to others—even, sometimes, to the right reverend Prelates in her own Church, and most memorably to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern in regard to his divorce reform legislation. She was, it can safely be said, a person whose courage and integrity were an example to all. It is right that such a person will go down for all time as the first woman to be Leader of the House of Lords.
The noble and learned Lord has spoken of Lady Young's many achievements and accomplishments in this House and outside—achievements particularly in politics, in the academic world, in business, in the voluntary sector and beyond. Last week I received a letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, expressing her sorrow that she could not be present today. She added that Janet Young was,
"a person of formidable intellect as well as resolute opinions and moral conviction",
and said that,
"it was a privilege, as her female successor, to be able to draw oil those qualities as well as her practical experience".
Many here knew her in different spheres. She was a distinguished Minister in the Foreign Office, and above all in education, about whose standards she cared with a passion.
I do not want to speak for too long, but I, too, should like to touch on two great threads that ran through her life: Oxford and the Christian faith. In Oxford, she was educated, both as a child and as a student. In Oxford, she married and settled with the husband and family to whom she was so devoted for over 50 years. In Oxford, she entered politics. There, she became an alderman and later a deputy lieutenant. It was there, as she would have wished, that she died and will rest. There are some who denigrate our great universities and their milieu. No place could be bad that produced and sustained Janet Young.

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Finally, there was Lady Young's faith—though "finally" is perhaps not the right word. For this was her lodestar in life and her safeguard at the end, when, with her courage, she lifted all who knew her. Her life was a life of service, nobly done, to her family, to her nation and to her God. My thoughts, and, I know, those of the whole House, go out to Geoffrey Young and to the whole family. They should know that this great House is with them in sympathy. They should know that in this House Lady Young's name and memory will always have a high place of honour.
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I believe that noble Lords on all sides of the House will deeply regret the loss of Lady Young. That may be particularly true of those in the House who are women and who recognise the way in which she led the procedure whereby women can today become leading figures in the community. She did this with elegance, tolerance and grace. I should like to remind the House that Lady Young also achieved a quite remarkable, almost miraculous, combination: she was one of the few Conservative politicians who was both respected and promoted by Mr Edward Heath and by the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher—quite an achievement!
It is true to say that Lady Young was a great achiever in the areas of the community and also within this House. Perhaps I may add that, to me at least, she represented the best of the traditional values in a way that evoked both nostalgia and respect. She believed in courtesy; indeed, her courtesy was absolutely unfailing, even at moments of controversy and even when she was under pressure. Lady Young believed in principle: her principles were unbending. They were iron principles but she was always ready to explain them, to defend them, and to discuss them. Her values were those of community, as her work in the Oxford City Council so clearly indicated, but not, as with some councillors, limited only to her locality. She saw it as a principle of what democracy is all about.
Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, so elegantly said, Lady Young was illumined by her faith. She brought to this House great grace—one might even say, as she would have seen it, the grace of God—through all her deliberations and presentations. Although there were issues on which some of us, including many of my colleagues on these Benches, would necessarily have disagreed with her, I do not believe that any of us who might have disagreed on some issue failed to recognise the conviction, the courage, and the commitment with which Lady Young spoke and with which she cleaved to the principles that she held. I share with other Leaders and Members of the House our deep sympathy for her family and for the three daughters' whom Lady Young brought up with such care and love. We should also like to extend our deepest sympathy to her husband, Geoffrey Young.
Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, from these Benches, on behalf of Cross-Benchers, I should like to
856
pay a warm and sincere tribute to a most remarkable and respected Member of your Lordships' House, and to send our condolences to her family.
Those who knew Lady Young over many years will speak of her many achievements and successes in life. I know that she was highly regarded and very much respected by the senior officials of the Whitehall departments in which she held office as a Minister. She was always particularly good at registering her appreciation of the support that she received from officials in the public service at all levels.
But Lady Young's time as a Member of this House must count for some of her finest and most rewarding years, not least as the first lady to be the Leader of the House. Her personality and strength of character, her vision and determination to maintain standards of morality and behaviour that she felt were so important to any civilised society were utterly formidable. By any measure Lady Young achieved results that most others would have found beyond them.
Like many Members of your Lordships' House I received from Lady Young over a number of years numerous letters of persuasive argument and advocacy, to be followed invariably with a note of thanks and appreciation. Her output was quite staggering. No doubt her attachment to the controversial causes that she championed led to her receiving mountains of mail. She seemed to be quite at her best in responding to such pressures and was a truly remarkable and principled Member of this House.
Lady Young's recent illness and withdrawal from the work of this Chamber served only to remind me of the loss to us, given the contributions that she made over many years to the fine reputation of this House. She is rightly remembered and honoured by the tributes that are being made from all sides of the Chamber today. On behalf of these Benches, I join in saluting this astute and gifted lady.
The Lord Bishop of Derby: My Lords, from these Benches we welcome the chance to echo and endorse the fine tributes expressed by noble Lords. We, too, regret such a sad loss both for this Chamber and far beyond. In expressing our sympathy today to Lady Young's family, we trust that they have long been encouraged by the recognition and awards that she won through a lifetime of service with integrity and consistency.
As bishops, it is a constant aim and aspiration of our teaching and leadership that Christian disciples should connect their faith, their beliefs, with the six-day week of their Monday to Saturday lives. In an age when many are inclined to reduce the significance of faith to personal preference and private behaviour, Lady Young constantly acted out the truth that beliefs must inform actions not just for the individual but in public life. In doing so she was undaunted at being in a minority. The application of her Christian faith was very visible as an expression not only of the head but also of the heart.

857
Lady Young was passionate about the causes she espoused and she readily challenged the bishops of the Church for which she cared so much. The noble Baroness, Lady Cox, put the matter so well in the Church of England Newspaper by saying that Lady Young was for people rather than against anyone. That was well evidenced by her courtesy. She was always extremely gracious to those with whom she might disagree. Here I speak from first-hand, one-to-one experience.
We on these Benches are at one with Lady Young's commitment to strengthen the family as the bedrock of a healthy community. That end was never in dispute between Lady Young and the bishops. She often challenged our understanding of the means to that end, and, in being made to think afresh, we were well served by this fellow Anglican whom we miss today.
The courage with which Lady Young faced her illness brings to light yet another reason why she will be remembered for her tenacity and selflessness.
These words are not my own, and they are not for me to say, but I believe they will be heard:
"Well done, thou good and faithful servant".
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, my name has been referred to. It is right that I should say that the difference of opinion between Lady Young and myself arose from differing views on the application of a common faith to a particular situation. That difference of opinion in no way affected our friendship which I greatly cherished. It is right for me also to say that in the end her point of view has triumphed.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I had the honour to succeed Lady Young as chairman of the Association of Conservative Peers whereupon she became our president She was a doughty fighter and famous as a Member of your Lordships' House and in public life generally. She will be most sorely missed. We all send our very deepest sympathy to her splendid husband, Dr Geoffrey Young.

Iraq
11.53 a.m.
Lord Williams of Mostyn: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows:
"Mr Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.
"Today we published a 50-page dossier detailing the history of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, its breach of United Nations' resolutions and the current attempts to rebuild the illegal weapons of mass destruction programme. I have placed a copy in the Library of the House.
858
"At the end of the Gulf War, the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes became clear. As a result, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions demanding Iraq disarm itself of such weapons and establishing a regime of weapons inspection and monitoring to do the task. They were to be given unconditional and unrestricted access to all and any Iraqi sites.
"All of this is accepted fact. In addition, it is fact, documented by United Nations' inspectors, that Iraq almost immediately began to obstruct the inspections. Visits were delayed; on occasions, inspectors were threatened; material was moved; special sites, shut to the inspectors, were unilaterally designated by Iraq.
"The work of the inspectors continued but against a background of increasing obstruction and non-compliance. Indeed, Iraq denied its biological weapons programme existed until forced to acknowledge it after high-ranking defectors disclosed it in 1995.
"Eventually, in 1997, the United Nations' inspectors declared they were unable to fulfil their task. A year of negotiation and further obstruction occurred until finally, in late 1998, the United Nations' team was forced to withdraw. As the dossier sets out, we estimate, on the basis of the United Nations' work, that there were up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including one-and-a-half tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. All of this was missing or unaccounted for.
"Military action by the United States and the United Kingdom followed and a certain amount of infrastructure for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missile capability was destroyed, setting the Iraqi programme back, but not ending it.
"From late 1998 onwards, the sole inhibition on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programme was the sanctions regime. Iraq was forbidden to use the revenue from its oil except for certain specified non-military purposes. The sanctions regime, however, was also subject to illegal trading and abuse. Because of concerns about its inadequacy—and the impact on the Iraqi people—we made several attempts to refine it, culminating in a new United Nations' resolution in May of this year. But it was only partially effective. Around 3 billion dollars is illegally taken by Saddam every year now, double the figure for the year 2000. Self-evidently there is no proper accounting for that money.
"Because of concerns that a containment policy based on sanctions alone could not sufficiently inhibit Saddam's weapons programme, negotiations continued after 1998 to gain re-admission for the United Nations inspectors. In 1999, a new United Nations' resolution demanding re-entry was passed and ignored. Further negotiations continued. Finally, after several

859
months of discussion with Saddam's regime this year, Kofi Annan, the United Nations' Secretary-General, concluded that Saddam was not serious about re-admitting the inspectors and ended the negotiations. That was in July.
"All of this is established fact. I set out the history in some detail because occasionally debate on this issue seems to treat it almost as though it had suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim, in the last few months of 2002. It is an 11-year history: a history of United Nations' will flouted, lies told by Saddam about the existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, obstruction, defiance and denial. There is one common consistent theme, however: the total determination of Saddam to maintain the programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions and the isolation of the Iraqi economy, in order to keep it. At any time he could have let the inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any time he could have co-operated with the United Nations. Ten days ago he made the offer unconditionally, under threat of war. He could have done that at any time in the past 11 years. He did not. Why?
"The dossier we publish gives the answer. The reason is that his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic leftover from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down. It is up and running.
"The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. For over 60 years, beginning just prior to World War II, the JIC has provided intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally its work is secret. Unusually, because it is important that we explain our concerns over Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose these assessments. I am aware, of course, that people are going to have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services. But this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture they paint is one accumulated over the past four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative.
"It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons; that Saddam has continued to produce them; that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons' capability.
"On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agent for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons'
860
programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons' production, all of it well funded.
"In respect of biological weapons, again production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a programme; and again Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it, pre-1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to acquire mobile biological weapons' facilities which are easier to conceal. Present intelligence confirms they have now got such facilities. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death.
"As for nuclear weapons, Saddam's previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by the inspectors following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"But we now know the following. Since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual use products such as anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; and a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors. And he has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls due to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.
"In addition, we know Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful. Again key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that this is for a civil nuclear power programme but it has no nuclear power plants.
"That is the position in respect of weapons. But, of course, the weapons require ballistic missile capability. This is again subject to United Nations' disarmament resolutions. Iraq is supposed only to have missile capability up to 150 kilometres for conventional weaponry. Pages 27 to 31 of the dossier detail the evidence on this issue. It is clear both that a significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended range Scud missiles; that in mid-2001, there was a step change in the programme and that by this year Iraq's development of weapons with a range of over

861
1,000 kilometres was well under way; that hundreds of key people are employed on this programme; that facilities are being built; and that equipment is being procured, usually in secret. Sanctions and import controls have hindered this programme, but only slowed its progress. The capability being developed is for multi-purpose use, including the use of weapons of mass destruction warheads.
"Now, that is the assessment to me from the Joint Intelligence Committee. In addition, we have well-founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his weapons of mass destruction programme as vital to his survival, as a demonstration of his power, and of his influence in the region. There will be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of this material there may be innocent explanations.
"There will be others who say, rightly, that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before he acquires a usable nuclear weapon. Though, if he were able to purchase fissile material illegally, it would only be a year or two. Let me put it at its simplest: on this 11-year history with this man, Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available, and with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate, would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed; to say, despite 14 separate United Nations' demands on this issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do nothing and to conclude that we should trust not to the good faith of the UN weapons' inspectors but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime?
"Our case is simply this: not that we take military action, come what may, but that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament as the United Nations has stipulated is overwhelming. I defy anyone on the basis of this evidence to say that is an unreasonable demand for the international community to make when, after all, it is only the same demand as we have made for 11 years and which he has rejected.
"People say: but why Saddam? I do not in the least dispute there are other causes of concern on weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, I said as much in this House on 14th September last year. But two things about Saddam Hussein stand out. He has used these weapons, thousands dying in chemical weapons attacks in Iraq itself. He used them in the Iran-Iraq war started by him, in which 1 million people died. And his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to. Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights. Read not just about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran; not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq; not just the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq; and not just the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 which led to the Gulf War. Read also about the routine butchering of political opponents; the prison "cleansing" regimes in which thousands die; the torture chambers and hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty International. Read it all, and again I defy
862
anyone to say that this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of getting his hands on more chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons.
"'Why now?' people ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, that he will use those weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion that dictators faced with a weakening will always draw; namely, that the international community will talk but not act; will use diplomacy but not force; and we know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will. If we take that course, he will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence grow and at some point, in a future which is not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction is not United States or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real.
"And if people say: 'Why should Britain care?', I answer, 'Because there is no way that this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world'.
"That, after all, is the reason the UN passed its resolutions. That is why it is right that the UN Security Council again makes its will and its unity clear and lays down a strong new UN resolution and mandate. Then Saddam will have the choice: comply willingly or be forced to comply. That is why alongside the diplomacy, there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action if diplomacy fails.
"Let me be plain about our purpose. There is no doubt that Iraq, the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam Hussein. They deserve to be led by someone who can abide by international law, not a murderous dictator; someone who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not languishing as a pariah state; someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by personal greed; and someone who can lead a government more representative of the country as a whole, while maintaining absolutely Iraq's territorial integrity.
"We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the Middle East. So the ending of the regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than Saddam Hussein.
"But our purpose is disarmament. No one wants military conflict. The whole purpose of putting this before the UN is to demonstrate the united determination of the international community to resolve this in the way it should have been resolved years ago: through a proper process of disarmament

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under the UN. Disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction is the demand. One way or another it must be acceded to.
"There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal with. First, Afghanistan is a country now freed from the Taliban, but still suffering. This is a regime we changed, rightly. I want to make it clear, once again, we are entirely committed to its re-construction. We will not desert the Afghan people. We will stick with them until the job is done.
"Secondly, I have no doubt that the Arab world knows it would be better off without Saddam. Equally, I know that there is genuine resentment at the state of the Middle East Peace Process, which people want to see the international community pursue with the same vigour. Israel will defend its people against these savage acts of terrorism. But the very purpose of this terrorism is to prevent any chance for peace. Meanwhile the Palestinians are suffering in the most appalling and unacceptable way. We need urgent action to build a security infrastructure that gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for the Palestinian Authority. And we need a new Conference on the Middle East Peace Process based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state. We can condemn the terrorism and the reaction to it. But, frankly, that will get us nowhere. What we need is a firm commitment to action and a massive mobilisation of energy to get the peace process moving again; and we will play our part in any way we can.
"Finally, there are many acts of this drama still to be played out. I have always said that Parliament should be kept in touch with all developments, in particular those that would lead us to military action. That remains the case. To those who doubt it, I say: look at Kosovo and Afghanistan. We proceeded with care and with full debate in this House, and when we took military action, did so as a last resort. We shall act in the same way now. But I hope we can do so, secure in the knowledge that should Saddam continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it has in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is necessary and right".
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
12.14 p.m.
Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lords the Lord Chancellor and the Leader of the House for arranging this recall to enable the House to express its views on the crisis in Iraq. It is entirely right that Parliament should be consulted and should provide leadership on an issue as important as this. I very much regret, though, that the dossier was not made available to the House at least last night after the Cabinet meeting. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord
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can explain what is in the dossier that is so important that it had to be hidden from the people and Parliament until early this morning.
Perhaps I may also ask the noble and learned Lord to underline assurances that there will be a further recall in the event of any serious escalation of the crisis or active engagement of British forces beyond their present duties in enforcing the no-fly zone. Furthermore, will an updating statement be made or a short debate allowed in the House when we return? The fact that 65 speakers are listed to speak in today's debate demonstrates the interest in this issue. I shall limit my remarks in reply to the Statement so that we can start the debate as soon as possible.
The Statement comes soon after the first anniversary of the war against terrorism, the successful dismantling of the Taliban regime and the weakening—though, sadly, not yet the destruction—of the vicious network of Al'Qaeda. President Bush's response to the outrage of September 11th was swift, proportionate, effective and just. The British Government were right to support the President and the United States in this fight and we on this side of the House record our respect for the Prime Minister in the energy and commitment he has given to the fight against terrorism. Whatever voices may be raised behind and perhaps even next to him in another place, he and our Armed Forces will carry our support in resolutely confronting terrorists everywhere and in aiming to stop the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Perhaps I may tell the House the revulsion which we on this side feel for the regime of Saddam Hussein and his murderous clique of cronies. They have written a catalogue of slaughter, tyranny, aggression and oppression unparalleled in the recent history of the Middle East. Those who now accept his pretended good faith to admit UN weapons inspectors—an offer made at the eleventh minute of the eleventh hour—would do well to reflect on his record. It is a record of prevarication, deceit, trickery and perverted ambition, set out clearly by President Bush to the United Nations and in the Government's dossier.
I believe that we should never take Saddam Hussein's promises at face value. This is a man who has sought and is still seeking a nuclear weapon; a man who has viciously invaded his neighbour; and a man who has attacked sovereign nations—Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia—with ballistic missiles. He is a man who has used chemical weapons, even against his own people; a man who dreams of unleashing deadly diseases against fellow human beings—Christian, Muslim or Jew it does not matter to him, for disease knows no frontier of age, sex, race or religion.
Perhaps I may also express my horror at the growing visceral anti-Americanism that we see today, not just in elements in this country but particularly in the countries of the EU. I hope that the noble and learned Lord can join me in saying that there can be no moral equivalence between the United States of America and an Iraq led by Saddam Hussein; between a tyrannical regime and one based on parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.

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In expressing support for the Government, perhaps I may ask the noble and learned Lord some specific questions about the present situation. In the light of the apparent offer by Iraq to receive UN weapons inspectors, how have we adjusted our current diplomatic objectives? Does he agree with the assessment of the Bush administration that the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq is not in itself enough? If so, is our objective the total disarmament of all Iraqi capacity and potential in the fields of biological, chemical and nuclear weaponry? How will it be accomplished and how will it be verified?
Are the UK Government prepared to join in action to achieve it, even if it has to be done outside the remit of current negotiations at the UN? Indeed, are we prepared to go to war to remove him even if weapons inspectors return to Baghdad? What vision do the Government have of a post-Saddam Iraq, which is surely in itself the most important question for those who want regime change? This is a grave and dangerous time, but if we prevaricate the danger will only grow. Now is the time for international resolution to be nurtured and sustained.
In conclusion, will the noble and learned Lord join me in praising the outstanding leadership of President Bush so far in this crisis? Did the noble and learned Lord note the remarks of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that President Bush had galvanised the international community by his address to the General Assembly a fortnight ago? I believe that Mr Annan was right. It is essential that the British Government stand with Mr Bush in the fight against terrorism and its backers worldwide.
But where we root out dictators or terrorists we cannot simply walk away. It is essential, too, that we go beyond military action, necessary though that may be, to remove the underlying causes of terrorism without ever for a moment condoning or excusing its perpetrators. We and our allies must be ready also to assist countries and peoples caught up in conflict to achieve the lasting peace with freedom and justice which others enjoy and on which true prosperity alone can rest. The Iraqi people, and freedom-loving people everywhere, must understand that and that alone should be our objective.
12.21 p.m.
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, may I also thank the Leader of the House for delivering the Prime Minister's Statement to us? I thank the Government too for making the dossier available. I strongly urge Members of the House to read it in full alongside the Statement. It is a great credit to our intelligence services that the dossier is so balanced, so objective, so factual and so much eschews rhetorical flourishes. I believe it to be a very great credit that we have an intelligence service able to deliver a statement of this kind.
Having said that, we on these Benches wholly share the view that Saddam Hussein by any possible measure is a terrible dictator who has performed the most unspeakable acts against his own people and his
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neighbours. Nobody can possibly forgive what happened in the battles with Iran and the treatment of the Marsh Arabs about which my noble friend Lady Nicholson will speak later. Nor can we forgive what has happened to the Kurdish people. None of us would try to defend Saddam Hussein's deliberate flouting over and over again of United Nations resolutions.
The dossier makes clear that we have today one final opportunity to avert military force. That final opportunity is to get the inspectors back into Iraq without any obstruction of their efforts and demanding the full compliance of the Iraqi Government in order to make their work not only possible but effective.
It is important to say—and on this I differ with the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde—that we should do our very best to pursue this possibility and to back the inspectors under UNMOVIC. They are more professional and now have long-term contracts which their predecessors in UNSCOM did not. We should try if we possibly can to avert a war which inevitably would kill thousands of innocent people in Iraq and outside, would put some of our own forces necessarily at risk of death and injury, and could destroy the infrastructure of Iraq in a way that made recovery very expensive and very difficult. Iraq is one of the oldest civilisations in the world. Much of value to history would be destroyed by such a war as well.
Those are not reasons for not facing up to the necessity of force should that be inevitable. As the Statement says, all of us recognise that the credibility of the United Nations depends on a willingness to enforce its resolutions. But it is, I hope, widely agreed throughout the House that we should do our very best to try to test out—indeed, we have a moral obligation to do so—what has been offered to us through the return of the inspectors to find out whether that offer is valid and will stand up to full investigation. I say that fully aware that we have been played games with by the Iraqi Government and that there have been continuous evasions and obstructions. But I believe that in UNMOVIC we have a group of inspectors who have every intention of making clear any systematic attempt to avoid complying with their desire to inspect all suspicious installations.
In that context we on these Benches believe that it is vitally important that Dr Hans Blix, the leader of UNMOVIC, should be given the operational capacity to report back to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council if he believes that his work is being obstructed or not complied with. It is very important that that should rest in the first stage with the United Nations rather than being second-guessed by any nation state, which would immediately undermine the faith of the international community in the inspection regime.
We also recognise, as the Statement and the dossier say, that Iraq has attempted to pursue weapons of mass destruction. I urge colleagues to read the dossier very carefully. Paragraph 23 indicates that it is very unlikely that Iraq could develop nuclear weapons in under five years through its own capacity. It goes on to

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say that even with foreign help it would be at least one to two years before Iraq could develop a nuclear bomb. That is not to say that Iraq would not wish to do so; it is breaking every bone it has in the attempt. The dossier more coolly estimates the real capacity to achieve that aim, and indicates that there is at least some time for us to get our response right.
In Part 2, paragraph 13, the dossier says very clearly that the inspectors achieved a very great deal when they were there and that one of the reasons for believing that the policy of containment was unsuccessful in the end was not that it was not successful when inspection was allowed but that it could not work once inspection had been rejected. It is important to say that because some very influential voices have been raised, not least that of the distinguished former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Michael Quinlan, to the effect that containment was a pretty substantial and effective policy while the inspectors were in Iraq.
I now come to several questions that I wish to put to the Leader of the House. First, can we seek his assurance that the Government will do their very best to try to set up a satisfactory inspection regime, which would seek full compliance with its orders in gaining access and with its disarmament programme? I take very strongly the point made in the Statement that this matter is not just about the development of weapons of mass destruction; it is about thorough and complete disarmament. There is no difference about that on this side of the House.
Secondly, does the Leader of the House agree that if compliance is found by the inspectors and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be inadequate, this House and another place will be recalled and an attempt made to seek again a United Nations resolution? The world should not go to war outside the channels of the UN. It is very important that the case is put before the Security Council.
Thirdly, can he confirm that there is no indication whatever in the dossier that there are any links which can be proven between Iraq and Al'Qaeda? It is important to say that, not because it stops Iraq being an evil regime, but so that some of the wilder suppositions of weapons of mass destruction passing into the hands of terrorists are made more doubtful by the dossier's implications that it can find no evidence to show that Iraq has been collaborating with the terrorist regime of Al'Qaeda which on 11th September last year committed the terrible atrocities against the United States.
I have two final questions. The first concerns the reference in the Statement by the Prime Minister to Afghanistan and to the hope of being able to rebuild Iraq should there be a military victory following the necessity of a military attack. I repeat and underline the word "necessity". In this House and elsewhere there are grave concerns about the exit strategy that was followed in Afghanistan, a country that appears to be sliding back to anarchy rather rapidly and where more and more requests are being made to extend the security force, ISAF, beyond Kabul. In some ways
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Afghanistan represents a failure of the international community to build upon the military victory that it claimed would open the door to a democratic and just Afghanistan. It is a long way from that. Can the Leader of the House assure us that the Government and the Government of the United States will turn their minds more seriously to the matter of the exit strategy and what follows victory, if there is a victory? Without that I believe that many of us are unsure as to the strategy and how we can ensure that it will not enrage and unite the Muslim world against us.
My last question concerns the Muslim world. Will the Leader of the House confirm that the Government are totally opposed to a war between civilisations and that there is no attempt to identify the Muslim community as the enemy? Will they also ensure that our minds are kept, as Mr Brent Scowcroft asked, on the war against terrorism and are not diverted to inter-communal war with all its possible dangers?
12.32 p.m.
Lord Williams of Mostyn: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, for the generally supportive approach that they have demonstrated. In answer to the last observation of the noble Baroness, this situation has nothing to do with a war between civilisations; it has nothing to do with an attack on Islam any more than we held our hand against Milosevic because he happens to be nominally Christian. It has nothing to do with that at all and I welcome the opportunity given to me by the noble Baroness to deal with that point.
I agree with her that we should all feel a sense of moral obligation and of due appropriate caution. But I believe that that is reflected in the whole tenor of the Prime Minister's Statement. Will we do our best to set up a satisfactory inspection regime? Yes. If compliance is not adequate can I guarantee the recall of this House? No, it is not within my gift, but I believe that I can say that over the past year I have done my best to ensure that the interests of the House are fully reflected in any business that we are able to deal with.
The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, asked one or two questions on similar lines. If there is a serious escalation will there be a recall of Parliament? I take his indication seriously. Can I guarantee an updating Statement on the return of Parliament or a short debate? Personally, if appropriate, I would believe that that would be a proper course for us to adopt, subject to the agreement of the usual channels.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord had a slightly different view on the provision of the dossier. We wanted to produce as up-to-date a dossier as possible. I had my copy, along with other Cabinet colleagues, before our Cabinet meeting last evening. The decision was taken—I believe it was a proper one—that it should have been available for parliamentarians to look at and consider before the debate rather than disseminated last night so that the press and the media would have a first opportunity to

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comment on it. It is impossible to please everyone on every conceivable occasion, but at least I please the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, on this one.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, for commending the Prime Minister's energy and commitment. One has to hear in mind that we are at the stage of returning to the United Nations for a mandatory resolution, in no small part because of the energy, skill and commitment of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. Anyone who doubts that or who takes note of the frothier headlines in the newspapers is deeply mistaken. There is no moral equivalence between Saddam Hussein and the United States. I am a great admirer, as I heard the other day the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, say she is, of the United States. This year I spent my holiday there, and had it not been for this recall this week I would have been in Washington talking to colleagues in the House of Representatives and the Senate about problems of common interest.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have made it plain on numerous occasions, and I am happy to repeat it, that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of acting in any way that is not consonant with the established norms of international law. The noble Lord asked me whether President George W Bush had galvanised the United Nations with his speech. That is a fair comment which I endorse. I know for a fact that immediately after the speech many of the representatives at the Security Council and at the General Assembly made their views, supporting President Bush, known to the Foreign Secretary. A number have said that it was the most engaged speech that a United States President has made in the context of the United Nations for quite a long time.
Will the diplomatic initiative continue? Plainly, yes. The noble Baroness touched on whether Saddam Hussein will be required to disarm as well as allow the inspectors in. Secretary Rumsfeld was right when he said that it is not an issue simply about inspection; it is also an issue about disarmament. Apart from Secretary Rumsfeld being right, I must draw your Lordships' attention to Resolution 687 which says:
"8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities".

The unambiguous answer that I am happy to give the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, is that the obligation being laid upon Saddam Hussein—an obligation of law which has been ignored for the past 11 years—is not simply to allow in inspectors on a half-hearted basis, on a deceitful and a deceptive basis, but also, once those inspectors have been allowed to carry out their work untrammelled, there is an obligation to have those weapons destroyed—that is to say, disarmament.

Iraq
12.38 p.m.
The Minister for Trade (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean)The Minister for Trade (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean) rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation with regard to Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the central issue before the House today is straightforward, solemn and serious. It is how the international community can make Iraq comply with its clear obligation to abandon its weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein has those weapons. He can use them, and we believe that in time he will do so.
His obligations were set out, as my noble friend the Leader of the House has said, in UNSCR 687 of 1991. That was the resolution that suspended the military action endorsed by the United Nations after Iraq's unprovoked invasion of its neighbour Kuwait. UNSCR 687 required Iraq unconditionally to engage in,
"the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision",
of its chemical and biological weapons and to abandon its nuclear programme. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was tasked with chemical and biological weapons inspection, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with ending Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
The briefing paper that we have placed in the Library of the House today shows that Iraq has continued to develop terrible weapons of mass destruction. It shows that Iraq has the means to deliver those weapons in armed conflict. It illustrates Saddam Hussein's record of unprovoked aggression in invading two sovereign states and his brutal suppression of internal and minority groups. All that adds up to compelling evidence that he would not hesitate to use the weapons if he saw the need.
As the Statement made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister makes clear, our briefing paper cites example upon example of Iraqi efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. To an unprecedented extent, the paper draws on intelligence material and leaves no doubt that Iraq's growing arsenal of such weapons can no longer be tolerated. It demonstrates that the Iraqi regime is increasing its capacity to terrorise and intimidate through the amassing of chemical and biological weapons. 'The regime has developed command and control systems to use those weapons, and we know that, under those systems, authority rests with Saddam Hussein and, perhaps, with his equally unsavoury son, Qusai.
The dossier goes on to show that Iraq is seeking components and uranium to take forward its already advanced nuclear programme. The dossier highlights the fact that the regime has developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents. It shows that Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles to deliver such weapons further afield. Moreover, it reveals that Iraq continues to use

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revenue from illicit oil sales to support those horrific programmes, in defiance of explicit UN resolutions, rather than buying food, medicine and other civilian goods for the long-suffering men, women and children of Iraq.
The dossier brings out clearly the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which brings together the heads of the three intelligence and security agencies. That assessment is that the Iraqi regime could, in certain circumstances, produce a nuclear weapon in a period of between one and two years. To the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, I say that that is a short time in international relations. The same committee has evidence that Iraq has sought to buy the significant quantities of uranium that it needs from Africa, at a time when Iraq has no civil nuclear power programme and, therefore, no legitimate reason to acquire uranium. Appallingly, the report shows that intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military is already able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.
The evidence from the Joint Intelligence Committee adds up to a terrible catalogue of actual and potential weaponry. We have a duty to face up to the responsibilities created by that evidence. How do we force compliance—not for its own sake, but in the knowledge that the weapons are being built for a purpose? That purpose is the domination of the Gulf, to achieve which Saddam Hussein will not hesitate to use the weapons, if he sees fit. We know that because he has already done so.
Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: My Lords, will the Minister confirm the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, that the impressive dossier that the Government have put before us does not show evidence of the distribution of the weapons to terrorist organisations or to Al'Qaeda? That is an important point. We would be here debating the problem of Iraq whether or not the atrocities of 11th September last year had taken place. It is extremely important that we keep the issues separate.
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, I can confirm that the dossier does not show a link with the events of 11th September; nor does it show any direct link with Al'Qaeda. There is a view that some members of Al'Qaeda have escaped to Iraq and have been harboured by the Iraqi regime. However, I agree with the noble Lord that the issue of Iraq stands by itself: we would be debating it irrespective of what happened last year. None the less, the events of last year taught us many dreadful lessons about the failure to deal with threats staring us in the face.
Over the past few weeks, I have heard several commentators remark that we cannot prove that Saddam Hussein would use the weapons. I heard that view expressed again this morning on the radio. It is said that, even if the weapons exist and the means to use them are growing greater, the essential factor—the intention to use them—cannot be proved. That is true, of course. However, we can consider Iraq's record on
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the issue. Iraq is the only country to be condemned by the United Nations for breaching the Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime has fought wars of aggression, in which millions have died, against two neighbours and has launched missile attacks against five of its neighbours.
Saddam Hussein's brutal disregard for human life is directed not just at those outside Iraq. He has used poison gas against ordinary Iraqis, deliberately murdering unarmed civilians. Halabja has become a terrible by-word throughout the world for the horror perpetrated there. Elsewhere in Iraq, the fate of 100,000 Kurds and 200,000 Shia Muslims is evidence enough of Saddam Hussein's callous disregard for innocent life. In all that, Iraq has not just persistently mocked the authority of the United Nations but has done more than any other country to undermine the global consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the dossier makes clear, the brutality continues. There is routine murder, rape and torture, some of it personally supervised by Saddam Hussein and his sons.
Of those who say, "Prove that Saddam will use the weapons", we ask, "What more proof do we need than his record?". I will ask another question: how would we—any of us—justify doing nothing while such a man ran such a regime, in defiance of the United Nations, until it was too late? Edmund Burke famously said:
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing".
We have all heard it argued that, once Saddam used the weapons, the full force of international community would be used against him. But how many innocent lives would be lost in his first strike? How, in the days after those lives were lost, would we justify having done nothing to prevent him?
Our objective is the UN's objective. It is clear: it is to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. We have tried to do it peacefully and methodically under UN auspices. After the liberation of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had no alternative but to admit UN weapons inspectors. Then, over a period of seven years, he systematically deceived, obstructed and intimidated those inspectors. Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has ignored 23 out of 27 separate UN obligations. Even more tellingly, Iraq has not, in that entire period, complied with any of the 14 separate obligations relating to weapons of mass destruction.
In refusing to comply over and over again, Saddam took a calculated gamble. He calculated that divisions in the Security Council would render the UN unable to enforce its own resolutions. We are now at a crossroads: the UN must deal with the growing, flagrant threats to international peace and security. Otherwise, its ability to protect our security against present and future threats from any source will be undermined and irreparably damaged by the will of one regime. Dictatorship and force will override the work of the international community and the rule of law.

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Last week's tactics were of course to be expected. First, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister declared that inspectors would not be readmitted—then, two days later, the Foreign Minister said that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. That was a blatant lie. He went on to say that inspectors might return to Iraq. We are all too familiar with those distraction techniques. The same promises were made by the Iraqi regime in November 1998—and Iraq did not deliver on that promise. Indeed, the inspectors were forced to leave only one month later. So the latest offer must be treated with deep scepticism.
We must not let Iraq sidetrack the United Nations. Now is not the time to let up on any pressure on the Iraqi regime. In light of experience, we need a tough, uncompromising, all-encompassing inspect ion regime. It should be embodied in a United Nations resolution—and that resolution should carry the implicit determination to use force if there is further non-compliance.
Some of your Lordships may ask why this is so pressing now. After four years without inspections, all the indications are that the weapons programmes are growing again. As many of your Lordships will have read in the paper in the Library, the intelligence assessment published today shows that Saddam Hussein regards his chemical and biological weaponry as more than weapons of last resort. In the four years since we last had an inspectors' report, all the evidence is that Saddam Hussein is continuing to add to his biological and chemical arsenals and is once again at work on his nuclear programme.
Some of your Lordships may ask why this regime is uniquely dangerous. There are other countries developing terrible weapons too. Are they as bad or worse proliferators? What are we doing about them? Yes, there are others. There are other threats to the international consensus on non-proliferation. The difference is that with the other countries involved, we have a working relationship through which we can effectively urge restraint. In each case, we are endeavouring through active diplomacy to encourage the governments concerned to come fully within the ambit of the international regulatory systems, and meanwhile to ensure that those systems are kept safely and not used.
There has been intensive diplomatic effort in that regard with India and Pakistan. It is raised regularly with Israel, which can be in no doubt of our very clear views. In respect of North Korea, the Foreign Secretary has authorised an upgrading of our diplomatic representation; similarly with Libya. My honourable friend Mike O'Brien visited in August—the first British Minister to do so in 23 years. Iran potentially has a key strategic role in the region and beyond. We aim at deepening our relationship with that country and to encourage the forces of democracy within it. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has visited Iran twice in the last 12 months and hopes to do so again in the near future.
Of course we should always try the path of diplomacy to resolve potential threats and conflicts for international security—but that requires reciprocity,
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an acceptance of norms and standards of behaviour. Those norms, those standards and that reciprocity are wholly absent in the Iraqi regime.
When we have discussed the issue in the past, some of your Lordships have suggested that by threatening to enforce international law in the case of Iraq, we are guilty of double standards with regard to Israel and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Those resolutions did indeed place certain obligations upon Israel, which have not been met. The resolutions also imposed on all Israel's Arab neighbours the obligation fully to recognise and make peace with Israel. Those obligations have not been met either. The critics who say that we cannot deal forcefully with Iraq because we are not equally dealing with Israel fail to address how we can deliver freedom and statehood to Palestinians and lasting security to Israel.
There is progress. It is slow and painful—and it is halting—but progress now is seen in the growing consensus that peace and security in the Middle East will come with the creation of a viable Palestinian state and an Israel within its borders and at peace with its neighbours. In the past few months, that shared recognition has been set out by the President of the United States and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. We remain committed to that policy and to pursuing it through the early resumption of negotiations in the United Nations Security Council.
My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will take that message with him when he visits the Middle East in a few weeks. Of course we recognise that the Middle East conflict is not an integral part of the problem with Iraq but, like many of your Lordships, we cannot ignore the importance of the issue itself and in the context of the politics and international relationships of the region. The truth is that there is widespread scepticism among many of our Arab friends about the willingness of the West to address those issues. My right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have done so consistently, patiently and diligently. They will continue to do so—as the Prime Minister's statement made clear.
My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will also leave no doubt in the minds of all his hosts in the region, when he visits them, about the threat posed by Iraq's weapons. We shall continue to deny Saddam Hussein's attempts to portray our confronting that issue as an attack on Islam. We shall continue to make it clear to our own Islamic communities in the United Kingdom that our argument is not with Islam and not with the people of Iraq but with a pernicious and brutal regime.
Our objective must be to force that regime to abandon its weapons of mass destruction. If Saddam Hussein is toppled from power in that endeavour, so be it—we would welcome his departure. Neighbouring countries would welcome his departure. The world would welcome his departure.
But our objective is to disarm Iraq through rigorous and determined United Nations inspections. To achieve that, we need to be ready to use force if

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necessary. The experience of the past decade demonstrates that Saddam Hussein shows no respect for negotiation, no respect for UN resolutions and no respect for international law. He responds only to force or the intention to use force. Any United Nations resolutions need to be backed up by that intention—an intention upon which we must be ready and willing to act.
That is a terrible eventuality to contemplate. The prospect of armed conflict, inevitable loss of human life and the individual suffering of innocent people caught up in events that they can neither influence nor understand is an awesome responsibility. But awesome too is the responsibility of failing to deal with the threat that is now so clear. If the Security Council does not press for unconditional and unrestricted access for UN inspectors, we must prepare for the eventuality that a uniquely aggressive dictator will ultimately use the monstrous weapons that he is developing. The threat would then be beyond our control and beyond that of the United Nations.
Many will ask what will happen next if there is armed intervention. How will it be done? When and how would those undertaking such action withdraw from Iraq? What is the exit strategy? The truth is that discussion of those questions in detail is not for today. If it comes to armed conflict, we shall need our forces to be as secure as possible. As always, the security and safety of our Armed Forces is paramount. As my right honourable friend's Statement made clear, the Government will keep Parliament in touch with all developments—particularly any that would lead us to military action, as we did over Kosovo and Afghanistan.
I can say that the government of Iraq is a matter for the Iraqi people. They deserve a better government—one based on the rule of law and respect for human rights; economic freedom; and a return to full membership of the international community. For its part, the international community has the right to look forward to an Iraqi regime that co-operates with the United Nations and plays a normal and peaceful role in the region and the world.
Hoping that things will get better is no answer. Delay will only worsen matters. Delay will allow Saddam Hussein to amass more anthrax, more VX, more sarin. It will allow him to develop the range of his missile systems. It will allow him to acquire fissile material to incorporate into his nuclear weapons and to integrate into his programmes. It will allow him to manipulate the UN, the very organisation on which we all depend to uphold the peace, security and international rule of law. That cannot be allowed to happen, for the sake of this generation and for our descendants. We have to be able to rely on the United Nations to uphold its ideals in principle and in practice.
The Government fully accept the gravity of the present moment. Today's recall of both Houses of Parliament is a clear testament to the seriousness of the threat facing us. But let us be equally clear that the message of the document the Government published
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today is a compelling and dreadful one: that in Saddam Hussein and his development of weapons of mass destruction, the man and means form a unique and terrible combination. It is a combination which is a threat to his own country, to his region and to the world. We now all look to the United Nations to have the determination to dismantle that threat.
As my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary made clear—unflinchingly, to all our friends as much as to others—the United Nations is the right place to pursue our determination. We believe that the time may be coming when we all have to turn that determination into action.
We do not seek this conflict. But we shall not turn our faces away. We shall confront this threat; and we shall continue in our determination to secure peace and stability for all countries of the region and the world. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation with regard to Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.—(Baroness Symons of Vernon Dean.)
1.2 p.m.
Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, I am sure all noble Lords will be grateful for the full way in which the noble Baroness set out the Government's approach to this crisis. We all look forward to the debate to come and I shall do my best not to stand in the way of that debate moving ahead given the huge expertise and experience upon this matter that will be mobilised this afternoon and evening—expertise and experience unequalled in any other forum.
We on these Benches, as we have already made clear, are not opposed—indeed we support it fully—to the Prime Minister's approach to a complex, fast-changing and extremely dangerous situation. But we reserve the right to ask a number of questions—indeed, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde has already put a number of them—and to be kept fully informed as the situation unfolds. In that I echo my noble friend; that it is difficult to be kept informed when we are presented with the dossier only a few hours before the debate on it.
I have read the dossier from cover to cover. But I cannot understand why it could not be published earlier. Though it brings together a good deal of fascinating detail—the intelligence people have done an excellent job—much of it already appears in a whole range of technical journals, on websites or in other intelligence reports. I cannot understand why it was not published last Friday. It would have made matters much easier for us.
In relation to the Prime Minister's and the Government's policy, the decision to take the UN route is the right one. That is not to say that we regard all the members of the UN, not even of the permanent members, as having impeccable records on human rights. Some of the component members in fact are far from that position. But taking the matter to the United Nations has brought the Arab countries and many others on side. That is a good thing. It is strongly to the Prime Minister's credit that, through his efforts at

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Camp David, that is the way the American administration is now going when a number of voices were being raised in Washington—they still are—saying that it was the wrong way to go.
Taking the issue to the United Nations raises a crop of new questions. How tough is the resolution we are now seeking? Is it the same as that put forward by President Bush or are we elaborating on that? Is the aim to help the inspectors identify in this enormous country—Iraq is huge—the weapons of mass destruction or to insist on the total, visible and verifiable destruction of those weapons? Or are we supporting the doctrine of coercive inspections which is now being vigorously developed by our opposite numbers in America and a number of other countries? Where do we stand in the end on the call for regime change and the rebuilding of a different kind of Iraq, which is the declared policy of a whole range of senior government officials in America? It is not just the talk of academics; regime change is their demand and their policy.
What will happen if no resolution is agreed? That is possible. Is it the Government's policy for us to go along with force anyway on the grounds that the resolutions have been flouted in the past, that the case stands and needs no legal reinforcement? I have no doubts that America can win on the battlefield. I do not share the view of those who say the whole military exercise will become bogged down in the sand. They said that at the time of the Gulf War when Kuwait was invaded. They were wrong then and will be wrong again. But can America win the politics and exactly what help do they want from us in winning the politics that will inevitably be thrown open in the new landscape that will emerge if force is used?
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, had some nice comments to make on the dossier. She urged us to read it and I did so. It contains a number of interesting matters. But it does not mention, as the noble Baroness pointed out, terrorism and September 11 last year. That is rather strange because our American friends do not make that distinction. American policy-makers, from the topmost level down, refer to the issues of the new war on global terrorism in the same breath as they refer to the need to deal with weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein. The fact is that where weapons of mass destruction meet global terrorism paves the way for unimaginable catastrophe. When the new kind of terrorist mentality combines with new weapons technologies, we are presented with a threat unprecedented in the history of mankind. That must be part of the case for the action now proposed.
Secretary Powell put it extremely well when he appeared in front of Congress the other day. He said,
"[at 9/11] the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat, a threat that could not be deterred…a threat that we could not allow to grow because of this connection between states developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organisations willing to use them without any compunction and in an undeterrable fashion. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is and will continue to be so for years to come".
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That states the broader case rather better than anything I have heard so far from the Government. If that is what is happening in Iraq, if there is a potential if not proven nexus between weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible hands that might use them, it makes the case for intervention even more overwhelming than it clearly is anyway.
We know that Saddam has biological and chemical weapons: botulinum and anthrax, gases, sarin and tabun—I believe he used tabun at Panjwin and at Halabja. I believe he used chlorine against the Iranians in the war and killed many thousands of Iranian troops in doing so. We know that he has been seeking nuclear weapons and trying to develop the infrastructure to complete and manufacture them. We know that Saddam Hussein is a homicidal and brutal individual who is ready to and has killed large numbers of Iraqi women and children. We know that he has a penchant for enormous palaces, which apparently contain not only domestic facilities but also all sorts of sinister weapons and other things.
We know that weapons of mass destruction are proliferating. The dossier does not provide an estimate, but it does not cover everything. However, it is estimated that 30 countries have the capacity to develop biological and chemical weapons and up to a dozen countries are seeking or trying to manufacture or already have nuclear weapons. If the BBC is to be believed—which is becoming difficult nowadays at times—this country is exporting to Iran parts of the component equipment necessary to develop its nuclear capacity.
A key question remains, even after reading the dossier: how does all this fit in with the dangerous new world of which we were given evidence on September 11th last year? And, if the case is to be well made from the proper moral high ground, how can we ensure that people understand that all these things are linked and that Saddam is part of a patchwork of enormous danger to us of a kind we have never faced before? That is the moral case for war and for putting a decisive stop to it all, by force if necessary, before it puts a stop to us. That is the case for the new doctrine of pre-emptive action; moving before and not after there are mass killings and mushroom clouds hanging over our cities.
I have some further questions for the Minister. What will happen later? Do we have a vision—I do—of a federal, democratic Iraq? The Kurds have said that they would like to go along with that; they do not want to break away from Iraq. Is there a possibility of a benign Iraq; a force for stability in the Middle East, instead of a force for evil and the culture of death? Is that wider vision in the Government's mind? We have not heard much about that, but it is important we should have such a wider vision. If we do, how is it to be secured? Should US troops, thousands of whom are already in the region, stay there for a long time and occupy the whole area? Are they ready to go into of her areas that might be at risk?

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Those questions hang in the air. We must have from the Government some indication of where we are going. As Clausewitz said, you should not take the first step in military action or towards war unless you have thought carefully about the last step as well.
I turn to the British role. Can we be more precise about our purposes and interests? I do not believe that the Americans can go it alone. Many senior American officials and academics believe that they can go it alone and that if the UN and the Europeans do not come along, they will have to do the business themselves. That is a mistaken view. Condoleezza Rice may have her thesis about the great powers, but in this modern globalised world the smaller nations are a vital part of the jigsaw.
Although I have not heard it from the Government, I believe that our Armed Forces and intelligence are crucial to the success of such a project, if force has to be used in the end. What about NATO? Do the Americans want NATO to play a part? We have conflicting views and reports from the United States. Do they want a rapid reaction force based on NATO as opposed to a European rapid reaction force? If so, who will go along with it? The French seem to be doubtful allies; the Germans are rudderless and have been stirring up anti-Americanism and vandalising the Atlantic alliance. They are now dependent on the Green Party, whose policy is to abandon nuclear power, encourage homosexual marriages and promote wind farms.
In my view all that makes nonsense of the common foreign and security policy, which I have always felt was a slightly dangerous illusion. Javier Solana has been trying to do noble work speaking for Europe on the Iraq crisis, but he cannot do so because there is no common basis. When he speaks, it is obviously not for the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister and for us.
There are questions about Saudi Arabia: is its support secure? If Saudi Arabia gets into difficulties, that will raise new crises and worries, many of which are currently in the minds of the oil and financial markets. What role will the Russians play? To begin with they sounded co-operative, then they began to be hostile about a new resolution. Now I am not sure where they stand, but their support is clearly necessary if the UN route is to be followed successfully. I presume they have some kind of price but we have not established what it is.
Field Marshal Montgomery once said that the first two principles of warfare are to identify the enemy and maintain your aim. President Bush, by being steadfast—as I believe he has been—has already moved Saddam a long way. We cannot trust Saddam; he has flouted every resolution, but there has been movement of some kind, which is good. But Monty also said—I use his phraseology—that "chaps must be kept in the picture". We and the public are the chaps in this case; the picture is fast changing and confusing. The Government direction is right and we are right to support it, but the Government and their allies must
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work much harder to keep the rest of us in the centre of the frame. That is where we all need to be as and when this perilous but necessary venture goes forward.
1.18 p.m.
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, in her detailed speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, referred at some length and with great power to the vicious behaviour of Saddam Hussein. No one on these Benches would disagree with that. But we have to be careful about an element of hypocrisy that is creeping into the debate. It is worth remembering that the United Kingdom and the United States never condemned the use of chemical weapons against Iran and against Iraq's own civilians. The United States voted against a UN resolution intended to condemn those actions and the United Kingdom—not, if I may say so, very impressively—abstained.
If we are serious about the possibility of going to war, we cannot pretend that the United Kingdom and the United States and other western countries have not been profoundly involved in bringing about this situation. As many noble Lords will know, the United Kingdom, the United States and other European countries continued to sell conventional arms to Iraq for years after it was clear that she was using unacceptable weapons. We must not try to wrap ourselves in a totally white sheet, as if we had nothing to do with the terrible crisis that now confronts us.
Secondly, nobody is suggesting for a moment that we do nothing. With great respect to the noble Baroness, who repeated several times that this was not an alternative, let me make it as clear as I can that we on these Benches are not suggesting that we do nothing. Rather, we are suggesting that the possibility of inspection be given a real opportunity to work and we are saying as loudly as we can that this is the best alternative for us.
The noble Baroness quoted substantially from the Prime Minster's Statement and from the dossier. Let me quote two passages from the dossier that are important in establishing that inspection could well be a successful and viable alternative to military action. I draw the attention of the House to page 27 of the dossier. I shall limit myself to two quotations. Paragraph 23 says:
"while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon".
Paragraph 25 says:
"The JIC"—
the Joint Intelligence Committee—
"assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile"—
one capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction—
"before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development".

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I provide a third quotation from the distinguished head of UNSCOM, Dr Rolf Ekeus, in an article called, "Yes, let's go into Iraq with an army of inspectors", published in the Washington Post on Sunday 15th September. He said:
"If we believe that Iraq would be much less of a threat without such weapons"—
weapons of mass destruction—
"the obvious thing is to focus on getting rid of the weapons. Doing that through an inspection team is not only the most effective way, but would cost less in lives and destruction than an invasion".
He went on to point out that President Bush, in what I felt was his otherwise striking and excellent speech to the United Nations, had drawn attention to his view that it was only an Iraqi defector—the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein—who gave evidence of the development of biological weapons in Iraq. Dr Ekeus, the head of the inspection team points out:
"the president does not appear to have been well briefed. In fact, in April 1995, four months before the Iraqi official defected, UN inspectors disclosed to the Security Council that Iraq had a major biological weapons program".
We need to be extremely careful about what we say. Some of the suggestions that the inspection regime was ineffective and slow and failed to detect important matters that were happening are largely not corroborated by the facts. We should be very careful about throwing cold water on the inspection regime.
One of the things that troubles us on these Benches is that there has been a deliberate attempt to throw cold water on the possibility of inspection. In that context, I was extremely disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, did not refer at any point in his very well informed speech to the possibility of inspection as an alternative to war.
I have to say again that we have a moral obligation to consider whether inspection might work as an alternative to war. The one thing we have to be clear about is that, as I have said before, any war will bring with it huge destruction and many deaths among innocents. None of us in this House can possibly say what may be the repercussions on the profoundly sensitive situation in the Middle East, deeply troubled as it is by the continuation of the dreadful low-level war between Israel and the Palestinians, which every day brings a new toll of unacceptable and vicious deaths on both sides and which continually infuses the anger and sense of injustice of many of the Arab governments, who believe that we have not adequately addressed the issue, nor seriously attempted to do so.
All of us on these Benches are deeply grateful to the Prime Minister for the efforts that he has made to persuade the United States to take the United Nations road, at least at this stage. He deserves great credit for that, as he deserves it for his earlier interventions, which we have reason to believe led to Iran not being included among those countries that might be seen as an immediate target of force. We owe him a great deal and I am sure that he has put in immense effort. It is important that President Bush came before the United Nations and, in doing so, effectively defied some of his louder and, if I may say so, more extreme voices,
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including Vice-President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who indicated that they regarded the UN as effectively a waste of time.
We cannot pretend that many of us are not deeply troubled by the consistently anti-UN tone of American opinion on the Right wing of the administration. That is one reason why we on these Benches continually reiterate the need to go through the United Nations and to do nothing to undermine the sole international body that we still have that is capable of building peace.
I have already said a few words about the lack of an exit strategy. I now quote from another source. I n leader, the International Herald Tribune commented on the statement of Secretary of State Colin Powell before Congress last week. It said:
"Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld each delivered lengthy statements to Congress last week arguing the case for action; strikingly, neither so much as mentioned the reconstruction problem".
That is another of our great concerns. I asked about it earlier. There is still no adequate indication that the United States Administration or—dare I say?—our own, have fully addressed this very difficult question.
I have two final points. One of our great worries is that unless we handle the whole issue with great sensitivity and handle the issue of inspection with a real commitment to making it work if it possibly can, we will profoundly offend opinion in many moderate Arab states—and not only in Arab states, but far beyond, in states such as Malaysia and Singapore, which have always been good allies of the West., in south-east Asia and beyond, in Pakistan and among Muslims in India. We will see a great multiplication of terrorism if we cannot show that we are treating the issue in the most cautious, careful and responsible way.
I conclude with a final question to the Government. I have all my life been a strong believer in the United States. It is, in my view, the world's greatest democracy, although I hope that India will one day be able to say that it is the other great democracy. However, having spent the past two months in a deeply divided United States in which respected voices such as former Vice-President Mondale, Senator Kerry, Senator Hagel of Nebraska, Senator Biden and many more, have cast grave doubts over the rhetoric of their own Right wing, I cannot pretend that we in this House cannot mention it. The issue is deeply troubling.
All too often that rhetoric has taken the form of destroying the fragile structures of multilateral international co-operation—from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Biological Weapons Convention. Many of us hoped and believed that those were part of the construction of a new international order of peace, democracy and mutual respect. We cannot pretend that in many ways the present Government have not been a critic of and have even undermined the multilateral structures of the UN and others.

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I turn to my final remark. I believe that we need to say to the Government that the doctrine of regime change is a terrifying one. If it were to be defined outside the structures of the United Nations—there is no question that the United Nations does and should deal with criminal acts against humanity; that is already its strength—let us consider what regime change might mean in India vis-à-vis Pakistan, in Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinian territory and in China vis-à-vis Taiwan. It is a doctrine that we should not play with—a doctrine of anarchy in international affairs.
I believe that in our support for the United States—I accept that support so far as concerns the Iraqi programme of mass destruction—we have a duty to be candid friends and, as such, to say to the US Administration: please be very careful about undermining multilateral structures and about using language which suggests that we are returning to the system of Westphalian nation states, which offers no answers to the terrible problems of terrorism that now confront our world.
1.31 p.m.
Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, I agree that there is nothing good about Saddam Hussein and the ruling clique that he controls so tightly in Iraq. The world could be a safer place if he were no longer in power. I say "could" because there can be no absolute about that judgment. What replaces the present odious regime should, first, be compared with it.
We have heard on both sides of the Atlantic that regime change is the political and strategic goal. Regime change is a shorthand phrase that encapsulates at least some of the current thinking and mood. Some might express it slightly differently and say merely that Saddam must go. Others might say that Iraq must give up its weapons of mass destruction.
But there must be more—much more—to these policy goals than just Saddam's removal or the verified elimination of his weapons of mass destruction. Change or removal of the Saddam regime is not a complete goal. Change or removal implies replacement. What, then, is to be the replacement regime? From whom and from where will the new regime spring? Can it be engineered overnight? A period of relative calm and stability within Iraq is surely necessary before such a successor regime can be up and running. Are we presuming that there will be elections? Elections in a country ruled as Iraq has been for so many years are not, for the Iraqi people, a tried and tested method of finding a new administration.
While there are, of course, many differences between the recent problems with Afghanistan and those in Iraq, there are some parallels, too. The Taliban were ousted. We wish to see Saddam's regime ousted. But, in spite of our best efforts, there is scarcely a stable and secure regime in Afghanistan nearly a year after the Taliban's removal. Tribal and ethnic differences in Afghanistan are causing difficulty. There will be difficulties between the different Arab groupings and the Kurds within Iraq following any removal of Saddam's regime.
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Western support and policing within Afghanistan are still essential. They could be no less essential in a new Iraq. How else could that country enjoy the stability and security so vital to any democratic process? How welcome in the region would be the necessary western forces required to ensure stability following the removal of Saddam? Indeed, can this task be left to regional countries alone? Have any of them yet made it clear that they would shoulder that demanding and critical role? We have had a good deal of difficulty persuading the Turkish Government to head up ISAF in Afghanistan.
Herein lies another uncertainty which must be resolved before we embark on any military onslaught. We need to be clear—and the neighbour countries in the Middle East that must be supportive of our operations if we are to succeed need to be clear—what the next stages of this campaign are going to be. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about the stages following any ousting of Saddam by a military operation. I am sure that there are such plans, but public support for any operation will much depend on understanding what is to happen once Saddam is gone. Let there be greater clarity and openness about that now so far as is possible.
There is another scenario which should have been foreseen and is now unfolding. If Saddam agrees to weapons inspections in a way that is acceptable to the United Nations, what then? Grounds for his immediate removal have gone. The rest of the world is left accepting his continuation in power. That is not regime change by any stretch of the imagination. Do those who speak of regime change dismiss all possibility that Saddam will comply, or at least appear to' wish to comply, with the United Nations demands in an acceptable way? What is it that makes them so certain that this time he is not sincere?
Many leaderships in the world—not all of them so despised as that in Iraq—have concerns about what to them seem to be dictatorial demands and restrictive conditions expressed by the United States and sometimes our own Government and which to them appear to challenge their legitimate authority and that of others. There is an important dividing line between the clear and wholly justifiable defence of our national interests and a wider wish to coerce renegade states to adopt the image favoured in western mature democracies.
At a recent gathering of a dozen heads of state and government of developing nations, which I attended in Malaysia last month, I witnessed at first hand the irritation and shared concern about what they perceived to be unwarranted and unsolicited interference in their affairs and conduct by Her Majesty's Government. Some of that anger had not dissipated weeks later in Johannesburg, when we heard some deplorable personal attacks on our Prime Minister. So often such differences arise because there is insufficient opportunity to talk through the issues and seek a way forward.
Who of status in the West has talked recently with Saddam Hussein? Megaphone diplomacy has a place in world affairs but it should not be the only means of

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communication. I hope that there are wise heads working behind the scenes to ensure that the reasons for disagreement are being discussed and, it is to be hoped, can be resolved. The use of force to pre-empt a perceived problem is, indeed, a drastic step to take. It must be the last option for the Government to approve and only when they are able to demonstrate that all others have failed or will not work.
One wonders what has happened to the once fashionable and effective policy of deterrence. In the Gulf conflict we deterred Saddam from using his weapons of mass destruction. We knew that he had chemical and biological capabilities. We were very concerned that he might employ them, particularly as we were going to invade Iraq to ensure the overwhelming defeat of the Iraqi Republican Guard forces. We took a number of steps to help to protect our forces from that chemical and biological threat.
In the event—there is reliable intelligence to support this view—he was deterred by a threat not to rule out the use of nuclear force. Why is such a deterrent policy no longer considered effective? What has changed since 1991 that now makes it an unreasonable alternative to pre-emptive attack on Iraq? Indeed, why is it inconceivable that Saddam sees possession of his weapons of mass destruction as his safeguard against invasion?
Finally, if force is to be the chosen method, I hope that the Government will heed the advice that they will receive from the chiefs of staff about the scale of commitments that our forces should undertake. There is still great concern about the level of manning in frontline and ancillary units. The Defence Medical Services, so essential if we suffer casualties, are in a parlous state. Shortfalls exist in logistic support and weapon stocks. The less the immediate threat to our national interests, the more important it is that we do not throw all we have into a less than critical adventure.
It takes no great effort of lateral thinking to say that we cannot rule out that Saddam would be provoked to use his weapons of mass destruction if Iraq were to be invaded. Our forces must be fully protected against such an eventuality.
I look forward to being reassured by the Minister that the concerns that I have expressed are appreciated and that solutions to them have been developed.
1.41 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of London: My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am particularly grateful for the sober and judicious tone of the dossier and for the way it focuses so strictly upon one issue: the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Over the last few weeks, the whole debate has been somewhat confused by lumping together a number of themes best disentangled. These themes might be headlined as terror, threat and tyranny.
First, terror there have been suggestions that Iraq, like former Afghanistan, is a rogue state sponsoring international terrorism and implicated in the Al'Qaeda network. There are, of course, a number of
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other much more plausible suspects. Having heard the introductory statements, particularly that of the noble Baroness, I welcome the fact that no one in your Lordships' House is arguing this connection as a reason for immediate intervention. It is extraordinarily important in the context of inter-faith relations to underline the fact that the present Iraqi regime is not notably Islamic. It embraces a great variety of believers of various religions and its ideological base is fairly hostile to an Islamic regime.
Secondly, threat—the dossier proves that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction and that he has re-animated this programme in recent years. As the noble Baroness underlined, he probably does not as yet possess a nuclear capability. However, memory of Scud missile attacks confirms that, if the chance arises, lie is prepared to use his weapons. The threat is real but the policy of containment with the use of overwhelming force if the Iraqi regime were again to attack any of its neighbours seems to have had, to date, a limited effectiveness. It is still very difficult to see what precisely has changed in the last few months to provoke immediate and urgent action. The dossier underlines the vital importance of the return of the weapons inspection regime, leading to disarmament. But faced with the threat clearly delineated in the dossier, merely stating a preference for peace hardly seems adequate in the circumstances.
Some religious talk about peace seems to be conducted at such an altitude that it can have no impact on the decisions that actually have to be made on the ground. Such hyper-moralism lacks practical wisdom. We are in a situation in which the old doctrines of deterrence have been undermined by the character of modern terrorism, revealed on 9/11. War is always a failure and many components of classical moral reflections on the conduct of war remain relevant, notably the imperative to avoid as much innocent suffering as possible. This is an imperative in Iraq, a country with a rich and ancient culture whose people have suffered grievously over the past decade.
Nevertheless, in view of the destructiveness of the tools available to modern terrorists and states, the use of pre-emptive strikes where a well-proven threat exists should not, a priori, be ruled out. There are situations in which the rapid and limited deployment of force can avert even more serious conflict. A example would be the Rhineland in 1936. The people who created the climate in which appeasement became practical politics never had to share the obloquy which fell on Chamberlain and his colleagues.
After terror and threat, we come to an especially difficult aspect of the situation facing us now: tyranny. There is no doubt that the regime is tyrannical. It is widely hated among the mosaic of people who compose modern Iraq. The exposure of violence and injustice inflicted by regimes on their own people has led to demands which governments find it very difficult to resist: that "something should be done". These demands are often fitful and fuelled by media focus and attention. But one of the conditions of stability in the modern world is predictability. If perceived tyranny, often one-sidedly depicted by the

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media, justified intervention by western powers at a time when our technical military superiority is approaching 19th century proportions, then the fears of many states throughout the world would be dramatically increased. I remember Russian friends at the time of the attack on Serbia, saying, "Are we next?" There are huge dangers in this unpredictability.
We need an international process to judge which instances of internal state conflict really demand the intervention of outside powers. No state, however powerful, should be left as judge and jury. There is only one institution remotely capable of helping to form such judgments and that is the United Nations. It is encouraging that President Bush has resisted the unilateralist faction that wanted to exclude the UN from the equation. As other noble Lords have said, there is some danger of setting the UN up for a failure. The UN is indispensable but urgently needs reform, support and endorsement if it is to do the work that our dangerous world demands.
To be specific, we need support and a development of the peace prevention capacity of the UN. We need reform of the Security Council to reflect the realities of power in today's world and to reflect the change in the pattern of conflict which we face. We need an end to the politicisation of appointments in the UN, which sometimes makes it a somewhat cynical environment. Above all, the nation-building capacity of the UN needs to be properly funded and supported by adequate police forces and judicial services. We need an enthusiasm for nation-building equal to the fervour which often accompanies a call to arms.
The Americans have made it clear that they do not regard nation-building as their remit. However, rebuilding Afghanistan after decades of civil war is going to take immense international commitment. Otherwise that country will unravel once again and return to the kind of anarchy which favours terrorists. The Prime Minister's own undertaking, given in the Statement delivered by the noble and learned Lord, is in this context particularly welcome.
I remember visiting Kosovo soon after the arrival of KFOR to meet the admirable sergeant major from the detention centre in Colchester who was in charge of the central gaol, housing the UCK downstairs and Serbs upstairs. They had to rely on such expertise. It is in all our interests that a reformed UN should have the capacity to tackle the longer-term problems of prevention and transformation.
President Bush has served notice on the UN and demanded action. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will encourage our American allies to follow up that re-engagement with the UN and their settling of the arrears question with a real determination to increase the effectiveness of the organisation.
If we miss the present opportunity of unchallenged and relatively benign American hegemony to strengthen the international institutional and legal framework, we shall enter the next historical period—when most probably Asia has re-asserted herself—in a
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paranoid frame of mind. In consequence, we shall be exposed to yet more waste of precious resources and brainpower as we devise ever more devastating ways of killing one another.
It seems to me that the shadow of the League of Nations hangs over this debate. Just as with the League in its own day, the influence of the UN depends on members' willingness to work through it. That means that the rule of international law, embodied first in the League and now in the UN, depends on the political will of the members. Last time, the strength of pacifism in Britain and France made public sentiment studiously passive in international affairs. If we fail to have a clear vision of international order and of how to secure it, recent experience suggests that there are extremist groups in the world determined to fill that vacuum.
1.52 p.m.
Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, I should begin with a declaration of interest. I am privileged to be president of the World Disarmament Campaign and of the One World Trust, although they should not be blamed for any of my shortcomings. It is always a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, whose friendship I greatly value. If those movements fall into the category that had the misfortune of attracting his strictures, that is, I fear, something that I must bear with fortitude.
I echo the right reverend Prelate's commendation of the tone of the Government's assessment and of the very fair way in which my noble friend introduced this debate. It is an emotive subject and it is good that we can discuss it in the relative tranquillity of your Lordships' Chamber.
It is no part of my intention to defend Saddam Hussein. Some of us were denouncing his activities long years ago, before Desert Storm. For my part, I should welcome a resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly or some other indication of international opinion as to the next steps, although I should certainly hope that that would refer to the question of inspection.
The question to be answered is: in the absence of such a resolution or indication, by what authority could President Bush appoint himself judge of when the situation requires military intervention, with all its tragic consequences? Some have pointed to the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. My Lords, Article 51 protects,
"the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs".
The immediate difficulty with that argument is that Iraq has not launched an armed attack on the United States or, at the moment, on anyone else. It is arguable that, although Article 51 does not say so, it includes a right to launch a pre-emptive strike if a state is threatened with armed attack. But that does not assist the argument, because it has not been suggested that Iraq is contemplating an armed attack on the United States.

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Those who seek to justify that line of reasoning are led to say that "armed attack" may now include harbouring or assisting terrorists. I should not seek to deny that there may be situations in which that is so. That was the justification used for intervention in Afghanistan, and in that instance the case was pretty clear. I am certainly not arguing against international accountability for horrendous crimes. That is why the American opposition to the International Criminal Court is so regrettable.
What is worrying is that there appears to be no greater evidence that Iraq is harbouring terrorists than that Iran, Libya or a number of other countries are doing so. There is a widespread anxiety, which we should take seriously, that if President Bush reserves for himself the right to decide, no one can be sure whose turn it will be next. Has he a shopping list?
Perhaps it would help to turn to the other justifications that have been offered for military intervention. In what respect is the argument unique to Iraq? One reason that is offered is that Iraq is either now in a position, or is likely soon to be in a position, to launch weapons of mass destruction. That seems to have been the burden of most of the debate. I do not venture a judgment because I have not had an opportunity to read fully and carefully the assessment. However, if it transpires to be so, it would not surprise me. For the present, I am prepared to assume that it is so. Of course, that is extremely worrying. If I may, I shall return in a moment to what we could be doing about it. But a growing number of other countries, some of which also have pretty ugly records, are in the same position. That cannot of itself justify an attack on Iraq unless we concede a right for America to attack India, Pakistan, North Korea or, for that matter, the United Kingdom.
The argument can be sustained only if one divides the world into the good guys and the bad guys. Only the good guys are allowed to have weapons of mass destruction, and to have them one requires a licence from the American Government. Iraq may well be in breach of a number of Security Council resolutions but that strengthens the case, surely, for seeking a United Nations decision before intervening.
The way in which to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction is to press on with making more effective international agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby. That imposes obligations not only on the non-nuclear states but also on the nuclear powers to negotiate in good faith for total nuclear disarmament. They have not. The noble Baroness suggested that there was an element of hypocrisy. I am not sure whether hypocrisy may not be better than shamelessness, but the fact remains that they have not done so. There will be an opportunity for that in Geneva next year at the preparatory talks for the next review of the treaty. Perhaps when my noble friend replies he will indicate the Government's intentions about that. Unhappily, it is now the declared policy of America to do the reverse: to escalate the development of nuclear weapons.
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We have heard a further justification for American intervention. The new policy blueprint, launched by President Bush on Friday, contains the following paragraph:
"The US National Security Strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better".
What is questionable is whether other states accept that as the criterion for establishing who is to be labelled the good guys or the bad guys. Certainly America is entitled to defend its own values but it does not follow that everyone has to share that. The American Government are realistic enough to know that security does not consist in weapons alone. Like the Roman empire—and, later, the British empire—they recognise the importance of establishing a hegemony over the values and cultures of the rest of the world. To earn the label of "good guys", we need to be good honorary Americans.
I echo what the noble Baroness said. Far be it from me to denounce the American way of life. It includes some highly commendable elements. However, it is understandable if other nations do not necessarily accept that criterion for admission to the international community.
We can debate whether all that is capable of falling within Article 51. The problem is that these days events move quickly. International law is a living and evolving body of principles, not something set in stone. But that serves only to emphasise the danger of leaving individual governments to their own interpretation of international law.
Perhaps it is more sensible to speak not of what is lawful but of what is legitimate. Legitimacy is a less precise concept but I suggest that it is a recognition among a wide section of the international community that in the circumstances a particular course of action would be just, proportionate and best calculated to limit the total damage. Commendably, it was that for which President Bush appeared to be arguing at the General Assembly. But he rather spoiled the effect by adding that, even if the international community disagreed with him, he would proceed undeterred. "I would like you to agree with me, but it won't make any difference whether you do or don't.
I do not doubt that he believes he is right; and that is just the problem. Anarchy is rarely about everyone doing what they know to be wrong. It is more usually everyone doing what they individually believe to be right. I greatly commend the efforts of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister for attempts to persuade the international community. I believe that that is the way forward".
Sometimes, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London said, the United Nations Charter seems designed to protect inertia rather than to encourage positive, collective action. But there is no better barometer of legitimacy. Those who cannot persuade the international community that they are right are probably wrong, and they certainly lack legitimacy. Our own Government have a good record and a good

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reputation. It would be a pity to lose that by proceeding in the absence of substantive international support.
Perhaps I may make one final plea. For years some of us have been calling for the long-awaited fourth special session on disarmament where the world can discuss the next steps to limit access to weapons of mass destruction. We have been repeatedly told that the time was not right. If that meant that the world did not see a need for further steps, surely it sees them now. Perhaps when the Minister replies, she can tell us something of the Government's thinking on that. But surely the time has come to accept that in future it will not do to wait until a crisis is upon us before we consider how it might have been avoided.
2.2 p.m.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, there are another 60 speakers. I shall be brief. In common with most of your Lordships, I greatly welcome the Prime Minister's decision to recall Parliament to discuss the Iraqi situation. I regret the fact that the dossier for which we have all been waiting was not ready until early this morning. Despite what the Leader of the House said, I think that it would have been better for your Lordships to have been able to see the evidence on which the Government's policy is based at a reasonable time before this debate.
However, there are a number of issues upon which I think that we are all agreed. There is no doubt that Iraq possesses biological and chemical weapons. It may well be that it is on the road to possessing nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. If it is not at present, I am quite sure that Saddam Hussein will go on trying to do so. There is no question that the regime is thoroughly unpleasant, has been aggressive on two occasions against its neighbours, is brutally oppressive to its own people and, as long as it has these weapons of mass destruction, can in no sense be relied upon not to use them.
We are all equally agreed that Saddam Hussein is a thoroughly unpleasant character, unscrupulous and cruel and, at the same time, a cunning and devious politician. I have met him on two occasions and, to say the least of it, did not come away with a very favourable impression. It is equally true that Iraq is in breach of a number of Security Council resolutions, not least the obligation to accept weapons inspectors and disarmament, although it must be said—it is not in mitigation—that it is not alone in ignoring UN resolutions. That I would say is common ground.
The question is this: what should we do about it? I am sure that it was right for the United States to go to the United Nations Security Council. I am equally sure that the Prime Minister played a part in achieving that result and I applaud him for it.
Unilateral action by the United States would have caused the greatest possible division, not just in the Arab world but also in Europe and elsewhere. The consequences would have been far reaching. The fact that Iraq has now said that the UN weapons inspectors
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can now return is not in itself enough. We have seen the impediments, prevarications, and obstacles which the Iraqis have put previously in the way of the inspectors. It is fair to assume that Saddam Hussein will use exactly the same delaying tactics again. Indeed, there are already indications of qualifications about what the weapons inspectors can or cannot see.
I believe, therefore, that the United States is right in insisting upon a new resolution which will place an obligation on the Iraqis not just to facilitate the work of the inspectors but also to disarm and to put a time limit and provisions for taking action if they do not comply. We have seen too much delay and obstruction. I hope and believe that such a resolution will gain the support of members of the Security Council.
It may well be that as a result there will be a change of regime in Iraq which, of course, is much to be hoped for. But if that does not happen, I am not clear what the United States' position is. It speaks of the imperative of a change of regime. But how will it bring that about, and on what basis? If the weapons inspectors have done their job properly and the weapons of mass destruction currently in the hands of the Iraqis have disappeared, Saddam Hussein does not cease to be a threat to the people of Iraq but he ceases to be a threat to his neighbours. It is on the basis of his possession of these weapons that we are now concerned. On what basis should be be removed? If he were to be removed, who would take his place? Would it be a government appointed by the United States? It is almost impossible to see how a fair, democratic election could take place in Iraq at present. The country is split religiously and racially. There are no obvious opposition leaders.
Those questions need to be asked and answered. One might go further. If Saddam Hussein has no weapons of mass destruction, he is no more dangerous to the rest of the world than other dictators and despots who oppress their citizens. Mugabe immediately comes to mind. He is no threat to our security but he is inflicting on his fellow citizens cruelties, discrimination and hardship. So far as I know, no one has yet suggested a compulsory change of his regime by force or otherwise. Would not such an action on the part of the United States set a precedent which it would be very difficult to accept in other cases? It seems to me that these are very important issues and I hope that the Government will think very carefully before accepting proposals for a change of regime of that kind. But on the issue of the inspectors and a new Security Council resolution, I am wholly on the side of the United States, and I hope that the House will show its support.
2.10 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Hillhead: My Lords, I agree with all of the clearly stated premises of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and with nearly all of his conclusions.
I have found this issue more perplexing than almost any that I can remember in my now excessively long political life. I have a high regard for the Prime

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Minister. I have been repelled by attempts to portray him as a vacuous man with an artificial smile and no convictions. I am reminded of similar attempts by a frustrated Right to suggest that Gladstone was mad, Asquith was corrupt and Attlee was negligible. My view is that the Prime Minister, far from lacking conviction, has almost too much, particularly when dealing with the world beyond Britain. He is a little too Manichaean for my perhaps now jaded taste, seeing matters in stark terms of good and evil, black and white, contending with each other, and with a consequent belief that if evil is cast down good will inevitably follow. I am more inclined to see the world and the regimes within it in varying shades of grey. The experience of the past year, not least in Afghanistan, has given more support to that view than to the more Utopian one that a quick "change of regime" can make us all live happily ever after.
I can understand the desire of the Prime Minister to maintain close relations with America, and to keep open the relatively narrow window through which the present United States Administration looks out to international opinion, as opposed to contemplating its own vast preponderance of power and feeling that this gives it a right and a duty to arbitrate the world.
That preponderance is almost without precedent in world history. Whether it is healthy for the world or comfortable for America's allies, let alone its proclaimed enemies, is open to argument. In the strenuous and sometimes frightening days of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, I would never have believed that one might, 20 years later, feel a twinge of nostalgia for the balances of the Cold War, for the nearly equal strain on the tug-of-war and for America's careful cultivation of its European allies that that involved.
I have long been a natural pro-American. Ever since I first went to America in 1953, I have remained half-captivated by the vitality of its life, the quality of at least some of its leaders and the fascinating complications of its political institutions. I have never seen a conflict between my European commitment and a desire to maintain a strong transatlantic link. Indeed, I think that one of the major recurring mistakes of British foreign policy since the war has been to believe that we should get on better with the Americans if we avoided too much entanglement in Europe. In fact, for a 40-year period, our unwillingness to play a full part in Europe was an exacerbating rather than a helpful factor in our relations with the United States. They were impatient with our exclusiveness.
By the same token, I have always been loath to use the term "special relationship". It is too unequal a relationship—the reality being that it is more special on one side than on the other—for that to be a wise label.
It is, of course, right—as my noble friend Lady Williams so eloquently set out in her brilliant speech earlier—fully to involve the UN in any action that may be taken against Iraq. Mr Blair deserves full credit for the persuasiveness with which he evidently spoke to President Bush on this issue. But involving the UN
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does not in itself absolve us from the responsibility of exercising cool judgment about what requests we put before the UN. Here I find considerable logical inconsistencies in what appears to be the policy of the American Government, and to some extent of the British Government too.
The reason why the international agenda has greatly changed in the past twelve and a half months is that individual acts of terrorism far exceeding anything hitherto known were then inflicted on New York. But they were not acts of governmental aggression, even though a number of states, with greatly varying degrees of complicity, bear some responsibility for having harboured and even trained, knowingly or unknowingly, those who committed the atrocity. What is wholly understandable is the overwhelming desire of the US Government to reduce the likelihood of any repetition of such attacks, either on themselves or on others.
But that is different from and does not appear to me to be very closely linked with the undesirable possession—or the desire for possession—by a number of states and by one obnoxious regime in particular of what are now commonly called. "weapons of mass destruction".
The problems are not the same, and the remedies are not necessarily the same. Indeed, it can be argued that an armed attack to take out this contingent future threat could increase the danger of scattered groups of terrorists attempting a repeat of 9/11.
Furthermore, when we have embarked on a policy of taking out undesirable regimes by external armed force, where do we stop? There are a number of regimes which either have or would like to have nuclear weapons. I, and, I guess, the majority of your Lordships, would much rather they did not have them. But it would be difficult to justify a policy of taking them out seriatim with either common sense or international law.
I raise these issues not with a desire to be negative—I recognise the immensely difficult problem facing Her Majesty's Government—but because I believe that there is an urgent need for clarity on them both from our own Government and from that of the United States. It is no answer just to brand anyone who raises them as a lily-livered appeaser who refuses to learn the lessons of history—particularly when that history is presented so crudely as to line up Winston Churchill with the gung-ho battalions, which shows a great ignorance of his words at the time of Suez as well as his caution about pre-emptive strikes at the time of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936.
I am in favour of courage—who is ever not in the abstract?—but not of treating it as a substitute for wisdom, as I fear we are currently in danger of doing.
2.19 p.m.
Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank: My Lords, if possible, like, I imagine, the whole House, I wish to see this matter solved without conflict. We are under no illusion that there are both political and military difficulties with operations against Saddam Hussein.

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If successful action is not taken by the United Nations, the threat that Saddam Hussein poses will continue to increase. It is a serious threat now, and the longer action is avoided the greater it will become with regional and international security being put at risk. That includes the security of our own citizens.
One hears political and military arguments that are against action at all costs. It is easy to take counsel of one's own fears. Iraq is a functioning and a cruel dictatorship. It will not be like Afghanistan, which is a failed country with warring tribes. The European allies of the United States are nervous and, in some cases, hostile to its aims. Many of Iraq's neighbours are unreliable, suffering in the region will increase, and international economies and the oil supply will be affected. What happens when Saddam Hussein falls? Will he retaliate with weapons of mass destruction if attacked? All those questions need to be addressed and considered very carefully. However, I do not believe that any of them should deflect us if, in the end, we need to take action.
Most of those who cry for what they call "incontrovertible evidence" do not, I believe, really understand what they are asking for. One can never be absolutely certain what Saddam Hussein will do and what his intentions, which change very quickly, are. But we know his record very well—the atrocities he has committed against his own people, his invasion of other countries, and his use of weapons of mass destruction against the Iranians and the Kurds. We know what he has said about Israel and its destruction. We also have evidence of his constant efforts to acquire weapons and their delivery means. He has sought to conceal or disguise his production capabilities in clear violation of his cease-fire obligations. Today, after nearly four years without inspectors, we should be most concerned.
I find the dossier on Saddam's activities produced today both compelling and chilling. I believe that it is very well supported by an excellent document produced at the beginning of this month by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. As the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said, it was only last week in the United Nations that the Iraqi Foreign Minister was lying about weapons of mass destruction and the holdings that they have. How can Saddam be trusted?
I applaud. It is quite right for the Prime Minister to ensure that the United Nations search for a solution. However, even though I am a strong supporter of the United Nations, I remain rather sceptical that this route will work. The United Nations' record of enforcing resolutions as far as concerns Iraq has, at best, been patchy. I believe I know what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, meant in her remarks, but I am rather of the view that the inspectors were not awfully successful. It was not their shortcomings; it was the way they were treated and handled by Saddam Hussein and his regime.
If any resolution is passed in the United Nations, I agree that it must be unequivocal as to what is expected of Saddam Hussein. It must be enforced, with a strict
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timetable being set to which he must adhere. I also agree with all that has been said about its importance. It must be supported. However, I have some sympathy with President Bush when he questions whether the UN will remain little more than a debating society: it does need reforming.
If asked, can the military eliminate Saddam's arsenal? I am not privy to intelligence and planning, but, from my own experience, I believe that although there are risks success can certainly be achieved, and achieved quickly. The Iraqi army is demoralised. It is much smaller than it was at the time of the Gulf War, and it is poorly equipped and supplied as a result of sanctions. The Iraqi army does not have a reputation of standing and fighting for Saddam Hussein. If, unfortunately, it comes to it and the United States conducts an operation both from the ground and in the air—supported, it is to be hoped, by the British and other allies—it is my view that the regime would fall and our aim very quickly achieved.
Of course we wish to avoid conflict. We want the United Nations to succeed. But the time is approaching when we may have to join the United States in operations against Iraq. If we take counsel of our fears, we will find the problem far, far greater in the years to come. Wait, and the threat grows. Strike soon, and the threat will be less and easier to handle. If the United Nations route fails, I support the second option.
2.27 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, I believe that the United States of America, as the one super power, does have a grave responsibility to use its power in the interest of international order. It is not just a question of their own national interest, influential though that obviously is. I therefore welcome their continuing role in relation to Iraq. I also welcome the fact that our own Prime Minister has kept close to the Government of the United States and has, I believe, influenced them in approaching the United Nations for a fresh mandate. I also admire the way that the Prime Minister has, in the past, urged armed military intervention in the face of many sceptics, as he did over Kosovo, and the way that he takes the Iraqi threat seriously. For it is serious.
Nevertheless, military action is no less serious and fraught with unpredictable consequences. The long tradition of Christian thinking on the morality of war urges that a number of key criteria have to be met before it can be regarded as morally legitimate. First, there must be lawful authority. Although there can be extreme situations when a nation might have to act without the consent of the United Nations, in the modern world where we are trying to build a greater sense of an international authority the UN must be regarded as that highest authority which, under normal circumstances, alone has the legal authority to initiate military action. So I welcome the attempt to obtain a new UN resolution. But without such explicit authorisation, whether in terms of a reaffirmation of earlier resolutions or a fresh one, the present basis for military action is dubious; and, if the war aims include a regime change, worse than dubious.

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The second condition that must be met is that there must be a just cause. The Christian tradition has never confined this purely to self-defence. If a threat is real, serious and immediate, there might indeed be a proper moral reason for pre-emptive action. This is obviously a crucial area for looking very carefully at the evidence. Like other noble Lords, I am grateful to the dossier provided by the Government for its objective tone. But I do not believe that the Government's assessment, any more than that in the report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, reveals much more than what we already knew—namely, that by the time the UN inspectors left in 1998 the Iraq nuclear capability had been incapacitated as had most of its chemical warfare stocks, but that a very significant biological weapon capacity remained. Furthermore, we knew that, since the inspectors left Iraq, it has taken steps to rebuild its nuclear weapons programme.
Nevertheless, while Saddam Hussein is certainly taking all steps to rebuild his programme, he has not yet done so. As paragraph 23 of Chapter 3 of the report states, the JIC judged earlier this year that,
"while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon".
Sanctions have been reasonably successful. They could continue to be so.
A policy of containment and deterrence has worked for more than 10 years now. Although the situation has obviously changed somewhat since the UN inspectors left, it has not, despite Saddam Hussein's efforts, dramatically changed. It has not changed enough to justify the hugely dangerous critical threshold of military action.
The third condition which must be met is that war must be a last resort. Every attempt to resolve the dispute by peaceful means must first have been tried and found to have failed. Iraq has said that it will have the UN inspectors back again. There is every reason to accept that offer and to continue to press both for UN inspectors being there and their having unfettered access. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said:
"The possibility of inspection must be given a real chance to work".
The fourth criterion that must be met is that the evil unleashed by war must not be greater than the evil which would ensue if military action was not taken. That is, of course, a very difficult area of political and military judgment. I shall simply quote the position taken by the Episcopal Church of the United States in June of this year, a view reiterated by its presiding bishop on 6th September. He stated:
"Military action would surely inflame the passions of millions, particularly in the Arab world, setting in motion cycles of violence and retaliation, further straining tenuous relationships that exist between the United States and other nations".
Fifthly, as a consequence of that fourth condition, there must be a reasonable prospect of success. I defer to the judgment of noble and gallant Lords in the House on that issue. I simply note that none of' the factors which made military success possible in Afghanistan seem to be present in Iraq.
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I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I stress that not only am I not a pacifist but I am a long-standing opponent of the crypto-pacifism which has infiltrated too many Church statements. I do not think we can talk about peace without reckoning seriously with the need for military force in order to maintain international order.
I found that with much moral fear and spiritual trembling I supported a policy of nuclear deterrence in the bad days of the Cold War. I supported military action in the Falklands, against Iraq in 1990 and in Afghanistan last year. I believe that we should have intervened much earlier than we did in the aftermath of the break up of Yugoslavia. I took such positions because I believed that the conditions for force to be used in a morally licit way were met. I do not believe that on present evidence the criteria are met for military action against Iraq.
The Iraqi threat is serious. Saddam Hussein has, as we know, used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. He is trying to build up his capacity and would use such weapons if it were to his advantage to do so, or, if he felt threatened, that he had nothing to lose by using them. He is not to be trusted. But a policy of containment and deterrence has worked so far. Saddam Hussein has had such weapons for 20 years. He has not used them since 1988, not even amid the 1991 Gulf War. The most likely way for Saddam Hussein to think seriously of using his weapons would be if his very survival were threatened. So, as Sir Michael Quinlan stated in an important article in the Financial Times on 7th August:
"To pre-empt the use of biological or chemical weapons by adopting the one course of action most apt to provoke it seems bizarre".
As he also said:
"If further strengthening of containment be thought necessary, there are ways to achieve that: the international community could declare that Iraqi use of biological or chemical weapons would be treated unequivocally as a crime against humanity".
The Prime Minister's Statement referred to the need to back diplomacy by the threat of force. For the threat to be credible Saddam Hussein has to believe that force might be used. But if it came to using that force it would almost certainly precipitate the use of those very chemical and biological weapons which the threat was designed to avert.
I believe that, tragically, military force does sometimes have to be used in this world to maintain some kind of rough and ready order. I admire the Prime Minister's moral courage and willingness to use such force where necessary. I believe that it is essential to continue to press for the implementation of UN Resolution 687. But although Saddam Hussein remains a threat—and he will continue to remain a threat—the evidence that would necessitate military action overriding all other considerations is not in my judgment yet there.
2.35 p.m.
Baroness Uddin: My Lords, I rise with great trepidation in your Lordship's House, more so than ever before, not least because I lack the expertise of

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conflict and war which has been referred to today, but also because dissent is often deemed unwise. I was tremendously humbled by the knowledge of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer. I echo many of the sentiments expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams.
I start as a Muslim. The majority of my community in this country and Muslims of the world do not need to be reminded that Saddam Hussein is not held in any great esteem. There is no tolerance for his continuous existence. Long before the West made him its favourite public enemy number one, he was the nightmare of most of the Muslim world. Mr Hussein, armed to the teeth by the West and funded by some Arab countries, is perhaps responsible for the deaths of more Muslims than any other person in history. We know that. It has been stated over and over again.
Sadly, when he served western interests no one cared what he did. When he gassed over 5,000 of his own people in Halabja in 1988 I remember no condemnation, no sanctioning of Iraq and no bombing of Baghdad. So I am glad that, for current convenience at least, there is official condemnation of those imperilled in Halabja in 1988.
Many of us are in total bewilderment at the present situation. We know that the Saddam Hussein of the 1980s is the exact Saddam Hussein—a little older—that we see today. So what has changed? It is believed in the Muslim and Arab worlds that this is a fight against Islam by the West, no matter how much reassurance we give—my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has stated again and again that that is not the view of ordinary people in the streets of the Muslim world—and that it is the next phase of destroying innocent Muslim lives and their countries, and that it is about the politics of oil and of revenge. These are the assumptions and conclusions of the ordinary folk of the Muslim world.
So it is perceived that nothing has changed except our backbone, and that we in Britain are betraying our morality, our integrity. Our stance on the matter of war against Iraq is perhaps said to be exposing our hypocrisy and our lack of honour. It is alleged that it displays the kind of abandonment of Palestine for which we were responsible well over 50 years ago. All these feelings are evident again in the Muslim world.
I feel that it is my responsibility to share with your Lordships a few observations that I noted during my recent travels in the Middle East.
I returned a couple of days ago from Egypt. During my visit I met hundreds of women from all over the Arab world, intelligent women who appear totally confused particularly about Britain's antics and role in the current Middle East conflict. America's belligerence and injustice hurt and sadden them, but Britain's lost sense of justice and honour traumatise them. Those are words used by women who represent the very highest offices in much of the moderate Muslim world.
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They ask why we are so keen to ensure that Saddam Hussein sticks to UN resolutions but let Israel, literally, get away with murder. Why are we so worried about the alleged weapons of destruction in Iraq but turn a blind eye to Israel's massive arsenal which is causing death and mayhem to the Palestinian people today? Why make a difference between the evil that is Sharon and that which is Saddam Hussein?
The ordinary man in the street in the Arab and Muslim world does not make a distinction between the bellicose American regime and the current regime of Saddam Hussein. We may not like it, but that is the truth. America is seen to be turning a blind eye to state terrorism perpetrated by Israel against the innocent of Palestine and doing nothing. I believe that in Britain we do not have to be associated with such divisive death and destruction.
Any decision we make now will have a massive impact on our image and, more importantly, our role in the future of the Middle East—a crucial part of the world, whether we like it or not. I do not believe that it is necessary for us to lose our moral and ethical direction for short-term temporary gain. I do not know what those gains are, but I assume there are some gains. We must not only have the courage to base our decisions on justice and fair play; we must also be prepared to lead others. That is what the moderate Muslim world expects of us.
Much of the moderate Muslim world hopes that we shall set a higher moral standard than America. A war against Iraq is not acceptable. The King of Jordan and the President of Egypt say that. I believe that we owe them some attention. Left to the fanatics of the countries that we are now attacking, or wish to attack, then the future holds out very little hope. In addition, it will do the innocent people in the region no good. Only the warmongers among us will benefit. Believe me, it will only whet their appetite. Appeasing the traders of death will only lead to more death, sadly, and destruction and tragedy.
Policies that the West is supporting in the Middle East are the source of all difficulties likely to come from that place. The brutalisation and humiliation of the Palestinian people must stop. The real just war is to fight for peace in the region.
Whether we like it or not, our behaviour in the Middle East for half a century is what we are being judged on now. Therefore, anything else is a distraction and a recipe for disaster. So far Israeli policies have turned the entire West Bank into a nest of suicide bombers. I was horrified—and if the ground could have moved I would have turned into it and died—when I heard that Wafa Idris, a woman, the first suicide bomber, was an ambulance worker. Having worked as a carer for years, she was converted into a destroyer by the insane events around her.
Last weekend I heard the delegation from Palestine. They explained the reason and the rationale. I have never visited Palestine. I do not know about the destruction. But it seems to me to make sense that someone from the streets, educated to such an extent, should have become a terrorist and turned her life, and

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the lives of her family, upside down, by becoming a suicide bomber. I fear such a trend in Britain if we enter Iraq.
American policy is slowly but surely turning the entire Muslim world into some kind of West Bank, or it has the potential to do so. We in Britain cannot possibly add our name to this unjust stand. The consequences are desperately frightening, especially in our role now as Washington's partner in playing world police.
It is our duty to ensure that sanity is resumed; that cries of peace, not war, dominate all our discourses and actions. Otherwise, we would be committing moral suicide, and losing all the respect that we have managed to secure as a result of centuries of contact, conflict and trade. Based on somewhat old evidence and without the full sanction of UN backing and the inspectors' report, I say no intervention in Iraq in my name.
2.48 p.m.
Lord Howe of Aberavon: My Lords, I cannot pretend that it is easy to follow a speech of such passionate sincerity. In addition, one listens to it alongside the prudent wisdom of my noble friend Lord Carrington and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, on the Liberal Democrat Benches.
I believe that the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, demonstrates just how grave and how complicated the issues are which lie beneath the apparent simplicities of the present problem. My noble friend Lord Waldegrave asked the noble Baroness what factors had changed between the debate of 14th September 2001 and the debate today. In particular, he asked if there is any stronger evidence against Saddam Hussein now than there was then of a connection with terrorism, to which she answered. "No".
However, something of crucial importance has changed. It is to be found in a sentence or two spoken by President Bush last week at the Pentagon—an intensely emotional scene for him—when he said this:
"We renew our commitment to win the war that began here… What our enemies have begun, we will finish".
Understandably perhaps, that linkage has developed with the passage of time. Bin Laden, as a figure of hostility, has proved too elusive and too evanescent to provide the kind of catharsis which the American people felt that they needed after the horrors of 11th September. Slowly the focus has shifted more, certainly, on to this most powerful and dangerous figure, a die-hard enemy of the United States, Saddam Hussein. That is the transition that has taken place.
What follows from that, I believe, is the need for immense care in balancing the hazards potentially set against each other; and immense care, too, in the language that we use in trying to deploy our case. That is the significance of what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said about the language used by some American Government spokesmen.
Let there be no doubt in your Lordships' House, I share the analysis offered by almost everybody else, that it is most important for us to tackle the problems
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of the weapons of mass destruction held by Saddam Hussein. I do not relent from that despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, said. The renunciation and destruction of those weapons and the compliance with the duty of inspection and surveillance laid upon him 11 or 12 years ago, is something which must be fulfilled. His whole course of conduct points to the conclusion that he is committed to exactly the opposite course.
In those circumstances, not just for the sake of the peace and stability of the region, but for the sake of the United States and all of us involved in the problem, the authority of the United Nations has to be invoked, has to be upheld, and has to be supported, in the last resort, by a credible threat of force. I believe that the resolution is essential and I say that not in any sense as a lawyer. It is 30 years since I last wore a wig in anger. I say it as someone concerned with the complex political issues here.
The entire framework of international relations requires us to secure a resolution with the right authority, on the right course, and the right conviction. As my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford, said, it requires more than that. It will not be enough to secure the resolution reluctantly, furtively, with a number of would-be allies and friends sitting silently on the sidelines. It requires sufficient understanding of the case that is being made to secure, as far as possible, committed support from as wide a range of the world as possible. I say that understanding the difficulties implicit in what was said by the noble Baroness.
That is why it is important for the presentation of the case that is being made by the United States to be made with such care. It is why the concept of a war against terrorism, put in that simple form, can so often be so misleading. The implication is that there is a simple battle which can and must be fought to a comprehensive, unconditional surrender world-wide and in which, to put it perhaps unsympathetically, one categorises the problem by saying that "those who are not for us are against us".
There are infinite shades of grey in this area, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, pointed out. There is a danger that absolutism in presenting the case we seek to make, absolutism in seeking loyalty on that side of the argument, could lead to the creation of an axis of antagonism. There are dangers, too, in believing that the war against terror can be won quickly, dramatically or decisively.
I was struck by a passage in the marvellous book about Churchill, written by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, in which he reminds us of the position of the British Government in Ireland in the early 1920s. We were then deploying the Black and Tans, martial law had been imposed throughout large areas of Ireland and our fellow countryman, David Lloyd-George, claimed in the London Guildhall that,
"We have murder by the throat".

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It was then perceived that triumph over terrorism in that part of our kingdom was close. Yet two years later it was necessary to come to terms with the Irish Free State; and 80 years later we are still grappling with the consequences.
That is why it is so important to have a proper understanding about the importance of what is happening in Israel and Palestine, and here I agree with the noble Baroness. For that, we in this country must accept a higher degree of responsibility than many others. The Balfour Declaration came from this country and we were responsible for Palestine when the state of Israel was itself being born by terror. It will be at our great peril if we do not concentrate a far more tenacious comprehensive effort on tackling the problems there. There would be much unwisdom if we allowed that to be overlooked. That is the first danger I perceive if we do not think about the matter carefully.
The second danger—and I mean no disrespect to our American friends when I say this, particularly provoked and angry as they are and, God knows, they have our sympathy—is that of some form of superpower overreach. The United States is now a super superpower of immense and unique authority and the temptation to overdeploy that or to deploy it too quickly and too unsympathetically must be great.
We take our minds back to about 100 years ago when the Pax Britannica preceded the existence of today's uneasy Pax Americana. We remind ourselves of that (in perhaps a rather childish way) when we notice that around the world, even today, alongside the Stars and Stripes Union Jacks are also occasionally set on fire. That symbolises, perhaps, a memory of our superpower status, for which people still tend to hold us responsible.
So far, in the years since the ending of the Second World War, the United States has conducted itself in relation to those matters with great wisdom and often great generosity, for which we have need to be very grateful. As my noble friend Lady Thatcher has said many times, we have been very lucky in our superpower. That is true: we have been lucky and blessed that a country under wise leadership has often been willing not just to lead the world in the creation of the multi-national institutions which are so important but also to be led by that world. Now that it is the world's only superpower, that relationship is all the more important. And we had similar experience years ago during the time of Pax Britannica.
My present worry is that the strand of wisdom is in danger of being overlooked. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, put it courageously, too. Yet, if one looks not just at one speech made by President Bush but at another he made earlier this summer (1st June) to the graduates at West Point Military Academy, one sees that he there well and correctly deployed the argument that American power, which he certainly did not understate, can help to bring and sustain peace to the world.
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We must recognise that it will be hard to bring peace to the world without it. However, it is most important for that power, when it is deployed, to be based and seen to be based not on anything resembling national ambition or even national anguish—and again one understands that in the United States—but upon a wider judgment, which reflects the interest of the wider world in seeking peace.
We therefore have much to be grateful for in the fact that President Bush has presented his case so clearly to the United Nations. We have much to be grateful for in our own Prime Minister for such influence that he has been able to bear in bringing about that conclusion. And we have much to be grateful for to both of them in their restoration of the United Nations to the centre stage.
I can well understand why the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, and others retain reservations about the effectiveness of that institution. For decades during the Cold War it was paralysed. We played some part in bringing it together into a state of activity, as we worked towards the end of the Iraq/Iran conflict. And it needs to be nurtured. We may have to face the situation in which, God forbid, the United States (with us alongside) feel obliged to tackle those problems on our own. But I pray not. We need to lead the United Nations with courage and wisdom to reach those robust conclusions.
I make no apology for closing my remarks by reciting the crucial sentence from Thucydides with which Colin Powell quit the Pentagon some years ago:
"Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most".
There has never been a moment when that lesson needs to be more clearly understood than today: that restraint and power have to go together.
2.57 p.m.
Lord Avebury: My Lords, we have listened to a most impressive contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon. I warmly agree with his comment about the risk of the United States indulging in superpower overreach: that at this point in history when there is only one great power, that power will be used in a manner inconsistent with international law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer, pleaded that it should not.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, agreed that nothing in international law allows us to demand regime change, much as we dislike the odious dictator, Saddam Hussein. There is no argument that he is utterly ruthless and maintains himself in power by executions, ethnic cleansing, torture, detention and censorship. Much as we may agree that Iraq would do better under almost any other leadership, changing a regime, however ghastly it may be, is not a legitimate use for armed force under international law. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the people of Iraq want to be invaded, with the loss of many lives, to that purpose.
The leaders of the two Kurdish parties in the north have not been consulted and are apprehensive that their territory may be used as a main battlefield. They

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see the Turks already massing tens of thousands of armed men on the border, some of whom have already crossed in anticipation of the conflict. It may well suit the Turks to occupy northern Iraq as a preliminary to reversing the 1926 Treaty of Baghdad by asserting claims to the region, including the oil supplies of Kirkup and Mosul, made originally by Ataturk in 1923. It might suit the Americans also to agree to such a strategy by Turkey. It would relieve the rest of the allied armed forces engaged in an invasion of the responsibility for looking after a substantial tranche of Iraqi territory. There is an enormous difference between occupying Iraq with a view to changing the regime and enforcing the previous resolutions of the Security Council, which is a matter coming squarely within the boundaries of international law.
President Bush recited a litany of Security Council resolutions that Iraq has ignored since 1991, not only requiring inspection but also the destruction of chemical and biological weapons. In repeating the Prime Minister's Statement the noble and learned Lord referred to the fact that destruction is a necessary concomitant of the inspection and is part of Resolution 687 going back to 1991. The inspectors not only have to identify these sites and verify the inactivation of the chemical and biological weapons agents, related subsystems and components as well as missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres together with their parts and repair facilities, but they have to destroy those components, missiles and weapons so that they cannot be used in the future.
The question of whether Saddam is now prepared to comply with all those resolutions can only be tested by allowing UNMOVIC personnel to return to Iraq and see whether or not they are able to carry out the mandate and whether that is rapidly followed, as it has to be under the resolutions, by the destruction of the weapons concerned. We could begin now by collecting close-up aerial images of the 700 suspect sites and visiting some of the largest and most important as Saddam has said that he is prepared to co-operate fully with the United Nations. I ask the Government whether there is any reason why the U2 flights, suspended in December 1998 when UNSCOM pulled out, should not now be resumed with the agreement of the Iraqi authorities. The sooner we start this work the sooner it will become apparent whether the inspectors are to be allowed to do their job. If they acquire any information at all, that would be useful if military operations turned out to be inevitable.
In their very helpful briefing published this morning, the Government say that chemical weapons are being produced at a number of sites. They give their locations and even photographs in some cases. The Government say that there is a theoretical possibility that the plants which have been identified might be used for illicit purposes. An example is the castor oil factory at Fallujah, where it is said that the residue from its manufacture could be used to make ricin, which is a particularly nasty toxin that has been known to be manufactured by Saddam in the past.
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The evidence on nuclear weapons is that attempts have been made only to buy components for a centrifuge enrichment plant, but there is no suggestion that such a plant, which would be large enough to be visible from satellites, is anywhere near completion. Let us assume for the sake of argument that since 1998 Saddam has built up a fairly large arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. The question is still whether they would be capable of delivery. Saddam has a missile with a range of 650 kilometres, which would allow weapons to be delivered to targets in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Eastern Turkey, Cyprus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Gulf States and parts of Egypt. The briefing includes a map which shows the range of the missiles. There is said to be no shortage of funds to pay for the development programmes to increase the range of these missiles to 1,000 kilometres.
The claim is made that the past two years Saddam has generated 3 billion dollars a year from illicit transactions which are not policed by the United Nations. If that figure can be substantiated it would indeed convince many people that there was deliberate concealment of large programmes from the international public. I wonder whether the Government, through the anti-terrorism measures which have been taken in this country and in other parts of the world allowing us to investigate the use of illicit funds and their transfer between one banking system and another, could not identify the movement of sums as large as 3 billion dollars a year and give us a little more information about that particular tranche of the evidence.
As regards the known whereabouts of the missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometres as well as the associated manufacturing and maintenance facilities, if the Iraqis do not destroy them voluntarily in accordance with Resolution 687, the UN could authorise their destruction under Article 42 of the Charter without approving more extensive military operations. Presumably, it would be necessary to eradicate delivery vehicles in the first stage of any wider conflict. If the United Nations decided to do it as a self-contained exercise, with a warning of further action in the event of continued failure to comply with Security Council demands, that would be a possible option short of an invasion and might be more acceptable to many of those who object to the occupation of Iraq itself.
In Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, we destroyed industrial facilities related to the missile programme and one suspected biological warfare site. The briefing claims that we were able significantly to degrade those facilities My noble friend Lady Williams quoted Rolf Ekeus as saying that we should now focus on getting rid of the weapons themselves because they constitute the real threat. I suggest that the Government should take into account that it is conceivable that the United Nations would be more disposed to pass a resolution authorising the destruction of the weapons than going further and mounting a full-scale invasion of Iraq.

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The noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, has told us of the overwhelming opposition to full-scale military assault on Iraq which exists throughout the whole of the Arab and Islamic world. I believe that the Arab and Muslim leaders, not just the King of Jordan or the President of Egypt, whom the noble Baroness quoted, but others, are conscious of the feelings of their people about the destabilising effect of the conflict on their societies. Muslims everywhere are saying that US-led military action is not going to stop at Iraq, but one by one it will target other Islamic states. I am only repeating what many people are saying in the Islamic world. It believes that Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen and Syria would be in the sights of the hawks in the Pentagon. The US is seen as implementing Israeli policy throughout the region, as the noble Baroness explained, and imposing a double standard on the UN whereby resolutions on Palestine or Kashmir, for instance, are set aside and only those relating to Iraq are implemented.
So there is a risk that a conflict would not only polarise the world between Islamic states and the rest, but also, as the noble Baroness suggested, it would act as a recruiting agent for suicide terrorists around the globe. I believe that already we have almost lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of the Ummah. We cannot begin to address that problem unless we deal firmly with Israel over the question of Palestine.
I have no reason to doubt the allegation made by President Bush that some Al'Qaeda terrorists have gained sanctuary in Iraq as they have in Pakistan, Iran and many other countries. The war against Saddam could disseminate the spores of terrorism further, as the noble Baroness suggested, and some could begin to germinate in the United Kingdom, which has already hosted men like Zacarias Moussaoui, a neighbour of mine in South London, and Robert Reid, the would-be "shoe bomber".
The elimination of Al'Qaeda bases in Afghanistan did not cripple the organisation, according to US defense officials. It dealt a heavy blow to its logistics and financing, but it is still functional as we see from the recent arrests in places such as Karachi and Morocco.
Is there any evidence of a partnership between Saddam Hussein and Al'Qaeda or do we have to rely on the hints given by President Bush in his speech to the General Assembly? The Security Council condemns the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al'Qaeda network, admittedly after the event, but it had already decided in Security Council Resolution 1373, that all states should take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by the provision of early warning to other states by exchange of information.
There is no doubt in anyone's mind about the association between the Taliban and Mr bin Laden, whereas in the case of Iraq there has been only sporadic and unconfirmed rumours of such a link. Saddam was alleged to have funded training camps in
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Somalia and to have assisted in the formation of an Al'Qaeda group in northern Iraq by al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a group headed by ex-Afghan Arabs in the PUK area to the north. If there is hard evidence of those or other threats arising from Saddam's collaboration in terrorism, why does President Bush not lay a dossier before the General Assembly and why has the Prime Minister not come forward with that evidence in the paper that was published this morning?
The Prime Minister has not allowed for consultation with the public on such matters because the document is limited solely to the existence of the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. By focusing on the narrow question of the existence of those weapons, and their means of delivery, he has avoided the wider discussion of the effects of a full-scale war on Iraq. The case has been made out for the destruction of the weapons as provided for by Resolution 687, but Parliament and the public are still in the dark about the Government's assessment of the fall-out that would arise from an invasion and occupation of the country. The people are uneasy, knowing that much of the Government's thinking is being withheld from them, but they sense the wider risks which I maintain are involved.
On the No. 10 website there is an intriguing quotation from one of the Prime Minister's predecessors, the Duke of Newcastle of the 18th century. He said,
"I shall not…think the demands of the people a rule of conduct, nor shall I ever fear to incur their resentment in the prosecution of their interest".
I hope that the right honourable gentleman, the Prime Minister, by endorsing that remark on his website, is not intending to follow the advice.
3.12 p.m.
Lord Vincent of Coleshill: My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to hold this special debate on Iraq because it gives the House a timely opportunity to address some important issues.
Inevitably, my professional interest centres on the possibility of a military operation, although I believe very strongly indeed that non-military options for dealing with the so-called dossier threats should be pursued thoroughly and vigorously in the first instance. That said, it may be that all such political, legal and economic measures, together with renewed UN inspections, will fail to achieve the necessary effects. If then there is still clear evidence of a growing lethal threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, then military action may in the end be the only course open to us if we are to avoid the risk of a far worse outcome later.
But effective military action will require sound preparations beforehand, based on clear and agreed political guidance. I realise that in a public debate such as this, we must be careful, when probing the Government's thinking on a possible military operation, not to prejudice inadvertently its security and place additional risks on those who will take part in it. We should not forget what Clauswitz told us; namely, that surprise and security are key elements of effective military operations.

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Clauswitz also told us that the first prerequisite in planning and conducting a successful military campaign is a clear statement of its objectives. Without such an understanding of the political and military goals, it is impossible to ensure that the size and capability of the forces concerned are adequate for the task; nor is it possible to formulate effective concepts of operation and the associated plans to meet vague or unspecified objectives. In that respect general statements, like "forcing a regime change", cannot provide adequate direction for those responsible for planning, mounting and conducting such an operation. Nor, I believe, can the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction be a purely military task.
From my knowledge of the Gulf War and, later, my direct involvement in the preparation and political approval of plans for NATO to replace UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of 1995, I know that that need for clear strategic guidance for prospective military operations can raise some sensitive political issues. If they are not addressed adequately at the outset, the consequences can be very serious indeed, even to the extent of undermining the whole operation as, I believe, the eventual failure of UNPROFOR by the middle of 1995 proved so tragically.
Against that background I should like to ask whether that strategically sound approach is now agreed in principle with the United States. More specifically, as the impetus for such an operation increases and we prepare to commit our own Armed Forces, could we hear, for example, whether we have considered its possible political and military objectives and whether the United states shares the same approach and the same goals?
Such guidance, in addition to defining these objectives as clearly as possible, needs to identify those matters that may well constrain our operations in order to avoid highly damaging and unwanted side-effects. Have those been considered with the United States? Further, have we agreed in principle with the United States that, if the need arises, under an appropriate international authority, we shall seek to achieve those objectives through a common joint operational plan and that we shall all be singing from the same military hymn sheet? If so, how is overall political direction to be provided for the approval of that plan and the daily conduct of the operation itself?
There are also some other difficult issues to be addressed in a timely manner, if our forces are to be ready to conduct such operations at what I believe would be acceptable risk. Faced with the assessment of Saddam Hussein's biological warfare capability in the Gulf War, for example, a decision was taken at the highest level to immunise our forces most at risk to provide adequate protection in case they were so attacked. That required substantial preparations, in the development, in the clinical trials, in the approval of the vaccines and in the programme to administer them in the field, which took several weeks and subsequently raised much wider concerns.
I realise that since the Gulf War we now have much more effective equipment for detecting biological agents on operations, but have we set in train the
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necessary preparations to protect our forces adequately from what is now perceived in the United States and elsewhere, and is indicated in the dossier, to be an even more serious BW threat from Iraq than it was 12 years ago?
As I said at the outset, I realise that those questions, which, on the whole, were addressed very substantially in the much clearer strategic context of the Gulf War, raise difficult and issues. However, if we do not deal with them again now, in concert with the United States, in a timely and effective manner, our forces could pay a high price later, to the possible detriment of the campaign as a whole. Nor should we forget that military operations are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Arrangements for the rebuilding of Iraq, with all its complexity, will need similar early consideration.
3.20 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Southwark: My Lords, your Lordships may recall the incident in The Life of Samuel Johnson where Boswell says:
"After we came out of church, we stood talking together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter… I observed that, though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it".
Boswell goes on to record:
"I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with a mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it. 'I refute it thus', he cried".
The existence—or non-existence—of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction has been equally difficult to prove or disprove. The dossier that has been made available today is, for me, Johnson's foot, kicking against a stone that proves to be all too real.
It would be foolish to come to any firm conclusions after a first reading of the dossier, but I am mostly persuaded that, whether or not Saddam Hussein is anywhere near to having a nuclear capability, he has biological and chemical weaponry and a modest number of missiles capable of delivering a lethal payload to neighbouring countries or to minorities in Iraq itself. That should not surprise us. In the mid-1990s, I was part of a delegation that visited Iraq. We met several Ministers there, and it was clear that Saddam's Government were interested in two things: the ending of sanctions and the rebuilding of their arsenal. The well-being of the Iraqi people has been sacrificed to those ends.
Over 11 years, the Iraqi regime has sought to evade the terms, laid down by the United Nations, that brought a conditional end to the Gulf War. The regime has worked consistently to undermine support for the sanctions and inspections regime that was meant to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction. To that end, the pressure from the Iraqi regime has been consistent and relentless. The regime exploits any opportunity of a relaxation of sanctions or any sign of a reduction in support for the containment policy. The grim conclusion to be drawn is that, unless that pressure is

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resisted, the regime will, sooner or later, achieve its objectives. That is no imaginary threat: the stone is all too real.
If the stone is kicked too clumsily, however, we might limp for some time. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford has sought to interpret ethical theories such as that relating to a just war in this complex situation. I want simply to acknowledge the relentless pressure applied by the Iraqi regime in its attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction. That process must be resisted, but I maintain that containment, rather than military action, is, at this stage, the wiser course.
The policy of containment—sanctions, no-fly zones and so on—has worked well enough for 11 years. As has been said, paragraph 23 of the dossier shows that that policy is, certainly, still effective in preventing the development of a nuclear capability. It is too soon to judge that that policy might not continue to work. It will require firm support from the UN Security Council. It will also require Iraq to allow the inspectors unhampered access, prompted by the stick of possible armed back-up and the carrot of relaxed sanctions. The Iraqi regime may well resist, as it has done in the past, but the attempt must be made.
I was pleased that the noble and learned Lord the Leader of the House and the Minister dissociated an attack on Iraq from any attack on Islam. However, I listened with immense interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin. As well as being bishop of a diocese that includes large numbers of Muslim people, I am co-chair of the Inter-Faith Network of Britain and Ireland, which gives me the opportunity to speak to people of all faith traditions. My experience echoes that of the noble Baroness: almost universally, British Muslims are hostile to the prospect of military action against Iraq.
As the noble Baroness said, most Muslims have little enthusiasm for Saddam Hussein and are well aware of the un-Islamic, secular, tyrannical nature of his regime. Their objections to President Bush's policy rest on three points, of which we must be aware. First, they are worried that the war on terror is becoming aligned with hostility to the Islamic world as such. Secondly, they complain that UN resolutions are applied selectively, outlawing Saddam Hussein while leaving other transgressors—notably Israel and Palestine—untouched. Thirdly, they are angry that little mention is made of the suffering of the Iraqi people as a consequence of the sanctions policy. I am sure that other noble Lords with greater knowledge will speak about that.
The opposition of most British Muslims to military action would not be greatly affected by the securing of some kind of UN authorisation. In such a scenario, the UN would be widely seen as having bowed to US pressure. Active support from other Arab states for an attack might be more significant in affecting opinion. We should continue to make every effort to mobilise the support of such states.
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Following 11th September last year, there was, in most parts of Britain, a revitalised sense of the importance of inter-faith relationships—particularly those between Christians and Muslims—as well as a severe challenge to the survival of such relationships. In the past few months, the general direction has been towards positive consolidation. However, channels of communication remain tenuous, and mutual trust and understanding are fragile. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, that the effect of any military action in Iraq on international relations with Muslim states and on relations with Islamic communities at home would be problematic and unpredictable.
There are, of course, equal risks associated with doing nothing in the face of the mounting evidence, if the UN Security Council refuses to adopt clear and robust resolutions or if Saddam Hussein refuses to allow the inspectors back in to do their job properly. In such circumstances, the use of military force might prove to be the least worst option. However, the world is not yet at that point. Please God, may we not get there.
3.29 p.m.
Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, as someone who spent the last 12 months in government service immersed in the Gulf War crisis, I have had, in the past few months, an enormous sense of déjà vu.
In 1991, I knew more about the Saddam regime than I would ever have wanted to. The main players are the same now as they were then, and their behaviour has not changed. The regime is unparalled in the efficiency of the terror by which it rules, as part 3 of the dossier details. Unless the regime is pinned down with a precision and determination which have been lacking on the part of the UN for the past 11 years, it will squirm and twist its way out of any undertaking to reveal what it is doing. The dossier makes it clear that it is essential to discover in detail what the regime is doing now—taking nothing on trust. I agree with the current issue of The Economist that in the case of Saddam, there is no reason to trust a serial liar and murderer.
The evidence of Iraqi secret attempts to acquire material for weapons of mass destruction has been accumulating since the early 1990s and is impressively documented in the dossier, which I find chilling—as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank. Proliferation is one of the most difficult targets for the intelligence and security services. The Iraqis are past masters at that deadly game. They were at it before the Gulf War. Your Lordships will remember some of the well-publicised cases at the time.
One difficulty in detecting proliferation attempts is that much of the material involved can be dual purpose, with an innocent commercial, pharmaceutical or engineering use—as well as being a component for a more sinister end. Orders are spread across different countries, placed by middlemen or cover companies, and often taken through many different countries before reaching their real, well-disguised destination.

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Companies supplying components range from those that are fully complicit, through those turning a blind eye and choosing not to be suspicious in order to land a lucrative order, to genuinely innocent firms that believe the cover story. In none of those cases will the companies alert the authorities. Such intelligence on proliferation that is produced is often from extremely sensitive sources—sanitised intelligence is often unfortunately so bland as to be unconvincing.
The dossier is all the more striking for giving a compelling account of conclusions reached from intelligence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, rightly said, there has clearly been an impressive range of intelligence achievements. Reading about the elaborate machinations, cover companies and suspicious activities in the former Soviet Union, Africa and other places, it is absolutely clear that Iraq's procurement efforts have continued since 1991 and are continuing—despite Iraq's agreements, undertakings and protestations.
The question is not whether Iraq has succeeded yet or how long it takes before it does but why should such an enormously costly and difficult effort be made unless Iraq plans to use weapons of mass destruction. Will we just wait until that happens, then deal with it?
We have made two particularly bad mistakes in the past in dealing with Saddam Hussein. The first was in 1991, when we ceased hostilities before ensuring the safety of the Shia who had risen in Basra at our urging—and who had overthrown Saddam's hated henchmen. The Shia were holding on, waiting for our help—but it never arrived because the allies concluded a ceasefire in my view at least 24 hours too early. The Shia in Basra all suffered terrible ends.
I am not the only person to say—not with hindsight—that the terms of the ceasefire were less than perfect. Let us not forget that two no-fly zones had to be instigated soon after the ceasefire because Saddam was attacking the Shia, marsh Arabs in the south and Kurds in the north.
The second mistake was in 1998 when UN inspectors, after a saga of harassment, had finally to give up and left Iraq. As the Statement said, military action by the United States and United Kingdom set the Iraqi programme back but did not end it. The UN response should have been much more robust and decisive—as should have been our assistance to the inspectors over the years, as they struggled to enforce their UN mandate.
It is important to keep in mind the special nature of the UN resolutions on Iraq. They are different from those applying to conflicts such as Kashmir or Israel, which is the most quoted comparison. I do not want to enter into debate about the Israel-Palestinian crisis but the Iraq resolutions embody and arise out of the terms agreed for a ceasefire in a war waged against Iraq on a UN mandate. Iraq agreed those ceasefire terms but in the 11 years since, it has evaded most if not all of them. If I may be unparliamentary, Iraq has driven a coach and horses through all the UN resolutions and ceasefire terms.
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Much is said about fears for the stability of the region if the Saddam regime falls. There is not time today to expand on why believe that a federal, more democratic Iraq—giving rights to Kurds and Shia, as well as to Sunni—could add to the region's stability, even if some of its neighbours at the moment would not like such a development. That debate is for a later date.
My right honourable friend's powerful Statement makes clear why we should act. He was right about acting in Kosovo and taking action in Afghanistan—and he is right about action now. We made two damaging mistakes with Saddam in 1991 and 1998. We must not make a third, possibly fatal mistake now.
3.37 p.m.
Lord Hurd of Westwell: My Lords, I will follow the noble Baroness in her comments about events inside Iraq but first wish to say that this debate and the Government's document are important for our democracy. I cannot remember a time when so many people have been interested but uncertain about a great matter of policy. Complete strangers come up to me in the street or on the train and ask, "What's going to happen about Iraq?" They do not blame or enthuse about the Government or President Bush. They are in neither state. They are just uncertain, anxious and unsure. More is needed these days if a British Government are to send British troops to kill and be killed. To do that now—it was not always so—a government need general support for a war.
I scribbled those thoughts before I heard Patrick Cordingley on BBC radio yesterday. He commanded the 7th Armoured brigade in the Gulf war. I did not agree with everything that he said but he made the point strongly—and was, entirely right—that in a democracy, one cannot expect and will never achieve unanimity about a war. But one can get general support and that is needed. The Government can secure general support but have not yet reached that point. In a parliamentary democracy, there is a natural sequence. The Government publish their evidence and views. Time is allowed to digest them, then Parliament debates and reaches conclusions. That sequence is not the one that the Government have followed, which is not a crucial point but one to remember for the future. The process of illumination and persuasion in which we are all, in a small way, engaged today is crucial for the future; it is not a luxury.
Having said that, the Government are right in their general analysis of Saddam Hussein—as is almost everyone who has spoken—whom I too have experience of. He is a deceitful, destructive and dangerous man. They were right to go down the UN route. That probably was not entirely easy. We had this argument in November 1990. It was a rare occasion when the State Department and the Foreign Office managed to prevail over the White House and No. 10. We went down the Security Council route. It turned out to be right, not just for legal reasons, but also for political reasons; gathering together support for Britain in the world.

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The present Government are right to work for a new up-dated resolution, provided it concentrates on weapons of mass destruction. It has not yet been mentioned, but we are fortunate in having Mr Blix as the international servant who is mainly engaged in these kind of preparations. I remember him as someone of firm and sober judgment. He will need both those qualities in his position at the present time.
The Government are right too to be tough, in such a resolution, on the consequences on Saddam Hussein and Iraq if the resolution is defied. All that is accepted. But I should like to make two points which are relevant and which could be crucial if we become engaged in a sustained war which lasts for a long time. We cannot be sure, one way or the other, whether that will be so.
My first point has already been mentioned but I shall embroider it a little; it concerns the connection between the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. We are talking about a possible war against a major Arab nation—Iraq. To succeed, in the long run, that effort requires at least tacit Arab support. I do not despair of that. I do not know anyone in the region who trusts or likes Saddam Hussein. I suspect the same is true in Iraq itself; that most of those who now cheer what he says would dance quite happily around his coffin. If we had any doubts about that, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, will have dispelled them.
But Arab public opinion is not focused on the danger from Iraq which we are discussing today; it is focused, night by night, on the sufferings of the Palestinian people conveyed through Arab media which are much freer than they used to be. Israel is entitled to our sympathy at her agony every time there is a suicide bomber. She is entitled to security. But she is not entitled to secure it in the way being attempted by Mr Sharon's government. We need, in whatever way is best, to make clear to the United States in that context—it is the superpower with particular leverage on the situation—that they have a choice. They can, as the White House Security Adviser said yesterday, help to forward the march of freedom in Muslim countries; or they can continue as the main prop of an Israeli Government who unsuccessfully seek to achieve their security through settlement, occupation and oppression. Either is a possible route. What the United States cannot do is play both roles at the same time.
I should like to ask the Minister a specific question arising out of that. The Palestinian people and their representatives are beginning, not before time, to show signs of discontent with President Arafat and his ineffective leadership. There are plans to hold an election in the West Bank and Gaza in January. That is a flicker of light in a dark sea. How can we prevent that flicker of light being snuffed out, as it would be by the present weight of the Israeli occupation in those areas in which elections could hardly be held?
I turn to my second and last point, which concerns Iraq itself. I listened with great care to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank. His knowledge is much greater than mine and he is probably right. The military strength of Iraq is now so
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enfeebled compared with 11 years ago that allied forces, or indeed the United States forces alone, could overcome it. It may be, if we were skilful and lucky, or if the Americans were skilful and lucky with our help, we do that with a relatively quick assault, or if we ran out of luck, in a sustained war with a good many casualties. But one way or another the outcome would be military success.
However, it would not be responsible to launch on such an effort, either quick or slow, without some idea about what would follow; about who would run Iraq thereafter. It cannot be done by the Kurds from the north. It cannot be done by the Shias in the south; it cannot be done by a combination of the two. Civil war is a perfect though disastrous possibility. Effective political control of Iraq, whatever the constitutional structure, would come from the centre and from Baghdad. That is where we need to look for legitimate authority.
It would be silly to ask the Minster for details. If we were told names or organisations then their lives would be relatively short because of the reach of Saddam Hussein's tyranny. But we need to be confident that the Americans and ourselves are looking to the future in that kind of way. There is an old Latin tag much loved by school debating societies: if you wish for peace prepare for war. That is relevant to the Security Council discussions at the moment. But we now live in a world where there is a second tag: if you are preparing for war you have to prepare for peace as well. That is also true in this case. It is not enough to say, as some Americans did in the beginning, "We will just go into Iraq, get rid of Saddam Hussein and get out". Nor, in my view, is it particularly realistic to talk in an airy way about holding immediate democratic elections out of which would emerge a pro-western democratic federal Iraq keen to make peace with Israel.
We must not delude ourselves. The process of nation rebuilding in Iraq will be a slow and strenuous one. We have to consider—it will be difficult; it will be the problems of Afghanistan on a much bigger scale—whether we and the Americans are prepared to keep troops after an immediate military victory to support and prop up whatever government emerges until it establishes its own authority against a background where such occupation would inevitably soon become unpopular.
Those are unpalatable points, but we cannot discuss these matters without looking that far ahead. My worry is that, unless these things are considered, unless we in Parliament can feel that they are being considered albeit we do not ask for the details, we may reach the stage where we worry about having won a war in six days and lost it in the six months which followed.
So I believe that Parliament, all of us, should accept the main analysis of the Government. We should not in any way belittle the dangers to us all, but particularly to the region described in the document the Government published today. We are entitled—no Minister will resent this—to ask questions to which

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full answers have not yet been forthcoming. But we need more answers. We need more illumination if the country is to give this enterprise the general support it needs to be successful.
3.49 p.m.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, in response to a question on the Statement, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, said that the Government were acting in accordance with the norms of international law. His words were echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, who said that we would take action to enforce international law.
It is vitally important that at the end of the crisis it is manifest that the norms of international law have been strengthened and not undermined by any action taken by this country and its allies. Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter states that,
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".
Those words do not support a claim of right to overthrow a repressive or tyrannical government, however desirable that may be. There is no doctrine in international law of intervention to bring about regime change, nor even a doctrine of humanitarian intervention with the use of force.
The dossier refers to human rights violations in Iraq, but that is no justification for military intervention. Essentially there are only two exceptions to the prohibitions in Article 2.4 of the Charter against the threat or use of force; namely, the right to self-defence and the enforcement of Security Council resolutions. The second exception has not been employed for many decades.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, referred your Lordships to Article 51 of the Charter:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security".
The test for judging whether the use of force was justified as an act of self-defence is in customary international law accepted to be immediacy, proportionality and necessity. It was defined by the US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case as long ago as 1837 as being whether the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. An act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it. It must be proportionate. The use of armed force should be for the purpose of defence and not for punishment.
Hence military action was lawful in international law as a response to the invasion of the Falklands by the Argentine. Article 51 was also employed to justify the invasion of a regime harbouring terrorists—Afghanistan—in response to the attack on the United States in September last year. That justification was confirmed by the Security Council.
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But no hard evidence has been produced in the dossier or anywhere else that Iraq currently harbours terrorists, so there is not a justification for unilateral action by way of self-defence at this time. For example, your Lordships may recall that in 1981 Israel bombed a nuclear reactor at Osiraq in Iraq and claimed to be acting in pre-emptive self-defence. That claim was fully examined by the Security Council and rejected because the threat posed to Israel's security was not immediate; the response was held by the Security Council to be neither proportionate nor necessary.
The dossier we have seen today demonstrates that Iraq has the capability—and it may be growing—but there is no evidence that it has the immediate intention to attack either the United States or this country. There is no imminent threat to our security nor to any ally of ours. Intervention in Kuwait was justified by the doctrine of self-defence; Kuwait called us in and sought assistance. It is certainly no justification in international law of military intervention that possession of weapons of mass destruction threaten economic interests in the region. The United States, nor indeed any country, cannot claim that a threat to oil is a justification for invasion.
Hence, if we are to stay within the norms of international law to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams, referred, it is essential to work through the United Nations. Pre-emptive self-defence without its sanction by the United States and ourselves would be illegal in international law. It follows that a new resolution must be sought at the United Nations which sets out a firm timetable for inspection and report. A failure to comply with such a resolution is in my view a judgment for the United Nations, not the United States—so are the means to coerce Saddam into compliance, if necessary by military intervention.
That is the way forward. I commend the direction set by our Prime Minister, followed by President Bush, in taking the United Nations route. That is the way to strengthen the authority of the United Nations and to confirm the rule of law to which we hope this country will always adhere. That is also the way to gain the general support of the people of this country to which the noble Lord, Lord Hurd, referred.
3.57 p.m.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, the paradox we face in dealing with Saddam Hussein's Iraq—many of the contributions to the debate have underlined this—is that only by threatening the use of force if he continues to defy the will of the international community expressed in any number of Security Council legally binding resolutions, and only by being prepared to back that threat by action, do we stand the slightest chance of achieving a peaceful outcome.
To believe that Saddam Hussein will comply with his obligations faced merely by exhortation and diplomatic advocacy is a triumph of hope over experience. It flies in the face of all that has happened over the 20-plus years since he began his career of murder and aggression as head of the Iraqi state. Nor is the Micawberish option of waiting for something to

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turn up at all appealing. For four years, Saddam's teams of scientists and engineers have been able to work, unhindered by international inspection, on programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction. The dossier we have seen today shows that.
We know that these programmes and those on the ballistic missiles for their delivery are the highest priority of Saddam Hussein's regime. When the inspectors first went to Iraq in 1991, they found nuclear, chemical and biological warfare programmes at a far more advanced stage than anything our intelligence efforts had led us to believe was the case. Their estimate was that if Saddam had not been foolish enough to invade Kuwait the year before and thus bring down on his head the international inspection regime, he would have had a usable nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it to a range of his neighbours by 1993.
Why on earth do we believe—as some well-meaning people do—that our lack of certainty about the present state of his weapons programme should be a source of doubt or comfort, or a reason not to take action? On past experience, the contrary conclusion is surely more compelling.
Reliance on deterrence and containment looks equally flawed. We are dealing with a man who, at the time of the Gulf War, believed that the coalition was bluffing in its determination to reverse his aggression against Kuwait. He was wrong. If we procrastinate and if he achieves his aim of developing this horrendous arsenal, what are we going to do then should he—as is all too likely—threaten to use or actually use weapons of mass destruction against his neighbours? The prospect of having to take massive action against sites that have been carefully placed among centres of civilian population is hardly attractive. The risk that, faced with such retaliation, he will use everything he has will surely be even greater than it is now when his capabilities to wreak such havoc—which have been outlined by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and in the government dossier—are by definition less than they will be if we leave these programmes to move ahead for longer.
All these considerations point towards the need to address the problem now and to make a serious and determined effort to scotch these weapons programmes, if possible through international inspections and disarmament, if not, by other means.
How sure can we be that getting the inspectors back in will do the trick? The only honest answer is that we cannot be sure. Saddam's track record of playing cat and mouse with the inspectors is proven. What can be said is that if the inspectors are given unfettered access, as they must be, that will hugely complicate the task and the risk of continuing to develop the programmes of weapons of mass destruction. The main Iraqi effort will then switch, as it did between 1991 and 1998, from development to concealment. The chances of their getting to the stage of actual deployment, let alone use, without prior discovery will be greatly reduced.
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It is surely worth giving the inspection route a real try, not damning it with faint praise from the outset, as some on the other side of the Atlantic are prone to do. However, the hand of the inspectors must be strengthened so that they are not again left, as they sometimes were in the past, in an unequal struggle against the forces of a totalitarian dictatorship. They should be required to report frequently and unambiguously to the Security Council, not only on what they find, but on the degree of co-operation that they get from the Iraqis. It needs to be clear that if full co-operation is lacking or if access is denied, more than just a slap on the wrist or a verbal admonition will follow. In that sense, the louder the noises off of preparation for military action, the more likely it will be that the inspectors are able to complete their task successfully.
I do not wish to weary the House with too much detailed analysis of what a future Security Council resolution—there certainly needs to be one—should contain, or how precisely the United Nations should handle Saddam Hussein's latest missive, appearing to offer unconditional access to the inspectors. That will be thrashed out in New York in the days and weeks ahead. If the letter means what it says—and there have been an awful lot of letters in the past that did not mean what they said—it is a step forward, but only the first of many steps that have to be taken and not the most difficult or the most important one to take.
Of far greater importance is the co-operation on the ground of the Iraqis—their willingness to have destroyed, removed or rendered harmless everything to do with their weapons programmes and their acceptance of an intrusive long-term monitoring programme to ensure that the whole business does not just begin over again. Those in the media and elsewhere who welcomed the arrival of the letter from Saddam Hussein with comments that I found too close for comfort to claims of peace in our time will have to wait a considerable time before it is clear whether a peaceful exit from this crisis really exists.
I warmly welcome the decision to go to the Security Council, which I believe owed much to the advocacy of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. I am convinced that it was the right decision. It was right in particular on political and diplomatic grounds, not on technical or legal grounds. In my analysis, Saddam Hussein's defiance of a large number of mandatory Security Council resolutions, which were an integral part of the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Gulf War and which were accepted as such by Iraq at the time, already leaves him open to the legitimate use of force. Above all, his failure to permit the,
"destruction, removal, or rendering harmless"
of all his weapons of mass destruction—the mere recital of those words of Resolution 687 underlines how far he has strayed from compliance—puts him at risk. Do not let us tie ourselves in knots over those legal complexities. If we are to have any chance of proceeding without the use of force, the key is that a single, unambiguous message goes from the Security Council to Saddam Hussein telling him what is required of him if he is to avoid the use of force.

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The message of the international community would gain greatly in strength if it were set in a wider framework, which could contain two additional elements. The first would be to set out clearly how those countries that are leading this debate—the United States in particular, but ourselves included—would work with a post-Saddam Iraq; how we would move rapidly to bind up the wounds of the past decade or more and how Iraq would be welcomed back as a key regional player with a substantial political, economic and security role in assuring the stability of the region. This approach was followed with considerable success in the case of Serbia post-Milosevic at the time of the hostilities over Kosovo. Our failure to do this so far in the case of Iraq has enabled Saddam Hussein to misrepresent the outside world's policy towards Iraq as one of humiliation and dismemberment and to persuade many ordinary Iraqis that our quarrel is with them and not with the regime under which they suffer.
The second element would be to reinvigorate the search for peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Many noble Lords have referred to the importance of that. Clearly, we must avoid the trap of enabling Saddam Hussein to claim that it is thanks to him that we are taking such action. We faced that same trap in 1990 and we successfully avoided it, but it did not prevent the first President Bush bringing the parties to the negotiating table in Madrid soon after the reversal of Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait. We have to face the fact that this question and the need to end the continuing bloodshed in Israel and Palestine are the priority of priorities to most Arabs. One ignores the priorities of one's friends and allies in the war against terrorism at one's peril. I hope that the United States will not do so and that we and other European nations will help them to rescue the peace process from the dead end in which it is stuck at the moment.
4.5 p.m.
Lord Janner of Braunstone: My Lords, I am sure that we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, for his clear and pungent explanation of why we should seek international inspection in Iraq, to avoid war if possible and otherwise why swift steps should be taken. He referred to "peace in our time". I am glad that I brought with me a document that I have treasured for many years. It is a letter written by Neville Chamberlain to Herbert Samuel—Lord Samuel—in October 1940. It is brief. It reads:
"My dear Samuel, It was very kind of you to write to me and I appreciate very highly the fact that I retain your approval of my efforts to maintain peace. Though that proved to be impossible, it did give us breathing time and that may in the end make all the difference".
That was appeasement. That was allowing Hitler to invade Czechoslovakia. That was giving Hitler time to prepare the bombing, the Blitz, the invasions and the murders. While the situation in Iraq is totally different, we must still look with care on anything that may appear to be "peace in our time" when it is not and which may give time to a ruthless dictator that he does not deserve. The dossier prepared today makes chilling
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reading. It makes clear the huge danger in which we and the world stand. That danger will inevitably grow greater day by day if not dealt with. That is the first issue.
Is there to be a strike against Iraq and, if so, when? I share the Government's view—indeed, it is the same view expressed by Opposition leaders in this House and in the other place—that we must take swift action one way or the other and not again have "peace in our time", which is simply a prelude to war.
The second issue, with which many noble Lords have dealt, is the spill-over of the ill will into relations between countries in the Middle East. I have been involved with this matter for very many years. I have visited most of the Arab countries—indeed, all that were prepared to have me, which does leave some exceptions. I have even tried to learn the Arabic language, which I do not recommend to anyone who wishes to maintain his sanity. It is very difficult but it is necessary.
Recently I asked the leader of a certain Arab nation: "When relations between your country and Israel were more or less normal and of great advantage to both countries, why have you now stopped them?" He replied, "The street". When I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, I thought, "Yes, that is the street, which, sadly, is true". That is not necessarily the view of Arab governments but it is the view which is being stoked up in the street.
People such as myself believe firmly that we must live together or die together and that the people in Israel and Palestine, too, must live together or they will die together. They must live together in two states but must do so in mutual respect and with the desire for peace for both peoples; otherwise it will not work. They should say "yes" to peace and "no" to terror, but it is very sad that that is no longer working.
I do not agree at all with the extraordinary comparison between Sharon and Saddam Hussein made by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin. I believe it to be ludicrous and unreasonable, unfair and disgraceful. Whatever I may think of Sharon's policies and however unlikely it is that I would have voted for the man, we must all recognise that he was elected by his people in one of six elections since the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein has been there since the Gulf War and before and there have been no elections. Whatever the faults and imperfections of the democracy in Israel or, indeed, here, Israel's Government, like ours, have been elected by their people. The top job of a government is to defend their people.
Not long ago, I asked my friend Shimon Peres, whom no one has ever accused of being a warrior: "Why the incursions? Why are your Government behaving in this way?" He replied with two answers. First, he said, "We have tried everything else. We do not like the incursions but we have to protect our people. Nothing else has worked". His second answer was, "What would your Government do to defend their people?"

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Then I spoke to my brother-in-law, who lives in Jerusalem with his family. He said, "It is all very well for you lot to criticise, but it is not your children and grand-children who are in danger of being killed by suicide bombers; it is ours. Our Government have been elected to try to protect us". They have not succeeded but that does not mean that a comparison between Israel and Iraq is anything more than lunacy. Israel is entitled to its security and entitled to protect its people. My noble friend—my friend of long-standing—Lord Hurd said that it is not entitled to do so in the way that it is. That is perhaps the case, but I hope that he will discuss that with the leaders there rather than making statements here when it is not, as my brother-in-law said, his family that is liable to be blown up by the suicide bombers. It is a very difficult decision and I would not like to be in their shoes.
There are many Arabs in Israel and, in my desperate attempt to learn Arabic, I went to a town called Sakhnin—an Arab town in lower Galilee. I lived with an Arab family and we are still friends. I shall see them when I go to Israel again for a conference next week. The members of that family have just as great a desire for peace as the Jewish people who live around them. They recognise as much as do my family that we must all work for peace. At present, the situation is awful for the Palestinians and for the Israelis and, together, they must work for peace. I believe that, instead of making statements attacking one or the other, we should be doing what we can to bring them together to the peace that they both want and need.
I turn to the subject of the spill-over into our own communities. We are the United Kingdom and we do not want to become the "Divided Kingdom". I listened carefully to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark. He is absolutely correct. There is a new fragility in those relations. He referred to relations between Muslims and Christians. I refer to relations between Muslims and Jewish people—an area in which, again, I have worked for many years.
Those relations have become extremely fragile. We know that the vast majority of Muslims in this country are not extremists. Those who receive the publicity—the extremists from the Finsbury Park Mosque, where they held their rally—do not represent the Muslim communities in this country. Those who took part in the Trafalgar Square Islamist rally do not represent the majority of their people. But others know how to take advantage of such situations. So it was no surprise when the National Front and the British National Party turned up at Trafalgar Square. And in my old city of Leicester the National Front is to hold a rally this Saturday. It is an anti-Islamist rally, as they have proclaimed.
I know that my Jewish community understands full well that if the right-wing extremists grow fat because of their attacks on Muslims and because of the blame they direct at Muslims for the current situation, others will be next. It will be the Jews, then the Catholics and then anyone else who is in a minority, whether they are black or white or gay or wherever they come from in the world. I only ask the Muslim community to
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recognise that the contrary also applies. If such people wax fat through attacking and blaming the Jews, they will be next. The overflow is from Palestine, Israel, the Jewish state, the Jews. Believe it or not, many Muslims blame the Jews for the September 11th attack. How sad.
Finally, what hope is there? I offer an example of one small ray of hope, arising out of deep tragedy. I wonder whether two or three days ago noble Lords heard of the murder of a British lad in Israel by a suicide bomber. The victim's name was Yoni Jesner. He was aged 19 and came from Glasgow. Together with his cousin, Gideon Black, he studied in London in a Jewish school. Many young people whom I know knew them. Yoni Jesner was murdered and Gideon Black was wounded. Immediately afterwards, Yoni's parents donated their son's kidney to a seven year-old Palestinian girl, who was operated on in an Israeli hospital and who is alive today thanks to that extraordinary, decent, kind and sensible act. It is a rough world in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and, indeed, sometimes here. But where there are acts like that, there is hope for reconciliation, hope for decency and hope for peace.
4.20 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Chester: My Lords, the issues before us today raise the acute dilemma of how to approach moral questions in the new circumstances of the 21st century. There are always lessons to be drawn from the past, but they are more limited than we sometimes acknowledge. I recall a historian saying to me some years ago that one of the few lessons of history is that there are relatively few lessons of history. History moves on and new circumstances emerge which are sometimes unprecedented in the dangerous world by which we are confronted. The speed with which the world moves on means these new circumstances will increase more and more as the sheer power of modern civilisation expresses itself.
This is at one with the whole history of the universe. For most of the time the universe has existed, there was no death. It was only when life evolved that death became possible. It was only when life evolved to form complex organisms that the possibility of disease and deformation arose. It was only when animals emerged, able to move around their environment, that creatures hunted and killed. Human beings represent a wholly new emergence on our planet bringing self-consciousness, an understanding of truth, beauty and justice and an ability to relate to our Creator. The shadow side is the possibility of moral evil. Nature may be red in tooth and claw, but nowhere there do you find the equivalent of the Holocaust or the Gulag, a Stalin or a Hitler.
This can be seen in modern times. The 20th century was an immensely bloodstained century. Historians estimate that probably more people died a violent death in the 20th century than in all the other centuries put together. The killing was on the grand stage. Idealism in the 20th century could pervert itself in the hands of despotism and totalitarian regimes, often hijacking religious ideas and images. However, in the

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20th century, weapons of mass destruction only surfaced on the margins. The early years of the 21st century have had the ideals of the last century thrust forward and intensified, the ideals, indeed, of those 19 misguided gentlemen who crashed the planes. Even without weapons of mass destruction, the potential dangers are that much greater. Many more people died on September 11th than at Pearl Harbour, despite the might of the Japanese forces thrown against the Americans.
It seems to me that the 21st century will have its own unique, greater and probably unpredictable dangers, like those planes flying into the twin towers. These new circumstances place considerable strain upon the traditional calculus of the just war. War is now potentially too dangerous and the threat of war too imprecise for countries simply to sit back and wait to be attacked. I understand why the American Government are taking the current line, however overstated and gung-ho it may be.
I support the broad stance which Her Majesty's Government are taking. A pre-emptive strike against a rogue state like Iraq, with its track record of striving to possess weapons of mass destruction, can be defended on the grounds of self-defence. That does not mean that military action against Iraq is necessarily justifiable at present. Many military, political and moral factors need to be considered with great care. A diplomatic or political solution would be far more preferable. The offer to allow the inspectors to return should be pursued with great seriousness and urgency.
Action by the United States independent of the United Nations would be most unfortunate, though it could not be ruled out on moral grounds. The UN is not infallible. However, the case for a stronger UN in the 21st century seems overwhelming. I would associate myself entirely with the remarks made by the right reverend prelate the Bishop of London. Whether this is achievable in today's global politics seems less certain. I support the position of the Government. However, the military and political calculations are fraught with great dangers. Much potentially could go badly wrong, although the same applies if we do nothing.
I conclude with a comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Janner of Braunstone. The log-jam in Israel and Palestine needs to be moved on. A particular matter which we often skate over is central to this—the settlements. The policy of placing settlements in the occupied territories is a Class A political error. It is an error comparable with that of the South African Government which in the late 1940s embraced apartheid. It took a very long time for international and internal pressure to persuade them of a bad mistake. The settlement programme in the occupied territories has to be reversed. Without it, I do not believe there can be two viable states living together. There are about a quarter of a million people living in the settlements. International aid will be needed to help Israel realise its mistake. If each settler were paid £20,000 to settle back in Israel, the cost would be £5 billion. A lot of money. But there has to be a will to will the means as well as the end. Unless we
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can make real progress in that part of the Middle East, all that is quite properly intended in Iraq will fall to nothing.
4.27 p.m.
Lord Rea: My Lords, I make no apology for being one of the "usual suspects club" when Iraq is discussed in your Lordships' House. I have twice visited Iraq with the leader of that club, the redoubtable George Galloway, MP. But over the years I have visited a number of other countries on parliamentary visits, paid for by their governments or sources sympathetic to them. In each case I have returned more critical of that government than before I went. In every case, though, I have been impressed by the generosity and friendliness of the ordinary people in whichever country I have visited. In Iraq there is still remarkable goodwill towards the United Kingdom but bewilderment and sadness that we can support the warlike stance of President Bush and his close associates.
My noble friend Lady Symons once said to me that she thought I was a good man but that I was being misled. I thought that it was extremely kind of her to warn me. My interest in the Iraqi problem is and always has been humanitarian, in particular the effect of sanctions on the health of children. I am perfectly aware that the harmful effect of these on the nutritional state of the population was greatly exacerbated by Saddam's cruelly mistaken decision to reject the oil for food programme from 1991 to 1995 and try to go it alone by increasing food production, a policy which was unrealistic and failed. According to Tun Myat, the United Nations Co-ordinator for the humanitarian programme in Iraq, there is sufficient food coming in through the oil for food programme to just feed the population who now receive an equitably distributed ration at very low cost. But the interruption of that programme that would occur if war came would have extremely serious consequences.
I believe that all noble Lords would like to see the back of Saddam Hussein. He has committed crimes against humanity in the past, which were vividly described in the dossier and for which he could justifiably face an international criminal court—even one that is not ratified by the United States. That is very different from effecting a regime change through "tyrannocide" or external military force, particularly if that is applied through the diktat of one nation, however powerful.
With calls for "regime change" in the air, there is surely a problem with "no holds barred" intrusive inspections, when one of the inspecting nations has the openly declared intent of overthrowing the government of the nation being inspected. The results of inspections would inevitably provide useful intelligence for any future attack. Hence Iraq's request to the United Nations that its territorial integrity be respected while the inspections proceed.
However, Iraq has now decided to take the risk—it really had no choice—and has agreed to allow UNMOVIC inspectors to return. The mechanism now

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exists for UNMOVIC to see on the ground whether the suspected sites that are mentioned or hinted at in the dossier which we now have before us are in operational condition. I gather from noble Lords that a bevy of journalists has been waiting in Baghdad at Iraq's invitation to visit the named sites. They are visiting the sites as we speak. Perhaps they have returned by now because it is later in Iraq than it is here. If, as a result of inspections, Iraq is found to have been lying and significant numbers of weapons of mass destruction are detected, they must be destroyed. If access to sensitive sites is barred, there is no need for an instant military ultimatum. There is a place for hard diplomatic bargaining under existing or—as has been suggested—new and tougher Security Council resolutions before launching missiles or a full-scale attack. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, the existence of inspectors on the ground will disable Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, even if Iraq attempts concealment.
However, supposing that Iraq were within reach of developing a dangerous level of operational weapons of mass destruction, as the dossier suggests, how would it be likely to deploy them? The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, touched on that. It is far fetched in the extreme to think that they could threaten the United States or any European country directly. That is portrayed in the diagram in the dossier. There is currently a strong and quite effective Iraqi charm offensive directed at the Arab world, five countries of which surround Iraq. Saddam came unstuck when he attacked two of them in the past and he is extremely unlikely to try that again.
The hypothetical target for weapons of mass destruction is of course Israel, which itself possesses the nuclear weapon. Israel is surely the country that President Bush means when he says that Saddam "threatens his neighbours". While Saddam has made serious errors of judgment in the past—as I said, when he attacked Iran and Kuwait—it is hard to imagine that he would make the mistake of launching an attack on Israel. That would mean political and military suicide for himself and his regime.
So why the enormous hurry and the huffing and puffing? We are not directly or indirectly threatened by Saddam's Iraq, however cruelly he tyrannises his own people. Nor would the world's oil supplies be threatened if his regime survives; he depends on his oil exports more than we do on importing his oil. And, like Stalin, whom he resembles in more ways than just the moustache, he will not survive for ever. Regime change to a more democratic state will eventually occur, as it will in the rest of the Arab world. However, that will be more stable and durable if it comes from within than through a military attack from without.
In the meantime, the best way for us to encourage a more liberal regime will be to engage with Iraq commercially and culturally. There is a long tradition of friendly association between the two countries, which most Iraqis are impatient to renew. Doing that presupposes an end to sanctions as we know them. It is highly likely—Tariq Aziz has said as much—that Iraq
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would, in exchange for the virtual lifting of sanctions, allow continued international monitoring of its armed forces. If a threat should be suspected or detected, appropriate Security Council action could be taken, including the re-imposition of sanctions. The lifting of sanctions would allow the rapid restoration of Iraq's damaged infrastructure, and that would provide many opportunities for investment and commerce for United Kingdom firms. Even now, under the crumbling sanctions regime, those opportunities are being quietly snapped up by Russia and certain EU countries. There would be an opportunity to renew the strong cultural and economic links between the UK and Iraq, which have been severed since the Gulf War. In exchange for the carrot of lifting sanctions rather than the stick of military coercion, which is all that is offered at the moment, it is also likely that autonomy for the Kurdish provinces could be agreed as well as the settlement of outstanding issues with Kuwait.
I have not mentioned the Palestine/Israel dispute or terrorism. Iraq has the most bellicose rhetoric against Israel of any of the Arab nations. If a settlement of that dispute could be reached that was felt to be just by the Palestinians, I do not believe that Iraq would persist in calling for the abolition of Israel, as it currently does. Like many others, I believe that that would be the best, and probably the only, way to lower tension and achieve disarmament in the Middle East, including Iraq. Israel's refusal for 35 years to evacuate the West Bank in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and, on the contrary, to build settlements there, as the right reverend Prelate mentioned, is held to be an outrage throughout the Arab world. To insist on Iraq's disarmament according to Security Council resolutions in the face of that is regarded in the Arab world as hypocrisy by the United States and the United Kingdom.
Finally, as other noble Lords have pointed out, there is no credible evidence for the involvement of Iraq in international terrorism. Far from helping to win the war against terrorism, it is highly likely that an American attack on Iraq would unleash more events like those of 9/11 because of the anger that would be generated throughout the Arab world. That was pointed out passionately by my noble friend Lady Uddin.
Terrorism can be defeated in the long run only by engaging with the underlying perceived injustices. In the case of Al'Qaeda, two of the injustices mentioned by Bin Laden in his video were the continued American air attacks on Iraq and the Palestinian conflict. The best way to counteract Al'Qaeda is not to attack Iraq but to bring her gradually back into the family of nations while at the same time working to create a viable Palestinian state. That aim has been repeated many times on both sides of the Atlantic. It is time for us to get on with it.
4.40 p.m.
Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar: My Lords, when or if the United States attacks Iraq and Britain takes part, it may well be one of the least compelling wars that Britain has ever fought: uncompelling because the

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given reasons that war against Saddam is a necessary part of the war against terror, and that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction present an immediate and appalling threat to the United States, Britain and everyone else, are not altogether convincing.
The first reason is surely specious because there is no evidence of any connection between Saddam Hussein and Bin Laden or Al'Qaeda. Such evidence would be extremely unlikely. Although the Iraqi regime is as abominable as one could find, both at home and abroad, it is almost the most secular of Muslim states in the Middle East or anywhere else.
The second reason seems extremely improbable. When, shortly after the end of the Second World War, it was discovered that Soviet Russia was out to build nuclear weapons, a number of people including, surprisingly enough, Bertrand Russell, advocated dropping an atomic bomb on Russia to stop it from doing so. Luckily, their counsels were disregarded. Russia became a nuclear power and theories of deterrence were evolved which worked. At that time the Soviet Union was ruled by a tyrant, Stalin, every bit as unspeakable as Saddam Hussein is today in Iraq. Deterrence has suddenly been forgotten or abandoned. It has to be; otherwise the threat would be shown to be far less real than people make out. If Saddam used any weapons of mass destruction against the West or Israel, as the noble Lord, Lord Rea, said, he would be pulverised within hours. It is, therefore, unthinkable that he could use them.
If the given reasons for war against Iraq are insufficient, why are Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld—but not, significantly, Colin Powell, or, according to General Zinni, virtually every general in the United States Army—itching for a war against Iraq? From the New York Times last week we know that on that very day, September 11th, Rumsfeld said, "Now we can go after Saddam". In other words, he was looking for an excuse.
I think that there are four additional reasons, none creditable and none attractive to most people in this country, why the hawks in the United States are out for war. Not necessarily in order of importance, the first is electoral. It has been pointed to by many in the United States. With the American economy languishing, medical costs rising and other problems, it is important for the Republican party to have a war atmosphere and to have the electorate focus on the probability of war rather than domestic considerations which favour the Democratic Party.
The second reason is oil. With its vast oil reserves, Iraq is obviously a tempting target to the United States, in particular to this administration with its close connections with the oil industry.
The third is historic or dynastic. Although Iraq suffered enormous damage, the mere survival of Saddam after the Gulf War has made a number of Americans think that in some way he won and they intend to remedy that.
The fourth reason is the American desire for control of the Middle East. As the distinguished American columnist, William Pfaff, put it a few days ago,
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"a part of the neoconservative and pro Israeli community influencing Bush administration policy argues that a war against Saddam Hussein should be seen in the context of a long-term American policy for transforming the Muslim Middle East".
As well as "regime change" in Iraq, that policy envisages American domination of,
"the entire Middle East",
and, above all,
"an Arab-Israeli settlement on terms acceptable to Israel".
The first and fourth reasons are the most important. Of course now the given cause of the war is the observance of UN resolutions. That is an extremely good cause in itself but, as has been asked, why are we being so selective about abiding by UN resolutions? Leaving aside Turkey, as has been said, Israel is in breach of many UN resolutions. If President Bush had said in his recent very able speech at the United Nations that both Iraq and Israel would have to abide by and obey United Nations resolutions so that Iraq would be disarmed and Israel would end its occupation of Palestinian land, his speech would have been almost unanimously welcomed and applauded. But, of course, he did not say that because of American double standards.
The noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, mentioned the double standards and pointed out that Israelis were not the only people affected by Resolution 242; the Arabs had to make peace at the same time. But she did not add that when the Saudi initiative was accepted at the Beirut Summit by all Arab states, Sharon's response was a deafening silence in words but not in gunfire: he merely intensified the war in Palestine. The American Administration are hated in most of the Middle East because of their policies on Arab-Israel which are regarded as corrupt and hypocritical: corrupt because they are not determined by decency or justice but by American domestic considerations, votes and money; and hypocritical because, while pretending to be even handed, they are entirely on one side. As Israel's leading columnist, Nahum Barnea, wrote recently, the administration have,
"let Israel wage its war against the Palestinians without restrictions".
And as one of Israel's most eminent historians, Avi Shlaim, has written,
"It is not peace that Sharon seeks with the Palestinians but their surrender and expulsion".
The Bush Administration will be even more detested if they attack Iraq, as will Britain, even though Saddam Hussein's regime is very unpopular in the Middle East. We must hope that war when it comes will be short and victorious. If it is longer, the only effect will be to create more terrorists in the Middle East.
4.48 p.m.
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: My Lords, today the Government have published the dossier, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and I welcome that. But surely examination of weapons of mass destruction is only one major element of our concern about Iraq. Are there not other areas of equal

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importance which we should discuss in order to bring into balance our overall foreign policy objectives? These should be, first, security for the region—by "the region" we do not mean just the Palestine-Israeli conflict which has been referred to a number of times by noble Lords—but also the oppression of the Syrians, the lack of human rights in Saudi Arabia and the various ways in which we seek security for a deeply troubled region mainly ruled by different variants of dictatorship. That security is a critically important factor.
Secondly, our task should be to implement the rights of the Iraqi people: first and foremost, their right to life. The UN declaration of human rights has been violated many hundreds, thousands and millions of times by Saddam Hussein. Should we not today be discussing in far greater depth and with much greater concern than we have shown in our debates in recent weeks the rights of the Iraqi people?
Then there is the question of the rule of international law. This is still a fragmentary mechanism. We have, against considerable opposition, established the International Criminal Court, but even that cannot be used retrospectively for the many crimes against humanity committed by Saddam Hussein, and against the Iraqi people in particular. In terms of international law, the question arises of the integrity of the United Nations no less; but beyond that, the rights of the Iraqi people have been cut across consistently, ranging from the depths of the conflicts created by Saddam Hussein's destruction of the Iraqi marshland to the bombing with chemical weapons of the northern Kurdish people. In those instances the United Nations convention on genocide has been breached.
All would agree that in our foreign policy we have a great responsibility for the maintenance in good repair of the transatlantic alliance. Here, we have a responsibility not only for the bilateral transatlantic alliance between the United States of America and the UK, important though that is, but surely for the maintenance and good repair of what is perhaps the most important force for peace and good in the world today. I refer to the transatlantic alliance between the European Union and the USA. Let us make no mistake: the 15 member states of the European Union and the further 13 potential entrants to the EU are the largest single bloc of people in the world brought together for peaceful reasons. When we link up with another great democracy, the USA, together we should be an unbeatable force for good, provided always that we are working for the right ends.
I am concerned that, in our deep intensive discussions on weapons of mass destruction, we may forget that they are a means and not an end in themselves, and that essentially it is not so much a question of who owns the weapons of mass destruction but of how those owners choose to use them.
I have a small piece of first-hand evidence to offer. I recall, in the late 1990s when the inspectors were still in Iraq, interviewing some deeply traumatised people who could barely breathe. They had crept across the border between Iraq and Iran, having been bombed, as
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they told me, by a weapon of mass destruction. A small aeroplane had come over the horizon into the southern Iraqi marshlands, too low, I suppose, for our Vulcan jets overflying the area to see. The plane dropped something which turned into a huge yellow cloud. I was told that a number of people had fallen dead on the spot, in a village near to the border with Iran. This small handful of people, choking and barely able to breathe, crept across. I took their testimony.
It is worth remembering that Iraq is an enormous country. Even were the weapons inspectors to crawl all over every millimetre of every so-called presidential site and dig down to eternity, how could they possibly find every trace of such weapons? That is not to say that we should not try, but the inspectors' report cannot be the only determinant.
I suggest that the genocide convention—our commitment to the right to life of the Iraqi people—and our deep concern for the security of region must weigh just as heavily in the balance as whether or not the inspectors manage to lay their hands on yet more weapons of mass destruction. But I wish them well.
In May this year, the European Parliament passed a profoundly serious resolution. I was the drafter of the resolution. It was strengthened by the Foreign Affairs Committee. In the end we passed it with an 85 per cent majority. It was a double-sized report because of the importance of what we felt we had to say. It was accepted by the European Commission. We are now awaiting such implementation of our final resolution as the Commission can achieve. We are concerned that the Council of Ministers does not seem to have taken the report fully into account.
We made a number of serious proposals. Our view at the time—and it continues to be our view—was that Iraq certainly posed a threat to regional stability and world security. I remind the House that under UN resolutions from the beginning of the last decade Saddam Hussein has been forbidden to set up training camps for terrorists. Yet we know that he has been training the MKO terrorists. We have all the evidence that we require that he has not stopped this particular action. I would guess that he has been training other terrorists too. But we have the knowledge that he has not stopped
In our European Parliament report we propose a number of matters that are discussed in the British Government's report today, including the need for independent inspectors to examine the reconstruction of prohibited programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. We felt most profoundly, however, that the serious humanitarian situation within Iraq should be addressed, and we reiterated the absolute obligation of the Iraqi Government,
"to implement fully and immediately"
all UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1284, and to co-operate in all respects with the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies.
We stated that in our view the Iraqi Government had indeed continued over the past 11 years to increase their regime of terror against all levels of society and

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to commit gross and massive human rights violations. This included the active persecution of the Kurdish people, the Turkmen, the Assyrian populations and the Shia; the earlier destruction of the Christian population; the destruction of the Jewish population earlier still; and particularly the destruction of the inhabitants and the entire destruction of the ancient way of life, including the animals and fish, of the Mesopotamian marshlands and of all the Tigris and Euphrates waterways. We stated in our resolution of May this year that there was no sign of a change in that policy.
Earlier this year a short report was published by UNEP. It took 10 years for UNEP to address the marshland drainage. Even so, there must have been some political interference. With regard to the destruction of the Iraqi marshlands—30,000 miles of waterways—the UNEP report did not show that the last 10 per cent is being destroyed now.
The European Parliament resolution comments that the status and situation of women, children, ethnic minorities and religious groups inside Iraq has gone downhill drastically and dramatically in the last decade. Political rights have been destroyed, as have civil rights, liberties and family rights. There has been systematic violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indeed, there has been the training of children in armies and associated practices with minors.
So we resolved that the European Council and the member states should take all necessary measures to bring those officials of the Iraqi regime who were responsible for those serious violations of international humanitarian law carried out inside Iraq and outside its territories before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal.
We pointed out that such a tribunal could indeed be established—as has been discussed but has not happened over a long period—by a United Nations Security Council Resolution, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. We took note that this had not happened despite many pleas. Therefore, we recommended another mechanism that had not been identified or articulated previously. I want to draw this to the attention of the House. Someone has to act to make this happen. We pointed out that such a tribunal could be set up, pursuant to treaty, by the concerned and injured states. We stated that this was an essential route to follow, since Article 11, the jurisdiction ratione temporis, of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court gives jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the statute in July 2002.
Recognising that it would take a little time for concerned and injured states to draw up a treaty and to set up a tribunal, we proposed the setting up of an office of inquiry for human rights violations in order to prepare all the necessary evidence and an official register of the numerous violations perpetrated by the Iraqi regime. We called on the European Union to set up such an office without delay.
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Many debates on Iraq have taken place during the past decade—indeed, I have been responsible for tabling a number of them myself. I am sad to recall that in one debate the present Leader of the other place completely disagreed and claimed, for example, that the drainage of the marshes was not happening. I remember that he declared in the other place that the burning of the houses in the villages was just what the Ma'dan had been doing for 5,000 years for health reasons. I also recall another Member in the other place who visits Iraq regularly asking from a seated position what the loss of a little drinking water was to a few Arabs. I am sad that such violations of human rights should have been treated with such levity and such a disgraceful attitude. I know that that would not happen in your Lordships' House.
I ask most seriously that we should here, today, take this major breach of the 1948 convention on genocide and look at Article 2, which defines genocide as:
"Killing members of the group: Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group".
We should also look at Article 3 and consider how such actions should be punished, as well as considering Article 8 that talks about the way in which this should happen, which is as I have described: bringing about a trial of the accused. The setting up of a competent tribunal of the state in the territory in which the act was committed is the first objective. However, that has not happened over the period of 11 years, or longer, in Iraq. Therefore, as regards these breaches of the convention, I believe that we have not only a right but an obligation to establish such a panel outside the country. Just two states would be sufficient. Curiously, they could possibly even be the United Kingdom and the USA.
That is why I urge your Lordships to take human rights and the security of the region just as seriously as the question of weapons of mass destruction. If we care only for ourselves and our defence, are we really worthy to be judged as people who uphold the moral standards of international law? I think not. We should be just as concerned about the people of the region and, most particularly, about the people of Iraq. I call upon this Government to take steps to bring out the perpetrators of these injustices. They should bring together the contracting treaty parties and rapidly establish the ad hoc criminal tribunal. They should urge the European Union, which is a good body for this task, to set up an office of human rights and introduce the register. They should move rapidly because the Iraqi people can wait no longer. We have had enough debates. The time has come to act. As the accused will not come willingly to trial, then, yes, I believe that we can and should justify the use of force.
5.3 p.m.
Lord Wright of Richmond: My Lords, an inevitable consequence of being the 25th speaker in a debate is that one is bound to repeat and perhaps—even worse—to appear to ignore points already made by previous speakers. However, I should like to ask the Minister the following brief questions.
First, if we join the United States in a military attack on Iraq, what follows? The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said that this was not a question for today. But, with respect, I believe that it is a question that we need to address. Who will run Iraq in Saddam Hussein's place—assuming that we can in fact change his regime? Do the Iraqi opposition groups have any credibility now, let alone after they have been put into power by outside intervention? Are we confident of being able to unseat that great survivor, Saddam Hussein, without at least the risk of him unleashing some of the weapons of mass destruction that any invasion is presumably intended to remove and destroy?
Secondly, I have read this morning's dossier very carefully. But I see nothing in it to prove Saddam Hussein's connections with Al'Qaeda, or, indeed, with Palestinian extremists, let alone any involvement in the events of 11th September. Of course we have known for a very long time what a despicable and murderous tyrant he is. But what has changed? And why the urgency?
Thirdly, the Prime Minister is to be congratulated on any influence that he may have brought to bear on President Bush to agree to a resolution in the United Nations Security Council. But is the international community being invited to pass a resolution, ostensibly designed to reach a diplomatic solution in Iraq, when the United States may already have taken the decision to go to war? I see that suggestions in New York that regime change is on ice have been vigorously denied in Washington.
Fourthly, I recall Ministers telling us that we must be tough on the causes of terror. Have our American friends forgotten that one of the main causes of terror and resentment in the Middle East, and throughout the Islamic world, is the lack of any apparent readiness in Washington to use their undoubted influence to bring about a just and lasting peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel?
Much has been made of Iraq's failure to implement Security Council resolutions. Given the continuing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, their failure to evacuate illegal settlements, and the outrageous attacks on President Arafat's headquarters during the past few days, talk of Iraq's failure to implement Security Council resolutions must strike the Islamic world as double standards at their worst.
I hope that I do not need, as other speakers have, to declare my admiration and affection for the United States, having served for five years in the British Embassy in Washington and having worked closely with American friends and colleagues for the 36 years that I spent in the Diplomatic Service. However, I find it astonishing that President Bush's speech to the
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United Nations contained no more than a few words on Palestine; and that the interview reported in yesterday's Financial Times with the National Security Adviser contained not a single reference to either Israel or Palestine. I very much welcome the passage on Palestine in the Prime Minister's speech that was repeated to us today. I hope that he can use his influence with President Bush to get the Americans to take the Palestinian issue as seriously as the Prime Minister clearly does.
I do not know whether the new strategy of preemption announced by Washington last week scares the Islamic world, whom it seems designed primarily to target, but, by God, it scares me. Frequent references have been made in the United States to further possible targets—or, "shopping lists" as described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell—for American military action. Iran, Syria and the Yemen have all been mentioned. Are we to stand shoulder to shoulder in the name of regime change there as well? And do we now accept the principle that international law and the United Nations Charter are irrelevant, and that unpleasant regimes should be evicted by external force?
I believe that we are at an extremely dangerous cross-roads. Are we wise to set ourselves on a collision course with the entire Islamic world, at a time when we should be concentrating our attention on the basic causes of terrorism and resentment against the West? Have we really measured the impact of a military attack on our wider political and economic interests in the Middle East, and on the stability of governments, with several of whom we have actually concluded treaties of friendship?
I hope that the Minister will confirm that our immediate aim in Iraq is not just disarmament, but disarmament through the effective, prompt and supported use of weapons inspectors. But in terms of removing a threat to the United States—or, indeed, to the world as a whole—the failure to move towards a comprehensive and just peace settlement in Israel and Palestine and also in Syria is, I submit, of equal urgency. I shall not get into an argument with the noble Lord, Lord Janner, who I see is not now in his place, except to remind him and the House that it was Mr Sharon's deliberate act of provocation in Jerusalem two years ago that set off the latest intifada over the past two years.
Finally, I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I again quote the Foreign Secretary's remark in April of this year, in the context of the Palestinian authority, that,
"none of us can choose who leads governments or administrations in foreign countries".
How do attempts to change other people's governments by force square with our calls for greater democracy in the Middle East?
5.10 p.m.
Lord Winston: My Lords, I have a son aged 21. One of his friends has already been referred to in the Chamber today by my noble friend Lord Janner of

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Braunstone. Jonathan was of the same age. He had five A-levels. He had places in Cambridge and in London. In two or three weeks' time he was due to start reading medicine in London. He was taking a lunch trip to visit some other friends of my son when his brains were replaced by a piece of metal.
Your Lordships have heard the story of how his mother flew out to Israel so that the life support machine was not switched off. My noble friend Lord Janner did not point out how he was nursed next to Arabs in the same hospital ward by people who were treating Arabs and Israelis equally. Noble Lords have heard how he donated his kidney. It might seem that this is an isolated incident. It is not.
I picked fruit with Palestinians. Cousins of mine built up factories on the West Bank in order to improve the lot of Palestinians and their welfare in all kinds of ways. My cousin was responsible for all kinds of water irrigation projects in what is now the West Bank. He did so because he felt that it was his duty to try and improve the lot generally of the area and not just of Israel.
Last year my son, the one I have just referred to, Ben, was teaching football to Arabs. He brought the Arsenal Football Club out there to support him. One of the Arab fathers said to him, "What a marvellous coach you are. You must be a professional". My son said, "No, actually, I'm a university student" He then immediately bought an entire Arsenal strip for the Arab boys of that village.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, said something which was absolutely pertinent. It has been referred to again and again. She said that we have not addressed the Palestinian issue. I would argue that none of us today has addressed the Palestinian/Israeli issue and that there is a failure of understanding of what the basic issues are.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London referred earlier to the perils of violence. One of the most violent things in our society is violent language. Sadly, in the past we have heard a good deal of violent language in this Chamber and in the other place. It is not helpful. It cannot heal wounds. Violent language does not bring peace.
In Jewish tradition there is a phrase called loshen h'rah which means "the evil tongue". It is regarded as being one of the worst things to do. Bad-mouthing someone undermines one in a quite extraordinary way. Sadly, for the past few years one of the problems that has faced us in the world has been this increase in violent language. Do noble Lords not think that those young men who flew into the twin towers in New York had not been deprived but that they had been subjected throughout their youth to the violent language, the commitment to do something which was an evil crime? That is a fundamental problem.
I do not know whether my noble friend Lady Uddin reads Arabic. Like my noble friend Lord Janner, I have tried to learn it. My modern Hebrew is also much of a smattering. But I can tell your Lordships that in the Middle East on the Palestinian side children from the very earliest ages are treated to the most appalling
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violent language—to anti-Semitic literature which would make the Nazis look like pansies by comparison. That violence of language pervades the society. It goes through the media, the newspapers, television and textbooks. One can see it. I, together with many of my friends, can provide evidence of that. It is self-evident. It is a problem that we must face. Until we understand that violence we cannot really get to grips with the issue.
I regret very much that my noble friend Lady Uddin is not in her place to listen to my speech. I wrote down carefully what she said. She said that Israel has perpetrated state terrorism; that Israel literally gets away with murder; and she talked of the brutalisation of Palestinian people. Those are some of the phrases she used. They are common phrases. They may seem banal and mild. They are not. They are quite shocking. She talked about the abandonment of the Palestinian people 60 years ago. Those people were not abandoned by Israel.
Israel is a tiny country, the size of Wales or Northern Ireland. It is surrounded by huge wealth and huge countries occupied by, in the main, a desperately poor people who are definitely and appallingly under-privileged and who desperately need help.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, talked about Iraq being the cradle of civilisation. It is true that written language started there. But we are not talking about Sumeria, Arcadia, Akkad or Ur. Iraq was founded by Britain in 1932. Indeed, it was only about eight years later that we re-invaded Iraq because we saw the Nazi sympathies in that country. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, referred to the Balfour declaration as though this was something unusual. But the whole of the Middle East is a creation of the West and to a large extent of the British Empire. We have to take some responsibility for that.
Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I just want to clarify what I said. I apologise if I referred to Iraq as though I was referring to the nation, I was referring to the geographical territory known as Iraq, which still has, as the noble Lord will know, many artefacts and monuments which date from the Sumerian civilisation.
Lord Winston: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I was not referring to her speech in any pejorative sense. It was merely to put the record straight, as it were.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, said that he thought that this issue was in many ways one of the most difficult he had faced in 30 years of politics. I have only sat in this Chamber for seven years, and I think that it is an extraordinarily perplexing issue.
Perhaps in many ways the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford summed up the feelings of so many of my friends. We would be prepared to fight a just war, but the question is whether this is actually justice.

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I do not believe that we can enter into the possibility of a confrontation which would be seen to be a conflict with the Muslim world. That is not acceptable. The Muslim world has an absolute right to exist and in peace the same as the rest of the world. It is particularly sad that so much of the Muslim world is extremely poor, under-privileged, sometimes poorly educated and—dare I say it—frequently very poorly led. There is a huge conundrum for the West.
Above all we must recognise that we must obey international law. Not to do so could result in a descent into tyranny, injustice, chaos and anarchy. That is something we could be facing. We have to find different ways of understanding the problem. Today, to my mind, we have shown surprisingly little understanding.
Perhaps I may refer to one aspect of the United Nations Charter which was referred to by my noble friend Lord Rea and to some extent by other noble Lords. There is a fundamental difference between chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. Iraq threatening peace is a grave issue. The issue about withdrawing to borders is not a matter of the threatening of peace; it is a question of resolution to achieve a peaceful process and it is not enforceable under UN law in the same kind of way.
It is all very well to talk about Israel refusing to return to its border, but that is misleading. Israel offered to return all those territories two or three years ago and because Arafat refused a moderate Labour government collapsed. The result was a hard line. The risk is that the more we have the conflict, the more the hard line may be followed.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, the Barak government offered the Palestinians home rule. However, the Israelis would continue their settlements, control the roads and control the borders. That is not an independent state. It was not a generous offer.
Lord Winston: My Lords, that is not my perception of what was referred to. I have no doubt that other speakers will come back on that issue and I do not want to detain the House. However, the issue was clearly that there was effectively something like an offer of 98 per cent of the disputed territory on paper. It was something that could be debated and negotiated. Sadly those negotiations failed, I believe, through no fault of the then Prime Minister.
Whatever happens, there must be no pre-emption in the Middle East. If the worst comes to the worst, simply having those mass weapons of destruction—appalling though the dossier is—is not a convincing reason to strike at the present time. I fear that we may even have to take a hit. It may even be Israel which needs to take that hit, but somebody may be struck by Iraq. Perhaps then there would be a just war that could ensue.
It is a sad issue. However, we must recognise that in these debates there will be all sorts of pieces of intelligence to which we shall not have access. To some
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extent, only people close to the centre of government will have that access. Above all, we must trust our leaders. At present we have fine examples of moral leadership. We must recognise that we shall have to trust the decision to those people when it comes. We shall have to follow that decision to do the best we can to try to ensure peace and to seek justice where it is needed.
5.22 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford: My Lords, I rise to speak as one of the signatories to the Pax Christi Declaration that was presented to the Prime Minister at the beginning of August. That declaration included this strong statement:
"It is deplorable that the World's most powerful nations continue to regard war and the threat of war as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy, in violation of the ethos of both the United Nations and Christian moral teaching. The way to peace does not lie through war but through the transformation of structures of injustice and of the politics of exclusion, and that is the cause to which the West should be devoting its technological, diplomatic and economic resources".
I remain firmly identified with that declaration and have an increasing sense of foreboding about the likelihood and consequences of some form of military action being taken against Iraq, particularly if the USA acts unilaterally. Brinkmanship is high risk strategy. It creates a war expectation momentum. Ears can be deafened to reason and readjustment. By prosecuting military action, economic and other resources are inevitably diverted from the war on poverty and injustice, further endangering the lives of millions of innocent people over and above those who become victims of the conflict itself.
I do not for one moment deny the brutality of the Iraqi regime. Saddam Hussein is guilty of heinous crimes against humanity. He has ruthlessly manipulated the sanctions deal to his own ends. But as a result, the Iraqi people—especially the children and not the regime—have borne the brunt of the sanctions in terms of infant mortality, chronic malnutrition, the inaccessibility of clean water, and crumbling health and education provision. How can we contemplate unleashing yet more misery upon them?
In addition, there is the question—and it has been touched on often today—of the possible destabilisation of the whole Middle East in the event of military action. It was King Abdullah of Jordan who warned that:
"The Middle East could go up in flames".
He added another vivid picture when he said:
"In the light of the failure to move the Israeli-Palestinian process forward, military action against Iraq would really open a Pandora's Box".
In my view, shared by many, there is a seemingly relentless concentration by Washington and London on dealing with Iraq which should be diverted to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is also the justifiable complaint that UN resolutions are being sought and then selectively applied to outlaw Saddam Hussein while leaving other transgressors untouched.

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The repercussions from any military attack on Iraq will inevitably be far wider than the Middle East. For example, the current fragile peace process, seeking to bring to an end years of civil war in the Sudan, could be jeopardised. Here in Britain, Christian, Muslim and Jewish relations would be severely tested. I serve a diocese which includes a substantial part of multi-faith multi-cultural East London, as well as Essex. Many Jews and Muslims are feeling vulnerable, particularly since 11th September last year. Both communities have witnessed verbal abuse, and in some cases physical abuse, both to property and to person. The discernible increase in anti-Semitism is a matter of concern.
Generally speaking, British Muslims would view an attack against Iraq as another example of "double standards". For Muslims in the US, Britain and Europe as a whole, that is exacerbated by increased "anti-terrorist" legislation which appears to undermine their basic human rights. Many Muslims in Britain are feeling further alienated as a result of the ongoing debate on citizenship and the need to "prove" their loyalty to the United Kingdom.
There is a growing feeling that speaking out against the Government over Iraq may be taken as evidence of "disloyalty". For many Muslims, in this country and elsewhere, a military attack on Iraq would be aligned with hostility to the Islamic world as such. Much of the patient work of repairing, healing and strengthening inter-faith community relations since September 11th could be destroyed.
We are all acutely mindful of Saddam Hussein's predictable record of flouting UN Resolutions. However, there remains—and this has been stressed again and again today—a strong moral obligation for further weapon inspection to be given a chance to work.
In conclusion, I believe that removing the dangers posed by dictators and terrorists can only ultimately be achieved by tackling the root causes of the disputes themselves. That is the path that needs to be pursued. Peacemaking with justice, not war-making, must be the focus. You will be aware of the apostle Paul's injunction:
"Do not he overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good".
My fear is that we are in great danger of being overcome by evil.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Alli: My Lords, I can only imagine the responsibility that must lay on the shoulders of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and his advisers. Theirs is seemingly an impossible task to balance the unbalanceable, to build a coalition where there is discord and to provide consistency where inconsistency has been the norm. Whatever the outcome of this debate and the debate in another place, I hope that my right honourable friend will reflect on what both Houses have to say and take strength and guidance from our words.
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I am not privy to the detailed intelligence that my right honourable friend has at hand, nor do I have access to the military and civilian expertise that he has. So my knowledge is limited to the dossier published today, which I have managed only to skim-read. However, in the final analysis, I hope and trust the Prime Minister's judgment on these matters because he will have before him a better picture.
It is these judgments over the coming months that I believe will lay the foundation for a new world order for the coming years. And it is in those judgments, too, that I believe lie the hopes of millions of young Muslims, Christians and Jews. Without that hope lies a path to terror and more violence.
There are two major objectives in my contribution to this debate today. The first is to reassure my noble friends on the Front Bench that they will have my full support in the coming months for whatever action they feel is necessary in this fight against terror. The second is to put forward my own view, along with others, in this House to help them in their deliberations about what that action might be.
There seem to be a number of pivotal questions, many of which have been touched on, that need to be addressed and I have tried to distil a complex set of issues into the following questions. First, does Saddam Hussein pose a credible threat to the peace and stability of the world? Secondly, does Saddam Hussein possess chemical and biological weapons? Thirdly, is Saddam Hussein attempting to build a nuclear arsenal? Fourthly, should the United Kingdom press for the full implementation of UN resolutions and if resisted should it use force' Fifthly, should the United Kingdom, together with the United States, seek a new UN resolution which is stronger and more robust? Sixthly, does the UK require any further resolutions from the UN to authorise the use of force? Seventhly, should the United Kingdom go it alone with the US even if it is isolated from the rest of the world? Eighthly, is regime change a sensible idea on which to base present and future foreign policy?
Let me address those questions in turn. Yes, I believe that Saddam Hussein poses a credible threat to the peace and stability of the world. And, yes, I believe that he has developed chemical and biological weapons and that he seeks a nuclear capability. And, yes, I believe that we should use force if necessary to ensure that UN resolutions relating to Iraq are fully implemented. It seems to be a nonsensical position to give an ultimatum about weapons' inspections without the ability to force compliance. If the UN does not implement its resolutions, it is the weaker for it.
Yes, I believe that if possible we should seek a stronger and more robust UN resolution. However, I do not believe that there is a further requirement for additional resolutions to authorise military actions. Although perhaps it is not wise in this instance, I tend to share the view expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, during the Falklands conflict when she made clear that she felt that sovereign powers should have the ability to act without reference to other organisations provided they were not in violation of international law.

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Should Britain go it alone with the US if isolated in world opinion? If my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were satisfied that that was the only course of action likely to succeed, I believe that they should. Finally, is regime change a sensible idea on which to base foreign policy? I have to say that on this issue I part company with our allies, the United States Administration. It is a very tempting policy, but I would counsel my right honourable friend the Prime Minister to be careful with such a policy because it unlocks as many injustices as it seeks to solve.
Having said all of that, I believe that whatever action we take in the coming months we will have residual obligations as a result of those policies. The first obligation is to examine our own policy towards Israel and in particular the Middle East and to put pressure on President Bush to do more to begin a sensible peace process and put it in place to curb a cycle of violence.
Secondly, we need to extend the hand of friendship to Muslim and Arab countries and seek a more permanent alliance with Arab nations. Further, we must embrace Islam and not shy away from it and we must support the moderates and not rubbish what we do not understand. Here I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Uddin for what must have been a difficult speech. I applaud her bravery.
Thirdly, we must stop the fight against terrorism being hijacked by those who seek to use violence and military action for which there is no justification, except political convenience. I think in particular of Israel, Pakistan, India and even Russia with regard to Chechnya.
Fourthly, we should never forget that we armed Saddam Hussein and supported his regime. If we are to keep the moral high ground, there can be no justification for arms sales into that region. I find the argument that if we did not sell arms they would be bought somewhere else morally repugnant. You cannot have an ethical foreign policy, or anything that resembles it, and sell arms.
Finally, we have to call Saddam Hussein's bluff. He long ago forfeited his right to be trusted and should not be allowed to hide behind the right of sovereignty, for it is he who is in violation of international treaty and law, not us; it is he who has turned on his own people, not us; and in this instance it is he who is the aggressor, not us. As in all cases of aggression, appeasement is a weak weapon and in most cases aggression needs to be fought with aggression—even though many in this House and outside hope and pray that further force can be avoided. But if it is needed we should be ready to use it and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister should know that I, in that event, will give him my support.
5.37 p.m.
Lord King of Bridgwater: My Lords, I welcome the debate and the opportunity for this House to contribute what is undoubtedly a considerable range
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of experience. The phrase "déjà vu" has already been used and it is obvious that some of us recognise similarities to situations we have been in previously.
It is right that this House and the other place are debating the matter because of the particular importance of the role of the United Kingdom. It is easy to flatter ourselves that we are key players. We know that we are not a world power but there is no question that one super superpower, as described earlier, cannot easily proceed on its own. It has a desperate need for partners. Previous personal observations lead me to believe that a particular British contribution can be made in terms of our background and experience over many decades of this sensitive and difficult part of the world. My noble friend Lord Hurd referred to the sense of public uncertainty so it is right that Parliament should speak at this most difficult of times. It should try to meet some of the concerns about an acutely dangerous situation that to many people has suddenly arrived.
In that most dangerous and volatile part of the world we have the unattractive and evil figure of Saddam Hussein. I do not believe that anyone seriously challenges the evidence, which is confirmed in the dossier and the earlier work of the IISS, that he is, if anything, accelerating his programme of producing lethal weapons of mass destruction. Added to that and, I am sure, to the question which the noble Lord, Lord Wright, sensed as to why we are in this situation and the Americans so concerned about the issue; whether or not Saddam Hussein intends to have such weapons purely for his own defence, the stability of his own regime and his own survival; and whether he sees weapons of mass destruction as a way to garner and increase his domination, power and influence in the area, there has to be the very real risk, which has been brought vividly home, that whether or not he has any link with Al'Qaeda at the present time, the fact is that in a rogue state, if ever there was one, there exist such weapons that could become the property of a terrorist group that does not need missiles or to address the maps that have been drawn out in the dossier to show just how far particular missiles fly. There are plenty of ways of moving weapons of mass destruction around the world. We know of the disruption caused to the US postal service by relatively small quantities of anthrax. That showed how easily terror could be spread without the need for massive missile capability.
It is in that situation that the United States initially and Her Majesty's Government have taken the view that enough is enough. United Nations resolutions were initiated 11 years ago at the end of the Gulf War. They have been systematically flouted and evaded over this period. Every device has been used to try to avoid the UN resolutions. Now it is not a stalemate situation, but the programmes are being accelerated. The resolutions now need to be enforced. The clear message of the Government and the United Nations should be that that is the objective. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alli. I find the phrase "regime change" particularly unattractive. We said during the Gulf War that if the outcome was the death of Saddam

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Hussein we would not shed tears over it. But the objective was the liberation of Kuwait and that was the kernel around which we were able to have United Nations support at that time. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, said, it is important to have a clear objective which not just nations, sophisticated ambassadors and the United Nations debating these issues, but people can understand. I accept that it may not be necessary for legal purposes, as the noble Lord suggested, but for presentational purposes there should be a new, strong resolution in the United Nations giving authority for the enforcement, if necessary, of UN weapons inspection and the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. That is the right course to take.
I also accept that that must be backed by credible force. Having seen that once and the difficulties that we had then, it is a much more difficult problem. It is very easy to say that we must have credible force. I ask noble Lords to consider what that means. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, referred to the possible degradation of the Iraqi army. I accept that it is probably not what it was. Perhaps it never was. That was one of the mysteries perhaps of the Gulf War. Nonetheless, we shall need significant forces and ensure that they appear credible. No one should be under any illusions that Saddam Hussein will resist, not just because he is naturally devious and wishing to be as awkward as he can, but because he needs weapons of mass destruction. They have been essential to the survival of his regime. He believes that it is only by possessing such weapons and using them, such as 100,000 chemical shells, that he was able to resist the human wave of Iranian troops which Iraq faced in the Iran-Iraq war. I do not support this belief, but Saddam Hussein believes that it was possession of chemical and biological weapons which persuaded us not to go to Baghdad at the end of the Gulf War. That is not true because our authority was the liberation of Kuwait and not the capture of Iraq or the invasion of Baghdad. But he believes that. In a real sense it is his life insurance policy. I do not fancy that Saddam looks forward to a quiet retirement in a suitable retirement home were he ever to lose power. Because of the challenge that he faces he will wish by every means possible to maintain his weapons of mass destruction.
Nonetheless, I believe that we have to work through the United Nations and establish the toughest possible resolution there for the inspectors to go into Iraq and to seek to identify and remove the weapons of mass destruction. I know that it is said in America—some may have heard Richard Perle say it last night on television—that if you know that using the inspectors will not work then why bother. The reason why one must bother, even though one may have the deepest cynicism about the system working, is to return to my message of carrying world opinion with us. We have to be seen to have tried and to have shown that that is our objective. It is important to keep faith with the vital Arab neighbour countries which are in such a precarious position.
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I believe that I was not the only noble Lord who was struck by what appeared to be a rather sudden change of view at the United Nations by a number of Arab countries who appeared to be unsympathetic and not keen to have troops based on their territory. They changed their views. I heard it suggested that that was in recognition of a superb speech by President Bush. His adoption of the route through the United Nations was obviously helpful, but I am sure that it was much more than that. Those Arab countries then believed that there was a determination to see this matter through. There was surprise in Arab countries at the end of the Gulf War when it was realised that Saddam Hussein was still in place even though Kuwait had been liberated and the Iraqi army had been defeated. That undoubtedly contributed to their nervousness and fear of his motivation and activities. I say as an aside that I cannot help thinking that if the bullets fired in Kandahar had been a centimetre or two in a different direction and Mr Karzai had been killed and the efforts of his special protection squad from the United States had been defeated, the result as regards some of the responses from Arab countries might have been different. That has brought out very clearly a point made by my noble friend Lord Hurd about the fragility of the situation. The insecurity of many of the countries and governments in the region contributes to the uncertainties in this most difficult problem that we face.
We now have to ensure that if we get a tough resolution from the United Nations we must have credible military force to back it up. That raises some horrific logistic problems and some very difficult problems of timing as well. The part of the world involved is not somewhere where one can stand to and stand down month after month. One moves into problems of temperature and the impossibility of conducting campaigns, perhaps in protective clothing and in temperatures around 40 degrees centigrade. There is a very real problem in how one sustains a militarily credible force in the area which is the only possible hope, if there is one, for a successful weapons inspection and the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction.
My own view on this matter now is that having reached the present position, it is essential that we see it through because we do not go back simply to where we were if we fail in the objective. If we fail to impose the will of the United Nations now on Saddam Hussein with the removal of his weapons of mass destruction, he will feel in a very real sense that he is now impregnable and that the world does not have the will to confront his deliberate obstruction of United Nations resolutions. He will become more aggressive and his neighbours will have to adjust their positions accordingly. They will then recognise where power lies and the future for that whole region will be much more uncertain and the position for the rest of the world and its future prosperity and security much more unpredictable.
5.50 p.m.
Lord Watson of Richmond: My Lords, in a debate of this length and complexity the danger of repetition is extreme and I am sure that I shall not avoid it entirely.

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However, for that reason I want to focus on only one aspect of the Iraq crisis, namely, this country's relationship with the United States.
I believe in the special relationship, but taking the qualification of my noble friend, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, on the special relationship, I accept that it needs qualification. The special relationship exists because of language, history and significant shared values, but geography, population and economic power ensure that it is a special but not an equal relationship. Moral toughness, clarity of policy, reality about national interest and political skill will always be needed to ensure that this special, but not equal, relationship, does not deteriorate into a subservient relationship.
Details are important. It may seem a small, even a trivial, matter but last week I was made uneasy by the press photograph of the Foreign Secretary standing behind Colin Powell wearing a Stars and Stripes lapel badge crossed with the Union Jack. Why? Because we live in an age of symbols, a visual and a tele-visual age. Loyalty and friendship should be proclaimed, but not a sharing of identity by a Foreign Secretary charged with demonstrating and conveying the policy of the United Kingdom.
In relation to Kosovo and earlier crises, Her Majesty's Government have held distinctive positions that have influenced Washington. The resolution of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, in relation to the Falklands at first dismayed and then persuaded Washington. The Prime Minister's clarity over Serbia had a similar effect on President Clinton. In those cases the United Kingdom "leveraged" the special relationship, using it to make a distinctive and, I believe, valuable contribution to allied policy.
In what way are we now doing so? I accept that the Prime Minister's counsel almost certainly may have tipped the balance inside the United States Administration in favour of going to the United Nations rather than around it. It is a fact that to many people in this country, and particularly in the Arab world, we simply appear to be in America's wake. To identify fully with America's sorrow after 9/11, to share it as we did in this House—visually, symbolically and in our hearts—was right. To allow our actions, even inadvertently, to appear to be virtually unconditional to US leadership is quite different.
We must ensure that any US pre-emptive action against Iraq is sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. We must also voice the widespread concern in Europe that the despair of the Palestinian people be addressed. Israel has the right not only to exist but to have the moral and material support of the West to ensure that she does. But despair and hopelessness will always render the Middle East a danger to the peace of the world and to remove Saddam Hussein without seeming to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will produce "regime change" but ultimately no change in the Middle East.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no countervailing military power to match that of the United States. As a friend and democratic ally of the
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US we should welcome the novel fact that the power of democracy is no longer "check-mated" by the power of dictatorship. But in this situation the United States needs friends with their own and different vision of the world and the confidence to express it. We need to reflect a European as well as an Atlantic perspective. We must heed the views of important voices in the Commonwealth, and, having just returned from South Africa, I would say especially the very considered opinion expressed by President Mandela.
Winston Churchill, that closest ally of the United States, also struggled with her and saw Britain operating within three circles and not one: the Atlantic relationship, the European relationship and the Commonwealth relationship. He was right then and to me his perception remains right today. Thus, if "regime change" is imperative in Iraq it may also be in Zimbabwe.
If the United Nations inspectors are in any way impeded in Iraq, the Security Council must sanction military action. Time is of the essence, for Saddam Hussein will surely seek a nuclear capability and, as is clear from the dossier, there is at least a chance of his acquiring it. But military action must be seen to support the international order and not defy it or avoid it. America's power determines her responsibility not only to defend herself but to promote stability and fairness in the Middle East. We have a responsibility to help the US to understand and to achieve that.
Earlier this week a television documentary reminded us vividly of how at Suez British troops were deployed without national consensus. To put British Armed Forces in harm's way without clear, distinctive, national objectives which demonstrate to the British people and to all our allies that we have thought through the consequences for ourselves and for the Middle East will be to invite disaster. This debate is a step forward. The sober dossier published by the Government also helps. A new United Nations resolution specifying the consequences for Iraq if the United Nations inspectors are defied or disarmament is refused by Hussein will take us further—probably decisively further—to national consensus. As of this afternoon the argument has not yet been won. For all our sakes it has to be.
5.57 p.m.
Lord Inge: My Lords, like many noble Lords I welcome the debate because I believe that we are faced with an enormously important issue. I hope that the weapons inspection regime will succeed, but I am fairly sceptical. The key question to ask ourselves is whether the weapons of mass destruction capability of Iraq and Saddam Hussein's intention are so dangerous that we are prepared to go to war. I recognise what that could mean in terms of sacrifice and in terms of possible major consequences that go beyond the Gulf. The results of military action are never what one expects and never turn out as one hopes. In my view, we may be faced with a situation more difficult than the Gulf War, Bosnia or Kosovo.

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There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. He has chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver some of them. Clearly, the character and personality of Saddam Hussein mean that he would be prepared to use them. Therefore, reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that we must be prepared to take military action. We do not have the luxury of saying to ourselves that we shall see how the weapons inspection regime goes—I shall touch on that in a minute—but we must have at the back of our minds the fact that we may have to use military force.
I pay tribute to our intelligence services, the unsung heroes who gathered the information and produced the dossier. I believe that, until recently, Her Majesty's Government presented the case for military action badly. As one or two noble Lords said, it would be disastrous if we were to commit our forces to armed action when they were unable to feel that they had the support of the country behind them. I cannot stress the importance of that too strongly.
What next? The Prime Minister and his officials deserve great credit for persuading President Bush to go via the United Nations. I am sure that that was the right way to proceed. However, we must recognise the pitfalls associated with that course of action. Saddam Hussein is, as has been said many times, a past master of duplicity and deception. He will play his usual cat-and-mouse game with the weapons inspectors, hoping that he can drag the process out and weaken the will of those who support America. There are already indications that some countries are beginning to wobble, if the weapons inspectors are to do their job effectively, we must be robust and unequivocal in our support of a credible weapons inspection regime. We should not underestimate the threats that the inspectors will face and the risks they will take.
My next thought may be more controversial. We must consider building up the military capability in theatre in parallel with the weapons inspections. That will give Saddam Hussein a clear indication of our intent to resort to military action if he blocks the work of the inspectors. If we go through a frustrating period of weapons inspection and delay the military build-up, we will send the wrong message to Saddam Hussein. We could lose the initiative and weaken the coalition.
I hope that we will not have to use force. I recognise the military, political and diplomatic difficulties associated with such a step. However, we must consider the option. I also believe that an internal coup is more likely if credible military forces are sitting on Iraq's doorstep.
Like many noble Lords, I believe that a huge issue which has not been addressed must be addressed urgently. What are our contingency plans if we have to take military action to help—I stress the word "help"—Iraq to keep itself together and avoid splitting into three parts? Iraq must become a more credible nation state that can play a more constructive international role. That is a difficult and daunting task, which will require large military and other forces in Iraq for some time. I hope that the United States
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recognises that fact and is fully committed to the task of nation building. That task cannot be handed over to a hotchpotch of nations. We need only look at Afghanistan to see the difficulties that lie ahead and to see how easily nations can slip back into had ways.
In focusing on Iraq, we should not forget the wider war on terrorism. We will not be able to rest on our laurels if we are successful in Iraq. As many noble Lords said, we cannot stress too strongly the fact that Iraq cannot be divorced from the threat of international terrorism. The failure of the international community to create a viable Palestinian state not only affects the stability of the Middle East and beyond but is a wonderful recruiting sergeant for Al'Qaeda and militant Islam. I do not underestimate the difficulties, but a solution to the problem is central to the success of any attempt to contain international terrorism. It should be an absolute priority for British foreign policy.
What will it all mean for the European security and defence identity? I should perhaps have mentioned this earlier. As one who strongly believes that Europe should do more militarily. I have been disappointed by the attitude of France, initially, and, more importantly, Germany. We would delude ourselves if we did not recognise that that had implications for the European security and defence identity. That may be an uncomfortable thing to consider, but it is better to talk about it than sweep it under the carpet.
6.7 p.m.
Lord Stone of Blackheath: My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, has suggested, once again, that the plight of the Palestinians is linked to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. At the same time, by failing to deal with Saddam Hussein, the international community leaves Israel under greater threat a rid exacerbates the plight of the Palestinians.
The map on page 31 of today's dossier shows that Tel Aviv is within easy reach of Iraq's Al'Hussein and Al'Abbas ballistic missiles. Someone suggested today that Israel might have to take the first hit. There is a direct nexus. We must deal with Saddam Hussein and step up political engagement in the Middle East. I suggest to the Minister that we should launch a pragmatic initiative in the area that could build on what she said in her speech. It would lead to a calmer, more stable Middle East that could, perhaps, influence the politics of Iraq for the better.
On 24th June, the President of the United States made a speech that was seen by the Israelis and the Palestinians and by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the neighbouring states as an important framework for moving forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. The US president's speech followed the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1397 in March, which, for the first time, achieved international agreement on the two necessary components of a peace settlement: security guarantees for Israel and specific statehood for the Palestinians.
The speech called for security and political reform in the Palestinian territories and envisaged the existence of a Palestinian state with provisional borders as soon

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as 2003. The president said that, with progress on security, Israel should withdraw to the lines that existed in September 2000 and end settlement activity, in accordance with Mitchell. The speech suggested that a permanent settlement between Israel and a nascent state of Palestine could be reached within three years, in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338.
Even in these violent times, there is widespread support for concerted global action along those lines. Peace proposals from widely differing sources include such steps. The Arab plan agreed at the Beirut summit in March contained similar positive aspects; the international quartet—Egypt. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the international donors—already plays a key role in Palestinian reform. Only last week, the quartet produced a more detailed road map that envisaged Palestinian elections, Israeli troop withdrawal and the creation of a full Palestinian state by 2005.
By itself, the speech is not enough. However, forceful groups around the world are working on proposals for pragmatic routes to peace. The work of such groups could come together in a coalition for peace, rather than in the coalition for war that we are discussing today. Since the president's speech, I have been present at private discussions involving forceful but moderate groups in Israel, in Ramallah and in Gaza and with people from all the neighbouring states, as well as Americans, Europeans and Japanese. There is wide agreement that there should, as the Minister suggested, be a political mechanism to maintain constant, high-level international involvement to encourage the two sides to end the violence and resume the peace process.
It is specifically suggested that that could be done in a way that used American influence constructively in the formation of a multi-national commission, led by the United States and modelled on the Mitchell commission. It should be in place no later than the end of the year and would give practical expression to the key elements of the president's speech. In particular, the commission would be charged with determining that meaningful Palestinian domestic reform had taken place. Subsequently, a Palestinian state with provisional borders would be established, starting a process towards a permanent settlement that could be reached within three years.
An appointed commissioner would, in turn, appoint three deputies—perhaps from the quartet—to oversee the separate but interdependent broad areas of economics, security and political affairs. Under those broad headings, there are seven major issues to be resolved, as anyone who is familiar with the negotiations that have gone on for decades will know. Thanks to long discussions and well thought-out papers, there is a viable compromise solution for each issue. The new commission would oversee seven groups of non-partisan experts, who would examine each issue—economic development, security, refugees, Jerusalem, borders, water and the environment. They would initiate a process of full consultation with all involved parties.
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As suggested in the Statement read at noon today, the commissioner would, one year after the formation of those seven groups and drawing on their findings, set parameters and recommend a date for a conference, to be sponsored by the United States and to be held in the region at the end of 2003. The conference would establish the framework for comprehensive peace and normalisation arrangements between Israel, Palestinians and the Arab world. By 2005, a new Palestinian state could be functioning; Israelis and Palestinians could feel more secure: the region would be more stable and perhaps begin to grow and flourish; and the Iraq issue would come under a new light.
That plan is not a dream and could be accomplished if moderates who support the Palestinians and Israel would work towards its fulfilment and put it to their supporters. The Arab world and Israel—with the support of the United States and Europe—have a responsibility for instilling hope, as well as for articulating and implementing a common vision for the region.
While all that occurs, it is vital that we help those on the ground who are continuing people-to-people work across communities. They are trying to heal the damage that has been done to civil society and to revive and strengthen the hearts and minds of the men, women and children who suffer because of our mistakes. Private-sector involvement is needed to underpin reconstruction and regional economic development. Businesses and non-governmental organisations are already at work across the region and I know of many more that are waiting to become involved if the politics move forward.
While dealing with Saddam Hussein, we need to formulate a concept that gives all the people of the Middle East a stake in their common future. The strategy that I suggest would provide the people in the region—and those who care about them—with a vision and a pragmatic plan that they could press their leaders to adopt. Or they could find leaders who would adopt that strategy. Energy and resources spent in that way, alongside Iraq action, would help to avert the disaster that many of us fear, resulting from a singular concentration on Iraq.
6.11 p.m.
Lord Mayhew of Twysden: My Lords, it is a sombre fact that there remain waiting to speak as many of your Lordships as have already taken part in this extremely impressive debate, so I shall only briefly delay the noble Lord, Lord Jacobs. Also, I have agreed with so much that has been said that I do not wish to spoil its effect by repeating it—no doubt worse.
Two important matters have characterised the debate. First, recognition of the massive danger that Saddam Hussein represents to the Middle East and the world. Secondly, acceptance that the matter cannot be ducked and must be dealt with in accordance with international law.
The dossier provides an ample foundation for everything needed to be said. When a noble and gallant field marshal tells the House that he finds the dossier's

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contents chilling, little more needs to be said on that score. I add my voice to the importance of the second characteristic of this debate—a determination that the matter be dealt with in accordance with international law.
Surely the experience of the past century has taught us all the lesson that mankind suffers terribly when its leaders flinch from upholding international law, paying the price and paying it in time. Whatever their imperfections—which are manifest—the United Nations charter and its connected institutions and other derivatives represent massive progress away from the rule of force and towards the rule of law. Those principles must not be allowed—as happened with the League of Nations 60 or 70 years ago—to atrophy for lack of will to operate them. Our country has been a leader in progress towards the rule of law by upholding the United Nations—sometimes in the face of strong temptation to set the law to one side.
Much has been said today about the Gulf War. Criticism has been levelled since the event of unfinished business. It is said that we should have finished the job. I believe that it was of critical importance to the United Nations—and through it to the rule of law—that the War Cabinet and Parliament conducted the Gulf War in strict accordance with the Security Council resolutions then in force—obtained through brilliant diplomacy in New York. To have motored on into Baghdad and brought about a regime change by force, which was not authorised, would have been to discard legality, discredit the United Nations, shatter the alliance and create a useful precedent for some unpleasant people to rely upon in future. That would have been quite an achievement—albeit in the wrong direction. That is to say nothing about when we could have got out, if it turned out that we were not entirely welcome.
As a consequence, we can claim that the United Nations today, for all its deficiencies, is a stronger instrument for enforcing the rule of law. As a result, the people of the UK expect us to uphold international law. They would not tolerate the commitment of our forces to active service in any circumstances in which it was not abundantly clear that we were upholding the rule of law—a point to which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, alluded.
I shall not comment on analyses of the circumstances in which forceful pre-emption might be lawful. They can exist. What matters is that the Government are rightly committed in the present circumstances to seeking a resolution from the Security Council, to achieve the total disarming of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction—with the implicit promise of enforcement in default. That seems not only right but extremely important. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said that it is not just a matter of law—that route should be followed, even more importantly, as a matter of political skill and practicality.
The precision of our own analysis and explanation is of critical importance. It must be precise—not least to those service people upon whom we may rely to
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enforce our policies. Yesterday, we were reminded by a military authority of unimpeachable persuasiveness—Major General Patrick Cordingley—that at the forefront of a British soldier's needs on active service is the knowledge that the people back home are wholly behind what he is required to do. We might add to that timely reminder the reflection that it would hardly be eccentric for a serviceman to require reliable assurance that his orders are lawful. He is entitled to that assurance. It is right that the Government define their objective as securing the complete disarming of all weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the Security Council resolution, not regime change.
It is extremely important that scrupulous care is taken in analysing the purpose of any proposed operation and justifying it—as much by the Americans as ourselves. Otherwise, the Government will not attract the confidence of those whom they send to fight, nor of the rest of the country. Even more importantly, the Government will not fulfil their duty to our servicemen. I much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Watson, in that regard. It may be a vivid and satisfying use of the language, to call Saddam an outlaw but it is sloppy language, betraying sloppy thought. We are supposed to be upholding the rule of law. The concept of an outlaw is unknown to modern law. It is a mistake to demonstrate that we do not know the law because that suggests that we do not care.
In common with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Vincent, I was once a National Serviceman. Some military talent was perceived in one of us. I was taught that maintenance of object is the first principle of war. I congratulate the Government on defining their objective as they have, and in maintaining it. I trust they will in future furnish Parliament in good time with the information that it needs to scrutinise progress, or the lack of it, and to confer the authority that will be needed for actions taken on our behalf.
6.20 p.m.
Lord Jacobs: My Lords, I was hoping to borrow a couple of minutes of time from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, but I fear he got close to his quota.
By the end of the day your Lordships will have spoken at least 60,000 words on the subject of Iraq. We must add to that the millions of words that have been spoken and written in the past four weeks. Of course, we must not forget the Iraq intelligence dossier, a mere 22,000 words so thoughtfully intended to be made available to us by the Government on the net at 8 o'clock this morning. So it will not be easy to add anything new to the debate.
I did not intend to speak about the Israel-Palestine situation; not because it is not vitally important, but because it is an issue on its own. Although it has influence on the Middle East situation, the question is not what happens in Israel and Palestine, but what happens in Iraq and whether we should take action. However, as so many noble Lords commented, I feel I should make just a few points.

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I have not been an uncritical supporter of Israel. Almost from the beginning I condemned the building of settlements on the West Bank. I questioned their reason. But whatever my views then, the fact is that we are in this situation today. Therefore how do I now view the situation?
I make three points. First, I presided for more than eight years over the Haifa University in Israel—a university of around 13,000 students. Around 20 per cent of the students were Israeli Arab. The students comprised Christians, Muslims and Druse. Have things been perfect there? No. But have the various groups and sects got on with each other? In practice, yes. There is no desire to cause problems. There is a good degree of tolerance and there are almost no demonstrations.
In addition, there are in Israel 1 million Israeli Arabs. They have the vote. They have their own Members of Parliament and they have more or less the same rights as the Jewish Israeli citizens, except that they are not allowed to serve in the armed forces. I asked one or two whether, when there was a full Palestinian state, they would like to move there to become Palestinian citizens. I did not find one—though there must be some—who wanted to do so. Clearly, living in Israel, even for non-Jews, is not an unacceptable way of life.
I want to say why I believe the situation is in such desperate straits today. A couple of years ago negotiations took place between Ehud Barak, the then Israeli Prime Minister, and Arafat. Those negotiations were extremely advanced. They took place first at Camp David and were followed up in Taba. At the end Israel made an offer which I wrote at the time was around 110 per cent of what it could afford to make. It covered in particular the settlements. It would give up 20 per cent of the settlements entirely and 80 per cent would remain within Israel. But in exchange Israel was going to give up more of the land it lost near the border on Gaza, which the Palestinians strongly wanted.
That was a key element. Almost all of the other matters were agreed. But at the end Arafat said, "What about the Arabs who left Israel?". In those days they numbered around 800,000. He said, "There are now 3.5 million and we would like the right for them to return". Israel inevitably said that it was not possible; that they could discuss some return but not of 3.5 million. At that point Arafat concluded the negotiations and left. He did not say to his own people, "The offer was pretty significant. It did not go as far as we want and we want it to be improved"; he just walked away and that was the end of the matter.
Shortly after that, general elections took place in Israel. Barak lost; Sharon came in with a very tough policy. His aggressive policy owes much not only to his own approach to these issues, but also to the disillusionment of the Jews in Israel. At that point they began to believe for the first time—those most strongly in favour of the peace agreement—that Arafat would not co-operate. From then on the situation
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deteriorated tremendously. That is why we are faced with the problems we have today. I agree that it cannot all be the fault of Arafat; but Israel went a long way to try to find a settlement. The willingness of Israel and its determination to find a settlement has never been stronger than it is today.
We should really be discussing Iraq. In view of the pertinent information made available to us, the prime issue we face is whether Saddam Hussein is truthful and can be trusted. Some words uttered last week by his Foreign Minister, Mr Aziz, can help us understand where the Iraqis are coming from. He declared,
"Other nations must respect the integrity and sovereignty of Iraq".
There can be no doubt about the intention of those words. Mr Aziz did not say, "You may remember how we respected the integrity and sovereignty of Iran", nor did he go on to say, "You may remember how we respected the integrity and sovereignty of Kuwait".
Why has Saddam Hussein been allowed to remain in power as the leader of his people? Saddam Hussein massacred tens of thousands of his own people, the Kurds; he invaded two sovereign neighbouring countries and after the Gulf War the United Nations took the soft option and allowed this man to remain in power. Is the sovereign nation of Iraq a responsible nation capable of caring competently for its own people?
Clearly, Saddam Hussein's past actions demonstrate his personal lack of integrity and trustworthiness. Your Lordships may fairly conclude that the world's present mistrust in him is sadly accurate. While he remains in power can any of us feel safe? If trust is to replace fear, what is our national responsibility?
Saddam Hussein perpetrated genocide when he drained the Marshlands where more than half a million Marshland Arabs lived. Two hundred thousand were forced into exile, but thousands upon thousands died of starvation. He also slaughtered more than 60,000 Shias who represented 72 per cent of the population but are ruled by the Sunnis, just 13 per cent of the population—including of course Saddam Hussein himself. If the United Nations fails to pass a strong, effective and comprehensive resolution on Iraqi disarmament or, having passed such a resolution, he fails to co-operate with weapons inspectors, should we be willing to support the US in a pre-emptive strike? Objectors to a policy of pre-emption believe that a pre-emptive strike is never the right policy. The last pre-emptive strike against Iraq was condemned by all nations, including Britain and the United States. It occurred in 1981 when Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad.
The United Nations at that time pressed Israel to compensate Iraq for this dreadful violation of Iraq's sovereignty, but the result of the attack was that Iraq was unable to manufacture its own fissionable material. The short-term positive consequence of the attack was that Iraq could not produce its own nuclear weapons for its invasion of Kuwait. Do any of your Lordships seriously believe that if it had them it would not have used them in the Gulf War?

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Most nations disapprove of pre-emptive strikes against sovereign states. Governments find it easier to justify retaliatory actions. If Saddam Hussein were to use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, the world would more easily unite and agree to retaliate. But is it necessary for us to wait for the need to retaliate? Are we content to live with this fear that emerges from time to time, casting shadows upon our lives, knowing the personal history of the unpredictability of Saddam Hussein?
When countries do not have democratic regimes and they are headed by kings or presidents, each nation will include within its history the definition of the words "complete suppression", invariably indicative of the total absence of free speech. If there is no free speech, how is it possible to oppose such leaders from within?
One must recognise that we are part of a global system that confronts us now. It concentrates political power in such a manner that the majority of humankind have no role whatever in determining their own destiny.
We British, and indeed many other nations, have a code of conduct that is honourable, truthful and just. When, as a humanity that shares and understands fundamental beliefs that benefit all people mutually, can we expect other nations to believe as we do? Sadly, in the year 2002 this understanding does not exist. We find it difficult to come to terms with those in power who are prepared to lie and deceive, whose word is never their bond and whose agreements are worthless. Adolf Hitler was such an evil man and so is Saddam Hussein.
6.32 p.m.
Lord Hylton: My Lords, it is a privilege to take part in the debate. I detest and condemn the evil done by Saddam Hussein and his government. Poison gas used on civilians at Halabja first alerted me to the wider plight of the Kurdish nation. Later with others I tried unsuccessfully to achieve a peaceful withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. I have campaigned for the release of the 600 or more hostages abducted from Kuwait. Today I loathe the torture and mutilation of army deserters that takes place in Iraq.
There are, however, tried and tested methods for dealing with dictators; principally, containment and deterrence. Many noble Lords have mentioned both. They worked against Stalin and his successors and they can succeed elsewhere. It needs to be made crystal clear that the least aggression outside Iraq or on the Kurds or the Marsh Arabs will be met by invincible retaliation. That, alas, was not done before Kuwait was invaded.
Other states such as Israel and Turkey occupy their neighbours' land. The Sudan and Turkey have waged massive internal wars, killing and displacing millions of their own people. China, Burma and Liberia all oppress their own people and harm their neighbours. India and Pakistan threaten each other with all-out war. Yet in none of those cases does anyone suggest that the existing governments should be replaced by force.
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I hope that a different standard will not be applied to Iraq simply on account of its oil. There is a strong presumption against the use of military force. I therefore strongly agree with the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States who, in their recent letter to their President, argued against the pre-emptive unilateral use of military force to overthrow the Government of Iraq.
Unilateral use of force would provide the worst possible example to whoever might be the stronger party in future conflicts. Here, I can claim the support of the Professor of International Law at Oxford, writing in The Times yesterday.
The consequences of war, as has been mentioned, are almost always unpredictable. I therefore ask your Lordships and the Government to consider carefully the side effects of a war against Iraq. Would the pacification of Afghanistan still be possible? What would be the consequences in every state with a Muslim majority? That point was notably touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin. If the West, including Russia, is seen to deploy military forces principally against Islamic peoples, will that not encourage worldwide terrorism?
I conclude by urging the Government and their allies to study with care the consensus emerging within the worldwide Roman Catholic Church on the subject of war in general and of war with Iraq in particular. Prudence, courage, fortitude and restraint are most urgently needed. They seem to argue strongly in favour of the containment and deterrence of evil and the maximum possible use of inspection.
6.36 p.m.
Lord Campbell-Savours: My Lords, I was pleased to hear the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden, set the record straight as to what happened at the end of the Gulf War, because people have convenient memories. It was not only that we were bound by way of a United Nations resolution, which did not provide for us to enter Iraq, but also there were demonstrations throughout all the major Arab capitals in the days preceding the discussions that took place in the tent on the road from Basra to Baghdad between the coalition authority and the representatives of the Baghdad Government. Over the years we have heard repeated references to events which sadly have been completely misunderstood.
I congratulate the Prime Minister on the skill he deployed in convincing the President of the United States of America that he should go down the UN route. I congratulate him also on standing shoulder to shoulder with President Bush in the brinkmanship they have deployed in insisting that in the event that Saddam Hussein does not deal with the issue of weapons of mass destruction, there may have to be some form of military engagement. That is the right approach.
It is ironic that those in the anti-war movement, many of whom I number among my closest friends, contributed to convincing Saddam Hussein that we meant business, because they raised the profile of the

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statements made by leadership in the western world. I take a historic interest in issues of Iraq. I have kept contact over the past 15 years with many of the expatriate Iraqi politicians in the West and others who have great knowledge in those matters.
I oppose vigorously the policy of containment based on sanctions that were never properly implemented and which has led to the position we are in today. That policy was born in the mind of the American Administration. Clinton adopted it. I have always believed it was a policy of weakness. Many of us repeatedly went to Washington to plead with representatives of American Administrations over the years, in Congress, the Senate, the White House and the State Department, to plead with them to bring that policy to an end because it would enable Saddam Hussein to rebuild his armaments industry and once again threaten the western world; indeed, the whole world.
The policy of containment has enabled Saddam Hussein to build up the revenues that he has been able to use to acquire the equipment that we have been talking about today. Page 32 of the report says:
"However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control either in the form of hard currency or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things)…
These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programme. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes".
On page 18, the report says:
"Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry has been helped by the absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency".
It was about that illegal border trade that we were going to Washington. I sent a researcher from my office in the House of Commons at the time to witness the trade going on into southern Turkey from northern Iraq. When he came back to the United Kingdom he told me that it was a bumper-to-bumper trade of trucks carrying oil into southern Turkey. When we made representations in the United States of America, people did not want to know about it. It was as if some deal had been entered into—which I subsequently found out was the case—whereby obligations to the Kurds required that they be funded. Of course, the Kurdish political parties were raising taxes on this illicit movement of oil traffic from Iraq into southern Turkey, thereby saving the American exchequer—and also, I presume, western aid agencies—the cost of funding northern Iraq's development in Kurdistan.
Furthermore, because those oil revenues at the beginning of the process were paid only, if I remember rightly, to the KDP and Masood Barzani, a row developed between the PUK, under Jalal Talebani, and the KDP, which ended up in the loss of lives in northern Iraq as they fought out who was going to get the oil revenues. The reality was that everyone turned a blind eye to the trade. That money raised from selling
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illicit oil supplies in southern Turkey, refined as well, sent in by truck, has been used by the Saddam Hussein regime to develop much of the programmes that we are discussing today.
The policy of containment prolonged arguments over United Nations sanctions, which people were led to believe were being properly implemented when they were not, leading to us in the West being blamed for the humanitarian suffering in Iraq. Even to this day, despite the fact that it is well documented that the responsibility for that suffering rests on Saddam Hussein, we are still held responsible in this country. Even in the other House today we have heard reference to that.
The policy of containment also allowed Saddam Hussein to make an effective link on the street, as the noble Lord, Lord Janner, said, between the position in Iraq and Israel. That has undermined the credibility of all that we have been doing in recent years. Clinton's dithering, by pursuing the policy of containment—which was supported after 1994 by successive British Governments, Conservative and Labour—has enabled Saddam Hussein to build up the menacing arrangements with which he is currently able to frighten much of the world.
Furthermore, the policy enabled Saddam Hussein to gain the confidence to obstruct UNSCOM. In doing so, it enabled Ritter to peddle his inconsistencies, which are now believed by much of the anti-war movement in the United States of America and in the United Kingdom. I went to a meeting in the other place some weeks ago attended by about 250 people from the anti-war movement. It was amazing. People were not listening to what Ritter was saying. They went in with preconceived views based on the international reputation that he has built up for opposing the policy that we have adopted on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. What he told the meeting—which they were not prepared to accept—was that he had no knowledge of what intelligence information was available to the United States and United Kingdom Governments. He went on to say that in the event that it could be shown conclusively that Saddam held weapons of mass destruction he would be among the first to join up for war. I do not think that I am misquoting him; I am sure that his address to the meeting was taped. I was at the meeting. I heard what he said. Let the tape confirm it. Those comments did not register with many people. He has been inconsistent.
A number of noble Lords have referred to the possible successor regime. Everyone seems to presume that the Iraqi National Congress, with which I have had dealings over many years, might well form the basis on which a new regime could be constructed in Iraq. That would be a mistake. The successor regime in Iraq must be an interim military arrangement run by people who, we can speculate, have already been identified by the Government of the United States of America. We know that there have been many conversations over recent years with people in the Iraqi opposition and those who come out of Iraq about what should happen in those conditions.

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There are some excellent people in the Iraqi National Congress, such as Ahmed Chalabi, who is an extremely educated and cultured man. However, I do not believe that he has the basis in Iraq to be able to create an alternative government to that of Saddam Hussein. We should look seriously at the kind of interim military regime—trusted by whatever coalition remains at the end of the process—that can bring in over a few years the democratic arrangements that we believe the people of Iraq will one day need, want and, we hope, get.
6.48 p.m.
Lord Eden of Winton: My Lords, I hope I am not being too naive if I confess to some puzzlement as to why this debate is taking place now. I wonder whether some new intelligence has become available about which we have not been told, which makes it imperative that the development of measures to restrain Saddam Hussein should be moved forward into a higher gear. I have to ask whether this debate and the publication on which it is based could have taken place more than a year ago. Could it have taken place before the horrendous events of September 11th last year, or even before the election of President Bush? Is there something new?
Perhaps the answer to my questions is that the true nature of the threat from the Iraqi dictator is seen today with greater clarity in the light of the post-9/11 happening. It is possible that the intelligence services of ourselves, the United States and others are more alert to the danger signals now than they were previously and that more accurate analysis and interpretation is available of a build-up of potential danger. If that is the case, of course it is to be welcomed. But it is a wonder that it has taken as long as it has because the threat posed by the development of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction has been present since soon after the outbreak of the Gulf War.
Those weapons, which have been developed over several years, have not been designed solely for the purpose of repressing Saddam's own people. However, I must say that I found rather curious the reference on page 44 of the dossier to that dreaded organisation, the Saddam Fidayeen, under the control of Udayy. According to the document, it,
"has been used to deal with civilian disturbances".
That is a misleadingly genteel way of referring to an organisation which is clearly extreme and has been guilty of the most horrendous cruelty, torture and murder—a catalogue which makes dreadful reading.
That organisation has itself spawned a special force, reportedly of some 30 strong, which has been described as "the elite of the elites". It has been trained in sabotage, urban warfare, hijacking and murder. It is not intended only, if at all, to deal with civilian disorders. Those people are known to be in the possession of credible United Arab Emirates passports and are therefore able to travel anywhere in the world. Therefore, the potential for international terrorism which they represent is very real.
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The weapons which are being developed by Saddam Hussein and the specially trained forces which are in existence are to be deployed—the words are of the Iraqi leaders themselves—against "our enemies". Whom do they identify as "our enemies"? It will come as no surprise to your Lordships that prominent among them are the United States and Israel. It is not without reason that those two are linked together. Anyone who travels anywhere within the Arab countries of the Middle East will hear on all hands about the close interrelationship between the policy of the United States Government and the attitude and actions of the state of Israel. The extent to which that sentiment is deployed may be unfair but it is a reality. It is very much in the minds of all people in those countries. The American Government certainly have it within their power to do far more about it than they have been doing of recent times.
A reference has been made to Mr Sharon in Israel. I was very much encouraged by what the Minister said in her opening speech. She referred to the need to ensure the existence of a viable Palestinian state and the need for Israel to have secure frontiers. But the policy being pursued by Mr Sharon of territorial annexation, provocation, retribution and revenge are not achieving anything positive at all in the Middle East—certainly not on behalf of the people of Israel.
Sooner or later, Mr Sharon will have to engage in serious negotiation, and the sooner he recognises that, the better. I hope that America will apply its undoubted influence on the state of Israel to ensure that negotiation takes place very quickly. Israel has all the advantage in that it is the most powerful nation and it has powerful allies. Therefore, it can negotiate from a position of strength and it is quite unnecessary that it should resort to the policies that it has been pursuing. I hope that the United States of America will rapidly become far more even-handed in its policies in the Middle East.
But we should not allow thoughts of that kind to detract from the reality of the threat which Saddam Hussein represents. In my view and in that of others, we are correct to seek to secure the widest possible degree of international support and commitment for exerting the strongest possible pressure on Saddam Hussein and for ensuring that the inspection is renewed in a far more effective way than was possible during the inspectors' previous tour in Iraq.
We should seek to ensure that urgent reporting takes place. My one concern in relation to the reintroduction of inspectors is that they will be played along and that month after month will go by with an interminable sequence of events and no conclusion. We must have regular reporting, speedy action and effective inspection. The inspectors' aim must be to provide the rest of the world with the confidence that they are exposing the true nature of the weapons that Saddam Hussein possesses.
If necessary—these words must be weighed very seriously by anyone who uses them—the current pressure being applied against Saddam will have to be backed up by force and the readiness to use it. Even as

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we speak, navies, military command posts, air control authorities and aircraft are being deployed closer to the scene of potential action in the Gulf. I hope that it is not only window-dressing but of serious purpose and intent. I also hope that it is being done in order to be ready to back up the actions being taken at the United Nations and the introduction of the inspectors.
None the less, I hope that we do not see yet again a repeat of what has been witnessed in other theatres of war recently—the raining down of thousands of bombs from excessively high altitudes in some form of carpet saturation. I do not know anything much about modern weaponry, other than what I see and read. I defer to the experts who are in the forefront of these matters and who have all the information at their command. However, I do hope that this time, if we do deploy force, it will be done with much greater precision and more speedily. The action needs to be much swifter, precise, decisive and on the ground.
If there is to be precision in weaponry, there needs also to be precision in the language we use. I recollect that on a recent visit to Iran I met many young people who were anxious to emphasise that we in the West should leave matters of regime change to them. They knew how to handle the situation internally and changes of government were their responsibility and the responsibility of their fellow citizens. What applies to the people of Iran must equally apply to the people of Iraq. We should do whatever we can to stand by and to help them but it is for them to effect the change that they must be yearning to bring about. There is an Arab saying that evil comes to the evil-doer. Saddam Hussein would be well advised to take heed.
7.2 p.m.
Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I shall be brief. I do not deny the chilling evidence of the dossier published today that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction and I, like my noble friend Baroness Williams of Crosby, do not propose that we do nothing about it.
The evidence in the dossier is no surprise. However, there is a clear indication in it, that, although we know much, we do not know all we would like to know about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Our intelligence community seems confident that there is even more than appears in the dossier. When the extent, nature or physical location of the threat is not really known, logic tells us that no amount of military preparation can ever be enough to counter it. In such a situation and given the proven disregard of this enemy for the lives of his own people, the only answers are diplomacy, understanding, international co-operation and mutual security.
Saddam has no respect for international law, but we must respect it. I am encouraged by the assurance of the Prime Minister that this country will always do so. We must continue to use our influence on the United States to do so also. No country, including the USA, must put itself above international law and act unilaterally. Nor must any country attempt to bully the international community.
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In her introduction to this debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, said that delay will allow Saddam to amass more biological and chemical weapons. According to Page 17 of the dossier, he already has enough. Very small amounts of these substances can kill many thousands of people. He may not yet have nuclear weapons and their delivery mechanisms to threaten us, but he does have chemical and biological weapons which require much less sophisticated means of delivery, especially if those prepared to deliver them have no regard for the safety of their own lives.
Around the world we are becoming very familiar with fanatics so consumed with hatred of others, they are prepared to sacrifice their own lives in order to destroy them. Given that fact, surely the case for diplomacy and inspection is strengthened by today's publication and the case for a first military strike against Iraq is weakened. Saddam may already have agents positioned in this country and the United States with Sarin and Anthrax nestling in their suitcases amongst their underwear. What is to stop him from giving instructions for them to be used, as soon as he is attacked? Saddam lacks principles but he has never lacked his own logic. We must be logical also and the logic of the matter is clear. We must keep up the pressure through the United Nations for the unconditional return of the weapons inspectors and their unfettered access to whatever and wherever they want to see.
I should like to draw the attention of your Lordships to an aspect of Iraq's surprise offer to which little attention has been paid. Iraq offered to allow politicians to accompany the weapons' inspectors. I am aware that a number of members of the United States Congress are prepared to take up this invitation and go to Iraq with the inspectors. I should like to ask the Minister whether any British politicians have been invited and whether any are preparing to go. In the matter of access for the inspectors, they may be able to bring special pressure and influence to bear.
This brings me to echo a comment made by my noble friend Lady Williams. I, too, spent the whole of August in the United States and was impressed by evidence of a deep divide in public opinion about this matter. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hurd of Westwell, that any war requires general public support. Despite the publication of today's dossier, mainly of old evidence, there is not yet support in this country for military action to remove Saddam Hussein, nor is there support in America.
There are many who cling to the principle that the USA should not make a first strike against another sovereign country. An American friend of mine said,
"Using our military to attack rather than respond to an attack is a fundamental departure from our principles. Pre-emptive attacks on other sovereign countries, no matter how much we dislike their regimes, have never been acceptable to our democracy unless we do so in order to protect ourselves or others from very imminent danger. I do not believe that danger has been proved at this moment in time".
Like my noble friend, I am a great admirer of much about the USA. However, America's sudden conversion to the importance of the UN is a matter I

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view with considerable circumspection. A country that has treated the UN with scorn over many years is not just Iraq and Israel in the east, but America in the west. Approaching the United Nations with a much belated cheque when he needs it on his side, is hardly likely to endear President Bush to the international community. The United States must not put itself above the United Nations and world opinion. It must not try to bully the UN and in future it must show a genuine interest in and support for the UN's efforts at world peace and sustainable development.
Saddam Hussein is not the one who will suffer if there is a military attack on Iraq. Count von Stauffenberg sat right next to Hitler but did not manage to kill him. Saddam has had 11 years to plan his escape and you can be sure that his plan will be a good one. No, it will be his already hard-pressed people who will suffer, especially the women and children of Iraq, who have had no say in who leads their country. He will lure his attackers into a Beirut-style urban war if he can and, in so doing, ensure massive casualties and win the propaganda war hands down.
Let us not forget the long-term consequences of military action. War does not only bring about death and destruction at the time; it also brings about starvation and poverty, and we have heard no good intentions from the Bush Administration about funding the rebuilding of Iraq after a war. That would be left to the international community, as usual. America's track record in this respect is not a good one.
My noble friend Lady Williams clearly laid out the objectives of these Benches in this regard and the very remote circumstances under which we would consider a pre-emptive attack on Iraq to be justified. I support her position. Frankly, given the probable consequences of admitting that all else has failed, I can hardly envisage circumstances under which I would feel that it would be either wise or justified to attack Iraq, no matter what weapons he has. Indeed, as I said earlier, the more wicked and dangerous his arsenal, the more vital it is to use international pressure and diplomacy to destroy it.
7.9 p.m.
Lord Haskins: My Lords, I strongly endorse the remarkable speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins. My sense is that to a large extent they reflect the mood of this House. There is no argument in the House about the wickedness of Saddam or the need to do something about it. The UN inspectors must pick up the British dossier and use it as their shopping list when they go to Iraq. If Saddam obstructs them, there will no doubt be a strong case for UN-sponsored military action in response to that situation. I hope and believe that that will not come about.
If a unilateral US response had UK support but not UN or EU support, that would have very serious consequences. First, will there be military problems if neighbouring countries to Iraq do not supply bases?
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Some people say that there will be. Secondly, will not a successful outcome of such a war fuel the flames of Islamic fundamentalism rather than quell them? Thirdly, rebuilding Iraq with the world community beside us would be difficult; how much more difficult it would be to build it unilaterally. Imagine having US and UK troops permanently in Iraq, as UN troops are permanently in the Balkans at present. Fourthly, where will British relationships lie with our European partners?
Many of the Americans' motivations for action in Iraq are very different from ours and those of our European neighbours. First, for the US, understandably traumatised by the events of 9/11, this is the first serious foreign violation of mainland American soil ever, excluding Pearl Harbor, which was not exactly mainland. Over the centuries, alas, Europe has become used to such violations, but not in recent years on the scale of 9/11.
Secondly, partly because of the rhetoric, the US is under great pressure to be seen to be doing something in response to 9/11. No such pressure exists in Britain and Europe. That would be a terrible reason to choose to go to war.
Thirdly, the partial military success of the US in Afghanistan—it is at this stage only partial—has persuaded some members of the Administration that the same bombing techniques would work in Iraq. They may be right but several senior UK and US military experts are questioning that. Iraq is not Afghanistan.
Fourthly, my noble friend Lady Symons made a very convincing argument about how Iraq is different from Iran and Libya. She said that our Foreign Secretary has gone to Iran to negotiate diplomatically and that a junior Minister has gone to Libya. Do the US Administration make such a distinction? Not so far.
Fifthly, some people in Washington do not appear to care very much about international opinion or international law. Britain and Europe cannot afford to ignore either, and they will not. I am glad to say that the former Vice-President of the United States seems to agree with us today.
Sixthly, there are people in Washington who appear to be determined to undermine the UN route whatever that may be, short of a regime change. Britain and Europe are not insisting on an unconditional regime change in Iraq. The Prime Minister has done a wonderful job—a remarkable job—of restraining the wilder instincts of certain members of the US Administration. He must seek to maintain that role, although it is not easy. Post the Cold War and post 9/11, there is great volatility and uncertainty within the US about its new international role. Before 9/11, this Administration showed dangerously isolationist inclinations. Post 9/11, this Administration are showing dangerous unilateralist inclinations. Both are wrong.
There is a paradox in America, American patriotism this summer has to be seen to be believed. I addressed American grocers at a conference in West Virginia.

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You could only get in if you wore the American flag on your lapel. On the other hand, a poll in Chicago this week shows that 60 per cent of American people want a solution through the United Nations. The US is in the UN loop largely because of our British Prime Minister. If the UN loop is successful, our Prime Minister must take the lion's share of the credit because he will have persuaded the US to stay within the UN and within international law to the relief of most people and of millions of Americans.
The Government have achieved a huge amount internationally in their attitude towards Africa, in the way they have brought a settlement, of a sort, in the Balkans, and in the way they have supported enlargement of the European Union and have championed the modernisation of the European Union. The Government gain great international credit for all those matters. It would be a tragedy indeed if, by unilateral British support of unilateral US action, much of that great work were put in jeopardy.
7.15 p.m.
Lord Weidenfeld: My Lords, this is one of the most important debates I have attended in more than 25 years in your Lordships' House. We are truly at a crossroad of history. I know that comparisons with Munich and the age of dictators, or the Suez crisis, and the idea that history repeats itself, may be open to argument, but it is interesting to observe here and elsewhere in Europe how postures in the face of historic challenges recur with remarkable accuracy—postures ranging from interventionist fervour, through masterly inactivity, timorous self deception and a certain amount of accommodation and appeasement.
The Government have offered us a frightening but also convincing assessment of Saddam's policies which converges largely with that of our American ally. Though proven culpable of past aggression and continued non-compliance with international treaties, Saddam Hussein is a past master in playing on the raw nerves of slumbering dissent within the Atlantic alliance and the Arab and wider Muslim worlds and at sowing doubt in our minds. To what extent his brand of despotism and terror are linked with the Al'Qaeda may be less in doubt than has been argued by some noble Lords. Overtly Saddam Hussein pays 25,000 dollars for each and every family which has a suicide bomber in its midst. Covertly, Iraqi police and secret service are in constant touch through a camaraderie of terror with the most diverse movements in the world of terror. Each and every Arab terrorist movement has had and still has a link, whether secular, religious or extremist, with Saddam Hussein.
Eleven years ago he decided to spurn the pardon of the world community, the chance of developing potentially the most prosperous and advanced country in the whole of the Middle East, in favour of his quest for amassing and hoarding weapons of mass destruction. As has been pointed out, Iraq is a real country with an educational infrastructure, a middle class with its pool of managerial talent and enormous,
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still undeveloped, natural resources—yet he preferred to pauperise his subject citizens. For what purpose? Clearly it was to hold neighbours and foes to ransom and pursue his dreams of conquest, meanwhile torturing, gassing and raping, thus ranking as one of the world's worst dictators. At one time or another, terrorists of every hue were trained by him.
On the issue of UN resolution we shall see whether the inspections will occur and, if so, whether they yield any result. But those who doubt whether anything good will come of parleying with a proven cheat may yet be proved right. There must be no compromise about enforcing the strict and stringent terms President Bush laid down in his speech before the United Nations. In this case, inspection is not meant to be a gentlemanly Royal Commission, English style. It must be more of a police inquiry since we are dealing with a chronic delinquent.
Those frowning at the phrase "regime change" must surely realise that we are splitting hairs. If Saddam truly complied with each and every condition laid down, there would be a regime change. First, he would not do so. If he did so, he would not last. It would fly in the face of experience. On the other hand, if there were to be an end to his rule, the defeat of Saddam Hussein could spell real chances of transformation in Iraq and real liberation for his people. We talk about chaos or despair. The noble Lord, Lord Hurd, alluded to it, as did the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. There is a chance of liberating the people of Iraq, for change towards honest government and a civil society leading to an indigenous form of democracy in one country is bound to be contagious. It must be said that we face dire options. But there is no question that inactivity harbours a far greater danger than resolute intervention.
The Jeremiahs who predict chaos on an apocalyptic scale are convincingly contradicted by distinguished experts on the region. When the Soviet empire was tottering before the fall, there were prophecies of doom, talk of bloodshed, civil strife and feuding warlords. Not a great deal of all this happened. Few people bemoaned the fallen titans of Communism. Who will bemoan Saddam? The collapse of the Soviet empire brought velvet revolutions in its wake. In post-Saddam Iraq, as one noble Lord has eloquently stated, the ranks of the civil service and the army could supply cadres to take over from the discredited leaders of the traditional governments and fresh faces will surface from the underground and from exile.
In that aftermath, the historic task of the allies and all those who wish to improve the lot of the misgoverned and ill-used subjects of the dictator would be immense. It would require statesmanship, compassionate understanding of traditions and of the psyche of the people in the region. It should be possible to steer developments in the direction of self-correcting evolution rather than brutal change and bloody revolution. That is the great art, the great task ahead. That is where Europe and moderate Arab regimes can help the United States in pacifying a post-Saddam Iraq.

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The need to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front is pre-eminent. The question must be addressed simultaneously with, but independently of, the settling of accounts with Saddam. The idea of a peace conference is an important and good one. Of course, it begs questions of its composition and procedure. The intifada has flared up once again. The fragility of temporary respites only adds to the pessimism on both sides. But conversely, should the problem of Iraq be resolved—that is to say, if Saddam is de-fanged—the chances for a successful negotiated settlement would dramatically improve. I submit that the peace in Jerusalem can best be brought about by disarmament in Baghdad: because the fear of insecurity, the dread of the Scud missile from Baghdad and the rocket from Lebanon are at the root of Israel's visceral fear of making the necessary concessions to the Palestinians. Yet the moment the world community, especially the United States, could reassure the Israelis that that lethal threat would cease to hang over their heads, the same large majority which today backs General Sharon's government of steely confrontation would tomorrow hack a policy of accommodation, of painful concessions and sacrifices, horn of a new-found feeling of security.
Perhaps I may say a word about Prime Minister Sharon, who has sometimes been unfairly demonised. He is showing great restraint. The noble Lords, Lord Stone and Lord Winston, referred to this. He was voted in in the wake of the refusal of the Palestinian leadership to make peace and accept the office of Ehud Barak. A whole new mythology is arising to the effect that Ehud Barak never really made an offer, that it was fake, that it was conditional on this and that. The fact is that maps were never brought in by the Palestinians; a counter-proposal was never brought in. There was no negotiation of any kind. It was simply a decision to stall and to terminate the negotiations and wait for a better opportunity for a better deal. That is why Sharon was voted in.
The noble Lord, Lord Gilmour, was critical of Sharon. He has been demonised in good company; namely, that of the President of the United States, the Vice-President of the United States and the Secretary of Defence. The fact is that Sharon wants peace. He simply wants the end of the intifada—because what is the point of sitting down at a negotiating table if, 10 minutes after the negotiations have begun, an aide-de-camp comes in and tells the Prime Minister that another 50 people have been killed in a kindergarten or in a restaurant in Tel-Aviv? What do you do? Do you say: "Let's move on to the next point on the agenda"? That is the reality. All the Manichaean demonising of Sharon is too simplistic.
It is important for us now to address the question of the aftermath. Again, if we concentrate all our fervour, all our interests and all the skills that we have into various schemes with the intention of making Iraq a liveable place after the demise of Saddam Hussein, that will serve a much greater purpose than handwringing about the past.
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In conclusion, the British Government's courageous stand in this crisis deserves to be endorsed and must not be allowed to weaken or falter. Perhaps we ought to borrow two new symbols from the aviary of political stereotypes and replace the hawk and the dove with the eagle and the ostrich. It is gratifying to know that the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister belongs to the first species and has refused to stick his head into the sand.
7.25 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester: My Lords, Like many noble Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this debate on a matter of such crucial importance to the world, both today and tomorrow. I should like to add my congratulations to the Prime Minister for his endeavours in what still is a very difficult situation. More than that, as I am retiring at the end of this month as Bishop of Manchester, I should like also to take this opportunity on what I assume will be my last chance to speak—but, who knows, we might be called back again tomorrow—to thank noble Lords for the privilege of serving here, for their encouragement and friendship, and for the opportunity and responsibility of pointing to some of the Christian and more broadly moral and religious dimensions of public life.
I can assure noble Lords that I shall pray for them and their successors that they will continue to serve this nation with, I hope, wit, wisdom and the offering of good experience. Christians are called to love their neighbours, including their enemies; to seek peace and reconciliation; and to work for the transformation and renewal of God's people and world—what some speakers this afternoon have referred to as "nation building" and "human flourishing".
Many noble Lords have set out the moral arguments relating to the factors that traditionally have been taken into account concerning the Just-War test, and how such factors should be varied to take into account modern weaponry. I shall not rehearse all those factors at this stage of the evening, but I should like to draw the attention of the House to my real concerns relating to the risks involved and the evil and damage caused by military action. The latter could well be greater than the other evils that we are already enduring.
First, who will pay for this war? In asking that question I am obviously asking about the billions—it will be billions—of dollars and pounds that will be spent and which might have been used in attending to the world's poor. A greater number of people, mainly children, die every day—yesterday, today and tomorrow—because of the lack of clean water in this world than the number tragically killed in New York on 11th September of last year. Every day more children die than the number of those killed in that one event. If noble Lords wish to check the figures, they should ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I repeat: the Chancellor of the Exchequer, not the Archbishop of Canterbury, has quoted the figures in one of our House journals.

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Similarly, when asking that question, I am also asking who will pay with their lives? The vulnerable people in Iraq have been well referred to tonight, many of whom have already endured terrible suffering. Do we honestly believe that Saddam Hussein will pay with his life? Where is Bin Laden? Perhaps bombs will unfortunately go astray which will bring neighbouring countries into the suffering. And, as has already been asked, what about our own armed forces? Will they be adequately protected if it comes to a chemical war?
I hear the question that noble Lords will ask; namely, who will pay if we allow Iraq to accumulate even more weapons of destruction? That has already prompted the question tonight regarding who has allowed Saddam Hussein, who, apparently—so we are told—has no friends, to accumulate over the years arms and equipment that have now been listed in the dossier supplied to us. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, gave us a story as to how that happened. But who is continuing to sell and make available the material, the know-how, that will allow Saddam to develop these weapons of mass destruction? Is it already all there in that nation of Iraq, or are there others who are playing hookey round the world? That takes us back to the Export Control Bill. We had a long debate earlier this summer on who controls what really goes on and about buying and selling. I do not mind admitting that in the North West there is a big defence industry. So who will pay?
My second concern is about the implications for the people in the United Kingdom, particularly if we go to war without the authority of the United Nations—I welcome all noble Lords' contributions made about that today—and the support of some Middle Eastern nations. Here I want to overlap with some of the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark.
As noble Lords are aware, in many parts of England local communities consist of a number of diverse communities which are characterised by ethnic origin, religious faith, long-standing residents and newcomers. Your Lordships will recall that in some of our towns in the North West we welcome and enjoy the presence of large Jewish communities and growing Muslim communities. Last year we experienced considerable difficulties in some of those communities. I shall not name them. That would only encourage people to start naming them and to make up the stories, but noble Lords know the stories.
My colleagues with whom I consulted before I came to the House—I am talking about clergy not only in the Diocese of Manchester, but in Blackburn and beyond—tell me that relationships are improving between the different communities and are becoming more positive and stronger. We have some encouraging stories to tell; for example, leaders of five different faiths came together in the centre of Manchester on September 11th this year to remember what happened on September 11th last year. A large crowd also gathered.
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However, there is a huge degree of fragility in the recent growth in good relationships. Some still regard one another with suspicion and occasionally with outright hostility. We have had our own share of attacks on persons and on religious buildings. The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury in his presidential address at the recent congress in Hong Kong made the point that,
"I myself have been involved in a number of international dialogues…but there is another reality…at local level…where minority communities face dangers and difficulties that belie the rhetoric of international…gatherings".
So, in a nutshell, how can we prevent the present struggle developing into a battle between the West and the Middle East, between America and the United Kingdom and Arab nations and then ultimately Christianity and Islam?
Minority families—many of them in parts of the North West of England—watch television beamed by satellite from the Middle East and Asia. They switch on for Match of the Day, the weather forecast and so on. Their view of the world, including the Middle East, Iraq, America, Israel, Palestine, the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan, and any possible invasion of Iraq, comes not from TV channels that most of us in England watch, but is beamed from countries which are much closer to where any action might be. Therefore, we need to understand that their world view is not shaped by what our Prime Minister or our spin doctors might say, or even by what religious leaders in England might say, but by satellite television near the situations in Iraq, by e-mails and by the whole Internet site system.
As we seek wisdom about the international dimension of this situation, and as we want to look for coherent support within the United Kingdom for any action that our leaders feel it is appropriate to take—I have in mind the military needing the support of the nation—I just ask that noble Lords bear in mind the possible local implications of any decisions taken or actions proposed and seek a little divine wisdom regarding how that is handled.
7.35 p.m.
Lord Grenfell: My Lords, it is a privilege and a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate. I am extremely sorry that regime change in the Diocese of Manchester—benign as it is—will deprive your Lordships' House of his wisdom. I am particularly grateful to him for having drawn your Lordships' attention to the costs of the war and how that money could be far better applied to the alleviation of poverty.
At this stage of the debate there is not a great deal new to be said. However, I feel that one must stand up and be counted. I congratulate my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on his tireless and eventually successful efforts to persuade President Bush and his administration to work through the United Nations. I congratulate the Government on producing a persuasive dossier which we have seen today.

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I fully support the Government's insistence on a tough resolution in the Security Council, authorising truly intrusive inspection with serious consequences if the inspection is frustrated by the Iraqi regime. It is clear that Resolutions 687 and 1284 do not meet the present situation and that we need new resolutions. Passing a new resolution is not going to be a pretty process. Inevitably, there will be some shameful horse trading to persuade Russia to go along with it and perhaps to secure China's abstention. However, securing that resolution is vital.
I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others, who said that we must give inspection a real try. Only if that fails will an armed response be justified. That means not rushing the work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Do not try to second guess Dr Hans Blix. Let him and the Secretary-General draw the conclusions. We should also heed the warning of Hans Blix that belligerent statements from certain quarters in the US administration can encourage only non-co-operation with the inspectors. I repeat, do not rush it.
The time given to the inspectors allows the United States time to build its coalition which will be necessary if the inspection fails and US-led military intervention is called for. The likelihood of non-co-operation—as many Lords have pointed out—is all too real. Military action to enforce disarmament may be deemed necessary. It goes without saying—and was well put by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge—that if and when our own military are called upon to participate they will need, deserve and have our full support. However, I hope—maybe against hope—that an attack on Iraq will not be necessary. The consequences could be far worse than the United States Administration have ever dreamed of.
If it is necessary, then it must be sanctioned by the United Nations. I would have the greatest difficulty in supporting an attack on the initiative of the United States alone, with or without British participation, in the absence of unanimity in the Security Council.
Two issues cause me great concern. The noble Lords, Lord Hurd of Westwell and Lord Watson of Richmond, and many others, have insisted on the need to look beyond military intervention. I see scant evidence that the United States Administration are doing so, even if our own Government are. There are many important questions that need answering, and they need answering before a decision is taken to take military action.
For example, how will post-Saddam Hussein Iraq be kept together and a balkanisation prevented? Will the United States stay in for the long run? There is talk in the Pentagon of a need to keep 75,000 troops for five years in Iraq after hostilities. That, and the costs of reconstruction, could be between 100 billion and 200 billion dollars.
There are those on the other side of the Atlantic who optimistically see the post-Saddam Hussein scenario as a kind of McCarthurian regency in Baghdad, as if post-war Japan and present day Iraq could be equated.
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That is a false comparison. James Webb—President Regan's former Assistant Secretary of Defense—recently commented on that persuasively. He pointed out that US occupation forces never set foot in Japan until the Emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for America's arrival. The Japanese were, and are, a homogeneous people. The Iraqis are a multi-ethnic people dividing into competing factions who, in many cases, would view an American occupation as infidels invading the cradle of Islam. As he put it, in Japan, American occupation forces quickly became 50,000 friends. In Iraq, they could quickly become 50,000 targets of terrorism. Will American public opinion accept that? That is another question that needs examination.
Then, most importantly, what of the Arab neighbours. Among others, my noble friend Lady Uddin, in a most powerful speech, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford eloquently addressed the issue. The leaders of Egypt, Jordan and other countries in the region will probably survive the inevitable street protests which will follow an invasion of Iraq. But they will not show inexhaustible patience with their own people. If the American flag is to be burnt every night on the streets of Cairo or Amman, what chance the United States Congress will continue to vote financial assistance to these countries? Therefore, the governments of those countries will eventually crack down on the protests. Authoritarian rule will be reinforced. Is that what the US expects of its determination to bring democracy to the countries of this region.
I know that many noble Lords do not want the debate to be seen as primarily a critique of the United States and I entirely agree. But we cannot and must not ignore the signals coming out of Washington. The crucial point we must never let go is that there is a difference between power and legitimacy. A few days ago, the United States Administration set out their new national security strategy. As by far the most powerfully armed nation in the world—the world's sole superpower—it sees itself as having not just the capability but also the right and duty to take pre-emptive action anywhere in the world at any time where there is a perceived threat against the security of the United States. They will not hesitate to act alone.
As Condolleezza Rice put it in her interview last weekend in the Financial Times:
"We want to be thought of as liberators".
I doubt that they will be seen as that. As Dominique Moisi of the French Institute of Foreign Affairs put it the next day:
"No one likes armed liberators, especially if they come from a different continent with a different culture and a different religion".
I find all this deeply disturbing. Close allies though we may be with the United States, we must not hesitate to address the issue. The defining thesis of this new US strategy is that the doctrine of deterrence and containment have outlived their effectiveness. Pre-emptive action by the sole superpower is now the name of the game.

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That to my mind sets an appalling precedent. Zbigniev Brzezinski last month addressed the dangers of a sudden attack on Iraq by saying that such an attack would prompt many in the world to justify any subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel, while setting a dangerous example for the world of an essentially Darwinian international system characterised by sudden pre-emptive attacks.
I fear that a Darwinian international system seems to be at the heart of the new US security strategy and to my mind it is very dangerous. It also implies that the United Nations is an irrelevant body. I am amazed by President Bush's timing. He goes to the United Nations General Assembly and tells it what the UN has to deliver. A week later he announces a security strategy that could totally bypass it. There is an extraordinary inconsistency in what he has to say.
Dag Hammarskjöld said that the United Nations was created not to bring mankind to heaven but to keep it out of hell. It was a wise statement. One of our greatest representatives in the United Nations was Gladwyn Jebb, later a distinguished Member of your Lordships' House. Twenty-five years after he relinquished that post, he reflected on the body he had helped to create. He said:
"in order that mankind should not destroy itself totally in its struggles, it is essential to have some place…in which reason, or law, can be brought to bear on conflicts either for preventing them, or for ending them in accordance with certain generally accepted rules. We must not despair if these rules are often violated, or, more frequently ignored, or even if the Super-Powers sometimes fail to make use of the machinery altogether. The great thing is that it should be there. And when the abyss really yawns before them I believe that this time…it is [to] the United Nations that the nations will turn".
I believe that the abyss really does yawn now. Britain was a key founding member, along with the United States, of the United Nations. I therefore urge Her Majesty's Government to do nothing, although called on by siren voices across the Atlantic, to undermine this global institution. So far the Government have stood firm. May that be their permanent policy. I hope that, as we have seen in the performance of the Prime Minister who has done so much to help bring the United States to see the validity of the United Nations, that that policy will indeed be permanent.
7.46 p.m.
Lord Blaker: My Lords, I apologise in advance in case I am unable to be here for the winding-up speeches. Because of the Tube strike it appears that if I were to stay for the full debate I might not be home before breakfast.
In the absence of the dossier which only appeared this morning, I have been reading the evidence to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate given on 31st July this year and especially to the evidence of Ambassador Richard Butler who was, as noble Lords will remember, the executive chairman of UNSCOM until 1999 when it ended. He is a distinguished Australian diplomat. He has been the
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ambassador of Australia in Thailand and at the UN. He is now diplomat-in-residence at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been in the business of arms control, inspection and verification for about a quarter of a century. He is obviously not very well informed about what has happened in the past four years although I have no doubt he is trying to keep up.
Nevertheless, what he had to say to the committee gives a very good perspective. Not surprisingly, his evidence was very much in line with the dossier. But there are some points worth mentioning tonight. First, a very clear picture emerges from his evidence on the subterfuges, excuses, trickery, delays and devices by which the Iraqis sought to prevent UNSCOM being effective. One gains a clear picture of Saddam Hussein as a prince of prevarication. That is very relevant when we are planning the next arrangements for inspection about which the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, very properly spoke.
The second point relates to nuclear weapons. Iraq has been working on getting nuclear weapons for 20 years, according to Ambassador Butler. When the Gulf War put an end to progress of that effort on the part of the Iraqis, inspection by the IAEA and UNSCOM showed that Iraq was only six months away from making a crude explosive nuclear device. All that Iraq needs now, according to Ambassador Butler, is fissionable material to make nuclear weapons and this may be obtainable elsewhere. Iraq is trying to obtain it.
As regards chemical weapons, as noble Lords are aware the efforts of Iraq have covered about 20 years. Chemical weapons were used against Iranians in the 1980s and against the Kurds in the 1990s. By 1998 UNSCOM had discovered that Iraq had loaded the chemical weapon, VX, one of the most powerful, and other chemical and biological weapons, into missile warheads.
On biological weapons, Iraq made very elaborate efforts, according to the ambassador, to conceal its weapons, more elaborate even than in the other two contexts. In his view that implies the great importance that is attached to biological weapons. It loaded anthrax into missile warheads during the time when Ambassador Butler was at UNSCOM and it looked at other methods of delivery such as sprays and other types of weapon involving smallpox, ebola and plague.
The most interesting difference between the evidence given by Ambassador Butler and the dossier published today relates to the question that my noble friend Lord Waldegrave asked the noble Baroness during her opening speech on the connections between Iraq and terrorism. In July this year, after referring to a place called Salman Pak outside Baghdad, which he described as a terrorist training centre, he said:
"There are detailed accounts available now of the through-put through that centre of a variety of nationalities, most of them from countries in the Middle East. But the point is not just Iraqis but a multiplicity of nationals being to that school, trained by Iraq in techniques of terrorism".
He went on to talk about an incident that occurred when he was the Australian ambassador in Bangkok when Saddam Hussein sent "a terrorist hit group" to

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Bangkok, as the ambassador put it. That group was identified by intelligence authorities. Their plan was to make an attack on three embassies, the Australian, the American and the Israeli. Ambassador Butler took assistance from the Thai army who lived in his embassy compound for some time. He continued:
"The end of the story is that the cell"—
the group sent from Iraq—
"involved was found. It was heavily armed, and it did indeed have detailed plans for a military attack upon those three embassies".
Why are those two matters not mentioned in the dossier? It is the opinion of Ambassador Butler that Saddam Hussein would not have transferred to other countries any ingredients for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction because he wished to preserve his pre-eminence and importance in the area.
Another point made by Ambassador Butler in his evidence was that it would be deeply dangerous to agree to a system of inspection that could lead to phoney examinations, more deceit and more concealment which may provide an illusion of security. That is a fairly obvious point. We have to bear in mind that although about 10 days ago Iraq sent a letter to Kofi Annan accepting, on the face of it, inspection without any conditions, within a few days Iraqi officials were talking of conditions such as sovereignty. They regard sovereignty as a condition that limits the rights of the inspectors to operate.
It is clear that we must start on a wholly new basis. I follow what the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, was saying about how important it is that the new arrangements for inspections should be extremely tough. It will be difficult, for example, to prevent evasion in connection with biological and chemical weapons because of the small quantities involved. It will be difficult to ensure that inspections are free and that they can occur where and when the inspectors wish. It is desirable that the next resolution makes it clear that if the inspections arc frustrated by the Iraqis the United Nations reserves the right to resort to force, which is one thing that Saddam Hussein clearly understands.
I conclude with two brief points, both in support of remarks already made. I strongly support what my noble friend Lord Hurd of Westwell said about the importance—the necessity—of being clearer about the sort of regime we want to see in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's. It was difficult enough creating some sort of regime in Afghanistan; it will be much more difficult in Iraq.
I also support the numerous noble Lords who say that the United States would make a serious error if it proceeded any further without taking steps to resolve the Middle East problem—the Palestinian-Israeli problem. That is a point of cardinal importance. We must take steps to solve that problem in a fair and balanced way. It is right to pay tribute to the success of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in persuading the United States to work through the United Nations. I hope that they can use the same skills in achieving that other objective.
7.56 p.m.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I must confess that I have torn up my speech. Speaking fiftieth in this long debate, I feel that there is no point in inflicting on the House that which has been more eloquently said by many others already. However, I shall endorse many of the speeches that have been made. In particular, my noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby put the position exactly as I would have wished to myself. She spoke for everyone on these Benches. I was also struck by the speech made by my noble friend Lord Watson of Richmond.
Listening to the soldiers, I agreed with much of what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, said. However, I agreed with everything that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, said. Listening to the former diplomats, I agreed with a great deal of the analysis set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, but I agreed with every word of what the noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, said. From the prelates, the speeches made by the right reverend Prelates the Bishop of London and the Bishop of Oxford were memorable. The speeches made by the noble Lord, Lord Hurd of Westwell, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden, were entirely apropos.
It was only last Thursday that Congress gave the President of the United States consent to military action in any one of three circumstances. The first was military action in defence of the United States; the second was action necessary to enforce United Nations resolutions; and the third was action necessary to maintain peace in the region. The overwhelming message from this House tonight is that no military action should be taken in any circumstances, without the firmest backing in United Nations resolutions.
It is also fair to say that the House has made it equally clear that it sees the need for action. This House shares the view that Saddam Hussein is unspeakable and that we must work with all vigour to extract from the United Nations as early as possible a new resolution or new resolutions that will, so to speak, do the trick. One can only wish the Government Godspeed in the continuance of that mission. As many have said, the Prime Minister two weeks ago would seem to have effected a key switch in United Nations policy away from the line being adopted by Vice-President Cheney—that the United Nations was superfluous to the action being contemplated—to the present position. As was said by my noble friend Lady Williams, many in the United States are as worried as most of your Lordships by sabre-rattling from across the water. Al Gore's remarks yesterday were of that ilk and greatly become him.
It has not been made sufficiently clear that a no-risk option is not available in the present predicament. Whether or not one acts, there is a real danger of conflagration in the Middle East. The present state of affairs is extremely fragile for all the reasons explained tonight. Saddam Hussein is at best an unpredictable tyrant.

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Those whose response to a no-risk option is that we must act early and with assurance delude themselves. Many eminent former soldiers have said that winning a war against Saddam Hussein in the Middle East must be the easiest victory that ever presented itself to a nation of the power of the United States. Winning the peace is the difficulty. For all the reasons eloquently explained in this debate, no peace is more difficult to win than in the Middle East.
I will touch briefly on the centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli situation to the difficulties faced by the region. The diplomatic software, not the military hardware, is crucial. Hearts and minds have to be won. The Prime Minister was absolutely correct in October 2002—during his hasty shuttle between the members of the coalition—when he made it clear that he was in the business of trying to influence opinion in the countries that subsequently and so successfully formed the anti-terrorist coalition.
How do the Middle East, Iran and the other nations most tied up with the crisis perceive our proposals and those of the Americans? How do they view US diplomacy? The answer given tonight is absolutely correct. The role of candid friend does not merely require us to raise the issues but to raise them directly and with whatever degree of brutality is necessary to influence America in its own best interests. It is also a matter of being a candid friend to Israel at least as much as to the United States.
My own background is typical of men and women of my generation, to whom the Holocaust was the defining event of 20th century history—and which led to my offering to enlist in the Israeli army in 1973. It cannot be said that I come from an anti-Israeli background. Anyone who has travelled in the Middle East will confirm that there is a great deal of antagonism towards the way in which America has conducted itself in recent years. There is no sense that the United States has been even handed. Rather, there is a sense that Israel is a client state of the US and that the needs, rights and entitlements of every other state in the region come third and fourth best.
Sadly, the United Kingdom is not entirely free from being tarred with the same brush. Although we have sincerely endeavoured to distance ourselves from the United States, I do not know that we have always been wholly successful. I recently attended a conference in London of mainly Israeli and Palestinian business men. Among those present were Israelis who had been engaged in the negotiations at Camp David and Taba. The message from that meeting, quite independently of my own thoughts, was that the state of affairs in Palestine is unsustainable. There is over 50 per cent unemployment; a living standard one-ninth that of Israel; 3.7 million refugees, 1.2 million of them living in 52 squalid, deplorable camps.
I was in Sabra and Chatila last year. I would say to the noble Lords, Lord Janner, Lord Winston and Lord Weidenfeld, that while having every conceivable sympathy with the strain and anxiety that they must feel, it is no use they or anyone else saying that Ariel
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Sharon was elected. A great many men—they are usually men—in history have been "elected". That is no guarantee against improvidence and lack of wisdom.
The fact is that last week saw the 20th anniversary of the massacre at Sabra and Chatila over which Ariel Sharon presided. He enabled the Falangists to slaughter between 1,000 and 2,000 of those Palestinians, man woman and child, one by one, over a 24-hour period. He set up and enabled that slaughter. An Israeli committee afterwards found him responsible and he was forced to resign as Defence Minister. For that man—leave aside the fact that he was a terrorist back in the British mandate days in the Hagana—to have been elected to power in Israel, far from giving him legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab world, merely reinforced their sense of where public opinion in Israel rests.
I make that point not in any sense to stir up feeling against Israel, but as one example of the extent to which we need, if we are candid friends, to say to the Israelis and the United States that they must have more regard to other interests in the Middle East than they currently appear to do.
We can look briefly at Iran. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, correctly referred to the fact that Iran alone suffered 1 million dead at the time Saddam Hussein attacked. And Saddam Hussein was backed and armed by the United States and ourselves. Those are the sort of recent historic facts which Middle East countries do not understand when we now act as we appear to be doing. I sit down, save to say to the noble Lords, Lord Janner and Lord Winston, that I can end on no better note than to quote the example of the young man, Yoni Jesner, who was so tragically slaughtered and whose organs were then given for an Israeli child. That at least gives a ray of light.
8.8 p.m.
Lord Bramall: My Lords, we have heard some excellent speeches, not least those of the noble Lords, Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Grenfell. I agree with much of what they said.
The priorities in the Middle East must surely be, first, however difficult it may seem at the moment, to obtain a just and guaranteed solution to the Israel-Palestine question; to build up the economic and political stability of Afghanistan; to encourage Pakistan and other countries to deal with any Al'Qaeda on their territory; and most urgent of all, to get the UN inspectors back into Iraq.
Saddam Hussein is indeed in breach of innumerable UN resolutions and the Security Council has every right, indeed an obligation, to insist on compliance and even to authorise the use of any force it believes necessary to ensure that happens. There can be no doubt that some degree of credible sabre rattling and psychological warfare has been necessary and could still be essential right up to the wire to bring about that compliance.
I therefore back the Government in their support of America in its diplomatic offensive with heavy military overtones and congratulate the Prime Minister on

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steering it through the United Nations, which is obviously the answer. That is the easy part. It is now up to the UN with our full support to enforce and maintain the unconditional return of the observers, backed, I hope, by a strong Security Council resolution holding President Saddam Hussein personally to account for that compliance.
I presume that the Government consider it important that time is now given for the observers to assess that task and report back before any further action is decided on. Here we come to the difficult part. If, in addition to all those priorities, irrespective of how the observers were making out, and without any further authority from the United Nations, British forces were to be committed to a large scale United States military action, primarily to effect a regime change, the British people—not unreasonably—would expect satisfactory and reassuring answers to some searching questions, some of which have hardly been touched on before this debate, to be sure that they had been thought through.
First, would such action really be necessary? Plenty of evidence is pouring in of the threat of Iraq developing and possessing weapons of mass destruction and delivery means. But surely the key question is whether, survivor that he is, Saddam would ever want or be in a position to use those weapons offensively when all the eyes of the world are on him and he must know that retribution would be terrible and swift. Could he still not be deterred, as to some extent he was during the Gulf War vis à vis Israel?
Iraq has not been appeased, as some claim it would be if it were not attacked. Sanctions are in place; there are no-fly zones at either end of the country. Selected sites in those zones have been taken out by air with impunity. Saddam must realise that other sites related to the production of weapons of mass destruction could be treated in the same way. Forces are at hand in the area ready to be used if so authorised. That is hardly appeasement. Observers able to do their job would greatly further inhibit him.
For 50 years we have based our defence policy on deterring, with heavy large-scale weapons of our own, those with more serious and numerous weapons of mass destruction. I wonder why the Government are so adamant that Saddam cannot be kept in place by similar methods; what the Foreign Office once in its wisdom described as "aggressive containment".
Secondly, would such action be morally justified? It is reasonable that the people of this country not only speculate whether the Americans can and will attack Iraq but whether they should. Unfortunately one cannot always base a country's foreign policy on morality. The instinct of self-interest, and, even more, self-preservation, is always more compelling both for governments and those who elect them.
But the weaker the case for necessity, the more the moral question has to be taken into account, particularly at times when pre-emptive action, largely to effect a change of ruler or implant a more favourable type of government, would not by itself be considered sufficient justification for war—consider
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the case of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. When such strong efforts are made to link military force to the authority of the United Nations the moral high ground is important, and this country is supposed to take a lead in such matters.
Thirdly, would an attack on Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein work? The advice of the chiefs of staff will be crucial; I hope that the Government are listening to them. With all the power at its disposal and no other superpower to gainsay it as occurred in the past, America can, I presume, eventually achieve any military objective it wishes, although historical precedent indicates that attack on a homeland as distinct from captured territory can be messy and prolonged.
Getting into Iraq may not present too many problems, but, as many noble Lords have asked, have we really thought through what we do when we get there and how we put together a fragmented and disparate Iraq that its Arab neighbours have never wanted broken up as a country? My noble and gallant friend Lord Vincent talked of the need for a clear political aim. Others have talked about any attack being only a beginning and not an end. A lot more work needs to be done on that.
Finally, will the wider aftermath of such an attack be beneficial or the reverse? There are two conflicting schools of thought. One, for which the support is slightly weakening, is that, as a result of a successful attack, with Saddam Hussein being removed, preferably with the help of a popular uprising, the terrorist-ridden, war-torn Middle East would somehow start to unravel beneficially, moderate Muslim governments would take heart and thus take more effective action against their dissident elements, the situation of Palestine would become more possible and the ability of the terrorists to strike another disastrous blow at the United States or Europe, with or without weapons of mass destruction, could be effectively reduced or even removed.
However, the other school of thought is that all-out war with Iraq, as distinct from aggressive containment, would produce in the area the display of massive, dynamic western military activity that is one of the mainsprings of motivation for terrorist action and outrages in the region and over a wider area. Far from advancing the war against terrorism—which could and should be conducted internationally by other means—and enhancing the peace process around Israel's borders, it would make things infinitely worse. Petrol, not water, would be poured on the flames.
Those who subscribe to this latter view might well consider that even if a prima facie case could be made for attacking Iraq unilaterally, the disadvantages might well outweigh the advantages and produce more pain and grief than they solved.
All this is a matter of judgment as to which scenario is more likely, which is difficult to make unless you are in possession of all the facts. I am not too certain of the answer, but it is a judgment that the Government, with all the diplomatic and intelligence channels at their

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disposal, can and should make on behalf of the British people. If the first point of view commends itself to them, they should stake their reputation on it and communicate it to the British people with all the conviction and vehemence that the Government can muster so that they can get a full consensus in the country, which our forces would need. If the second point of view prevails and they more or less say that come what may, right or wrong, the special relationship is so important that it must be supported at all costs, that viewpoint should be tested as well.
Many of us—including the British Government, I am sure—hope that the authority of the United Nations and the influence of other Arab and Muslim states will be sufficient to get Iraq to accept certainly no less than all the points in the previous United Nations resolutions. Then the case for further military action will have been weakened and an opportunity will exist to hold hack or pull back with honour. If not, then the Government will face a very serious situation. Going to war, which is what it would be, is a very serious step—particularly a war that, whatever the outcome, is bound to antagonise large sections of the Muslim world and cause a great many innocent casualties. If then I, like the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, would fear for the future and hold a pessimistic point of view, which I certainly did not at the time of the Falklands War, when I held office, or at the time of the Gulf War, when I visited the area in a parliamentary delegation—on both occasions, I was convinced that whatever risks there were should be taken and that we would win-it is because I feel in my heart of hearts—I believe that many who know the Middle East better than I do would agree—that the peace and stability of the world would best be served by less, not more, western military action in the Middle East, following the pattern successfully set in the last quarter of the 20th century in South-East Asia.
The West, led by America, must remain strong, alert and ever-vigilant, with improved missile defence and constantly improving and better-funded intelligence. It must be ready, too, to adopt the laws in a democratic society so that terrorist cells cannot so easily be planted and prosper. The much-needed bridges which will have to be built in the future between the affluent West and the less secure and resentful Muslim world would then be on the basis of mutual trade, aid, where it was needed and asked for, and, above all, mutual respect. Under those circumstances—again, I look at South-East Asia—I believe that Al'Qaeda would wither on the vine or that its members would be properly treated as criminals, as has so often happened in the years gone by.
8.21 p.m.
Lord Morris of Manchester: My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Williams and my noble friend Lady Symons, speaking with all their customary sincerity and conviction, argued a powerful and persuasive case for the policy that the Government are
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now pursuing as the world contemplates the prospect of what some in the media are already calling "Gulf War Two".
I have an interest to declare but not a financial one. It is my close working relationship with representatives of ex-servicemen and women, now in broken health, many of them terminally ill, who sacrificed their well-being in Gulf War One, and the bereaved families of those who sacrificed their lives. They became known to me, first, as Honorary Parliamentary Advisor for many years of The Royal British Legion and then as a founder member of its Inter-Parliamentary Gulf War Group of parliamentarians, medical and legal specialists, veterans of the conflict and ex-service charity leaders. Other members of the group include the noble Countess, Lady Mar, the noble Lord, Lord Burnham, Gisela Stuart MP, Michael Mates MP and Paul Tyler MP. The MoD is also represented.
It was my role in that group—and in this House in securing parliamentary time for five debates on the problems and needs of Gulf veterans and the bereaved families—that led the United States Congress to make me, without any known precedent, a co-opted member of its Congressional Committee on Gulf War Illnesses. Never was the "special relationship" more special. I was invited to sit on equal terms with members from both sides of Congress and have since done so at meetings on Capitol Hill. I did so again when, last June, the committee met here in the Palace of Westminster—the first Congressional committee ever to do so—to take evidence from British Gulf veterans.
The principal lesson I learned from that experience is that we could soon become involved in a second Gulf War without having applied, or even fully learned, the lessons of the first.
For we still do not know, 12 years on, even whether it was safe to subject British troops deployed to the Gulf in 1990 to a multiple immunisation programme of up to 14 inoculations and the first ever issue of nerve agent pre-treatment sets—NAPS tablets—as antidote to biological agents. Indeed, I am ministerially informed that Porton Down will not report on the programme's "long-term effects on humans" until late next year at the earliest, long before when further British troops could be in the Gulf facing an adversary known to be capable of deploying chemical, biological and possibly nuclear devices against them. This is of concern not only to Gulf War veterans—and their serving colleagues—but to former senior soldiers of the highest distinction. The noble and gallant Lord, Field Marshal Lord Bramall—a former Chief of the Defence Staff, whom I am delighted to be following in this debate—is in no doubt about the importance of the issue in terms both of explaining many of the still undiagnosed illnesses of Gulf veterans and safeguarding troops now awaiting deployment.
In the debate on Gulf War illnesses which I opened in your Lordships' House on 15 January 2001, the noble and gallant Lord said, at col. 1014, that,
"one glaring question stands out above all others"

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and he described the combination of NAPS tablets and up to 14 vaccines, all administered at the same time, as by far the most likely common factor in causing subsequent indisposition or worse among Gulf veterans. The depth of his disquiet about the time-scale for completing the Porton Down studies was made equally clear.
This is in part why the ex-service community want Parliament now to be given all possible information on arrangements made to immunise our troops now awaiting deployment, more especially reservists, against any biological weapons that might be used. "Is the immunisation process already under way?", I am asked by The Royal British Legion. "Have all of the vaccines that are to be used been approved?"
They want specifically to know what precautions have been taken to protect British troops against the effects of nerve gases and what, if anything, has replaced the NAPS tablets that were used last time.
The ex-service community accept that mistakes made in 1990–91 were not deliberate; but they rightly insist that every lesson learned from past mistakes must be fully explained and seen to have been acted upon for the protection of troops now facing active service in the Gulf.
The scale on which veterans were reporting war-related illnesses soon after the 1991 conflict led even many doctors to think that there could be a single underlying cause. But the range of symptoms was very wide; and while this does not exclude damage done to the immune system by the multiple immunisation programme as the single most common cause of Gulf War illnesses, it was demonstrably not the only cause when so many veterans were presenting symptoms of organophosphate poisoning; of PTSD; of the effects of massive oil pollution from the firing by Iraqi troops of Kuwait's oil wells; and of involvement in the clean-up of vehicles and sites attacked by DU weapons.
Here again we need to know today what lessons have been learned under each of these heads and what action has been taken to apply them in protecting troops now about to be deployed.
The ex-service community also want reassuring, first, that organophosphates will not again be used to prevent fly-borne diseases and that sufficient stocks of other pesticides have been made available. Secondly, they want to be reassured that early warning devices that were discredited by the MoD as being over-sensitive in reacting to substances other than toxic gases have now been replaced by a system in which the department has confidence. Thirdly, they seek reassurance about the SA 90 rifle, more especially to hear that instructions and training have been given to deal with the problem involved in failing to maintain the rifle correctly. And, fourthly, they ask whether the issue of "melting boots" has been fully addressed.
My work with the Congressional committee of inquiry also made me aware that the prevalence of motor neurone disease is disturbingly higher among Gulf War veterans, both here and in the US, than it is in the population as a whole. I also learned that, had they been Americans, the late Nigel Thompson and
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other British veterans who have died of the disease would have had their illness accepted as war-related. Here the MoD continues to "study" the link, while the US Department of Defence has already acted.
Again, illnesses among US veterans exposed to the fall-out plume from US bombing of the Iraqi chemical weapons stored at Khamisiyah in southern Iraq in March 1991 are accepted as war-related. Not so those of British veterans who were exposed to nerve agent by the bombing; and they and their families want to know why. For they see the denial of parity of treatment as unjust.
They ask also why, while in the United States a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the effects of the conflict was set up very soon after the liberation of Kuwait, there still has been no such wide-ranging inquiry here.
Of all the duties it falls to parliamentarians to discharge, none is of more compelling priority than to act justly to citizens who are prepared to lay down their lives for their country and the dependants of those who do so. There was no delay in the response of our troops to the call of duty in 1990–91. Nor should there be any delay now in settling in full our debt of honour to them or in maximising the protection of those who could soon be putting their lives on the line in a renewal of hostilities in the Gulf. That commitment too is one of honour.
8.31 p.m.
Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, if I am not here at the end of the debate, that will not be because of a lack of stamina, although this debate could much more usefully have taken place over two days. It is a great mistake to think that in relation to very complex subjects such as this, having less time available, which makes shorter speeches necessary, contributes most to the debate. There are so many different matters on which all of us want to add our views; we want to do so and could usefully do so. Moreover, if I am not here later, that is not because I have any disrespect for the customs of your Lordships' House. In 35 years, I believe that I have never not stayed to the end of a debate in which I have spoken. If I do not stay this evening, that is merely because in trying to get to your Lordships' House this morning, I had difficulty negotiating the outer defences that had been thrown up and came a real purler; I will be better off at home.
Before I turn to the short speech that I want to make, I take up a point that was made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. In a very good speech—this has been a debate of very good speeches, not least that made by the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Manchester, who raised some important issues—the right reverend Prelate made a statement that goes to the heart of the debate. He said that he thought that it was morally acceptable to go to war on occasion and under certain circumstances because of what was threatened rather than because of what had happened. I believe—if I, a member of the inferior clergy, may say this to an empty Bishops' Bench—that that is bad moral theology. It leads one down a very tortuous

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path. One starts wondering, when one is considering individuals whose genes lead one to believe that they will almost certainly commit serious crimes, about how to deal with such people. That path should not be pursued. We should stick to the way in which people behave.
Like all noble Lords, I speak for myself, but I also speak for the Green Party. I do so with the more confidence because my party held its conference last week and, as will all party conferences this summer, it expressed its views on this subject.
Terrorism is a frightful thing; persecution is a frightful thing; and nothing I am about to say should be held to diminish our condemnation of Saddam Hussein and his regime for their part in these crimes.
But we believe that war is an even more terrible thing, coming as it does from the considered decision of states to unleash organised violence, backed by the semblance of legality, upon the world. We do not believe that it should ever be embarked on by civilised nations except with the sanction of the body that they have set up for this purpose, the UN, and then strictly within the framework of any conditions that body may have laid down. For that reason we strongly condemn the determination by President Bush and possibly our own Prime Minister to "go it alone" if they do not obtain a UN resolution which satisfies them. Such an action would be criminal, and the intention to do it is an intention to commit a criminal act.
Further, we hold that the UN must abide by its laid down rules, which specify the right to act in response to aggression. No aggression is threatened by Iraq at present. The holding of weapons of mass destruction is not in itself an aggressive act or the US and the UK would be equally guilty. Indeed, my party calls on both nations to surrender theirs. But, more to the immediate point, I believe that there is no excuse ever for a pre-emptive strike, for the reasons upon which I have touched.
Finally, I shall close with a quotation from a Republican Party president who had himself, unlike the present President, considerable experience of war, General Eisenhower. He said:
"Indeed I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it".
8.37 p.m.
Lord Davies of Coity: My Lords, this debate is,
"to take note of the situation with regard to Iraq and weapons of mass destruction".
Despite that, and no doubt understandably, a great deal of attention has been paid to America's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I intend to address the question of Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, United Nations resolutions and the United Nations role in enforcing those resolutions.
I know that no one in this Chamber welcomes the prospect of war with Iraq. I certainly do not. But is that the simple, straightforward question to be faced? I suggest not. It seems to me that we have to ask, first, is
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a war with Iraq inevitable? Secondly, if it is inevitable, should it be fought on our terms or do we wait until the enemy has the opportunity to strike first in whatever form that may take? Of course, it would be comforting to believe that a military conflict with Iraq is not inevitable. But is that realistic? And that poses the third question.
In order to reach a reasonable conclusion on those questions, I believe that it is necessary to examine the record of the man with whom we are dealing—Saddam Hussein. I appreciate that he has given a commitment to allow United Nations inspectors to return to Iraq after a four-year absence. I shall come to that issue later. In the meantime it is sufficient to say that allowing inspectors into Iraq is not an end in itself but only a means to an end—the end being the removal of weapons of mass destruction. That is the commitment entered into in 1991, 11 years ago, following the Gulf War, which clearly has not been honoured.
So what of the record of the dictator with whom we are dealing? By a very conservative estimate, he was responsible for the mass killing of 200,000 Kurds in the late 1980s. We know that at least a further 300,000 Iraqis have been slain on the orders of Saddam Hussein. We know that in the region of 600,000 Iraqis died in the war with Iran; and we know of the countless Iraqis who were slaughtered as a result of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.
That record must surely tell us what value this man places on human life. If he places no value on the lives of his own people, what value does he place on the lives of the rest of us? The answer is unequivocally: none whatsoever. He is a tyrant who has no difficulty in embracing terrorism. I should not be surprised to learn that he knew of, even if he did not participate in, the atrocity of September 11th. I believe that Saddam Hussein would have no compunction in unleashing weapons of mass destruction on the world, particularly the free world, if it suited his purpose and if he were given the opportunity to do so. I believe that he must be stopped before that day comes—it is to be hoped by peaceful means but, if that is not possible, the employment of military means will, I fear, become necessary.
Perhaps I may say a few words on Iraq's contempt of United Nations resolutions and its past treatment of the United Nations inspectors. First, we know that there is a series of United Nations resolutions with which Iraq has failed to comply. That in itself justifies holding Saddam Hussein to account.
But at the stage we are at now, what must be of greatest importance is Saddam Hussein's latter-day concession—I use the term with some sarcasm—to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq after an absence of four years. But even given this development, would it not be folly to ignore our experience of the inspections between 1991 and 1998?
In June 1991, very early on in the inspection, there was the first showdown, when inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency were barred from intercepting nuclear-related material by Iraqi security forces who attempted to intimidate the inspectors by firing their weapons.

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In September of that year, agency officials were prevented from moving sensitive documents in Baghdad—and the Iraqis exerted this pressure on the inspectors for four days.
Following repeated attempts over the years by Iraqi forces to frustrate the work of the United Nations, the most blatant violation came in 1995. Until then, Baghdad had denied having biological weapons. In that year, inspectors unearthed Iraq's covert biological weapons programme—and only subsequently did Iraq admit to producing "tens of tonnes" of biological warfare agents. Richard Butler, who led the last United Nations team to be withdrawn from Baghdad, in 1998, said that Iraq had built,
"a wall of deceit and concealment",
to fool inspectors in the past and might do so again".
So this is the experience of the past from which we must draw our conclusions for the future. The United Nations was created to maintain peace on this planet and to curb the excesses of tyrants and dictators whose actions threaten people's safety and security the world over. In this regard, for 50 years it has provided a great service. However, it seems to me that in respect of Iraq the United Nations has been extremely long-suffering.
In the week before George Bush made his speech to the United Nations, and during the period when America was widely criticised for suggesting the possibility of a military strike on Iraq, I was on holiday not in America but in the Baltics. While reading a novel by Robert Goddard entitled Past Caring, I came across a line which read:
"Truth without action is knowledge honour".
How appropriate that seemed in relation to the United Nations and Saddam Hussein's continual and persistent flouting of its resolutions.
The "truth" is as I have described. But where has been the action—conspicuous, I suggest, by its absence? The "knowledge" is clear, but has not the honour of the United Nations already been dented, and is it not now at risk of further damage? Let us not delude ourselves by thinking that the United Nations, or Iraq, would be acting as they are now if it had not been for the United States and Britain making it abundantly clear that if the United Nations did not fulfil its responsibilities, then others would do it for them.
The United Nations has a clear responsibility to resolve problems, not to avoid them. As the past has taught us, avoiding difficulties in the short and medium term only results in even worse consequences in the long term. What happened on 11th September was catastrophic, but I do not want to wait to see a terrorist attack in the future that could possibly involve nuclear weapons and that would dwarf what happened to the Twin Towers and to the Pentagon.
Whether it is Iraq or elsewhere, we can no longer afford to be relaxed, or, worse, be complacent or apathetic to the dangers that confront us today. Like most noble Lords here, I am old enough to remember the Second World War. I have also read enough about the Spanish Civil War that preceded it. In both cases,
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our failure to act at the appropriate time only added to our eventual difficulties. In Spain we did nothing to defend democracy when Hitler, at the same time, was supporting Franco and the fascists—a war which many have said the Fuhrer saw as a dress rehearsal for World War Two. Yet, despite those developments, we embarked on a policy of appeasement with Hitler. And what good did that do us?
I am afraid that there are too many examples where we have allowed our enemies to take the initiative. In today's technological age, with the increasing growth of terrorism we cannot afford to relax and ignore the threat with which the free world is now confronted. I believe that the weapons of mass destruction must be removed and destroyed. If the United Nations inspectors can achieve this, then the best solution will have been found. However, there is no doubt that this will require the genuine co-operation of the Iraqi regime. But if that does not succeed, I believe that the United Nations must fulfil its responsibility and take the alternative and unavoidable action that is necessary to enforce the UN resolutions. In my view, a failure to do so will result in the United Nations following the same path as the League of Nations.
8.47 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Coity, and that is especially so this evening because I happen to agree with everything that he said. As a very old-fashioned Conservative, on defence of the realm I tend to support the Government and oppose them on everything else. I also take the view that it is no time of night to make a prepared speech and propose to entertain a somewhat jerky debate.
Whatever Saddam Hussein intends to do with these weapons, in about a year he will have the whole range and the means of delivery with devastating consequence—all this in defiance of United Nations resolutions. The credibility of the United Nations and of the world community is as stake unless these weapons are destroyed. Inspection has become the plaything for delay, while Saddam Hussein builds up his arsenal. And delay but heightens the order of the threat. Mandatory destruction with the authority of the United Nations is now urgent owing to the weather conditions in Iraq. This has to be the time for action if we are to act.
In that respect I am afraid that I take issue with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and her party. It is assumed that armed intervention would be directed to protect inspection and, as I think was suggested by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, the inspectors and to pinpoint and ensure verified destruction to safeguard our own salvation and that of others from the threat of attack. Furthermore, in default of agreement by or obstruction by Saddam Hussein, in any extension of such intervention due to the exigencies of war no attack shall be directed against the civilian population, as was the case on both sides in World War II.

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There is a need for clarification of the nature of the commitment of our Armed Forces. We are not under attack. Is the regime change still to remain on ice? It is assumed that there shall be no—as one reads in the papers—wholesale bombardment, no all-out war and that every attempt will be made in any event to avoid civilian casualties.
The Government have confirmed that before any decision is taken in Cabinet to commit our Armed Forces, who are now on standby, to engage in such armed intervention, debate should have ensued from the United Nations' regulation and on updated intelligence, of which the House shall have had due notice. One of the reasons why I tend to support the Government on defence of the realm is that they have access to the whole of the intelligence, which cannot possibly be, for security reasons, in the dossier. On that matter one has to trust the Government.
As yet no decision has or could have been taken pending such debate. In the meantime, is it not of vital consequence that diplomacy at the United Nations and elsewhere should not be inhibited or undermined by this debate? As has been said by many noble Lords—for example, in the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, my noble and learned friend Lord Howe and my noble friend Lord Hurd—this is a highly sensitive situation which requires very careful handling.
I turn to the nature of the threat and to the legitimate action in self-defence as opened by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernon Dean. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, was of crucial consequence. He dealt with self-defence from the position of threat of attack from weapons of mass destruction delivered at any time without any warning with devastating effect. That situation has not been encountered before in the international law of self defence. That has to be met, and the previous concepts have to be extended, in order that proportionate action in self defence—if the only way to defend oneself is by pre-emption—is self defence. The nature of the threat was expounded by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, with quiet but commanding authority. I believe that the House is indebted to him because he opened the door to extension of public international law to meet the situation in the world as it is.
The speech of my noble friend Lord Carrington, which provided the essential analysis of the position and what should be done about it, commends itself. My noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater, in his analysis of the difficulties, came to the conclusion that we shall have to see it through, but with the support of the world community under the rule of law. In effect, that was also the view of my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew of Twysden.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams, confirmed that the fundamental requirement was destruction of those weapons, one way or another.
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Inspection is relevant only if it were to serve as a means to that end. That is the issue between myself and the Liberal Party, to which I referred. The strength of our special relationship is the flexibility to adapt to changed circumstances. However, in the light of the statement and the dossier, is it not to be doubted whether any change of circumstances could affect the fundamental requirement?
In that situation, is it sensible or realistic that any government should ignore the intelligence, much of which we know cannot be disclosed, the record of Saddam Hussein, the evidence of Khalid Henza, and so forth? Could any government bury their head in the sinking sands of hope and indulge in prolonged chatter at the talking shop while Saddam Hussein builds up his arsenal? The spectre of control of the whole of the oil supply from the Middle East by Saddam Hussein hovers in the wings of this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, said that the purpose of those weapons was to dominate the Gulf. She is absolutely right, I believe. Whether she is right or wrong one cannot be certain. However, there is a real threat, not only to global states but, in particular, to the states in the Gulf.
Surely this is no time to seek appeasement, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Coity, said. We cannot do it. We have to see it through. There is in public international law just cause for action in self defence to eliminate the threat. I believe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, believes that too.
9 p.m.
Baroness Strange: My Lords, it hardly seems like 11 years since we were discussing exactly the same problem—what to do about Saddam Hussein. At that time, I suggested, I remember, that he be encouraged to read The Water Babies and to contemplate the character of Mrs Be-Done-By-As-You-Did. This, I fear, he has signally failed to do, or he would have stopped torturing and killing people, he would have stopped piling up weapons of mass destruction, chemical nasties and biological beastlinesses which, apart from the idea of their ultimate use, are expensive to make and to keep and do not appear to serve as any form of useful deterrent. Indeed, a deterrent from what? Their very existence and the fact that they are there simply incites other people to get rid of them.
We are all agreed that Saddam Hussein is an ogre. Whether he achieves a nuclear potential by Christmas, as some newspapers suggest, or in two years' time, as Secretary Powell appears to believe and indeed the dossier seems to indicate, there can be no doubt that he would want to use it. But he is not the only ogre in the world. What about President Mugabe in Zimbabwe, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, pointed out? He has expropriated all the farms from the white people, who now have no land, no money and nowhere to go to since, unlike the Ugandan Asians in similar straits, we will not re-admit them to Britain. A large proportion of the black population is starving and will die—men, women and children. And a terrorist organisation, the Green Bombers, is going about

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killing indiscriminately, black people and white people. But we are not threatening war on Zimbabwe unless the regime is changed. We are doing nothing.
This is not a time for jingoism and rattling sabres. It is a time of close international co-operation not only between Britain and our closest friends and allies, the United States, and some of our European partners, but between all the United Nations of the world. We must have the United Nations resolutions on weapons inspections upheld and proper inspections taking place. As all noble Lords have pointed out, the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister has been splendidly instrumental in achieving that. We must act together with the rest of the world under the aegis of the United Nations. That is, after all, what the United Nations is for.
We have to consider carefully also the welfare of our own service personnel. It is they who will bear the brunt of whatever we decide now. We do not know what will happen if they do invade. We do not know whether chemical and biological weapons will be used. Speaking as the president of the War Widows Association of Great Britain, I would like to quote George Washington. He said:
"The willingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no matter how justified, shall be directly proportional as to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their nation".
It is possible, as some of the hawks flying around have seemed to suggest—not my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall, who is not in his place—that in the end we may have to use force. But going to war with Saddam Hussein is like throwing a stone into Loch Ness to try and hit the monster. You may succeed, but you do not know what ripples that stone will create, nor to where they will travel.
9.5 p.m.
Lord Turnberg: My Lords, of course the best course of action would be for the United Nations to send an unrestricted inspection team into Iraq, and we should make every effort to support that end. But does anyone seriously doubt that without a serious threat of military action Saddam would allow in the inspectors? It is only by maintaining that threat and following it through, if necessary, that we can possibly hope that the UN will be able to act successfully. So I strongly support the Government's line and welcome the Minister's Statement.
Other noble Lords have brought Israel into the debate, although it stretches my imagination at least to concede that it is Israel which makes Saddam such an evilly inclined man and provokes him into perpetrating the crimes that he has committed. But clearly it is important for us to make every effort to help resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Everyone here, and especially there, wants it with all their hearts. Israel wants nothing more desperately than freedom from the daily acts of terrorism to which the people are subjected and a sense of security, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has suggested in what I took to be a rather selective review of the history of the region. They desperately
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desire peace; and the Palestinians want nothing more clearly than their right to self-determination, their own state and relief from the misery that they undoubtedly suffer. I believe that these two sides could reach agreement with or without the help of others, as outlined in the optimistic ideas described by my noble friend Lord Stone and emanating from the Mitchell plan.
But there are other forces at work which do not want such a peaceful resolution. I would like to concentrate my few remarks on these. Some Arab countries want nothing less than the total destruction of Israel. Of course, it is possible that Saddam will try to broaden any conflict by attacking Israel in the belief that that will earn him credit with some of his neighbours.
But there is a more sinister aspect to the way in which Israel may be drawn into the conflict which has not been touched on today but which will have considerable implications for stability in the region and way outside it. That is the way in which Iran and Syria in particular are taking advantage of a possible conflict in Iraq by building up a massive armed force in southern Lebanon. Israel certainly has no conceivable interest in engaging in a war on its northern border. It clearly has nothing to gain from such a conflict. The only reason why Hezbollah is there in such large numbers, armed now with hundreds of short, medium and long-range rockets, is to do the bidding, of its Iranian and Syrian sponsors, funders and trainers to open up a front for the total destruction of Israel.
That the Iranian and Syrian leadership want to rid the Middle East of Israel is absolutely clear from their official and unofficial pronouncements, and they never deny it. A conflict with Iraq will provide the excuse, but of course Israel will be forced to defend itself and so the conflict will grow.
It is time that the international community in general and the United Kingdom Government in particular took very seriously the activities of Iran and Syria as they concentrate on Saddam Hussein. I ask the Minister whether he agrees with me that the stability of the region, and much more widely, is threatened by these provocative activities in southern Lebanon and whether the Government will bring pressure to bear on Iran and Syria to consider the dangers that they and everyone else face when they support terrorism in this way and pursue their current course of action.
9.9 p.m.
Lord Marlesford: My Lords, for me the lesson of this debate has been to take a wider and a longer view of what is happening in relation to Iraq. The speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, reminded the House that we meet against a backdrop of increasing alienation between different worlds: the rich and the poor; the black and the white; the secular and the religious; the religious and the religious; and the democratic and the authoritarian.
That alienation was repeatedly and depressingly demonstrated at the recent Johannesburg world summit. The only area where the division of view

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continues to wither away is between those few who still advocate socialism as an economic system and those who recognise that, for all its faults, only capitalism can provide for the mass of the people the standard of living that can come from the goods and services that technology provides.
The attack on the United States in September last year demonstrated the depth of hatred towards America. At that time it was generally recognised that there was a need to be tough on terrorism and tough on the causes of terrorism. Sadly, the second part of that equation appears to be off the agenda. Many noble Lords will have heard John Simpson, the chief BBC foreign correspondent, reporting from Johannesburg on the sympathetic reception received by Iraq's foreign minister. He added that if Saddam himself had attended he would have had a rapturous welcome. I found that chilling.
The need to drain the reservoir of hatred was well put forward in the emergency debate held a year ago. Sadly that reservoir is now full to overflowing. Like it or not, in every Arab mind America is identified with the Jewish cause. For years Arabs have been outraged at the way in which the United States has abused its veto power by unswerving support for Israel. I believe that with the desirable removal of Saddam, the Americans should use their financial leverage to insist that all Jewish settlements are removed from the West Bank, with a deadline for so doing. As a matter of practical American politics, I recognise that that will probably have to wait until after the November congressional elections.
The window for a ground war in Iraq is November to March and understandably President Bush is being influenced by his November elections. If at that time the United States were to be poised for war, that might help the Republican party. As it is unlikely that action will be launched by then we may see different political priorities in America after those congressional elections. I believe that the latest public opinion polls that I heard this afternoon on CNN are rather optimistic. They showed 78 percent support for American military action under UN authority, but 60 percent against unilateral American military action.
Our troops are the finest in the world and I believe that it is unlikely that the United States will go for a "full frontal" involving a campaign by troops on the ground without British military support, so I believe that we have a real chance of influence over America. The world is only too well aware that President Bush will make the final decision but Her Majesty's Government must not appear to agree in advance to underwrite that decision.
Another important practical factor in considering British participation in a military operation on the ground relates to the equipment of our troops. I mention three examples: the communications equipment, the rifle and the suitability of a main battle tank for desert warfare. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will answer the debate, because I should like to refer to the Clansman system. Our troops are still required to use that obsolete and
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unreliable radio communication system. It is obsolete because it is not secure; security must be added by manual encryption. That is wholly unrealistic, given the pressures of today's battlefield. The system is so unreliable that soldiers of all ranks—I have talked to them—habitually use private mobile phones for military communications during exercises. Will Her Majesty's Government make arrangements for American equipment to be used—if there is an operation in Iraq—until the new Bowman system is in place? I recognise that the Bowman saga went on under the Conservative Government, but this Government have been in office for five years, so they also bear responsibility.
The famous dossier that we got today is a useful background brief. However, I did not think that there was much new material in it. It is well put together, although it is extraordinary that such an important document should be published without a date on it. That is not much of a tribute to future historians, but I am not wholly surprised. The noble and learned Lord the Leader of the House said that Ministers thought that it was better that Parliament got the document before the press got at it. That says something too.
I do not share the doubts of those who question whether Saddam is a threat and is utterly evil. I am sure that he is, and the sooner he is dead, the better. If he is killed, however, is should be either at the hands of his own people or through foreign military action taken within international law. Going to war without UN cover, now that America has agreed to seek UN backing, would permanently damage the UN's position as a guardian of world peace. Moreover, a failure by the Security Council to pass a resolution to put real pressure on Saddam could be as damaging as the failure by the League of Nations to act against Mussolini apropos of Abyssinia in 1935.
Pending the internal overthrow of Saddam—eventually, he will be overthrown internally—we must keep him in his box. He must, of course, be subjected to what is being described as intrusive arms inspections. That could be supplemented by legalising and extending the no-fly zones and including helicopter flights. Military means, short of a full frontal assault, could make it increasingly hard for Saddam to govern.
All the experts agree that any successor to Saddam who was seen as the nominee of a foreign power would rapidly be killed by the Iraqis. Poor King Faisal lost his life in 1958 because he was seen as a British stooge. Today, an American stooge would be even more unacceptable. Although the Middle East would be less dangerous without Saddam, the crucial question is whether the region would be more or less stable if Saddam were overthrown by external military force. That is a question for today. The experts' view is that the region could become less stable. In Saudi Arabia, the Arab street could revolt and end the fragile regime in that country. The danger is that anti-western fundamentalists would replace virtually every regime in the Gulf. We could end up worse off than we are today. We should not forget, given the present fragility of the world economy, that a rise in the price of oil—however temporary—is extremely deflationary.

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We know that Saddam has strong Samson tendencies. Under real threat, he is all too likely to seek to pull the whole edifice down with him. Would there be anybody in Iraq to stop him? I pray that there would. Otherwise, there is a real risk that, when under western attack, Saddam might use biological or chemical weapons against Israel, to which Israel would almost certainly retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where would that leave the world and, in particular, the USA?
I respect and admire much about our Prime Minister. He has done a great deal for the reputation of our country. As has repeatedly been said, he has persuaded our American allies to try the UN way. I cast no aspersions on his sincerity but in this grave situation, I do not yet have full confidence in his judgment as to the conditions in which the UK should support American military action. I should like the Prime Minister to take a longer view.
I hope that someone will draw the attention of Mr. Blair to the words of Winston Churchill when making his parliamentary tribute on the death of Neville Chamberlain:
"In one phase, men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield "because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however, the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour".—[Official Report, Commons, 12/11/40; col. 1617.]
9.20 p.m.
Lord Moran: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, who gave us a good deal to think about. It seems probable that before long the United States will attack Iraq. If so, should we take part? In my view, we should not. We should only go to war if we ourselves are threatened or if vital British interests are at stake. Kamal Ataturk put it like this in 1923:
"The strength of a nation shall be expended to defend its own existence. It is totally wrong to forget that".
When my generation fought against Hitler, we knew that if we did not fight or were defeated our country would be at the mercy of a monstrous dictator. If we lost our lives, at least it would be in a good cause. That would not be true if we took part in a war against Iraq. We are not under any immediate threat. Nor are vital British interests at risk. In those circumstances, I do not believe that it would be right to send our young men to face being killed, possibly by biological or chemical weapons. Saddam would have nothing to lose and might use them this time. Essentially, it is not our quarrel.
We did not expect the United States to join us in expelling the Argentines from the Falklands. Neither should we he expected to join any attack on Saddam.
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I have been concerned for some time about the Government's readiness to commit what forces we still have to operations in Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Afghanistan that have little to do with British interests. The Prime Minister seems to model himself on Henry V. With Iraq it is,
"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more".
He appears more interested in that than in the serious problems that the British people face at home. I do not mean that we should fail to support the United States at the United Nations and elsewhere, provided that US actions are reasonable. When the United States was attacked last year, it was reasonable to respond by going after Al'Queda. Earn glad that they defeated the Taliban. I was sorry that Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar eluded them but it is good news that the American and Pakistani authorities have apprehended a man who appears to have been a leading figure in planning the attacks on New York and Washington.
I thought President Bush's call for a worldwide effort to deal with the menace of terrorism was to be welcomed but if other countries take part, they must first deal with their own terrorists whom they know best. The Spanish and French authorities are doing just that with their recent arrest of ETA leaders and moves against Batasuna. We have not done the same. Mr. Blair speaks out against terrorism but has done nothing to tackle our own terrorists. On the contrary, he has caved into them. Adams and McGuinness are both leading figures in the IRA, which not only maintains a large arsenal of explosives and weapons but also takes part in international terrorism, as it was evidently doing in Colombia. Nevertheless its leaders are allowed to be Ministers in Northern Ireland. That makes a mockery of our Government's denunciations of terrorism.
Although the initial reaction of the United States Administration a year ago was understandable, it is much less clear why they have now switched their attention to Iraq. Nothing much has changed there since the 1991 war. President Bush must be conscious of his father's decision to halt the offensive when he did. I have always thought that if George Bush senior had allowed the headlong pursuit of the defeated Iraqi forces to continue for another week or so, the situation might now be less worrying.
There seems to be no evidence that the Iraqis were involved in last year's terrorist attacks on the United States, as the noble Baroness confirmed when she opened the debate. I wonder why Iraq suddenly became, on the anniversary of 11th September, Washington's public enemy number one. If there is a threat from Iraq in the near future, the country which is at greatest risk is Israel. Israel too has often disregarded United Nations resolutions. Only today the BBC reported that its reaction to the latest Security Council resolution on the destruction of Arafat's headquarters was to dismiss it, saying, "They can say what they like".

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Israel has built some 145 settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Those have been described by the United Nations General Assembly as,
"illegal and an obstacle to peace".
Sharon's government, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure Israel's security from suicide bombers, using American-supplied fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships, missiles and much else, is crushing and humiliating the oppressed Palestinian population, who are without any means of defence. What would have been the reaction if we, in Northern Ireland, had gone in for targeted assassination and killed numbers of innocent women and children as the Israelis have done. Their brutality under Sharon's leadership, coming on top of the forced acquisition of land and scarce water, and the establishment of roadblocks, curfews and much else, has built up a wall of impotent hatred. The Americans, seen as blind supporters of Israel, are putting themselves at huge risk by making themselves hated through out the Muslim world. What makes people in northern Nigeria want to call their sons Osama?
The only country that could conceivably help the Palestinians in their extremity is Iraq. I wonder therefore if it is not Sharon who has persuaded President Bush to deal with Iraq. If so, will we not be sending our young men out to run great risks simply to fight a war to help Sharon? It is one thing to attempt to disarm Iraq, though that may not be easy; it is quite another to have as an objective the elimination of the present regime, deeply unpleasant though it is. If we go along with that, where does it end? The world is full of thoroughly unpleasant leaders and deplorable regimes. Are we to try to get rid of them all?
I hope we can work for a firm but sensible Security Council resolution which will have the support of the world's leading powers and make it possible for the inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's store of weapons of mass destruction without the need for a bloody and destructive war. But, in any event, I think we should argue strongly for a balanced, fair and unbiased Middle East policy.
I welcome what the Prime Minister said about that in his Statement. If we are to deal with Saddam, we must also deal with Sharon. We must try to persuade the United States to be much less partisan in dealing with the problem of Israel and the Palestinians. We should insist that all the Israeli settlements in occupied Palestine, in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem should be removed and Israeli forces withdrawn so that an independent Palestinian state, free of occupation and oppression, can be established alongside Israel. Only thus can we hope to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East.
9.29 p.m.
Baroness Turner of Camden: My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to participate in this important debate. I am against war on Iraq. I am totally
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unpersuaded that the present regime, unpleasant as it is, poses any threat to the United States or ourselves. The dossier does not persuade me either.
There are many scare stories around that Saddam Hussein is such a threat to world peace that a pre-emptive strike is necessary. Who says so? Not the countries immediately surrounding Iraq, nor our neighbours in Europe, not Russia, not China, not India; only ourselves, apparently, and the United States. Many noble Lords have indicated that a pre-emptive strike by the United States and ourselves would be illegal under international law.
Iraq was devastated over a decade ago in the Gulf War. Two hundred thousand Iraqis died in that war. Its civilian infrastructure was heavily damaged. Since then, it has been subjected to economic sanctions regarded by some as punitive and to intermittent bombing attacks by ourselves and the Americans, including Operation Desert Fox in 1998. To suggest that this wrecked country poses a threat to us and to the United States defies belief.
But the bombing continues. A couple of weeks ago, a number of planes dropped 25 bombs on an Iraqi installation. It was not even claimed that the planes were defending the no-fly zones or being attacked by Iraqi air defences. That was an act of war and I do not recollect a UN mandate for it.
President Bush has gone to the UN, but he has said, "You either do it our way, or we will do it ourselves". Clearly, he wants to go to war. He is not interested in the Iraqi offer to admit inspectors unconditionally. He wants a new UN resolution and is intent on making it as difficult as possible for Iraq to comply.
It does not seem unreasonable that a country that has endured years of sanctions and bombing should seek some relief from those pressures if it readmits inspectors. But no, the USA wants regime change and is not interested in inspection. Saddam Hussein is so evil that he cannot be allowed to continue as leader of Iraq. Of course he is a brutal dictator; that is not in question. But it hardly needs saying that America has a history of supporting rather dubious leaders when it suits and then demonising them when it does not. That is true of Saddam Hussein as it was of Milosevic.
During the war with Iran, Saddam was heavily supported by the United States and ourselves with money and weapons. There was no criticism of atrocities then. Incidentally, the support then given to Saddam is not mentioned in the dossier. But now the blood price must be paid to get rid of him. That price will not be paid by us. No one really expects to see Iraqi bombing planes in the skies over London. Nor will his scud missiles reach us. The price will be paid by civilians; by millions of ordinary Iraqis with whom President Bush says he has no quarrel.
As always, the United States and ourselves will start the offensive with a bombing campaign. The idea will be not to endanger lives on our side—understandably—so the bombing will be conducted at around 15,000 or 20,000 feet. We shall be told, of course, that only military objectives will targeted and hit. I do not believe it. Not only will thousands of

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innocent people be killed or injured in the bombing, but the destruction of the civilian infrastructure that always occurs in such circumstances will mean that many more will die as power, water and food supplies are destroyed or contaminated.
We must ask ourselves whether the threat posed by Saddam Hussein can justify such a catastrophe; for it will be a catastrophe for the civilians involved. I do not think it does. I have no doubt that the United States can succeed in its objectives. It is, after all, the only superpower. Its technological superiority is immense. Moreover, a recent study reported that the Iraqi regime is weaker now than at the time of the Gulf War.
The question is whether we should support or join such a venture. We do not yet know what a new UN resolution will say, but it seems clear that President Bush wants to go ahead whether he gets a mandate or not. Many people believe that it is all about oil. With a compliant regime in Baghdad, the United States would have unrestricted access to the second largest reserves of oil in the world. There would be no need then to dig up Alaska.
Those who feel as I do—and there are many of us—are often derided as being anti-American. We are not. We know that there are many Americans who feel as we do. President Bush has sought to bring them on side by trying to link the Iraqi regime with the horror of 9/11, when so many innocent Americans were killed, but there does not seem to be any such link. If the war proceeds, there will be growing opposition within America. We should note particularly the statement just made by the former presidential candidate, Al Gore. Many Americans do not want this war any more than we do. We must do everything to try to stop it and to ensure that problems get solved within the UN. The appalling suffering that is modern warfare must not be inflicted again on innocent people. I urge the Government to think very deeply before committing this country to such a course.
9.36 p.m.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, I rise as the 55th speaker in this debate and I am completely convinced that the First Lord of the Treasury is waiting with bated breath to hear every word that I say, take it on board and act on it.
We have to be careful when we combine Iraq with terrorism. There is an immense sloppiness in using the phrase "war against terrorism". Several people have talked about the IRA. We know that there have always been arguments about one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter.
We also have to be careful when we contrast Al'Qaeda, whose inspiration is the reactionary—I use the word in its true sense—appeal of desert Muhammadanism of 622 Anno Hegirae, with the Baghdad regime, whose progenitor is the reaction of the Muhammadan world when it found, in the words of Edward Gibbon,
"that when the sun of science arose in the West the Muhammadans were very confused about what had happened".
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Saddam Hussein is the heir of Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammed Ali, Kemal Ataturk, the young Turks, Nasser and that secular, tyrannical, modernising form of Muhammadanism. We have to separate those two.
When I listened to the Leader of the House repeating the Prime Minister's Statement, I thought, "There are the words of a great statesman". It was a beautifully constructed Statement. I also remember how the Prime Minister had taken on the old dinosaur—I think that I am being complimentary with that word—part of the Labour Party and reformed it. I then contrasted this strange man's attitude on this occasion with his attitude towards other matters of internal policy, on which one sees a shilly-shallying man who has no principles, cannot make up his mind and makes Harold Wilson look a principled man. I am torn between deep admiration and the opposite.
I am more or less convinced by the Government's document, except that it says that in 1991 Saddam had more bottles of nasties than he has now. When he was attacked then, he did not use the bottles of nasties. He is not being attacked at present, so will he use the bottles of nasties now?
I accept that Saddam Hussein is an extraordinarily—again, I use the word—nasty man. There is nothing whatever to recommend him. For the sake of this argument, let us assume that the Prime Minister is right. He made a very powerful case in his statement. But we have not asked ourselves how he will go about such an attack and I do not believe that anyone in their right mind would want to know the details. But I believe that we should have an outline of how it will be done and what troops will be involved.
Above all, very few people, with the possible exception of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Inge, have asked what will happen following an attack. Let us remember that Iraq was cobbled together in the 1920s by amalgamating the alliance of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra out of the old Turkish empire. Basra was Shia; Baghdad was Sunni; and Mosul was Kurdish. Mosul is Arab and has the oil, but the majority of its population is Kurdish. However, because we did not want an independent Kurdistan, we allowed the French to have the Syrian part of Kurdistan, Turkey was allowed to keep its part and we put the rest into Iraq. That was a part of 1918 peace-making of which we should not be particularly proud.
If there is a war and if force is used, what will happen if the central authority in Baghdad collapses? Several different gangs of armed thugs will be left fighting each other and, in desperation, there will be the possibility of the use of germ warfare—"Let us just let off a rocket or three and hope it hits Tel Aviv". Following that, that kind of Liberal Democrat parish councillor, Mr Sharon, will immediately counteract with nuclear weapons and the whole of the Middle East will go up in flames.
I am not saying that Saddam Hussein does not pose a very serious danger. I know that he does. I am asking—I have heard nothing on the matter in the debate thus far: what is the worst-case scenario, are we thinking about it and do we know what to do? If we do

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not try to answer those questions, we shall be failing in our duty. Saddam Hussein is a threat and is, as I said, an extremely nasty fellow. There is nothing whatever to recommend him; he must be controlled.
But have we thought the matter through? Many noble Lords who have spoken today have said that we must do something, but no one has talked about what will happen if the whole of Mesopotamia breaks up. If it falls into pieces and anarchy breaks out, are the Americans prepared to act as a colonial power? That is what will be necessary and what will happen following military intervention. That is the question to which we must address ourselves.
9.43 p.m.
Lord Selsdon: My Lords, I suffer from two disadvantages. The first is that the two people who were to speak between me and my noble friend Lord Onslow have "scratched" and I must follow directly after my noble friend. The second is that I must admit that I am the same age as Saddam Hussein.
I also suffer in that I am not sure what to do next. I have been very privileged to listen to the debate today. I was very confused this morning and I am rather confused now. I want to pay a great tribute to the Ministers sitting opposite. I have noticed that, while they have been in power, they have stuck rigidly to the Front Bench and have listened to many speeches. They have done so more often than any Minister since I have been in the House. It must be extremely boring for them, but let us see whether I can change the scene.
I have been to Baghdad and to Iraq many times—probably more often than anyone in your Lordships' House. I have not necessarily done so willingly and occasionally have done so reluctantly. That is partly because, when I was in the banking world and the financing trade, we were the main correspondent bankers for the government of Iraq and its banks. When I chaired the government's committee on Middle East trade, the Foreign Office, with all the rather devious ways in which it behaves, would say, "You are very honoured. You are chosen to go off to Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran"—all the places where Ministers dared not tread. But I like the Iraqi people. I should like to pull my noble friend up a little. At the end of the First World War, there was this chap called Lawrence of Arabia in the north and the British Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the south. They were getting rid of the Ottomans and Lawrence charged down with his Arab legions quicker than anyone else. They could march overnight in the cool of the desert. He arrived first and took this fellow Faisal and said, "You're King of the Arabs". When the British team from the south arrived, they said, "So what?"
The French got a little uptight—cheesed off, one said. I always wondered why de Gaulle always said that it is extremely difficult running a country where there are 246 different cheeses, to which he added later, "and too many head cheeses." The French were so upset that we withdrew and just made Faisal King of Iraq.
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Then the League of Nations turned up and said, "We like the British very much. We trust you." We were given the mandate for Iraq and Trans-Jordan which included all of Jordan. The French got Syria and the Lebanon. They already had large chunks of north Africa, so the French and we together, directly or indirectly, controlled the Arab world.
As good imperialists, we ran Iraq out of India. I always thought of that later when we had to try and encourage the then Foreign Secretary my noble friend Lord Carrington to put in a presence in Iraq. He said, "Not something likely." But as he was in India, he came from India. The Iraqis would have preferred him to come from London but the Foreign Office kindly explained that India had always run Iraq.
This may appear fairly stupid but let me move on to what happened in 1974 and times after that. We started to help the Iraqis industrialise. The first time it came to public notice was when 57 London double-decker buses drove across the desert from Kuwait to Iraq, because they wanted double-decker buses. Not Leyland, but the old AIC. The label AIC had to be put on the front. When they arrived, they complained that the buses that they were used to had rear platforms that were low enough for ladies in long skirts to step onto. Could the British engineers lower the rear platforms? And we did.
This was just the start of our relationship. We trained Iraqis in this country in banking and engineering. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester should know that most of them went to Manchester or Leeds universities. Most of the ruling Ba'ath Party are very strong supporters of Manchester United and Manchester City. They will probably be watching this debate live, not only on the Parliamentary Channel but also when they occasionally manage to hack into our system here. They have great respect for your Lordships' House.
The Iraqis complained to me that we, the British, had effectively helped to make them and we were not prepared to talk to them. I talked a little while ago to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, or as the Iraqis call him, 'Sir Hannay' because, when he was in the United Nations, he was the only person to whom they were allowed to talk, except for people like me. They complained bitterly that they were no longer allowed to talk to their friends. I believe that this was one of the most important sanctions.
At the moment, I feel we are confused. As an eminent mathematician said, "There are no whole truths, only half truths. But people try to make half truths, whole truths and that is supping with the devil".
We do not know what the truth is. We have before us a document that quite frankly I could have written myself from my own knowledge and information. It is almost a straight crib from Section 5 of the anti-terrorist Bill about pathogens.
When we talk of weapons of mass destruction, we must ask ourselves what the military capability of Iraq is today. Colin Powell, on the Frost programme, pointed out that he thought it was a third of what they had in 1991. Therefore, let us assume they have a

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military capability. They are looking for nuclear weapons as many people have done. But who are their enemy? Can they attack the United Kingdom? No. Do they want to? Probably not. Do they want to attack the United States? No. Their enemy is Israel. Within the Middle East we therefore have to say, "Who is afraid of whom?". Politics that begin with fear end with folly.
I am worried about the attempt to associate terrorism with Iraq. Let us look at what happened in the United States. There were a number of incidents: the Oklahoma bombing; as my noble friend Lord King said, someone putting anthrax in the post; and, of course, the twin towers. That was an incident with American aeroplanes in the United States and there were problems with security in the United States; it was not necessarily a total invasion from abroad.
Terrorism literally means government by fear. Iraq has been remarkably capable of governing itself, through the Ba'ath Party, by fear. One removes all opponents instantly; one pulls one's gun out of a top drawer and one shoots them. That has happened in socialist systems throughout the world: remove the opposition. In the past we would have said, "And the hosts took the field and there were no survivors". When we in politics in the West start to fall into the trap of creating fear in order to unite our own people behind us, we create fear of a regime, of an enemy, of disease and of anything else.
It would be perfectly easy to take all of these pathogens and diseases and create the most horrendous scenarios, which frighten people. They involve infecting a whole range of people in a host country—they are about to die of cancer, put on aeroplanes and shoved off around the world, and that is put in the newspapers. What the Iraqi regime—the Ba'ath Party—has managed to is something that even New Labour has failed to do: it has dominated the press and the media worldwide. It has almost its own Alastair Campbell. Suddenly one notices Saddam Hussein is no longer in military uniform; he is in civilian uniform and holding a gun in his hand as though he were a hunter firing a shot, as the Berbers did in the desert and the hunters do in Bravade. He is changing his image and removing fear of himself.
The regime is and for a long time has been dangerous. They are not necessarily our enemies. My fear is that the United States, which is our great ally, has failed to recognise that the world is beginning to see it as an enemy of the world. That fear can be rammed home. It starts slowly and builds up over a long period. We are the friends and allies of the United States. We know Iraq and the Middle East. It should listen to us in a way that it has perhaps never listened before. I urge noble Lords to pay attention to the noble Lord, Lord Wright, in view of his background. He knows what he is talking about, as do others.
I should like the UN to give the United Kingdom the mandate for Iraq and for us to lead the initiative. Of course we must go in and disarm but we must not send inspectors in without force behind them. Like so many in the Middle East, the Iraqis recognise strength and understand commitment. We are trusted because we
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observe the law, as many noble Lords have said. We cannot do anything without the mandate and authorisation of the United Nations. I, for one, in 1991 would have gone on to Baghdad but I take the view that the law was not with us. Right is on our side. We must make sure that the law is as well, and we must act positively.
9.53 p.m.
The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, the noble Lord has been a great refreshment in this long debate, for which we are grateful. He ended on a serious note. A war against Saddam Hussein, in my view, however evil a dictator he is, would be a diversion from our fundamental objectives, which are to defeat poverty and terrorism. It would not necessarily help the people of Iraq, it would be a poor excuse for our failure to respond adequately to the challenge of terrorism and it could jeopardise the hard-earned support of the international coalition. Threats of war to back up a UN resolution is one thing, and all noble Lords agree that that is desirable. Reform of the UN system to reinforce resolutions is also necessary, but that is not what President Bush is about. He does not intend to wait for the UN to change. The question today is whether we should stand beside him and why.
As other noble Lords have said, Iraq itself poses no direct problem to us or the United States. We are not a threatened nation as we were in 1938. Any such comparison is odious. September 11th was an atrocity without precedent: it was a different kind of attack, needing a highly co-ordinated and well-focused international response.
Despite the casualties, the war against the Taliban and Al'Qaeda achieved results within a clear UN framework. This absurd war on the axis of evil serves the opposite purpose by breaking up a carefully balanced alliance. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, there is no legal justification for it at present.
In the war against terrorism close co-operation with the leading Arab states was essential. When it comes to Iraq, President Bush is calling the shots and the Middle East, UN, Russia and even Europe are all but ignored. On these occasions, our Prime Minister is transformed. He is no longer the man who went to see President Assad and received Chairman Arafat. Instead, he stands shoulder to shoulder with the boys in the White House as though only an evangelical Atlantic partnership can save us from a tyrant. By this action he clearly risks separating himself from Parliament and large numbers of his own party in another place, as we have heard today.
We are told that he favours a new Middle East peace initiative, Splendid. But the last time we heard that, as the noble Lord, Lord Gilmour, said the peace initiative was killed stone dead not by suicide bombers but by General Sharon and the hawks in Washington; and Downing Street said little or nothing.
The Government contain a majority of MPs who value a truly international dimension in world affairs. They would like to see a strengthening of the UN and a greater awareness of poverty and injustice. While they

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may see the value of NATO in anti-terrorism, they do not want a Labour leader taking us to war with Iraq in a new US-led crusade. In the quest for liberty, they may ask: what happened to life and the pursuit of happiness?
The war against terrorism should not be about war. It should be a vigorous campaign against organised criminal activity and a sustained drive for diplomacy, conflict resolution and international development. The Government know that well. No one can doubt that September 11th, whatever the warped Islamist intent of the suicide bombers, was a reaction to world inequality, with the twin towers as potent symbols of Judao-Christian hegemony in world economic affairs as much as to US policy in the Middle East.
Most people recognise this imbalance and would like to address it through our Government. In our April debate, I said that the Iraqi people were suffering enough without another war. I mentioned a survey carried out by Save the children in northern Iraq which showed that three in five families have to live on only six dollars a week. This is the position of many people in the Middle East today. We cannot simply put countries right one by one with F16s and cluster bombs followed by promises of reconstruction, as Condoleeza Rice said this week. We have to face the much longer challenge of development, as many aid agencies and NGOs are doing in Iraq. None of them believes in the military solution.
Fortunately, we have the Foreign Office, which has traditionally understood the Middle East, and related organisations like the BBC and British Council. But lately the FCO has been under some restraint because of Israel. What about Israel? Apparently, its weapons are of no concern to us and the Americans do not see it as a threat to world peace. It does not, they are told, possess a mad dictator, weapons of mass destruction or a people in servitude. It is a sister democracy, an ally, a trading partner; and, more than that, it is a homeland with well watered and defended settlements—a resort for their kith and kin in a hostile environment. That is the sort of stuff the Americans believe about the Holy Land until they can see for themselves what is happening. Then they will see the hold which Sharon has on the United States which allows him to have Palestine by the throat and to conduct disgraceful military attacks in the name of anti-terrorism. No wonder there are people trying to bomb themselves out of a ghetto, just as their persecutors did before them under the British mandate. The middle ground is continually falling away. It seems that the European Union has backed off under US and Israeli pressure, leaving Arafat friendless and the Hamas militants unrestrained. It is a senseless, hopeless policy. It is a lack of policy. I am relieved to hear so many noble Lords say that the peace process is closely connected with this debate. It must now be a priority for this Government.
Are we subject to charges of racism if we accuse Israel, or of anti-Semitism if we sympathise with Palestinians? Of course not, I visited the region a year ago and I drew my own conclusions. Israel is
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conducting a dirty war of occupation and the world will never be free of terrorism while it is allowed to bulldoze the homes of Palestinians and compound their poverty, vulnerability and humiliation, as the noble Lord, Lord Moran, reminded us. What is the value of UN resolutions in Ramallah today? Palestinians, too, make mistakes but from a position of weakness. They are now almost leaderless and defenceless.
So do we side with the so-called besieged democracy, the occupying power which still pretends to be the victim, or do we recognise the injustice on both sides? Plainly, the former is our current policy, however much we claim the opposite. This is a moral blackmail which has ensnared western democrats, including many in the Labour Party, who feel helpless and remain silent. But it amazes those in the Arab world, who can see what is happening and can understand much of the motivation behind today's appalling terrorism.
So what is to be our new role in the peace process? Are we going to forge a new European partnership and rebuild the trust of which the noble Lord, Lord Jacobs, spoke? I was pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, say that General Sharon wants peace. But how are we to find that trust and that peace after our failure to act over the past two years of intifada? We should begin by dropping this war against evil and return to the main purpose of the coalition. Can we still look our Pakistani, Saudi, Jordanian, Egyptian and Gulf friends in the eye and say that we are their friends provided they join a war against Iraq?
We could learn something from the German and Canadian government positions. We could rethink our Atlantic partnership, rebuild our relations with the Middle East and base them on mutual respect, not just on the oil and arms trade.
The Gulf War does not have to be fought all over again just for the sake of Israel's security. Of course there must be strong UN resolutions on WMDs, and the inspectors must return. But it must be a truly international policy, not one dictated by the United States.
How can Britain continue to hold America's hand while it flagrantly rides over the UN? The noble Lord, Lord King, said that Bush cannot proceed alone; in other words, he needs to be guided. That is a very fair position, but I am not as confident as he. If Blair believes that he is leading Bush by the hand back into the centre ground—as many of us have said, and as we momentarily thought when he addressed the United Nations—all well and good. But it is much more likely that he is being dragged off course into a new and more dangerous adventure. Unless he realises this in time and demonstrates his membership of the whole world, he will be ignored by many other nations which matter to us all. It is time that this Parliament, and indeed his own party, brought him and this country back into the international community.
10.3 p.m.
Lord Naseby: My Lords, while the recall of Parliament is to be welcomed, in my judgment we have been recalled rather later than we should have been. It is particularly cynical that we should receive a document this morning and be expected to read its 50 pages in any depth—which, incidentally, are dated on the very last page. That is not joined-up government. It is not fair to Members who wished to make a serious contribution to the debate to have the document delivered this morning. It is an unacceptable way in which to treat either House.
I suspect that I am one of the very few fathers whose son took part in the whole of the Gulf War. He was in the front line, one of the doctors charged with initially assessing the casualties as a member of the Royal Army Medical Corps, which, sadly, this Government have allowed to lapse and virtually to collapse so tragically. I also suspect that I am one of the few who had a good friend killed in the Twin Towers. So I come to this debate with no gung-ho background, but with the utter realism of the risks that would arise from any possible military action.
I also come to the debate with three historical episodes that I believe we in this country must never forget. The first is the week of 24th to 28th May 1940, when the Cabinet sat and debated and when the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, recommended in essence that a deal should be done with Hitler. Winston Churchill, a minority voice initially, was the one that stood out because he realised that no deal was possible with Herr Hitler. One has to reflect a little on what would have happened if those voices that wanted a deal had actually been the ones that were successful.
Secondly, one has to reflect upon the 1920s and the early 1930s and the position of the then German government—their weakness in allowing Herr Hitler to rise to power, in commuting his prison sentence, and in allowing his party, and the thuggery associated with it, to develop. It ill-behoves the current German Government to criticise the President of the United States and to allude that he has any degree of association or commonality with Herr Hitler. The present German Government appear to me to be very similar to the German government of the 1920s and the 1930s.
The third analogy that I draw is the one of 1936 when because of the weakness of the western allies Hitler moved into the Rhineland. If that move had been challenged there and then, perhaps the Second World War would have taken on a very different aspect.
My conclusion from those three historical instances is that if you are faced with evil—there are many evil regimes, but we are putting our particular focus on Iraq at present—you must face up to that evil and the sooner you do so the better, because the later you leave it the more difficult it becomes. It is possible that the offer for inspectors to return unfettered will be successful. I personally think that it is rather unlikely, but certainly it must be tried. It is just possible that they can achieve the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
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However, even if those inspections are successful, there is what should be happening now and in the weeks ahead. In my view, there is no reason why the United Nations should not review and update the resolutions on Iraq. Further, those resolutions must not be optional. But if they are treated by certain countries as optional, and if they cannot be persuaded to join the world view, we shall have an evil situation. If Iraq flouts those inspections, I believe it is right that the United States and the United Kingdom should look to their own interests.
When we hear the concluding speech tonight, or perhaps if Parliament is recalled again later on next week, I hope that we shall be told something more about the strategy in the event that Saddam Hussein is deposed, killed, or goes into exile—some of the points that my noble friend made in his speech. There must be an exit strategy, as well as an entry strategy. It is a great pity that the present Government trust Parliament so little that we are involved today almost as an afterthought.
Nevertheless, I make my position clear. I support the Prime Minister in his linkage with President Bush, his desire to have updated and tougher UN resolutions and his recognition that if UN resolutions are flouted, and if the UN will not act when they are flouted, then we, the Americans and, one hopes, others, will have to act.
If we do act we must be ever more vigilant because of how Iraq will react, for in that scenario Saddam Hussein will be a desperate leader and desperate leaders will stop at nothing.
10.10 p.m.
The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, it has been said that all wars are waged against children. Through Centrepoint I have been introduced to young Kurds from Northern Iraq with exceptional leave to remain in this country. So I should like to take this opportunity to ask her Majesty's Government, first, whether they are keeping Iraqi children in mind. I am sure they are, but I want reassurance on that point because these children are so vulnerable. Secondly, I ask them whether they will seize any opportunity that the current diplomatic round may allow to review the sanctions regime, which does so much to harm Iraqi children. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, spoke eloquently about the many problems associated with the current sanctions regime.
One is appalled when one considers how many children—3,051 according to Newsday—were orphaned by the fanatics who perpetrated the atrocities of 11th September last year in the United States. Some children lost both parents in the attack. Many Israeli children have been murdered in suicide attacks. Others have had their parents stolen from them in the bombings of buses, cafes and restaurants. Palestinian children have lost their mothers and fathers.
Nearly 50 per cent of Iraqis are children. One third of those children are malnourished and one in five suffers from chronic malnourishment. The under-five

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mortality rate has deteriorated 160 per cent under sanctions, reversing the positive trend of the 1980s. Sanctions were introduced as a result of the unspeakably awful regime lead by Saddam Hussein.
School enrolment of girls has declined because of lack of teachers and increasing poverty. Female illiteracy rates are rising steeply. Without education these women are unlikely ever to learn how they might choose to limit their families. Population growth will continue to outstrip any improvement in service provision. The current sanctions regime denies funding for teacher training and exacerbates poverty.
One recognises that we are still engaged in diplomacy. Military action, if it is to be taken, is still some way off. But should there be such action of any length and intensity the consequences will be devastating for many Iraqi children.
In January of this year the Save the Children Fund published a report entitled Understanding Kurdish Livelihoods in Northern Iraq. It states:
"The sanctions and ration regime created by the UN Security Council has undermined and distorted markets and livelihoods and destroyed normal economic life for the vast majority.
The rations system instituted…has created unprecedented levels of dependency.
Poor people would not be able to afford to feed themselves if the…ration was suddenly removed".
I am grateful also to Save the Children for providing me with a video documentary entitled "Is Anyone Listening?" It is comprised of interviews with young Kurds in the North of Iraq. In particular, one animated young girl, Tanka, struck me. She said that she loved her school. Every day she speaks about it with her sisters. She wanted to obtain a qualification but her father removed her from school to help him and her sister in the fields. Much of her day is spent collecting water from a distant standpipe. Her shoulders always hurt, as water is carried on them either in pails or in large cans. Is it anything less than tragic that so much of that girl's potential, and that of her fellows, is being squandered? Without literacy can she and her sisters ever look forward to anything more than labouring and child bearing?
I ask the Minister whether during the current round of diplomacy the Government are keeping fully in mind the hardships endured by Iraqi children? Will he and his colleagues seize any opportunity to review UN sanctions? If there is to be a military conflict will the Government pursue all means possible—including the preparation of adequate stockpiles of food and providing the means of its distribution—to minimise the impact that such action is likely to have on Iraqi children?
Surely, if we want other communities not to attack us without any thought of loss of life of our children, it would be prudent for us to demonstrate that we take very seriously the well-being of children not of our own community.
10.16 p.m.
Lord Hardy of Wath: My Lords, the phrase "asymmetric warfare" has frequently come into play during the past 12 months. It is even touched upon in the new chapter of the Strategic Defence Review. I suppose that it means the ways in which the small power can contest or fight the larger one. I do not believe that Saddam Hussein actually wants to have a war with the United States. However, he has all the qualifications and pursues all the policies which would be required for that approach.
He is ruthless: the treatment of his own people, let alone people in Kuwait, or the Iranians who suffered in the Iran/Iraq war, demonstrates his ruthlessness. He is cunning: as the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, pointed out he has adopted a more avuncular image on international television. He is determined to acquire the most awful weapons and has done so at the cost of the children of Iraq, who suffer dreadfully. He has earned illicitly, through smuggling of oil, vast sums of money which could have provided the medical care and food which his people desperately need. He has used that money to strengthen his armoury of horror. He is extremely good at propaganda—for example, for a long time now the American and Royal Air Force aircraft have flown over the north and south no-fly zone. Without their operation, heaven knows how much more suffering would have been inflicted upon the northern Kurds and the southern Shi'ites. All we hear about is the need for sanctions to be lifted and the no-fly zone operations cancelled.
However, the fact remains—and I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm this—that there have been 2,500 threats or attacks on aircraft policing those no-fly zones in full accord with the United Nations authority. If it were not for the professional expertise of the air crew involved, perhaps we would have seen a successful interception by Iraqi radar. However, should those aircraft retaliate, then the world's media will be shown photographs of bombed houses or crippled children which it will be claimed are consequent upon the inaccuracy of the allied air forces fulfilling the international obligation.
The cunning of Saddam Hussein is demonstrated by the way in which he has almost contemptuously flouted the United Nations. I fear now that he will string matters along in order that the reality of his failure to take any real notice of the United Nations will coincide with the development of the hot weather in the Middle East, so that it would be an intolerable burden for our own forces to wear the protective gear in periods of savage heat.
It may be true that the Iraqis still do not have the fissile material and so forth necessary to complete the preparation of a nuclear weapon. But if, as described in the dossier we are debating, it is believed that there is a risk of Iraq acquiring a nuclear weapon within the next two years, we must consider whether we should allow Iraq to string things out so that the hot weather comes before failure to fulfil its obligations as regards inspection arrangements. That would mean that one of the two years to nuclear reality would have passed.

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I do not believe that Saddam wants war, but I believe that he wants to be dominant. The fact that Iraq has the world's second largest oil resources may be a factor in that. If we are to ensure that sanity develops in Baghdad, we must accept that we should not enter into conflict without clear aims. If there is to be conflict, that cannot be separated from the need to have a resolution of the Middle East situation.
There is a danger that America might act unilaterally. If it does, the world will be a far worse place. There will be cynical comment that America is taking action to comfort the Texas oil men. There will be cynical comment about America taking the action in order to provide oil to sustain an energy policy which the rest of the world may resent. That may not be helpful as it could lead to a more isolationist approach in Washington.
It is important that the Prime Minister should seek to maintain a close relationship in order to ensure that the United Nations will be safe from the almost mortal wounding which will occur if it allows the development of the nuclear weapon and the deployment of the horrible weapons which Saddam Hussein has obtained. There are dangers, not merely the nuclear ones. There is the development of the UAV to distribute chemical and biological weaponry; the development of mechanisms such as the adaptation of missiles to extend their range to a more potent degree; and the use of the economic weapon. The development of plant disease such as wheat smut could have a devastating effect, perhaps far more than any of our fears on grant-maintained or genetically modified food.
It is a dangerous time. The Government are right in their present approach, but if there is a cause for regret it is that Europe is insufficiently quick militarily to play any part in the structure of peace should conflict take place. If it does, there will be required considerable military resources in Iraq, and it would be a pity if that were left to the United States and the United Kingdom, when the rest of Europe and other parts of the world have a considerable interest in the matter. It is a pity that that interest has not been maturely and sensibly expressed in many cases during the past three months.
10.23 p.m.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, this has been a long debate, and I am sure that it will not be the last we shall have on the subject. I hope that we shall return to it on many occasions during the next few months.
One should mention the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester who, sadly, made his last speech in this House. It would also be appropriate to mention the remarkably good series of speeches—perhaps the largest number from the Bishops' Bench I have ever heard in a debate in this House.
We started with the Government's dossier and I, too, want to compliment them on publishing it at least a couple of hours before the debate began. It is fair and balanced, but it tells us little that is new and little that was not in the IISS report and in a number of
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publications available from the United States. It gives us the full catalogue of weapons of mass destruction as we know them. It confirms the appalling nature of the Saddam Hussein regime, but, as a number of speakers have suggested, it does not say that inspections have failed and that any further inspections would not succeed. I quote from page 39, paragraph 13, of the report under the sub-heading "Inspection achievements". It states,
"Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme".
Our aim must be to restore a vigorous inspection programme.
We welcome the focus which Her Majesty's Government have put on weapons of mass destruction and not simply as a brief excuse on the way to conquest and enforced regime change. My noble friend Lady Nicholson of Winterbourne also correctly added that we have to be concerned with human rights. Those or us who have struggled with the question of humanitarian intervention over the past 10 to 15 years know that the case for regime change on grounds of human rights abuses has to be very carefully made and very seldom used.
We on these Benches support a robust inspection regime backed by the threat of force. But it matters immensely how Her Majesty's Government, in co-operation with the United States and others, move forward from here to re-enforcement. The path forward must be multilateral, not unilateral; through international law and international institutions, not going round the side of such institutions if they do not immediately provide the answers that the United States wants.
In the last resort it may be necessary to use force to enforce UN resolutions and if that is so it will have the support of our party. But that must be the collective intervention of the international community. If it is just the United States and the United Kingdom alone, we shall have failed to make our case and our support for such action cannot be taken for granted.
But, as so many speeches have made clear, this is not just about Iraq. Many speeches today have dealt with Israel and Palestine as a constant theme. The weapons of mass destruction which Iraq has been accumulating are a threat to its neighbours and a claim for domination of the Middle East and of the oil supplies there. War on Iraq overlaps with, and in some ways distracts from, the war on terrorism and easily slides, as a number of speakers have said, into a war on Islam. The concern that many of us on these Benches have is that a war on Iraq which is not carefully prepared and justified may damage the war on terrorism. As the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, said in a very powerful speech, a war on terrorism can only be won it-moderate Muslims are persuaded that western democracies are open to the Muslim world and not hostile. That is one reason why there has to be parallel action on the Israel-Palestine conflict to a move to disarm Iraq. We are all

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conscious of just how much bitterness there is at the present moment on the two sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict and how much despair.
But the lines of a compromise are relatively clear. There has to be a two-stage solution, a substantial withdrawal from the current Israeli settlements and a limitation on the Palestinian claim for the right of return. It would help if there were new leadership on both sides. I do not wish to defend in any way Mr Arafat or Mr Sharon. It is extremely important that under current circumstances the heaviest pressure is brought to bear on the Israeli Government not to take advantage of pressure on Iraq to expel large elements of Palestinians from the West Bank and not to demolish the rest of the Palestinian infrastructure which has not already been taken down.
Success in disarming Iraq should, as the noble Lord, Lord Weidenfeld, remarked, make Israelis feel more secure. Therefore, those two matters go together. The cost to the West of a badly handled attack on Iraq could be severe in terms of a surge of anti-Americanism and possibly also of Anglophobia across the Muslim world and across European publics.
Two weeks ago I attended a conference in Washington, convened by a number of US foreign policy agencies, on the subject of anti-Americanism. The most powerful intervention came from a senior diplomat from Singapore who remarked that it had been discovered that middle class Muslims in Singapore had been plotting to blow up American and other installations on the island. He also said that one must understand that if American actions in the Middle East appear to be biased against the Muslim world, it will not be only in the Arab states that one will be faced with severe problems.
One has to be concerned about the stability and future of the Saudi regime and we have to be concerned about our future relations with Iran. One of the best critical examinations from the United States of what will happen after the conflict that I have read in the past couple of weeks raised the question: will the Iranians be happy with American troops guarding their border posts for five years after we occupy Iraq? That suggests that the American policy towards Iran could usefully be a little more constructive.
Post-conflict reconstruction, as a number of noble Lords have said, is extremely important and loose talk within the United States about comparisons with Germany and Japan after 1945 are clearly extremely damaging. Both Germany and Japan had been completely defeated, had made unilateral surrenders and were occupied. I hope that that is not what the Americans are proposing for the whole of the Arab world and the Middle East.
There has to be a regional approach which includes a long-term commitment to nation building and democracy building. There also has to be a broader approach to international order within which Muslim countries and states can be comfortable. Our aim must be to strengthen the United Nations and international law, not to weaken it. As many noble Lords have said,
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it is also about transatlantic relations and about how the United States sees its future role in the world. Many noble Lords have made clear to the Government how concerned they are about the current debate within Washington. There is a deep divide within the Republican party on America's role in the world. It is far more bitter than our Conservative Party's worst point in the final days of Mrs Thatcher's term of office. The active hostility towards Colin Powell on the ideological right and the determination to get rid of him if they can that one sees in semi-serious American newspapers I find quite shocking.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Winston, talked about the dangers of violent language. There is some horrifyingly violent language within the right wing American press. Mention has been made of Saddam as an outlaw and Muslim fundamentalists as mad. There has also been constant reference to America's enemies, dividing the world into us and them. That is not a good way in which to approach the complexities of international politics. As my party said yesterday, there is an air of triumphal imperialism that one also sees in people within the Administration as well as outside. Before they entered the Administration Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton and Doug Frieth wrote things decrying the United Nations and wanting to raise the United States above international law.
We need a different language from the United States. We need the sort of language that the Truman Administration managed to find for the Truman Declaration and the Roosevelt Administration tried to find for the Atlantic Charter. Such language must include the rest of the world and avoid the aggressive "America first" rhetoric used by too many in the current Administration. In that context, we welcome President Bush's United Nations speech. It was extremely constructive and showed that the President had resisted many of the pressures from the right. I am a little less happy with the security strategy that followed it; it has a triumphalist air.
The ideological right is unrepresentative of the United States as a whole. I welcome the growing criticism from within the United States, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government put all their weight into the debate in Washington on behalf of the moderates and against the ideological right. I was happy to hear a US Congressman refer the other day to the "Rumsfeld-Cheney axis" and the "Powell-Blair axis". That is a good indication that the Prime Minister is putting his oar in on the right side. As a candid friend of the United States, we should spell out our conditional support in public to Congress, to US audiences via the American media and, of course, to British and European audiences and beyond.
What should Her Majesty's Government say to the Bush Administration and to American audiences? First, they should say that we are willing to share in the maintenance of international order but that it must be collective international order. Secondly, we should say that we wish to defend and promote universal values. Language matters, and we must speak of universal values, not of western or Judaeo-Christian—let alone American—values. On Radio 4 this morning, Indarjit

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Singh, the editor of The Sikh Messenger, made an important distinction between language that implies that the West is imposing its values on the Muslim world and language that expresses common values of universal civilisation that we should all share.
Universal values mean universal standards, so there should be no double standards towards American allies in Israel and elsewhere. Having universal values also means promoting international institutions and international law. We should encourage the Bush Administration to make it clear that they have now changed their initial position on support for the United Nations, on non-proliferation, on energy conservation—including Kyoto—and on nation building, which they had happily decried. The United States cannot claim to be outside and above international law as, sadly, some members of the Bush Administration appear to do.
What are Britain's other priorities? In the long run, British influence in Washington depends on being seen to speak for the European allies and for Europe as a whole. The Government have been in danger of neglecting our European allies in recent months. We should turn back to the strengthening of European defence co-operation, which was a French and British initiative. It is vital to revive it and press ahead, not only because Mr Rumsfeld, in particular, is demanding that we make a more effective contribution to defence but because European influence over the United States depends on our being seen to have greater military capability. It would also help to promote a European study of the problem of weapons of mass destruction. Overwhelmingly, the debate on weapons of mass destruction has taken place in the United States, but we should focus the attention of our parliaments and publics on the severity of the problem.
All those actions are needed to build consensus. We should work through the UN to build a worthwhile, tough UN resolution. We must build consensus at home and abroad. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, said that those who cannot persuade the international community are probably wrong. We should be setting out to persuade the international community.
Earlier on, a number of colonists in America suggested that when putting across a difficult argument one should start with decent respect for the opinions of men—which is what we and our American allies now need to have.
In the last resort, the use of force may prove unavoidable but we have not yet exhausted the alternatives.
10.40 p.m.
Baroness Rawlings: My Lords, on behalf of Members on these Benches, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, for introducing this debate and therefore affording the opportunity to debate the long-awaited dossier. This has been an exceptional emergency debate on a complex subject. I have found it illuminating listening to distinguished speakers with great expertise in the military and diplomatic fields.
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This is yet another subject where your Lordships' experience and knowledge are outstanding. I speak with due humility. It is a daunting task winding up this debate but I hope to encapsulate fairly the mood and some of the points made without being too repetitive. I trust your Lordships will forgive me if I do not cover, after 10 hours, all the valid points made in the debate.
I was fortunate to participate in the International Institute of Strategic Studies annual conference earlier this month and have had more time to study the institute's document A Net Assessment of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction than today's dossier—which we received only this morning, for reasons not yet adequately explained.
As my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford said in his eloquent speech, we fully support the Prime Minister in his support for President Bush in the face of a common threat—a stance that our leader, lain Duncan Smith, has consistently made clear.
Understandably, many of your Lordships have asked whether it would not be illegal and immoral for Britain to support an American war against Iraq. Others—such as the noble Lord, Lord Moran, and many outside the House—ask why Saddam poses a threat to us. We have read and heard loud and clear from many of your Lordships today facts—which at this late stage I will not repeat—indicating that the illegality is firmly on the side of Iraq.
The informative dossier and the IISS document details Saddam's stockpiling and weapons programme. They demonstrate how close he is to obtaining a nuclear capability, which represents a far more potent threat. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, in a forceful speech, and others said that the Iraqi forces have been much reduced, most of their tanks are obsolete and their air force is diminished. Your Lordships have heard that a mixture of Saddam's immorality—having used weapons against his neighbours and his own people—combined with his unpredictability in passing weapons to terrorist groups undoubtedly affects our national interest. It is difficult to see how or why Saddam Hussein should take any notice of yet another UN resolution or agree to accept the new suggestion of coercive inspections. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Grenfell and Lord Hannay, about the importance of inspectors.
What assessment have the Government made of the system of coercive inspections recently mooted in the American press? We welcome President Bush's United Nations speech, demonstrating as it did something that we have long thought—that the American Government are thinking carefully about the issue and, more importantly, are keen to engage the wider international community.
Of course, Iraq is not an easy problem to solve. No one claims that it is. As Goethe said, every solution of a problem is a new problem. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Onslow, asked, "What next?". Several speakers emphasised forcefully—I agree—that our objective is to render harmless Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programme.

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We fully support all noble Lords who stressed the necessity to have a clear blueprint for the rebuilding of Iraq, for the Iraq we would like to see and the Iraq the Iraqi people would like to see should there be any military action. I should be grateful if the Minister could reassure the House that those problems have been considered and indicate his thinking on the matter. Indeed, only a few days ago the Iraqi newspaper, Al-Iqtisida, the newspaper owned by Saddam's eldest son, called for the formation of suicide squads to launch attacks on the West. Iraq plays a key role, both as a financial sponsor and harbourer, thereby threatening international peace and security. Therefore one of the most effective ways of defeating terrorism is by tracking the money that supports its activities.
During the last Session, on 9th July, my noble friend Lord Saatchi raised an important question concerning terrorist-related assets frozen in UK bank accounts. Can the Minister tell the House what further progress has been made in finding and freezing terrorist-related funds and how any of those findings impact upon the current situation in Iraq?
Finally, people are asking daily for more compelling evidence of the threat. The dossier provided by the Government is important, but a point was put to me recently which I should like to put to the Minister. Can the Minister tell the House whether the Iraqi opposition has been approached? This opposition group, the INC, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is based in the UK and the US. It is funded by the West. Bearing in mind that it claims to command the support of 80 per cent of Iraqis back home and maintains secret connections with top levels of the Iraqi Army, would it not be well placed to confirm publicly what we have hitherto received only from other sources? It could provide us with the extra evidence that public opinion demands. Why not ask it to produce an authoritative defector to testify in front of the UN? For it is through the UN, as most noble Lords have said, that whatever action is taken against Saddam Hussein must be channelled.
We have heard passionately-held and differing views today—or should I say "tonight" at this late hour. Like other noble Lords, I hope that this confrontation may be resolved peacefully. Only—I repeat, "only"—if that proves impossible then I cannot but recall Aristotle's words, "We make war that we may live in peace".
10.49 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Bach): My Lords, I begin by praising and thanking all those who have spoken in the debate. This has been a particularly stimulating and informed debate with a huge variety of expert knowledge. It has been a very good debate, but also a very long one. I am sure that the House will be with me in this at least: I intend to limit myself to 20 minutes at the most—if I do not, my Chief Whip will.
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Free speech is one of the proudest traditions of this House and a vital part of our way of life. I believe we all agree on the importance of the issues under discussion. What is so impressive is the way in which Members of this House listen to those who hold sometimes very different views from their own. Sadly, this is not a privilege permitted to the people of Iraq.
However, in closing, it is worth returning to the key questions posed earlier today by my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in another place. First, does the Iraqi regime pose a real and growing threat not only to the region but also to this country and our allies? Secondly, if so, what should the Government, in concert with our allies, do in response?
The dossier published today sets out in considerable and convincing detail the evidence to support the Government's belief that the threat is real and increasing. It also highlights the manner in which Saddam Hussein has blatantly and consistently ignored and evaded UN resolutions. The connection between Iraq and terrorism has been discussed. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, raised the issue and was mildly critical of the dossier because it did not make a connection between Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The noble Lord will remember that the document is a report from our intelligence community on what we believe to be matters of fact. It is emphatically not about speculation.
Your Lordships would rightly have been critical of us making a connection we could not substantiate. Of course if any weapons of mass destruction fall into terrorist hands it would be catastrophic—an expression used in the debate. But evidence of such weapons passing from Iraq to terrorists does not exist. That is not to say that there is not considerable evidence of Iraqi support for various types of terrorism over the years. As noble Lords have said, there is no evidence of direct links to Al'Qaeda in the dossier, but Iraq has a long record of support for terrorism including Palestinian terrorist groups such as Abu Nidal; the activities of the MEK against Iran; payments to the families of suicide bombers and the assassination of political opponents in Iraq and abroad.
The House will remember that Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate the first President Bush and the Emir of Kuwait in 1993. All this should come as no surprise to anyone in this House.
Earl Russell: My Lords, does the Minister agree that that the House is persuaded that there is a threat from Saddam Hussein, but there is no consensus in the House as to whether a military action against him—even a successful one—would make us, the Middle East, or the world any safer?
Lord Bach: My Lords, that is certainly one of the issues in front of the House. There are others as well. I shall proceed. Saddam Hussein's record since seizing power in Iraq in the late 1970s has been characterised—as has been said throughout the

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House—by a disregard for international law, human decency, and the true interests of his own people. It has been motivated by personal self-aggrandisement and ambition. With calculated disregard for human life he has used some of the most appalling and vicious weapons ever developed against his neighbours, even his own people; often against innocent civilians who were the least well protected. That has resulted in many thousands dying in agony while thousands more will suffer from their injuries for the rest of their lives. One noble Lord accused Saddam Hussein of having made serious errors of judgment. I do not know whether those facts that I have just set out represent some of those serious errors of judgment in his opinion.
In the wake of the Gulf War, a major international effort was launched to uncover and then destroy those WMD programmes. The sheer extent of the programmes and how close he came to developing the ultimate horror—a useable nuclear weapon—deeply shocked the international community. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, asked how different the events of 1990–91 would have been if Saddam had completed his nuclear ambitions. We should ponder that when deciding what it is best to do next.
These facts have long been recognised by the United Nations and are graphically exposed in our dossier. I remind the House that since 1990 the Security Council has imposed nine resolutions involving 27 specific obligations. Their aim has been to expose the true dimensions of these programmes and to ensure that they are completely dismantled, yet Saddam has consistently prevaricated and made a mockery of international law. He has defied the United Nations and scorned diplomacy and seeks to rebuild his arsenal. He has broken 23 of the 27 obligations and ignored world opinion. What is more, he has harassed the inspectors, hampered their movements and eventually, in 1998, expelled them from Iraq, only one month after having promised them unconditional access.
I remind some noble Lords that of course we shall go down the United Nations inspection route, but we shall do so with our eyes wide open, never letting up the pressure on Iraq. That pressure must involve the possible use of force. The House has to come to terms with that.
The evidence published this morning leaves no doubt that Saddam is continuing to develop, conceal and protect his weapons of mass destruction programmes. The important point from the dossier is that he is still manufacturing chemical and biological weapons. He also retains a capability to deliver such weapons by missile and is seeking to enhance that capability. All that is contrary to UN resolutions. A judgment is made in the dossier that Iraq has military plans for use of the chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. That has not been said very much when the dossier has been quoted. It also makes the point that some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of the order to use them.
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Saddam's intention to acquire nuclear weapons remains undiminished. He has sought covertly to acquire technology and materials, including large quantities of uranium, and has taken care to retain and use the specialist expertise developed in his pre-1991 nuclear weapon programme.
There is also ample evidence in the dossier that the regime has used the experience of the previous UN weapons inspections in order better to conceal its current activities. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, quoted from paragraph 13 of the dossier. I am sure that he has read paragraph 14 as well. Paragraph 13 talks about inspection achievements, but paragraph 14 begins:
"Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998 there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues".
The paragraph ends:
"Overall, Richard Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had 'a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work'".
The inspectors were very useful and they did a wonderful job. But let us not pretend to ourselves that somehow the inspectors managed to achieve all that they wanted.
We cannot know all the details of how Saddam Hussein may lash out next time, but one thing is clear and I believe that the House is united upon it. Doing nothing now is just not an option. Saddam Hussein, armed with nuclear weapons, would be even more of a menace than he is to the international community, to its neighbours in the region and to the UK. It is a threat that will not go away. It is a regime that twice launched unprovoked and unjustified wars of aggression upon its neighbours.
We have long made clear our commitment in support of the United Nations to contain Saddam. For more than 10 years, the Royal Air Force has kept much of Iraq safe for its people through its humanitarian patrolling of the no-fly zones in Iraq. That is directly in support of UN Security Council resolutions. It has constrained Saddam from further repression of the Kurds and other minority groups in the North and the Shia in the South. Perhaps f may pay a compliment to the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson of Winterbourne, for the work she has done in this field and for the expertise with which she spoke about the tragedy that unfolded in the south of Iraq.
The Royal Navy has played its part, too, sailing with the international maritime force to enforce United Nations sanctions on Iraq. I myself have just returned from a short visit to the Gulf where I had the privilege of meeting some of the men and women on HMS "Argyll" and at the Ali Al-Salem airbase. It is right in a debate such as this that we pay tribute to the men and women of our Armed Forces who have placed themselves—and still do every day—in harm's way to carry out the vital endeavours.
Those efforts continue to be invaluable but, as the dossier shows clearly, the policy of containment is no longer effective. The threat posed by Saddam to

1023
regional and international security is real and it is growing. I quote from what the Prime Minister said on 3rd September:
"It is not that for 10 years he has not been a problem. He has been a problem throughout the last 10 years. What has changed is, first, that the policy of containment is not any longer working—certainly without a massive change in the way that the regime is monitored and inspected. Secondly, we know from 11th September that it is sensible to deal with these problems before, not after".
Indeed, how could the containment work properly without inspectors? There have not been any inspectors for three-and-three-quarter—nearly four—years.
What happens next? Many noble Lords—the noble Lords, Lord Hurd, Lord Wright, Lord Campbell-Savours, Lord Grenfell, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and others—asked what would happen after all this was over. As my noble friend Lady Symons made clear, there are questions that we honestly cannot yet answer fully. But I can assure all noble Lords that Her Majesty's Government are very aware of the peril of winning the war and losing the peace.
Obviously, in the end, the Government of Iraq must be a matter for the people of Iraq. I believe that Her Majesty's Government have good credentials on this issue. We have had some good precedents over the past few years. I mention Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. Despite all the criticisms that we have heard today, I also include Afghanistan. Obviously there will be more to come on that matter. I know that that is not a fully satisfactory answer to the questions that are posed but it is an issue that Her Majesty's Government are thinking about a great deal.
I assure the House that military action by ourselves or our allies is neither imminent nor inevitable. Members of this House know perhaps better than anyone else the tragic cost of war. Here, I pay tribute to the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Vincent, Lord Craig, Lord Inge, Lord Bramall and Lord Guthrie, all of whom took the trouble to speak today and are courteous enough to be here this evening. As always, they spoke with authority from their enormous military experience. We may well hear more from them in due course.
Of course, we would all agree that a diplomatic solution that fully satisfied our concerns would be the preferred outcome. We are doing everything in our power to achieve that. However, if diplomatic action does not succeed we must be prepared to take further steps. We in the Ministry of Defence will take prudent steps to ensure that our servicemen and women are ready, fully trained and fully equipped to undertake any task that their country may ask of them. We would not take such action lightly but nor will we shirk our international obligations.
Recent operations, from Sierra Leone to Afghanistan, have demonstrated that, as part of an international coalition, our military strength can provide regional stability, root out terrorism and give local people a chance to rebuild their nations and their
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homes in safety. A great deal has quite rightly been said about the Middle East peace process in the course of this debate. The importance of achieving a just and lasting peace between the Palestinians and Israelis cannot be understated.
Noble Lords will remember hearing a long time ago now—this morning—my noble and learned friend Lord Williams reading the Prime Minister's Statement. Towards the end of that Statement, he dealt with the Middle East peace process. Noble Lords also heard from my noble friend Lady Symons that the Foreign Secretary himself will in a few weeks visit that part of the world. The Government take that issue extremely seriously, as the Prime Minister's words show.
We continue to insist that all parties must abide by UN resolutions and that the road to peace begins with acceptance by all sides of UN Resolution 1402, which involves Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian towns, an effective ceasefire and the return to negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Hurd, asked about the elections in Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza. We support well-prepared and effective elections and we are urging the Palestinian Authority to set a realistic date for those elections and Israel to allow conditions suitable for them to take place. However, we must not let our concerns about the Middle East peace process cloud our determination to deal with Saddam Hussein. That point was not lost, frankly, on those in the region with whom I was fortunate enough to have discussions last week. We have heard a great deal about the street and about Arab sentiment; much of it, I am sure, is correct. However, my experience over the past week was that some distinction was made between those issues. I do not think that we should immediately assume that all Arab countries take precisely the view that those two issues are necessarily interlinked all the time.
Let us not forget that Saddam Hussein has murdered more Muslims and Arabs than perished in the four great wars that took place between Israel and the Arab states during the 20th century. It is only free from the danger that Saddam poses that the people of the region have a chance to build peace.
The way open to Saddam is clear: he must re-admit the weapons inspectors now and unconditionally, and he must accept immediately all the obligations imposed by the United Nations.
We have had a free and open debate. Saddam should not mistake such a debate for evidence of uncertainty on our part. We draw strength and unity from our democratic principles—tyrants always misunderstand that. We must and we will face up to our responsibilities towards this appalling regime and the threat that it poses towards us and our allies. I conclude by thanking all noble Lords who have spoken, particularly the right reverend Prelates who spoke from the Bishops' Bench. I single out the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for his fine contribution.

1025
In another place, the Prime Minister today said,
"should Saddam continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it has in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is necessary and what is right".
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I have no doubt that we in this House will do no less. I ask the House to agree to the Motion.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at ten minutes past eleven o'clock.

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  Health Authorities: Efficiency and Value for Money
  Obesity
  Obesity
  NHS Healthcare Workers: HIV Testing
  NHS Healthcare Workers: HIV Testing
  Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill
  Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Bill
  National Health Service: Overseas Providers
  National Health Service: Overseas Providers
  NHS: Treatment of Overseas Visitors
  NHS: Treatment of Overseas Visitors
  NHS: Suspension of Consultants
  NHS: Suspension of Consultants
  National Service Framework for Mental Health
  National Service Framework for Mental Health
  Mental Health
  Mental Health
  Blood and Blood Components: Safety
  Blood and Blood Components: Safety
  National Blood Authority
  National Blood Authority
  Medical Research
  Medical Research
  Food Standards Agency
  Food Standards Agency
  Broadmoor
  Broadmoor
  Specialist Children's Services in the North West
  Specialist Children's Services in the North West
  Mental Health Patients: Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy
  Mental Health Patients: Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy
  Epilepsy-related Death
  Epilepsy-related Death
  Parliamentary Ombudsman
  Parliamentary Ombudsman
  Commissioner for Public Appointments Annual Report
  Commissioner for Public Appointments Annual Report
  Regulatory Impact Assessments
  Regulatory Impact Assessments
  Iraq
  Iraq
  Public Bodies: Appointment of Women
  Public Bodies: Appointment of Women
  Ragwort on Verges of A14 and A11
  Ragwort on Verges of A14 and A11
  Bio Fuels
  Bio Fuels
  Tourist Signs
  Tourist Signs
  Pathfinder Projects
  Pathfinder Projects
  Pendle Inquiry
  Pendle Inquiry
  EU Membership
  EU Membership
  Kosovo
  Kosovo
  Kaliningrad
  Kaliningrad
  Chechnya
  Chechnya
  British Studies Centre, Bamberg
  British Studies Centre, Bamberg
  Russian Federation: Tacis Scheme
  Russian Federation: Tacis Scheme
  Isla Perejil
  Isla Perejil
  EU Membership: Benefits
  EU Membership: Benefits
  Sellafield
  Sellafield
  Mineworkers' Vibration White Finger
  Mineworkers' Vibration White Finger
  Four-hundredth Anniversay of Union: Possible Stamp Issue
  Four-hundredth Anniversay of Union: Possible Stamp Issue
  Ofgem: Revised Rules and the Marine Industry
  Ofgem: Revised Rules and the Marine Industry
  Russian Federation: Patent Rights
  Russian Federation: Patent Rights
  Russian Federation: Nuclear Safety
  Russian Federation: Nuclear Safety
  EU Member States: Energy Resources
  EU Member States: Energy Resources
  Marina Operators: Resale of Electricity, Gas and Water
  Marina Operators: Resale of Electricity, Gas and Water
  Single Equality Body and Human Rights
  Single Equality Body and Human Rights
  Disability Rights Commission: Funding
  Disability Rights Commission: Funding
  Defra: Spending
  Defra: Spending
  CAP Reform
  CAP Reform
  Bio Fuels
  Bio Fuels
  North/South Ministerial Council
  North/South Ministerial Council
  Irish Nationality
  Irish Nationality
  Northern Ireland Government: Sinn Fein Membership
  Northern Ireland Government: Sinn Fein Membership
  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission: Migrant Workers Convention
  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission: Migrant Workers Convention
  Northern Ireland Prisons: Drugs
  Northern Ireland Prisons: Drugs
  Maze Prison Site
  Maze Prison Site
  Northern Ireland Police Service
  Northern Ireland Police Service
  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
  Northern Ireland: Recorded Rapes
  Northern Ireland: Recorded Rapes
  EU Legislation
  EU Legislation
  North Belfast: Rioting on 12 July
  North Belfast: Rioting on 12 July
  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
  Northern Ireland Health Workers: Security
  Northern Ireland Health Workers: Security
  Downing Street: Entertainment Budget
  Downing Street: Entertainment Budget
  Downing Street: Use of Apartments
  Downing Street: Use of Apartments
  Goverment Policies: Precedent
  Goverment Policies: Precedent
  Ardoyne Area: Security Arrangements
  Ardoyne Area: Security Arrangements
  Northern Ireland: Ceasefires
  Northern Ireland: Ceasefires
  Republic of Ireland: Grant of British Citizenship
  Republic of Ireland: Grant of British Citizenship
  Provisional IRA
  Provisional IRA
  Peers' Expenses
  Peers' Expenses