Sitting of 17 February 1998

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MADAM SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS

  PRIVATE BUSINESS
  LLOYDS TSB BILL [Lords] (By Order)
  Order for Second Reading read.
  To be read a Second time on Tuesday 24 February.

Oral Answers to Questions
  SCOTLAND
  The Secretary of State was asked—

  Common Fisheries Policy
  Mr. Gray: When he last met the Scottish Fishermen's Federation to discuss the common fisheries policy. [28068]
  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Calum Macdonald): My noble Friend the Minister responsible for agriculture, the environment and fisheries, Lord Sewel, last met the Scottish Fishermen's Federation on 17 December, prior to the Fisheries Council that was held in Brussels on 19 and 20 December 1997.
  Mr. Gray: Lord Sewel will doubtless have told the Minister of the Scottish Fishermen's Federation's grave concern that, after devolution, Scotland will lose the powerful voice at the Council of Ministers that she currently enjoys by right, rather than by invitation. What will happen when there is a difference of opinion between the Scottish Parliament and the English Parliament? How will the Scottish view be put over to the Council of Ministers?
  Mr. Macdonald: The hon. Gentleman is wrong on two counts. First, Scottish Ministers have no "as of right"; arrangements are reached between Departments. Secondly, there will be no English Parliament; there will be a United Kingdom Parliament, and the two Parliaments will co-operate in the same way as Departments currently do.
  Mr. Godman: Like many others, the federation is rightly and properly seeking radical reform of the common fisheries policy. Does my hon. Friend agree that an essential element of that reform must be a complete ban on,
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  or a severe reduction in, industrial fishing, which damages commercially valuable species, particularly on the Wee Bankie and the Buckie Man's bank?
  Mr. Macdonald: I know that there is concern about the scope and amount of industrial fisheries. The Government are examining that issue at the moment and my hon. Friend's views will have been noted.
  Sir Robert Smith: In the Minister's discussions with the federation, have any concerns been expressed about the operation of any designated ports? In particular, can he reassure smaller fishing communities that the implementation of designated ports will be flexible, so that medium and smaller fishing boats can use them?
  Mr. Macdonald: I assure the hon. Gentleman that we want the operation of designated ports to be practical and effective. We are, of course, listening to the views of the various federations on that. We shall produce a consultation paper, after which we shall hold consultations.
  Mr. Ancram: Given that Scottish fishing comprises more than 70 per cent, of the total United Kingdom fishing industry, will the Minister reconsider his rather complacent answer to my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) about Scottish fishermen's concern that the right of access to the Council of Ministers, which he currently enjoys as a United Kingdom Minister, will be lost when the Scottish Parliament is established?
  Is not it somewhat perverse that, just as Scottish fishermen need the strongest possible voice in Europe, that voice is about to be denied them? When will he accept that vague assurances of informally agreed arrangements or concordats are simply inadequate? If he will not protect the interests of Scottish fishermen in legislation, would not it be better for Scottish fishing to be a reserved issue, at least to ensure that their voice is heard strongly in the Council of Ministers?
  Mr. Macdonald: I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman should repeat the error. There is no right of access as such. These are arrangements that are reached between Departments and the same sort of arrangement will be reached between the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments after devolution. There really will be no change in the situation.

  Agriculture Industry
  Mr. Russell Brown: When he next intends to meet farmers and the Scottish National Farmers Union to discuss the agriculture industry. [28069]
  The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Donald Dewar): I met leaders of the National Farmers Union of Scotland on 9 February. No date has yet been set for a subsequent meeting. My noble Friend Lord Sewel meets Scottish NFU leaders regularly.
  Mr. Brown: I thank my right hon. Friend for his reply. Farmers throughout Scotland will be looking forward to continual contact with him and Lord Sewel. May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the difficulties that

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  the sheep export business may face in the coming months because we have to remove specified risk materials? When carcases are split, they do not travel well to the export market and French business could be turned away.
  Mr. Dewar: We recognise the severe difficulties that face the beef and sheep industries. That is why both have been targeted in the recently announced £85 million increase in support payments. I recognise the problem caused by the removal of specified risk material and we have discussed it with the NFU. All European member countries will face that problem from 1 April; we are anxious to find the best way forward. Above all, we must have regard to safety and that is the basis on which the move has been introduced.
  Mr. Charles Kennedy: Does the Secretary of State, also, welcome the road-to-Damascus conversion—having been briefed by his local NFU branch—indicated by the question of the hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Brown), given his intemperate remarks about the state of Scottish agriculture at the Scottish Grand Committee? Will the right hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the problem is widespread throughout the country and that the alarm felt in particular by hill and upland farmers will have been accentuated as a result of Lord Sewel's television interview on Saturday night, in which he clearly stated that he expected there to be fewer people in hill and upland farming in the future? That interview has set the alarm bells ringing in many of our constituencies. I have requested a meeting with Lord Sewel on behalf of my hon. Friends to discuss that problem further. Will the right hon. Gentleman give his support for an early meeting if at all possible?
  Mr. Dewar: I may be wrong, but I did not see the hon. Gentleman at the agriculture debate to which he referred. I am relieved to learn that he reads the Hansard reports so avidly. I am not inclined to take lessons in intemperate speech from the hon. Gentleman—he does it rather well. On the substantive point, of course there is concern. A few minutes ago, I referred to the £85 million additional support package announced recently by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, which is strongly supported by the Scottish Office. We are conscious of the difficulties of getting the reform and the structural change in the industry that the NFU wants as much as the Government. We will all work hard to make progress on Agenda 2000 in Brussels and we are conscious of the need to ensure that it is not a unilateral effort on the part of the United Kingdom, but something on which the whole of Europe is moving—I hope in the right direction—as one.
  Dr. Fox: The Secretary of State may be aware of the report in the New Scientist of the week commencing 5 January that E. coli 0157 and 0111 are at epidemic levels in beef produced in Chile and Argentina. In view of that evidence, what guarantee can he give us that beef imported from those countries is as safe as home-produced beef?
  Mr. Dewar: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we check and we will continue to take stringent precautions on those matters. British beef is safe—we have repeatedly said that and so, to be fair, did our predecessors. We are
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  urgently trying to help the industry to boost sales at home and to reassure the public. The positive encouragement of quality beef sales is important. Of course we want to ensure that foreign imports are fit for human consumption and we have taken steps to do so.
  Mr. David Stewart: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is important to encourage the British armed forces to buy as much British beef as possible? Does he welcome the fact that they have doubled expenditure on it in the past 12 months?
  Mr. Dewar: That is a matter for my colleagues in the Ministry of Defence. I welcome the fact that British beef has been competitive. I guess that, for obvious reasons, the Army buys sensibly at good prices. That it is buying more and more British beef underlines the fact that it is a good buy for everyone.

  Local Government Finance
  Mr. Letwin: When he last met the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to discuss the financing of local government in Scotland. [28070]
  Mr. Dewar: On 23 January.
  Mr. Letwin: In the light of his letter to the president of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities of 30 November, in which he announced that he was making a real-terms reduction in the amount of money available to local authorities, will the Secretary of State explain why he thinks the convention has not made more fuss?
  Mr. Dewar: I think that COSLA was probably relieved—[Laughter.] Let me explain. The increase in cash terms is 3.4 per cent. COSLA had expected the plans that had already been announced to be implemented if there had been no change of Government. That would have meant a cash increase of only 1 per cent. It is a difficult settlement that faces councils with hard choices but it is infinitely better than what was threatened if, by misfortune, the Tories had been returned to power.
  Mr. Maxton: Will my right hon. Friend take this opportunity, while considering local government finance, to make it clear to Scottish National party-controlled Perth and Kinross council that charging pupils who have to stay in hostels while attending secondary school £300 a year is an unacceptable breach of the right of every school child in Scotland to a free education? Will he note that that council also charges the highest musical instrument fees of any local authority in Scotland?
  Mr. Dewar: That is a matter for the council, which is controlled by the SNP. It is not for me to direct on such matters. The authority must choose its priorities within the spending limit that has been set. Difficult problems face all local authorities. Perhaps the difficulties in its own back yard will remind the SNP of the difficulties of councils in other areas.
  Ms Roseanna Cunningham: Does the Secretary of State agree that the local authority budget cuts that are

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  threatening the closure of organisations such as rape crisis centres are insupportable? Will he join me in supporting the Big Issue campaign against such closures?
  Mr. Dewar: There has been some movement in the urban programme. We are particularly concentrating on priority partnership areas as part of the social exclusion strategy, which I am sure the hon. Lady supports. I recognise that there are difficulties. It is important to concentrate on our priorities. We have to ensure that the projects that continue to receive funding are important and serve the public interest. Rape crisis centres and the women's aid organisations have a good, positive record that I am sure will be borne in mind.
  Mr. Savidge: Will the Secretary of State consider the special financial difficulties of cities such as Aberdeen where services are extensively used by non-residents? Will he consider both immediate problems and longer-term solutions, such as reviewing the distribution formula?
  Mr. Dewar: We are always willing to listen to representations. I pay tribute to the co-operation that we have had from COSLA and individual authorities in managing the random changes and impact that would otherwise have resulted from variations in, for example, grant-aided expenditure for social work. That co-operation has been enormously useful. The distribution formula is always altered by agreement. It is a complex, long-term project and I cannot offer my hon. Friend instant changes, but I understand the problem.
  Mr. Kirkwood: When the Secretary of State meets COSLA, will he pay particular attention to the representations that will be made by local authorities that cover landward areas about the impact of transportation costs on their budgets next year? Is he aware that, next year, school transport will cost my local authority, Scottish Borders—not a big authority—more than £2 million? Will he assure the House that he will use his considerable influence with his Treasury colleagues to ensure that there will not be excessive increases this year in excise duty on fuel?
  Mr. Dewar: I am quite sure that my colleagues at the Treasury are familiar with those representations. They will also be familiar with the many commitments given by the Liberal Democrats to cut CO2 emissions and to pursue policies to bring that about. Very often, politics is a matter of difficult choices. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be mindful of the fact that we have made announcements about petrol prices in terms of our general approach to increases above the rate of inflation.

  Scottish Parliament
  Mr. Salmond: When he last met the Confederation of British Industry and the Scottish Trades Union Congress to discuss the powers of the Scottish Parliament; and if he will make a statement. [28071]
  The Minister for Home Affairs and Devolution, Scottish Office (Mr. Henry McLeish): My right hon. Friend last met representatives of the CBI Scotland on
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  30 January to discuss a range of issues, including the powers of the Scottish Parliament. I last met the STUC to discuss its response to the Scotland Bill on 7 January.
  Mr. Salmond: How does the Minister understand the process of consultation on the Scottish Parliament? Will he confirm that the minutes of the consultative group meeting for 19 January confirmed that the decision on the interim location of the Parliament would come before that body? The Minister accepted that proposal just last week. Why, then, are his civil servants briefing that that decision has already been made in favour of the general assembly building? Can the Minister say whether that is correct? If so, what is the point of having consultative meetings if the Scottish Office is proceeding by diktat?
  Mr. McLeish: Since 1 May, the Government have attempted to be as open as possible on every aspect of the Scottish project. That is why we established the consultative steering group, which involves all the political parties, to consider the nuts and bolts of the Parliament, its working procedures and Standing Orders. That process of consultation will continue. I can confirm that we shall discuss the options for the temporary home for the Scottish Parliament in that consultative steering group, but no decisions have yet been made. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State intends to make a decision in March.
  Mr. Eric Clarke: Has the Minister had in-depth discussions with the Scottish CBI and the STUC on welfare to work?
  Mr. McLeish: That is not within my remit, but is within that of my hon. Friend the Minister for Education and Industry. When we have met the CBI and the STUC, they have been conscious that that project is exciting in terms of devolution and they want to be part of it. They are aware—as we are—of the aspirations of Scots to find jobs and to ensure that young people receive training. Those organisations want a prosperous and successful Scotland. Indeed, they have signed up with us to ensure that that happens.
  Mr. Ancram: When the Secretary of State met the CBI on 30 January, did he accept its concerns about the potential dangers to Scottish business inherent in the tax-varying proposals in the Scotland Bill? Did he undertake to make adjustments, if necessary by secondary legislation, to meet those concerns? Will he confirm that the concerns related, among other things, to the knock-on effects on capital gains tax? Will he assure the House that those concerns will be met in legislation before the Scottish Parliament comes into being and in a way that that Parliament will not subsequently be empowered to undo?
  Mr. McLeish: I am pleased to offer the right hon. Gentleman the reassurance he seeks. Tax-varying powers should not extend to the taxation of capital gains; the Bill achieves that in clause 69(2). On the wider front,

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  the CBI made some positive suggestions and my right hon. Friend agreed to discuss those matters further before we finalise the technical details of the tax-varying powers.
  Mrs. Ewing: How many meetings he has had with European Union Ministers and Commissioners since 1 January to discuss future relations between the Scottish Parliament and the EU. [28072]
  Mr. Dewar: Since the start of the year, my colleagues and I have had 13 meetings with Ministers of European Union member states at regional and national level or with EU Commissioners. A range of matters were discussed, including our proposals for a Scottish Parliament.
  Mrs. Ewing: I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has had that number of meetings. What attention has been paid to structural funds, which are vital to the future of the Scottish Parliament, the European Union and the economic and social structure of our society? By the time the Highlands and Islands Convention next meets, will the Minister be able to tell us what representations he has made in connection with the NUTS II programme, which is vital to defining the areas that will have access to structural funds? Can he advise us on what he thinks will be the best outcome of those representations?
  Mr. Dewar: I think that the hon. Lady is trying to tempt me, at the Highlands and Islands Convention meeting, to look into the future with a certainty that I would not claim to possess. We are of course pursuing the matter energetically; I have discussed it with Commissioner Wulf-Mathies and Commissioner Flynn and a great deal of work is being done at official level. We are all aware of the Commission's opening position and of the changes that that might suggest in respect of this country and Scotland. We also recognise that those are opening shots in what may be a fairly protracted campaign in which we intend to engage fully.
  Mr. Wallace: Will the Secretary of State confirm that the Government's policy in respect of relationships between the Scottish Parliament and Executive and the European Union remains as was set out in paragraph 5.6 of the White Paper, specifically that "in appropriate cases" Scottish Executive Ministers will be able to speak for the United Kingdom in Council meetings? What assessment has he made of post-Maastricht legislation in Germany, which gives the Lander rights of early information on EU proposals as well as rights of representation and of speaking?
  Mr. Dewar: The hon. and learned Gentleman may be horrified if I admit to inadequacy, but I have not looked specifically at changes in the Lander situation. I do know that we are working out what I believe are extremely satisfactory arrangements within the United Kingdom. I am familiar with the passage of the White Paper he mentions and that remains our position. There will be a United Kingdom delegation and Scotland will be represented in that delegation. As now, it will be a matter for the delegation to decide who speaks and when. That system has worked well in the past and I expect it to continue to do so.
  Mr. Ancram: When will the Secretary of State accept that those relations cannot be left to the transient
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  invitations of Westminster Governments or to unenforceable concordats made without benefit of parliamentary endorsement; and that to do so would be to betray the assurances given in the White Paper? Does he agree that if someone says that his word is as good as his bond, a wise man will always take his bond; and that the Scots have a right to see those assurances entrenched in statute and not to have to rely on promises politically given and easily broken?
  Mr. Dewar: That is a clever remark, but it gives a rather unfortunate insight into the level of trust within the Conservative party. It is puzzling that those who speak with the greatest enthusiasm about the partnership that is the United Kingdom are those who question most persistently whether it can be trusted to work. I believe that it can and that it will, in the mutual interests of us all.

  Higher Education
  Mr. Donohoe: What action he proposes to take to ensure that there is less disparity in the proportions of Scots from (a) affluent and (b) deprived areas going on to higher education. [28073]
  The Minister for Education and Industry, Scottish Office (Mr. Brian Wilson): The Government regard wider participation as one of their key priorities and have advised the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council accordingly. A national conference on widening participation in higher education will be held on 1 May this year.
  Mr. Donohoe: I welcome that reply, but I am sure that my hon. Friend will be aware of the survey undertaken by the Educational Institute of Scotland that shows that more than 80 per cent, of children of affluent households go on to higher education whereas only 11 per cent, of children from deprived areas do. What is my hon. Friend going to do about that?
  Mr. Wilson: I am familiar with the figure quoted by my hon. Friend. It reflects the miserable reality of the current funding arrangements, which some Opposition Members are anxious to defend. The system simply has not delivered to people from lower-income backgrounds and I assure my hon. Friend and the House that one of our top priorities is to ensure that nobody who has the potential to benefit from higher education is cut off from doing so because of his or her social and economic background.
  Mrs. Laing: What steps is the Minister taking to protect the traditional four-year Scottish degree course at Scottish universities, given the introduction of tuition fees?
  Mr. Wilson: The two are not causally related. Perhaps the hon. Lady does not understand that the four-year degree course is not quite as traditional as she thinks—it is a relatively recent phenomenon—
  Mr. Gray: My hon. Friend did it—and so did I.
  Mr. Wilson: The hon. Gentleman says that the hon. Lady did it, but I am not sure that she embodies tradition

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  in the Scottish education system. Having so many doing four-year degree courses is a relatively recent phenomenon. With the advent of "Higher Still" and advanced highers, many more Scottish students will look for more flexible entry into higher education.
  Mr. Davidson: Does my hon. Friend accept that access to higher and further education is partially determined by the chances that youngsters have throughout their time in education, from the nursery sector through the primary sector to the secondary sector? Does he agree that unless the Government are willing to spend substantially more on education in areas of deprivation, such as in my constituency, we shall not be able drastically to increase the number of children from modest backgrounds who go on to higher and further education?
  Mr. Wilson: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend's comments. That is why we are pumping as much money as we can into every phase of education. I am especially proud of the £24 million extra that we have been able to put into early intervention in primary schools, which I am certain is crucial in improving the life prospects of every child.
  Mr. Welsh: Is the Minister aware of the Edinburgh university student association survey that shows that 91 per cent, of Scottish head teachers believe that tuition fees and the abolition of grants are incompatible with the principle of equal access for all, regardless of financial circumstances? Will he now put pressure on the Department for Education and Employment to abandon its short-sighted policy and look again at Labour's tuition tax and student loan policies?
  Mr. Wilson: Anyone who thinks that tuition fees are a barrier to low-income entry into university has probably made the mistake of reading The Scotsman or listening to the hon. Gentleman, as 40 per cent, of students—indeed, everyone from households with an income of less than about £23,000—will not pay a penny in tuition fees. My purpose is to get £140 million extra each year into Scottish higher education, which will not only safeguard the quality of the product but give access to people from all backgrounds—low, middle and high.
  Mr. Alexander: Will my hon. Friend join me in congratulating Paisley university, which this year has experienced an increase of 8 per cent, in applications for undergraduate courses?
  Mr. Wilson: I certainly shall, because I think the experience of Paisley gives the lie to an awful lot of the rubbish that has been spoken on this subject. Paisley university draws its students mainly from lower-income backgrounds. It has increased its applications by 8 per cent. However, most of the whingeing in the higher education circle has emanated from St. Andrews university, which has also had increased applications, including from students south of the border. The figures show what rubbish has been talked on the subject. My interest is in addressing the message to the people whose life prospects depend on applying for university and not listening to the scaremongering and politicking that have come from the Conservative Benches.
  Mr. Gorrie: In the Muirhouse area of my constituency are a number of organisations that are vital for getting
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  people back into the education system. They are at serious risk because of the ending of urban aid money or as a result of the reduction in grant to the City of Edinburgh council. Will the Minister consider making available some funds to pick up those organisations, which are right on the button for the social exclusion policy that the Government support but in dire straits? They will go under if they do not very quickly receive help.
  Mr. Wilson: As I said in my original answer, access to education from the widest range of social groups is a very high priority for me and for the Government. I invite the hon. Member to write to me if he knows of specific organisations in that category. He knows that urban aid funding is not meant to be a permanent funding solution for any organisation and that, inevitably, if new organisations are to qualify for urban aid funding, others must drop out. One hopes that the main stream will find other ways of continuing, but I invite the hon. Gentleman to write to me.

  Primary Schools (Language Tuition)
  Ms Squire: What proportion of primary schools in Scotland currently offer foreign language tuition. [28074]
  Mr. Wilson: There are at present teachers qualified to teach modern languages in 74 per cent, of Scottish primary schools.
  Ms Squire: Does the Minister agree that, in spite of that, the take-up of foreign languages by children and young people in Scotland has been very disappointing; that the development of fluency in two or more languages opens up tremendous opportunities, especially in employment; and that it seems that the best way to start is at primary school? What further action do the Government hope to take, especially in this year, when we hold the European presidency, to encourage greater foreign. language development in Scotland?
  Mr. Wilson: If I wanted to be complacent, I could simply say that we are already far ahead of the United Kingdom as a whole in that respect, and that we are continuing to expand the successful and praiseworthy modern languages in primary schools scheme. However, I entirely share my hon. Friend's analysis. I think that our proficiency in languages in Scotland—and, perhaps, in the rest of the United Kingdom as well—is a disgrace. For all the reasons that she states, there is an enormous amount to be done to improve our language competence. I believe that we could do much more through the education system, including, for instance, immersion in modern languages in the primary years. We should also ensure that within the curriculum there is no disadvantage to pupils who opt for modern languages. That is vital.
  Mrs. Ray Michie: If the threat to primary schools in the highlands and islands area continues, there could soon be few primary schools left to teach another language, or anything else. Is the Minister aware that in Argyll and Bute 10 primary schools have now been earmarked for closure, in addition to the four that have already closed? Those schools certainly will not be able to teach another

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  language. How does he view that development, in the light of the funding that he recently announced for the Argyll and Bute education authority?
  Mr. Wilson: As the hon. Lady is aware, I know Argyll and Bute reasonably well. I also know the local authority, and I think that it would maintain that its proposals were education led rather than finance led. Of course, the decisions are matters for the authority's judgment. It inherited an enormous number of small primary schools and, for reasons that the hon. Lady and I both regret, there is continued population movement away from some areas. Judgments then have to be made by the education authorities. I have nothing but empathy with small primary schools, but there remain judgments of balance on educational and financial grounds for education authorities to make.
  Mr. Connarty: The Minister, I am sure, will accept that to advance something like primary education teaching in languages requires co-operation. He will no doubt have noted in The Times Educational Supplement of last week the concerns expressed by local authorities at the number of directives coming from his Department, which has been worrying them. He will recall that I handed him three sheets totalling 55 directives sent out by his Department to education authorities since May last year, and I hear that they are actually speeding up in January and February. Will he give the House an assurance that he will go back to his promise of co-operation with local education authorities to build the education they require, rather than allowing his civil servants to bombard them with directives, which cuts across their own plans in education?
  Mr. Wilson: I assure my hon. Friend that the approach is one of partnership and consensus, as will be reflected later this week when the action group on standards in Scottish schools, which I chair, meets people from all the branches of education represented on it, so as to take forward important reforms. When I took my job, one of the first things I said was that there was unnecessary paperwork and bureaucracy going into schools and taking up the time of teaching staff and head teachers. If I could be shown examples, I would end that. I must practise what I preach, and if my hon. Friend can show me unnecessary letters that have gone into schools, I shall ensure that the flow is reduced.
  Miss McIntosh: Will the Minister agree to extend the Lingua programme to primary schools both in Scotland and throughout the United Kingdom, and can he inform the House what the cost to the British taxpayer would be?
  Mr. Wilson: On costs, I would be pleased to write to the hon. Lady. In principle I support the extension of language programmes in schools. That is the practical approach adopted in Scotland and I am always looking for ways of furthering it, and of taking advantage of European programmes that encourage it.

  Local Government (Best Value Scheme)
  Mr. Doran: How many local authorities have qualified to date under the best value scheme. [28075]
  Mr. Dewar: All Scottish councils have demonstrated commitment to best value, although some are further
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  forward than others. Accordingly, I propose to retain the moratorium on compulsory competitive tendering for a further year. Five councils will be subject to conditions, including three that have accepted the need to retain competitive tendering. We put great emphasis on the importance of best value as a means of improving, with the co-operation of local government, the delivery of services to the public.
  Mr. Doran: I thank my right hon. Friend for that announcement, which will be welcomed by local authorities throughout Scotland, especially my local authority in Aberdeen, which has led the way in the introduction of best value regimes. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the move away from the rigidities and inflexibilities of CCT, which he has confirmed today, will lead us into a new regime for local government finance, in which good housekeeping and best practice will be rewarded?
  Mr. Dewar: That is certainly the intention, and it is the joint ambition of the local authority world and the Scottish Office. Plans have been laid out and objectives defined. The important thing is to deliver on both.
  Mr. Ian Bruce: I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will acknowledge how difficult it is to do away with compulsory competitive tendering and bring in best value. Has he undertaken a comparison of the costs of local authorities in Scotland with those in the rest of the United Kingdom, especially as Scottish local authorities get 20 to 25 per cent. more funding than the rest of the country? Can he bring that figure down, to the benefit of the UK taxpayer?
  Mr. Dewar: The hon. Gentleman, who I think has some Scottish antecedents, never misses the chance. His antecedents, I fear, are well buried, but the name is a clue. Simplistic comparisons of the kind in which he specialises are not always helpful. If he looks at the geography, social structure and environment in which many local authorities in Scotland operate, he will come across some of the explanations that he seeks.

  Millennium Link
  Mr. Canavan: What recent representations he has received about funding for the millennium link project to reunite the Forth and Clyde canal and the Union canal. [28077]
  Mr. McLeish: The Government have received representations from hon. Members, elected members, local tourist boards and other interested organisations in support of the project. I shall arrange for detailed information to be placed in the Library of the House.
  Mr. Canavan: As independent consultants estimate that 4,000 permanent jobs and 1,500 jobs during the construction stage could be generated by the project, plus an annual injection of £55 million into the central Scotland economy, with additional benefits in terms of tourism, leisure and recreation, will my hon. Friend try to ensure that the project receives the full amount of £16.4 million requested from the European regional development fund, bearing it in mind that the total cost of

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  the millennium link is only about one tenth of that of the millennium white elephant being planned by the Dome Secretary at Greenwich?
  Mr. McLeish: I shall ignore the opportunity to comment on the latter part of my hon. Friend's contribution. We share a concern for the project. The Scottish Office supports the project. A meeting is to be held on 24 February at which the two partnerships involved will come together, so there will be an opportunity for British Waterways and Scottish Enterprise to reinforce the case made by my hon. Friend. On Thursday my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I will be able to discuss the entire millennium link with canalside Members and we can go into much greater detail with them then.

  Electronic Tagging
  Mr. Browne: How the pilot programmes of electronic tagging will be monitored and evaluated. [28078]
  Mr. McLeish: The pilot programmes of electronically monitored restriction of liberty orders will be the subject of two research projects. The first, taking place during the pilot projects, will focus on the implementation, use, impact and cost of the orders. The second will examine the long-term impact on reoffending rates.
  Mr. Browne: I welcome the addition of restriction of liberty orders to the range of orders available for community-based disposals in the court, not least because they help to move the debate about law and order in Scotland on beyond the Tory obsession with gaols and longer prison sentences. Is it the Government's intention that RLOs will be used as a true alternative to prison sentences, and if so, how do the Government intend to get that view across to sentencers?
  Mr. McLeish: My hon. Friend is right. RLOs will be an alternative to custody, but as with the English pilots, will not be exclusively so. That is part of the Government's programme to develop robust, tough alternatives to custody in the community. We have the community service order and the supervised attendance order, we will move on to drug treatment and testing orders, and now we have the restriction of liberty orders. As part of the co-operative exercise in implementing the RLOs, we will be having further discussions with all sections of the criminal justice system, and information will be provided to the courts, but ultimately it is for the sentencers to decide. Our task is to put before them a wide and comprehensive package from which they can choose appropriate, value-for-money and tough sentences in the community.
  Mr. Wray: Given that the question deals with prisoners and crime, I wish to ask a specific question relating to two prisoners, T. C. Campbell and Joseph Steele. Will my hon. Friend answer a question regarding section 124 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996? [Interruption.] I will ask my question if I am given a chance to speak.
  Madam Speaker: Order. Hon. Members must let the hon. Gentleman put his question. It appears to relate to a
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  constituency case with which the Minister is probably not familiar at this stage, but the Minister is indicating that he will respond.
  Mr. Wray: My hon. Friend the Minister is well aware of the case. Under section 124 of the 1996 Act, the former Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Forsyth, released the two prisoners more than a year ago. The criminal appeal court, however, made a different decision under section 17 of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997. In view of new evidence, would my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland consider acting under section 124 of the 1996 Act?
  Mr. McLeish: The changes in the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act were carefully drafted with the intention of achieving a balance between protecting witnesses and allowing a review when circumstances warrant it. We will study the judgments in the Campbell and Steele case, but it would be wrong to rush into decisions on the effectiveness of the new provisions. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will, however, consider any fresh petitions submitted to him.

  LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT

    Queen's Counsel
    Mr. Mullin: What assessment he has made of the advantages of phasing out QCs; and if he will make a statement. [28098]
    The Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): My noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor has no plans at present to phase out Queen's Counsel.
    Mr. Mullin: What is the purpose of QCs, except as a device for perpetuating restrictive practices and artificially inflating fees?
    Mr. Hoon: Like my hon. Friend, I have the advantage of having recently read a publication called "Silk Cut: Are Queen's Counsel Necessary?". Chapter 7 considers a number of reform possibilities, and chapter 8 advocates outright abolition. I am sure that the Lord Chancellor would welcome hon. Members' views on whether any of the possibilities should be implemented.
    Mr. Ian Bruce: Surely what must worry the House is the attempt to phase out the most distinguished QC, namely the Lord Chancellor. Is it not strange that three Ministers who are patrons of an organisation called PressWise should write to hon. Members today to back up the Lord Chancellor in his bid to ensure that the issue of privacy goes before the courts, and that we pass the Human Rights Bill with its provision to control the press? Will the Minister back up his boss by retaining this matter in the Lord Chancellor's Department?
    Mr. Hoon: I would be delighted to try to answer the hon. Gentleman's question, but, as I am sure he realises, his supplementary has nothing to do with the main question, or indeed with the Department in which I am a Minister.

    Convention on the Abduction of Children
    Mr. Gareth Thomas: If he will make a statement on the working of the Hague convention on the abduction of children. [28100]
    Mr. Hoon: The 1980 Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction provides for the return of children who have been wrongfully removed from, or wrongfully retained away from, their country of habitual residence. More than 40 states are party to the convention, which came into force in the United Kingdom in 1986. It has been of significant benefit to the UK in securing the return of abducted children.
    Mr. Thomas: I am grateful for that response. Given the draconian nature of orders made under the convention, will my hon. Friend consider implementing a review to ensure consistency and uniformity in its implementation among states that are signatories?
    Mr. Hoon: I thank my hon. Friend for his question, and for his representations about the matter on earlier occasions.
    The Government are generally satisfied with the operation of the convention, but when issues arise either generally or bilaterally they are discussed at the appropriate level through judicial and administrative channels. I am confident that that is the best way of securing a better and fairer system. The Government participate fully in mechanisms for reviewing the operation of international conventions relating to child abduction, both internationally and bilaterally. Such work involves the alignment of different jurisdictions and different traditions of law and society and inevitably involves difficulty.

    Legal Aid
    Mr. Gale: When he next proposes to meet (a) the chairman of the Bar Council and (b) the president of the Law Society to discuss legal aid. [28101]
    Mr. Hoon: I am meeting the chairman of the Bar Council on 9 March and the president of the Law Society on 11 March to discuss the Government's proposed reforms of civil legal aid.
    Mr. Gale: When the Minister meets them, will he discuss the proposed blend between legal aid and conditional fees? Does he not consider that the Lord Chancellor's speech made last autumn, relating to the prospect of conditional fees being introduced by 1 April, is now dependent on a total shambles? Would it not have been advisable for the Lord Chancellor to discuss the proposals with consumers and the professional groups involved? Has he not made a cardinal error?
    Mr. Hoon: The Government have consulted widely, and, indeed, have been consulting ever since the Lord Chancellor outlined the proposals some four months ago. We have received a number of thoughtful and helpful suggestions as to how to take the proposals forward. We shall publish soon a consultation paper based on
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    those suggestions and listen to the responses to it. By the time the proposals are put before Parliament, we expect there to have been at least seven months of consultation.
    Mr. Skinner: Is my hon. Friend aware that it is difficult to sell the argument about cutting legal aid and changing it quite dramatically for people who in many cases need it? Does he accept that it is made even more difficult by the fact that the Lord Chancellor is not helping matters along either? He is supposed to be the brightest brain in the legal profession, but his political judgment seems to be lacking. We cannot sell the idea when at the same time he is spending £69,000 on wallpaper and £8,000 on beds.
    Mr. Hoon: I hear my hon. Friend's remarks. Questions relating to the reform of legal aid are clearly within my departmental responsibility, but I hope that he will accept that questions relating to the expenditure on the Lord Chancellor's residence are entirely within the responsibility of the House of Lords.
    Mr. Burnett: One major disadvantage of replacing much legal aid with conditional fees is that they pitch the interests of the client not only against those of the lawyer but against those of the insurer, if there is one. What investigation is the Department making into establishing a contingency legal aid fund to fill the void in access to justice for middle-income Britain?
    Mr. Hoon: That was one of the helpful suggestions that we received from the Bar Council and the Law Society. We are considering carefully the suggestions that have been made. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will await the publication of the consultation paper so that he can see how we propose to deal with the helpful suggestions that have been made.
    Mr. Waterson: Will the Minister confirm that,.after the consultation, he will be prepared to look carefully again at the proposals, which not only reduce access to justice for poorer litigants but would deprive those same litigants of much of the fruits of their litigation? Does he accept that it would have been a lot better to have had proper consultation before announcing the proposals rather than afterwards?
    Mr. Hoon: The Lord Chancellor made it quite clear in his speech in October, in which he outlined the proposals that we are discussing, that we would contemplate the withdrawal of legal aid only where there were adequate means to ensure that the great majority of our citizens had access to the courts. That remains the case. That principle will condition all the proposals that we introduce.
    Mr. Gerald Howarth: What progress he is making with the introduction of his legal aid reforms. [28102]
    Mr. Hoon: A consultation paper will be published in the next few weeks setting out the Government's proposals for the extension of the conditional fee scheme and for changes to the scope of civil legal aid. Decisions will not be made about the reforms to be introduced until the responses to the consultation paper have been fully considered.
    Mr. Howarth: The Lord Chancellor told the Law Society last year that he intended to introduce these

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    proposals by 1 April. Is not the policy in a complete shambles? Would it not be better if the Minister's noble and learned Friend spent more time dealing with the needs of people on middle incomes, who are concerned about these proposals, rather than, as the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) said, spending taxpayers' money lining his apartment? Does the Minister understand that the gross arrogance of his boss, the Lord Chancellor, is a grave embarrassment to the Government?
    Mr. Hoon: I have already explained to the House that the Government have embarked on a detailed consultation process. We have received helpful suggestions to which we have given serious consideration. Before we act on them, we shall produce yet another consultation document, which will allow people to make representations on the Government's intentions. The matter will then be placed before Parliament, which will allow a further debate. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied that the process is exhaustive, if not exhausting, and takes account of all the affected interests.
    Rev. Martin Smyth: Has the Department considered the problem faced by people who have had to take legal aid to defend themselves against malicious claims that have eventually been withdrawn, who have then lost the money that they had to pay up front for that legal aid? Surely those people should be proteced.
    Mr. Hoon: We are aware of the particular position of defendants in the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman describes. I hope that he will be satisfied by the reference to that problem in the consultation paper.

    Legal Profession (Tax Treatment)
    Mr. John M. Taylor: What discussions he has had with the Treasury concerning its proposals to change the tax treatment of the legal profession. [28104]
    Mr. Hoon: It would not be appropriate for me to comment on any discussions that may have taken place within Government.
    Mr. Taylor: I sincerely hope that, despite that smokescreen of an answer, the Minister argued with the Treasury that the tax changes will have a discouraging effect on young practitioners and new entrants to the profession. Did he make that argument?
    Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman knows that my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary announced the proposal well in advance of any Budget determination, precisely so that the professions could be consulted, and so that any representations made about the effects of the proposal could be considered. The hon. Gentleman is surely aware that such representations have been made, and I am sure that my hon. Friend will take them into account.

    Mortgage Repossessions
    Mr. Kidney: What assessment he has made on the basis of the last 12 months' figures of the trend in mortgage repossession cases being filed at court and possession orders being made. [28105]
    Mr. Hoon: The trend is downwards. In 1997, fewer mortgage possession actions were issued and fewer possession orders made than in each of the previous two years.
    Mr. Kidney: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for pointing out that the figures are down. Nevertheless, every repossession represents a personal tragedy, and the figures are still shamefully high compared with previous periods under a Labour Government when the number of mortgage repossessions was tiny. Will he confirm that that shows the need to manage the economy properly to avoid periods of boom and bust, so that people are not thrown out of their homes as a consequence of the mismanagement of the economy? Has not Labour promised to talk to the mortgage industry about more flexible mortgages, and will he confirm that that may be a way forward to avoid such tragedies happening again?
    Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his suggestions. Ministerial colleagues with direct responsibility for housing matters are considering those questions as part of the detailed housing comprehensive spending review that is being undertaken by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions with the Department of Social Security. I assure my hon. Friend that the outcome of their considerations will be announced to the House in due course.

    Public Records
    Mr. Baker: What steps he is taking to make available in the Public Record Office documents between 20 and 30 years old. [28106]
    Mr. Hoon: Our proposals for freedom of information, set out in the White Paper, "Your Right to Know", will enable more records to be released before they are 30 years old. There will be a legal right of access to official documents of any date, except where disclosure would cause harm to specified interests or would be against the public interest. Whether disclosure would cause harm will be a matter for an independent commissioner.
    Mr. Baker: I welcome that response and the Government's work on freedom of information. May I commend to the Minister a Bill that would reduce the period from 30 years to 20 years and that was afforded the luxury of three minutes' discussion on 30 January? I hope that the Government will see the merit of that Bill and help it through on 27 March.
    Mr. Hoon: I have had the considerable advantage of reading the hon. Gentleman's proposals. Of course, they will be considered carefully.

    Law Centres
    Mr. Goggins: What plans he has to improve the funding of law centres [28107]
    Mr. Hoon: Law centres are primarily funded by local authorities. In addition, nine law centres currently receive

    893
    grants under the Legal Aid Act 1988, and all law centres employing appropriately qualified solicitors can be paid through the legal aid green form scheme for the advice and assistance they provide. In August 1997, following changes approved by Parliament, the Legal Aid Board extended its pilot for the provision of advice and assistance by not-for-profit advice agencies, to allow the funding of salaried lawyers at law centres.
    Mr. Goggins: I thank my hon. Friend for that answer, which clearly demonstrates the complex way in which law centres are funded. In view of the need for impartiality and, in poorer areas, the growing need for access to free
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    legal services, will he consider reverting to the original idea? Is he prepared to fund law centres directly from his Department?
    Mr. Hoon: I cannot commit the Department to funding the entire costs of law centres, but I hope that my hon. Friend will be pleased to hear about a number of developments. In particular, the green form scheme will be replaced with fixed-price contracts by the end of 1999. The Government intend to introduce contracts generally for publicly funded legal services once the necessary legislation is in place. It will be open to law centres, along with other suppliers of legal services, to seek contracts. I am sure that that will improve their funding position.

Human Rights Bill
3.31 pm
Mr. Ian Bruce: On a point of order, Madam Speaker. Yesterday, the Home Secretary made a statement on the amendments that were to be made to the Human Rights Bill. Today, along with other hon. Members, I received a letter from an organisation called PressWise, which has as its patrons three Ministers—one at the Department of Social Security, one at the Department for Education and Employment and one at the Northern Ireland Office—decrying such amendments to the Bill. Have any of those three Departments asked to make a statement on control of the press, as it is most confusing when the Government give us one message and we get another in the post?
Madam Speaker: I have not been approached by any Minister seeking to make a statement today.

School Buses (Safety)
3.32 pm
Mr. Malcolm Bruce: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to introduce safety regulations for school buses; and for connected purposes.
Like many hon. Members, over the years, I have received many representations on school bus safety. I commend the present and previous Governments for all that has been done in recent years to reduce the number of deaths and serious injuries. Nevertheless, all hon. Members will agree that there are still too many accidents and injuries. Parents who see their children heading off to the school bus, especially in rural areas, are understandably anxious that everything possible is being done to eliminate the dangers that their children face.
Safety measures introduced in recent years have helped to reduce dramatically the number of fatalities and serious injuries on our roads, in spite of the substantial increase in traffic. The numbers killed have dropped from more than 5,500 per annum in the first half of the 1980s to around 3,500 per annum today. The numbers seriously injured have fallen from around 75,000 to around 45,000 per annum. They are still too high, but there has been a considerable reduction. The total number of injuries, however, has remained about the same, so we have reduced the severity of accidents rather than their absolute number by a combination of technology and road safety measures, with which the Bill is primarily concerned.
The specific record for buses shows a fairly static pattern, but, as all hon. Members will know, the worst accidents and near misses tend to be widely publicised and cause a great deal of public concern and dismay. To a greater or lesser extent, in recent years the Government have taken action on the issues on which I am focusing attention, but there is now clear scope for a consolidating Bill to strengthen and extend safety measures.
I think that everyone—not only hon. Members but the public—is aware, either by visiting north America or by seeing them on television or at the movies, of the highly distinctive north American school buses, which are black and orange-yellow with flashing lights. The north American experience may not be entirely appropriate for the UK, but I believe that we can learn from it.
School buses should have clear and prominent markings. Currently, school buses are required to display a black and yellow sign depicting two children. I argue that those signs are not very prominent, and that they are not always removed when the bus is not on school business. Buses are also allowed to use their hazard flashers to indicate that they are picking up or setting down, but there is little evidence that many do.
I therefore suggest in the Bill that buses must be more prominently and distinctively marked. Even if signs are removable, they should be impossible to miss. Buses carrying schoolchildren should be unmistakeable. Additional warnings and road safety rules should apply when buses are picking up or setting down. For that reason, prominent and distinctive flashing lights, mounted front and rear, should give a clear warning that a bus is stopping, stationary or moving off, and also in which direction it is travelling.
When lights are flashing, it should be illegal to overtake a school bus. The reasons for that seem to be clear. Although it is preferable to encourage children to wait for

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the bus to move off, leaving clear vision, the fact is that very often children getting off a bus attempt to cross the road quickly, when they may be hidden from view by the bus itself. I therefore believe that a prohibition on overtaking would reduce the accident risk in those circumstances. I argue also that traffic approaching from the opposite direction should be required to slow down to no more than 20 mph and be prepared to stop.
I can testify that—according to the police on duty at the time—in the past two or three years, one fatality in my constituency might have been averted had those regulations been in place and enforced.
In the past couple of years, another experiment has been conducted in my constituency which has been largely successful. Variable speed limit signs have been installed outside Kintore primary school, on the A96—which is the main Aberdeen to Inverness road. When children are arriving or leaving the school in the morning, at lunchtime and in the afternoon, the signs are changed from 30 to 20 mph. At those times, buses and cars are parked outside the school.
I have myself observed—I was there last Friday—that most traffic does observe the limit; everyone is much more alert to the possibility of children leaving the school; and the school crossing patrol and children have more safe opportunities to cross the road. The Government also believe that the experiment has been broadly successful and will be encouraging its wider use where appropriate, taking account of local factors.
There has been a long campaign in the House, after some tragic and widely publicised accidents, to ensure the fitting of seat belts in school buses. The Government have introduced regulations requiring the fitting of seat belts in minibuses registered after 1988. It seems reasonable to rule that only minibuses that are capable of being safely fitted with seat belts may be used as school buses, and that seat belts should be so fitted.
It is extraordinary that other buses are subject to no such regulation. Indeed, there is no requirement for seat belts in coaches and buses, and children can even travel standing on buses. It is reasonable eventually to require safety restraints for all our children, as advocated by BUSK—the belt up school kids campaign.
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I have discussed the proposals in the Bill with those at ROSPA—the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents—who told me that they represent a significant contribution to school bus safety.
I believe that the improvements that we have had—which I have welcomed—in recent years have been piecemeal and remain incomplete. It really is time to consolidate and to make it clear that there is no compromise in our determination to adopt practical measures to make school buses safer.
I accept that no rules will legislate for the idiots or for the negligent: there must be no let-up in vigilance and road safety campaigns that make everyone aware of the dangers. Children must continue to be warned to take every care when crossing the road, whatever regulations are in place. A couple of weeks ago, a truck failed to observe the speed restrictions in Kintore and came within inches of killing the school crossing patrol. Not surprisingly, she has now terminated her employment.
I do not believe that these regulations are a guarantee of absolute safety—I do not pretend they are—but if they were in place, they would reduce risk, accidents and casualties. We must create a culture of care. We must monitor closely how the regulations are working, and we must enforce them. A spokesman from ROSPA told me that a number of the changes introduced in recent years have simply not been monitored to see how effective they are, and how they can be enhanced and improved. I would argue that we need to bring all the measures together.
I am pleased to say that my Bill has attracted support from all parties in the House, and I commend it to the Government and the House. I hope it will lay the foundations for greater safety for school buses and for our children on their journeys to and from school for now and for the coming years.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Malcolm Bruce, Mr. Don Foster, Mr. Gareth Thomas, Mr. Graham Brady, Mrs. Margaret Ewing, Mr. Phil Willis, Mr. David Stewart, Mr. Cynog Dafis, Mr. Peter Bottomley and Mr. James Wallace.

School Buses (Safety)
Mr. Malcolm Bruce accordingly presented a Bill to introduce safety regulations for school buses; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 20 March, and to be printed [Bill 122].

Iraq
Madam Speaker: I must tell the House that I have selected the amendment standing in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, and I must limit speeches between 7 pm and 9 pm to 10 minutes.
3.41 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Robin Cook): I beg to move,
That this House condemns the continuing refusal of Iraq to comply with its obligations under the relevant post-ceasefire UN Security Council Resolutions, by allowing UNSCOM to carry out without restrictions the required inspections of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes; believes that these programmes represent a continuing threat to international peace and stability; fully supports the efforts of the Government to reach a diplomatic solution to the present confrontation with Iraq within the framework of these Security Council Resolutions; and expresses its full support also for the resolve of the Government to use all necessary means to achieve an outcome consistent with these Resolutions.
This debate takes place at a critical moment in our confrontation with Saddam Hussein. We still seek a peaceful end to the dispute. Military action is not inevitable. We do not want to take military action, and we would willingly stand down our forces if we can secure our objectives by diplomacy.
It is Saddam—not us—who has refused to engage in the diplomatic efforts to find a solution. He persists in refusing to accept that all sites must be open to inspection. In particular, he is still insisting that inspections of the so-called "presidential" sites must be one-off visits, rather than continuing inspections. At no point during this crisis has he ever put in writing the offers of a compromise which others claim he has made.
We are keeping the door to peace as wide open as possible for as long as is reasonable. Britain believes that Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, should visit Baghdad to explore whether there is a basis for securing Saddam's agreement to the resumption of effective inspections by the United Nations Special Commission.
Until late last night, the permanent five members of the Security Council met to agree on a common position which would provide the brief for the Secretary-General's discussions with Saddam. Discussions centred on a text drafted by Britain, and I believe that all quarters of the House can be proud that, throughout the present crisis, Britain has taken the lead in drafting work at the UN.
I am pleased to tell the House that the remaining areas where agreement has not been reached are narrowing and we are hopeful that an agreed conclusion can be reached later today, after the representatives at New York have had an opportunity to consult their capitals. I am therefore optimistic that we can secure an agreed authority for the Secretary-General to travel to Baghdad. I cannot express the same confidence to the House about the prospects for his success in Baghdad. That will depend entirely on whether Saddam is willing to take seriously the visit of the most senior UN official, and whether Saddam is ready to recognise that any agreement must be fully consistent with the UN resolutions.
We want a diplomatic agreement. We also want an agreement that will be lasting. We are willing to entertain a solution to the dispute over the presidential palaces
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through which UNSCOM inspectors might be accompanied by diplomatic representatives. We have never resisted a solution that would result in what has become known as "UNSCOM-plus". What we cannot accept is an "UNSCOM-minus" solution. There can be no agreement that compromises the ability of UNSCOM to carry out effective inspections without restrictions, without time limits, and without no-go areas. That is our bottom line.
We do not draw the line there because of diplomatic nicety. Even less do we draw it there because, as was put to me in an interview this morning, we are concerned with saving face. We draw the line there because UNSCOM's job is to prevent Saddam acquiring weapons that could wipe out whole cities. A gutted UNSCOM could not do that job.
UNSCOM and the associated inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency have scored major successes in reducing the capacity of Saddam to threaten the stability of the region and the peace of the world. They have halted his long-range missile programme, which could have brought Europe within range of Saddam's arsenals, and they have dismantled the nuclear programme, which could have given him an atomic bomb. Through a process of inspection and verified destruction, the UNSCOM inspectors have demolished more weapons capability than was destroyed by the allied forces during the Gulf war.
However, there were four areas in the original mandate given to UNSCOM. It has yet to secure the same success in dismantling Saddam's capability in the other two areas—chemical and biological weapons.
The germ and nerve gas weapons that Saddam is known to covet would be lethal to whole cities. The volume on which Saddam hopes to produce such weapons is on such an irrational scale that it leaves frightening questions over his intentions.
Saddam has not accounted to UNSCOM for 600 tonnes of chemical precursors for the VX nerve agent. That would be sufficient to produce 200 tonnes of the agent itself. One drop of VX is enough to kill.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: Are we clear about what would happen if a bomb or a missile hit such a stockpile?
Mr. Cook: We are entirely clear about the dangers of hitting such a stockpile. That is why we have taken great care in our targeting plan to ensure that we do not hit such completed weapons. There are many points on the supply chain that can be interdicted. Saddam has the capability in the form of chemical precursors. He needs large equipment to turn it into the final form. Those points in the supply chain could be interdicted without any risk to human life, and would set Saddam back many years in acquiring the capacity to threaten human life in the Gulf.
Saddam's biological weapons programme goes in parallel with his chemical weapons programme. It is dominated by anthrax. UNSCOM estimates that Iraq has the equipment and the growth agents to produce 350 litres per week—enough to fill two more missile warheads each week. Saddam is also known to have sought to acquire at least two other forms of biological weapon—the

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botulinum toxin, which kills over a week by progressive paralysis, and the bacterium Clostridium, which causes gas gangrene and produces the most painful death of all three.
Mr. Alex Salmond: Will the Foreign Secretary address a point which I know concerns even those of us who do not believe that doing nothing is an option? That is that the present course of action might result in the bombing of Iraq and the inevitable risk of civilian casualties; and that the position of Saddam Hussein might be entrenched in Iraq, his capacity to oppress his own people unimpaired and his capacity to threaten others only set back if not removed. Will the Foreign Secretary address that real concern?
Mr. Cook: Yes, I assure the hon. Gentleman that I shall address that at some length in my speech. Since he has raised the questions at this point, I shall make two points in response to him. If military force had to be used—the objective of our policy is to try to find a solution without it—Saddam most certainly would not be strengthened. He stays in power by military power and force. He should be under no illusion that that military power would be hard hit in the event of a military strike. I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman said about doing nothing not being an option, but walking away from the crisis and leaving Saddam in possession of such weapons would not be a peaceful outcome, either. It would only guarantee that the peace of the region was broken at a future date when Saddam felt strong enough.
Mr. Chris Mullin: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Cook: Yes, but then I must return to my speech.
Mr. Mullin: Has my right hon. Friend seen reports that Saddam has taken some of his weapons to third countries such as Libya, Yemen and Sudan? Is there any truth in that?
Mr. Cook: I am not aware of those reports. It would be a very difficult transfer to effect. I shall certainly make inquiries about my hon. Friend's allegations, although we are not aware of any evidence at the moment to support the claim. He is of course correct to draw attention to the fact that the weapons could potentially be easily transported—if Saddam were able to acquire them—and the threat could spread well beyond the immediate neighbours of Iraq.
Mr. Jeremy Corbyn: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Cook: No, I said that I would return to my speech—if my hon. Friend will allow me.
It is important that we remember that, with Saddam, the use of such weapons is not merely theoretical. He used mustard gas extensively in the Iran-Iraq war against fellow Muslims. Next month will see the 10th anniversary of his most notorious use of chemical weapons, when he wiped out the entire town of Halabja and its population of 5,000 Iraqi Kurds with a mixture of nerve and cyanide gases. The great majority of those who were killed that
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day were women, children and elderly men who were not under arms. That fact demonstrates that the weapons are not legitimate weapons of military defence. They are weapons of terror for use against civilian populations.
It is for that reason that Britain, like most other nations, signed up to the chemical and biological weapons conventions, which outlaw the production or use of such weapons. Those international agreements will be pointless if we allow the weapons that we have tried to ban to be retained in the hands of Saddam Hussein. Saddam himself, as a condition of the ceasefire, pledged to abandon his attempts to build an arsenal of mass destruction. He accepted the UNSCOM inspectors as the means of verifying that he had fulfilled his own undertakings. Far from honouring his commitments, Saddam has persistently sought to defeat the inspectors by an organised conspiracy of deception and concealment. As one paper noted at the weekend, he has woven not so much a tissue, as a wall-to-wall tapestry, of concealment.
Three years ago, Iraqi defectors brought with them evidence of a co-ordinated and sustained programme of concealment by Saddam of his chemical and biological weapons. Since then, UNSCOM has attempted to uncover the key points in the supply chain of those weapons programmes. It has been met by determined obstruction of its work. In the 18 months to November 1997, UNSCOM sought access to 63 sites where it believed that concealment was taking place. It was obstructed and delayed from carrying out inspections at 38 sites. It was flatly refused access to a further 14 sites. In other words, Iraq complied with its obligation to permit prompt access at only one in five of the sites under suspicion. As Richard Butler, the executive chairman of UNSCOM, noted:
"Saddam avoids answering questions and prevents UNSCOM from finding the answers."
Against that background, it is wholly false for Iraqi diplomats to appear on television pretending to be the reasonable party, which wants only to discuss some matters of detail. The only reason why, seven years after the Gulf war, the UNSCOM regime and the sanctions to enforce it are still in place is that Saddam has never reconciled himself to dismantling his weapons of mass destruction, and has persistently done everything he can to frustrate the inspections.
The current dispute over the presidential sites shows how unreasonable Saddam's demands can be. The compounds around the presidential palaces are vast, and are typically home to the very organisations that oversee his military and weapons programmes. It is a measure of the magnitude of these sites that the UN has had to dispatch a special team to Iraq to map them. We understand that their total land mass may be 70 sq km. No inspection regime can be effective if Saddam is allowed to punch such big black holes in the area where UNSCOM's writ runs.
The number and size of the presidential compounds exposes as fraudulent the Iraqi propaganda that sanctions are the cause of the hardship and suffering of the Iraqi people.
Mr. Bernie Grant: Does my right hon. Friend recall that, after Saddam was defeated in the Gulf war, he set fire to all the oilfields in Kuwait in an act of spite? If, as my right hon. Friend says, Saddam has anthrax and chemical weapons, I suspect that he would

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unleash them on the rest of the region if he were defeated again. Does my right hon. Friend agree that, if that is the case, war should be the very last resort, and every effort should be made to secure a diplomatic solution to this crisis?
Mr. Cook: I have absolutely no difficulty in agreeing with my hon. Friend's punch line. All Labour Members—and, I think, all Opposition Members—agree that military force should be used only as the last resort. We are exploring every possible avenue to achieve a diplomatic solution, which is why we strongly back the visit to Baghdad of Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If, however, he goes to Baghdad to discuss in good faith with Saddam Hussein the possibility of finding a diplomatic solution, but is unable to persuade him to reach a meaningful agreement, we are nearing the point of last resort.
Mr. Tony Benn: The Government's motion clearly expresses the hope of a peaceful settlement. However, if it is carried and Kofi Annan's visit is a failure, the Government will have the authority of the House to use force. Is my right hon. Friend prepared to table such a motion in the Security Council authorising the use of force? If so, can he assure the House that the five permanent members would agree to it, as required by the United Nations charter?
Mr. Cook: I cannot guarantee what other permanent members of the Security Council will do—I can speak only for Britain. However, I can certainly confirm that Britain very much wants a further resolution in the Security Council. Indeed, for the past two weeks, we have been negotiating the draft of such a text with the other permanent members and with a number of the non-permanent members, from which we have received overwhelming support.
We believe that, whatever the outcome of Kofi Annan's visit to Baghdad—even if he secures agreement—it will be prudent to introduce a further resolution to ensure that any agreement is codified before the Security Council, so that we are all, including Saddam Hussein, quite clear about what he has agreed to.
Mr. Michael Colvin: On legitimacy, the use of force is authorised by Security Council resolution 687. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm that 687 also reaffirms resolution 678, which authorised Operation Desert Storm? Is he happy that that authorisation covers the use of ground troops as well as air strikes? Some of us are concerned that air strikes alone will not be enough to bring about a satisfactory conclusion of military conflict, if that is the way that we have to go.
Mr. Cook: Neither we, the United States nor any other member of the United Nations have any plans to deploy ground troops. My hon. Friend is correct: resolution 687 is a ceasefire resolution—in other words, it sets out the terms of the ceasefire of the Gulf war, and that is the ceasefire that Saddam Hussein is breaking, which in turn gives rise to a legal interpretation about authority. Having said that, our view is very strong. There should be a further Security Council resolution to demonstrate to Saddam and the rest of the world that any action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom has the support of an international consensus.
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As I said, it is Saddam Hussein, not sanctions, who is responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people. There are no sanctions against the import of food or medicine. Those are in short supply in Iraq because Saddam's first priorities are his presidential sites and his weapons programmes.
Unlike Saddam, we are neither afraid of the Iraqi people nor are we foe to them. On the contrary, Britain has continuously been in the lead at the United Nations to increase the oil-for-food programme. I am pleased to tell the House that we intend to table before the Security Council this week our resolution more than doubling the volume of that programme, and we are confident that it will be adopted. It enables Iraq sharply to increase the oil revenues that it can earn, but they must be earmarked for humanitarian purposes, and they will be closely monitored to ensure that they are not diverted from food and medicine into the military machine or internal repression.
Mr. Corbyn: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Cook: I will give way to my hon. Friend on this occasion, but I must make progress, and this may be the last intervention.
Mr. Corbyn: Can my right hon. Friend confirm that, under the current arrangement, only half the value of the oil sold under the oil-for-medicines-and-food programme is spent on medicines and food, and that the rest is taken by the oil companies and the United Nations itself?
Mr. Cook: No, I cannot confirm any such thing. The receipts from that programme are closely monitored. It is not merely food and medicine—about that, my hon. Friend is right—as Saddam Hussein is allowed to purchase equipment that would help him to restore water supplies and to provide for other humanitarian forms of relief. The problem has been that the Iraqi regime has constantly obstructed the programme. Indeed, when the original oil-for-food programme came on stream, the Iraqi regime undercut much of its value by making an offset reduction in its contribution to the rations of the Iraqi people.
Today, we will have a frank and open debate. The House will weigh carefully the gravity of the situation and the complexities of achieving an acceptable solution. Those in the House who may agree with the Government on our objectives, but disagree with the Government on our tactics will be free to deploy their arguments.
Of course, we would not be having this debate at all if Saddam allowed one tenth of that freedom and democracy to his own people. He does not do so because he knows that, if he did, he would be toppled. Any statement critical of Saddam Hussein is punishable by death under Iraqi law.
Mr. Nicholas Soames: Just like the Labour party.
Mr. Cook: That was a flippant response to what is a very serious question for the Iraqi people. Saddam and his family remain in power through force and fear. He even murdered both his sons-in-law when they disagreed with him.

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If any hon. Member doubts the brutality of Saddam's regime, I invite them to study the report of Max van der Stoel, the UN special rapporteur on Iraq, who only last November described the human rights situation there as "terrible", and concluded:
"the system of military dictatorship effectively requires that human rights violations occur in order to retain the positions and privileges of those in power."
His report describes the use of murder by the internal security forces as routine. Since that report only last November, Iraqi security forces have shot 1,200 prisoners, following a directive from Saddam's son to reduce prison overcrowding.
I began by stressing that we would prefer a peaceful solution to the crisis, but, as I have said, a solution that left Saddam with his present capability would not be a peaceful solution. Saddam Hussein has already used such weapons in the past. If we leave him in possession of those weapons, sooner or later he will use them again. That is why, while seeking a diplomatic solution, we continue to prepare for the use of military force if necessary.
The task of UNSCOM is to find and destroy Saddam's chemical and biological weapons. If we cannot get agreement that enables UNSCOM to do that task effectively on the ground, we are ready to do it by air power. Saddam should not doubt our resolve, nor should he doubt that, in the event of military action, his military power base would be hit hard. The air power now in place in the Gulf is substantial.
There has been some recent speculation that Saddam might retaliate with chemical or biological weapons. Our assessment is that the threat of such retaliation is low, and it would be difficult for him to square any such retaliation with his continual claim that he does not possess any such weapons. As in 1991, he should be in no doubt that, if he were to do so, there would be a proportionate response.
To those who want us to rule out military action now, I warn them that that would make it impossible for us to achieve a satisfactory diplomatic solution. Saddam has a history of backing down under pressure. The more clearly we demonstrate that we are ready to use force, the better the chance we will have of securing the diplomatic solution that all reasonable people would prefer.
That message is widely understood throughout the international community. The majority of our European partners have recognised that the twin tracks of intensive diplomatic efforts, backed by the pressure of military preparations, offer the best prospect of a satisfactory solution. At the informal meeting of the European General Affairs Council last week, the majority of the countries present supported that approach. Germany, Portugal and the Netherlands have all offered support facilities for military preparations.
All the countries of the Gulf peninsula have been visited by me or another British Minister. Our diplomatic success is reflected in the strong communiqué issued by the Gulf Co-operation Council at the end of last week, which
"stressed that the current crisis has been created by the Iraqi regime alone",
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and concluded that Iraq alone must bear responsibility for
"the severe results"
of what might happen as a consequence of what the council described as
"Iraqi intransigence".
Dr. Jenny Tonge: I thank the Minister of State for giving way. How far will it be possible for the Government, the Government of the United States and the United Nations fully to inform the Iraqi people of the situation and ensure that they know what is being said over here, and do not just have to listen to the propaganda of Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Cook: I hope that the hon. Lady does not know something about my demotion that has not yet been notified to me. To respond to her precise point, we have made all reasonable efforts to make sure that that message is heard in Iraq. Indeed, I made a point of spending an hour on television in Kuwait when I visited the Gulf, in the full knowledge that its broadcasts can be received throughout Iraq.
I will not deny to the hon. Lady that it is extremely difficult for us to get past the censorship of Saddam Hussein. The one thing that he cannot censor from his own people is their clear knowledge of the degree of oppression, hardship and brutality that he imposes upon them. We note that he has not had the courage to appear in public in Iraq for a long time now.
Mr. George Galloway: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Cook: In view of my hon. Friend's long interest in the matter, I shall give way, but it must be the last time I do so.
Mr. Galloway: I am most grateful to the Foreign Secretary. Can he say how free the debate was in the Parliaments of those countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council that have even the pretence of Parliaments? How free was the debate in the mass media of the countries that belong to that council? Have any of the Governments of the member countries of that council supported his plan to bomb Iraq?
Mr. Cook: I quoted at length from the strong and tough statement of the Gulf Co-operation Council, which pins clear responsibility on Saddam Hussein for any military action. My hon. Friend is well aware of the constitutional arrangements around the Gulf. I can tell him that the press conference I held in Kuwait was a vigorous one, at which I was cross-examined effectively by what were obviously extremely lively media, whatever the limitations on democratic practice elsewhere in the Gulf.
I have mentioned that we have support in Europe and understanding in the Gulf. Around the globe, we have received strong statements of public support—from Australia to Argentina in the southern hemisphere, and from Canada to Japan in the northern hemisphere. At the United Nations, we have obtained overwhelming support for our position among the non-permanent members of the Security Council, and we are working particularly closely with our European partners, Portugal and Sweden, which are currently non-permanent members. Last night's

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meeting demonstrated the wide common ground and the agreement on objectives among the permanent members of the Security Council.
That broad degree of international support underlines the other issue that is at stake in the current confrontation. It is vital that we win this confrontation because of the clear and real danger posed by Saddam's arsenals of terror; but it is also important that we win this confrontation because the authority of the UN itself is at stake. It was the UN that approved the terms of the ceasefire in the Gulf war; it was the UN that passed resolution 687, which provides the authority for UNSCOM to carry out effective inspections; and it is the UN's Secretary-General who may be about to depart for Baghdad with the full authority of the UN for his mission to get Saddam to abide by the undertakings that he gave to the UN.
If Saddam were now to be permitted to set aside all those decisions of the UN, and if we were to walk away and allow him to do so with impunity, there would be no point in invoking the power of the UN the next time we are confronted by a dictator threatening the security of his region or the lives of his people. There would be no point, because we would have allowed the authority of the UN to become another of the many casualties of Saddam Hussein.
The Government firmly believe that, in the modern world, we need a United Nations that can speak with authority for the international community, and can act effectively against those who threaten the peace of member states. That is why we are determined that Saddam Hussein must recognise the authority of the UN, by abandoning for all time his programmes for weapons of mass destruction. We ask the House to show the same resolve by backing us tonight.
4.14 pm
Mr. Michael Howard: I beg to move, To leave out from the second "Resolutions" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"fully supports the resolve of the Government to use all necessary means to achieve an outcome consistent with these Resolutions; and emphasises the importance of setting the clearest possible objectives linked to any action that might be taken.".
I am grateful to the Government for arranging this debate, for which I and others called last week. It is essential that the House has the opportunity to consider what is undoubtedly a very grave situation. No one who has taken part, as I did before the Gulf war, in a Cabinet decision to authorise military action can be insensitive to the difficult judgments that the Government have to make. We are discussing today matters of life and death.
We in the Conservative party support the stand that the Government have taken: we support their efforts to find a diplomatic solution and to keep the military options open. The Foreign Secretary has this afternoon described in detail the evil nature of the regime of Saddam Hussein. We endorse that description in full, but the justification for military action goes far beyond the evil nature of the regime. To understand that justification, it is necessary to go back to the Gulf war and its immediate aftermath.
The Gulf war was a great achievement by the international community: naked aggression was reversed and the rule of international law upheld. British Governments, under the leadership first of my right
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hon. and noble Friend Baroness Thatcher and then of my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), played a critical part in that achievement. British forces played a crucial part in the military campaign, displaying great skill in what was widely acclaimed as a campaign notable for its support, planning and execution.
However, there are different views about the outcome of the Gulf war. There are those who say that we stopped too soon, that the coalition forces should have continued to Baghdad and that Saddam Hussein should have been toppled. Others point out that there was no authority for action of that kind, that the resolution that the Security Council had then passed did not authorise it and that in the circumstances such action would have been difficult to justify. The point that links that outcome to the dilemma that we face today is this: faced with that difficulty, the Security Council did not do nothing; it did not simply abandon the area or wash its hands of the problems that remained.
The Security Council passed a resolution that formed the basis for what was intended to be a comprehensive settlement. That resolution was Security Council resolution 687 and it was adopted on 3 April 1991. It dealt with several questions that remained to be resolved in the aftermath of the Gulf war. It dealt with the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and with reparations to Kuwait. It made it clear that the trade embargo against Iraq that had been authorised by previous resolutions did not apply to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, in addition to the previously authorised exemptions for medicines and health supplies and certain foodstuffs.
The resolution also dealt with the question of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, with stocks of related materials and with ballistic missiles. It recorded that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop or acquire any of those weapons; and that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, the removal or the rendering harmless under international supervision of those stocks. In order to ensure that Iraq complied with those undertakings, the resolution authorised the formation of a special commission, which we know as UNSCOM. UNSCOM was to inspect Iraqi relevant capabilities and Iraq was to yield to UNSCOM the weapons and stocks referred to in the resolution. Those provisions were at the heart of the settlement in the aftermath of the Gulf war.
Of course, resolution 687 is not the only relevant Security Council resolution—in particular, it has to be read with the resolutions that went before it—but it sets out the basis of the settlement that was reached. It was accepted by Iraq and it represents the clearly expressed will of the international community.
Had the questions then been asked, "What happens if Saddam Hussein ignores these provisions? What happens if he reneges on these undertakings? What happens if he flouts this resolution?", it is inconceivable that the answer would have been, "We should allow him to do so with impunity."
The provisions that I have cited to the House were not empty requirements. They were not formalities. They were not meant to be taken lightly. They were not meant to be defied. They set out a real, compelling obligation. It is an obligation that must be enforced.

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It is not, of course, an abstract obligation. Since 1991, UNSCOM personnel have unearthed 48 Scud missiles, 30 chemical missile warheads, 480,000 litres of live chemical agents and a manufacturing plant designed to produce anthrax and other biological weapons. Therefore, the obligation of securing full, comprehensive and continuous access to those sites is not just an abstract question of enforcing Security Council resolutions, however important that is; it is about preventing a dangerous dictator from acquiring the means to destroy whole populations.
We have horrifying evidence of Saddam Hussein's disregard for human life. We have seen his brutal aggression against neighbouring states, against his Kurdish citizens, against his Arab citizens, against members of the Baath party, against members of his own Takriti clan—even against members of his immediate family. Such a man, armed with the capacity to cause destruction at a distance, would not hesitate to use it.
Mr. Paul Flynn: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman recall that, after repeated pleas from Labour Members, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to stop the export of the precursors of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons from this country, a previous Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, told me and the House, on 20 April 1990, that I should remember that Saddam Hussein was a signatory to the international non-proliferation treaty and that, as such, the previous Government had full confidence that he would not manufacture nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction? Should not we have at least some apology from the previous Government, who treated today's evil dictator as a trusted ally?
Mr. Howard: The truth is simple. We know now much more than we knew then. Those matters have been exhaustively canvassed since then, and if the hon. Gentleman thinks that the point that he raises has any relevance to the issues before the House this afternoon, he needs to make that clear to the House in a way in which he has not done so far.
Mr. Rhodri Morgan: Over the weekend, I read that, in 1994, an export licence was given for growth medium to be exported from this country by a British subsidiary of Unilever; the culturing mechanism to grow anthrax spores was exported from this country to Iraq. Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell the House how that was allowed?
Mr. Howard: I heard the Secretary of State for Defence reply to a question on exactly those lines on a television programme last week. He said that he would investigate those reports, and I am sure that he will. The Secretary of State also made the point that distinguishing between materials that can be used for genuine medical purposes and those that can be misused for the type of purpose to which the hon. Gentleman referred, is by no means easy. I expect that it is common ground across the House that it is sensible for us to make available materials that can be used to heal the sick in Iraq.
For the reasons that I have given, securing access to Saddam Hussein's weapons sites is, first and foremost, a measure designed to save human lives—perhaps
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millions of lives. Another reason why we support the Government's stand is that we believe that lawbreaking, terrorism and violence must never be rewarded. That is an issue of absolute principle. Every time aggression achieves its goals, or is seen to do so, the fabric of the law is torn. If a dictator can use violence to his advantage, others will be encouraged by his example.
That was the lesson of the League of Nations. It is a lesson well understood in this House and in this nation. It was in support of that principle that the United Kingdom fought for the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. It was in defence of that principle that we joined the original coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991.
Mr. Dalyell: If that principle is so immutable, why does it not apply to Israel?
Mr. Howard: I shall deal later with the comparisons frequently made between Israel and Iraq, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to exercise a little patience.
The question, then, is: how is that obligation to be enforced? There is no one in the House who would not prefer it to be enforced without military action, and without the suffering, misery and death that will inevitably accompany any such action. That is why it is so essential that every diplomatic avenue that remains should be fully and thoroughly explored. That is why, if the Secretary-General of the United Nations goes to Baghdad, he will carry with him our hopes and prayers.
Saddam Hussein has stepped back from the brink on many previous occasions; we all hope and pray that he does so again. But—it is a "but" that must be faced—if he does not, are we to walk away and content ourselves with empty gestures? Or are we to combine with our allies to take whatever action we can to enforce those solemn obligations?
We in the Conservative party believe that it is right to take such action. That is why we support the Government in the stand that they have taken. However, we make this plea: let there be no confusion or uncertainty in our objectives. Let there be no doubt or ambiguity about them.
Those objectives have in the past been expressed in different ways. The Foreign Secretary has spoken of the need to allow the UNSCOM inspectors to complete their tasks. The President of the United States has spoken of the need to reduce Saddam Hussein's ability to use weapons of mass destruction to wage war on his neighbours. The Secretary of State for Defence has spoken of weakening the ability of Saddam Hussein and his regime to survive.
The Foreign Secretary used different language again on the radio this morning. Not only do the words of those statements differ; they mean different things. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will agree with me that there must be clarity and consistency in our objectives.
Clear objectives, diplomatic, strategic and military, must be linked to the action that the Government propose to take—and they must be objectives capable of being achieved by that action. That is the purpose of the amendment on the Order Paper in the names of my right hon. Friends and myself.
However, as the Foreign Secretary will be aware, among the things that I have never sought to press him to make public are the range of military options available

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to the allies, and the specific targets of any air strikes. Ministers have, rightly, stressed the difficulty of discussing those options in public, for the obvious reason that that would alert Saddam Hussein to the allies' intentions. Given that, was it wise of the Foreign Secretary to be quite as precise as he was on the "Today" programme this morning in discussing options and targets?
I have set out the Conservative party's position. There are, however, some other matters touched upon by the Foreign Secretary with which I must deal before I finish.
Mr. Gordon Prentice: May I ask the shadow Minister, just so that I can get it clear in my own mind, whether he is suggesting that his favoured outcome would take us beyond the UN resolution, and that he seeks the removal of Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Howard: Not at all. I have not said anything that would give ground for any such supposition. Indeed, it is for the Government, with their knowledge of all the relevant factors, to define their objective with clarity and without ambiguity.
There are some matters touched upon by the Foreign Secretary with which I must deal before I finish. It is, of course, a matter of intense regret that the coalition of forces that has been assembled to enforce the will of the United Nations is not as broad as it was at the time of the Gulf war. It is a matter of particular regret that there has not been unanimous support from within the European Union. The countries of the European Union are, after all, those with which for the most part we work most closely. They are those with which we have many interests in common. It is bound, therefore, to be a matter of particular regret that notwithstanding welcome declarations of support from many of our partners, agreement across the board is lacking.
I must deal also with suggestions that are made not only in the House but by many of our friends in other parts of the world that we and the United States would in some way be guilty of double standards in taking action to enforce Security Council resolution 687—the point that the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) had in mind.
It is one thing to criticise the actions of the current Israeli Government in the context of the peace process and the lack of progress in reaching a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. We have made such criticisms and we shall continue to do so. However, it is quite another thing to attempt to equate Saddam Hussein with the democratic Government of the state of Israel. We do not believe that there is any such equation. We think that the differences should be recognised.
The Foreign Secretary was somewhat less than wholly forthcoming when he answered a question from the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) about the fresh Security Council resolution that the Foreign Secretary has mentioned to us in the past. Can we be told in the wind-up to the debate what progress the Government have made in securing it? Given what the Government have previously told us about the legal authority provided by resolution 687, what is the purpose of this resolution? What are the prospects of success in achieving it?
Mr. Galloway: Did the right hon. and learned Gentleman see the pictures last week of Mordecai
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Vanunu, the longest-serving solitary confinement prisoner in the world, being led into a courtroom in Israel with his face in an iron brace like the one for Anthony Hopkins in "The Silence of the Lambs", to prevent him from speaking out about the weapons of mass destruction in the possession of Israel? On the subject of UN resolutions, has not Israel been in breach of resolutions 242 and 338 for more than 30 years?
Mr. Howard: As I have just said, it is perfectly possible and indeed legitimate to criticise Israel for a number of its actions, but that does not mean that it is right to make the equation that the hon. Gentleman and some of his hon. Friends are wont to make between a dictator such as Saddam Hussein and the democratic Government of the state of Israel.
Mr. Gerald Kaufman: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman, as a Jew, agree with me, as a Jew, that many of the actions of the Israeli Government are disgraceful, loathsome and contemptible, but that such actions cannot be allowed to confuse or cross lines with the gross violations of the dictator who has murdered millions of people and who is ready to murder more if given the opportunity?
Mr. Howard: I have never sought to compete with the right hon. Gentleman in his command of invective. I will not follow him precisely in the first part of his question, although I have readily acknowledged that there are many aspects of the decisions that have been taken by the Government of Israel which are the object of legitimate criticism. I agree with the second part of the right hon. Gentleman's question, and he makes a telling point.
I welcome what the Foreign Secretary told us about the oil-for-food resolution. It underlines the fact that our quarrel is with Saddam Hussein and not with the Iraqi people.
I hope that when the Secretary of State for Defence winds up, he will tell us a little more about the command arrangements in the event that military action should be necessary. Will British forces on this occasion defer to overall US command? If so, will there be a right of access to a higher political level, as there was during the Gulf war? I hope that we can be enlightened during the wind-up to the debate.
As the crisis in the Gulf reaches its denouement, the Government will have difficult judgments to make. Conservative Members will be scrutinising those judgments with vigilance, as is our duty. We shall continue to insist on clear objectives linked to the means of achieving them. But, in regard to the essentials of the stand that they have taken, the Government can rely on the support of Her Majesty's Opposition.
4.34 pm
Mr. John Major: I support the Government's policy. I do so reluctantly, because the situation at present is fraught with danger; but, if diplomacy were to fail, doing nothing would be no acceptable option. For that reason, I believe that the Government deserve the support of the House at the present time.
Let me say at the outset that the present crisis is no rerun of the Gulf war. In 1990, Iraq had invaded a sovereign nation: it had invaded Kuwait. The Gulf war

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was a mission of expulsion—a mission to throw out an aggressor who had occupied a peaceful neighbouring country. On this occasion, there is a separate problem. This time, the diplomatic action—and, perhaps, the military action to follow—is to enforce international law as set out in United Nations resolutions, and to prevent something that might happen if we did not do so: to prevent the danger of a dictator continuing to develop chemical and biological weapons and the means to use them, perhaps over a wide region.
That is, for many people, a more difficult and a more subtle objective, and the risks associated with it are certainly different. The political decisions to be made, in many ways, may be more difficult than those that were to be made at the beginning of the 1990s.
I want, very briefly, to make four straightforward points. The first is to do with international support. Of course, a diplomatic solution is the preferred option: no sane person would wish for anything else, if it is available. I hope—I trust that every hon. Member hopes—that, if agreement can be reached and Kofi Annan goes to Baghdad, he will be successful. A great deal has been happening, and continues to happen, on the diplomatic front. But whether Kofi Annan's mission is successful will not depend just on what he says to Saddam Hussein; it will depend on whether Saddam Hussein is prepared to accept the will of the international community when, yet again, it is presented to him by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
There is one other element of diplomacy that I think is very important to the Gulf, and very important not just to the international community but, particularly, to the British nation. I think it absolutely essential for the Government to continue to use all our diplomatic resources to explain our policy, and to enlist support from our friends across the middle east. I know that the Foreign Secretary has had meetings in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; I know that the Prime Minister is seeing King Hussein; I know that Ministers in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office have met other Gulf and middle east leaders. All that is immensely welcome.
Let me say to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that I hope that that effort will continue. Speeches in the House—important though they are—or at the United Nations are not a substitute for continuing face-to-face contact with our allies across the Gulf to explain why we are following the policy that we are following, and what we believe the dangers would be if we were to do anything else.
We British have many long-standing friends and allies in the Gulf. They will have said to the Foreign Secretary, as they have said to many of his predecessors, that they believe that the British have a better and deeper understanding of the wider region of the middle east than many other western democratic nations. For that reason, I hope that the Government will continue to explain personally to our friends that we are not engaged in a knee-jerk reaction to Saddam Hussein, but we are concerned that there are great dangers in not upholding international law—not least to those very friends in the Gulf who are so concerned at the moment. Last time, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. No one doubts that,
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had he been successful, his next target would have been the Gulf states themselves, which are unable to resist a military might of the size of Iraq's.
There is a further point that I hope we shall emphasise on every occasion. We have no hostility to the Iraqi people or to the Iraqi nation as a whole. We have no intention—neither have the Americans, nor any other western democratic nation—of dismembering the state of Iraq now or at any stage in the future. That may seem self-evident to us in the cosiness of the United Kingdom, but it needs stating and restating all across the middle east, because, outside mosques in every middle eastern country, after every prayer meeting, a different message will be cried out daily to fuel anti-British and anti-American sentiment. We should lose no opportunity to refute that whenever we are in the middle east or have access to a middle eastern audience.
My second point is about what we delicately call collateral damage. It is a fashionable phrase. Bluntly, it means the death of innocent people in any military action that we may be forced to undertake. In our country and in the democratic west as a whole, if military targets are at risk, we move civilians away from those targets, to protect them. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein may well move people to the targets, to protect the targets themselves.
The Foreign Secretary and our other allies will be well aware of that, but if we are driven to military action, I hope that the targets will be the means of production of chemical and biological weapons, and that we shall be as cautious as possible to ensure that we are nowhere near known storehouses—I know that we have a great deal of information about where they are. Our job is to stop Saddam Hussein making more chemical weapons, not by accident to release existing stocks into the atmosphere. The whole purpose is to be able to get at those stocks and safely and securely to destroy them.
I hope that, among the military targets, we shall look at the assets of the Republican Guard and other elements of the Iraqi war machine. They are not only legitimate targets, but their destruction would weaken the apparatus of repression that has kept this man in power, abusing his position and the lives of the people in his country for too long.
My third point is, perhaps, less often examined, but should be: what will Iraq do in the present circumstances? We know little or nothing about what Iraqi intentions may be. I remember that, in the middle of the Gulf war, to our complete surprise Saddam Hussein flew a whole squadron of aircraft to Iran. We were never entirely sure why. To the best of my knowledge, it was not a smart move—he never got them back. It was wholly unexpected. He might have other surprises for us. He fired Scud missiles successfully at Israel—at Tel Aviv. We do know why he did that—to provoke a reaction; to unite Arab opinion against the west and against Israel. I am not confident that he will not do that again.
The Foreign Secretary has assessed the risk as low. I pray that he is right, but it is not a negligible risk. It could occur. For that reason, I hope that Saddam Hussein will be warned, as he was before, of massive retaliation should he attack any third country, including Israel. Those countries, including Israel, should be assured that massive retaliation will come from countries other than themselves. In those circumstances, I hope that Israel—we can all understand how difficult the decision

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would be for the Israeli Cabinet—would leave the retaliation to other people, were it to prove necessary, as it wisely did in the early 1990s. It would require restraint and bravery on the part of the Israeli Cabinet, but it is necessary. Iraq's motives would be to provoke Israel to retaliate, because if it did so, many of the Arab states would be diverted into an anti-Israeli coalition, and it would magnify the risk of a wider war.
Do not brush aside and underestimate that danger, because, quite apart from extreme Arab opinion, moderate Arab opinion is very sour indeed at present because of the total lack of progress recently in the middle east peace process. I hope that both the United States Government and our own Government will make it clear straight away that, quite apart from this dispute, it is the clear priority of our Governments to re-establish a momentum in the negotiations before that bitterness continues to sour so much of what happens across the middle east.
Mr. Dalyell: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the issue of Iran, as a visitor to Iran in October, I ask him why those who have suffered casualties of first world war proportions—one sees the war memorials to the horrendous Iran-Iraq war in every city and small place in Iran—and who have every reason to loathe Saddam Hussein, and do, still do not think that a British-American air pounding of Iraq, particularly of Karbala, An Najaf and other places of the Shi'ites, is either sensible or justified?
Mr. Major: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, who feels deeply about this issue, that is a question for the Iranians and not for me. I can answer from our point of view. Suppose that we were to do nothing. Suppose that we decided to take no action because it was too difficult or too uncomfortable, or it might go wrong—all those things could happen—and two years from now Saddam Hussein had a delivery system for chemical and biological weapons and used it. What would the House say to itself and what would history say if we knew that we had the opportunity to take action now and we chose not to? I do not suggest for a moment that this is an easy option. The Government have no easy option, and they deserve our sympathy in the decisions that they have to take, but the securest option, the option of least long-term risk, is to accept the policy on which the Government have embarked. For that reason, they have my full support.
My fourth point concerns the internal situation in Iraq—a situation that is intolerable for millions of ordinary Iraqis. We were absolutely right some years ago to allow the sale of oil for the purchase of medicines and food in Iraq. I very much regret that that was not taken up in the interests of the people of Iraq in the way that it could have been, and for the reasons that we intended it to be taken up.
I was very pleased to hear what the Foreign Secretary had to say about a new UN resolution to enable a greatly increased amount from oil revenues to be used for the benefit of the people of Iraq, but it depends on Saddam Hussein taking up the option. I wonder whether he will. Does he really regard that as the way in which he wishes to go? Based on precedent, he might well not. Therefore, I hope that we shall look again at how we might alleviate the hardship of innocent people in Iraq, if necessary through targeted, specific aid, delivered and approved
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under UN resolution—a most welcome initiative—if we can achieve it. That at least bypasses the obvious and easy block that Saddam Hussein has at present on assistance.
In 1991, in a different range of circumstances, we led the world in establishing the safe havens policy in northern Iraq. I believe that time and circumstances are right to look again at innovative and fresh ways in which we might help other people who are in great distress across Iraq. Not only does that seem right in terms of ordinary humanity, but it would emphasise our concern for the Iraqi people and strengthen support from friendly Arab leaders, who are appalled at the hardship in Iraq and fearful of it worsening. It would also have the incidental advantage, but advantage none the less, that it would massively embarrass the present Iraqi regime if the nations against which Saddam Hussein is whipping up such hatred were to seek to help the very people whom he oppresses so vilely.
We are in a miserable and dangerous situation. This is no time for jingoism: only a fool goes into battle smiling. If diplomacy fails, the Government will be faced with unpalatable choices. Do we allow Saddam Hussein to flout international law, to break his word, to build up a weapons arsenal and to increase greatly the danger of a wider middle east war? Surely that is unthinkable.
Do we accept that there are other would-be strutting dictators around the world who would be encouraged and emboldened if Saddam Hussein were to get away with turning up his nose at the rest of the world? Surely we accept that.
Ann Clwyd: A year ago, the right hon. Gentleman lent his support to a campaign to indict Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. Does he agree that whatever happens, we must focus attention on Saddam Hussein's crimes? He should appear before an international criminal court to answer for those crimes.
Mr. Major: I believed that a year ago, and I believe it just as strongly today. It applies not only to Saddam Hussein, but to other people. The sooner such an international mechanism is in place and workable, the better.
Diplomacy might not fail, because Saddam Hussein has backed away at the last minute before. From what the Foreign Secretary said, it seems that we can hang on to at least a glimmer of hope for a little while. However, if diplomacy failed, it would be right for us to use force. I do not like it: indeed, I hate it, but I know that it might have to be done. As I understand it, that is the Government's position. If so, they deserve support. I am here this afternoon to declare that they have mine.
4.51 pm
Mr. Gerald Kaufman: When the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) was Prime Minister, he had to deal with problems comparable to those with which my right hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench now have to deal, and Her Majesty's Opposition gave him their full support. Not only did the elected shadow Cabinet of the parliamentary Labour party give him its full support, so did the parliamentary Labour party, the national executive committee of the Labour party, and the Labour party conference by an eight to one vote. It is essential to draw

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the House's attention to the fact that the Labour party is pursuing the very same policies in government as it pursued in opposition.
It perplexes me that certain Labour Members have tabled an amendment that, among other things, "notes" the failure of the Iraqi Government to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The amendment does not condemn or deplore, but notes the failure of Saddam Hussein to conform to those resolutions. Clause 4 of the Labour party's constitution contains a commitment to the defence and security of the British people, and to co-operating with European institutions, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and other international bodies. The words "the United Nations" were inserted into clause 4 by one of the principal signatories to the amendment that "notes" the failure of Saddam Hussein to conform to United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The situation is clear. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. When he gained possession of Kuwait, he murdered and tortured Kuwaitis, destroyed their property, looted their homes and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr. Grant) pointed out, risked environmental catastrophe by blowing up Kuwaiti oilfields. He had previously invaded Iran, causing massive casualties both to his own population and to innocent Iranians who had never provoked any fight with him.
After Saddam Hussein gained possession of Kuwait, he launched unprovoked missile attacks on civilian populations in Saudi Arabia and Israel. He has murdered, tortured and poison-gassed countless of his own citizens.
There are many dictators and many deplorable Governments in the world today, but there is no Government whose record of murder of their own and other populations compares remotely with that of Saddam Hussein. He has violated every one of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that has been passed since 2 August 1990. More relevantly, he has violated ceasefire resolution 687. If one goes through that resolution clause by clause, one realises what he has failed or refused to do despite the specific commitment he gave when he agreed to the ceasefire in 1991.
The Security Council has affirmed all 13 resolutions that it has passed since 2 August 1990. Let us put on record in Hansard what Saddam Hussein accepted in the ceasefire resolution. He accepted unconditionally
"the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of … All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities"
and
"All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities".
We have heard from the Foreign Secretary that Saddam Hussein was working on missiles that could have delivered warheads to this country, which is much more than 150 km away.
As part of the ceasefire agreement, Saddam Hussein unconditionally undertook
"not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items"
and he accepted that there should be a plan for developing
"the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance".
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There was not a limited timetable. I utterly fail to understand what is going on in the heads of hon. Members who table an amendment saying that the United Nations Security Council should abandon what was decided in exchange for the lifting of sanctions, given that the resolutions originally passed were unconditional. Saddam Hussein accepted "ongoing monitoring and verification". That resolution is as valid today as it was when it was carried seven years ago, and Saddam Hussein has violated it deliberately, repeatedly and continually.
Mr. David Winnick: Did not all hon. Members who signed the critical amendment, if they were here at the time, strenuously oppose the war and the liberation of Kuwait? Had they been listened to at the time—fortunately they were not—Kuwait would have remained under Iraqi enemy occupation and a number of other countries probably would have been invaded.
Mr. Kaufman: That is absolutely true. The issue does not appear to matter to those hon. Members, who intermittently favour conformity to Labour party conference decisions.
I quoted from United Nations Security Council resolution 687 the commitments that Saddam Hussein made and failed to carry out. The resolution reaffirmed a previous resolution, which authorised the military action that was taken at the beginning of 1991. Resolution 678, which was carried on 29 November 1990, made it clear that, in authorising member states to use "all necessary means", it was authorising military action. Those exact words appear in the Government's motion this afternoon.
The resolution authorised the United Nations
"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660"—
which told Saddam Hussein that he had to get out of Kuwait—and gave validity to such action under
"all subsequent relevant resolutions".
The "all necessary means" that the Government properly included in their motion this afternoon applied not only to all the resolutions passed before resolution 678, but to "all subsequent relevant resolutions", including resolution 687. Although I agree with my right hon. and hon. Friends and with the right hon. Member for Huntingdon that it is laudable for the Government to go to the UN Security Council and seek to obtain another resolution, resolutions 678 and 687 already authorise military action, if that is what the Government, the United States and their other allies decide.
Let us therefore be very clear that the words that authorised the military action on 15 January 1991 also authorise such action now, if such a decision is made. There is specific authority under a United Nations Security Council resolution to do so.
Of course Saddam Hussein has never at any time for a single moment voluntarily accepted a Security Council resolution, ever since he invaded Kuwait in 1990. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Huntingdon were absolutely right to make the point that, if Saddam Hussein gets away with the continuing violation of a whole series of UN Security Council resolutions, he will undoubtedly feel free to continue to violate them. If we do not take action now—whether it is diplomatic action to require him to conform

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to the resolutions or military action in the absence of his readiness willingly to do so—we shall have to act later, when it will be even more difficult and dangerous.
The Kuwait Information Centre has issued a bulletin that quotes from the emergency session of the Gulf Co-operation Council of Foreign Ministers, stating:
"The crisis was created by Saddam Hussein's continued refusal to allow UN weapons inspectors free and open access to all suspected sites in accordance with UN Resolutions which Iraq itself had previously accepted …
Following the meeting of the Gulf Co-operation Council, ministers issued a statement calling for Iraq to submit to the demands of UN weapons inspectors for unrestricted access to its weapons sites.
The Foreign Ministers said Baghdad would be entirely to blame for the grievous consequences if it persisted in its refusal."
My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) intervened in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and alluded to the fact that the states that make up the Gulf Co-operation Council may not be the most democratic nations in the world, and he has an inviolable point in doing so. However, I would say to my hon. Friend and to others that, if the Gulf Co-operation Council had taken a different point of view and declared its opposition to military action, I do not think that the lack of democracy in its member countries would have impeded anyone from quoting it in aid in opposing military action.
The bulletin also referred to the firm line taken by Italy, Spain, Norway and Denmark, which announced that they would back military intervention if it became necessary and condemned Saddam Hussein's refusal to agree to the implementation of the existing oil-for-food deal.
Some may say that the bulletin was produced by Kuwait, and one would not expect anything else from that country. Indeed, what else would one expect from a country that has been invaded, ravaged, raped, pillaged, had many of its citizens murdered and its national assets destroyed by the very same person some hon. Members think that we should go a bit soft on and who, if we are nice to him, perhaps may be nice to us? There is no evidence whatsoever that Saddam Hussein will respond to anything but the toughest possible line.
Like the right hon. Member for Huntingdon, I hope that the toughest possible line will stop short of military force, but if there is to be military force, it is better that it should be now, at the end of the diplomatic road, rather than later. It should be swift, definitive and conclusive. If force is used, only the dictator of Iraq will be to blame. My right hon. Friends have the total support of the overwhelming majority of right hon. and hon. Members in the line that they are pursuing.
5.6 pm
Mr. Menzies Campbell: The Government deserve our support in the Lobby tonight, not least because of the balanced and rational speech by the Foreign Secretary. If anyone had been in any doubt about the Government's position, surely that doubt would have been removed by the eloquent sincerity of the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major). He speaks with an informed and proper understanding of the serious and even sombre issues involved in the debate because, just over seven years ago, he had the responsibility of committing British service men and women to the action
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to remove Iraq from Kuwait. For Parliament to contemplate that is a serious and sombre moment, and we should never forget it.
As the Foreign Secretary made clear, for seven years, since the end of the Gulf war, Saddam Hussein's behaviour has been characterised by prevarication, deception and obstruction. The issues that lie at the heart of the present crisis could have been resolved long ago. The rehabilitation of Iraq could have begun and the condition of its people could have been improved. What stands in the way of that today is exactly what has stood in its way since the end of the Gulf war—the unconscionable intransigence of Saddam Hussein.
In preparation for this debate, I have read again the House's debates between August 1990 and February 1991. I cannot help but observe that—as we have just passed the second anniversary of the publication of the Scott report—the character of some of those debates might have been rather different had the House possessed the information that Sir Richard Scott set out in the report that he ultimately published. Neither should the House ignore the fact that Michael Rose, Hugh Beach and James Eberle—three men with distinguished military careers—have once again, this week, underlined the folly of failing to control properly the export of materials that, in the hands of adversaries, could easily be used against our own service men and service women.
As the right hon. Member for Huntingdon said, the issue in 1990 was the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. Nevertheless, the debates are striking, because many of the issues of principle that were being discussed then are the same issues of principle that we are trying to grapple with today. The debates are striking also because military action was seen then as a last resort. For six months, Saddam Hussein was given chance after chance to withdraw from Kuwait. Each opportunity was spurned. Notwithstanding that, diplomatic efforts continued—although, time after time, they were treated with contempt.
As the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) rightly reminded us, during that period of six months, Kuwait City was laid waste. Its citizens were taken hostage. The people of Kuwait City were intimidated and murdered; their wives and daughters were raped; and the city was sacked, as if by some mediaeval warlord. Even the traffic lights were looted.
After all that—after the Gulf war—the international community gave Iraq an opportunity for redemption and to make reparation; and it did so, rightly, with conditions. Does anyone now say that those conditions were unreasonable? I think not. Does anyone now believe that Saddam Hussein should not have been required to give up weapons of mass destruction? I think not. Can anyone say that Saddam Hussein has not had enough opportunity to do so? Again, I think not.
Does anyone believe that Saddam Hussein should be permitted freedom of action, to acquire and maintain chemical and biological weapons or the means of their manufacture? Does anyone seriously believe that, if he acquired that capability and the means of delivery, he would not threaten to use it to pursue his aims in middle east? Does anyone deny that, if he had weapons of mass destruction, there is a real risk that he might use them? He has done so in the past.

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Just as was done before the Gulf war, we must take every opportunity to resolve those issues by diplomatic means. It is right that the United Kingdom should be in the vanguard of such efforts. There can be no compromise on the principle of immediate and unrestricted access, as set out in the terms of resolution 687—which, as the right hon. Member for Gorton has just said, followed hard upon the terms of the agreed basis upon which a ceasefire was entered into.
Diplomatic efforts should be directed to three separate issues. First, there is room for manoeuvre on the composition of inspection teams, so long as their core membership remains suitably qualified and trained inspectors of the United Nations Special Commission. We can add diplomats from other countries to those teams so long as the teams retain the technical capacity to identify and destroy weapons of mass destruction, the means of their manufacture and the means of their delivery.
Secondly, we can permit or—more correctly—encourage increased sales of Iraqi oil for humanitarian aid. It is surely a measure of Saddam Hussein's inhumanity to his own people that he has consistently failed to take full advantage of opportunities to sell oil for food—just as he has consistently failed to import food and medicines, against which there are no sanctions. The international community can only do its best to reach out over the head of Saddam Hussein to try to assist the citizens whom he is so readily willing to sacrifice.
Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby): The hon. and learned Gentleman has mentioned the debates on Iraq in 1990 and 1991 and the diplomatic objectives. Is he concerned, as I am, that, if Saddam Hussein remains in power regardless of what happens in the next few months, in seven years, those of us who survive general elections will be back discussing the same issues?
Mr. Campbell: If, seven years ago, someone had said to those of us who were then hon. Members that we should be revisiting the issue in seven years, because Saddam Hussein would not have destroyed or allowed access to the means of production of weapons of mass destruction, we simply would not have believed it. In the post-Gulf war atmosphere, it was believed—perhaps naively—that so comprehensive had been the defeat and so easy had been Iraq's ultimate expulsion from Kuwait that there was no basis on which Saddam Hussein could resist the will of the international community.
Thirdly, as part of those diplomatic initiatives, it should be made clear that—if the inspections are permitted and all the obligations and resolutions are implemented—sanctions can be lifted. There is a view that sanctions must last as long as Saddam lasts. It is sometimes said that that is the view of the United States. If it is the view of the United States, it is wrong.
Sanctions were imposed by Security Council resolutions that required the implementation of certain obligations. However, there is no continuing legal basis for sanctions once all those obligations have been fully
922
met. The Security Council should make that clear. As a clear matter of legal principle, one cannot impose penalties beyond those that are authorised by resolution.
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman recall the resolution on the need for Saddam Hussein to end his repression of the Kurds? As he has not ended his repression of the Kurds, how can it be said that we should proceed on the basis described by the hon. and learned Gentleman?
Mr. Campbell: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do not think that he heard the preface by which I reached that conclusion. I said that, if the obligations in the resolutions are implemented in full, sanctions can be lifted. If, as he said, there are resolutions containing provisions dealing with the continuing repression of—if my memory serves me correctly—not only the Kurds but the marsh Arabs, continuing sanctions to that extent would be legally justified.
Ms Diane Abbott rose—
Mr. Campbell: I should like to make some progress.
Six diplomats of considerable experience proposed in the pages of The Independent on Monday the foundation for a United Nations Security Council resolution. From their experience and understanding of those matters, it is clear that that proposal is worthy of serious consideration. I hope that it has received such consideration in New York.
We were told by the Foreign Secretary that the Secretary-General of the United Nations may go to Baghdad, but that as yet, unsurprisingly, the complete details of his mandate are unclear. I hope that he receives a more courteous reception than his predecessor did some six or seven years ago, when Saddam Hussein kept him waiting in an anteroom cooling his heels for approximately six hours.
When the Secretary-General goes to Baghdad, if he does, it must surely be the case that he should carry the instruction of the Security Council that the principle of the observance of the obligations and the resolutions of the Security Council is not something upon which he can compromise. Suppose all those efforts fail? As a last resort, I accept that we should be prepared to use military force. I do not say that lightly, without having weighed the consequences or without being conscious of the risks.
The first objective of military action should be to reduce Saddam's present capability to manufacture and deliver weapons of mass destruction; the second, to suppress his capability to do either of those in the future; the third—as I thought the Foreign Secretary rather implied in response to an intervention—to target his wider military capability as a recognition of the refusal to implement the obligations contained in the peace settlement and embodied in the UN resolutions.
Questions have been asked as to whether such military action is legal without a further resolution of the Security Council. In my opinion, it is—for these reasons. The ceasefire was agreed on certain conditions, including the obligation now contained in the resolutions. Saddam Hussein is in material breach of the obligations and, as a result, in breach of the terms of the ceasefire. In those

923
circumstances, it is my considered view that there is no further legal reason for a Security Council resolution before military action is commenced. However, there may well be compelling political reasons, and I very much hope that the initiative being taken in New York at the instance of the British Government is successful.
Supposing we were to rule out military force? Supposing it were impossible to reach a diplomatic solution to the present crisis? What sanction would we have? How could we encourage or compel compliance? The truth is that the threat of military force is not separate from the diplomatic campaign—it is an essential part of it.
Mr. Robert Marshall-Andrews: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree with the view expressed by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), and endorsed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), that there is legitimacy in an attack immediately upon other targets in Iraq—specifically military targets, such as those of the Republican Guard—on the basis of the UN resolutions?
Mr. Campbell: Yes, and I rather thought that I had made that point.
It is right to emphasise again that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people who daily have to suffer the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime. Let us be clear—Saddam Hussein does not care for his own people. Otherwise, he would not use them as human shields; otherwise, he would not have refused, until recently, to avail himself of the oil-for-food arrangements; otherwise, he would not subject them to systematic barbarity. Iraq is a country in which executions on a whim are commonplace, in which there is no due process of law and in which sadistic cruelty is practised without care for the consequences.
In the debates of 1990 and 1991 which surrounded the Gulf war, there was a constant theme which, regrettably, still provides a context against which present events must be assessed. The theme contained two elements. The first was that, once Kuwait was liberated, strenuous efforts must be made to achieve a just settlement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people. The second was that there could be no lasting peace in the middle east unless there were such a settlement.
Strenuous efforts were made after the Gulf war, for which President Bush has never received the credit he undoubtedly deserves. Those efforts culminated in the Oslo accords, based on the principle of land for peace. Those accords have the status of treaties and the Palestinians and the Israeli Government are bound by them. Their implementation was never going to be easy, but Mr. Arafat and Mr. Rabin—with great personal and political courage—signed them and began to try to put them into practice. Mr. Rabin, in due course, paid with his life for that courage.
The Government of Mr. Netanyahu are in breach of the treaties, and therefore in breach of international law. The Government of Mr. Netanyahu consistently breach international law by the programme of illegal settlements in the Palestinian lands, particularly in and around Jerusalem. The peace process is in stagnation. That is deeply damaging for stability in the middle east but, worse, it has provided Saddam Hussein with an opportunity to harness anti-American sentiment.
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The timing of the latest crisis is no accident. It follows hard upon the failure of the economic conference at Qatar where, in spite of the efforts of the United States, there was a clear demonstration of Arab disillusionment. The stagnation of the peace process has made it impossible for Egypt to support military action. It has embarrassed Jordan, and made it impossible to form a coalition such as was created in the days before the Gulf war.
As we are uncompromising in our condemnation of Saddam Hussein's breaches of international law, we must be equally vocal in our criticism of the failures of the present Israeli Government to fulfil their obligations. In international law, resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN have the same weight as resolution 687. By 242 and 338, the Palestinian people are, by law, entitled to a proper homeland.
Like everyone else in the House, I earnestly hope that military force will not be required, that Saddam will accept his legal obligations and that diplomatic initiatives will prevail. If he were to accept the obligations, the stability of the middle east would be greatly enhanced. However, there will, in truth, be no opportunity for long-term stability until the international community does as it promised seven years ago—find a just and lasting settlement between Israel and the Palestinian people. Until that is done, Saddam Hussein will be quick and adept to exploit the frustrations of the countries of the middle east, and these debates may be rather more frequent than we should have preferred.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael J. Martin): Order. As the House knows, a large number of hon. Members wish to speak. It would be appreciated if hon. Members did not approach the Chair to ask where they are in the order of things. The shop will be closed.
5.26 pm
Mr. Tony Benn: If this debate is to make sense, we should understand the area of total agreement and where differences of opinion exist. First, no one in the House supports the regime of Saddam Hussein, who is a brutal dictator. I shall come to the support he has had from the west, but he is a brutal dictator and nobody in the House defends him. Secondly, no one in the House can defend for one moment the denial by the Iraqi Government of the implementation of the Security Council resolution which said that there should be inspections. The third issue on which there is major agreement, but little understanding yet, is the sudden realisation of the horror of modern chemical and biological weapons, which do not depend on enormous amounts of hardware—previously only available to a super-power—but which almost anybody, perhaps even a terrorist group, could deliver.
The disagreement is on how we deal with the matter. The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major)—whose speech was listened to with great attention—was talking about a preventive war. I shall read Hansard carefully, but he talked about a preventive war. There is no provision in the UN charter for a preventive war. If we are realistic—we must not fool ourselves—that huge American fleet of 30 ships and 1,000 aircraft is not in the Gulf waiting to be withdrawn when Saddam makes a friendly noise to Kofi Annan. The fleet has been sent there to be used, and the House would be deceiving itself if it thought that any so-called "diplomatic initiatives" would avert its use.

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This is a unique debate as far as I am concerned. I have sat here with the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) through four wars—the Korean war, the Suez war, the Falklands war and the first Gulf war. I cannot remember an occasion when any Government asked the House to authorise, in a resolution, action which could lead to force.
Mr. Donald Anderson: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Benn: No. If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I want to develop a case briefly.
The reason is that the right to go to war is a prerogative power. The Government are inviting the House—I understand why—to share their responsibility for the use of force, knowing that force will be used within a week or two.
We are not starting afresh. I opposed the Gulf war. We should have asked why Saddam got into Kuwait and why he was not stopped. We had the war. The equivalent of seven and a half Hiroshima bombs was dropped on the people of Iraq—the biggest bombardment since the second world war. Some 200,000 Iraqis died. Depleted uranium bullets were used. I have had two or three letters from Gulf war veterans in a mass of correspondence in the past week, one of whom has offered to be a human shield in Iraq because he feels that he was betrayed by the British Government and does not want the Iraqi people to suffer again.
All the evidence confirms my view that sanctions are another instrument of mass destruction. They destroy people's lives, denying them the food and medicines that they need. It is no good saying that Saddam took the money for his palaces. If that is the case, why does the United Nations Children's Fund now say that there are 1 million children in Iraq starving, along with 500,000 who have died?
Bombing the water supply and the sewerage plants is like using chemical weapons, because the disease that spreads from that bombing contributes to disease in the country. And, at the end of all that, Saddam is stronger than he was at the beginning. Nobody denies that. People ask why we have to go back seven years later. It is because the previous policy inevitably made him stronger. We know that when a country is attacked, leaders wave their fists and say, "We will never give way." It happened in Britain, it happens when we are dealing with bombings from Ireland—it happens all the time. Are we such fools that we think that if we bomb other people they will crumble, whereas when they bomb us it will stiffen our resolve? The House ought to study its own history.
The Government's motion would not be carried at the Security Council. I asked the Foreign Secretary about that. Why is he asking us to pass a resolution that he could not get through the Security Council? On the basis of his speech, the Russians and the Chinese would not vote for the use of force. Why involve the House of Commons in an act that runs counter to what the Security Council would accept?
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Benn: I have very little time. I want to develop my argument. There are many others who want to speak.
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I hope that the House will listen to me. I know that my view is not the majority view in the House, although it may be outside this place.
I regret that I shall vote against the Government motion. The first victims of the bombing that I believe will be launched within a fortnight will be innocent people, many, if not most, of whom would like Saddam to be removed. The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon, talked about collateral damage. The military men are clever. They talk not about hydrogen bombs but about deterrence. They talk not about people but about collateral damage. They talk not about power stations and sewerage plants but about assets. The reality is that innocent people will be killed if the House votes tonight—as it manifestly will—to give the Government the authority for military action.
The bombing would also breach the United Nations charter. I do not want to argue on legal terms. If the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) has read articles 41 and 42, he will know that the charter says that military action can only be decided on by the Security Council and conducted under the military staffs committee. That procedure has not been followed and cannot be followed because the five permanent members have to agree. Even for the Korean war, the United States had to go to the General Assembly to get authority because Russia was absent. That was held to be a breach, but at least an overwhelming majority was obtained.
Has there been any negotiation or diplomatic effort? Why has the Foreign Secretary not been in Baghdad, like the French Foreign Minister, the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Russian Foreign Minister? The time that the Government said that they wanted for negotiation has been used to prepare public opinion for war and to build up their military position in the Gulf.
Saddam will be strengthened again. Or he may be killed. I read today that the security forces—who are described as terrorists in other countries—have tried to kill Saddam. I should not be surprised if they succeeded.
This second action does not enjoy support from elsewhere. There is no support from Iraq's neighbours. If what the Foreign Secretary says about the threat to the neighbours is true, why is Iran against, why is Jordan against, why is Saudi Arabia against, why is Turkey against? Where is that great support? There is no support from the opposition groups inside Iraq. The Kurds, the Shi'ites and the communists hate Saddam, but they do not want the bombing. The Pope is against it, along with 10 bishops, two cardinals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Perez de Cuellar. The Foreign Secretary clothes himself with the garment of the world community, but he does not have that support. We are talking about an Anglo-American preventive war. It has been planned and we are asked to authorise it in advance.
The House is clear about its view of history, but it does not say much about the history of the areas with which we are dealing. The borders of Kuwait and Iraq, which then became sacrosanct, were drawn by the British after the end of the Ottoman empire. We used chemical weapons against the Iraqis in the 1930s. Air Chief Marshal Harris, who later flattened Dresden, was instructed to drop chemical weapons.
When Saddam came to power, he was a hero of the west. The Americans used him against Iran because they hated Khomeini, who was then the figure to be removed.

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They armed Saddam, used him and sent him anthrax. I am not anxious to make a party political point, because there is not much difference between the two sides on this, but, as the Scott report revealed, the previous Government allowed him to be armed. I had three hours with Saddam in 1990. I got the hostages out, which made it worth going. He felt betrayed by the United States, because the American ambassador in Baghdad had said to him, "If you go into Kuwait, we will treat it as an Arab matter." That is part of the history that they know, even if we do not know it here.
In 1958, 40 years ago, Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary and later the Speaker, told Foster Dulles that Britain would make Kuwait a Crown colony. Foster Dulles said, "What a very good idea." We may not know that history, but in the middle east it is known.
The Conservatives have tabled an amendment asking about the objectives. That is an important issue. There is no UN resolution saying that Saddam must be toppled. It is not clear that the Government know what their objectives are. They will probably be told from Washington. Do they imagine that if we bomb Saddam for two weeks, he will say, "Oh, by the way, do come in and inspect"? The plan is misconceived.
Some hon. Members—even Opposition Members—have pointed out the double standard. I am not trying to equate Israel with Iraq, but on 8 June 1981, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor near Baghdad. What action did either party take on that? Israel is in breach of UN resolutions and has instruments of mass destruction. Mordecai Vanunu would not boast about Israeli freedom. Turkey breached UN resolutions by going into northern Cyprus. It has also recently invaded northern Iraq and has instruments of mass destruction. Lawyers should know better than anyone else that it does not matter whether we are dealing with a criminal thug or an ordinary lawbreaker—if the law is to apply, it must apply to all. Governments of both major parties have failed in that.
Prediction is difficult and dangerous, but I fear that the situation could end in a tragedy for the American and British Governments. Suez and Vietnam are not far from the minds of anyone with a sense of history. I recall what happened to Sir Anthony Eden. I heard him announce the ceasefire and saw him go on holiday to Goldeneye in Jamaica. He came back to be replaced. I am not saying that that will happen in this case, but does anyone think that the House is in a position to piggy-back on American power in the middle east? What happens if Iraq breaks up? If the Kurds are free, they will demand Kurdistan and destabilise Turkey. Anything could happen. We are sitting here as if we still had an empire—only, fortunately, we have a bigger brother with more weapons than us.
The British Government have everything at their disposal. They are permanent members of the Security Council and have the European Union presidency for six months. Where is that leadership in Europe which we were promised? It just disappeared. We are also, of course, members of the Commonwealth, in which there are great anxieties. We have thrown away our influence, which could have been used for moderation.
The amendment that I and others have tabled argues that the United Nations Security Council should decide the nature of what Kofi Annan brings back from Baghdad and whether force is to be used. Inspections and sanctions go side by side. As I said, sanctions are brutal for innocent
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people. Then there is the real question: when will the world come to terms with the fact that chemical weapons are available to anybody? If there is an answer to that, it must involve the most meticulous observation of international law, which I feel we are abandoning.
War is easy to talk about; there are not many people left of the generation which remembers it. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup served with distinction in the last war. I never killed anyone but I wore uniform. I was in London during the blitz in 1940, living where the Millbank tower now stands, where I was born. Some different ideas have come in there since. Every night, I went to the shelter in Thames house. Every morning, I saw docklands burning. Five hundred people were killed in Westminster one night by a land mine. It was terrifying. Are not Arabs and Iraqis terrified? Do not Arab and Iraqi women weep when their children die? Does not bombing strengthen their determination? What fools we are to live as if war is a computer game for our children or just an interesting little Channel 4 news item.
Every Member of Parliament who votes for the Government motion will be consciously and deliberately accepting responsibility for the deaths of innocent people if the war begins, as I fear it will. That decision is for every hon. Member to take. In my parliamentary experience, this a unique debate. We are being asked to share responsibility for a decision that we will not really be taking but which will have consequences for people who have no part to play in the brutality of the regime with which we are dealing.
On 24 October 1945—the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will remember—the United Nations charter was passed. The words of that charter are etched on my mind and move me even as I think of them. It says:
"We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind".
That was that generation's pledge to this generation, and it would be the greatest betrayal of all if we voted to abandon the charter, take unilateral action and pretend that we were doing so in the name of the international community. I shall vote against the motion for the reasons that I have given.
5.42 pm
Mr. Tom King: The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) spoke with passionate sincerity, as he has spoken often in the House on such matters. As the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) pointed out, the right hon. Gentleman spoke with equally passionate sincerity at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. If his voice had been listened to then, Kuwait would still be a ravaged, pillaged and destroyed country—and very probably, other countries in the middle east would be as well.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield said that people's lives were at risk by the House's decision tonight. I do not think that anybody listening to the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) or my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) is under any illusion that anybody is enjoying this debate, or believes that it is an opportunity to score some political success. The House is facing the least worst option in an appallingly difficult situation.

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The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) correctly reminded the House that the motion incorporates words that are directly lifted from United Nations resolution 687: "all necessary means". In that respect, the right hon. Member for Chesterfield is correct. I did not have a chance to leave the Chamber to check, but I am not sure whether he is correct in saying that this is the first time that the House has been asked to support the Government's position on the use of force, because that was precisely how we approached the previous unfortunate encounter which led to the Gulf war.
Debates were held consistently in which the House was asked to support the Government's use of military force. With increasing majorities on every occasion, the House supported the Government's position, which eventually led, following the refusal of Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait, to the need to use military force.
This is a critically important debate. It is very important that we stand up and make clear our position. It is important that, if the House supports the Government, as I and other right hon. Members do, it makes that support abundantly clear by the clearest possible signal. It is no secret that Saddam Hussein and the regime in Baghdad are some of the keenest observers of international opinion, attitudes and views. He watched CNN regularly before and during the Gulf war.
It is no secret, either, that we are here today because Saddam Hussein observed divisions in the Security Council; the international community was no longer speaking with the same united voice. Saddam Hussein saw that as his opportunity, which, as the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) pointed out, has been made all the greater by disaffection among much moderate Arab opinion from Israel's attitude. Saddam Hussein has seen his opportunity to test once again the international community as he did with the invasion of Kuwait. We must show very clearly where we stand.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon said that this is not a rerun of the Gulf war, and of course he is right. But, in a real sense, it is unfinished business. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe made the point very well. Where did resolution 687 come from? It is the ceasefire resolution. It was the condition under which we stopped the previous, highly successful, military campaign to liberate Kuwait. Some might say that we stopped it too soon, but stop it we did, and on the explicit condition that the resolution would be observed.
On 6 April 1991, the Iraqi Foreign Secretary wrote to the UN Secretary-General accepting the terms of resolution 687. The right hon. Member for Gorton clearly spelled out how the core of the resolution is, explicitly, the setting up of UNSCOM and the rights to search for, identify, inspect and destroy weapons of mass destruction. It has been accepted specifically by Iraq. Connected resolutions which have followed have been implicitly accepted as well.
The Foreign Secretary occasionally says that UNSCOM has destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than were destroyed in the Gulf war. Everyone who was familiar with the problems of bombing in the Gulf war—I shall speak about them later—knew that the programme of destruction would not be hugely successful, because,
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at that time, we knew relatively little about many of the dispositions in Iraq, It is no secret that intelligence is one of the commodities in shortest supply because of the strength and ruthlessness of the Iraqi regime.
We won the victory that secured the liberation of Kuwait, and we caused significant damage to Saddam's military capability, but we were not particularly effective in destroying the weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 687 recognised that the programme to eliminate the weapons of mass destruction would have to be continued.
I pay tribute to the extraordinary courage and determination of the officials and members of the United Nations team. Some hon. Members will have read in the Sunday newspapers this week the interesting personal account of a member of that team, who described what it was like to be in Iraq and to look down the barrel of the gun of a security man who was determined to obstruct the UN's work.
The article described what it was like never to know whether one's life was at risk because the people UNSCOM was dealing with were going to engineer an unfortunate accident. UNSCOM has carried out its work and destroyed so many weapons of mass destruction in the face of the Iraqi regime's massive attempts at evasion and deception.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield referred to common ground. I hope that all hon. Members accept that Saddam Hussein has been determined to maintain a programme for the production of weapons of mass destruction of a nastiness and evil that the world has arguably never before seen in terms of biological and chemical warfare. We cannot simply walk away and allow that to continue. I hope that part of the common ground, even for those who are not in favour of military action, is that that massive programme must be stopped.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield asks whether we care about young children and the casualties that might occur as a result of military action. We are here today precisely because we care hugely about the possible consequences if the situation is not dealt with, not only for children, but for people of all ages and all races, in Iraq, in the middle east and perhaps beyond.
Mrs. Alice Mahon: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. King: I hope that the hon. Lady will excuse me if I do not give way at the moment.
The critical point is to establish whether we can secure diplomatic agreement to a strong and united resolution. I am concerned about developments in the United Nations. I had the privilege to be Secretary of State for Defence when we had strong support in the United Nations and the middle east, including from the Arab community.
The current situation is obviously much more difficult, but I hold the view that resolution 687—which flows directly from resolution 678 and refers back to it—is firm ground on which to stand. I hope that, whatever political imperative drives the new resolution, the strength of our position—of which I share the interpretation of the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife—will not be undermined.
I agree with the proposal to expand the oil-for-food programme, which the Foreign Secretary announced. If I recall rightly, one of the grievances that Saddam Hussein

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claimed to have against Kuwait when he invaded it was the way in which it was handling the oil market; he believed that Kuwait had allowed the upstream price to fall too low, but was profiting from its downstream retail distribution. Significantly, the world oil price is currently at rock bottom; the oil-for-food programme must be expanded if only to take account of that, although there are obviously also strong humanitarian grounds for expansion.
I hope that we shall secure a strong United Nations resolution, to prepare the ground for the Secretary-General's visit to Baghdad. I believe that he is the right person to go. I do not believe for a moment that the Foreign Secretary should go—that would be quite improper. This is a United Nations matter, based on a United Nations resolution; it is not, as the right hon. Member for Chesterfield tries to pretend, a personal fight between America and Iraq or between Britain and Iraq.
I trust that the Secretary-General will not go to Baghdad unless it is pretty clear that Iraq will give a positive response. It would be unacceptable if he were humiliated in an attempt by Saddam to score a public relations coup. With that reservation, I hope that he will go.
Everyone must devote their efforts to solving the crisis peacefully; the Foreign Secretary made it very clear that that is much the best way. I have a modest qualification for knowing some of the problems of a military response. I believe that targeting can now be much more effective than it was in the Gulf war, as our intelligence about the dispositions in Iraq is much greater than it was then. Many lessons have been learned to improve the accuracy of weapons; I believe that we are better equipped to ensure the most accurate possible targeting.
None the less, everyone recognises that there is no certainty in this. Military action is an extremely dangerous and difficult course on which to embark. It is also obvious that there is a limit to what air power alone can achieve. If all other options fail, however, the world community cannot walk away. I have assumed that there is unanimous recognition in the House that Iraq has massive supplies and the determination to continue to produce extremely nasty weapons of mass destruction. That knowledge—I hope that it is common ground—surely makes it impossible for us to walk away.
It has often been said that, during the Gulf war, a perhaps rather surprised world was shown for the first time—it was the end of the cold war and all those years when the United Nations had not worked, with vetoes coming from one side or the other and no real cohesion, authority or power—that, when the nations of the world, with the permanent five and the other members of the Security Council, were prepared to stand together, they could be a real force for good in a troubled and uncertain world. In some ways, on this occasion we are fighting too much on our own. Perhaps too few countries yet appreciate that the United Nations standing together is a precious asset that is valuable to every citizen in the world.
Therefore, I hope that we will understand the importance of standing by the authority of the United Nations, and will recognise that it must be defended at all costs. I hope that, from our standing together with other nations that share that view with sufficient resolution, Saddam Hussein will recognise the force and
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determination of the world community, and our objectives will be achieved by diplomatic means. If not, alternative, military action may be necessary.
5.59 pm
Mr. Bruce George: History, constitutional law, political practice and the Executive orientation of our political system have determined that the House does not declare war, or initiate or terminate wars. Our role is to endorse, which we usually do, or to oppose, which we rarely do.
On occasions, opinion in the House and in the country is divided. Some would argue that the House is at its best when we are indulging in hysteria and displaying signs of being a legislature on heat, with the hurling of abuse and creative tension, but I would argue that, on national security issues, the House is at its best when it displays none of those characteristics, but exhibits a large degree of consensus. I suspect that when people analyse our proceedings today, they will appreciate that there has been a remarkable degree, if not of unanimity or consensus, of basic agreement. I cannot recall many occasions on which a Foreign Secretary's speech was largely approved by the Opposition spokesman, who made a similar and almost indistinguishable speech. A former Prime Minister, the Liberal Democrat spokesman on defence and foreign affairs and almost everyone else who has spoken have said that we do not want to go to war, that we are not being jingoistic and that we are speaking critically, not cynically. In most cases, we are speaking without emotion and telling the Government that they must negotiate hard, but that if the negotiations fail and we have been seen to be using our best endeavours to resolve the crisis by negotiation, regrettably, we may have to have recourse to physical force.
I deeply disagree with the imputation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), whose views I do not agree with, but respect. He is part of our post-war history, although I disagree with his interpretation of that history. I do not believe that if I go into the Lobby in support of the Government—which I will—there will be blood on my hands. If I sit on my hands or oppose the Government, and if the House is foolish enough to dissent from their view, we shall have to accept responsibility for that action too. In supporting the Government—as we will do—we shall not be initiating the action, but endorsing it. We shall be saying that we must share a responsibility. If things go right, we shall claim some of the credit. If things go wrong, we may want to run and hide, but we must accept responsibility for our individual and collective action.
Having studied security issues for many years, I cannot say with absolute confidence what is going to happen tomorrow morning, let alone in one, two or three weeks. One politician is supposed to have said of another, "I wish I was as certain of some things as he is of everything." I do not approach the crisis with any absolute confidence that what our Government or the American Government are doing will inevitably turn out be right. The world is not like that. To accept the argument in terms of simplistic good and bad or right and wrong, is to delude oneself considerably.
The House has debated other wars. On one occasion, it was not even recalled to discuss a war because it was thought to be too insignificant. On occasions, the House

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has been deeply divided—divided Houses and divided countries will almost inevitably lead to the failure of the military venture that has been reluctantly authorised. Jingoism has been absent from this debate. The House's sober approach reflects the fact that most people realise that the Government have proceeded cautiously and with good intent.
I do not like the phrase, "the just war". There are very few just wars. Even during the second world war, there was no unanimity. The fascists opposed what we were doing and until the Communist party in Moscow gave the British communists direction, there was considerable ambivalence among them. There were pacifists, whose views I respect, and those who believed that we should sit out the war and gain the advantage after it—a view that I do not respect. If ever there was a just war, it was the second world war.
People should not have a moral sense of superiority, saying, "My perception of history and events is so perfect and my moral perception so beyond criticism that anyone who dares disagree is per se immoral, his views should be deprecated and he or she bears blood on their hands." That is to reduce a complicated dilemma to such a trivial level as to be almost worthless.
What the Government are doing is right and just. The alliance of nations that George Bush was able to assemble in 1991 may not be so arrayed on this occasion, but let us remember that most of the coalition countries played a marginal role in providing military forces as their role was largely symbolic. The United States could have completed its military task without recourse to anyone else but, politically, the authorisation of the United Nations was necessary.
Are we to say that because France, Russia and China, which have their own agendas, do not endorse what Britain or the United States wants to be done, the whole institution should be paralysed? If necessary, we have an authorisation for the use of force, as lawyers have told us. Even if there were not that authorisation, we could argue strongly that it would be necessary to threaten or use physical force.
As everyone knows, even those who oppose physical force, Saddam Hussein has violated international law and United Nations resolutions, and has built up such a substantial and threatening arsenal of chemical and biological weapons that he has to be stopped. Those who argue against military force rely on the United Nations and its moral authority to undo the damage. However, the United Nations was unable to resolve the crisis in Bosnia by using purely its moral authority. Only when certain countries, notably the United States, decided to put more than moral authority into resolving the crisis was real success gained.
Saddam has repeatedly obstructed, prevaricated and done everything possible to elevate ducking and diving to a science. To argue, as he does, that he has been co-operative with UNSCOM inspectors is to stretch reality. If he is not stopped, he will be a threat to regional and international security. In pressurising him and taking him to the brink, up to the point of switching on the engines of the aircraft, he must be given the opportunity of accepting the United Nations resolutions. If he accepts them, it is imperative that we do not simply accept his
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word because his word is worthless. If we accept a climbdown—there will be attempts to try to mask such a climbdown; certainly to his people whatever he does will be deemed a major diplomatic success—the armed forces should remain to ensure that he complies with United Nations resolutions. The moment the ships go over the horizon, he will be encouraged to return to his old habits.
The consequences of backing down now and withdrawing without achieving our justifiable objectives would be serious, although some will disagree with my reasons for saying that. As a great believer in the North Atlantic alliance, I think that if we leave the United States on its own, the alliance's future would be jeopardised. The United States would ask why it should bother to remain in the alliance. Senators may ask why they should ratify NATO enlargement or retain US forces in Bosnia if, in a time of crisis, their NATO partners are not prepared to stand by them. I believe in the special relationship with the United States; it would be in tatters in such a situation. European-American relations would degenerate worryingly. Above all, Saddam would be left alone. If the United States and other countries do not get together on this, he will be free to use his weapons at a time of his choosing. It is wise to get the lessons—the retaliation—in first.
As many have said, perhaps the United States should be more diligent in putting pressure on the Israeli Government. First, the limited success in putting together a coalition can be significantly attributed to the intransigence of the Israeli Government in implementing the middle east peace accords. Secondly, I believe that we should be more vigilant in controlling the export of arms. Few countries can be free of guilt in respect of exporting arms that can be used for immoral purposes.
Thirdly, I invite our good friends in the Treasury to realise that wars can begin when they are not anticipated. If we have forces that are as capable as ours are at present, we at least have a range of options that would not be available if defence expenditure were further reduced. Fourthly, hon. Members should not hold their breath, expecting a European defence policy to provide an alternative to our current alliance structure. It has been said that some of our allies in the previous Gulf crisis reached for their cheque books and dived into their cellars. It is important that European nations rely less on the United States or the United Kingdom and do more than offer moral support; many are not even offering that.
The Defence Select Committee this morning had a briefing in the Ministry of Defence from the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister for the Armed Forces. The Committee will visit the United States next week. That does not reflect brilliant timing on my part, but it should be an interesting time to exchange views with our American colleagues.
Mr. Dalyell: Did the Defence Select Committee hear the views or advice of the chiefs of staff? It may be unrealistic to think that their advice could be given to the entire House of Commons, but I have asked the Secretary of State for Defence to make it available to either the Intelligence and Security Committee or the Defence Select Committee. I am not a member of either, but has that been done?
Mr. George: When I began my speech, I did not think that I would agree with what the hon. Gentleman would

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say, but I would like people such as the assistant chiefs of the defence staff to appear before the Select Committee. With the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, I expect to meet military personnel later in the week.
It is clutching at straws to assume that there is any profound difference between senior military advice and political leadership. If my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield were here, with his knowledge of history, he could have reminded us that, on defence, the House in the 19th century was largely occupied in trying to establish parliamentary and civilian control over the military. If a member of the military cannot accept political direction from those democratically accountable to the House, that person should seek an alternative career. I suspect and hope that there is agreement. I suspect that, in the country, it is widely agreed that Saddam must be confronted if all else fails. I accept that that is inevitable, but those who wish to exercise their moral judgment against the decision of the overwhelming majority of this House will perhaps give some aid and comfort to Saddam. I am appalled by that.
Mr. Galloway: Disgraceful.
Mr. George: That remark is not disgraceful. My hon. Friend's views are well known.
I was glad to have been called because I waited a long time in the Falklands debate, but was not called. Even though there was no vote on that Saturday morning in 1982, no one could have been under the illusion that there was more than fractional support for those who opposed the Government's decision to send the task force. I was part of the fractional minority who felt that sending the task force was wrong, first, on the ground that we had been thrown out of better places than the Falklands without resorting to military means. Secondly, it was dangerous; the balance of forces was such that I had no great confidence that we would emerge victorious. I was wrong—just. Once the Government and Parliament had made that decision, my opposition ceased and I totally supported, as we should now support, our men and women, be they up in the air, on the sea, under the sea or on land. I hope that even if hon. Members disagree with what the Government are doing, they will express their views privately. I do not expect them to do it, but I hope that they will do as I did. When the chips are down, we must support the men and women fighting on our behalf.
6.18 pm
Mr. Nicholas Soames: I wholly endorse the words of the Chairman of the Defence Committee. From my experience of the Secretary of State for Defence and my long-standing knowledge of the Chief of the Defence Staff, I should be surprised if a cigarette paper could be put between them. Any mischief-making suggestions on that account are unhelpful to the decision-making process and totally untrue. I also endorse what he said about how imperative it is that the House sends a strong message to the Royal Air Force detachments and the Royal Naval task force, which will be heartened and invigorated by the support that I am sure will be expressed for the Government in the Lobby tonight.
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Let us be quite clear, as everyone has been, that Saddam Hussein and his wicked, vile regime must be dealt with. Beyond any doubt, he possesses chemical and biological weapons and, contrary to all the articles of war, he has used chemical weapons on the Kurds and the Iranians. He invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait and visited the most wicked cruelty and devastation on its population and its land. He dropped Scud missiles at Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Dhahran and Haifa. He is in wilful, permanent and gross breach of UN resolutions and has persistently interfered with the UNSCOM inspectors as they try to carry out their mandate to secure and destroy those weapons of mass destruction.
During my two and a half years at the Ministry of Defence, every three months or so I was visited by Ambassador Ekeus, the then head of UNSCOM, who reported on what was happening. He told me that there was nothing new about that interference, which had been going on for years, but that it had finally reached intolerable levels.
The Iraqis have lied, cheated and attempted to conceal that arsenal of weapons. In the face of continuing Iraqi intransigence, it is clear that they have more to hide and that this matter must be resolved. Saddam Hussein's treatment of his own people is unspeakable, and the world must be a safer place by forcing him to comply with the 1991 ceasefire, let alone the terms of the UN resolutions.
I hope that it does not have to happen, but if it comes to it, it will be the job of the American and British forces to dismantle the apparatus of Saddam's wicked regime. We are all probably agreed upon that proposition, but how to go about it is an altogether different kettle of fish. There are respectable grounds for believing that the bombing of Iraq will achieve nothing. There are people in the House who hold such views with great passion and who have every right to be heard. Such bombing could lead to the strengthening of Saddam Hussein's position internally and it could alienate world opinion, particularly if there are large numbers of civilian casualties. In extreme circumstances, it could increase the risk of a wider, prolonged war.
For my part, and with some reluctance, I believe that, on this occasion, it is right that Britain should support the United States because the proposed military action is for just motives. I pray that the targeting experts will have developed a careful and sophisticated plan. Unlike the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), I hope that they will pause regularly to remind Saddam Hussein that he only has to agree to unrestricted, unconditional access for that military action to be discontinued.
The problem is that the military option is not an effective substitute for UN weapons inspectors having unrestricted access on the ground and the ability to get hold of and destroy those ghastly, malign weapons. It is imperative that every worthwhile diplomatic avenue is explored. There is no point in the Secretary-General going to Baghdad without clear instructions from the permanent five on the Security Council. To do otherwise would gravely damage the credibility of the UN, whose credibility and integrity are already seriously questioned. If he were to go to Baghdad, it should be made plain to the Iraqis that a prompt response is required and that, failing a satisfactory answer, the military option will then have to be exercised.

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What will happen? Saddam will be bombed and the sanctions kept in place indefinitely, and the only sure losers will be Iraq's poor, long-suffering civilians. If that happens, this House should understand and focus clearly upon the grave consequences for British interests in the middle east and British foreign policy in Europe and beyond. My right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) made a good point about the middle east with which I whole-heartedly agree.
I travelled regularly to the middle east when I was at the Ministry of Defence and I always reported back on the increasing resentment and anti-western feeling that existed in all countries of the Gulf. That has come about because the Arabs, quite rightly, deeply resent the uneven-handed way in which the Americans, and, regrettably therefore, ourselves, have dealt with the Arab-Israeli question. They are right to be angry and they are right to be frustrated with America and her allies, but the fallout for us is serious and must be addressed by a more creative and vigorous policy. The middle east peace process is now in critical need of repair and, whatever the result of events as they unfold in Iraq, unless important steps are taken to reinvigorate that process, it will remain a festering and dangerous source of discontent and mischief, with potentially grievous consequences for stability in an already highly turbulent area.
I believe that Foreign Office Ministers have not done enough to push forward the middle east peace process. The Foreign Secretary will need to devote a great deal more time to the middle east than his rather exotic and varied priorities have thus far enabled him to do. The right hon. Gentleman has neglected our friends in the Gulf. Labour Members may disagree, but in nine months in office, he has made one visit to the Gulf and that was only in response to an emergency. It is little wonder that our Arab friends attach so little credibility to the Government's policy on the middle east.
Quite apart from the neglect of our interests in Arabia, the Government have failed dismally during the current crisis to give any leadership in Europe. I agree with the right hon. Member for Chesterfield that it is quite extraordinary that at a time when Britain has the presidency of the European Union, the Government have done so little to try to build a coalition and to carry our European partners with us. It really is time for the Government to drop the rhetoric and lead the Governments of Europe in a new initiative to try to bring peace to the middle east.
Of course, it is much harder for Britain to find common ground with the Germans and the French than it is with the Americans, but that effort must be made. The Government may have tried, but they certainly have not done enough. Our European friends and allies are rightly angry and bemused by the behaviour of the Labour Government. The Foreign Secretary must understand that without a real commitment to the nitty-gritty detail of business with Europe on all fronts, the utility to Washington of the Government-to-Government special relationship will gradually diminish, to our great disadvantage.
It is now clear to European politicians that, at the end of the day, the Labour Administration, with all the rhetoric and fancy packaging about their commitment to
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Europe, most favour a client state relationship with America. That is a lamentable and foolish state of affairs, which has done our country grave harm.
We should support the current American position, but we should do so from a European perspective. We should not just follow along blindly, but bring to the vital decisions the broader European opinion which, through our presidency, we must represent, and which we have so foolishly neglected in international affairs.
If the military option is judged to be unavoidable and if it is to succeed, the forces must be of a greater strength than those currently prepared. There will need to be a steady build-up of ground troops, but that should be run in tandem with a continuing extensive diplomatic effort. If Britain is to take part in those operations in the future, it is well prepared to do so with the joint rapid deployment force. I pray that it will not come to that.
When the Secretary of State replies to the debate, I hope that he will tell us about the Government's thinking on the future of Iraq, post a military strike. What has been their response to the concerns of the neighbouring countries? What about the Saudis, who really fear that Iraq might be split into a Kurdish north, a Sunni Muslim centre and a Shia Muslim south, supported by an untrustworthy and unreliable Iran? What account have the Government taken of the views of President Mubarak of Egypt, who believes that things will be much worse after an air strike—and he a great supporter of the west? What steps in the light of a military or indeed non-military resolution do the Government intend to take to renew the middle east peace process, which is all of a part with the Iraqi problem? We need some vigorous British and European ideas that will enable us to stop hanging on with both hands to America's coat tails and break the deadlock that is so deeply damaging to peace in the area.
6.29 pm
Mr. George Galloway: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary for his assurance that this is a free Parliament composed of free Members of Parliament who have a right—indeed, an obligation—to make their views known in the House and to follow their conscience on matters of war and peace. How different was that assurance from the extraordinary statements of my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George). It would be a strange sort of Parliament in which Members kept their views private. It would be a strange sort of Parliament in which Members who expressed a view different from that of the majority could be accused of giving succour and comfort to a dictator whom some of us have fought for far longer than some of those who muster such dread condemnation as has been voiced this evening. It would be a Parliament more like the Parliament in Baghdad than the Parliament in this country, for which we fought over the centuries. I disdain to keep my views on this matter secret.
The Iraqi regime has been effectively carpet-bombed this evening and I shall not repeat the condemnations that I have been making all my political life and that have already been made. I shall speak up for some people who have not been much mentioned this evening: the poor Iraqi citizens, who never elected Saddam Hussein and who—however much we make them suffer, however often we bomb them and however long we sanction them—cannot remove the dictator who stands astride them.

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Last week, for three whole days, the attention of the whole country was fixed on the village of Chippenham. It was evacuated, people were moved out of their homes and a 30-ft mound of earth was built by the Royal Engineers. Witnesses who saw the explosion of the so-called "fat boy"—the 50-year-old piece of ordnance dropped by the Luftwaffe during the second world war—spoke of how terrifying it was and how awesome were the shock waves. Are we really saying that we are going to vote tonight to drop, not one fat boy, not 10, not 100, not 1,000, not 10,000, but tens of thousands of fat boys on the Iraqi people? Let us be clear: there is no such thing as precision bombing. There is no such thing as a smart bomb—bombs do not have brains, still less hearts. I have been in the Amariya air raid shelter in Baghdad, where the silhouettes of men, women and children are carbonised on to the walls as a result of a precision bomb launched by the United States of America.
In parenthesis, let me tell those who say that the Americans have carefully targeted their strikes so that they will not hit the chemical and biological weapons that my old grandfather was bombed by the United States air force all the way from Alamein to Monte Cassino. Given the US record on friendly fire, I am not sure whether it is a good thing that they know or do not know where the weapons are. One thing is for sure, if one bomb lands on one stockpile of one sort of biological or chemical weapon, it will send into the atmosphere enough poison gas to choke the very Iraqi people with whom we are told we have no quarrel. If the wind changes, all the kings and sheikhs of Araby had better be on aeroplanes' to London or Paris, or they will be choked and poisoned too. If the wind blows the right or the wrong way, poor citizens will suffer the consequences of American precision bombing.
On that subject, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you may have noticed the weather report for England on Saturday—St. Valentine's day. As a result of freak atmospheric conditions, sand from the Sahara desert landed on England's green and pleasant land. If sand from the Sahara can reach England, what about anthrax, VX gas and all the other dreadful, hideous and obscene weapons that we have been talking about this evening? By the way, those weapons are in the possession of almost all the countries in the middle east—indeed, they are in the possession of almost all the countries in the world.
We were the first people to drop chemical weapons on Iraq. In 1920, under the colonial secretaryship of Winston Churchill, the grandfather of the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames), rebel tribesmen in the Euphrates valley were bombed with chemical weapons by the British armed forces. The United States of America, our special friend, has 30,000 tonnes of those obscene weapons—yes, the same United States of America that carpet-bombed with chemical weapons the people of Vietnam for almost 20 years. Agent orange and defoliation bombs were used and, to this day, children are born hideously deformed because of the chemicals dropped by our special friends.
The reality is that the Iraqi people have suffered long enough. It is sheer sophistry to talk about there being no sanctions on food and medicine. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and I have walked in the hospitals where the children are expiring for want of medicines in Iraq. Of course there is a food-for-oil deal now, but for many years under sanctions there was no
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such deal—[Interruption.] There was not a food-for-oil deal from the beginning of the conflict. For many years the Iraqi Government, even if they were ready to do so, were starved of the ability to buy food and medicines. If the food-for-oil deal is to be doubled, that means that it is now only half what it will become if that proposal goes through; and the current level of food for oil is double what it used to be.
First there was no food for oil, then there was food for oil, then it was doubled and now it is to be doubled again and that is because anyone who has eyes to see knows that the Iraqi people are dying like flies as a result of economic sanctions. Do not take my word for that—ask the United Nations Children's Fund, ask the World Health Organisation, ask the Harvard medical team, ask the Cambridge medical team and ask all the doctors and scientists who have been there and who have smelt the death being caused in Iraq as a result of the sanctions.
Sanctions are at the core of the issue. The Iraqis believe—the Arab world, the broader Muslim world and many others agree with them—that the United States has no intention of lifting sanctions and that it will move the goalposts at each and every opportunity. They have been moved even during this debate: my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said that the Iraqis must comply with the requirements of UNSCOM, but other hon. Members rose to say, "What about the Kurds?" and other hon. Members will rise to say, "What about the Shi'ites in the south?" or "What about the lack of parliamentary democracy?" The goalposts are constantly being moved—that is what the Arabs believe. They believe that UNSCOM, which is stuffed with American military personnel and paid for by the Pentagon, not by the United Nations, has no intention of ever giving Iraq a clean bill of health in respect of chemical weapons.
As I am talking about sophistry, let me say that the impression has been given here this evening that the Gulf Co-operation Council countries support the attack on Iraq. That is entirely false. The United Arab Emirates opposes this strike, as does Qatar. Saudi Arabia, our most important ally in the area, opposes this strike. His Highness Prince Sultan, the Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia, has unequivocally stated that Saudi Arabia is against this military strike. What about President Hosni Mubarak, our best friend in the Arab world? Last week, he warned the British Government that an attack on Iraq would detonate shock waves of extremism across the entire middle east, and begged the allies not to do it.
It is a strange policy that can count only on the support of the Government Front Bench, the Opposition Front Bench and Bill Clinton's discredited Administration in Washington, that cannot count on the support of the Arab countries, of the European countries or of a majority of the Security Council of the United Nations. Everyone is out of step except Uncle Sam and Johnnie Bull. Well, it is just not credible.
I shall close on this point. So far—[Interruption.] I hear the Minister for the Armed Forces, sotto voce from a sedentary position, talking about 1940. Let me tell him about appeasement: the appeasement of Israel for 50 years by the international community, during which time Israel has invaded Arab country after Arab country, occupied Arab lands, bombed Arab capitals, and imprisoned, tortured and murdered the Palestinian people.

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Let me tell the Minister about the appeasement of a country that has done all that—that has broken international law times without number, and that possesses so many weapons of mass destruction, from the nuclear to the chemical, that it has to wire up its biggest dissident, Vanunu, with a metal cage on his lower jaw so that he does not, in court, impart to the world community how many weapons of mass destruction he saw with his own eyes while working on Israel's nuclear programme.
The appeasement of Israel's crimes is the real reason why the Arabs are not with Great Britain and the United States of America in this enterprise. It is the appeasement—
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson): May I ask my hon. Friend a simple question? Is it not true that every one of the Arab countries that he listed just now has called on Saddam Hussein to comply with the resolutions, and called on him to allow the inspectors back in the terms that were in the resolutions? At what point in his speech will my hon. Friend call for that as well?
Mr. Galloway: Right now. Every one of those countries has said what the Secretary of State said, and I say it too. I want to cleanse the entire world of these filthy, obscene weapons, which are sold to dictatorships for profit by private enterprise companies. I want them to be eliminated in all countries. However, the Secretary of State's use of words does not avoid my central point, that every one of those Arab countries opposes this attack. Every one of them is begging the international community to avoid and avert this attack. Why does not the Secretary of State for Defence deal with that substantive point? A policy that cannot command even the support of the royal family of Saudi Arabia is a friendless policy indeed.
I believe that the Americans are holding Kofi Annan back from the car to the airport right now. They have locked the Secretary-General away until they lasso him with enough conditions and enough qualifications to guarantee that his mission will be a failure. I believe that the majority of right-thinking people in the world are thinking, "Godspeed, Kofi Annan. Make haste to Baghdad. Stay there as long as is necessary. Go the extra mile for peace." When Iraqi women and children start to be carried out—no, swept out—of burning buildings in Baghdad, it will be a shame, a blot—which all the perfume in Arabia will never extinguish—on the reputation of this country.
6.44 pm
Mr. Alan Clark: It is certainly an experience to follow, and to listen to, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway). Plainly, he has not had implanted in his skull one of those electrodes programmed by the Minister without Portfolio and Mr. Alastair Campbell to which the hon. Member for Hackney, South and Shoreditch (Mr. Sedgemore) attributes the brain power of every one of the hon. Ladies on the Labour Benches. He is on record as having said that in a recent speech.
It is also a great pleasure, which enlivens every debate in this place, to listen to the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), but I should like to supplement
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his trips down the memory lane of history with a recollection of my own. When he ran through all the various episodes in which the United Kingdom had militarily intervened in theatres around the globe since the war, he rather skated over the Falkland Islands. I was in the Chamber on 9 April 1982, and I remember hearing him say—in a magnificent speech, every bit as eloquent and moving as the one that he made today, and at such pitches of volume as we heard this afternoon—that the President of the United States would intervene, that the task force would have to turn round and come back, that it would be a complete rerun of the Suez expedition, and that we were incapable of recapturing the Falkland Islands because we were under the thumb of the Americans and because we were industrially, economically and militarily incapable of doing so. Well, the right hon. Gentleman chose not to remind us of that occasion, but I hope that it at least establishes that his predictive powers are not always impeccable.
The debate is taking place at a time when, for the second time in six years, there is an amphibious and carrier task force in the Gulf, and plainly the whole House must give the members of that force our loyalty, support and admiration for the manner in which they are responding to the task—a task by no means clear—which has been set them. Therefore, I hope that the putting of a number of questions to the Secretary of State will not be taken as impugning to any degree our support for individual members and units of the armed forces. I hope that you will agree, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that those are questions which can, and should, legitimately be asked in the House.
First, what has been done to protect our personnel from chemical and bacteriological weapons? I understand that the full range of available injections is not being administered. Why not? Secondly, what provisions are in place for protecting the lives and safety of United Kingdom civilians in Iraq? Thirdly, will the Secretary of State make it clear that the abuse and torture of prisoners, as happened in the last Gulf war, would not be tolerated, and would be treated as an escalation of the conflict?
Fourthly—I think the House will agree that this is important—to what extent are we privy to, or have we consented to, United States tactical planning and targeting? Fifthly, do these weapons actually exist—that is to say, in capable weapon form—or are we talking simply about supplies and components that are to be interdicted?
Next come the broad strategic realities. What do we hope to achieve? Is it that Saddam will simply roll over, apologise and admit the inspection teams to wherever they wish to go—or, if that is too Utopian, that Saddam will disappear, be displaced or assassinated? If we hope for that, we have certainly altered our objectives since the time when I was a Minister at the Department of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), when Saddam was deliberately kept in place as a make-weight to the ayatollahs on one side and the unfettered exercise of Israeli power on the other.
If Saddam is to be destabilised by military action—although I suggest that that is no more likely than his being strengthened in his position—what will be the position of a fragmented Iraq? We have heard the Foreign Secretary and others say that there is no intention to break up Iraq but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) pointed out, the break-up of

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Iraq is almost inevitable if the Iraqi Government are destabilised in conditions of extreme violence. It is the most likely consequence.
Will Turkey then be reconciled to the emergence of a Kurdish state in the north? How will the ayatollahs in Iran respond to division and demarcation between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims? How will all those repercussions affect the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states?
The scene has much of the appearance of an impending retributive military action whose consequences have not been fully thought through. History shows that such actions can be the precursors of very long wars indeed.
6.50 pm
Mr. Donald Anderson: Like the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark), I descend from the peaks of absolutes and certainties and recognise, with him, the uncertainties and the judgments that will have to be made, often on the basis of inadequate evidence.
There are indeed problems involving the strategic balance within the region, such as the position of Iran if Iraq is crippled. There are also wider questions that we must consider in the context of our transatlantic relations, as well as the problem of Russian-American relations.
Obviously there are no certainties, but at the end of the day we must seek on the basis of principle, with whatever difficulty, to reach decisions. We are not academics, weighing the series of problems that face us. Ultimately, amid all the gloom and the problems, a decision must be made.
As parliamentarians we must accept the fact that much of the evidence is not properly before us. For example, we cannot make a proper assessment of the strength of the Iraqi opposition. We do not know whether they have been so ruthlessly extirpated by Saddam Hussein that there is no chance of their rising up against him.
We do not know about other key matters, either, such as the possible effect of bombing that goes astray and lands on the anthrax barrels. We do not know to what extent, if any, any serious diplomatic movement has been shown by Saddam in response to the flurry of diplomatic activity over the past few days. We can only wish godspeed to Kofi Annan and hope that he has been given a sufficiently flexible brief, not to negotiate but to take a message that will be seen as reasonable by world opinion.
We are prey to many sources, and we are not sure whether some of them may be designed to mislead us. Last Friday, for example, there was a suggestion in The Times that many, or at least some, of the Russian weapons inspectors were feeding information to Saddam Hussein. If that were well founded it would certainly cast doubts on the idea of increasing the number of Russian inspectors, as well as on Russia's mediation efforts. We do not know.
In that context, I congratulate the Foreign Secretary and the rest of the Government on seeking to throw some light on the background by the publication for Members on 4 February of a paper showing not only the mandate of the United Nations Special Commission, which is binding on Saddam Hussein as part of the peace agreement, but an analysis of UNSCOM's work since 1991 and an account of the increasing evasions and obstructions on the part of Saddam Hussein.
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In the light of that paper, surely no one can put faith in the veracity of Saddam Hussein's word, or with any credibility see him as a victim rather than as someone who is the author not only of his own fate but, alas, of that of the people of his country. The Foreign Secretary set out a catalogue of deception and obstructions. Anyone inclined to give the benefit of any sort of doubt to Saddam Hussein should read and reread that note, which hon. Members received on 4 February.
Clearly Saddam Hussein is an evil dictator and a threat to the peace of the region, and perhaps more widely. However, there are other evil dictators in the world—other people who threaten the peace of their regions. What is different about Saddam is surely the fact that, as a result of the war of 1991, he reached an agreement with the United Nations of which he is blatantly in breach. We as an international community are faced with the choice of whether to do nothing, to do something ineffective, or to seek to do something that, despite all the problems, is as effective as we can manage.
We must of course concede that there are far greater difficulties now than there were in 1990–91, when the aim was clear. There had been an invasion of a neighbouring country—Kuwait, a member of the United Nations—and the aim was clearly to expel the invader from that country. Had the United Nations coalition force gone beyond that, invaded Basra, gone on to Baghdad and tried tyrannicide, that would have had no international legitimacy because it would have gone well beyond the remit of the UN resolutions.
I can see that different United States spokesmen have set out different war aims and that Saddam Hussein has used the suffering of his people, which he has inflicted on them for his own ends, for successful propaganda. The difficulty of reassembling the Gulf war coalition is now much greater, in part because of the way in which Premier Netanyahu has behaved in Israel, with his settlements policy and his failure to comply, at least adequately, with the Oslo accords.
All that said, Russia has its own agenda, as does France which, putting the most generous construction on it, is best able, it says, to play the role of "interlocuteur valable" by seeking to distance itself from the other European allies. In the main, our European allies are now very much on board in the current initiative.
In spite of all those difficulties and problems, which are different from those of 1991, I remind my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) that, had we accepted his position in 1991, during the six months of negotiation before the military strike we would still have been negotiating—but negotiating with a Saddam who was in Kuwait, and possibly in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states too.
That is the essential weakness of the case—
Mr. Corbyn: Will my hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Anderson: My hon. Friend did not give way to me when I was trying to put that case to him.
Mr. Corbyn: That was not me.
Mr. Anderson: I give way to my hon. Friend.
Mr. Corbyn: I thank my hon. Friend for giving way now that I have reminded him who I am.

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Does my hon. Friend not recall that, in the last few days before the launch of the strikes against Iraq by the allied forces to liberate Kuwait in 1991, President Gorbachev had indeed intervened, and successfully negotiated the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait? Does that not demonstrate that there was a serious attempt by the then Soviet Union to achieve a settlement, which the United States simply did not want?
Mr. Anderson: I suspect that my hon. Friend is rewriting history. Had those diplomatic efforts continued beyond six months, as some are suggesting now, without the option of a military strike, we would still be negotiating and Saddam would still be encamped in Kuwait City. That is the essential weakness of the argument of those who want a form of diplomacy without any military strike at the end to back it. That is the real problem.
Even those who are willing to give Saddam Hussein the benefit of many doubts must acknowledge his clear defiance of the United Nations resolution. What is now the proper response? Do we do nothing? That surely would be unthinkable. What a precedent for any other dictator who sought to defy the will of the United Nations and the world community. Do we rely simply on diplomacy? We know what might have happened if we had tried to do that without backing it with an ultimate military option in 1990–91.
A reasonable policy is surely diplomacy plus. Negotiation has a better chance of success if there is a military message behind it, but the military message can be credible and saleable to world opinion only if it can be shown that a serious process of diplomacy preceded it. The war drums may now be rolling and there may be a feeling of inevitability. I hope that we shall show by all our actions that we are serious about diplomacy, and that we are prepared to be flexible on some key details, such as what we learn about the package that is being discussed with Kofi Annan in respect of the weapons inspectors.
We must show to the people of Iraq and wider regional opinion that there is light at the end of the tunnel. There have been contrary indications from US spokesmen about sanctions. As a sign of good will, there should surely be a linkage between compliance and the gradual removal of sanctions.
Mr. Allan Rogers: My hon. Friend has invoked the strength of United Nations resolutions and the issue of sanctions. Is it not strange that we return to that argument, especially after listening to the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark)? When he was in power as Minister for Defence Procurement, and when he served at the Department of Trade and Industry, he flouted UN resolutions regarding the imposition of sanctions in the export of arms and conspired with British industrialists to feed Saddam Hussein's war machine. Part of the problem that we face now is that when people like him were in government, they ignored UN resolutions and broke them, when Lord Howe, who was then the Foreign Secretary—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The intervention is far too long.
Mr. Anderson: I hear my hon. Friend. My aim tonight is to give a clear signal, along with all sections of the
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House, that if the reasonable diplomatic options have been exhausted, the military option exists. If diplomacy stands alone, it will have no effect. Of course any option is high risk and there are many uncertainties, but to do nothing would involve far greater uncertainties than the policy pursued by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, which I endorse.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Before I call the next speaker, may I remind the House that Madam Speaker has placed a 10-minute limit on speeches from 7 pm until 9 pm.
7.3 pm
Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith: May I say how much I agree with the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). As I have only 10 minutes, and 1 know that many other hon. Members want to speak in the debate, I shall try not to repeat points that have already been made, although I may refer to the fact that I agree with them.
I have visited the United States a number of times, and I was there a few weeks ago with some colleagues. We went to the Senate, the House of Representatives, the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the State Department. I could not recognise the policies described by some hon. Members, as though there were some great devious plot on the part of the United States to continue to ram sanctions down the throats of the poor, suffering people of Iraq, to pave the way for bombing and to tear Iraq apart, thereby creating a disruptive situation in the middle east.
I have never found people in the United States more thoughtful than I did on my most recent visit, or more considerate about the repercussions of a policy that is devilishly difficult to deal with.
How does one ignore a country that has deliberately flouted United Nations resolutions? As the hon. Member for Swansea, East said, that is a matter for diplomacy. I agree with him that diplomacy is not an end in itself. There comes a time when it must be backed up with threats, and possibly the threat of military action, which can be be shown only by positioning troops. If our experience between the wars is anything to go by, we must recognise that reality.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) went back to the past and spoke about his childhood. Let me say why, when it comes to upholding the United Nations, I subscribe so strongly to diplomacy plus military action if diplomacy fails. I remember the circumstances in which I grew up. My father had been gassed and wounded in the first world war, and recovered. My mother had the guts to get in a car and drive people round through zeppelin raids as a volunteer. As the shadow of that war began to recede, a new shadow loomed—the threat of another war.
That threat of that war got worse and worse, because we appeased and appeased. We never stopped appeasing. We tried to reckon that we could deal with Mussolini over sanctions. We failed, and a Foreign Secretary resigned. We tried to think that something could happen to stop a dictator moving his troops into a demilitarised zone, contrary to the treaty of Versailles, and we did not have the guts to go in and oppose him.

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We could not find allies, just as today it is difficult to find Arab allies. I understand why. Why should Arab states that got involved in the war when one of their fellow states was invaded stick their neck out now, especially in view of the difficulties that arise over Israel? They know that they would put their lives and kingdoms under threat, partly because of Israel, partly because of the lies that are told, partly because of Muslim fundamentalism, and partly because in the end there are some nations that cannot face up to the reality, just as happened between the two world wars.
What, then, are we to do? Are we to sit back and do nothing? I agree with the Foreign Secretary's speech. It is not in line with reality, realpolitik, decency, a sense of moral fibre or leadership if we wash our hands and say that we can do nothing. Of course we have compassion for the people of Iraq, although I am bound to say that, from the shots that I see on television, the people of Iraq look remarkably well fed, compared with pictures of people in the poor states of Africa, where we can see how badly fed they are. We hear of the destruction that was rained on Baghdad, but it is amazing how many new buildings one sees and the palaces that have been built.
I will not take moral lectures from anyone on either side of the House that the responsibility is mine. The initial responsibility lies with the regime in Iraq and with that dictator. I ended up as a soldier in the second world war because of the refusal of many countries between the two world wars to recognise that there are people who are intrinsically evil. We must stand up to them and their dictatorships, because, if we do not, our turn will come in the end. The second world war was unnecessary and would not have happened, if we had had the guts to stand up at the right time.
Opposition Members share similar experiences to mine with regard to the North Atlantic Assembly. We tried to back through parliamentary means the resolution of our Governments to stand up to Russian threats during the cold war. We did so, and we did not at the same time threaten the Russians with weapons or acts of aggression; we stood our ground. That, for me, is the real reason why today there is a generation throughout Europe that can look forward to years of peace—which goes for the Russians as well as everyone else.
In the end, those dictatorships tumbled because we faced them down. That, I think, is the root of the argument that we are having today. Obviously, if diplomacy is to succeed, we must convince those with whom we wish to enter into an agreement—those whom we wish to discard the reckless creation and use of weapons—that there is no future for them in such action. I believe that, by doing so, we shall do them a service, provided that we have the courage in the end to say that a lesson must be learned.
Mr. Mubarak, for example, knows very well where the danger lies. It does not lie in the United States—although it has made mistakes over Israel, as many hon. Members have pointed out. Mr. Mubarak knows that the threat to his country, and to other Arab countries, lies right there in Iraq. That is why he has said—it is on the record; I believe that it was quoted extensively in yesterday's Financial Times—that he would like the United Nations representative, be it the Secretary-General or whoever else is sent, to tell the Iraqi leader that he should submit to the conditions imposed by the Security Council resolution. He should allow the inspectors to return, without
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imposing any conditions. He could then hope that his friends outside—for he has friends outside—would put pressure on the United States and its fellow UN members to lift the sanctions that have imposed the hardship, and help his countrymen on their way. First and foremost, Saddam Hussein must renounce the weapons he has; but if he cannot respond to Mubarak, how much less likely is he to respond to us at present?
I hope that the Government will have our full support in the rest of the debate. Because we have experienced wars, we know how terrible they can be. I never want to see another, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) has posed some important questions: the public out there need to be convinced.
Let me say one more thing about the United States. I observed no gung-ho attitude among Congressmen. I note that the President is taking the argument to the people, and so should we.
7.12 pm
Ann Clwyd: Although I feel as passionately as some of my hon. Friends who have spoken, I do not share their view. I have not been to Baghdad, but I have been to northern Iraq many times. If people think that things are bad in Saddam's Iraq, they should realise that things are far worse in northern Iraq.
The Kurds of northern Iraq are the subject of a double embargo—the embargo of Saddam Hussein, and the embargo of the United Nations. I can list the names of the places that I have visited: they include Sulamania, Erbil, Kifri and Penjwin. I have seen children in hospitals who, having taken half a course of antibiotics, have been told, "There are no more medicines for you." Their parents have been told that they will have to rely on the black market.
I have seen refugees thrown out of their homes by Saddam Hussein, who never ceases his repression of the Kurds living in his territory. Saddam Hussein has broken not only the resolution applying to UNSCOM, but many others—resolutions telling him not to oppress the Kurds. That oppression has continued since 1988, and has taken place before and after the Gulf war. Saddam Hussein has engaged in a programme of Arabisation. As recently as November, he was throwing Kurds out of their homes, telling them that they had 24 hours to go into the north or into the desert in the south.
The first time I went into northern Iraq was in 1991, when the Kurds were fleeing across the mountains into Iran. Thousands upon thousands died in those mountains—victims of Saddam Hussein's oppression. I saw what was happening inside the north. As I crossed into the north, I heard continuous bombardment. I stayed for 24 hours; then I came back to the House and described, from the Dispatch Box, what I had seen in the mountains. People—including the then Prime Minister—said at the time, "This will never happen to the Kurds again. We will protect them from the oppression of Saddam Hussein." Unfortunately, although that was the wish, it was not the reality.
As those of us who take a close interest in it know, there is no consistency in foreign policy: there are constant contradictions. We have continually encouraged the Kurds in their uprising. I say "we", and by "we" I mean both the Americans and ourselves, for we were

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involved as well. We encouraged the Kurds in 1991, and in 1995.1 visited northern Iraq again in March 1995, when the Kurds were battling with Saddam Hussein's forces. They were told, "Keep on fighting—the Americans are coming." We falsely promised them that we would be there to support them in the event of their taking on Saddam's forces. We let them down on that occasion, and we did the same in September 1996.
In January 1996, we and the Americans attempted to deal with the two Kurdish sides which, by that time, were fighting each other over the taxes from the traffic across the borders between Turkey and Iraq and between Iran and Iraq. We ignored the sanctions-busting that has continued since 1991. Kurds fought each other because they were short of resources, and, again, we turned a blind eye. We did not assist them; we just let them get on with what was supposed to be a new democracy. We encouraged the elections and sent observers, but after that we let the Kurds get on with it again.
There was a big gap between January and September 1996. In January, there was a budget freeze in the United States. The Kurds had agreed to reach some kind of peace. A commission was supposed to be being set up to monitor that peace. When the American budget was restored, nothing happened until the end of August, by which time it was too late.
What was the allies' response? Instead of protecting the Kurds from the invasion of Saddam Hussein, who went into the north with hundreds of thousands of troops, we sent cruise missiles into the south. It looked very good on television, but it did not help the Kurds at all. Saddam's forces and the security police were then inside northern Iraq, as they still are.
I am very worried about what may happen now. I believe that it is very important for Saddam Hussein to be made to comply with UN resolutions. UNSCOM has managed to unearth and destroy many of the weapons that he was rebuilding. I ask again: why did he ignore the UN's offer of food for oil for five years? If he was concerned about his people, why did he spend five years refusing to accept that offer? He was, of course, rebuilding his weaponry. Instead of spending the money on his own people, he spent it on increasing his weapons of mass destruction. That is why it is essential that he is made to comply with the resolutions.
I know many of the Iraqi opposition, because I have campaigned on this issue for more than 20 years. We have talked to the Iraqi opposition, and it is not true to say, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) did, that they are totally opposed to military action. Except for the Iraqi Communist party and one other small party, they are not. However, they want to see it linked with the end of Saddam Hussein. They do not want military action on its own, only to find that he is still in power. They want that ruthless dictator removed from the scene. They do not want any more unfinished business.
We all hope that military action will be averted, but if it takes place—because I still believe that he must be made to comply with the resolutions-our Government must have a political programme, and part of that must be the indictment of Saddam Hussein. After that, I suggest that we give assistance to the people in the north and the
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south of Iraq. Sanctions against them should be lifted, because we have no quarrel with them. They are not involved with Saddam Hussein. They oppose him, so it makes no sense that the UN embargo against them should continue.
A no-drive zone should be put in place, so that Saddam Hussein will not have the opportunity further to oppress the people in the north or the Shias in the south. Most of all, it is important to assure the public in Britain and the Iraqi opposition that we are not sending useless cruise missiles to bomb the deserts—that, if any missiles are used, they have specified targets, and that they will take out those places that may contain the weapons with which we are concerned, the Republican Guard, and the things that Saddam Hussein holds dear to him. If military action takes place, he has it in his hands to ensure that his civilians are moved away from possible targets.
I disagree with those who say that Saddam Hussein is a bad man, but the Iraqi people—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady has had her time.
7.22 pm
Mr. Andrew Robathan: I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), because I agree with much of what she said. There is not a great deal that is new to be said in the debate, so I shall try to avoid repeating points that have been made. I shall certainly not dwell on the seriousness of the situation, the threats of terrorism that may exist to the United Kingdom, the threats to the whole of the middle east, and the threat to Israel, which could lead to nuclear retaliation and thereby a threat to world peace as a whole.
Before we send our young men to kill other people's sons and daughters, whether or not they be Iraqi soldiers, we should be absolutely certain of what we are trying to achieve. It may be that bombing raids are the least worst option with regard to Iraq, but I urge caution, for it seems that there is a lack of clarity in our objectives.
In January 1991, I volunteered to rejoin the Army because I believed that the threat to world peace demanded that I, too, should play my part. Hon. Members may recall that we were expecting the most awful war. I argued during the selection process for the seat of Blaby that if we had to fight, we should, and I had no reasonable excuse for not going.
The force that we assembled in Saudi Arabia in January 1991 was, I believe, the largest military force assembled by the western allies since D day. The coalition of countries and armies has been called President Bush's greatest success. It was a tremendous logistic effort and was very impressive. It was an outstanding military force. As one very unimportant member of that force, it seemed to me more like taking part in a large military exercise, such as those of the British Army on the Rhine, rather than a war. Indeed, it transpired that our deaths as a result of Iraqi action were fewer than our deaths in road accidents. Indeed, I believe that they were fewer than the deaths as a result of friendly fire from American jets.
One hundred hours after the ground assault began, the Americans stopped the war. Most of us who were there—the allies, including the Arabs—were astonished that we should have left the job unfinished. People said that we must not go to Baghdad. We did not need to. All that

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we had to do was cut off those in the Iraqi Republican Guard, who were then in the east of the country, from their escape routes. Instead, we allowed them to escape. They would probably have surrendered, as most of the Iraqis did. They then kept Saddam Hussein in power.
Mr. Salmond: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Robathan: I am sorry; I cannot.
Mr. Salmond rose—
Mr. Robathan: No. We have only 10 minutes, as the hon. Gentleman knows.
I suppose that the Americans stopped partly because they believed that they had achieved their aim, and partly because there was tremendous American public reaction to the devastation on the road north of Kuwait city. How could anybody have been so foolish as to allow television cameras into A-10s as they shot up fleeing Iraqis? How could anybody have allowed over-excited pilots to make comments on television such as, "This is a turkey shoot?" More than anything else, why on earth was it necessary, because the road north of Kuwait city was already cut some 100 miles north by the French? So it was that James Baker could appear on television in Washington, saying, "The allies have taught Saddam Hussein a lesson." Thus Bush's greatest success became his greatest failure.
What lesson had the allies taught the world? That Saddam Hussein remained and remains in power despite the best efforts of that huge army, while all his protagonists and antagonists—Thatcher, my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), Bush and Mitterrand—have gone. The lesson to Saddam Hussein's neighbours could not be clearer. Another lesson that our Government should take on board is that the United States might make decisions that are in its own interests and not in the best interests of Britain and the world.
This is not 1991. For a start, I shall not be volunteering for service. President Clinton is not President Bush. No coalition is assembled. There is no support from the French, the Russians or from many local Arabs for military action. No substantial ground forces are assembled. As far as I can see, there is no specific, attainable and lasting objective. In military terms, bombing can do little on its own. It might destabilise Saddam Hussein, but it will certainly not destroy all his capabilities or his armies, and I fear that it is unlikely to destroy him.
What is the political objective? It has been suggested that this will "bring him to heel". When I hear comments such as that made by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Leeds, Central (Mr. Fatchett), who said:
"We are determined to ensure that Saddam Hussein complies with Security Council resolutions"—[Official Report, 13 February 1998; Vol. 305, c. 746.],
I fear that we have learnt nothing from the past.
When I came back from the Gulf, somebody said to me, "Doesn't it suit us to have a weakened Saddam Hussein in Baghdad?" It was reminiscent of James Baker's comment. We should understand that there is no riding this particular tiger.
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There is a political objective that we should have, and it should be stated: the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Everybody talks about him as a tyrant, naming him as responsible for atrocities against his own people and others. He is evil incarnate, but we seem unable to make the final, logical step—to say that if he is responsible, he must be held responsible and removed from power. Instead, we may add to the woes of his own people by bombing them.
As a start, we should, as the hon. Member for Cynon Valley said, indict Saddam Hussein for war crimes or crimes against humanity. The list of his crimes is endless and includes unprovoked attacks on Kuwait and Iran, executing prisoners of war and using nerve agents against his own people. How much worse are his crimes than those committed by Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia, who was, for good or ill, elected in a quasi-democratic process as President of Republika Srpska? The Foreign Secretary said that that may have to await the establishment of an international criminal court. That is nonsense. If there is any point in being a member of the Security Council, surely it is to persuade it to act now on this issue.
We should pursue Saddam Hussein by legal means, and we should ensure that the World Service and others get the message home to the people of Iraq. We must drive a wedge between the coerced and intimidated population of Iraq and the dictator, and we should give that population hope of deliverance.
In September 1995, Saddam Hussein was reaffirmed in office for a further seven years by a vote of 99.96 per cent. Surely that says all that needs to be said about the intimidation and fear on which his rule is based. We should assist the Iraqi opposition as best we can, despite their fragmentation and internal quarrels.
It was reported today that MI6 attempted to achieve the assassination of the dictator. I do not expect any comment on that, or on reports of SAS hit squads trying to get Saddam Hussein. The SAS is not superhuman, and I do not think that there would be many volunteers for that exercise.
Indictment is not the whole answer, but it would at least be a start. We blame Saddam Hussein for atrocities, and then we deal with him as a legitimate leader. He has no legitimacy: he has only de facto authority. This is a man with whom it is impossible to negotiate in any positive meaning of the word. Of course, we must be able to fulfil weapons inspections, but we must be able to dictate terms and not negotiate. We were able to dictate terms in 1991 after the use of force.
In the aftermath of the Gulf war, it was often said that the allies had to stop when they did, because otherwise Iraq might have fallen apart. To which I would respond, "So what?" The kingdom of Iraq was cobbled together by the British in the 1920s. If the Kurds wish to go their own way, that is up to them and we should let them decide their future, notwithstanding any concerns in Iran, Syria or Turkey. It seems unlikely that the southern Shi'ites would be particularly interested in becoming part of Iran, but that is up to them. That would have been the logical result of the uprisings that we encouraged in those areas. What could be worse than the current situation?
My plea to the Government is that we move on, and that we take as our primary aim the end of Saddam Hussein's rule, otherwise we shall be back discussing this problem in another seven years. To his people and to his

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neighbours he is as bad as Hitler. With the advantage of hindsight, we would not think twice about trying to displace Hitler. If it is considered by better informed judges than me that air strikes are necessary, I support that as the least worst option. But it must be recognised that they are only a temporary option, and that there can be no lasting peace in the middle east while Saddam Hussein remains in power in Baghdad.
7.32 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell: May I, as a Gentile, say a gentle word to my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman)? I visited Jerusalem and was greatly moved by the holocaust museum. I was moved in exactly the same way when I visited the Amariya in Baghdad. Conclusions can be drawn. The commemoration of such horrors has an effect on the Arab people, just as it has on the Jewish people.
I should like to follow the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) and ask questions about chemical weapons. I asked similar questions in the Adjournment debate on Friday, but they remained unanswered.
Anthrax is a bacterial disease of cattle and sheep that can affect humans. The germ can exist as spores, like those scattered from a ripe mushroom or toadstool, which can be blown for long distances by the wind. Rubbed into the skin, anthrax is a deep black sloughing sore that leads to blood poisoning. Inhaled, one hundredth of a millionth of a gram of anthrax spores is enough to cause severe pneumonia, again with blood poisoning.
Both forms of the illness are fatal in up to 80 per cent, of cases within hours or days, unless intensive antibiotic treatment is given urgently. That is unlikely to be available in post-sanctions Iraq or to the ordinary population of its neighbours. No one has told anthrax spores that they must not go for the civilian population, and that they should not harness a wind to be blown to friendly states.
My first question is: are we sure that by bombing we are not risking pollution and a terrible disease scourge in western Asia?
Anthrax spores can survive for a long time in soil or dust, and may remain a risk to health for years. The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) knows Gruinard island off the west coast of Scotland. That beautiful conical island has been anaesthetised for 50 years. People still cannot go on to the island because at the end of the second world war anthrax experiments took place there.
My second question is: are we sure that even by accident—not on purpose—we hall not let anthrax spores loose throughout vast tracts of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and further afield?
VX agent is one of the nerve gases. It was used by Iraq against Iran, and probably against the Kurds. It is similar to sarin, which was used by the Japanese urban terrorists Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway about two years ago. I am told by Dr. Douglas Holdstock that it is a volatile liquid that can be dispersed as an aerosol. A 1 mg drop can be fatal, and it can be absorbed through intact skin. An amount equivalent to a half-litre bottle of spring water
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could theoretically kill half a million people. It paralyses the nerve-muscle junction, and floods the throat, lung and bowel with fluid. Death is due to asphyxiation and can occur within minutes.
Treatment requires rapid transfer by trained ambulance personnel to an intensive care unit. Pralidoxime is a specific antidote, but I am informed that only a few hospitals in the United Kingdom stock it, and that it is currently in short supply.
My third question is: does the Ministry of Defence have quantities of that antidote? If so, can we at least be given an assurance, without the details, that such eventualities are taken into account? That dovetails with the question of the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea.
There are three possible ways in which chemical and biological weapon agents may be distributed as a result of an attack on Iraq, and they are not mutually exclusive. It is not possible to give figures for possible casualties, which depend on the amount of agent, population density and weather, as rain would deposit the agents close to the site of deposition.
If Iraq has CBWs in a usable form, such as Scud missiles, they could be fired in response to a US-UK attack, which was the use-them-or-lose-them scenario for NATO and Warsaw pact nuclear weapons for more than 30 years. If those missiles were to land on cities such as Riyadh and Tel Aviv, they could cause many casualties, and in the case of Israel could trigger a response with nuclear weapons against Baghdad.
My fourth question is: are we suggesting that those weapons, if they exist, would not be used? I repeat the question that was put earlier: what would Saddam Hussein do if his back was against the wall in those circumstances? That is a serious question.
My fifth question concerns accidental release by bombing. An accurate direct hit on a cache of CBWs in a closed space could generate sufficient temperature and pressure to incinerate and destroy the cache. As far as can be gauged from reports, the United Nations and the United States do not know precisely how many sites contain CBW agents, or indeed where some of them are. A near miss either from inexact aiming or as a side effect of an attack on another target could liberate large amounts of CBW agents. The House may recollect that an explosion at a Russian munitions factory at Sverdlosk in the Urals in the 1960s liberated anthrax from a nearby store. Although there were not great populations in the Urals, it had an absolutely devastating effect. What do we do in the event of an accidental release?
There is also terrorism. CBW agents could be transported in the baggage of travellers and used by terrorists on US and UK cities. They could be sprayed from crop-spraying aircraft, liberated in underground railway systems—as in Tokyo—or even scattered from high buildings. It would not be without risk to the distributors, but suicide missions are not unknown in the middle east.
The possibilities that I have outlined highlight the risks of the possible bombings of Iraq, over and above doubts that they would advance the cause of weakening Saddam Hussein and allowing the UN inspectors to continue their work. We should take seriously the concerns of the International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War and many others.

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Finally, it may be asked of people like me, "What on earth would you do?" Frankly, I would at least try lifting sanctions by stages, because that might let loose all sorts of forces in Iraq that wished to change the regime. I know that I am accused of being naive, but at least I speak from personal experience, having been there in 1994, and it is the best judgment that I can offer the House.
7.41 pm
Sir Raymond Whitney: The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), whose sincerity and persistence are greatly admired throughout the House, is right to emphasise the horrors of chemical weapons and biological agents, but sadly, his speech—and the amendment in his name and that of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn)—suggests that he ignores many of the other factors in the difficult equation with which we are trying to wrestle.
More than a century ago, statesmen of various nationalities tried to construct an international organisation that would somehow eliminate the scourge of war from the world. Of course, the search continues and yet remains to be successful. The League of Nations was a gallant effort that failed—partly because of the non-participation of America, but more importantly, because the democracies of the 1920s and 1930s lacked the courage and resolution to stand up to dictators who were not very powerful when they started out. Mussolini and Hitler could have been nipped in the bud had the international community had the guts to do so.
After the second world war, the international community tried to learn from its mistakes and it constructed the United Nations. Here too, we ran into difficulties with the Soviet veto in the Security Council and for many years, the United Nations was, in effect, neutralised. Happily, we were saved from the ultimate horror of a nuclear holocaust by the balance of nuclear deterrence between east and west. That is not to say that there were not hundreds of small and quite horrible wars throughout the period. That brings us to the crucial importance of the United Nations today and the challenge that Saddam Hussein represents.
The position is clear and we must guard against determined efforts to fudge that clarity, examples of which we have heard from the right hon. Member for Chesterfield and the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway). They tried to cover the harsh and difficult reality that confronts the Government—and indeed all of us—with a fog of confusion. It is a time for clarity and steadfastness, and the recognition of what is at stake and what is not. What is not at stake includes the issues of Israel and Palestine. They may be serious, but they are not directly related to the issue at hand. The issue is not oil supplies or who supplied Iraq with what and when. Mistakes have always been made and they will always be made. The issue is not the United Kingdom being a poodle of the United States, as has been alleged. The Labour Government and the Opposition are at one in recognising the size of the problem and the remedy that is available to us. Of course it is not a good solution, but it is the only one available and it is increasingly recognised by countries with which we have an affinity and which are generally recognised to have the international standards to which we happily aspire.
It is a simple matter and we must not let the obfuscators get away with it. It is also unique because only Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded a neighbouring country without
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provocation. Only Saddam Hussein offended against United Nations Security Council resolution 687, having agreed to scrap his weapons of mass destruction and allow UNSCOM to operate. Only Saddam Hussein has shown himself ready to use horrific chemical and biological weapons to which the hon. Member for Linlithgow referred, not only against his enemies, but against his own people. Although other countries may have stocks of those weapons, only Saddam Hussein is producing them in the massive quantities that we have now discovered.
None of those points has been denied. All the members of the Security Council agree on the circumstances and I believe that the course is clear. Of course, we must continue to negotiate, but there must be a limit. Negotiation without the potential use of force will never succeed against Saddam Hussein, as all our experience of him demonstrates. Certainly it is difficult, but any alternative to the course that the Government are embarked on and that we support would be very much worse.
As I said, for nearly a century we have been struggling to find an international mechanism and, on the whole, the position is favourable. Members of the Security Council are not pure democracies by our standards, but at least Russia and China are now countries with which, I hope, we can do business. Of course we do not all see eye to eye at the moment, and the French position on the issue is regrettable, but we can make more progress in the United Nations and the Security Council. The one way in which to torpedo that and to destroy any hope of progress would be to let Saddam Hussein get away with it. If he is seen to win, it will be a fatal blow to the United Nations and to the region, and other rulers in the region know that. Very much has been made of the position of the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, but there is no doubt that if and when Saddam Hussein departs the scene or is toppled, the first to celebrate will be his Arab neighbours.
Let us have an end to the cant and hypocrisy. Of course war is terrible. We do not need the hon. Member for Kelvin to shout at us about his compassion for people who are killed in war. We support the Government's motion because we understand that war is terrible and we want to stop it.
This is an historic debate. Hon. Members have already mentioned the Falklands debates. I remember, on that first Saturday debate, urging some caution. I believe that it is not too fanciful to compare this debate to that notorious one in the Oxford union in the 1930s which—in the words of that motion—encouraged Hitler to believe that "this House" would not fight for Queen and country.
If there were substantial support today for the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Chesterfield, it would have the most harmful effect on peace in the middle east and on the future of the structure of the United Nations.
7.49 pm
Mr. David Winnick: I should like to nail the lie that the United States, Britain and other countries are engaged in warmongering, and that we cannot wait for military action to be taken. If Britain and the United States were so keen on war—because of the length of the crisis over weapons inspections in Iraq—we would already be involved in war.
There is an overwhelming wish to determine whether diplomacy can succeed. We do not want war; we want to avoid war. Therefore, the accusations made by

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some—whether they are Members or some outside here—that we are warmongering and cannot wait to bomb Iraq or to see Iraqi civilians killed are lies. Such lies should be nailed at every opportunity.
There will be no war if, because of the latest diplomatic activity, Saddam Hussein complies with the wishes of the United Nations Security Council and does what he said that he would do at the end of the 1991 war. He has only to do what he agreed to do when he lost the war in Kuwait.
What means of persuasion would exist if we said that military action would be taken in no circumstances? Do we expect that butcher—that murderous dictator—to say, "In all the circumstances, I must agree with the Security Council's 1991 decision"? If there is any hope that he will comply—who knows; but I do not have much hope that he will—and avert war, it will come about only because of the threat of force. Only the threat of force will determine whether there is a peaceful outcome—which is what we all want.
Those who demand that there should be no war should realise that responsibility for military action, if it comes, will lie with the Iraqi criminal regime. I do not accept for one moment that there will be blood on my hands or on the hands of any of my colleagues who go into the Government Lobby today; it is nonsense to suggest that. If we were so interested in war, military action and killing civilians, why would we place such great emphasis on diplomacy? If we want war, why are we desperately hoping that the Iraqi dictator will even now see sense?
The hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) told us that there were terrible civilian casualties in 1991. I deplore those civilian casualties; I will always deplore civilian casualties. However, I must accept that, if military action is taken, there cannot possibly be a guarantee that innocent civilian lives will not be lost.
I was here, in September 1990, when the House was recalled after the invasion of Kuwait, and I was in the Chamber for all the debates that preceded military action in January 1991. The allies gave Saddam Hussein four months to get out of Kuwait; they gave him four months to avoid war. At every opportunity, he was pleaded with to avoid war.
Now we are told that—somehow—the allies, the international community and those of us who were Members of Parliament in 1990–91 are responsible for the casualties and the harm that resulted. Responsibility for what occurred lies with only one source—the Iraqi dictator. As one who said then that military action was justified if Saddam Hussein refused to leave Kuwait, I do not accept responsibility for what occurred. It is as sensible to say that, from 1939 onwards, the House was responsible for the terrible casualties and millions killed in the second world war. We know only too well where the responsibility for that war lay.
The critics were wrong about what happened in 1991. The hon. Member for Kelvin quoted my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George). Although I agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South, I did not agree with his concluding line. I would be the last person to lecture any hon. Member. I accept entirely that if one believes that an action is wrong, one should oppose it, no matter what. I have no disagreement with the hon. Member for Kelvin on that particular score.
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Nevertheless, seven years ago, the critics were hopelessly wrong. Although it does not automatically follow that they are wrong now, the line that they pursued then—that virtually all the Arab world would rise up against the west if war broke out, and that there was no guarantee that Kuwait would ultimately be liberated—was wrong. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait did end. Had it not ended—as sanctions would never have done the trick—not only would Kuwait have remained under enemy occupation, but Saddam Hussein would have learnt that he could invade any country in the region. Why not? If the allies were unwilling to intervene militarily, there was no reason why he should not have continued with other invasions. Therefore, seven years ago, the war not only liberated Kuwait, but has ensured that no other country in the region has been invaded by Saddam Hussein.
Yes, ordinary people in Iraq have suffered—they have suffered greatly. I think that even the critics agree that, for over 20 years, they have suffered from a terrifying, brutal dictatorship. I agree that some—not all—of the critics were enemies of the Saddam Hussein regime long before Opposition Members expressed an interest in it. I accept that entirely. However, it is not very logical for one to be against that brutal dictator and to use every opportunity in the House to say so, but also to be against taking action against him when he commits criminal aggression. I did not see the logic of that seven years ago, and I do not see it now.
We have been told about civilian casualties. What about the casualties in the war between Iraq and Iran? The fact is that, on both sides, a total of 1 million people died in that war. Who started that war? We are told that the United States supported Iraq. That may well be so, but the United States did not instigate the war. Saddam Hussein started that war, with callous indifference to the suffering of the Iraqi people, and he stopped it only when he could not win it. Therefore, when we are rightly told—we should be told; we should remind ourselves—about all the civilian casualties and about all the innocent people who died who were in no way associated with that regime, let us remember also how many others died and suffered because of that terrible war that lasted for eight years.
As we know, Saddam Hussein's regime is a brutal dictatorship. He used gas 10 years ago: 5,000 people were killed. I do not know how many hon. Members protested in the House. Nevertheless, that is the nature of the criminal regime that we are facing.
We are told that other countries are in breach of United Nations resolutions and the hon. Member for Kelvin made much of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I agree that Israel has been in breach of conditions, which I deplore, but it is senseless to be unable to distinguish between Governments such as Israel's and terrible, brutal dictatorships such as Iraq's.
Let us hope that diplomacy works. If we surrender now, however, there will be every incentive for Saddam to continue to play cat and mouse with the UN and the international community. We have a duty and a responsibility to act if diplomacy does not work. I accept my responsibility, as I did seven years ago. If there is, as I hope, an overwhelming vote in the House in favour of the motion, it will be justified and will reflect the broad feelings in the country at large.
7.59 pm
Mr. Alex Salmond: Two things have depressed me about this evening's debate. First, there have been a number of disparaging references to agendas—"the French agenda" and "the Russian agenda"—as if the United Kingdom and the United States do not have agendas. We are trying in the debate to find the agenda of the international community.
The second thing that has depressed me—I absolve the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) from this—is the attempt to say that people should stop thinking, salute and rally round the flag. I do not think that the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) would pay the slightest attention to any such request but no such request should be made and he is entitled to speak his mind, as are others.
Mr. Winnick: I said that.
Mr. Salmond: If the hon. Gentleman had been listening, he would have heard me say that I absolved him from that criticism.
I am glad that I am speaking after the hon. Members for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) and for Blaby (Mr. Robathan), who started to put together a better position than either of those taken by the Government and Opposition Front-Bench Members, and also better than the position taken by the hon. Member for Linlithgow and his friends. I do not believe that it is morally indefensible to take military action, but I do believe that it is morally indefensible to take such action unless there is a political strategy designed to end the suffering of the peoples of Iraq.
I want to list a few of the aspects on which I agree with the Foreign Secretary and which I welcome. I welcome his support for the Secretary-General's mission to Iraq and the fact that a new Security Council resolution is to be sought. The legitimacy of the existing resolutions is debatable, and I welcome the doubling of the allowance for oil for food.
I want to make some serious points to the Government about my great concerns about their position. The Foreign Secretary did not touch at all on the substantial charge of hypocrisy that can be levelled against the western world. Saddam Hussein is a western creation. He was armed to the teeth by western Governments and western companies. There is no doubt about that—the only doubt is over how long the supply of weapons went on.
It is also the case that other countries oppress their populations—Indonesia, for one—and that other countries, such as Israel, have weapons of mass destruction. I do not compare even the dictatorship of Indonesia with the evil of Saddam Hussein, and I certainly do not compare Israel with Saddam Hussein. None the less, Israel is a state in breach of international obligations to the Palestinian people.
Whatever we say about the differences, that is not how it will play in the Muslim world. The right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major)—in what was an impressive speech—argued that we should take every opportunity to tell the people of Iraq that we are not really their enemies. However many opportunities we may get on CNN or Kuwaiti television, I do not think that the man in the mosque will believe the occasional interview with western
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politicians in comparison with what will be put forward daily in the Arab world about western hypocrisy and intentions.
The hon. Member for Blaby should be listened to. He was there, and he saw the duplicity in the aftermath of the last Gulf war, when the Republican Guard was allowed through allied lines to slaughter the people who had been asked to rise up and overthrow the dictator by no one less than the President of the United States. Anyone who has spoken to the Iraqi opposition forces knows the grievance that still exists as a result of that action.
Dr. Julian Lewis: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Salmond: I apologise, but because of the time I shall not give way.
The right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) gave the game away by speculating about the impact of the dismemberment of Iraq and about what might happen if there were democracy in Iraq. The feeling among Iraqi opposition forces is that the western aim to keep Iraq together has been more important than the interests of the peoples of Iraq. There are some, perhaps, who would not like to see a democratic Iraq unless there were a democratic Saudi Arabia, or unless democracy spread to the other friendly states of the Gulf.
The charges of hypocrisy cannot be swept aside. Apart from the armed conflict which might result, they are the very stuff of the propaganda war that will inevitably take place, whether there is armed conflict or not. We are in a poor and invidious position, standing with our hands on our hearts saying, "Unlike the other countries, we do not have an agenda."
Where I depart from the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) and the hon. Members for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) and for Linlithgow is on the question of what has to be done. I disagree not with their analysis, which is correct, but with their conclusions. The right hon. Member for Chesterfield told the House that we should be all be aware of the dangers of chemical and biological weapons, and that there should be international agreements to stop our companies selling those weapons to people who could use them against their own people or others.
However, we already have an international agreement to stop the development of those weapons in Iraq. Where would we stand in terms of forging other international agreements if that international agreement could not be defended? I depart from the hon. Members in that I do not think that the do-nothing option is credible.
That is why I agree with the hon. Members for Cynon Valley and for Blaby. We should try to put together a genuine political strategy. It will not be easy, but bombing parts of the production system in Iraq in the hope that that might destabilise, as opposed to entrench, Saddam Hussein is not an easy option. The collateral damage in terms of the innocent human beings who almost certainly will be killed will be one of the elements not just of propaganda but of truth, which will weigh against that as a successful strategy.
The right hon. Member for Chesterfield was correct about the likely reaction among Iraqis to bombing of that nature. Also, the idea of a no-drive zone to stop tank

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movements south of the 32nd parallel and north of the 35th parallel is not an easy option. It is a military option, but it is designed to expand something that we should have defended; the safe havens concept which the right hon. Member for Huntingdon, rightly, was proud of seven years ago. It is a much better option than bombing, and should be accompanied by the indictment of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity. As the hon. Member for Cynon Valley said, it should be accompanied also by the release of sanctions from those parts of Iraq which we hope to make genuinely safe. We should try to bring about the destruction from within Iraq of its tyrannous evil regime.
I conclude where I started. It is not my position, nor that of my party, that it is morally indefensible to fight in defence of what we know to be right. It would be morally indefensible to impose yet more suffering on the Iraqi peoples unless we have—and can convince everyone that we have—the genuine interests of the peoples of Iraq at heart.
8.8m
Mr. Dale Campbell-Savours: I think that the speech of the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) will stand the test of time. The speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) was quite remarkable. It was moving, beautiful and passionate, but at its very heart there was a flaw. He did not deal with what might happen in the event that the negotiations sponsored by the UN with the Iraqi Government were to collapse. That is what we are talking about this evening. What happens if those negotiations fail? What is the way forward?
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) also made an interesting speech. He has a rich tapestry of experience to back up his contributions. He, too, did not come up with any conclusions. The only hon. Member on that side of the argument who did was my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). However, his softly, softly approach on sanctions is opposed by the Iraqi opposition, who believe that it will strengthen Saddam Hussein's position.
We have to consider the basic principles of what we are dealing with. Saddam Hussein is a dictator. We know that he has chemical weapons. We know that he is prepared to use them. We know that he is prepared to occupy neighbouring states. We know that he is prepared to lie. We have to do something. Whatever happens in the negotiations, the major powers will have to address the need for military action at some stage to resolve the problems in that part of the world.
We have to set clearly identified political objectives for military action. Military action without clearly defined political objectives will be a disaster. Everything will be lost and those who participate in the action will be discredited. I accept that military action may be necessary, but we should have specific objectives.
In recent years, we have failed to secure a policy on Iraq that meets political objectives and commands the support of the opposition groups inside and outside Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress has had a lot to offer in the past three or four years. Unfortunately, it has not been treated reasonably by the United States of America or by the previous United Kingdom Government. I do not know what is the present Government's attitude.
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I remember going to Washington in 1991 to lobby the Executive on the treatment of the Kurds. Officials in the State Department told us that action would be taken to protect them. That never happened. I went to the inaugural international conference of the Iraqi National Congress in Ankara in 1993. All the opposition parties from here and throughout the near east were assembled. There were great hopes, but nothing happened. Today, much of the Iraqi opposition have been dissipated. The future rests in sponsoring their activities.
I should like to lay a few possibilities before the House. We should support the Iraqi opposition openly. We should release frozen assets in the west to fund the opposition as a Government in waiting. The INC should be given the Iraqi seat at the United Nations. We should promise the Iraqi opposition groups that sanctions will be lifted on the fall of Saddam Hussein. We should announce a limited amnesty for certain individuals who might feel that they were likely to face trial for genocide. I recognise the important work being done by Indict. It is important that some people in Iraq realise that they will not face trial if the Government fall. We should organise and fully fund a propaganda bombardment campaign of Iraq by television, radio, short wave communication and even leaflet drops. We should consider lifting sanctions on the north for some products for which safeguards against leakage are possible.
Most importantly, if diplomacy does not work, we should punish Saddam Hussein for his UNSCOM transgressions by taking the port of Basra on the Shatt al Arab. A Basra enclave should be established, under the control of a substantially reinforced and properly funded INC. That would form the basis for a free Iraq, shielded to the north by the no-fly zone that currently covers southern Iraq. It would be a bridgehead supplied by sea—a sanctions-free zone. Its territory and influence would expand to the north as it gained the confidence of the people of Iraq. I am sure that Ministers recognise the implications for oil exploration and exports, given Basra's location. It is a strategic military site; an oil, trade and freight centre. It should be developed with western money, under the control of the INC.
If that were part of a wider military agenda, which could include the highly selective bombing of strategic sites, there would be potential gains. Bombing without clearly defined political objectives would be a disaster. If the Iraqi people feel sure that the odds are stacked against Saddam Hussein and see hope on their boundaries in the Basra enclave, they will respond accordingly.
8.16 pm
Mr. Ieuan Wyn Jones: This has, understandably, been a sombre debate, full of emotion. The opinions expressed on both sides have ranged from absolute support for military action to equally passionate opposition. Among those who have reluctantly come to the conclusion that military action is inevitable there has been considerable unease about the enterprise. I suspect that that unease is fuelled by the lack of an international consensus for such action.
I start where the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) started. At least one thing unites us all—our total horror at Saddam Hussein's regime, with his appalling record of human rights abuses and his blatant refusal to agree to the United Nations resolutions on the

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inspection of his weapons of mass destruction. He is capable of and has carried out atrocities against his people. He is capable of carrying out further atrocities against them. He has the capacity to inflict considerable damage on his people, on his neighbours and on those further afield. That is common ground. We are debating how best to ensure that Saddam Hussein complies with the United Nations resolutions and whether and in what circumstances military action might be acceptable.
It is worth reminding ourselves once again that there is no unanimity among the nations represented at the United Nations on whether military action is at present justified. As we have heard, three permanent members of the Security Council do not support the use of military action. As has been stressed, the United Kingdom currently holds the presidency of the European Union. The majority of EU member states do not actively support the UK's position. Perhaps most important, there is opposition to the use of military force among Iraq's Arab neighbours. My party would be extremely concerned if military force were used given the lack of support among so much of the international community.
It will be much more difficult for the UK-US alliance to use its considerable diplomatic force and weight to achieve a lasting settlement in the area if military force is used. If, for any reason, military force does not achieve its target, diplomatic avenues will have been cut off. There is little likelihood that, after the use of military force, Saddam Hussein—if he remains in power—would allow inspectors to examine his weapons of mass destruction. The moral authority which countries in the west should have would be gravely damaged.
None of us can know whether military intervention would be a success. How can we be sure that it would wipe out Saddam Hussein's capacity to use chemical and biological weapons? How will we know if intervention has been a success unless inspectors are allowed to inspect?
We are told that the justification for the use of military force is that Iraq has failed to comply with UN resolutions and Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. Yet, Israel, which has also breached UN resolutions and similarly possesses weapons of mass destruction, is not criticised. Double standards in approach are clearly not lost on Arab countries in the middle east. There is a stalled peace process in the middle east. Arab countries are quite right when they say to us in the west that we are not treating Iraq and Israel with equanimity. Illegal settlements are continuing without hindrance from Washington.
Mr. Mike Gapes: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Jones: I am sorry but, because of time, I will not be able to give way.
I alluded to the UK's presidency of the European Union, to which the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) referred in detail. I am very concerned too. One of the main criticisms of the common foreign and security pillar of the Maastricht treaty related to its intergovernmental nature and the problems that that would cause. It was virtually impossible, for example, to secure a consistent and coherent European foreign and security policy. That was starkly demonstrated during the war in
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Bosnia, when individual member states began recognising constituent parts of former Yugoslavia rather prematurely. The lack of a clear EU line in those circumstances was one of the reasons why the Serbs felt able to flout international opinion for so long. I fear that the EU again missed a golden opportunity to address that issue in the Amsterdam treaty. There is still no formal mechanism for adopting a common European position on Iraq.
That leads to the rather ludicrous position of the EU president being prepared to act in a way which is not sanctioned by the majority of member states. That is a matter of current concern, and will cause increasing concern unless it is addressed. I would like the EU to be given a much more prominent role in foreign affairs and security matters. Our experiences teach us that European treaties should be revisited.
Like all hon. Members, I would like the diplomatic initiatives pursued by the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to be fully supported by the Government. My party differs from the Government not on the question of the willingness to pursue diplomatic initiatives but on the question of military action. The international community should stand back at the moment, allow the initiatives to proceed, see what results arise from them and go back to the UN for sanctions if necessary. We should not take any unilateral action.
I sincerely believe that all hon. Members in this debate hold their views genuinely. In an article in The Observer, the Prime Minister said:
"We live in a democracy, unlike Iraq. People are free to criticise the Government over our willingness, if necessary, to use military force against Saddam. So they should be. I accept such criticism is made in good faith."
I hope that the Government accept that my party's criticism is in good faith and that we should pursue by all means possible all diplomatic initiatives.
8.26 pm
Mr. Harry Barnes: I am glad that the debate has moved away from the opinions of two Front-Bench teams and that Back Benchers are expressing alternative views.
I was one of those who opposed the action taken in the Gulf war, and I would defend that position today. However, I recognise that, in the Gulf war, there were clearly stated military objectives to free Kuwait and rid it of Saddam Hussein's troops. Many hidden agendas were none the less involved, and the hideous action on the road to Basra went beyond the objectives.
What military objective is in front of us at the moment? Basically it seems to be aimed at the Iraqis' allowing American weapons inspectors into Iraq to continue their work and tackle the problems of the weaponry. Some hon. Members have suggested that we should go beyond that, but that is essentially the position of the American and British Governments. What sort of objective is it? It seems one of bombing Saddam Hussein because he will not act in relation to inspection, waiting to see what has occurred and then bombing again because he refuses to act.
Saddam Hussein has a bunker mentality. He has slaughtered and murdered his own population, gassed and bombed and executed. He is therefore not likely to be brought into line by bombing, especially when bringing him into line means his having to accept a weapons

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inspectorate—and nothing beyond that. Saddam Hussein just continues the game, and our only option is to continue to bomb and bomb. That may put him in a desperate situation, in which he begins to think of anthrax-capped missiles in an attempt to tackle the problem.
I believe that we should look for alternative strategies to ensure that the situation in Iraq changes. I do not go along with those who simply want another military adventure, in which Iraq is invaded and taken over. We should first sort out what we are supporting and what we are trying to achieve—we do not want a substitute Saddam Hussein to be established through our military action.
My hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) made a number of proposals, which were of great interest, but what happens if those measures do not work—what option then arises? Will he fall back on the position that the Government may be driven to adopt if they do not make the Iraqi dictator back off—to bomb and bomb? My position differs, in that I would not seek to engage in such action.
Economic sanctions have been entirely counter—productive. Since Saddam Hussein came to power, Iraq has suffered the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war and sanctions. In that period, Iraq, which reached the peak of its economic development in 1979, has absolutely collapsed. The gross domestic product per head is between an eighth and a tenth of what it was.
We are not talking about societies in the 1930s that had developed to a similar level. Iraq had witnessed advances in technology and in the use of energy, but all that was destroyed. The Iraqi people are now in the most terrible circumstances. That is why we should stress the need for action to relieve economic—as distinct from military—sanctions.
I want to consider further the condition of the people. In 1955–56, I was in Basra in Iraq doing my national service. Between that period and the time when Saddam Hussein came to power—a period in which Iraq experienced many different developments—gross domestic product per head grew some six and a half times. That was very much tied up with oil—the Iraqis put all their eggs into one basket—which gave fantastic returns, especially when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries increased oil prices in 1974.
Prosperity in Iraq was considerable, particularly in relation to other middle east countries. In 1970, Iraqi GDP per head was 17 per cent, of the figure for the United Kingdom, whereas by 1980—the start of Saddam Hussein's period in power—it had grown to 42 per cent, of the United Kingdom figure. Extensive development had occurred, with all that that entails. There had been periods of agrarian change and new social provisions, such as additional housing.
That was before Saddam Hussein moved the country to military provision, which proved to be a disaster. By 1994, Iraq's GDP per head was only about 16 per cent, of the UK figure. Let us remember the conditions that arose as a result: the shortage of goods; the desertion of the country by professionals; the massive unemployment; the collapse of the economy; hyper-inflation; currency speculation; and the printing—even the photocopying—of money.
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To say in the House that the people in Baghdad look as though they are well fed, and that the problem is not ours but Iraq's, is disgraceful. We should be concerned about the condition of the Iraqi people and how they can build up their provisions. If there was a growing economy, the people could begin to build a democratic infrastructure. We should associate ourselves with the people who have those interests, and ensure that their circumstances are such that they can tackle the problem.
If the Iraqi people are bombed and bombed, what will happen? They will seek protection from the only source that seems to offer it, even though they are liable to be slaughtered by that protector. They will not be able to look for other possibilities and come together through different networks to build for the future.
We must not become involved in a programme that consists only of open-ended bombing. We should not rely on sanctions that build on the years of deprivation caused by Saddam Hussein's actions, or on the climate in which Saddam Hussein has been operating. We are in a desperate situation, but there is a road down which we should not go. When we have adopted that view, we should consider some of the ideas that have been suggested tonight about the alternatives in assisting—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to resume his seat.
8.36 pm
Mr. Jonathan Sayeed: I hope that the hon. Member for North-East Derbyshire (Mr. Barnes) will excuse me if I do not respond to all the points he made, although I shall try to cover some of them.
Despite the length of supply lines, the lack of airborne early warning and the mistakes that were made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, few doubted the justice of our decision to retake the Falklands. Similarly, there was little doubt in the international community that it was right to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
This time, however, much is different: no sovereign territory has been invaded; our immediate economic interests are not in peril; international support is, at the very best, muted; and, under Britain's uninspired presidency, the European Union is divided. Moreover, the political and military aims are unclear—President Clinton, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary or the Defence Secretary each seem to have a different view.
Consequently, the doubts over the wisdom of going to war are much greater now than they were at the time of the Falklands or in 1990–91. There is considerable alarm at the possible scale of Iraqi casualties, and great fear at the prospect of Iraqi-inspired terrorism in the United Kingdom. Many suspect that President Clinton wants a little foreign adventure.
The result of this considerable unease is that many are saying, "We must stop and we must wait." However, such people do not explain why we must stop and for how long we must wait. Does anyone believe that Saddam Hussein would allow an unemasculated UNSCOM back into Iraq? The very reason that he expelled it was because it was being effective despite the difficulties under which it was working.
For those who tell us that we must wait, I would ask: for how long—a week, a month, a year? Should we wait until our forces lose their operational efficiency and are

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therefore endangered themselves? Should we wait until the allies lose their collective nerve? Should we wait so long that Saddam Hussein perfects his ability to wage a worldwide war? That is what he has been determined to do for decades.
In 1981, the Israelis bombed the nuclear facility at Osirak in Iraq just before it went critical. There was worldwide condemnation, particularly from the French and Germans—the French, who supplied the plant and the Germans, who supplied much of the technology via Brazil. What they conveniently forgot to tell people was, first, that the plant was not designed to produce electricity, secondly, that Iraq had much cheaper ways to produce electricity with its indigenous oil supplies, and thirdly, that the chemical composition of the uranium supplied was designed for producing weapons-grade plutonium.
There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is determined to use weapons of mass destruction if he needs to do so. I have long held the belief that Saddam Hussein poses a clear threat to world peace. In 1985, I said of Iraq and others:
"I am convinced that if nuclear war ever broke out it would be initiated not by the super powers but by a nation without any sense of responsibility, where power is concentrated in the hands of the evil, the insane, or the bigoted dictator."—[Official Report, 6 June 1985; Vol. 80, c. 537.]
The Gulf war lifted the immediate threat of atomic or nuclear weapons being used by Saddam Hussein in the near future. The decision to end the ground war after only 100 hours left Saddam Hussein in possession of the weapons of mass terror and in command of his power base. I said at the time that the terms and the timing of the ceasefire left us with unfinished business that would return to haunt us and it has. We must not make the same mistake again. In every action that Saddam Hussein has perpetrated in the past 20 to 25 years, he has shown that he is determined to dominate by terror. If the threat is insufficient, the means will be used.
So, in answer to the question, "Why go to war?", I have to say that we may well have to. Unless the Secretary-General is successful—I pray that he is, but I am sorry to say that I doubt that he will be—our task will be difficult to do, but easy to say. It will be to destroy the works of Saddam Hussein and to destroy his power base, so that he can be brought down and brought to trial. There is no safety in silence, and, if we are passive, there will be no peace.
8.43 pm
Mr. Ernie Ross: Once again, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was clear and specific about what we expected of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime, and consistent in his approach not only to this problem but to international law.
Like the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell), when preparing for this debate, I looked back at the debate held during the last major crisis with Iraq in 1990. At that time, the international community was absolutely clear about its objectives and the basis on which it had to act to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty. At that time, I pointed out that the key to the success of western policy had to be the non-selective implementation of Security Council resolutions and the principles of international law by the international community. Today, that message needs to be restated with more urgency than ever before.
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In 1998, we are facing a very different situation. The situation is as clear, but action against Iraq is being considered against a backdrop of extreme anger and frustration in the middle east over United States policy vis-a-vis the middle east peace process. I want to make it clear from the outset that I support the threat of military action to enforce the rule of law with regard to Saddam Hussein's defiance of the UN. However, we should not be asked to support such action unless it is taken alongside a renewed and serious commitment to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions as they apply to the Israeli occupation of occupied Arab lands in the west bank, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.
In 1991, after the first Gulf war, the then US Administration, under the guidance of Secretary of State James Baker, initiated a peace strategy based on international law and backed up with real measures designed to disabuse Israel of the notion that it could continue to act outside international law. In the seven years since that time, the United States and the international community have gradually moved away from that insistence on the applicability of UN Security Council resolutions to Israel; as a result, the peace process has all but disintegrated.
The results are the situation that we face today. No sane person in the middle east disagrees with the need to deal with Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons capability, or underestimates the brutality of his regime. However, we cannot afford to ignore the strength of feeling that has been generated by years of refusal to insist with the same rigour on the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation. Saddam Hussein watched, and learned that, by hanging on and obfuscation, he might just escape. We have to make it clear to him that he is not going to escape, and nor will anyone else.
Arab newspaper editorials, both here in London and throughout the Arab world, point to the danger of ignoring the strength of feeling on the issue in the middle east. We cannot afford to ignore it in this debate. Arab opinion sees western powers determined to crush the military capability of one power in the middle east, while protecting the military dominance of another—Israel—which is still occupying sovereign Arab territory.
People ask me why so many Palestinians seem to support the Iraqi regime in times of crisis. The answer is that rallies in support of Iraq are an expression of the extreme frustration at policies backed by the United States and designed to protect Israel from the exacting standards of international law—laws that we are demanding Saddam Hussein should abide by—and therefore to frustrate the legitimate goals of Palestinian self-determination and the return of occupied Arab lands.
Mrs. Louise Ellman: Does my hon. Friend agree that to attempt continually to scapegoat Israel simply diverts attention from the gross actions of Saddam Hussein, and ignores both attempts that are being made to find a peaceful solution to the middle east conflict and the violations of the Oslo accord by the Palestinians as well as by Israel?
Mr. Ross: We are not talking merely about Israel or Saddam Hussein, but about international law. We were first allowed to act against Saddam Hussein because of

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international law and Security Council resolutions, and we have to insist on that law. We cannot be selective. It is because we have been selective that we have been called into question time and again. When my hon. Friend has been here longer, she will realise how Israel has been allowed to flout international law time and again.
I welcome the comments of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister linking the situation in Iraq with the need to make progress in the peace process. That is what Arab Governments have repeatedly told us they want. Progress will result only from determined effort by the international community to enforce Security Council resolutions on all parties in the middle east, but most specifically on Israel.
For Arab public opinion, confidence will be restored only if, alongside its determination to enforce international law in Iraq, the west takes meaningful, tangible steps to enforce it in respect of Israeli occupation. In this renewed crisis of United States and European foreign policy in the middle east, the two issues are inextricably linked—that explains why so few Arab leaders can give unqualified support for an attack on a regime that threatens them so directly.
Political instability is not an idle threat in the middle east. A few days ago, a man was caught as he tried to attack the British embassy in Amman with a petrol bomb. On a recent visit to Jordan, as part of a delegation organised by the Labour Middle East Council, the Jordanian Government told us in no uncertain terms about the anger that has been fermented there in respect of the economic downturn caused by its inability to trade with Iraq. Arab Governments look to the United States and the European Union to deploy even-handedness in the middle east so that such feelings can be assuaged, and so that Arab and Israeli public opinion can be offered some hope of real peace and stability in the region.
Progress in the wake of any action taken against Iraq must reflect the determination of Britain and Europe to ensure a return to the peace process and its basis in international law. It will no longer be acceptable merely to condemn the illegality of settlement building on the west bank, as we have done on several occasions. The European Union can and must take action based on its obligations under international humanitarian law to insist that settlement building ceases.
I have tried to suggest that more than Iraq is at stake tonight. We are dealing with international law. The forum in which to deal with that is the United Nations. If we are going to rebuild the United Nations as the forum in which to act without having to resort to the use of force, we must ensure that we all abide by international law.
In 1993, in a debate on the Gulf and the RAF, I said:
"If we cannot demonstrate that we are going to be even-handed, in the longer term the comparison between Britain's standing and resolve in different cases in the same region will damage perceptions of British intentions and credibility. It will also damage the credibility of the Security Council and the belief that it will carry out its functions, as set down in the United Nations charter. International law will be brought into disrepute. Such damage risks setting the scene for future consequences and additional costs and burdens, which the politicians of the future—including ourselves—will have to deal with."—[Official Report, 21 January 1993; Vol. 217, c. 555.]
Once again, we are having to deal with our failure to ensure that people abide by international law. What is different? Why do I disagree with some of my
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hon. Friends and urge them to consider voting with the Government tonight? We can legitimately charge the previous Government with failing to live up to their responsibilities under international law—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman must conclude his speech.
8.53 pm
Mr. Crispin Blunt: I am aware of the long-standing expertise and interest of the hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) and share much of his analysis about the corrosive effects of the Arab-Israeli dispute on the formulation of western policy in the region.
No one can envy the Government the challenges that they face in trying to manage the Iraq issue. They have all the problems of a democracy operating within the bounds of international law faced by a gangster who is sustained in power by terror and has no compunction about shedding the blood of his people, let alone that of others. That this man is still in power is an obscenity to us, but a catastrophe for the Iraqi people. There is also the threat posed to us all by this man without compunction, who has led the United Nations a merry dance of deceit over his possession of the most awful weapons available to man. The Government were right to catalogue the extent of the arsenal that he has tried to conceal. His record of murder and genocide is so appalling that we are led easily to the conclusion that something must be done. He surely cannot be allowed to get away it. We must be careful. That would be a policy judgment based on emotion, not rationality, if it could not be delivered.
The only way that we can be sure of imposing our will on this tyrant is to remove him from power. At the same time, the Takriti Baath party apparatus, steeped in the blood of ordinary Iraqis, must be dismantled and the Iraqi people given a chance to recreate the pillars of civic society so corrupted under the dictatorship. The truth is that we do not have the stomach for that exercise, which can be achieved only with ground troops—hundreds of thousands of them, supported by an international coalition. Such a coalition might be easier to put together if the political fate of Saddam was certain. The expedition would involve enormous cost, and this time there is no Kuwaiti treasury in exile with £100 billion to underwrite it.
I suspect that if Iraq was our neighbour, our perception of the threat would be different, but for us, the uncertainty of the intelligence picture of his present or near future weapons capability, at least to those of us outside government, makes the threat seem one that we could be prepared to tolerate. It is, however, worth remembering that Tel Aviv is closer to Iraq than is London, and perceptions there will be very different from ours. That is a complicating factor made worse by the acquiescence of the United States in an Israeli policy towards its Palestinian population in violation of its commitments under the middle east peace process and the United Nations.
We cannot escape the conclusion that there does not exist in our country or in the United States the will to commit troops to achieve the most desirable objective of ejecting Saddam from power. Certainly, no one else possesses the will and the capability. That is

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understandably frustrating. In our frustration, we must recognise that our objectives must be limited, as our weapons of sanctions and diplomacy backed up by air power are limited. None of them is sufficient to end the regime or ensure its compliance with existing United Nations Security Council resolutions. Therefore, our rhetoric must also be limited. In this difficult situation, the Government must use their influence to guide the United States away from any policy that is born of frustration that will end in perceived defeat.
The Government have real influence. It is likely that the military assessment of the Pentagon will be shared by the Ministry of Defence. The strength of our much more collegiate system of government is that that assessment is likely to be shared across Whitehall. That is not so in the United States, where the Pentagon is but one actor in the drama. Congress, the State Department, the national security adviser and the President are all likely to have different perspectives. The influence of the British Prime Minister in shaping alliance policy to political objectives that accord with the realities of the limitations of our military power is considerable. He does not need and indeed he must not tie himself to a policy that our military and their military believe is flawed and unachievable.
We must make sure that if military force is used, such uncertainty is removed from its use as much as possible, and that political control is sustained. That means that the objectives of military action must be achievable and clearly understood. I do not envy the Government their difficulties with that.
We cannot achieve implementation of current UN Security Council resolutions through military objectives because we cannot force Saddam to comply with the forces that we are prepared to deploy. Therefore, of necessity, the military objectives must be different from those of diplomacy. The closest linkage that can be achieved is the destruction of the sites to which the inspectors have been denied access.
Other targets will be of more questionable legality. Saddam is one, but no one would be terribly concerned if we killed him. The Republican Guard and the rest of the security force infrastructure that holds him in power is another. It would be extraordinary, however, if they were not now widely dispersed. If I were commanding a squadron of tanks in that situation, I would have already dispersed them from barracks, preferably to garages and anywhere else affording overhead cover among the civilian population. Notwithstanding the convenience of locally available human shields, such locations would be by far the best places to hide.
We could attack what is left of the civil infrastructure of Iraq, and what has been replaced, after the first Gulf war, but that certainly goes beyond the scope of current UN authority and would be of highly questionable military and political merit.
I do not expect the Secretary of State for Defence to comment on targeting when he replies to the debate. He has my support in trying to address those difficult issues, not least at one remove from the real centre of power. He and the Prime Minister, however, possess real influence if they feel themselves being dragged towards a course of action with which they are unhappy. They must use all that influence to stay on top of events, which means that the military option must be limited and controllable, if it has to be used at all.
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Labour Members who are at odds with their Government have made much of the military difficulties. They have addressed the potential drawbacks of backing up diplomatic rhetoric and sanctions with force. They have argued that military attack could reinforce Saddam' s internal position and in the Arab world. They have discussed the possibility of a split in the coalition against him. They have also discussed the consequences of successfully bombing an anthrax store. They have argued that, at the end of the process on which we are currently embarked, he is still likely to be in power.
Those right hon. and hon. Members have failed to answer the question: what if we do nothing? Are we to be impotent in the face of tyranny? Are we to gamble on the hope that Saddam receives an assassin's bullet before he acquires a deliverable biological capability? With all the wretched compromises that accompany any coalition of democracies seeking to take military action, we will allow him to flout the will of the world at the peril of the population of his neighbours and beyond.
If UN resolutions are ever to mean anything, then, when faced with a regime such as Saddam's, which is in violation of resolutions on weapons of mass destruction, those resolutions must be backed by force. As the vehicle by which that force will be delivered, our armed forces deserve clear tasking and leadership. Equally, the Government and our armed forces, in seeking to address those difficult issues, deserve our support tonight.
9.2 pm
Dr. Stephen Ladyman: I strongly deplore some of the comments made in the House tonight, which seem to imply that it is inappropriate for some of my right hon. and hon. Friends freely to express their opinions. It has been suggested that somehow they give succour to the enemy if they say that perhaps we need to think more seriously about some of the issues. I deplore such an attitude, and the day that we accept it, wherever the suggestion comes from in the House, is the day our democracy is no better than that in Baghdad.
I do not dissent from my right hon. and hon. Friends on many of the details, but I have come to a different conclusion from them—ultimately, when there is no other option available to us, we may indeed have to use military force. I have reached that different conclusion for a number of reasons that I shall try to elucidate.
Let us consider how Saddam Hussein came to possess bacterial weapons. He set up a bio-warfare establishment at Muthanna in 1985, and we know for a fact that studies were made of anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflotoxin, mycotoxin and ricin. He adopted the Daura foot-and-mouth facility in 1990 and we know that studies were made there of camelpox, haemorrhagic conjunctivitis and human rotavirus. No matter how much the UNSCOM inspections may have found, it is not possible that what was learnt in those establishments has been unlearnt. The ability to make those weapons is available to Saddam Hussein. What we do not know is how many he has made and what he has done with them.
I am no military expert: I have never had to serve in the armed forces, nor have I any great military expertise; but once upon a time, before my career took a different line, I was a biologist and I can tell the House that most of the bacteria and toxins that I have listed need to be delivered fresh. Anthrax, by contrast, can be stored for

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decades. The likelihood is that Saddam had large amounts of anthrax stored away even before the first Gulf war. He has certainly been able to build up his stocks, despite the UNSCOM inspections. In recent weeks, hon. Members have been saying how effective the UNSCOM inspections have been, but they have not been completely effective and Saddam still has a massive store of anthrax.
Anthrax, if it is to be toxic, must be delivered in particle form, and about 10,000 spores have to be inhaled. It is not easy to nebulise and distribute it and, if it was likely to be used on a battlefield, one's enemy would probably be prepared for it and would have immunised its soldiers. We know that anthrax is not a battlefield weapon, nor is it a tactical weapon; and we know that the UNSCOM inspections have probably destroyed most of Saddam' s missile capability for delivering it, so what conclusion can we reach? We have to conclude that he possesses anthrax not as a tactical weapon, but as a terrorist weapon.
I was once fortunate to be on the same platform as Lord Soper, who used a phrase that I have always remembered:
"The possession of a weapon conditions the possessor to accept the possibility of its use."
We already know that Saddam Hussein is prepared to use nerve gas and chemical weapons and has stooped to the most incredible depths of depravity. The possession of terrorist weapons must condition him ultimately to accept the possibility that his response to military action will be a terrorist response.
Anthrax is no discriminator between people of different races or different religions. It is relatively easy to distribute in a terrorist scenario. In a briefing, a US defence expert admitted that anthrax was more likely to be used as a terrorist weapon and that it could be distributed by using a glass jar and a hand grenade. That would be all that was necessary to launch a terrorist attack using anthrax. I conclude that Saddam Hussein has to be made to give up those weapons. If all else fails and if all diplomatic avenues fail, we must be prepared to take that final step to make him give up those weapons. If we do not, sooner or later, he will use them as terrorist weapons.
I shall go further and say that one of the most worrying aspects of this debate is that we have not touched upon the possible consequences of our attacks. The hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) spoke about the need for ground troops, and 1 accept what he said. Once military action starts, I cannot envisage this matter being resolved without ground troops becoming involved. Once ground troops are involved, there will be a temptation for Saddam Hussein to use nerve gas against them. I have seen a published Central Intelligence Agency memorandum that shows that, by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, he had become very skilled in deploying nerve gas. The Americans have always reserved the right to respond with nuclear weapons to a nerve gas or bacterial attack on them. We should all be deeply worried about that.
The other way in which I differ from some of my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Chamber tonight is that I have decided that it is appropriate to support the Government's motion because, although it gives them the power ultimately to use a military threat, it also gives them the choice not to, and it requires them to explore every possible avenue towards a diplomatic solution to
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the problem. I believe that we shall avoid massive loss of life only if we avoid the need for military action, but, sooner or later, if the diplomatic solution does not work, I am prepared to take the consequences of having voted tonight for military action.
9.10 pm
Mr. Keith Simpson: Tonight's debate has ended where it began, with all hon. Members on both sides of the House discussing the crucial issue. I suspect that, if they can listen to it, that discussion will be listened to with interest by our military personnel serving in the Gulf. The crucial issue is the prospect that they may have to go into action, as a consequence of a decision by our Government and by the Government of the United States of America, acting under United Nations authority. That is an awesome prospect.
Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan), who donned uniform in 1990, I was merely a Whitehall warrior, working alongside my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), and I understand and appreciate the pressures on Ministers. I appreciate that, in the words of General James Wolfe, later killed at Quebec, war is "an option of difficulties". There is no easy option.
For Conservative Members, there is a dichotomy, in that we have decided that we shall broadly support the Government's position but, like the Government when they were in opposition eight years ago, we wish to retain the freedom to comment and to question them very heavily on the actions that they take.
Briefly, I want to home in on the military action. Many hon. Members, including the hon. Member for South Thanet (Dr. Ladyman), have mentioned a fact that worries many hon. Members on both sides of the House—even those of us who broadly support the Government's position. That is the fact that, so far, there seems to be a lack of clarity by the Government about what might happen if we need to use military force. I understand that Ministers may very well reply that they cannot give us such information—that we should not expect them to, on the ground that that is sensitive military information. That is what the Ministers I worked with said in 1990.
However, I have to say to Ministers that I believe that the world has moved on in eight years. Two weeks ago, the Prime Minister, rightly, called for a policy of educating the public about the crisis, and I believe that that meant more than educating the public by telling them what the threat was from Iraq. We must also think in terms of educating the public about the possible consequences of military action. It is no longer a narrow state secret. For heaven' s sake, the newspapers and CNN are often better informed, and earlier informed, than the Chamber of the House of Commons, and if we are to have an educated debate on this question, we must understand the military action.
My right hon. Friends have tabled a short amendment to the Government motion, in which they have tried to make it clear that Conservative Members—and I think many Labour Members—want a very clear link, establishing the political objectives of the military action. This is not an

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academic debating point for the military professionals who have advised the Government, and the military commanders and their subordinates in the Gulf. It is quoted in, ironically, the Royal Air Force's air power doctrine. I remind the House of that, to show the strictures under which the armed forces operate.
The doctrine says:
"Selection and Maintenance of the Aim"
is vital, and:
"In the conduct of war, and therefore in all military activity, it is essential to select and define the aims with absolute clarity before operations start".
I am not 100 per cent. sure that we have achieved that yet. That is not a nit-picking academic point; we had the problem in 1990 when we were trying to make certain that the political aim was clear and we had unity of purpose. I do not think that we have that yet.
Deriving from that principle are two further points, which the services themselves lay down. The first is that
"Governments must be quite clear about their military objectives".
Secondly—the commanders on the spot will be bearing this in mind—
"Commanders at all levels must know exactly what they are required to achieve".
As yet, we do not know what the commanders have been directed to achieve.
Genuine doubts are raised about the application of air power, and whether we can achieve what we want without putting in ground forces. When my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) asked a legitimate question about the nature of the command relationship between ourselves and the Americans, the response from the Secretary of State for Defence was not sufficient. We are the junior partner, but we have some say over the strategy. We need to make it clear publicly now what that relationship is.
War is an option of difficulties. It is not easy for the Government. Many Labour Members have criticised them, and I fully supported the hon. Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway) when he said that we had the right to debate and put forward all points of view in the House.
None the less, in this particular case, in terms of the option of difficulties, it is up to all hon. Members to support the Government' policy, which is to require Saddam Hussein to abide by United Nations resolutions and to let the inspectors—not American inspectors, but UN inspectors—back in to pin him down. If we do not do that, Saddam will see it as a defeat for the United Nations.
As both Ministers and my right hon. Friends have said, let us be in no doubt that Saddam plays a game of bluff, and that some of things that he understands are resolution, unity, cohesion and the fact that at the end of the day, we might be prepared to put our armed forces in harm's way. I know that that is easy for me to say, but we do not do it lightly. That is why people join the armed forces; they understand the requirement, and they fulfil it bravely in a way that we must admire. However, the least that the armed forces expect from us is to have a clear objective to achieve, and for the Government to provide them with the resources to achieve it.
I hope that when he sums up, the Secretary of State for Defence will address some of those issues, especially in terms of the need to educate the public about the political
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objectives and the military means. In that way, we shall bring greater pressure to bear on Saddam Hussein and achieve our objectives.
9.17 pm
Sir George Young: I begin by saying how delighted we are to see the Minister for the Armed Forces back in his place ready to be deployed. We wish him a speedy and complete recovery from his recent illness.
In common with a number of hon. Members, I have listened to nearly every word that has been spoken in the debate over the past six hours. It has been a sober and balanced debate in which a clear consensus has emerged for the Government motion—sharpened, it is to be hoped, by the Opposition amendment. However, equally clear has been the recognition of the risks involved and of the fact that although one option is preferable, none of the options is attractive.
It has been a debate devoid of jingoism. Indeed, there has been some resentment on the part of those who have defended the Government—some of the more peaceful Members of this House—that they have been accused by some of their colleagues of being bloodthirsty and full of war lust. Those of us who know the hon. Members who have defended the Government's position know that those accusations are untrue.
What has emerged is broad agreement that appeasement would be wrong. It would be wrong today, and even more wrong for tomorrow. Another feature of the debate has been the sincerity of views. Hon. Members have defended their views in their own words and for their own reasons. It has been a debate far removed from hon. Members paraphrasing briefing from the Whips Office. I think that it is right to conclude from the debate, although, of course, we must await the vote, that the Government have broad support for the strategy that they have tabled.
One of the themes of the debate has been the similarities and the differences between the 1991 crisis and the present one. That was one of the themes of the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell). He rightly said that the same broad principles were at stake.
In both cases, a new Prime Minister has been confronted by the need to build with US allies a coherent political and military response to unlawful action by Saddam Hussein which has threatened to destabilise the middle east. In both cases, the Government's robust response was supported by the Opposition. In both cases, the UK has been militarily prepared for its role.
The Secretary of State was good enough to write in The Parliamentarian that our armed forces
"are the best in Europe, if not the world".
Only with an effective and well-trained, well-equipped fighting force can the UK's contribution and our debate this evening be meaningful.
There have also been key differences between this crisis and that in 1991, which were touched on by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby (Mr. Robathan) and many others. The alliance is smaller and the French are not on side. This time, there has been no invasion. That leads to a crucial point which has been mentioned throughout the debate, and it concerns

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objectives. In 1991, the political and the military objectives were clearly linked. The political objective of liberating Kuwait linked naturally to the military objective of ejecting the invading army. The two objectives coincided.
This time, the political and the military objectives do not have the same neat relationship. The political objective is the readmission of the UNSCOM inspectors, but the link between that and such military action as may be contemplated is less direct and more tenuous. That lies behind the calls for clarity that we have heard throughout the debate—for clarity of political objective from the politicians, and for our troops, if the time comes, clarity of military objective.
Those who have followed the crisis from the beginning will have been concerned by the absence of answers from Iraq to some basic questions. If, as he claims, Saddam Hussein is not in the business of producing weapons of mass destruction, why the resistance to the work of UNSCOM, to which he originally agreed? What does he seek to hide from the inspectors? What does the leader of an impoverished people think he is doing with 14 presidential palaces? If, as we now know, he has developed and used weapons of mass destruction, what are his motives in storing those poisonous cocktails in such large quantities? Is it not better to confront him today, rather than wait until tomorrow?
My right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) quoted from an article in The Sunday Times which many hon. Members will have read. It was an article written by a British UN arms inspector outlining the obstruction and hazards that he faced, with bugged hotel rooms, waiting four days outside one building for access and, in his own words, coming
"within a hair's breadth of being shot by over-zealous, trigger-happy 17-year-olds."
I agree with the concluding sentence of that article:
"Our mandate is to have immediate, unrestricted access to any site in Iraq, and our mission will not be accomplished until this is permitted."
Yes, there are risks in military action. We have heard about them from hon. Members today. In one respect, however, I think that the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) was wrong. He argued that a criticism that could be made of the Government's strategy was that it would strengthen Saddam Hussein. I do not happen to agree, but the argument was turned neatly against the right hon. Gentleman by one of his hon. Friends, who said that it applied even more strongly to an alternative strategy that removed the underpinning of the threat of force from the sanctions now working on Saddam Hussein. For many of us, however, the highlight of the debate was listening to the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) lashing with his tongue not Opposition Members, but some of his right hon. and hon. Friends.
If there are risks involved in military action—and there are—I believe that more risks are involved in no action. But there is another risk that has not really been touched on today: the risk of a diplomatic fudge that would leave Saddam in control, possibly claiming victory—that would leave him able to continue to develop his literally poisonous regime, and that would damage the credibility
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of the collective action on which the freedoms that we all value now depend. That is why the diplomatic endgame on which we are now embarked is crucial, and why it is vital that, if Kofi Annan goes to Baghdad, he goes with a clear remit. What we cannot have is UNSCOM left in Iraq, but operating under conditions that would make its work ineffective. I was delighted to hear the Foreign Secretary rule out that option in his opening speech.
The debate has achieved something else. It has not just been about the similarities and the contrasts since 1991; it has shown how the whole crisis has moved on since the cold war. At that time, the concern was the deployment of nuclear weapons by a strong and stable country. Today, we are concerned about the deployment of chemical, bacteriological weapons by a poor country with an unstable leadership. That, surely, is the nature of the military threats in the 21st century: they are very different from those in the second half of the 20th century, and they are threats to which the United Kingdom's defence must adapt in the years ahead.
Another issue has not been mentioned, but is worth a paragraph. That is the importance of our reserves, which are now much more usable as a result of the Reserve Forces Act 1996. Members of the Royal Naval and Royal Air Force Reserves are in the middle east now, but, if the scenario were to take a turn for the worse, our regular forces would need to be supported by volunteers from the Territorial Army, the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and the Royal Naval Reserve.
We have heard first-class speeches from hon. Members on both sides of the House. Let me touch on some of the speeches of my right hon. and hon. Friends. We heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, who was Prime Minister at the time of the earlier crisis, and from my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater, who was Secretary of State for Defence at the time. We also heard from a number of my hon. Friends who have served in the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Defence. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Blaby, who fought in the 1991 Gulf war; and, at the end of the debate, we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson), who, I think, outlined the role of the Opposition—to give broad support, but also, as is their right, to question and criticise if necessary as the situation unfolds.
A subject that has hardly been touched on is the question of resources. The only speaker to mention that was the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), who fired a warning shot across the Treasury bows. Can the Secretary of State confirm that the costs of our response to the Gulf crisis will be met from the reserves and will not represent a further squeeze on his Department or on other spending programmes? At the beginning of the financial year, the Chancellor pre-allocated quite a lot of this year's reserves. Some of us pointed out that that was possibly a rash thing to do. I hope that there is enough in the reserves to meet the costs of this unforeseen crisis.
I also ask the Secretary of State about the interrelationship of the strategic defence review and the hostilities that may lie ahead. I hope that he will agree that if there is a war in which our troops are engaged,

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all the energies of his Department will be focused on a successful outcome and that any war with the Treasury will have to wait.
Mr. James Gray: In view of what my right hon. Friend said a moment ago about the Territorial Army, does he agree that the preservation of the TA at its current strength will be necessary if there is to be a war in the Gulf?
Sir George Young: Indeed. As I mentioned, a number of reserves are already out in the middle east. They will have to backfill some of the posts that will be vacated if the more pessimistic scenario develops.
On the strategic defence review, we cannot risk the high morale of our troops being undermined by more leaks about where the cuts might fall. We had the story in The Observer a fortnight ago, and there was further speculation last weekend, about the command structure of the paras. We cannot have the energies of Ministers and senior officials diverted from the urgent task in hand.
When he replies, will the Secretary of State also clarify exactly where we are with the further Security Council resolution, which the Government felt was desirable and were brokering last week, which declares Iraq to be in material breach?
I understand that the Government plan to accept the Opposition's amendment. If that is the case, it is welcome news and shows unanimity on this crucial subject.
It is often said that the House of Commons no longer matters—it has been said more often since 1 May. Tonight, the House of Commons does matter, for two reasons: first, the vote at 10 o'clock is a democratic barometer of how Members of Parliament in a free country wish to confront the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. The vote will be watched not just by him to see how strong is our resolve, but by others, who want to know that the principle of collective security, made credible by the potential use of force, is one in which they can have confidence. Every vote at 10 o'clock will influence the position on the scale.
There is another reason why the vote is important. I have constituents in the Gulf, as has nearly every hon. Member. I want the constituents of North-West Hampshire who are prepared to risk their lives to know that their Member of Parliament backs the cause for which they are prepared to fight. Not only does their Member of Parliament as an individual support that cause, but their Member of Parliament, as a representative of the broad communities from which our armed forces come, also supports them.
I urge all hon. Members to support both the amendment and the Government's motion. Of course we must pursue to the full the diplomatic solutions. We must also express common purpose with those who are prepared to fight, but, crucially, we must reassert that the House of Commons believes that the threat and the use of force if all else fails is a legitimate and essential response to the threat to collective security posed by Saddam Hussein.
9.33 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson): The subject of today's debate is important and serious, and the House of Commons has risen to the
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occasion. As the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) said, a broad consensus behind the words and spirit of the motion has clearly emerged. I am glad that the Government will be able to accept the Opposition amendment, which will unite that consensus across the parties.
There have been a few dissident voices, some of which I disagree with strongly, but we are a free Parliament of free voices, and no one is penalised or punished as a result of the views that they express.
There have been a number of outstanding speeches, such as that of the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), who will join us in a moment. He apologised to me, because he has been delayed. The right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), who once held the onerous position that I now hold, also made an important speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, and my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, made serious contributions to the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross), who has considerable knowledge of the Arab world and whose authority on this subject is unquestioned, made a good and serious contribution. My right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), for whom I served as a deputy and from whom I learned the gentle art of confronting those with whom I disagree, made a speech that all of us will remember for a long time. Hon. Members on both sides of the House made serious contributions to a serious debate.
The need for this debate and the crisis that the world faces this week are the direct result of the actions of one man who has brought misery to his own people and recklessly threatened the security of the whole region. Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, is that man. Over the past decade, he has conducted chemical attacks against one of his neighbours; he has invaded and annexed another; he has bombarded others with ballistic missiles; he has poison-gassed 5,000 of his own country's citizens with chemical weapons; and he has started and lost two wars.
Saddam Hussein is without question a profoundly dangerous neighbour, who threatens the stability and safety of what is still one of the most volatile regions of the world. Our debate has rightly focused on the threat that he poses with weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological and even nuclear. Some may doubt his intentions and his ambitions, perhaps even believing his propaganda that he has nothing to hide and that he never had anything to hide. Fortunately, there is a very simple test. If he had nothing to hide, he could let weapons inspectors in to prove it. If he had done so, their job might by now be complete.
Instead, Saddam has chosen to forfeit more than $100 billion-worth of oil revenues as he relentlessly defies the post-war United Nations resolutions. His children starve, his hospitals lack drugs and his economy is in shreds, but his regime still floats on a lake of lavish luxury for the elite, his armed forces soak up the resources that could feed the hungry, and his people's misery is manipulated as a human propaganda tool. What sort of mentality defines a regime that has spent $1 billion on palaces and presidential complexes since the end of the Gulf war in 1991, while almost a million Iraqi children

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under five years of age are chronically malnourished? It is probably the same twisted mentality that has caused him to be at war or subject to international sanctions for 16 of the 18 years since he seized power.
The House should be in no doubt that the present crisis has been deliberately engineered by Saddam Hussein, and that it was a calculated move. It came as no surprise. It was all of a piece with his past attempts to flout the will of the international community: the attempted assassination of President Bush in 1993; the massing of Republican Guards to threaten Kuwait in 1994; the invasion of Kurdish Irbil in 1996; and the threat to exterminate the marsh Arabs in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf war. Such violations have become almost routine.
Mr. Galloway: As my right hon. Friend mentioned the utterly bogus Bush assassination attempt, I should mention that a dear friend of mine, the finest woman painter in the Arab world, Leila al Attar, was killed by a cruise missile fired by President Clinton in retaliation for that so-called assassination attempt. Would my right hon. Friend say that her death served any purpose and that hers and other deaths in that cruise missile attack in any way affected Saddam Hussein's venality and made him change his course of action? What makes my right hon. Friend think that 1,000 cruise missiles will make any more difference?
Mr. Robertson: I shall tell my hon. Friend that, when the coalition forces massed in 1991—my hon. Friend opposed that military action—Saddam Hussein was driven out of Kuwait, a land that he had invaded and crushed and whose people he had tortured and imprisoned. Had I heard in my hon. Friend's speech tonight—powerful as it was in a cause with which I do not agree—a word about the 600 Kuwaitis who were captured at the end of the war and have never been seen since, I might have thought it slightly more balanced.
The House is in no doubt that the crisis was engineered, as many hon. Members have said. However, the UNSCOM inspections are at the very heart of the international community's need to rid itself of the specific threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the events of the past few months hold a specific significance. What is at stake here is more than just access to a host of sites blocked off to UN weapons inspectors. What is at risk, and on the line now, is the very authority and the credibility of the United Nations and its ability ever again to tackle the proliferation menace, which may be the biggest threat to mankind over the next century. The hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell), whose distinguished and powerful speech I omitted to mention at the beginning of my remarks, also made that point.
Saddam has chemical and biological weapons—some so awful and horrific that they beggar ordinary comprehension. We know, because the UN inspectors found some but not all of them.
Mr. Frank Cook: Concern has been expressed during the debate about the possible dispersal of chemical and bacteriological elements. I am not of the view that there will be a conflict. I believe that the issue will be settled by diplomatic means and that Saddam will make capital out of that anyway. However, as a means of
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containing the possible dispersal of chemical and biological agents, has any consideration been given to the use of low-yield tactical thermo-nuclear devices?
Mr. Robertson: No. I shall deal with my hon. Friend's question about the possible dispersal of chemical and biological weapons later in my speech.
The UN inspectors, who were lied to, obstructed, deceived, and harassed but who persisted in their efforts, uncovered huge stocks of weapons and destroyed what they found. I have a list which comprises only part of what was found: 38,000 filled and unfilled warheads, 48 long-range Scud missiles, 690 tonnes of chemical agent and an even deadlier cocktail of toxins, poison gases and germ mixes—all designed to terrify and subjugate Saddam's neighbours and the wider region. There is bound to be more.
In the last few weeks, we found out that, in the past, Saddam had yet another chemical weapon that we had not known about—agent 15, one more filthy uncivilised weapon of war in his armoury.
Mr. David Kidney: My right hon. Friend mentioned agent 15—which might just have been the cause of Gulf war syndrome. No veteran who has been disabled by Gulf war syndrome and no hon. Member who has met veterans who have been disabled by it can but feel anger that Iraq might have possessed and used agent 15. Will my right hon. Friend tell the House how Saddam Hussein got hold of agent 15 in the first place?
Mr. Robertson: My hon. Friend asks a very good question. Last week, in response to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), I told the House that I did not know who sold agent 15 to the Iraqi regime. I do have information on how the Iraqi regime may have obtained agent 15, although—for reasons that I am sure that all hon. Members will understand—I am not prepared to divulge those details. However, I can assure the House that Saddam did not acquire agent 15 from Britain.
Saddam himself admits to using 3,000 tonnes of chemical gas in his war with Iran. In Halabja-10 years ago this year—he used poison gas against his own people. That year, I personally spoke to some of those whom he brutalised with what they called the "bombs with no voices". I will remember for ever those people's tales, their faces and their families.
We have the evidence, and we have the facts. We have seen what Saddam had, and we know what he used. We know that he still hides some of the mass-murdering weapons or the means of putting them together. We know beyond doubt, question or contradiction that he wants to keep them, and to develop them and the means of delivering them. We do not have to guess about his ambitions to use them. That is why the terms of the Gulf war ceasefire were so specific. His armoury of chemical and biological weapons had to be discovered and destroyed.
United Nations Security Council resolution 687, which has been mentioned many times in this debate, was crystal clear. It stated:
"Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons … and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres".

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Inspections were to be unfettered and immediate. Seven years on, after a concerted campaign of obstruction, Saddam's regime still refuses to honour its undertakings.
If the efforts of diplomacy fail and Saddam will not listen to the widespread view that he must let the inspectors return with full access—which is the view taken not only by every Arab state but by so many others—we shall have to act. The object of military action—which has been mentioned by so many hon. Members—if it must be used, will be clear: to diminish significantly Saddam's military capabilities, including his ability to deploy, conceal and recreate his weapons of mass destruction to threaten his neighbours.
The political objective of any military action is also clear. It is not to remove Saddam—as some hon. Members have suggested—or to humiliate or punish him or his regime, but only to secure full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, including restoration of a fully effective United Nations Special Commission.
Mr. Robathan: I have been agreeing with the right hon. Gentleman until the last minute. He has provided a litany of what Saddam Hussein has done wrong. Although I agree with the right hon. Gentleman entirely, he must realise that what we are about to do—although I support its limited military objectives—is to punish the people of Iraq. Next year, Saddam Hussein will be back. Will the right hon. Gentleman and his Cabinet colleagues consider further personalising the conflict—taking action against Saddam Hussein as an individual, and trying to drive a wedge between him and the people of Iraq?
Mr. Robertson: The hon. Gentleman served in the Gulf war, and we pay tribute to the service he gave to this country, but his suggestion is not practical, sensible or in line with international law—unlike what we are doing.
Mr. Salmond: Is there nothing in the agenda proposed by the hon. Members for Blaby (Mr. Robathan), for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) and myself for a political strategy accompanying military action which commends itself to the Secretary of State?
Mr. Robertson: My hon. Friends the Members for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) and for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) have campaigned about Saddam for many more years than a lot of people in the House, as has the hon. Gentleman himself. They have asked for the release of frozen Iraqi assets to the Iraqi opposition, with whom my hon. Friends in the Foreign Office have been in regular discussions. I am advised that, under UN Security Council resolution 661, we could not release frozen assets to individuals. The hon. Gentleman and others asked us to impose no-drive zones in certain parts of Iraq, but the military advice I have is that that would be dangerous and difficult and would ultimately involve the same kind of problems we are talking about.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley mentioned the possibility of indicting Saddam Hussein for war crimes. The Government are strong supporters of the concept of an international court where we could make sure that international law was upheld and where those
984
who were in breach of it could be brought to justice. Those were some of the agendas proposed during the debate, and by members of the Iraqi opposition. My response is that they have been carefully considered.
Mr. Alan Simpson: My right hon. Friend listed the ways in which Saddam Hussein has obstructed the UNSCOM team. Does he accept that, as things stand, we do not know in detail what stocks of chemical and biological weapons Saddam may have or where they may be located? In planning the military strategy of any bombing, what calculation has been made of the worst case in terms of civilian casualties that we are willing to contemplate?
Mr. Robertson: The whole objective of any action we take will be to minimise civilian casualties and to maximise the damage to Saddam's military capability. I am sure that that answer comes as no surprise to my hon. Friend, but it is the basis of all our planning.
I want to make it clear to those hon. Members who, quite properly, asked under what authority action would be taken, that any action involving UK forces would be based purely on international law, and on the authority that comes from the ceasefire agreement and other UN Security Council resolutions.
On 14 January this year—only four weeks ago—in a statement, the President of the Security Council determined that Iraq's failure to give access to UNSCOM was unacceptable and
"a clear violation of the relevant resolution."
Let us make no mistake—this is all about a challenge to the authority of the UN. If Saddam' s challenge to the Security Council succeeds, what happens the next time? What happens when the next belligerent—the next proliferators—threatens a neighbour or a region? Will the UN have any authority to act?
Letting Saddam off, doing nothing, backing off, settling for some convenient fudge in the face of Saddam's defiance—those are options too dangerous to contemplate. The confrontation started by Saddam can be ended by Saddam. If he lets the inspectors in to test his word, order will be restored.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has outlined the Herculean efforts being made to get a diplomatic outcome—based on unconditional, unrestricted access to all sites—and those efforts will go on. Time is running out. Saddam Hussein has to know that, because every day that passes without inspections of the so-called palaces and sensitive sites increases the risk that his deadly arsenal will be back in production.
We are not talking about palaces like Lambeth palace or Buckingham palace. They are not sensitive sites like Chelsea barracks in London. They are vast building complexes. Earlier today, the Ministry of Defence released a photograph with maps to illustrate the size of one such site. Superimposed on a map of central London, it stretches from Wandsworth bridge to Tower bridge and from Hyde park to the Oval cricket ground. That site contains hundreds of buildings and two palaces. Those are the sensitive sites that we are talking about.
For the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway), I have done the same for Glasgow. The site would stretch from Hyndland,

985
close to his constituency, to Celtic football club's ground and from Drumbreck up to the rhubarb fields of Robroyston. That is the scale of the sites to which Saddam denies access to the UNSCOM inspectors, who are backed by the authority of the United Nations.
Mr. Dalyell: My right hon. Friend promised to answer the questions that I asked, along with the right hon. Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Mr. Clark) and several others, about how to contain biological and chemical weapons from the civilian population and perhaps even other friendly states.
Mr. Robertson: That question presumes that Saddam has the weapons that my hon. Friend and others suggest that he does not have. I shall not be drawn on our targeting plans, which will affect Saddam if diplomacy fails. However, we shall properly take account of the information that we have, the sensitivity of the issue and the need to minimise civilian casualties.
Mr. Robert N. Wareing: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Robertson: No. I apologise to my hon. Friend, but I am short of time.
Military action is not our best option or our preferred option. However, without the option of force, we know from Saddam's track record that he will not move. Some people ask whether a military strike from the assembled forces in the Gulf can change Saddam's mind. I assure the House that it can and that we firmly believe that it will. If military action is necessary, it will significantly set back Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programme even if UNSCOM is not immediately reinstated. That would be better than a gutted UNSCOM.
I appreciate that genuine concerns have been expressed about the possible targeting of various locations. We could not go into action without bearing in mind the risks to our troops, to civilians and to those who might be affected if particular weapons were hit.
Our troops are in the Gulf because we believe that it is right for them to be there. It is important to demonstrate to Saddam the determination of the international community. In the early days of the crisis, there was an assertion that the United States and the United Kingdom stood alone in response to Saddam's mischief-making. Events have shown that those critics were wrong. There was widespread international condemnation of Saddam' s challenge from the outset. Support grows every day. That support is now taking material form, as Australia, Canada, Poland, Denmark and many other allies come forward to provide forces, facilities or political support to the coalition. New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman also fall into that category. The confrontation is between not the United States and Iraq, but the Iraqi regime and the authority of the United Nations.
As Secretary of State for Defence, I carry the burden of deploying into the theatre of possible war many young men and women of Britain's armed forces. They are among the finest troops in the world—as professionally excellent in fighting as they are, and have been proved to be, in peacekeeping. I carry the burden with great
986
seriousness, and I salute their bravery, their sense of service and their dedication to their country and to international order. I do not want to send them into battle. I take no pleasure in asking them to risk their lives; I detest the prospect. Their very existence is to ensure that international order is secure. They go, if they have to go, with our support, our blessing and our prayers.
Amendment agreed to.
Main Question, as amended, put:—
The House divided: Ayes 493, Noes 25.

Division No. 173]

[10 pm

AYES

Ainger, Nick

Caborn, Richard

Ainsworth, Peter (E Surrey)

Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)

Ainsworth, Robert (Cov'try NE)

Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)

Alexander, Douglas

Campbell, Menzies (NE Fife)

Allan, Richard

Campbell-Savours, Dale

Allen, Graham

Cann, Jamie

Amess, David

Casale, Roger

Ancram, Rt Hon Michael

Cash, William

Anderson, Donald (Swansea E)

Cawsey, Ian

Arbuthnot, James

Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)

Armstrong, Ms Hilary

Chapman, Sir Sydney

Ashton, Joe

(Chipping Barnet)

Atkins, Charlotte

Chidgey, David

Atkinson, David (Bour'mth E)

Chisholm, Malcolm

Atkinson, Peter (Hexham)

Chope, Christopher

Baldry, Tony

Clappison, James

Ballard, Mrs Jackie

Clark, Rt Hon Alan (Kensington)

Barron, Kevin

Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)

Battle, John

Clark, Dr Lynda

Bayley, Hugh

(Edinburgh Pentlands)

Beard, Nigel

Clark, Dr Michael (Rayleigh)

Beggs, Roy

Clark, Paul (Gillingham)

Beith, Rt Hon A J

Clarke, Charles (Norwich S)

Benton, Joe

Clarke, Eric (Midlothian)

Bercow, John

Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)

Beresford, Sir Paul

Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)

Bermingham, Gerald

Clelland, David

Betts, Clive

Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey

Blair, Rt Hon Tony

Clwyd, Ann

Blears, Ms Hazel

Coaker, Vernon

Blizzard, Bob

Coffey, Ms Ann

Blunkett, Rt Hon David

Collins, Tim

Blunt, Crispin

Colman, Tony

Boateng, Paul

Colvin, Michael

Borrow, David

Connarty, Michael

Boswell, Tim

Cook, Rt Hon Robin (Livingston)

Bottmley, Peter (Worthing W)

Corbett, Robin

Bottomley, Rt Hon Mrs Virginia

Corston, Ms Jean

Bradley, Keith (Withington)

Cotter, Brian

Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)

Cousins, Jim

Brake, Tom

Cox, Tom

Brand, Dr Peter

Cran, James

Breed, Colin

Cranston, Ross

Brooke, Rt Hon Peter

Cummings, John

Brown, Rt Hon Gordon

Cunningham, Rt Hon Dr John

(Dunfermline E)

(Copeland)

Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)

Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)

Brown, Russell (Dumfries)

Darling, Rt Hon Alistair

Browne, Desmond

Darvill, Keith

Browning, Mrs Angela

Davey, Edward (Kingston)

Bruce, Ian (S Dorset)

Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)

Bruce, Malcolm (Gordon)

Davidson, Ian

Buck, Ms Karen

Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)

Burden, Richard

Davies, Rt Hon Ron (Caerphilly)

Burnett, John

Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice)

Burns, Simon

Dawson, Hilton

Butler, Mrs Christine

Day, Stephen

Byers, Stephen

Dean, Mrs Janet

Cable, Dr Vincent

Denham, John

987

Dewar, Rt Hon Donald

Hanson, David

Dismore, Andrew

Harman, Rt Hon Ms Harriet

Dobbin, Jim

Harris, Dr Evan

Dobson, Rt Hon Frank

Harvey, Nick

Donaldson, Jeffrey

Hawkins, Nick

Donohoe, Brian H

Hayes, John

Doran, Frank

Heal, Mrs Sylvia

Dorrell, Rt Hon Stephen

Healey, John

Drown, Ms Julia

Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)

Duncan, Alan

Heath, Rt Hon Sir Edward

Duncan Smith, Iain

Heathcoat—Amory, Rt Hon David

Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth

Hepburn, Stephen

Eagle, Angela (Wallasey)

Hesford, Stephen

Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)

Hewitt, Ms Patricia

Edwards, Huw

Hill, Keith

Ellman, Mrs Louise

Hodge, Ms Margaret

Emery, Rt Hon Sir Peter

Hoey, Kate

Ennis, Jeff

Home Robertson, John

Evans, Nigel

Hoon, Geoffrey

Faber, David

Horam, John

Fabricant, Michael

Howard, Rt Hon Michael

Fallon, Michael

Howarth, Alan (Newport E)

Fatchett, Derek

Howarth, George (Knowsley N)

Fearn, Ronnie

Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)

Field, Rt Hon Frank

Howells, Dr Kim

Fisher, Mark

Hoyle, Lindsay

Fitzsimons, Lorna

Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)

Flight, Howard

Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)

Flint, Caroline

Hughes, Simon (Southwark N)

Flynn, Paul

Humble, Mrs Joan

Follett, Barbara

Hunter, Andrew

Forsythe, Clifford

Hurst, Alan

Forth, Rt Hon Eric

Hutton, John

Foster, Don (Bath)

Iddon, Dr Brian

Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)

Illsley, Eric

Foster, Michael J (Worcester)

Jack, Rt Hon Michael

Foulkes, George

Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)

Fowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman

Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)

Fox, Dr Liam

Jamieson, David

Fraser, Christopher

Jenkin, Bernard

Fyfe, Maria

Jenkins, Brian

Galbraith, Sam

Johnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)

Gale, Roger

Johnson, Miss Melanie

Gapes, Mike

(Welwyn Hatfield)

Gardiner, Barry

Johnson Smith,

Garnier, Edward

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

George, Bruce (Walsall S)

Jones, Barry (Alyn & Deeside)

Gibb, Nick

Jones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)

Gill, Christopher

Jones, Helen (Warrington N)

Gillan, Mrs Cheryl

Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)

Gilroy, Mrs Linda

Jones, Nigel (Cheltenham)

Godman, Norman A

Jowell, Ms Tessa

Goggins, Paul

Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald

Golding, Mrs Llin

Keeble, Ms Sally

Goodlad, Rt Hon Sir Alastair

Keen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)

Gorman, Mrs Teresa

Keetch, Paul

Gorrie, Donald

Kemp, Fraser

Gray, James

Kennedy, Charles (Ross Skye)

Green, Damian

Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree)

Greenway, John

Key, Robert

Grieve, Dominic

Khabra, Piara S

Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)

Kidney, David

Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)

Kilfoyle, Peter

Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)

King, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)

Grocott, Bruce

Kingham, Ms Tess

Grogan, John

Kirkbride, Miss Julie

Gummer, Rt Hon John

Kirkwood, Archy

Gunnell, John

Kumar, Dr Ashok

Hague, Rt Hon William

Ladyman, Dr Stephen

Hain, Peter

Laing, Mrs Eleanor

Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)

Lait, Mrs Jacqui

Hall, Patrick (Bedford)

Lansley, Andrew

Hamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archie

Lawrence, Ms Jackie

Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)

Leigh, Edward

Hammond, Philip

Leslie, Christopher

Hancock, Mike

Letwin, Oliver

988

Levitt, Tom

Olner, Bill

Lewis, Ivan (Bury S)

Öpik, Lembit

Lewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)

Osborne, Ms Sandra

Liddell, Mrs Helen

Ottaway, Richard

Lilley, Rt Hon Peter

Page, Richard

Livsey, Richard

Paice, James

Lloyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)

Palmer, Dr Nick

Lloyd, Tony (Manchester C)

Paterson, Owen

Lock, David

Pearson, Ian

Loughton, Tim

Pendry, Tom

Love, Andrew

Perham, Ms Linda

Luff, Peter

Pickles, Eric

Lyell, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas

Pickthall, Colin

McAvoy, Thomas

Pike, Peter L

McCafferty, Ms Chris

Pond, Chris

McCartney, Ian (Makerfield)

Pope, Greg

McDonagh, Siobhain

Pound, Stephen

Macdonald, Calum

Powell, Sir Raymond

McFall, John

Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)

MacGregor, Rt Hon John

Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)

McGuire, Mrs Anne

Prescott, Rt Hon John

MacKay, Andrew

Primarolo, Dawn

Mackinlay, Andrew

Prior, David

Maclean, Rt Hon David

Purchase, Ken

McLeish, Henry

Radice, Giles

Maclennan, Rt Hon Robert

Rammell, Bill

McLoughlin, Patrick

Randall, John

McNamara, Kevin

Rapson, Syd

McNulty, Tony

Raynsford, Nick

MacShane, Denis

Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)

Mactaggart, Fiona

Reid, Dr John (Hamilton N)

McWalter, Tony

Rendel, David

McWilliam, John

Robathan, Andrew

Madel, Sir David

Robertson, Rt Hon George

Major, Rt Hon John

(Hamilton S)

Malins, Humfrey

Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)

Mallaber, Judy

Robinson, Geoffrey (Cov'try NW)

Mandelson, Peter

Roche, Mrs Barbara

Maples, John

Roe, Mrs Marion (Broxbourne)

Marek, Dr John

Rogers, Allan

Marsden, Gordon (Blackpool S)

Rooker, Jeff

Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)

Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)

Martlew, Eric

Ross, William (E Lond'y)

Mates, Michael

Rowe, Andrew (Faversham)

Maude, Rt Hon Francis

Rowlands, Ted

Mawhinney, Rt Hon Sir Brian

Roy, Frank

Maxton, John

Ruane, Chris

May, Mrs Theresa

Ruddock, Ms Joan

Meacher, Rt Hon Michael

Ruffley, David

Meale, Alan

Russell, Bob (Colchester)

Merron, Gillian

Russell, Ms Christine (Chester)

Michael, Alun

St Aubyn, Nick

Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)

Sanders, Adrian

Milburn, Alan

Savidge, Malcolm

Miller, Andrew

Sawford, Phil

Mitchell, Austin

Sayeed, Jonathan

Moffatt, Laura

Shaw, Jonathan

Moonie, Dr Lewis

Sheerman, Barry

Moore, Michael

Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert

Moran, Ms Margaret

Shipley, Ms Debra

Morgan, Rhodri (Cardiff W)

Short, Rt Hon Clare

Moriey, Elliot

Simpson, Keith (Mid-Norfolk)

Morris, Ms Estelle (B'ham Yardley)

Smith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)

Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)

Smith, Angela (Basildon)

Moss, Malcolm

Smith, Rt Hon Chris (Islington S)

Mountford, Kali

Smith, Miss Geraldine

Mudie, George

(Morecambe & Lunesdale)

Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)

Smith, Jacqui (Redditch)

Murphy, Jim (Eastwood)

Smith, John (Glamorgan)

Nicholls, Patrick

Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)

Norman, Archie

Smyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)

Norris, Dan

Snape, Peter

Oaten, Mark

Soames, Nicholas

O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)

Soley, Clive

O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)

Spellar, John

O'Hara, Eddie

Spelman, Mrs Caroline

989

Spicer, Sir Michael

Turner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)

Spring, Richard

Twigg, Derek (Halton)

Squire, Ms Rachel

Twigg, Stephen (Enfield)

Stanley, Rt Hon Sir John

Tyler, Paul

Steen, Anthony

Vaz, Keith

Steinberg, Gerry

Wallace, James

Stevenson, George

Walley, Ms Joan

Stewart, David (Inverness E)

Walter, Robert

Stoate, Dr Howard

Ward, Ms Claire

Stott, Roger

Wardle, Charles

Strang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin

Waterson, Nigel

Straw, Rt Hon Jack

Watts, David

Stringer, Graham

Webb, Steve

Stuart, Ms Gisela

Wells, Bowen

Stunell, Andrew

White, Brian

Sutcliffe, Gerry

Whitehead, Dr Alan

Swayne, Desmond

Whitney, Sir Raymond

Syms, Robert

Whittingdale, John

Tapsell, Sir Peter

Wicks, Malcolm

Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann

Widdecombe, Rt Hon Miss Ann

(Dewsbury)

Wilkinson, John

Taylor, Ms Dari (Stockton S)

Willetts, David

Taylor, David (NW Leics)

Wlliams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)

Taylor, Ian (Esher & Walton)

Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)

Taylor, John M (Solihull)

Willis, Phil

Taylor, Matthew (Truro)

Wills, Michael

Taylor, Sir Teddy

Wilson, Brian

Temple—Morris, Peter

Winnick, David

Thomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)

Winterton, Mrs Ann (Congleton)

Thomas, Gareth R (Harrow W)

Winterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)

Timms, Stephen

Winterton, Ms Rosie (Doncaster C)

Tipping, Paddy

Woodward, Shaun

Todd, Mark

Woolas, Phil

Tonge, Dr Jenny

Worthington, Tony

Touhig, Don

Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)

Townend, John

Wyatt, Derek

Tredinnick, David

Yeo, Tim

Trend, Michael

Young, Rt Hon Sir George

Trickett, Jon

Truswell, Paul

Tellers for the Ayes:

Turner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)

Janet Anderson and

Turner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)

Mr. Jim Dowd.

NOES

Abbott, Ms Diane

McDonnell, John

Barnes, Harry

Mahon, Mrs Alice

Bennett, Andrew F

Michie, Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)

Canavan, Dennis

Sarwar, Mohammad

Clapham, Michael

Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)

Skinner, Dennis

Cohen, Harry

Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)

Corbyn, Jeremy

Wareing, Robert N

Dafis, Cynog

Wigley, Rt Hon Dafydd

Galloway, George

Wse, Audrey

Gerrard, Neil

Wray, James

Grant, Bernie

Jones, Ieuan Wyn (Ynys Môn)

Tellers for the Noes:

Livingstone, Ken

Mr. Tam Dalyell and

Llwyd, Elfyn

Mr. Tony Benn.

Question accordingly agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House condemns the continuing refusal of Iraq to comply with its obligations under the relevant post-ceasefire UN Security Council Resolutions, by allowing UNSCOM to carry out without restrictions the required inspections of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes; believes that these programmes represent a continuing threat to international peace and stability; fully supports the efforts of the Government to reach a diplomatic solution to the present confrontation with Iraq within the framework of these Security Council Resolutions; fully supports the resolve of the Government to use all necessary means to achieve an outcome consistent with these Resolutions; and emphasises the importance of setting the clearest possible objectives linked to any action that might be taken.

DELEGATED LEGISLATION
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): With permission, I shall put together the motions relating to delegated legislation.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 118(6) (Standing Committees on Delegated Legislation),

DELEGATED LEGISLATION
  NORTHERN IRELAND
  That the draft Financial Provisions (Northern Ireland) Order 1997, which was laid before this House on 16th December, be approved.

  CONSTRUCTION
  That the draft Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Exclusion Order 1998, which was laid before this House on 18th December, be approved.
  That the draft Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, which were laid before this House on 12th January, be approved.

  CONSTRUCTION (SCOTLAND)
  That the draft Scheme for Construction Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 1998, which were laid before this House on 19th January, be approved.
  That the draft Construction Contracts (Scotland) Exclusion Order 1998, which was laid before this House on 19th January, be approved.

  CIVIL AVIATION
  That the draft Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) (Fourth Amendment) Order 1998, which was laid before this House on 26th January, be approved.—[Mr. Clelland]
  Question agreed to.

  Gwent Tertiary College
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Clelland.]
  10.16 pm
  Mr. Llew Smith: My involvement with one of the colleges that makes up Gwent tertiary college goes back some 35 or more years to when I was an evening class student. Anyone who knows the history not only of that college but of colleges throughout Gwent will be filled with sadness, dismay and anger about what has happened to them over the past few years.
  Before the appointment of Sue Parker, who until recently was the principal, the colleges were remarkably successful, both financially and academically. I want to mention the college that I attended some 35 years ago, Cross Keys, which is in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Touhig). In the two years prior to the appointment of Sue Parker as principal of Gwent tertiary college, there was a surplus of £2 million. Some people may say that that is not the proper measuring rod of a good college, and I would agree with them, although an increasing number of people believe that it is. But academically, too, Cross Keys college, which is part of Gwent tertiary college, was a success in the years leading up to the appointment of Sue Parker: it had a 95 per cent. success rate at A-level and was justifiably proud of that achievement.
  I may be old-fashioned, but I should have thought that the proper response to such success would be to reward it by building positively upon it. Unfortunately, with the appointment of Sue Parker, and indeed with the support of the governing body of Gwent tertiary college, the response to that academic and financial success was to alter the structure of the college to such an extent that it almost resulted in its destruction. For example, the principals of each of the colleges that make up Gwent tertiary college were removed from those colleges and transferred to a super-management centre miles away from the action. In addition, ineffective and costly management structures were built up.
  As a result of those structural changes, the college quickly faced financial chaos. Debts rocketed and, at one stage, it faced a possible debt of £6 million. Redundancies followed, including redundancies among those who had helped to build the college into something of which we were all justifiably proud. In recent weeks and months we have heard allegations about the misuse of European money which could result in Gwent tertiary college having to pay back £1 million to the European Union and possibly losing another £2 million in grant applications that have already gone in.
  The governing body's response to that chaos was to appoint Cyril Lewis, who was asked to draw up a report on the running of the college. It also appointed Ernst and Young to draw up a similar report. It is interesting to note that both reports were kept secret. The public, Members of Parliament, the students and the staff, who had devoted their lives to the college, had no right to examine those reports to discover why certain conclusions had been reached.
  Not only was that unacceptable, but it reflected the inefficiency of the governing body, which allowed that to happen. Those reports were paid for from public funds—
  992
  from people who make up one of the poorest communities of Gwent. Given that public funds paid for those reports, the public should be able to say to those who wrote them, "Either we are allowed to decide what to do with your report, or you do not get paid; it is as simple as that." The college, however, allowed those who had drawn up the reports to decide what should be done with them. I cannot understand that.
  One or two people have done well out of the chaos that the college faced, and Cyril Lewis is one of them. He has received £650 a day, which is somewhat above the average daily earnings of people who work in Islwyn or Blaenau Gwent. Over the past 10 months, he has earned between £70,000 and £80,000. What has he achieved for that? I suspect that, if one questioned the staff of the college, they would say that he has achieved nothing. He has not come forward with any new ideas—in fact the main result of his report has been redundancies and restructuring. In addition to those two reports, another four reports are being undertaken to examine the running of the college and, once again, as I understand it, those reports will remain secret. That is not acceptable and it cannot be defended.
  When Sue Parker resigned—which is putting it politely, as we all know that, in reality, she was dismissed—that provided an ideal opportunity for the college to start again. I believe that my hon. Friend the Minister has the power to sack the governing body, and he should do so. The problem did not lie only with Sue Parker: she was working in conjunction with, and with the support of, the governing body of Gwent tertiary college. I ask my hon. Friend whether he would be willing to use his power to bring about those sackings.
  Mr. Lembit Öpik: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Smith: No, I have only a few minutes.
  Will my hon. Friend the Minister also examine whether any of the people who were responsible for the financial chaos now facing the college are still in positions of power and, if so, why? Are any of those who were responsible for the alleged misuse of European funds still in power and still employed and, if so, why? Will he also intervene following last week's announcement, of which all hon. Members were informed, of more redundancies and posts to be left unfilled in the college? Is it not wrong that those who devoted their lives to the college and who helped to make it the sort of college of which each and every one of us in Gwent was justifiably proud should now experience a worsening of their conditions and, in many cases, the loss of their jobs?
  Mr. Öpik: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Smith: No, I am sorry, but we have only a few minutes.
  Is my hon. Friend the Minister satisfied with the appointment of the new principal? As I understand it, the new principal was recently taken to an industrial tribunal by the trade unions for attacking the conditions of part-time lecturers, and he lost the case. I would suggest that he is not the sort of person who can begin to rectify the wrongs of the past few years or who can begin to build better relationships.

  993
  Is my hon. Friend willing to allow further education in communities such as Gwent to be run by an unelected and unaccountable quango, consisting largely of business people who failed dismally in their task as governors? If we are going to leave education to such people, the college certainly faces disaster. If matters are left to the quango, the message that goes out from the Government is that they are abdicating responsibility for further education in Gwent. I am convinced that that is not a message that the Government want to send. I remember my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who has just entered the Chamber, saying a couple of years ago that we should make a bonfire of all the quangos in Wales. I agreed with him then and I agree with him now. The governing body of Gwent tertiary college is one quango that should be thrown on that bonfire.
  My hon. Friend the Minister should also draft and introduce legislation to rid Gwent tertiary college of that quango. The running of the college should be returned to the hands of elected and accountable local authorities. If we fail to do that, the future for Gwent tertiary college is indeed dismal. Ministers have both formal and informal powers and the people who make up the college—students, staff and parents—are demanding that they use both forms of power to begin to rectify the wrongs of the past few years and to help to ensure that, once again, Gwent tertiary college is the jewel in the crown of further education in Gwent.
  10.28 pm
  Mr. Don Touhig: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) for giving some of his time to allow me to take part in the debate.
  All Gwent Members of Parliament are concerned about the scale of the problems at Gwent tertiary college. Just two weeks ago, it was announced that the number of non-teaching staff would be reduced by 88; that is in addition to the teaching staff who have already left. Inevitably, that has led to cuts in teaching hours, which must affect the ability of the college to deliver the quality of education of which my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent spoke.
  However, the underlying problem facing the college has existed for two years or more, and the problem stems from the failure of the governing body to do the job for which it was appointed. Indeed, its record of mismanagement beggars belief.
  On 13 February 1996—two years ago—the governors approved a new management structure, telling the then principal that implementation should be monitored by various committees of the governors. It has now become apparent that little, if any, monitoring took place. As a result, five campus principals were unilaterally removed and replaced by five site managers, actually increasing the number of managers. A new cross-college team of functional directors was appointed, and no account was taken of how that would be funded. A substantial number of new middle management posts was created, going well beyond the original proposals.
  In the end, the number of managers at the college increased from about 50 to 118. That had two effects. First, it raised managers' salary levels well beyond the
  994
  budget's ability to meet those demands; secondly, it led to the removal of so many teaching staff that a raft of new part-time lecturers had to be appointed to fill the gap.
  Seemingly without realising it, the governing body increased the staff costs at the college by £4.5 million, at a time when student numbers there were static. Those who were promoted were placed on a range of salary increments that only stored up further financial problems.
  Within a year—on 25 February 1997—the governors finally woke up to what had happened, and dismantled the whole structure. At that time, together with fellow Gwent Members of Parliament, I met senior members of the governing body in the House, and asked how management had increased in such numbers without anyone noticing. I was told: "It was not part of the culture to notice the rise in management numbers." We were further told that one of the college's failings was its lack of management skills in negotiating with the trade unions. "Trade unions were too successful in negotiating with us," we were told. Some of the governing body were of the view that they had been "ripped off'.
  The whole sorry tale began to unfold when the principal was suspended and then resigned, but she agreed to resign only if the governors signed a gagging clause promising not to release any details of why she was leaving the employment of the college. At that time, Gwent Members of Parliament asked the National Audit Office to carry out an investigation, and, as a consequence, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent said, the governors commissioned two reports.
  However, when Members of Parliament asked to see those reports, we were told that we could see them only by sitting in the room with the governing body, reading the reports and handing them back—rather as the present Foreign Secretary had to do with the Scott report. As my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent also said, neither of those reports has ever been published, although the governors have taken decisions based on information in them, and we are now told that the reports cannot be published because they contain so many potentially libellous statements that the governing body risks endless litigation.
  As I have said, four separate reports are being prepared on the running of the college, by the National Audit Office, the Department for Education and Employment, the Further Education Funding Council for Wales and the accountants Ernst and Young. I am given to understand that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent has said, probably only one—the National Audit Office report—will ever be made public.
  Mr. Öpik: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Touhig: I am sorry; normally I would give way, but I have very little time.
  How much longer will this farce continue? How much longer will the college be run by a group of people who meet behind closed doors, spend millions of pounds of taxpayers' money, and are seemingly unaccountable for anything that they do? I believe that an option is available to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Wales, and that is to use the powers conferred on him by the Further and Higher Education Act 1992. Those powers give him the opportunity to direct the funding council to report on the management of the college.

  995
  If, as a result of that report, the Secretary of State feels that the college has been mismanaged, and on the recommendation of the funding council, he can sack the governing body. Its members deserve to be sacked and replaced by a new team, and if we are to restore confidence in the college, that must be done.
  The mismanagement that is at the root of the college's problems resulted from the fundamentally flawed 1992 Act, whereby Gwent tertiary college, like all colleges in Wales, was taken out of the control of local education authorities and handed over to the new governing bodies, which acted as corporate bodies. I have no doubt that, if the college were still being run in partnership with the LEAs, we would not have the awful problems we now face.
  I have always held the view that students, staff and representatives of the local authorities, among others, should sit on the governing bodies of colleges. That structure best serves those who use the colleges and those who run them. Without a proper balance, effective accountability is not possible.
  That idea is not new. My hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) served on the Committee on the Further and Higher Education Bill, as it then was, in 1992, and he urged that course of action then. It is the lack of accountability that led to the mismanagement of Gwent tertiary college.
  That mismanagement has been damaging throughout Gwent, but especially in my constituency, because all post-16 education in Islwyn is carried out at the Cross Keys campus of the tertiary college. Cross Keys has an enviable reputation, but it is now at risk as a result of the mismanagement. If we want to build on the success that the college has had the past, we cannot allow the present governing body to continue.
  I hope that the Minister will agree that decisive action needs to be taken, so that my constituents and others throughout Gwent believe that we are doing something positive to restore confidence in the running of the college.
  I also hope that, in the long term, the Secretary of State will decide that we should change the whole management structure of FE colleges throughout Wales. That could be done in one of two ways. The colleges could again be run in partnership with the LEAs, or the Welsh assembly, when it is set up, could take responsibility for running them.
  The best way forward is to make the running of further education in Wales open and accountable. If it were, the fiasco that we have seen at Gwent tertiary college would never have happened. I hope that the Minister will tonight take the first steps towards showing that we intend to do that.
  10.36 pm
  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Wales (Mr. Peter Hain): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Smith) on raising this subject, and my hon. Friend the Member for lslwyn (Mr. Touhig) on joining him. The debate gives me the opportunity to say a few words about our further education colleges in Wales, before I come to the specific matters that my hon. Friends have raised in connection with Gwent tertiary college.
  996
  The 26 further education colleges in Wales do an excellent job, often in difficult circumstances. They are the mainstay of our drive to increase and widen participation in education and training throughout Wales, including the up-skilling of our labour force. In our forthcoming Green Paper on lifelong learning, further education will be highlighted as a key agency in delivering our commitment to transform Wales into a learning country, as the foundation of building a world-class economy.
  Gwent tertiary college, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent said, was launched on 1 April 1993, amid high hopes. With such exciting developments as the LG investment, its role is crucial in helping to provide the high-quality skills base that Gwent needs. It is therefore tragic that the college stumbled into a catastrophic crisis, which produced such a serious deficit last year. Poor management meant that tough action was needed.
  I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn about the gravity of the problem. In two short years between 1994–95 and 1996–97, staff costs rose by a staggering 30 per cent. Staff numbers went up by 120—most of those were managers—while student enrolments stayed constant. That sort of gross imbalance and inefficiency was unsustainable.
  A recovery plan was drawn up by the governing body, based on advice from the Further Education Funding Council for Wales, Mr. Cyril Lewis and the college's internal auditors Ernst and Young, and is now being implemented. The college is now forecasting a small—£0.5 million—operating surplus, as against a projected loss of £6.7 million for the year ending 31 July 1998. Provided that the recovery plan is followed, the future position of the college is much more secure, financially at least.
  I appreciate the difficulties that staff and management have experienced over the past few months. I met the college's representative from the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education at a meeting last year arranged by my hon. Friends. However, there is no alternative within the current regime but for Gwent tertiary college to live within its means.
  I understand the frustration of hon. Members about the reports and the fact that they cannot scrutinise them closely. I asked through the funding council for the reports to be made available to my hon. Friends, and some of them took the opportunity to look at them. That course should be pursued.
  As for Mr. Cyril Lewis, he was employed by the governors of the college in June 1997 to examine its management affairs, diagnose the root problems and make recommendations on a recovery plan for the college. That is a difficult task, given the size and complexity of the college, and the huge deficit that was projected.
  The financial forecasts for the year ending July 1998, as I said, projected a deficit of £6.7 million. On the basis of the management and financial reports, the governing body is taking action that will result in the college incurring an estimated surplus of £500,000 at the end of the current academic year. Of course, that is not certain, but without the action that has been taken to recover the college's financial position, it would have been facing bankruptcy by now.
  It was and is for the governors of Gwent tertiary college to consider the value of Mr. Lewis's remuneration, which I understand is just over £77,000 from the public purse.

  997
  I understand the strong feelings about the size of that fee among staff who have been made redundant or had their income cut as part of the recovery plan. Those feelings have rightly been echoed in the Chamber tonight. The governors and the funding council take the view that they have turned around the college's finances by £7.2 million by paying out the £77,000 fee—just 1 per cent. of that total saving—to resolve a complex and intensive emergency.
  I hope that no one will wish to defend the top-heavy management structure of 118 posts that was so clearly inefficient, and which has been replaced with one of just 35 posts.
  The situation has been extremely difficult, and I sympathise with the staff, the governors—many of whom have acted with honour—and the local community, including local Members of Parliament and the local authorities.
  May I respond specifically to the issues raised, first, by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent on the European social fund? I am aware of the discussions taking place between the ESF auditors and the college over its use of ESF grants. The audit has not been completed yet, and it would therefore be inappropriate to speculate on whether any ESF grants will need to be repaid. I understand the seriousness of the situation, and my hon. Friend's concern about it.
  Let me deal with my hon. Friend's call for me to sack the governors, and explain the circumstances in which that power might be implemented. I do not have the power to sack the governors. However, the Secretary of State has powers under section 56 of the 1992 Act to direct the Further Education Funding Council for Wales by order, but he would not be able to exercise such powers unless he was satisfied, following legal advice, that the funding council was acting unreasonably.
  The Secretary of State also has power under section 57 of the same Act to intervene in the event of mismanagement or breach of duty by an FE institution on the recommendation of the funding council—I stress, on the recommendation of the funding council, not otherwise. The same test of reasonableness would apply to the actions of the institution and the council. Both powers are safeguards, to be used as a last resort after the most careful consideration and expert legal advice. To date, neither power has been exercised in Wales.
  My hon. Friends called for immediate ministerial action—"decisive action", I think, was the phrase used. I understand their frustration, but the way in which the legislation is drafted does not allow that. The situation has been difficult, and I well understand the points that have legitimately been raised this evening.
  998
  I trust that the college governors and the new principal, Mr. David Mason, who takes up his post in April, will make it their priority to rebuild the confidence of the college's staff, the local community and Gwent Members of Parliament.
  Mr. Llew Smith: Does my hon. Friend appreciate that, even before Mr. Mason takes up his post, he has lost the confidence of many of the staff because of his background experiences, including the court case in which he is involved in the college that—I believe—now employs him?
  Mr. Hain: I hear what my hon. Friend has said, but the fact is that Mr. Mason is taking up his post in April.
  We must all recognise that Gwent tertiary college is too important an institution, in too strategically important a part of Wales, to be either under-performing or failing more badly. I assure my hon. Friends that I shall monitor the situation very carefully, and invite them to keep in close touch with the funding council, the college and, indeed, me.
  Mr. Öpik: Is this not a stark reminder of the dangers that have resulted in such a sorry tale, owing to the quango culture that has been allowed to develop in Wales?
  Mr. Hain: There is much truth in what the hon. Gentleman says. My hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent has made the same point. I hope never to see this situation repeated.
  My hon. Friend spoke of the unelected, unaccountable quango, and the state that the Tory Government left. I simply remind him that the National Assembly for Wales will have power to deal with that quango state, to reform it and to address the relationship between the funding council and democratic accountability—and, indeed, the status of further education colleges. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Wales has specifically given the assembly that power, and it will be free to exercise it. My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn was right to remind us of that.
  Our manifesto gave a commitment to reforming the governance of FE colleges to increase local accountability. It is vital that we secure increased local accountability—in general terms, to bind FE colleges much more closely to the community they represent and serve, and also to ensure that we do not see a repeat of the tragic episode from which Gwent is seeking to recover.
  I am now considering how to implement the manifesto commitment. The Welsh Office will make an announcement in due course.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at fourteen minutes to Eleven o'clock.

PRIME MINISTER

  Committee on Europe
  Mr. Howard
  To ask the Prime Minister (1) if costs relating to his proposed cross-party committee on Europe will be met from public funds; [25822]

  (2) what criteria he will adopt for membership of his proposed cross-party committee on Europe; [25820]

  (3) when he expects to form his proposed cross-party committee on Europe. [25821]

  The Prime Minister
  [holding answer 27 January 1998]: When further details are available we will make them public.

  Welfare Reform Roadshow
  Mr. Ieuan Wyn Jones
  To ask the Prime Minister for what reasons he will not be visiting Wales during his welfare reform roadshow.[26992]

  The Prime Minister
  Pressures of time make it impossible for me to visit all the places I would like to, as often as I would like to. However, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Employment did attend the welfare reform roadshow held in Wales on 5 February.

  Overseas Travel
  Mr. Llew Smith
  To ask the Prime Minister if he will list the(a) officials and (b) industrialists who accompanied him on his recent visit to Japan; and if he will list those (i) Ministers, (ii) officials and (iii) industrialists his delegation met during the visit. [28240]

  The Prime Minister
  I was accompanied on my official visit to Japan by:

  Mr. John Holmes—Private Secretary;

  Mr. Alastair Campbell—Chief Press Secretary;

  Mr. Phillip Barton—Assistant Private Secretary;

  plus nine No. 10 support staff providing secure communications and administrative support; one official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and two officials from the Department of Trade and Industry. This is in line with support provided to previous Prime Ministers when travelling abroad.

  In addition, the following leading members of the business community accompanied me, at their own expense, and took part in discussions with the Japanese on developing trade links:

  Sir Colin Marshall, British Airways

  Mr. James Dyson, Dyson Appliances

  Mr. John Rose, Rolls Royce

  Dr. John Russell, ICI

  Peter Sedgwick, Schroders

  Michael Shears, Ove Arup

  522

  Sir Clive Thompson, Rentokil

  Dr. Peter Williams, Oxford Instruments

  Mr. Robert Wilson, Rio Tinto

  Mr. Allen Yurko, Siebe Plc

  Mr. Nick Scheele, Jaguar

  Sir Iain Vallance, British Telecom.

  I met the following Japanese Ministers:

  Mr. Hashimoto, Prime Minister

  Mr. Mitsuzuka, Finance Minister

  Sakakibara, Vice Minister for International Affairs

  Horiuchi, Minister of International Trade and Industry.

  I also met a number of Ministry of International Trade and Industry officials.

  I met the following Japanese industrialists during my visit:

  Mr. Sohoiciro Toyoda KBE, Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation

  Mr. Shoh Nasu, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company

  Mr. Hirotaro Higuchi, Chairman of the Board, Tokyo-Mitsubushi Bank

  Mr. Kozo Uchida, Director General of the Keidanren

  Mr. Katsuhiro Fujiwara, Managing Director of the Keidanren

  Mr. Norio Ohga, Chairman and CEO, Sony Corporation

  Mr. Josei Itoh, Chairman Nippon Life Insurance Co.

  Abortions
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Prime Minister if he will give responsibility for answering questions on the numbers and trends in the numbers of terminations performed under the Abortion Act 1967 to the Department of Health. [29678]

  The Prime Minister
  Following the creation of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 1 April 1996 there is an agreed division of responsibility between ONS and Departments for answering Parliamentary Questions with a statistical content. Oral questions and written questions including issues of policy are answered by the relevant Department, while written questions seeking statistics only are answered by ONS. In line with these arrangements written questions seeking only statistics on abortions in England and Wales, are delegated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Director of ONS for answer. There are no plans to change these arrangements.

  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Prime Minister how often, and to which part of government, reports are made by places licensed to carry out terminations under the Abortion Act 1967. [29679]

  The Prime Minister
  All non-National Health Service places approved by my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Health, for Scotland and for Wales, under Section 1(3) of the Abortion Act 1967, to carry out termination of pregnancy, are subject to unannounced visits and monitoring by officials of their Department. All registered medical practitioners have a statutory obligation to notify the Chief Medical Officer of the relevant Department of each termination of pregnancy they perform.

  Iraq
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Prime Minister if he will place a paper in the Library setting out the authority under international law which underpins his policy towards Iraq. [29749]

  The Prime Minister
  [holding answer 19 February 1998]: Security Council resolutions are a matter of public record.

  The requirement for Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction under international supervision is part of the conditions laid down by the Security Council for the ceasefire established at the end of the Gulf conflict in SCR 687.

  The Security Council currently has the question of Iraq's compliance under active consideration.

  Amsterdam Summit
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Prime Minister what tape recordings were made of the Amsterdam Treaty summit. [29694]

  The Prime Minister
  I understand that, in accordance with normal practice, the proceedings of such meetings are recorded by the Secretariat General of the Council. These recordings are made for internal purposes and are not available to member states.

TREASURY

  Tax Evasion
  Dr. Marek
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his estimate of the loss to the Exchequer arising from evasion of(a) income tax, (b) VAT, (c) corporation tax and (d) all other taxes in the last year for which figures are available. [26416]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 30 January 1998]: It is not possible to determine the amount of tax that is lost through evasion.

  Individual Savings Account
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many responses he has received to his consultative document "The New Individual Savings Account" broken down into(a) letters, (b) trade submissions and (c) other responses; and if he will make a statement. [24554]

  Mr. Geoffrey Robinson
  [holding answer 22 January 1998]: Comments were asked for by 31 January. By 4 February, the Inland Revenue had received

  3,096 letters from individuals

  273 trade submissions

  7 other responses.

  Ministers had received a further 3,303 responses by the same date, although this figure includes some duplication as a number of respondents copied their responses to more than one recipient.

  We are grateful to everyone who has taken the time to share with us their views on the ISA proposals and we will consider them all carefully. Consultations of this kind
  524
  allow the Government to draw on the widest possible range of experience and expertise. The ISA is an important and, we believe, exciting initiative, and we want to get it right.

  Business Profits
  Mr. Peter Atkinson
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Ms Lawrence) of 22 December 1997,Official Report, column 471, when he expects to make a final decision to confirm the withdrawal of the practices which permit professional businesses to pay tax on profits on a cash basis. [29580]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The consultation period ended on 14 February. We will be considering the various points made on the proposals, including those concerning the timing of their implementation. There will be no announcement of any decision on the withdrawal of the cash basis practices in advance of my right hon. Friend's Budget.

  Mr. Peter Atkinson
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for Preseli Pembrokeshire (Ms Lawrence) of 22 December 1997,Official Report, column 477, what representations he has received following the decision to withdraw the practices which permit some professional businesses to pay tax on profits worked out on a cash basis. [29579]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The Inland Revenue Press Release issued on 22 December invited comments on the proposals to withdraw the cash basis practices available to professionals. The Inland Revenue has received a large number of responses and I myself have received several. The Inland Revenue has also had a number of meetings with representative bodies, including the Law Society, the Bar Council, and the different accountancy bodies. The consultation period ended on 14 February. Thereafter we will be considering the various points made on the proposals.

  Inland Revenue (Invoices)
  Mr. Lilley
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many invoices sent to the Inland Revenue were not paid within(a) 30, (b) 40, (c) 50 and (d) 60 days in the period since 1 May 1997. [29186]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: Since 1 May 1997 the Inland Revenue has paid 322,816 invoices. 95.58 per cent. were paid within 30 days. The number of invoices not paid, including those in dispute, within this period is:

  (a) 30 days: 14,916

  (b) 40 days: 11,256

  (c) 50 days: 9,969

  (d) 60 days: 8,845.

  Corporation Tax
  Mr. Lilley
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if the proposed system of advanced payments of corporation tax had been in force, how many companies would(a) have benefited and (b) have been disadvantaged if their size had been determined using previous years' profits rather than an accurate estimate of current year profits in each of the last three years. [29192]
  525
  Mr. Geoffrey Robinson
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: The following table gives broad estimates of the numbers of companies standing (a) to benefit and (b) be disadvantaged if the criterion for allocating companies to the small, medium or large categories for the purposes of instalments (under the modern system for the payment of corporation tax published as a consultative document in November 1997) was related to profits of the previous rather than the current year.

  Companies would benefit if their previous years' profits placed them in the small company category rather than a larger profit category, or the medium-sized category rather than the large company category for instalment purposes. Disadvantaged companies would be placed in larger profit groups on the basis of their previous years' profits. The table shows that there would have been substantially more companies benefiting than losing from using previous year profits in 1993–94 and 1994–95 as profits increased quickly after the earlier recession in company profits, but by 1995–96 the difference would have been small.

  The estimates however exclude the cashflow benefits to many small companies from the proposed abolition of advance corporation tax and their exclusion from instalment payments. The table assumes that the use of the suggested previous year criterion would include protection against manipulation of accounting periods aimed at lessening the impact of instalments.

  Accounting periods ending in the years shown

  Thousands

  1993–94

  1994–95

  1995–96

  (a) companies benefiting

  21

  20

  15

  (b) companies disadvantaged

  11

  10

  14

  Tax Burden
  Mr. Lilley
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the tax burden as a percentage of gross domestic product in each year from 1997–98 to 2002–03 on current taxation plans. [29183]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: Projections of the tax burden, based on the usual assumption that there are no tax changes beyond those already announced in past Budgets, were published in Table B3 of the November 1997 Pre-Budget Report.

  Disposable Income
  Mr. Lilley
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the impact of the tax changes announced in the July 1997 Budget on the annual disposable income of(a) an individual on average earnings and (b) a married couple on average earnings with a £50,000 mortgage. [29195]

  Dawn Primarolo
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: The only Budget 97 measure likely to have a direct effect on the disposable income of individuals aged under 60 is the reduction from 6 April 1998 in the rate at which mortgage interest relief is given from 15 per cent. to 10 per cent. Relief is limited to the interest on loans of £30,000. As a result an individual and a married couple on average earnings and a £50,000 mortgage will receive
  526
  less relief. This assumes, by convention, no change to the latest available estimated average building society interest rate.

  Theft and Fraud
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his estimate of the cost of theft and fraud to(a) his Department, (b) its agencies and (c) non-departmental public bodies in (i) 1995–96, (ii) 1996–97 and (iii) 1997–98 to date. [27727]

  Mrs. Liddell
  [holding answer 5 February 1998]: The current estimate is:

  £000

  Department/Agency

  1995–96

  1996–97

  1997–98estimate to date

  Inland Revenue

  2,043

  210

  38

  of which:

  Valuation Office Agency

  87

  17

  11

  Customs & Excise

  240

  167

  129

  HM Treasury

  40

  25

  18

  National Savings1

  351

  459

  363

  Office for National Statistics

  15

  33

  5

  Royal Mint

  nil

  nil

  nil

  1 Losses almost exclusively relate to external fraud.

  Tobacco Smuggling
  Mr. Fallon
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what estimate he has made of revenue lost to HM Treasury from the illegal sale of tobacco products in the most recent period for which figures are available. [26539]

  Dawn Primarolo
  HM Customs and Excise estimate that the revenue (excise duty and VAT) lost to the Exchequer through cross-Channel smuggling of tobacco products in 1997 was about £690 million. There are no official estimates for the revenue lost on tobacco products involved in commercial fraud, smuggling in freight consignments or by air passengers.

  Euro
  Mr. Gill
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pursuant to his answer of 5 February 1998,Official Report, column 777, if he will commission research on the effect of the sale of excess reserves of (a) gold and (b) foreign currency by central banks participating in the euro on (i) world gold prices and (ii) international exchanges. [29765]

  Mrs. Liddell
  No.

  Inheritance Tax
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many landowners who received conditional exemption from inheritance tax in the last three years for(a) land and buildings and (b) works of art were peers. [24954]

  Dawn Primarolo
  I regret that the information requested is not available.

  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if local authorities are informed in every case of the land within their area to which the public has a right of access due to the owner receiving conditional exemption from inheritance tax. [24576]
  527
  Dawn Primarolo
  When advising the Inland Revenue on matters relating to conditional exemption for land, the relevant Government heritage agencies consider each case on its own merits and they liaise with local authorities or national park authorities whenever it is appropriate to do so.

  Fuel Tax
  Mr. Matthew Taylor
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is his estimate of total income to the Treasury resulting from a three pence per litre increase in tax on vehicular fuel. [29491]

  Dawn Primarolo
  The full year revenue yield in 1998–99 from a 3 pence per litre tax increase (duty plus VAT) on road fuels is £1.1 billion.

  Mr. Matthew Taylor
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the total income to the Treasury resulting from(a) a 6 per cent., (b) an 8 per cent. and (c) a 10 per cent. annual increase in tax on vehicular fuel per annum in each year for the next five years. [29490]

  Dawn Primarolo
  Revenue yields for the various options for road fuels described in the question are given in the following table:

  £ million

  1998–99

  1999–2000

  2000–01

  Increase road fuel duties by:

  6 per cent. per annum

  1,075

  2,200

  3,420

  8 per cent. per annum

  1,425

  2,935

  4,580

  10 per cent. Annum

  1,775

  3,670

  5,745

  The estimates include consequential VAT and are for the additional revenue compared with leaving the existing duty rates unchanged in a full year. Detailed estimates for later years are not published.

  Pensioners (Taxation)
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many pensioners, and what percentage, pay tax in each tax band; and how many, and what percentage, pay no tax. [29671]

  Dawn Primarolo
  Estimates for 1998–99 are given in the table. The estimates are based on information from the 1995–96 Survey of Personal Incomes and population estimates from the Government Actuary's Department; they are therefore provisional.

  Individuals aged 65 and over

  Number (millions)

  Percentage

  Not liable to income tax

  5.9

  64

  Lower rate

  2.0

  22

  Basic rate

  1.1

  12

  Higher rate

  0.2

  2

  Total

  9.2

  100

  Far East (Economic Instability)
  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pursuant to his answer of 3 February 1998,Official Report, column 570, how much the United Kingdom has made available for assistance to Asian countries through the international financial institutions to help them deal with economic instability; and what the extent of the United Kingdom's financial commitments is in this respect. [28116]

  Mrs. Liddell
  No additional funds have been made available to the international financial institutions for this purpose. The loans disbursed through these institutions have been funded from their existing resources which include contributions from all their members.

  Working Families Tax Credit
  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the redistribution of income between couples if family credit is replaced by the proposed working families tax credit paid to the principal earner. [28182]

  Dawn Primarolo
  Any redistributive effects of the Working Families Tax Credit will depend on its design and this is what my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer is considering currently.

  Tax Avoidance Scheme
  Mr. Timms
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what plans he has to introduce legislation to counter tax avoidance schemes involving the sales of companies to avoid payment of corporation tax. [30277]

  Dawn Primarolo
  The Government announced at the time of the last Budget, in July, that legislation would be introduced in the next Finance Bill to counter these schemes, and the Inland Revenue have today published the legislation in draft for consultation.

  The proposed legislation will strengthen measures introduced in 1994 to counter schemes which exploit the rules on company purchase and abandonment. The new legislation is designed to stop alternative schemes which have been developed since 1994. The Government are determined to curb tax avoidance, and will act to counter any further attempts to get round the rules on company purchase and abandonment, giving consideration to backdating to the commencement date for the current provisions any future measures which may be necessary to counter variants of these schemes.

  Public Information
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how frequently, after what delays, and with what precision he publishes information on changes in(a) inflation, (b) unemployment, (c) benefit claimants, (d) the balance of trade, (e) the numbers taking up smoking and (f) the numbers involved in conceptions that are terminated legally and deliberately. [29674]

  Mrs. Liddell
  The information requested falls within the responsibility of the Chief Executive of the Office for National Statistics. I have asked him to arrange for a reply to be given.
  529
  Letter from Tim Holt to Mr. Peter Bottomley, dated 17 February 1998:
  The Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked me to reply, as Director of the Office for National Statistics, to your recent question on frequency, delay and precision in publishing various information.

  The requested information is given in the attached table.

  Frequency

  Delays

  Precision

  Inflation

  M

  Month

  One decimal place

  Unemployment (LFS)

  Q1

  6 weeks

  Nearest 10005

  Benefit claimants (Claimant count)

  M

  5 weeks

  Nearest 100

  Balance of Trade

  M

  Within 8 weeks3

  Nearest £ million

  Taking up smoking

  N/A2

  N/A

  N/A

  Conceptions terminated

  Q and A

  5 months and 6 months4

  100% count

  1 From April 1997 the LFS will be published monthly.

  2 Only adult and children prevalence figures are published.

  3 Published within eight weeks of the end of the reporting period for trade with EU member states, and within four weeks of the end of the reporting period for trade with other countries.

  4 From 1997. Prior to 1997 the delay was nine months and 7–24 months respectively.

  5 Estimates of less than 10,000 are not published. This is because the data are not robust.

  VCT and EIS Schemes
  Mr. Horam
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what proposals he has to modify the VCT and EIS schemes. [20952]

  Mr. Geoffrey Robinson
  Decisions on whether or not to modify the VCT and EIS schemes are a matter for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Budget statement. The hon. Gentleman would not expect me to anticipate it.

  National Insurance (Upper Earnings Limit)
  Mr. Martin Bell
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the amount of additional revenue which would have been raised in 1997–98 if the upper earnings limit on national insurance contributions had been abolished. [25799]

  Mr. Denham
  I have been asked to reply.

  Estimated additional revenue of some £3.7 billion would have been raised in respect of 1997–98 earnings if the Upper Earnings Limit on employees' Class 1 contributions had been removed for that year.

  The figure assumes that the current 10 per cent. Class 1 contribution rate would apply to earnings above the present Upper Earnings Limit and that an Upper Earnings Limit would remain in place for the calculation of employee and employer contracted-out rebates.

  Source:

  Government Actuary's Department.

  Mr. Fallon
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) how many people would pay more tax if the upper earnings limit on employees' national insurance contributions were increased to £30,145; [26205]

  (2) how much extra revenue would be raised by increasing the upper earnings limit on employees' national insurance contributions to £30,145. [26206]

  Mr. Denham
  I have been asked to reply.
  530
  Estimated additional revenue of some £1.5 billion would be raised in a full year if the Upper Earnings Limit on employees' Class 1 contributions was increased from its present level to £30,145, and about 3.5 million people would become liable to pay more contributions.

  The figures assume that the current 10 per cent. Class contribution rate would apply to earnings above the present Upper Earnings Limit and that the current Upper Earnings Limit would remain in place for the calculation of employee and employer contracted-out rebates.

  Source:

  Government Actuary's Department.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

  Ambassadors (Languages)
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many ambassadors speak(a) one, (b) two, (c) three, (d) four and (e) more than four foreign languages. [29740]

  Mr. Tony Lloyd
  According to information held at February 1998:

  (a) four Heads of Missions have competence in one language

  (b) 27 Heads of Missions have competence in two languages

  (c) 34 Heads of Missions have competence in three languages

  (d) 33 Heads of Missions have competence in four languages

  (e) 47 Heads of Missions have competence in more than four languages.

  Twenty-six have competence in five, 13 have competence in six, three have competence in seven, two have competence in eight, one has competence in nine and one has competence in twelve.

  This information is based on a combination of examination passes and self-declarations. During the course of 1998, procedures are being introduced which will make objective testing the only basis for recorded language competence in the FCO.

  Entry Clearance Officers (Bombay)
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the level of sickness among entry clearance officers in Bombay.[29564]

  Mr. Fatchett
  The level of sickness among Entry Clearance Officers in Bombay is low. During 1997, the 10 full time ECOs in Bombay took a total of 11 days sick leave. Seven temporary additional staff took a total of 11days sick leave.

  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what(a) allowances and (b) holidays entry clearance officers in Bombay receive. [29563]

  Mr. Fatchett
  Entry Clearance Officers in Bombay, as elsewhere, are drawn from both HM Diplomatic Service and the Home Office. Their conditions of service vary accordingly, although local Cost of Living and Difficult Post Allowances are paid on the same basis. Individual allowances also vary according to salary levels and family circumstances. Typically, a Home Office Immigration
  531
  Officer with spouse and one child in Bombay will receive an annual package of allowances worth between £9,937 and £11,221 depending on salary. A Diplomatic Service Officer in the same family circumstances will receive from £10,261 to £10,361 again dependent on salary.

  The standard leave entitlement depending on length of service is 35 to 42 days plus seven to 14 days local leave and in Bombay, 14 days unhealthy leave addition. All leave while overseas is based on a seven day week, so that weekends and public holidays falling during leave count against that settlement. In Bombay staff are entitled to six fare paid journeys during a three year tour of duty.

  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the level of staffing of entry clearance officers in Bombay. [29561]

  Mr. Fatchett
  There are currently 10 Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) working in the visa section in Bombay. The authorised establishment is 10 officers. The section is, therefore, fully staffed. During 1997, the number of ECOs in Bombay never fell below the authorised establishment.

  In addition, in 1997, the visa section was reinforced with an extra seven ECOs, to cope with the increased number of applications during the busiest months. The additional staff provided 22.5 man months of support.

  In 1998, an additional seven officers will again be provided, amounting to 24.5 man months of support during the busiest period.

  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the current salary levels of entry clearance officers in Bombay.[29562]

  Mr. Fatchett
  Entry Clearance Officers in Bombay, as elsewhere, are drawn from both HM Diplomatic Service and the Home Office, usually the Immigration Service. Their respective annual salary ranges are:£12,384 to £18,228 (HM Diplomatic Service)
  £12,526 to £19,970 (Home Office).

  Both groups receive a Recruitment and Retention Allowance of £1,776 per annum.

  Settlement Applications (Waiting Times)
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what plans he has to reduce the waiting times in(a) Bombay and (b) New Delhi for applicants for settlement. [29574]

  Mr. Fatchett
  Waiting times for applicants for settlement entry clearance are constantly monitored by the Entry Clearance Managers in Bombay and New Delhi. Appointments are allocated at the maximum rate consistent with the maintenance of service standards to non-settlement applications. The current waiting times at both Posts are within the maxima laid down. In the case of Right of Abode claimants, dependent relatives over 65 and special compassionate cases there is no waiting time at either Post.

  Venezuelan Ambassador
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what plans he has to meet the Venezuelan ambassador to Britain. [29570]

  Mr. Fatchett
  None. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central (Mr. Lloyd), met the Venezuelan Ambassador, HE Sr Chaderton-Matos, onl6 October 1997.

  NATO
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the enlargement of NATO. [29577]

  Mr. Fatchett
  As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House on 9 July, Britain, together with our NATO Allies at the NATO Summit on 8 July invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to begin accession talks to join NATO. On 16 December, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, together with his NATO colleagues, signed the Accession Protocols. A debate on NATO enlargement will take place in the House before the Government ratify the Accession protocols.

  India (UN Security Council)
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the advantages of India becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council. [29575]

  Mr. Fatchett
  We want to see an early enlargement of the Security Council and better representation on it for developing countries. It is widely expected that India, given its long and important contribution to the United Nations, would be a candidate for permanent membership of the Security Council if additional permanent seats were created.

  United States (UN Debt)
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations he has made to the USA to repay its UN debt. [29576]

  Mr. Fatchett
  My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has made clear to Madeleine Albright on several occasions that we expect the US to pay their UN arrears and future contributions promptly and in full.

  Visitor Visas
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what plans he has to deal with problems arising in the issuing of visitors' visas. [29567]

  Mr. Fatchett
  Any problems arising from the issuing of visitors' visas are reviewed by the Entry Clearance Manager at the Post concerned. Where appropriate, the Entry Clearance Manager consults Migration and Visa Division of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for policy advice on individual cases or assistance with operational difficulties.

  Bahrain
  Mr. Corbyn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent meetings have been held at Ministerial level with Ministers in the Bahrain Government; and what was discussed. [29465]

  Mr. Fatchett
  My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence held separate meetings with the Bahraini Crown Prince and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28 January. They discussed many issues but focused mainly on the current crisis in the Gulf. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary also raised the question of constitutional development and the recent request to the Bahraini authorities from the Committee for Popular Petition for political dialogue.

  I also met the Bahraini Minister for Foreign Affairs on 28 January. We discussed regional security issues, including Algeria and the Middle East Peace Process. We also discussed this Government's continuing concerns about human rights in Bahrain.

  Mr. Corbyn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what meetings the British Ambassador to Bahrain has had with(a) the Government and (b) human rights groups to discuss human rights abuses; and if he will make a statement. [29467]

  Mr. Fatchett
  Our Ambassador in Bahrain has frequent meetings with Ministers and officials of the Bahraini Government. Their discussions cover many areas of mutual concern, including human rights issues. There are no human rights groups in Bahrain.

  Iran and Iraq
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of recent reports of meetings between representatives of the Governments of Iran and Iraq. [29868]

  Mr. Fatchett
  I have read them with interest. The banians have more reason than most to appreciate the threat which Iraq poses to its neighbours.

  UK Presidency
  Mr. Hayes
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of those aspects of his ethical foreign policy which will affect the conduct of the United Kingdom Presidency of the European Union. [29830]

  Mr. Doug Henderson
  During our Presidency of the EU, and beyond, we will continue to work with our European partners to ensure that human rights remains a central element in the EU's relations with the rest of the world.

  European Culture Capital
  Mr. Hayes
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards an inquiry at European Union level on the financing of Thessalonika as European culture capital. [29827]
  534
  Mr. Doug Henderson
  The financing of the annual European City of Culture programme is primarily a matter for the authorities of the city concerned. Cities raise funds from their own resources, normally with some support from their national Governments and, increasingly, from private sector sponsors.

  The role of the EU is mostly limited to the process of designation. Each City of Culture receives only a nominal sum from the relevant Community cultural programme, Kaleidoscope, to help finance its operations, amounting to approximately 1 per cent. of the City's budget. In 1997, this sum was 400,000 ECU (£273,000).

  As part of the overall programme, each City of Culture is also required to produce a report within six months of the end of the year. The report for 1997 by Thessalonika is due by the end of June 1998.

HOME DEPARTMENT

  Circus Animals
  Mr. Baker
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many(a) prosecutions and (b) convictions have been recorded for instances of cruelty to animals within circuses for each year since 1980; and if he will make a statement. [29130]

  Mr. George Howarth
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: The main legislation protecting the welfare of circus animals is the Protection of Animals Act 1911. However, court proceedings data do not identify the location of an offence. In 1996, there were 967 prosecutions under this Act of which 764 resulted in a conviction.

  The table details prosecutions and convictions under the Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 and the Protection of Animals Act 1934 which relate more specifically to performing animals.

  Number of defendants prosecuted and convicted of offences under thePerforming Animals (Regulations) Act 1925 1 and the Protection of Animals Act 1934 2, 1980–1996

  England and Wales

  Performing Animals (Regulations) Act 1925 1

  Protection of Animals Act 1934 2

  Year

  Prosecutions

  Convictions

  Prosecutions

  Convictions

  1980

  —

  —

  4

  2

  1981

  1

  1

  1

  1

  1982

  1

  —

  5

  4

  1983

  2

  1

  7

  7

  1984

  1

  1

  1

  1

  1985

  —

  —

  5

  5

  1986

  2

  2

  5

  5

  1987

  3

  3

  2

  2

  1988

  2

  2

  4

  4

  1989

  —

  —

  1

  1

  1990

  1

  1

  1

  1

  1991

  —

  —

  1

  1

  1992

  —

  —

  1

  1

  1993

  1

  —

  9

  8

  1994

  —

  —

  4

  3

  1995

  —

  —

  2

  2

  1996

  —

  —

  3

  2

  1 The exhibition and training of performing animals without being registered.

  2 The prohibition of certain public contests, performances and exhibitions with animals.

  On-line Lotteries
  Mr. Berry
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he received from(a) BACTA, (b) Littlewoods, (c) Camelot and (d) Scottish and Newcastle between 2 May 1997 and 17 November 1997 in respect of on-line lotteries. [29837]

  Mr. George Howarth
  During the period in question, I received letters from the British Amusement Catering Trade Association (BACTA), and Camelot and met them to discuss various gambling issues, including on-line lotteries.

  BACTA expressed the view that it would be undesirable for rapid draw on-line lotteries to be played in liquor licensed premises. Camelot was concerned that such games should not be introduced without research into their likely effects.

  We did not receive any representations from Littlewoods or Scottish and Newcastle on this subject. I met Scottish and Newcastle's trade association, the Brewers and Licensed Retailers Association.

  Mr. Faber
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) what advice he has received from the Gaming Board on(a) the legality and (b) the desirability of on-line lottery draws; and if he will place a copy of the advice in the Library; [29996]

  (2) on what date he first received advice from the Gaming Board in respect of on-line lotteries. [29999]

  Mr. George Howarth
  The Chairman of the Gaming Board wrote to me on 16 May 1997.

  The Board set out its concerns about on-line lottery games fully in its Annual Report for 1996–97, which was presented to Parliament on 11 July 1997.

  Mr. Faber
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) what research his Department has(a) undertaken and (b) commissioned in respect of on-line lottery draws; [29993]

  (2) on what date his Department received advice from Dr. Sue Fisher on the possible impact of Pronto; [29997]

  (3) on which date his Department received advice from Dr. Sue Fisher on the possible social impact of Pronto. [29836]

  Mr. George Howarth
  The Home Office has not commissioned or undertaken research on on-line lottery draws.

  Following informal discussion, Dr. Sue Fisher was invited to submit a paper on the possible social impact of Pronto, which was received on 12 November 1997.

  Mr. Faber
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has received from(a) the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and (b) the Director General of Oflot concerning rapid on-line lottery draws. [29994]

  Mr. George Howarth
  In considering the policy implications of on-line lotteries, I consulted Ministerial colleagues, including an exchange of letters with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.
  536
  We did not receive representations from the Director General of OFLOT.

  Mr. Faber
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list those organisations consulted by the Gaming Board in respect of on-line lotteries who later advised him. [29998]

  Mr. George Howarth
  I understand that the Gaming Board's advice was based on its own assessment of the regulatory implications of on-line lotteries.

  Hepatitis C (Prisons)
  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many cases of hepatitis C there were among prison inmates in each of the last 10 years in each prison in Britain. [29838]

  Ms Quin
  Figures on the number of cases of hepatitis C in each prison in England and Wales have been collected only since 1995. Prisoners are not routinely screened for hepatitis C and cases are recorded only when prisoners volunteer information about their hepatitis C status. The table records the number of such cases recorded in the financial years 1995–96 and 1996–97. I have asked for official advice on the implications of introducing routine screening.

  Total number of hepatitis C cases reported in year.

  Establishment

  1995–96

  1996–97

  Acklington

  0

  0

  Malbany

  0

  3

  Aldington

  0

  0

  Ashwell

  0

  4

  Askham Grange

  2

  8

  Aylesbury

  1

  2

  Bedford

  1

  4

  Belmarsh

  0

  0

  Birmingham

  0

  2

  Blakenhurst

  6

  27

  Blantyre House

  0

  0

  Blundeston

  7

  13

  Brinsford

  0

  0

  Bristol

  0

  0

  Brixton

  0

  8

  Brockhill

  2

  19

  Buckley Hall

  0

  6

  Bullingdon

  1

  19

  Bullwood Hall

  1

  0

  Camp Hill

  0

  3

  Canterbury

  0

  22

  Cardiff

  12

  0

  Castington

  0

  0

  Channings Wood

  12

  7

  Chelmsford

  0

  1

  Coldingley

  4

  2

  Cookham Wood

  13

  7

  Dartmoor

  10

  16

  Deerbolt

  0

  0

  Doncaster

  22

  9

  Dorchester

  9

  4

  Dover

  0

  0

  Down view

  1

  0

  Drake Hall

  5

  17

  Durham

  1

  0

  East Sutton Park

  0

  2

  Eastwood Park

  2

  10

  Elmley

  2

  2

  Erlestoke

  3

  2

  Everthorpe

  22

  29

  Exeter

  10

  16

  Featherstone

  1

  1

  537

  Total number of hepatitis C cases reported in year.

  Establishment

  1995–96

  1996–97

  Feltham

  3

  0

  Ford

  1

  1

  Frankland

  0

  7

  Full Sutton

  0

  4

  Garth

  0

  3

  Gartree

  0

  0

  Glen Parva

  0

  3

  Gloucester

  1

  4

  Grendon

  13

  3

  Guys Marsh

  1

  21

  Haslar

  0

  0

  Hatfield

  0

  0

  Haverigg

  5

  10

  Hewell Grange

  0

  0

  Highdown

  15

  7

  Highpoint

  8

  8

  Hindley

  0

  2

  Hollesley Bay

  0

  0

  Holloway

  0

  49

  Holme House

  0

  1

  Hull

  19

  9

  Huntercombe

  0

  0

  Kingston

  0

  0

  Kirkham

  1

  7

  Kirklevington

  0

  0

  Lancaster

  0

  3

  Lancaster Farms

  16

  Latchmere House

  1

  0

  Leeds

  7

  0

  Leicester

  1

  4

  Lewes

  25

  0

  Leyhill

  0

  0

  Lincoln

  2

  8

  Lindholme

  8

  46

  Littlehey

  20

  0

  Liverpool

  1

  4

  Long Lartin

  3

  3

  Low Newton

  8

  5

  Maidstone

  4

  3

  Manchester

  0

  0

  Moorland

  23

  25

  Morton Hall

  2

  3

  Mount, The

  0

  3

  New Hall

  10

  28

  North Sea Camp

  1

  3

  Northallerton

  0

  0

  Norwich

  2

  4

  Nottingham

  17

  0

  Onley

  0

  0

  Parkhurst

  0

  5

  Pentonville

  2

  5

  Portland

  0

  1

  Prescoed

  0

  0

  Preston

  39

  45

  Ranby

  28

  4

  Reading

  0

  0

  Risley

  22

  19

  Rochester

  0

  0

  Send

  0

  0

  Shepton Mallet

  6

  4

  Shrewsbury

  4

  0

  Spring Hill

  5

  0

  Stafford

  0

  2

  Standford Hill

  1

  2

  Stocken

  4

  11

  Stoke Heath

  0

  0

  Styal

  0

  2

  Sudbury

  0

  0

  Swaleside

  2

  5

  Swansea

  1

  11

  Swinfen Hall

  0

  2

  Thorn Cross

  1

  0

  USK

  0

  0

  538

  Total number of hepatitis C cases reported in year.

  Establishment

  1995–96

  1996–97

  Verne, The

  8

  19

  Wakefield

  8

  1

  Wandsworth

  6

  30

  Wayland

  3

  3

  Wealstun

  6

  5

  Wellingborough

  0

  2

  Wellington

  0

  0

  Wetherby

  0

  0

  Whattton

  0

  0

  Whitemoor

  0

  0

  Winchester

  0

  0

  Wolds

  19

  12

  Woodhill

  0

  0

  Wormwood Scrubs

  3

  3

  Wymott

  0

  5

  Total

  543

  760

  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has to introduce needle exchanges in prisons to reduce the spread of hepatitis C. [29846]

  Ms Quin
  There are no plans at present to introduce a needle exchange scheme in prisons in England and Wales but I have commissioned advice on this subject.

  Women Prisoners
  Mrs. Brinton
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps he is taking to implement the recommendations of "Women in Prison: A Thematic Review" by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons. [29199]

  Ms Quin
  The Prison Service welcomed the report "Women in Prison: A thematic review by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons". The Prison Service is already progressing work in a number of areas highlighted by the Chief Inspector's report.

  In his thematic review, the Chief Inspector recommended that there should be a Director of Women's Prisons. This was considered within the structural review of the Prison Service which was completed recently. The Director General accepted the recommendation of the review and has created a Directorate of Regimes within which there will be a number of Assistant Directors responsible for developing policy for specific groups of prisoners. An Assistant Director for Women and an Assistant Director for Young Offenders have been appointed.

  Work to develop regimes for women encompasses the areas of concern highlighted by the Chief Inspector. The Prison Service in the coming year will be piloting new constructive regimes in two women's establishments. Initiatives also in hand at the moment include: re-examination of the policy on age mixing; the development of programmes to address offending behaviour specifically tailored to women's needs; training

  539
  programmes for those working with women in prison; and work on a protocol for dealing more effectively with disruptive women prisoners.

  Mrs. Brinton
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the appropriateness of custodial sentences for the majority of women offenders. [29200]

  Mr. Michael
  Prison is necessary for the most serious offenders, whether male or female, when the court considers such a sentence is necessary in order to protect the public or when other penalties are not appropriate. The Government wish to see full use of community sentences for women and we are seeking to increase the effectiveness of such sentences. Where prison is the sentence decided by the court, we want the time to be used constructively so that offenders are less likely to reoffend when released rather than more likely to offend or to offend more seriously. This principle applies to both men and women in prison. Last month, we announced a pilot programme of work with young prisoners before release to increase the likelihood that they will be able to succeed in the New Deal after release and go on to find work.

  A number of new developments are taking place specifically in relation to Prison Service establishments for women. An Assistant Director for Women has recently been appointed. New regimes will be piloted in two women's establishments in the coming year. The Service is re-examining the policy on age mixing. Programmes for women to address offending behaviour are being designed. Work is in hand to deal more effectively with difficult and disruptive women prisoners. New training programmes are being brought in for staff. The Prison Service is working towards the standards set out in the Department of Health publication 'Changing Childbirth', revising policy on pregnant women in prison and mother and baby units; and medication levels in establishments for women are being reviewed.

  Prison Secure Estate (Visits)
  Mr. Clappison
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list the wings or units within the Prison Secure Estate containing 15 or 16-year-old young persons on remand which have been visited(a) by himself and (b) by other Ministers in his Department. [29121]

  Estimated compliance costs of the Data Protection Directive—covering the private sector, charities and local authorities. Costs are shown as percentages of total estimated start-up and recurring costs respectively.

  Category

  Computer start-up

  Manual start-up

  Total start-up

  Computer recurring l

  Manual ecurring

  Total recurring

  Obtaining Consent

  17.8

  0.7

  18.5

  0.3

  0.23

  0.5

  Articles 10 & 11 (informing the data subject)

  50

  1.45

  51.5

  75.7

  0.36

  76.1

  Subject access requests

  1.4

  1.05

  2.5

  1.2

  0.69

  1.9

  Direct marketing

  0.2

  0.001

  0.2

  0.1

  0.001

  0.1

  Data exports

  4

  0.006

  4

  5

  0.007

  5

  Article 17.3 & 4 (use of processor)

  6.6

  —

  6.6

  3.6

  —

  3.6

  Sensitive data

  0.002

  0.05

  0.1

  0.001

  —

  0.001

  Other, training, forms etc.

  16.6

  0.08

  16.7

  12.8

  0.02

  12.82

  Total

  96.6

  3.4

  100

  98.7

  1.3

  100

  540
  Ms Quin
  No complete, central record is kept of which parts of a particular prison have been visited by a Minister. However, Ministers have visited the following establishments which may contain 15 or 16 year old young persons on remand:My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary visited Brinsford Young Offender Institution (YOI) on 6 January and Feltham YOI on 13 February.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth) visited Feltham YOI on 10 July 1997 and Lancaster Farms YOI on 13 October 1997.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) visited Cardiff prison on 31 January 1998.
  I visited Exeter prison on 11 July and Glen Parva YOI on 30 October. I am visiting Low Newton on 20 February.

  Data Protection
  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if Clause 27 of the Data Protection Bill[Lords] applies to those personal data processed by the Security Service which are intended to assist the police in relation to serious crime; and if he will make a statement. [29116]

  Mr. George Howarth
  Clause 27(1) provides that personal data are exempt from the data protection principles and from Parts II, III and V and clause 52 of the Bill if the exemption is required to safeguard national security. Clause 27(2) provides for Ministerial certification of the need for exemption and clause 27(4) allows appeals by people directly affected. The form of exemption in respect of personal data processed by the Security Service is under consideration.

  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to his answer of 29 January 1998, Official Report, column 342, concerning the compliance costs questionnaire in relation to data protection, if he will publish aggregate statistics relating to responses made by(a) local authorities, (b) Government departments, (c) large manufacturers, (d) small manufacturers, (e) financial institutions, (f) charities, (g) marketing organisations and (h) retailers, for each of the questions Q2 to Q8, Q10 to Q12, Q15, Q18, Q20 to Q23 and Q27 to Q31, indicating the breakdown between manual data and computerised data. [29117]

  Mr. George Howarth
  I am afraid that the information is not readily available in the precise form requested. However, following is a table giving a percentage breakdown of the costs to non-Government organisations by reference to the main categories of additional spending.

  The costs to Government Departments were assessed separately, not through the questionnaire.
  541
  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the compliance of measures in the Data Protection Bill[Lords] with the requirement for a definition of consent set out in Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC; and if he will make a statement. [29041]

  Mr. George Howarth
  The Directive does not require us to amplify the terms it uses. We consider that the Bill gives proper effect to the requirements of Community law.

  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will list those cases, with respect to the lawful processing of sensitive personal data under Schedule 3 to the Data Protection Bill [Lords], where the Secretary of State has used Article 8(4) of Directive 95/46/EC to specify additional exemptions; if he will list the reason for each exemption; and if he will indicate the nature of the suitable safeguards which are intended to protect the data subject. [29115]

  Mr. George Howarth
  Article 8(4) of the Directive, relating to reasons of substantial public interest, is reflected in paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 to the Bill. The latter provides an exemption for processing which is necessary for the administration of justice, the exercise of functions conferred by any enactment or the exercise of any function of the Crown, Minister of the Crown or Government Department.

  The exemption is necessary to enable the conduct of legitimate functions as authorised by Parliament. The safeguards are the legal constraints on the discharge of the functions in question and more specific provisions included in some of the relevant statutes.

  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the protection afforded to the media in the Data Protection Bill[Lords]. [29044]

  Mr. George Howarth
  Clause 31 of the Bill exempts processing for special purposes (journalistic, literary or artistic purposes) from some provisions of the Data Protection Bill. The processing must take place with a view to publication and the data controller must reasonably believe both that publication, having particular regard to the special importance of freedom of expression, is in the public interest and that complying with the data protection rules is incompatible with the special purposes.

  Clause 42 allows the Data Protection Commissioner to serve a special information notice on the data controller for the purpose of ascertaining whether the processing is being undertaken only for the special purposes and with a view to publication. Clause 44 restricts the ability of the Commissioner to serve an enforcement notice on a data controller in respect of processing for the special purposes unless it does not meet the necessary criteria and the court has granted leave for the notice to be served.

  Challenges may be made after publication; but the exemption still applies if the conditions are satisfied.

  In line with Article 9 of the European Communities Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), these provisions are intended to reconcile the privacy protections in the main data protection regime with the needs of freedom of expression.
  542
  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to(a) Recital 10 of Directive 95/46/EC and (b) the exemptions in the Data Protection Act 1984 relating to crime and taxation, if he will make a statement on Clause 28(4) of the Data Protection Bill [Lords] in respect of (a) the UK's obligations towards Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention and (b) the lessening of protection afforded to data subjects. [29043]

  Mr. George Howarth
  Clause 28(4) provides a power for the Secretary of State, by order subject to affirmative resolution, to exempt from the first data protection principle, subject access rights and non-disclosure provisions any processing relating to the prevention or detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders or the assessment or collection of taxes.

  No decision has been taken on the precise use of this power. Before taking such a decision, we would have full regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and the 1995 European Communities Directive on Data Protection.

  Standard List Offences
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how frequently, after what delays, and with what precision, he publishes information on the number of people convicted for the first time of a standard list offence. [29672]

  Mr. Michael
  Information is published annually on people convicted of a standard list offence for the first time. The most recent figures are for 1995 and were published in November 1997. They appeared in Chapter 9 of "Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, 1996" (Cm. 3764). Information is based on a sample of those convicted of a standard list offence in three sample weeks and is presented as a percentage of the total sample.

  In 1995, the sample size was 18,000 (out of an annual total of 353,000). In 1995, the estimated percentage of offenders with a first conviction was 35 per cent. The chance that the annual rate differs from this by more than one percentage point is about 1 in 200.

  Correspondence
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department on how many occasions during the past six months his Department has been unable to reply to letters from hon. Members within one month of receiving them; what assessment he has made of the adequacy of his departmental performance in replying to inquiries by hon. Members; and if he will make a statement. [29595]

  Mr. Straw
  Between 1 September 1997 and 13 February 1998, 5,681 of the 9,948 letters received from hon. Members were either replied to more than 30 days after receipt, or still await a reply after more than 30 days. I am not satisfied with my Department's performance in dealing with replies to hon. Members and I refer the right hon. Member to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for South Dorset (Mr. Bruce) on 3 February 1998,Official Report, column 587.

  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if it is his Department's policy always to answer either by way of an acknowledgement or a substantive reply every letter received from the general
  543
  public; and on how many occasions during the past six months his Department has found it necessary to reply to members of the general public that it has been unable to trace original letters about which follow-up inquiries are being made. [29552]

  Mr. Straw
  It is my Department's policy to acknowledge or reply to all correspondence received from the general public. I am not able to state how many times over the past six months a reply has been given that an original letter cannot be traced, since at present there are no systems in place to monitor the progress of general correspondence. However, a monitoring system is shortly to be installed as part of a project to improve the handling of correspondence.

  Racial Incidents
  Mr. Allan
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to his answer of 26 January 1998,Official Report, columns 38–40, if he will list the number of racial incidents in 1996–97, by police force per head of population. [29489]

  Mr. Michael
  The number of racial incidents in 1996–97, by police force, per thousand population1 is given in the table.

  Forces

  Racial incidents per thousand population

  Avon and Somerset

  0.21

  Bedfordshire

  0.14

  Cambridgeshire

  0.2

  Cheshire

  0.09

  City of London

  0.04

  Cleveland

  0.12

  Cumbria

  0.08

  Derbyshire

  0.22

  Devon and Cornwall

  0.05

  Dorset

  0.1

  Durham

  0.04

  Dyfed-Powys

  0.04

  Essex

  0.08

  Gloucestershire

  0.06

  Greater Manchester

  0.23

  Gwent

  0.11

  Hampshire

  0.1

  Hertfordshire

  0.34

  Humberside

  0.06

  Kent

  0.16

  Lancashire

  0.24

  Leicestershire

  0.32

  Lincolnshire

  0.01

  Merseyside

  0.11

  Metropolitan Police

  0.75

  Norfolk

  0.07

  North Wales

  0.01

  North Yorkshire

  0.06

  Northamptonshire

  0.33

  Northumbria

  0.34

  Nottinghamshire

  0.32

  South Wales

  0.29

  South Yorkshire

  0.13

  Staffordshire

  0.21

  Suffolk

  0.11

  Surrey

  0.07

  Sussex

  0.18

  Thames Valley

  0.11

  544

  Forces

  Racial incidents per thousand population

  Warwickshire

  0.13

  West Mercia

  0.06

  West Midlands

  0.27

  West Yorkshire

  0.3

  Wiltshire

  0.06

  Provincial total

  0.17

  England and Wales total

  0.25

  1 The information was originally requested per head of population; however, the number of racial incidents relative to the population is too small to enable meaningful data to be presented on that basis.

  Penal Lexicon Web Site
  Mr. Beith
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what assessment he has made of the benefits to the Prison Service of access to the web site, Penal Lexicon; and if he will make a statement. [29415]

  Ms Quin
  No assessment has been made of the benefits to the Prison Service of the Penal Lexicon or any other subscription service available on the Internet.

  Young Remand Prisoners
  Mr. Clappison
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many 15 and 16-year-olds remanded to adult prison accommodation on a subsequent court appearance were(a) found not guilty of all charges and (b) sentenced to a non-custodial sentence in the most recent years for which figures are available. [29258]

  Mr. Michael
  Information on the sentencing of juveniles held on remand in adult prison accommodation is not collected centrally. Information is available on the sentencing of juveniles remanded in custody by the court, although the place of remand is not collected.

  Juveniles who are refused bail are usually remanded to local authority accommodation. Exceptionally, 15 or 16-year-old boys meeting certain conditions may be remanded to a remand centre or prison. These conditions are:
  that the defendant is charged with a violent or sexual offence or one punishable in the case of an adult with imprisonment for a term of 14 years or more; or
  that the defendant has a history of absconding while remanded in local authority accommodation and is charged with or has been convicted of an imprisonable offence alleged or found to have been committed while he was so remanded.
  and in either case, that the court considers that only a remand to a remand centre or prison would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from him.

  In 1996, the most recent year for which information is available, some 840 male defendants aged 15 or 16 appeared in court having been remanded in custody and charged with a violent or sexual offence or one punishable in the case of an adult with imprisonment for a term of 14 years or more. Of these, 220 were acquitted, found not guilty, had the charge withdrawn or were not proceeded against; 280 were sentenced to immediate custody and a further 340 were sentenced to a non-custodial sentence. No information is available on either previous propensity to abscond or court deliberations.

  Child Protection
  Mr. Levitt
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will allow those voluntary sector organisations which work with children but have no statutory obligation to obtain police vetting of potential employees and volunteers access to such vetting. [29804]

  Mr. Michael
  Part V of the Police Act 1997 contains provisions which will enable all organisations which work with children to obtain access to criminal record checks on their employees and volunteers. We are currently considering how to phase in implementation of Part V in the light of a review which took account of experience gained in implementing the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and proposals in the Crime and Disorder Bill.

  Flunitrazepam
  Mr. Greenway
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will consult the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs on a proposal to reschedule flunitrazepam as a class B drug. [29524]

  Mr. George Howarth
  The class (A, B or C) under which a controlled drug is listed under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 determines the maximum penalty for offences (essentially unlawful productions, supply or possession) involving that drug. The broad principle governing the classification of a drug is its harmfulness. The greater it is the higher the classification. The benzodiazepines, of which flunitrazepam is one, are used as hypnotic and anxiolytic medicines and are all in class C.

  It is the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1985 which determine the degree of regulation over a controlled drug and, following a decision by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, we plan to lay before Parliament shortly amendments which will, subject to Parliamentary approval, impose tighter controls on flunitrazepam with effect from 1 May 1998 by moving it from Schedule 4 to Schedule 3 of the Regulations. The change was agreed by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. As a result of the re-scheduling, it will become an offence to possess the drug without lawful authority; imports and exports will become controlled; and safe custody requirements will apply. We have no plans to consult the Council further at this stage.

  Mr. Ricky Reel
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps he is taking to ensure a full investigation into circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Ricky Reel. [29494]

  Mr. Michael
  This investigation, which is an operational matter for the Commissioner, is continuing. An investigation into the Metropolitan Police's handling of this case is being undertaken by Mr. Peter Fahy, an Assistant Chief Constable from Surrey Police, overseen by the independent Police Complaints Authority. My right hon. Friend has discussed the case with the Commissioner.

  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what representations he has received concerning the death of Mr. Ricky Reel. [29492]
  546
  Mr. Michael
  We have received a number of representations from the family's Member of Parliament, my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell).

  Prison Population
  Mr. Beith
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will make a statement on the latest Prison Service prison population projections; and what financial plans have been made to meet those projections. [28847]

  Ms Quin
  The latest projection of long-term trends in the prison population was published on 29 January 1998. It estimates that the prison population will increase from the current level of around 64,000 to an average of 69,600 in 1999 and 72,200 in the year 2000. If trends in court sentencing practice continue as in recent years the population is expected to reach 82,800 by 2005. Alternative scenarios in the projection give a population for 2005 of between 64,400 and 92,600.

  The projection does not take account of Home Detention Curfew which is expected to result in a fall of around 3,000 prisoners by the end of 1999. Nor does it take account of the measures in the Crime and Disorder Bill or possible changes in trends in community sentences.

  To accommodate the rising population, my right hon. Friend has made an adjustment to the additional resources made available to the Prison Service last July. I refer the right hon. Member to the reply my right hon. Friend gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer) on 13 February 1998, Official Report, columns 402–03.

  The additions to capacity together with the implementation of Home Detention Curfew should contain the projected prison population below planned capacity until 2001. The building of new prison capacity beyond 2001 is under discussion as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review.

  Prison Service Funding
  Mr. Beith
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what has been the annual expenditure on the Prison Service, in real terms, in each of the last five years for which figures are available; what is the planned annual expenditure for the next two years; and what is the marginal change in each year in real terms. [28844]

  Ms Quin
  The Prison Service annual net expenditure for the last five years and planned net expenditure for the next two years is:

  Real terms £ million

  Percentage change (real terms)

  1993–94

  1,617.30

  —

  1994–95

  1,687.30

  4.3

  1995–96

  1,713.10

  1.5

  1996–97

  1,608.60

  -6.1

  1997–98

  1,709.70

  6.3

  1998–99

  1,719.60

  0.6

  1999–00

  —1

  —

  1 Subject to Government comprehensive spending review

  Note:

  All figures are outturn, except 1997–98 which is forecast outturn and 1998–99 which is provisional.

  Young Offender Units
  Dr. Cable
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what resources per head were allocated to young offender units for the education of 16 to 21 year-olds in(a) London and (b) the Home Counties in each of the last three years. [28785]

  Ms Quin
  Prison Service budgets are not allocated, nor can spend be meaningfully calculated, per head for education. Every prison governor is given a budget to manage their establishment. It is for the governor to decide, within the framework of guidance from the area manager and advice from in-service educational specialists, how to allocate resources between the various regime and other operational needs.

  Governors buy educational provision, through a standard call-off contract according to need and available resources, from providers contracted to their own establishments.

  Total education expenditure for discrete young offender establishments in London and the home counties (defined as counties which border on London boroughs) are given in the table. The current population of each of the establishments is also listed.

  Establishment

  1995–96£

  1996–97£

  1997 to December£

  Population

  Aylesbury1

  375,517

  304,971

  301,997

  310

  Bullwood Hall2

  190,014

  212,484

  147,064

  68 young offenders: total population 135

  Dover1

  173,848

  133,831

  125,319

  304

  East Sutton Park2

  122,134

  97.326

  64,278

  5 young offenders: total population 94

  Feltham3

  366,453

  398,875

  234,838

  913

  Reading3

  170,818

  155,264

  109,929

  219

  1 Young offender institution

  2 Female young offender institution and prison

  3 Young offender institution and remand centre

HEALTH

  Ambulance Services
  Mrs. Ballard
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will list those health authorities which purchase ambulance services below the Orcon response standards for(a) 999 calls and (b) urgent calls. [28838]

  Mr. Milburn
  Information on ambulance service performance is published in the National Health Service Performance National Guide 1997–98 and Department of Health KA34. Copies are available in the Library.

  Eye Tests
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what plans he has to introduce free eye tests; and to what timescale. [28823]
  548
  Mr. Milburn
  Free National Health Service sight tests are currently available to children, people on low incomes and people predisposed to, or suffering from, selected eye diseases. The criteria for these sight tests are covered by the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review, which should be completed by the summer.

  Dental and Eye Checks
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what assessment he has made of the extent to which(a) NHS dental checks and (b) eye tests are available for all seeking them. [28824]

  Mr. Milburn
  The Department has received no representations that people find it difficult to get their sight tested. We are aware that, although National Health Service dentistry is accessible for much of the population, there are areas where there are problems of access. We have introduced the Investing in Dentistry Scheme, for which we have made available £9 million this year and £10 million in 1998–99, to tackle these localised problems.

  Hospital Services (South-west London)
  Mr. Colman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what assessment he has made of the long-term capacity of Kingston Hospital. [29055]

  Mr. Milburn
  Kingston Hospital National Health Service Trust will be working up a detailed business case for capital investment for the longer term. This will include a thorough assessment of longer term patient flows and will take account of the range of hospital services available to the population of south west London. The two Thames NHS Executive Regional Offices will be overseeing this process.

  Mr. Colman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will ensure that long-term fully-financed plans are in place for Queen Mary's Hospital, Roehampton before approving further reconfiguration of hospital services in South West London. [29058]

  Mr. Milburn
  Consultation has now closed on the proposed changes in South West London and Kingston and Richmond Health Authority and Meiton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority are considering all the comments and proposals put forward during the consultation process.

  Mr. Colman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what assessment he has made of the short-term capacity of(a) St. George's Hospital, Tooting and (b) Kingston Hospital, to take on extra in-patient work from Queen Mary's Hospital, Roehampton. [29054]

  Mr. Milburn
  Kingston and Richmond Health Authority, Meiton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority and local trusts have been working together to ensure that, subject to comments and proposals put forward during the consultation period, there will be sufficient capacity in neighbouring hospitals to take on work flowing from Queen Mary's Hospital, Roehampton.
  549
  Mr. Colman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will ensure that no services are transferred from Queen Mary's Hospital, Roehampton until(a) alternatives have been put in place at neighbouring hospitals and (b) the necessary transitional finance is available. [29057]

  Mr. Milburn
  Public consultation on the future of Queen Mary's Hospital, Roehampton was completed only recently. Health authorities are yet to reach a decision following consultation. No services will be transferred from Queen Mary's Hospital Roehampton until adequate facilities are available in neighbouring hospitals.

  North Essex Health Authority
  Mr. Ivan Henderson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health (1) how many days the Chair and each of the non-executive members of North Essex Health Authority spent on health authority business during(a) the financial year 1996–97 and (b) the present financial year to date; [29125]

  (2) who was responsible for nominating the Chair and each of the non-executive members currently serving on the Board of the North Essex Health Authority; [29124]

  (3) if he will list the interests of the Chair and non-executive members of the North Essex Health Authority; [29123]

  (4) if he will list the expenses incurred by the Chair and each of the non-executive members of the North Essex Health Authority during the financial year 1996–97; [29126]

  (5) if he will list the amounts earned by the Chair and each of the non-executive members of North Essex Health Authority during the financial year 1996–97 for their duties on behalf of the Authority. [29122]

  Mr. Milburn
  The current Chairman and non-executive members were all appointed in 1996, after a recruitment exercise including local and national advertisements. The additional practice of seeking nominations for appointments to National Health Service Boards from hon. Members and local authorities was introduced in 1997. Information is not held centrally on the expenses incurred by board members, the interests they have declared or the days they have spent on board business. In 1996–97, the annual remuneration payable to the Chairman of the North Essex Health Authority was £19,285 and the non-executive board members were entitled to £5,000 each.

  Consultants (Merit Payments)
  Mr. Levitt
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will investigate the system of consultants' merit payments within the NHS to ensure that it is fair. [29165]

  Mr. Milburn
  We are deeply concerned about the possibility of unfairness in the distinction awards scheme and we are considering what further action might be taken.

  NHS White Paper
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will make a statement on the budgetary structure of the primary care groups proposed in his recent White Paper on the NHS. [29063]
  550
  Mr. Milburn
  The new financial arrangements will promote access to high quality care right across the country by fair distribution of resources through health authorities to inclusive Primary Care Groups. New unified budgets for Primary Care Groups will be established covering hospital and community services, general practitioner prescribing and the general practice infrastructure. This will allow clinicians to better influence the use of resources by aligning clinical and financial responsibilities.

  NHS Employees (Remuneration)
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health how many NHS employees are currently remunerated below(a) £4.26 per hour, (b) £4.00 per hour and (c) £3.75 per hour. [29011]

  Mr. Milburn
  I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) on 13 January 1998,Official Report, column 153.

  Minimum Wage
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health when he expects to be able to calculate the costs to the NHS of any given level of a minimum wage. [29052]

  Mr. Milburn
  Information about the earnings of National Health Service employees is currently being collected by the Department.

  NHS Trusts
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will make a statement regarding the proposed statutory obligations of NHS trusts to work in partnership with other trusts. [29050]

  Mr. Milburn
  The New NHS White Paper sets out our plans to improve co-operation and partnership between National Health Service trusts. These include a new statutory duty on local NHS bodies to work together for the common good. Legislation will be brought forward as Parliamentary time allows.

  Waiting Lists
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what forecast his Department has made of the numbers of patients waiting more than 12 months for treatment by July 1999. [29010]

  Mr. Milburn
  None.

  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health (1) what plans he has to change the current methodology for calculating NHS waiting lists; [29015]

  (2) if he will make a statement on current methodology used in calculating health service waiting lists. [29012]

  Mr. Milburn
  We have no plans currently to change the methodology for calculating national health service waiting lists which shows the numbers of patients awaiting admission to hospital, on a trust and resident basis, at the end of each quarter.

  General Practitioner Budgets
  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what proportion of patients are currently served by general practitioner practices holding their own budgets. [29007]

  Mr. Milburn
  Fifty-seven per cent. of the registered population of England is currently served by a general practitioner fundholding practice.

  Mr. Maples
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health how many submissions he has received from doctors since 2 May requesting an end to general practitioner practice level budgets. [29006]

  Mr. Milburn
  Since 2 May 1997, we have consulted widely in the National Health Service and discussed with representatives of the professions proposals to abolish the internal market in the NHS. This culminated in the publication of the White Paper, The New NHS, containing our proposals for setting up Primary Care Groups. We have received a wide measure of support for these proposals.

  Southampton Community NHS Trust
  Mr. Swayne
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will make a statement on Southampton Community NHS Trust's arrangements for the disposal of three sites, currently occupied by the Lymington Hospital, to a preferred bidder and PFI partner. [29360]

  Mr. Milburn
  The value of surplus or redundant estate owned by National Health Service trusts can form part of the negotiations between the trust and its preferred private sector partner in a Private Finance Initiative deal, but any such assets must be sold or disposed of at open market value. In the case of Southampton Community NHS Trust, the valuations for the three redundant sites owned by the trust will be independently assessed by the District Valuer and the full business case setting out the final arrangements for the PFI scheme will have to be approved by the NHS Executive and Her Majesty's Treasury.

  Passive Smoking
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what steps he is taking to protect asthma sufferers from the effects of passive smoking(a) at work and (b) in public places. [29260]

  Ms Jowell
  The Department of Health is working closely with other Government Departments and agencies, including the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and the Health and Safety Executive, on what measures might be included in the Tobacco Control White Paper, to be published later this year, to protect the public, including asthma sufferers, from the effects of passive smoking.

  The White Paper will also take into account the conclusions of the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health (to be published shortly) on the scientific evidence on the health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke.

  Water Fluoridation
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what statutory provisions govern the responsibility of health authorities for decisions on water fluoridation. [29399]

  Mr. Milburn
  The final decision on implementing fluoridation schemes rests with the water undertaker. The Water (Fluoridation) Act 1985 was consolidated in the Water Industry Act (1991) and Section 87 (i) of this states that"Where a Health Authority have applied in writing to a water undertaker for the water supplied within an area specified in the application to be fluoridated, that undertaker may, while the application remains in force, increase the fluoride content of the water supplied by the undertaker within that area."

  Hepatitis C
  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what assessment he has made of the effect of needle exchanges in the community on the incidence of hepatitis C in each of the past three years; and if he will make a statement. [29845]

  Ms Jowell
  We have not made any such assessment. Acquisition of hepatitis C is most often asymptomatic and new infections are usually not identified.

  HIV may also be transmitted among drug misusers through the sharing of blood contaminated injecting equipment. Needle exchange schemes have contributed to the decline in the prevalence of HIV in this group.

  The Department is currently seeking ways of improving the surveillance of hepatitis C prevalence among injecting drug misusers.

  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what is his estimate of the incidence of hepatitis C in each of the past 10 years(a) in prison and (b) nationally; and if he will make a statement. [29842]

  Ms Jowell
  The number of new infections nationally is not known. Hepatitis C infection rarely produces an acute symptomatic illness with jaundice and hence very few incident infections are identified.

  Tests for antibodies to the virus will identify individuals who have been previously infected by the virus but do not distinguish between resolved infection and established chronic infection.

  Laboratory reports of the presence of antibodies to hepatitis C in the general population received by the Public Health Laboratory Service's Communicable Diseases Surveillance Centre for England from 1991, the earliest year for which figures are available, to 1996 are shown in the table. The rise in laboratory reports is consistent with increased testing and reporting during that period:

  Laboratory reports of hepatitis C infections, England 1991–1996

  Year

  Number

  1991

  26

  1992

  228

  1993

  410

  1994

  726

  1995

  1,291

  1996

  1,912

  553
  Prisoners in England are not routinely tested for hepatitis C. We understand from Her Majesty's Prison Service that information on the numbers of prisoners infected with hepatitis C is based on voluntary disclosure or testing. This information has been collected only since 1995. In the financial years 1995–96 and 1996–97, there were 543 and 760 reports of prisoners infected with hepatitis C respectively.

  Radiotherapy Damage
  Mr. Sanders
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will award ex gratia payments to women suffering permanent, progressive, disabling injuries after radiotherapy treatment for breast cancer; and if he will make a statement. [29867]

  Mr. Boateng
  We are aware of the often severe problems experienced by women who have been injured following radiotherapy treatment for breast cancer. Unfortunately, there are risks associated with most medical interventions and radiotherapy treatment for breast cancer is not the only area where patients may suffer health and other problems as a result of treatment they have received.

  Following careful consideration of the issues we have no plans to introduce a general scheme of ex gratia payments for specific groups such as those who have suffered injury as a result of radiotherapy treatment for breast cancer.

  National Health Service bodies already have the authority exceptionally to make ex gratia payments in individual cases. Decisions to do so for those suffering adverse side effects from medical treatment are a matter for the individual NHS trust, after careful appraisal of the facts.

  Public Works Directive
  Mr. Campbell-Savours
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what rules or arrangements exist to prevent collusion or the development of cartels amongst candidates expressing an interest and admitted to negotiate under Article 22 (3) of the Public Works Directive 93/37. [24686]

  Mr. Milburn
  [holding answer 26 January 1998]: The National Health Service Estates Agency, an agency of the Department of Health, has issued policy and guidance on works procurement in Concode. When contracts are negotiated value for money must be demonstrated as with any open competition. Negotiations are also subject to European Community Regulations. It is also normal practice to include an anti-collusion clause in contracts.

  Random Breath Tests
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health if he will estimate the(a) direct and (b) indirect effects of random breath testing on death and injury from drink driving. [28822]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  I have been asked to reply.

  It would not be possible to make such estimates since the effect of random breath testing would depend on the precise nature of the testing regime and the extent of enforcement.
  554
  The potential for improving enforcement to reduce deaths and injuries from drink driving is discussed in the consultation document Combating Drink Driving: Next Steps issued by my Department on 2 February.

WALES

  Forestry Commission Land
  Mr. Ruane
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will list the locations and size of Forestry Commission land sold in Wales since 1 May 1997. [29231]

  Mr. Win Griffiths
  The subject of the question relates to matters undertaken by Forest Enterprise. I have asked its Chief Executive, Dr. Bob Mcintosh, to arrange for a reply to be given.

  Letter from Bob McIntosh to Mr. Chris Ruane, dated February 1998:
  The Secretary of State for Wales has asked me to reply to your Question about Forestry Commission land sold in Wales.
  I enclose a list of those areas of Forest Land that have been sold since 1 May 1997. These sales were all agreed before that date.

  Forestry Commission forest land sold in Wales 1 May—10 February 1998

  Name of property

  Area (hectares)

  Grid reference

  Allt Cil Y Llyn Fawr

  2.5

  SN623334

  Allt Hengeraint (road improvement)

  0.7

  SN473603

  Allt Y Fron—Abermarlais

  5.6

  SN689290

  Bodfuan (Garn Boduan)

  101.0

  SH315393

  Bryn Hendre

  10.0

  SH315373

  Brynffynnon Coed

  6.0

  SH471433

  Caeau Bodfel

  28.0

  SH345374

  Cathilas

  51.4

  SN595320

  Cefn Derw Cil Owen

  10.0

  SO140805

  Cefn Perfa Wood

  3.4

  SO127892

  Cil Llwyn

  15.0

  SO009653

  Coed Allt Ddu

  3.0

  SH956679

  Coed Bryn Kenrick

  8.0

  SH947701

  Coed Caeau Gwynion—Abermarlais

  4.8

  SN691298

  Coed Glyn Aeron

  57.0

  SN105300

  Coed Melin Y Moch

  12.0

  SJ070578

  Coed Plas Isaf

  5.0

  SH963678

  Coed Salisbury

  4.0

  SH911693

  Curnia Bank

  13.3

  SO207839

  Geufron

  10.1

  SO175932

  Hendre Rhys

  18.3

  ST048928

  Kinmel Estate

  0.1

  SH977761

  Llan Llwyd

  3.8

  SO187825

  Maesgwyn

  20.0

  SN088290

  Nant Ffrwd

  26.0

  SN572328

  Nant Merddyn

  48.0

  SH930616

  Penycarreg East

  3.0

  SO062821

  Penycarreg West

  11.0

  SO055815

  Penycastle Wood

  10.4

  SO135880

  Rosehill Wood—Abermarlais 3

  3.9

  SN693292

  Sychpant and Penlan

  70.0

  SN040360

  Ty Rhyg

  120.0

  SN050300

  Tyn Y Cwm

  3.5

  SO153835

  Ynys Galed

  22.0

  SH464440

  Correspondence
  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what is his policy for responding to letters received in the(a)Scottish Gaelic, (b) Welsh, (c) Urdu, (d) Hindi and (e) Chinese language. [28059]

  Mr. Ron Davies
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: Letters received in Welsh are replied to in Welsh. Letters received in other languages, including Scottish Gaelic, Urdu, Hindi and Chinese, are replied to in the language of the original wherever practicable.

  Sheep Dip
  Mr. Charles Kennedy
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what advice his Department gives to farmers on the disposal of synthetic pyrethroid sheep dip. [29734]

  Mr. Win Griffiths
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: Advice on the disposal of sheep dips is given on the label of every product and in the leaflet, Sheep Dipping, published jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Health and Safety Executive and the former Department of the Environment. A new edition of the leaflet is in preparation and, as before, it will be sent to all known sheep farmers in Great Britain. Advice is also contained in the Code of Good Agricultural Practice for the Protection of Water published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Welsh Office.

  The National Proficiency Tests Council organises a test leading to the issue of a Certificate of Competence which includes the disposal of all types of sheep dip. A Certificate is currently required for the purchase of organophosphate (OP) dips but the government has accepted the advice of the Veterinary Products Committee that the requirement should be extended to cover the purchase of non-OP dips, including those containing synthetic pyrethroids. We are currently consulting on a change in legislation which would take effect on 1 August 1998.

  Mr. Charles Kennedy
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what monitoring of the impact of synthetic pyrethroid sheep dips on(a) the aquatic environment, (b)the soil environment and (c) fisheries (i) has been carried out and (ii) is planned by his Department; and if he will make a statement. [29735]

  Mr. Win Griffiths
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The Environment Agency, which is responsible for monitoring the aquatic environment in Wales, has initiated monitoring programmes to assess the impact of sheep dip compounds, including synthetic pyrethroids, on the chemical quality of the aquatic environment, including any effects on fish populations. The monitoring has been targeted on the most intensive sheep rearing areas, including Wales. A full report of the findings is being prepared by the Agency. There is no specific monitoring of soil.

  Last month, the Government published draft groundwater regulations relating to England, Wales and Scotland which specify additional monitoring requirements for groundwater, including of synthetic pyrethroids.

DEFENCE

  Courts Martial
  Mr. Kemp
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proposals he has made to allow senior noncommissioned officers to serve on courts martial. [30414]

  Dr. Reid
  The issue of membership of courts-martial was considered by the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill in 1996 although no firm proposals for change were made. I am pleased to announce that, following an extensive internal review initiated by the previous Administration, we have accepted the recommendation that membership of courts-martial be extended to Warrant Officers. This enhancement will make available to courts-martial the additional experience and judgment of Warrant Officers.

  I welcome this recommendation as further evidence of the Services' willingness to embrace change while safeguarding the system of military justice which is essential to their effectiveness.

  This change will require primary legislation and it is envisaged that the relevant amendments will be included in the 2001 Armed Forces Act. A decision in principle now will allow any necessary preparation and training to be set in hand by the Services.

  Low Flying
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to reassess the situation in respect of low flying aircraft in Wales following the recent accident in Italy. [29592]

  Mr. Spellar
  Low flying continues to be an effective means of penetrating hostile air defence systems. It require rigorous training and continuous practice in a realistic environment, subject to stringent regulation to ensure that it is carried out safely while minimising disturbance to those on the ground. The whole of the United Kingdom excluding built up areas is, in principle, open to low flying and Wales will continue to see a proportion of this activity.

  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what are the Government's targets for reducing low flying by aircraft over Wales in the current year; and if his Department achieved its target for 1997. [29594]

  Mr. Spellar
  The amount of low flying training undertaken throughout the United Kingdom is limited to that strictly necessary for aircrews to achieve and maintain operational effectiveness. It is kept under continuous review and specific in-year targets are not set. Since 1988, low flying in Wales has reduced by about a half.

  MOD Police
  Mr. Ainger
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list those facilities in the(a) public and (b) private sector that have a current full-time requirement for MoD Police; and if he will list the current annual cost at each facility. [29179]
  557
  Dr. Reid
  [holding answer 12 February 1998]: This is a matter for the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Defence Police. I have asked the Chief Executive to write to my hon. Friend.

  Letter from Michael Smallwood to Mr. Nick Ainger, dated 17 February 1998:
  I am replying to your Question to the Secretary of State for Defence about the Ministry of Defence Police, on behalf of the Chief Constable/Chief Executive of the Ministry of Defence (MDP) Agency, as this falls into his area of responsibility. The Chief Constable/Chief Executive is away from the office at present.
  The MDP are based at 109 locations, where there is a requirement for their services, costing a total of £149,256 million per annum. I am withholding the list of locations in accordance with exemption 1, 'information whose disclosure would harm national security or defence', of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. I am also withholding details of the annual cost of the MDP at each location under both exemptions 1 and 13, 'information including commercial confidences, trade secrets whose unwarranted disclosure would harm the competitive position of a third party', of the Code of Practice.
  The budget and costs of the MDP are however included within the Annual Report of the Chief Constable. I attach a copy of the relevant pages from the 1996–97 report. A complete copy of the Annual Report is held in the Library of the House of Commons.

  1995–96 £000

  percentage

  1996–97 £000

  percentage

  (a) Expenditure

  Gross Expenditure

  156,115

  —

  149,256

  —

  Gross Income

  21,846

  —

  18,871

  —

  Net expenditure subject to Vote

  134,269

  —

  130,385

  —

  (b) Expenditure Analysis

  Staff costs (Note 1)

  130,971

  83.9

  121,925

  81.7

  Overtime (Note 2)

  10,260

  6.6

  13,163

  8.8

  Administrative costs (Note 3)

  11,574

  7.4

  11,076

  7.4

  Accommodation costs (Note 4)

  3,310

  2.1

  3,092

  2.1

  Total

  156,115

  100

  149,256

  100

  (c) Income Analysis

  Other Government Departments/Agencies

  12,381

  56.7

  10,198

  54.1

  Foreign Government customers

  4,517

  20.7

  4,422

  23.4

  Defence contractors

  3,913

  17.9

  2,509

  13.3

  Other receipts

  1,035

  4.7

  1,742

  9.0

  Total

  21,846

  100

  18,871

  100

  Note 1-Analysis of staff costs

  MDP pay

  105,199

  80.3

  96,755

  79.3

  MDP ERNIC

  9,124

  7.0

  9,149

  7.5

  MDP Pension contribution

  13,569

  10.4

  12,287

  10.1

  Civilian/Service pay

  3,079

  2.4

  3,734

  3.1

  Total

  130,971

  100

  121,925

  100

  Note 2-Analysis of overtime costs

  MDP overtime

  9,825

  95.8

  13,079

  99.4

  Civilian overtime

  435

  4.2

  84

  0.6

  Total

  10,260

  100

  13,163

  100

  Note 3-Analysis of administrative costs

  Permanent transfer

  2,373

  20.5

  2,829

  25.6

  Travel and subsistence

  1,282

  11.1

  1,821

  16.4

  Information technology

  2,663

  23.0

  1,149

  10.4

  558

  1995–96 £000

  percentage

  1996–97 £000

  percentage

  Vehicles/transport

  2,842

  24.6

  3,254

  29.4

  Telecommunications

  567

  4.9

  314

  2.8

  General administration expenses

  1,754

  15.2

  1,550

  14.0

  Other contract services

  93

  0.8

  159

  1.4

  Total

  11,574

  100

  11,076

  100

  Note 4-Analysis of accommodation costs

  Works maintenance

  1,927

  58.2

  1,658

  53.6

  Public utilities

  577

  17.4

  624

  20.2

  Contract catering and cleaning

  806

  24.4

  810

  26.2

  HQ relocation costs

  0

  0

  Total

  3,310

  100

  3,092

  100

  Land Rovers
  Mr. Gray
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 18 December 1997,Official Report, column 280, on Land Rovers, if he will list the planned changes in EU Regulations concerning exhaust emissions with which it would be difficult for the 110 series Army Landrover to comply; and what representations the Government have made to the EU about such exhaust emission regulations. [27195]

  Mr. Spellar
  [holding answer 3 February 1998]: EU Directives to reduce vehicle emissions apply at the date of vehicle manufacture and are not retrospective. All Land Rover Defender 110 Series vehicles in service with the MOD complied with the emission regulations in force at their date of manufacture, and the Trucks Utility Medium (High Specification) vehicles now being delivered comply fully with current EU regulations. Future EU Directives will require the motor industry to comply with more stringent emission limits. As such, EU Directive 96/69/EC will set tighter limits for mass carbon monoxide, combined hydrocarbons and oxides of nitrogen, and particulates for this class of vehicle manufactured after 1 October 1998. Beyond that date, future legislation has not been fully defined. It is not MOD policy to seek exemption from EU Directives on emissions levels relating to these vehicles.

  The Government are committed to reducing pollution by cutting emission levels. We are, therefore, exploring ways in which the emissions of all the in-service Land Rover vehicles, including the 110 Series vehicles, could be reduced.

  Defence Expenditure
  Mr. Key
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will list the defence expenditure of NATO countries in 1996(a) as a percentage of gross domestic product (market price), (b) as total national defence spending, (US $m) and (c) per capita defence expenditure, (US $). [29449]
  559
  Dr. Reid
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The information requsted for calender year 1996 is as follows

  Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP

  Percentage

  Greece

  4.5

  Turkey

  4.1

  United States

  3.7

  France

  3.0

  United Kingdom

  3.0

  Portugal

  2.5

  Norway

  2.4

  Netherlands

  2.0

  Italy

  1.9

  Denmark

  1.8

  Germany

  1.7

  Belgium

  1.6

  Spain

  1.5

  Canada

  1.5

  Luxembourg

  0.8

  Defence expenditure in US$ million

  US$ million

  United States

  271,802

  France

  46,402

  Germany

  38,990

  United Kingdom

  34,526

  Italy

  23,458

  Spain

  8,616

  Canada

  8,616

  Netherlands

  7,850

  Turkey

  7,424

  Greece

  5,582

  Belgium

  4,240

  Norway

  3,672

  Denmark

  3,086

  Portugal

  2,601

  Luxembourg

  141

  Defence expenditure per capita (US$)

  US$

  United States

  1,023

  Norway

  838

  France

  794

  Denmark

  589

  United Kingdom

  587

  Greece

  531

  Netherlands

  504

  Germany

  475

  Belgium

  417

  Italy

  409

  Luxembourg

  338

  Canada

  287

  Portugal

  262

  Spain

  219

  Turkey

  118

  The figures are our latest estimates and are based on information drawn from NATO sources. They update the provisional figures published in October 1997 in the MOD Performance Report 1996/97 (CM 3781).
  560
  The figures have been calculated using 1996 average market exchange rates, which do not necessarily reflect the relative purchasing power of individual currencies. They are therefore only a guide to comparative defence effort.

  For the UK, the defence budget in the financial year 1996–97 amounted to 3.0 per cent. of GDP; and in 1997–98 and 1998–99 is estimated to amount to 2.7 per cent. of GDP in both years.

  Nuclear Deterrence
  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions he has had regarding the maintenance of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrence capacity beyond the lifetime of the Trident programme; and if he will make a statement. [29463]

  Mr. Spellar
  I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 23 June 1997,Official Report, column 357, to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn).

  Service Personnel (Cyprus)
  Mr. Cox
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many service personnel stationed in Cyprus have been charged with disorderly conduct while off duty in(a) a civilian court or (b) a court martial, in each of the last three years. [18585]

  Dr. Reid
  Figures broken down as requested are not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. Total figures for the number of offences of disorderly conduct committed by the members of the Resident Infantry Battalions and other permanent units in Cyprus in the last 3 years is set out in the table:

  Offence

  1995

  1996

  1997

  Assault (or similar offences)

  20

  16

  117

  Drunkenness

  6

  5

  5

  Criminal Damage

  2

  1

  8

  Total

  228

  22

  30

  1 Includes 10 cases still under investigation or yet to be heard in court.

  2 Includes 18 RGJ "Reported Incidents" which may not have led to charges.

  Royal Haslar Hospital
  Mr. Rapson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the timing of the privatisation of the Royal Haslar Hospital Laundry and Sterile Services. [28142]

  Dr. Reid
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: I have commissioned the Chief Executive of the Defence Secondary Care Agency to carry out a strategic review of the Agency and to report to me in the Spring 1998. The future of the laundry and sterile services at the Royal Hospital, Haslar, will be considered in the context of the outcome of this work.

  Britannia
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will refit the former Royal Yacht 'Britannia' as a hospital ship for possible use in the Middle East. [29607]

  Dr. Reid
  No. Britannia was paid off on 11 December 1997.

  Bahrain
  Mr. Corbyn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many United Kingdom military personnel have(a) visited in an official capacity, (b) been stationed in and (c) been seconded to Bahrain in each of the last five years. [29466]

  Dr. Reid
  Figures for the number of United Kingdom military personnel who have been stationed in Bahrain or visited in an official capacity over the last five years are not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost. No United Kingdom military personnel have been seconded to Bahrain in the last five years.

  Mr. Corbyn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many Bahrain service people have(a) visited and (b) attended training courses in Britain in each of the last five years. [29468]

  Dr. Reid
  Figures for the number of Bahraini Service personnel who have visited the United Kingdom are not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

  It has been the practice of successive Administrations not to release details of military assistance provided to other countries on the grounds that this information has been considered confidential between Governments, and that disclosure would risk damaging our international relations. However, this practice is being reviewed against the background of the Government's commitment to openness. I will write to my hon. Friend once the review is complete and a copy of my letter will be placed in the Library of the House.

  Mr. Corbyn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent meetings have been held at Ministerial level with ministers in the Bahrain Government; and what was discussed. [29609]

  Dr. Reid
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary held separate meetings with the Bahraini Crown Prince and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 28 January. The main focus of these meetings was the current crisis in the Gulf. My noble Friend the Minister for Defence Procurement visited Bahrain on the 13–14 February and held discussions on Iraq with the Amir, Prime Minister and other ministers.

  Trident
  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when he plans to complete the loading of the first core into the reactor of the fourth Trident submarine; and if he will make a statement; [29461]

  (2) what is the cost of the first fuel core for the reactor of the fourth Trident submarine; and if he will make a statement. [29462]
  562
  Mr. George Robertson
  The loading of Vengeance's fuel core is scheduled to be completed during May 1998. I am withholding details of core costs under exemption 1 of the code of practice on access to Government Information relating to defence, security and international relations.

  Foreign Policy Baseline
  Mr. Mackinlay
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what documents or speeches constitute the Foreign Policy Baseline against which the Strategic Defence Review can be assessed. [29750]

  Mr. George Robertson
  I outlined the emerging conclusions of the first phase of the Strategic Defence Review, which looked at the foreign and security policy framework, in my speeches to the House on 27 October 1997, Official Report, columns 609–20, and to the Royal United Services Institute on 18 September 1997. The results of this work will form an important part of the Review White Paper.

  Enriched Uranium
  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department has spent on the enrichment of uranium for the nuclear-powered submarine programme in(a) the United States of America and (b) the United Kingdom in each year since 1982; and if he will make a statement. [29460]

  Dr. Reid
  I am withholding this information under exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information relating to defence, security, and international relations.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

  National Minimum Wage
  Mr. Redwood
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what plans she has to introduce additional sectoral or regional exemptions to the national minimum wage. [28618]

  Mrs. Beckett
  [holding answer 9 February 1998]: I have no plans to introduce any sectoral or regional exemptions.

  Mr. Redwood
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade when the Ministry of Defence first informed her Department that it wished to exempt the armed forces from the national minimum wage. [28584]

  Mrs. Beckett
  [holding answer 9 February 1998]: It has never been the policy of this or any other Government to disclose details of internal discussions between Ministers.

  Millennium Compliance
  Mr. David Atkinson
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will make a statement on progress in her Cabinet Group to ensure that computer systems are millennium compliant. [27873]
  563
  Mrs. Beckett
  The Government attach major importance to tackling his problem effectively. However, in accordance with long-standing practice, information about proceedings of the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees is not made public.

  Mr. David Atkinson
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what requests she has received from Action 2000 for more staff and an increase in budget; and if she will make a statement. [27875]

  Mrs. Roche
  I look forward to receiving from Don Cruickshank his proposals for a fully costed programme of collective activities over the next two years which will support businesses in the private sector in their efforts to tackle the problem.

  Mrs. Gillan
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what steps she is taking to ensure that disinterested advice is available to the consumer of personal computing products about the changes that need to be made to their computer systems in order for them to be millennium compliant. [25650]

  Mrs. Roche
  [holding answer 27 January 1998]: The consumer can get impartial advice from Action 2000, which operates a help line, 0845 601 2000, and a website, www.open.gov.uk/bug2000.htm.

  The Chairman of Action 2000 is continuing to work with the Director of the Consumer Association to develop a collaborative approach to helping consumers understand and prepare for the Millennium Bug challenge.

  Action 2000 has also appointed Karl Feilder to give it expert advice on the problems with personal computers.

  Mrs. Gillan
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if Action 2000 is being set up as an independent company. [29508]

  Mrs. Roche
  [holding answer 13 February 1998]: Yes.

  Oil and Gas Industry
  Mr. Beggs
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade how she proposes to protect existing jobs and promote increased long-term investment in the United Kingdom oil and gas industry. [29798]

  Mr. Battle
  The Government are keen to ensure that the optimum level of exploration and development of the United Kingdom continental shelf is carried out. To that end, the UK's hydrocarbons licensing regime seeks to encourage continuing investment in oil and gas exploration and production in this country and its continental shelf.

  Multilateral Agreement on Investment
  Mr. Chaytor
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will list the exemptions tabled by the United Kingdom as part of the draft texts of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment and place in the Library copies of the exemptions tabled by other OECD countries. [29926]

  Mrs. Roche
  The UK's draft list of exceptions has already been placed in the Library. It includes exceptions for broadcasting, fishing, marine and air transport, and 564
  financial services. The draft lists from other countries have been tabled in confidence; it would not be appropriate for the UK to make them public.

  Mr. Stunell
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what safeguards for local authorities and Government departments and agencies she has(a) sought and (b) achieved to date in relation to potential claims of discrimination arising under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment currently being negotiated. [28328]

  Mrs. Roche
  The UK, like other participants in the MAI negotiations, has submitted a list of exceptions where we are not willing to have the obligations of the Agreement apply. The list contains no exceptions specifically related to local authorities, since discrimination against investors on grounds of nationality is not a factor in their decisions. Any claims under the MAI would be made against the national government.

  Coal (Emission Standards)
  Mr. Boswell
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what estimate she has made of the increased costs of coal-fired power generation as a result of the accelerated imposition of emission standards recently announced. [25482]

  Mr. Battle
  [holding answer 26 January 1998]: The Environment Agency has issued a Consultation Document setting out proposals for new sulphur dioxide targets. My Department is currently considering these.

  Arms Sales
  Mr. Cohen
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will list the arms deliveries, and their dates, to Iraq between January 1988 and the imposition of the arms embargo upon Iraq. [27060]

  Mrs. Roche
  The Department of Trade and Industry does not maintain records of arms deliveries to any destination. A list of Export Licence Applications for Iraq from the period 1984–90 formed Part A of Appendix A to Sir Richard Scott's Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.

  EU Structural Funds
  Mr. Ennis
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what steps she is taking to extend the use of gross domestic product per capita as a key qualifying criteria for objective 2 of the EU structural funds. [26789]

  Mrs. Roche
  The Government, in discussions with the Commission and other Member States, have pushed strongly the idea that GDP per capita, measured at either a national or a local level, should be a factor in determining eligibility for the proposed new Objective 2 of the Structural Funds.

  Mr. Watts
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will seek to reform the EU structural funds to provide that no member state shall receive more per head of eligible population in the 2000–06 period than in the
  1994–99 period. [26757]
  565
  Mrs. Roche
  The Government believe that all existing Member States should expect cuts in their Structural and Cohesion Fund allocations (when comparing 2006 with 1999) if costs are to be contained in preparation for EU enlargement.

  We have suggested that the average per capita Structural Funds allocations of regions retaining eligibility for the same Objective should not increase, particularly if other regions lose eligibility.

  Mr. Watts
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what steps she is taking to ensure that the United Kingdom share of the European structural funds in the 2000 to 2006 period reflects its current position in terms of per capita GDP. [26756]

  Mrs. Roche
  The Government, in discussions with the Commission and other Member States, have pushed strongly the idea that GDP per capita, measured at either a national or a local level, should be a factor in determining allocations and eligibility under the proposed new Structural Funds.

  Market Research
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what expenditure has been incurred by her Department, agencies and non-departmental public bodies(a) in 1996–97 and (b) since 1 May 1997 on (i) opinion polling, (ii) focus groups and (iii) other forms of market research; if she will list the surveys commissioned and the purpose of each; and if she will make a statement. [26592]

  Mrs. Beckett
  [holding answer 5 February 1998]: The surveys commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry and the agencies for which DTI is responsible are mainly small surveys for the purpose of programme evaluation or to assess customer satisfaction. There are very few surveys which entirely involve opinion polling or market research as such.

  In 1996, those surveys which involved an element of opinion gathering cost a total of £0.8 million (Table 1). In the period from 1 May 1997, this expenditure has increased to £1.9 million (Table 2) due to the commissioning of a Workplace Industrial Relations Survey to assess state of industry at an estimated cost of £1.2 million.

  No records are held centrally of surveys commissioned by the Department if out of the scope of Survey Control.

  Table 1: Regular Surveys in 1996

  Title

  Purpose

  National Weights and Measures Customer Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Export Marketing Information Centre User Satisfaction Questionnaire

  Customer satisfaction

  Quality Management System for Export Services

  Customer satisfaction

  Business Links Baseline Tracking Study

  Programme evaluation

  Radiocommunications Agency Customer Survey

  Citizen's charter

  Patent Office Customer Survey

  Citizen's charter

  Biotechnology Means Business Evaluation

  Programme evaluation

  Subtotal (7 surveys)

  Ad Hoc Surveys in 1996

  Evaluation of the LINK Optoelectronics Programme

  Programme evaluation

  DTI France Desk—Private Label Clothing and Fabrics

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of the Manufacturing Planning and Implementation Programme

  Programme evaluation

  566

  Table 1: Regular Surveys in 1996

  Title

  Purpose

  Evaluation of Consultancy Support for European Activities—Framework IV

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of the APAG Trade Review

  Programme evaluation

  Environmental Technology Best Practice Programme

  Programme evaluation

  Valid Analytical Measurement—Assessment and Understanding and Marketing Needs

  Market research

  Companies House Marketing Research

  Market research

  Survey of Firms: Evaluation of the Area Advisory Groups to the BOTB

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of the Export Promoters Initiative: Survey of Firms

  Programme evaluation

  Value for Money Survey of Export Intelligence Customers

  Customer satisfaction

  Loan Guarantee Scheme: Evaluation of the Advice and Counselling Pilot

  Programme evaluation

  Survey on the Influence of Workplace Disciplinary Procedures on Application to Industrial Tribunals

  Assess state of industry

  Business Link Evaluation June 1996

  Programme evaluation

  Regional Customer Supply Network Charging Study: Telephone Survey of Customers

  Customer satisfaction

  Evaluation of Improved Oil Recovery and Reservoir Simulation Programmes

  Programme evaluation

  The Impact of Sunday Trading Act on Employment Practices

  Assess state of industry

  Evaluation of Business Links

  Programme evaluation

  Overseas Trade Services Marketing and Brand Awareness Survey

  Programme evaluation

  Subtotal (20 surveys)

  Surveys to households and individuals

  Potential for Green Electricity Supply to UK Domestic Consumers

  Market assessment

  Consumer Packaging "Openability"

  Opinions on packaging

  Safety Instructions for Consumer Products

  Opinions on product safety

  Fireworks '96 Evaluation

  Safety campaign awareness

  Subtotal (4 surveys)

  Grand Total (31 surveys)

  Total cost: £816,000

  Table 2: Regular Surveys since 1 May 1997

  Title

  Purpose

  National Weights and Measures Customer Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Export Marketing Information Centre User Satisfaction Questionnaire

  Customer satisfaction

  Quality Management System for Export Services

  Customer satisfaction

  Business Links Baseline Tracking Study

  Programme evaluation

  Radiocommunications Agency Customer Survey

  Citizen's charter

  Patent Office Customer Survey

  Citizen's charter

  Biotechnology Means Business Evaluation

  Programme evaluation

  Design Council Evaluation and Tracking Study

  Programme evaluation

  Workplace Industrial Relations Survey

  Assess state of industry

  Companies House Customer Satisfaction Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Subtotal (10 surveys)

  DTI Ad-Hoc Surveys conducted since 1 May 1997

  Environmental Technology Best Practice Programme

  Programme evaluation

  Survey of UKAEA Contractors

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of the Regional Supply Network

  Programme evaluation

  Support for Overseas Trade Fairs and Seminars Study

  Programme evaluation

  Engineering, Automotive and Metals Customer Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Future Market Potential for Photovoltaic Products

  Assess state of the industry

  Business Link Campaign Evaluation (Benchmark)

  Advertising campaign evaluation

  Business Link Campaign Evaluation (Follow-up 1)

  Advertising campaign evaluation

  567

  Table2: Regular Surveys since 1 May 1997

  Title

  Purpose

  Insolvency Service User Survey 1997

  Customer satisfaction

  Study of the Effectiveness of New Approach Directives

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of Export Market Research Scheme

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of Retex Initiative

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of Konver Initiative

  Programme evaluation

  British National Space Corporation Customer Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Evaluation of Industry '96

  Programme evaluation

  Evaluation of Design of High Speed Machinery Programme

  Programme evaluation

  Mid-Term review of British National Space Corporation Applications

  Programme evaluation

  Demonstration ProgrammeReview of European Supply Network

  Programme evaluation

  Subtotal (19 surveys)

  Sun'eys to households and individuals

  Redundancy Payments Service Customer Survey

  Customer satisfaction

  Consumer Product Recalls

  Consumer attitudes

  Insolvency Service Communications Review

  Customer awareness

  Subtotal (3 surveys)

  Grand total (32 surveys)

  Total cost: £1,858,000

  British Geological Survey
  Ms Roseanna Cunningham
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade how many people are employed by the British Geological Survey in Scotland, broken down by job category; what facilities for map making the British Geological Survey maintains in Scotland; and if she will provide a breakdown of British Geological Survey spending in Scotland as a ratio of overall spending in each year since 1990. [28552]

  Mr. Battle
  [holding answer 11 February 1998]: The British Geological Survey currently employs 201 people in Scotland as shown in the table.

  Job Categories

  Scientists

  Scientific Support

  Administration

  Total

  Petroleum Geology, Geophysics and Offshore Surveys

  89

  —

  1

  90

  Geological and Hydrogeological Survey

  47

  —

  —

  47

  Minerals, Environment and Geochemical Surveys

  5

  —

  —

  5

  Corporate Services and Business Development

  12

  21

  5

  38

  Local Administration, Facilities Management, Computer Support

  —

  —

  21

  21

  Total

  153

  21

  27

  201

  Map-making facilities exist locally at BGS in Edinburgh. Of the 19 people involved in these cartographic services, 14 are responsible for producing Scottish geological maps.
  568
  BGS spending in Scotland as a percentage of overall BGS spending in each year since 1990 is set out below:

  Year

  Percentage

  1990–91

  18

  1991–92

  17

  1992–93

  18

  1993–94

  19

  1994–95

  19

  1995–96

  18

  1996–97

  18

  1997–98

  18

  Civil Servants
  Mr. Duncan
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will list by grade the number of officials in her Department at grade 3 or above who have(a) taken early retirement, (b) taken official leave, (c) been dismissed, (d) changed jobs within the Department, (e) moved to another Department and (f) been offered and rejected an alternative position (i) within the Department and (ii) in another Department since 1 May. [27453]

  Mr. Nigel Griffiths
  [holding answer 5 February 1998]: Since 1 May, the Regional Director for the North East has taken early retirement. Most Senior Civil Servants have taken leave during that period, but we do not keep central records. None has been dismissed. There have been ten staff moves within the department involving posts at or above a level equivalent to what was formerly Grade 3. These have all been routine moves for career development or operational reasons (for example because a post has been abolished or a new one created). There have also been two loans and one permanent transfer at that level to other Government Departments; one case was because of Machinery of Government changes; the others involved progression to more senior levels in the Senior Civil Service. Moves at this level are the subject of discussion with individuals and their line managers during which it is normal for a number of options to be considered.

  Japan and Taiwan (Spirits Taxes)
  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what representations she has made to the Government of Japan concerning the tax regime for whisky in that country and on the need for adequate regulations on the definition and labelling of whisky. [27902]

  Mrs. Roche
  [holding answer 9 February 1998]: The long-standing dispute with Japan over discriminatory taxation of imported spirits, including Scotch Whisky, was resolved during December 1997. An agreement has been negotiated with Japan, building on the interim settlement reached in January 1997. Letters were exchanged between the European Commission and the Japanese Government on 24 December 1997. The new agreement now guarantees a level playing field on taxation for our spirits exports to Japan. In addition to accelerated equalisation of tax rates, exports of whisky and brandy will also benefit from the total elimination of import tariffs by 2002. These significant, new tariff concessions will also apply for the very first time to gin, vodka, rum and liqueurs. DTI officials were closely

  569
  involved in negotiations with the Japanese Government and the final agreement was concluded with the full support and endorsement of the Scotch Whisky Association and the Gin and Vodka Association.

  Whisky exports to Japan were worth £129 million in 1996, and have already seen a 33 per cent. rise since 1 October 1997, when the first tranche of tax cuts were introduced. This new agreement presents even greater opportunities for the growth of British spirits exports, which this Government will continue to help the industry to pursue as appropriate. This case also shows the effectiveness of the WTO in dealing with trade disputes and sends an important signal to other countries which continue to tax foreign spirits at a higher rate than those produced domestically.

  Mrs. Ewing
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what discussions she has had with her European counterparts regarding action to ensure Japan and Taiwan introduce non-discriminatory taxation for (i) EU spirits and (ii) Scotch whisky. [27903]

  Mrs. Roche
  [holding answer 9 February 1998]: In the case of Japan, I refer the hon. Member to my earlier answer.

  In the case of Taiwan, officials in this Department continue to work closely with their colleagues in the European Commission and in fellow EU Member States to press Taiwan to put an end to its discriminatory taxation of imported spirits. The current discrimination particularly affects the UK's Scotch whisky and the Irish whiskey industries, but France has concerns over brandy, as do other Member States on white spirits. As a result of such consensus between the UK and other Member States, the European Commission has maintained a strong line with Taiwan during its bilateral market access negotiations over Taiwan's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

  In November last year, the Head of the British Trade & Cultural Office in Taipei and his French counterpart wrote a joint letter to Taiwanese President Vincent Siew urging immediate equalisation of taxation on all spirits. Disappointingly, this request was rejected. Nevertheless, the UK, other Member States and the Commission are continuing to keep up the pressure.

  UK officials both in London and Taipei have conveyed their disappointment to Taiwan over this response and their expectation of a speedy end to the tax discrimination, as has Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President, European Commission, in a recent letter to the Taiwanese Minister of Finance, Paul Chiu.

  The discriminatory taxation on imported spirits, along with other concerns—notably on the lack of Taiwanese legislation on spirits definitions—is one of the key issues holding back an EU-Taiwan market access agreement in relation to Taiwan's accession to the WTO. Officials in this Department will, therefore, remain in close contact with the European Commission to ensure that it continues to reflect the UK's and other Member States' concerns on spirits in negotiations with Taiwan on WTO accession, the next round of which takes place in Taipei from 23–25 February.

  Bad Debts (Asia)
  Mr. Redwood
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what provision ECGD has made for bad debts on its Asian risks. [28587]

  Mrs. Beckett
  [holding answer 9 February 1998]: Records readily available indicate that the provisions on outstanding Claims Balances of £36.lm on Asian Markets as at 5 February 1998 were £28.3m.

  EU Funding
  Mr. Rhodri Morgan
  To ask the President of theBoard of Trade if she will make a statement on European Commission proposals to reduce the maximum coverage of structural funds eligibility to 40 per cent. of European Union population. [27310]

  Mrs. Roche
  [holding answer 3 February 1998]: In the Commission's communication "Agenda 2000" published on 16 July 1997, it was suggested that the proportion of EU population covered by the geographically targeted Objectives of the Structural Funds should be reduced from 51 per cent. to between 35 per cent. and 40 per cent. The Government are still considering this proposal. While geographic concentration of some kind may be one way of containing the overall cost of the Funds and thus assist EU enlargement, the Government have suggested that this should not increase the average per capita Structural Funds allocations of regions retaining eligibility for the same Objective, particularly if other regions lose eligibility.

  Overseas Visits
  Mr. Redwood
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade if she will list visits abroad by her Department's Ministers since 18 November 1997. [29526]

  Mrs. Beckett
  [holding answer 13 February 1998]: Since 18 November 1997, my Ministerial colleagues at the DTI and I have undertaken the following visits abroad.

  President of the Board of Trade

  17–22 November—India and Australia

  10–21 January—China, Hong Kong and Pakistan

  3–4 February—Paris

  Minister for Trade

  15–24 November—Quatar,UAE and Yemen

  1–2 December—Barcelona and Madrid

  7–11 December—Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary

  12–13 December—Geneva

  17–18 December—Paris and Rome

  15–16 January—Prague

  30 January—Hungary

  2 February—Brussels

  3–7 February—Zimbabwe

  Minister for Science, Energy and Industry

  16–18 November—Angola

  24 November—Geneva

  5–7 December—Canada

  8 December—Brussels

  20 January—Bonn

  3 February—Brussels

  4 February—Madrid and Lisbon

  8–9 February—Athens

  11–13 February—Brussels

  571
  Minister of State

  8 December—Bonn

  15 December—Brussels

  17 December—Strasbourg

  Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe

  20–21 November—Frankfurt

  26–27 November—Brussels

  27–29 November—Italy

  21 January—Brussels

  Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Competition and Consumer Affairs

  23–28 November—Washington and Boston, USA

  14–16 December—Vienna, Austria

  11–13 January—Maastricht and Amsterdam

  1–3 February—Stockholm

  11–12 February—Brussels

  Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Small Firms, Trade and Industry

  17–18 November—Paris

  30 November-1 December—Brussels

  14 January—Stockholm

  19 January—Brussels

  7–11 February—Egypt

  Dounreay
  Mr. Llew Smith
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what progress has been made in developing a waste management and disposal strategy for the sodium in the heat exchange systems at the fast reactors at Dounreay; which consultants have been used; and what estimates have been made of the likely final costs. [29281]

  Mr. Battle
  The UKAEA has developed a strategy for the safe management and disposal of the sodium contained within the Prototype Fast Reactor and the Sodium/Potassium in the Dounreay Fast Reactor. These strategies, and the resultant programmes of work, are agreed with the DTI and the independent Regulators (the Nuclear Installation Inspectorate and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency) and are currently being implemented. The UKAEA have used a large number of external advisers in the formulation and implementation of their strategies and plans for the two reactors. The choice, selection and record of which advisers have been used is an operational matter for the UKAEA. As it is Government policy to ensure good value for money by tendering for the work, the cost estimates for this work and the contract value which will be subject to tender are commercially confidential.

  Mr. Llew Smith
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade concerning how many underground shafts in which radioactive materials have been disposed of the Government has been provided with information by the management of the nuclear power development establishment at Dounreay; and when the information was provided. [29297]

  Mr. Battle
  There is only one nuclear waste shaft at Dounreay, known as the Intermediate Level Waste Shaft. In answer to my hon. Friend's question of 16 December 1997,Official Report, columns 119–20, I have already informed the House that I am considering the UKAEA's recommendations for environmental remediation of the shaft. The waste management issues arising from the use
  572
  of the shaft as a disposal facility are already in the public domain as part of the process of strict independent regulation. These plans also include the packaging of material in the Wet Silo storage facility ready for its ultimate disposal. The Wet Silo is a fully engineered facility licensed for the storage of radioactive material.

  Mr. Llew Smith
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what plans exist for the decontamination and restoration of the second nuclear waste shaft at Dounreay; and what estimate the Atomic Energy Authority has made of the costs. [29283]

  Mr. Battle
  There is only one nuclear waste shaft at Dounreay, known as the Intermediate Level Waste Shaft. I have already informed the House that I am considering the UKAEA's recommendations for environmental remediation of the shaft in my answer to my hon. Friend's related question of 16 December 1997,Official Report, columns 119–20.

  Packaging Waste Regulations
  Mr. Stunell
  To ask the President of the Board of Trade what progress has been made with the review of the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations; when she intends to table amendments; and if she will make a statement on the factors she will take into account when doing so. [28661]

  Angela Eagle
  I have been asked to reply.

  I refer the hon. Member to the answer given to my hon. Friend the Member for Normanton (Mr. O'Brien) by my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Environment on 17 December 1997, Official Report, columns 193–94.

  The Advisory Committee has made a good start on its work and held hearings with representatives of small retailers, wholesalers and the waste industry. Representations on the matters to be covered by the review may be made either to the Advisory Committee or to my Department.

NORTHERN IRELAND

  Children (Northern Ireland) Order
  Mr. Mallon
  To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what steps are taken to provide professional training and guidance to (i) social workers, (ii) youth workers, (iii) teachers and (iv) others in the requirements of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995. [29028]

  Mr. Worthington
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: In 1995, a multi-disciplinary Children (Northern Ireland) Order training strategy was implemented ranging from basic awareness training for a wide range of staff to advanced level training for staff in specialist roles. The strategy was delivered by Health and Social Services Boards and voluntary organisations in partnership, working closely with education and the courts. The Boards and the voluntary organisations are being funded to continue to deliver training to meet staff needs as services under the Children Order develop.

  In 1996, the Department of Health and Social Services issued guidance on the Children Order to Health and Social Services Boards and Trusts.
  573
  The Department of Education, Northern Ireland has issued guidance on the implications of the Order for schools and on child protection. Further guidance is planned on parental responsibility and court reporting for the 1998–99 school year.

  Additional resources have been made available to provide general awareness training for all education and library boards' staff and more specialists training for officers regularly in contact with children such as Education Welfare Officers, Educational Psychologists and Youth Workers. Each education and library board is engaged in implementing a programme of training for key personnel in schools on child protection and other related Children Order matters and has developed Child Protection Procedures.

  In April 1995, the Youth Council for Northern Ireland published a guide to the Children Order for youth workers. The Council has also issued draft Child Protection Procedures for consultation. The Certificate for Part-time Youth Workers/RSA involves consideration of the Children Order.

  Mr. Mallon
  To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland what resources were made available to each health and social services trust, and each education and library board, for the implementation of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, in each year since the Order was enacted. [29029]

  Mr. Worthington
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: Health and Social Services Trusts are not directly funded by the Department of Health and Social Services. However, the allocations of additional resources to the Health and Social Services Boards for the implementation of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 in each of the financial years from 1995–96 were as follows:

  £

  Year

  Eastern Board

  Northern Board

  Southern Board

  Western Board

  1995–96

  455,000

  263,000

  199,000

  183,000

  1996–97

  1,058,000

  611,000

  462,000

  424,000

  1997–98

  2,337,000

  1,349,000

  1,021,000

  936,000

  The additional resources to the Education and Library Boards specifically for implementation were as follows:

  £

  Year

  Belfast ELB

  North EasternELB

  South EasternELB

  Southern ELB

  Western ELB

  1996–97

  118,000

  118,000

  118,000

  118,000

  118,000

  1997–98

  409,000

  401,000

  372,000

  417,000

  419,000

  Social Fund
  Mr. Mallon
  To ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (1) what assessment she made of the advantages of centralising Social Fund activity in the Southern Region in the Newry Social Security office,(a) exclusively and (b) in conjunction with one or more other offices; [29030]
  574
  (2) what are the projected costs for the administration of the Social Fund in the Southern Region, under the plans to centralise on two sites; [29031]

  (3) what were the administration costs of the Social Fund in each Social Security Agency office in the Southern Region in the last available year; [29032]

  (4) which social security offices in the Southern Region were subjected to a PAFT analysis, as part of the current assessment of delivery of Social Fund services in the region; [29033]

  (5) how many applications to the Social Fund were dealt with by each office of the Social Security Agency in the Southern Region in each financial year since the Fund was established; [29035]

  (6) how many people are employed by the Social Security Agency on the Social Fund, in each office in the Southern Region. [29036]

  Mr. Worthington
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: Responsibility for the subjects has been delegated to the Social Security Agency under it's Chief Executive, Mr. Chris Thompson, and I have asked him to arrange for a response to be given.

  Letter from Chris Thompson to Mr. Seamus Mallon, dated 13 February 1998:
  I have been asked to reply to your recent Parliamentary Questions about the administration of the Social Fund in the Social Security Agency's South District.
  Ref: 29030
  The main advantages of centralising Social Fund include reducing managerial overheads while maximising staffing, training and support, leading to improved efficiency, accuracy and quality of service. This would have applied equally to Newry exclusively and/or in conjunction with one or more other office. Newry Social Security Office was considered as one of the potential central processing sites prior to its destruction in July 1997. The temporary site at Canal Street has insufficient space to accommodate a Social Fund processing unit.
  Ref: 29031
  The main costs associated with the administration of Social Fund relate to salaries which are projected to be £763,704 a year when Social Fund is centralised on the two sites.
  Ref: 29032
  Information on the administration costs (salaries) for each office within the District is set out on the attached table.
  Ref: 29033
  While PAFT considerations were given to all seven Social Security Offices in South District, a full PAFT analysis was carried out in the Armagh and Portadown offices only, as these were the only offices with sufficient accommodation to house centralised units.
  Ref: 29035
  Statistical returns are destroyed 18 months after the period to which they relate which means that the information you have requested is only available for the 1996/97 and 1997/98 financial years. This is also set out on the attached table.
  Ref: 29036
  The number of people employed in each office in South District for Social Fund is listed on the attached table.
  I hope this information is helpful.
  575

  Number of social fund applications

  Social Security office

  Projected full year salary costs 1997–98 (£)

  1996–97

  11997–98

  Number of social fund staff

  Armagh

  100,840

  4,851

  3,983

  6 (includes 2 part-time)

  Banbridge

  56,006

  2,502

  2,004

  3 (includes 1 part-time)

  Dungannon

  138,497

  6,833

  5,840

  8 (includes 2 part-time)

  Kilkeel

  0

  Processed in Newry SSO

  Processed in Newry SSO

  0

  Lurgan

  186,989

  9,387

  8,000

  12 (includes 3 part-time)

  Newry

  248,222

  13,757

  12,049

  14 (includes 4 part-time plus 1 existing vacancy)

  Portadown

  106,757

  5,890

  4,944

  6 (includes 2 part-time)

  Total

  837,311

  —

  —

  —

  1 1997–98 figures represent the period from April 1997 to January 1998.

SCOTLAND

  Farm Incomes
  Mr. Laurence Robertson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the current average income of cereal farmers in Scotland and on the change which this represents from the previous year. [28079]

  Mr. Prior
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the current average income of pig farmers and the change which this represents from the previous year. [28081]

  Mr. Macdonald
  The Scottish Office does not collect any information on the income levels of pig farmers. In the cereal sector, we do not hold figures on the average income of farmers. However, net farm income, which is a measure of the farm business, had declined sharply over this year from last.

  Mr. Swayne
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will estimate the effect on farm incomes in Scotland of parity between the green pound and sterling. [28093]

  Mr. Macdonald
  It is not possible to isolate the impact of currency fluctuations from other factors that determine farm incomes. However, the freeze in the conversion rates used to calculate the sterling value of most subsidy payments has protected farming from the full effect of sterling appreciation. This is estimated to benefit Scottish farmers by around £60 million over 1997 and 1998.

  Agricultural Imports
  Mr. Paterson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many inspections of imports of agricultural produce there have been in Scotland in the last year; and how many consignments were refused entry to Scotland. [28080]

  Mr. Macdonald
  The question covers a wide range of agricultural products and much of the information requested is not held centrally. As regards controls over Specified Risk Materials and imported meat, inspection procedures are now in operation. It has not been necessary to refuse entry to any consignments in Scotland.

  Integrated Transport Policy
  Dr. Moonie
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made in the development of an integrated transport policy in Scotland. [28082]
  576
  Mr. McLeish
  My right hon. Friend will publish a White Paper later this year. This paper will set out measures to achieve the Government's aims for an integrated transport system that is appropriate to the needs of the people, economy and environment of Scotland.

  Health Inequalities
  Mr. Roy
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received on the green paper on tackling the inequalities in health in Scotland. [28083]

  Mr. Galbraith
  The Green Paper "Working Together For a Healthier Scotland" was published on 5 February 1998. It sets out our proposals for improving health in Scotland and for tackling inequalities. Comments on the Paper have been invited by 30 April 1998. None have yet been received.

  Lockerbie
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he has taken to follow up the visit to Scotland by the United Nations team to study the Scottish legal system in respect of the Lockerbie bombing. [28084]

  Mr. McLeish
  The report of the United Nations legal experts was circulated as an official document of the Security Council. The report concluded that the two Libyan accused would receive a fair trial under the Scottish judicial system. The text of the conclusions of the report was transmitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Diplomatic Missions around the world in order that they might bring these conclusions to the attention of their host governments.

  Further and Higher Education
  Mr. Welsh
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland when he last met representatives from Scotland's(a) universities and (b) further education colleges to discuss funding arrangements; and if he will make a statement. [28085]

  Mr. Wilson
  My right hon. Friend and I meet the Principals of Scottish universities, Colleges and further education colleges regularly. Our discussions are always constructive and invariably touch on funding.

  Students (Tuition Fees)
  Mrs. Laing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the administrative arrangements for the introduction of tuition fees for students. [28086]

  Mr. Wilson
  The Students Award Agency for Scotland will be responsible for assessing applications from Scottish domiciled students for the payment of tuition fees. It will also continue to deal with applications from existing students.

  Dairy Farmers
  Dr. Julian Lewis
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the current average incomes of dairy farmers and the change which this represents from the previous year. [28088]

  Mr. Macdonald
  Forecasts based on the Annual Survey of Farm Accounts in Scotland indicate that the Net Farm Income of dairy farms is expected to fall from an average of £30,000 per farm in 1996–97 to £14,400 per farm in 1997–98.

  National Health Service Trusts
  Mr. Home Robertson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made towards achieving greater co-operation between NHS trusts. [28089]

  Mr. Galbraith
  Substantial progress is being made. The White Paper, "Designed To Care" set out our plans to abolish the internal market, replacing competition with an efficient system of co-operation and collaboration within the Health Service in Scotland.

  Abortion
  Mr. Amess
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what recent representations he has received on changing the abortion law in Scotland. [28090]

  Mr. Galbraith
  Since the Government took office in May 1997, we have received six letters seeking changes in the law on abortion.

  Road Traffic
  Mr. Chope
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his latest estimate of road traffic growth in Scotland in 1998. [28091]

  Mr. McLeish
  Forecasts of road traffic growth for Scotland are not produced separately from the National Road Traffic Forecasts for Great Britain published by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The latest forecasts, published in October 1997, take no account of our developing transport policies. On the central estimate, the forecast shows an increase in road traffic of 38 per cent. between 1996 and 2016 and 60 per cent. from 1996 to 2031.

  Live Animal Transport
  Mr. Gerald Howarth
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will meet representatives from the NFU in the Western Isles to discuss the transportation of livestock to the mainland. [28092]
  578
  Mr. Macdonald
  The Minister responsible for agriculture at the Scottish Office my noble Friend Lord Sewel, would be pleased to meet representatives of the Scottish NFU at a mutually convenient date should they consider this necessary to discuss transport of livestock.

  Crown Office
  Miss Kirkbride
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the budget of the Crown Office in the last year. [28094]

  Mr. Dewar
  The budget for the Crown Office and Lord Advocate's Department is provided by Parliament under separate vote arrangements: Class VIII, Vote 7, 1997–98. The current authorised cash limit for that year is £45,337,000. Details were published in the Supply Estimates, a copy of which is in the House Library.

  Local Government Services
  Mrs. Ray Michie
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the future administration of local government services. [28095]

  Mr. Macdonald
  Local authorities are best placed to decide how to administer their services. Best Value gives councils a chance to create a climate of continuous improvement in service quality and costs. It will require a radical rethink of the way council activities are organised and delivered.

  Social Exclusion
  Mrs. Fyfe
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he plans to take to ensure that there is a strategic approach within the Scottish Office to tackling social exclusion. [28096]

  Mr. Macdonald
  On 8 December, my right hon. Friend announced that he was setting up a Social Exclusion Network to co-ordinate Government action on social exclusion in Scotland. The Network consists of senior officials from Scottish Office Departments, the Employment Service and the Benefits Agency. Its work will be steered by my noble Friend the Minister with responsibility for agriculture, the environment and fisheries, who will report regularly and directly to my right hon. Friend on progress.

  On 2 February we issued a consultation paper, "Social Exclusion in Scotland", the responses to which will inform our approach to tackling exclusion.

  Tourism Grants
  Mr. Hoyle
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the impact of section 4 tourism grants in Scotland. [28097]

  Mr. Wilson
  The section 4 scheme was suspended in Scotland in 1993. From that date, support for business development in the tourism sector has been provided by Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise and their networks of Local Enterprise Companies. While the section 4 scheme was successful in raising standards throughout the tourism industry, I believe that the present arrangements for assistance to the industry are simpler and more relevant to its present day needs. These give the
  579
  industry access to the agencies responsible for delivering a wider range of support including business advice and training as well as direct assistance for capital projects.

  Cromarty Firth Port
  Mr. Maclennan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to protect the residents of Invergordon from environmental pollution by operators at the Cromarty Firth Port; and if he will make a statement. [29225]

  Mr. Macdonald
  Primary responsibility for pollution issues within the confines of the port lies with the Cromarty Firth Port Authority. Highland Council have the power and responsibility to address problems in so far as there may be any effect on health or damage to property. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency have nevertheless had discussion with the Council in an effort to help them identify ways of resolving the situation.

  Scottish Parliament Building
  Mr. Jenkin
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what assessment has been made of the likely cost of(a) clearing the site and (b) clearing asbestos from the site at Holyrood before construction can commence on the new Parliament building. [29499]

  Mr. Dewar
  Clearing the site at Holyrood is estimated to cost in the region of £500,000. The only known asbestos which presents a hazard is to be removed by Scottish and Newcastle plc before vacating the site. Any unforeseen asbestos hazard which is subsequently encountered will be dealt with through a general contingency provision in the missives under which the company will bear a substantial share of the cost of removal.

  Forestry
  Mr. Hoyle
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what targets he has set for lowland forestry; and to what extent these targets are being met. [29253]

  Mr. Dewar
  We are committed to increasing the area of woodland in Britain, both in the lowlands and in the uplands, but we have not set any specific targets.

  Sheep Dips
  Mr. Charles Kennedy
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what monitoring of the impact of synthetic pyrethroid sheep dips on(a) the aquatic environment,(b) the soil environment and (c) fisheries (i) has been carried out and (ii) is planned by his Department; and if he will make a statement. [29733]

  Mr. Macdonald
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The Scottish Environment Protection Agency, which is responsible for monitoring the aquatic environment in Scotland, carry out targeted monitoring to assess the impact of sheep-dip compounds, including synthetic pyrethroids on the chemical quality of the aquatic environment. No monitoring is carried out in respect of the soil environment. The effect on fisheries is covered by the monitoring of the aquatic environment.
  580
  The draft Groundwater regulations, published for consultation in liaison with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions on 12 January 1998 specify additional monitoring requirements for groundwater.

  Mr. Charles Kennedy
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what advice his Department gives to farmers on the disposal of synthetic pyrethroid sheep dips. [29731]

  Mr. Macdonald
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: Advice on the handling of sheep dips, including their safe disposal, must be given on the label of every product. Comprehensive advice is also provided in the Government leaflet, "Sheep dipping". A new edition of the leaflet is in preparation and will be sent to all known sheep farmers. Advice is also contained in the Department's Code of Good Practice for the Prevention of Environmental Pollution from Agricultural Activity.

  In addition, a Certificate of Competence is required by all purchasers of OP dips. This is organised by the National Proficiency Tests Council and includes confirmation of competence in disposal. While currently required only for the purchase of OP dips, the Government have accepted the advice of the Veterinary Products Committee that certification should be extended to cover the purchase of non-OP dips including those containing synthetic pyrethroids. We are currently consulting on the change in legislation necessary to achieve this.

  Student Awards Agency
  Mr. Welsh
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what plans he has to(a) increase the number of staff employed by, and (b) improve staff training in the Student Awards Agency for Scotland. [29715]

  Mr. Wilson
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The Review of the Student Awards Agency for Scotland which I have ordered will consider the lessons to be learned from the unacceptable delays experienced by many students in the processing of their awards in 1997 including the possible need for more staff. Training of staff is an important component in improving the Agency's efficiency and this will be taken account of in the Review.

  Beef on the Bone
  Mr. Swinney
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland, pursuant to the answer to the hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice) of 11 February 1998,Official Report, column 271, if he will list by district the number of butchers who have been (a) cautioned and (b) prosecuted for selling beef on the bone; how many cases have been referred to procurators fiscal in each district; what advice he has issued to procurators fiscal concerning the public interest in pursuing prosecution for selling beef on the bone; and if he will make a statement. [30051]

  Mr. McLeish
  My noble and learned Friend the Lord Advocate is responsible for the prosecution of crime in Scotland. Although the Beef Bones Regulations 1997 have been brought to the attention of Procurators Fiscal,
  581
  I understand from the Lord Advocate that no specific guidance has been issued. Although no central record is kept of prosecutions under these regulations, I am aware that criminal proceedings have been initiated in one such case, which is due to call at Selkirk Sheriff Court on 10 March 1998.

  Procurators Fiscal exercise discretion as to whether proceedings should be taken in the public interest, making use of the range of prosecution options and alternatives to prosecution, including the issue of written or personal warnings.

CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT

  Lost and Stolen Items
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport if he will list those items valued at more than £25 stolen or lost from his Department since 1 May 1997; and if he will make a statement. [27753]

  Mr. Tom Clarke
  [holding answer 5 February 1998]: Since 1 May 1997, my Department has lost a pager valued at £179, an answering machine valued at £30 and foreign currency worth approximately £347.

  Millennium Commission
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (1) when Commissioner Patricia Scotland first met representatives of(a) the Asha Project, (b) the Swamanarayan Hindu Mission Project and (c) the Belgrave Bhaeno Project; [29800]

  (2) if he will list the Millennium Commission projects which Commissioner Patricia Scotland has visited which were led by the Asian communities and the date of each visit. [29799]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  These are matters for the Millennium Commission. I shall write to my hon. Friend in my capacity as Chairman of the Commission, and place copies of my reply in the Libraries of the House.

  Mr. Paice
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport if he will ask the Millennium Commission to increase the resources allocated to the 21st Century Halls for England Project. [30036]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  This is a matter for the Millennium Commission. I shall write to the hon. Member in my capacity as Chairman of the Commission, and place copies of my reply in the Libraries of the House.

  Theft and Fraud
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what is his estimate of the cost of theft and fraud to(a) his Department, (b) its agencies and (c) non-departmental public bodies in (i) 1995–96, (ii) 1996–97 and (iii) 1997–98 to date. [27752]
  582
  Mr. Tom Clarke
  [holding answer 5 February 1998]:

  The available information is given in the table:

  £000

  1995–96

  1996–97

  1997–1998 to date

  Department for Culture, Media and Sport

  10

  0

  656

  Historic Royal Palaces Agency

  24,523

  12,688

  15,160

  Royal Parks Agency

  0

  0

  0

  Non-Departmental Public Bodies

  333,972

  144,949

  15,160

  1Figures shown take account of amounts recovered.

  2Updated from information given in the annual fraud return to Treasury to take account of additional information about the value of losses.

  Data on non-departmental public bodies is not include in the annual fraud return to the Treasury.

  Digital Television
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what steps he is taking to ensure people living in Wales will be able to receive digital terrestrial television. [29683]

  Mr. Fisher
  Digital terrestrial television will be able to deliver digital services to the majority of the population. The Independent Television Commission estimates that 74 per cent. of the Welsh population will be in the reception area of digital terrestrial services once the launch phase comprising 81 transmitters across the UK is complete. The coverage of digital services beyond the 81 sites is one of the issues looked at in the Government's consultation paper "Television: the Digital Future" published on 12 February. We are seeking views on the extension of digital transmissions beyond the initial planned 81 sites, and examining the possibility of extending access to digital services by using other broadcasting technologies.

  Film Industry
  Mr. Sheerman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what has been the total revenue earned by the film industry from exports in each of the last 10 years. [29410]

  Mr. Tom Clarke
  The revenue received from overseas film companies in the UK in respect of film production and performance in cinemas or on television for 1987 to 1996 is as follows. These are the latest 10 years for which figures are available from the Office for National Statistics:

  Receipts from overseas by UK film companies in respect of film production and performance in cinemas or on television

  Year

  £ million(current prices)

  1987

  264

  1988

  230

  1989

  263

  1990

  334

  1991

  290

  1992

  282

  1993

  336

  583

  Receipts from overseas by UK film companies in respect of film production and performance in cinemas or on television

  Year

  £ million (current prices)

  1994

  425

  1995

  495

  1996

  522

  Source:

  Office for National Statistics, News Release, Overseas transactions of the film and television industry 1996, 10 October 1997.

  These figures understate the total revenue received from overseas. There are earnings from other kinds of transactions measured only in aggregate, so that the film industry component is not separately identifiable. For example, profits due to UK parent companies from subsidiaries and branches overseas are included under investment income in the Balance of Payments. The figures shown above also exclude receipts by film companies for items such as management fees, merchandising and agency fees. ONS estimates are available for 1991 onwards for these "other overseas service transactions" but only for the total of such earnings by film and television companies. These figures are as follows:

  Receipts by UK film and television companies for "other overseas service transactions"

  Year

  £ million(current prices)

  1991

  108

  1992

  126

  1993

  162

  1994

  143

  1995

  168

  1996

  192

  Source:

  Office for National Statistics, News Release, Overseas transactions of the film and television industry 1996, 10 October 1997.

  Mr. Sheerman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (1) how many films have been filmed in the United Kingdom in each of the last 10 years; [29354]

  (2) how many films have been produced in the United Kingdom in each of the last 10 years; [29424]

  (3) how many films have been financed in the United Kingdom in each of the past 10 years. [29426]

  Mr. Tom Clarke
  There are no aggregate figures on the financing of films. The aggregate figures for films produced or made in the United Kingdom in each of the past 10 years are as follows:

  Year

  Films produced in UK

  1988

  48

  1989

  30

  1990

  60

  1991

  59

  1992

  47

  1993

  67

  1994

  84

  1995

  78

  1996

  128

  1997

  115

  584
  A breakdown of figures for the whole 10-year period is not available. However, in 1997, the breakdown was as follows:

  British productions shot mainly or wholly in the UK:60

  British productions shot partly in the UK and partly abroad:6

  British productions shot mainly or wholly abroad:8

  Majority UK international co-productions shot partly in the UK and partly abroad:4

  Majority UK international co-productions shot mainly or wholly in the UK:6

  Majority UK international co-productions shot mainly or wholly abroad:10

  Minority UK international co-production shot mainly or wholly in the UK:1

  Minority UK international co-production shot mainly or wholly abroad:8

  Foreign films shot partly or wholly in the UK:12.

  NESTA Board
  Dr. Gibson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport if he will list the scientific organisations which have been consulted about the composition of the NESTA Board. [29048]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  The National Lottery Bill would require me, before appointing NESTA's Trustees, to consult representatives of bodies active in science, technology and the arts. In preparation for the establishment of NESTA, my Department is seeking the views of a wide range of bodies and individuals, many of which are active in more than one of these fields. It is not, therefore, possible accurately to identify scientific organisations alone. The complete list of bodies being consulted is given. In addition, all those who responded to the proposals for NESTA in our consultation paper "The People's Lottery" have been informed of the process for identifying candidates for these posts and their views are welcomed. The posts of Chair and Trustees of NESTA are also being advertised in the national press.

  3i

  AEA Technology plc

  Amaze Ltd.

  Armagh Observatory

  Armargh Planetarium

  Art of Change

  Artec

  Artificial Life

  Artimedia Centre

  Arts Catalyst

  Arts Council of England

  Arts Council of Northern Ireland

  Arts Council of Scotland

  Arts Council of Wales

  Association of British Healthcare Industries

  Association of Art Historians

  Association of British Orchestras

  Association of British picture Restorers

  Association of Business Sponsorship in the Arts

  Association of Composer Organisations

  Association of Independent Research and Technology Organisations (AIRTO)

  Association of London Government

  585

  Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry

  Autograph

  BAFTA

  BBC

  BBC Education

  BioIndustry Association

  Black Dog Publishing

  Board for the Engineering Profession

  Brighton Media Centre

  British Academy

  British Actors' Equity Association

  British Association for the Advancement of Science

  British Copyright Council

  British Film Commission

  British Film Institute

  British In Vitro Diagnostic Association

  British Library

  British Music Publishers Association

  British Music Rights Limited

  British Pharma Group

  British Phonographic Industry

  British Screen Advisory Council

  British Screen Finance

  British Technology Group

  British Tourist Authority

  British Venture Capital Association

  BT Laboratories

  Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation

  Cambridge Consultants Ltd.

  Carnegie UK Trust

  Catalyst

  Cavendish Management Resources

  CBI Scotland

  Centre for Alternative Technology

  CERAM Research

  Channel 4

  Chemical Industries Association

  Commission for Racial Equality

  Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals

  Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals

  Confederation of British Industry

  Conference of Drama Schools

  Contemporary Art Society

  Council for Dance Education and Training

  Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils

  Council of Europe

  Council of Science and Technology Institutes

  Craft Development Agency

  Crafts Council

  Cultural Partnerships

  Design Council

  Design Directorate

  Development Board for Rural Wales

  ENGAGE (Gallery Education Association)

  Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

  Engineering Council

  Engineering Employers' Federation

  English Heritage

  586

  Equal Opportunities Commission

  Federation of Small Businesses

  Focus Central London

  Foundation for Art and Creative Technology

  Foundation for Science and Technology

  Foundation for Sport and the Arts

  Haringey Arts Council

  Highlands and Islands Enterprise

  Hull Time Based Arts Ltd.

  Hyperjam

  Illuminations Interactive

  Illuminations Television

  Incorporated Society of Musicians

  Independent Television Commission

  Independent Theatre Council

  Industrial Research and Technology Unit

  Inside Cable and Telecoms Europe

  Institute of Biology

  Institute of Directors

  Institute of Engineering Designers

  Institute of Patentees and Inventors

  Institute of Physics

  Intellectual Property Awareness Working Party

  Intellectual Property Development Confederation

  Intellectual Property Institute

  International Media Consultants

  Islington Council

  Jerwood Foundation

  Jubilee

  Kirklees Media Centre

  Laboratory of the Government Chemists

  Library and Information Commission

  Light House Media Centre

  Lighthouse Arts and Training Ltd.

  Local Government Association

  London Film and Video Development Agency

  London Institute

  LUTCHI Research Centre

  Manchester Institute for Popular Culture

  METIER

  Modern Recordings

  Mondial Television

  Museums and Galleries Commission

  Museums Association

  Music Education Council

  Musicians' Union

  National Association for the Teaching of Drama

  National Association for the Teaching of English

  National Association of Decorative and Fine Arts Societies

  National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education

  National Campaign for the Arts

  National Council for Drama Training

  National Council on Archives

  National Dance Teachers Association

  National Education Business Partnership Network

  National Engineering Laboratory

  National Federation of Music Societies

  587

  National Film and Television School

  National Foundation for Educational Research

  National Literacy Trust

  National Museum of Science and Industry

  National Music Council

  National Physical Laboratory

  National Society for Education in Arts and Design

  National Trust

  National Weights and Measures Laboratory

  Natural History Museum

  North East Wales Institute of Higher Education

  Northern Ireland Business Education Partnership

  Northern Ireland Film Commission

  Northern Ireland Growth Challenge

  Northern Ireland Science and Technology Regional Organisation

  Office of Science and Technology

  Oxford Trust

  Paul Hamlyn Foundation

  Performing Arts Labs

  Photographers' Gallery

  Prevista

  Prince's Trust

  Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television

  Publishers Association

  Queen's University

  Radio Academy

  Radio Authority

  Royal Academy of Engineering

  Royal Academy of Music

  Royal College of Music

  Royal Institute for British Architects (RIBA)

  Royal Institute for Chartered Surveyors (RICS)

  Royal Institute of Great Britain

  Royal Northern College of Music

  Royal Society of Arts

  Royal Society of Chemistry

  Royal Society of Edinburgh

  Royal Society of Literature

  Royal Television Society

  Ruskin School of Drawing and Fine Art

  S4C

  Salford University Business Services Ltd.

  Save British Science Society

  Science and Technology Regional Organisation (SATRO) North Scotland

  Scottish Agricultural College

  Scottish Council for Educational Technology

  Scottish Electronic Forum

  Scottish Engineering

  Scottish Enterprise

  Scottish Financial Enterprise

  Scottish Higher Education Funding Council

  Scottish Media Group

  Scottish Oil and Gas Innovation Forum

  Scottish Science Trust

  Seeing The Light Ltd.

  Shaping the Future of Science and Technology

  Signals—Essex Media Centre

  588

  SIRA Ltd.

  Skillset

  Snowdonia Business Innovation Centre

  Society of Archivists

  Society of London Theatre

  Soda Creative Technologies

  Sonic Arts Network

  South Bank University

  South East Wales Business Innovation Centre (SEWBIC)

  Sseyo

  Studio Fish

  Tate Gallery

  Teaching Company Scheme

  TEC National Council

  Techniquest

  Technology Colleges Trust

  Telepolis—Magazine of NetCulture

  Thames Gateway Technology Centre

  The British Council

  The Media Trust

  The Patent Office

  The Royal Society

  The Salters Institute of Industrial Chemistry

  The Science Engineering Technology Mathematics Network

  The Ulster Museum

  The Welding Institute (TWI)

  Theatrical Management Association (TMA)

  UK Sports Council

  United Kingdom Institute for Conservation

  University of Glamorgan

  University of Portsmouth

  University of Ulster at Jordanstown

  University of Wales

  Urban Regeneration Committee

  Visual Arts and Galleries Association

  Voluntary Arts Network

  Welsh Design Advisory Service

  Welsh Development Agency

  Welsh Funding Councils

  Welsh Local Government Association

  Year of Engineering Success

  Yorkshire and Humberside Arts

  Youth Arts Network.

  Women's Sport
  Mr. Spring
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what initiatives he has undertaken to encourage more female participation in sport; and what meetings he has had with(a) women's groups and (b) the Minister for Women in this respect. [29556]

  Mr. Tom Clarke
  We are determined to improve opportunities for women of all ages and at all levels in sport. That goes for participants, competitors, coaches and administrators.

  The UK and Home Country Sports Councils actively encourage women to get involved in all sports. They are underlining the significant achievement of women in sport and helping improve levels of participation. The National

  589
  Lottery is having a big impact in this area. Organisations must demonstrate ways in which they are helping to increase the participation of women in order to secure funding. This is proving very successful in encouraging more women into sport, including those sports traditionally regarded as male-dominated. We shall continue to work with the Sports Councils to examine further ways to help women in sport.

  I met Ms Kamlesh Bhal, Chairperson of the Equal Opportunities Commission, on 29 July 1997 to discuss a number of issues, including women in sport. Although my hon. Friend the Minister for Sport has not met any women's group in particular, he has met a number of women who are involved in women's sport and will continue to do so.

  My hon. Friend hopes to meet the Minister for Women to discuss women's sport in due course.

  Mr. Peter Davis
  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what restrictions on public statements on his resignation were agreed to by Mr. Peter Davis as part of his resignation settlement. [28600]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  I issued a statement agreed with the Director-General, Peter Davis, on Tuesday 3 February. No further statement will be issued which is inconsistent with this without Mr. Davis' prior written consent.

  Under the terms of his letter of appointment,Mr. Davis is required to seek the approval of the Head of the Home Civil Service to the proposed text of any memoirs relating to his responsibilities as Director-General.

  Appointments
  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (1) what vacancies currently exist for appointments to be made by the Secretary of State to non-departmental public bodies; [28850]

  (2) how many (a) notified vacancies and (b) vacancies arising through appointments expiring, currently exist for appointments to be made by him. [28882]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: Vacancies exist or current terms of appointment come to an end during 1998 on the bodies listed below. It is not possible to state how many expiring appointments will result in vacancies since some board members may be invited to serve a further term. This list does not include those bodies where appointments are for Her Majesty the Queen or my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and where my role is to advise.

  Advisory Committee on the Government Art Collection

  Advisory Committee on Historic Wreck Sites

  Advisory Committee on the Public Lending Right

  Advisory Council on Libraries

  Arts Council of England

  British Film Institute

  British Library

  British Tourist Authority

  Broadcasting Standards Commission

  Crafts Council

  English Heritage

  590

  Horniman Museum

  Independent Television Commission

  Imperial War Museum

  Library and Information Commission

  Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester

  National Film and Television School

  National Lottery Charities Board

  Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art

  Royal Armouries

  S4C.

  It is also my expectation to make appointments to three new public bodies—the New Opportunities Fund; the National Endowment for Science, Technology and Arts; and the Historic Royal Palaces Trust.

  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what consultation takes place between the Secretary of State and the current trustees of non-departmental public bodies prior to the announcement of appointments by the Secretary of State. [28831]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: Chairmen are invited to make their own suggestions on appointments and are consulted before appointments are announced.

  South Bank Centre
  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport when he expects to make a decision on the South Bank Centre redevelopment project referred to him by the Arts Council of England. [28832]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: The South Bank Centre has applied to the Arts Council of England for Lottery funding for its proposed redevelopment scheme. Decisions on the award of Lottery funds are a matter for the Arts Council, as an independent lottery distributing body.

  Arts Council
  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport when he expects to publish the results of the current review of the Arts Council structure. [28870]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: My Department, in common with all others, is currently undertaking a fundamental review of expenditure involving a re-evaluation of all the activities in the sectors covered by the department and its sponsored bodies. I expect to publish the outcome of the review in the summer.

  Devolution
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what discussions he has had with the Scottish Office on the impact of the Government's devolution proposals on his Department's responsibilities. [27983]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: I have not yet had any bilateral discussions. However, they will take place as necessary in due course. I am a member of the DSWR Cabinet Committee which discusses devolution issues, and there is close liaison at official level on all relevant subjects.

  Physical Education
  Mr. Truswell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport what assessment he has made of the impact on sport development of the removal of physical education from the core curriculum. [29408]

  Mr. Tom Clarke
  Physical education has not been removed from the curriculum, it must still be taught by schools. The Government have suspended some detailed requirements as part of our initiative to raise levels of numeracy and literacy in particular, but good PE and sport still has a vital part to play in developing the skills of our young people.

  Victoria and Albert Museum
  Mr. Maude
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport when he expects to make a decision on the Victoria and Albert Museum extension. [28869]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  [holding answer 10 February 1998]: The Victoria and Albert Museum submitted a revised economic appraisal for its British Galleries project in January. This involves the refurbishment of the fifteen galleries documenting the evolution of art and design in the UK from 1500 to 1900. The appraisal will be scrutinised by my Department and the Treasury before approval can be granted. I understand that an application for funding has been made to the Heritage Lottery Fund.

  The Museum also has plans to build the "Boilerhouse" extension in Exhibition Road, South Kensington as designed by the architect Daniel Libeskind. However, an application to the Millennium Commission has been refused and we understand that the Museum has applied to the Arts Council for funds for a feasibility study. No decision is required from my Department at this stage.

  National Lottery Licence
  Mr. Berry
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport when he proposes to request bids to run the National Lottery; and what meetings he has held with prospective National Lottery licencees other than Camelot. [29835]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  The current operating licence expires in September 2001. The Director-General of the National Lottery will announce in good time before then when bids should be sent to him. I have had no meetings with any prospective bidders on the subject of the next licence.

  Mr. Berry
  To ask the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport if he will list the criteria by which he will assess proposals to run the National Lottery when the current licence expires. [29834]

  Mr. Chris Smith
  Under the National Lottery etc. Act 1993 responsibility for considering applications to run the National Lottery lies with the Director-General of the National Lottery. The key criteria on which the Director-General will assess proposals are set out in the relevant legislation; that the Lottery is run with propriety, that the interests of participants are protected and, subject to these,592
  that the good cause proceeds are maximised. The National Lottery Bill currently before Parliament contains provision for a panel to advise the Director-General on the selection of the operator.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT

  Legal Aid
  Mr. Yeo
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what discussions he has had with the insurance industry about the introduction of contingency fee arrangements. [28103]

  Mr. Hoon
  I have set out these details in previous answers to questions from the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) on the 15 of December 1997,Official Report, columns 43–44, and 30 of January 1998,Official Report, column 393. Since then, the working group looking at conditional fees insurance has met on the 6 of February. At this, the second meeting, my officials, representatives of the Association of British Insurers, and the insurance industry, were joined by representatives of the British Banking Association, clearing, and other banks.

  Mrs. Spelman
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what progress he is making with the introduction of his legal aid reforms. [28109]

  Mr. Hoon
  A consultation paper will be published in the next few weeks setting out the Government's proposals for the extension of the conditional fee scheme and changes to the scope of civil legal aid. Decisions will not be made about the reforms to be introduced until the responses to the consultation paper have been considered.

  Mr. Keith Simpson
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what progress he is making with the introduction of his legal aid reforms. [28112]

  Mr. Hoon
  A consultation paper will be published in the next few weeks setting out the Government's proposals for the extension of the conditional fee scheme and changes to the scope of civil legal aid. Decisions will not be made about the reforms to be introduced until the responses to the consultation paper have been considered.

  Civil Aid Certificates
  Mr. Llwyd
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department when he plans to announce the results of the consultation process on the proposed changes to the issue of civil aid certificates in certain types of action; and if he will make a statement. [28108]

  Mr. Hoon
  The consultation paper setting out the proposals for the extension of the conditional fee scheme and removal of most claims for monetary recompense from the scope of civil legal aid will be published in the next few weeks, inviting responses during a specified consultation period. Decisions will be announced after the responses have been considered.

  Magistrates Courts
  Mr. Greenway
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department if he will make a statement about the North Yorkshire magistrates courts committee's proposals for the future of the magistrates courts service in the county. [28110]

  Mr. Hoon
  Decisions concerning the future of the magistrates' courts service in a given area are for the relevant magistrates' courts committee (MCC) to determine. Each MCC has a statutory responsibility to provide an efficient and effective service to court users. This would, of course, include deciding, in consultation with its local providing authority, whether its existing resources meet the MCC's needs both current and future.

  However, should proposals for change be made by the MCC, certain applications will arise that require the Lord Chancellor's attention. My Department currently holds two such applications for North Yorkshire, (i) for the reorganisation of petty sessional divisions and (ii) an appeal against the proposed closure of Ripon Magistrates' Court later this year.

  It would, of course, be inappropriate for me to comment on either of those matters as they have yet to be considered by the Lord Chancellor.

  Immigration Adjudicators
  Mr. Malins
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what plans he has to increase the training given to immigration adjudicators. [28111]

  Mr. Hoon
  I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 10 November 1997,Official Report, column 572. Training is a matter for the Chief Adjudicator. All adjudicators receive appropriate training. In particular, all adjudicators will receive training on the Human Rights Bill before it is implemented.

  Legal Profession (Tax Treatment)
  Mr. Nicholls
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department what representations his Department has made to Her Majesty's Treasury concerning its proposals to change the tax treatment of the legal profession. [28099]

  £

  Event

  Place

  Date

  Cost

  Climate Change Seminar

  London

  5 June 1997

  569.95

  London Referendum Green Paper Launch

  London

  29 July 1997

  704.00

  Integrated Transport Consultation Launch

  London

  18 August 1997

  357.20

  Millennium Riverbank Experience

  London

  18 August 1997

  1,427.50

  Integrated Transport Consultation Launch

  Regions

  12 September 1997

  188.00

  New Driver Act Launch

  London

  12 September 1997

  274.95

  Heathrow Bus Lane Launch

  London

  25 September 1997

  770.00

  Construction Task Force Conference

  London

  22 October 1997

  422.41

  World Squares Launch

  London

  5 November 1997

  1,697.88

  Opening of New Puffin Crossing

  London

  3 December 1997

  347.21

  Transport Operators Forum

  London

  22 January 1998

  4,650.00

  Child Road Safety Campaign Launch

  London

  28 January 1998

  1,199.15

  Total

  12,608.17

  594
  Mr. Hoon
  It would not be appropriate for me to comment on any discussions that may have taken place within Government.

  Overseas Visits
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary,Lord Chancellor's Department how many times the wives of Ministers in his Department have accompanied Ministers on overseas visits; and in each case what was the cost of their travel and other expenses. [25143]

  Mr. Hoon
  [holding answer 23 January 1998]: As I indicated in my answer to the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) of 15 January 1998, Official Report, column 278, my noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor was accompanied by Lady Irvine at the 14th Conference of Commonwealth Speakers and Presiding Officers, held in Trinidad and Tobago on 4–11 January 1998. It has since come to light that the total cost of the trip from public funds for the Lord Chancellor, Lady Irvine and an official was, in fact, approximately £9,200, as I explained to the hon. Member for Spelthorne in my letter of 21 January, a copy of which was placed in the Library.

  Fixed Costs Regime
  Mr. Corbett:
  To ask the Parliamentary Secretary,Lord Chancellor's Department if he will publish the results of research by the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies into the fixed costs regime. [29995]

  Mr. Hoon
  I anticipate publishing the research in conjunction with a consultation paper on costs in the fast track after Easter.

ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND THE REGIONS

  Departmental Publicity
  Mr. Bercow
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what has been the cost of media presentations and press conferences which he has given, other than those held at his Department. [25157]

  Angela Eagle
  [holding answer 23 January 1998]: Since 2 May 1997, direct expense has been incurred in mounting media presentations and press conferences involving Ministers held outside my Department or its Agencies as follows:

  Funding (Shropshire)
  Mr. Paul Marsden
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what additional funds have been allocated to Shrewsbury and Atcham and Shropshire since 1 May out of his Department's budgets. [27106]

  Mr. Raynsford
  The following tables provide details for those programmes where additional funds have been allocated to Shrewsbury and Atcham District Council and Shropshire County Council in 1997–98 since May 1997.

  £000

  Original Allocation

  Revised Allocation

  Change

  Shropshire County Council Local Government Reorganisation SCAs

  2,700

  5,100

  +2,400

  £000

  Original Allocation

  Revised Allocation

  Change

  Shrewsbury and Atcham District Council

  Capital Receipts Initiative

  0

  221

  +221

  Cash Incentive Scheme

  50

  83

  +33

  Total

  50

  304

  +254

  The following table provides details of those programmes where additional funds have been allocated to Shrewsbury and Atcham District Council. These figures are based on budget allocations known at this time. No additional allocations have been made to Shropshire County Council in 1998–99.

  £000

  1997–98

  1998–99

  Change

  Shrewsbury and Atcham District Council

  Capital Receipts Initiative

  221

  757

  +536

  Revenue Support Grant

  2,191

  2,268

  +77

  Redistributed Non-Domestic Rates

  3,041

  3,114

  +73

  Total

  5,453

  6,139

  +686

  Ashley Heath
  Mr. Chope
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1) what additional cost has been incurred compared with budget forecasts as a result of errors made in the calculation of noise predictions in respect of the A31 road improvement at Ashley Heath; [28479]

  (2) what were the noise predictions made before construction started on the A31 Ashley Heath improvement in respect of the impact upon properties in St. Ives Wood; and what were the noise levels recorded after construction was complete; [28524]

  (3) how many claims for purchase or compensation have been made by householders in respect of the impact of the A31 Ashley Heath improvement; and how many have so far been settled, and at what cost; [28525]
  596
  (4) what forecast was made prior to construction of the cost of claims for purchase or compensation for landholders affected by the A31 Ashley Heath improvements. [28526]

  Ms Glenda Jackson:
  I have asked the Chief Executive, of the Highways Agency, to write to the hon. Member.

  Letter from David York to Mr. Christopher Chope, dated 17 February 1998:
  The Transport Minister, Glenda Jackson, has asked the Chief Executive of the Highways Agency to reply to your recent Parliamentary Questions about the A31 Ashley Heath junction improvement. In his absence I am writing on his behalf.
  Estimates provided by the District Valuer before construction began for the cost of acquisition of property and compensation arising from construction of the scheme amounted to £130,000. This did not cover the cost of buying under discretionary purchase rules property which was considered to be seriously affected by traffic using the new scheme.
  To date 9 interests in property needed for construction have been acquired at a cost of approx £125,000 and 95 claims for compensation for loss in value of property have been received which could cost £150,000. Property to the value of £2.6m has been acquired because it was considered to be seriously affected but will be resold and it is expected that a large part of that sum will be recouped.
  Revisiting calculations of predicted noise levels from traffic using the junction improvement led to applications for purchase of property which had previously been refused being accepted. Additional costs of about £100,000 resulted.
  In accordance with the Noise Insulation Regulations, predictions of future noise levels in the vicinity of the junction were published in 1991. I will arrange for a copy of this report to be placed in the House of Commons library. No comprehensive measurement of noise levels has been made since the junction improvement has been completed although the local authority has taken several spot readings.

  Tachograph Interference
  Mr. Öpik
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1) if he will make a statement on the penalties for tachograph interference; and how many incidences of such interference have been recorded in each of the last three years; [28955]

  (2) what Government publicity has been issued on the subject of tachograph interference; and if he will make a statement. [28956]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  The maximum penalties for producing a false tachograph chart by tampering with the device are, on summary conviction, a fine of £5,000 and, on conviction on indictment, two years imprisonment. Convictions are also taken into account by the local Traffic Commissioner when reviewing an operator's compliance with the conditions of his licence. Offenders can be called to a public inquiry, and their licences can be curtailed, suspended or revoked.

  The Vehicle Inspectorate's Annual Effectiveness Report1 includes statistics on tachograph and other drivers' hours offences that are reported for prosecution by the Inspectorate. For 1995–96, it is not possible to differentiate tachograph interference offences from other

  597
  tachograph and drivers' hours offences. The best available figures for the subsequent two years for offences concerning interference with the tachograph and its records are:

  1996–97: 681 (England and Wales only)

  1997–98 (April to December): 775 (England, Wales and Scotland only).

  The figures do not include offences detected by the police.

  It would not be appropriate to publish information abut the nature of tachograph interference because of the risk that methods might be imitated.
  1Vehicle Inspectorate: Traffic Safety and a cleaner environment:
  A Report on the Vehicle Inspectorate's Effectiveness as an Enforcement Agency 1996/97.

  Environmental Appraisals
  Mr. Matthew Taylor
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions how many civil servants in(a) his Department and (b) other Government departments have been trained in environmental appraisal techniques since 1 May. [29021]

  Mr. Meacher
  Environmental appraisal, whether for policies, projects or programmes, covers a range of skills which are acquired by staff across Government through various routes, including formal training, learning on-the-job and reading guidance documents. Figures are not collected centrally for the numbers of staff, in the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions or in other Government departments, trained in these various ways. I understand, however, that the Civil Service College gives formal training on environmental appraisal in courses on Option Appraisal for economists and on "Spending Public Money Wisely" for fast-stream administrators; both of these normally run twice annually with an attendance of about a dozen each time, and each has run once since 1 May 1997.

  Children (Road Accidents)
  Ms Shipley
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions how many children were(a) killed and (b) injured in road accidents (i) during school hours and (ii) while travelling to and from school in the latest period for which figures are available. [29164]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  In 1996, there were 35 children killed while travelling to and from school and 8,941 injured, of which 1,377 were injured seriously. These figures include some pupils who are aged 16 years old. In 1996 there were 270 children (aged 0–15) killed and (in the same age group) 44,835 children were injured, of which 6,519 were seriously injured. However, because of differing school hours and days, it is not possible to determine how many occurred during school hours.

  Ms Shipley
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions how many children were killed in road traffic accidents(a) in total, (b) by drivers while speeding and (c) by drivers under the influence of (i) alcohol and (ii) drugs in the latest period for which figures are available. [29163]
  598
  Ms Glenda Jackson
  In 1996, there were 270 children (aged 0–15) killed in road accidents in Great Britain. In 1995, the most recent year in which sufficiently detailed data is available to analyse drink drive casualties by age, it is estimated that 15 children were killed in accidents involving a driver with an illegal level of blood alcohol. No figures are available for children killed in accidents involving a speeding driver or a driver under the influence of drugs although research suggests that around one third of all accidents involve excessive speed. Recent research is also beginning to indicate a greater presence of drugs in drivers killed in road accidents, although we have no evidence as to the causative effect of drugs in such accidents and no information is available regarding child casualties in such accidents.

  English Nature
  Mr. Alan Campbell
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what plans he has to carry out a review of the work of English Nature. [29409]

  Angela Eagle
  The work of English Nature is under regular scrutiny. The annual Corporate Planning round provides an opportunity to assess performance, identify priorities and assist the allocation of resources.

  English Nature was brought into existence in 1991 as a result of the re-organisation of the former Nature Conservancy Council. Its work was reviewed in 1994 when a study was carried out into the possibility of merging English Nature with the Countryside Commission. The Joint Nature Conservation Committee, through which English Nature in conjunction with Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales, carries out some of its functions assigned to it by the Environmental Protection Act 1990, has also recently undergone a strategic review. In common with Government Departments and the other Countryside Agencies, the role of English Nature is being examined as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review.

  An important aspect of English Nature's work is the notification and management of the network of Sites of Special Scientific Interest. The Department is preparing a consultation paper seeking views on how these sites can be better managed. We expected to be able to issue the paper to the public in the late Spring.

  Dog Registration
  Mr. Green
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what plans he has to make provisions for the establishment of a dog registration scheme by local authorities. [29247]

  Angela Eagle
  My Department is considering the issues surrounding the establishment of a dog registration scheme. A decision on the appropriate way forward will be taken in due course.

  Gas Storage
  Mr. Nigel Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1) what assessment he has made of safety risks of gas bullets stored near Gloucester Road in Cheltenham; [29396]
  599
  (2) if he will make a statement on the safety record of the range gas storage methods; [29397]

  (3) what measures he expects to take to remove gas bullets from residential areas; and if he will make a statement. [29398]

  Angela Eagle
  I have no proposals to remove gas bullets from residential areas. Gas bullets are used to store gas at high pressure and currently there are twelve such notifiable hazardous installations in Great Britain. All are subject to health and safety legislation requiring operators to submit a safety report which sets out the measures taken to ensure safety at the installation to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Assessment of these reports takes into account predictive, technical and operational elements, and consideration of the causes and consequences of major accidents on the site. An assessment of on-site and off-site risks and details of control measures on the site are also made.

  HSE also sets a "consultation distance" around these installations. The Local Planning Authority (LPA) is required to consult HSE on planning applications within the consultation distance, to give HSE the opportunity to provide advice on safety issues affecting the proposed development. However, the ultimate responsibility for deciding on planning permission rests with the LPA.

  HSE's advice is based on residual risks posed by an installation of this type, after the overall risks have been reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable. The basis for the advice and the criteria used by HSE in formulating such advice are set out in "Risk criteria for land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards", published in 1989 by HMSO.

  HSE has set a consultation distance around the notifiable hazardous installation operated by BG Transco, Gloucester Road, Cheltenham. In 1997 HSE was asked to advise the LPA in Cheltenham on two planning applications within the consultation distance of the Gloucester Road site. Both cases were passed to HSE's Major Hazards Assessment Unit (MHAU).

  The first case involved the conversion of land adjacent to the BG Transco site into a play area for Gloucester Road Primary School. MHAU's assessment led HSE to advise against granting planning permission. The assessment was based on developed policy which is to advise against developments involving vulnerable populations (such as school children) in the consultation zone.

  The second case also involved the provision of a play area for the same school; it required the demolition of a house and social club and conversion of a small area of land adjacent to the school. This was further away from the BG Transco site than the first case, but still within the consultation zone. MHAU's assessment took account of the overall reduction in the population at risk and the small increase in area of the school. It was felt that this development would not put children at greater risk and in this case HSE did not advise against granting planning permission.

  Formal assessments of the safety risks at the Gloucester Road site were undertaken during 1992 and 1995. A further safety report is due shortly.
  600
  Natural gas in Great Britain is normally stored in the following ways:

  (a)in low pressure gas holders;

  (b)in high pressure storage bullets;

  (c)as liquefied natural gas;

  (d)in underground caverns.

  These storage methods have a good safety record and in recent years there have been few incidents and no injuries.

  Repossessions
  Mrs. Ballard
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what estimate he has made of the number of repossession orders which have been made in the last six months because of arrears caused by the difference between the standard mortgage interest rate and the actual interest rate levied by building societies. [29723]

  Mr. Raynsford
  My Department does not make estimates relating to possession orders. The Lord Chancellor's Department publishes quarterly figures for mortgage possession orders in the county courts. These give no information on the reasons for the action.

  Peat Working Group
  Mr. Randall
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, pursuant to his answer of 22 December 1997,Official Report, columns 433–34 on the Peat Working Group, for what reasons no non-governmental conservation organisation is a member of the group. [29670]

  Mr. Raynsford
  The purpose of the Peat Working Group has been to collate factual information and to advise my Department on the relevant issues. Its membership comprised organisations with a statutory responsibility for either conservation or planning control over peatlands together with the peat industry, who have property and working rights on a number of the bogs. Nature conservation interests were covered by the statutory countryside conservation agencies. The conservation non-governmental organisations (NGOs) together with other interested parties were invited to provide the Group with factual information. Meetings were held between these and officials from my Department on a number of occasions. These organisations were also consulted on the contents of the draft Mineral Planning Guidance Note No. 13 issued in 1995. However, at a recent meeting between officials and representatives of the conservation NGOs, an invitation was extended to them to be represented on the Group when it next meets. I understand that the invitation has been accepted.

  Bathing Water Standards
  Mr. Vaz
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what steps he proposes to make beaches cleaner. [29544]

  Angela Eagle
  Following the answer my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Environment gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie) on 4 December 1997,Official Report, columns 289–91, the Environment Agency is preparing a report on the prospects for compliance with EU bathing water quality

  601
  standards and the action needed on bathing waters which persistently fail. The report will take into account improvements resulting from completion of the remaining schemes in the bathing water improvement programme, implementation of the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive and the Agency's new policy on consents for discharges close to bathing waters. As part of the current review of water company prices, options for more investment to improve bathing water standards are being addressed and initial decisions will be taken this summer.

  Diesel Hotline
  Mr. Brake
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions how many calls the Vehicle Inspectorate dirty diesel telephone hotline received between(a) November 1996 and January 1997 and (b) November 1997 and January 1998 [29774]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  I have asked the Chief Executive of the vehicle Inspectorate,Mr. Ron Oliver, to write to the hon. Member.

  Letter from Ron Oliver to Mr. Tom Brake, dated 17 February 1998:
  The Secretary of State has asked me to reply to your question about the number of calls received by the Vehicle Inspectorate's smoky vehicle telephone hotline between (a) November 1996 and January 1997 and (b) November 1997 and January 1998.
  Details for the two periods are as follows:
  November 1996—January 1997 1,954 calls
  November 1997—January 1998 2,294 calls.
  There was a noticeable increase in the number of calls received in January 1998 and this has been attributed to the publicity campaign promoting the service launched by the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) on 23 December 1997.

  Bonn Convention
  Mr. Dafis
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what steps the Government have taken to fulfil their obligations under the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; what areas are outstanding; and if he will make a statement. [28156]

  Angela Eagle
  The United Kingdom's obligations to conserve migratory species in accordance with this important Convention are reflected in existing national legislation, especially the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, and the programmes of my Department and the statutory conservation agencies.

  The most recent summary of progress was published in March last year, entitled Report of the United Kingdom Government to the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Geneva 10–16 April 1997. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

  The report details conservation activities relating to the species listed in the Appendices to the Convention and other migratory species, and gives information on research projects. It also provides information on the implementation of the Convention in the United Kingdom's Dependent Territories. The report also covers the United Kingdom's implementation of two regional agreements concluded under the Convention, the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS) and the Agreement on the Conservation of Bats in Europe. Both
  602
  Agreements have been ratified by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has also signed, subject to ratification, the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement (AEWA).

  Bern Convention
  Mr. Dafis
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what steps the Government have taken to fulfil their obligations under the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats; what areas are outstanding; and if he will make a statement. [28157]

  Angela Eagle
  The Government's obligations under the Bern Convention have been fulfilled by the enactment of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, as amended, and the Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/2716).

  Ramsar Convention
  Mr. Dafis
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what steps the Government have taken to fulfil their obligations under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance; what areas remain outstanding; and if he will make a statement. [28158]

  Angela Eagle
  The Government are making excellent progress in designating Ramsar sites. Since the UK acceded to the Convention in 1976, we have listed 120 sites covering 491,646 hectares, including two in the Dependent Territories.

  On 2 February, at an event to mark the 27th Anniversary of the Convention, the Government launched the UK Targets for the Ramsar Strategic Plan. The strategy sets targets for the UK to achieve further progress, towards the wise use of wetlands, and identifies specific goals, for the period to 2002. I have arranged for a copy to be deposited in the Library of the House.

  European Union Habitats Directive
  Mr. Dafis
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what steps the Government have taken to fulfil their obligations under the European Union Habitats Directive; what areas remain outstanding; and if he will make a statement. [28159]

  Angela Eagle
  The European Union Habitats Directive was transposed into UK law through The Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations 1994 and The Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1995. We have submitted 262 areas covering 1,526,817.62 hectares to the European Commission as part of our obligation to put forward a list of candidate Special Areas of Conservation. We have recently consulted on further areas and will be submitting additional sites in the coming weeks.

  Drugs (Driving)
  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions if he will estimate the number of prescriptions issued for medicinal
  603
  drugs whose side-effects include performance impairment comparable to that of 80mg of alcohol per 100ml of blood. [29843]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  This information is not available.

  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what drugs can be detected by the(a) Cozart and (b) Drugwipe tests; and how many and what percentage of the total of medicinal drugs which if taken in accordance with directions can reduce drivers' performance to a level comparable to that of 80mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood can be detected. [29839]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  The Cozart test can separately identify five drug groups; cannabis, amphetamines (including ecstasy), cocaine, opiates and benzodiazepines. The Drugwipe test also detects drugs from the first four of these groups i.e. cannabis, amphetamines (including ecstasy), cocaine and opiates, but does not detect benzodiazepines. The information sought for medicinal drugs is not available.

  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what assessment he made of simulator and epidemiological studies on links between illegal drugs and driving ability undertaken in(a) America, (b) Australia, (c) Canada and (d) Holland in reaching his decision on drug driving tests; and if he will make a statement. [29847]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  The Department considered in detail the evidence available from both simulator and epidemiological studies, worldwide, before undertaking its own epidemiological study of drugs in road fatalities and announcing its plans to assess the roadside practicability of two drug screening devices.

  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what is his estimate of the percentage of the population who take cannabis at least once every 30 days; and what was the percentage of road fatalities who were found to have traces of cannabis in their bodies in his Department's recent test. [29841]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  According to the British Crime Survey 1996, cannabis had been taken by 12 per cent. of the 16–29 year age group in the previous month; figures for other age groups are not available. The percentage of road fatalities who were found to have traces of cannabis in their bodies was also 12 per cent.

  Driving Licence Design
  Mr. Hayes
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what criteria were used in deciding on the design of the new United Kingdom driving licence. [29826]

  Ms Glenda Jackson
  The content and format of the photocard follow the requirements laid down in the relevant EU legislation, which was aimed at ensuring that licences are easily recognisable throughout the EU.

  Poll Tax
  Mr. Sanders
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions what is his 604
  Department's latest estimate of outstanding poll tax payments to each local authority in England and Wales. [29832]

  Mr. Raynsford
  Information on uncollected community charge and council tax for each local authority is not available centrally. However, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy regularly publish estimates for individual authorities: figures for 31 March 1996 are available in their Revenue Collection Statistics 1995–96 publications, a copy of which is in the Library of the House.

  Housing (Hampshire)
  Mr. Hancock
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions how many people are on the housing waiting list of East Hampshire District Council; and what were the equivalent figures at the same time in each of the last five years. [27566]

  Mr. Raynsford
  [pursuant to his reply, 10 February 1998, c.125]: Local authorities in England report the numbers of households on their housing register/waiting list (excluding existing tenants awaiting a transfer) at 1 April each year in their annual Housing Investment Programme (HIP1) returns. The data reported by East Hampshire District Council for 1997 and the previous five years are as follows:

  1992: 1,607

  1993: 1,528

  1994: 2,045

  1995: 1.555

  1996: 1,206

  1997: 1,683.

  Local authorities have different practices for compiling and managing their housing register/waiting lists which mean that simple comparisons between authorities can be misleading. Authorities practices may change which can also affect comparisons over time.

AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

  Farm Values
  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is his estimate of the average value of farm buildings and land in England and Wales; and what evaluation he has made of the correlation between the value of land and the level of farm subsidies over the past 20 years. [29458]

  Mr. Morley
  The average price of all agricultural property sales notified to the Inland Revenue in the three months ended June 1997 (the latest period available) was £4,515 per hectare in England and £4,303 per hectare in Wales. These averages will be affected by the prevailing market conditions and the location and quality of the land sold in the period.

  There is evidence to suggest that support for agriculture has, to some degree, been capitalised into the value of land.

  Quota Hopping
  Mr. Hayes
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will consult(a) representatives of the fishing industry and (b) Spanish officials to co-ordinate informal repurchase of quota-hopping fishing vessels or their licences. [29823]

  Mr. Morley
  There have been opportunities over successive years for vessel owners to withdraw from the UK fleet under the decommissioning schemes which have been operated by the Fisheries Departments. There has also been an active market in vessels and vessel licences. So far as I am aware, these arrangements have been operated to the satisfaction of the parties to the transactions without the need for co-ordination by Government. However, if I received a request from those in the industry to promote co-ordination, I would be ready to consider it.

  BSE (Compensation)
  Mrs. Dean
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what percentage of total BSE compensation payments has gone directly to producers. [29229]

  Mr. Rooker
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: More than 90 per cent. of the BSE-related compensation paid during 1996–97 and 1997–98 has gone to producers. About 20 per cent. has been paid directly to them; the rest has reached them via livestock markets, slaughterhouses and abattoirs.

  Meat Imports
  Mrs. Dean
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what steps he is taking to ensure that imported meat has been slaughtered under the same hygiene standards as those in the United Kingdom. [29237]

  Mr. Rooker
  [holding answer 16 February 1998]: The slaughter of animals in all EU Member States must comply with Community rules governing the protection of animals at the time of slaughter and killing (Directive 93/119/EC). It is a requirement of these rules that meat imported from Third Countries must be from animals slaughtered or killed in accordance with conditions equivalent to those applying in the Community. Common rules on meat hygiene standards, applicable in all Member States, are similarly laid down in Directive 64/433/EEC for fresh meat and Directive 71/118/EEC for poultry meat. For imports from third countries, Directive 72/462/EEC requires compliance with equivalent conditions to those in Directive 64/433/EEC for the hygienic production of fresh meat, and Directive 71/118/EEC for poultry meat. It is for the European Commission to ensure that Member States and third countries are complying with their legal obligations.

  Dietary Supplements
  Miss McIntosh
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for what reasons he intends to restrict the availability of vitamin B6. [29383]

  Mr. Rooker
  [holding answer 13 February 1998]: The Government's decision to limit the level of vitamin B6 in dietary supplements sold under food law was taken in the light of advice from the Committee on Toxicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the
  606
  Environment and from the Food Advisory Committee, that prolonged intake of high doses of vitamin B6 may be harmful.

  Cow's Milk
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what guidance he offers to farmers on altering the butterfat content of cow's milk by adjusting the feed content. [29738]

  Mr. Rooker
  The butterfat content of milk is largely determined by the breed and genetic merit of the cow, but it can also be affected by the composition of the cow's diet. Individual milk producers can obtain advice on feeding through their normal farming advisers. The results of the Department's and other sponsors' research in this area are disseminated through their respective technology transfer programmes.

  Integrated Administration and Control System
  Mr. Todd
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is the proportion of IACS forms received by his Department which contain initial errors and inaccuracies requiring further contact by his Department's officials. [29197]

  Mr. Rooker
  This information is not available.

  Moorland Scheme
  Mrs. Anne Campbell
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many farms, having how many sheep, are eligible to participate in the Moorland Scheme; and how many farms having how many sheep have joined the Moorland Scheme. [29155]

  Mr. Rooker
  The Moorland Scheme applies within the Less Favoured Areas, but excludes land in Environmentally Sensitive Areas. The total area in which the Scheme may apply is about 400,000 hectares. It is not possible to state how many farms are eligible to join the Scheme as this depends on meeting the specific eligibility rules. The Scheme is based on payment for the removal of ewes from eligible heather moorland to meet stocking limits. To date, scheme agreements are in place on 23 farms, involving a reduction of 6,361 sheep from moorland grazing units totalling some 9,300 hectares.

  Environmentally Sensitive Areas
  Mrs. Anne Campbell
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food how many farms, having how many sheep, in(a) the Lake District, (b) the Pennine Dales, (c) the North Peak, (d) the South West Peak, (e) the Shropshire Hills and (f) Dartmoor are eligible for ESA payments; and how many farms in each locality, having how many sheep, have joined the ESA schemes. [29156]

  Mr. Morley
  The information requested on numbers of holdings and numbers of sheep is not readily available and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost.
  607
  The following table shows the current number of ESA management agreements and the percentage of eligible land under agreement:

  ESA

  Number of ESA agreements1

  Percentage of land eligible for the scheme which is under agreement

  Lake District

  1,129

  55

  Pennine Dales

  862

  70

  North Peak

  98

  80

  South West Peak

  582

  80

  Shropshire Hills

  318

  25

  Dartmoor

  547

  40

  Note:

  1Some agreements are joint agreements covering more than one holding.

  Varroa
  Mr. Öpik
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what assessment he has made of the potential evolution of a drug-resistant form of varroa; and if he will make a statement. [28969]

  Mr. Rooker
  There is evidence of a strain of varroa on the Continent which is resistant to the drug Bayvarol but we are not aware of any incidence of it in the United Kingdom. The position is kept under close review.

  Mr. Öpik
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what assessment he has made of the extent of the varroa outbreak among bees in the UK; what steps he has taken to combat its spread; and if he will make a statement. [28967]

  Mr. Rooker
  The Statutory Infected Area (SIA) for varroa now includes the whole of England and Wales and affected areas in Dumfries and Galloway. The most northerly occurrence to date has been in Golspie, Scotland.

  Control measures are based on varroa being statutorily notifiable disease. Upon first finding evidence of varroa infestation in Devon in 1992, a SIA was declared with movements across the boundary being strictly controlled. Information on the geographical distribution of the mite was collected via a number of sources, including searches. Now that the SIA covers the whole of England and Wales, the need for formal searches there has been removed. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, random Spring and Autumn searches continue to be carried out. Where isolated incidents have occurred in Scotland these have been dealt with by destruction of hives and bees.

  British Meat
  Mr. Key
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what discussions(a) he, (b) his Ministers and (c) his Department have had with the Ministry of Defence about the supply of British (i) beef and (ii) lamb to HM Forces; and if he will make a statement. [28260]

  Mr. Rooker
  [holding answer 6 February 1998]: My right. hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food spoke to the Secretary of State for Defence late last year about the purchases of British beef by the armed forces. This conversation has been followed up in correspondence and in discussions between my noble
  608
  Friend Lord Donoughue and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my learned Friend the Member for Warley (Mr. Spellar). Since this Government took office, there have been no discussions between the two Departments at official level on this issue. Since the primary requirement of the Ministry of Defence is for frozen beef and we have significant stocks in UK intervention stores, discussion has focused on the supply of intervention beef rather than that of beef from the open market. As yet we have not discussed the purchase of lamb.

  We all have to recognise, however, that Public Bodies are generally required to look for best value for money in making their procurement decisions. Furthermore, we are required to note that it would contravene the Treaty of Rome to operate a "Buy British" policy. Nevertheless we shall continue to explore ways in which the volume of British beef purchased might be increased.

  Agriculture Council
  Mr. Jack
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food if he will publish the full details of the United Kingdom presidency's work programme which were discussed at the EU Agriculture Council on 20 January. [25250]

  Dr. John Cunningham
  [holding answer 26 January 1998]: A copy of the text of my statement to the 20 January Agriculture Council has been placed in the Library of the House.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

  Montserrat
  Mr. Chope
  To ask the Secretary of State for International Development which firm is managing the provision of prefabricated units for Montserrat. [29992]

  Clare Short
  Brown and Root Ltd. are currently managing provision of prefabricated units, on Montserrat.

  Multilateral Agreement on Investment
  Ms Drown
  To ask the Secretary of State for International Development what assessment she has made of the impact of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment on the ability of developing countries to pursue policies to(a) diversify their economy and (b) promote domestic industries. [29954]

  Clare Short
  Foreign investment can make a substantial contribution to development and the elimination of poverty. Many developing countries, particularly the least developed, are currently marginalised from global investment flows. The Government believe that a better international framework for investment has an important part to play in helping to meet the objective of eliminating poverty. My Department is commissioning a study of the development implications of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which will be ready in good time to present to our negotiating partners before the agreement is concluded.
  609
  Mr. Chaytor
  To ask the Secretary of State for International Development what assessment she has made of the benefits for non-OECD countries of the proposals in the current draft text of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. [29917]

  Clare Short
  The Government support the aim of providing a better international framework for investment, increased investment in developing countries, we believe has an important part to play in helping to meet the objective of eliminating poverty. My Department is commissioning a study to look at any implications the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) may have for developing countries, which we will share with our negotiating partners. The UK is also pressing for "special and differential treatment" in the accession process, which would allow some flexibility for the needs of developing countries to be taken into account, if they seek to accede to the MAI.

  Ms Drown
  To ask the Secretary of State for International Development what steps her Department will take to include the views of government and non-governmental organisation experts from developing countries in its assessment of the impact of the MAI on developing countries. [29953]

  Clare Short
  Officials from my Department have already taken part in consultations organised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) with governments and NGOs of developing countries on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). My Department has also consulted NGOs on the study we are undertaking of the development implications of the MAI which will also consider discussions on international investment rules in the World Trade Organisation and UNCTAD.

DUCHY OF LANCASTER

  Ministerial Travel
  Mr. Baker
  To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he will list the engagements he undertook in the United Kingdom in the course of his duties during January indicating in each case which were accessed by(a) car, (b) train, (c) aeroplane and car, (d) aeroplane and train and (e) other means. [28931]

  Dr. David Clark
  Details of the engagements I have undertaken in the United Kingdom during January 1998, and the mode of transport used, are set out in the following table.

  Date

  Destination of journey

  Mode of transport

  Tuesday 6 January

  Visit to Wansbeck Business Park (Northumberland)

  Car

  Thursday 8 January

  Cabinet Meeting (London) Visit by EU Commissioners to mark the start of the UK Presidency (London)

  Train and Car

  Monday 12 January

  'Better Government' speech to Association of British Insurers Trade Executives Group (London)

  Car

  610

  Date

  Destination of journey

  Mode of transport

  Tuesday 13 January

  'Better Government' speech at Coopers & Lybrand Event (London)

  Car

  Interview: 'Westminster Live'(London)

  Car

  Wednesday 14 January

  Millennium Commissioners Meeting(London)

  Car

  Monday 19 January

  Speech to Local Business Partnership Seminar (Newcastle)

  Car

  Tuesday 20 January

  Launch of the 'Citizens First' Initiative in the UK with Commissioner Monti & Lord Simon (London)

  Car

  Monday 26 January

  Meeting with Austrian Ambassador (London)

  Car

  Tuesday 27 January

  Speech to the British Retail Consortium (London)

  Car

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

  Standard Assessment Tests
  Mr. Willis
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment what plans he has to reduce the cost of Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 SATs. [29981]

  Ms Estelle Morris
  The Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 National Curriculum tests provide valid and reliable assessments of pupils' progress, and contribute towards the raising of school standards and effectiveness. The cost of these tests, and associated administrative arrangements, are kept under constant review by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority to ensure that they are conducted as efficiently and economically as possible, while maintaining the quality of information they provide.

  Hotel and Catering Training
  Mr. Sheerman
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment what is the percentage drop-out rate by students on full and part-time courses in(a) NVQ level 2 and 3 Food Preparation and Cooking,(b) BTEC National Diploma in Hotel, Catering and Institutional Operations and (c) advanced GNVQ Hospitality and Catering. [27090]

  Dr. Howells
  The drop out rates from National Vocational Qualifications are not measurable because these qualifications are not timebound; the position is the same for the BTEC National Diploma in Hotel, Catering and Institutional Operations.

  The latest figure on drop out rates for the Advanced GNVQ in Hospitality and Training (1995/96), for full time students, is 14 per cent.

  School Partnerships
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, pursuant to the letter from the Minister for School Standards of 23 December, when he expects to receive the first recommendations of the Committee under the Chairmanship of Chris Parker on co-operation between various sectors of education; and if he will make a statement. [27969]
  611
  Mr. Byers
  The Advisory Group on Independent/State School Partnerships is due to present to me its initial findings by the end of March 1998 and its final recommendations by the end of July 1998.

  Class Sizes
  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment if the information about which local authorities had received financial support for reducing infant class sizes was made available to any hon. Members before the public announcement on 12 February. [29829]

  Mr. Byers
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I signed letters on 11 February containing this information to hon. Members whose constituencies lie within the areas of the successful local authorities.

  New Deal (Allowances)
  Mr. Duncan Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment what description is used by his Department to identify the allowance to those aged under-25 years who participate in an education, an environment task force or a voluntary sector option of the New Deal; and what statutory basis governs this allowance. [30042]

  Mr. Andrew Smith
  Young people participating in the Full-Time Education and Training option of the New Deal for 18–24 year olds will receive a training allowance; those in the Voluntary Sector or Environment Task Force option may receive either a training allowance or a wage paid by the organisation for which they are working. Training Allowances are payable under Section 2 of the Employment and Training Act 1973.

  Mr. Duncan Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment what is the source of funding for the allowance for the under-26 year olds participating in an education, an environment task force or a voluntary sector option of the New Deal. [30044]

  Mr. Andrew Smith
  The New Deal for 18–24 year olds will be financed from the Windfall Levy on the excess profits of the private utilities.

  National Minimum Wage
  Mr. Duncan Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment if those who are disabled who take part in the Welfare to Work scheme will be guaranteed the national minimum wage. [30050]

  Mr. Andrew Smith
  The Government have set out in their evidence to the Low Pay Commission the argument that disabled people should not be treated any differently from non-disabled people. The Commission will be making recommendations on the initial level and application of the National Minimum Wage to the Government by the end of May.

  New Deal
  Mr. Dorrell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment if he will list the companies which have announced their support for the New Deal. [29693]

  Mr. Andrew Smith
  Over 1,000 companies have signed Employer Agreements to date including the 34 large employers listed below.

  Allied Domeq

  Allied Leisure

  Anglian Water

  Arriva PLC

  British Aerospace PLC

  British Airports Authority PLC

  British Airways

  British Steel plc

  Brown and Jackson

  BT

  Clydesdale Bank

  Dixons Group PLC

  Granada Group

  Kwik Save Stores Ltd

  Manpower

  National Express

  Northern Foods

  Nycomed Amersham

  Our Price

  Pertemps

  Prudential Corporation

  Rolls-Royce

  Rover Group

  Rugby Group

  Sainsbury's

  Savacentre Ltd

  Securicor Guarding

  Somerfield

  Tate & Lyle

  Tesco

  Unipart Group

  Vaux

  Whitbreads

  W. H. Smith Group.

  School Software
  Mr. Dorrell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment when he expects to publish the details of the agreement announced by the Prime Minister last year between the Government and Microsoft Inc. for the provision of software to schools. [29488]

  Dr. Howells
  Microsoft is one of a number of companies preparing educational material and services as a potential contribution to the National Grid for Learning and the strategy outlined in the consultation document "Connecting the Learning Society". However, no formal agreement with the company to supply software to schools is in place.

  New Deal (Employer Agreements)
  Mr. Dorrell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment how many work places will be provided in 1998–99 under the employer agreements signed to date under the New Deal arrangements. [29692]

  Mr. Andrew Smith
  Signing an Employer Agreement expresses an employer's commitment to New Deal and enables them to offer jobs under the programme. It does not commit them to providing a specific number of jobs.

  Policy Reviews
  Mr. Dorrell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Employment what policy reviews are currently underway within his Department. [29530]
  614
  Mr. Blunkett
  My Department continuously reviews its policies. The following reviews are currently being undertaken:Departmental Spending Review. As part of the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review my department is currently undertaking a review of all its programmes and its running costs expenditure. I will be reporting its conclusions to the Ministerial Committee on Public Expenditure in the late Spring.
  Review of the threshold exempting employers with fewer than 20 employees from the Employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. A review of the effects of the threshold exempting small employers from the employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act. The review includes a consultation exercise ending on 2 March. Launch date was 3 December 1997. The intended date of report will be in late Spring 1998.
  Review of Qualifications Appeals Systems. Announced on 16 December 1997. Preliminary conclusions are expected in May 1998.

SOCIAL SECURITY

  Family Credit
  Mr. Willetts
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what is the average value of a weekly family credit payment; and what is the average estimated value of weekly family credit payments to which people are entitled but which they do not claim. [30038]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  The latest available information on the take-up of Family Credit is for 1995–96. The average estimated value of weekly Family Credit payments to which people were entitled but did not claim was £24.30.1 At that time, the average award of Family Credit was £54.822.

  The most recent estimate of the average weekly award of Family Credit of £59.013 was for August 1997.

  Sources:

  1Income Related Benefits Estimates of Take-up 1995–96.

  2Family Credit 5 per cent. sample of awards.

  3Family Credit Statistical Inquiry, August 1997. 5 per cent. sample of awards.

  Mr. Willetts
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people claimed family credit; how many people are estimated to be entitled to family credit but have not claimed it; what was the total amount of family credit payments paid; and what was the estimated value of unclaimed family credit in the last year for which reliable data are available. [30037]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  The latest available information on the take-up of Family Credit is for 1995–96. It is estimated that 240,0001 families were entitled to Family Credit but did not claim it. At that time, there were 676,0002 families receiving Family Credit. Expenditure was £1,7403 million and the estimated value of unclaimed Family Credit was £3004 million.

  The most recent estimate of caseload is for August 1997 when 757,0005 families were receiving Family Credit.

  Sources:

  1Income Related Benefits Estimates of Take-up 1995–96.

  2Family Credit 5 per cent. sample of awards. Figures rounded to the nearest thousand.

  3The 1997 DSS Departmental Report (Cm 3613).

  4Income Related Benefits Estimates of Take-up 1995–96.

  5Family Credit Statistical Inquiry. August 1997. 5 per cent. sample of awards. Figures rounded to the nearest thousand.

  Mr. Willetts
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many men receive family credit payments; and if he will express this figure as a proportion of all family credit payments. [30039]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  757,0001 families receive Family Credit of which 351,0001 are lone parents. 336,400 of those lone parents are female and 14,300 (4 per cent.) are male. Information on the gender of the claimant in couple families is not available.
  616
  However, the vast majority of couple families have a female recipient as there is a requirement for the female member of a couple to be the claimant. There are occasional exceptions to this rule, for example, to cover mental incapacity.

  1All figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

  Source:

  Family Credit 5 per cent. sample of all awards.

  Child Support Agency
  Mr. Duncan Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many payment accounts at the Child Support Agency collection service were(a) pre-CSA arrangements, and (b) CSA assessments, at the end of each month since April 1994. [30041]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in the table.

  Number of accounts from April 1995

  Month

  1995–96

  1996–97

  1997–98

  April

  175,113

  209,134

  258,126

  May

  177,048

  211,670

  262,151

  June

  179,893

  213,744

  266,451

  July

  182,058

  215,736

  271,467

  August

  188,477

  219,979

  277,079

  September

  192,528

  222,104

  278,722

  October

  196,670

  224,913

  —

  November

  201,142

  227,373

  —

  December

  202,762

  230,316

  —

  January

  205,193

  233,707

  —

  February

  207,640

  236,460

  —

  March

  207,465

  239,284

  —

  Note:

  The Child Support Agency's collection service holds accounts for cases where there is a child support assessment, there are no accounts for pre-CSA arrangements.

  Mr. Duncan Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security in what proportion of cases where a parent with care is on income support a benefit saving arises due to(a) a pre-CSA child maintenance agreement, and (b) a CSA assessment. [30040]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is that 80,000 people in receipt of Income Support1 also receive maintenance from liable relatives.

  1 This figure does not include those parents with care who have arrangements whereby their maintenance is retained by the Secretary of State and they receive full Income Support.

  Source:

  Income Support Statistics Quarterly August 1996.

  Appeals System
  Mr. Alasdair Morgan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will review the current arrangements for the suspension of benefits during the
  617
  period in which a government agency is appealing against a decision to award benefit to a claimant; how many claimants currently have their benefits suspended pending an appeal; how many claimants have had their benefits (a) upheld and (b) rejected following appeal by a government agency in each of the last five years; and if she will make a statement. [29464]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  Provision for suspending payment of benefit pending resolution of a factual or legal doubt as to entitlement has existed since 1946. We are committed to the principle that benefit should go only to those entitled to it. It would be irresponsible to allow irrecoverable overpayments to accumulate during periods when entitlement is in doubt. This principle is safeguarded by the power to suspend payment in certain circumstances—a power which is being carried forward in the Social Security Bill currently before Parliament.

  Regular statistics are not kept on the numbers of suspensions imposed. However, a scan of the Income Support computer system in July 1997, found that, of all those entitled to Income Support at any one time, less than 0.5 per cent. had payment of benefit suspended or withheld. Estimated numbers are significantly less for most other benefits.

  TV Advertising
  Mr. Swinney
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will list the amount spent on television advertising in 1998 for(a) benefits which require a claim to be registered, (b) the automatic winter fuel payment to pensioners and (c) other automatic benefits; how many television slots for advertisements for each of the above categories of benefits were purchased for broadcast in the periods (i) 9.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m., (ii) 5.00 p.m., to 11.00 p.m., and (iii) 11.00 p.m. to 9.00 a.m.; for what reasons benefits were advertised which claimants receive automatically; and if she will make a statement. [30158]

  Year

  Grand Total Expenditure Annual Real Growth %

  Benefit Expenditure as % of GDP

  Benefit Expenditure as % of GGE(X)

  Admin Expenditure as % of GDP

  Admin Expenditure as % of GGE(X)

  1978–79

  —

  9.3

  22.0

  0.4

  1.0

  1979–80

  1.2

  9.2

  21.6

  0.4

  1.0

  1980–81

  2.3

  9.7

  21.6

  0.5

  1.0

  1981–82

  11.3

  10.8

  23.8

  0.5

  1.1

  1982–83

  6.4

  11.3

  24.7

  0.5

  1.1

  1983–84

  6.8

  11.6

  25.9

  0.5

  1.1

  1984–85

  3.1

  11.7

  25.8

  0.5

  1.1

  1985–86

  3.1

  11.6

  26.9

  0.5

  1.1

  1986–87

  4.7

  11.6

  27.5

  0.5

  1.2

  1987–88

  -0.4

  10.9

  27.0

  0.6

  1.4

  1988–89

  -4.7

  10.0

  26.2

  0.6

  1.5

  1989–90

  -0.7

  9.7

  25.3

  0.6

  1.5

  1990–91

  3.4

  10.2

  26.0

  0.5

  1.3

  1991–92

  10.1

  11.4

  27.8

  0.5

  1.3

  1992–93

  8.8

  12.4

  28.6

  0.6

  1.3

  1993–94

  6.3

  12.9

  29.8

  0.6

  1.3

  618
  Mr. Denham
  The Winter Payments scheme will help all pensioner households with fuel bills to pay, and give the most help to the poorest. It is an unprecedented initiative, which dwarfs any action taken by any previous Government to tackle winter cold.

  It is important that pensioners know as soon as possible how much they will receive, as well as how and when the payment will be paid so that they can plan with confidence and turn up their heating if there is a spell of cold weather. The simplest and most cost-effective way to let them know that a payment will be made is through publicity. Therefore, a multi-media campaign, including television advertising was launched in conjunction with Help the Aged, Age Concern and the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux.

  Approximately £850,000 is being spent on television advertising, in 1998, to inform pensioners about Winter Fuel Payments.

  Television slots are purchased regionally according to the audience profile of programmes. On average, approximately 82 per cent. of the slots fall between 9am–5pm and 18 per cent. between 5pm and 11pm. No slots have been purchased between 11pm and 9am.

  The television campaign, which is still running, has been designed to reach over 70 per cent. of the target audience with at least five opportunities to see the advertisement.

  There has been no expenditure, in 1998, on television advertising on other benefits.

  Social Security Expenditure
  Mr. Kirkwood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) if she will list the growth rate in expenditure by her Department in real terms and the underlying growth rate for each year since 1979; [30157]

  (2) if she will list the total expenditure by her Department on (a) benefits and (b) administration as a proportion of general government expenditure and as a proportion of gross domestic product for each year since 1979. [30156]

  Mr. Field
  The information is set out in the table.
  619

  Year

  Grand Total Expenditure Annual Real Growth %

  Benefit Expenditure as % of GDP

  Benefit Expenditure as % of GGE(X)

  Admin Expenditure as % of GDP

  Admin Expenditure as % of GGE(X)

  1994–95

  1.2

  12.5

  29.4

  0.5

  1.2

  1995–96

  1.6

  12.4

  29.6

  0.5

  1.2

  1996–97

  1.9

  12.3

  30.1

  0.5

  1.3

  Notes:

  1. Average real growth pa (growth rate) 3.6%.

  2. The "Grand Total Expenditure" expenditure figure includes additional local authority expenditure on Housing and Council Tax Benefits.

  3. The figures for GDP are consistent with those published in Pre Budget Report. They include adjustments to remove distortion caused by the abolition of domestic rates.

  4. The figures for GGE(X) are consistent with those published July 1997 FSBR and earlier equivalents. They exclude privatisation proceeds, expenditure out of the proceeds of the National Lottery, and receipts of interests and dividends from public corporations and the private sector are netted off.

  Mr. Kirkwood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security (1) what estimates her Department has made of(a) future social security expenditure and (b) future underlying rates of growth; [30052]

  (2) what estimates her Department has made of future social security expenditure on benefit payments to the (a) elderly, (b) sick and disabled, (c) family, (d) lone parents, (e) unemployed, and (f) widows and others. [30053]

  Mr. Field
  The information is set out in the table.

  £ million

  1997–98

  1998–99

  1999–2000

  Elderly

  42,426

  44,152

  45.792

  Sick and Disabled

  25,156

  26,621

  28,179

  Family

  18,740

  19,302

  19,929

  Unemployed

  7,160

  6,832

  6,713

  Widows and Others

  2,244

  2,282

  2,318

  Total Benefit Expenditure

  95,727

  99,189

  102,932

  Grand Total DSS Spending

  99,314

  102,727

  106,492

  Annual real growth

  —

  0.6%

  1.0%

  Source:

  The figures are taken from the March 1997 Social Security Departmental Report.

  Working Mothers
  Mr. Cousins
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security, pursuant to her answer of 21 January 1998,Official Report, columns 565–66, what are the latest estimates she is collating for labour market participation by lone parents in the United Kingdom; and if she will list the prevailing unemployment rates in each of the counties listed in the years referred to in the answer. [26947]

  Mr. Field
  The information is not available in the format requested.

  The latest estimate from the Spring 1997 Labour Force Survey suggests that the labour market participation rate of lone parents in Great Britain is around 44 per cent.

  The prevailing unemployment rates in each of the countries listed in the years referred to in the written
  620
  answer, 21 January 1998, Official Report, columns 565–66 are given in the table.

  Unemployment rates in European countries

  Country

  Year

  Unemployment rate

  Belgium

  1992

  6.7

  Denmark

  11993

  8.1

  Germany

  1992

  6.3

  Greece

  21992

  7.8

  Spain

  1991

  15.9

  France

  1992

  10.2

  Ireland

  1993

  15.6

  Italy

  1993

  10.3

  Luxembourg

  1992

  2.0

  Netherlands

  1994

  7.2

  Austria

  1993

  4.3

  Portugal

  1991

  3.9

  Finland

  1993

  17.9

  Sweden

  1994

  7.8

  United Kingdom

  1991

  8.6

  1 Date not provided for Denmark in the previous answer. The date is taken to match the source data used to compile the table replicated in that answer.

  2Date not provided for Greece in the previous answer. The date is again taken to match the source data used to compile the table replicated in that answer.

  Note:

  ILO definition of unemployment used throughout—i.e.unemployment and actively seeking work within the last four weeks.

  Source:

  Eurostat Yearbook 1996.

  Lone Parent Benefits (Newcastle)
  Mr. Cousins
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many claimants of(a) lone parent benefit and (b) lone parent premium there have been in the Newcastle Benefits Agency district since 1992. [26941]

  Mr. Field
  I refer my hon. Friend to the written answer I gave him on 21 January 1998,Official Report, columns 672–73.

  Civil Servants
  Mr. Forth
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many civil servants in her Department at each grade for grade 3 or above have(a) resigned, (b) retired before pensionable age and (c) moved to different responsibilities within the department since 1 May 1997; if she will indicate the Minister to whom each was responsible; and if she will make a statement. [26927]
  621
  Mr. Field
  From 1 April 1996, the Department moved away from grades for staff previously at grade 5 and above, to a system based on nine overlapping pay bands. Posts were scored in a range of 7 to 22, using Job Evaluation of Senior posts (JESP) methodology. Posts with a JESP score of 13 or above are considered to be equivalent to grade 3 or above.

  Since 1 May 1997, no civil servants have resigned; no civil servants have retired before pensionable age and one civil servant in a post with a JESP score of 16 has moved to different responsibilities within the Department. The officer was responsible to the Secretary of State.

  In addition three such civil servants have transferred to other Government Departments on either a temporary or permanent basis.

  Pensioners (Income Support)
  Mr. Sayeed
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many pensioner claimants of income support there are broken down by(a) sex, (b) marital status and (c) socio-economic group; and what estimate he has made of future trends in these figures and on what assumptions. [27318]

  Mr. Denham
  Information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in the tables.

  Numbers of pensioners receiving Income Support as at May 1997

  All cases

  Single claimants

  Couples

  All cases

  1,720,000

  1,454,000

  266,000

  Male

  542,000

  300,000

  242,000

  Female

  1,178,000

  1,154,000

  24,000

  Notes:

  1. Figures are not collected by socio-economic group.

  2. Numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand. Due to rounding, totals may not tally.

  3. Pensioners are defined where the claimant or partner is aged 60 or over.

  4. Sample size 5 per cent.

  5. Numbers exclude claimants who transferred to Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance with effect from October 1996.

  Source:

  Income Support Quarterly Statistical Enquiry, May 1997.

  Forecast numbers of pensioner benefit units that will receive Income Support in the future

  Number of pensioner benefit units on Income Support

  1998–1999

  1.805,000

  1999–2000

  1,808,000

  Notes:

  1. Figures in the table are average caseloads which underlie the expenditure forecasts given in the 1997 DSS Departmental Report.

  2. The forecasts are based on assumptions about the future numbers of pensioners in the population, the proportion of such pensioners that would receive Income Support, and the numbers of such pensioners that would be in residential care or nursing home accommodation. Forecasts of this type are not split by sex, marital status or socio-economic group.

  Benefits (Wales)
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how much(a) attendance allowance remained unclaimed by disabled people, (b) income support remained unclaimed by pensioners and (c) social security payments remained unclaimed in Wales in the last year for which figures are available. [27146]

  Mr. Denham
  Information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is as follows:

  An estimate of take-up of Attendance Allowance for Great Britain, based on the disability follow-up to the 1996–97 Family Resources Survey, should be published later in the year. It may be possible to estimate take-up separately for Wales if sample sizes allow.

  It is estimated that, in 1995–96, the amount of Income Support unclaimed by pensioners in Wales was between £60 million and £90 million. In the same year, the total amount of Income Support, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and Family Credit unclaimed in Wales is estimated to be between £170 million and £260 million.

  Notes:

  1. All take-up estimates exclude the self-employed as their entitlement to income-related benefits cannot readily be established from survey data.

  2. Estimates for Wales should be regarded as indicative only, as they are based on modest sample sizes.

  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what measures he will take to increase the level of take up of social security benefits in Wales. [27145]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  We would encourage anyone who thinks that they may be entitled to a benefit to make a claim, wherever they live in Britain. We are particularly concerned about the million pensioners not claiming Income Support. We have commissioned research to find out why they do not make a claim, and from April we will be spending £15 million on a number of pilot projects to find the best way of encouraging them to claim. We will take into account any factors which may effect their reluctance to make a claim, including the type of area in which they live.

  Drug Addicts
  Mr. Woolas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what plans she has to ensure access to disability benefit for sufferers of benzodiazipene drug addiction. [26536]

  Mr. Denham
  Normal entitlement rules apply to people with benzodiazipene drug addiction claiming a disability benefit.

  Benefit Increases
  Mr. Flynn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what estimate she has made of the cost of increasing the basic pension, widows' benefits and long-term incapacity benefit in April 1998 in line with prices; and what would be the additional cost of increasing them in line with average earnings. [26467]
  623
  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table. The estimated gross additional cost for uprating basic pension and all linked benefits by earnings would be £200 million, rounded to the nearest £10 million.

  Cost of the April 1998 RPI uprating

  £ million

  Benefit

  Cost 1998–99

  Retirement pension:basic

  1.1

  Widows' benefit: basic

  30

  Incapacity benefit long term: basic

  200

  Notes:

  1. The table shows the costs of uprating for the three contributory benefits only and does not show any associated costs or savings on means-tested benefits.

  2. Figures are rounded to the nearest £10 million.

  Source:

  DSS forecasting models based on benefit rates announced in the 1977 Uprating Statement.

  Staff Travel
  Mr. Stunell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what was the total real terms value of(a) staff car mileage claims paid and (b) staff rail fares paid by his Department; for what amount of staff car mileage reimbursement was made; and what was the percentage change on the previous year for each year since 1989–90. [25797]

  Mr. Field
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is in the table.

  The amounts shown are composite figures covering motor mileage, rail and air travel and cannot be broken down into specific totals.

  Year

  Amount of UK travel (£)

  Percentage adjustment

  1989–90

  20,220,472

  —

  1990–91

  24,716,711

  +22.2

  1991–92

  24,739,188

  +0.1

  1992–93

  20,632,745

  -19.9

  1993–94

  22,915,580

  +10.0

  1994–95

  24,500,782

  +6.5

  1995–96

  24,158,110

  -1.4

  1996–97

  21,147,786

  -14.2

  Mr. Stunell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many staff were employed by her Department; and what percentage of these were eligible to claim a car mileage allowance on 31 March in each year since 1990. [25794]

  Mr. Field
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in the table.

  Number of staff employed by the department since 1989

  1 April

  Staff

  1989

  83,426

  1990

  80,890

  1991

  78,945

  1992

  78,277

  1993

  84,824

  624

  Number of staff employed by the department since 1989

  1 April

  Staff

  1994

  89,960

  1995

  89,248

  1996

  92,114

  1997

  93,465

  Notes:

  1. The numbers of staff are expressed as full time equivalents.

  2. The information requested on the percentage of staff eligible to claim a car mileage allowance is not available. Detailed records of staff mileage claims are kept and controlled locally across the Department.

  Disability Living Allowance
  Audrey Wise
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people are currently receiving any element of disability living allowance; and how many are receiving(a) the care component and mobility component at any level, (b) the care component only and (c) the mobility component only. [26405]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Recipients of disability living allowance by care and mobility components1

  Number

  Total:

  1,955,500

  Highest rate care and higher rate mobility

  264,900

  Highest rate care and lower rate mobility

  65,600

  Highest rate care only

  38,100

  Middle rate care and higher rate mobility

  282,800

  Middle rate care and lower rate mobility

  182,500

  Middle rate care only

  88,900

  Lower rate care and higher rate mobility

  239,200

  Lower rate care and lower rate mobility

  63,000

  Lower rate care only

  119,000

  Higher rate mobility only

  532,300

  Lower rate mobility only

  79,100

  1Figures relate to 30 November 1997.

  Note:

  Due to rounding to the nearest 100 the samples do not sum.

  Source:

  Analytical Services Division: 5 per cent. sample data.

  Mr. Fitzpatrick
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what is the average duration of claims for disability living allowance broken down by mobility component and care component. [26160]

  Mr. Denham
  The average duration for Disability Living Allowance awards of care component is 157 weeks and the average duration for awards of mobility component is 163 weeks.

  Notes:

  1. The source for these figures is a five per cent. sample of claimant cases and the figures relate to claimants with entitlement to the benefit at 30 November 1997.

  2. Disability Living Allowance (DLA) was introduced in April 1992.

  3. These figures do not include those in receipt of Attendance Allowance or Mobility Allowance in April 1992 and who were transferred to DLA at that date.

  4. No allowance has been made for suspensions in the payment of either DLA component, because data on these is incomplete.
  625
  Mr. Fitzpatrick
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people receiving incapacity benefit also receive disability living allowance, broken down by care and mobility component. [26161]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  People in receipt of incapacity benefit and disability living allowance

  000s

  All awards

  585

  Awards of care component only

  49

  Awards of mobility component

  193

  Awards of both components

  342

  Notes:

  1. Figures related to 31 August 1997.

  2. Due to rounding to the nearest 1,000 the figures do not sum.

  Source:

  Analytical Services Division : 5 per cent. data.

  Mr. Fitzpatrick
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people receive disability living allowance; and how many of these(a) also have earnings from employment, (b) also receive incapacity benefit, (c) also receive income support and (d) also receive severe disablement allowance. [26159]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Numbers

  All recipients1,2

  1,956,000

  Recipients also in receipt of:7

  Incapacity Benefit2,3

  585,000

  Severe Disablement Allowance2,3

  292,000

  Income Support2,4

  610,000

  Proportion of all recipients with earnings from employment5,6

  7 per cent.

  Notes:

  1 Figures relate to 30 November 1997.

  2 Analytical Services Division : 5 per cent. sample data.

  3 Figures relate to 31 August 1997.

  4 Figures related to 31 May 1997.

  5 Analytical Services Division : 1995–96 Family Resources Survey.

  6 The figures are based on sample counts which have been adjusted for non response. They are subject to sampling error.

  7 Could be receiving more than one of the other benefits mentioned.

  Figures rounded to the nearest 1,000.

  Ms Walley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what the average residual income of disability living allowance claimants would be if disability living allowance were removed. [27662]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the tables.
  626
  It is not possible to allow for any consequential effects on income related benefit entitlement. Information on net incomes excluding Disability Living Allowance (DLA) is shown in the tables, for income measures as used in Households Below Average Income statistics. These take the income of the households to which DLA recipients belong and adjusts for household size and composition; this gives "equivalised" incomes.

  Estimated average value in equivalent £ per week ofhousehold income going to DLA claimants with and without DLA, income before housing costs (BHC)

  Average value in £ per weekof income with benefit

  Average value in £ per weekof income without benefit

  Average equivalised value

  249

  203

  Corresponding cash values for Single person

  152

  124

  Couple no children

  249

  203

  Couple 2 children aged 3 and 6

  346

  282

  Estimated average value in equivalent £ per week of household income going to DLA claimants with and without DLA, income after housing costs (AHC)

  Average value in £ per week of income with benefit

  Average value in £ per week of income without benefit

  Average equivalised value

  218

  172

  Corresponding cash values for Single person

  120

  95

  Couple no children

  218

  172

  Couple 2 children aged 3 and 6

  303

  239

  Notes:

  1. By way of comparison average equivalised incomes for the whole population were £289 per week BHC and £250 per week AHC.

  2. Figures are rounded to the nearest pound and are in June 1997 prices. The measure of DLA used is combined measure of both the care and mobility elements.

  3. Average figures given show equivalent £ per week where income has been adjusted for household size and composition. The table also show the money values this average represents for different household types.

  4. This answer draws on the departments Households Below Average Income series based on the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the 1995–96 financial year and covering Great Britain, and as such the following points should be noted:

  (i) Recipients in institutions are not covered by the Family Resources Survey.

  (ii) The FRS is a sample survey and all estimates must be treated as approximate.

  Source:

  Households Below Average Income.

  Mr. Wyatt
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what has been the change in the number of children claiming disability living allowance since 1983. [27099]

  Mr. Denham
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in the table.
  627
  Disability Living Allowance was introduced in 1992. Any child in receipt of Attendance Allowance or Mobility Allowance on this date were transferred to this benefit.

  Children claiming Attendance Allowance, Mobility Allowance or Disability Living Allowance

  1983

  1997

  Children claiming benefit for care needs

  1,353,000

  2,4189,000

  Children claiming benefit for mobility needs

  5,617,000

  3,7107,100

  1 Analytical Services Division. Figures estimated from a 100 per cent. count of statistical records adjusted to reflect the extent to which they overstate the number of live cases. Figures rounded to nearest 100.

  2 Analytical Services Division: 5 per cent. data.

  3 Figures relate to people claiming attendance allowance at 31 March 1983.

  4 Figures relate to people claiming disability living allowance care component at 30 November 1997.

  5 All Figures relate to children 15 and under except for children claiming benefit for mobility needs where figures are based on 100 per cent. data relate to children aged 14 or under and exclude those with awards under the Vehicle Scheme Regulations of 1977.

  6 Figures relate to people claiming mobility allowance at 31 December 1983.

  7 Figures relate to people claiming disability living allowance mobility component at 30 November 1997.

  Figures do not sum as the same child may receive benefit for care and mobility needs.

  Mortgage Benefit
  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what would be the cost to the Exchequer of introducing a mortgage benefit scheme which treated low income homebuyers not on income support in the same way as low income renters are treated under the housing benefit system. [28018]

  Mr. Field
  A mortgage benefit for low income homebuyers not on Income Support or income based Jobseeker's Allowance would cost in the region of £750 million in 1997–98, if it was fully taken-up.

  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what would be the cost in 1998–99 of paying the full mortgage interest costs of income support recipients from the first day of a claim. [28017]

  Mr. Field
  The cost of extending help with mortgage interest to all Income Support recipients from the first day of a claim is estimated to be £35 million in 1998–99.

  The estimated cost would be £70 million if income based Jobseeker's Allowance recipients were included.

  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what would be the saving in public expenditure in(a) 1998–99, (b) 1999–2000 and (c) 2000–01 if income support assistance with mortgage interest costs were not available until (i) 12 months and (ii) 18 months, into an income support claim. [28016]
  628
  Mr. Field
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Estimated savings in public expenditure from making income support and income-based jobseeker's allowance assistance with mortgage costs unavailable to any borrower until 12 or 18 months into a claim

  £ million

  Cash prices

  12 months

  18 months

  1998–99

  40

  40

  1999–00

  100

  155

  2000–01

  100

  170

  Notes:

  1. The measures apply to all claimants, including those exempt from the current nine month waiting period.

  2. There is no knock-on impact on Housing Benefit expenditure (for example as a result of increase re-possessions).

  3. All cases where the claim is received before April 1998 are treated under current rules.

  4. All figures rounded to the nearest five million.

  Brazilian Mahogany
  Mr. Alan Simpson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what amount of Brazilian mahogany has been(a) acquired and (b) specified by her Department in (i) 1996 and (ii) 1997; and for what purpose. [28383]

  Mr. Field
  This Department does not specify any mahogany or any other tropical hardwood in furniture specifications, and has not knowingly acquired any during 1996 and 1997.

  People With Brain Injuries
  Mr. Hancock
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what recent representations she has received from individuals and organisations concerning disability benefits for people suffering from brain injuries. [27951]

  Mr. Denham
  Several letters, which have been sent by individuals to their Members of Parliament, have been passed to Ministers. These have expressed concern over possible changes to benefits and taxation. They ask us to consider the particular problems of those with brain injuries and to consult fully with organisations representing disabled people.

  We have met, and will continue to meet, with people who are sick or disabled and their representatives. These meetings have been very useful in helping us in our considerations during our comprehensive review of spending.

  Attendance Allowance
  Mr. Pike
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what plans she has to reduce the waiting times for attendance allowance appeals before the Disability Appeals Service; and if she will make a statement. [27380]

  Mr. Field
  The operation of the appeals system is a matter for the Independent Tribunal Service.

  However, we are determined to reduce the current delays and complexity in the appeals system. The Social Security Bill, which paves the way for modernising the delivery of Social Security, including the handling of appeals, had its second reading in the House of Lords on 15 January. The Secretary of State will assume

  629
  responsibility for the administration of the appeals system. She will set and publish demanding targets for the administration of appeals, including attendance allowance appeals, and will report on the results.

  Mr. Pike
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what is the average length of time an attendance allowance appeal is on the waiting list before being heard by the disability appeals service; what percentage of such appeals succeed; and what estimate she has made of(a) the regional variations in appeal waiting time and (b) the regional variations in appeal success rates. [27379]

  Mr. Field
  The operation of the appeals system is a matter for the Independent Tribunal Service who report that the information requested is not available in the format requested.

  Attendance Allowance appeals are heard by Disability Appeal Tribunals and, in July 1997, the average time from date of appeal to date of decision-issue in an appeal heard by a Disability Appeal Tribunal was 30 weeks. This is based on information provided by the Independent Tribunal Service.

  Industrial Injury Benefit
  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people received industrial injury benefit; and what was the average amount received by each person(a) in Great Britain and (b) on the most disaggregated, regional level in the last year for which figures are available. [27375]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Industrial injuries disablement benefit awards current at 5 April 1997 by Government office region

  Number

  Average weekly £ paid

  All regions

  262,283

  29.32

  North East

  24,007

  30.13

  Yorkshire and Humberside

  23,780

  30.13

  East Midlands

  18,483

  29.42

  East

  21,463

  28.41

  London

  32,053

  28.21

  South East

  3,100

  27.70

  South West

  14,146

  29.32

  West Midlands

  34,168

  28.81

  Merseyside

  33,378

  27.90

  North West

  7,242

  27.70

  Wales

  20,829

  31.75

  Scotland

  25,725

  30.03

  Overseas

  3,909

  32.96

  Note:

  Figures are based on a 10 per cent. sample of cases in payment as at 5 April 1997.

  Young Unemployed
  Mr. Willetts
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many people aged 18 to 24 years are estimated to be neither in work, nor in education and training, nor in receipt of Job Seeker's Allowance; and how many of these receive other benefits. [27713]

  Mr. Field
  The information requested is not available.

  Computer Systems
  Mr. Clifton-Brown
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will list each major new computer system that(a) her Department, (b) non-departmental bodies and (c) agencies under her responsibility have purchased in the last five years; what was the initial purchase cost and what was the final cost; what was each system's (i) planned and (ii) actual date of commissioning; what major computer systems will be purchased by bodies in categories (a), (b) and (c) in the next financial year; and what is their estimated cost. [27845]

  Mr. Field
  This information requested can be obtained only at disproportionate cost.

  The Department makes extensive use of a range of computer systems to support the administration of Social Security and has been involved in a continuous programme over the past five years of developing and upgrading its major systems. These systems have been either developed "in house" or procured through contracts with the Private Sector. The Department is looking at opportunities to use new computer systems in support of its Modern Service Programme but no commitments have been made for the next financial year.

  Lone Parents
  Mr. Bradshaw
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many lone parents will be eligible for assistance under the New Deal in Exeter. [27656]

  Mr. Field
  The New Deal for Lone Parents is currently available in eight areas around the UK (not including Exeter).

  From April 1998, lone parents in Exeter who make a new claim for Income Support will be offered the opportunity to participate in the New Deal for Lone Parents, and from October, the service will be available to all lone parents who are in receipt of Income Support.

  Figures of how many lone parents in Exeter are expected to be eligible for the New Deal for Lone Parents are not available. However, the most recent figures available (November 1995) suggests that there were 2,0001lone parents in receipt of Income Support within the Exeter Local Authority District, whom 1,0001had a youngest child of school age. The New Deal for Lone Parents is primarily aimed at lone parents whose youngest child is at school. However, the service is also available for lone parents with pre-school children.

  1 Numbers rounded to the nearest thousand.

  Source:

  Income Support Quarterly Statistical Enquiry, November 1995.

  Benefits Review
  Ms Walley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what definition of needy is being used in the current benefits review. [27663]

  Mr. Field
  The Welfare State exists to prevent poverty where possible and relieve poverty where necessary. Many people need support because they are old or unable to work, and many need extra help because of a disability. We are committed to providing this support.
  631
  We also believe that work is the best form of welfare for people of working age. That is why we are committed to reforming the welfare system around the work ethic, to provide new opportunities to those whose greatest need is help and encouragement in returning to and staying in work.

  Maternity Pay
  Mr. Gordon Prentice
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security, pursuant to her answer of 23 January 1998,Official Report, column 737, if she will list the number of women receiving statutory maternity pay in the most convenient available bands showing the amount of maternity pay per week for the latest 12 months for which figures are available. [26268]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Number of recipients of Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP), total amounts of SMP and average amounts of SMP by amount of theweekly earnings related portion of SMP for GB, 1995–96

  £

  Weekly amount of SMP (earnings related portion)

  Number in receipt of SMP(000s)1

  Total amount of SMPmillions2

  Average amount of SMP3

  under 100

  32

  31.8

  1,000

  100 to 199

  62

  94.2

  1,500

  200 to 299

  38

  79.7

  2,100

  300 to 399

  19

  50.9

  2,700

  400 to 499

  6

  20.4

  3,300

  500 to 599

  2

  7.4

  3,900

  600 and more

  3

  14.9

  5,100

  1 Rounded to the nearest thousand.

  2 Rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

  3 Rounded to the nearest hundred.

  Note:

  The figures are based on an estimate of those whose whole period of SMP is within the 1995–96 tax year and excludes those whose claim straddles two tax years. The total number in receipt of SMP in that year was around 321,000.

  Source:

  The Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB) a 1 per cent.sample of the National Insurance Recording System taken at February 1997.

  Mr. Cousins
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what reduction in expenditure would have resulted from limiting the earnings-related element of statutory maternity pay to the weekly earnings level implied by the upper earnings limit for national insurance in the financial years 1995–96 and 1996–97; and how many claimants of statutory maternity pay would have had their payment limited in each year. [25001]

  Mr. Denham
  The latest available information is for the 1995–96 tax year. 11,000 recipients of Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) (in Great Britain) would have had their earnings related element of SMP reduced if there was a limit on the amount of SMP paid equivalent to the weekly upper earnings limit on which National Insurance contributions are payable. The estimated savings made by reducing their amount of SMP to the weekly upper earnings limit would have been £9.6 million in 1995–96.

  Industrial Disablement Benefit
  Mr. Dismore
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he will specify by region(a) the number of
  632
  claimants of industrial disablement benefit and (b) the annual amount claimed by way of industrial disablement benefit. [26259]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Current Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB)Assessments at 5 April 1997 and Estimated Expenditure for the Year 1996/97, by Government office Region

  Assessments

  £ million

  All assessments

  262,283

  661

  England

  All regions

  211,820

  534

  North East

  24,007

  61

  Yorks and Humber

  23,780

  60

  East Midlands

  18,483

  47

  East

  21,463

  54

  London

  32,053

  81

  South East

  3,100

  8

  South West

  14,146

  36

  West Midlands

  34,168

  86

  North West

  33,378

  84

  Merseyside

  7,242

  18

  Wales

  20,829

  52

  Scotland

  25,725

  65

  Overseas

  3,909

  10

  Invalid Care Allowance
  Mr. Burstow
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will assess the advantages of allowing invalid care allowance to be paid in addition to a state-funded pension. [23351]

  Mr. Denham
  It remains a basic principle of the Social Security system that only one benefit at a time can be paid to a person for income maintenance. Invalid Care Allowance (ICA) is designed to provide a measure of income maintenance during periods in which the claimant cannot work because of caring commitments. To pay in full in addition to another income maintenance benefit such as Retirement Pension, would be duplicating provision for the same need.

  When a person is eligible for more than one benefit at the same time however, there are safeguards to ensure that she does not lose financially. In practice, Retirement Pension (RP) is paid in full taking precedence because it is the contributory benefit. If RP is higher then ICA, as frequently happens, no ICA is payable. However, if ICA is higher, then the "extra" is used to top-up the RP to the ICA rate.

  Council Tax Benefit
  Mr. Yeo
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will list for each local authority the number of households in receipt of(a) any amount of council tax benefit and (b) council tax benefit covering 100 per cent. of council tax; and if she will give the figure in each case expressed as a proportion of the total number of households in each local authority. [24520]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  [holding answer 23 January 1998]: Information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in

  633
  the table "Numbers of Council Tax Benefit Recipients in England, Wales and Scotland". Copies of the table have been placed in the Library.

  Most Council Tax Benefit recipients who are also in receipt of Income Support or income based Jobseeker's Allowance will, unless there are deductions for non dependants, be receiving Council Tax Benefit covering 100 per cent. of their council tax.

  Mortgage Payments
  Mr. Fearn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what assessment she has made of the impact on those who have taken out mortgage indemnity insurance and subsequently become unemployed of the recent court judgment that these mortgage payments constitute income which is to be set against benefits; and if she will amend the regulations to ensure that home owners are not discouraged from insuring their mortgage payments. [25412]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  Payments from mortgage payment protection policies are treated differently from payments from other creditor insurance on which subject Departmental officials and representatives of the insurance industry have recently held a number of meetings. Mortgage payment protection insurance used to pay the normal liabilities associated with a mortgage, such as capital, endowments and PEPs is generally ignored in the calculation of benefit. If payment is made direct to the lender, the full amount is ignored. If paid direct to the borrower, the amount of income taken into account in Income Support and Jobseeker's Allowance is the excess after payments for housing costs and other related insurance liabilities are deducted. Where benefit includes an amount for mortgage interest (ISMI), the insurance income is taken into account up to the amount of ISMI payable. In Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefits, payments for building insurance and mortgage payment protection premiums are taken into account.

  All Social Security regulations are kept under review and the treatment of income from mortgage protection insurance is currently being considered as part of the Department of Environment Transport and Regions led Housing Review.

  Pensioner Incomes
  Mr. O'Hara
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what percentage and number of(a) single pensioners and (b) pensioner couples have (i) an income not including the state pension and (ii) an income not including any state benefits of at least (1) £125 per week and (2) £150 per week. [25301]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Income of pensioner units not including the state pension

  £125 and over

  £150 and over

  Singles

  Number

  750,000

  550,000

  Percentage of singles

  17

  12

  Couples

  Number

  1,2000,000

  1,050,000

  Percentage of couples

  45

  38

  634

  Income of pensioner units not including any state benefits

  £125 and over

  £750 and over

  Singles

  Number

  600,00

  450,000

  Percentage of singles

  13

  11

  Couples

  Number

  1,050,000

  900,000

  Percentage of couples

  38

  33

  Notes:

  1. The information is based on gross unequivalised weekly income before housing costs at July 1995 prices. Reported incomes from the State pension and all benefits were subtracted to give the income distribution shown. The results are based on survey respondents' identification of different elements of benefit income, and therefore are subject to mis-reporting. It is not possible to distinguish between the different elements of the State pension on the Family Expenditure Survey. Therefore, the estimate of State pension income will include basic, SERPS and the graduated pension. As the estimates are based on survey respondents' identification of different elements of benefit income the estimates are subject to mis-reporting.

  2. The Pensioners' Income Series gives estimates for pensioner units. A pensioner unit is defined as a single person over State Pension Age (SPA) or a couple where the man, defined as the head, is over SPA.

  3. Numbers of pensioners units are rounded to the nearest 50,000 percentages to the nearest 1 per cent.

  Source:

  The Pensioners' Income Series 1995–96 based on the Family Expenditure Survey.

  Mr. O'Hara
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what percentage of(a) single pensioners, (b) pensioner couples and (c) all pensioner households were dependent on state benefits for at least 75 per cent. of their income in the latest year for which figures are available. [25119]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Percentage of pensioner units dependent upon state benefits for at least 75 percent. of their income.

  Type of pensioner unit

  Percentage

  Single Pensioners

  55

  Pensioner Couples

  36

  All Pensioner Units

  48

  Notes:

  1. Estimates are based upon weekly gross income and reported benefit income in July 1995 prices.

  2. A pensioner unit is defined as a single person over State Pension Age (SPA) or a couple where the man, defined as the head, is over SPA. The estimates are based upon the income and benefits of the pensioner unit, and do not include the income of any other household members.

  Source:

  Pensioners's Income Series 1995–96.

  Mr. Webb
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what was the median income of(a) single pensioners, (b) married pensioners and (c) all pensioners who (i) had reached state pension age within the previous five years and (ii) were aged 75 years or above in each year since 1974; and how many pensioners were in each category. [29831]

  Mr. Denham
  This information could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
  635
  Mr. O'Hara
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what percentage and number of pensioner couples have (i) an income not including the state pension and (ii) an income not including any state benefits of at least(a) £250 per week and (b) £300 per week. [25302]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the tables.

  Income of pensioner couples not including the state pension.

  £250 and over

  £300 and over

  Number

  550,000

  400,000

  Percentage of couples

  21

  16

  Income of pensioner couples not including any state benefits.

  £250 and over

  £300 and over

  Number

  500,000

  400,000

  Percentage of couples

  19

  14

  Notes:

  1. The information is based on gross unequivalised weekly income before housing costs and benefit income at July 1995 prices. Reported incomes from the State pension and all benefits were subtracted from gross income to give the income distribution shown. The results are based on survey respondents' identification of different elements of benefit income, and therefore are subject to misreporting.

  2. The Pensioners' Income Series gives estimates for pensioner units. A pensioner unit is defined as a single person over State Pension Age (SPA) or a couple where the man, defined as the head, is over SPA.

  3. Numbers of pensioner units are rounded to the nearest 50,000, percentages to the nearest 1 percent.

  Source:

  The Pensioners' Income Series 1995/6.

  Mr. O'Hara
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what(a) percentage and (b) number of (i) single pensioner and (ii) pensioner couples have a total income of at least (a) £125 per week and (b) £150 per week; and what percentage of pensioner couples have a total income of at least (1) £250 per week and (2) £300 per week in the latest year for which figures are available. [24808]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Gross weekly income of pensioner units

  Status

  £125 and over

  £150 and over

  Singles

  Percentage of singles

  41

  27

  Number

  1.8 million

  1.2 million

  Couples

  Percentage of couples

  91

  79

  Number

  2.45 million

  2.1 million

  Gross weekly income of pensioner couples

  £250 and over

  £300 and over

  Percentage of couples

  36

  28

  Notes:

  1. The information in the table is based on gross unequivalised weekly income before housing costs at July 1995 prices.

  2. The Pensioners' Income Series gives estimates for pensioner units. A pensioner unit is defined as a single person over State Pension Age (SPA) or a couple where the man, defined as the head, is over SPA.

  3. Numbers of "pensioner units" are rounded to the nearest 50,000, percentages to the nearest 1 per cent.

  Source:

  The Pensioners' Income Series 1995–96.
  636
  Mr. O'Hara
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he will list(a) the mean and (b) the median income for (i) single men aged 65 to 74 years, (ii) single men aged 75 years and over, (iii) single women aged 65 to 74 years, (iv) single women aged 75 years and over, (v) pensioner couples aged 65 to 74 years and (vi) pensioner couples aged 75 years and over for (a) 1979 in the prices for the latest year for which figures are available and (b) the latest year for which figures are available. [24811]

  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the tables.

  Mean and median weekly income of pensioner units 1979 and 1995–96

  £

  1979

  1995–96

  Type of pensioner unit

  Median

  Mean

  Median

  Mean

  Single men aged 65–74

  86.40

  114.60

  129.10

  174.00

  Single men aged 75 and over

  76.20

  93.60

  117.10

  155.80

  Single women aged 65–74

  74.30

  84.60

  114.50

  134.00

  Single women aged 75 and over

  73.70

  81.90

  112.20

  142.90

  Couples head aged 65–74

  140.00

  186.10

  222.20

  298.10

  Couples head aged 75+

  114.80

  146.10

  179.00

  235.50

  Notes:

  1. The Pensioners' Income Series gives estimates for pensioner units. A pensioner unit is defined as a single person over State Pension Age (SPA) or a couple where the man, defined as the head, is over SPA.

  2. The averages are based on gross weekly income before housing costs. All amounts are £ per week in July 1995 prices, and are rounded to the nearest 10 pence.

  Source:

  The Pensioners' Income Series 1995–96.

  Interest Rate Calculation
  Barbara Follett
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will estimate the effects of a change in the way the standard interest rate is calculated by including mortgage lenders which have converted to banks on(a) the level of the standard interest rate and (b) the cost to the Government. [24400]

  Mr. Keith Bradley
  The standard rate for mortgage interest payments for people on benefits would currently be 8.17 per cent. if mortgage rates of the largest banks, including building societies which have recently converted to banks, had been included equally with the main building society rates. This estimate is based on current averages of the largest building societies and banks basic mortgage rates. However, historically the gap between the mortgage rates of the two has been significantly smaller than at present and the rates might converge once again in the future. How the interest rates of banks and building societies move relative to each other in the future is, however, impossible to tell.

  Incapacity Benefit
  Ms Walley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many claimants of incapacity benefit would qualify for means-tested benefits if incapacity benefit were withdrawn. [27665]
  637
  Mr. Denham
  The information requested is set out in the table.

  Estimate of the additional number of people who would become entitled to the various income related benefits if incapacity benefit were withdrawn

  Benefit

  Numbers

  Income Support

  400,000

  Housing Benefit

  50,000

  Council Tax Benefit

  240,000

  Family Credit

  20,000

  Notes:

  1. Numbers based on caseload figures as at 31 August 1997 rounded to nearest 10,000.

  2. It is assumed that Incapacity Benefit recipients over State pension age would claim Retirement Pension. Some may incur a loss as Retirement Pension is taxable where in prescribed circumstances Incapacity Benefit is not. It is not, however, possible to estimate the proportion of this group which might claim income related benefits with any accuracy.

  3. Figures in the right hand column cannot be summed as one claimant may be entitled to a number of different benefits.

  Source:

  Family Resources Survey and DSS.

  Disability Benefits
  Mr. Matthew Taylor
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security, pursuant to her answer of 26 January 1998,Official Report, column 707, on disability benefits, if she will list the benefits which (a) have been reviewed and (b) are still subject to review. [27281]

  Mr. Denham
  Our Comprehensive Spending Review covers all Social Security benefits paid on account of incapacity for work, disability and caring. The review is on-going.

  Pensions Statistics
  Mr. Sayeed
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many United Kingdom citizens(a) own personal pensions and (b) are members of occupational pension schemes, broken down according to (i) sex, (ii) age groups 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50 and 51 to 60 years, (iii) marital status, (iv) employment in the categories (1) working full-time, (2) part-time, (3) housewife, (4) unemployed, (v) number of dependent children aged 0 to 4, 5 to 10 and 11 to 16 years and (6) socio-economic group; and what estimates she has made of how these figures will change in the future. [27317]

  Mr. Denham
  The information is not available in the format requested. Such information as is available is set out in the table.

  millions

  Occupational pension

  Personal pension

  (i)

  Men

  5.8

  4.5

  Women

  4.3

  2.3

  (ii)

  21 to 30

  2.0

  1.5

  31 to 40

  3.1

  2.0

  41 to 50

  3.0

  1.8

  51 to 60

  1.7

  1.1

  638

  millions

  Occupational pension

  Personal pension

  (iii)

  Married or cohabiting

  7.8

  5.3

  Not married or cohabiting

  2.3

  1.4

  (iv)

  Full-time employees

  8.9

  4.0

  Part-time employees

  1.2

  0.6

  Homemakers

  n/a

  0.1

  Unemployed

  n/a

  1—

  (v)

  At least one child aged between 0and4

  1.6

  1.2

  Children all aged between 5 and 15

  2.3

  1.4

  (vi)

  Professional/managerial

  3.2

  2.3

  Other non-manual

  4.4

  2.0

  Skilled manual

  1.6

  1.1

  Semi-skilled manual

  1.0

  0.5

  Unskilled manual

  0.2

  0.2

  1Represents less than 0.1 million.

  Notes:

  1. All figures have been rounded to the nearest 0.1 million.

  2. The figures are based on information from the 1995 General Household Survey (GHS). The 1995 survey is the latest for which data is available.

  3. All figures refer to Great Britain.

  4. The figures refer to people who belong to their present employer's occupational pension scheme, or who currently have a personal pension.

  5. Proportions estimated from the 1995 GHS have been applied to Office of National Statistics (ONS) total population estimates for mid-year in 1995 in order to give an indication of the likely number of people in each category. In doing this, it is assumed that the respondents are representative of the overall population of Great Britain. The figures may not be representative in all aspects and so should be treated with caution.

  6. The General Household Survey does not include citizens currently living in institutions such as prisons, hospitals and university halls of residence.

  7. Data is only available for both male and female homemakers combined rather than just housewives.

  8. The data for full-time and part-time workers who have accrued personal pension benefit entitlements excludes self-employed people.

  9. Data giving the number of dependent children in the 0 to 4, 5 to 10 and 11 to 16 age groups that respondents had was not available. Figures are shown by whether the respondents had at least one child aged between 0 and 4 or all their children aged between 5 and 15.

  10. No estimates have been made of how these figures will change in the future.

  IT Equipment
  Mr. Cousins
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how much in total has been spent by(a) her Department's agencies and (b) centrally on (i) the Smartcard payment system, (ii) on-line data and information systems in standard and cash prices in the financial years (1) 1994–95, (2) 1995–96 and (3) 1996–97; and how much is proposed to be spent in the current and two succeeding financial years. [26943]

  Mr. Denham
  The Department does not have a Smartcard payments system. The Benefits Agency is involved with Post Office Counters Ltd in a project to introduce a magnetic stripe Payment Card which will eventually replace order books and girocheques. This is
  639
  being taken forward as a Private Finance Initiative and the cost of developing and managing the new Payment Card Service is borne by the supplier.

  The cost to the Benefits Agency of administrating the project is set out in table 1. These prices could change if current planning assumptions for the introduction of the Payment Card are varied. The cost of developing the Benefits Agency systems to support the new payment method is included in the total Departmental spend on its data and information systems set out in table 2.

  Table 1

  £ million

  Year

  Cash prices

  Adjusted

  1994–95

  1.03

  1.12

  1995–96

  3.56

  3.76

  1996–97

  20.76

  21.32

  1997–98

  29.38

  29.38

  1998–99

  34.25

  32.56

  1999–00

  31.29

  29.00

  The total amount spent by the Department and its Agencies on its data and information systems in the years 1994–95, 1995–96 and 1996–97 is set out in the table in cash terms and adjusted to 1997–98 prices. An estimate for 1997–98 expenditure is included but plans for 1998–99 and 1999–2000 are yet to be finalised.

  Table 2

  £ million

  DSS agencies

  DSS HQ

  Year

  Cash prices

  Adjusted

  Cash prices

  Adjusted

  1994–95

  307.015

  332.949

  6.128

  6.646

  1995–96

  303.526

  320.356

  3.740

  3.947

  1996–97

  284.789

  292.478

  3.042

  3.124

  1997–98

  279.202 (forecast)

  4.094 (forecast)

  Benefit Integrity Project
  Mr. Rendel
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will ensure that statistics relating to the Benefit Integrity Project distinguish between(a) reviews of life awards and (b) renewal claims of disability living allowance. [29691]

  Mr. Denham
  One of our key aims is to rebuild integrity in, and public support for, the Social Security system and the way in which public money is spent. Benefits should go to those who are properly entitled to benefit. This is why we have continued with Benefit Integrity Project.

  The administration of this programme is a matter for Peter Mathison, Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency. He will write to the hon. Member with further details.

  Letter from Peter Mathison to Mr. David Rendel, dated 16 February 1998:
  The Secretary of State for Social Security has asked me to reply to your recent Parliamentary Question, concerning if she will ensure that statistics relating to the Benefit Integrity Project (BIP) distinguish between (a) reviews of life awards and (b) renewal claims of Disability Living Allowance (DLA).
  640
  The BIP is looking again at designated DLA beneficiaries' current care and mobility needs. Information is collected through a programme of visits and postal enquiries. Selection of customers who will receive either a visit or a postal enquiry will be done monthly, on a random basis, by computer scan. The customers involved will be those with awards of the higher rate of the mobility component combined with either the highest or the middle rate of the care component. During the period covered by BIP, some restricted awards in the above categories will expire and fall due for renewal.
  Statistics are available for renewal, postal and visit enquiries. We do not distinguish between life awards and restricted awards and there are no current plans to do so.
  Information about the BIP is placed in the House of Commons Library each month.
  I hope you find the reply helpful.

  Benefit Fraud
  Mr. Lilley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security how many calls have been received on the benefit fraud hot line in each month since it was established. [29719]

  Mr. Denham
  Tackling fraud and abuse is a top priority for the Government.

  Questions on Benefit Agency operational matters are the responsibility of the Chief Executive, Peter Mathison. He will write to the right hon. Member.

  Letter from Peter Mathison to Mr. Peter Lilley, dated 16 February 1998:
  The Secretary of State for Social Security has asked me to reply to your recent Parliamentary Question about how many calls have been received on the benefit fraud hot line in each month since it was established.
  Since its launch on 5 August 1996 to the end of January 1998, the National Benefit Fraud Hotline has received 359,684 calls. The monthly breakdown from August 1996 to January 1998 inclusive is shown in the attached annex.
  Future opportunity for publicity is currently under consideration.
  I hope you find this reply helpful.

  National benefit fraud hotline monthly breakdown of calls received

  Month/Year

  Period of calls (weeks)

  Number of calls received

  August 1996

  4

  41,826

  September 1996

  5

  32,633

  October 1996

  4

  22,360

  November 1996

  4

  21,805

  December 1996

  4

  14,139

  January 1997

  4

  15,831

  February 1997

  4

  27,075

  March 1997

  5

  31,185

  April 1997

  4

  18,680

  May 1997

  4

  15,072

  June 1997

  4

  16,272

  July 1997

  5

  18,808

  August 1997

  4

  14,755

  September 1997

  4

  12,362

  October 1997

  5

  17,076

  November 1997

  4

  11,770

  December 1997

  4

  8,970

  January 1998

  5

  19,065

  Total

  359,684

  Note:

  Figures are provisional and subject to change.
  641
  Mr. Swinney
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if she will estimate the number of people who are(a) claiming benefits fraudulently and (b) not claiming benefits to which they are entitled in (i) Great Britain and (ii) Scotland. [26091]

  Mr. Denham
  [holding answer 3 February 1998]: The estimate of the number of people claiming fraudulently is informed by an extrapolation from the results of a series of benefit reviews. The Benefit Review programme which

  Benefit

  % of confirmedfraud or strongsusplcion of fraudfoundwithin the casesexamined

  Year of Benefit Review

  Numbers claimingbenefit at a point inthat year(thousands)

  Estimated numberof peoplecommitting fraud atthe dateof review. Based onrandomsample of claims(thousands)

  Income Support

  11.1

  1996–97

  5,553

  620

  Housing Benefit

  6.3

  1995–96

  4,784

  300

  Disability Living Allowance

  12.2

  1995–96

  1,688

  210

  Invalid Care Allowance

  6.5

  1995–96

  325

  21

  Retirement Pension

  less than 0.013

  1995–96

  10,304

  less than 13

  Unemployment Benefit

  7.8

  1994–95

  470

  37

  An additional indicator is the number of successful investigations. These are cases where, following a fraud investigation, one or a combination of the following conclusions occurs: benefit is reduced or stopped, an overpayment is calculated or a prosecution instigated. During 1996–97, 524,966 successful fraud investigations into claims administered by the Benefits Agency were carried out in Great Britain, of which 58,891 refer to investigations within Scotland.

  Not all successful investigations result in a prosecution. The Benefits Agency prosecutes only the more serious cases of benefit fraud to act as a deterrent. Local authorities are responsible for the administration of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. The total number of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit cases where fraud was established and a weekly benefit saving claimed for the year 1996–97 in Great Britain was 190,000, of these, 12,000 were in Scotland.
  642
  commenced in 1994 is looking at the extent of fraud and incorrectness in all major benefits. The benefit reviews were conducted under the previous administration and the definition of fraud used to produce results is currently being evaluated. All the figures presented are consistent with the results of the benefit reviews. The results should not be added together as some people will be committing fraud on several benefits and the reviews all refer to different periods. All the figures refer to Great Britain, separate estimates for Scotland are not available.

  Successful investigations cannot be added to the results of the reviews to inform a total figure. The reviews are a snapshot of the level of fraud at the time the review was carried out, and these estimates can change.

  The total number of people not claiming Income Related Benefits in 1995–96, were estimated to be between 2.9 and 4.5 million in Great Britain, and between 250,000 and 400,000 in Scotland. Estimates for other benefits are not available.

  Notes:

  1. Income Related Benefits refer to Income Support, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and Family Credit. All estimates exclude the self-employed as their entitlement to income-related benefits cannot be readily established from survey data.

  2. The estimate for Scotland should be regarded as indicative only, as it is based on modest sample sizes.

  Source:

  Family Resources Survey.

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Blackburn.

  Millennium Dome
  Lord Peyton of Yeovilasked Her Majesty's Government:
  Whether they are satisfied with the progress made with their plans for the Millennium Dome.
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the Government are pleased with the New Millennium Experience Company's progress with the Millennium Dome. The construction of the dome is, if anything, ahead of schedule and real progress has been made on the content, some of which will be made public next week.
  Lord Peyton of Yeovil: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord will pause in his assumed enthusiasm and have in mind that many people are profoundly shocked at this kind of money, from whatever source, being spent on a project of this kind at a time when many projects in the arts, health and education are short of funds; and at the thought of spending it in a place of quite unusual poverty and distress. Will the noble Lord convey to the Government that many people are profoundly shocked by this sortie and wonder what on earth the response has been from the 40 or so religious bodies, which I understand have been consulted, and also whether almost the only inspiration is drawn from Disneyland?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I shall treat the noble Lord's first two questions entirely with the seriousness that they deserve. Of course I am aware that there are many different views about the Millennium Dome and whether it is a worthwhile project. As to that, perhaps only time will tell. The noble Lord refers to large sums of money. I remind him that this is not public money in the normal sense; £399 million of the money is to come from lottery funding and the rest from sponsorship and ticket sales. The noble Lord rightly refers to the poverty in the area, but he will recall that at least 2,500 jobs will be created in the construction of the dome and 5,000 jobs will be available—a considerable number will be taken by local people—when the dome is open to the public.
  Baroness Ludford: My Lords, is the Minister aware that many Londoners may also feel that the money could have been better invested in London transport, particularly the Underground system? Is he confident that the Jubilee Line will be finished on time? If it is not, how will people get to the Millennium Dome?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the Government have been assured by London Underground
  138
  Limited that the Jubilee Line will be open well in advance of the dome for through running from Stanmore to Stratford at 21 trains an hour, which is certainly adequate for the purposes of the dome. As I say, that will occur well in advance of the opening of the dome.
  Lord Montague of Oxford: My Lords, in view of unemployment of 12.5 per cent. in Greenwich and 18.5 per cent. in Tower Hamlets, and with the £450 million from the Millennium Commission, does my noble friend agree that my late colleague and fellow commissioner of the Millennium Commission was right to agree to chair the Cabinet committee set up by John Major to ensure the progress of this project; and that he was also right to ensure that residential and commercial developments would take place on the site, the details of which are likely to be announced later this week?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I join with my noble friend in paying tribute to the work of Mr. Michael Heseltine in the early stages of this project, which emphasises the point that this is not a party political issue. I also pay tribute to Mr. Heseltine's vision for the east London corridor to which the work in the dome and—as my noble friend rightly says—around the dome will be a significant contribution.
  Lord Rotherwick: My Lords, can the Minister tell us how well advanced is the funding of the Millennium Dome?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I have already referred to the biggest single item of funding which is of course the funding from lottery sources. That of course includes provision for inflation and contingency. Further progress on sponsorship will not be possible until we are able to make public more of the content of the dome which, as I told the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, will happen next week. Of course ticket sales will be recouped only when the dome is open.
  Baroness Nicol: My Lords, can my noble friend say what proportion of the money was spent on decontaminating the site? Is that not money which would have to be spent whatever use was made of the site? Will that not be of benefit in the future?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, my noble friend is right to say that the decontamination of the site is an important contribution not only for the period of the opening of the dome but for the future. I do not have an exact figure; no doubt I should. But I shall write to my noble friend. However, it is a substantial long-term investment for a site which a year ago had been contaminated for 150 years.
  The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, can the Minister tell us whether there is any truth in the story that the dome is to have an enormous figure of a woman and a child which could easily be interpreted as a vulgar cartoon of the Incarnation?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, it is indeed the fact that there will be an enormous figure.

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  Mr. Heseltine and I saw a maquette of the figure last year. I do not think that by any stretch of the imagination it could be described as a vulgar figure. It is more androgynous and to me reminiscent of Egyptian statues.
  Viscount of Falkland: My Lords, the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but the House may agree with me that, in answer to the charges by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, of gross over-expenditure, the noble Lord gave the impression that the fact that a large amount of expenditure will come from the lottery in some way mitigates the offence of over-expenditure. Am I wrong in understanding that?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, part of the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, explained where the money is to come from. Of course there will always be disagreement about priorities for expenditure of this kind. I respect the views of those who take a different view from that of Government.
  Lord Elton: My Lords, the noble Lord has managed to give all these answers without reference to the occasion which the erection will commemorate. Can he please assure us, in better terms than he did the last time I asked him, that the dome, and what goes on in it, will commemorate the birth of the saviour of the world?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I can certainly confirm that that is a significant element in the dome, although of course it has to be available to those of all faiths. In support of that, I should tell the noble Lord that the Minister without Portfolio will again meet the Lambeth Group next Monday. That shows the seriousness with which he takes the point that the noble Lord makes.

  Nursing Staff: Pay
  2.45 p.m.
  Lord Campbell of Allowayasked Her Majesty's Government:
  Whether in the light of the review of nurses' pay a generous and realistic provision will be made.
  The Minister of State, Department of Health (Baroness Jay of Paddington): My Lords, the Prime Minister announced on 29th January that the Government had accepted in full the pay increases recommended by the Review Body for Nursing Staff. Pay scales for nursing staff will rise by 2 per cent. from 1st April and by 3.8 per cent. from 1st December. Unlike recent years, nurses will receive a proper national pay award rather than facing the lottery of local pay bargaining. This is the highest pay award to nurses in the past six years.
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  In addition, the Government accept in principle the review body's recommendation on discretionary points for some senior nurses and we shall be taking this forward in the context of wider discussions about the NHS pay system.
  Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. Are the Government aware that the Royal College of Nursing takes the view that this staged award of 2.6 per cent. is wholly inadequate to deal with the nursing shortage? Are the Government also aware that in this crisis situation the Royal College of Nursing seeks the setting up of a strong independent review body for pay and the establishment of an improved career structure for all nurses? What will the Government do about it?
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, I of course accept that the Royal College of Nursing has made the points described about the pay award. But, as the noble Lord said, it is rightly concerned about the career structure and opportunities for the professions. We are addressing that. An extra 1,300 new training places are being made available for nurse education and training this year. We have put aside £2.15 million to promote publicity about the new training places. In the context of the NHS White Paper, we are also allowing for a more positive role for nurses in the higher reaches of NHS management. Together with the Royal College of Nursing and other professional bodies, we are working on a widespread strategy to ensure that the serious matter of nursing staff shortages is addressed.
  Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the Minister aware that her reply will be welcomed by many voluntary organisations which assist British nurses—in particular, our Royal British Legion?
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, I am grateful, as always, to my noble friend for drawing attention to the very good work of voluntary organisations such as the Royal British Legion. They are essential to continuing and developing the strategy that I described.
  Baroness Robson of Kiddington: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the reputation of the National Health Service rests largely on the dedication and devotion of the nurses who have served us for the past 50 years, and that the future of the NHS depends enormously on their continued dedication? Is the noble Baroness therefore concerned that the pay award will be implemented in two stages so that the figure is not 3.7 per cent. over a year? In addition, the shortage of applications to the nursing schools, and the fact that 25 per cent. of older nurses will retire, will inevitably cause a great strain on the National Health Service.
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, I am second to none in commending the extraordinary role that nurses have played during the 50 years of the NHS. This Government have accorded particular emphasis to the whole of the staff of the NHS and their general

  141
  dedication and skill. That is why, for the first time, we are developing a human resources strategy for the 1 million people who work for the NHS, all of whose contributions are valued and understood.
  We are aware of the shortages that exist. That is why we are paying special attention in the short term to recruitment and, even more importantly, to retention. As the noble Baroness may have seen in a report today, a recent survey into the reasons for nurses not returning to the profession once they have left to marry or take alternative employment, points to the hours that they are expected to work rather than to their pay. It is a matter that we are urgently addressing.
  The Earl of Halsbury: My Lords, does the Minister recall that when I was chairman of the body that set up the review body which settled nurses' pay for a long time to come, we equated the salary of a ward sister with that of a station sergeant in the police force? What has become of that equation?
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, the review body, on whose independence we rely as when it was originally established, states that there has not been any significant change in the relative position of nurses and their main comparators since 1990. The growth in real average earnings for nurses during that period has been 14 per cent., as compared with 12 per cent. for all employees.
  Baroness Cox: My Lords, I declare an interest as vice-president of the Royal College of Nursing. Does the Minister agree that there are serious problems at present in terms of nursing morale and the retention of senior nurses? Will she therefore further agree that it is very important that the new discretionary salary points recommended for senior nurses by the review body should be implemented immediately, and not be delayed as is proposed, if we are to stem the tide of more and more senior nurses leaving the health service?
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, I precisely agree with the noble Baroness, who speaks with authority about the particular role of senior nurses. As I said in answer to the original Question, we have accepted that point in principle. It is being considered in the broad structure of the NHS pay review strategy which we are developing. Interestingly, as the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Royal College of Nursing, in its own review of the reasons why people left the profession, did not put pay among the top five. Other reasons, such as promotion, a desire to gain broader experience and lack of development opportunities were placed higher—as was the issue of unsocial hours to which I referred in my reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Robson.
  Lord Ewing of Kirkford: My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend will draw to the attention of the House the fact that it was the Labour Government of 1974–79 (in which, incidentally, I was health Minister for Scotland) which substantially reduced the working
  142
  hours of nurses. I encourage the Minister to go down the path that she hinted at earlier and implement another substantial decrease in nurses' working hours.
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, as always, I should hope to follow in the distinguished footsteps of my noble friend. However, in the context of today's employment practices, it may be flexibility of working hours rather than the numbers of hours worked which needs to be examined more closely in relation to nursing.
  Earl Russell: My Lords, will the Minister clarify two figures that she gave in her first Answer? In dealing with a phased award, what is the percentage rate of the award averaged over 12 months? When she said that it was the most generous award for the past six years, did that claim relate to the final figure or to the average over 12 months?
  Baroness Jay of Paddington: My Lords, I was quoting the final figure: 3.8 per cent. As to the average over 12 months, I am sure that the noble Earl's mental arithmetic is better than mine. I shall have to write to him to establish that.

  Party Political Broadcasts
  2.54 p.m.
  Lord Thomson of Monifiethasked Her Majesty's Government:
  What response they are making to the proposals of the broadcasting authorities to alter the arrangements for party political broadcasts.
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, the arrangements for party political broadcasts are for broadcasters to decide. The Government welcome their decision to consult political parties, voters, viewers and listeners before proceeding with their proposals. The Government do not intend themselves to respond to the consultation. However, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport will keep himself informed of progress on this, as on other broadcasting matters.
  Lord Thomson of Monifieth: My Lords, with respect, is that not a slightly naïve Answer? Is the Minister aware that the arrangements for party political broadcasts are normally a parliamentary matter in a committee that sits in Parliament under the chairmanship of the Government Chief Whip, unless arrangements have changed since my day? Given the domination of broadcasting in terms of political influence, is it not one of the great bulwarks of our democracy that political parties cannot buy broadcasting time—whereas in the United States, for instance, the vast sums that are needed for such broadcasts are one of the sources of corruption in the American political system? Is not the proposal to abolish party political broadcasts entirely between elections the thin end of a very dangerous wedge?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I am sure the whole House will agree that we would not wish to

  143
  introduce in this country the practice that obtains in America and other countries of having paid broadcasts on television and radio involving vast sums of money. As to the issue of responses to the broadcasters' proposals, it is in the first instance the responsibility of political parties and those concerned outside with the democratic process rather than with the Government formally as such.
  Baroness Flather: My Lords, is the Minister aware that, during the last election, there was a party political broadcast by the BNP in which animal noises were superimposed on a street scene in Brixton? Some of the broadcasters chose not to make any changes. The BBC showed the broadcast in its entirety; LWT removed the animal noises. The broadcast gave great offence to a large number of people who also have rights to be protected from that type of party political broadcast. Further, is the Minister aware that the broadcast ended with an inference that the last great war was fought for the sake of keeping this country for the indigenous white British? As the Minister knows perfectly well, the British were not alone in fighting against the fascists; many of us fought with the British against them. It does not do much good for the relationships between communities to find that we have fascists telling us what to do in party political broadcasts.
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I am very well aware of the issues raised by the noble Baroness. I am sure that many in this House will share her views about that particular broadcast. Broadcasters have to comply with the law of the land—for example, in relation to racial hatred—and they have to ensure that programme material does not offend against taste and decency. I understand that the complaints were investigated by the broadcasting authority but were not ultimately upheld. However, the broadcasters have been asked to consider the issues raised. I have no doubt that they will take very great notice of the point that the noble Baroness raises.
  Lord McNally: My Lords, would not the request to the broadcasters to drop party political broadcasts have more credibility if they showed more interest in reporting politics and Parliament seriously during prime time and showing serious political programmes and news in prime time, rather than wanting to clear their schedules of anything that seems likely to fulfil their mandate to inform?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I am sure many noble Lords will agree with the noble Lord that politics is far too important a subject to be left solely to election periods. The broadcasters propose the replacement of party political broadcasts with a different framework for party election broadcasts. But the noble Lord's point is well taken; I have no doubt it will be taken by the broadcasting authorities.
  Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that many people will find with some surprise
  144
  that the Government do not have an opinion on these proposals and do not aim to give a response? We on these Benches are in general supportive of the proposals, with one exception: the question of Budget broadcasts. Will the Minister confirm that, if the Chancellor of the Exchequer raids people's savings and pensions, as he did in the previous Budget, he will give a television broadcast explaining why he is doing so and what the effects will be on the people of this country?
  Lord McIntosh of Haringey: My Lords, I am interested to hear what the noble Lord says about the view of the Opposition Benches on the broadcasters' proposals and that in general they support them. The response from this side will be made by the Labour Party rather than by the Government. We shall certainly make our views known by the deadline of 31st March, including a view on whether Budget broadcasts should be continued.

  New Deal for Disabled Persons
  3.1 p.m.
  Lord Ashley of Stokeasked Her Majesty's Government:
  Whether they will ensure that, as part of the "new deal" for disabled people, employers will not be required to make a financial contribution which would diminish employment opportunities.
  The Minister of State, Department for Education and Employment (Baroness Blackstone): My Lords, we shall not require employers to make any financial contributions that will diminish employment opportunities for disabled people. The aim of the New Deal for Disabled People is to help those on various incapacity benefits who wish to work to do so. The key feature of the New Deal will be help from a personal adviser and access to such specialist services as are needed to retain or obtain a job.
  Lord Ashley of Stoke: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that that is a decision of far-reaching importance for the job prospects of many disabled people and will be warmly appreciated by them? Can my noble friend tell the House whether it also means that employers taking on disabled workers under the New Deal will face no extra costs if new equipment or adaptations are required?
  Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his support for this programme. Within the New Deal for Disabled People the full range of existing services for disabled people currently provided by the employment service, including the access to work programme, will be available. Under Access to Work employers do not have to make a financial contribution to any special help, such as equipment, which my noble friend mentioned, when they recruit an unemployed disabled person. The access to work arrangements cover the first three years.
  Lord Davies of Coity: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the only way in which we can

  145
  guarantee employment opportunities for disabled people is by ensuring that there is some measure of compulsion on employers unless they can show just cause why it would not be practical?
  Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, the Government hope to change the attitudes of employers and the public about the provision of job opportunities for disabled people. We are aware that a great many people with disabilities would like to work, given the opportunity. I do not believe that compulsion is the right way to generate new opportunities for those people.
  Lord Campbell of Croy: My Lords, can the noble Baroness assure us that the access to work scheme, introduced some four years ago and widely acclaimed, will not be changed to require additional finance from employers? Are the Government consulting the Employers Forum on Disability, which possesses much knowledge and experience in this field?
  Baroness Blackstone: Yes, my Lords, the Government are consulting the Forum on Disability. Some changes have been made to access to work which I believe the noble Lord will think positive. Last summer the Government announced that Access to Work would be able to help where an employer wishes to employ a disabled person. The cost-sharing rules have been relaxed. The Government will not require either employers or the self-employed to pay the annual threshold for the second or third year. However, we are aware of the concerns of many about the effect of cost-sharing. We wish to consider the matter, including whether changing the powers under which Access to Work is run might mean that we could provide more help for those working in small or medium-sized firms. I hope that is helpful.
  Lord Morris of Manchester: My Lords, in thanking my noble friend for replying to me so helpfully yesterday, can I ask her to convey to interested colleagues across Whitehall the strongly-held view of workless disabled people that more will be done to improve their job prospects by tackling unjustified discrimination against them in the labour market, and improving access for them to public transport, than anything that can be achieved by cutting the benefits on which their independence so crucially relies?
  Baroness Blackstone: Yes, my Lords, I can certainly convey to my ministerial colleagues in a variety of departments my noble friend's views. The Government support schemes that help disabled people with transport costs. Indeed, transport costs of disabled people who obtain jobs are covered by the access to work scheme.
  Lord Higgins: My Lords—
  Noble Lords: Lord Addington! Lord Addington!
  Lord Higgins: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness to elaborate on the Answer which she gave yesterday—
  The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Richard): My Lords, it is customary to allow the main Opposition spokesman a
  146
  chance to ask a question. I know that we are desperately short of time. I hope that in those circumstances those on the Liberal Democrat Benches will permit the noble Lord opposite to ask his question.
  Lord Higgins: My Lords, I am deeply grateful. I apologise if I am curtailing the noble Lord's Question. Will the noble Baroness elaborate on the Answer which she gave to a related Question about the disabled yesterday? Are we right in thinking that, in the course of his speeches around the country on these issues, the Prime Minister will discuss the New Deal for Disabled People? Can she confirm what I understood from her Answer yesterday; namely, that the meetings will be open to the general public?
  Baroness Blackstone: My Lords. I believe that only yesterday the Prime Minister had a discussion with representatives from disabled groups about benefit schemes and ways in which they might be reformed. The New Deal for Disabled People will also be discussed. The Government consulted a variety of groups on that matter last November. A bidding process for the New Deal for Disabled People will allow a wide variety of bodies to put in bids with innovative schemes. I know that the Prime Minister will want to hear about those schemes and to listen to the views of the general public on the welfare to work reforms scheme when he is travelling around the country.

  Business: References to Baroness Trumpington
  3.8 p.m.
  The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Richard): My Lords, during the very short debate yesterday afternoon on the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, I referred to the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington. I said about her:
  "I am very fond of the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington. She is a great lady. I have listened to her with enjoyment and respect. When she gets up she commands the attention of the House".—[Official Report, 16/2/98; col. 28.]
  What I did not say yesterday afternoon was that the noble Baroness had been a Minister of State. I was dealing with her position when she was a Baroness in Waiting. The fact that she had been a Minister of State in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had, I fear, escaped me. It was pointed out to me forcefully afterwards—not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, herself. It perhaps underlined the point that I sought to make yesterday afternoon, that governments have always made use of the singular skills of their Lords and Baronesses in Waiting, and they certainly did so in the case of the former Minister of State at MAFF.

  Shrewsbury and Atcham Borough Council Bill [H.L.]
  Read a second time, and committed to an Unopposed Bill Committee.

  Iraq
  3.10 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean)rose to move, That this House takes note of the current situation in Iraq.
  The noble Baroness said: My Lords, today we debate the crisis in the Gulf at a crucial time. There is still the possibility for a peaceful end to the crisis. We are not set on an inexorable path to military conflict. We continue to work intensively at the Security Council to secure agreement for a new Security Council resolution. Diplomatic contacts with other governments throughout the world are constant.
  At every stage we have held out the opportunity to Saddam Hussein to end this crisis. We continue to hold out that prospect. We have no desire to use force. We would willingly stand down our troops and bring back our ships. Our overriding wish has been, and continues to be, to avoid force, to preserve peace, and to preserve lives. There is a peaceful solution to this crisis. It is Saddam Hussein who has declined to take that solution, but he does still have time to do so.
  In all our discussions in this House since the start of the present crisis—so far we have had two Statements, one Unstarred Question and three Private Notice Questions—we keep the door to peace as wide open as possible. We are supporting the efforts by the UN Secretary-General to find a solution. We wish him success in his planned trip to Baghdad. Kofi Annan goes with the full blessing of the Security Council and with the united backing of its permanent members. He carries with him a firm message for Saddam Hussein. The international community is united and determined to see Saddam carry out his obligations under the ceasefire agreement he reached at the end of the Gulf War. We hope he agrees to do so. If he does, we will need Iraq to commit itself in writing to full implementation, with clear and explicit penalties for breaking any agreement.
  We support the efforts by the French and Russian Governments, among others, and their envoys, to broker a solution with Baghdad that meets the requirements of the international community. Throughout this crisis we have been and remain in constant and intensive negotiations with our Security Council partners. We are sparing no effort to find a peaceful solution. Over the past few weeks my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my honourable friend, Derek Fatchett, and my noble friend Lord Gilbert have all visited the Gulf to confer with our friends in the Middle East on the present crisis.
  So we are keeping the door of peace open for as long as we possibly can. But let me be starkly clear. That time is drawing to an end. We may soon find ourselves faced with the need to use force in order to require a dictator to comply with the decision of the international community. Saddam Hussein is a dictator who poses a severe threat to the whole region, as well as inflicting deep misery upon his own people. If force is used, lives may be lost. British lives may be lost. It is a grave matter facing this House. It is not one that any of us faces lightly.
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  But if we do reach that point, then I can assure the House that we will proceed to achieve our specific objectives. Those objectives will be to secure full Iraqi compliance with the demands of the Security Council and to prevent Iraq from developing or maintaining weapons of mass destruction notably by ensuring UNSCOM has full and unrestricted access throughout Iraq. It is worth remembering the success that UNSCOM has had to date. It has found and destroyed 48 Scud missiles, more than 38,000 chemical weapons, six missile launchers, 480,000 litres of live chemical agents, 30 special missile warheads for chemical and biological weapons, and hundreds of items of CW production equipment. But much still remains to be done. Among the materials that remain unaccounted for are biological weapons agents, key items of chemical weapon production equipment and other lethal materials for weapons of mass destruction. Those include 17 tonnes of growth media for BW agents to grow the anthrax virus; 4,000 tonnes of CW precursors; 31,000 CW munitions and 600 tonnes of VX precursors. They are all weapons of mass destruction and we know that they exist.
  I am sure that noble Lords will not expect me to go into details about specific military targets. But I assure the House that our Armed Forces will have an achievable, identifiable mission. We will give them the tools and the mandate to achieve that mission.
  In our previous discussions in this House, some of your Lordships asked about the legality of our action. Any action involving UK forces would be based on international law. The charter of the United Nations allows for the use of force under the authority of the Security Council. The Security Council resolution adopted before the Gulf conflict authorised the use of force in order to restore international peace and security in the region. Iraq is in clear breach of Security Council Resolution 687 which laid down the conditions for the ceasefire at the end of the conflict. Those conditions included a requirement on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction under international supervision. Those conditions have been broken.
  The international community has been accused of applying double standards between Iraq and Israel. Indeed, one or two of your Lordships raised anxieties on that point. This is not the case. In the case of both countries, we insist on respect for international legality and support the implementation of UNSCRs. We must remember too that Iraq is led by an aggressive dictator who persistently flouts UN resolutions and who has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and against his own neighbours. Israel is a democracy which has engaged in a wide-ranging and potentially fruitful negotiating process.
  On occasion, some noble Lords have said that we cannot succeed because international support is lacking. But international support for our position is building. Australia, Canada, Poland, the Netherlands and New Zealand have all undertaken to deploy forces to the Gulf. Germany has agreed to make its bases available for US operations in the Gulf. Within the European Union many of our other partners recognise that if diplomacy fails it will be necessary to resort to force.

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  My right honourable friend the Secretary of State briefed EU colleagues in Panama last week. Following the meeting he stressed the common view of European partners that Saddam Hussein must comply with the relevant UNSCRs and in particular permit UNSCOM to carry out effective inspections of sites where it suspects chemical and biological weapons or vital information are concealed. Recent visits to the Gulf by my noble friend Lord Gilbert, my honourable friend Mr. Fatchett and my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary have shown strong support for our position among our Gulf partners.
  There is another important aspect of Iraq's confrontation with the international community. That is the impact on British nationals in the region. Feelings are running high throughout the Middle East. My department is advising people living in or travelling there to be careful. It would be extremely foolhardy for anyone to travel to Iraq at this time. We recommend strongly against it. We are not advising against travel to other parts of the region, nor are we suggesting to those already there that they need to leave. We are advising British nationals to register their presence with the nearest British Embassy, and to take careful note of Foreign Office travel advice. We keep our advice under constant review. Indeed, I did so only this morning. The safety of British citizens is always a priority of the very highest order. I assure your Lordships that it remains so now.
  Let us be quite clear about why we are now discussing military objectives. At the end of the Gulf War, seven years ago, Saddam Hussein undertook to abandon building arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. He pledged to stop building nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. He promised to let UN inspectors confirm those pledges. He agreed to destroy any weapons he had accumulated. In response, the UN Security Council made clear that when this process was complete, we could start to talk about the lifting of UN sanctions.
  We remain deeply concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq. For this reason we have taken the lead at the UN to implement the UN Secretary-General's recent recommendations to improve and expand the "oil for food" scheme. We are leading discussions to reach agreement on a UK draft text and hope that it can be adopted later this week. Our aim is to see the Secretary-General's recommendations implemented swiftly to provide much needed humanitarian relief for the Iraqi people. We have noted objections to the Secretary-General's recommendations from Iraq. This is yet another sign of Saddam Hussein's cruel disregard for the well-being of his people.
  Throughout the past seven years it has become clear that Saddam Hussein has systematically broken every one of his promises and every one of his pledges. He has lied, he has cheated and he has deceived. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State released a paper yesterday setting out Saddam Hussein's systematic attempts to conceal his weapons programmes. It describes the decision taken by the Iraqi authorities to deceive UNSCOM from the very start.
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  Let us also be clear that this is not an abstract debate. It is not an academic argument about Saddam Hussein's weaponry or the scale of it. Sadclam Hussein wants chemical and biological weapons for a reason. He has repeatedly tried to extend his borders. He invaded Iran. He used chemical weapons in that long and bloody conflict. Once that was over he invaded Kuwait. But his ambitions do not end with the possession of chemical and biological weapons. He is not producing anthrax and nerve agents for their own sake. He wants them because he believes that possession of those weapons will give him a decisive advantage over his neighbours. It will give him the potential to wipe out whole cities, vast numbers of people.
  If his ambitions are not checked, thousands of people could die. Thousands more could be seriously injured. Whole families could be left in torment. This is not fantasy. It is fact. My Lords, remember Halabja and remember the Marsh Arabs. Her Majesty's Government believe that we cannot allow and we will not allow this to happen. The Gulf would be totally destabilised. Beyond that, the impact on global stability would be massive. If we do not act now, then we may find ourselves having to pay a much higher price before too long. And it will not be only we who bear that cost, but Iraq's neighbours and Iraq's own people as well.
  Let us be under no illusions about the nature of the man with whom we are dealing. Saddam Hussein is a dictator. He is a dictator who remains entrenched in power, entrenched in that power through his own ruthlessness. He causes untold misery and suffering to the Iraqi people. This is a man who has used women and children as human shields. He is prepared to do so again. The use of human shields is a contravention of international law and the Geneva Convention.
  Saddam Hussein and his apologists are trying to claim that it is we who are being unreasonable, that we want to use force. But that is a lie. This is a view that can be taken only by those who disregard the past and refuse to look at present facts: facts about the weapons and facts about the man who possesses them. For seven years the UN inspectors have been trying to do their job. For seven years they have been obstructed at every turn by a dictator hell-bent on preventing them from succeeding, a dictator who values the prospect of building an arsenal of terror more highly than he values the welfare of his own people. For seven years the Security Council has bent over backwards to solve these problems peacefully, to work around Iraqi obstructions so that UNSCOM can do its job. And after seven years of obstruction and systematic deception, after seven years of lying, can he seriously claim that all we need to do is sit down with him and "work things out"? Those who say the international community needs to show more flexibility should remember that for seven years Saddam Hussein has seen that flexibility as a weakness so he can carry on building chemical and biological weapons. We will take a great deal of convincing that after seven years, he has changed his ways.
  In reality, on the ground, what we have seen is UN inspectors harassed, delayed and obstructed throughout their mission. We have witnessed a systematic attempt to deceive the international

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  community, an attempt which has been demonstrated time and again by UNSCOM. We have repeatedly gone out of our way to preserve the peace in the face of continued provocation from Iraq.
  Saddam Hussein has hidden behind excuses and smoke-screens. He has invented bogus arguments about the nationalities of individual inspectors. He has tried to declare no-go areas in his palaces and at his presidential sites. Some of them are as big as cities. He has tried to impose time limits on the inspections. He has dressed up his obstruction in the clothes of wanting a discussion on detail. But again and again it has been the same story—deception and buying time. And all the while he is accruing and constructing his weapons of mass destruction. We have had seven years—seven years of discussion. At the end of it Saddam Hussein is still obstructing the UNSCOM inspectors. He is still trying to build his weapons.
  My Lords, enough is enough. There must be no more games, no more obstruction and no more deceptions. Saddam Hussein must let UNSCOM do its job. It is simple and it is straightforward. Moreover, it is right. The choice is his. He can give UN inspectors full and unrestricted access. We look to him to do so. It is in his power to resolve this crisis, and we hope he will. We hope he will respond to the huge international effort for peace. If he chooses not to do so, then the position is clear, and he must accept the consequences of his decision. I beg to move.
  Moved, That this House takes note of the current situation in Iraq. —(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean.)
  3.28 p.m.
  Lord Moynihan: My Lords, in the light of the events of recent days, I am grateful to have this timely opportunity to hear a clear and unambiguous statement of government policy on Iraq. This is not the first time Saddam Hussein has presented a naked challenge to the will of the international community, vested in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. It is vital that the Government have a clear, unwavering policy on Iraq, together with our international partners, since the consensus of world opinion presently focused on Iraq doubts that this will be the last time that the Iraqi despot attempts to dictate to the United Nations.
  Since the end of the Gulf War Saddam Hussein has repeatedly flouted Security Council resolutions. In 1993 he violated the no-fly zones and last August his attack on Arbil in northern Iraq was a clear violation of Security Council Resolution 688. The US military response to his aggression in northern Iraq, strongly supported by the previous administration, sent an unequivocal statement that such behaviour will not be tolerated. Last November, again he attempted to re-write the Gulf War ceasefire terms agreed in the Security Council resolutions when he expelled the UN weapons inspection team.
  So today I take the opportunity to reiterate the Opposition's support for the Government's firm stance in this crisis. But we make this plea. Let there be no
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  confusion or uncertainty in our objectives. Let there be no doubt or ambiguity about these objectives. And let there be clarity about the implications of these objectives. We deplore Iraq's failure to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. In government and now in opposition, we supported the UN efforts to end Saddam Hussein's programme for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Iraq. We share the Government's present determination to take all possible diplomatic steps while leaving the military option open—all steps which will lead to Saddam Hussein complying with the resolutions of the UN Security Council, which are not negotiable. No country can determine the composition of UN teams and no country should defy UN resolutions.
  As we have heard from the Minister, and as I speak today in your Lordships' House, intensive diplomacy is under way in an attempt to enable a peaceful solution to be reached. We are very glad to learn from the Minister that progress in that direction is being made. It is now looking very likely that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, will visit Baghdad later this week. That will be a welcome development. We also welcome the fact that although the proposals coming out of Baghdad have fallen short of the UN requirement to date, to a optimist they indicate that Saddam Hussein may at last be bowing to international pressure.
  Will the Minister confirm that the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the permanent members of the Security Council will be to negotiate on the basis of full and unfettered access to all sites that UNSCOM wishes to inspect, with no time limits imposed, and that the professionalism and integrity of UNSCOM will be maintained? Any indication that Saddam Hussein could pick and choose the composition of the inspection team or the clauses of the relevant UN resolutions with which he wishes to comply would set a disastrous precedent and the credibility of the United Nations would be at stake.
  If the UNSCOM-plus solution—that is, free and unfettered access to the weapons inspectors, but accompanied by diplomats—is sufficient to resolve this crisis and to persuade Saddam Hussein to back down, the Opposition would welcome it. However, since November the work of UNSCOM has been repeatedly blocked, obstructed and hindered. During the crisis in November, Richard Butler did not rule out the possibility that it may have been contrived by Iraq because UNSCOM was getting close to making a real discovery to deflect attention from the real issue of the weapons and to give Iraq time to move the evidence and force the inspectors to start their search all over again. Furthermore, there have been unconfirmed reports that Iraq has smuggled missiles and technology to produce weapons of mass destruction to the sympathetic rogue states of Sudan, Libya and the Yemen. Richard Butler has said that,
  "if Iraq has moved things out of the country, the logic of that is clear.

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  Given this, does the Minister believe that the UNSCOM-plus solution will be a lasting one and that we will not get a repeat of this very same situation in two or three months' time when Saddam Hussein again decides to play hide-and-seek with the international community?
  Do the Government agree that a lasting solution is vital to maintain the authority of the international community acting through the Security Council and that we will witness the irreparable erosion of that authority if we do not find a permanent solution to this crisis? Diplomatic and moral authority rests with the Security Council. The international community cannot allow itself to be drawn into a protracted game of cat-and-mouse in which Saddam Hussein ignores the rules defined by the Security Council and invents his own as he goes along.
  Yesterday, for the first time, the Government outlined their military objective and gave a clear statement that military strikes would target those sites which they believe would complete the job of preventing Saddam Hussein from developing his weapons of mass destruction that UNSCOM has not been allowed to do. I must admit that some of us were surprised at the Foreign Secretary's announcement of the targets of the military option on Radio 4 this morning. I wonder whether the timing of that announcement was wise, offering, as it does, important military intelligence to Saddam Hussein. From these Benches, while it has been our position that any military action must have a clear objective and must be directly linked to our diplomatic and strategic aims, it is vital that we absorb the bitter lesson that history has taught us—that is, of how the danger of bombing without precise military and political objectives can escalate beyond a government's control. Any ambivalence over the ultimate goals of the operation will inevitably lead to uncertainty and confusion. Should all diplomatic means be exhausted and it proves necessary to take the military option, on behalf of the British servicemen and women whose lives may be put at risk, clear unequivocal objectives must be set.
  There will be many questions today about the targeting plans and the military options which have been outlined by the Foreign Secretary. As I understand it, these have been "very carefully" designed to avoid any release of chemical or biological agents into the atmosphere although we have heard defence officials estimate that up to 1,500 Iraqi civilians could be killed in air strikes. The military objective, we hear, will not be the destruction of Iraq but to diminish significantly Saddam's military capability, including his ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and to prevent him from creating such weapons in the future.
  But, given the destruction that a suitcase of anthrax or a teaspoon of VX nerve gas can wreak, is it not the case that even the most surgically precise of air strikes runs the risk of releasing chemical and bacterial weapons into the atmosphere with potentially deadly consequences? Can the Government therefore elaborate on their view that a conventional military strike, however precise, is the most appropriate way to prevent the actions of a terrorist deploying both chemical and biological weapons and the means of producing them?
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  For extremely important questions are posed about the global handling of terrorism, which includes the use of these weapons. These questions need to be addressed in full. They include to what extent a conventional response to terrorist acts can be successful, particularly without men on the ground? Furthermore, what assessment have the Government made of the remarks to US senators last week by General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which he questioned the ability of an air strike to reduce substantially Iraq's capability to make weapons of mass destruction, given the ease with which Saddam Hussein could convert a hospital or a fertilizer plant into an anthrax or mustard gas manufacturing facility? General Shelton said,
  "I didn't say we could eliminate his weapons of mass destruction. We can't".
  I would welcome the views of the Minister's replying to the debate on those comments.
  This House warmly welcomed the UK initiative to draft the new Security Council resolution condemning Saddam Hussein's repeated obstruction of UNSCOM's work. The Foreign Secretary announced last week that this was a UK initiative and that the UK was taking the lead on drafting a text. I hope that it will be possible to clarify whether the new resolution was intended to provide legal authority from the Security Council for the use of force, or was it to demonstrate the united will of the Security Council?
  Still on the subject of the resolution, in addition to the Minister's very important comments about the legal foundation for any military action against Iraq which I followed carefully—I know that we shall return to this point when my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew of Twysden addresses your Lordships—I should like some extra clarification because there is still in my mind and, I believe, in the minds of Members of your Lordships' House, some confusion about whether Resolution 678, which authorised the use of force following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and Resolution 687, which authorises the UN weapons inspection team, provide adequate authority to validate military action today. Can the Minister confirm that Resolution 678 would apply only to a situation in which Iraq had not withdrawn from Kuwait, while Resolution 687 does not specifically sanction military action although its objective is stated as,
  "restoring international peace and security in the area set out in the recent resolutions of the Security Council"?
  Can the Minister confirm that Resolution 687 provides adequate authority and, if so, what was the purpose of the Government's proposed new resolution?
  I know that Members of your Lordships' House are concerned about the growing opinion that the crisis has revealed rifts in the permanent membership of the Security Council, given that China, Russia and France have all expressed their consistent opposition to military action. It is vital that the Security Council speaks with one voice. It must remain firm and united in the measures that it takes to insist that Iraq co-operates with UNSCOM and complies with the relevant Security Council resolutions. I would welcome the Minister's comments on that issue because it was the United

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  Nations, not the United States, that was defied by the Iraqi leadership during this crisis and it is vital that the Security Council acts together or it will risk compromising the influence of the international community.
  I turn briefly to an issue raised by the Minister—support from Iraq's neighbours in the Arab world. We on these Benches widely welcome the growing element of support from around the world for the actions outlined. The success of the Gulf operation in 1991, however, depended greatly on the support of many Arab states. In the event of military action against Iraq, I believe that it is widely accepted that a similar level of support would not be forthcoming now. It is important for your Lordships' House to consider the impact that the refusal of Arab states to endorse a military solution to the Iraq crisis may have on US-Arab relations and what implications it has for the future security of the region and the influence and credibility of the United States to negotiate in a future crisis and in further Middle East peace talks.
  I believe that that highlights the importance of the relationship between, for example, sanctions and unfettered access for UNSCOM inspectors. We shall shortly hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, whose views, I believe, will find considerable support in this House. I assure the noble Baroness that, unlike yesterday, I anticipate a smooth transition from my speech to hers! If the noble Baroness concentrates on what I know she believes to be extremely important in this context, I hope that the House will learn from the Minister's reply what influence the Government are exerting to ensure that Saddam Hussein's manipulative strong-arm tactics and repeated defiance of the West do not endow him with kudos among his neighbours.
  I should very much like to hear the Minister's reflections on the consequences of the courses of action open to us, both diplomatic and military, for the politics of the region as a whole. During the four Statements and the debate that we have had specifically on Iraq, your Lordships' House has not had the benefit of hearing the Government's assessment of the political, diplomatic and geo-political ramifications on a number of key issues, such as our relations with the Arab League, the implications for the future of the Middle East peace talks and the rehabilitation of Iran.
  I have posed many of these issues as questions for the consideration of the House and of the Minister who is to reply. Britain, as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, has a major role to play in bringing security and democracy to that volatile region. The Middle East is a vital piece in the jigsaw of world peace and prosperity. One dictator cannot be permitted to undermine the security and stability of a region in which we have a particular interest, long-standing friendships, commercial links and close ties between our peoples. Iraq has huge potential once its people are released from the yoke of tyranny under which they are currently enslaved. I emphasise that the international community must stand by to help with reconstruction and renewal to ensure that Iraq takes its place in the family of nations once this crisis is over.
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  For the past six years Saddam Hussein has traded in a currency of concealment, lies and deception. We must make it clear that Saddam Hussein's juggernaut on the road to defiance and transgression will not bring power, kudos and legitimacy, but only bankruptcy in its wake. The only route to prosperity and acceptance by the world community is to comply fully and unconditionally with Security Council resolutions. Only in that way will sanctions be lifted.
  If modern history has taught us anything, it is the peril of unchecked tyranny. Short-term appeasement will pay us few dividends. Britain, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has a duty to protect the integrity of the United Nations. Britain has a duty to stand firm with our allies against the twin forces of tyranny and aggression, as we did in 1991. We have a duty to remain vigilant to ensure that Iraq co-operates fully with the UN so that UNSCOM inspectors can carry out their full mandate to prevent the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On behalf of the Opposition, I assure the Government of our committed support where they pursue clear and firm policies towards Iraq in order to achieve those goals.
  3.46 p.m.
  Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, in this crucial debate, I begin by congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, who spoke on behalf of the Government, and the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, who spoke on behalf of the Conservative Party, on what I believe were two remarkable, clear and strong speeches. Before I say anything else, let me say that there is nothing as important as clarity in a situation in which we may perhaps be about to commit our young men and women to the risk of losing their lives in a cause which all of us believe to be a proper one.
  Therefore, I want to say as strongly as I can that anyone who reads the inspectors' reports or the earlier reports of the UNSCOM expeditions from 1996 onwards cannot be under any illusion that Saddam Hussein has not mounted a series of efforts to try to create weapons of mass destruction. I want to state fairly and clearly that if the diplomatic solution is not successful, we understand that the military action which the Government have outlined will become inescapable.
  Having said that, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, in asking the Minister about that diplomatic initiative because, as the noble Lord rightly said, the great advantage of the success of the diplomatic initiative is that it would leave the structures of UNSCOM in place, and UNSCOM has been more successful than any other effort in detecting and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If one reads the reports, one realises that UNSCOM has had a remarkable record of achievement. Time and again, the inspectors have seized upon fragments of information to lead them to the factories and hidden sites where Hussein's government have embarked upon weapons experiments, development and production.
  The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, was absolutely right that one of the most crucial elements in the crisis is to try to get across to the Arab states and the other states in

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  the region, with which the United Kingdom has worked successfully and closely over many years, the message that we shall go the last mile in an attempt to get a diplomatic solution, with the clear indication that that must lead to an unconditional resumption of inspections in all parts of Iraq where the inspectors believe that weapons or other facilities may be concealed.
  In that context I should like to ask the noble Baroness about two initiatives explored in the past two weeks which appear to be most fruitful. The first, which has been explored in particular by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, and which, encouragingly, the United States has indicated its willingness to consider, is the addition of monitors from the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to the inspections to be made, if Saddam Hussein is willing once again to allow unconditional access. This is one of the areas that been explored in the diplomatic negotiations between Saddam Hussein and Russia, France and other countries. It has also been explored in visits by the Gulf states to Baghdad. In this context I should like to quote a major article in yesterday's Washington Post:
  "US officials have indicated that Washington probably would agree to this plan as a face-saving device for Saddam Hussein provided Iraq understands and accepts that UNSCOM remains the operational 'core' of such inspections".
  The first question that I should like to put to the noble Baroness is whether, in demonstrating that we are willing to go that extra mile, she believes that this is still a live possibility. Can she indicate the Government's support for it? She helpfully said that the Government wished the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General well.
  The second question arises in the context of the possibility of a diplomatic initiative. I recognise that the hour is terribly late, but the repercussions of military action are grave. Can the Minister clarify one possible area of vagueness? What is the position about sanctions were there to be an unconditional acceptance by the Hussein regime of a resumption of inspections? The noble Baroness will be aware that yesterday in the Independent there appeared a letter signed by four of Her Majesty's Government's previous ambassadors to Iraq. In that letter they indicated their view, which must be taken seriously, that some indication that sanctions would be gradually eased over a period of time, subject to Hussein fully accepting UNSCOM's presence, might provide a possible basis for a diplomatic outcome. Perhaps the noble Baroness can say a little more about that. I only raise the matter because that may conceivably help in the crisis that we confront.
  Like the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, I ask the noble Baroness to say a little more about a very difficult area in this crisis; namely, to make absolutely plain that military action, if it occurs, is fully within the terms of a resolution. The Foreign Secretary, in another place, indicated as long as two weeks ago that the United Kingdom Government hoped to table a resolution on these matters. It was subsequently delayed, rightly in my view, in an attempt to get more signatories and support. On 10th February in another place the Foreign Secretary said in response to a Question put by Mr. Tam Dalyell,
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  MP, that there would be a clear and unambiguous resolution on the matter. It is vital that there should be so that the objectives of any military action are absolutely clear and unambiguous. Can the noble Baroness add anything further in response to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and my question on this matter?
  I should like to mention two other matters before I conclude. The first is the issue of winning the support of the Arab states. I feel obliged to say that while I agree with the noble Baroness that Israel is a very different country from Iraq and indeed has a lively and thriving democracy, in which incidentally critics of the Israeli Government flourish and are free to express their opinions very strongly and loudly, in the Middle East there is a perception of double standards. I believe that we must deal with that perception by making it plain that United Nations' resolutions, to whomsoever they apply and at whatever time they are agreed by the Security Council and the General Assembly, should be obeyed.
  My second point is the support, if it should come to that—though I pray that it will not—for military action if there is no alternative. We cannot accept that we bear no responsibility in this matter. Sadly, it is now plain that some of the resources available to Iraq were supplied by this country, France and other EU countries and that in the 1980s some resources were supplied by the United States at a time when she saw Iraq as the great champion against Iran. One of the lessons to be drawn from this crisis is that there must be a much more rigorous regime to deal with the export of either dual use or militarily lethal exports to other countries. I remind the House of the comment in the Scott Report that the Houses of Parliament were knowingly misled about the export of these weapons.
  I conclude by saying that I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and the noble Baroness that we must stand up in this critical moment. But if there is still room for a diplomatic outcome I am sure that the whole House agrees that we should do everything possible to support the Government in pursuing that means of resolving this critical problem.
  3.57 p.m.
  The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, I begin by giving my most sincere apologies to the House that I will not be able to stay until the end of this important debate due to a previous commitment that I feel obliged to honour. However, I shall read what is said, especially the words of the Minister, with great attention.
  In recent weeks I have rung up some of the wisest strategists and military experts I know only to hear a great sigh down the phone and the expression of a sense of bafflement. I believe that we are confronted by one of the most acute dilemmas that has faced the world since World War II. The Minister reminded us of the weapons possessed by Saddam Hussein and the threat of horrendous proportions that they pose. Another factor of hardly less significance is the authority of the United Nations in all future arms control programmes. The future stability of the world depends very much on arms control. That in turn depends on the ability of United

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  Nations inspectors to have free and unfettered access to all possible weapons sites. For those two reasons it is vital that the international community stands firm against the present Iraqi regime. Indeed, its horrific potential for destruction makes it that much more imperative to resist; otherwise, any dictator would think that he could bully the international community if only he raised the stakes high enough. It is crucial that the international community remains firm in its resolve.
  The Churches hope and pray that this firmness will have the effect of getting Saddam Hussein to allow access to inspectors without the use of force. When it comes to the possibility of use, those of us who are not pacifists will draw on the criteria of the Just War tradition. I should emphasise that this is not an arcane body of knowledge but the accumulated wisdom of Christian civilisation reflecting on the morality of warfare. All the arguments in the House today will be related, in one way or another, to that tradition. Indeed, we may very well be like the person who was told that he spoke prose all his life without knowing it. Nevertheless, the strength of the Just War tradition, which began with Augustine and was further refined by Aquinas and numerous other figures right up until our own time, provides a structure and a consistent way of approaching the moral dimension of those issues. I hope that it might therefore be of use to the House if I briefly set out those criteria.
  First, there must be legitimate authority. In any action against Iraq, that means the authority of the UN. The US claims that that is already implicit in previous resolutions requiring Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction. But, as we know, others argue that on such a serious issue as that a new resolution is needed. Yet such a resolution authorising military force would not at the moment receive the support of China and possibly of neither France nor Russia. The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, raised important questions in that area. They were reiterated by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. I hope that we shall be able to receive clarification of that crucial issue of legitimate authority.
  Secondly, every attempt to resolve the dispute by peaceful means must have been tried and exhausted. There have been seven years of trickery and lies in which Saddam Hussein has exhausted the patience of the international community. It seems that there are no further peaceful steps to be taken. Yet even up until the last moment there are frantic diplomatic efforts going on, and of course we warmly welcome them.
  Thirdly, a calculation must be made so that military action would not cause more harm than would be the case if such action did not take place. But that calculation depends very much on what is trying to be achieved, the goal of any action. Furthermore, there is another criterion of the Just War tradition closely linked to that; namely, that there must be a reasonable chance of success. The reason for that is obvious, because a failed attempt would obviously cause more suffering than allowing a dictator to remain. It is also clear that in this kind of calculation, moral, political and military considerations are bound up together. In short, what a government do in trying to calculate the consequences
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  of possible courses of action is a profoundly moral matter. That has always been emphasised by the Christian tradition.
  As we know, various aims of military action have been put forward. The most recently stated war aim was put by President Clinton in these words,
  "I think the precise question should be, 'Could any military action, if all else fails, substantially reduce or delay Saddam Hussein's capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and deliver them to his neighbours'? The answer to that, I am convinced, is 'Yes.'"
  He says, "if all else fails". But such failure would inflict substantial damage on innocent people; it would stop inspectors going in for good; it would enhance Saddam Hussein's prestige, simply because he had survived; and it would unite much of the Arab world against the United States.
  The Just War tradition makes a distinction between ius ad bellum, the moral considerations which must apply before a military action, and ius in bello, the morality that applies during the actual combat. The most important principle for ius in bello is that military targets only must be aimed at. Civilians, or more precisely those not directly contributing to the war effort, must not be the object of direct attack. Of course innocent civilians always do suffer. But that brings in the principle of proportion again, the weighing of consequences, which also applies to ius ad bellum. In other words, the suffering inflicted by a military strike must be less than would be the case if that military strike were not undertaken.
  It is those criteria and the constraints that arise out of them that are very much in the minds of Church leaders of all the communities at the present time. Nevertheless, we should I believe bear in mind what the most reverend primate the Archbishop of Canterbury said to the General Synod of the Church of England last week:
  "I am aware that the way in which the strategic options are debated publicly in this country can itself affect the chances of a peaceful outcome because of its impact on the perceptions of the Iraqi regime".
  We are hoping that the threats of force will bring Saddam Hussein to his senses, and it would be wrong for any Church leader to undermine the reality of that threat by any loose talk. Furthermore, it is governments who have the awesome responsibility of making decisions about the military action. They may be in possession of facts unknown to the rest of us, and indeed there may be an actual policy that is different from the declared one. For those reasons a certain reticence from Church leaders is appropriate at this stage.
  There is another aspect of this conflict that particularly concerns the Church at this time; that is, the effect of any military action on the Moslem community in this country. After the Gulf War, in some of our larger cities, children were taunted in the playground for being Moslem, and therefore allegedly supporters of Saddam Hussein. The Churches will do all that they can now, as they did then, to build supportive bridges to the Moslem community. But I believe that all of us—Churches, Government and, especially, the press—need to do all that we can to damp down any possible or potential Islamophobia.

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  There are ancient Christian churches in Iraq, and there are Moslem communities in this country. Most of them, too, think that Saddam Hussein is appalling. We need to disassociate those communities in the public mind from any connection with Saddam Hussein. If military action does take place, I fear that at least some Moslems in this country will feel frightened.
  The uncertain outcome of any military strike, the certain suffering of a fair number of innocent Iraqis, and the potentially counter-productive effects of a miliary strike, worry Church leaders as they worry all of us here. Nevertheless, it is important to stand firm, while at the same time exploring other diplomatic means of a peaceful resolution right to the end. That means, too, that if in the judgment of the Government the criteria of the Just War tradition are met, military strikes cannot be ruled out as a last resort. Those are awesome decisions to have to make, and, as I said after the Government Statement on Iraq in this House, the prayers of Christian people everywhere will be very much with those who have to make them in the days and weeks ahead.
  4.07 p.m.
  Lord Mayhew of Twysden: My Lords, I greatly appreciate the privilege of being able to follow the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. It was a speech to which I listened with admiration, reassurance and much sympathy. It would be valueless for me to attempt to develop his important argument. Although there is always a case for reticence on the part of lawyers, and there is, as the right reverend Prelate said, on this occasion, a case for reticence on the part of churchmen, there is one issue upon which it is legitimate, and I hope helpful, at this stage for me to focus.
  I preface my remarks by saying that of course there can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein is in flagrant breach of the Security Council resolution to which he signed up. He has broken its provisions. In so doing, there can be equally no doubt that he has posed to the Middle East, and perhaps more widely, a grave threat: his is a breach of international peace and security. That much is beyond any argument. Equally it is plain that the threat could be dispelled, as it should be, by Saddam Hussein himself allowing the Security Council inspectors back in, giving them untrammelled access, and allowing his weaponry to be destroyed under supervision, as required by the provisions of Resolution 687.
  However, today we are concerned with the position which obtains and which has arisen through Saddam's refusal to do that. I wish to focus on the legal basis for whatever military action may be carried out by Her Majesty's Government and their allies. I leave aside the important question of military efficacy. It is not a matter on which I have any expertise. I mention it only because if it is deployed I hope that it will be 100 per cent. effective and total in the sense of securing its objective.
  It is highly important that the states taking part in military action should know the legal foundation for their action, should identify it, and should make it plain. I do not believe that it is a matter of legal pedantry. It
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  is important for two reasons. First, it is important for world order, largely, although not entirely, based on the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, it is important in the interests of the service personnel who would be called upon to deliver that military action and those instructing them to do so. Therefore, I welcome the Minister's comments that any military action would be founded upon, and taken in support of, international law.
  In August 1990 when Saddam Hussein launched his attack on Kuwait, our Government and the American Government rightly recognised, and at once, that it was essential to found our active response to that invasion upon an impeccable legal base of international law. And we did so. We did it first, and immediately, by invoking the doctrine of collective self-defence. That requires a prior armed attack to have been made upon a state. The doctrine is specifically reserved in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
  Secondly, as soon as possible we secured, in the first instance, Resolution 660 in August in the Security Council, and thereafter Resolution 678 on 29th November, authorising member states to take all necessary action to restore international peace and security in the area. That area was defined in the earlier resolution as Kuwait, the invasion of Kuwait having been determined by the Security Council as representing a breach of international peace and security. The last resolution, passed in November, provided the foundation for the military action which three months later succeeded so brilliantly in expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
  I suggest that by securing those legal foundations, identifying them, and making them publicly known, we greatly assisted the success of the necessary military action. We did so, first, by excluding spurious, or any serious, challenge to its legality and, secondly, by largely forestalling an accusation of western imperialism which could have been anticipated. We upheld the authority of the United Nations and demonstrated that it was capable not only of being a law-making organisation of international character but a law-enforcing organisation, too. Thereafter, military action was kept purposely and firmly within what was alone authorised by Resolution 678; namely, the use of all necessary means to get Saddam out of Kuwait.
  The problem today is that whatever else Saddam has done he has elected to remain out of Kuwait. Therefore, I suggest that the question we face is whether breach of the ceasefire resolution, Resolution 687, can properly be relied upon without more as authorising the allies to take military action which may be seen as having a wider purpose than was authorised by Resolution 678 before the ceasefire was agreed.
  I do not wish to say more. I acknowledge with sympathy the heavy responsibilities which Her Majesty's Government carry. However, I wish to ask the following questions. Have the Government received clear legal advice that the action which they contemplate is already authorised by Resolution 678? Will military action be limited to what is authorised by Resolution 678, revived, as it is argued to have been, by the ceasefire regulation? Or will the Government feel it

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  desirable to seek some further and wider authorisation? Those are important questions and I am grateful to the House for listening to them.
  4.16 p.m.
  Lord Kennet: My Lords, I follow conveniently on what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, and go further into the question whether sufficient authorisation already exists. First, I apologise to my noble friend the Minister for having missed the entirety of her speech, which I regret greatly. My absence was due to circumstances which I could not control. I hope only that I shall not ask her questions which she has already answered, or blame her for not having said things which she has already said. If that happens, I ask her to turn around and glare at me.
  The International Herald Tribune carried the following story the other day. Mrs. Albright asked one of the ruling Saudi Princes whether at least they would once again help to pay for the attack on Iraq. He told her of the shepherd who was losing a lamb a week to a wolf. The shepherd acquired two sheepdogs to protect his flock, but then found that he had to kill a lamb every day to feed the dogs. So he decided to stay with the wolf.
  What support is there for the United States—I mean real support—for action without UNSC approval and not just words which do not actually condemn? In the Middle East, they point out that the Anglo-Saxons are the peoples with the least experience of war on their own soil. Then there are the three obedient NATO postulants, recommending themselves to the US Senate.
  Before coming to the world implications, perhaps I may say a few words about the European implications. What about our intended "leadership" in Europe? Is the ever-increasing subservience to Washington what the Prime Minister really intended, or was he swept off his feet by the famous Clinton glow? He went to Washington wearing two hats: the Prime Minister of this country and for six months the Prime Minister of the country holding the presidency of the European Union. The latter hat he threw away, perhaps innocent of any intention of doing so.
  I know well from previous debates and so forth that one will be accused of pacifism, disloyalty and so on if one says that an attack on Iraq is not in this country's interest. So let me say that I come from a line of naval officers going back to the 18th century; I fought in the Royal Navy in the Second World War; I did not belong to CND; I supported the recovery of the Falklands; and although I thought that the 1991 Gulf War should have been avoided, when it was not I thought that it should be fought through. Since then, the attacks on Iraq seem mainly to have been for the sake of testing weapons.
  Before I come to the long-term significance of the proposed attack, I will raise two more detailed points. If the US or we bomb a BW or CW weapon or precursor stockpile and trigger the release of germs or poisons, are we going to blame Saddam Hussein for the consequences? These, we know perfectly well, are targets of mass destruction, and many times over the
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  Tory governments refused to consider banning attacks on them—something the Swedish Government were proposing long ago. In civil law, those who cause accidents and explosions in such places as Chernobyl, and Seveso, and Bhopal are held responsible. George Robertson told David Frost on Sunday that what we would do would be proportionate. That is required by international law, so there can be no attacks on targets of mass destruction. Perhaps the Minister who winds up will confirm that and tell the House what the Secretary of State for Defence believes our attack should be proportionate to.
  In any case, we should not be surprised if Saddam had already got some chemical or biological weapons emplaced here and in the US where they could do much damage, awaiting release in retaliation.
  But now to the larger field. When in a civilised state you come to a jam in international affairs and everyone runs about seeking a way forward and one cannot be found, that is the moment to pause and ask where we were going in any case. What kind of a runabout time is this? What is the current trend of our journey through the generations? International affairs are not chaotic and they are not beyond the control of groups of people working thoughtfully and determinedly together. But how many of us ever take advantage of that?
  With the leave of the House I shall start a long way back. Do not fear: I shall move fast. Five centuries ago England did not exist as a civil entity: it was just a ragged cloth of hatreds and alliances among cousins and neighbours and their armed leaders, punctuated by sublime cathedrals. But then Welsh Henry made it a state, and put down the private armies, and quite shortly England was accepted, and shortly after again became an object of pride. The Union of England and Scotland came a hundred years later, and lo and behold the wild warrior and the suave exploiter lay down and bred together.
  And so it happened all over Europe: a France was made out of sticks and stones of humanity, a Spain out of some large logs, a settled Russia out of half-nomad allegiances, and finally a Germany out of a hundred bourgeois princedoms and an Italy out of fifty mercantile ones.
  All this just made the wars bigger and more bloody by making the combatant units bigger and richer. The blood-frenzy culminated in the First World War, where a generation was made to believe that the highest moral glory was to stagger out of a frozen trench and advance a hundred yards into 100 per cent. lethal machine gun fire. That was believed to be God's work.
  But that thought-structure was destroyed along with the millions of young men who had been force-fed with it, and we were able to dream of a League of Nations which could be to the whole world as the US was to its component states and as Britain and Germany had long ago been to Wales and Saxony.
  Only the most torpid blockhead could fail to ask himself now: what sort of UN can be to Europe, America and Asia as the European Union is to its own

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  constituent nations? If that is imaginable, and it is, then it is our duty—perhaps our highest duty—to take no action which will make it less likely.
  The overall political obstacles to the obvious answers to this question have been the same both for the League and for the UN. The US never joined the League of Nations. Thus the rest of us were left without the participation of that great democracy, which had done more than any other country to invent the League in the first place. And we were left without its help in war until we were well and truly on the ropes and Germany saved us by attacking Russia and Japan saved us by attacking Pearl Harbour.
  And now again the US is not able to play any constructive part in steering the UN towards its manifest destiny because it is both in long-standing default on its dues—its normal dues and its peace keeping dues—and it is so selective about the resolutions and the bits of international law it is interested in enforcing. Against Saddam Hussein UN resolutions must be enforced; against Israel they absolutely must not—even though Israel's very existence as a state rests on a resolution of the United Nations.
  So it is up to the rest of us to find the actions and inactions which will be the most likely to make the UN more focused and swifter in its actions. This, I had hoped, was a fundamental part of the Labour manifesto—as regards international affairs, the foundation commitment—on which the Government were elected.
  Now what does more focused and swifter mean? In this case, I submit, it means having frequent and unimpeded opportunities to debate and decide what is to be done next. There should be a careful structure—there should have been for the last six years—receiving and publicly debating the reports of UNSCOM and other inspectors. The UN official reporting on child health in Iraq, for instance, is as adamant as Mr. Butler about what he sees and knows: that the present situation in his field is not tolerable. He and Mr. Butler should both be reporting to the General Assembly and Security Council, and the secretariat should be sending drafts and memos round the member governments, adjusting, focusing, doing the work of political administration and democracy which is so familiar to us in our own countries.
  Little of all this has been done in the present case. If we were to attack Iraq now, without doing any of it, and without a resolution of the Security Council, we should be acting like some species far back up the tree of political evolution: it would be like the Wars of the Roses. If we were to begin to do the necessary work now, at speed, we should stand a chance of wresting human understanding and development from the black jaws of habit. If we were to do the work thoroughly, we should have some hope of earning the blessing of future generations.
  We cannot afford a world in which the United States takes on itself to be judge, jury, hangman and universal interpreter of what is law. The Government must look at what "full spectrum dominance" by 2010 and the militarisation of the United States' international
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  behaviour means for the world at large and for this country. We have always opposed military hegemony and should not now be promoting it.
  The two great needs are: first, a renewed and now public discussion in the Security Council, leading, secondly, to a clear resolution, either authorising or not authorising an attack on Iraq by a member state or states, which, thirdly, is then observed. Without this, the proposed American-British attack would be legally on the level of the Franco-British attack on Egypt in 1956. I trust that that is not our purpose; that on the contrary, we are labouring to keep the United States within the bounds of law.
  4.29 p.m.
  Lord Owen: My Lords, with every speech that we have heard so far, I believe that we have found points which indicate that the situation facing us over Iraq in 1998 is both different from and more difficult than the one we faced in 1991. Kofi Annan is a cool-headed, cautious but determined diplomat. I think that he has been quite right to concentrate, before he goes to Baghdad, on trying to reach consensus from the Permanent Five. If anyone can bring a satisfactory, hard-headed solution out of a meeting with Saddam Hussein, I believe that it is Kofi Annan. He is someone for whom I have the profoundest respect. I wish him all good fortune.
  Nevertheless, we must recognise that Saddam Hussein went into the invasion of Kuwait and then, in particular, into all the negotiations, mainly with the Russians, about withdrawal before the war, with the clear understanding that he was ready not just to commit his nation to war but also to commit his nation to certain defeat. This is a man who calculates extremely carefully. Indeed, one has only to consider the way that he shielded his helicopters throughout the 1991 war; he never used them, because he knew that he would need them in the aftermath. He knew that communications would be completely destroyed and that, if he was going to stop an insurrection in his country, he would need those helicopters. Very tragically, we fell for that and allowed him to use his helicopters, with tragic results.
  I believe that there is a very real chance that Saddam Hussein will deliberately provoke military action by refusing to accept all the different formulations which will be offered to get him off the hook. He has impaled himself deliberately on that hook; and we need to understand that fact. He believes that if he brings military action upon his country he can win a political victory. Against that background, we have to calculate at every level with extreme care. I have in mind the situation where we do not achieve what the Minister of State in her opening speech said was the prime objective; namely, full written compliance with his obligations entered into as a result of the ceasefire. Let us be clear about this. There would not have been a ceasefire if Saddam Hussein had not taken on those obligations. Many people have criticised that ceasefire. I am not one of them. I think that it is easy to second guess that war. The prime task then was to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, to keep the coalition together and

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  to live under the rule of international law, following the resolutions which gave us the power to use force to ensure that he withdrew from Kuwait.
  However, we now face a different situation; namely, to change the mind of Saddam Hussein. I have profound doubt that he will ever do so. Even if he signed up to a form of words, I believe that this problem would be with us for months and years ahead. If he does not sign up and we take military action, however careful the strategy embarked upon is—and I am not here to be an armchair strategist—I do not believe that that of itself will bring about a change of mind from Saddam Hussein. In my view, it will be necessary to use force and the Government will have my full support if they are driven into that situation. It would be far preferable for us to get unanimity from the Permanent Five and a Security Council resolution specifically authorising the use of force, which would not run the risk of a veto. Indeed, I heard what the former Attorney-General said about the difficulty of living within the law and the need to live within the law of the United Nations relying on existing resolutions. Although I am no lawyer, I tend to believe that there is enough room for manoeuvre to take action if we had to, but it would be far more preferable to take action with specific authorisation.
  During my short time before the House, I should like to concentrate on the political strategy which simply has to underpin the military strategy. I shall argue very strongly against the belief that this will all be settled from 20,000 feet. All experience shows that air power on its own very rarely achieves success. I know that many people think that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled by NATO air strikes; but that was really not the case. They were a very useful adjunct, but there was basic, successful and on-the-ground military action of the Croatian forces against the Serbs in Krajina and in western Bosnia. There were also British and French forces on the ground in Sarejevo with recently arrived artillery and equipment, which was capable of operating when aircraft were not capable of dealing with Serb positions.
  I believe that President Clinton is right to start increasing slowly the military on-ground capacity of his forces. There are 1,800 troops already in Kuwait, with 4,000 others expected to arrive. If we have to take military action, I hope that our Government will feel able to make a contribution. I do not necessarily have in mind the massive ground forces that we assembled in 1991, but there will be a need for a sustained military strategy which could not be sufficiently carried out purely by air forces and which will need an on-ground capacity in emergencies.
  There are many obstacles and problems facing us, especially as regards how to restrain Israel if it were to be attacked. That would not be easy, as it was not easy in 1991. Indeed, I believe that it would be almost impossible in 1998. But what political strategy might have to underpin action over a period of months, not weeks, and perhaps even longer? I know of three major negotiations which must be embarked upon. The first relates to the Kurds. What has happened to the Kurdish people from 1991 to the present day is a scandal.
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  A terrible wrong has been allowed to happen. We must learn from the terrible mistakes that were made. Many of us—and certainly our country—have committed errors as well as the United States, and others.
  We have to go back in history to the time of the League of Nations and after the end of the First World War. We must look painstakingly at Woodrow Wilson's 14 different principles. We tried to negotiate a treaty in 1920 which would offer a Kurdish state. However, for a variety of reasons, which are very complex and which I shall not touch upon today, that has never been delivered. It may be a Kurdish state but, in my view, that would not be the first step. I now believe that a Kurdish protectorate is absolutely essential. We have been inhibited by this in the past because we have taken the view that the integrity of Iraq is essential in order to contain Iran. That may or may not have been correct. Certainly in the 1980s it had a good deal of intellectual strength behind it. But it has no intellectual strength at all in 1998. That strategy must be revised.
  There is already an air exclusion zone operating from the 36th parallel. We need to consider redesigning the parameters of that zone. I believe that we must start negotiations; indeed, it is not just enough to talk to the Kurdish people. We all know from their history how difficult they have always found it to reach agreement and about their fractious nature. We must talk to the Turkish Government. It is important to remember that President Özal did in March of 1991 talk to the Iraqi Kurds and was ready to challenge the hitherto accepted wisdom in Turkey that there could never be a Kurdish protectorate in Iraq.
  I believe that it is possible to envisage a Kurdish protectorate, eventually a Kurdistan, totally within the parameters of Iraq. That Kurdish state would have to accept that there could not be any violation of the borders of Turkey and of Iran. However, there will have to be discussions. Turkey has been damaged internally by not dealing with the Kurds. One of the problems of Turkey coming into the European Union stems from the civil rights and other abuses that largely come from an unsolved and, I believe, an unsolvable problem of the Kurds in Turkey under present policy.
  So I believe they must be talked to. Secondly, I believe it is also essential to talk to Iran. Some people will not agree with that, but I believe that the stand-off from a dialogue with Iran has gone on for long enough. We have a new president in Iran who has made important moves in the direction of a dialogue with the West, and in particular the United States. The United States may not yet be ready to talk directly with Iran, in which case the United Kingdom is well placed to start that dialogue which should concern the Kurdish situation in Iraq and also—this is essential—the Shi'ite Moslems, because if the Kurds were appallingly treated, the Shi'ite Moslems have been subjected to appalling treatment also. No one knows that better than the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson of Winterbourne. Those things will happen again. We know that if Saddam Hussein becomes stronger again and if he accepts some form of words and continues in power, he will go back to those people who have opposed him and systematically destroy them. We owe it to those people

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  to protect them better this time than we have done over the past seven years. I believe that negotiation is essential.
  Then there is a third negotiation which is already going on but which needs to have the commitment of the President of the United States of America; namely, the Arab/Israeli negotiations. I do not believe that we would be having anything like the difficulty that we are currently experiencing in getting friendly Moslem countries to stand with us on the fundamental issues of principle which go to the core of the UN charter; namely, the eradication of biological and chemical weapons—particularly when these chemical weapons have been used by Saddam Hussein—if there were not a widespread belief that the United States is no longer committed to the Oslo peace process, and that there has somehow been a rather fundamental change in these negotiations. Again I do not expect any comment in the wind-up speeches on this matter, but I believe privately that the British Prime Minister, who has handled this whole episode extremely well, should raise this question. I do not share the criticism that he is a poodle or any of the other ridiculous comments. It is a fundamental aspect of British foreign policy that where it is possible we work closely with our principal ally the United States of America.
  Most people know that that relationship triumphs when critical advice is given privately. When you have a different view, you argue it from within as an ally and as a partner. We have a legitimate view to put to the United States administration on the handling of the Arab/Israeli dispute, and I hope that we shall do so. We shall do so with the support of many Israelis who are as disillusioned about what has happened over the past year or so as are we on the outside. That is an essential element. Were we to have to take military action I believe that we may embark on a fairly long period of military and political activity. During that time it will be necessary to talk to the Turkish Government, to the Iranian Government and to talk to the Israeli Government and to make it quite clear that there has to be more realistic progress.
  This will be a fraught and extremely difficult operation. There is no one who does not hope that there will be a serious diplomatic settlement. However, history tells us that bits of paper are not always enough. It has to be a real settlement this time. I tell your Lordships one essential reason why. The criticism of the present United States—which I have often made—since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 has been that it has not done enough; that it did not do enough in Somalia or in the early years in Yugoslavia; it did not do enough in Rwanda; it possibly did not even do enough in Korea. If, on an issue of substantive principle, the United States has decided to stand firm and defend the United Nations charter and to stand firm on the necessity of getting rid of these weapons of mass destruction and it was to be deserted, and particularly by Britain, the effect would be devastating. I believe it would lead to a real, deep isolationism in the United States and a cynicism about international law. It would probably continue to take
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  unilateral action when that suited but it would be an unconstrained superpower. That would be a situation of extreme gravity.
  Therefore there are much deeper issues here than even Iraq or the region that lie behind the British Government's decision to stay firmly and solidly with the United States and keep whatever advice we have when there is a slight difference, and whatever criticism we have, privately and quietly between friends. I end by saying that if we have to take military action I hope and pray for those in the Armed Forces who have to undertake this difficult operation that they will choose wisely in the weeks and months ahead.
  4.45 p.m.
  Lord Beloff: My Lords, it is difficult to follow so extensive and important an analysis of the political aspects of the crisis we are facing. More immediately, of course, we face—or many people appear to face—a crisis of conscience about the immediate action to be pursued. There must therefore be some concern about the genuine possibility of the United Nations Secretary-General's venture into diplomacy.
  Why do we find diplomacy so difficult in this area, and why do we find it difficult to discuss this and the difficulties that it presents us with, as the right reverend Prelate has mentioned? To answer that question we might look at something quite different. As we concentrate on Iraq today the inhabitants of Belgium have something quite different on their minds; a report about a gruesome murderer of little children and the failure of the police and judicial system to bring him to book. What is the nexus? I have not, of course, seen the Belgian official report which was published only today, but it seems to me that one element must be that ordinary people, policemen, magistrates and other citizens, find it almost impossible to imagine the mind of a person whose ambition in life was to find opportunities to torture little children. I have a feeling that one of our difficulties when we discuss how to deal with Saddam Hussein is that most decent people find it almost impossible to enter into the mind of an individual who has massacred thousands of his own citizens, and foreigners as well, and who is apparently determined to give himself the apparatus which would enable him to wreak the same havoc on others, possibly only in the region, but perhaps in the wider world. If we cannot enter into the mind of a person of that kind, our diplomacy becomes difficult.
  The noble Lord, Lord Owen, believes nevertheless that Saddam is a rational person and makes rational decisions. If that were the case, one would have to ask what is the objective of these rational decisions? As far as I followed the noble Lord, Lord Owen, in that part of his speech, it is to retain Saddam's political authority in Iraq. But that authority surely is maintained only because he has the force to maintain it. Therefore it is difficult to see why a rational approach to his predicament would lead to anything which would diminish his ability to use that force. I would not disagree for a moment with what the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said about either the Kurds or the Shi'ite Moslems of the south. But assuming that there is still to

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  be the core country of Iraq around Baghdad—the old Mesopotamia—we would hope that the regime would not survive either the diplomacy or, if the diplomacy has to be given up, the conflict that would follow. We clearly must believe that the Iraqi people have the capacity to get something better going.
  The trouble is that we may also find it difficult to know how the Iraqi people would respond either to our diplomacy or to our use of force. We see them on television screens apparently applauding Saddam Hussein. We see them denouncing ourselves, the Americans and others. Do we know whether that is genuine or the product of immeasurable fear? Those of us who live in civilised societies may find it difficult to think of political attitudes being conditioned primarily by fear. I suspect that the only people in a position to understand how the Iraqi people behave are those, now not so many in numbers, who lived under Stalin or Hitler. Even later, we have had revelations from the East German archives of how people behave when their personal security and the security of their families are at stake in any political move they make.
  Those are the problems which lead people to seek, perhaps desperately, some way of avoiding a conflict. They say, "Well, if we go to war this will increase Saddam's popularity"; or, "It will show that there is no feeling in most countries for action of this kind." I find that sympathetic on the whole as an attitude, although not as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. He develops imaginary history of the past and future in order to promote his own stance on these issues. But, for most people, who feel repugnance at the idea of such a conflict, I have nothing but respect and admiration.
  The difficulty is that they, too, have no answer. They say, "We rule out the use of force. We accept the powerful arguments against it, moral, possibly legal and certainly political." They then have to say, "What do we think will happen to the weapons of mass destruction?". Even the most pacifically inclined do not deny that they exist in Saddam Hussein's possession. I take it that even the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, will not tell us that it is all imaginary, that there are no weapons of mass destruction. Those people have to say, "We cannot accept the solutions at present on offer." We have to say to them, "Please can you tell us how else it can be done?"
  4.55 p.m.
  Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: My Lords, we seem to be preparing to go to war with Iraq again. We are debating it with heavy hearts. But we built up this monster. As Shakespeare would have it,
  "Ay, there's the rub".
  Although we did not create him, he is an Iraqi. We armed and inflated him. But now we have summoned an armada to bring him low.
  Of course the explicit mission is not to destroy him personally. The goal is limited to attack on clusters of weapons production and possibly, if we can find them, his praetorian guard. Perhaps that is because it is clear that whoever else is assaulted, he will be safe deep in
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  bunkers way beneath the surface. But without weapons he falls because he rules by fear and money, force and brutality. And what weapons he has assembled. Perhaps they are not nuclear yet. The French effort of 1981 to make nuclear weaponry was destroyed. But that same year Saddam Hussein sent 75 Scud missiles in just one day into the southern Iranian province of Khuzestan while the heinous policy of dual containment, still, alas, in place today, during that appalling war between Iran and Iraq resulted in weapon sales to both sides from 37 nations, including Britain. That left 1 million dead.
  In 1988 his invasion of Iran was finally repulsed and he turned in revenge on the Iraqi Kurds with chemical warfare, in clear contravention of the 1925 Geneva Convention. He retained thousands of Iranian prisoners of war and used them for ghastly experiments as he built up his biological weaponry. That same year he started to drain the historic Sumerian marshlands of Iraq and Iran, and he began to destroy the marshland people.
  We in Britain relaxed the guidelines on arms sales to Iraq around that time, ignoring the bloated faces of the dead Kurdish children. We saw their faces in the newspapers and on television. DTI Ministers visited Baghdad to start the process of fresh arms sales from the United Kingdom to Iraq. A Foreign Office Minister, intelligent, intellectual and ignorant, wrote an enthusiastic note urging British arms manufacturers to sell to Baghdad, not hearing the cries of the tortured political prisoners in Al Gharaib Prison just below their feet in Baghdad. Ten thousand people—Tuesdays and Thursdays were the execution days—were picked out by numbers to be killed. They were not what you and I would call political. Some of them were doctors, some nurses, some intellectuals. Britain built up the medical school in Baghdad, the finest in the Persian Gulf. The education system came from Britain. All those people were our friends; they were not politicians. But they opposed a tyranny which is beyond our understanding.
  I have a doctor friend, tortured unbearably for months on end. He was one of the people who had to authorise the executions, noting down the dead bodies as they were cut from their stakes. I have talked to the fathers who were given the execution chits showing that their sons had been killed. These were the people who were supposed to be political prisoners.
  In that same year on the BBC's "Any Questions" I called for an international war tribunal for Saddam Hussein. I have to say that I found scant support for such a view from the body of informed opinion of my side then. I was told that we needed arms sales to defend ourselves. I was given some sort of warped logic that they had our weapons and therefore it was easier for us to defend ourselves. Were Britain's interests really best served by making a level killing field in the Arabo-Persian Gulf? There is no such thing as a clean war. Saddam Hussein would not bother if there were. He is a cruel man. Events in Kuwait showed us that in 1990.
  I talked later to a man in Kuwait. He had rushed out when he saw a dead body on the ground during the invasion. It was the body of his closest schoolfriend. He went to find him on the ground. He was clearly dead,

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  and he put his arms around him. He found that his fingers, his hands, almost his arms went right into the body as he touched it. Every bone in that man's body had been deliberately broken. His body was like a piece of jelly. A monster breeds monsters.
  Every family in Iraq has a spy, usually the children, reporting on a daily basis to the authorities about what their parents say. It is a terrible society. As someone who fled from Iraq to the United States said recently, the whole of Iraq is a living concentration camp. When Saddam Hussein's troops were driven back from Kuwait, they took prisoners of war with them. They have not yet been released; they have never been heard of again. He practised his vengeful cruelty in 1991 on Iraqis in north, south and central Iraq alike. The uprising, stimulated or at least encouraged by President Bush, collapsed in a welter of blood and pain.
  He went on assaulting his people, this time using the weapons that we, the allies, in the peace treaty after the Gulf War, had authorised him to use. I saw it happen on the ground. There were airborne assaults outside the safe haven—a wonderful concept derived from a British army officer's idea. There were machine guns mounted on helicopters; bombs from fixed-wing aircraft; and chemical drops where masks were needed. I personally saw mustard gas-type injuries on southern Iraqi people inside Iraq. I saw ground-to-ground missiles. I came across a warm spot and a huge amount of earth everywhere. A ground-to-ground missile that was authorised for Saddam's use had gone right across the marshlands near to the Iranian border. Those ground-to-ground missiles kill 25,000 people if they hit a town and go up in flames. Those are, of course, conventional weapons. We authorised him to keep them and use them. As he drained the marshlands, tanks were able to roam freely and plant bombs right up to a point beside the Iranian border.
  I found help for the refugees fragmentary and hard to obtain as thousands upon thousands of them flowed across the border between 1991 and 1993–95, as the border was closed, and closed and closed and Iraqi tanks came closer and closer, chasing the refugees in the north and the south. It was also difficult to convince the West that these were people who should be helped. It was difficult to deliver the aid. There was suspicion as to the motives, as if the West's hands were permanently tainted.
  Outsiders just would not believe that the victims' pain was not imaginary. I was told that all of them were terrorists. They were Moslems—Shi'ah Moslems to boot; they had to be terrorists, didn't they? As if every single Shi'ah Moslem, all those who somehow had come out of Iraq, were themselves a part of some international terrorist brigade.
  I set up a dialogue with the director-general of UNESCO, Federico Mayor. Britain did not belong to UNESCO. Together we have created a permanent standing conference on dialogue between the European Union and Islam—the dialogue of civilisations. Surely that is the way forward. I went to speak to the White House, asking for American help. I tried four times. All that they would talk about was what they perceived as
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  the coming fall of Iran. They had misunderstood the situation. What they were watching was in fact the excitement before a general election and in the following year the excitement of electing the president. The problem of dual containment has meant that the United States appears to believe that Arabs and Persians, Iraqis and Iranians, are just the same; that they will respond in exactly the same way, whatever is done. It is a false assumption.
  As to the Pentagon, I showed them photographs of the marshland children out of their environment and in despair in camps. They said contemptuously: "Oh, they don't look as though they are starving. We get better photographs of starving children from Africa. These won't get you any sympathy." I went four times to the State Department to ask for help, to ask for aid for those people. I was given the names of various charities in the United States which were supposed to help refugees. The biggest one of all begged me for visas. I said, "I'm sorry, I'm not a travel agent." The person with whom I was speaking said, "But I have to go there. I have to see." I said, "I can give you the film and the photographs." He went on begging me for visas. Eventually, as a sort of joke over the telephone, I said, "I can't understand why you can't get your own visas. Do the Iranians think that you used to be head of the CIA?" There was a long pause. "Funny you should say that", he said, "I was." And the people went on suffering.
  I talked to representatives in France. They were making contracts with Iraq—contracts for oil extraction from the marshlands later on. I talked to representatives in Germany. Of course, they were busy, as we now understand, furnishing Saddam's arsenal. I went to talk to people in the Netherlands—until I discovered that Netherlands engineers were building the dams in the marshlands. Meanwhile, the drainage of the marshlands went on. The size, the scale and the horror of the suffering is unbelievable, happening in a place half the size of Wales, the size of New Jersey. And we knew it was going on.
  It was not believed. Ministers who knew refused to act, or even to release the knowledge. Why? Because, as one—only one, I agree—said to me, "If the public knew what was going on, they would want us to do something."
  Today, the western appeasers of the tyrant claim that we must not cause further environmental damage. I have here a halfway-house report on the drainage of the marshlands. Who noticed the environmental damage then, in 1993? Who noticed the small town that went way back into history as 10,000 people were totally wiped out? A small boy in a camp today, aged just 13, with sisters of 11 and 9, has no parents. His mother was killed in Iraq. His father died on reaching the refugee camp. He begs from the other beggars to try to survive. There is a blind family—six of them, all blind as a result of the damage—with only the mother who can see. She begs all day to survive. Amar himself, the boy with 45 per cent. third degree burns is now in Britain, saved thanks to Guy's Hospital.

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  We should remember that sanctions exclude aid. Do not imagine that aid would not be there if it was possible to achieve. Aid through Baghdad is impossible to achieve. I have offered half-a-million pounds-worth of medical aid to Baghdad, not once but several times. I even met Iraqi ministers to discuss it personally. They rejected it. There is no aid to the south of Iraq and I believe it is minimal elsewhere.
  A woman watched her husband being run down by a tank, one of a line of men killed by that method of execution in front of their wives and daughters. She said to me frantically, "Take my voice to the West. Let the West hear what suffering we are going through."
  Yet we did not learn the lesson. In 1996, when 135,000 northern Iraqi refugees fled across the border as Saddam invaded the north of Iraq, the safe haven area, there was western inaction and disbelief. The numbers were not believed. I went out there myself immediately and stood on the border as the bombs came over, counting the refugee numbers and making a "Today" broadcast through Landsat to try to convince people that, yes, those numbers were there. Instead of help, I feel that we have sent into Iraq the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—war, famine, disease and death.
  The Iraqi people have suffered too much. They cannot be helped with a despotic maniac owning all government power and position—a real tyrannus rex. If we have any heart, and any concept of real human rights, we should now start to work towards a fairer government in Iraq; we should assist in trying to restore the marshlands, to help Iraq towards a better future.
  For ourselves, we should make a firm resolve, from which we should never deviate, that we should not build our own prosperity upon the broken bodies of another people. Arms sales restraint should surely be our watchword, a real code and one that we should bring into the wider world.
  As for Saddam, it is not for us to deal with him. We should work hard to crush and destroy his power base, which threatens the region and a wider area, by taking away his weapons. After that, let the Iraqis make up their minds and decide on their own future. If they say that those who live by the sword should die by the sword, then let us work hard for an international war crimes tribunal so that the lessons learned need not be repeated. Auschwitz and Belsen echo down the ages; Al Gharaib Prison will, too. I support the Government.
  5.11 p.m.
  Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar: My Lords, no one has a greater or more intimate knowledge of the horrors perpetrated by Saddam Hussein on the marsh Arabs than has the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson. I am sure that the whole House has immense respect for the extraordinary and dedicated work she has for so long devoted to this cause.
  There was an impressive consensus among the three Front Benches in support of the Government's line on this issue. Unfortunately I do not share it and find my views much closer to those expressed in the three
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  succeeding speeches by the right reverend Prelate, my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew and the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and to what the noble Lord, Lord Owen, so eloquently said about the Kurds.
  It seems to me that the proposed military action, which we all still hope will be avoided, will be futile, damaging and hypocritical. It will be futile because it seems extremely unlikely that it will work. Like my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew, I am unable to judge the military efficacy of these matters, but I have taken the trouble to speak to many people who know about them. I have not found one who has much faith that the bombing will achieve its objectives. And one does not have to confine one's knowledge to private contacts, because a number of doubts have been publicly expressed by people who have considerable expertise on the subject. Previous evidence shows that bombing in these circumstances does not achieve its objective.
  I believe that it would be damaging, mainly because of its considerable consequences elsewhere. As President Mubarak of Egypt said to the Financial Times in an interview yesterday:
  "I think things will become much more serious with air strikes".
  There is very little doubt that air strikes will lead to a considerable increase in Islamic fundamentalism. It will do considerable damage to pro-Western regimes in the Arab world and will create alarm, not only in the Arab world but also elsewhere. It will, I believe, destroy whatever faith still exists in the United States and Britain as useful mediators in the Middle East.
  The noble Lord, Lord Owen, said that it was unfair and wrong to call the Government the poodle and parrot of America, but I believe that on this issue that is exactly what they have been. The noble Lord also said that it would be very damaging to America if we did not always follow their line. That is not a view that is even shared by the Americans themselves. The headline to a striking article by a former State Department adviser in the Herald Tribune before Christmas was:
  "Too Special a Relationship Makes Britain a Feeble Ally".
  The writer, Mr. Charles Maechling Jr., went on to say,
  "British parroting of U.S. foreign policy has so diminished Britain's standing as an independent force in world affairs as to make it more of a diplomatic encumbrance than an asset".
  He went on to talk about Britain's "abdication of independence" and other matters of that kind, which we certainly seem to have seen in this crisis. I believe that not only Britain's reputation but also her interests will be damaged in the Middle East.
  Military action would be hypocritical because, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said, America is very selective with regard to the United Nations resolutions that it chooses to seek to enforce. We had a good example of that when the current American Secretary of Defense went to Russia. He said that one of the reasons for the crisis was that we had to see that Saddam Hussein observed the United Nations resolution. Yet when he was a senator, Mr. Cohen spent much of his time urging the United States to recognise Jerusalem as the single, undivided, eternal capital of Israel, which would be in

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  complete defiance of the United Nations resolution and of history, justice and truth, and a good many other things.
  In her impressive opening speech the noble Baroness denied that the West were operating double standards. She said that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator—I should think every person in this House and indeed outside fully agrees with that—whereas Israel was a democracy. I do not suppose she meant to imply that democracies have a greater licence over the United Nations resolutions that they choose to obey, but there seemed to be an implication to that effect. Although Israel is a democracy as far as Israelis are concerned—and all credit to her for that—she is certainly not a democracy as far as the Palestinians are concerned, who have suffered a malign, brutal and savage occupation for the last 30 years; so much so that the daughter of a holocaust survivor, Sarah Roy, recently talked about the de-development of Gaza.
  The fact is that the double standards are blatant. Saddam Hussein has weapons of destruction and will be punished for disobeying United Nations resolutions. Israel too has weapons of destruction and is consistently rewarded by the United States for doing exactly the same thing. She is showered with billions of dollars and has just been given the latest American military equipment.
  It is all very well for the noble Baroness to shake her head, but that is true. She said that we must see that Israel obeys United States resolutions. We say that, but in fact she has been disobeying them for 30 years and there is no reason to believe that she will not go on doing so because she knows that she always has the covert—and occasionally overt—support of the American administration. There is so little support for America in this crisis because of the blatant double standards involved. The noble Baroness talked about the strong support from our Gulf allies. So strong is that support that, for the reasons that I have given, not a single one of the major allies supports military action.
  What should be done? First, we should start being even-handed. Then we should remember the importance of the strategy of deterrence. After all, deterrence kept peace in Europe for 50 years. I cannot see why the same principles do not apply in the Middle East. Assuming that Saddam has these weapons—and I do assume that he has them, although it is not absolutely certain—if he used them on Israel or anyone else, he would be obliterated almost straightaway. The idea that he would use them seems to me extremely unlikely.
  We should then put forward a plan. There should certainly be unrestricted access to Saddam's sites. There should be proper teams, on the lines of Mr. Ekeus rather than of Mr. Butler, who seems an extremely unfortunate choice. There should be a proper international distribution in the teams. We should put a time limit on that process and give a definite undertaking that, provided no obstruction has taken place up to that time limit expiring, sanctions will end.
  That seems to me to be a feasible negotiating position and something I hoped the Government would put forward. However, they seem to be doing entirely what
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  the Americans say and have not put that position forward. It may well be that the Americans want a war—it would help President Clinton in his current difficulties—but we certainly do not want a war. I regret therefore that the Government have not been more active in trying to prevent one.
  5.20 p.m.
  Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, following what was said by the noble Lord, I do not believe that the action will stop at an aerial bombardment. I am inclined to believe that it has already been decided that the aerial bombardment will not be successful in bringing about the end that we seek. Aerial bombardments, damaging and disastrous though they are to those on the receiving end, seldom achieve the object they seek. In the end that must be done on the ground by the poor bloody infantry. I do not see any reason to suppose that this operation will be any different.
  I have always been opposed to war. I was born six years before World War I, which was the war to end all wars. I had some difficulty in persuading myself to join in the proceedings of World War H. but I finally did succeed in persuading myself that the evil against which we fought was so great that it was desirable that I should play my small part in resisting it. And so I joined the Royal Air Force, similar to my noble friend who spoke earlier.
  The reason that I am opposed to war is that it seldom achieves the end it seeks. If I could be persuaded that this war was desirable, the passionate and well-informed speech we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, would have persuaded me. And if I believed that the war would achieve its aim, then I would be in favour of it; but I do not believe it will.
  The noble Lord, Lord Beloff—who speaks without notes, and I wish I did—wondered whether I should touch on the question of the weapons which have been gathered together by the tyrant in Baghdad. I have no difficulty in doing so. My noble friend in the Foreign Office was kind enough to supply me with the report of the commission which investigated the whole matter. Insufficient praise has been given to that group. At considerable risk it disclosed a situation which some perhaps do not realise to be as alarming as it is.
  I need quote only one short paragraph from the report which sets out at the beginning what it achieved. It achieved a great deal. It uncovered a considerable amount of highly dangerous material which had been gathered together under the regime. At the end of the report it says why there is still anxiety and shows clearly that there is every reason for anxiety. The report dealt with various armaments that had been gathered together and continued that,
  Over 600 tonnes of VX precursors are also not accounted for. These could make 200 tonnes of VX. One drop is enough to kill. 200 tonnes could wipe out the world's population".
  That is not a headline from a tabloid, as I thought it was when I first heard it on the radio; it is the considered view of the expert inspectors who carried out that examination.

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  What do we do in those circumstances? Do we go ahead with the war? It seems to have been forgotten that those weapons will be used by Saddam Hussein in the war which we are proposing to launch. We shall therefore create a situation which will probably be worse than the one with which we started. That is nearly always the way with wars. I remember in the last war we carefully avoided killing civilians, bringing back bombs—I was not in Bomber Command; I was in Fighter Command, but it was well known at the time—to drop them in the sea if the exact military target could not be found. We ended up with blockbusters which were intended to frighten the civilian population and in fact killed women and children also. That was the end of that war to cure barbarism; we became barbaric ourselves, and ended up with Hiroshima.
  At the beginning of this century around 3 per cent. of the casualties in war were women or children; now 60 per cent. of the casualties are women and children. They are the target of modern war, and that is barbarism. Modern war is a form of barbarism and if we stick our hands into it we become barbaric ourselves.
  I am therefore not in favour of starting this war. People may ask, "All right, you are not in favour of the war, but what are you in favour of?". To some extent I follow the line indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Gilmour; that is, that there is an alternative method of approaching the problem. However, it is an alternative which presents us with considerable difficulty because we have to give something to the monster. The problem we are up against is that the methodology which we have so far been following has failed to separate the monster from his people; in fact, it has solidified the situation. He is the hero because he is the man who fights the West.
  We must therefore take action over a longer period. At the moment we can express the hope that the Secretary-Genera] who will be going to Baghdad shortly will be successful in finding a solution to the problem. If so, all the fears expressed in our debate will not come about. But suppose he is not successful; what then? What can be the next step if we do not go to war? It must be the kind of action mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Gilmour, and by the noble Baroness when she spoke of the possibility of an approach to the monster.
  It has to be done because the alternative is worse. We have to bargain. We have to say that in return for future verified reductions or the disappearance of the materials he has been gathering together illegally and wrongly and in return for allowing back the inspectors we will gradually remove sanctions. That is the only way to deal with the problem. The alternative is to fight out a war which will not be successful and which could lead to the termination of the human race.
  5.30 p.m.
  Baroness Cox: My Lords, I speak with some trepidation in a debate to which so many experts are contributing. However, I wish to focus on some of the wider ramifications of the challenge Saddam Hussein is posing to the international community, with particular
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  reference to his policies of exporting weapons of mass destruction to other countries, and to ask the Government for their response to the implications of these policies.
  A great deal has been said and written about the effectiveness of air strikes against targets within Iraq. However, even if they achieved everything they are intended to accomplish, they would provide only a short-term solution. For they would still leave untouched the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons which Iraq has exported to other countries and the plants which Iraq is helping to establish for the further development of the weapons of mass destruction in those countries. My noble friend Lord Moynihan referred to "unconfirmed reports" of exports of such weapons. But there is considerable evidence. Therefore, in my contribution, I should like to highlight the very disturbing evidence of Iraq's involvement in the development of weapons of mass destruction outside Iraq; for example, in Sudan and Libya. Sites of storage of weapons of mass destruction and the development of new weapons in these countries are unchecked by United Nations inspection teams.
  The transfer of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction started before the outbreak of the Gulf War. In 1990, when Saddam Hussein realised that intensive bombing of Iraq would occur, key sensitive elements were smuggled out. Further dispatches of materials and of experts to safe havens took place in the spring of 1991. Two of the most important weapons of mass destruction programmes were transferred to Iraq's close allies, Sudan and Libya. I will quote some of the information which has been made available by reliable sources from Sudan and I will draw heavily on a significant report released on 10th February, just last week, which was prepared by the United States House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. I shall be using those sources for information on both Sudan and Libya.
  The Iraqi-Sudanese strategic co-operation was established during the Gulf War and has developed in subsequent years with the delivery by Iraq to Sudan of weapons and of personnel with specialist expertise. In March/April 1991, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, asked Sudan's President Omer El-Bashir for permission to move Iraqi chemical weapons and Scud missiles to Sudan to avoid their destruction by the UN teams. Later, in 1991, as UN inspections became inevitable. Iraq transferred a large number of Scuds—estimated at about 400 missiles—and chemical weapons for "safe keeping" to Yemen and Sudan. Those sent to Yemen were subsequently transferred to Sudan.
  The American report details further movement of supplies, including nuclear material, to Sudan in 1992. Subsequently, Iraq has been enhancing its relations with Sudan, providing support of many kinds for the fundamentalist Islamic military regime in Khartoum—the National Islamic Front. The NIF has been waging a war, which it has publicly declared a jihad, against its own people, including the predominantly Christian or Animist Africans of the south, the people of the Nuba Mountains, many of whom are Christians, others Animists or Moslems; and more recently, people in

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  eastern Sudan, including the Moslem Beja people. Therefore, this war in Sudan is not a straight Christian/Moslem war. Indeed, many moderate Moslems are opposing a regime which is supported by Iraq; and that cruel conflict has already claimed more than 1.5 million lives and created the displacement of more than 5 million people.
  The first joint Iraqi-Sudanese weapons of mass destruction project was built to provide facilities for chemical weapons near Wau, in Bar-El-Ghazal, southern Sudan. There have since been credible reports from reliable sources in Sudan of the deployment of chemical weapons around Kadugli in the Nuba Mountains and in the south. Witnesses have reported that deaths and injuries occurred among residents and there was a significant change in the colour of corpses and of animals and trees, similar to changes observed in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. Intelligence reports identified the agents as low quality mustard taken from an early consignment shipped to Sudan from Iraq just after the Gulf War. Since then there have been reports of the actual use of mustard gas canisters against the Sudanese People's Liberation Army by Sudan government forces on at least two occasions—in 1995 in southern Sudan; and in 1997 in eastern Sudan.
  Even more disturbing, perhaps, if it is possible, than the reports of the use of chemical weapons are reports of the development of new complexes for their production. In May 1997, Iraq began the secret transfer to Sudan of equipment for the production of weapons of mass destruction which had so far been kept hidden in Iraq as a strategic reserve. Iraqi experts arrived in Sudan to prepare for the production and storage of biological weapons which Saddam originally planned to use against the Kurds.
  Recent reports from sources inside Sudan claim that the NIF regime has now established two more complexes for the manufacture of chemical weapons, missiles of different sizes and artillery units. The first complex was commissioned in 1997 and is based in a district in Khartoum North. It contains an administration building, a chemical factory disguised as a pharmaceutical factory and a five-star hotel for hosting foreign experts. The second base is in the Yarmouk complex south-west of the fuel depot in the Al Shagara area south of Khartoum. This complex was commissioned on 15th August 1996 and sources from inside Sudan claim that chemical weapons have been manufactured with Iraqi finance and expertise. There are further reports that Iraqi weapons and equipment have been buried underground in an area south-west of Khartoum and that there is another complex south of Khartoum at the Jebel Awlia military base.
  The report by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare also details the development of relationships between Iraq and Libya. I quote just one excerpt typical of many disturbing examples:
  "In late 1995, Saddam Hussein … authorised the transfer to Libya of the secrets of Iraq's most sensitive armaments programmes—particularly the biological weapons programme…With the UN inspectors expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, Baghdad decided to retain in Iraq only the operational biological bombs and warheads, as well as the equipment required to sustain them in operational posture. In 1996, Saddam ordered the surviving
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  sophisticated development and production systems as well as the extensive know-how and related documentation to be transferred to Libya".
  I have described these developments in some detail because they raise issues which are germane to the discussions surrounding the current situation in Iraq and to the proposed air strikes. Of course I believe that there can be no room for complacency or leniency with Saddam Hussein, with his track record of the production of weapons of mass destruction and of his ruthless use of them against his own people. I have visited the Kurds in Northern Iraq—or Iraqi Kurdistan—and seen how they still suffer from the aftermath of Saddam's brutality. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, rightly emphasised, they are still suffering horrifically and they require a Kurdish protectorate.
  But I believe that Saddam's ruthlessness cannot be underestimated. His policies of exporting so much of his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the capability for their further and continuing development for safekeeping to regimes that cannot be trusted to refrain from their use raises far-reaching questions. May I therefore ask the Minister three of those questions?
  First, does this dispersal of much of Saddam Hussein's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction outside Iraq and also the means for continuing to create those weapons of mass destruction have any bearing on decisions to undertake air strikes and other military offensives against Iraq? Secondly, is there a case for urgent consideration of measures to investigate the extent to which Iraq has exported materials and expertise for the development of weapons of mass destruction to other countries, particularly to Sudan and Libya? Thirdly, do the Government have any policy with regard to working with other UN member states to try to achieve the detection and the control of the development and use of weapons of mass destruction in those countries working in conjunction with Saddam Hussein, particularly Libya and Sudan?
  I am aware that these additional questions may not be very welcome at a time when the situation in Iraq itself poses questions which are urgent and of enormous significance. But to focus predominantly, even exclusively, on Iraq may play into Saddam Hussein's hands, if he has already anticipated this attention, and if the contents of his "treasure chest" of sinister weapons have already been shared with allies capable of carrying out equally ruthless destruction in pursuit of equally ruthless policies. I suggest that we ignore them at our peril.
  5.41 p.m.
  Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I hope to make my intervention in this debate a relatively brief one, partly because there is a long list of speakers and most of what needed to be said—and some that did not need to be said—has already been mentioned. The second reason is that I believe there is a very strong argument that at this particular stage of this crisis the less we say about these things and the less that we engage in speculation about the details, the better. I believe it is clear from today's debate that there is a great deal of common ground which we can accept and, I believe, dismiss.

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  I believe that few people would argue that Saddam Hussein should not be prevented from making weapons of mass destruction and stockpiling them. He should be forced to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions; but, furthermore, he should be brought to his senses, if possible by diplomatic action. I do not believe that anyone seriously dissents from that. No sane person wants a war. When the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, says that he is opposed to war, for once I can agree with him. I am opposed to war also.
  But the question here is not whether war is a good or a bad thing in isolation. The argument is whether Saddam Hussein can be brought to his senses and back into the international community of civilised nations by diplomatic means if those diplomatic means are not backed up by the threat of military action.
  Although, as I say, I am opposed to war as a human activity, I have always believed that armed force, or the threat of it, is a legitimate instrument of legitimate foreign policy. Part of my reason for believing that has been the support that is given to that view by the Christian doctrine of the just war. Although he is not in his place at the moment, perhaps I may say what an intellectual delight it was to hear the doctrine of the just war outlined so clearly and brilliantly by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford. I believe that that is true in this case. It is valid, right and legitimate that in the pursuit of legitimate diplomatic ends we should pose, if necessary, the threat of military action.
  That is why I have found over the past weeks that the endless discussion of strategic and military details has been somewhat vacuous and counterproductive. Going around London in the past few weeks one could be forgiven for thinking that the only military experts in this country are in newspaper offices, television studios or driving London taxis. That, of course, is not the end of the matter. There should be discussion about this issue of a restrained and intelligent kind. It is a matter of legitimate concern—and the point has been made several times in this House this evening—that whatever military action is embarked on it should have clearly defined, valid and limited objectives. But there is nothing new in that. That should always be behind the planning of any military operation in any context. But I believe that endless speculation about such matters as whether air strikes on their own will be enough; what will happen if we hit a target of weapons of mass destruction; and all the detail that must have been considered many times by the military planners themselves, is probably only of help to the regime in Baghdad. As soon as it feels that there is the slightest doubt about our resolution in this case its position will be strengthened.
  When we think about the possibility of armed force having to be used in this context, it is arguable that the British and American Governments—the two countries most likely to be mounting military action in this case—probably have the best military and diplomatic advice available to them of any country in the world. At least, that has been my experience from both ends of the spectrum. In my view it is extremely unlikely that this or the previous government—or any government of this
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  country that I can contemplate—would embark on some mad, trigger-happy military venture without careful planning and careful thought about its content and its consequences.
  Certainly, there would be no demand for that from the military. There have been suggestions in some of our newspapers that our generals and air marshals are simply drooling with delight at the thought of dropping bombs on Saddam. I believe that perhaps it is not sufficiently realised that those most anxious to avoid war and military action are those whose business it is; those who have had experience of it and who know at first hand what a wasteful and barbaric business it is.
  Before I sit down perhaps I may enter a more than usually sombre note. I am encouraged to do so because the noble Lord, Lord Gilmour, in his extremely interesting speech, touched on it himself. It is the frequent mention of the danger that Saddam Hussein may at some stage use his weapons of mass destruction outside the region and even use them against us. I would articulate perhaps more strongly what the noble Lord said, which is that Saddam Hussein should not forget that we, through the prudence of several successive governments, have the means to deter not only nuclear attack but any attack. Any attempt by Saddam Hussein to use weapons of mass destruction against this country would risk the most terrible retribution. I hope that he realises that.
  But if Saddam Hussein, as a result of listening to the uncertain sound of some of the cracked trumpets in the international community, decides that the threat of armed force is an empty one, that is the moment when it is most likely to have to be used. The Government deserve support for the courageous stand that they are taking in this crisis. I am delighted to discover, if this debate is any indication, that the Government have that support.
  5.49 p.m.
  Lord Bethell: My Lords, I do not want to go to war either; I would much prefer that we could settle this matter by diplomatic means, but I found the solution proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, unconvincing. I do not think that even the prospect of the removal of the sanctions imposed on Iraq would in itself be enough to persuade Saddam Hussein to give up his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
  We have heard from other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Gilmour, that such weapons may not be in the hands of Iraq only, but may have been given to other countries with which Saddam Hussein has a relationship. We are led to believe that there are nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel, Pakistan, India and perhaps South Africa and other countries. I do not know whether I speak for a majority, but I have an instinctive feeling that undesirable though that fact is, there is probably no very great danger at the moment from nuclear weapons being in the hands of the countries that I have just mentioned.
  We must also bear in mind that weapons of mass destruction, such as the bacteriological and chemical weapons held by Iraq, are in some ways more

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  dangerous. Those terrible weapons can easily be distributed. There are international treaties forbidding their manufacture and use. We in this country have forsworn the use and the manufacture of bacteriological and chemical weapons. The mega-powers, Russia and America, have done or are doing the same.
  There are grave concerns about this matter. I do not believe that one can accept absolutely at face value the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that the less said about it the better. I have a feeling that there is genuine concern among ordinary people in the country about what may be about to happen in the next few days. The Government and the usual channels were right rather belatedly to put the matter before Parliament and to hold debates both here and in another place on the wide-ranging issues raised by the situation in Iraq. This country may very well be involved in military conflict in the next few days and it is essential that the country supports the Government in this. For what it is worth. I offer my own support. I wish that the same could be said about all our allies. It is said that, as happened over Bosnia, Europe is displaying a patchwork of attitudes.
  I turn now to one specific point which I find particularly worrying. I have in mind Russia's attitude to this crisis. It is widely hoped that Russia is on our side, generally speaking, over the Iraqi crisis. I have heard it said that our aims are the same—that is to say, the aims of America and Britain are the same as those of Russia—and that only the methods used are a little different. It has been said that the methods used by Russia and ourselves complement one another because our approach, containing as it does a threat of force, is that much more effective when reinforced by Russia's diplomatic efforts. However, a large question mark has to be raised over Russia's position and we have to ask whether the Russians have been entirely frank with us over the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. I gave notice to the Minister this morning about this point and I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, will be able to respond to it.
  We very much hope that Russia is our partner in the building of peace and world order, but recent reports coming from the American Government have indicated that that may not be the case over Iraq. It may not be as simple as we would like to hope. It is said that Russia is rather enjoying the West's discomfiture over Iraq and profiting from it, frying or catching its own fish largely because of its resentment at having suffered so many losses during the past decade. It would be alarming if we had to conclude, as a result of this crisis with all its other perils, that Russia is taking an adversarial position towards the West over Iraq and that Russia has become a reckless, lawless land, with cowboys in charge of weapons of mass destruction, or even that it is helping to supply Iraq with weapons of mass destruction. Again, various American sources have made that point.
  I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, that one cannot go into too much detail. We cannot inform through ministerial Statements here or in another place our adversary and enemy in Iraq of what we propose to do or what we have discovered about how he gets his weapons. It has been said that Iraq has received
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  substantial and valuable equipment from Russia to help it to build up its capacity for bacteriological warfare. We need to know the basic presumptions on that and other issues on which our foreign and defence policies are based if we, the people, are to continue to support the Government as it is very desirable that we should.
  It has also been suggested by senior American officials, and widely reported in this country, that Russian members of the United Nations Special Commission have been giving information to Iraq via the Russian intelligence service, thus frustrating the efforts of the United Nations monitors. I do not necessarily believe what has been said, but I am concerned about it and I should be glad if the Minister could give me some reassurance.
  I have also heard that supersonic Cruise missiles have been made available to the Iranian Government and that they are at the moment deployed in the Gulf not too far away from the British and American vessels which may be taking part in conflict in the next few days.
  The Government have a problem here. They clearly cannot reveal their hand to the House because anything said here will no doubt be studied by those with whom we may be in conflict in a few days' time. However, I should be grateful if the Minister could tell us as much as he can, particularly about Russia's attitude to the problems that we face with Saddam Hussein. Is Russia on our side? Is it our partner in peace, or is it still the same old dangerous Russian bear?
  5.58 p.m.
  Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford spoke of the "horrific weapons" held by Saddam Hussein, and my noble friend Lady Cox referred to the fact that some of those weapons have already been exported to other countries. As we have heard, and as we all know, in 1991 Saddam Hussein agreed to abolish such stockpiles as he had and to cease the production of such weapons. He has not done so. What are we to do about the situation? It may appear to be gratuitous to put that question at this time.
  After all, we and the United States, with some very modest assistance from other countries, have assembled a large task force whose main purpose, I imagine, is to try to browbeat Saddam Hussein into acceptance of the return of the United Nations inspectors. I think that most of those who planned that task force would assume that if the browbeating were successful we would have achieved a triumphant victory of the kind which Clausewitz would have referred to as the best kind of victory—one achieved without the firing of a single shot. If the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, can achieve it, it will also be a great triumph for the United Nations. That is a triumph that I believe is highly desirable in the complex circumstances of the late 1990s.
  As we have heard very eloquently, particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, Saddam Hussein is not a rational man. He is not the kind of person who would react as we ourselves would react in such circumstances. In that respect he is similar to Hitler. As

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  Mr. Neville Chamberlain discovered, it was very difficult to deal with someone about whose reactions and background one had no knowledge. It is therefore possible that we shall find ourselves going ahead with air strikes, the purposes of which have been discussed and defined.
  Many Members of your Lordships' House have expressed anxiety about the consequences of those air strikes without criticising the reason for them but simply wondering whether they are the best course. The obvious anxiety derives from the fact that there are very few examples, if any, of victory being achieved purely by air strikes. There is a possibility that some such strikes might go wrong, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, pointed out, and perhaps result in the escape of the poisons that we are trying to control. It is also the fact that however brave, even heroic, pilots and crews may well turn out to be, it is only too easy to represent military action from the air as a cowardly undertaking, particularly in a poor country. There is also uncertainty as to exactly the long-term end of the air strikes.
  I should like to put forward an alternative suggestion. This does little more than expand slightly on what the noble Lord, Lord Owen, suggested was desirable in his remarkable and important speech; namely, that the political background and implications of whatever military action is decided upon should be considered more carefully than they have been. I hope that this does not offend the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, who remarkably for a noble Lord of his wide democratic experience suggested that the less we talked about these matters the better. Nevertheless, I wish to take the risk and perhaps this is something that he will not condemn.
  I believe that we should give much greater support—money and arms—than we have so far to the Iraqi opposition, including to the Iraqi National Congress, whose chairman normally lives in this country. We could support those gifts of money and arms with covert action of the kind which this country surely over many generations has shown itself particularly well equipped to carry out, particularly in this part of the world. Some suggestions along these lines were made by the United States ex-Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Perle, in a widely distributed article last week. Meantime, the assault force already assembled should be kept in being, thus keeping the Iraqi government guessing and keeping Saddam Hussein uncertain as to what our motives are but showing endless patience of the kind that police forces now show when they deal with a kidnapper whom they have besieged.
  Of course, it will be represented that a policy based on what I have suggested is either too late—I am not sure that that is the case but as this is the first debate that we have had on this matter I do not see how I could have proposed it earlier—or risks the break-up of Iraq. That is something that may have to be faced. It has been suggested that that should be opposed because Iraq's allies would be against it. Let us suppose that there were to be a triumphant victory in Iraq and we managed to establish democratic government. Surely, such a break-up would be likely anyway. The Marsh Shia Arabs, after all, have very little in common with the Kurds.
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  The noble Lord, Lord Owen, made a comment about the Kurds with which I am in full agreement. He referred to the possibility of the establishment of Kurdistan as a separate state. That matter has been discussed since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The noble Lord referred to a conference in Cairo in 1921 when the question of the future of the Kurds was decided. On that occasion the idea of backing the establishment of an independent Kurdistan was proposed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but he was dissuaded from pursuing that by civil servants, Sir Percy Cox and his oriental secretary, Gertrude Bell. I need hardly remind your Lordships that the colonial Secretary of State who made that proposal and who would have backed it further was Winston Churchill.
  I should like to make three further points. First, I support the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on one other matter. If the United States is to go to war over Iraq in the interests of the United Nations, I believe that the time has come for it to pay its dues to that organisation.
  Secondly, I believe that the British position should have been consistently discussed with our European partners, particularly at a time when we were about to assume the presidency of the European Union for the first six months of this year. It is only too easy to imagine how France would have reacted to this situation had she found herself in these circumstances. The French President would have announced that the voice of Europe could not be silent in deciding the destiny of the Middle East. I dare say that the name of the operation would have been much more "European" than "Operation Bolton", which scarcely seems to be an appropriate name for this undertaking.
  Thirdly, we are discussing the possibility of war in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that we are going to declare war or that the laws which in the past used to operate when wars occurred should apply in these circumstances. I dare say that there are certain disadvantages in a government saying that they will declare war. Nevertheless, for those who are fighting it there are many advantages. For example, it would be possible to insist on either a much tighter level of censorship than is possible in these circumstances or indeed complete censorship. At the very least those conducting the combat would not be distracted by the CNN news bulletins in Baghdad. I believe that much more thought should be given to this matter than has been the case. I made a proposal along these lines in this House at the time of the Falklands War. It was pooh-poohed by the Minister concerned. The word "war" was not used until historians started writing about it later. The same has happened on almost every occasion since 1945 when military action has had to be taken.
  We are led to conclude that the problem could be described by the question, "When is a war not a war?", and the answer, "When it is fought at the end of the 20th century". That is something worth bearing in mind, because there will be other hags. My noble friend Lady Cox suggested where they might be. Similar problems will occur in the future which can be overcome provided of course that we manage the present situation successfully and happily.
  6.10 p.m.
  Lord Blaker: My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, but with much less historical knowledge, I shall refer to Hitler. My first political recollection was of Hitler marching in to the Rhineland in 1936. We remember what happened. The western powers failed to react in any way. The US had opted out of Europe. Hitler concluded that he had free rein, without any opposition, to pursue his ambitions. So he moved into the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland.
  We now know from the records that if the French and British had responded vigorously to Hitler's move into the Rhineland he would have retreated. The whole history since that time might have been different. He felt that the West would never oppose him.
  We are at a comparably critical point at present. In contrast to the Rhineland affair, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in the early 1960s, the West, in the form of President Kennedy, responded vigorously, strongly, firmly and sensibly. The Soviet Union withdrew. The whole history of relations between the Soviet Union and the West was altered in a favourable way.
  We all want a peaceful solution if it can be achieved. The question that faces us, as we all agree, is whether, if a peaceful solution is impossible, force should be used. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford that this is one of the most acute dilemmas faced by the British Government since the Second World War. The decision is much more difficult than the one relating to the Iraq affair in 1990–91, and the question of whether we should have attempted to rescue the Falklands in 1982. It has much more serious implications for us and for the world.
  I see very little room for compromise. Saddam Hussein is saying that he will decide what sites the inspectors can inspect and who may be members of the inspection teams. He is saying that they can visit a particular site only once, and not return to monitor that site again. He is saying that because the inspectors have been pretty effective. We have heard from the Government reports of how much material they have discovered and how much has been destroyed, and that they believe he has much more. We cannot concede any of the points upon which Saddam Hussein is insisting. I do not believe, for example, that we can accept President Mubarak's suggestion that there should be a time limit on inspections. We can accept what is called UNSCOM plus, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan suggested.
  Of course military action has its problems. The first problem is the squeamishness of people who spend their time watching television reports in this country, in the US and other countries in the West when they are faced, as they would be faced, with pictures of weeping women in Baghdad and seriously wounded children. Saddam knows that. I feel confident that he is counting upon the squeamishness factor which he will ensure comes into force, because somehow he will make sure that we see those pictures on television. He is counting on that factor to result in our not having the will to carry the matter through. It may take some time, and I shall return
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  to that point. We must remember that the Vietnam war was won by the North Vietnamese in the sitting rooms of America.
  The second problem with military action is that the intelligence sometimes, and possibly often, will be wrong. My experience of war tells me that that is often the case. That is not necessarily because the intelligence people are inefficient but because events in war move very fast and the other side is always doing its best to confuse us. It is not surprising that we are sometimes confused. I hope that if we take military action our intelligence will be more effective than it was in 1991. Perhaps, when he replies, the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, will say something about the statements I have seen that our intelligence capacity has improved considerably since 1991.
  The third problem with military action is the difficulty of defining the objectives. As reported in the Observer last Sunday, the Prime Minister said:
  "The aim of any military action will be to diminish significantly Saddam's ability to deploy, conceal and re-create his weapons of mass destruction capability, or threaten his neighbours. That will he done, either by ensuring the inspectors can resume their work, or by destroying as much of that capability directly as we can and undermining his ability to sustain it militarily".
  The Foreign Secretary, whom many of us will have heard on Radio 4 this morning, talked in a similar fashion to the Prime Minister when he spoke about attacking the capability of Saddam Hussein, not the stocks. I welcome the fact that he excluded the stocks, because it would be dangerous to attack the stocks. That might spread lethal weapons all over the atmosphere. I welcome the way in which the objective has been formulated.
  It needs frequently to be repeated that aerial attack alone will not solve the problem—far from it. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, made that point. It was made also by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney. For the first time in 30 years I found myself agreeing with him, and I am sorry that he is not in the Chamber at present. He and I have jousted frequently over military matters during the past 30 years. It is a fundamental point.
  The destruction of Saddam's capability can he achieved only by the people on the ground. It cannot be done by aerial attack. If we succeed in diminishing—to use the Prime Minister's word—Saddam Hussein's capability for conducting war by chemical or biological means, it will nevertheless not be enough to change his attitude towards inspection. I suspect that we shall have to return. It will not be a matter of just a week. It will be a return engagement later to try to change his mind a second time. If it comes to military action, I believe the affair could last a considerable time. That brings me back to the question of the possible squeamishness of the population of the West in the face of casualties in war.
  The fourth difficulty about military action was referred to by my noble friend Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar, and the noble Lord, Lord Owen. It is that we have so little support from the Arab countries. That is attributed—I believe rightly—to the policies of the present Government of Israel and the failure of the US to put pressure on that government to conduct their

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  affairs more appropriately, more in keeping with international law. I deeply regret the fact that the US Government have not put that pressure on. I hope that they might learn from this affair the importance of doing that.
  On the other hand, the renouncing of the use of force has dangers which I believe are greater than the use of force. The first is the large scale of Saddam Hussein's chemical and germ warfare capability and the enormous size of his stocks. A terrifying number of casualties could be caused by small quantities of these lethal agents. We know that Saddam Hussein has already used chemical warfare and we know that because of the portability of the weapons the threat is not limited to his neighbours but is world-wide. It certainly affects this country.
  Secondly, Saddam Hussein has shown that he is unlikely to make concessions unless he faces the strongest pressure. The strongest pressure is the use of force. If Saddam Hussein were to agree to a United Nations resolution, believing that force would never be used against him, how long would be keep the resolution and observe any agreement that he might make? Thirdly, if Saddam Hussein gets away with it this time, not only will the United Nations be seriously weakened, but other countries, some of which were mentioned by my noble friend Lady Cox, will regard themselves as having free rein to follow his example.
  Diplomacy cannot go on for ever. It has been right to try at length, but it would be wrong to accept a half baked proposal such as that adopted last November at the instigation of the Russians. I was interested to hear the comments of my noble friend Lord Bethell about the Russians. I hope that the Minister will respond to my noble friend's question because last week saw reports about the alleged activities of the Russian intelligence services in relation to informing Saddam Hussein of the plans of the inspectors which had detrimental effects on their ability to carry out those inspections.
  We hope for a good agreement with Iraq reached by the United Nations and properly carried out. That is much the best way ahead. If that is not possible I take the view of the majority of your Lordships: force will have to be used. On 12th February, General Sergeyev, the Russian minister for defence, asked the American Secretary of State for Defence whether the uncompromising and tough stand of the United States on the issue of Iraq helps to strengthen stability and security in the world. My answer is yes.
  6.22 p.m.
  Lord Stone of Blackheath: My Lords, I promised myself that I would not speak too soon after my maiden speech and that if I did I would not be pugnacious. However, I guessed what would be said in today's debate and therefore put my name down to speak, and I was right. The Middle East is an area where in ancient times unbelievable stories were told. In their re-telling they became the truth in the minds of many. Today, a strange phenomenon is emerging in the debate over Iraq. Too often, when the Iraqi crisis is raised Israel is
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  mentioned. Israel is not directly involved in the latest crisis over Iraq. That is a myth. Israel hopes to remain disengaged from the conflict.
  The charges against Israel are bizarre, but are repeated again and again in parliamentary debates, in the media and again here today. These myths have assumed a kind of credibility that cannot be ignored. The first is that the US is demanding Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, but it makes no reciprocal demands on Israel for similar resolutions from the UN. The second is that the Arab world would not support military intervention against Saddam Hussein because of "Israeli foot-dragging in their peace process". The third is that Israel should be subject to Iraqi-style UN inspection of its weapons. The last of those charges is not worrying. Most reasonable people accept that Israel's presumed nuclear arsenal is of a purely defensive and deterrent nature and no more threatens regional or world peace than similar weapons held in the hands of other democracies such as Britain and the United States.
  As regards the UN resolutions on Israel, yes, since the signing of the Oslo accords the General Assembly has passed no fewer than 36 non-binding resolutions condemning Israel. But more serious, because they are binding, are the Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 425, which form the basis of the land-for-peace negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbours. These resolutions have been endorsed by successive Israeli governments. They have provided the negotiating basis and the legal framework for Israel's agreement with Egypt and Jordan. They will play a similar role in eventual agreements with the Palestinians, the Lebanese and the Syrians. The point is that these resolutions are not unilaterally enforceable. They take two to tango, and we hope that they will.
  Yes, this latest crisis in Iraq should remind us that the Israeli and Palestinian dilemmas are of great urgency. But they cannot be glossed over in a desire for swift progress at any cost. And their plight in Israel and Palestine is not helped by linking their issue with Iraq. On the contrary, Israelis and Palestinians are again queuing up for gas masks, hoping that we will do the right thing in Iraq.
  The charge that Israel is somehow responsible for the break-up of the Arab coalition against Saddam is a red herring. Arabs all over the world fervently hope that the US and Britain will broker a diplomatic solution and know that Saddam's weapons point to his own people, his neighbours, Israel and the whole world.
  We know that some people would have liked there to be no Israel. But even if Israel did not exists now, at this time Saddam Hussein would still be sitting on thousands of litres of anthrax. We Jews thrive on guilt. We are pleased to be blamed for most of the problems in our families, in our community, within Israel and with our immediate neighbours. But we feel for the ordinary people of Iraq. They have suffered enough. Their pain is the dictatorship under which they live. Israel, the only democracy in the region, did not cause this crisis.

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  The resolution of the situation in Iraq will be along the lines of the blend of diplomacy and force put to us by the Minister and not by creating more myths and legends.
  6.26 p.m.
  Lord Marlesford: My Lords, there has been a suggestion that we would do better not to talk too much about these matters. I sometimes believe that in the apparent privacy of your Lordships' Chamber we have an advantage over another place in being able to discuss such matters frankly.
  If ever there were a moment when it was necessary to disentangle morality from expediency and to identify the scope for diplomacy as a substitute for war this must be it. I believe it crucial to set a fresh diplomatic objective which is politically, legally and morally justifiable. If military action proves necessary in order to achieve that, military action must be viable.
  In a real way, the problem of Saddam Hussein goes back to the Iran-Iraq war when he was backed by the West as a useful surrogate against the Ayatollahs. There was the understandable belief that the rise of Islamic militancy in Iran would be to the disadvantage of the West. On the other hand, the Gulf War was an example of where a resolute and morally right combination of diplomacy and force was successfully used to fulfil a clear objective.
  However, since then there has been a belief that somehow the overthrow of Saddam Hussein could fragment Iraq and destabilise the Gulf. That belief, referred to several times today, was strong in 1991 and still lingers. There have been many examples of the failure and immorality of such political expediency in history. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, mentioned the Kurds and I was reminded that it was to keep the balance of power in Europe that determined Castlereagh and Metternich to support the Turks in their repression of the Greeks. It was not until Canning went back to the Foreign Office in 1822 that the Turks were told, "Enough is enough."
  My noble friend Lord Blaker referred to the obvious analogy of Hitler. More recently there was the rather shameful way, after the invasion by Vietnam of Cambodia, in which both China and the United States, for their own reasons, continued to support the odious Pol Pot.
  The crucial lesson now is that diplomacy and the threat of force must have not just the same objective but one which can be achieved. We are told constantly, most of all by President Clinton, that the object is not to remove Saddam from power but the reintroduction and full acceptance of the UN weapons inspectorate. Even if that were to be achieved, does anyone really think that Saddam would cease to build his secret arsenal or that he would cease to torture and murder his unfortunate citizens?
  Saddam has proved repeatedly that there can be no salvation for his people or the security of the region until he is removed from power. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, made the case for that in her speech. It is not even today on the Security Council agenda and at least
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  two of the permanent members of the Security Council are doing their best to give Saddam the impression that they are using their diplomacy to save his bacon. The Russians, to whom my noble friend Lord Bethell referred, have huge rewards to gain from the oil deals which they have done with Saddam and the French are once again seeking to re-establish their commercial hegemony in the Gulf.
  As for Saddam, if he remains in power and sanctions are lifted, he could become far wealthier than he was before the beginning of the Gulf War. There would then be much less chance of his removal and his evil and the potential instabilities would be 10 times worse. We have passed the point at which disarmament, as a condition for the removal of sanctions, is enough. The clear and stated objective of the United Nations should now be the removal of Saddam and his family. No bombing of Baghdad or any number of presidential palaces will achieve that, at least not at a price which is acceptable to world opinion today or to history tomorrow.
  Before the Gulf War started, I asked a friend of mine who had served in Baghdad what is the most important thing to remember about Saddam. He said that it is that Saddam is a Samson who would pull down the walls with him rather than give in or give up. That proved to be the case before the Gulf War started. He is as clever as a fox and is as ruthless as any of the most notorious psychopaths in history. I believe that he is seeking to lure the West into a trap. It is true that he does not understand the West. But he does understand his own people. He is now posing as a devout Sunni Moslem and indeed has incorporated the Koran into his flag. He is seeking to build up regional alliances. However, fortunately, Arab alliances are fickle and these are mere gestures against the West. I believe that they will disappear as soon as the West changes its tactics.
  If there were to be air strikes now, Saddam would be out of Baghdad before the first shot was fired. He might go to his own village of Tikrit, a mere 75 miles north of Baghdad, but with a nest of bunkers beneath it, or to the mountains. I doubt whether there would be any military opposition to the Americans. Saddam would simply wait for the American forces to defeat themselves in the eyes of the Arab world. The Gulf War ended when it did partly because the West wanted to keep Saddam in power but also because the world was sickened by the slaughter on the road from Kuwait. The right answer now is to start a fresh round of diplomacy, not in support of a shooting war but in support of a psychological war. I so much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, about that.
  Meanwhile, the international community, through the Security Council, should declare Saddam a war criminal. That proposal was made by my right honourable friend John Major some months ago. The noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson of Winterbourne, horrified us with more than enough evidence for an indictment of that sort. Indeed, what he did at Halabja, that unfortunate Kurdish village in north-east Iraq, in itself would be adequate justification for such an accusation. We should use broadcasts, leaflets and all forms of subversion of his regime from outside, including finance of the government in exile. We should

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  perhaps offer the Iraqi people a bill of rights. I believe that the Iraqi people need to be persuaded that they have a chance to get rid of Saddam. He is already deeply unpopular. The pictures of him which used to be all over Iraq have gone, although they are put back from time to time for the sake of the television cameras. The overthrow of Saddam will come. He will probably end up being shot by his own Republican Guard.
  Our Prime Minister has great international stature and considerable influence with President Clinton. Our diplomats are second to none with their skill and knowledge of the Arab world. Britain must act now. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Owen, that we must act quietly and try to persuade the Americans that the futile and dangerous direction of Clinton's policy must be changed. Policy should become the permanent removal of Saddam Hussein and all his works.
  6.35 p.m.
  Lord Bramall: My Lords, first, I must apologise and crave the indulgence of your Lordships for not being present during the earlier part of the debate. Therefore, apart from anything else, I lay myself open to being guilty of repeating what other noble Lords have said already. But I was in Yorkshire attending the funeral of my World War II commanding officer, and I know that no noble Lord would wish to dissuade or deter me from that.
  The last thing that I want to do is to weaken in any way support for Her Majesty's Government in their determination that Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to go on producing and stockpiling NBC weapons and must comply with the Security Council resolution on free inspection which makes possible that prohibition. With so many imponderables, difficulties and dangers, it is not at all easy to arrive at the best solution. But clearly if diplomacy is to work, as is to be hoped, Saddam Hussein must have a threat of very dire and effective consequences hanging over him. Any suggestion that the United States and ourselves and those who stand with us do not somehow mean business would therefore be most unhelpful.
  But when it comes to the actual use of force, if and when that becomes necessary, then I believe from my experience and what I might call informed memory of such matters—which I share with other noble Lords going back a long way, far further than many in Whitehall today—I am entitled to ask three basic questions. First, as with any military operation anywhere at any time, what is the aim of the exercise? Field Marshal Montgomery, if no one else, impressed on us all how vital is the selection and maintenance of the aim as a first principle of war.
  In the Gulf War the aim was clear. In some people's minds it was not exactly the right one but it was clear enough: to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait as soon as possible and teach Saddam Hussein a lesson. Perhaps he was not taught a sufficient lesson, but the American coalition, under the clear authority of the Security Council, had assembled enough military resources on the ground, in the air and at sea, to be able to do the job properly, come what may.
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  I remember well that, after the attack on Kuwait, I went out with a parliamentary delegation under the leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Pym, which included the present Leader of the House. I came back convinced that the combination of most precisely-targeted and disruptive air attacks and, in due course, concentrated armoured assault would achieve the aim; and it did, or more or less did, in a very short time.
  This time, the aim is much more obscure. Is it just to destroy the NBC weaponry which exists and Saddam Hussein's present capacity to improve and increase it—that is, if we know where those sites are and will continue to be? Is it to reduce Iraq to such a stone-age condition that never in the future will it be possible for Saddam Hussein to recreate the capacity to make such weapons? Is it, as has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, to ensure the removal of the dictator, either by death or by other unspecified means? I do not ask the Minister for highly sensitive answers, but I beg the Government, with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, to get the aim absolutely clear and to stick to it.
  My second question is whether the Government consider—nay believe—that sufficient and correct forces have been or will have been assembled to do the job. I say this because I can think of no case where military aims and objectives have been achieved by air attack alone. Massive destruction of German cities was not sufficient to remove Adolf Hitler in World War IL nor did President Nasser throw in the towel, as was confidently expected in 1956, when the Royal Air Force destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground and bombed Cairo. It might not be a bad thing for Ministers to re-read the history of the Suez crisis, where there was little international authority for what we did.
  Even the high-tech and very smart weapons which did so much damage to Iraq in the Gulf War were not sufficient by themselves to recapture Kuwait, let alone remove Saddam Hussein. Even if one feels disposed to quote the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and I do not imagine that the Government have such things in mind—their aftermath required the early arrival of an occupation force. Yet there seems to be little sign of a land back up to support and, if necessary, exploit air and sea based strike forces—a land element which, of course, as far as this country is concerned, becomes, as a result of the endless defence studies and reviews over the past 10 years, ever more difficult to provide.
  Finally, I turn to my third and last question. Has any proposed operation been thought through to the bitter end, which is the hallmark of good generalship? Have we, at the Chiefs-of-Staff level, clawed through every detail of the American plan, because undoubtedly it has to be an American one? I do not see, as there was in the Gulf, a de la Billière to stand alongside the American commander on the spot and, where necessary, give him wise advice.
  Further, what if, after the air and missile strike, the NBC weapons have still not been destroyed, or only partly so—and, of course, we may never know because all ground inspection will by then have ceased? Do we go on and, if so, what are the targets? What if, after

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  devastating destruction in Iraq, Saddam Hussein is still there? Again, do we go on and on and, if so, in what way? If, as a result of an Anglo-American attack, Saddam Hussein retaliates with his own Scud missiles from mobile launchers, which he may still possess, targeted on Kuwait, on Saudi Arabia but, above all, on Israel who this time, without perhaps the assurances provided by the desperate efforts of special forces, hits back at Iraq? Have we considered the consequences for the stability of the whole of the Middle East? There is also the possibility, I suppose, that Saddam Hussein may introduce bacterial agents into, say, water supplies around the world or indulge in other forms of terrorism. Have we made all the necessary counter-preparations for that situation?
  Again, I am not asking for answers which might be embarrassing. I only ask for the deepest possible reflection and thought in depth. If, after weighing up the balance of advantage and disadvantage, of good versus evil, and of success versus failure, a war option is decided upon, and under the circumstances is considered morally justified, it must, as I am sure other noble Lords have said, be done properly.
  In modern war there are seldom any soft options; no quick fixes which give pain and grief only to your opponent and no body bags for yourself. In the Falklands crisis the whole thing was thought through and the risks weighed up carefully—and, as it happened, accurately. The aim was clear. It was thought worth it. It was morally justified and it was done properly. The same could be said of the Gulf War in 1990. I only hope that the same rigorous thought processes are being applied this time.
  6.45 p.m.
  The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, it is impertinent for a rather bad former soldier in Her Majesty's Life Guards who plays with a Lee Enfield rifle to get up and actually ask the same question as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. I believe that the case for war could not have been made better than by the noble Baronesses, Lady Nicholson and Lady Cox. They both pointed out that Saddam Hussein is evil beyond peradventure. The supreme irony is that he is named after one of the Prophet's small nephews who was massacred by a Umayyad general.
  Saddam Hussein's assassination would be a blessing; his removal but a service to humanity. In that I am in complete agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford. However, I should gently remind him that it was under the premiership of Wellington that the battle of Navarino was fought not under the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Canning, who is referred to as an unfortunate incident in the Queen's Speech. However, that is just a minor quibble regarding an otherwise excellent speech, with which I am in complete agreement.
  I, too, want to return to exactly the same point made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. Ever since Thucydides it has been established that infantry on the ground are the only thing, and even they cannot always control an area. It does not matter whether you are a
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  hoplite in Persepolis, a legionary on the wall, Rifleman Costello at the seige of Bala Hauz or a soldier on the streets of Belfast, you must have infantry on the ground.
  That brings me to the question which is exactly the same as that asked by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. Let us assume in this action that the Prime Minister appears to say that we are not going to attack Saddam Hussein's stocks of weapons. The RAF, the USAF, the Royal Marines and the Fleet Air Arm bomb for 10 days, a week, a fortnight or even three months. It does not really matter. As has been pointed out, Saddam Hussein shows not the slightest concern over the welfare of the people. He uses Iraq for his own personal benefit without a thought for humanity or for the rule of law. So, eventually, this comes to a stop. The weapons of war are not destroyed and the likelihood of the inspectors going back in is nil. Where do we go from there? What happens then?
  The other alternative is this. Again, the noble and gallant Lord nicked my speech from me. Peradventure there are four Scud missiles in existence. Peradventure two of those missiles are knocked out by bombing; and, peradventure two are fired and one of them is knocked out by a Patriot missile. However, the other, loaded, if noble Lords will excuse a mixed metaphor, to the gunwales with anthrax, lands in a suburb of Tel Aviv. Would the present Israeli Government stand idly by? They are not renowned for following the rule of law, and, indeed, they are not renowned for listening to even friendly advice. Indeed, they have never hesitated to oppress Palestinians. So what would they do? They would almost certainly use their own nuclear arsenal because, as has been said, it would be in self-defence. But where do we go from there?
  Those are the two questions that I ask. I have no knowledge of what the answers will be. I find it incredibly difficult even to give a smidgen of helpful advice. I just know that they are questions which have to be asked and I know that we face a very serious future. I wish the Government all the luck in the world. I am awfully pleased I am not in it.
  6.49 p.m.
  Lord Islwyn: My Lords, the Gulf War took place seven years ago and the immediate military objectives of the United States, aided by the United Kingdom, were quickly realised. It is estimated that in that war between 16th January and 27th February some 88,000 tonnes of bombs were dropped on Iraq. I understand that is equivalent to seven Hiroshima-sized bombs. Casualties in Iraq were heavy. There have been various estimates of anything between 100,000 and 400,000 casualties. By comparison America suffered only 137 dead.
  Such horrifying details are significant enough, but the consequences of economic sanctions have been far greater in humanitarian terms. According to the World Health Organisation 500,000 Iraqi children under the age of five have died as a result of malnutrition and lack of medicine following the economic embargo. There have been outbreaks of various diseases, including typhoid and cholera. In addition there is also a massive lack of necessary medical supplies, including

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  medication for epilepsy, diabetes and asthma, and shortages of antibiotics. There are high levels of anaemia and shortages of vaccinations for children. Many Iraqis are now drinking unpasteurised milk, particularly in rural areas. These are just some of the massive problems that Iraq is now facing and it will take decades to recover. Yet these economic sanctions are ineffective, as the noble Lord, Lord Healey, pointed out in the foreign affairs debate on 28th January. He said economic sanctions are ineffective,
  "because a dictator can always blame the foreigner for the sufferings inflicted upon his people".—[Official Report, 28/1/98; col. 239.]
  The Jordanian Foreign Minister, Fayez Tarawneh stated,
  "We have seen seven years of sanctions—seven years of no results".
  The legitimacy of a military action to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait was not difficult to comprehend. But where is the rationale for using air power systematically to destroy or cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry, electric power stations, refineries, petro-chemical complexes, telecommunications centres, bridges, roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives, radio and television broadcasting stations, cement plants and factories producing aluminium, textiles, electric cables and medical supplies? The list is endless. But apart from this whole-scale destruction, are we to engage in another military strike when civilian casualties will inevitably be heavy? In all conscience I find it difficult to go along with that argument.
  It seems to me, too, that America has yet to learn the lesson of Vietnam. Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator and I feel that we are fully justified in isolating him diplomatically and assisting in his removal by any legitimate or obtainable means. The immediate crisis was brought about because Iraq objected to the presence of United States members of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Saddam Hussein claimed that UNSCOM was under the control of the United States and was infiltrated by members of American military intelligence. He further complained that the high percentage of United States inspectors hindered the completion of the work and that the United States had made it clear that it does not want sanctions lifted until Saddam Hussein is removed. Is this the policy of Her Majesty's Government, because these inspections have already been carried out for over six years? There have been United Nations representatives in Baghdad in the past few days. Apparently they are there to prepare the way for a visit by the Secretary-General with a view to bringing about a diplomatic settlement of the present crisis. I hope that will unfold and that further military conflict can be avoided.
  It is worth pointing out, as numerous noble Lords have already done, that the present crisis is different from that of 1991. Then Egypt and Syria led the Arab contingent that expelled Iraq from Kuwait. But today these countries lead the chorus of Arab protests against American and British threats. The Gulf states are divided and Saudi Arabia has said that it will not allow its territory to be used for strikes against Iraq. There have undoubtedly been divisions in the Security Council. As I understand it, it is three to two against
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  military action. So where is the legitimacy for that action? That point was made forcefully earlier this afternoon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew.
  France has adopted rather an aloof attitude but the wild card has undoubtedly been Russia. First, we had a warning from President Yeltsin that a military strike against Iraq could even lead to a third world war. Last Friday I was fascinated to read in the Daily Telegraph of the Russian Defence Secretary accusing the Americans of rushing into battle and endangering world stability. The noble Lord, Lord Blaker, has already made this point. Ironically the Russian Defence Secretary quoted to the Americans the words of Abraham Lincoln:
  "Force is all conquering but its victories are short lived".
  Many commentators and people with military expertise cannot understand how the proposed bombardment of Iraq will achieve its objective of wiping out Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons. Apart from this, what will such military action do for America's standing in the Middle East, for Arab states will be bitterly resentful? Unfortunately we seem to be tied to America's apron strings and the ill feeling will undoubtedly extend to us. Meanwhile France, which has been described as the jackal of Europe, will be waiting to pick up the lucrative contracts which will eventually become available with the rebuilding of Iraq.
  Finally, there is the charge of double standards in the treatment of Israel and Iraq. Some will argue—as did the noble Lord, Lord Stone, this evening—that the comparison will not stand up in the present situation. Nevertheless Israel occupies one-third of the Lebanon at the present time and the Golan Heights belonging to Syria. Both countries are in violation of United Nations resolutions and each has weapons of mass destruction. In turn, the United States bombs Iraq and at the same time supplies Israel with military hardware. At the time of the 1991 crisis, America promised the Arabs it would endeavour to settle their dispute with Israel. The reality though has been altogether different, for the peace process has been left in abeyance and illegal settlements go on without hindrance from Washington. One cannot help but gain the impression that America's hands are just not clean. So I am a little disturbed that a Labour Government are allowing themselves to be dragged along the same path. The noble Lord, Lord Wright, a former head of the Foreign Office, in a debate he initiated on 28th January, said at col. 235 of Hansard:
  "Our relationship with the United States has sometimes been depicted … as an Anglo-Saxon 'Trojan horse' within the walls of Europe … we are prepared to give uncritical support to all American policies".
  He went on to say that this is not the way we can hope to influence the United Nations administration or Congress.
  As a country we have had a long and unique experience of the Middle East. There is now a belief that we are little more than the poodles of Washington. Our political and economic interests are being damaged as a result.
  7 p.m.
  Lord Holderness: My Lords, one advantage of speaking late in the debate—it has been a fascinating discussion—is that it enables one to take part in it rather than to add to a long list of carefully prepared speeches.
  This country has been in greater danger than it is today, but, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out, the difficulties and the challenges that we face at present are in many ways more challenging than anything that is easily in our memories. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, pointed out that the challenge in the Falklands and the Gulf was in a sense much simpler to understand and to meet. We now await the mission of the Secretary-General, we pray for its success and we understand that if it fails the Government are determined to join in military action against Saddam Hussein. As some noble Lords have pointed out, that shows what a vast amount we have learned in the 60 years since Hitler was unopposed when he walked into the Rhineland. Many of us with long memories are well aware that the failure of Britain then to resist the illegal breaking of a treaty was quickly rewarded by six years of a bloody and destructive war. That failure to resist was not repeated either in answer to the Falklands or the Gulf, and the Government, if I may say so, deserve a great deal of credit for being determined to resist it today.
  The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, in a clear and comprehensive speech, drew attention to the objectives now before us if our diplomatic efforts fail. My noble friend Lord Moynihan and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, emphasised the great need for clarity in our objective. To me it is utterly important that those who are prepared, as I am, to give full support to the Government should be completely certain of their aim.
  The Foreign Secretary has repeatedly stressed—the noble Baroness repeated it today—that our aim is, first, to ensure compliance with United Nations resolutions and, secondly, the provision of unrestricted access for the UNSCOM inspectors. As I understand it, not on the agenda is the removal of Saddam—highly desirable though most of us would feel that to be—or an attack on his special republican guard. Nor, I understand, in the first instance is it on the agenda to protect Iraq's neighbours from these diabolical weapons. A number of noble Lords have drawn attention to the danger that threatens those nations that surround Iraq. But both the destruction of the weapons themselves and the prevention of recreating weapon-making capacity now seems to be clearly one of our military objectives.
  The Foreign Secretary said recently in another place,
  "If we succeed in removing a large part of those arsenals, and the equipment and capabilities that produce them, I would regard that as having secured an objective of military action".
  I do not think that one could be clearer than that. But, as we are well aware, diplomatic effort has not yet failed. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, made clear his view that the United Nations Secretary-General is admirably fitted to achieve a settlement, if such a settlement can be achieved by anyone on earth. In view of Saddam' s vile record—and no speech was more descriptive of it than that of the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson of
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  Winterbourne—it is difficult for any of us to brim over with optimism about the achievement of such a settlement with Iraq.
  As to other noble Lords, I find it hard to understand the absence of unity, even in regard to the diplomatic effort, quite apart from any question of military action, among nations which are surely well aware of the enormous danger that now threatens the world. Meanwhile I believe that Great Britain and the United States have taken the only course open to us in preparing for military action in the hope of increasing the diplomatic chance of success. I believe that a triumph of diplomacy offers much greater possibilities of achieving a constructive agreement than war. For if diplomacy fails—and it looks likely that our diplomatic effort will fail now—it will not only decrease the authority of the United Nations; it will face the Government with the difficult task of turning such a failure into military success.
  The debate has shown a remarkable consensus and solid support for the policy of Her Majesty's Government. But this has not removed all doubts which have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, my noble friend Lord Gilmour, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and the noble Earl, Lord Onslow—it is a doubt that I share—about the prospects of military action achieving all the Government's objectives. I do not believe that I am alone in believing that some statements about the weapon destruction achievable by a week of military action are wildly optimistic. Therefore, any reassurance that the Minister can give us when he replies will greatly increase my enthusiasm for the course upon which we are now embarked.
  7.8 p.m.
  Lord Craig of Radley: My Lords, much has been said in recent days, and repeated during the course of this debate, about the purposes or objectives of military action should that option be chosen because Saddam Hussein refuses to abide by the United Nations resolutions. I raised this point during the Statement on Iraq on 26th January. I did not then receive a very positive answer.
  I echo the calls for clarity such as that made by the noble Lord, Lord Holderness. There is still confusion in the minds of many on the right response of the Government on this crucial question. I heard the Secretary of State for Defence say in a radio programme at the weekend that the purpose of military action, in the event of a failure of diplomatic initiatives, would be to coerce Saddam Hussein to allow UNSCOM to continue its work unimpeded in Iraq. That seems to be the language of threat rather than military purpose. This morning the Foreign Secretary indicated on the "Today" programme that, if diplomacy failed and military action was taken, it would be to disrupt and damage the Iraqis' chemical and biological weapon capabilities.
  The strategic objective, set out a number of times by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. of enabling UNSCOM to complete its task is clear enough. But how does military action best contribute to that? How quickly after death and damage have been inflicted on Iraq from

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  the air will it be possible for UNSCOM to return to its ground inspections without threat to its members? Obviously, the Government will have that consideration in mind. Perhaps the Minister will be willing to say more on that issue when he replies.
  But now, with so many of our forces deployed, trained and ready for action, is no longer the time to be throwing large measures of doubt on the Government's purpose in relation to the threat of or use of force. Our service men and women deserve and need the support of the whole country if they are committed to operations, even though some questions as to their purpose still hang in the air. The more clearly and unambiguously the Government can state the purpose of military action, the better. There is room to improve the rhetoric, to get more "on message", so that we are clear about the contribution to our overall strategic objectives in carrying out air or other operations.
  What we can be sure about is that every television channel in the world will display pictures of the first bombs and missiles landing in Iraq, with voices over drawing conclusions for viewers about the choice of targets. Those pictures will be preceded with live shots or library footage of aircraft taking off and Tomahawk missiles being fired from ships. They will be followed by the inevitable live questions to British and American spokesmen, probing questions as to why we have attacked such and such a target in such a way and what we expect to gain from it. Whatever purpose and objectives we had in mind will be exposed to the most detailed and confrontational journalistic scrutiny. Commentators will look to find divergences of view on every aspect of the operation. We shall need to ensure that what is said live in Washington, London, Kuwait city or wherever receives a common, concise and distinct response. Without that, public support and recognition for the efforts of our forces could be lost, no matter how many effective sorties have been flown into Iraq.
  With all that in mind, I conclude by returning to another question which I posed during the Statement on Iraq last week. How will the decision to use force be taken? Shall we merely follow the American lead, or is there now agreement that it will be a joint decision by the two governments and others who may be taking part? Do we need further United Nations approval? That question has been asked a number of times. Once again, answers to those key questions will be expected, if not beforehand, then at the very first media briefing or conference after the initial raids have been mounted.
  I am confident that no British government are going to allow others to commit our forces to their first attack. That, of course, Her Majesty's Government must do. But if, as some maintain, the bombing attacks have to go on and on for some time, what international command and control arrangements do the Government perceive? What has been agreed? Are we to have a war cabinet? Have we a clearly established national line of command to our front-line forces and their supporting units, so that if Her Majesty's Government wish our forces to stop, that can be immediately arranged?
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  I ask those questions not to seek to trap or embarrass the Government, but to help to foresee the answers that we must provide in the days and weeks ahead to ensure that our responses have been considered and are readily available to our spokesmen in theatre or at home. With so much professional experience and expertise to help a new administration, I am sure that sound advice is being tendered from many quarters. We can be confident that it is also being listened to and heeded.
  Our Armed Forces will give a good account of themselves if they have to be committed. They will deserve the whole-scale and heartfelt backing of this country and the wider international community in their actions. The Government can give us that lead and express their confidence in the forces achieving that which may be asked of them.
  As a final postscript to those who believe in a diplomatic solution, I ask: does it provide a final solution, or only a rest period, an interval, in the difficulties we face in the on-going confrontation with Saddam Hussein? Until he has gone, neither diplomatic nor military solutions will solve our problem.
  7.16 p.m.
  Lord Elton: My Lords, I labour under at least one difficulty. It is my habit on entering a debate of this length and importance to look down the list of speakers and see whose speeches I can possibly miss in order to take refreshment outside the Chamber. On this occasion I could find only my own name as being one worth missing, and consequently I am speaking on an empty stomach. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Gilmour of Craigmillar for having been out to take a meeting, and with less enthusiasm to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, who is not present to hear my remarks.
  The Government have come to this House and the other place with a simple question: will you trust us and will you support us in a military assault, if it is necessary, on Iraq? From the general tone of this debate it must be clear that the answer is yes. But it is a qualified yes. We then come across a second difficulty; namely, the need to remember the Chalfont rule—the more you expose your resources and objectives, the more you weaken your effectiveness. So we cannot be too specific in this debate without doing harm to our cause.
  However, first, we may usefully examine the context of the confrontation. I cannot help reflecting on how lucky my generation is, and indeed the generations of all your Lordships, because we have lived for over 50 years in a world in which one weapon of mass destruction is now fairly generally available. I refer to the nuclear weapon. The reason we are so lucky is partly human common sense, partly the strict restraint which the powers possessing the weapons have been able, until recently, to impose upon their proliferation and partly that we live under the beginnings of an effective international law. We have to remember that, if we fight, we are fighting in a glasshouse. We have to fight in such a way as not to break the glass.

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  That brings me to the remarks of my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew. I merely ask whether the Government will pay proper attention to his question. The rule of law depends in the end always upon the acceptance and support of the great majority of those who are ruled by it. Justice must therefore not only be done but be seen to be done. If justice is not seen to be done, and if operations carried out in the Middle East are seen as an Anglo-Saxon assault upon Arab institutions—which is how the propagandists opposed to us would like the situation to be seen—that will do us infinite damage. It will also do infinite damage to the matrix of the rule of law.
  As to the resources and objectives, we can only ask questions. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, focused those questions sharply on three issues.
  The second qualification I would put on the support which your Lordships would be wise to give the Government is that they should be able to satisfy the criteria set by the noble and gallant Lord. They will have to choose the objective with care. Although I sympathise with the instincts of my noble friend Lord Marlesford, I cannot find any provision in international law—if there is one I should be glad to hear of it—which allows for a war to depose an individual or party from the rule of a country unless that individual is a war criminal. There is merit in the suggestion that Saddam Hussein should be labelled a war criminal because that would open another objective.
  The second issue is the adequacy of resources, as pointed out by the noble and gallant Lord and the right reverend Prelate. It is necessary to satisfy the rules of jus ad bellum that the means of successful prosecution should be available at the beginning.
  Finally, it should be thought through to the end. Just as the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, one of our two remarkable and intrepid travelling Baronesses, has shown us the iniquity of Saddam's rule at home, so my noble friend Lady Cox, an equally intrepid and frequent traveller, has shown how this genie is out of the bottle. If our objective is to stop the deployment of these weapons, we need to think through what will happen after we put the cork in one bottle and find that there are at least two, if not three, more to cope with.
  We have not talked much about morality, although the right reverend Prelate spoke about it. We must remember that the decision to go to war is a horrendous one which inevitably leads to loss of life for friend and foe and which is to be avoided at every possible opportunity. Therefore, while we regard diplomacy and war as part of the same continuum, if we think of Clausewitz—and we are at present progressing through diplomacy into war—if it is at all possible to achieve the end of containing this evil and maintaining international law without going to war, the Government will have even more enthusiastic support from me and others than I offer them already.
  7.22 p.m.
  The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, an Anglo-American initiative, if it is backing up a UN decision to force an evil regime to destroy its chemical
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  and biological weapons, must be applauded. The public will reasonably cheer our side if it launches its missiles, and our Armed Forces will certainly do their utmost. But this is not a medieval crusade, a Vietnam-style raid or even a re-enactment of the Gulf War when there were, as we heard, clear objectives.
  As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, so interestingly said, this is a completely new form of warfare. We cannot expect results from weapons alone, even from a superpower. As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said, whatever happens this week will only be a move in the game; something else will have to follow. Aerial strikes, if not ordered by the UN, must be a component of a much wider international consensus, with the backing of the Security Council. We look forward to the Minister's response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, and also to comments in the media by Sir Harold Walker and others during the past few days.
  The noble Baroness the Minister said last week that it was desirable to get maximum unity of purpose in the UN. That sounds like an opt-out. I believe not that it is desirable but that it is essential. The air strikes will be merely a catalyst. It will require a lot more diplomacy to achieve the desired purpose of Resolution 687. Humanitarian aid is, in my view, a necessary strand in that diplomacy.
  But have we been leading, or following, a lead? The impression given to our European neighbours and one-time Gulf allies, until the past few days at least, has been that we are backing up a superpower, not that we belong to a new coalition which represents the international community's view and offers a lasting solution, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan put it. We have moved further in our diplomacy. We now at least have ground support from Germany and others. But surely, above all during our EU presidency, we should have listened more carefully to our European and Arab friends? They still need persuading that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. They need persuading that we are not just hurling missiles against a madman but are simultaneously concerned about humanitarian aid reaching ordinary citizens and helping the country get back on its feet. That message has not been received. I wonder whether, in our preoccupation with chemical weapons, we have really tried to send it.
  As my noble friend Lord Gilmour and others said, it might help if we showed more interest in the cause of the Palestinians and the Oslo peace process. How can we tell them that Security Council Resolution 687 has to be implemented immediately when they are still waiting for other resolutions on the occupied territories? Is our diplomacy based on US protection of Israeli fears? Why do we ourselves not send more missions to the Middle East, as Europeans, instead of waiting for tours by the Secretary-General and other Security Council members?
  There is a sense abroad that Britain is a pig in the middle, with neither leadership nor integrity of purpose, unable to delay the Americans by more than a few days. I do not myself believe that to be the case as far as this Government are concerned. As I have said before in

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  these debates, I believe that we have a strong commitment to the Iraqi people, which this Government well understand, and that we can make more of our role in providing humanitarian aid to Iraq, not necessarily through oil for food but in our own right. As was made clear in last week's Statement, we have been prominent in co-sponsoring the 2 billion dollar oil-for-food programme since 1996 under SCRs 986 and 1111 and in supporting the Secretary-General's present initiatives to extend the programme. We are the second largest donor of humanitarian aid to Iraq. Yet no one seems to notice that—neither our media nor the British public who are subscribing to it.
  Are we ashamed of helping Iraq? Can we not advertise the fact that we are seriously engaged in another war, a war with hunger and malnutrition in a once wealthy oil state which now ranks among the world's poorest countries? Admittedly it is poverty of another kind—of real deprivation of services. As a wealthy nation we can appreciate what the Iraqi people feel when their water or electricity are cut off and when there is literally no medicine or healthcare for large numbers who have come to expect it. This is surely another campaign which deserves support during the current crisis.
  It is true that there are considerable problems in implementing oil for food, and some doubt the wisdom of increasing it when there are other channels of support. The Minister may like to say whether the report of the implementation unit mentioned in the noble Baroness's Statement of 26th January is sufficiently satisfactory for an increase. I have here the Secretary-General's November report, and I have spoken to some of the aid agencies. The UN programme falls far short of what we might expect. There are acute shortages of spare parts, delays in transportation and inequalities in distribution. Hospital deliveries are often incomplete or inadequate. For example, urine bags arrive without catheters or drip syringes without saline solution. The Iraqi ration system is highly regarded, I understand, by the international agencies in Iraq, and yet greed and bureaucracy inevitably play their part. There are also adverse effects on Iraqi agriculture in importing large quantities of wheat and flour which then compete in the market with local produce. On top of all this, there are, as we have heard, US and Iraqi objections and there is bound to be doubt that Iraq can meet its oil targets while—ironically—protecting its installations from possible air strikes. Nevertheless, one assumes that the general effect of the programme is still beneficial. I would be grateful for the Minister's confirmation on that point. However, I am doubtful that we should rest our commitment to humanitarian aid to Iraq on the principle of the oil-for-food deal alone.
  The Iraqi people are facing critical shortages, as others have said, and, in the case of children, severe malnutrition which has increased the under-five mortality rate by eight times during the past decade. But we do not admit that we are among the nations trying to help Iraq, regardless of air strikes and chemical weapons. For example, the Prime Minister's Observer article hardly mentions humanitarian aid. Their needs on
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  the ground which have been exacerbated by our sanctions as well as by one man's tyranny are just as important as our military and diplomatic offensive.
  We have an active aid programme through the DfID as well as through some of our best-known voluntary agencies both in northern Iraq and in and around Baghdad. We have been engaged in a basic form of chemical warfare of another kind in Iraq. In more than 3,000 villages around Dohuk, Erbil and Suleimanya, we have been training farmers in the use of insecticide spraying as part of agricultural extension work. We are working through the Mines Advisory Group—the only de-mining agency—on mine detection and clearance in the north. We are assisting UNICEF with the control of diarrhoea and vitamin A deficiency; we are supporting the Kurdistan Children's Fund with the resettlement of displaced families; we are helping the Save the Children Fund with a large-scale programme of rehabilitation; and we are keeping water supply and sanitation systems going through Care International and maintaining health and education programmes in Baghdad and in some of the worst affected areas.
  All that is going on against a background of acute deterioration of the Iraqi infrastructure and government services, an unstable economy and a chaotic political system, quite apart from the fear engendered by the oppressive regime and the international crisis it has brought about. Infant mortality and malnutrition rates are rising despite foreign aid which is only a fraction of the 100 billion dollar revenue lost to Iraq since the Gulf War. There are huge problems for the United Nations agencies and NGOs working in Iraq. Some may ask, "What is the point of humanitarian aid when it is so undermined by the political crisis?"
  Nevertheless, I believe the international agencies, especially the NGOs, are running effective aid programmes and they and all aid workers—whose purpose is solely the relief of the suffering of people, though they are well aware of the events going on around them—deserve much more recognition for what they are doing in one of the world's most difficult countries. Above all, they need to be seen as an integral part of the international effort, not just to make Iraq's leaders see sense, but to keep our military involvement in its proper perspective. Whatever the outcome of a just war, the people will still be there to judge it.
  7.32 p.m.
  Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, this has been an excellent debate with a great deal of expertise and sober comment from all sides. I have learnt a lot and I hope that we have contributed to the Government's thinking on this extremely difficult subject.
  We all recognise the hard choices in the present crisis. We understand the appalling character of the Iraqi regime and of Saddam Hussein as its dictator. We understand the gross misuse of resources within Iraq and the obscene stockpile which Saddam Hussein and his supporters are building up. There may be no alternative to the use of limited force. But, in saying that, many of us share the views William Waldegrave set out in

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  yesterday's Daily Telegraph, which I felt expressed not only my opinion, but also that of many of my Liberal Democrat colleagues. He said,
  "We now have a decision—not for the first time—between a badly conceived American policy and no American policy at all … Meanwhile, it seems that nothing is being done … to move forward peace between Israel and what must emerge as a Palestinian state. The resentment thus caused sours Western relations throughout the Middle East … Our Prime Minister is therefore right. But I just hope he and his advisers are pressing the President hard on what will follow when the bombing raid fails".
  That is a sober assessment from a Member of Her Majesty's official Opposition. But we should not have reached this point and should not have to start from here. I want to talk now about the broader context. Why has Saddam found the opportunity to exploit Arab opinion and divide Western governments? The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, talked about the other conflict—hunger—but there is a third conflict; that is, the battle to capture the support of Arab public opinion throughout the Middle East, at which Saddam Hussein, like other dictators before him, is a great expert. He is actively wooing public opinion in other countries against their own governments, in particular in cases where their governments are our friends.
  We must ask why the Gulf War coalition has faded away; why European governments—sadly, including the British—have been so incoherent and impotent in Middle Eastern politics. We cannot disentangle the current and immediate crisis from the wider question of Western policy toward the Middle East—by that, I mean American policy, British, French and German policies; European policies as a whole.
  The current Iraq crisis affects the stability of the Gulf: that includes the stability of the current Saudi Arabian regime—extremely important to us—the future stability of the smaller Gulf states and of Jordan, a key Western friend in this region; the stability of the current Egyptian Government; and relations with Iran on which British and other European perceptions currently differ from those of the United States. We have to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the question of Western, including American, attitudes to the United Nations. The opportunity for Saddam Hussein to exploit Arab sympathies was created by the election of the Netanyahu Government and its backsliding on the Oslo accords and by the US administration's failure to press that government to reconsider. I regret that. Many of my Israeli friends deeply regret it also. We all understand how divided are Israeli society and the Israeli political elite over current policies. There is much unhappiness in Israel itself.
  I must disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Stone of Blackheath; this is deeply connected with the Iraqi crisis. Madeleine Albright herself said that at the outset. This has given the window of opportunity for Saddam Hussein to think that he can get away with baiting the West without the West attracting the support of moderate Arab regimes.
  American policy sometimes appears to be domestically driven. The strategy of dual containment was partly driven by those who saw Iran and Iraq as
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  double threats to Israel. I see that Zbigniew Brzezinski is quoted in today's Financial Times as saying,
  "Our policy of dual containment to isolate two countries has been a smashing success…the only problem is that the two countries are the United States and Israel".
  That is part of the problem. In this case the British Government are clearly right, that we need to welcome the moves within the Iranian Government towards a more moderate policy; to build other coalitions within the Middle East and not simply to be driven by, in this case, the dynamics of New York state politics, Senator d'Amato and others, pushed out on to the world. There are those in the United States who talk about a clash of civilizations between the West—what someone called a "Judaeo-Christian" civilization—versus Moslem fundamentalism.
  There again, our interests differ from theirs. I used to fight elections in West Yorkshire. I recall that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie originated from the political divisions within the Bradford Asian Moslem community. Our Moslems too are affected by this crisis. Our perceptions, therefore, differ from many of the American elite.
  The American antagonism to the United Nations, which has also been partly driven by domestic perceptions that the UN has been over-critical of Israel, does not help us in a situation in which we are wishing to stand on the legality of international law and on insistence that all UN resolutions must be accepted. Western policy towards the Middle East over the past 15 to 20 years has focused too much on military build-ups and arms sales and not enough on long-term stability—first supporting the Shah's Iran against the Soviet Union, then supporting and arming Iraq against Iran, and now supporting and heavily arming Saudi Arabia against Iraq and Iran, and of course doing the same with Israel and Turkey.
  We need American leadership and we need American projection of power to maintain international order. Therefore, in the last resort, we have to give our support to the United States. But our interests are not the same as those of the USA and our perceptions are not the same as those of the American press or the US Congress. We should therefore offer the Americans our critical support and should do that in concert with our European partners, not pursuing the illusion that Britain alone can influence the American policy debate. That is a major failure of British policy so far—the failure to concert with our European neighbours.
  After the invasion of Afghanistan, the then British Government, particularly our then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, set out to establish better crisis procedures for European political co-operation. That led to the London report, under a previous British presidency. Here again we have a British presidency and we are told that the Foreign Secretary used the occasion of a meeting in Panama to consult his European colleagues. The British presidency should have convened a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Europe at an earlier stage, as we on these Benches suggested two weeks ago. We received a reply from the Government that this was not a European matter but a UN matter.

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  At the weekend I was re-reading the Amsterdam Treaty. I note that Article 19 provides:
  "Member states shall coordinate their action in international organisations … Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter".
  Yesterday, the Government moved the Second Reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, which incorporates the treaty into British law. I am not entirely sure that they have absorbed the full implications of Article 19 and of the whole CFSP chapter.
  We do not face a hostile continent. Europe operates effectively only if the three major European states—Britain, France and Germany—work together. It is too simple to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, has just whispered, "What will we do about the French?" All three governments, ourselves included, have failed.
  If we are to take European co-operation further, we also have to take European action on the control of arms sales a great deal further.
  We are just publishing a new code on European arms sales which begins with the statement:
  "European Union member states are committed to a strong defence industry".
  If that means that we have to go on selling arms, the major arms market in the world, accounting for nearly 40 per cent. of arms sales, is the Middle East. That is where we have been selling them. That is where we have to go on hoping that we can sell them. That contributes to the situation which we now again face. We need a stronger arms code—I note that even the Financial Times says today that the British/French proposal is too weak—and we need to recognise that that means that in future the British and the French will be selling fewer arms abroad. But we also need to look again at European policy towards the Mediterranean, including Libya, towards Palestine and towards Jordan. If it is indeed the case that Saddam Hussein has transferred some of his weapons to Libya and to Sudan, that directly affects not just ourselves but also Italy, a neighbour of Libya. After all, Italy is the only member state of the European Union which has had hostile weapons fired against it since the Second World War—Libyan weapons against the island of Lampedusa—and Italy is also affected directly when Kurds from northern Iraq attempt to flee to the European Community. So we have failed so far to use our position as president of the European Union to deal with some of the wider ramifications of this crisis.
  We have a number of questions for the Government. Do we need a new UN resolution? I thought that the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden, was extremely powerful on this point. What are our wider objectives in the Middle East? If we accept—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, would wish to agree with this—that war is a continuation of diplomacy, then after a short war we need to continue
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  our diplomacy. We need to know where we go after we have dropped the bombs and fired the weapons. If we agree that we need to pursue more active European co-operation, how do the Government propose to do it? What sort of critical support do we intend to give to the United States, including urging the US Administration to give clearer and less ambiguous support to the United Nations? What proposals do we have for tougher control of future supplies of arms and dual use equipment to dangerous areas like the Middle East? Lastly, what incentives can we offer to Iraq in terms of the oil-for-food proposals, which the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, mentioned—ways out which can provide us with an opportunity to influence Arabic public opinion and Moslems at home as well as abroad?
  If it must be done, military action will have to be taken. But military action can be only an instrument in a longer term approach to the Middle East as a whole. We need to see more clearly from the Government that they have a longer term strategy, that they have explained it to, and co-ordinated it with, others, and that they are not just following the United States.
  7.46 p.m.
  Lord Burnham: My Lords, this has been an occasion for very many noble Lords to put their cards on the table. In fact, I think that all those who have spoken have put their cards on the table except, as my noble friend Lord Elton pointed out, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, who clearly prefers to play poker with the cards face downwards.
  I congratulate the Minister on her clear, forthright and robust exposition of the Government's policy. It is clear that she spent yesterday afternoon well. A similar debate is being held at the moment in another place. I am sorry that I am not a schizophrenic in that I might be able to listen to the debate there, but I doubt whether in another place they have had the benefit of the skills and knowledge which have been displayed by the speakers in this Chamber. There are, I would suggest, very few there with the specialist knowledge and expertise of such as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, the noble and gallant Lords who have spoken, and the noble Lord, Lord Owen. I hope that the other place can benefit from what has been said here.
  Almost everything that can be said on the subject has already been said, but there is one thing I will say—and it does not matter how many times it has been said before. On these Benches we are broadly in line with the policy of the Government. This comes as a small surprise as in past years, particularly at the time of the 1990–91 Iraq crisis, not all of those who now sit on the Government Benches held entirely the same views as they do today. But the Conservative Party now shares the Government's determination to take whatever steps are necessary to make Saddam Hussein comply with the resolutions of the UN Security Council. That is not as easy as it was in 1991 and the issues are not as clear-cut. There is not, of course, a physical occupation of another country. However, there is terrifying evidence of an enormous stockpile of chemical and biological weapons

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  which Saddam Hussein has the power to unleash on anyone whom, in his paranoia, he believes to threaten Iraq—most probably Israel.
  The United States has decided that it is its duty to implement the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 687. It does that on the basis that it is the best way of keeping the long-term peace. There seems to be no other way. We can only hope that it can be achieved by diplomatic means.
  Like the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, I had planned to—and indeed I shall—quote from William Waldegrave's article in the Daily Telegraph yesterday. I point out to the noble Lord that, despite being an eminent Conservative, Mr. Waldegrave lost his seat at the last election and is not a member of the official Conservative Opposition. His views, while greatly respected, are his own. He said that it is the first and unchanging interest of this country to support whatever system is available—whether a balance of power or a legal framework—which seems best able to do this. Imperfect though it is, the only candidate for our support is the hegemony of the United States, embedded, more or less, in the legal framework of the United Nations.
  In his usual manner, my noble friend Lord Moynihan fired a series of questions at the Minister, to which I hope he will get satisfactory answers. However, I accept that my noble friend is a machine gun, of small calibre but exceedingly powerful, and the noble Lord may not be able to reply to all his questions at this time, but I hope that the answers will be given in due course. I would like to feel that I was his caddy, but the caddy is the man who hands the weapons to his player and I cannot fulfil that function. I have hopes of becoming his change bowler.
  One aspect of the situation covers the important point of Saddam Hussein and his relationship with the Iraqi people. The international community has made it abundantly clear that the great suffering of the Iraqi people is a direct result of Saddam Hussein's actions. Sanctions are still in place not because of a capricious desire for humiliation and revenge within the international community; they are still in place because of Iraq's failure to comply with its international obligations. The Iraqi people are suffering because Saddam Hussein prefers to purchase weapons instead of food and to build monuments instead of buying medicine. I say to the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that the deaths of over half-a-million children cannot be blamed on the sanctions resulting in poor nutrition and lack of medicine. Food and medicine have never been the subject of sanctions, which are the symptoms and not the cause of this tragedy. In his relentless pursuit of his personal agenda, Saddam Hussein is responsible for the deaths of every one of those children. He is responsible for the starvation and deprivation of his people, which has gone on for far too long.
  But what now are we going to do? In the 1939–45 war the American air force was not totally famous for the accuracy of its bombing. In the last days of that war this did not really matter as Germany was a high-density country and bombs did not have to hit their target to achieve the effect of demoralising the German people
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  and destroying its industry. However, that may run counter to the right reverend Prelate's views of jus in bello.
  But now American aircraft can achieve pin-point accuracy which is fortunate as it must be the object of any bombing to destroy the sites where Hussein's nefarious weapons are made and stored. Above all, it must be the object of the United Nations to destroy Hussein or his reputation, which enables him to keep supreme power as the leader of his people. It is the custom of Arabic nations to follow their leader, whoever he may be, in a fanatical manner and to the exclusion of every other consideration. It is not only in Iraq that this habit shows; Algeria, Libya and Iran are other notable examples. It was the West's most serious error, especially in the opinion of the Israelis, not to give Hussein's son-in-law full support at a moment when he might have been put forward as a possible alternative leader. Now it would do no good whatever to damage the interests of the common people or to kill large numbers by bombing. Whatever happens Hussein will no doubt make full use of any bombing as a propaganda weapon and will show large numbers of bodies slaughtered by the dastardly Americans. We must do everything we can to reduce his chances of doing so effectively.
  Finally, on a matter which, I suspect, will draw groans from the Minister, I would like to depart slightly from the subject of this debate by asking not only what part this country is able to play but what part it would be able to play in a similar crisis in a few years' time if the impending strategic defence review is after all, as we all fear, Treasury-led and the Armed Forces suffer very serious cuts. In the context of today's Iraq crisis the most urgent question relates to the replacement of the two aircraft carriers now in the Gulf. Without them or their replacement in due course, it is clear that the United Kingdom will not be able to play any real part in ensuring peace among the nations.
  We have been told that the review will be in accordance with the Foreign Office view of future events. I hope that the Foreign Office will have taken note that the end of the Cold War has not meant the end of the need for all the three Services to be maintained in a state of readiness at a level where they are able to play a significant part in any crisis that may arise. We have had the Falklands, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iraq (one) and now Iraq (two). Who can tell where the next will come from? All we can be certain of is that there will be a next and we must be ready for it. It will not suffice to have all our ships in mothballs and our servicemen at such a low state of preparedness that they cannot be sent into action within months, if at all.
  I have no doubt that the heart of the Minister is in the right place on this issue. That goes also for his honourable and right honourable friends in the Ministry of Defence in another place. I hope they may be able to convince those who have their greedy hands poised to purloin parts of the financial cake for other purposes that this money needs to be spent on defence.
  This has been a very useful, indeed, a vital debate. I hope that the Minister will be able to cheer and reassure all those who are disturbed by, even if they

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  support, the action the Government are taking. Nobody can be other than disturbed. Let us hope that, like the Arabian Nights, it all comes right in the end. But to all those who oppose the policy of this Government, I would say, "In that case, what will you do?" I do not know the answer and I doubt if they do either.
  7.56 p.m.
  The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Gilbert): My Lords, this has been one of those rare debates which, I suspect, will repay reading, just as it has been very worth while listening to it this afternoon and this evening. Before I wrestle with the substance of the debate, I thought it might be helpful to your Lordships to give noble Lords a short report on my very recent visit to the Gulf and tell you about the morale of the forces out there and their state of preparedness. I am sure that your Lordships will be delighted to know that their morale is exceedingly high.
  I visited the RAF Tornados at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait; I visited the TriStar, the Nimrod and VC10 forces in Bahrain. I was also able to go on board HMS "Coventry", which is one of our Armilla Patrol ships. She was tied up in Bahrain when I was there. I have to say that the speed with which the Royal Air Force has managed to deploy and get itself in operational order in Kuwait is nothing short of miraculous, particularly considering the fact that they are using an airfield from which RAF planes have not deployed since 1961. They are well aware of their responsibilities. I was able to tell them how proud we were of them all. I am sure that your Lordships share those sentiments.
  While I was in that part of the world I met the Deputy Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary of Kuwait. I met the Emir, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Ministers in Bahrain and also the Emir and Foreign Minister in Qatar. There are several things that I would like to tell your Lordships about those meetings. They are part of a pattern by which either Foreign Office or Defence Ministers have visited every country in the GCC in the past few days. The Foreign Secretary has been to Saudi and briefly into Kuwait as well. His honourable friend, Mr. Fatchett, has visited Egypt, the Emirates and Oman. I believe that what they found was similar to what I found. The mood was sombre. There was concern. In fact, many of the concerns that have been expressed in this debate tonight echo what our friends in that part of the world said to me.
  Some of our friends in that part of the world said that they were reluctant to see military action. I assured them that we are also extremely reluctant to see any military action in the Gulf not only because we do not want to impose casualties on Iraqi civilians or servicemen, but because we do not want to put the lives of our young men at risk.
  Our friends in that part of the world were also concerned—this matter has been touched on several times in the debate—at the alienation of opinion in their own countries from the United Kingdom and the United States because, as has been said several times, there is clearly a widespread perception in that part of the world
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  that double-standards are being applied. They feel that we are not even-handed, particularly with respect to the peace process. Again, that point has been raised several times tonight. I pointed out that Her Majesty's Government have made some firm and unambiguous statements. In particular, the Foreign Secretary condemned the settlements in the West Bank. I also said that we have exercised our influence with our friend, the United States, to try to get the Netanyahu Government to move more quickly on the peace process. All of those to whom I spoke clearly recognised that, far from being a poodle of the United States, the British Government's record was one to be admired in those respects. They understood that we were doing what we could to advance the peace process as far as possible.
  Our friends in that part of the world also made it clear that if negotiations failed, they would support us. We are already extremely grateful to the governments of both Kuwait and Bahrain for the host nation support that they are giving to our forces. The Kuwaiti Government and the Crown Prince said that Her Majesty's Government were to be given every possible facility. I met the colonel in charge of the air base there. Relations between our forces there and the Kuwaiti Government and their representatives are first-rate. We are very grateful to our friends for that.
  I turn now to the question of whether or not the current resolutions that have already been passed by the Security Council will be sufficient justification in themselves for the United Kingdom to embark in due course on military action if Mr. Kofi Annan is not able to extract from Saddam Hussein the guarantees that we all consider necessary for UNSCOM to be able to continue its activities without hindrance.
  I am pleased to tell the House something that was reported in the other place this afternoon by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. The five permanent members of the Security Council met until late last night to agree on a common position which would first provide a brief for the Secretary-General's discussions with Saddam Hussein. The Foreign Secretary said this afternoon that the remaining areas where agreement has not been reached are narrow and that he hoped that an agreed conclusion could be reached later today after the representatives in New York had had an opportunity to consult their capitals. He was therefore very optimistic that, with our co-members of the Security Council, he could secure an agreed authority for the Secretary-General to travel to Baghdad. Indeed, that may already have been achieved by now.
  I turn now to the position with regard to legal advice. I know that I put myself at risk in talking about legal matters but, as I understand it—different countries receive different legal advice on such matters—we do not need an additional Security Council resolution, but we would far prefer to have one if possible.
  I turn now to some of the other issues mentioned in the debate. I should like particularly to deal with some of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Cox. I was glad to have had some forewarning of the questions that she asked. Indeed, only about an hour

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  before I came over to the House this afternoon, I asked what information we had from the best source available to me with regard to those matters. I have not been able to get any authoritative information on those matters, but I shall be happy to study the questions which the noble Baroness raised—the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also raised them in his opening remarks—about whether Saddam Hussein has been, as it were, "parking" some of his weapons of mass destruction and stores of agents in other rogue states. I consider those matters to be extremely important and I undertake to the House and to the noble Baroness that I personally will ask for an investigation within the United Kingdom Government of every single one of the points which the noble Baroness raised. Indeed, if the noble Baroness would like to write to me with any other details, I should be happy to receive any such information as she wants to give me.
  Like several other noble Lords, I was particularly struck by the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, who is not in his place at the moment, and by his description of what constitutes a "just war". He asked whether the resources deployed in such a war were proportionate to the requirements of the situation. That came very close to one of the questions asked by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, who referred to proportionality and asked whether we have adequate resources at our disposal. As the noble and gallant Lord will know, and as several other noble Lords have been good enough to say, Her Majesty's Government are extremely fortunate in the technical expert military advice at their disposal. We would not dream of deploying our forces out there if we did not think that they were adequate to the task being laid upon them.
  I have been asked many questions implicitly and sometimes explicitly tonight about our targeting policies and whether we have considered the effects of hitting such-and-such a type of target. I do not think that your Lordships will expect me to answer any such questions because they are matters of high security classification. In any case, the answers might change from time to time. However, in answer to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, I can say that we are, of course, having detailed discussions with our American friends about targeting plans. In the last resort, authority over our servicemen will remain with our forces. They will not be subordinate to the United States should at any time a matter arise where we thought that it was inappropriate for our forces to continue to be deployed in the activities for which they have been sent there.
  The noble Lord, Lord Owen, made an extremely helpful speech, saying, as I have just said, that he thought that there was enough room to act under existing resolutions but that it would be better still to get P5 unanimity if possible. That is Her Majesty's Government objective, as I am sure noble Lords will accept.
  I cannot agree with what the noble Lord said about the creation of a Kurdish protectorate. I make it absolutely clear that the preservation of the integrity of Iraq is something that Her Majesty's Government fully support. It is no part of our policy to see the
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  disintegration of the Iraqi state into two or three parts, as is often suggested would be a helpful development. I cannot emphasise that strongly enough.
  It is also no part of the policy of Her Majesty's Government to use air strikes on Iraq, if they take place—I emphasise "if"—as a method of getting rid of Saddam Hussein; nor is it a requirement of the ending of the sanctions that Saddam Hussein be removed from power. We would be extremely pleased to see the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, but it would be sufficient for the sanctions policy to come to an end if the UNSCOM inspectors were allowed to return and have absolutely unfettered access to all sites at all times. When they have reported that they have completed their task the sanctions will be raised.
  The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, and other noble Lords referred to the oil-for-food resolutions. The only reason why the Iraqi people do not have enough food and medicines is that Saddam Hussein prefers to build monuments rather than buy medicines. He prefers to spend money on armaments rather than foodstuffs. This country has taken the lead in trying to double the oil-for-food programme from 2.5 billion dollars to 5 billion dollars a year. Only one person is responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people, and that is Saddam Hussein. I revert to my visits to the Middle East. I am glad to say that every single leader I met in that part of the world was totally of that view. They were also of the view that Saddam Hussein had to be made to subscribe to the United Nations Security Council resolutions and that it was intolerable that he should continue in impudent challenge to the authority of the Security Council.
  The noble and gallant Lords, Lord Craig and Lord Bramall, asked me to clarify the military objectives of Her Majesty's Government. At this stage I do not believe that I can add anything to what the Foreign and Defence Secretaries have already said about military aims. It is difficult to go further than to say that our objective is to diminish Saddam Hussein's stocks of weapons and agents and greatly damage his capability to regenerate them at any time in the future. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, said that we might be faced with a good number of questions on television as to why we had attacked such and such targets. I very much doubt that there will be television cameras positioned at the targets that we shall be attacking when that day comes. I can assure both him and the House that we shall not attack residential areas and shall confine ourselves to military targets.
  The noble Lord, Lord Burnham, touched on the one great difference between 1991 and 1998; namely, that today precision-guided munitions are much more accurate than they were a mere seven years ago.
  Lord Bramall: My Lords. I apologise for interrupting the Minister, but can he inform the House whether a Commander British Forces Gulf has been appointed, like General de la Billière? If that were done I believe that it would give this House

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  confidence that there was wise advice on the spot alongside the American commander and that British forces would be used in the correct manner.
  Lord Gilbert: My Lords, as always, I am obliged to the noble and gallant Lord. We have already appointed a commander, JCO or JOC—I forget all these initials—of our forces out there. I do not believe that the noble and gallant Lord should have any concerns about the sensible deployment of our forces if, unfortunately, we have to use the military option.
  Our forces are there and they are in good heart. I told those whom I was able to meet how very proud of them we were and that we very much hoped that we would not have to call on their courage and skills in the days and weeks ahead, but I could give them no guarantees that that would not be the case.
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  I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, asked me to give a guarantee that these events would not recur in two or three months' time even if we got a satisfactory temporary military solution. Unfortunately one can give absolutely no guarantees of that kind. Such is the nature of Saddam Hussein that at the last minute he might back down, we would all go home and he would start his capers all over again in six months' time. There are risks in action and in inaction. We very much hope that it will not come to military action, but if need be our forces are ready and I am sure that they will have the full support of the House. I commend the Motion to the House.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at seventeen minutes past eight o'clock.

  Depleted Uranium Ammunition
  Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Further to the Written Answers by the Lord Gilbert on 12 January (WA151–2), what specific circumstances prevented the acquisition of sufficient information to answer the question set down on 11 December 1997 by the Countess of Mar on the incident at St. George's Lines, Camp Doha, in 1991, and on related questions pertaining to depleted uranium; and whether they will publish their answers in Hansard without delay, as well as placing them in the Library of the House. [HL172]

  The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Gilbert)
  In order to answer the seven related questions concerning depleted uranium to which the noble Lord refers, it has been necessary to establish the position in 1990–91 on a number of matters. This required the location of relevant contemporary documentation and also some of the personnel who were involved at the time. This work could not be completed within the timescale in which questions are normally answered. However, I have now written to the noble Countess answering all but one of the questions. A copy of this letter is attached and a copy will also be placed in the Library of the House.

  Following is the letter referred to:

  "Shortly before Christmas, you tabled a number of Parliamentary Questions concerning the use of Depleted Uranium, DU, ammunition in the Gulf. In particular, you sought information on training aids for personnel who deployed to the Gulf, safety instructions issued to military and civilian staff responsible for transporting, handling and using DU ammunition, and any risk assessment or research which has been carried out into the possible effects of exposure to DU. You also asked when the Ministry of Defence applied to the Health and Safety Executive for guidance on the use of DU and whether MOD will place in the Library of the House a copy of the 1991 report by the UK Atomic Energy Authority on the effects of DU fragments left in Southern Iraq. In addition, you asked a number of questions concerning the fire which occurred at Camp Doha near Kuwait City on 11 July 1991. I apologise for not responding earlier, but it has taken some time to obtain the necessary information to enable me properly to answer your questions.

  DU hazards

  Before I answer your specific questions, I thought it might be useful if I set out the Government's current position on the suggested link between the use of DU rounds during the Gulf War and the illnesses being experienced by some Gulf veterans. Two types of potential hazard are posed by DU: a radiation hazard,
  WA18
  although DU is a low specific activity material as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a chemical toxicity hazard, which is similar to that posed by other heavy metals, such as lead. DU has the potential to cause adverse health effects if ingested; inhaled, for example from DU dust in the vicinity of a target, such as a tank which has been hit by the DU round; or absorbed, for example from embedded DU shrapnel. There is however so far no evidence to suggest that there is a link between the use of DU rounds in the Gulf and Gulf veterans' illnesses.

  UK DU tank ammunition used in the Gulf

  Tank ammunition with a DU core was used by both British and US troops during the Gulf War. DU-based tank ammunition was brought into service by MOD because of its unique capability as a kinetic penetrator against the most modern types of armour.

  Prior to the Gulf War, the CHARM 1 round based on DU was being developed for use by the new Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank, also then under development, together with a more powerful gun. At the time of Operation GRANBY, it was, however, realised that the existing tungsten-based round in use with the Challenger 1 tank, which was the Main Battle Tank used by UK forces during the Gulf conflict, might not be sufficiently powerful to defeat the most modern Iraqi tanks, the Soviet designed T72s. It was, therefore, decided that MOD should proceed with the emergency development of a DU round for Challenger 1. The CHARM 1 DU round needed only minor modifications to fit the existing 120mm rifled-barrel L11 gun on Challenger 1, but a totally new charge needed to be developed. The new charge and slightly modified DU round were known at the time of the Gulf War as Jericho I and II respectively.

  In the mid-1980s, radiation dose rates were measured around Ammunition Container Assemblies, ACAs, containing DU ammunition, and at strategic points in and around a Chieftain tank loaded with DU rounds. These measurements, which were carried out by the Atomic Weapons Establishment, AWE, at Aldermaston, showed that there is no significant external radiation hazard to personnel working around ACAs and that tank crews would be unlikely to receive a radiation dose greater than the present National statutory dose limit in all reasonably foreseeable circumstances. These results were confirmed as being applicable to Challenger 1 tanks during a further trial held in November 1990 by AWE at Royal Ordnance Chorley. The new round was, therefore, deployed to the Gulf and issued just before the start of Coalition operations against Iraq. Our current assessment is that 88 DU tank rounds were fired by UK forces during hostilities with Iraq. Additional DU rounds had been fired earlier during work-up training to establish the round's Mean Point of Impact, MPI. After the Gulf War, the unfired CHARM 1 DU rounds were placed in ACAs and returned to the UK, where they remain in storage.

  When the decision was taken to bring the CHARM I DU round into service for the Gulf, an RAOC Technical Ammunition Bulletin, TAB, was produced, which set out the safety procedures for those, such as Ammunition

  WA19
  Technicians, who were involved in its handling, transportation and storage. It was subsequently believed within MOD that the contents of this TAB had also been communicated to all those who might come into contact with DU ammunition, although it was not drafted for this purpose. However, it was discovered in 1993 that only certain groups had been given this advice. We believe that the TAB was issued to personnel involved in explosive ordnance disposal, whose work entailed a direct risk of significant exposure, and to Ordnance Corps personnel involved in the transportation and storage of the ammunition, but it appears that it was not seen by tank crews. This TAB has now been declassified and I attach a copy for your information, a copy of which I will also place in the Library of the House. The TAB in question refers to a second, more highly classified, TAB which gave the specifications of the DU round. The current version of that second TAB remains a classified document.

  Training aids for the Gulf

  The DU-based tank round used by UK troops in the Gulf conflict is almost identical in size and shape to the tungsten-based round which was already in use with Challenger 1. It was thought, therefore, that no specific training aid for the new DU round was considered to be necessary.

  Current DU tank ammunition

  The tank ammunition training rounds currently in use in the British Army do not contain DU, as DU tank rounds are not used during peacetime training. The new operational round for Challenger 2, known as CHARM 3, which is due to enter service in 1999, will contain a DU core. No satisfactory alternative material currently exists to achieve the levels of penetration required to defeat modern Main Battle Tanks. Although research is being conducted into alternative materials, none has so far demonstrated significant potential. The CHARM 3 DU round will not be used during peacetime training. A surrogate non-DU round with a restricted range and considerably decreased penetrative capability, to be known as the CHARM 3 Training Round, C3TR, is being developed for this purpose, although the procurement programme to provide this round has yet to be endorsed.

  Use of DU ammunition by the Royal Navy

  At the time of the Gulf War, the Royal Navy was equipped with 20mm ammunition containing DU for its Vulcan Phalanx close-in-weapon-system. This ammunition was not used in the Gulf, apart from some rounds fired for proving purposes.

  Safety instructions for the use of this ammunition were, at the time of the Gulf War, covered in a Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance, CINO, Formal Safety Statement issued on 18 November 1988 and subsequently updated on 3 May 1990. This document was widely circulated among the ammunition handling authorities and also to the Weapon Engineering Training School at HMS Collingwood, where all ships' maintainers of Phalanx are trained. Since the Gulf conflict, this document has been reissued on a further three occasions. A Defence Council Instruction, DCI,
  WA20
  entitled Radiological and Toxicity Hazards associated with Phalanx DU ammunition was also in existence before the start of Coalition operations against Iraq. The CINO Safety Statement and the DCI are classified documents. No formal instructions were issued to ships in the Gulf as the training provided to ships' maintainers at HMS Collingwood was deemed to be sufficient.

  Safety instructions

  General instructions and guidance concerning DU ammunition are published by the Explosives Storage and Transport Committee, ESTC, of the Ministry of Defence in the form of Prescriptions and Guidance Notes. ESTC is an inter-departmental body which provides a mechanism through which the Secretary of State for Defence meets his obligation to ensure that MOD ammunition and explosives are stored and transported safely when in the charge of the MOD. ESTC Guidance Note No. 1 covers the storage and transport of DU munitions, including the properties of DU, radiological protection, accident consequences, and fire fighting and post-accident recovery. Guidance Note No. 5 covers contingency planning for accidents/incidents involving DU ammunition. Individual munition-specific Prescriptions, including Prescription No. 4 for the 120mm DU tank round, are also published centrally in MOD and cover the legal and safety aspects of storage and transport. The classification of the three documents referred to above is currently under review.

  The ESTC publications are distributed to, amongst others, the three Services, the Procurement Executive and the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, DERA. They may be adopted directly by the individual Services and departments or, if appropriate, interpreted, along with safety advice provided by the Ordnance Board, in Single Service Explosives Regulations; for example, the Army's Ammunition and Explosives Regulations which cover the identification, health hazards, precautionary measures and safe procedures for the disposal of DU ammunition.

  Consultation with HSE

  As far as MOD officials are aware, the Ministry of Defence has not formally applied to the Health and Safety Executive, HSE, for official recommendations, guidance or usage procedures in the storage and transportation of DU ammunition. However, HSE are consulted on these aspects through their membership of ESTC. The MOD instructions and guidance do, of course, take into account all relevant legislation.

  DU exposures

  The Government are not aware of any UK Service personnel who sustained shrapnel injuries from DU ammunition. A very small number of British troops, who expressed concern that they might have inhaled DU dust during training in the Gulf before the start of hostilities, were nevertheless subject to Whole Body Monitoring on 8 February 1991 by the Defence Radiological Protection Services, DRPS, at the Institute of Naval Medicine. They showed no detectable DU contamination. Whole Body Monitoring involves monitoring an individual with an array of sensitive

  WA21
  radiation detectors placed around the body and is a widely used and well established technique. None of those veterans who have so far been examined by the Medical Assessment Programme, MAP, has displayed symptoms consistent with exposure to DU. A report published in 1993 by the DRPS, a copy of which has already been placed in the Library of the House, concluded that there was no indication that any British troops had been subjected to harmful over-exposure to DU during the Gulf War.

  Research

  No specific research is being conducted in the UK into the effect of exposure to depleted uranium and contaminated debris on military personnel who served in the Gulf. However, the US Government is conducting research to investigate the long-term health effects and toxicity of DU, including potential reproductive and carcinogenic effects. In addition, the US Department of Veterans Affairs is studying the effects of uranium absorption and low-dose uranium exposure in its continuing follow-up of US veterans with DU shrapnel wounds. The teams conducting epidemiological studies into the health of UK Gulf veterans and their families are, though, aware that DU is one of many possible exposures in the Gulf which have been put forward as a potential cause of Gulf-related illnesses and will be taking this into account in their studies. The Government are not aware of any research currently being conducted on Iraqi civilians who may have come into contact with DU after the Gulf War, nor are we aware of any which is planned.

  Risk assessments

  Qualitative and quantitative risk assessments of possible DU contamination of British troops have been carried out since the Gulf War and the results of these are summarised in the DRPS report which I have already mentioned. Precise details of these assessments, which give details of the specification and performance of the DU tank round, remain classified, as this information could be of use to potential aggressors. I am, therefore, withholding them under exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.

  AEA paper

  In one of your written questions, and during Oral Questions on 22 January, you refer to a report of August 1991 by the UK Atomic Energy Authority, AEA, on the effects of DU ammunition fragments left in Southern Iraq after the Gulf War. I will reply shortly on this issue.

  Camp Doha

  Turning to your question concerning the fire at Camp Doha in Kuwait on 11 July 1991, contemporary departmental records indicate that the 14th/20th King's Hussars, the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars had left the Gulf region by mid-April 1991. However, approximately 250 personnel, mainly from the 2nd Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment and Headquarters British Forces Middle East, were present at Camp Doha when the fire occurred, as the HQ for the
  WA22
  UK forces that remained in Kuwait, known as St. George's Lines, was inside the camp.

  The fire broke out in a US motor pool in the North Compound of Camp Doha on 11 July and resulted in the destruction of a large number of US vehicles and injuries, some serious, to approximately 50 US personnel. There is no mention in surviving contemporary UK records of any UK personnel suffering from DU shrapnel wounds or illness caused by exposure to DU as a result of this fire, although a small number of UK personnel were reported to have suffered superficial injuries, mostly from flying glass. There were no fatalities, either US or British.

  When the fire broke out, the British contingent, with the exception of the Guard Reaction Party and a Signals detachment, who were located at the Camp's main gate, were immediately evacuated and later accommodated on RFA Sir Galahad and at a nearby camp. On the following day, 21 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron began to clear bomblets and unexploded ordnance from the British section of Camp Doha. During this clearance operation, which was completed a few days later, a further British soldier was injured by a live artillery bomblet, which did not contain DU. Once the British section of the camp was safe from the threat posed by unexploded ordnance, the UK contingent returned to collect their vehicles, equipment, stores and personal belongings and cleaned up the British section, as far as this was possible before handing over the site to the US Army. All UK personnel were clear of the camp by 17 July 1991.

  No specific regime is in place to monitor those UK personnel who were present at the time of the fire or during the subsequent clearance operation for possible delayed effects of exposure to DU. However, like all Gulf veterans, any of those present at Camp Doha on 11 July who are concerned about their health as a result of their service in the Gulf, can seek a referral to the MAP, a process with which you are familiar.

  The US Department of Defense is currently investigating this incident, along with other DU-related matters, and plans to publish its findings in a detailed "case narrative" on DU later this year.

  A copy of this letter will be placed in the Library of the House, and will be published in Hansard in response to Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn's question."

  Courts-martial: Membership
  Lord Gregson
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What proposals they have made to allow senior non-commissioned officers to serve on courts martial. [HL658]

  Lord Gilbert
  The issue of membership of courts-martial was considered by the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill in 1996, although no firm proposals for change were made. I am pleased to announce that, following an extensive internal review initiated by the previous Administration, we have accepted the recommendation that membership of courts-martial be extended to warrant officers. This
  WA23
  enhancement will make available to courts-martial the additional experience and judgment of warrant officers.

  I welcome this recommendation as further evidence of the Services' willingness to embrace change while safeguarding the system of military justice which is essential to their effectiveness.

  This change will require primary legislation and it is envisaged that the relevant amendments will be included in the 2001 Armed Forces Act. A decision in principle now will allow any necessary preparation and training to be set in hand by the Services.

  Lord Chancellor's Residence: Refurbishment
  Lord Aberdare
  asked the Chairman of Committees:

  Whether he will clarify the position on refurbishment of the Lord Chancellor's Residence.[HL634]

  The Chairman of Committees (Lord Boston of Faversham)
  The process by which decisions on works in the House of Lords are taken is as follows:

  1. The Administration and Works Sub-Committee considers and approves proposals based on estimates prepared by the Parliamentary Works Directorate.

  2. The Finance and Staff Sub-Committee approves the necessary expenditure.

  3. The House of Lords Offices Committee considers the recommendations of its two Sub-Committees and reports to the House.

  4. The House debates and agrees to the Offices Committee's report.

  Membership of the Sub-Committees consists of senior members from all parts of the House. Backbenchers have a majority of members on the Offices Committee.

  Following the general election, the Lord Chancellor's Permanent Secretary, Sir Thomas Legg, advised the Lord Chancellor that it would be in the interests of the office for him to reside in the Residence as his predecessors had done. Black Rod, as Agent of the Administration and Works Sub-Committee, put forward proposals, on behalf of the Lord Chancellor, for a comprehensive restoration prepared by the Parliamentary Works Directorate. The Sub-Committee, aware of work carried out on the Speaker's rooms in the House of Commons, agreed that the Lord Chancellor's Residence should be restored to a similar standard.

  The Administration and Works Sub-Committee approved these proposals on 8 July 1997. The sub-committee recommended that the work, to a total of £650,000, should be carried out as a single project, rather than staged over two years. This proposal was subsequently approved by the Finance and Staff Sub-Committee on 16 July and endorsed by the Offices Committee on 22 July. The House itself
  WA24
  approved the Offices Committee report on 30 July 1997 (Hansard, col. 181).

  The Palace of Westminster is a Grade I listed building. Repairs and refurbishments are carried out to standards which are in keeping with the listed status of the House and in accordance with the needs of a Speaker's Residence. The decoration has to reflect the original schemes designed by Barry and Pugin.

  The refurbishment of the Residence was not part of the 10-year programme of works for the Palace of Westminster prior to the general election and was not included in the works estimate for the current financial year. It has however proved possible to accommodate that part of the expenditure which will fall for payment in 1997–98 (£350,000) from within the estimate and without the need to seek a supplementary estimate. This is in part due to savings in the works estimate arising from the Dissolution of Parliament in 1997 (when the House did not sit for several weeks). Consequent upon the decisions of the Committee referred to above, the work has now become part of the 10-year rolling programme.

  A Parliamentary Answer on 19 November 1997 gave details of contracts which had been placed amounting to £333,784. Since then the following contracts have been let:

  £

  Soft furnishing

  51,000

  Carpets

  21,000

  Furniture

  96,000

  Ceramic tiles

  5,000

  Blinds

  5,000

  Domestic equipment and tableware

  11,000

  Total

  189,000

  There have been inaccuracies in recent press reports on the likely cost of this work which is taking place. Carpets, orders for which have been completed, cost £34 per square yard and not £100 as quoted in the press. Similarly, fabric for curtains is being supplied at £60 per square yard and not £200 as reported. The dining table, which will seat 16, and not 10 as reported, will cost £9,640, not £25,000 as reported.

  The contracts placed for these works are standard parliamentary contracts and have been in use since 1990. No special arrangements have been made for the Residence. Clauses relating to the Official Secrets Act relate to the possibility that contractors may have access to official information of a confidential and sensitive nature.

  Details of contracts are regarded as commercial-in-confidence and contractors who work with the Palace of Westminster are not expected to comment to the press or other similar bodies without prior approval. This is normal commercial practice and has nothing to do with the Official Secrets Acts.

  NATO Enlargement: Cost to UK
  Lord Judd
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  When they last estimated the additional cost to the United Kingdom of NATO enlargement and what this cost is now estimated to be. [HL549]

  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean)
  NATO Defence Ministers agreed last December, based on detailed analysis by NATO, that the cost to NATO budgets of admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be some US$ 1.5 billion over 10 years. It is estimated that the UK's share will be £110 million.

  Mr. Yasser Al-Sayegh
  Lord Avebury
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they accept that Mr. Yasser Al-Sayegh no longer holds dual British and Bahraini citizenship, and that since he is now solely a British citizen, the Government has the power to take up his claim for damages in respect of wrongful imprisonment and ill-treatment. [HL492]

  Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
  Mr. Yasser Al-Sayegh held dual Bahraini and British nationality at the time of the incidents which took place in Bahrain. We have no reason to believe his Bahraini nationality has subsequently been removed. As such, the Bahraini authorities could properly say that we have no legal standing to espouse a formal claim on his behalf.

  Lord Avebury
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether, in accordance with their policy of assisting unemployed people back to work, they will assist Mr. Yasser Al-Sayegh to pursue his claim for wrongful dismissal by the Housing Bank of Bahrain. [HL493]

  Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
  Mr. Al-Sayegh's claim for wrongful dismissal arises from a civil dispute between him and his former employer and we have no standing to intervene.

  Iraq
  Lord Avebury
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will publish the text of any Article of any Resolution of the United Nations Security Council which authorises the use of military force if the Government of Iraq refuses to comply with the requirements of the Security Council concerning the elimination of weapons of mass destruction or fails to co-operate with United Nations inspectors appointed to oversee that process. [HL543]

  Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
  The requirements on Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction under international supervision are part of the conditions laid down by the Security Council for the WA26
  ceasefire established at the end of the Gulf conflict in SCR 687. The text is a matter of public record.

  The Security Council has the question of Iraq's compliance under active consideration and I cannot speculate on further decisions by the Council as the crisis develops.

  The Rural Population and Government Policy
  Lord Patten
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will list those of their policies that work to the benefit of people living and working in the countryside. [HL479]

  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Baroness Hayman)
  A broad range of government policies benefit people living and working in the countryside. We are making sure that we build the rural dimension into our programmes where relevant and tailor them as necessary to address the distinctive needs of rural areas.

  Examples of policies which will benefit people in rural areas range from the Government's plans to create Regional Development Agencies which will bring a new strategic focus to regional economic development and help to tackle the problems of rural regeneration; the New Deal programme which will be sensitive to the needs of young unemployed people in rural areas; and the recently announced Village Shop Rate Relief scheme, designed to help protect an important rural service.

  Diabetic Drivers
  Lord Alderdice
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they have received any representations from the British Diabetic Association or other bodies in respect of the adverse effects on insulin-dependent diabetic drivers of the provisions of European Union Directive 91/439. [HL557]

  Baroness Hayman
  The Government have received written representations from a number of bodies, including the British Diabetic Association (BDA), about the effect of implementation of Directive 91/439 on insulin-treated diabetic drivers. I met representatives of the BDA on 12 February to discuss their concerns.

  Lord Alderdice
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What new scientific evidence supports the restrictions on insulin-dependent drivers introduced by European Union Directive 91/439. [HL556]

  Baroness Hayman
  Evidence of the dangers of driving by insulin-treated diabetics predates Directive 91/439 and has led to the introduction of restrictions on such driving in many countries, reflecting international medical opinion. At the EU level, restrictions on the driving of heavier and larger vehicles were required by the First Driving Licence Directive, adopted in 1980. The further harmonisation under Directive 91/439
  WA27
  requires that drivers of 3.5–7.5 tonne lorries and minibuses with 9–16 seats should also have to meet the more stringent health standards.

  Lord Alderdice
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will seek to amend European Directive 91/439 in order to ensure that insulin-dependent diabetic drivers are individually assessed rather than treated as a homogeneous group. [HL558]

  Baroness Hayman
  The directive requires that licences to drive Group 2 Vehicles are not granted or renewed to insulin-treated diabetics other than in very exceptional cases. Any change to that requirement would be for the European Commission to propose. The Government are implementing the directive in accordance with advice received from the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Diabetes and Driving.

  Vehicle Registration Documents: Harmonisation
  Lord Brougham and Vaux
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will support the proposals relating to the harmonisation of vehicle registration documents in the European draft directive on registration documents for motor vehicles and their trailers. [HL562]

  Baroness Hayman
  The Government support the proposed directive, which we believe to be a useful and practical measure to help enforcement authorities across the Community combat vehicle crime. In particular, we welcome the encouragement which the directive gives to the electronic exchange of vehicle registration information, as a means to combat the illegal transfer of vehicles between member states.

  Speed Limits
  Viscount Exmouth
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they intend to reduce 30 mph speed limits to 20 mph; and if so:

  (a) which motoring groups and other groups have been consulted;

  (b) which of these have offered support for the proposed reduction in speed limit;

  (c) when the new limit will be introduced;

  (d) whether the reduction will be nationwide; and

  (e) who will cover the cost of amending the necessary road signs. [HL564]

  Baroness Hayman
  The Government have no present plans to reduce the national 30 mph urban speed limit to 20 mph. We intend to propose amending existing legislation in order to make it easier for local highway authorities to make 20 mph speed limits in particular WA28
  cases and will consult interested groups and organisations in due course. The costs of installing the present 20 mph zones have been far outweighed by the benefits in casualty savings.

  Thorne and Hatfield Moors
  Lord Beaumont of Whitley
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What action they propose to take to implement the advice of English Nature to stop the extraction of peat in the Thorne and Hatfield Moors. [HL495]

  Baroness Hayman
  The Government are not aware of any advice from English Nature that the extraction of peat at Thorne and Hatfield Moors should be stopped.

  Rural Policy: Institutional Framework
  Lord Beaumont of Whitley
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will hold a public consultation before announcing any restructuring of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food which would affect the countryside agencies. [HL555]

  Baroness Hayman
  It was announced on 3 December that the Government were accelerating that part of the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review which was considering the institutional arrangements for delivering rural policy. The Rural Development Commission, the Countryside Commission, English Nature and the Farming and Rural Conservation Agency are being consulted about this work. Terms of reference for the Comprehensive Spending Review of rural and countryside policy were published on 24 July 1997, with comments invited. We shall be considering, in the light of the outcome of the specific work on institutions, whether any wider consultation would be appropriate.

  Trade with EU: Currency Exchange Costs
  Lord Hooson
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they have reliable figures of the annual cost to exporters and importers within the United Kingdom of exchange rate charges in their trade within the European Union. [HL511]

  Lord McIntosh of Haringey
  Estimation of such figures raises difficult methodological problems. No such figures can be regarded as reliable.

  Musical Education in State Schools
  Lord Hogg of Cumbernauld
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What is their policy on the teaching of music in state schools in England and Wales. [HL542]
  WA29
  The Minister of State, Department for Education and Employment (Baroness Blackstone)
  Music remains a foundation subject in Key Stages 1, 2 and 3 of the English National Curriculum, which all state schools are required to teach. From September 1998 primary schools in England will have greater flexibility in how to teach music as part of a broad and balanced curriculum. In Wales, the position of music in the National Curriculum is being considered as part of a wider review. The Qualifications, Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales (ACCAC) is consulting teachers and others so as to identify options for reducing overload within the curriculum which reflect the distinctive nature of the National Curriculum in Wales.

  Music Students: Tuition Fees
  Baroness Young
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether students studying at the Royal College of Music, the Royal Academy of Music, the Royal Northern College of Music, Trinity College of Music and the Guildhall School of Music and Drama will all have to pay the £1,000 tuition fees. [HL583]

  Baroness Blackstone
  Support from public funds for the tuition fees charged by publicly-funded universities and colleges will be provided on a means-tested basis up to £1,000 a year for every eligible home and EU full-time undergraduate entering higher education from the academic year 1998–99 (apart from those who are, exceptionally, to be treated as continuing students). Means-testing will not apply to fee support for continuing students.

  This means that new home and EU entrants to full-time undergraduate courses at the Royal Academy of Music, the Royal College of Music, the Royal Northern College of Music and Trinity College of Music should not have to pay fees if they come from lower-income families. Those from middle-income families will receive help with fees up to £1,000, depending on their own and their parents' or spouse's income. Others from well-off families will receive no assistance with fees. But tuition for all home and EU students will be subsidised from public funds through the grant that their institution will receive from the Higher Education Funding Council for England. The Government plan no changes in the financial support for postgraduate students at these institutions.

  The Guildhall School of Music and Drama is not a publicly-funded institution, so different arrangements will apply. For Guildhall students, the maximum tuition fees that will be paid from public funds for each eligible home full-time undergraduate in the academic year 1998–99 will be three instalments of £1,200 each. The remaining costs of tuition will be met from private sources, as the school receives no public funds from the HEFCE.

  Adventure Centres: Licensing Charges
  The Earl of Mar
  and Kellie asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will maintain equal charges for the licensing of adventure centres in the statutory and non-statutory schemes. [HL560]

  Baroness Blackstone
  The Adventure Activities Licensing Regulations were laid in 1996 to ensure the safety of schoolchildren and other young people under 18 years of age taking part in certain outdoor pursuits in Great Britain. Since a voluntary accreditation scheme—without the age limit—already exists in Wales and another is currently being piloted in Scotland, it would clearly be good practice for complementary schemes within Great Britain to be harmonised in so far as that is possible; but the Government's role would be to encourage, not lead on, non-statutory measures.

  Abortion and Breast Cancer
  Lord Braine of Wheatley
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will place in the Library of the House any studies into the connection between abortion and breast cancer. [HL530]

  The Minister of State, Department of Health (Baroness Jay of Paddington)
  There have been over 70 studies published worldwide examining any possible link between abortion and breast cancer. References for those studies published since 1995 have been placed in the Library. The Imperial Cancer Research Fund's Cancer Epidemiology Unit, which is the co-ordinating centre for the Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors and Breast Cancer, is currently examining the worldwide evidence on abortion and breast cancer.

  Divorce
  Lord Patten
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they are satisfied with the working of the present divorce laws. [HL478]

  The Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg)
  The Government believe that the overall provisions in the Family Law Act 1996 will provide a better system than the present law for identifying saveable marriages, and ensuring that, where the marriage cannot be saved, couples have the necessary time and information to consider the best possible arrangements for their future lives apart.

  Lord Patten
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether it is their intention to make divorce easier. [HL477]

  The Lord Chancellor
  The Government have no such intention.

  Scottish Parliament: Car Parking
  Lord Berkeley
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  How many car park spaces are being designed to be incorporated in the new Scottish assembly building in Edinburgh for:

  (a) Members of the Scottish Parliament

  (b) officials; and

  (c) visitors [HL531]

  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Scottish Office (Lord Sewel)
  Detailed car parking proposals for the Scottish parliament building at Holyrood have not yet been finalised.

  Lord Berkeley
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether the number of car park spaces being designed to be incorporated in the Scottish assembly building in Edinburgh complies with Edinburgh City Council's transport policies. [HL532]

  Lord Sewel
  Detailed car parking proposals for the Scottish Parliament building at Holyrood have not yet been finalised. Once proposals are prepared, they will be discussed with the City of Edinburgh Council.

  Scotland: Home Ownership
  Lord Selkirk of Douglas
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  How many public sector houses have been sold in Scotland since 1945; how many of these were sold to sitting tenants; how many of the sales were by the rent-to-mortgage scheme; and what percentage of Scottish households are currently in home ownership.[HL499]

  Lord Sewel
  Information on the sale of public sector houses prior to 1973 is not centrally available. Between January 1973 and March 1997, a total of 393,273 public sector house sales were made known to the Scottish Office.

  Information on the status of the purchaser is not available prior to April 1979. Of the 387,955 house sales between April 1979 and March 1997 which were made known to the Scottish Office, 341,063 were sales to sitting tenants.

  There have been 1,042 sales recorded under the rent-to-mortgage scheme since its introduction in 1989 to the end of March 1997.

  It is estimated that 59.2 per cent. of dwellings were owner occupied at 31 December 1996.

  Lord Selkirk of Douglas
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  How many housing association units there are in Scotland; how many of these are for rent; how many for low-cost home ownership; and what percentage each figure represents of the total. [HL500]
  WA32
  Lord Sewel
  In Scotland, as at 31 March 1997, there were 115,078 separate dwellings owned by housing associations registered with Scottish Homes. Of this total, 108,515 units were for rent and 6,563 were for low cost home ownership through shared ownership arrangements. These figures represent 94 per cent. and 6 per cent. of the total.

  Scotland: Roads Programme
  Lord Selkirk of Douglas
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What road starts in their construction programme they intend to make in Scotland within the next three years; and whether they intend to upgrade the A.1 and the A.8000, and, if so, when. [HL501]

  Lord Sewel
  The trunk road programme in Scotland is currently the subject of a strategic review which was announced in June 1997. During the review there is a moratorium on new major road projects except for two—the A.75 (The Glen) and the A.828 (Creagan Bridge)—which were at an advanced stage of planning when the review was announced. Construction of these projects is expected to begin during the financial year 1998–99. A programme of minor road improvements, including work on the A.1 is continuing during the review.

  The strategic review will be considering investment priorities across the whole of the Scottish trunk road network, including the A.1. The A.8000 is not a trunk road but, exceptionally because of its importance in linking the Forth Bridge to the central Scotland motorway system, proposals to upgrade it will be considered within the strategic review. A trunk road programme will be determined after the review is completed in the summer of 1998 and in the light of the resources available.

  Minister for Women: Staff
  Earl Russell
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  How many staff are employed in the office of the Minister for Women. [HL498]

  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Social Security (Baroness Hollis of Heigham)
  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Women has three staff in her office and one driver. In addition 23 full-time and 7 part-time officials work in the Women's Unit—the Civil Service Branch which supports both Minsters for Women.

  Disability Benefits: Real Value
  Lord Morris of Manchester
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Further to the Written Answer by Baroness Hollis of Heigham on 4 February, whether they can offer any measure of the movement in the real value per week of the principal disability benefits to the individual claimant over the period since 1979. [HL494]

  Baroness Hollis of Heigham
  The information requested is set out in the tables.

  Attendance Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  Higher

  Lower

  Higher

  Lower

  November 1979

  18.60

  12.40

  48.25

  32.17

  November 1980

  21.65

  14.45

  48.70

  32.51

  November 1981

  23.65

  15.75

  47.52

  31.64

  November 1982

  26.25

  17.50

  49.63

  33.09

  November 1983

  27.20

  18.15

  49.05

  32.73

  November 1984

  28.60

  19.10

  49.15

  32.82

  November 1985

  30.60

  20.45

  49.86

  33.32

  July 1986

  30.95

  20.65

  49.61

  33.10

  April 1987

  31.60

  21.10

  48.52

  32.40

  April 1988

  32.95

  22.00

  48.68

  32.50

  April 1989

  34.90

  23.30

  47.72

  31.86

  April 1990

  37.55

  25.05

  46.91

  31.30

  April 1991

  41.65

  27.80

  48.91

  32.65

  April 1992

  43.35

  28.95

  48.82

  32.60

  April 1993

  44.90

  30.00

  49.91

  33.35

  April 1994

  45.70

  30.55

  49.53

  33.11

  April 1995

  46.70

  31.20

  48.99

  32.73

  April 1996

  48.50

  32.40

  49.68

  33.19

  April 1997

  49.50

  33.10

  49.50

  33.10

  Invalid Care Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  November 1979

  14.00

  36.32

  November 1980

  16.30

  36.67

  November 1981

  17.75

  35.66

  November 1982

  19.70

  37.25

  November 1983

  20.45

  36.88

  November 1984

  21.50

  36.95

  November 1985

  23.00

  37.48

  July 1986

  23.25

  37.27

  April 1987

  23.75

  36.46

  April 1988

  24.75

  36.56

  April 1989

  26.20

  35.83

  April 1990

  28.20

  35.23

  April 1991

  31.25

  36.70

  April 1992

  32.55

  36.65

  April 1993

  33.70

  37.46

  April 1994

  34.50

  37.39

  April 1995

  35.25

  36.98

  April 1996

  36.60

  37.49

  April 1997

  37.35

  37.35

  Severe Disablement Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  November 1979

  14.00

  36.32

  November 1980

  16.30

  36.67

  November 1981

  17.75

  35.66

  November 1982

  19.70

  37.25

  November 1983

  20.45

  36.88

  November 1984

  21.50

  36.95

  November 1985

  23.00

  37.48

  July 1986

  23.25

  37.27

  WA34

  Severe Disablement Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  April 1987

  23.75

  36.46

  April 1988

  24.75

  36.56

  April 1989

  26.20

  35.83

  April 1990

  28.20

  35.23

  April 1991

  31.25

  36.70

  April 1992

  32.55

  36.65

  April 1993

  33.70

  37.46

  April 1994

  34.80

  37.72

  April 1995

  35.55

  37.29

  April 1996

  36.95

  37.85

  April 1997

  37.75

  37.75

  Mobility Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  November 1979

  12.00

  31.13

  November 1980

  14.50

  32.62

  November 1981

  16.50

  33.15

  November 1982

  18.30

  34.60

  November 1983

  19.00

  34.27

  November 1984

  20.00

  34.37

  November 1985

  21.40

  34.87

  July 1986

  21.65

  34.70

  April 1987

  22.10

  33.93

  April 1988

  23.05

  34.05

  April 1989

  24.40

  33.37

  April 1990

  26.25

  32.80

  April 1991

  29.10

  34.17

  Disability Living Allowance (Care Component)

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  Higher

  Middle

  Lower

  Higher

  Middle

  Lower

  April 1992

  43.35

  28.95

  11.55

  48.82

  32.60

  13.01

  April 1993

  44.90

  30.00

  11.95

  49.91

  33.35

  13.28

  April 1994

  45.70

  30.55

  12.15

  49.53

  33.11

  13.17

  April 1995

  46.70

  31.20

  12.40

  48.99

  32.73

  13.01

  April 1996

  48.50

  32.40

  12.90

  49.68

  33.19

  13.21

  April 1997

  49.50

  33.10

  13.15

  49.50

  33.10

  13.15

  Disability Living Allowance (Mobility Component)

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  Higher

  Lower

  Higher

  Lower

  April 1992

  30.30

  11.55

  34.12

  13.01

  April 1993

  31.40

  11.95

  34.91

  13.28

  April 1994

  31.95

  12.15

  34.63

  13.17

  April 1995

  32.65

  12.40

  34.25

  13.01

  April 1996

  33.90

  12.90

  34.72

  13.21

  April 1997

  34.60

  13.15

  34.60

  13.15

  Disability Working Allowance

  Weekly benefit rate

  Real value at April 1997

  April 1992

  42.40

  47.75

  April 1993

  43.95

  48.86

  April 1994

  46.05

  49.91

  April 1995

  46.85

  49.15

  April 1996

  48.25

  49.42

  April 1997

  49.55

  49.55

  Note:

  The Retail Prices Index (all items) produced by the Office of National Statistics has been used in this calculation.

  Benefit Uprating Comparisons
  Lord Morris of Manchester
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  What would have been the extra costs to the Exchequer in each year from 1980–81 to 1996–97 of updating by the higher of average earnings or prices:

  Gross cost of uprating benefits by the higher of earnings or prices

  RP

  IVB/IB

  NCRP

  SDA

  WB

  GA/CSA

  AA/DLA

  IIDB

  (£bn)

  (£bn)

  (£m)

  (£m)

  (£m)

  (£m)

  (£m)

  (£m)

  1980–81

  0.1

  *

  *

  *

  10

  *

  *

  10

  1981–82

  0.7

  0.1

  *

  10

  50

  *

  20

  30

  1982–83

  0.9

  0.1

  *

  10

  70

  *

  20

  10

  1983–84

  1

  0.2

  *

  10

  80

  *

  40

  50

  1984–85

  1.8

  0.3

  10

  30

  130

  *

  70

  50

  1985–86

  2

  0.3

  10

  30

  130

  *

  90

  60

  1986–87

  3

  0.5

  10

  50

  170

  *

  140

  90

  1987–88

  4.4

  0.7

  10

  70

  220

  *

  220

  110

  1988–89

  5.2

  0.9

  10

  90

  240

  *

  290

  130

  1989–90

  6.1

  1.1

  10

  110

  250

  *

  370

  150

  1990–91

  6.8

  1.3

  10

  140

  270

  *

  450

  170

  1991–92

  7.1

  1.5

  10

  180

  280

  *

  540

  180

  1992–93

  8.3

  1.9

  10

  210

  310

  *

  810

  200

  1993–94

  8.9

  2.1

  10

  240

  330

  *

  970

  210

  1994–95

  9.2

  2.4

  10

  280

  330

  *

  1,140

  230

  1995–96

  9.9

  2.3

  10

  300

  330

  *

  1,340

  250

  1996–97

  10.1

  2.3

  10

  320

  330

  *

  1,470

  240

  Rate if increased by the higher of earnings or prices since 1980 in current prices

  £ per week

  RP

  IVB/IB

  NCRP

  SDA

  WB

  WA

  CSA

  AA/DLA

  IIDB

  November 1979

  23.30

  23.30

  14.00

  14.00

  23.30

  32.60

  7.10

  18.60

  38.00

  November 1980

  27.60

  26.45

  16.60

  16.60

  27.60

  38.65

  8.40

  22.05

  45.05

  November 1981

  30.90

  29.60

  18.60

  18.60

  30.90

  43.30

  9.40

  24.70

  50.45

  November 1982

  33.50

  32.10

  20.15

  20.15

  33.50

  46.95

  10.20

  26.75

  54.70

  November 1983

  36.40

  34.90

  21.90

  21.90

  36.40

  51.05

  11.10

  29.10

  59.45

  November 1984

  38.25

  36.70

  23.00

  23.00

  38.25

  53.65

  11.65

  30.60

  62.50

  November 1985

  41.60

  41.60

  25.00

  25.00

  41.60

  58.30

  12.65

  33.25

  67.95

  July 1986

  43.45

  43.45

  26.10

  26.10

  43.45

  60.85

  13.20

  34.70

  70.95

  April 1987

  45.90

  45.90

  27.55

  27.55

  45.90

  64.25

  13.95

  36.65

  74.90

  April 1988

  49.50

  49.50

  29.70

  29.70

  49.50

  15.05

  39.50

  80.75

  April 1989

  53.90

  53.90

  32.35

  32.35

  53.90

  16.40

  43.00

  87.95

  April 1990

  59.15

  59.15

  35.50

  35.50

  59.15

  18.00

  47.15

  96.50

  April 1991

  65.60

  65.60

  39.35

  39.35

  65.60

  19.95

  52.30

  107.00

  April 1992

  70.80

  70.80

  42.45

  42.45

  70.80

  21.55

  56.45

  115.45

  April 1993

  74.25

  74.25

  44.55

  44.55

  74.25

  22.60

  59.20

  121.10

  April 1994

  76.90

  76.90

  46.05

  46.35

  76.90

  23.25

  60.90

  124.60

  April 1995

  80.00

  80.00

  47.90

  48.20

  80.00

  24.20

  63.35

  129.60

  April 1996

  83.10

  83.10

  49.75

  50.10

  83.10

  25.15

  65.80

  134.65

  April 1997

  86.60

  86.60

  51.85

  52.20

  86.60

  26.20

  68.55

  140.30

  Actual weekly benefit paid at April 1997 prices

  £ per week

  RP

  IVB/IB

  NCRP

  SDA

  WB

  WA

  CSA

  AA/DLA

  IIDB

  November 1979

  60.44

  60.44

  36.32

  36.32

  60.44

  84.57

  18.42

  48.25

  98.57

  November 1980

  61.08

  58.49

  36.67

  36.67

  61.08

  85.48

  16.87

  48.70

  99.66

  November 1981

  59.47

  56.96

  35.66

  35.66

  59.47

  83.18

  15.47

  47.52

  97.04

  November 1982

  62.11

  59.47

  37.25

  37.25

  62.11

  86.88

  15.03

  49.63

  101.35

  November 1983

  61.41

  58.79

  36.88

  36.88

  61.41

  85.93

  13.71

  49.05

  100.27

  November 1984

  61.52

  58.86

  36.95

  36.95

  61.52

  86.10

  13.15

  49.15

  100.36

  November 1985

  62.41

  62.41

  37.48

  37.48

  62.41

  87.34

  13.12

  49.86

  101.84

  July 1986

  62.03

  62.03

  37.27

  37.27

  62.03

  86.87

  12.90

  49.61

  101.30

  April 1987

  60.65

  60.65

  36.46

  36.46

  60.65

  84.98

  12.36

  48.52

  99.03

  April 1988

  60.79

  60.79

  36.56

  36.56

  60.79

  12.41

  48.68

  99.28

  April 1989

  59.62

  59.62

  35.83

  35.83

  59.62

  12.24

  47.72

  97.36

  WA36
  (a) retirement pensions; and (b) all other social security benefits that had been uprated on that basis until 1980; what the rates of payment for those benefits on that basis would have been in each year; and what was the actual rate in each year at 1996–97 prices. [HL210]

  Baroness Hollis of Heigham
  The information is set out in the tables.
  WA37

  Actual weekly benefit paid at April 1997 prices

  £ per week

  RP

  IVB/IB

  NCRP

  SDA

  WB

  WA

  CSA

  AA/DLA

  IIDB

  April 1990

  58.60

  58.60

  35.23

  35.23

  58.60

  12.06

  46.91

  95.70

  April 1991

  61.06

  61.06

  36.70

  36.70

  61.06

  11.39

  48.91

  99.70

  April 1992

  60.98

  60.98

  36.65

  36.65

  60.98

  10.98

  48.82

  99.55

  April 1993

  62.36

  62.36

  37.46

  37.46

  62.36

  10.89

  49.91

  101.83

  April 1994

  62.43

  62.43

  37.39

  37.72

  62.43

  10.62

  49.53

  101.02

  April 1995

  61.73

  61.73

  36.98

  37.29

  61.73

  10.33

  48.99

  99.97

  April 1996

  62.63

  62.63

  37.49

  37.85

  62.63

  10.14

  49.68

  101.40

  April 1997

  62.45

  62.45

  37.35

  37.75

  62.45

  9.90

  49.50

  101.10

  Key to benefits:

  Retirement Pension Basic (RP).

  Non Contributory Retirement Pension (NCRP).

  Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA).

  Invalidity Benefit/Incapacity Benefit Short Term Higher Rate and Long Term (IVB/IB).

  Widows Benefits (WB).

  Guardians Allowance (GA) and Child Special Allowance (CSA).

  Attendance Allowance (AA)/Disability Living Allowance (DLA).

  Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB).

  Notes:

  1. Invalidity Benefit was replaced by Incapacity Benefit in April 1995.

  2. Widows Allowance ceased in April 1988.

  3. Attendance Allowance was replaced by Disability Living Allowance in April 1992 for people who became disabled before the age of 65.

  4. The Retail Prices Index (all items) and the Average Earnings Index (whole economy) as produced by the Office of National Statistics was used in these calculations.

  5. VAT on fuel was added in April 1994 at the rate of 50p single person for the following benefits: Retirement Pension, Widowed Mother's Allowance, Invalidity Benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance and 20p for single person for NCRP.

  6. The abatement of 5 per cent. applied to Invalidity Benefit in 1980 and has also been included.

  7. Costs are in 1996–97 prices, and have been rounded to the nearest £10 million where estimates are in millions and £0.1 billion where estimates are in billions.

  * denotes less than £0.5 million where estimates are in millions and £0.05 billion for estimates in billions.

  9. The earnings-link uprated benefit rates include the increases made to benefit rates on account of the introduction of VAT on fuel.

  10. All costs are on a gross basis and do not include income-related benefit offsets.

  Northern Ireland: Analysis of GCSE Results
  Baroness Blatch
  asked Her Majesty's Government:

  Whether they will publish data for Northern Ireland showing comprehensive schools, modern schools, grammar schools, state schools, independent schools and all schools separately, the percentage of all 16 year-old pupils in each of the year 1994 to 1997 obtaining five or more passes at grades A* to C, showing data separately for boys, girls and all pupils,

  Percentage of Year 12 pupils obtaining 5+ GCSEs at grades A*-C 1993–94 to 1996–97

  Secondary Schools

  Grammar Schools

  Controlled

  Maintained

  Controlled Integrated

  Grant Maintained Integrated

  Controlled

  Voluntary

  All Schools1

  1993–94

  Total2

  25%

  28%

  23%

  40%

  92%

  91%

  49%

  Number of Schools

  78

  78

  1

  3

  18

  53

  231

  Number of Year 12 pupils

  7,299

  8,107

  40

  222

  1,970

  6,132

  23,770

  1994–95

  Total2

  25%

  28%

  29%

  28%

  95%

  93%

  51%

  Number of Schools

  77

  78

  1

  5

  18

  53

  232

  Number of Year 12 pupils

  7,296

  8,377

  55

  236

  2,271

  7,019

  25,254

  1995–96

  Boys

  20%

  21%

  23%

  26%

  91%

  92%

  45%

  Girls

  32%

  40%

  31%

  43%

  97%

  95%

  59%

  Total

  26%

  30%

  27%

  34%

  95%

  94%

  52%

  Number of Schools

  78

  78

  1

  8

  18

  53

  236

  Number of Year 12 pupils

  7,993

  8,654

  55

  272

  2,303

  7,091

  26,368

  WA38
  and showing separately for each type of state school the percentages for local education authority schools, voluntary schools (including together voluntary controlled, voluntary aided, and special agreement schools), grant-maintained schools and, where appropriate, CTCs and including, for each category of school, the number of schools and the number of 16 year-old pupils. [HL452]

  The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Dubs)
  The information requested is as follows:
  WA39

  Percentage of Year 12 pupils obtaining 5+ GCSEs at grades A*-C 1993–94 to 1996–97

  Secondary Schools

  Grammar Schools

  Controlled

  Maintained

  Controlled Integrated

  Grant Maintained Integrated

  Controlled

  Voluntary

  All Schools1

  1996–97

  Boys

  22%

  23%

  23%

  37%

  94%

  93%

  47%

  Girls

  34%

  42%

  29%

  47%

  96%

  96%

  60%

  Total

  28%

  32%

  26%

  41%

  95%

  94%

  54%

  Number of Schools

  76

  79

  1

  10

  18

  53

  237

  Number of Year 12 pupils

  7,563

  8,439

  50

  347

  2,245

  7,054

  25,698

  1 Data are not available in respect of independent and special schools.

  2 Separate figures for boys and girls not available.

  WA40