Sitting of 15 January 1991

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
DEATH OF A MEMBER
Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the death of Donald Richard Coleman, esquire, CBE, Member for Neath, and I desire, on behalf of the House, to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the hon. Member.
Oral Answers to Questions
  EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

    Administrator-Teacher Ratios
    Mr. Butler: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he has any plans to reduce the administrator-teacher ratios within local education authorities.
    The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Michael Fallon): There are unacceptably wide variations in the proportion of resources LEAs delegate to schools. We published proposals last month to require that by April 1993 at least 85 per cent. of resources should get down to the school level. That is where the right decisions will be made.
    Mr. Butler: Will my hon. Friend confirm that local management of schools has, at long last, identified the heavy administrative load from which some education services suffer? Is not it time that it was reduced?
    Mr. Fallon: My hon. Friend is right. It is wholly wrong that councils such as Coventry and Cleveland should employ as many non-teachers as teachers on their education budgets. Parents and teachers want more of their schools' money given back to the schools themselves, and that is what the new requirement will ensure.
    Mr. Campbell-Savours: With Cumbria making every effort to ensure that as much money as possible is devolved to schools, may we presume in return that the Government will look favourably on that authority when they make the next settlement?
    Mr. Fallon: I am delighted to hear from the hon. Gentleman, and Cumbria has confirmed it to me, that that authority hopes to do much better next year—it needs to do much better—in delegating more money downwards to its schools.

    Secondary Schools (Expenditure)
    Mr. Ian Bruce: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science how much at today's prices was being spent per pupil in secondary schools in 1979; and how much is planned to be spent this and the next financial year.
    The Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Kenneth Clarke): Average school-based spending per secondary pupil in 1978–79 was £1,165 at 1988–89 prices. In 1988–89, the latest year for which actual spending information is available, it was £1,690. That represents a real-terms increase of some 45 per cent.
    Detailed information for 1990–91 and 1991–92 is not available on a comparable basis. In 1990–91, the secondary block of the standard spending assessment allows for total expenditure of some £2,175 cash per 11 to 16-year-old secondary pupil. The figure proposed for 1991–92 allows some £2,550 cash per 11 to 16-year-old secondary pupil. That represents a further real-terms increase of 10 per cent. in one year.
    Mr. Bruce: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for that comprehensive reply which, I am sure he will agree, nails the lie that the Government and the Conservative party are not willing to devote more and more resources to education. Has he had a chance to receive feedback about what has happened under the LMS changes to the effectiveness with which the money is spent? Does he agree that it would be better to give 100 per cent. of the money to schools to allow them to decide what they buy from the central education department at county hall?
    Mr. Clarke: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's comprehensive question, which required me to give the figures. I agree that they show that improving standards in our education do not depend wholly on increasing real-terms expenditure, because that is what we have been doing consistently in our period of office. Local management of schools allows money to be spent most effectively at local level in the school. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State has issued a circular suggesting that as much money as possible should be made available in that way. A school that feels confident that it can handle its resources best itself should contemplate opting for grant-maintained status.
    Mr. Ashton: Arising out of that carefully planted question, are not there now fewer children of that age at school than there were in 1979 and does not it cost as much to maintain and run a school with fewer pupils? Is not it also a fact that much more expenditure now comes from the county council and through the poll tax, not from the Government?
    Mr. Clarke: If the question was planted, I know not by whom—certainly not by me. It is a question frequently asked about actual expenditure on education and it brings out the most relevant figures of all, which are those of real-terms spending per pupil. It has risen spectacularly during the period of this Government. Next year's local authority allocations, to which I have just referred, show a 16 per cent. increase in the standard spending assessment—10 per cent. ahead of the rate of inflation. The resources are there and we must ensure that they are used to the best effect to obtain the higher standards that we want.
    Dame Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that local management of schools is a step in the right direction? Those of my schools which have opted out find that they can spend the money a great deal better than Lancashire county council ever did. They are appointing more staff and they can devote more to books and equipment. Roll on the rest opting out.
    Mr. Clarke: I am delighted to hear of that experience. As news spreads of how successful grant-maintained schools have been, we shall see many more applications. They are now beginning to come in. I agree with my hon. Friend that the money that we are putting into education is best spent by governors who feel confident that they are able to do so in a grant-maintained school under their control.
    Mr. Andrew Smith: May I invite the Secretary of State to confess that the statistics of which he boasts do not bear out his claims for the education service, first, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) pointed out, because the numbers of school-age children have fallen from more than 10 million to 8·6 million and, secondly, because the Government have cut expenditure on the nation's schools in real terms by more than a quarter? In addition, have not the Government also cut the share of gross domestic product and the share of public expenditure devoted to education, and does not that show that it is time for a Labour Government with a real commitment to investment in the nation's education in place of the neglect and statistical gimmickry that are characteristic of this Administration?
    Mr. Clarke: The hon. Gentleman's assertion of a 25 per cent. real-terms cut is startling. There seems to be some ingenious arithmetic or use of statistics behind that which he had better explain to me on paper if he wants to carry on using that figure. The proportion of GDP is an irrelevant measure of public spending for any service. As it happens, Britain spends a higher percentage of GDP on education than most of our competitors, but that tends to be a measure of the level of GDP. I have shown that there has been an enormous increase in real-terms spending on pupils and I do not believe that the Labour party would have exceeded it. Everyone knows that improving standards of education, standards of reading and spelling have to do with many more things than just the level of public expenditure per pupil.
    Mr. Knox: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science how much was spent per pupil at secondary schools in Staffordshire in the most recent year for which figures are available; and what was the comparable figure in 1978–79, at constant prices.
    Mr. Fallon: Staffordshire spent £530 per secondary pupil in 1978–79 and £1,610 per secondary pupil in 1988–89. At 1988–89 prices those figures are £1,165 and £1,610 respectively—a real-terms increase of about 38 per cent.
    Mr. Knox: Does my hon. Friend agree that those figures show an impressive increase in expenditure per pupil in secondary schools in Staffordshire, which nails the lie that there have been cuts since the Government took office?
    Mr. Fallon: Yes. Increased spending on education under the Government is not a big idea but a big fact.
    Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: How much of the extra expenditure in Staffordshire is due to the imposition of the national curriculum, for which many schools have to buy different books? In particular, how much extra will his announcement yesterday on the changes in the geography curriculum cost? Would not it have been better to follow the proposals made by The Geographical Association and have geography taught in a way which is much more relevant to modern living?
    Mr. Fallon: A substantial proportion of the extra resources are being spent on the national curriculum—and every penny spent on the new national curriculum is a penny well spent. As to additional resources, the national curriculum is being introduced in stages and money will be provided as appropriate.

    Schools (Capital Expenditure)
    Mr. Hoyle: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science when he expects to make an announcement on capital expenditure for schools; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will make a statement about his criteria for funding capital improvements and tackling disrepair and dilapidation in schools.
    The Minister of State, Department of Education and Science (Mr. Tim Eggar): My right hon. and learned Friend announced his decision on the 1991–92 annual capital guidelines for local education authorities, and grant to voluntary-aided schools, on 17 December. In that announcement we gave priority to agreed committed expenditure, the provision of new school places and cost-effective projects to remove surplus places.
    The remaining resources are distributed to contribute towards capital improvement work at schools and £109 million will be available for such work this year—an increase of more than 50 per cent. on the sum available in the current year.
    Mr. Hoyle: Is the Minister aware that the Secretary of State's statement showed a drop of 9·6 per cent. over the previous year in Cheshire schools' capital expenditure? Surely he is not surprised that parents in Cheshire are extremely concerned at that vast reduction. How can he justify that cut?
    Mr. Eggar: Cheshire had a very good settlement. Its annual capital guidelines include almost £1 million for improvements to schools and for other work. In addition, there was an allocation of almost £2 million for capital expenditure by governors of voluntary schools.
    Mr. Cohen: Why has the Government's education capital allocation been so inadequate that it has failed to stop the rundown of schools, and why do some—such as Newport junior school in my constituency—receive such exceptionally low priority? Under the Department's guidelines, even the slightest modernization—such as dealing with leaking roofs and dangerous windows and floors—is classed as an improvement and is therefore deemed to fall outside the Department's basic needs allocation. Is not the truth that the Government do not give a fig for our school children and that they are forcing a slow death on many of our most-loved schools?
    Mr. Eggar: I suggest that if the hon. Gentleman is worried about Newport junior school, he knocks on the door of Waltham Forest local education authority, which did not include that school in its bid to my Department. It is up to that LEA to provide the funds—and to ask for them if they are wanted.
    Mr. Thornton: My hon. Friend will be aware of successive reports by Her Majesty's inspectorate showing a direct correlation between the quality of the environment in our schools and the standard of education in them. Although I welcome the extra £109 million that is being made available, against the background of an estimated £3 billion of outstanding repairs, will my hon. Friend and his colleagues talk to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment to see whether anything can be done to increase the release of capital receipts to local authorities—which could perhaps be ring-fenced—to bring about important improvements in the state of our schools?
    Mr. Eggar: As my hon. Friend recognises, in addition to the annual capital guidelines, it is possible for LEAs to raise capital and to spend it on their schools—and a considerable number do so. About £2·6 billion has been spent by LEAs since the annual survey to which my hon. Friend referred.
    Mr. Harris: Does my hon. Friend recognise the deep disappointment felt in Cornwall at its capital allocation for the coming year? It is felt not only by members of local education authorities but among many parents. Will he review the criteria for drawing up allocations, because it seems to us that it does not take sufficient account of the need, for example, to replace old Victorian village schools, of which there are many in Cornwall?
    Mr. Eggar: I am aware, from representations that my hon. Friend and others have made, of the special problems in Cornwall and of the difficulties of local education authorities. Of course, the criteria have been agreed with the local authority association. If at any time it wishes to reconsider those criteria, or to discuss them with us, we shall be happy to meet it.
    Mr. Matthew Taylor: Despite what the Minister said, many people will find it hard to understand how those criteria work. Despite the overall increase, many local authorities have seen dramatic cuts. Devon has had a big cut and in Cornwall, where £100 million of spending is needed to get up to the Government's standards, the allocation was cut to a little more than £6 million this year. Will the Minister review the figures? Will he review the allocation given to Cornwall? Does he expect that, having already delayed it once, he will have further to delay implementation of the Government's minimum standards for school buildings and the environment in which children are taught?
    Mr. Eggar: Of course, we are prepared to listen to suggestions for changing the criteria, but those criteria have to be appropriate for all local authority associations throughout the country for them to be recognised generally as being fair. From time to time, some authorities benefit from the way in which those criteria are drawn up and some do not benefit. That is inevitable when one has objective criteria. As we have already announced, we shall be reviewing the premises regulations shortly.
    Mr. Brandon-Bravo: My hon. Friend must know that many local education authorities, in common with other departments, think in multiples of what they know they can expect from the Department. They include a range of minor capital works which there is no way that any Minister would specify or ring-fence. Is there no method of bidding for capital spending which will stop local authorities from blaming the Minister for every shortcoming in their areas?
    Mr. Eggar: I am afraid that my hon. Friend is right. Some local education authorities play political games with their applications. It is for the LEA to decide how to spend those capital guidelines and other borrowing amounts that it has at its disposal in the way that it thinks appropriate. It is answerable to the governors and parents if it refuses to go ahead with capital works improvements and others that it has suggested.
    Mr. Fatchett: The Minister seems remarkably complacent in his answers about the £3·5 billion of outstanding repairs in our schools and the fact that tens of thousands of children are taught in dilapidated buildings. Does he reject the proposition by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Thornton) that there must be a link between low-quality buildings and an inability to provide high-quality education? In an earlier response the Minister seemed to accept that it was all right for school buildings to be of a low standard because it had no adverse effect on education. Thousands of parents up and down the country do not subscribe to that view.
    Mr. Eggar: The hon. Gentleman has not looked at the figures. This year there is 15 per cent. more capital guideline expenditure than last year and there is a 21 per cent. increase in the spending available for voluntary-aided schools on the figure for last year, when there was a considerable increase on the year before. Massive amounts of additional resources are being made available by the Government for spending on capital equipment and on improvements as well as new build.

    Grant-maintained Schools
    Mr. Andrew Mitchell: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many schools have now decided to seek grant-maintained status.
    Mr. Amess: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many schools have applied for grant-maintained status.
    Mr. Kenneth Clarke: Eighty six schools have submitted applications to the Secretary of State and I am awaiting a further 12 applications following ballots in favour. Of the 86 applications, 56 have been approved, 12 rejected and 18 have yet to be decided.
    Mr. Mitchell: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that the popularity of the Government's policy for promoting grant-maintained status is growing significantly with parents, governors, teachers and schools, as demonstrated by the fact that there are five times the number of ballots pending compared with a year ago? How long does he think that it will be before the Opposition decide to disavow their shameful and ill-intended opposition to this excellent policy, as they did with the right to buy?
    Mr. Clarke: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend's premise. The first grant-maintained schools are experiencing a big improvement in morale, closer parental involvement, more applications for places and a general all-round improvement. I cannot understand why the Labour party remains wedded to the concept of bureaucracy controlling our schools. Like my hon. Friend, I believe that it will rapidly come round to accepting that this is a much more sensible way to run a great public service.
    Mr. Amess: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that Chalvedon school in Basildon has become the first grant-maintained school in Essex? Does he agree that grant-maintained status has nothing whatever to do with opting out of the state system, but rather signals a change in the method of funding and an increase in educational opportunities?
    Mr. Clarke: I entirely agree. Many other applications are being considered in Essex and those promoting them wish to make their schools better state schools. I believe that that experience will lead many others to apply very shortly.
    Mr. Leighton: Does the Department of Education and Science still believe in the elimination of surplus places? If so, why, when the London borough of Newham wanted to close a secondary school that was surplus to requirements and open on the site a primary school that was needed, did the Secretary of State's predecessor—for what I can only assume were ideological reasons—give it grant-maintained status to frustrate that sensible management decision? How can the right hon. and learned Gentleman possibly justify such action and will he, as a new Minister, review it?
    Mr. Clarke: Certainly we believe that surplus school places should be removed. The Audit Commission demonstrated that a great deal of money would be released for capital investment if we shed the large number of such places that exist. It is not true that applications for grant-maintained status are an automatic way out; as I said, 12 were rejected when the proposals in those instances were plainly not acceptable. The case of the Stratford school was decided on its merits: parents were committed to making the school grant maintained. I deplore the reaction of Newham and connected authorities which have gone to extraordinary lengths to try to close the school because it had the temerity to try to opt out of local authority control.
    Mr. Straw: The Secretary of State must know that the policy of opting out is a moral and educational failure. Last Saturday, The Times described it as evil; it is proof of the Government's subscription not to standards but to double standards. Can the Secretary of State explain why, if no bribes are being offered to schools that try to opt out, the capital allocations for schools that do so, at £355 per pupil, are five times the level of those for local authority schools in the surrounding areas? If no bribes are being offered, is the Secretary of State willing to allow the financial arrangements of opted-out schools to be examined by an independent inquiry?
    Mr. Clarke: I repeat my assertion that public services are best delivered by those—in this case, the teachers and governors—who are in closest contact with parents. When
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    such people are capable of being given that responsibility, they should be given it. I am astonished that the hon. Gentleman is so much in the pocket of local authorities that wish to maintain their empires that he describes the opting-out policy as "evil".
    Mr. Straw: That was in The Times.
    Mr. Clarke: The hon. Gentleman quoted that extraordinary proposition with approval. Let me ask him to visit any of the successful grant-maintained schools to which my hon. Friends have referred and try to explain to governors, teachers and parents that he considers their independence an evil in the state system.
    Mrs. Maureen Hicks: Is not it a fact that, by opening the way for choice and the other benefits provided by grant-maintained status and local management of schools, we are making parents, governors and head teachers more aware of the resources available for education? As parents see that some town halls are hanging on to the money at the centre, will not they increasingly want their schools to opt for grant-maintained status? What further steps can we take to protect those parents, guarantee that they are given that choice and ensure that they are not politically engineered into being frightened away from going for what is good for them?
    Mr. Clarke: I agree with my hon. Friend. We are taking steps to ensure that a fair proportion of the local authority central expenditure that would otherwise be needed for a school is transferred to the school itself. The governors of grant-maintained schools invariably find that they can make better use of the money and, as my hon. Friend so wisely said, they become more aware of what is involved in choices about how to spend money in schools.
    We must explain the case properly and ensure that all those who should be interested in the policy are properly canvassed about it, to counter what my hon. Friend describes as the politically motivated distortions being created by some local authorities which simply want to retain their own staffing levels and control over public funds.

    Small Primary Schools
    Mr. Jack Thompson: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what representations he has received about opting-out of small primary schools; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Eggar: There has been a general welcome by parents and governors alike in response to the decision to extend the eligibility to apply for grant-maintained status to primary schools with fewer than 300 pupils.
    Mr. Thompson: Is the Minister aware that his Department's policy of encouraging the elimination of surplus places in primary schools is in direct conflict with the opting-out policy? Is it not clear to him that in counties such as Northumberland, with a huge rural population and a considerable number of small primary schools, any school opting out will cause serious problems for an authority which is currently Labour controlled and has the support of the Conservative councillors in preventing opting out? It will kill the education service in rural areas if schools opt out. Will the Minister reconsider the policy in relation to small primary schools?
    Mr. Eggar: I have some difficulty following the hon. Gentleman's logic. If those schools are supported in their application for opting out by parents, governors and staff and they are viable schools, why should not they, rather than the administrators at county hall, be responsible for spending the money? They must be best placed to know how to spend the money to the benefit of their pupils in a way that is appropriate in their school.
    Mr. Dunn: Does my hon. Friend share my great concern that those who criticise the grant-maintained schools provisions do so because they are motivated by a dislike of the involvement of the consumer? After all, it is the consumer who starts the process leading to the award of grant-maintained status and that is why the Labour party dislikes it so much.
    Mr. Eggar: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. It is for that reason that there is a continuing and welcome upsurge in the number of schools applying for grant-maintained status.

    Assessment and Testing
    Mr. Win Griffiths: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what further proposals he has for amendments to the implementation of assessment and testing in the national curriculum.
    Mr. Kenneth Clarke: My speech at the north of England conference on 4 January sets out my proposals and I have placed copies in the Library.
    Mr. Griffiths: How much money did the Secretary of State waste on the pilot studies that everybody told him beforehand would not work? Does he intend to carry out any pilot studies on the new proposals for seven-year-olds and, if so, will he make further changes if they, too, prove impractical?
    Mr. Clarke: The £6 million spent on the pilot studies was money well spent. My predecessor would have been bitterly criticised if he had not piloted those tests. It is in the light of the experience of those pilots that the tests have been greatly simplified and the proposals now being discussed with the profession will be simple and useful to them and extremely informative to parents when they are introduced in July this year.
    Mr. Allason: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the national curriculum has proved quite successful, even if it was brought in rather too quickly? Does he agree that a greater proportion of resources would be available for schools, pupils and teachers if less money were spent by local education authorities on administration?
    Mr. Clarke: It is now almost universally accepted that the national curriculum is a good idea and it is being supported throughout schools. With respect, I do not agree with my hon. Friend's implied criticism of my two predecessors who are said to have introduced it too quickly. That is now an excuse for former opponents who are coming on side. If my two predecessors had not pressed on with the reforms, the reforms would not have been started by now. Their success is suddenly being perceived. I agree with my hon. Friend's final comment that we need less money spent on administration and more spent where it counts—in the classrooms.
    Mr. Andrew F. Bennett: Will the Secretary of State reconsider his proposals for the geography curriculum? As the right hon. and learned Gentleman is in favour of democracy, does he agree that one of the key problems in a democracy is deciding priorities? Would not it be a good idea to teach pupils at an early stage that one of the most difficult areas in which to make decisions is land use? Would not it have been sensible to keep that in the geography curriculum rather than return to a purely factual-based curriculum?
    Mr. Clarke: Pupils need to acquire that essential body of factual knowledge and the skills necessary for a true appreciation of it before starting to strike attitudes and form opinions about subjects. We must achieve the right balance in the curriculum as it is being introduced in our schools.

    Scientific Research
    Mr. Knapman: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science when he expects the new arrangements for the funding of scientific research in higher education institutions to become operative.
    The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Alan Howarth): I congratulate my hon. Friend on his recent appointment to membership of the Agricultural and Food Research Council. To answer his question, the new arrangements for funding research projects supported by research councils in higher education institutions will take effect from 1 August 1992.
    Mr. Knapman: I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent reply, but will he assure the House that adequate arrangements have been made during the transitional period and that there will be no reduction in funds for scientific research?
    Mr. Howarth: The reason why my right hon. and learned Friend deferred the introduction of the new arrangements until 1992 was so as not to disturb the existing cycle of grant applications and to ensure that the detailed preparations for the new system could be thoroughly carried out. He has invited the research councils to work with representatives of the higher education institutions and the Department to draw up a detailed specification of the new boundary and to put in place new grant application arrangements. I can give my hon. Friend the assurance that he seeks on resources. The new arrangements will represent a cost-neutral transfer of funding responsibility from the Universities Funding Council to the research councils.
    Mr. Douglas: Does the Minister accept that a market solution is quite inappropriate for this part of higher education and that there is a crisis in the funding of fundamental research in our higher education institutions, particularly in Scottish universities? How much of those funds is likely to be devoted to fundamental research in Scottish universities? The position must be rectified as soon as possible.
    Mr. Howarth: It is healthy and proper that there should be selectivity, concentration on excellence and bidding for the available research funds. The money that the Government have made available for science has increased markedly. The money available through the science

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    budget and the Universities Funding Council has increased by 10 per cent. The distribution of those funds, to Scottish institutions and elsewhere, is a matter for the research councils and the UFC.
    Dr. Bray: Is the Minister aware that the proposed arrangements are another way of increasing the attrition of research funding in higher education and basic science generally? What are the Government's long-term objectives? Are they to remove all autonomy from institutions of higher education in relation to research strategy and to concentrate it solely in the hands of research councils and donors?
    Mr. Howarth: There has been no attrition of funding. On the contrary, as I said in answer to the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas), we have increased the amount of funding available through the science budget and the Universities Funding Council by 10 per cent. It certainly is not our intention that all the money made available from the taxpayer in support of scientific research should be channelled through the research councils. We are seeing a shift of a certain proportion of funding from the Universities Funding Council to the research councils so as to clarify where responsibilities lie. We certainly do not intend to end the dual-support system. It is important that funding should be available to universities through the Universities Funding Council so that they can support projects initiated in universities and, in particular, so that they can support the work of promising young scientists who are developing their scientific abilities and experience but who may not yet be at the point where they are able to make a claim on research council funding. [Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I ask the House to give a fair hearing to these important education answers.

    Reading Standards
    Mr. John Evans: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what proposals he has to monitor reading standards nationally; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Kenneth Clarke: The national curriculum will secure, for the first time, national monitoring of standards in reading from age seven onwards. This summer's tests for seven-year-olds will supply the first data in what will soon become a much fuller picture. I have instructed Her Majesty's inspectorate to continue to monitor reading standards and provide me with regular reports.
    Mr. Evans: Will the Secretary of State confirm that, after nearly 12 years of Tory government, cuts in the education service, our children's reading standards are, not surprisingly, declining? Will he acknowledge that one reason for that decline is the inability of local authorities to maintain their schools library service, due to lack of funds—a situation which is worsening as a result of the poll tax?
    Mr. Clarke: Recent reports show that we do not have enough information on the subject, but they also show that the inadequate reading standards being achieved have little or nothing to do with resources or any of the other excuses put forward. What is required is the systematic application of good teaching methods in schools and for
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    local education authorities to pay much closer attention to the problem. That is why I have written to the chairmen of the local education authorities and I have asked Her Majesty's inspectorate to circulate its report to all head teachers. I am sure that we shall address the issue of good teaching methods, properly applied in schools, to get reading standards up to the level that this country requires.
    Mr. Pawsey: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that much of the responsibility for poor reading standards must lie with the permissive educational regimes which have been pursued in many of the nation's classrooms? Does he agree that what is required is not necessarily greater funding but greater rigour, greater discipline and greater structuring of reading and the way in which it is taught?
    Mr. Clarke: I agree with my hon. Friend's approach. What is required is good, systematic teaching, principally using phonics, as well as other methods, to teach pupils. The reports show that overdependence on some of the stranger new methods of teaching reading which have been introduced is damaging to pupils' performance. That is the key issue which we must address, along with others.
    Mr. Straw: Why does the Secretary of State not have the guts to admit that HMI's report on reading is a stark indictment of the Government's shameful record on that issue? It shows that one in five young children cannot read properly. The back of the report, which the Secretary of State evidently has not read, states that there is a lack of non-contact time, a lack of spending on books and a lack of under-five provision, among other factors named by head teachers. Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain why his predecessor was so complacent about the reading standards of this nation's children that he abandoned all national monitoring of reading standards in 1989?
    Mr. Clarke: Why does the hon. Gentleman not have the guts to admit that the Labour party has been closely associated with every change in teaching methods and with moves towards an overdependence on curious child-centred methods which have been responsible for the problem of reading standards in our schools? No one abolished anything in 1989. The hon. Gentleman makes a totally artificial point about the change in the location of a unit which was moved into the School Examinations and Assessment Council, where it is still operating and monitoring reading standards.
    Mr. Patrick Thompson: In monitoring reading standards, will my right hon. and learned Friend give more weight and encouragement to traditional methods of teaching reading, writing and spelling? Will he take a closer look at what is going on in our teacher training colleges?
    Mr. Clarke: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Most parents look for those schools where the teaching methods are reasonably formal and reasonably well oriented and aimed, above all, at achieving success in reading and spelling. Our introduction of national curriculum testing, our extension of parental choice and our insistence that local authorities should pay more attention to all those factors will get our schools back on to a sensible track of getting reading standards up to the quality that we require.

    Nursery Education
    Mr. Nicholas Brown: To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what proposals he has to increase the number of places available in nursery education; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Eggar: It is for local authorities to decide, in the light of annual grant settlements and local circumstances, what provision they might make for nursery education and other services for the under-fives.
    Mr. Brown: In 1972, the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) pledged the Conservative party to the creation of an extra 300,000 places for three to four-year-olds. As we are still 200,000 places short, why is it taking the Conservative party so long to implement that pledge? Or has its time expired?
    Mr. Eggar: The hon. Gentleman is obviously unaware that more than 150,000 more under-fives attend a maintained school now than was the case in 1979 and that there has been an increase in real spending on nursery school provision of about 50 per cent. in the past 10 years.
    Mr. Haselhurst: Does my hon. Friend believe that playgroups also offer a valuable pre-school experience? Will not the extra money that has been granted to the Pre-School Playgroups Association achieve valuable results?
    Mr. Eggar: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. The doubling of the grant that we are able to make available to the Pre-School Playgroups Association is very welcome to the association and will especially help to improve the quality of care that it is able to provide through voluntary organisations.
    Ms. Armstrong: Perhaps the Minister has forgotten the report that the Secretary of State published just before Christmas of his own committee, which was chaired by another member of the Government. It said that there needed to be an expansion of provision for under-fives and an improvement in quality. When will the Government accept their responsibility, or will they leave it to the next Labour Government to ensure that children under five have that opportunity?
    Mr. Eggar: As the hon. Lady rightly says, my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science published the report just before Christmas. It was a valuable report which concentrated on improving the quality of care and education for the under-fives. I know that there will be a considerable response to the report from local education authorities and from others. The Government have already made a number of responses, including, as I have already said, increasing the grant available to the Pre-School Playgroups Association.

  PRIME MINISTER

    Engagements
    Mr. Jacques Arnold: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.
    Mr. Arnold: In the course of his busy day, will my right hon. Friend spare a thought for the Kuwaiti people who are now in the sixth month of brutal occupation? Does he agree that if British forces have to go into action, they will be fighting in support of the United Nations for the principle that small nations may live in freedom and in peace?
    The Prime Minister: I very much agree with my hon. Friend. I shall of course, seek to deal with those matters in the course of my speech later this afternoon. If we are to have a safe world—and, clearly, that is our objective—we need to safeguard the positions of small countries with large and potentially aggressive neighbours.
    Mr. Kinnock: In view of the brutality—[Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order.
    Mr. Kinnock: In view of the brutality against unarmed people in Lithuania and in Latvia in recent days, will the right hon. Gentleman today make direct contact with the Soviet Government to make it clear, beyond all doubt, that for Britain and the European Community any improved relations with the Soviet Union will relate directly to the extent to which the authorities conduct affairs peacefully and with proper respect for basic human rights in all parts of the Soviet Union? Will the right hon. Gentleman give notice that continued violence will severely deter support for economic development in the Soviet Union?
    The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I can confirm that we have already made such representations to the Soviet authorities. I deeply deplore the actions in Vilnius and, of course, their tragic consequences. I regard them as unnecessary and undesirable, and I hope that they will never be repeated. I will be happy to pass the right hon. Gentleman's remarks direct to the Soviet authorities.
    Sir Trevor Skeet: May I ask the Prime Minister a direct question? In the event of poisonous gas or bacteria being used in the middle east in the event of war, will he reserve the option to use a nuclear device if that is necessary for the protection of our own troops?
    The Prime Minister: We have made it very clear to the Iraqis that we would take a very serious view indeed of the use of any chemical or biological weapons, but I must say to my hon. Friend that we have a wide range of weapons and resources at our hands and I do not envisage needing to use the sanction that he suggests.
    Mr. Ashdown: Does the Prime Minister realise that he has the overwhelming support of the people of this nation and of this House in his determination to ensure that international law is upheld by the enactment in full of the United Nations resolutions requiring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait? But does he also realise that, consistent with those terms, it is right to pursue every last possibility for peace? Notwithstanding the fact that the French initiative no doubt has very little chance of success, would not it be wiser to pursue rather then reject it?
    The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support today and for his strong support in recent weeks, which has been most helpful and much appreciated. We certainly subscribe to the principle of a last appeal to Saddam Hussein to obey the Security Council resolutions and leave Kuwait, but we have considerable reservations about the particular wording proposed by the French, which seems to us materially to weaken the Security Council resolutions and to have some other drawbacks as well. While we subscribe to the principle of a last appeal, I fear that I cannot agree with the precise wording proposed by the French.
    Mr. Conway: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Iraqis' ability to avoid the effectiveness of sanctions will be aided by the £4 billion worth of gold and foreign reserves looted from Kuwait? Will he assure the House that if we discover that any country breaking sanctions is in receipt of United Kingdom aid, that aid will be stopped immediately?
    The Prime Minister: We certainly take a very serious view indeed of sanctions-breaking, when one considers that sanctions have been working and, to a degree, effectively—although, alas, not remotely effectively enough to achieve the end that we wish, which is the removal of the Iraqis from Kuwait. I will certainly bear in mind the advice that my hon. Friend has given me.
    Mr. Nicholas Brown: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Brown: When the right hon. Gentleman met President Mitterrand, was he told the details of the French initiative and, if not, why not? If he was told the details, did he have any proposals of his own to make?
    The Prime Minister: I am bound to say that I think that the substantive part of the hon. Gentleman's question would be more appropriately directed to President Mitterrand than to me.

    Terrorism
    Mr. Hunter: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a further statement on the United Kingdom's contribution to international co-operation against terrorism.
    The Prime Minister: We condemn all acts of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed. We shall maintain our firm stand against terrorism at home and overseas. We remain in very close touch with our partners and allies in these matters.
    Mr. Hunter: As so many terrorist organisations have declared their support for, or received support from, Saddam Hussein's ally the Palestine Liberation Organisation, can my right hon. Friend assure us that there will be effective international co-operation against acts of terrorism which may be committed in support of Iraq and will he ensure that there will never be any surrender to terrorism?
    The Prime Minister: I can certainly confirm the last point to my hon. Friend and I very much hope that his
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    earlier point is also the case. I can also assure him that we take the threat of terrorism very seriously indeed and have taken the appropriate cautionary measures. In particular, we have been urging other Governments to improve security at their airports. Very great vigilance will be required both at home and abroad and we are making it clear to everyone that that will undoubtedly be necessary in the weeks ahead.
    Mr. Madden: In view of the gathering support for the French initiative—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a definitive question about terrorism.
    Rev. Martin Smyth: I welcome the Prime Minister's statement that we take a firm line on terrorism, but in the light of the two recent kamikaze bombings in Londonderry and Fermanagh is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that he is getting full co-operation from the Republic of Ireland?
    The Prime Minister: The Irish Government have made clear to us their continuing commitment to cross-border co-operation against terrorism. We will, of course, continue to discuss improvements to that cross-border co-operation, through the mechanism of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
    Mr. Ian Bruce: Does my right hon. Friend agree that, as we now have better relations with Syria, urging Syria at the end of this conflict to make peace with Israel would be an extremely good way of ensuring that international terrorism is dealt with?
    The Prime Minister: As my hon. Friend knows, we have restored our relationship with Syria and we hope that that will herald a greater degree of co-operation between our two countries. I hope that in future Syria will turn away from any form of terrorism.

    Engagements
    Mr. Galbraith: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Galbraith: During the Prime Minister's recent visit to Scotland he re-emphasised his position on the poll tax that nothing was ruled out and nothing was ruled in. Yet in the previous week, when interviewed by David Frost, he said that proposals for the abolition of the poll tax would not arise. Can he explain the apparent contradiction?
    The Prime Minister: First, the whole House is pleased to see the hon. Gentleman back in the House and looking a good deal fitter than he was. On his remarks about the community charge, we have repeatedly made the position clear. It is a fundamental review and until it is concluded we cannot be precisely certain about what will emerge. I offered a contingent thought in my early interview with Mr. Frost. What the reality will be, we shall have to see.
    Mr. Butler: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Butler: What urgency does my right hon. Friend give to compensation for coal mining subsidence?
    The Prime Minister: I confirm to my hon. Friend that that is an important matter. He will know that the Government have been considering it for some time. I can now confirm to my hon. Friend that it is the Government's intention to bring forward a Bill in the current Session. The Bill will improve the arrangements for compensation and the repair of houses for those affected by mining subsidence and provide for quicker settlement of disputed claims.
    Mr. Livingstone: Will the Prime Minister assure the House that the Government have not issued any contingency orders for the printing of call-up papers for men aged 18 to 25 who are unmarried?
    The Prime Minister: We have no such arrangements in hand.
    Mrs. Currie: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mrs. Currie: Has my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister noted the unanimous vote in the Iraqi National Assembly backing Saddam Hussein in his efforts for war? Does he agree that a unanimous vote in this House today would also demonstrate the determination of Britain, if it must, to put Saddam Hussein to flight and obtain justice for the Kuwaiti people?
    The Prime Minister: I most certainly did notice the vote in the Iraqi assembly. I share my hon. Friend's view that the largest possible degree of support from the House for the Government's position would be most welcome, not only as an indication of international solidarity but, perhaps more importantly, as the clearest possible indication to our troops in Saudi Arabia that they have the full and united support of the House.
    Mr. Leighton: Having invaded Kuwait to grab the oil, is it not true that Saddam Hussein has been unable to sell a single pint of it and has been unable to sell Iraqi oil either? While the two pipelines are closed, do not those effective sanctions render his position untenable in the long run? Would not it be better to maintain those effective sanctions, rather than resort to the early use of force, which could have unforeseen consequences?
    The Prime Minister: I can only say that I wish that the hon. Gentleman was right. The reality is that sanctions have been in force for a considerable period of time. They
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    may have caused some economic harm to Iraq. What they have not done is cause Iraq to remove itself from Kuwait and end the terrorism that is continuing there day after day.
    Mrs. Gorman: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mrs. Gorman: Does my right hon. Friend agree that on a cold day such as today, young people should not be sleeping in our streets when they could be in the ample bosom of some kindly landlady who, but for the twin bogey men of the Rent Acts and the taxman, could be encouraged to let spare rooms? On such a cold day as this, we should be concentrating our minds on removing all the obstacles that prevent people from letting rooms in private houses.
    The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend puts the matter most colourfully and is undoubtedly an encouragement to us all. As my hon. Friend will know, we reformed the Rent Acts in 1989 and we believe that the legislation now strikes a better balance between landlord and tenant. None the less, I agree with my hon. Friend that further measures are necessary to increase the supply of rented accommodation. My hon. Friend the Minister for Housing and Planning will be examining that matter.
    Mr. Trimble: To ask the Prime Minister if he will list his official engagements for Tuesday 15 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Trimble: We applaud the Prime Minister's determination that aggression in the Gulf shall not be rewarded and we only hope that the same determination is applied here as well. I refer the Prime Minister to recent press reports about indirect negotiations and contacts between the Northern Ireland Office and Sinn Fein. I ask the right hon. Gentleman for an assurance that there will be no such contacts, direct or indirect, and to ensure that the aggression and terrorism of the IRA and Sinn Fein are not rewarded.
    The Prime Minister: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have taken a consistent view that Irish terrorism, or terrorism of any sort, should not be rewarded. That has, been, is and, I assure the hon. Gentleman, will continue to be our position.

Privilege
3.31 pm
Mr. Speaker: I have a short statement to make on a matter of privilege.
I have received a complaint from the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) that the guidelines laid down by the Yorkshire area of the National Union of Mineworkers, in respect of the actions of hon. Members sponsored by the union, are in breach of the privileges of this House. I am satisfied that the complaint raises issues that justify me in granting precedence to a motion relating to it. If the hon. Member now tables such a motion, it will appear as the first item of business tomorrow.

BILL PRESENTED
  DECLARATION OF WAR (REQUIREMENT FOR PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL)
  Mr. Harry Cohen, supported by Mr. Harry Barnes, Mr. Tony Benn, Mr. Andrew F. Bennett, Mr. Bob Clay, Mr. Jeremy Corbyn, Mr. Bernie Grant, Mr. Ken Livingstone, Mr. Max Madden, Mrs. Alice Mahon, Ms. Dawn Primarolo and Mr. Dennis Skinner, presented a Bill to ensure that war cannot be declared on troops committed or kept abroad by Her Majesty's Government without the approval of the House of Commons: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 18 January and to be printed. [Bill 55.]

  Statutory Instruments, &c.
  Mr. Speaker: By leave of the House, I shall put together the Questions on the two motions relating to statutory instruments.
  Ordered,
  That the Value Added Tax (Construction of Dwellings and Land) Order 1990 (S.I., 1990, No. 2553) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.
  That the draft Road Traffic (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[ Mr. Wood.]
  Mr. Phillip Oppenheim: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Speaker: I shall take it after the ten-minute Bill.

Coal Mining Subsidence (Damage Arbitration, Prevention and Public Awareness)
3.32 pm
Mr. Alan Meale: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to establish the rights of owners of houses, land, buildings and other constructions which have suffered damage due to subsidence resulting from the working and getting of coal or of coal and other minerals worked therewith, to full repair or equitable compensation of their properties; to establish an independent arbitration procedure to resolve any disputes that may arise out of such damage or any matters relating thereto; to require any public body or organisation involved in the working or getting of coal and other minerals to take steps to prevent subsidence damage; and to promote public awareness of workings which might give rise to such damage.
I promise the House that I shall not take up its time unduly, as it is clear that there are other important matters in the minds of hon. Members today.
I am glad to use this opportunity to congratulate those people who have been involved in campaigning about coal mining subsidence damage. That campaign has had its effect and it has involved hon. Members on both sides of the House, members of local authorities and the COALS organisation of Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire. That organisation has been deeply involved in the campaign to try to get justice for people whose properties and homes have been damaged by coal mining subsidence. As a result of their efforts and the efforts of hon. Members, we are at last making some headway and there is a light on the horizon for people who have suffered grave injustice in their everyday lives.
I do not want to take up too much time, but I must repeat one fact. Although I am grateful to the Prime Minister for his promise today of a Bill to deal with this problem that will be introduced in this Session, no such Bill is as yet written and ready for hon. Members to read. The Bill that I am proposing today has been sanctioned and supported by all those who have sought to get justice for people who have suffered damage to their property. This year is the fourth occasion on which the Bill has been presented. For four consecutive years the Bill has been presented to the House; four times it has tried to achieve justice. I hope that by this time next year we shall have legislation which will ensure justice for home owners and property owners throughout Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire and all the coalfield areas.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Alan Meale, Mr. Dennis Skinner, Mr. Frank Haynes, Mr. Joseph Ashton, Mr. Jimmy Wray, Mr. Harry Barnes, Mr. Don Dixon, Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse, Mr. Eric Illsley, Mr. George J. Buckley, Mr. Martin Redmond and Mr. Jimmy Dunnachie.

Coal Mining Subsidence (Damage Arbitration, Prevention and Public Awareness)

  COAL MINING SUBSIDENCE (DAMAGE ARBITRATION, PREVENTION AND PUBLIC AWARENESS)
  Mr. Alan Meale accordingly presented a Bill to establish the rights of owners of houses, land, buildings and other constructions which have suffered damage due to subsidence resulting from the working and getting of coal or of coal and other minerals worked therewith, to full repair or equitable compensation of their properties; to establish an independent arbitration procedure to resolve

  733
  any disputes that may arise out of such damage or any matters relating thereto; to require any public body or organisation involved in the working or getting of coal and other minerals to take steps to prevent subsidence damage; and to promote public awareness of workings which might give rise to such damage: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 25 January and to be printed. [Bill 56.]
  Mr. Phillip Oppenheim: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask for your advice on whether it is in order for the hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. Meale) to introduce his Bill when the Government have already announced that they are to introduce a Bill to compensate victims of subsidence, something which the Labour Government signally failed to do?
  Mr. Speaker: I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman should raise that point. The hon. Member for Mansfield (Mr. Meale) was perfectly in order. If the House recollects, the announcement that the Government would introduce a Bill was made by the Prime Minister only a few moments ago.

The Gulf
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wood.]
Mr. Speaker: Before I call the Prime Minister, may I say that a very large number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to participate in this very important debate. I propose to put a limit of 10 minutes on speeches between 6 o'clock and 8 o'clock, but I ask those who are called before that, particularly if they are Privy Councillors, to bear that limit in mind.
Mr. Bob Cryer: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Since there have been two debates on the Gulf in the past few months, may I ask whether you will give preference to hon. Members who did not speak in those debates?
Mr. Speaker: I shall seek to balance opinion in the House.
3.37 pm
The Prime Minister (Mr. John Major): There is overwhelming concern in Parliament and in the country about the situation in the Gulf. That concern is shared by everyone, but must self evidently be most acutely felt by the families and friends of our troops at present in the Gulf.
The position has been brought about, first, by Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait and, secondly, by its continued and blatant refusal to implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and to withdraw wholly and unconditionally from the country which it invaded in early August. It is now five and a half months since the first of the resolutions and the deadline for Iraq to comply runs out today. Therefore, the Government thought it entirely right for the House to debate the situation.
Since we last discussed these matters on 11 December last year, there have been important diplomatic and military developments. In addition, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I have both visited the middle east to discuss the position with the rulers and with the Governments there. I have recently met President Bush, President Mitterrand, and Secretary Baker for the same purpose and my right hon. Friend has been in constant contact with his European Community colleagues and many others. Yesterday, upon his return from Baghdad, I also spoke at length to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I intend to cover those developments shortly, although I shall not on this occasion go into the detailed background to the present crisis, which was dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) with characteristic clarity last September. I shall, however, report on the various discussions that my right hon. Friend and I have had. I shall then explain why the Government regard full implementation of the United Nations resolutions as being so crucial. Finally, I shall set out to the House how we intend to act.
Before I do so, I should like to make one general point. I hope that this debate will not in any way be seen either here or, perhaps more appropriately, beyond here as a party-political or partisan occasion. With the clear danger of hostilities looming, through no wish of anyone in this country or the House, it seems to me acutely important that our forces in the Gulf should feel that they have the

735
united support of the vast majority of the House and of the country. It will be in that spirit in which the Government approach the debate.
Mr. Gavin Strang rose—
Mr. Dave Nellist rose—
The Prime Minister: I should like to make a little progress, if the hon. Gentlemen will forgive me.
Since the invasion on 2 August the international community has collectively and repeatedly called on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, 12 Security Council resolutions have been passed, either unanimously or with very substantial majorities, and dozens of visits to Baghdad and appeals to Saddam Hussein have been made by international statesmen from many countries. Most recently, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, has met Tariq Aziz in Geneva and the Secretary-General of the United Nations has met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.
Despite all this, Iraq is still in Kuwait and shows no imminent signs of leaving. I fear that the contrary is the case. In recent weeks Iraq has continued to increase the size of its forces in and around Kuwait. There are now nearly 600,000 troops, more than 4,000 tanks and more than 3,000 artillery pieces. Its defences are continually being strengthened. Chemical weapons, already used by Saddam Hussein against his own people, have been deployed. Contrary to international agreements, Iraq has produced and threatened to use both chemical and biological weapons, the use of which would be wholly contrary to international agreements. Iraq also continues to develop a nuclear weapon, although we do not believe thus far that she has succeeded in doing so.
Mr. Tam Dalyell rose—
The Prime Minister: If the hon. Gentleman will let me make a little progress, I shall give way to him later.
At the same time, Iraq has constantly and, in my view, cynically changed the pretexts given for its invasion of Kuwait. At various times we have been told that the invasion took place for different reasons: first, because Kuwait had artificially depressed the world price of oil; then because Kuwait had failed to pay compensation to Iraq for lost revenues; and then because it had occupied territory on Iraq's border. We were then told that there had been a coup d'etat in Kuwait and a new Government established that had appealed for Iraqi support. That absurd untruth soon disappeared without trace. Then we were informed that Kuwait had been wholly absorbed into Iraq, and the Iraqi information Minister told the world
"to forget that a place called Kuwait had ever existed."
It was even suggested that Kuwait had been attacked because it posed a threat to Iraq's security—a notion so absurd that the whole world dismissed it with contempt, and dismissed it immediately.
Finally, we were told, least credibly of all, that the purpose of the invasion had been to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question. In my discussions in the Gulf, I have found that non-Iraqi Arab leaders are particularly contemptuous of that excuse and have made that crystal clear to me and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. The real fact is that Iraq's action has made a settlement of that longstanding and very real
736
problem infinitely more difficult. Only when Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait shall we be able to resume efforts to find a solution with any hope of success—and that, of course, we shall seek to continue to do.
Rarely in history can there have been a more cynical catalogue of lies and deceits. The reality is clear for all to see: Iraq has used military force to wipe Kuwait off the face of the map and to plunder its resources. Nor is that all. Intimidation, torture and murder of the Kuwaiti people have continued without respite. The appalling details have been carefully and shockingly catalogued in the report by Amnesty International, which should be compulsory reading for everyone who expresses a view on this issue.
What the report reveals is truly shocking: people executed—in my view, murdered would be a better word —for failing to display a photograph of Saddam Hussein in their homes; teenage boys murdered in the sight of their mothers and sisters, their bodies then left on the street as garbage and their families forbidden to take their corpses home to give them a decent burial. This is literally horrifying, a tale of unbelievable and sickening cruelty since last August.
Those who caution delay because they hate war—hate the very thought of war, as all hon. Members must surely do—must ask themselves this question: how much longer should the world stand by and risk these atrocities continuing in Kuwait?
Mr. Cryer rose—
Mr. Strang rose—
Mr. Nellist rose—
The Prime Minister: We are talking not only of atrocities. Hundreds of thousands of Kuwaitis have been forced to leave their country as a part of a systematic effort to change populations, to expunge records and to erase national identity itself. At the start of August, there were 700,000 Kuwaitis in Kuwait; today there are 250,000, a fall of two thirds. Organised robbery has taken place on a gigantic scale, with everything from cars and buses to medical equipment—even incubators for use in hospitals —being taken away: stolen, ransacked and taken as spoils of war to Iraq.
What we are seeing is not just a simple dispute or everyday difference of opinion. What we are witnessing in Kuwait is an attempt to eliminate an entire state by a dictator who has shown himself to be a thorough force for evil in his actions over recent years.
Despite all this, neither we nor our international partners have given up our efforts to find a peaceful solution on the basis of full implementation of the United Nations resolutions. The United Nations, the European Community, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference have all separately tried to persuade Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions. Many individual countries and Governments have made their contribution. And yet, what happened last week when Secretary Baker met the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva to try yet again to bring about a peaceful solution? Tariq Aziz refused even to mention Kuwait or to discuss withdrawal. He showed no flexibility or, shockingly, any remorse for the crimes that have been committed in Kuwait since the beginning of August. And an invitation to Tariq Aziz to meet the European Community was brusquely and immediately rejected and ignored.

737
Subsequently, as the House knows, the United Nations Secretary-General travelled to Baghdad to offer his good offices. We welcomed that unreservedly. Even at that late stage we hoped that reason would prevail. Mr. Perez de Cuellar's mission had the full support of Britain, of the United States and of the European Community and, I believe, the full support of the whole world community which holds him in such continual respect. Yet his involvement demonstrated, perhaps more clearly than anything else could, that the confrontation is not just between the United States and Iraq or the west and Iraq, but between the United Nations and an aggressor that has overrun a neighbouring small and innocent country.
But I am sorry to report that the Secretary-General's efforts, too, were crudely and brutally brushed aside. When I spoke to him yesterday he told me, without any doubt or hesitation, that there was nothing favourable to report from his meeting with Saddam Hussein; not the slightest sign of willingness to comply with the Security Council resolution either now or in the future.
Mr. Alfred Morris: In the event of an unprovoked attack on Israel in the days ahead, what would be the British Government's response and what consultation has there been with other Governments about that possibility?
The Prime Minister: Of course that possibility is one which we have been considering, not least because Saddam Hussein has made it clear on a number of occasions that he may seek to involve a nation at present standing wholly adrift from this particular dispute in the way described. I hope very much that that will not happen and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not speculate on what would follow, but I feel sure that the international community, at present part of the allied force, would regard that as a wholly unacceptable way for Iraq to behave and would respond accordingly. I hope very much indeed that the restraint that has been shown by the state of Israel will continue in the weeks ahead. That restraint has been extremely helpful.
In the past 24 hours the House will have seen reports of a French initiative put forward just a few hours after the European Community Foreign Ministers had concluded that the conditions for an initiative no longer existed. It would be more accurate to say that what is involved is an appeal to Saddam Hussein to reconsider and to withdraw even at this late hour, and that is something which we all wish to see. But what I believe we cannot do is to water down the existing Security Council resolutions. We have supported those for a long time. They call for total and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. Nor can we be party to extending the United Nations deadline or in any way reward Iraq for its aggression.
Those are the criteria on which we would judge any proposal. Saddam Hussein must be given no false expectation that peace can be had without complete and full implementation of the Security Council resolutions.
Mr. Paddy Ashdown: I think that the whole House agrees with the Prime Minister that there can be no question of a watering down of existing United Nations resolutions, but, according to the report in The Independent today, the French initiative calls on the Security Council to ask Iraq
"to announce without further delay its"—
Iraq's—
738
"intention to pull out of Kuwait according to a set timetable and to begin now with a rapid and large-scale withdrawal."
Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why he regards that as being a watering down of the terms of the United Nations resolutions?
The Prime Minister: Let me reiterate the point in order to put it in its proper context. We fully subscribe to the idea of a last appeal to Saddam Hussein to obey the Security Council resolutions. We have no difficulty with that point. But we do have considerable difficulty with the French text. All along we have supported the Security Council resolutions and we must judge the French text by two criteria: whether it is wholly consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and whether it is likely to lead Iraq to comply with those resolutions or simply have the effect of taking the pressure off Iraq at this very late stage. In our judgment, it fails those tests and it is for that reason that, although we are content with the idea of a last appeal, we cannot accept and cannot support the particular proposition put forward by the French.
Mr. Tony Benn: It would appear that one of the major reasons why the Government reject the French initiative, which I certainly welcome, is the matter of linkage. But is the Prime Minister aware that when the war begins a linkage denied in the conference hall may be established on the battlefield within hours and if Israel is drawn into the conflict the two issues will come together? Is he also aware that, when the war is over, the proposal made by President Mitterrand will be the basis of the peace conference? Why cannot we have the peace proposal before the bloodshed instead of afterwards?
The Prime Minister: As I indicated to the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), I did not share the view put forward by the French that their proposal is wholly consistent with the United Nations resolutions as we have thus far known them. Perhaps I may elaborate on that point. The French text only calls on Iraq to announce its intention to withdraw according to a timetable. The Security Council has called for an immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal. There is a distinction. But equally relevant is the fact that I do not think that we would be wise to place much faith in an indication of Iraq's intentions against the background of the lies, deceit and treachery that we have seen in the last six months. There is no basis of trust and therefore we must rely on an appeal either from the Security Council or from the Secretary-General that is wholly and completely consistent with the resolutions that we have supported for so long.
If I add in reply to the right hon. Gentleman a word about my discussion with President Mitterrand, he may find it useful. My clear impression from my discussions with President Mitterrand yesterday is that, like all of us, he hopes and prays that hostilities can be avoided. But particularly in the wake of Iraq's totally negative response to the United Nations Secretary-General, President Mitterrand sees no realistic prospect that Iraq can now be persuaded to take the essential step of withdrawing from Kuwait.
No one, anywhere, can claim that the international community has not tried for peace. If it turns out that we shall have failed, we shall have failed only because Iraq has rejected every attempt to reach a diplomatic solution.
Mr. Dalyell: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
The Prime Minister: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will permit me to make a little more progress.
In parallel with those diplomatic efforts, the international community has, with very few execptions and contraventions, applied economic sanctions against Iraq. As the House knows, they are among the most sweeping sanctions ever agreed by the United Nations. They have interrupted 90 per cent. of Iraq's foreign trade and have caused widespread dislocation of its economy.
What is the real test of the sanctions? It is not just whether they cause economic misery in Iraq. The real test is whether they bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. So far, they have failed to achieve that. [HON. MEMBERS: "Give them time to work."] I will deal precisely with the points that Opposition Members want to raise, if they will give me a moment. It is clear that the sanctions will not succeed by the deadline set by the United Nations for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, or for a very long time after that.
There are those who argue—and I understand their concern—that we should give sanctions more time to work. But at what price should we give them more time to work? Allowing more time for sanctions to work has other implications.
Mr. Denis Healey: The Prime Minister has again referred to the tragic plight of the people of Kuwait, of whom perhaps 2,000 have already been killed since the beginning of August. What does the right hon. Gentleman think would be the effect on the people of Kuwait of a war to reconquer Kuwait? Has he read the report in today's Financial Times in which one of the leading members of the al-Sabah family, speaking from the comfort of his luxury hotel in Dhahran, hundreds of miles from the fighting line, said that he would be quite happy to see the "flattening" of Kuwait if it meant that he got back sovereignty of the territory? Does the Prime Minister really think that that sort of war will do anything to help the people of Kuwait?
The Prime Minister: The liberation of Kuwait is an important principle. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, other important principles are at stake in this dispute and in a few moments I will deal with them at some length. If the right hon. Gentleman will permit me, I shall return to the point about the time taken for sanctions to work. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I will return to the points raised earlier about sanctions, to which the House is entitled to a reply. The point that was concerning the House was whether we should give sanctions more time to work. I said that more time for sanctions has other implications. It also means more time for Iraq to continue to extinguish Kuwait. It means more time for Iraq to prepare its defences against allied troops and perhaps a greater subsequent cost in the lives of allied troops. It means more time during which Kuwaitis will be tortured or killed. Because sanctions are not having their intended effect, we would, in addition, in practice be extending the deadline for Iraq's withdrawal while relaxing pressure on Iraq to comply.
Mr. Strang rose—
The Prime Minister: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall continue.
To do so would destroy the credibility of the international community's response to Iraq's aggression
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and that is why I do not believe that we have the time, nor would we be wise, to let sanctions run a lengthier and fuller course. That is the situation we face.
Several Hon. Members rose—
The Prime Minister: If hon. Members will forgive me, I shall make a little more progress.
Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that every hon. Member who is rising to intervene is anxious to take part in the debate. They will not be able to do so if there are constant interruptions.
The Prime Minister: The situation that I have just outlined is the situation we must face. Throughout recent months the Government have taken great care to consult their allies, the United States, Europe and—perhaps most important of all in many ways—the Arab world. Last week I met the Emir of Kuwait, the King of Saudi Arabia, the Sultan of Oman and President Mubarak.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has just returned from visits to other Gulf states, as well as Jordan and Turkey, on which he will report in his winding-up speech. Earlier this week I spoke to Mr. Mulroney, Secretary Baker and President Mitterrand—
Mr. Dennis Skinner: Blood on their hands.
The Prime Minister: I wish that the hon. Gentleman would show as much concern for the blood in Kuwait City in the past few months.
Throughout my visits I found a rock-solid determination to make Saddam Hussein withdraw. Among our allies there was no talk of compromise, no talk of concessions, no suggestion that the United Nations' deadline should be extended and no inclination whatsoever to weaken or back down in the face of Iraq's intransigence. [Interruption.]
Mr. David Blunkett rose—
Mr. Speaker: Has the hon. Gentleman a point of order for me?
The Prime Minister: The resolve of our Arab allies to see the United Nations resolutions implemented remains unshaken and unshakeable—[Interruption]
Mr. Blunkett: Does the Prime Minister accept that many of us agree with what he has just said about the need to stand rock solid over the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, but we would be better able to assess for ourselves the effectiveness of sanctions if we had before us an assessment of how sanctions had worked, the loopholes that existed and what might be done to close them? Does he accept that people like myself, who are willing to agree that there should be greater caution today of all days, are also clear that, if professional troops have to be used to get Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, we would back it if we had the information that he has to enable us to make the judgment that he is making? Will he give the elected Parliament that information so that we can make that judgment for ourselves?
The Prime Minister: I have two points to make in reply to the hon. Gentleman's intervention. First, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will deal in his winding-up speech specifically with the details of the impact of sanctions. Secondly, the overall purpose of sanctions is to ensure that Iraq leaves Kuwait. So far they have failed in that respect and show no sign of imminent success.
Mr. Nellist: Will the Prime Minister give way?
The Prime Minister: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall make some progress.
It is to restore the independence of Kuwait, to defend Saudi Arabia and to back up these diplomatic efforts and the peaceful pressure of sanctions that more than 30 nations have contributed to the multinational effort in the Gulf. Over the past few weeks, the scale of those forces has grown steadily. They now contribute an awesome assembly of military power, on a scale not seen since the second world war.
Britain's contribution to that force numbers more than 35,000 service men and women. I was able to meet a number of them last week while I was in the Gulf. I can tell the House with no equivocation that their morale is high, their professionalism obvious and their confidence impressive. They have the equipment that they need and the determination that we would expect of them. They are working well with their American and other allies.
Mr. Dalyell: Will the Prime Minister give way?
The Prime Minister: No, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
I explained to those service men and women while I was there why we had to ask them to be there and what might lie ahead. I told them, too, of the great concern felt for them by everyone at home, as well as the tremendous pride here in their performance in the Gulf. I am in no doubt whatever that they understand the risks and the dangers, as professional service men. They know what they may be asked to do.
Mr. Skinner: You are not going to risk your life, are you?
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should not make accusations of that kind from a sedentary position. It does not add to a debate on such an important matter.
Mr. Skinner: Yesterday, my hon. Friends and I demanded a vote on whether we go to war—[interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must sit down.
The Prime Minister: Let me just say to the hon. Gentleman in all sincerity that, whatever he may think, I would have been proud to be there with those young men and women. As professional service men, they know what they may be asked to do. They left me in no doubt that they are both able and ready to do it.
Sir Eldon Griffiths: As one who has a son in the Gulf, may I ask my right hon. Friend to explain the exact chain of command from the President of the United States through General Schwarzkopf to the British commanders in the field? Is he satisfied that the British Government are able to make their contribution to that chain of command?
The Prime Minister: The troops in the Gulf are under British command and under American tactical control. The degree of liaison in the relationship between both commanders and men in the Gulf was—on the evidence of my own eyes—very high and very impressive. My hon. Friend would have been perfectly satisfied with it had he been there.
Mr. Nellist: Will the Prime Minister give way?
The Prime Minister: I think that the hon. Gentleman knows that I have given way a number of times. I am conscious that a large number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to express their own views, and I want to leave them some time in which to do so.
Peaceful means of persuading Iraq to withdraw—the diplomatic efforts, the sanctions and the allied military presence—have been tried for six months now, but without success. A line has to be drawn somewhere and it has been drawn—not hastily by us or by any one state, but deliberately and collectively by the United Nations Security Council with resolution 678.
From tomorrow the situation changes. We continue to hope and to look for a peaceful solution, but from tomorrow we shall also be justified in using all necessary means of bringing about Iraq's withdrawal; and that includes the use of force. That is not a pleasant prospect, but, as we face it, let us never forget that the decision to use force was first taken by Saddam Hussein entirely of his own choosing when he chose to invade Kuwait.
The principles at stake are crucial and we must uphold them. First—I hope that this is not too simplistic, but I feel it deeply—there is a clear dividing line between what is right and what is wrong and what Saddam Hussein has done in Kuwait is, in the simplest and clearest terms, just plain wrong and unforgivable.
Mr. Cryer rose—
The Prime Minister: I am surprised that the hon. Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer) has so little interest in the principles at stake in this matter that he is unwilling to listen to them.
Secondly—
Mr. Andrew Faulds rose—
The Prime Minister: Secondly—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) is seeking to take part in the debate. He will not be able to do so if Saddam Hussein behaves in that way.
The Prime Minister: Secondly, if Saddam Hussein were to get away with his aggression and gain from it, other small countries in the vicinity, and those elsewhere in the world with large and potentially aggressive neighbours, will all too likely face similar problems and similar dangers. That is the second reason why there can be no deals, no partial withdrawal and no artificial linkage to solutions of other problems—nothing but absolute commitment to implement the Security Council's resolutions in full and without delay.
Thirdly, the failure to secure Saddam Hussein's withdrawal would have grave implications for the balance of power throughout the middle east. It would mean putting off difficulties today at the expense of greater difficulties in the not-too-distant future—greater difficulties made more intransigent as Iraq acquires even more devastating and dangerous weapons and as its appetite for success and conquest grows.
But there is a fourth, overriding point. We have made progress, particularly over the past 12 months, towards establishing in many ways a more peaceful world in which there is greater respect for the United Nations and its resolutions. At last it has seemed that the United Nations

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might live up to the aspirations of its founders. All our hopes for that would fall away if we were to allow Saddam Hussein to get away with swallowing up Kuwait in the way that he proposes. It simply cannot, must not and will not be permitted. So, if we are to have that safe world, we must demonstrate conclusively that aggression cannot succeed. If we fail to do so, when nearly the whole world is united against Iraq, we will face a heavy penalty ourselves for any future aggression. Much of the responsibility would rest with us.
For all those reasons, we have all made it clear to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw. We have also made it clear that if he leaves Kuwait and returns within the borders of Iraq, force will not be used against him. Let me reiterate that point: if he voluntarily retreats and withdraws into Iraq, he will not be attacked there. But if he does not leave, force will be used and he will be expelled from Kuwait.
Mr. Dalyell rose—
The Prime Minister: Will the hon. Gentleman forgive me?
I hope that Saddam Hussein understands the sheer weight of the forces that are ranged against him and the scale of armour and equipment which the multinational alliance has at its disposal. If he realises that, he will also realise that he cannot win and that the only consequence of failing to withdraw is to bring about the destruction of his armed forces and great damage to his country.
We do not want a conflict. We are not thirsting for war, but if it comes I believe that it would be a just war. However great the costs of such a war might be, they would be less than those that we would face if we failed to stand up for the principle of what is right, and to stand up for it now. I believe that if Iraq does not withdraw, the time has come to make a stand.
But even now it is not too late for Saddam Hussein to relent and to pull out his forces. We have always seen the possibility that he will do that at the very last moment, but I must tell the House that we see no sign at present that that is likely. None the less, we must hope that he sees sense. We must hope that he does not force the allies to fight. But let him be under no misapprehension at all: if necessary, we will commit our forces to fight. From tomorrow, we are ready, with our allies, to do whatever is necessary to implement the resolutions of the United Nations in full to ensure that Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition, without delay and without reward.
Over the months, we have worked for peace and we have hoped for peace; but we are prepared for war, and the choice must be Saddam Hussein's.
4.16 pm
Mr. Neil Kinnock: From the outset of this crisis, caused by the aggresson of Iraq against Kuwait, it has been clear that, in the interests of the whole world community, the will of the United Nations must prevail and Iraq must quit Kuwait completely and unconditionally. It is also clear that great devastation would result from a war. It would therefore be best, if at all possible, for the purposes of the United Nations to be achieved without further use of force, with sanctions and the blockade being given the maximum time to have effect.
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It is plainly the case, too, that if it should become certain that the objectives of the United Nations can be achieved only by the use of armed force against Iraq, as authorised by Security Council resolution 678, such force would then have to be used.
As a result of United Nations decisions, the strictest economic sanctions in history and the most complete blockade ever have been enforced. Iraq can buy nothing; Iraq can sell nothing. The Iraqi economy is being severely impoverished, most of Iraqi industry is almost at a standstill and there are, according to the CIA, severe shortages of what it calls "critical commodities", particularly meat and other important foodstuffs. Faced by that and by the huge military forces deployed against him, Saddam Hussein cannot now fail to understand the seriousness of the world's intentions.
As his record shows, Saddam Hussein is, of course, not a man to be impressed or concerned about the scale of the suffering and the sacrifices endured by the Iraqi people. But he must be aware of the fact that, if he does not comply with the decisions of the United Nations, he risks the fate that he has so often inflicted on those whom he rules.
In the months since he invaded Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has offered excuses for his action and has put forward conditions for his withdrawal: none is valid. He has claimed that economic grievances were the cause of his aggression, but he must know now that they can be addressed only if he quits Kuwait. Even if there had been legitimacy in his assertions that Iraq had claims to Kuwait oil, that would not have justified invasion and it would most certainly not have excused the barbarism against innocent Kuwaitis and people of other countries in that land.
Saddam Hussein has claimed that if he completely withdrew he would still be attacked, but those claims have long been met with firm and solemn undertakings—the latest from the Prime Minister this afternoon—that such action will not be taken if he gets out of Kuwait.
Saddam has claimed that he wants to link withdrawal to the plight of the Palestinian people. That claim is, to say the least, cynical. His brutality against his own people, against the Kurdish people and, since 2 August, against the Kuwaiti people deny him any humanitarian credentials. The concern that he has professed for the Palestinians since August is rather too recent to be very convincing. Whatever his other illusions, he cannot believe that there is any realistic possibility of convening an international conference on the middle east and United Nations resolution 681 until the implementation of United Nations resolution 660.
Plainly, there can be no beginning for a conference while there is continuing occupation. Saddam Hussein's presence in Kuwait, far from being the means of propelling the international community into tackling Arab-Israeli conflict and the misery of the Palestinians, is preventing it. By maintaining his aggression, Saddam Hussein is not fostering international action for the Palestinians; he is blocking it.
In such circumstances, trading the immediate convening of a conference for a promise to consider withdrawal would not be the course to peace and stability; it would lead in the opposite direction. If that were to occur, Saddam Hussein would retain his current power in Iraq. He would keep intact his conventional, biological and chemical weapons. He would go on developing nuclear

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arms capacity. He would be a ready provider of arms to terrorists and oppressors anywhere in the world. He would have the status of a hero among parts of the population in the middle east and elsewhere. He would therefore pose a perpetual threat to the security of the region and, indeed, of the wider world.
To make concessions to Saddam Hussein before withdrawal would leave him with great strength. It would not mean war prevented; it would mean no more than war postponed, and postponed only to a time when the potential for mass destruction is even greater than it is now.
These factors mean that there continues to be no justification for conceding anything that would erode the basic United Nations requirements; nor is there any reason to relax the view, which I put on a previous occasion to the House, that even if ultimately Saddam Hussein retains his "position in his country", he
"cannot be allowed to retain his power to jeopardise the region."—[Official Report, 6 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 750.]
If Saddam Hussein were to accept that he should retain his power to jeopardise the region, it would light the fuse for God knows what in the future. That is what we must recognise. All of us in this place and throughout the world who seek peace and stability must recognise that basic point about the nature, regime, record and ambition of Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq. That much is very straightforward.
Tragically, Saddam Hussein is not the only dictator in the world or the only tyrant in the region—far from it. He is certainly a monster whom the countries now ranged against him have helped to grow. All of that is true. All of it is a bitter lesson for the future conduct of policy by democracies, but none of it changes the fact that it is his aggression, his present and potential power and his menace to the region that must now be reversed without reward. All of us could draw up a supportable, desirable agenda for addressing the atrocities committed by dictators all over this planet. But we know very well that what we have to do now is to address the one posing the most direct threat to the stability of a region and the peace of the world.
There can, of course, he a sequence of events that relates United Nations resolution 681 and the establishment of an international conference to resolution 660 and the withdrawal from Kuwait. But that sequence must begin with the unconditional ending of occupation as specifically required by the United Nations, supported by this country and, at its conference and at all other times, by the party that I lead. That is vital because of the critically important need to get Iraq out of Kuwait. But it is also vital because the authority of the United Nations to be the major instrument for international security in the future is now directly at stake. If, for any reason, the writ of the United Nations does not run in the Gull, the organisation will, at best, be condemned to return to the role to which it was confined by the rigidities of the years of the cold war. The United Nations will then never achieve its full purpose and full status as a means of arresting and deterring the violence that is the cause of so much of the world's misery and so much of the world's poverty.
Dr. Dafydd Elis Thomas: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that the argument for those of us who are opposed to the use of force is not
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whether the writ of the United Nations should run in the Gulf, but how it should run, and whether there is a way to implement international law and sanctions that will avoid a massive carnage at the end of the 20th century?
Mr. Kinnock: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I am making the case—and will develop it—for doing everything possible to secure the objectives of the United Nations without the use of force, if that is possible. However, I must say to the hon. Gentleman that if his view is that there are no circumstances—at any time or anywhere—in which force can be used, I should respect his views as those of a pacifist and I should fight to defend his right to hold that opinion. However, the fact remains that, as the instance of the crisis is the most ruthless aggression, as occupation is maintained by aggression, as a threat continues and as it could be forestalled only by the deployment of force, we are not warmongering when we say that the writ of the United Nations should run against Saddam Hussein and his aggression.
If the writ did not run, aggressors—large and small—would be able to act with even greater impunity. Our best chance in this generation for building global security would have been abandoned. If that were to be the outcome of the first post-cold war test of the United Nations, those here and elsewhere who, like the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Dr. Thomas)—who is entirely sincere and supportable in his view—desire peace in the Gulf and peace in the world would get less of it.
Mr. David Winnick: Does my right hon. Friend agree that this party at least has been wholly consistent in its support of the United Nations? We supported the United Nations in 1956 against aggression committed by a Tory Government. We are now supporting the United Nations and international law against a terrorist dictatorship which has committed blatant and criminal aggression in Kuwait.
Mr. Kinnock: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for pointing out the historic and current truth that our support for the United Nations has been consistent. It is a matter of some pride to me that, thanks to the efforts of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), commitment to the United Nations appears in the constitution of the party that I lead. I am glad of that. I also consider—[Interruption.] It was a notable contribution by my right hon. Friend, and people throughout the party recognise that.
There is now a great opportunity and I hope that everyone who has ever sought the asset of the United Nations to try to resolve the tensions and difficulties of the world will take note of it. It could be the case—and I place it no more highly than that—that if, especially by peaceful means, the United Nations can secure the objectives of its resolution 660 in the Gulf, we shall not have to preface our description of and concern about the woes of the world with the phrase, "If only the United Nations had some power". There is the possibility of at least the foundations —if not the full edifice—of power and authority for the United Nations being built now. In the Chamber today, and in the vote tonight, hon. Members should recognise that part of the reason for their vote must be the endorsement of the legitimacy of United Nations resolutions 660 to 678.
Mr. Harry Ewing: There is confusion about the decision to vote tonight. Technically, the House is debating a motion that the House should adjourn. To make matters clear to those inside and outside the House who are watching and listening to this debate, this whole issue—the most important that the House has debated since 1939—should have been debated on a substantive motion. There is no point in my right hon. Friend lecturing us on how we should vote or what the effect of our vote will be if those on the Front Benches have connived in the adoption of the present procedural position.
Mr. Kinnock: I would not dream of lecturing my hon. Friend, who is a dear friend, but I can offer him some friendly instruction. There was no question of connivance or contrivance of any description whatever between those on the Front Benches on the motion. Moreover, although it would be desirable, helpful and useful to have a substantive motion to discuss, I do not think that there is any conscious citizen in the United Kingdom, watching our proceedings and concerned about the prospects in the Gulf, who does not understand what the issues at stake really are and how hon. Members will act in the debate and vote. To think otherwise would be to misunderstand the level of comprehension of the people of our country.
A subject that exercises many hon. Members' minds is the prolonged agonised condition of the middle east. There is a great need to control and remove weapons of mass destruction throughout the middle east—in every country. There is a great need to end the misery of the Palestinians —the injustice that they suffer—and the insecurity of the Israelis. There is a great need to promote economic development and uproot the poverty that fosters extremism and fundamentalism. There is a great need, in short, for a middle east security strategy to address all these issues. But without a United Nations which has the necessary influence and power, such an enterprise—which I know is sought by the Foreign Secretary and many others, right across the Labour party and elsewhere—will never be undertaken, let alone achieved. That is why the full authority of the United Nations must now be upheld and that must be done by supporting the resolutions on the Gulf crisis—from 660 through to 678.
Mr. Ron Brown: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Kinnock: I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me, but I have already given way and I am conscious of the time.
There is no serious person who would not greatly prefer the objectives of the United Nations, set out in resolution 660 and restated in subsequent resolutions, to be attained by sanctions rather than by armed conflict. That is plain common sense, especially when the costs of warfare are so huge. There can be no one who does not realise that war would be massively destructive in the region and that unknown numbers of innocents and combatants would be killed and terribly injured. There can be no one who does not recognise that the consequences of the impact of a Gulf war on the world economy may be severe for many countries and ruinous for many of the poorest.
Those are not the only potential costs of warfare. In our debate on 6 September 1990, several right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House raised important political questions relating to the reaction which could come from many Arab people, depending on the way in
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which we deal with the crisis. Those considerations still stand. Indeed, they have been sharpened by subsequent events. We have the grim assessment of the former ambassador to Iraq, Sir John Moberley, speaking in the BBC "On the Record" programme on Sunday. He said that war in the Gulf
"is unlikely to have a clear-cut ending. It will leave a messy and unpredictable political situation.
Secondly, there will be an increase in extremism and terrorism in the area, arising from resentment, particularly if there's no progress on Palestine.
Thirdly, the long-term security arrangements in the region may cause problems, particularly if the United States is seen to be taking the lead. It would be much better to come under the auspices of the Security Council.
And, finally, there's a problem if Iraq begins to disintegrate with the possibility of the Iranians wanting to establish a Shi'ite regime in the south."
That is a bleak analysis, made all the more sombre by its realism. It is a considerable argument for using the cumulative pressures of sanctions and the blockade until it can be shown that those pressures cannot and will not secure the objective of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
A war in the Gulf may ultimately have to be fought. In that case, military victory will be won by the forces against Iraq. But here and now we must consider in this House not just what happens in the approach to war but what happens after such a war. What Sir John Moberley called the
"messy and unpredictable political situation"
that will result from the crisis must, together with the potential scale of destruction and probable economic turmoil, be taken into full account. They are essential elements in reaching a judgment about ending reliance on blockade and sanctions and the timing and use of force. No one in the House should neglect those considerations.
Giving proper attention to those factors does not mean that we can or should be diverted from the purpose of achieving the objectives of the United Nations and securing the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. It means that, in the course of pursuing such a purpose, we must address the inseparable need to achieve durable peace and order in the region. In doing that, I do not argue for relying on sanctions alone or for relying on sanctions indefinitely. I have never done that. From the outset of the crisis, it has been obvious that, in the nature of Saddam Hussein's record, regime and actions, sanctions alone could never be enough to prevent his further aggression, either in August or at some subsequent time. Neither would they be enough by themselves to show that the world would settle for nothing less than his departure from Kuwait. That is why it was right for the substantial multinational force speedily to be deployed in the Gulf region. It was right for the United Nations to give navies —as my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) continually sought—the power to maintain the blockade with force if necessary. It was right for the United Nations in resolution 678 to authorise the use of "all necessary means" to uphold and implement the decisions of the Security Council.
As the military commitment patently has to be made, no one in the United Nations and no one who supports the United Nations could at any point justifiably say to Saddam Hussein or imply to him, "We shall go this far but never, in any circumstances, go any further." If that was ever done, it would completely contradict the very effect which the combined weight of sanctions, isolation and

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military readiness is intended to produce. We continue to urge the use of that combination. We do so in the hope that it can still achieve compliance with the United Nations resolutions and in the belief that the purposes of longer-term peace and stability in the region could best be served in that way.
Mr. John Bowis: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House and the nation how long he would wait and how many Kuwaitis would have to suffer and die before he would act?
Mr. Kinnock: I shall come to that specific point shortly, but in the meantime I will say this. The argument of concern and support for the Kuwaiti people is a good argument. However, it has to be said that when faced with the alternatives of non-violent means or war to secure the clearance of Kuwait by Iraq, the balance must come down in favour of avoiding war if possible and against concern for the Kuwaiti people. The reason for that is straightforward. I know that the hon. Gentleman speaks with sincere concern and he will be aware that, given the size of the settled areas and of Kuwait City, in any conflict the nature of the bombardment that will take place aerially and from elsewhere means that those areas will be utterly devastated with incalculable casualties.
Part of the reason for making the argument for the longest possible use of sanctions in no sense represents a concession to Saddam, acquiesence or appeasement; it is to do with trying to ensure that the kill rate is as low as possible and kept as low as possible. God forbid that any one extra person should be lost if it is at all possible to prevent that.
The force of the combined pressure should be continually deployed, but we must recognise the reality, which I am sure hon. Members on both sides do readily. There is no doubt that there are substantial stresses and problems in maintaining the current scale of allied forces at high readiness over a long period in an extremely difficult climate in the desert. However, it is clear that, if there is any possibility of achieving Iraqi withdrawal without war, such problems will be of a different order from those arising from the results of war. That is true not only in terms of human sacrifice and suffering, but in terms of harm to the world economy and the consequential political instability. That is why 15 January should not be regarded as the date of ultimatum. It is the reason why the climate in the Arabian desert and the proximity of Ramadan, although very important, should not be allowed to be the sole factors determining the course of events. It is the reason why all efforts short of war should be exploited for as long as possible before force is used. [HON. MEMBERS: "How long?"] As I said earlier, until it can be shown beyond doubt that the only means of securing the objectives of the United Nations is by resort to force.
The information required to make that judgment is by definition denied generally, but what we have known from the outset is that the original prognostications about the effects of sanctions and much subsequent evidence prove that there is a tight noose around the neck of Saddam Hussein. For every possible reason—economic, social, humane and military—there must be a substantial argument, especially when the conditions after war are taken into account, for trying to maintain our position for as long as possible without resorting to force. That is the
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case I am making. I am not saying that force should be prohibited or the case for it dismissed; it should be the last resort and not the eager resort sought by some Conservative Members, although not by the Prime Minister.
Mr. James Arbuthnot: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Kinnock: I shall not give way, as I have already done so several times and I do not want to stretch the patience of the House.
There is speculation that the continuation of reliance on sanctions would, in the near future, produce some weakening of international support for action against Saddam Hussein. In reality, however, there is no available evidence to sustain that view. On the contrary, among those nations that have committed forces, what we might call the western countries have every reason to sustain their stance. The Arab countries have every possible interest in pursuing to success the strategy of getting Saddam out of Kuwait since they are most directly subject to the menace posed by his regime with its present conquest and regional power. In the wider world community, nations large and small need the United Nations to prevail. All have cause to ensure that Iraq does not control a substantial share of world oil reserves in that country and in Kuwait. Those factors support the case for further intense pressures to be exerted for as long as possible.
If, in the wake of the weary and fruitless mission of Perez de Cuellar—I join the Prime Minister in regretting the fact that his mission was not more productive—there is still some surviving chance that the aggression of Saddam Hussein can be reversed without reward and without war, that chance must be pursued to its fullest possibility. That is why it is right for the French and other Governments to continue diplomatic efforts even if the deadline is passed. Certainly they should not be inhibited even as we examine the details of what is proposed.
So much is at risk in war, most of all, as you know very well yourself, Mr. Speaker, for those who fight in that war. Therefore, those who make the commitment to warfare need to be sure that there is no other possible way. They must be sure beyond doubt that war in the immediate future is the only way in which to achieve Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and sure that it is the essential way in which to maintain the alliance. Above all, they must be sure that that is the best way in which to ensure future stability in the region.
The United Nations has decided that Saddam Hussein's aggression must end in complete, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
Mr. Ron Brown: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Kinnock: No. I have already made that plain.
The United Nations has decided that Saddam Hussein's aggression must end in the restoration of international peace and security in the area. I and, as a matter of policy, my party support the decision of the United Nations. Although we and the Government may differ about the best means to implement those decisions, the support of the Labour party for our forces, if they are engaged, is natural, clear and total.
In the variety of discussions that have taken place some say that I should, as they put it, "distance" myself from the

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Government. I will not distance myself from our basic and complete commitment to fulfilling resolution 660. I will not distance myself from the United Nations and from our forces when they face danger. I will not distance myself from the reality. In government we would simply not have the privilege of dropping a note to all world dictators to say, "Would you please be good enough to act like civilised human beings for the duration of a Labour Government and not invade anybody?" That is reality, a reality which all of us who seek to govern this country in justice must and do recognise.
When I vote tonight I shall vote in the same way and for the same reasons as I have done since our first debate on 7 September. I shall continue to be consistent with the objectives that I set out then and with the adopted policy of the Labour party at its conference. I shall act to ensure that neither Saddam Hussein nor anyone else can represent the subtleties of voting in this House of Commons in this democracy as being in any way a concession to his aggression. I shall vote in support of the United Nations because, for all our sakes, the purposes and authority of the United Nations must prevail.
4.48 pm
Mr. Edward Heath: As I have been privileged to take part in the two earlier debates in the House, I shall do my utmost to obey your instruction to be brief, Mr. Speaker, so that the large number of hon. Members who have not yet taken part may have an opportunity to do so.
First, I should remind the House of the statement of the Secretary of State for Defence in our debate on 7 September, when he said:
"We are not there to attack Kuwait or Iraq. We are there to defend Saudi Arabia ‖ That is the present position, and it is absolutely clear."—[Official Report, 7 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 842.]
We are now in an entirely different position. There comes a time when Governments and Members of the House should step back a few paces and ask how have we got here, what has led us to this, and what we should do next. The decisions that the Government may have to make in a comparatively short time are some of the most crucial since September 1939.
The second point of which I wish to remind the House is the wording of resolution 660, to which both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have rightly referred. Paragraph 1 condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On that there is no disagreement. The Leader of the Opposition made an eloquent denunciation of President Saddam Hussein, but all these things were known throughout the eight years in which he was attacking Iran and he was then built up by the United States and by the Soviet Union, and after 1964–65, in a non-armament way, by the British themselves. There is nothing new about this. Therefore, what sometimes makes the rest of the world a little suspicious of such eloquence is the fact that we now have rediscovered the United Nations and apparently have discovered these attitudes and aspects of President Saddam.
The second paragraph of the United Nations resolution
"demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990".
That is constantly said to be United Nations policy.
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The third paragraph
"calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences".
It does not say that Iraq must first withdraw from Kuwait and then discussions follow; the two are simultaneous. Obviously he cannot withdraw overnight. There has to be an arrangement, preferably supervised by the United Nations, for his withdrawal from Iraq. The third paragraph continues:
"and supports all efforts in this regard"—
therefore, President Mitterrand can be wholeheartedly supported under the United Nations resolution—
"and especially those of the League of Arab States".
Therefore, everything that is done by the Arab countries to achieve a peaceful solution can be supported.
If the differences which exist, and are well known, between Kuwait and Iraq are to be resolved, the argument that in no circumstances must anything be done which could be pointed to by President Bush or anybody else as being at least face saving or a gain for President Saddam does not enter into it, because United Nations policy is that at the same time the differences between Kuwait and Iraq should be negotiated. That is the point which has been overlooked consistently, or ignored deliberately, by the President of the United States and, I regret to say, by our own Government. It was not mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this afternoon. It is of equal importance, and it is to come about at the same time.
The issue at stake is what could become a major war. We have heard some of the appalling consequences from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and from the Leader of the Opposition. The consequences are appalling not only for Kuwait and for Iraq but for the whole of the middle east. The effect on the oil wells could be immensely damaging to large areas around them; the use of chemical and biological weapons could cause immense harm to other parts of the world and could result in complete chaos in the middle east. Because of all this, the United Nations was absolutely right to concentrate on resolving the differences between the two countries as much as on Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait itself.
The last resolution of the United Nations is not mandatory but permissive. The date of 15 January was fixed—I understand, very largely at the inducement of the Soviet Union—in order to prevent the United States from making an earlier attack upon Iraq. On the point made by the Leader of the Opposition about the character of President Saddam Hussein and the possibilities after the affair is settled one way or the other, one can only deal with the President himself if one invades and captures Iraq, and one can only deal with the weapons which he possesses, or any developments towards atomic weapons, if one invades and takes over Iraq—[HON. MEMBERS: "No." ]—unless there is a means of getting a complete security operation instituted in the middle east as a whole. That means that Israel has to be included in the operation and that the lands taken over by Israel must be surrendered in the same way as Kuwait has to be surrendered. That is governed by resolution 242, which has been on record for 23 years, and nothing has happened about it.
Mr. Strang: The whole House respects the way in which the right hon. Gentleman has applied himself to the issue. Earlier he said, rightly, that the so-called phased withdrawal in the French initiative was consistent with the United Nations resolution. Since the Prime Minister

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sought to argue in his speech that the Mitterrand initiative is inconsistent with the United Nations resolution, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman where the inconsistency is? The Prime Minister did not tell us. Some of us are inclined to the view that the French initiative may be wholly in line with the United Nations resolution.
Mr. Heath: I should like to see on paper exactly what President Mitterrand is suggesting. If he is suggesting that there should be a middle east conference to deal with these problems, I believe that he is entirely within the context of the resolution. President Bush has recently emphasised that he has constantly called for a middle east conference; therefore, I do not understand why he cannot say now that there will be a conference. For those who are always shouting for dates, he could give a date for it, provided the rest of the resolution was carried out.
On the question of dates, I would have been entirely against fixing 15 January as a withdrawal date because of what will happen. War will not be started by the end of 15 January.
Mr. Anthony Beaumont-Dark: Why not?
Mr. Heath: My hon. Friend can ask the Government; certainly it will not be started. President Saddam Hussein can then say, "Look, they said that 15 January was a deadline—and what has happened? Nothing." It gives him that point to argue. Similarly, if a date is fixed for the end of sanctions, that will give him another opportunity later to argue, "As sanctions have not brought me down, it shows that I am winning." That is what we must avoid in international affairs in dealing with such a situation and with someone like President Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Anthony Nelson: May I put to my right hon. Friend with all respect a possible fallacy in one of the arguments which he has just put to the House, namely, the case for naming a date now for a conference on the middle east after any war? Surely the resolution of such a conference would require the agreement of the state of Israel, and the state of Israel is hardly likely to be conducive to making concessions at any such conference if it is clear that the conference has been called over the duress of trying to prevent a war. Even those who would like to see a conference and a resolution of the middle east problems should pin no faith or hope on calling for a date for such a conference now. For that reason, there can be and must be no linkage.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Heath: Perhaps I can help my hon. Friend and those behind me who are cheering. I am not demanding a date. I said what I did in order to help those who were shouting just now for a date for the end of sanctions. If they want dates for that, they should have dates for other things. I am not asking for a date for the conference on the middle east. If President Mitterrand is going to arrange it, I want to agree that there should be such a conference. As has been said so often in the past, I see no reason why we should say we cannot have it now because it would allow President Saddam Hussein to save face. With President Kennedy's solution to the Cuban missile crisis, as on all such great occasions in history, the objective was to allow President Khrushchev to save face. President Kennedy did that and so avoided a third world war, which was right.
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Everybody knew at the time that sanctions could not possibly be effective in four to five months. But all the signs are that they are bound to be effective—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]—because it is the one case in the modern world in which a country is cut off. It is cut off from revenue and supplies. Those who say that sanctions took 15 years to work with Rhodesia should remember that we knew all the time that South Africa was not going to comply.
Mr. Beaumont-Dark: It will take 15 years with Iraq.
Mr. Heath: I shall give my hon. Friend a little map. Iraq is quite differently placed as a country. Unless we put a naval blockade on South Africa, which was impractical for us, we knew that South Africa would go on supplying Rhodesia. What is more, we were constantly under pressure from President Kaunda and those north of Rhodesia to keep open the lines from South Africa through Rhodesia in order to keep those countries going. That was why it took 15 years. The case of Iraq is quite different. All its petrol sales have been cut off. The only case that I have so far seen drawn to public attention—
Ms. Mildred Gordon rose—
Mr. Heath: I shall give way in a moment.
The only attempt so far to break sanctions was made by a Russian ship that was apparently keeping President Hussein supplied with Soviet weapons. That in itself points to a danger—a great danger bearing in mind the events in the Baltic states and all the questions opened up about President Gorbachev's future and whether we are now returning to a regime that is much more like the cold war. Where are all our forces and what will Europe do in the event of the re-establishment of the Soviet military? What about the position of Russia with regard to the United States and the rest of Europe? Those issues must also be taken into account because they are desperately serious.
We should continue with sanctions and do all that we can to ensure that they are successful in obtaining the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Ultimately, the world may come to believe that force is necessary. We must then be fully aware of all the consequences of using force. But until then—[Interruption.] There is no point in asking, when is that exactly?
Mrs. Maureen Hicks: One problem is that, while we prevaricate and wait for sanctions to work, Saddam Hussein may develop a nuclear capability. What will happen to our troops sitting out there on our behalf waiting for sanctions to work?
Mr. Heath: On the first question, it is most unlikely that Saddam Hussein will be able to make any progress on the development of nuclear weapons while the blockade continues.
Mr. Roger King: Not wholly unlikely.
Mr. Heath: Yes, I accept that it is wholly unlikely that Saddam Hussein can possibly develop his nuclear weapons.
What about our forces in the Gulf? In the words of the American commander, "If it is a question of death or sunbathing in the sun, I would rather go sunbathing in the sun." Our forces are quite capable of coping. What is unforgivable is to say that we must go to war because we

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are impatient. If we as a country did that—[Interruption.] We did not go to war with Hitler because we were impatient.
Mr. Cecil Franks: The same argument was used on 3 September by people in the House.
Mr. Heath: If we were to go to war because we were impatient, our forces could say, "We are being sacrificed because you are too impatient to pursue the alternative course." That is the real challenge facing us. For this period, we should use all our skill to continue to carry out sanctions in an endeavour to bring about a change in President Saddam Hussein's attitude. That is not impossible. He once made a most dramatic change that nobody expected; he welcomed Iran back, gave its people everything they had lost, and was friends with them.
Mr. Stuart Bell: The right hon. Gentleman has met Saddam Hussein. When he did so, did he ask him to withdraw from Kuwait? If so, what response did he get?
Mr. Heath: This answer should command a large fee. Briefly, I said to him, "The United Nations' resolution states that you must withdraw from Kuwait, and you must do so. If you withdraw from Kuwait, there is nothing left for the British and Americans to do but to go home." [HON. MEMBERS: "What did he say?"] He said, "If I withdraw from Kuwait, what assurance will you give me that, instead of going home, the British and Americans will not go into Kuwait and attack me from there?" Since my visit, the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and President Bush have given an undertaking that that will not happen, but I believe that more is necessary. I believe that the Arab League must put a buffer round to separate Kuwait from the other countries and Iraq. That will be the Arab League's duty.
President Hussein said to me, "You are putting forward hypothetical situations." I said, "Yes, because I want to find out your response to each hypothetical situation." I suggested a number of other such situations to him, emphasising all the time that the United Nations' resolution meant that he should withdraw. Of course, we all know that problems exist between the two countries and have done for a long time. The resolution states that they should be resolved. A peacekeeping force could then be sent in to ensure that the peace remained.
I believe that our duty at present is to persist with sanctions and to do the utmost possible to ensure that they are kept by everyone involved and to see whether there is a sudden change in President Saddam's attitude.
Alternatively, President Saddam may find himself gradually brought to a position where he has no alternative but to withdraw from Kuwait.
5.8 pm
Mr. Paddy Ashdown: When I rose to speak on 6 September following the speech of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath)—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. Will hon. Members please leave quietly?
Mr. Ashdown: I recall that I bemoaned my fate of always following the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup. On that occasion I found myself agreeing with a large proportion of what he said. Today I fear that for reasons which I shall explain I shall have to part company with him on major portions of his speech.
We are dealing with a literally terrifying issue. Democracies go through agony when considering whether or not to embark on war and use force, and it is right and proper that they should go through that agony. Decent people throughout Britain will have come to conclusions different from mine and those of other hon. Members for perfectly proper, right and sincere reasons. Therefore, I echo the Prime Minister's comments at the start of his speech when he said that he hoped that the debate would not be conducted in a partisan spirit, but would address a terrifying, moral and practical problem in a rational manner, understanding the views of different people who had reached different conclusions.
All the conclusions that each of us in our separate ways will have reached will be based on judgments, not truths. It is at the very heart of the democratic process that those judgments should be out in the open and open to question. I should like to explain my position and that of my party and how we rationally approach the answers to four questions.
First, is it possible at this midnight hour to reach peace?
Mr. Ron Brown: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Ashdown: The hon. Gentleman must forgive me. I intend to make progress and I shall not give way at this point.
Secondly, if we fail to find peace, will it be necessary to use force? Thirdly, if we use force, can we, as the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup suggested, wait a little longer to ensure that sanctions are tested through? Lastly, if we have to use force, what should be the aims of the war in which we would then be involved, what should be the limitations on it and what should we hope that its outcome will be?
Can we, as we teeter on the last millimetres at the edge of this terrible decision, still reach peace? All hon. Members, whatever their hopes, judgments or wishes, and whatever line they want to pursue—
Mr. Ron Brown: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Ashdown: The hon. Gentleman must recognise that I am not his right hon. Friend and that I have not the slightest intention of giving way.
We must all recognise that we must be deeply pessimistic about the possibility of achieving peace at this last moment. I know that the Prime Minister agrees that it must be our aim, consistent with the terms of the UN resolution, to search for and to explore any last realistic, constructive approach to peace that remains open to us. That is what I have said that the Prime Minister must do. I think that he has underestimated the French initiative. I agree with the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup that that initiative does not dilute or undermine the terms of the UN resolution. I believe that it is on all fours with the resolution. However, I welcome the Prime Minister's statement that there will be at least one final appeal from the Security Council.

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I hope that the Prime Minister agrees that if today is not a deadline for the start of war, by that definition it also cannot be a deadline for stopping talks. If there are further lines to pursue, they should be pursued, although not as delaying tactics. Only constructive lines must be pursued. In these difficult times we shall of course support our troops on the field if the terrible decision has to be taken, but I must point out that the French initiative requires a timetable for withdrawal, the immediate withdrawal of large numbers of troops and a UN peacekeeping force to monitor and oversee that withdrawal.
There is also the nasty issue of linkage, and I share the Prime Minister's determination that we should not put ourselves in the position in which we reward Saddam Hussein. The French resolution stipulates the calling of a peace conference at an appropriate time, which is already the policy of the United Kingdom Government. It is the declared policy of our Government, and we support it, that there should be a middle east conference to deal with these matters. I must caution the Prime Minister in the gentlest possible terms not to get caught by the following perverse paradox: the moment the first shot is fired or the first bomb is dropped in a war, a middle east peace conference becomes inevitable. Would it not be illogical to go to war on an issue that becomes inevitable the moment we do so? There must be questions about linkage, but we can surely find the wit and the way to portray a conference not as a concession to Saddam Hussein but as a means of resolving the problem of the Palestinians which Hussein's occupation of Kuwait is preventing from happening. In that way Hussein becomes the bulwark to the resolution of the Palestinian problem, not the instrument to which the benighted Palestinians look for a resolution to their problem.
I anticipate that if the French initiative were put to Iraq it would be rejected by Iraq, but if the Prime Minister were seen to be pursuing last steps towards peace without diluting the United Nations resolutions he would take away Saddam Hussein's capacity to play the Palestinian card. I can see no disadvantage in that course of action.
Every right hon. and hon. Member except for a few Labour Members can see clearly that there can be no dilution of the terms of the United Nations resolutions without affecting the authority of the United Nations and undermining the primacy of international law. If, therefore, every last desperate effort at peace having failed, we have to use force, then we must be prepared to use it. It would be a good enough reason to use force to free Kuwait from the misery, oppressions, terror and torture that the Prime Minister described. It might be a good enough reason to consider the use of force to stop the further aggrandisement of Saddam Hussein. Iraq will be armed in two years' time with nuclear weapons which we have no doubt that Saddam Hussein will use once he has them. The use of force for that reason might, therefore, prevent greater conflagrations in future. But these are not the primary reasons for being prepared to use force now. The prime reason was exactly as the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition expressed it: if we do not now back international law and take every action necessary to uphold the authority of the United Nations, we shall have a broken-backed United Nations—
Mr. Skinner: Its authority must be upheld everywhere.
Mr. Ashdown: That is true. I have sometimes attempted to ask the hon. Gentleman how he will be able to complain about a Panama or a Grenada in future if on this occasion we do not stand up for Kuwait—
Mr. Cryer: The United Nations resolutions on such countries have not always been complied with in the past.
Mr. Ashdown: That is a departure that we can now make—but only if we back the United Nations on this occasion. I warn hon. Members who oppose my view to beware. If we do not now back the United Nations and international law, we shall have a broken-backed United Nations at the very moment when the world needs a strong one and when we shall have to face—
Mr. Tony Banks rose—
Mr. Bernie Grant rose—
Mr. Cryer rose—
Mr. Ashdown: We shall have a broken-backed United Nations at the very moment when international gangsters armed with nuclear weapons confront the world—because we failed to control the proliferation of those weapons. That is the moment when we shall need a counterbalance to a world in which there will be only one super-power—
Mr. Skinner: Why does not the leader of the Liberal party tell the whole story about the United Nations, and about how, when the United States proposed a vote on a resolution to set the date of 15 January, America was so far behind with its subscriptions that it crawled in to pay them before the vote was held—and told Egypt that the United States would bail it out with $3·5 billion?
Mr. Ashdown: Sometimes I despair. Why do the hon. Gentleman and others who take a similar line always seek explanations in the past instead of facing up to the problems that confront us now? However we arrived at this situation, and whatever the ingredients that went into it, the authority of the United Nations is at stake and we must back that authority and support the rule of international law.
Mr. Ron Brown rose—
Mr. Ashdown: I am keen to allow other hon. Members to speak —
Mr. Brown rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Miss Betty Boothroyd): Order. Will the hon. Gentleman resume his seat?
Mr.Brown rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must resume his seat. Mr. Ashdown has the floor.
Mr. Ashdown: The upshot is that our troops are not in the Gulf to uphold British or western influence. We could be said to have created the monster that is Saddam Hussein, with whom we are now trying to cope, but that does not lead me to the conclusion that the world should pay the price of war because of our past follies in the middle east. Nor are British troops in the field in the middle east to assure our oil supply. Our gluttonous dependence on oil and our failure to learn the lessons of the 1970s does not lead me to believe that we should risk a war on that basis alone. Our troops are there as the

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instruments of international will, the upholders of international law and the preservers of the authority of the United Nations.
Mr. Franks: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Ashdown: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, several hon. Members have sought to intervene and I should like to make some progress.
I therefore come to whether, if we have to contemplate the use of force, we can give sanctions more time. I wish that I could tell the House that the answer to that question in my view is yes. When I spoke on 6 September I said that I hoped that sanctions would be given sufficient time. I said that they needed sufficient time to be judged, but we must judge the present situation according to what is happening, not what our hopes were.
The question is best answered by seeking to obtain answers to two questions. First, would the prolongation of sanctions have an effect on the Iraqi people? The answer would no doubt be that in due course it might. It probably would, but that is not the key question. The question to be answered is not whether it would have an effect on the Iraqi people but whether it would have any effect on the will of Saddam Hussein. Although I wish that sanctions had worked, and I longed for them to work, I do not believe that one can make a judgment which leads one to answer yes to that question without suspending rational judgment in favour of pious hope, and I do not believe that we should be considering this matter on the basis of pious hopes.
What would happen if we were to prolong sanctions, having exhausted every last avenue for peace? In the meantime, Saddam Hussein would strengthen immensely his defences in Kuwait. There are those who argue that his military capacity would be diminished, but that is counterbalanced by far by the preparations that he would be able to make to resist any retaking of Kuwait in the name of the United Nations—by far. In so doing we would raise the cost that has to be paid in the lives of our troops in achieving success.
In the intervening months, Saddam Hussein would be able massively to increase—quantitatively and perhaps also qualitatively—his access to and capacity for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Again, the price that we would have to pay for success if we wanted to use force then would be higher in the lives of our troops.
In the intervening time, although the Leader of the Opposition seems to wish to ignore it, there would be some risk to the cohesion of the international coalition. It may well be that if we waited until September—incidentally, that worry comes not from the western powers but from the Arab powers who have serious problems with the maintenance of the stand of the international coalition —or October or November, the option of force would not be open to us.
The hard and difficult judgment that we must now make is this. A prolongation of sanctions is unlikely to be successful in changing the will of Saddam Hussein. If it were to happen, however, it would be almost certain to raise the cost that must be paid for success in terms of the lives of our troops and may even increase the chances of failure and, with that, the failure of the authority of the United Nations.
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Gloomily, I have to reach this conclusion. If at the end of the day, all avenues to peace having been exhausted, we have to grasp this terrible nettle, it would be better that we grasped it when we had to rather than to delay and pay a higher price later.
I now address my remarks briefly to the question of aims, constraints and objectives. I hope that the Government will, in clearer terms than I have heard so far from the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence or the Foreign Secretary, announce what the aims of any action would be. It is important that if we go into this terrible action we do so clear about our objectives. It would be a catastrophe to allow a war which invented its own aims as it rolled along. We must now state what our aims will be. That means that the Prime Minister should confirm—perhaps the Foreign Secretary will do so when he replies—that the aims of our operation as an instrument of the will of international law do not extend further than the terms of the UN resolutions, that they are consistent with those and do not go further.
Secondly, I greatly welcome the Prime Minister's statement on the use of nuclear and chemical weapons in response. We do not need to use them. We have sufficient conventional forces to deter effectively or to respond effectively without their use. But the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary must realise that the Liberal Democratic party could not countenance and would not support the use of nuclear or chemical weapons.
Mr. Cryer: Nor does the United Nations.
Mr. Ashdown: Nor, indeed, as the hon. Gentleman says, does the United Nations.
Therefore, the constraints that we use must be proportional to the task. The aim has to be consistent with the UN resolutions—the freedom of Kuwait, not the acquisition of Iraqi territory. We all recognise that action within Iraq against its air force and chemical capacity may be part of the operation in Kuwait, but it should not include the acquisition of Iraqi territory.
If we are in the Gulf now as the instrument of international will, supporting the authority of the United Nations, the United Nations has a part to play in that operation. It is obvious that the conduct of the war must lie with those nations which have troops at risk in the field. The United Nations should now be responsible for the construction of any peace which follows. That peace cannot be on the basis of a Versailles conference where those with forces in the field carve up the territory which may or may not have resulted. It must be a peace vested in the United Nations, constructed in the United Nations and based on a broad middle east peace conference, arranged for and carried through under United Nations auspices.
The House today debates a literally terrifying decision. We in the Liberal Democratic party hope that the Government will pursue every last realistic avenue for peace. But if, as regrettably seems likely, peace fails, we believe that action must be taken to uphold international law. In voting with the Government today, we are not only giving that support to which our troops in the field are entitled; we are also expressing our view that it is only by upholding international law and backing the authority of the United Nations that the long-term peace of the world can be assured.
5.27 pm
Mr. David Howell: After the very fine speech by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and many of the points, but not all, so excellently and eloquently made by the Leader of the Opposition, and the forceful and fine speech made by the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), I wish to add only a few points and to detain the House for a minimum of time in doing so.
First, as the hours tick away and the enabling hour for United Nations approval of the use of force approaches, we should have the most profound respect for those who recoil from the very idea of extended force and war, particularly those who have themselves been involved in the great wars of the past and who understand better than some of us the sheer terror, hell, cruelty and indiscrimination of the war process as it continues.
But to those people, whose instincts one completely respects, we have to say that, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister reminded the House, we already have war in the Gulf. That war began in the early hours of 2 August when the tanks of Iraq rumbled into Kuwait and when people began to die, and have continued to die ever since. There has been a war, and the issue before us now, which has gradually unfolded with terrifying clarity, is how we check Saddam Hussein, this warmonger, with his intention of evil aggression clearly announced, from expanding that aggression and from strengthening his weapons to control it further; how we check that evil so that a greater evil does not result. When people say that war is evil, we can only agree—but sometimes the smaller evil must be faced to halt the larger evil. That point is at the centre of the immensely difficult decision that must be made.
If Saddam Hussein will not move towards peace, even in these last hours, and if he is not checked, he will continue to use the force that he has shown, and is showing hour by hour—in the form of terror, street executions, man hunts and other atrocities. That is surely an easy lesson for those of us in Britain to understand. Without drawing too much on historical analogies, which can be overworked, it must be embedded in our folk memory that if such people are not checked at an early stage, there is always a much higher price to pay later in bloodshed, misery and terror. That is something which many people in Britain who do not understand the higher complexities and the interweaving of the finer arguments can understand. It is an argument which can easily be grasped by people who remember, or whose parents remember, the hostilities of the past.
Are sanctions failing, or could we somehow maintain them and eventually see Iraq's war effort wither and Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait? There is little evidence of that. Instead, one sees every sign that the effects of the sanctions have long since peaked, and that, like the old fishing net, gaps are developing even in the oil trading system—for there is evidence that trading with Iraq in oil is still taking place on a small scale. Certainly the sinister trade in the international arms market continues. In a thousand other ways, Iraq is at the centre—as it has been throughout history—of a gigantic trading network which cannot indefinitely be bottled up, and which shows every sign of redeveloping.
Of course, sanctions have proved uncomfortable for Iraq, and they will continue to do so—but they will not do the trick. They will not lift Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
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They will not even create the starvation among the mass of the Iraqi people that would compel Saddam Hussein to think again, for the very good reasons that living standards in Iraq are appallingly low anyway, and that the potential for expanding its food production is considerable and is now being exploited. Although one prayed that sanctions would do the job, there is no evidence that they will achieve their purpose—certainly not in a foreseeable time frame, and perhaps not for years ahead.
Even if one could foresee the day, a year or two ahead, when Saddam Hussein declares, "We have had enough of being the pariah of the world", where would we be? By then, Iraq would have developed a nuclear capacity. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) suggested that the Iraqis do not have such a capacity now, though other reports imply that they are capable of manufacturing a rather crude nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, it would probably be bigger than anything dropped on Hiroshima, even if too big to carry under the wing of an aircraft. The Iraqis already have the mechanism for creating some kind of nuclear detonation—and that would certainly still be the case in two years' time, sanctions or no sanctions.
As much as one yearns to go with those who argue that we should wait for sanctions to work, the truth is that the clock is ticking the other way, and the longer that Saddam Hussein is allowed to get away with his actions, the deeper he will dig into Kuwait, and the more likely it is that he will successfully defy the collective security of the world.
Collective security is the light which failed at the League of Nations. It was the light which many in the Labour party, and in many other parties also, tried to reignite, and which they believed passionately would somehow secure peace. Again and again it was discredited. Speeches were made, rhetoric was tried, and sanctions were implemented —but they all failed in the inter-war years. After years of the United Nations being a feeble, divided force because of third world arguments, non-alignment, the hostility of the communists against the capitalists and the lining up against anything that the Americans supported, we now begin to see it emerging as an effective force, bringing together all the great nations, and the smaller ones, of the planet. It is uniting the Americans, Europeans, Asians, Chinese—and even the Soviet Union in its travail, as it disintegrates. They and many other countries are working together, having recognised the need to display collective security in such a way that their representations are seen as something more than a tap on the wrist or a rap across the knuckles.
In that situation, one must surely have the support of all political parties and their leaders—as we have in this instance—in emphasising the need for collective security particularly at this time, at the start of the post-cold war period and the beginning of a new era, when there really is a chance, for the first time almost in living memory, for collective security to be effectively organised. That is not to say that such an arrangement can bring peace to the middle east. As the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) rightly said the other day, the middle east is inherently unstable and always will be. Nevertheless, we ought to be able to create some envelope framework or order by which the instability of that boiling stew can be contained and not spill out to create more hideous tragedies and global instability.
I acknowledge the point made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that the tone of the French initiative

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goes beyond the substance of the United Nations resolutions. However, we should not be too harsh on the French. Their president is himself under some political pressure, and he is in a delicate situation in having to commit French troops to fighting. President Mitterrand must demonstrate that he is reaching his decision independently—in a French way that may sometimes madden us, but it is a trait that the world recognises. I may not agree entirely with the French, but I understand why they feel that they must go the final mile, or kilometre, in proving beyond doubt to the French people that there is no further room for diplomacy.
Ms. Gordon: The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the thoroughgoing, two-and-a-half-day debate in the American Congress, during which members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate reflected the unease felt by a large number of the American people that sanctions have not been properly tried. Iraq has only one major export—its oil—and needs to import about two thirds of its food requirements. Even Iraqi dinar are printed in this country. If we turn our minds to devising constructive ways of putting pressure on Iraq—
Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady is meant to be making an intervention, not a speech. I ask her to make her point.
Ms. Gordon: If we can devise better ways of applying pressure rather than entering into a dreadful bloodbath, we shall save bloodshed, the break-up of families and everything else that war brings—and I have lived through a war, and know what one is like.
Mr. Howell: No one doubts that sanctions are having an impact and are proving irritating, frustrating and difficult for Iraq. Nevertheless, they are not doing the trick. The international oil market is fairly indiscriminate and even now it is being fed by Iraqi oil. Not every sanction is working in the way that it should or in the way that we hoped that it would. The effectiveness of sanctions eventually wears out and I fear that the system is not on our side.
I repeat that we should not be too harsh on the French. As to their proposals for a middle east conference and linkage, I recoil from the linkage concept as it somehow implies that the Iraqis' attack on Kuwait is of the same order as the Israelis' occupation of the west bank. Although there may be injustices in both, they did not arise under the same conditions and they should not be compared.
Mr. Heath: Given that both pipelines from Iraq have been cut, there is a blockade of all shipping, and no roads are available to the Iraqis, can my right hon. Friend explain how Iraq is still able to export its oil? Should not my right hon. Friend inform the authorities?
Mr. Howell: Certainly. I am doing so now and I have done so already. Road facilities for moving oil still exist. I must inform my right hon. Friend—I shall discuss this with him later if he wishes—that people in the oil market tell us that Iraqi oil is somehow seeping into the system. Because of the sanctions arrangements, it should not, but links exist. I do not know whether it goes through
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neighbouring countries or on ships of other nationalities, but there is evidence that some revenue from oil is passing to Iraq.
Mr. Alan Williams: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Howell: No, I must move on as it is only fair to other hon. Members.
I recoil from the question of linkage and there is too much of it in the French proposal. In due course there will be some sort of conference to address the need for security arrangements in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli issue with more vigour. That will have to come, but there is no question of its coming to order, in response to some agreement made with Saddam Hussein. That conference will begin to make sense only if it is well prepared and if Israel is in a different mood from the mood that it was in when it was considering its security in April and nearly met the PLO in Cairo, but backed out at the last minute.
Ms. Clare Short: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Howell: No, I shall press on.
I do not think that the fact that the French have raised linkage at this last moment should count too much against them. It is worth trying anything to get the message through. However, the truth of the matter is that Saddam Hussein probably does not need a message. Perhaps he needs an excuse or a peg, but that opportunity has been open to him all along. It has been open since 2 August and it is still open now. He could withdraw from Kuwait and bring about peace from the moment that he did so and from the moment that he complied with the resolutions.
One understands all the eloquence which has been directed against war, but it should be addressed to that man in his cocoon, with his inner voices and his Messianic stance, who seems determined, and probably was determined from the start, to provoke a war and to bring the most fearful retribution upon himself, his country and his people. That is what he is going to do unless, in the next few hours, he takes a step to avoid it. We should sombrely and grimly face that fact if the further safety of nations both large and small is to be assured.
5.42 pm
Mr. Michael Foot: I wish to confine my remarks to the question of sanctions, especially in the light of what the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said at the end of his speech, when he stressed that sanctions need to be kept at the centre of our debate. I believe that that is absolutely right. I believe that my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) put that issue in its proper context. One of the main purposes of our debate should be to get answers from the Government, which we have certainly not had yet. What is the Government's verdict? When did they make the decision? How does that tie up with the deadline? I do not believe that the Government or their allies have fully examined the effects and the possibilities of sanctions. In the face of such peril for the world, it is outrageous that the Government have not given us a much fuller account of that aspect of the matter. I hope that they will reply to the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup and to the remarks that he made at the end of his speech.

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Since our previous debate on this subject the options have closed. Since that time almost all the talk outside the House, and some of it on this side of the House, has been to the effect that the military option is the only one left. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has written about the reality of the military option, if we are forced to it. The House should face that reality and should realise that we are facing more terrifying consequences than those of any brief military action—which is the likely outcome that has been described.
For those reasons, and because the military option has always been viewed in that fashion, it was necessary to explore sanctions diligently, persistently and with a determination to carry them through to the end. I do not believe that our Government or any other Government can claim that they have carried out that obligation. The earlier votes at the United Nations would not have been secured, in my view, if provision had not been made for sanctions as the first major step to try to secure a settlement of the dispute.
Some of the accounts today have been extraordinary. We heard the spokesman for the Liberal party saying that if we continued sanctions—perhaps for another five months until the autumn, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East suggested—Saddam Hussein would have a better chance of improving his economic and military situation than the forces assembled against him would have. That seems an astonishing proposition to me. How could it be that the great powers, with considerable armies, the means of supporting them and all those resources, could be gravely weakened if another five or six months were allowed to pass and that Saddam Hussein would be able to strengthen his position? I do not believe that that is a sensible proposition. Indeed, I should have thought that the balance would have been the other way around. In any case, surely a choice between peace and war should not be based on such an absurd suggestion.
Sir Russell Johnston: To be fair to my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), he was talking specifically about chemical weapons and the fact that Saddam Hussein is pretty near to creating some sort of nuclear device.
Mr. Foot: The hon. Gentleman may not have had the advantage of doing so, but I heard the right hon. Member's speech and he was talking about the whole issue. I do not believe that there is much difference between any hon. Members who consider what may be the consequences of a terrible war, if they do it faithfully and honestly, but some people have a rather subdued idea of the consequences which could soon spread from such a war.
For example, if there is a war the Palestinians will be in the worst position. Let us suppose that they joined in the war and rebelled—no doubt they would claim that they were doing it in support of their cause. The ensuing suppression would be horrific because the Israeli Government would feel that their existence was at stake. We should take into account the fate that the Palestinians might have to face, although it does not seem to worry Saddam very much. I believe that the leader of some of the Palestinians, Yasser Arafat, made a grave error by taking the view of the war that he has taken, but that does not alter the fact that we have responsibilities towards the Palestinians and what might happen to them. There are
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other places in the middle east—although none where the situation is quite so delicate as in Palestine—where this explosion could cause such huge injustices and horrors. We should think not twice, but four, five or more times to try to find a different way out.
Every speaker today and in previous debates has said that there may come a point when there is no other possibility of getting Hussein out of Kuwait than the use of force. However, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup and I believe that that point has not yet been reached and the world does not believe that that point has been reached.
Great peace demonstrations have taken place throughout Europe—here in London, in Paris and in Germany, for instance. The demonstrators do not support what Saddam has done in Kuwait, and, although some were pacifists—to whom all honour should be given for having expressed their views—many were simply saying that the sanctions alternative was a much more civilised, intelligent way of trying to settle the dispute, and one that had not yet been sufficiently explored and implemented. If the Government turned their back on such a volume of opinion, they would do a disservice not only to the cause but to our service men, and to all those who must bear the heaviest burdens.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East has taken every opportunity to make that case to the House very strongly and I hope that he will have a chance to underline it this evening. Anyone who reads what he has said about both the scale of possible events in the middle east and the possibility of effective sanctions will recognise that we cannot simply accept the authority of the Government's statement that enough has already been said on the subject.
I was astonished at the insolence of this morning's Times leader about sanctions. That newspaper should be especially careful about expressing views on appeasement, how to deal with dictators and other such abstruse questions. According to the The Times,
"Yet congressmen and senators could still find reason for backing off"—
from resorting to war, that is—
"not least the notorious appeaser's remedy of 'giving sanctions longer to work.'"
One would have thought that the hand of a Times leader writer would wither before he dared to write such words.
When sanctions were applied against Italy before the last war and someone suggested that they should be given a little longer to work, it was a previous Prime Minister, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who said that that was midsummer madness. But, if we had made sanctions work properly then, we might have been able to stop Fascism in Spain, Austria and elsewhere. We could have stopped the second world war by taking effective collective action, starting with economic sanctions and taking further action if they did not succeed. The Conservative Government of the day, however, called off the sanctions before they had had a chance to injure Mussolini at all. In fact, I believe that we supplied Mussolini with even more arms than we have given Saddam Hussein.
I hope that the House will pay proper attention to the alternatives, not merely this evening but in future debates. None of us ever accepted the deadline as the time when it was permissible to go to war. Although Saddam Hussein has shown his intransigence at every opportunity, which has helped to close some of the options, the decision of Her

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Majesty's Government appears to have closed others. I believe that today's debate can force the Government to reconsider all those questions.
I trust—as, I think, do most other hon. Members who have spoken—that a fresh discussion will be held in the United Nations Security Council to discuss President Mitterrand's latest proposals. The right hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) was very patronising about the French President, but he knows a little about such matters. Is it not possible that his primary wish is to secure a peace —on the basis of collective security, which he, like many Opposition Members, has supported for many years? There will be no desertion of that principle, but we believe that it can best be applied by means of sanctions, at least in the first instance. The time has not yet come to abandon that option and resort to methods that would have incalculable consequences for the middle east and, indeed, the world as a whole.
That would not weaken the United Nations; it would strengthen it. If the world goes to war on the basis of the propositions now being advanced, the chances of maintaining the coalition will be seriously damaged, for a variety of reasons that I—among others—have already mentioned, especially the Palestinian question. I do not want that to happen; I want the coalition to remain strong.
If the Government have the determination to go ahead with a more intelligent policy than war, I believe that we can hold that coalition together for longer and make it more effective still. The House should use this opportunity to give the Government new instructions.
Madam Deputy Speaker: Before I call the next speaker, I must remind the House that from 6 pm speeches will be limited to 10 minutes.
5.56 pm
Mr. Michael Mates: The right hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) has spoken with his customary eloquence and passion, even when propounding arguments with which many of us profoundly disagree and when attempting, in a charmingly deceptive way, to rewrite history. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not follow his speech. I wish to be brief, and I do not want to talk about the principles involved in the circumstances in which we find ourselves today; I want to discuss some of the practical consequences, which I hope will prove helpful.
I had the good fortune to visit the Gulf last month with most of the members of the Select Committee on Defence, together with the Opposition defence spokesmen—the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) and the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell)—and four distinguished Members of the other place. It was a very successful, interesting and stimulating visit. Having seen troops from all three services—the Royal Air Force in Bahrain, the Navy on HMS London and 7 Armoured Brigade in the desert—we were supremely impressed with the high morale, the efficiency with which the complicated operation to send them all out there had been conducted, the equipment with which they had been provided and their general preparedness for a task which none of them wants to do, but which all are prepared to do if that is required. That was the most moving impression that I received: every soldier, sailor and airman to whom
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I spoke hoped that we would find a way to avoid war, but every one of them was entirely prepared to do his duty if war should come about.
Mr. Dennis Canavan: The hon. Gentleman said that the service people out there expressed the hope that politicians at home would try to find a solution which would avoid war, but have not the British Government simply followed the American line that negotiations are not allowed even though United Nations resolution 660 refers to them specifically?
Mr. Mates: No, that is not true. I regret having given way to the hon. Gentleman; I was trying to be courteous.
Another impressive feature was the level of cooperation with the United States command structure. Loose talk from the ignorant about being lapdogs of the American commanders could not be further from the truth; if it were true, I should be as concerned about it as anyone else. We were able to discuss with the commander, General de la Billière, whom I have known for 25 years, the arrangements that he has been able to make with General Schwarzkopf and with which he is totally satisfied. It was impressive to see the level of co-operation between the two staffs in all the services. As we went around the air control operations centre, we saw members of the Royal Air Force at every third or fourth desk working side by side as a team with their American colleagues, not in any form of subservience but exchanging expertise, experience and advice, which can bring nothing but benefit to a joint operation should it have to come about.
Ms. Short: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Mates: I will not give way as I am now restricted to 10 minutes. I should dearly love to give way if I had the time, but I hope that the hon. Lady will forgive me.
A question has been raised by the doubters about the efficiency and effectiveness of our equipment. We were able to satisfy ourselves that our forces have everything that they want. The tanks that were so badly maligned are working very well—better than in Germany—and that is largely because they are being used. It is because we have not been able to get them out and manoeuvre them that they have had such problems. Aircraft down-time was much less after more flying than our pilots had found in Germany or the United Kingdom, and the atmosphere in terms of equipment and readiness to do the job was thoroughly positive and commendable.
Enough of that, however. I want to talk about what might occur should war start, not that I want that, as it is better to think about it now than if hostilities commence. I wish to deal with the media and censorship. Already we are hearing cries from certain sectors of the media that they must be allowed to say, do, show and write what they like, but that must not be because sometimes by doing that they may make our service men's cause harder. Certainly, the truth must be told and it must be no part of any censorship to deny to the British people the truth of what is happening, but there is always censorship in war because there is always information which, if it were released to the enemy, would be of help to them and would assist them in countering what we are doing in a better way than would otherwise have been the case.
That raises a difficulty which, in my experience, is totally new. We have never conducted a war in which the

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media have had full access to both sides. That is the first problem. There will be media in Baghdad as well as in the Gulf. Instant communications will make censorship extremely difficult and will throw an even greater responsibility on the media not to say or do anything which might harm our cause. That point was brought home to me vividly at a press conference in the desert at 7 Armoured Brigade headquarters. The assembled media were there and several of us gave interviews. I asked one of the journalists when the interview I had given would get home. He said, "It's gone." It went instantly. That is totally new. There are telephones out there and if one of our tank commanders could afford to buy it and pay the bill he could have a telephone in his tank and dial home. The reporters are doing just that, which gives their responsibility an entirely new dimension. The media must not say or do anything either consciously, which I am sure that they would not do, or unconsciously which would give an enemy any help. That is a new responsibility and I hope that the Ministry of Defence is addressing it, although with what certainly it can control such things I do not know. I hope that those from the media who are listening will take into account that very new and critically important aspect in terms of what needs to be hidden as well as what needs to be told.
Mr. Heath: I agree with much of what my hon. Friend says, but he will be aware that the BBC and ITN are already questioning heavily the regulations that have been made. The American press will print everything and American television will cover everything, as they did in Vietnam every moment of the day and night. If the information is covered in the American press, it will be impossible to stop it being covered in our press and media in the same way.
Mr. Mates: I hope that my right hon. Friend is wrong and that it will not be impossible. If there is one area in which it is absolutely crucial that the media exercise self-restraint, it is on the question of casualties. The worst thing in the world would be for the wives and families of our service men to see or hear from the newspapers or media that their loved ones have been hurt or killed. That is a responsibility that the services take seriously. They want to ensure that such information is made available in a compassionate and helpful way. It was a major cause of difficulty in the Falklands war, where there was some control, but because it involved largely naval casualties and one knows who is on a ship if it is hit, it was a different problem from that facing the Army and Air Force. Nevertheless, there is a real responsibility to ensure, so far as is humanly possible, that the media do not divulge that sort of information before the proper authorities in this country have been able to take the action that they will be planning with the greatest care to carry out in the most humane way possible.
Finally, the immediacy of communication from here to there has never happened before. Members of the services can be listening to this debate if it is put out on the World Service at this moment. Members of tank crews and air crew underneath the wing of their aeroplanes waiting to fight a sortie can hear the debate. They can hear the comments and the criticisms. That puts extra responsibility on all of us, should hostilities come about, to say nothing which could be interpreted as undermining our total determination to see the enterprise through if it
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starts. It puts a greater responsibility on politicians, media figures and public figures generally to restrain themselves should hostilities begin. By all means, let us have the post-mortems afterwards, and the criticisms made with hindsight when peace has been restored, but not when our soldiers are there prepared to die and perhaps dying. They should not hear one word of criticism from us which, carelessly uttered, can be delivered instantly to them and undermine the effort that we are making for them.
6.7 pm
Mr. Denis Healey: This is the third time in my nearly 40 years in the House when I have watched a great nation sleep-walking to disaster with its eyes open and its mind closed. The first occasion was Suez in 1956, the second was the long tragedy of the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and I fear that on this occasion Britain and the United States are sleep-walking together in the Gulf. In all three cases the central problem has been the inability of Governments to accept the facts about the consequences of their actions that have been put to them by their own advisers, allied with a quite stupefying lack of proportion.
Britain embarked on the Suez enterprise in 1956 when eastern Europe was in turmoil and we knew that the Soviet Union was having to decide whether to intervene in Hungary. The United States intervened in Vietnam in the belief that if it did not win that war, all the dominoes in the world would fall. It lost the war and the only domino that fell was a communist domino in Cambodia. In this case we are contemplating war when 15 million Africans are threatened with death by famine and we know that we will not have the money to support them if we engage in a war.
We know that free trade between the developed countries of the world is threatened by the collapse of the GATT talks. Nobody has time to worry about that because of the imminent war, although Britain and the United States are engaged in a recession. We see eastern Europe's attempt to restore democracy crippled by a tripling of oil prices brought about by the Soviet Union, followed by the doubling of oil prices caused by the Gulf crisis and a further doubling or tripling, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Monetary Fund, it' there is war in the Gulf. Finally, we see the Soviet leaders trying to take decisions of historic importance on how to deal with revolt among their nationalities at a moment when those in the west who might influence their choice are so anxious to retain Soviet support for war in the Gulf that they are refusing to say what they really think. I accept what the Foreign Secretary said about that, but what action will follow his rude words we have yet to discover.
Against that background, it is surely madness to embark on war if any alternative is available. Is war necessary to achieve the objectives agreed by the United Nations resolution that was passed a month or so ago? We are assured by the head of the CIA, no less, that it is not. He told the United States Congress in great detail that sanctions were already having a major effect on the civilian economy of Iraq and that within three to nine months they would have a major effect in crippling Iraq's military capability.
When Mr. Cheney, the Defence Secretary, was faced with those statements and his own statements to the same effect, made even as recently as last December, he

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preferred to use other arguments for not persisting with sanctions. The first was that we cannot any longer allow the Kuwaitis to be submitted to the brutality of the occupying forces. So far, 2,000 Kuwaitis have been killed, but, as I pointed out to the Prime Minister earlier today, the Financial Times this morning reports a senior member of the exiled Kuwaiti ruling family—which, incidentally, left behind 275 heavy tanks and 480 armoured vehicles for the Iraqis to take over and use against us, because it was not warned of the imminent attack, of which the CIA had warned the President two days earlier—as saying:
"We have already lost a lot of our infrastructure. So we really don't have a lot to lose. I don't want it to be flattened, but, if the flattening of Kuwait is the liberation of Kuwait, I would have that."
Let us have no more crocodile tears about the fate of the Kuwaiti people. We undoubtedly feel deeply for them, but a war will subject them to far worse suffering than they have yet endured under Saddam Hussein.
We were told by Mr. Cheney that if we continue with sanctions the coalition will fall apart. All the evidence of the past few days is that if we embark on war the coalition may fall apart. We have, already, major differences between the United States and Britain on the one hand and all the European members of the coalition on the other, which is symbolised by Britain's support of America's refusal to support Mitterrand's proposals for last-minute negotiations, although they are already supported by Germany, Italy, Spain and, we now hear, the Soviet Union.
We are told that our military power is at its peak, but we were told by the American generals that it would not be at its peak for at least another month. We still have to get agreement among the members of the coalition on the command and control of a war. When I raised this question with the Secretary of State for Defence in a recent debate, he said that it was quite improper for me to raise it. I tell the Foreign Secretary, who has some experience of the peace-time Army, that to go into a war with six large contingents, of which only two are under agreed command structure, and in which the French, Saudis, and Syrians are operating the same weapons as the Iraqi opponent, is to invite mutual catastrophe on a devastating scale. In Vietnam, the Americans lost 10,000 of their 65,000 casualties through such a muck-up at the hands of their own forces.
When I consider that we are contemplating a war without formal agreement that the Saudis and the Muslim contingents will join in, I feel very much like the German admiral who, when the multilateral force was explained to him some time ago, replied, "I would rather swim." This is a serious matter because if we go to war without that sorted out, we shall risk unnecessary mutual slaughter of the members of the coalition.
Although we cannot be certain, the war will probably involve an appalling loss of life—we have been told so by the military concerned—economic disaster and political instability in the middle east for at least a generation. It may also have a long-term effect on the willingness of the United States to continue accepting international responsibilities. We are already faced with attacks from all sides in Congress about the unwillingness of the Europeans and Japanese to share the burden. If the war has the consequences which I fear, and which were
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predicted by many people in congressional hearings in the United States, we could find America withdrawing and Britain being beached offshore on the edge of Europe, having lost its relationship with the Europeans, on which we thought the Foreign Secretary set so much store.
I hope, at this last moment, that the Government will change their mind about the French initiative and will support the view taken by all our European partners, except the Danes, and by the European members of the coalition. If we are committed to war, we shall do everything to support our troops. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) and I fought with our troops, although we regarded the Government of the day as responsible for a war that would have been unnecessary if they had taken the right measures in earlier years. If we are committed to this dreadful gamble, I hope that we shall continue to press for peace and an end to the killing at the earliest possible moment on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. That, again, is a matter on which I hope the Government will, for the first time, show some independence of Washington.
6.17 pm
Sir Peter Blaker: I want to pick up the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) referred to today, as he has in the past, about United Nations resolution 660. As he reminded the House, it calls on Iraq to withdraw immediately from Kuwait and on Iraq and Kuwait immediately to begin negotiations on the resolution of their differences.
We must remember the context on which the resolution was passed. It was passed on the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—while the invasion was still in progress. Those who are familiar with the United Nations Security Council will know that that resolution is common form in such a situation.
The Iraqis ignored that resolution and pressed forward. In the following days, they completed their occupation of Kuwait. It is not unreasonable, in view of their refusal to recognise the authority of the Security Council, for us now to say that the call for negotiations is out of date and is no longer relevant. I understand that that is the Security Council's position on negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq. Negotiations are not to be contemplated until there has been a total evacuation of Kuwait by Iraq, whatever may happen afterwards.
In recent days, I have been thinking about what I would say in a letter to a nephew if I happened to have one serving with British forces in the Gulf. I believe that I would say something like this. In every generation, a tyrant sets himself up with the ambition to conquer his neighbours—someone who defies reason and does not have the same human motives held by most of mankind. The world is learning slowly and painfully how to deal with such people. The first lesson is to deter them from aggression. That can be done by making it clear that aggression will mean that they will lose more than they gain. That worked in Europe but it failed in Iraq, because it was never tried—partly because the world's responsible countries, which are mostly democracies, had their attention focused elsewhere, partly because they did not take enough trouble to analyse Saddam Hussein and

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partly because they thought that Iran, the enemy that Saddam Hussein was fighting for eight years, was an even more dangerous threat.
When deterrence fails, the responsible countries must make sure that the aggressor surrenders his gains. I am afraid that that is a much more painful and expensive job than it would have been to deter him in the first place. Nevertheless, we now have a new chance, both of deterring and of remedying aggression, because the Soviet Union appears to be joining the ranks of the responsible countries.
For the first time in the history of the United Nations we may be able to make it an effective peace-keeping body. Until now, on the really difficult questions, the United Nations has been paralysed by divisions between the permanent members of the Security Council, but in the past six months the Security Council has passed 12 resolutions which would have been inconceivable only a year or two ago. This development is of the greatest possible importance for the United Nations and for the future peace of the world. If the United Nations is effective in forcing Saddam to withdraw, a new and more hopeful phase could open up, with an effective and powerful United Nations able not only to monitor situations in which peace has been secured—which is what its so-called peace-keeping forces have done in the past—but to force an aggressor to withdraw or even to deter aggression. But if the United Nations fails this time to force Iraq to withdraw, it will be a serious blow to its power from which it may take years to recover. If the United Nations does not succeed this time, with virtually unanimous support, when will it succeed?
Some people argue that we should continue to rely on the United Nations economic sanctions to get Saddam out of Kuwait, but none of them can say how long it will take. Saddam seems to have absolute control and Iraq is a rich country by the standards of the developing world. No one can say how long the coalition against Iraq will hold firm. If it crumbles, sanctions will crumble too. The coalition was created only with great difficulty and with some very unlikely partners. Unexpected events, perhaps involving Israel—which is hated by the Arab members of the coalition—could break up the coalition before sanctions could force an Iraqi withdrawal.
If we do not take military action soon, we shall have to wait until the autumn. On 17 March Ramadan begins, during which it is doubtful that our Arab partners would agree to begin military action. It is followed soon after by the time of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In any case, by the late spring, the weather will be so hot as to make warfare difficult, especially if there is a risk of the Iraqis using chemical weapons.
Every responsible leader on the western side hates the prospect of war, not least those who can remember the second world war. This war will be shorter and probably more intense, but regrettably the signs are that Saddam is determined to have it. Repeated efforts have been made over nearly six months to persuade him that there is a better course, but one thing that we cannot do is reward his aggression. To do so would entrench him even more deeply in power and make him "a hero". The Leader of the Opposition rightly used that phrase to describe what Saddam's status will be if we fail the United Nations. Saddam might feel free to attack other countries. Other
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dictators around the world would try to seize their smaller neighbours. It would be a step towards a more dangerous world.
There are two other reasons for taking military action soon in the absence of the peaceful departure of Saddam from Kuwait. First, since August, the Iraqis have been systematically plundering Kuwait and torturing, murdering or expelling many of its citizens.
On purely humanitarian grounds, the sooner we liberate their country, the better. Some Opposition Members have correctly pointed out that that would cause Kuwaiti casualties, but the message that I get from the representatives of free Kuwait in this country is that they are reluctantly prepared to accept that situation. They want Iraq out of Kuwait soon, even if force has to be used.
Secondly, if Iraq, especially under Saddam, were to acquire nuclear weapons, the whole of the middle east—indeed, the whole civilised world—would be under a threat many times more terrifying than we have seen for half a century. That must not be allowed to happen. If there must be war with Iraq, it is better to have it now rather than later.
I would end by saying to my hypothetical nephew: you have an important job to do and the whole of Parliament is proud of you and your colleagues. If there is war, we pray that it will be brief. We are confident that it will be won.
6.26 pm
Mr. Greville Janner: No one in the House would welcome war—certainly no one who remembers previous wars, no one who has friends or family or constituents serving in the forces in the Gulf, and no one who, like me, has family living in Israel or in other areas where they are at grave risk. But we must ask, what is the alternative? Only if there is no real alternative must we accept the sacrifice of war.
The question is whether sanctions will work. It is hard for the House to make that judgment because we do not have the information on which to do so. By its nature, intelligence information goes to the Government of the day and, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition rightly said, it is not shared. I have always been a pessimist about the working of sanctions against Saddam Hussein. I know a little of the area and, for several reasons, I do not believe that they will work.
First, we in this decent land do not understand the nature of dictatorship and what a dictator can impose on the people over whom he has power.
Second, the living standard of the people in Iraq is very low, and they can sustain hardship and privation at a level that we would never endure.
Third, Saddam Hussein is a dictator who is totally ruthless. We should not forget that Saddam gassed and killed thousands of Kurds. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) reminded the House that Saddam did a turnaround in Iran. But that was only after a million people had died. Only then did he turn around and go, leaving matters exactly where they were—except that a million people died for nothing. We should not forget the Kuwaitis. They may not be, as someone said, at the top of the agenda. But they are people. I do not much like the Kuwaiti regime or the other feudal dictatorships; but still less do I like the middle eastern military dictatorships.

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What about linkage? I have always wanted a peace conference, but not a peace conference that cannot work —a peace conference where Israel is led to sacrifice on the altar of appeasement. If there are to be concessions, they will only come about in negotiation between people who believe that it is in their interests to concede, and who want to avoid war and death. They will not result from a linkage in which one party is drawn there in chains. That cannot work.
Some of us remember the sigh of relief that we gave —and I include myself even though I was a child about to be evacuated—when Chamberlain avoided war in 1938. We must recognise that he saved lives in 1938 but only at the cost of millions of lives afterwards. Those millions of lives included members of our own forces, members of our own families and, in my case, half my family.
I do not believe in the appeasement of dictators; it does not work. I should like to believe, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) explained with his typical eloquence, that sanctions could work. He has well explained the dread alternatives that would come with war. But appeasement does not work. The only linkage that we should have with Saddam Hussein leaving Kuwait is with peace and not by creating a modern middle eastern Czechoslovakia—which, by the way, will not sit down and meekly accept its own destruction.
I listened with interest to the Prime Minister complimenting Israel on the restraint that it has exercised so far. But for people to say—as some hon. Members have said to me—that if Israel is bombed they hope that it will not react is to live in the unreality of a dictatorship and not in the reality of a democracy. That democracy may have elected a Government whom we do not like, but, if I may say so, so has British democracy—and too often for my taste.
Israel is entitled to react. If Israel is bombed or if Saddam Hussein carries out his threat to drop chemicals or germs on people in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem—including not only Jews like my own family, but also millions of Arabs—the Israelis will react powerfully, and so would we in the same circumstances. It is nonsense to suggest anything else.
Linkage is a concept known to some of us who dabble a little in magic. Hon. Members may remember the Chinese linking rings which link and unlink, and come together and fall apart entirely at the will of the conjuror. Such is the linkage that Saddam Hussein would wish to have. He did not go into Kuwait to help the Palestinians, but to help himself to Kuwait. He went into Kuwait for no reason other than that he wanted to occupy it, to take it over, and to have the oil. From that vantage point he would, effectively, command not only the middle east but the economies of the world.
I hope desperately that there will be no war—for personal reasons, for constituency reasons and for national reasons. If there is to be a war, I hope that it will be very short, that we will win it very fast and that the Americans and our troops will swiftly succeed, because if it is a long and nasty war on land, there will be devastation for us and for the rest of the world. But if the alternative to war today is war against Saddam Hussein in a few years' time when he has nuclear potential, that will be the ultimate disaster.
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Some hon. Members may remember that, in 1981, I ventured to suggest that Israel was right to take out Iraq's nuclear potential. I do not believe that anyone agreed with me. This place rose up and shouted. But today I am grateful for Israel's action. I hope that other hon. Members will realise what a catastrophe it would be if Saddam Hussein now had a nuclear potential. I believe that if we must act, we must do so today, before he gets nuclear potential tomorrow.
6.34 pm
Rev. Ian Paisley: Today, we face war in all its hideousness, its hellishness and its horrors. Those of us who come from 20 years of terrorist war in Northern Ireland daily know something, albeit on a small scale, of the tragedies, sorrow, anguish and agony of deadly conflict. The cry of orphans, the sobbing of bereaved wives, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, and the mutilation of bodies are ever before us in Northern Ireland.
However, the grim and terrible conflict that confronts us today is a sea of blood compared with a tiny crimson stream. It is the Gulf crisis, and what a gaping gulf it is. If war comes, how many will perish in its maw? However, grim and terrible as war is, there are some things worse than war—to surrender to diabolical aggression, to bow to ruthless tyranny, to permit the devilish murderer to enjoy his bloodsoaked gains, to turn a deaf ear to those who are being savagely tortured and to forsake a small country that cannot save itself. That is worse than war, because that is the sowing of the seeds of even greater aggression. It is the motivation of a tyrant to even greater atrocities and the encouragement of other dictators to follow a similar path, leading to an ever-widening circle of helpless, innocent victims.
The terrible consequences of neutrality in this case—which, in reality, is only surrender by instalments—are far worse than the consequences of war. The aggressor must be resisted and those who draw the sword must learn that they will perish by the sword.
When the House was recalled during the summer recess, I closed a brief speech with these words:
"Many Hon. Members have used the words 'God forbid that this should happen'. I echo them. I call on the Prime Minister to go to see Her Majesty the Queen and advise her that this nation should have a day of prayer and humility to ask almighty God to avert this calamity."—[Official Report, 7 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 877.]
I regret that that did not happen. I still believe that, at this dark and final hour, a miracle could happen. But war or no war, we need to acknowledge that we require the wisdom and help of Almighty God today. Human impotency stares us all in the face. Let not pride lull us into the deception that the race is to the swift and that the battle is to the strong. Let us, with humility, acknowledge our deep need today as a nation.
6.38 pm
Mr. Tony Benn: We have had an interesting debate. The vote tonight is the vote that the Government want as a mandate for the use of force from any time after 5 am tomorrow when the deadline expires. We must not be misled by the fact that it is on a different motion, and I shall come back to that. Every one of us has

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a duty to speak his mind as best he can. I shall vote against the Government tonight and I hope that other hon. Members will vote against them or abstain.
This is not a debate between pacifists and realists or between those who favour the United Nations and those who do not; it is a debate about how we tackle a very grave problem and a grave attack on international legality.
The House is a representative body. The nation is very deeply divided on the use of force. On 11 December, when we last had a vote on the Adjournment, hon. Members voted by 10 to 1 in favour of the Government for a United Nations resolution bringing us to the point at which force would be used. That very day, Dr. Gallup conducted a poll, which has just been published and which showed that only 31 per cent. of the nation believed that force should be used. Earlier this week, The Daily Telegraph suggested that less than half the nation favoured the use of force. We in this place must reflect the views of those whom we represent, and that is what I am doing now.
I shall not go in great detail into the consequences of war when it comes; that has already been done. One million men, armed to the teeth—in many cases by the same arms manufacturers—face each other across the Iraqi-Saudi border. The casualties among troops will be heavy. There will be heavy casualties among the people in the region. Nuclear weapons may well be used. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, Kuwait could be destroyed. There could be an ecological disaster if the oil fields are burnt. A worse third-world famine—there is already such a famine—could ensue as developing nations will not be able to pay the high price of oil. The economies of the west, which have depended to a great extent on the finances from the Arab countries in our banking system, could be affected.
War would solve nothing. We are talking not just about the legacy of terrorism, to which reference has been made —although I am sure that there would be such a legacy. The region that would then have to pick itself up would be in a far worse state, even if we scored what is called a victory after what is called a surgical strike, because Iraq and the area around it would have been destroyed.
I must say in passing—I raised this matter with you, Mr. Speaker, yesterday—that it is an utter disgrace to the House that the different views held by hon. Members should not be allowed to be tested in the Lobbies. In the United States, both Houses have had their votes. Why have the Government given us no chance to test our views on the French initiative; on the length of the sanctions process; or on the possibility of negotiation? I think that it is because they are not so sure of how the vote would go were all those options to be put. One has only to hear Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen on the subject of sanctions to realise that, if an amendment calling for sanctions to be given more time had been tabled, there would have been a vote heavy in favour of it.
That brings me to a point that must be mentioned: there is nobody left in the House who was serving in the House during the last world war. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes, there is."] I am talking about serving in Parliament during the last war. I am talking about the effect of war on the British Parliament. We have seen—and we will see when British forces are sent into action—that it is the royal prerogative that allows the Government to go to war. That old feudal anachronism is wheeled out to bypass the House. We note reports in the newspapers to the effect that there will be briefings for Privy Councillors across the
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Front Benches when war begins. That is the way in which the parliamentary process consolidates knowledge at the top at the expense of others. The Archbishop of Canterbury has been brought forward to bless some "limited" bloodshed. The censorship of the media has already begun. No journalist in the Gulf is to move beyond his escort officer. The censorship of dissent by the media has also begun. The House is about to see the internment without trial of Iraqis, some of whom may have come here to escape from Saddam Hussein.
We are now experiencing jingoism—a term that I have looked up. I have listened to the Front-Bench spokesmen saying, "We do not want to fight." They keep saying that. They should finish the poem:
"We don't want to fight, but by jingo if we do, we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too."
This country is experiencing the greatest wave of jingoism that I have seen in my life. I am reminded of John Bright's speech in the House just before the Crimean war:
"The angel of death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings."
I think that I am the first person who has spoken in this debate who has made any reference to those people in society who actually want war. We know it from the popular press. We see it every day. But nobody has made any reference to it. President Bush said—it was reported in The Daily Telegraph— "We will destroy Iraq." He said that the Americans would destroy Iraq if Iraq did not withdraw. Where is the United Nations resolution saying that we will destroy Iraq? Hon. Members on both sides of the House have said, "We must topple Saddam before he gets nuclear weapons." Where is the UN resolution about toppling Saddam before he gets nuclear weapons? What emerges from debates of this character is that there is a major difference between the UN agenda, which is to restore legality, and the other agenda.
The arms manufacturers have made a lot of profits out of the arms that will be used. Their scientists will be watching to see which weapons work. War sells newspapers and boosts television ratings. It diverts attention from domestic problems.
I am delighted that the French have come out with their initiative because there must be simultaneously an Iraqi withdrawal, United Nations monitoring, an Arab peace force, a peace conference covering Palestine and Cyprus and guarantees of no attack. If the peace initiative put forward by France today were the policy of this Government and of the United Nations, we should avoid war and secure the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. It is no good talking about linkage—a subject that I mentioned when the Prime Minister kindly gave way. We can deny linkage in the conference chamber until we are blue in the face. But the day we attack Iraq and Iraq attacks Israel and Israel responds, the linkage that we deny will be burned into the history books on the battlefield. Then we shall be back where we started. After the war is over, we shall have to come to the French initiative, so why not have it before the bloodshed?
What is our duty to the troops? They are under orders. Our troops have been put under foreign operational command. We represent them in this place; we must question Ministers here. What the Government have done by denying us a substantive motion is to disfranchise our own troops so that the Members of Parliament who

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represent them cannot ask the question, and table the amendment, that would allow the interests of our troops to be considered.
This is the most important debate that has taken place in my 40 years in the House. Let my hon. Friends and others be clear: a vote for the Government tonight is a vote for war and will be interpreted as such. Each and every one of us carries a great responsibility. We have to set aside party feelings and electoral considerations, because we must never risk lives to win votes. The lives of millions of people in the world may be influenced by our vote. I beg the House not to give the Government the mandate for war which they want but to oppose the motion, or to abstain, so that we can look afresh at how this problem might be solved without resorting to the most catastrophic bloodshed.
6.48 pm
Sir Ian Gilmour: The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) was very dismissive about the procedure that has been adopted tonight. He may remember that a motion for the Adjournment brought down a Government in 1940, so it is hardly a contemptible way of doing things. The right hon. Gentleman was certainly able to express his views comfortably, and he did so very well.
Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, I shall vote for the Government tonight, although I am extremely unhappy with the course of events. I am quite sure that my right hon. Friends do not want war. I am almost equally sure that President Bush and Mr. Baker do not want war. Nevertheless, we seem almost certain to have a war which is likely to have horrendous consequences and which no one except Saddam Hussein wants. That surely shows that something has gone badly wrong with either the strategy or the diplomacy of the allies, or both. Unquestionably, the objective of getting Iraq out of Kuwait is right. Saddam's wholly inexcusable aggression cannot be allowed to stand. It is not the end which is at fault but the means.
A month or two ago a decision was evidently made not to wait for sanctions, backed up by the threat of force, eventually to compel an Iraqi withdrawal but to rely on force alone while demanding unconditional surrender. It was evidently decided that a massive military build-up, not supported by inducements, would force Saddam Hussein to withdraw. That strategy may still work—we have not reached the deadline yet—but it looks more unlikely with every moment that passes. It was always a high-risk strategy and one which, in my view, was unnecessary.
Sanctions were and are working well. The Government now tell us that sanctions would not do the job. However, they have not produced any evidence for that. The CIA thought that sanctions were working well until it was told to go away and think again. It has been shown that 97 per cent. of Iraq's oil has been cut off. The former chiefs of staff who testified to the congressional committee also believed that sanctions were working well.
Iraq has almost 1 million men under arms. For a country of its size, that is far too many for its economy. All in all, Iraq's position is not sustainable for long. Sanctions should have been allowed to continue taking their toll of the Iraqi economy and Saddam Hussein's war machine.
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The allies' diplomacy—or American diplomacy—has been even more defective than their strategy, but perhaps it is still not too late to remedy that deficiency. It has been the allies' position that aggression cannot be rewarded—and it was repeated by President Bush in his letter to Saddam Hussein, which Tariq Aziz foolishly refused to deliver. The President wrote:
"There can be no reward for aggression. Nor will there be any negotiation. Principle cannot be compromised."
Those would be unimpeachable sentiments in a perfect world. Certainly Saddam does not deserve any reward for his aggression or for his many subsequent atrocities. But, equally, innocent Iraqi civilians do not deserve to be bombed into oblivion and in any case "deserts" play a limited part in international politics and diplomacy. The Palestinians do not deserve what is happening to them on the west bank and in the Gaza strip and has been happening for a long time.
More importantly, the principle which Mr. Bush now says cannot be compromised has continually been comprised by the United States Government in the middle east for the past 25 years. Saddam Hussein fought an aggressive war against Iran and was duly rewarded by massive sales of arms—although not, I am happy to say, from the Government led by my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher). He was also rewarded by a great deal of money from countries everywhere around. Similarly, Israel invaded Lebanon two years later causing massive civilian casualties and was duly rewarded by not only masses of dollars but by retaining a so-called security zone on Lebanese soil. So the principle on which the United States now says that it stands is one which it has not hesitated to break in the past.
What is the reward that it is suggested that Saddam Hussein should be offered? It is an international conference on Palestine and the other problems of the middle east. Of course we all know that Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait to help Palestine or the Palestinians. Until very recently, he showed a minimum of interest in either Palestine or the Palestinians. Nevertheless, Mr. Perez de Cuellar has been in favour of an international conference on Palestine for the past eight years, as he said recently. In a non-binding statement, the Security Council has said that it, too, favours a conference at an appropriate time. So do a great many other people.
Now the American Government and apparently my right hon. Friends object to the French proposal for an international conference because they are opposed to linkage between the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian problems. Of course there is linkage. As former President Carter said:
"There is no way to separate the crisis in the Gulf from the Israeli-Palestinian question".
Even the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Levi, has courageously admitted that there is "psychological linkage" between the two problems.
Linkage is clear. Apart from anything else, America's behaviour over Israel and Palestine for many years is the reason why many Arabs support Saddam Hussein, however much they may detest him. Of course, I have no idea whether Saddam will accept the French proposals, but surely we ought to find out. Are we really going to go to war in order not to have a peace conference on Palestine? That would be not just the higher insanity but the lower insanity, especially as in any case we are in favour of a peace conference.
Mr. Ivan Lawrence: Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Sir Ian Gilmour: No. I have only 10 minutes.
We all know that the United States has domestic political difficulties with its strong pro-Israeli lobby, but it is surely the task of America's allies to help the President to withstand that lobby and not meekly to support it. It would be grotesque to become bogged down in what is linkage and what is not. We are not playing games; we are playing for high stakes. Many lives are at stake. In any case, it should be possible to devise some form of words that produces unlinked linkage or linked unlinkage, or whatever. Even if it is not, to prefer war to agreeing to a peace conference would be unforgivable.
It may well be that Saddam Hussein now wants a war or would prefer a war to giving up Kuwait. He professes that he will win such a war. He is so out of touch that he may really believe that. If he wants a war, it can be argued, even by those like me who regret that the allies have got themselves into their present position, that he should have his way and be attacked as soon as possible. But we do not yet know for sure that Saddam wants a war. We do not know for sure that he cannot be persuaded to change his mind and choose peace, which would mean withdrawal from Kuwait.
Therefore, I very much hope that the French proposals will be adopted and put to Baghdad. If Saddam Hussein turns them down, we shall know that he is determined on war. In any case, if war comes, I shall wholeheartedly support our superb armed forces in the Gulf.
6.56 pm
Mr. Andrew Faulds: When I spoke in the emergency debate on 6 September last year I made the point that this whole moral crusade launched by the United States in the United Nations was based on their massive oil needs and consumption. I believe that there is universal awareness of that prime economic concern, even among some of the dunderheads on the Benches opposite. I cited the second reason as America's intent to overthrow Saddam Hussein for the protection of Israel and the furtherance of Israel's interests. However outrageous over the years Israel's behaviour has been, whether in the invasion of Lebanon, where the Israelis tried out a lot of United States new weapons and caused thousands of Lebanese deaths, or in their attempts to put down the intifada of the Palestinians in Palestinian territory—where they caused and are causing hundreds of deaths—United States policy has been to defend Israel's actions and to veto in the United Nations any effort by other nations to censure or condemn Israel's conduct. That is all because of the 3 to 4 per cent. of the total American population that makes up the Zionist lobby which dictates America's middle eastern policies.
Most hon. Members are unaware and unconcerned—one should never underestimate the ignorance of Members of the House of Commons on a whole range of issues—and most of our own people do not know, because of the appalling uninformative nature of the popular press, that America has had a strategic alliance with Israel since Reagan's day. Had we taken a test on that before the debate, many hon. Members would have said, "What are you talking about?". They do not know.
There can be no doubt that any military action planned by one of those countries is revealed to the other. When the
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strategic alliance was set up, no Pentagon planners could foresee that a situation might arise when the United States would work with "Arab allies" in a fake alliance such as has been clobbered together by the United States at the United Nations. The unrepresentative present leaders of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco—undemocratic and corrupt as each of them is—have joined the gang because of the massive bribe of American economic assistance and debt relief.
So the Americans now have a problem. How can they hold this rag-bag of Arab armies and others together if Israel joins in the attack on Iraq? Israel does not give a damn if the alliance falls apart as long as Saddam Hussein is destroyed, which is now the main aim of the whole operation.
When Israel is engaged, the alliance with the Arab countries will start to fall apart. As Iraq is attacked and devastated, the peoples of the Arab world will increasingly voice their hatred of America and there will be an immense growth in the fundamentalist holy war, anti-western drive. There will be a massive rejection of the present leaders of large parts of the Arab world.
If Iraq is destroyed, what can the hated west then hope to do to restore stability in the devastated area and to restrain Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Syria and Turkey, from falling upon the corpse to take their fancied bit of territory? In the process of all that, Israel will play as destructive a role as she can in removing such a powerful Arab country as Iraq. In the aftermath, by some contrived provocation, Israel will move into Jordan, which has long been her intention under the biblical fantasy of Eretz Israel. She will pretend that the Palestinians can settle there, under Israeli control of course.
Last year, when I mentioned negotiations as a proper way forward, the former Prime Minister went into an intemperate tantrum and screamed of appeasement—hon. Members will remember that—but what can be wrong with negotiation if by such a means we avoid a horrendous war? President Mitterrand deserves our gratitude for his efforts to prevent that, even at the last moment.
The Americans persist in their refusal to countenance a conference as part of a peace outcome. However, why should the Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular, believe that a conference will follow the defeat of Iraq? America and Israel have persistently refused to allow a proper resolution of the Palestinian problem and the wrongs that the Palestinians have undergone for more than 40 years.
What has happened to the Labour party? We seem to be so electorally eager that every consideration must be subservient to winning the next election. Every policy, and apparently every principle, must be subject to that aim. If opposing the destruction of large areas of the middle east and avoiding the devastation and the thousands of deaths that would ensue, together with the appalling economic damage to the countries of the third world, leads to the loss of popular support, it is a price the Labour party should be prepared to pay. Principles should still apply just occasionally in politics and, more particularly perhaps, to the Labour party.
7.3 pm
Sir Hector Monro: I shall leave the speech of the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) to be sorted out within his conscience and that of his party.

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I strongly support the Government and their view that we must support the United Nations. That has also been the message from the Leader of the Opposition and that of the Liberals. That is a key point and we must not overlook it.
I have full praise for my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence for the way in which they have negotiated in the past six months in a particularly difficult period of our history. They have come through with high marks, and they command total support from most hon. Members.
Of course everyone wants peace, but all peaceful means now seem to have been exhausted. Today we have listened to the French contribution, which is now being considered, but I do not believe that Saddam Hussein has said anything in the past five months to suggest that he has any intention of listening to reason.
There seems to be no alternative but to become involved in the war that has been going on for five months. In common with other hon. Members, I believe that further delay is much more likely to cost lives than getting on with action now.
Those who advocate more time for sanctions must balance that view against the nuclear capability of Iraq and, in the shorter term, the inevitable stronger defences that will be erected around the border of Kuwait. It is also important to bear in mind Iraq's input in terrorism in recent years. Its opportunity to influence and to encourage further terrorism throughout the world must be stopped as soon as possible.
There is every indication to suggest that we shall be fighting soon—I hope for a short time only. In common with my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates), I have immense confidence in our services in the Gulf, and those of our allies.
Recently I visited strike command and I was immensely impressed by the chain of communications. I was also heartened by what my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East said about the visit of the Select Committee on Defence to the Gulf. I agree with my hon. Friend about the role of the media. I hope that they will allow our forces and those of our allies to get on with winning the war. The media must try to keep out of the way as it is extremely difficult to fight a war with television cameras poking over one's shoulder all the time. There is a great responsiblity on the BBC and the IBA to behave extremely responsibly and in a manner supportive of our forces in the Gulf.
I echo the praise that my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East has given to our forces, but I should also like to praise our reservists and auxiliaries. We are lucky to have such excellent and well trained reservists. I am involved with the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, which is a fine force with a fine history. It began its flying operations in the 1920s, and 16 of its 21 squadrons fought in the battle of Britain. Today we have 19 squadrons and units, and all the auxiliaries, in common with the Territorial Army, are volunteers. They train regularly and attend annual camps. They are highly efficient and form part of the line of battle of the Royal Air Force.
In a time of emergency it is certainly right that those auxiliaries should be called out, and the Government have been right to do so. The auxiliaries are trained just for that
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purpose to support the regular RAF at times of crisis. I am glad to note that 4626 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron from Wiltshire has gone to the Gulf in support of the RAF medical team. The auxiliaries responded to the call almost to a man—or should I say to a woman since there are more female nurses and doctors in the squadron than male. They deserve great credit for their immediate response in support of our forces in the Gulf. It is important to know, however, that there is a good procedure for those who have compassionate reasons not to be called out. A few people met those reasons and were allowed to stay at home.
The Royal Auxiliary Air Force also has other squadrons specialising in aerodrome defence, movements and communication. Those squadrons are anxious to be called out, if required, whether to go to the Gulf or fill in for RAF regulars in this country or in Germany.
I stress the importance of calling out reservists in an emergency under the Reserve Forces Act 1980. If one is a reservist, it is much easier to be called out than to have to go to one's employer or to one's wife and family and say, "I think I ought to volunteer for the Gulf; I hope you do not mind if I am away for some months." If people are called out, they know where they stand. Their jobs are secure and they know that the financial side will be looked after. The response has been first class not only in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force but in the Territorial Army. I know how well 205 Scottish General Hospital, RAMC, responded to the call. It is important to keep units operating as units with their own officers and NCOs.
My hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces has been helpful on all aspects of the Gulf, particularly in answering hon. Members' queries. Is he making progress on reservists' pay and the offer of a 20 per cent. increase in their military pay where the circumstances require it, bearing in mind that reservists have been called out at short notice and may have had domestic, mortgage and other problems to resolve?
With the Gulf and Russia highlighting the uncertainty of the world, should we not think again about "Options for Change"? I appreciate the predicament in which the Ministry of Defence is placed. On the one hand, it is taking a leading role in preparation for the Gulf and for what looks like inevitable war, and on the other it is working on "Options for Change" when it does not know what the position will be in a year's time. The Gulf problem blew up out of nothing. In recent weeks new problems have arisen in Russia. We should put "Options for Change" at the back of our minds for another year until we see what forces we need and where we are likely to need them.
Our service men are anxious to know their long-term future, but they would be happier if they could see a settled world ahead, with their responsibilities set out in front of them, rather than taking a sporting chance on what may happen in 12 months' time. Therefore, decisions on "Options for Change" should be postponed because they will be highly controversial and will cause much hardship and hurt in the Army, particularly if cap badges are to disappear. This is not the moment to contemplate major changes.
I give entire support to the Government and to our forces in the Gulf. I am sure that the Government will have a massive majority tonight.
7.13 pm
Dr. David Owen: A new system of common security in the world depends on our capacity to uphold the United Nations charter. That means upholding it all over the world. The Soviet Union is flouting the United Nations charter in Lithuania by depriving that country of the right to self-determination. Israel has not kept to resolution 242 in the occupied territories. Iraq is in flagrant breach of the United Nations charter in its occupation of Kuwait. The linkage of those three issues is the United Nations charter; they cannot be linked in any other way than by a determination to uphold the charter.
In Iraq there is a real chance, for the first time since the charter was formulated in San Francisco, to get world powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, so to commit themselves to the United Nations charter that it will be much harder for them to escape its implications in other parts of the world.
The key issue in the debate is whether we ought to continue with sanctions and hold back on the use of force. Few people have denied that in order to uphold the charter it is necessary to threaten both economic sanctions and the use of force. It is a question of the balance between the two. It has been little short of a miracle that the multinational coalition has been able to hold so strongly for the last five and a half months. The real reason why we are approaching a time when the multinational force will have to commit itself to armed force in order to throw Iraq out of Kuwait is that, if we are honest, we know that the coalition is coming under considerable strain.
Eduard Shevardnadze in his recent speech made it clear that he was under intense domestic attack for the stance that he had taken on behalf of the Soviet Union over Iraq. We need to remember that the Soviet Union was the largest supplier of arms to Iraq and had a treaty of friendship with it; the continuation of the coalition is causing great strain within the Soviet Union.
France is the other large supplier of arms to Iraq and the European country closest to it. We have seen over the last month how much strain the coalition is causing inside France, with opinion polls showing a majority against committing French forces to uphold the United Nations charter in Iraq.
We have seen how over the past few months the world has begun to accept that Saddam Hussein's reason for attacking Kuwait was to uphold the rights of the Palestinians. No country has a better record of upholding Palestinian rights and providing jobs and occupations for Palestinians and substantial financial support for the Palestinian cause than Kuwait. It is a total corruption of the truth to believe that the invasion of Kuwait has anything whatever to do with the Palestinians. To believe that the path to a solution to the invasion of Kuwait lies through Jerusalem is a delusion.
We must remember that dictators are often impervious to logic and reason. It has been obvious for some time that Saddam Hussein is ready to fight. We will not get through the next few difficult days and weeks with the correct judgment if we think that Saddam Hussein is waiting for diplomatic coverage and an excuse to withdraw. We will have to face the need to eject him by armed force. I do not think that the coalition can withstand until the autumn, or for another five or six months, economic sanctions.
Mr. Tony Banks: Why not?
Dr. Owen: I have tried to explain why I do not believe that it can. In many ways I wish it could.
So we come to the whole question of what should be our posture during any armed warfare and our attitude to a possible ceasefire and a peaceful settlement. I hope that there will be no question of repeating the mistakes of Vietnam when there was far too much political interference with the military. It is a hard thing to say, but this war will have to be fought fast and furiously. There is no room for risking a missile with a gas warhead or a biological warhead coming through the defences, whether it be to Israel, to Saudi Arabia or to any of the surrounding countries. The military must feel that they have the freedom to prosecute a war with the aim of the defeat of Saddam Hussein. That is the fundamental aim.
We must recognise, too, that we shall be doing a service to the cause of peace if we do not try to draw this out with a token force or any of the other partial scenarios. He must know that it will be all-out war. Of course, that war will have to be taken to Iraqi territory. It cannot be confined entirely to fighting within Kuwait. I shall not pretend to be an armchair strategist and shall say nothing more than that I believe that the military leaders must be given the essential freedom to prosecute the war as they feel best to achieve success and protect the lives of the troops under their command.
In my judgment, Saddam Hussein will and does believe that if he negotiates from the battlefield he will achieve more success. If he demands a ceasefire it will be hard not to stop. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that our aims go beyond the United Nations resolution which has not specified our anxiety about nuclear weapons or mentioned the Iraqis' capability for manufacturing chemical and biological weapons or the vast conventional forces that they have assembled. Those four elements are a threat to the region's future security and are a perfectly legitimate target in the event of armed hostilities. That is why they should be hit and hit fast in the early part of the battle. It will not be possible to get back into this once a ceasefire has been declared.
The next issue involves lifting sanctions and what happens after a ceasefire. It seems essential that there must be on-site, on-the-ground inspection and verification of the armed potential of Iraq in the subsequent period. We should not agree to a ceasefire until that is conceded, signed, sealed and settled.
How bad is the war likely to be? Everyone is preparing public opinion for the worst, and it is right to do so. So often things go wrong in war and casualties are frequently caused by mistakes. But we can slightly exaggerate the strength of the forces against us. There is no doubt that in conventional tank warfare, dug in, the Iraqis have built up considerable expertise. I do not think that that is likely to be our first chosen course for battle. However, our superiority in the air is massive, our technology considerable and our intelligence excellent. With good heart, united forces and a clear command structure, we have every prospect of a quick and clean success.
The issue of the command structure is of the utmost importance. I do not expect the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence to reveal all the details in the House—we all know that the matter is massively complex —but I hope that the command structure is being given

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constant attention because that is where we are most vulnerable and where the whole exercise could come painfully unstuck.
Mr. Rupert Allason rose—
Dr. Owen: I shall not give way.
The maintenance and upholding of the United Nations charter is a perfectly legitimate and noble strategic political objective for our armed forces. It may well be that, in future, British forces will rarely, if ever, fight a purely national war for the integrity of the United Kingdom. It is more likely that they will act as part of a multinational force upholding the United Nations charter around the world. Therefore, it is immensely important that that objective is not only achieved, but is seen to be the proper responsibility of our armed forces. If it is successful, the fact that we were able to achieve that end with democratic allies from the west and from the Arab countries will be of tremendous importance. I hope that we are successful and that the war is prosecuted quickly and brutally.
7.23 pm
Mr. Michael Morris: It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). I think that I am one of only two hon. Members with a son in the Gulf. He has been there for three and a half months. The House will realise, therefore, that our family, together with 35,000 other families, has followed what has been happening in the Gulf with acute attention in recent months. Such families listen to every news report and daughters-in-law throughout the country hang on every word given forth. Yesterday, I listened to the Panorama programme which reviewed the position in the Gulf.
To a man and woman, all the young people of our armed forces who went out to the Gulf signed on voluntarily. I believe that the vast majority of them signed on consciously knowing that at some time it might be necessary for them to serve this country. Those parents interviewed on the Panorama programme who pretended that that was not so were not faithfully representing their own children.
Our thanks should go out to people such as Mrs. Sue Thomas of Swansea, who is perhaps unknown to all hon. Members except the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). She is a lady who is on her own and, with her son in the Gulf, has acted as a co-ordinator for the news and has helped to ease problems among the young men and women out there. I pay tribute to her work and hope that British Telecom will respond to the letter sent to it by the hon. Member for Swansea, East in which he suggested that Mrs. Thomas's phone bill should be ignored. If it is not, I will pay for it.
I pay tribute to the Ministry of Defence and Ministers. There have been a few slip-ups, as there are bound to be, but the commitment shown by Ministers has been absolutely superb. I have put issues to them, responses have come back via the blueies and other colleagues have made similar approaches. On behalf of our forces who have been in the Gulf during the past months, I thank my right hon. and hon. Friends who have worked long and hard.
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I re-echo the sentiments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) about the media. Our troops in the Gulf will not understand it if the media undertake reporting that is to the detriment of the forces. I hope that the media will also understand that, while we in the House are experienced in handling the media, that is not true of the ordinary man or woman soldier in the field. I hope that that fact will be respected.
I pay tribute to the national health service. I have checked on the reception that will be given to casualties by our hospitals and my research has, thankfully, produced a 100 per cent. response to the effect that this country's hospitals are ready, instructions are clear and preparations have been made. That problem had to be faced and I thank the Secretary of State for Health for the fact that it has been.
The families of our young people in the Gulf know that their relatives face a number of questions. They know that they will be wondering whether it is right that they should be there in the first place. All those in the services to whom I have talked know and all the correspondence that I have received shows that our young people understand why they are in the Gulf. They recognise that it is unacceptable for a small country to be invaded and virtually erased from the map. They also understand that there is a difference between the position in Kuwait and that involving Grenada, Panama and some of the other examples put forward. They appreciate the total purpose of sanctions —a controversial issue. We have all known in our hearts that sanctions imposed on an Arab nation led by a despot were never likely to persuade him to withdraw from a territory that had become the 19th part of his country. Sanctions were imposed to communicate to him that the world was serious and that he had better take the world seriously.
The time has come when we have to make the sad choice to take up arms now or to postpone doing so for about another eight months. It is all very well for hon. Members in this Chamber, which is air conditioned—and all very well for that general in the United States whom I, too, heard say that our colleagues in the Gulf would rather get sunburned—but I wonder how many hon. Members have served in the far east. I worked there for two years and I can testify that it is hard enough to work in hot conditions, so it must be much more difficult to fight in them. How many hon. Members have ever put on a survival suit? I and a few others have, but I have never done so in 120 degrees of heat. If our armed forces are to be asked to fight, let them fight in the relatively cool weather of the next six to eight weeks.
Our young people out in the Gulf have taken their training seriously; they have moved up to the front line; they recognise that they have a job to do; and they are exceedingly well trained. I wish them all godspeed to return to this country.
7.31 pm
Ms. Dawn Primarolo: It is incredible that the attitude to the United Nations appears to have two separate lives—post-August 1990 and pre-August 1990. Hon. Members seem to take their bearings from resolution 660; from it they lay down a new order for the United Nations and they wipe the slate clean of all the transgressions against international law and United Nations authority before that date. Some hon. Members

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suggest, so it seems, that we can ignore the transgressions of the United States in Panama, Grenada, E1 Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia and Vietnam; and we can ignore the flouting of international law by the United States as witnessed in its refusal to accept the ruling by the international court that it illegally mined the ports of Nicaragua and should now pay compensation. All that is to be put aside and the new world order that we all seek in the post-cold war period must start from the invasion of Kuwait.
Then we are surprised when the Iraqis and many Arab countries and other nations throughout the world feel aggrieved by our logic and tell us—rightly—that the rules are being made to fit in with our objective, which is oil.
It is also interesting to note that, while pleading for so much peace, we are taken inexorably towards a catastrophic war which threatens consequences beyond our imagination or comprehension and which will inflict untold ecological and environmental damage. It will inflict horrendous loss of life, both civilian and military, in the middle east and disrupt the region's political and economic stability—as well as that of the rest of the world. By ignoring the prospects of ecological and environmental changes that may result, we are possibly putting at risk I billion people in the world, whose crops will fail and who will be faced with climatic changes. And we contemplate a disaster on this massive scale in the name of a moral imperative to which I, too, would subscribe—but consistently. It is wrong to invade another country, wrong to use economic and military might to blunder around the world in order to secure a country's political and economic objectives. But that is what the United States has done and it is not` surprising—
Mr. James Paice: What about the Soviet Union?
Ms. Primarolo: No nation that sits on the Security Council can fairly claim not to have transgressed international law.
All these immense problems are being contemplated because we refuse to negotiate or consider what may be on offer. We would rather send thousands to their deaths and put at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands more in a game of brinkmanship that passes for so-called diplomacy —trying to frighten someone into doing something instead of sitting down and negotiating with him.
The liberation of Kuwait is certainly important, and Iraq must be made to withdraw from it—but not by a scorched earth policy which will leave nothing behind. Where is the international justice and peace behind these double standards? How can we build peace on war? The charter of the United Nations was drawn up to avoid war and to settle disputes by peaceful negotiation, so how can we build a future when we use that very organisation to declare war and unleash its disaster on the world?
We live in an era of modern communications, and aggrieved Muslims throughout the world believe that they must continue to seek redress of injustice, so in the next decade this crisis will still be unresolved. War solves nothing: it creates further crises.
It is still unclear exactly what is being sought. There have been many suggestions of how we could solve the crisis. It has been said, for instance, that the Kuwaitis are prepared to lease back the disputed islands. The press has reported that the Saudi Minister of Defence has agreed
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that there should be negotiations over the disputed oil field. Iraq has committed itself, after the crisis, to the Egyptian proposal of last April to set up a security and peace conference for the region at which all the destructive weapons both of Israel and of Iraq would be the subject of negotiations. If all that is so close to being achieved, what is it that appears to be forcing us into war?
It appears to be two things. First, there is our absolute refusal to deal with the Palestinian issue and to recognise the linkage, despite the fact that since 1980 the EC has actively pursued a peace conference in order to settle that question, despite the fact that it is United Nations policy and despite the fact that the occupation by Israel of the Palestinian areas has been declared illegal. We are prepared to go to war on that basis.
The Mitterrand proposal is accepted by almost everybody except ourselves and the United States. Even the Saudis have said that they are prepared to consider it. Yet we quibble about the words. We will not go to the negotiating table. We are prepared to use the organisation that we say should establish the new world order on a vote to veto something to prevent a new policy coming forward that should achieve peace. That is not the way in which decisions should be made, and it is certainly not the way in which we should be considering the facts before us in this crisis.
In Bristol, as in many other parts of Britain and throughout Europe, a massive peace movement is developing. That peace movement is making its view clear. In December, Bristol presented to Downing street a petition of 8,000 signatures, and one of 5,000 signatures today, pressing the Government to continue to seek a peaceful situation to the conflict with Iraq and to give the United Nations sanctions time to take effect. We urge the Goverment to do the same: avoid the risks of war which may involve nuclear and chemical weapons.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): Order.
7.41 pm
Mr. Robert Boscawen: No thinking person can hold other than the utmost forebodings of a long war in the Gulf. Any talk that we heard earlier today about jingoism in the House or outside is completely unreal.
As a Member with a substantial defence base of the Fleet Air Arm to represent, I am grateful for the chance to say how welcome it will be to our service men that the House, as I believe it will tonight, gives them its overwhelming support for whatever they are called upon to do.
Saddam Hussein, like Hitler before him, has demonstrated now beyond conjecture that he wants war. Sadly, there is no point any longer trying to fathom why he does so. Nevertheless, the democracies and many individuals representing them, officially and unofficially, have been right to go to the end of the road to see if he can be deflected by reason, provided that we continue to uphold the one principle that naked aggression cannot be allowed to prosper; the principle that so many before us more worthy than us found, sooner or later, that they had to be prepared to fight and many to die for. They faced it even more reluctantly at the time than we are doing here today in the House. Any other course can only allow the evil to fester and progress to a far greater calamity in the end.

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The United Nations endorsement of that principle is an enormous plus for the future peace of the world, and I am delighted that it was so ably endorsed this afternoon at the beginning of the debate by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister who made a particularly fine speech and by the Leader of the Opposition at the beginning of his speech.
That may be a simple and certainly honourable purpose, but it is the better for remaining simple and undistorted by clever words and complex formulas. There has, of course, to be a complex settlement at the end in the area of the vastly different historical and tribal interests, but it cannot come about through one aggressor robbing a neighbour of his life and freedom for his own peculiar ends.
That the Government and our allies should allow sanctions to continue as long as possible in order to change Saddam Hussein's mind is an important and persuasive argument, but unless we can be sure that that will change Saddam Hussein's mind, our leaders should reject it. They must ask themselves which method will best protect the lives of our service men and allies in the Gulf. That is what our leaders will want above all else, and our people will want to see that they do it. When they ask themselves that question, I believe that they will realise that if they wait too long the lives of our service men will be at greater risk. Therefore, the argument for prolonging sanctions should not be applied. To do so would also take away from the military leaders one of their greatest weapons—that of surprise—and we should in no circumstances allow that.
It appears likely that our service men will shortly be at war in the Gulf. Having spoken to the commanding officer of the fleet establishment in my constituency, I have been convinced that, disagreeable though whatever comes may be, the service men are ready and their equipment is well oiled. We have every right to be proud of them in whatever they do.
The war will be disagreeable. The extent of violence at the beginning of modern war is bound to be terrible and our armed services will suffer some heavy bombardment, many of them for the first time. Disagreeable though that will be, and the noise terrifying, they will soon learn that they will come through and still be around at the end of it. They will learn quickly that noise can be a friend on the battlefield as well as causing them a pit in the bottom of the stomach. They will experience too the marvellous feeling of hearing the support of their own aeroplanes, guns and allies. I am certain that they will give us cause for pride and they will show the tremendous feel for humanity which the British service man is incomparable in displaying.
It is to service men's families and loved ones at home that we should give our greatest regard at this time. Their quiet and silent role is perhaps the hardest of all. In particular, the press and the media have the enormous responsibility of maintaining the guidelines and ground rules laid down in order to allay their anxieties. The media have the power to cause tremendous and unnecessary anxiety in the homes of many of our service people if they fail to meet their responsibilities. We all invite the media to remember that.
We pray that some of our forebodings will be disproved. We ask for the safe return of the British men
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and women in the Gulf and for those of our allies. We know that they will not let us down. Let us see that we in this House give them our full support.
7.50 pm
Mr. Stanley Orme: At the end of 1945. I was a young airman stationed in the middle east and awaiting demobilisation, along with millions of other service men who had served throughout the second world war. I looked forward to a different Britain and to a different world from that which existed when we entered the 1939 war. Over the next 40 years, I fought and worked for a United Nations that would be a world force for peace and sanity.
That was prevented by the catalogue of disasters that was outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South (Ms. Primarolo). The cold war prevented the United Nations from working in the way that we wanted, not least because of the Vietnam war, Brezhnev doctrine, Cuban missile crisis, and many other incidents.
In the present post-cold war period, we have for the first time a unanimous United Nations decision aimed at implementing a policy agreed by its members, and that gives us a fresh opportunity. Over the past 30 or 40 years, many of my right hon. and hon. Friends have, like myself, fought for a fresh order based on the United Nations. It is no use saying that one wants to achieve such an order but then to deny the United Nations the means to implement its policies, if that becomes necessary.
Having said that, I am firmly of the opinion that not enough time has been allowed for sanctions against Iraq to be properly implemented. The Prime Minister has not given any information today about the way in which they have failed or about the main problems. I believe that we must go that extra mile in trying to achieve peace before resorting to force. That is essential, just as it is essential that the French proposals should be examined in detail. They should be put on the table, and the House ought to have an opportunity to debate them.
Mr. Winnick: But there has been no response to them in Baghdad.
Mr. Orme: Then let them be put to Baghdad, and let us see what the reaction is. That would not be to display any weakness, but rather would be to explore every avenue.
I am very chary of the one or two armchair critics or generals who talk at such times of a quick and swift end to the war. I served in uniform in a war for six years, and it did not end either swiftly or without massive loss of life, particularly in the western world and in the far east.
I am under no illusion about the regime in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Throughout the 1980s, I was involved in an organisation which was concerned with civil rights and with the rights of certain Iraqis. In 1981, my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and I went to the Iraqi embassy to plead on behalf of trade unionists and socialists in that country who were being tortured and executed. It was a harrowing experience to enter that embassy and hear the steel doors clang behind us, and to see everyone inside carrying automatic weapons. That is the kind of regime with which we are dealing. What has happened to Iraqi trade unionists and socialists, as well as to the Kurds, is an example of the horrors that have been perpetrated under the present

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regime. The occupation of Kuwait is another indication of the extent of the action that the Iraqi Government are prepared to take.
I am sure that no right hon. or hon. Member is under any illusion about the need to avoid military action, if that is possible, and to find a solution—which is why we must go that extra mile. Nevertheless, and as has been said by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, if British troops become involved, we are bound to support them. However, let us hope that progress can be made and that every avenue will be explored. I trust that, when the Foreign Secretary replies tonight, he will describe the French proposals in more detail than did the Prime Minister, report what has happened at the United Nations today, and say whether the Government are prepared to go that extra mile.
7.57 pm
Mr. Julian Critchley: If my hair is as red as my suit, it is due not to vanity but to enemy action.
The hon. Member for Bristol, South (Ms. Primarolo) asserted that wars solved nothing. She is wrong, for on occasion wars do provide a solution. One might argue that the Great War solved nothing and only postponed a second world war, but the hon. Lady cannot assert that the second world war solved nothing when in fact it brought the downfall of the Hitler regime.
It is clearly true that wars are much easier to start than to finish, and that the objectives for which countries go to war frequently change during the course of the hostilities. Given the likelihood that we shall be at war in a day or two, we should ask ourselves certain questions about the Iraqi situation. If the objective is only to liberate Kuwait —which is clearly a desirable objective—would the allies then be in the position of having to defend a land frontier against an Iraqi counter-attack, and of having to do so indefinitely?
Is it our objective to overthrow Saddam Hussein? 1f so, one wonders quietly whether there are enough freedom-loving, sensible Iraqi parliamentarians prepared to come forward to administer Iraq in the circumstances of their country's humiliating defeat. However, although these problems are acute, it is not the allies' fault that they should be posed for us to solve. It is the fault of the "thief of Baghdad" himself—Saddam Hussein, whose aggression is clearly unforgivable.
The former leader of the Social Democrats, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), referred briefly to the position in the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Iraq. How ironic it is too that it should be, and probably now is, in the western interest that the cohesion of the Soviet Union remains a reality. If the Soviet Union were to break into a series of warring, nationalist-based republics, who would keep control of the 12,000 nuclear warheads which the Soviet armed forces possess? I have always been convinced that the most significant and sinister member of the Communist party is the Soviet equivalent of my right hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Onslow).
I speak as the Member for Aldershot, which is the home of the British Army. We have a thousand Aldershot-based service men in the Gulf at present; and, over and above that, the Cambridge military hospital, which for years has sustained the national health service locally, has moved lock, stock and barrel to the Gulf. Clearly, local residents
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are anxious that it should return and I have been able to persuade the Minister for Health to give an undertaking that it will reopen.
The problem is that we are now obliged to face the real possibility of war. I do not think that the French initiative is especially useful. Clearly we have to avoid linkage where we can. When it comes, the attack must be executed swiftly, because waiting indefinitely would lower the morale of our troops in the Gulf.
There is a debate between airmen and soldiers. Airmen believe that they have the power, which might of itself win the war. Clearly, it is more important that the Army moves into Kuwait swiftly behind an air attack, because unless one occupies the enemy's territory there is no point is having soldiers out there.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Sir H. Monro) referred to "Options for Change". It would be tactful of the Government, and especially the Minister of Defence, if they stopped speculating in public for the time being about "Options for Change" because soldiers who are going out to the Gulf to fight, and possibly to die, are not a little anxious that they may eventually return to find that the units, regiments and corps to which they belong no longer exist. There is a good case for a peace dividend, on the assumption that all in the garden will be lovely indefinitely, but I think it wise to stop talking for the moment about "Options for Change".
One certainly gets the impression that majority opinion in this country is reluctantly in favour of hostilities. The situation is not of our making but of Saddam Hussein's making. We have a great interest in destroying his chemical, nuclear and biological capability. We shall enter hostilities as a member of the United Nations. What is important about the exercise is that we are in pursuit not of British national interest but of something different, although just as important—the principle of a real world authority, which should be able to protect small nations against large nations and thereby determine and guarantee the freedom of small as well as large countries. That principle is worth fighting for.
8.4 pm
Rev. Martin Smyth: This evening's debate has been wide-ranging, fascinating and, at times, confusing. As a father, and also as a minister giving guidance to people, I used to say, "Never threaten a child unless you intend to carry out the threat, and never make a promise unless you intend to keep it." The tragedy is that having told Saddam that he must leave Kuwait by 15 January, if we are not prepared to stand by our word if he does not withdraw, we shall have opened the way for further aggression.
The hidden agenda is not simply Kuwait—and, ultimately, control of international oil—but the struggle for leadership of the Arab nation. That is one aspect which we need to underscore at present because, in the light of the comments of the hon. Member for Bristol, South (Ms. Primarolo), Muslims throughout the world will be bitter as a result of any action taken at this time. We have to remind them, and others, that the aggressor was Saddam, against a Muslim people, the Kuwaitis. Therefore, we have to go beyond the concept of so-called western imperialists—capitalists or Christians, under whatever guise—oppressing the Arab east. The fact is that there has been naked

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aggression by President Saddam Hussein against the Kuwaiti people and, ultimately, a threat to the Arab world.
Some hon. Members have asked about the French proposal as though it was on the table and Saddam had sat down to discuss it and was prepared to accept it. I am reminded that the Secretary-General of the United Nations said that it takes two to tango and that he did not find a lovely lady in Baghdad with whom he could tango. We have to stand by the role of the United Nations. When I visited it in November with other hon. Members, we discovered that the general consensus was that if the United Nations could not deal with this problem it could deal with nothing because this is the first time that there has been unprovoked naked aggression by one member of the United Nations against another. If the United Nations cannot deal with that, its whole structure is threatened.
I ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to suggest to us tonight whether, among the other proposals, there have been any proposals from Algeria and the Yemen, as has been reported in the press, and especially whether he is aware if Her Majesty's ambassador in Sana'a has been given a proposal for the Arab solution in Yemen, because when I was there with another colleague as part of the Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation we heard much of the Arab solution and we pressed to be given details. A solution was presented to us and we asked that it be put in writing and given to the ambassador in Sana'a so that it could be transmitted to the Government, not as the personal comment of an individual or as a foreign commentary, but as a commitment from a nation which was speaking a great deal about an Arab solution. The tragedy of our visit was that we heard people in public criticising the use of force, but in private saying that they did not think that Saddam would be put out of Kuwait without the use of force. They all faced that reality. When people seek a linkage between Israel, Palestine and Kuwait it does not exist merely in the event of war developing but because of what has happened—and has already been mentioned by one right hon. Member tonight, to the best of my memory.
The Palestinians have suffered greatly as a result of the invasion of Kuwait. The finances that were being advanced from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to help them have dried up. Along with others, the Palestinian people must face the harsh reality that the whole region is suffering—not because an independent nation, Israel, has sought to defend its frontiers and in so doing has taken over other territory to protect herself. I believe, as others do, that there will come a time when a peace conference will have to be held to make new arrangements there. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind what was said at two IPU conferences by the Speaker of the Knesset, who had himself suffered in internment camps and who had seen so many of his people suffer in the holocaust. He put it on record that he would never remove a homeland from the Jewish people. Where they live is their own decision; they can go where they like in a free society. In his view, however, those who talk glibly about a solution should remember that people have a right to live in a homeland. I should like to think that the funds that have been available in the Gulf during past years, and could become available in the future, might be used purposefully to help
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Palestinian refugees to resolve the problems, rather than allowing terrorism to continue and destroy the community.
Finally, I must put on record the support of the people in Northern Ireland for our forces in the Gulf. Some of our people are serving with the British forces, and we stand beside them. We recognise, however, that there are others who, looking for peace, fondly believe that it will come as a result of prayers. The hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) pleaded for a day of prayer to be called by the former Prime Minister, but that has not been done. Perhaps we do not want to bring the Almighty into the matter, but there is a lesson to be learnt from the last world war. Only when our people humbled themselves and sought the help of the Almighty did we begin to be delivered from the dictator, and I firmly believe that only when we humble ourselves again will we see the way forward to success.
I remind anyone who takes a jingoistic view—whether in the international forces or in Saddam's regime—of an old biblical quotation, which says, roughly, "Let not him that putteth on his armour boast as he that puts it off."
8.12 pm
Mr. Nigel Forman: I believe that the key reason why this country may find itself involved in war before very long is the overriding need to do all that is necessary to preserve and enforce United Nations collective security in the post-cold war era.
Even at this late hour, we all hope that Saddam Hussein will order an Iraqi withdrawal. He has acted at the 1 1 th hour before, and may do so again. The world community, however, cannot afford to wait indefinitely for economic sanctions to work. That seemed to be the siren song in part of the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, and, indeed, in that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath). I believe that they were both wrong, for a delay in the use of force beyond the present cool season in the Gulf could rule out such action altogether.
This is because frontline troops cannot be kept at maximum readiness for ever and have to be rotated. It is because of the political difficulties of holding the United Nations coalition together, especially for Arab states such as Egypt and Syria, whose Governments have problems in holding their peoples under an American-led United Nations banner, and because the Soviet Union itself is in a critical state which means that we can no longer rely on the continuity of Soviet foreign policy. It is also because of the political difficulties of maintaining the resolve of public opinion in free democratic societies with the modern mass media—societies such as the United States and even the United Kingdom.
There is little or no evidence that Saddam Hussein really cares about the fate of his own people, let alone the Kuwaiti people. Indeed, he seems to have an almost infinite capacity to impose cruelty and suffering on others —witness the cruel and cynical way in which he tolerated perhaps half a million deaths in his own country during the long Iran-Iraq war. Nor does he appear to care a fig for the force of world opinion; if he did, he would not have flouted no fewer than 12 United Nations resolutions.
My argument was put very well by Albert Wohlstetter in a recent edition of The Wall Street Journal. He said:
"Saddam is likely to tolerate the pain the embargo will inflict primarily on his civil society longer than the domestic

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and international coalition would bear the high political and economic costs of insisting on his getting out without compromise."
Nor should we forget, when trying to assess the rights and wrongs of the issue, the way in which the Iraqi president has ruthlessly and cynically shifted his ground in his attempts to justify the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait—a point made very well earlier by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Let me give two examples. Saddam Hussein has for a long time led a secular dictatorship in Iraq, yet we now hear from him and his spokesmen the rhetoric of Islamic holy war. Saddam invaded Kuwait palpably for economic and material reasons; yet he is now trying to claim that he did it only for the sake of the Palestinian cause. Each of those claims should be treated with the contempt that it deserves.
Mr. Tim Devlin: It seems to me, and to many academic analysts of the middle-eastern problem, that what Saddam Hussein cares about most is Arab public opinion, and that, if he is allowed to walk away from this crisis having seen off the entire world by way of the United Nations force, he will be an unstoppable engine for Arab nationalism in the years to come and will be very much strengthened.
Mr. Forman: My hon. Friend has made a good point. In the psychological warfare that has been taking place in the last few months, there is clearly an important division between the views of the Governments of many Arab states and the views of the street, as it were. Saddam Hussein is plainly aware of the advantages that he thinks there are for him in playing a demagogic part.
Security Council resolution 678 clearly authorised the use of force by the United Nations coalition. It mentioned the date of 15 January in the hope of concentrating Saddam Hussein's mind. It may still achieve that, but deadlines postponed are deadlines undermined. Delay could fatally damage the credibility of the United Nations' position, and bolster Saddam's confidence and prospects.
Today, the choice between peace and war still lies essentially with Saddam Hussein. In a little while there may be no effective choice, for the reasons that I have given. That will obviously mean a bad outcome for the people of Kuwait, and also for those of Iraq. It will be a setback in the search for a durable settlement in the long-standing Arab-Israeli dispute, and it will probably make the building of new security structures in the whole middle-east region more difficult.
Yet, if it does come to war, the House can best make its contribution by speaking as much as possible with one voice in support of the United Nations and the principles of collective security—and, if necessary, in support of our magnificent troops, if and when they have to go into battle.
8.19 pm
Mr. Peter Shore: Democracies do not easily resort to war. Government, Parliament and people have first to be persuaded that the use of force is right and that it has become unavoidable. Although very different views have been expressed in today's debate, that should not subtract from the large area of agreement that exists on both sides of the House. First, we are clear that we are dealing with an act of naked aggression. Kuwait and its people have been attacked,
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occupied and cruelly treated for no reason other than that Kuwait is rich, small and virtually helpless against the armed might of its overpowering neighbour.
There have been many acts of aggression since the foundation of the United Nations 45 years ago. However, what has happened in Kuwait is unique in two respects. First, the Security Council of the United Nations is united in its insistence that Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to get away with his conquest, that he must unconditionally withdraw his forces from the whole of Kuwait and that the lawful Government of that country should be re-established. Secondly, it is the first time since 1945 that an aggressor state has sought to change not just the Government of another country or rectify its borders or impose penalties but to destroy and annex the victim nation. That is what Saddam Hussein has attempted to do.
Both sides of the House agree that this relapse into the lawlessness of the 1930s must be halted and that the aggressor must be compelled to withdraw. The House has agreed that action should be taken only with the full authority of the United Nations. My right hon. Friends the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Foreign Secretary have from the start rightly insisted that there should be clear United Nations authorisation for every measure against aggression. While all parts of the House ardently wish that a solution can be found by a combination of resolute diplomacy backed up by an economic blockade, it is agreed that the military option must be available. The only point of dispute—it is a serious point—that has arisen is not about the use of force but when it is right for that option to be exercised. That argument is finely balanced. There are people of considerable reputation and experience in this country and this House, and in the United States and both Houses of Congress, who have taken the view that it is workable and preferable to maintain the blockade until Saddam Hussein is compelled to withdraw.
I shall not rehearse all the arguments for and against, but I want to add two considerations that in my mind have tilted the balance. First, we all know that on 29 November the Security Council authorised the use of "all necessary means", including force, if Saddam Hussein had not withdrawn by 15 January. Of course, it has been said that that is not a precise ultimatum and that there is no immediate resort to arms from midnight tonight. However, having pronounced a date, the authority of the United Nations is now committed and every day and every week that passes from today will lead to the erosion of United Nations' authority and to mounting tension throughout the middle east and the world.
Secondly, I am persuaded that Hussein means war and wants war. There have been numerous chances for him to avoid a clash of arms and I shall not rehearse them all, but his attitude and commitment cannot be doubted by anyone who watched and heard reports of the UN Secretary-General's visit to Baghdad. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was kept waiting for six hours and then lectured by the aggressor. No wonder Mr. Perez de Cuellar put his head in his hands and said that there is little room left for diplomacy. If the French can bring off a last minute coup without loss of credibility to the United Nations' position, like everyone else in the House I would welcome it. However, I do not believe that it will be any more successful than all the other attempts that have been made and all the other missions to Baghdad

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that have taken place. Those who invest their hopes in an economic blockade and believe that it will suffice have to face those facts.
Mr. Bowen Wells: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Shore: I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon, but he knows that I am under great restraint.
There is, I recognise, a minority view in the House and in the country which was demonstrated in considerable numbers on Saturday in Trafalgar square. There are those who have persuaded themselves that the issue is not about Iraq annexing and invading Kuwait but about American concern for the supply of oil. I find that absurd. It is a paradox that the two nations of the industrial world—Britain and America—who have or could easily obtain their own supplies of oil have been most active in organising the military resistance to Saddam Hussein. Far from being the selfish pursuit of United Kingdom and United States oil supplies, it is because we know from our experience in 1974 and 1979 that it is the world economy, including western Europe, eastern Europe, Japan and still more the non-oil developing countries, that will be most grievously affected that we are concerned that the price of oil should not be driven up and that supplies should not be intercepted as they were so tragically in 1974.
There are those who have deceived themselves or are deceived by Hussein's propaganda that there is a direct link between his aggression in Kuwait and the occupation of the west bank by Israeli troops. Not one Iraqi has been killed or injured in the struggle for Palestinian self-government, but hundreds of thousands of casualties have been inflicted upon others and upon themselves by Iraqi internal repression, by its vicious use of force against its own Kurds, by its eight-year war against Iran and, most recently, its cruel conquest of Kuwait. No one with any knowledge of recent middle eastern history and United Nations interventions there can possibly believe that the unacceptable situation on the west bank arose from a simple act of Israeli aggression or that the Arab nations have accepted what is required of them under Security Council resolution 242.
If—in the next few days or, at most, the next few weeks —war proves unavoidable, it will not be a war waged for imperialist greed or a selfish desire to corner the oil supply of the Gulf but a war for the central purpose for which the United Nations was founded. It will be a war against aggression and to establish the rule of international law and the authority of the United Nations. It will be a war to rescue the damaged and abused people of Kuwait. There can be no crocodile tears about that. They have been damaged, ravaged and abused. It will be a war in which the sacrifices made by those directly involved will earn and deserve the gratitude of their fellow citizens and the world community.
8.27 pm
Sir Richard Luce: This is a sombre occasion against a background in which we may in a short time ask our service men to risk their lives for their country. It is right that every viewpoint reflected in the Chamber today should be heard and treated with respect. We have heard a great variety of views. I agree
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wholeheartedly with the views expressed by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore), who has injected a sense of reality in the debate when we had sensed a degree of self-delusion about what is happening in Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.
We are facing one of the most challenging post-war tests for the United Nations and for all the 30 or so countries involved in the military force in the middle east. It is a unique opportunity for the United Nations to re-establish international law and order in the middle east.
It is nearly six months since the invasion took place. We are entitled to ask ourselves at this stage what evidence is available to suggest to us that Saddam Hussein may in the near future withdraw peacefully from Kuwait. If we examine that question, it is hard to believe that he will do so. One has only to look at his position. He has abused human rights in Kuwait and has decimated the country. One has only to look at the firm entrenchment of his massive forces around Kuwait and his refusal to accept Kuwait's right to exist. Over the past five and a half months he has refused to accept Kuwait's right to exist as an independent nation. He has refused to budge one inch in discussions with several leaders of the western world. His rhetoric is extreme and becomes more extreme and more provocative, and he invokes God to his cause. Despite the fact that many people suggest that he wishes to do so, he has made no attempt to save face. In the past few days, he showed utter contempt for the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In doing so, he treated the United Nations and the rest of the world with contempt. He appears to dismiss, with contempt, the wider consequences of his actions, such as the flow of thousands of refugees from his country, the suffering that that has caused and its effect on the neighbouring country of Jordan. His actions affect world oil prices, which in turn affect the economies of the third world and eastern Europe, which are struggling to achieve economic development and a better standard of life. That shows that the long-held fears of other Gulf states—that Suddam Hussein and Iraq pose a threat to their independence—are justified.
Saddam Hussein's record gives us no sense of hope. Throughout most of his presidency, he has been in conflict of one kind or another; for example, the treatment of his own people and the Kurds, and the Iran-Iraq war, in which at least 100,000 Iraqis and 250,000 Iranians were killed. That was of no benefit to his people or to anybody in the middle east.
It is right to respect the views of those who say that if we allowed sanctions a little longer to work they would have their effect. We must examine that carefully. I have found no evidence to suggest that by prolonging this in the hope that sanctions will have their effect Saddam Hussein will withdraw. If he does not withdraw against the background of the past few weeks and the deadline of 15 January imposed by the United Nations, he is not likely to withdraw in the foreseeable future. In addition, we must remember the world's experience of sanctions being imposed in the 1930s and the post-war years.
Mr. Winnick: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that, if Saddam Hussein wanted to avoid war, even at this late hour he would have made it clear that he accepted the French proposals in outline? Is he aware that there has been no response to those proposals from Baghdad today? It is quite clear that he wants war.
Sir Richard Luce: If that is so, it is simply further evidence, and the House deludes itself if it thinks that he is likely to change his mind at the last moment, although we must all pray that he does.
We are faced with the prospect that we may need to liberate Kuwait—"liberate" is the most important word —thereby giving greater hope and protection to the smaller states of the world and the interests of international order. There are no precise historic parallels, but we must learn the lessons of the 1930s and the history of Czechoslovakia. If we do not act positively now, the danger of war at a later stage is that much greater.
On 28 November 1988, an Arab leader said in a speech to Arab lawyers:
"An Arab country does not have the right to occupy another Arab country—God forbid, if Iraq should deviate from the right path, we would want Arabs to send their arms to put things right."
Saddam Hussein made that speech. It is right that he should heed his words now, or pay the price that he anticipated. If he refuses to do so, we shall find ourselves near the time when we must liberate Kuwait. In so doing, it must be right that we should let the world know that, in the aftermath of the withdrawal from or the liberation of Kuwait, the United Nations, Britain and the other nations participating in the forces there are ready to work with the forces of moderation in the middle east to help to construct a more stable middle east. Britain's past role in the middle east has been singularly important. We helped to create Iraq and Israel and to protect the Gulf states. We have a heavy responsibility and duty on our shoulders to work to create good from tragedy.
8.36 pm
Mr. Jim Sillars: Many states and many individuals have been involved in the process that finally took Saddam Hussein into Kuwait. I want to make it perfectly plain that we believe that in the final analysis one person will decide for war or peace—Saddam Hussein.
I shall quote from a bulletin called "Voice of the Arab World", which is produced by a British organisation. It produced an intelligence report in December that illustrates my point about several people being involved in the process that brought us to the present situation. It says:
"File Five: Washington and Whitehall policy up to 25 July.
The Americans are not the only ones who at one time or another 'took' to Saddam Hussein. A former British ambassador to Baghdad, during his time there, escorted David Mellor, then British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in to see the president. The ambassador said later: 'It was a very sympathetic, encouraging meeting. Iraq was one of Britain's most valued trading customers. She remained the stalwart enemy of Iran. Add that background to the buoyant, self-confidence of Mellor and you have the ingredients for a cordial meeting between two interesting and intelligent men.'"
The article points out that, while the Iraqis were massing on the Kuwaiti border—apparently the CIA told Washington of that, but it either could not or did not want to hear—
"the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie met Saddam on 25 July at a time when his tanks were lined up on the border. Her recorded words were: 'The United States has no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait.' The ambassador thereby emphasised to Saddam an U.S. 'hands off policy in the Arab Gulf. She pressed on to make two other points: 'I have been instructed by Secretary
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of State Baker to emphasise and underscore this message to you. I am under instructions from President Bush to seek better relations with Iraq.".
I draw the House's attention to the word "conflicts" in the statement made by the US ambassador to Saddam Hussein. Many people believe that that was the green light for the border dispute and that the real problem is that Saddam Hussein went beyond the border that was in dispute. Whatever contribution other people may have made to the stimulation of his ambitions, ideas or false information, Saddam Hussein is the person who will decide for war or peace.
I have not evaded or avoided the possibility of military force being employed against Saddam Hussein. Nor am I sanguine about the amount of time that is available to us. It is a purely personal judgment, but I believe that if he is still in possession of Kuwait after Ramadan there will be no prospect of getting him out. If we are honest, we are all aware that the coalition which gathered around the United States and the United Kingdom is shaky and may not last long.
Are we at the final moment? Are we at the point when we can conclude that there is no alternative, barring unleashing force against Saddam Hussein? The Scottish National party and I believe that we are not. Earlier this afternoon, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) mentioned President Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis. The important formula for Kennedy was, "Never put your adversary in a corner that he cannot come out of. Always leave him some means of escape." That has not happened in our relations with Iraq over this problem.
I have just been passed a note saying that the French initiative has totally collapsed, which I very much regret. I do not want to go into whether it collapsed because of problems in the Security Council or because Saddam Hussein said he did not want anything to do with it. I am not in a position to relay that information to hon. Members.
It is a great tragedy that the French initiative was not picked up immediately it became known because it had two important elements, one of which was withdrawal. A BBC translation of the initiative states that its purpose is
"To invite Iraq to announce the intention of withdrawal without further delay. The intention to withdraw to a scheduled calendar and begin massive and immediate retreat".
I disagree with the Prime Minister, who said this afternoon that the wording undermined the United Nations' resolutions. It does nothing of the kind.
The second element of the French initiative was a call for a middle east peace conference. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary and the Government will retort that the concession of a peace conference would give some success to an aggressor. I read the Foreign Secretary's article last week in The Scotsman and his speeches and those of the Prime Minister. They talk as though some great, sacrosanct moral imperative is involved.
International affairs have nothing to do with morality; they are founded on state interest and the practical limits of power that can be applied in a given situation. That is why the events in East Timor did not produce the response made to the Kuwait invasion. That is why Lebanon could be invaded by Syria and Israel without a similar response. That is why we have had diplomatic rapprochement with Syria, which not long ago was a terrorist state. That is why

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tonight all we can do is wring our hands about the Baltic states rather than urge the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to intervene.
If people want to move nearer home on the issue of state interests and the contradiction with morality, let them remember what the House did in respect of the Falklands and compare that with what we did in respect of Hong Kong where, because of our perceived state interests and domestic interests, we were willing to allocate 3·5 million Hong Kong Chinese to a regime which shot young students dead in a square in Peking.
Hon. Members say that the United Nations charter is extremely important and that we will go to the end to defend it. Let us take a hypothetical situation, which could become a reality—the Ukraine, where a range of people have always argued that in no circumstances is the Ukraine other than an independent area which should never have been taken into the Soviet Union. The Ukraine has a seat in the United Nations. What happens if they declare their independence and invoke the charter? Everyone knows that no peacekeeping force would be sent, because of the practicalities of the limitations on power.
Mr. George Galloway: I very much admire the hon. Gentleman. This is one of the best speeches that I have heard this evening, not least because I did not get to make mine in this, the third of the Gulf debates. So magnificent a speech is it that I am bound to ask the hon. Gentleman a question. I shall go into the Lobby to vote against a war and against the Government. Will the hon. Gentleman and the Scottish National party be there with me?
Mr. Sillars: I shall deal with that point when I come to the end of my speech—[HON. MEMBERS: "Come on."] I am not subject to the 10-minute rule.
Mr. Cryer: Say, "Yes, I will" or "Yes, we will."
Mr. Sillars: I shall answer the question put by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galloway) at the end of my remarks.
I want to discuss the issue in terms of the reality of state interests. State interests are involved with the west. If Kuwait were noted for its wheat and not its oil, there would be no crisis and no army. Is it really in the best interests of the west to have war before every aspect of diplomacy is exhausted? That is a key question.
I want to be specific about Palestine. I have heard people say that there is no linkage, and I would not pretend that Saddam Hussein went into Kuwait to promote the Palestinian issue to the top of the world agenda—of course he did not. But he has now introduced the Palestinian issue. He has opened up a possible avenue of escape for himself. Bearing in mind the Kennedy dictum, should we open up that avenue even further to allow him to escape?
Some people say that there is no link, but anyone who knows anything about the middle east knows that the Palestinian issue is a great current that wholly determines, shapes and forms the political climate of the whole middle east. Perhaps it is put better than I can put it if I quote Patrick Cockburn in an article in The Independent today. Referring to linkage, he said:
"The difficulty is that the security problems of the Middle East are both linked. The fact that the Iraqis did not originally
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invade Kuwait on behalf of the Palestinians does not alter this. From the first days after the invasion, Palestinians on the West Bank and in their diaspora throughout the Arab world supported Iraq because they, more than anybody else in the Middle East, have most to gain from a change in the balance of power in the region."
There is linkage whether we like it or not. All Arab attitudes have been formed by the events of 1948, 1967 and 1973—that is the Palestinian issue.
There are risks. Suppose that we get an agreement and a diplomatic move which allows Saddam Hussein to retreat and he becomes some sort of hero—partial loser but also partial winner. Risks are involved, but they must be balanced against the other risks inherent in the consequences of war unleashed in the middle east. All major conflicts generate death and destruction, but they also whip up political shock waves which knock over previous political structures. Nothing is ever the same after a war. This war will release a shock wave in a region littered with regimes lacking legitimacy in terms of popular support—a region in spiritual, intellectual and political turmoil, one of the most unstable in the world.
For those reasons, we do not believe that we should go to war until the exhaustion of every diplomatic effort has been proved.
I end by replying to the hon. Member for Hillhead. At business questions yesterday I said that it is a disgrace that this place is being forced to vote on a war and peace issue, with all its complexities—not black and white but shades of grey in between—on a technical motion on the Adjournment. If we vote for the motion with the Government, they will be able to claim that we support them and the leader of the Labour party will be able to claim that we support his war aims which go far beyond those of the United Nations. We cannot go into that Lobby subject to that interpretation. The problem of going into the Lobby with the hon. Member for Hillhead is that we do not agree with some of the things that he and his hon. Friends have said—
Mr. Galloway: No war in the Gulf.
Mr. Sillars: No. The hon. Gentleman must take on board the fact that the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn)—[ Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. This is very unparliamentary.
Mr. Sillars: The hon. Gentleman must take on board the fact that the right hon. Member for Chesterfield has been arguing that in no circumstances can one apply force to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. We do not agree with that, so we cannot join those hon. Members in the Lobby. It would have been far better if we had had substantive motions which could have been amended and on which we could have voted. We will not be manipulated by the Government or by the Opposition Front Bench or by other hon. Members.
8.50 pm
Mr. Peter Temple-Morris: I am somewhat reluctant to intervene in the trials and tribulations of Opposition Members. I hope that the House will calm down and will get back to the subject. Incidentally, it would be no bad thing if the House got back a little to the principles and morals involved as well. The hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) would not expect me to agree with most of what he said. He took me and the

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House around the world so quickly that we are all dazed geographically and politically by his various examples, apart from being dazed by the trials and tribulations.
I should like to think that the hon. Gentleman may be right in believing that we have not yet reached the final moment, but I fear that he is wrong. I was naive enough—I said so publicly as well as privately—to feel that there would be an Iraqi withdrawal at the last minute. I based that view on the fact that Saddam Hussein was not a complete fool. He has conducted himself in a clever and almost crafty way in playing the various forces that have been ranged against him. I thought that Saddam Hussein would not risk the destruction of his country, and the death of so many of his armed forces and of his people. I thought that he would go for the so-called "nightmare scenario", which means a partial withdrawal, and which has scarcely been mentioned in the debate. I believed that he might partially withdraw, but might keep the disputed part of the Rumaila oilfield and the islands. We may even yet have to address that question.
I and other hon. Members in the debate are extremely pessimistic. Saddam Hussein appears to have decided that he can better survive as leader of his country—bearing in mind the fate that has awaited Iraqi leaders historically if they got it wrong—after a defeat and after having fought than after a withdrawal from which he gets little or nothing. That is sad, so I agree with the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) that that man intends to fight. We must, of course, try for peace and we must go down various avenues for the extra mile. Some of my hon. Friends may agree that we have been down a lot of avenues and a lot of extra miles.
The present position is that all the initiatives are as nothing. My own pessimism began when I learned of the deplorable way in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations was treated in Baghdad. On the tapes tonight, we heard—this is quite apart from arguing the question of linkage, with which I do not agree—that after the French had put linkage as part of their terms, the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said that he had had no tangible response from Baghdad. That is the present position.
The realities are simply these. We are not dealing with what might have been, with whether we could have got something different or with whether, if we had been in charge, we could have done something different. We are faced with an illegal and brutal invasion. We are faced with a second invasion of a different country in a decade. We must face the fact that if nothing is done here, there will be further invasions.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) put the argument well. Against Iraq is ranged the most powerful military force since the second world war. It involves the United States, ourselves and a number of others. It also has the full backing of a world body—the United Nations. To back off now would mean that there would be no world authority left. It would be open season for every dictator and terrorist in the world.
I want to describe what I believe would happen if we backed off. The future would be even more precarious than the future that could await us should there be a war. First, Iraq will take over the military and, increasingly, the political leadership of the Arab middle east and there could never be a more unscrupulous and unprincipled leader. Secondly, the Gulf states are always vulnerable and
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they would collapse unless we stayed there virtually indefinitely. That is not on and would not be a good thing anyway.
Thirdly, Israel will undoubtedly be involved in a further middle east war if Saddam Hussein has his way in the present crisis. Fourthly, the forces of Arab moderation and balance will effectively be demoralised. Egypt and Syria will not chance their arm again with the west if we let them down over this, which is a very difficult position for them. Fifthly, as has been so well put recently, not only the prosperous world but the third world will increasingly become dependent on the will of dictators. Sixthly—a horrifying prospect—Iraq will become a nuclear power.
We must concentrate on the future, whether there is peace or war. It is paramount that we concentrate on gaining a solution—and it will not be easy—to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the Palestinian position. The participation of the United States, in the same thorough and good way in which it has led the world during the present crisis, is needed increasingly on the issue, which is the rallying cry for much of the trouble throughout the region.
The region is divided between the countries which are deprived of wealth and are generally more populated and the countries that are under-populated and extremely wealthy. A more equal distribution of the oil wealth must be worked out across the Arab world.
A further point for the future is that we must establish —whether there is peace or war—a United Nations-backed, mainly Arab peacekeeping force for the area and that force will, of course, be backed by the west. We must encourage political progress in the Gulf states. Whatever can be said about those countries, the inhabitants have not in recent years faced an overwhelmingly democratic future.
Last, but not least, there must be far tighter international control of weapons supplied to these countries. They have the money to buy equipment of vast destructive power, but they have few of the skills or the maturity of government which should go with the ability and opportunity to use those weapons. We must aim for all these things in the future.
8.57 pm
Mr. Bernie Grant: There has been the stench of hypocrisy about this debate, and also the stench of racism. I agree with the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) who spoke about Lithuania. The British Government have said that Lithuania is a free and independent country which is not part of the USSR. The USSR has sent troops into Lithuania. Therefore, the British Government should do what it has done about Saddam Hussein, Iraq and Kuwait: it should get the United Nations to send troops to throw the Russians out of Lithuania. There is one reason why they will not do that —the colour of the Russians is different from the colour of the Iraqis and that is a fact.
I spent eight days in Iraq as leader of the peace mission organised by the British branch of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement. We were there to find out what the Iraqis thought because the media over here had not been putting the Iraqi point of view. If we are to believe what we hear from President Bush, our own Prime Minister and the gutter press, Saddam Hussein is a half-mad dictator—a devil who rules by brutality alone and does not care about

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his people. But the fact of the matter is that Saddam Hussein is not mad—he is ruthless, yes, but he is not mad —and he cares about his people. When I was in Baghdad, the Iraqi people told me that they had the greatest respect for Saddam Hussein. The same is true in Jordan. The reason is that Saddam Hussein has made his people feel that the Arab people should be proud of their ethnicity and race. The west takes no account of that.
President Bush says that there should be no linkage. I will tell the House about linkage. I remember when the Americans called a conference to discuss Namibia after the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, at which the South Africans were defeated by the Angolans and the Cubans. The first thing that the Americans said was that they had to have linkage: if they wanted the South Africans out of Namibia, the Cubans had to leave Angola. It had nothing to do with the issue. The Americans are nothing but a load of hypocrites if they think that we will accept the policy of no linkage.
The present situation could be resolved easily if Israel said that she was prepared to go to a conference to discuss the Palestinian issue. Why will the Israelis not do that? It is because Israel wants to maintain her expansionist policy in the middle east—and Israel is allowed to get away with that because the Americans want one power only in the region, and that power must be Israel.
I am opposed to much of what has been said tonight and to sanctions against Iraq. I think that there should be an Arab solution. If the Arabs got together without any pressure from the west, they would be able to resolve the issue. The Palestinian issue must be an integral part of any conference. I believe that there should be a discussion on secure borders for Israel, too, but I certainly feel that unless there is linkage there will be no prospect of peace in the middle east.
If there is war tomorrow, the effects on third-world countries will vastly outweigh the effects within the region. The Minister for Overseas Development has already told us that there will be no extra money for the starving millions of Africa because of the amount of money that will have to be spent on war in the Gulf. That is only one aspect. There will be hunger and starvation the like of which has never been seen before in the oil-importing countries. A report of the United Nations committee on trade and development has already stated that if the price of oil goes to $30 per barrel, $26 billion will be taken away from third-world countries and put back into the coffers of oil-producing countries, including this country. It is clear to me that the world, around America and its allies in the Gulf, is heading for war for one reason and one reason only: it wants control of the middle east.
There is also a subsidiary reason: the people involved are people of colour. I end as I began: if we are talking about white people invading a white country, United States and British forces would never be involved as they are in the Gulf today.
9.3 pm
Mr. Gerald Kaufman: As we approach what may be the gravest turning point in post-war international history, it is right that this House of Commons should remind itself of the nature of the crisis that we face. Parallels have been drawn with other crises in
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which this country has been involved—with Suez, referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), and with the Falklands. Those comparisons are faulty.
Suez was a conspiracy among three countries of which Britain was one. Britain was party to an aggression that violated two United Nations General Assembly resolutions and involved a British veto of two Security Council resolutions: it was Britain against the United Nations. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), from whom we heard again today, should remember all this very well; he was the Government Chief Whip at the time and he had the responsibility of delivering a majority to sustain Anthony Eden's violation of international law. Although Suez had serious international implications, it fundamentally affected only the four countries in dispute. In Britain the Prime Minister was overthrown and the country's imperial role was ended for ever.
In the Falklands there was an act of aggression by a fascist dictatorship which, tired of negotiating what it regarded as a valid case, invaded the islands which it claimed and so violated the United Nations charter. Again, although important principles of international conduct were involved, it was a dispute between two countries, each with supporters of its case, which did not involve the United Nations directly. The solution of the dispute by the United Kingdom exercising its right of self defence under article 51 of the United Nations charter affected only the two countries involved. Argentina was expelled from the islands and the Argentine junta was ousted soon afterwards.
The Gulf crisis that we have debated throughout today is very different. Although one country has invaded and consumed another, the dispute is not simply between those two countries. Immediately after the invasion took place on 2 August, the United Nations Security Council intervened. It took a series of unprecedented measures intended to force the aggressor to disgorge his spoils. If those spoils are not disgorged, the repercussions will affect not merely Iraq and Kuwait, but the entire world community.
If the most stringent measures ever taken by the United Nations fail, the United Nations will in future be worthless as an institution created and designed to maintain international order and security. That is why we in the Labour party have been determined that the will of the United Nations must be upheld and implemented. It was a Labour Government who were involved in the creation of the United Nations 45 years ago. It is the Labour party which has a constitution requiring us to support the United Nations. We have invested too much faith and hope in that organisation to stand by and see it shattered by the recalcitrance of one country.
Ever since 2 August the Labour party has been clear in its view of how the crisis should be solved. We have based that view insistently and inextricably on support for the authority of the United Nations. It is based not on support for any individual Government, including the British Government, but on the firm rock of the United Nations. We advocated economic sanctions and naval and air blockades to enforce them. We advocated diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a peaceful solution fully within the United Nations resolutions. We said that if an option

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of force was to be available to provide backing for the sanctions and the diplomacy, that option must have what in the House on 7 September I called
"the clear and unquestionable authority of the United Nations".—[Official Report, 7 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 892.]
Mr. Dalyell: Does my right hon. Friend accept that some of us would be much more comfortable if, to establish the firm rock of the United Nations, we went back not to the Security Council but to the General Assembly and asked a specific question? We should ask whether it is the will of the General Assembly of the United Nations—all the member countries—that we should embark on a human and ecologically catastrophic war. If that question were put and answered, many of us would be much happier.
Mr. Kaufman: My hon. Friend is well aware that such questions are referred to the General Assembly only when the Security Council is stalemated. That is precisely what happened during Suez when the British Government's veto of two Security Council resolutions placed the matter in the hands of the General Assembly. We welcome the diplomatic efforts that have been made and are still being made. I hope that they will continue, whether they are made by France—although it appears that the latest French initiative has failed—the Yemen or anyone else who feels ready to try. But let us be clear that every diplomatic effort that has been attempted has been the initiative of the countries or international organisations united against Iraqi aggression.
It was President Bush who proposed the talks in Baghdad and Washington, which never took place, and the talks in Geneva that failed. It was the European Community that proposed talks with Tariq Aziz, which he spurned. It was a senior French emissary who went to Baghdad and it is the Prime Minister of Yemen who has gone there. It was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who represents us all, the Security Council and the General Assembly, who went to Baghdad and, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) reminded us, was left cooling his heels for six hours before Saddam Hussein deigned to meet him.
Let us be blunt. The senior statesmen and women of the world have danced attendance on Saddam Hussein while he, the initiator of the aggression, has not taken one step to resolve the situation that he has created. He has frustrated the efforts of those who have sought an outcome through diplomacy. Mr. Perez de Cuellar said, after their meeting eventually took place:
"He never mentioned the word withdrawal".
As all of us in the House agonise about how to resolve this crisis peacefully, let us be clear that the crisis could be resolved peacefully in one moment if Saddam Hussein withdrew from Kuwait and if he decided to undo what he alone did—if he simply got out. Instead, as resolution 678 puts it, he is in "flagrant contempt" of the United Nations. He says that he has no grievances, but he knows that UN resolution 660 urges that those grievances be resolved through direct negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup referred to those negotiations today, but they can take place only if there is a Kuwait—an entity whose existence Saddam Hussein denies—and if there is a legitimate Kuwaiti Government restored to authority as resolution 661 laid down.
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Saddam Hussein claims that he is concerned for the Palestinians, who indeed continue to suffer under Israeli occupation. If they continue so to suffer, Saddam Hussein must bear a full share of the responsibility, because since the House last debated the Gulf crisis, the Security Council has passed resolution 681 which, accompanied by a statement by the Security Council president, provides the basis for the international conference which Saddam Hussein says he wants to deal with the problem. The statement says that such a conference should be held at an appropriate time. It is an historic and unprecedented resolution. Not for nearly a quarter of a century has the Security Council passed a comprehensive resolution aimed at securing a middle east settlement and justice for the Palestinians.
If the Security Council's authority is flouted over 12 resolutions dealing with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, how can an appropriate time—I should like it to be very soon, for I have advocated such a conference for many years —be fixed for that conference when it can only be convened through the authority of the United Nations? If Saddam Hussein cared as much about the Palestinians as he rhetorically claims, and as much as many hon. Members genuinely care, he would immediately withdraw from Kuwait for that reason alone. However, he shows no sign of getting out. The whole of the UN awaits the decision of one man who holds all of us to ransom.
We all agree that Saddam Hussein's aggression must be reversed. What is causing anxious debate in the House and the country is how it should be done. The Labour party advocates diplomacy and we believe that that should continue as long as there is any point to it. However, diplomacy should not reward Iraq—there can be no reward for aggression—nor should it do a deal with Iraq. The Security Council resolutions insist that withdrawal must be unconditional. Diplomacy should explore, until success is reached or there is no further point, the possibilities of persuading Iraq that withdrawal is in its interests as well as in the interests of the international community.
The Labour party advocated economic sanctions. They have been in operation for 166 days. I am sure that when the United Kingdom Government embarked on those sanctions they did so in good faith. I am not sure whether the Government hoped or expected that the sanctions would succeed in 166 days or fewer, but two things are clear: first, the sanctions have had a considerable effect; secondly, they have not yet had the effect of inducing Iraq to leave Kuwait.
That sanctions have had an effect is clear from impeccable sources. By November the United States State Department had reported that 97 per cent. of Iraq's oil exports had been cut off, that imports of machinery, industrial goods, semi-finished goods and raw materials had declined by 90 per cent. and that some food prices had increased eightfold.
Mr. William Webster, director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, gave evidence to the House of Representatives armed services committee last month when he provided further information. He said that more than 100 countries are observing sanctions, that sanctions have all but shut off Iraqi exports and that imports into Iraq have been reduced to less than 10 per cent. of the pre-invasion level. He said that many light industrial and assembly plants have been affected, as has Iraq's only tyre manufacturing plant. He revealed that sanctions have

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deprived Iraq of $1·5 billion of foreign exchange every month and that Iraq will have nearly depleted its foreign exchange reserve by the spring. He said:
"Reduced rations, coupled with rapid inflation … will compound the economic pressures".
He said that even with favourable weather Iraq would be able to produce less than half the grain that it needs, and that the effect of sanctions will be felt first by the Iraqi air force and then by its army.
The Iraqi industry Minister has admitted that 60 per cent. of factories are closed due to lack of spare parts or raw materials and that almost 80 per cent. of Iraqis are unemployed or under-employed.
No doubt on the basis of that or similar information, Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, the commander in chief of United Kingdom air forces and joint commander of the British forces, stated that by the end of October —I have no reason to think that he has changed his mind since—the refinement of crude oil into aviation fuel and lubricants for tanks and other vehicles was already becoming more of a problem for Saddam Hussein. He said:
"If we can enforce the embargo more effectively life must get more difficult for him."
The air chief marshal summed up:
"We have obviously got to give several months or longer for sanctions to work. We are pinning our faith on sanctions. There is evidence they are starting to bite."
That is clearly an important view. Equally clearly, I would be the first to insist that judgments on policy must be the responsibility not of service officers, however senior or distinguished, but of elected politicians. The House should take that evidence into account. Because sanctions have not yet succeeded does not mean that they are bound to fail.
The House should take into account, too, that the date of 15 January, inserted into resolution 678, is, as the Foreign Secretary explained when the resolution was going through the Security Council,
"not … the date upon which military action starts"
but
"It is the date after which member states will be authorised to take action in pursuit not of their own objectives but of the specific requirements of the Security Council".—[Official Report, 28 November 1990; Vol. 181, col. 869–70.]
That interpretation was endorsed a week ago when President Bush stated:
"January 15 is not a date certain for the onset of armed conflict."
It was reinforced yesterday by General Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser, who said:
"Every day we're closer to Saddam Hussein's deadline. We don't have one, but he has one."
It was with those considerations in mind that I told the House in our debate five weeks ago on 11 December:
"Stipulation of the date does not necessarily trigger the use of force on or immediately after that date. We in the Labour party repeat our position that the option of force should be invoked only after the maximum time has been given for sanctions to work".
I continued:
"We should not be hemmed in by the date of 15 January. We should not be boxed in by the compulsion of the desert timetable and the effects of the weather on the ability to wage war. If a longer haul is judged likely to achieve the effect of sanctions, we should not rely on other considerations to reject the longer haul."—[Official Report, 11 December 1990; Vol. 182, c. 837.]
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That has been our position from the start and it remains our position today. We still hope that it will prevail.
We appreciate that as an Opposition we can warn, advise and recommend, but not decide. The prerogative of decision lies with the Government. Therefore, the question arises as to what the Labour party's attitude should be if the Government's decision is contrary to what we recommend and early use of force is decided on. Here, my judgment is very much affected by what has become of the position the Government held at the outset of the crisis.
I have reminded the House tonight that in the first of our debates on the subject on 7 September 1990 I insisted that if there was to be an option of force standing behind sanctions and diplomacy, it should have what I called,
"the clear and unquestionable authority of the United Nations."
I said:
"We believe that any further operations found necessary … should … be clearly and unequivocally authorised by the United Nations."
Much of that debate in September was dominated by discussion of whether article 51 of the United Nations charter was sufficient authority for the use of military force against Iraq. I said:
"It is not enough to be able to argue a technical case under article 51"—[Official Report, 7 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 892.]
That was not the Government's position at that time. The right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher), opening the debate as Prime Minister, spent a large proportion of her speech advancing a view quite contrary to the view of the Labour party's spokesmen. She spoke of what she called the right of individual or collective self-defence under article 51, which she claimed was affirmed in resolution 661. She said:
"To undertake now to use no military force without the further authority of the Security Council would be to deprive ourselves of a right in international law expressly affirmed by Security Council resolution 661."
She continued:
"I have full legal authority for everything that I say on these matters, and for those reasons I am not willing to limit our legitimate freedom of action … My views have been approved by the topmost legal opinions that we can get." —[Official Report, 6 September 1990; Vol. 177, c. 737–38.]
If that had continued to be the Government's policy, I might have been in considerable difficulty tonight when contemplating my attitude to the use of force should the Government decide, as I hope they will not, to go ahead with force earlier rather than later, if at all. But what the right hon. Member for Finchley stated as the Government's policy on 6 September is no longer Government policy. That policy was abandoned in the most explicit terms on 9 November when, after talks with Mr. James Baker, the United States Secretary of State, the right hon. Lady came to Downing street as was her wont in those days and announced that she had given her approval for the United States to seek a United Nations resolution authorising military action in the Gulf.
The then Prime Minister could not have been more open about this change of policy. She declared:
"We do not believe one"—
that is, a resolution—
"is necessary for legal reasons. We already have the legal authority. The only question is how best to keep this coalition of opinion together and that, of course, we consider."
The Government changed their mind and I am glad that they did. They supported the Security Council resolution when previously they had rejected such a resolution. That

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resolution went through on 29 November. It is a resolution for which the Labour party pressed and on which we insisted. We are very glad that the Government came round to our way of thinking.
We ardently believe that the option in resolution 678 ought not to be taken up until sanctions have been given a better and further chance, but if that view is rejected we have to be consistent. We must accept that such action will have been taken in accordance with a resolution for which we pressed long and hard, a resolution which is now United Nations policy embodied in that resolution.
That is why I remind the House of our long-stated view that sanctions should be persisted with over the longer haul—[HON. MEMBERS: "For how long?"] Neither the United States when it drafted the resolution nor the United Kingdom Government when they supported it wanted a deadline at all. It was inserted at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The United Nations, having slipped into the error of one deadline, ought not to slip into the error of another.
Ms. Short: I have heard my right hon. Friend say on a number of occasions that the 15 January deadline, which I considered a major error, came about at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said today that he understood that the Soviet Union asked for that deadline because it was later than the deadline that the Americans were pressing for. This deadline is a major error in the west's strategy in the Gulf, and I should like to hear what my right hon. Friend has to say about the point made by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup.
Mr. Kaufman: I can give my hon. Friend two pieces of evidence, one of which is on the record and one of which is not. I assure my hon. Friend that I obtained the latter in the past eight days on the highest and most authentic authority.
The first piece of evidence was provided by the Foreign Secretary who, in Hansard on 28 November, specifically confirmed that this was done on the insistence of the Soviet Union. As for the other piece of evidence, I have been told by other parties involved in the negotiations that the deadline was inserted at the insistence of the Soviet Union; and there could be no better authority for that information than those parties. If the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup disagrees, he will have to produce evidence contrary to mine, but I cannot imagine any evidence that could controvert the evidence that I have.
I say again that sanctions should be persisted with over the longer haul. I also say to the House that if the British armed forces are sent into action under the authority of resolution 678 and in accordance with an objective that we support, the Labour party will give its unswerving support to our armed forces.
On 11 December I told the House that at the end of that debate I would be voting not for the Government but for the policies that the Labour party has advocated since the invasion of Kuwait. I said that I would vote to send a signal to Saddam Hussein that the Labour party is unequivocal in its support of the United Nations.
I shall vote tonight in the same Lobby and for the same reason, not for the Government, not to urge or encourage war, but in support of the United Nations. I want Saddam Hussein to know that the Labour party is impregnable in its support for the United Nations; that the United
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Nations demands that Saddam Hussein leaves Kuwait and that leave Kuwait Saddam Hussein will. I pray that he leaves Kuwait peacefully.
9.30 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Douglas Hurd): This has been a sombre debate, rightly, because the country may stand on the edge of war and it is right that the House should look into these deeps. My hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Boscawen) spoke of his memories and experiences. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Morris) mentioned his family anxiety. Such speeches were deeply moving because of the personal feeling behind them.
The right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) asked a key question about our aims if there is a war, and they are clear. They are contained in the Security Council resolutions. They are to get Iraq out of Kuwait—all of Kuwait—to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait and to uphold in that way the collective security and authority of the United Nations. Beyond that, there is no hidden agenda. There is no intention to dismember Iraq. There is no intention to impose on Iraq a Government or, indeed, a president of our choice. We have not added to or sought to add to the requirements of the Security Council. The international community has been clear about those aims from the beginning.
I will pick up one or two of what seem to me to be the important points raised during the debate before I return to the main theme. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) referred, as he has done before, to his interpretation of Security Council resolution 660 and what it says about negotiation between the Kuwaitis and the Iraqis. My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker) picked up the point, as did the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) just now.
Resolution 660 was passed on 2 August, the day on which the Iraqis moved into Kuwait and before they had secured all its territory. We and all members of the Security Council wanted to see negotiations between the Government of Kuwait in Kuwait and the Government of the invading force, just as we wanted the invading force to withdraw, but it is a very different matter to expect the Kuwaiti Government in exile to take on the full burden of negotiating with the Iraqis on the restitution of their rightful territory, particularly with a Government, one of whose Ministers says that there is no such thing as Kuwait.
Of course there is an agenda. My right hon. Friend is right. There is an agenda between those two countries, not least because it is certain that the Kuwaitis will want substantial reparations from Iraq. But these negotiations can only take place between two Governments who control their respective states. Therefore, before that part of resolution 660 becomes realistic, we must bring about the return of the territory in Kuwait to its legitimate Government.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Sir R. Luce) mentioned in passing the position of Jordan. I was there two days ago. A large part of Jordan's economy is theatened or being damaged by the sanctions against Iraq which the Jordanian Government are now attempting to implement. Two days ago, I again had talks with the king, crown prince and Ministers of Jordan, and I came away

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feeling sympathy for their predicament. I hope that they find a way through. None of my right hon. and hon. Friends nor I agree with the political analysis that the king has adopted throughout the crisis, but the Jordanians seek compliance with the Security Council resolutions. Their standing and place in the region has been seriously damaged. I and other right hon. and hon. Members have talked about that situation to others of Jordan's traditional friends in the region, and we would like to see the resumption of the traditional friendly links between Jordan and countries such as Egypt and the Gulf states.
Mr. Nellist: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Hurd: Perhaps I can get on a bit.
Mr. Heath: Perhaps I may return to my right hon. Friend's point about paragraph 3 of resolution 660. In fact, the Kuwaiti royal family left Kuwait before the Iraqis went in and are now established in Saudi Arabia as the Government of Kuwait, so there is nothing to prevent the Kuwaiti Government from negotiating with the Iraqi Government. To start picking and choosing paragraphs from United Nations resolutions at this stage is neither justifiable nor tolerable.
Mr. Hurd: I do not think that the House considers that it is justifiable to expect a Government in exile—whether in London 50 years ago or in Saudi Arabia now—to start negotiating with the people occupying their territories.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) spoke, as he has done before, of the horrors to come if there is fighting. All fighting is a horrible business, of course, but the right hon. Gentleman has been uniquely inaccurate in his past prophesies. In 1982, he predicted that any opposed landing in the Falklands would inflict intolerable casualties on the Falkland islanders, and that the result of a successful British action would be that the Argentine Government would be replaced by a regime far more nationalistic, and far more determined to secure revenge, than that of General Galtieri.
I could not check the accuracy of all the remarks made by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East as he spoke of some things that I knew not of, but when he remarked on matters about which I do know, he was wrong. In particular, he was wrong about the Soviets, and about the position that the European Ministers adopted in Brussels yesterday when they all—including the French—decided that the Community and its member states would regretfully have to conclude that the conditions for a new European initiative do not exist as of this moment. I fear that that has proved to be the correct conclusion.
Mr. Nellist: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way now?
Mr. Hurd: No, I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman.
Many right hon. and hon. Members raised the question of the Arab-Israel situation and linkage. Once the aggression against Kuwait is reversed and Iraq is out of Kuwait, it will be possible and necessary to return to the other problems of the middle east. Everyone concerned—President Bush, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, and the European Community—have made that clear.
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We have been working on a solution to the Arab-Israel problem since the foundation of the state of Israel, and even long before then. In recent years, the Security Council has charted the way. It is a conflict of competing claims and rights, and not exactly comparable with any other problem. The territories in question were occupied by Israel in 1967 as a result of an attack planned against Israel which it pre-empted. We do not agree with Israel's occupation of those territories, and we do not believe that it provides a legitimate basis for Israel's security, but the historical basis for it is different from that of the Gulf crisis, and the Security Council resolutions are also different.
Mr. Ernie Ross rose—
Mr. Hurd: I shall continue with this point and then I will give way to the hon. Gentleman.
I shall press for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, balanced by Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure borders. Resolution 338 called for direct negotiations.
For many years there was no general Arab readiness to accept either resolution, but we have repeatedly stated that recent steps by the PLO and the Arab League have placed the onus upon Israel to respond. We support self-determination for the Palestinians. We support a direct dialogue between Israel and representative Palestinians, and we believe that an international conference is the right forum for negotiations between all parties concerned, at the right time. That is our policy.
Saddam Hussein has not helped forward this policy, and he has not helped forward the peace processes—he has hindered it and held them up. As the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) made clear, Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait to help the Palestinians; he invaded Kuwait to help himself. It is absurd to argue that one can end one occupation by imposing another.
I should just tell the House that—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. Would the Foreign Secretary carry on, please?
Mr. Hurd: Iraq's standing in the Arab-Israel question is that of one Arab state, not as a spokesman for all Arab states. That point was made clearly and insistently to me by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, when I was in the area the other day.
Iraq's recent aggression makes it much more difficult, for the time being, to work towards a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, but once Iraq is out of Kuwait we shall have to return to this, and we shall have to bring fresh energy and imagination to the issue. Fresh thinking will be needed from the Arab states, which are still technically at war with Israel, by the Palestinians, by Israel and by the international community.
I entirely agree, and I am sure that most hon. Members would agree, that the suffering and injustice brought about by this problem must spur us on.
Mr. Ernie Ross: I agree with the Foreign Secretary that it would be wrong to link the two issues, but no matter how hon. Members or people in the west may feel, the majority of people in the Arab world see a linkage, if only because of our failure to deal just as efficiently and effectively in international law with the Palestinian question. If the right hon. Gentleman does not like the word linkage, what about the term parallel endeavours?

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Since Iraq invaded Kuwait, 72 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli defence forces. As the Foreign Secretary knows, last Wednesday four Palestinians were deported from the west bank and Gaza. Until we deal with those issues just as effectively and firmly—that is in no way linkage, but a parallel endeavour—people will not accept that we are serious about the middle east.
Mr. Hurd: As the Leader of the Opposition said, by invading Kuwait Saddam Hussein has held up and prevented any possible progress on the Arab-Israel question. That is the fact of the matter. Once he is out of Kuwait, as I have said, we shall have to return to the subject with vigour and with fresh ideas.
I have been asked about the French proposal—
Mr. Nellist: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Hurd: I am not giving way to the hon. Gentleman.
The Prime Minister dealt with the French proposal in his opening speech. The Security Council has been meeting informally today—the last day of this important chapter in its history. Four months after the original invasion, the original resolution 678 gave Saddam Hussein a further 45 days to decide whether he would comply. The Security Council and the Secretary-General have done their utmost to remind Saddam Hussein that 45 days have now passed by issuing a solemn appeal to him. That seemed to us to be a wholly sensible step. What we have not wanted to do is to suggest, even obliquely, that the time frame set by the Security Council should be extended, or that we have been converted by Saddam Hussein, in the context of his aggression, to the idea of an international conference on the Arab-Israel problem. The Arab members of the coalition would resent that fiercely, as has been made clear to me, and I cannot conceive of Israel's attending a conference convoked in such a way and under such auspices.
That said, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) that there is no case for harshness towards this proposal. What is necessary is for realism to be applied to it. We have been working all day in New York to achieve an appeal to Saddam Hussein around which all Security Council members can rally. We believe that a straightforward appeal of that kind would be the right course for the Secretary-General and the Security Council today.
This morning, we put forward certain British ideas to try to find the basis for such an appeal. I have just received a message from our representative in New York to the effect that the Security Council has agreed that the Secretary-General will make a statement, which he has said will fully reflect the Security Council resolutions, within an hour or two. If that proves to be right, it would seem a sensible end to the day's work.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Hurd: I will give way to the hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon), who asked me to. [Interruption.]
Mr. Nellist: I am not sure why hon. Members find that so funny. What is the Secretary of State frightened of? Why will he not answer the question?
Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the Foreign Secretary was giving way to the hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon).
Mrs. Alice Mahon: I thank the Foreign Secretary for giving way.
If war breaks out—in a very few hours—I believe that the right hon. Gentleman, his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and President Bush will have been total and abject failures. They will have failed the whole world, and in particular the people of the middle east. They are all failed politicians—wimps—and they will go down in history as the people who caused blood to be spilt by thousands in the middle east.
Mr. Hurd: I shall answer that point by describing where I think the real danger lies. Before I do so, however, I will fulfil the promise given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that I would say something further about sanctions.
It is perfectly reasonable to ask—as many have asked themselves and the Government—whether sanctions should not be given longer to take effect. Since sanctions were imposed, Iraqi oil exports have dwindled to virtually nothing, and Iraq is now cut off from its sources of external finance. Sanctions are not completely watertight, but there is no doubt that the flow of goods to Iraq is a very small proportion of that before the invasion of Kuwait. At the time of the invasion, Iraq had considerable food stocks. Although there is some rationing, consumption remains fairly high, and there is no reason to suppose that Iraqis face short-term difficulty in that regard. Steps have been taken by a dictatorial regime to force an increase in agricultural output.
Industry is also prepared for a long haul. As has been pointed out, many factories have closed as a result of deliberate action by the Iraqi Government to divert resources to the military sector. We believe that the key sectors of industry are likely on this basis to continue operations for a long time, and the Government have the option of closing down more factories without disruption and without affecting essential services.
I come now to the key question—that of the military. President Saddam Hussein has systematically built up a large arsenal in recent years. It is therefore hardly surprising that we see no signs that he is at present short of spares. We believe that that arsenal provides him with so much hardware that he can still afford to capitalise if necessary.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East has studied the matter carefully, and will appreciate this point. One test is the rate of sorties by the air force. It has not declined, which suggests that Iraq does not see a need to reduce sorties in order to conserve spare parts. Similar is true of the operations of the ground forces such as tanks and artillery. Prodigious quantities of hardware are deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, together with ammunition, and we see no evidence that the imposition of sanctions has so far affected those elements. We believe that Saddam Hussein could hold out for a long time without dramatically affecting his fighting arm, and that is the critical point.
Mr. Healey: My right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) quoted the evidence given by the head of the CIA, Mr. Webster, a few weeks ago to the American Congress when he stated that the air capacity of Iraq would begin to be affected by about Easter, that other weapons would begin to be affected in

819
six or nine months and that there would be a serious impact on the military capability by next autumn. Does the Secretary of State agree or disagree with Mr. Webster?
Mr. Hurd: I have given the House an up-to-date—as of this week—assessment of the situation. Mr. Webster's evidence was given some time ago. I do not believe that there would be a wide divergence of assessment and I have given the House the best assessment that we have.
Mr. Healey rose—
Mr. Hurd: The question that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East has not tackled is whether sanctions will get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. There is no doubt that if they were left in place for a long time, they would impose substantial hardships on the Iraqi people, but that is what they have been used to enduring for years. Saddam Hussein does not care for the suffering of his people. He has proved that in the war against Iran in which 350,000 people died. He is preoccupied with his own position and with the strength of his military machine. Will the right hon. Member for Leeds, East accept that there is no evidence that sanctions will have a decisive effect on Saddam Hussein's armed forces in the foreseeable future? That is the key point. Unless we wish to delude ourselves, we must face the possibility that sanctions, no matter how long they are applied, will not force Saddam Hussein to withdraw. They will not achieve such a decisive rundown of his military machine that he will leave Kuwait.
People could argue that we should put that proposition to the test if waiting were cost-free, but it is not. As time passes, it will be easy for the world outside to forget what has happened. Saddam Hussein has taken a sovereign nation, a member of the United Nations, and wiped it off the map. Its people have fled or been murdered and we estimate that of the 700,000 Kuwaitis who lived in Kuwait before August, only 250,000 remain there. If we let this pass, Kuwait may never be restored. Theoretically, the military option may still be open to us in six or 12 months but, as the right hon. Member for Leeds, East knows, in practice it may be eroded. Time passes quickly in these matters and familiarity with a tragedy can easily blunt the outrage. If we do not take action within the foreseeable future, assuming that a peaceful outcome is prevented, it may be that the conditions for action will not again be favourable.
I fear that we must accept the possibility that by the time we looked again at the military option Kuwait would have become just another item on the international agenda. In fact, the will and the means might not come together again. If we blink now, how could we expect Saddam Hussein to believe in a military option again? To those who say, as many do and as many will be tempted to do in coming months, "Let sanctions work", I say that I fear that that is not a safe option.
Miss Joan Lestor rose—
Mr. Hurd: I shall give way in a minute.
In a year or so, we may find that sanctions have not worked, that Saddam Hussein is still in Kuwait after more plunder, torture and killings and that, in practice, the military option no longer exists. I do not believe that any sensible hon. Member would regard that outcome as acceptable or safe.
Miss Lestor: If the policy of sanctions has been abandoned, when was that decision taken?
Mr. Hurd: It has not been abandoned; it is in full force. As the right hon. Member for Gorton emphasised, it was right to pursue it. We must seriously assess its prospects, not in terms of hardship for the Iraqi people but in terms of so crippling Iraqi's military machine that it has to get out of Kuwait. I have given the House the best assessment that I can of that situation.
Mr. Benn rose—
Mr. Nellist rose—
Mr. Hurd: I am coming to a close.
Several hon. Members, particularly those who will vote against the motion, have drawn our attention to many other acts of injustice and repression in the world, some of which are continuing and some of which have defied solution before. Of course it is right that we must continue to look for answers to problems in Cambodia, Lebanon and Palestine, with which I have dealt, and in Lithuania. On 2 August, we were faced with a clear, abrupt act of aggression. I cannot understand how it can be argued that that act of aggression should go unredressed because there are other injustices in the world. We should not forget Kuwait simply because we have other grievous problems to remember—a point made notably by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore).
In all this swell of argument, the essential point is more clearly understood in this country than elsewhere. We must ask, for what cause are we justified in asking young men and women to put lives—their own and others—at risk in war? The answer is safety—the safety of this country and of the international community, of which we are a part. The threat from Iraq to this country is not of invasion or direct bombing, although it might come from terrorism, but if we want a safe world we must accept the principle that a small, peaceable state cannot be obliterated, that aggression must be reversed and that, in part, our safety depends on the safety of others. We have learnt that lesson the hard way several times in this century. We must not only accept the point in argument but act on it. Everybody respects the pacifist position, but pacifists would accept that their position involves accepting, or at least putting up with, acts of aggression and letting them succeed.
Of course we must try peaceful action first. We have used peaceful means for more than five months, and for six weeks Saddam Hussein has known that from tonight members of the United Nations are authorised to use force to secure compliance with the Security Council's resolutions. The right hon. Member for Gorton rightly said that the most striking fact is that Saddam Hussein has refused to discuss, let alone admit, the need for withdrawal. I expected it to be otherwise. I thought that in the past week or so there would have been a flow of clever proposals from Baghdad, designed to divide the coalition and to confuse the issues. I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Temple-Morris) said about that. I thought that there would be proposals for partial withdrawal—or for withdrawal, but not yet—or that Saddam Hussein would pounce on one of the compromises floated before him in such profusion. That has not been so, and this evening, as I understand it, he has shown no interest—rather the reverse—in the latest

821
French idea. He knows the range of forces against him, and he knows that if he fully withdraws he will not be attacked and that we have not added to the requirements of the Security Council. Unless there is some sudden change, which we can only guess at but cannot, I fear, expect, the only conclusion is that he prefers war to a satisfactory and fair solution of these disputes.
Mr. Benn rose in his place, and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
Question put accordingly, That this House do now adjourn:—
The House divided: Ayes 57, Noes 534.

Division No. 36]

[10 pm

AYES

Abbott, Ms Diane

Lewis, Terry

Barnes, Harry (Derbyshire NE)

Litherland, Robert

Benn, Rt Hon Tony

Livingstone, Ken

Bennett, A. F. (D'nt'n & R'dish)

Loyden, Eddie

Bidwell, Sydney

McAllion, John

Brown, Ron (Edinburgh Leith)

McFall, John

Campbell, Ron (Blyth Valley)

McKelvey, William

Clay, Bob

Madden, Max

Cohen, Harry

Mahon, Mrs Alice

Corbyn, Jeremy

Mallon, Seamus

Cousins, Jim

Marshall, David (Shettleston)

Cryer, Bob

Michie, Bill (Sheffield Heeley)

Cummings, John

Mullin, Chris

Dalyell, Tarn

Parry, Robert

Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H'I)

Primarolo, Dawn

Eadie, Alexander

Redmond, Martin

Ewing, Harry (Falkirk E)

Sedgemore, Brian

Faulds, Andrew

Skinner, Dennis

Fyfe, Maria

Strang, Gavin

Galloway, George

Thomas, Dr Dafydd Elis

Godman, Dr Norman A.

Vaz, Keith

Gordon, Mildred

Watson, Mike (Glasgow, C)

Grant, Bernie (Tottenham)

Wigley, Dafydd

Heffer, Eric S.

Williams, Alan W. (Carm'then)

Hinchliffe, David

Wise, Mrs Audrey

Hood, Jimmy

Wray, Jimmy

Hoyle, Doug

Hughes, John (Coventry NE)

Tellers for the Ayes:

Jones, leuan (Ynys Môn)

Mr. Dave Nellist and

Lambie, David

Mr. Dennis Canavan.

Lamond, James

NOES

Adley, Robert

Barnes, Mrs Rosie (Greenwich)

Aitken, Jonathan

Barron, Kevin

Alexander, Richard

Batiste, Spencer

Alison, Rt Hon Michael

Beaumont-Dark, Anthony

Allason, Rupert

Beckett, Margaret

Allen, Graham

Beggs, Roy

Alton, David

Beith, A. J.

Amery, Rt Hon Julian

Bell, Stuart

Amess, David

Bellingham, Henry

Amos, Alan

Bellotti, David

Anderson, Donald

Bendall, Vivian

Arbuthnot, James

Bennett, Nicholas (Pembroke)

Armstrong, Hilarys

Benton, Joseph

Arnold, Jacques (Gravesham)

Benyon, W.

Arnold, Sir Thomas

Bermingham, Gerald

Ashby, David

Bevan, David Gilroy

Ashdown, Rt Hon Paddy

Biffen, Rt Hon John

Ashley, Rt Hon Jack

Blackburn, Dr John G

Ashton, Joe

Blair, Tony

Aspinwall, Jack

Blaker, Rt Hon Sir Peter

Atkins, Robert

Blunkett, David

Atkinson, David

Boateng, Paul

Baker, Rt Hon K. (Mole Valley)

Body, Sir Richard

Baker, Nicholas (Dorset N)

Bonsor, Sir Nicholas

Baldry, Tony

Boscawen, Hon Robert

Banks, Robert (Harrogate)

Boswell, Tim

822

Bottomley, Peter

Dover, Den

Bottomley, Mrs Virginia

Dunn, Bob

Bowden, A (Brighton K'pto'n)

Dunwoody, Hon Mrs Gwyneth

Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)

Durant, Sir Tony

Bowis, John

Dykes, Hugh

Boyes, Roland

Eastham, Ken

Boyson, Rt Hon Dr Sir Rhodes

Eggar, Tim

Braine, Rt Hon Sir Bernard

Emery, Sir Peter

Brandon-Bravo, Martin

Evans, David (Welwyn Hatf'd)

Bray, Dr Jeremy

Evans, John (St Helens N)

Brazier, Julian

Evennett, David

Bright, Graham

Fairbairn, Sir Nicholas

Brooke, Rt Hon Peter

Fallon, Michael

Brown, Gordon (D'mline E)

Fatchett, Derek

Brown, Michael (Brigg & Cl't's)

Favell, Tony

Brown, Nicholas (Newcastle E)

Fearn, Ronald

Browne, John (Winchester)

Fenner, Dame Peggy

Bruce, Ian (Dorset South)

Field, Barry (Isle of Wight)

Bruce, Malcolm (Gordon)

Field, Frank (Birkenhead)

Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon Alick

Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey

Buck, Sir Antony

Fishburn, John Dudley

Buckley, George J.

Fisher, Mark

Budgen, Nicholas

Flynn, Paul

Burns, Simon

Fookes, Dame Janet

Burt, Alistair

Foot, Rt Hon Michael

Butler, Chris

Forman, Nigel

Butterfill, John

Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)

Caborn, Richard

Forsythe, Clifford (Antrim S)

Campbell, Menzies (Fife NE)

Forth, Eric

Campbell-Savours, D. N.

Foster, Derek

Carlile, Alex (Mont'g)

Foulkes, George

Carlisle, John, (Luton N)

Fowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman

Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

Fox, Sir Marcus

Carrington, Matthew

Franks, Cecil

Carttiss, Michael

Freeman, Roger

Cartwright, John

French, Douglas

Cash, William

Fry, Peter

Chalker, Rt Hon Mrs Lynda

Galbraith, Sam

Channon, Rt Hon Paul

Gale, Roger

Chapman, Sydney

Gardiner, Sir George

Chope, Christopher

Garel-Jones, Tristan

Churchill, Mr

Garrett, John (Norwich South)

Clark, Rt Hon Alan (Plymouth)

Garrett, Ted (Wallsend)

Clark, Dr David (S Shields)

George, Bruce

Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)

Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John

Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)

Gill, Christopher

Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)

Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian

Clarke, Tom (Monklands W)

Glyn, Dr Sir Alan

Clelland, David

Golding, Mrs Llin

Clwyd, Mrs Ann

Goodhart, Sir Philip

Colvin, Michael

Goodlad, Alastair

Conway, Derek

Gorman, Mrs Teresa

Cook, Robin (Livingston)

Gorst, John

Coombs, Anthony (Wyre F'rest)

Gould, Bryan

Coombs, Simon (Swindon)

Graham, Thomas

Cope, Rt Hon John

Grant, Sir Anthony (CambsSW)

Corbett, Robin

Greenway, Harry (Ealing N)

Cormack, Patrick

Greenway, John (Ryedale)

Couchman, James

Gregory, Conal

Cran, James

Griffiths, Sir Eldon (Bury St E')

Critchley, Julian

Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)

Crowther, Stan

Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)

Cunliffe, Lawrence

Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)

Cunningham, Dr John

Grist, Ian

Currie, Mrs Edwina

Grocott, Bruce

Curry, David

Ground, Patrick

Darling, Alistair

Grylls, Michael

Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)

Gummer, Rt Hon John Selwyn

Davies, Q. (Stamf'd & Spald'g)

Hague, William

Davies, Ron (Caerphilly)

Hamilton, Hon Archie (Epsom)

Davis, David (Boothferry)

Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)

Day, Stephen

Hampson, Dr Keith

Devlin, Tim

Hanley, Jeremy

Dewar, Donald

Hannam, John

Dickens, Geoffrey

Hardy, Peter

Dicks, Terry

Hargreaves, A. (B'ham H'll Gr')

Dixon, Don

Hargreaves, Ken (Hyndburn)

Dobson, Frank

Harman, Ms Harriet

Dorrell, Stephen

Harris, David

Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James

Haselhurst, Alan

823

Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy

Lilley, Peter

Hawkins, Christopher

Livsey, Richard

Hayes, Jerry

Lloyd, Sir Ian (Havant)

Hayhoe, Rt Hon Sir Barney

Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

Haynes, Frank

Lofthouse, Geoffrey

Hayward, Robert

Lord, Michael

Heal, Mrs Sylvia

Luce, Rt Hon Sir Richard

Healey, Rt Hon Denis

Lyell, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas

Heath, Rt Hon Edward

McAvoy, Thomas

Heathcoat-Amory, David

McCrea, Rev William

Henderson, Doug

McCrindle, Sir Robert

Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael

Macdonald, Calum A.

Hicks, Mrs Maureen (Wolv' NE)

Macfarlane, Sir Neil

Hicks, Robert (Cornwall SE)

MacGregor, Rt Hon John

Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

McKay, Allen (Barnsley West)

Hill, James

MacKay, Andrew (E Berkshire)

Hind, Kenneth

Maclean, David

Hoey, Ms Kate (Vauxhall)

McLeish, Henry

Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)

Maclennan, Robert

Hogg, N. (C'nauld & Kilsyth)

McLoughlin, Patrick

Holt, Richard

McNair-Wilson, Sir Patrick

Home Robertson, John

McNamara, Kevin

Hordern, Sir Peter

McWilliam, John

Howard, Rt Hon Michael

Madel, David

Howarth, Alan (Strat'd-on-A)

Major, Rt Hon John

Howarth, George (Knowsley N)

Malins, Humfrey

Howarth, G. (Cannock & B'wd)

Mans, Keith

Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

Maples, John

Howell, Rt Hon David (G'dford)

Marek, Dr John

Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)

Marland, Paul

Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)

Marlow, Tony

Howells, Geraint

Marshall, John (Hendon S)

Howells, Dr. Kim (Pontypridd)

Marshall, Sir Michael (Arundel)

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)

Martin, David (Portsmouth S)

Hughes, Robert G. (Harrow W)

Martin, Michael J. (Springburn)

Hughes, Simon (Southwark)

Martlew, Eric

Hunt, David (Wirral W)

Mates, Michael

Hunt, Sir John (Ravensbourne)

Maude, Hon Francis

Hunter, Andrew

Mawhinney, Dr Brian

Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas

Maxton, John

Illsley, Eric

Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

Ingram, Adam

Mayhew, Rt Hon Sir Patrick

Irvine, Michael

Meacher, Michael

Irving, Sir Charles

Meale, Alan

Jack, Michael

Mellor, Rt Hon David

Jackson, Robert

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Janman, Tim

Michael, Alun

Janner, Greville

Michie, Mrs Ray (Arg'l & Bute)

Jessel, Toby

Miller, Sir Hal

Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey

Mills, Iain

Johnston, Sir Russell

Miscampbell, Norman

Jones, Barry (Alyn & Deeside)

Mitchell, Andrew (Gedling)

Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)

Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)

Jones, Robert B (Herts W)

Mitchell, Sir David

Jopling, Rt Hon Michael

Moate, Roger

Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald

Monro, Sir Hector

Kellett-Bowman, Dame Elaine

Montgomery, Sir Fergus

Kennedy, Charles

Moonie, Dr Lewis

Key, Robert

Moore, Rt Hon John

Kilfedder, James

Morgan, Rhodri

King, Roger (B'ham N'thfield)

Morley, Elliot

King, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)

Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)

Kinnock, Rt Hon Neil

Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)

Kirkhope, Timothy

Morris, M (N'hampton S)

Kirkwood, Archy

Morrison, Sir Charles

Knapman, Roger

Morrison, Rt Hon Sir Peter

Knight, Greg (Derby North)

Moss, Malcolm

Knight, Dame Jill (Edgbaston)

Mowlam, Marjorie

Knowles, Michael

Moynihan, Hon Colin

Knox, David

Mudd, David

Lamont, Rt Hon Norman

Murphy, Paul

Lang, Ian

Neale, Sir Gerrard

Latham, Michael

Needham, Richard

Lawrence, Ivan

Nelson, Anthony

Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel

Neubert, Sir Michael

Leadbitter, Ted

Newton, Rt Hon Tony

Lee, John (Pendle)

Nicholls, Patrick

Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)

Nicholson, David (Taunton)

Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark

Nicholson, Emma (Devon West)

Lester, Jim (Broxtowe)

Norris, Steve

824

Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon

Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)

O'Brien, William

Smyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)

O'Hara, Edward

Snape, Peter

O'Neill, Martin

Soames, Hon Nicholas

Onslow, Rt Hon Cranley

Soley, Clive

Oppenheim, Phillip

Speed, Keith

Orme, Rt Hon Stanley

Speller, Tony

Owen, Rt Hon Dr David

Spicer, Sir Jim (Dorset W)

Page, Richard

Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

Paice, James

Squire, Robin

Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil

Stanbrook, Ivor

Patchett, Terry

Stanley, Rt Hon Sir John

Patnick, Irvine

Steel, Rt Hon Sir David

Patten, Rt Hon Chris (Bath)

Steen, Anthony

Patten, Rt Hon John

Stern, Michael

Pattie, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

Stevens, Lewis

Pawsey, James

Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)

Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth

Stewart, Andy (Sherwood)

Pike, Peter L.

Stewart, Rt Hon Ian (Herts N)

Porter, Barry (Wirral S)

Stokes, Sir John

Porter, David (Waveney)

Stott, Roger

Portillo, Michael

Straw, Jack

Powell, Ray (Ogmore)

Sumberg, David

Powell, William (Corby)

Summerson, Hugo

Prescott, John

Tapsell, Sir Peter

Price, Sir David

Taylor, Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)

Quin, Ms Joyce

Taylor, Ian (Esher)

Radice, Giles

Taylor, Matthew (Truro)

Raffan, Keith

Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

Raison, Rt Hon Sir Timothy

Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman

Randall, Stuart

Temple-Morris, Peter

Rathbone, Tim

Thatcher, Rt Hon Margaret

Redwood, John

Thompson, D. (Calder Valley)

Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn

Thompson, Jack (Wansbeck)

Reid, Dr John

Thompson, Patrick (Norwich N

Renton, Rt Hon Tim

Thorne, Neil

Rhodes James, Robert

Thornton, Malcolm

Richardson, Jo

Thurnham, Peter

Riddick, Graham

Townend, John (Bridlington)

Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas

Townsend, Cyril D. (B'heath)

Ridsdale, Sir Julian

Tracey, Richard

Rifkind, Rt Hon Malcolm

Tredinnick, David

Roberts, Sir Wyn (Conwy)

Trimble, David

Robertson, George

Trippier, David

Robinson, Geoffrey

Trotter, Neville

Robinson, Peter (Belfast E)

Turner, Dennis

Roe, Mrs Marion

Twinn, Dr Ian

Rogers, Allan

Vaughan, Sir Gerard

Rooker, Jeff

Viggers, Peter

Rooney, Terence

Wakeham, Rt Hon John

Ross, Ernie (Dundee W)

Waldegrave, Rt Hon William

Ross, William (Londonderry E)

Walker, Bill (T'side North)

Rossi, Sir Hugh

Walker, Rt Hon P. (W'cester)

Rost, Peter

Wallace, James

Rowe, Andrew

Waller, Gary

Rowlands, Ted

Walley, Joan

Rumbold, Rt Hon Mrs Angela

Walters, Sir Dennis

Ryder, Richard

Ward, John

Sainsbury, Hon Tim

Warden, Gareth (Gower)

Sayeed, Jonathan

Wardle, Charles (Bexhill)

Scott, Rt Hon Nicholas

Wareing, Robert N.

Shaw, David (Dover)

Warren, Kenneth

Shaw, Sir Giles (Pudsey)

Watts, John

Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')

Wells, Bowen

Sheerman, Barry

Wheeler, Sir John

Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert

Whitney, Ray

Shelton, Sir William

Widdecombe, Ann

Shephard, Mrs G. (Norfolk SW)

Wiggin, Jerry

Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)

Wilkinson, John

Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)

Williams, Rt Hon Alan

Shersby, Michael

Wilshire, David

Shore, Rt Hon Peter

Wilson, Brian

Sims, Roger

Winnick, David

Skeet, Sir Trevor

Winterton, Mrs Ann

Smith, Andrew (Oxford E)

Winterton, Nicholas

Smith, C. (Isl'ton & F'bury)

Wolfson, Mark

Smith, Sir Dudley (Warwick)

Wood, Timothy

Smith, Rt Hon J. (Monk'ds E)

Woodcock, Dr. Mike

Smith, J. P. (Vale of Glam)

Yeo, Tim

825

Young, David (Bolton SE)

Tellers for the Noes:

Young, Sir George (Acton)

Mr. John M. Taylor and

Younger, Rt Hon George

Mr. Tom Sackville.

Question accordingly negatived.
10.21 pm
Mr. Harry Ewing: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this matter. You will recall that when I intervened in the speech by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon to make a point about the confusion in the House and in the country about the technicality of the motion that we debated tonight, I was, to put it mildly, pooh-poohed. I was told that everyone in the country would understand what the vote meant tonight.
I should be grateful for your advice, Mr. Speaker, because not even everyone in the House understood what tonight's vote meant. There was great confusion in both Lobbies with Conservative and Labour Members going into one Lobby and then coming out. It is an absolute scandal that we should have voted in this way on such an issue.
Mr. Speaker: I understand that the hon. Gentleman is a former Whip so he should certainly understand the procedure of the House.
Mr. Ewing indicated dissent.
Mr. Speaker: Well, if he was not a former Whip, he certainly looks like one. I believe that the House understands the procedure on a vote taken on the Adjournment.
Mr. Bernie Grant: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. All sorts of interpretation will be
826
placed on the vote tonight. As a new Member, may I ask whether you can help me out by telling me your interpretation of that vote?
Mr. Speaker: Whenever we have a vote on the Adjournment, the Question is put in the way that I put it this evening. If the hon. Gentlman would like a private teach-in, I should be delighted if he would come to see me after I have left the Chair when I could discuss it with him over a suitable beverage.

PETITION

  BALTIC REPUBLICS
  10.23 pm
  Mr. Martin M. Brandon-Bravo: It is my privilege to present this petition on a matter of grave concern which was signed as a matter of urgency on Sunday by 152 of my constituents who represent not only those of Lithuanian birth or parentage, but the Latvians, the Estonians and the many hundreds of Ukranians and others of the city of Nottingham. Their petition reads:
  To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament assembled.
  The Humble Petition of the citizens and constituents of Nottingham of Lithuanian birth and parentage showeth that there has been military action and threat of repression against Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and other republics.
  Wherefore your Petitioners pray that your honourable House will call upon the Soviet government to withdraw its forces and enter into negotiation with the freely elected governments of the Baltic states, and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to withhold all economic aid to the Soviet Union.
  And your Petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray, etc.
  To lie upon the Table.

Speech Therapy
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Sackville.]
10.24 pm
Ms. Hilary Armstrong: The debate arises from specific problems in South West Durham health authority in ensuring that all school-age children for whom speech therapy is recognised as a need have access to appropriate therapy. My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Foster) and I wrote to the Minister requesting a meeting. The refusal of that request and the nature of the Minister's reply in health questions on 18 December prompted me to apply for the debate.
The areas of difficulty are clear in South West Durham, but I know that they are not unique to South West Durham. There is a shortage of speech therapists nationally which has been highlighted in the House on a number of occasions and in Government reports. There is a great drop-out rate from the profession—almost equal that of teachers—and much demoralisation which was exemplified in the evidence given in the equal value case pursued by Dr. Enderby and Mrs. Clark, and supported by my trade union, the Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union. I should make it clear that I am sponsored by that organisation, but that I am not speaking on its behalf tonight.
The position of children who are identified as part of a statement of educational need as requiring speech therapy is particularly difficult. If a health authority recognises that a child requires speech therapy but is unable to make it available, what happens? The response from the Under-Secretary of State for Education to a question from the hon. Member for Bolton, North-East (Mr. Thurnham) is not helpful. It says of the Court of Appeal ruling on the Lancashire case, as it is now known, that
"speech therapy could be considered either educational or non-educational provision. However, the ruling does not diminish health authorities' general responsibilities under the National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973 to provide speech therapy, and it does not mean that education authorities are under any legal obligation to fund speech therapy."— [Official Report, 10 December 1990; Vol. 182, c. 288.]
In other words, the Minister says that it is a responsibility of the Department of Health.
The general problems to which I have referred are highlighted in the South West Durham area. The health authority covers part of my constituency and part of that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland. Other Durham county Members have been involved in representations because of constituents who are affected.
In south west Durham the decision was taken nearly two years ago that the cover being given on a general referral basis was so inadequate that it was virtually useless. A decision was taken to prioritise. The process has highlighted serious deficiencies and made them clear to people seeking speech therapy, to general practitioners, and so on. It may be that other means would not have highlighted the shortages quite so much, but that is what happened in south west Durham. I know that there are severe problems in other parts of the country.
The system of priorities led to 409 children over five years of age being discharged from therapy. By now, that
828
number has presumably increased. Those children were not referred on a whim. Speech therapy was identified as necessary to their learning.
I quote the case of five-year-old Andrew Wayman of Watling terrace, Willington. The report from the speech therapist, as part of the statementing process under the Education Act 1981, recommended that Andrew needs weekly speech therapy, a language programme devised by a speech therapist and implemented daily as part of his everyday routine by his teaching staff and parents and additional support in school to assist that work.
The need for speech therapy of that nature was subsequently confirmed in the statement issued on 3 August 1990. By that time, Andrew had received speech therapy four times, and his parents had been notified that he did not come within the priority system and therapy was being withdrawn. The local education authority has considered joint funding for speech therapy posts in the district health area. However, there are six health authorities within the Durham county council area and to provide posts for all those authorities would be exceptionally expensive at a time when the local education authority is having to reduce expenditure to comply with Government spending regulations.
Andrew's mother, Mrs. Wayman, is to be congratulated on her determination to get the very best for Andrew. She has co-operated with the authorities at every stage, but knows that Andrew and many others like him are simply denied the help that it is acknowledged they need. I am sure that I need not remind the Minister that Her Majesty's inspectorate's report on reading, published only last week, said that problems in getting prompt and sufficient specialist help for those children with severe reading difficulties deserved to be taken seriously. Those problems are taken seriously by parents like Mrs. Wayman, speech therapists and organisations such as the Association for All Speech Impaired Children, who know about the effect of lack of speech therapy.
This evening we are looking to the Government to demonstrate that they take the problems seriously and are prepared to do something about them.
Mr. Gerry Steinberg: I suspect that the child of whom my hon. Friend is talking may well have attended or be attending the school in Spennymoor of which I was head teacher for nearly 10 years and which local children attended. I am absolutely appalled to find that that school now gets no speech therapy. There are children in my constituency who attend my ex-school whose parents have written to me. The policy of South West Durham health authority is that no child over five will receive speech therapy. It is an appalling disgrace that children in special education who desperately need speech therapy do not receive it from that health authority.
I hope that my hon. Friend will pursue the Minister tonight to get a solution to that problem that involves not only the Government, but the South West Durham health authority making more funds available so that more speech therapists can be employed.
Ms. Armstrong: My hon. Friend makes his points cogently. The child attends a special school now. When he was first identified, he was in the nursery class attached to Willington Church of England-aided school. The head told me when I visited the school that six of the 22 children in the class required speech therapy. South West Durham

829
has allocated its priorities in such a way that, unless children between the ages of five and 16 have a specifically identified disability, they do not receive speech therapy.
It would be beyond my professional expertise to comment on whether the priorities that the authority has identified are the right ones, but I know about and can comment on the inadequacies in the service that those priorities have highlighted, and their serious consequences. I understand that the Government are funding a project with the College of Speech Therapists to compile standards for the future provision of speech therapy. When will that project be completed? Will the Government take prompt action on its completion to promote and secure those standards nationwide? Can the Minister outline the steps he will take to ensure that South West Durham upholds those standards and has the resources to do so?
My hon. Friend the Member for City of Durham (Mr. Steinberg) may be interested to know that South West Durham spends more per head of population on speech therapy than neighbouring Durham and North West Durham. Yet it still faces enormous difficulties which leave constituents with problems that they should not have to face.
Will the Government initiate urgent discussions with the Department of Education and Science to sort out the unholy mess surrounding responsibility for speech therapy for children with special educational needs? The Government must recognise their responsibility in this area. Ever since the Education Act 1981, the issue has been tossed around between Departments. Numerous people and organisations have contacted me in the past few days, some of them disputing the interpretation of the decision of the Court of Appeal by a Minister in the Department of Education and Science. It is critical that Departments work together so that parents are not left in the indescribable position of being told by one Department that the matter is the responsibility of another. They are often left in the middle, feeling that they have let their children down even though it is not their fault.
Children such as Andrew Wayman do not have a second chance. Children should not have to look for a second chance; we should give them the best possible chance first time around. This is a pressing issue for South West Durham, and I hope that the Government will commit themselves to ensuring that children get the therapy they need, when they need it.
10.38 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health (Mr. Stephen Dorrell): First, I apologise to the hon. Member for Durham, North-West (Ms. Armstrong) for the fact that she sought a meeting with me and, due to a misunderstanding in the Department, that was, not explicitly, but by implication, refused. If a meeting is sought by an hon. Member, my policy is to agree to it and I apologise for the fact that the impression was given that I was refusing to meet her on a issue where there is rather less division between her and the Government than perhaps our actions and her words might lead people to believe.
In reality, there is no dispute at all between the hon. Lady and the Government and between the Government and the speech therapy profession about the value of the speech therapy service to the users of it. It is a key service
830
which has been developing quite fast within the national health service since 1979, during the period for which the Government are responsible, and that is because we recognise that it is a service which offers opportunities to people to develop or to rediscover a key life skill, and is, therefore, an important part of a comprehensive system of health care.
Understandably, in the context of the pattern of provision in South West Durham, the hon. Lady has concentrated on the importance of speech therapy to children between the ages of five and 16, but I am sure that she would be the first to acknowledge that that is not the only client group for whom speech therapy holds important benefits. Another client group that is often quoted and for which speech therapy holds particular benefits is stroke victims. The Government recognise and, as I shall seek to show, have developed the speech therapy service against the background of the recognition of the value of speech therapy in terms of developing life skills or of rediscovering them after the victim has suffered a stroke.
The best evidence of the Government's commitment to the importance of speech therapy is to be found in the Government's record since 1979 in committing resources to the development of speech therapy and in the employment of speech therapists within the NHS. The revenue expenditure on speech therapy services in England has risen by 120 per cent. in real terms during the past 12 years, with the result that in March 1990 we were employing 2,856 whole-time equivalent speech therapists in the NHS, compared with 1,510 12 years earlier. That is an increase in the number and capacity of the speech therapy arm of the NHS of 89 per cent. during the period for which the Government have been responsible.
We can demonstrate not only in words but in actions that there is no division about the importance of speech therapy and the benefits that speech therapy can offer. That is not to say, of course, that all the problems have been solved, and I shall deal with that in a moment.
Mr. Steinberg: A constituent of mine whose child was attending my ex-school received a letter which said:
"Due to the ever-increasing demands on the speech therapy service, South West Durham health authority has to implement a policy whereby we provide therapy only to children under five years of age. Although your child may still require help with his speech and language, unfortunately we are unable to offer him speech therapy and his name has been taken off our lists."
That is abominable and disgraceful. We must do something about it, whether that means the health authority or the Government allocating more resources or more speech therapists being trained.
Mr. Dorrell: With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, it would help the House if he allowed me to make my speech. He should agree that his intervention did not take the argument much beyond the points that were clearly made by his hon. Friend the Member for Durham, North-West. I was seeking to demonstrate that the Government do not need persuading of the importance of speech therapy. We also recognise that further progress needs to be made in the development of the service from the position in which we now find ourselves.
The service is significantly more developed than it was 12 years ago, but clearly further steps must be taken. The health service currently employs six speech therapists per 100,000 of population. As the hon. Lady came close to

831
saying, that is roughly the ratio of speech therapists employed in South Durham. The Davies and Enderby study argued that there is a need for a significant increase, and pointed out the opportunities that exist for using skilled speech therapists more effectively than present delivery patterns allow, by making proper use of assistants, ensuring that skills are accurately targeted at those who need them most, and making certain that the therapist has the skill necessary to meet the needs of a particular patient.
We take all those factors on board and they form part of the speech therapy service's long-term planning. Also, we are currently reviewing the pay and grading system used in the employment of speech therapists against the background of the undoubted difficulties encountered in some areas of recruiting people of adequate skill. We have not only a record that demonstrates the importance that we recognise should be attached to speech therapy but plans to take the service further as resources become available, as part of a growing national health service.
We acknowledge the national need to develop the service and, as the hon. Lady knows, it is part of the NHS's management structure to define broad national objectives but to leave the design of the delivery of the service to local health authorities, because they have a degree of knowledge about the circumstances of a particular locality that cannot possibly be matched by the service's central management at Richmond house. We seek to encourage delegation of management decision-making because we believe that is by far the best way of providing for the effective use of resources in meeting identified health needs within a particular district.
The hon. Lady asked me to comment on the question of who has responsibility for the provision of speech therapy services. Although she may understandably feel, in the light of certain recent cases, some uncertainty in that respect, we are clear now that the primary responsibility rests with the national health service. It is a health issue. Ministers at both my Department and the Department of Education and Science, as well as the Council of Local Education Authorities, agree that prime responsibility for speech therapy should remain with district health authorities, in respect both of children with special educational needs and the generality of patients.
I do not seek to shuffle off responsibility for the service. It would be odd if I did, because it has developed significantly under this Government's period in office and is much more complete now, in terms of the service that it provides, than it was some years ago. We plan to develop
832
it further, because we recognise the opportunities that exist for the effective use of resources in the speech therapy service.
I was keen to put that general picture on the record because it is important for it to be understood that the Government do not have an equivocal attitude towards the service. It is true that, in respect of the speech therapy service—as with all others within the health service, and as with the rest of private and public sector provision—there will always be choices to be made between relative priorities. We shall always want to develop it and other services faster than resources allow and, for resource reasons, we shall always have to put the brakes on the service's rate of development. However, we have developed the service and we fully intend that, against the background of a growing national health service, it should continue to develop.
I shall now comment on circumstances in the South West Durham health authority. It is important that the national health service should be run on the basis that general guidelines and, more important, general health objectives are agreed at the centre, and the delivery and design of the service in a particular locality are left to managers there, who are far better placed to decide the detailed design of the service for their area than are Ministers in Whitehall.
The service that the hon. Member for Durham, North-West has described is significantly different from the type of service provided in the generality of health districts. Health authorities have a responsibility to provide, within available resources, a speech therapy service to meet the needs of all their local population.
I am pleased to say that, to ensure the most effective and efficient delivery of speech therapy services in South West Durham, the district health authority has now invited the Department's speech therapy officer to review provision of that service within the area, probably with a professional colleague from outside the Department.
I hope that the hon. Lady will take that as evidence of our desire to ensure that the design of speech therapy services in that health district conforms with a proper national expectation of the sort of speech therapy service that we want to be delivered there and elsewhere in the country. It is not an indication that the health authority has, to put it crudely, got it wrong, but simply a desire to ensure that, in using the scarce resources at its disposal, the health authority either has produced or will produce a design for the speech therapy service that meets the proper expectations that people have for that service, against the background of a health service which is committed to the development of speech therapy services and fully understands the benefit that it can bring to patient groups.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.

EMPLOYMENT

  Deaf Trainees
  Mr. Ashley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Employment if the Training Agency has researched the use of the communication support services for deaf trainees; and if he will make it his policy that the provision of these services will be maintained by the training and enterprise councils.

  Mr. Jackson
  My Department has conducted no formal research specifically into the use of communication support services for deaf trainees. Training and enterprise councils are required to provide a communication service for deaf trainees, together with other relevant support to trainees with disabilities where appropriate.

HOME DEPARTMENT

  Marriage Breakdown
  Mr. Hinchliffe
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is his latest estimate of the full annual cost to the Government of marriage breakdown.

  Mr. John Patten
  Detailed research on which to base a firm estimate is not available. We are presently considering an estimate that RELATE—formerly the National Marriage Guidance Council—has drawn up based on its own work. It is likely that considerable further research and verification would be necessary before this could be used as a definitive basis for calculation.

  Metropolitan Police
  Mr. Hague
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will publish the statement by the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan police on the force's strategy for 1991.

  Mr. Kenneth Baker
  I am placing copies of the strategy statement for 1991, which I fully endorse, in the Library today. I am also sending copies to all right hon. and hon. Members whose constituencies fall wholly or partly within the Metropolitan police district. I am inviting London Members to discuss the statement with me.

ENVIRONMENT

  Refuse Disposal and Collection
  Sir Thomas Arnold
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment what action he intends to take with regard to circular 13/88 and the matter of charges for the collection of waste from mixed hereditaments.

  Mr. Baldry
  I understand that some local authorities have not fully complied with the advice given by my hon.452
  Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory) in his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Boscawen) on 4 July 1990.

  This guidance recognised that some of the waste from a composite property arises from the residential part of the property. My hon. Friend advised that the most sensible way for local authorities to treat such properties under their existing powers is that, once they have received a request to collect commercial waste from such properties, they should collect or empty free of charge at least one refuse sack or dustbin per week per property. They should also be prepared to consider alternative or additional arrangements on an individual basis.

  It is our intention to revise the Collection and Disposal of Waste Regulations 1988 to which circular 13/88 relates. The revision will take account of the changes brought about by the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and we shall take the opportunity to clarify the advice to local authorities about the treatment of refuse collection from composite hereditaments. However, no local authority should use our plans to revise the regulations as an excuse for delaying implementation of the policy that I have described.

  Mr. Janman
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment (1) what information he has on(a) the lowest and (b) the highest United Kingdom refuse disposal costs per tonne;

  (2) what information he has on (a) the lowest and (b) the highest United Kingdom refuse collection costs per tonne;

  (3) what information he has on the cost of United Kingdom refuse collection to local authorities;

  (4) what information he has on the cost of United Kingdom refuse disposal to local authorities.

  Mr. Baldry
  The costs of waste collection and disposal vary widely depending on the type of waste, method of collection or disposal, and proximity of disposal facilities. The Department has no information about highest and lowest costs, and the latest published figures for average costs are for 1986–87. These are set out in the table.

  total £ million

  per tonne £

  Gross revenue expenditure on waste disposal by local authorities in England and Wales

  270

  10

  Gross revenue expenditure on waste collection by local authorities in England and Wales

  515

  29

  The information should be treated with caution both because estimates of waste tonnage are not always reliable, and because the response rate from local authorities was very poor. Figures for later years cannot be produced because the base data are insufficiently reliable. The Department is currently reviewing the availability of waste statistics as a whole.

  Water Charges
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment, further to his reply of 18 December,Official Report, c. 116, (a) what definition of undue discrimination is to be used in drawing up guidelines on water charges and

  453
  (b) if he will list the various classes of customers and potential customers for whom protection against such discrimination is to be provided.

  Mr. Baldry
  I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him yesterday.

  Crown Offices
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment whether there are any covenants or other restrictions on the Crown offices in Crown way, Cathays, Cardiff, which would prevent their use by(a) Government Departments other than the Welsh Office and (b) non-Government users or bodies.

  Mr. Yeo
  The freehold of the Crown Offices in Crown way, Cathays, Cardiff is vested in the Secretary of State for the Environment. The conveyances contain restrictive covenants limiting the use of the premises for the purpose of Government Offices.

  Environment Council
  Mr. John Marshall
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will make a statement on the outcome of the Environment Council on 20 and 21 December 1990.

  Mr. Trippier
  I represented the United Kingdom at this meeting.

  The Council agreed a new regulation for the control of substances that deplete the ozone layer. This is necessary to implement within the Community the revision of the Montreal protocol which was agreed in London last June, but it also demonstrates our commitment to the protection of the ozone layer by requiring a faster phase-out within the Community. Under the regulation, chlorofluorocarbons will be cut by 85 per cent. by the middle of 1995 and phased out by the middle of 1997—two and a half years in advance of the Montreal protocol requirements. Halons are to be cut by 50 per cent. by the start of 1995, and phased out by the end of the century. Carbon tetrachloride will be phased out by 1998, and 1,1,1-trichloroethane by 2005. In certain cases exemptions for essential uses, such as medical aerosols and some fire-fighting applications, may be permitted, should those prove necessary. I pressed at the Council for an even quicker phase-out of CFCs and halons. Nonetheless, the agreement reached is a major step forward in protecting the ozone layer, and sends a strong signal to the rest of the world that still faster cuts than those agreed in London can be achieved.

  The United Kingdom worked actively to secure agreement in the Council of a common position on the proposal for a consolidated directive on car emissions. The strict new standards it contains would come into effect from the end of 1992. They would require the fitting of three-way catalysts to all new cars, and would reduce pollution from each car to about a quarter of present levels. The Council also agreed to invite the European Commission to produce a proposal for a further round of yet stricter standards which could come into effect from 1996. This is excellent news for Europe's environment and confirms the Community's determination to come to grips with pollution from transport. It is also good news for the motor industry, which will now have a much clearer idea of the standards towards which it should engineer.

  The Council agreed a directive on hazardous waste to replace the existing directive on toxic and dangerous waste
  454
  which dates from 1978. The new directive's most important feature is a provision for defining hazardous waste in a clear, practical way. Before the directive comes into force a list of hazardous wastes will be drawn up. Other features of the new directive are controls on the mixing and movement of hazardous waste. The new directive will be implemented by means of the proposed revision of the Control of Pollution (Special Waste) Regulations 1980.

  A regulation establishing a programme of action for the protection of the Mediterranean sea was agreed. The programme, known as MEDSPA, will provide pump-priming funds for a range of actions to help deal with the serious environmental problems affecting the Mediterranean.

  The Council also agreed a resolution welcoming the European Commission's recent green paper on the urban environment. The resolution notes that, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the primary responsibility for protecting the urban environment lies with local, regional and national authorities, but recognises that in certain areas there may be a role for the Community to play. The Council has invited the Commission to establish a group of experts to advise on possible further action.

  Proposed directives on sewage treatment and on the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances were both discussed in detail. Very good progress was made in each case on resolving a number of outstanding issues, and Ministers expressed the hope that agreement could be reached on both directives at the next Council meeting.

  With support from a number of member states, I was able to secure from the European Commission a commitment to review the operation of certain aspects of the existing directive on the protection of wild birds. In particular, the Commission agreed to look at those provisions in the directive that impede action against certain pest species for which control measures are necessary, and where this would not endanger the conservation of the species. This is a welcome recognition on the Commission's part of the need to address an anomaly which has caused some concern here.

  The Council also held brief discussions on climate change, on the use of economic instruments to achieve environmental objectives, and on the site of the European Environment Agency.

  Rural Development Commission Factories
  Mr. Burns
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he has reached a decision on the disposal of the Rural Development Commission factory estates; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Trippier
  The Rural Development Commission and its predecessors have funded a very successful programme of workspace provision over many years. Following the announcement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry on 23 April, I have sought the advice of the Rural Development Commission on the disposal of its portfolio. The RDC portfolio has a number of special characteristics, among them the fact that many of the factory units that have been provided are in small blocks in remote rural areas. I am pleased to announce that having received the Rural Development Commission's advice, I have decided to proceed with the sale of the portfolio. Government policy
  455
  is to encourage suitable premises and sites to be made available through the private sector to new and expanding enterprises in rural areas. The sale of the estate is intended to further this policy by involving the private sector in the ownership and management of property in rural areas. It also builds on the existing policy of selling units to tenants in appropriate circumstances. I propose to introduce a new grants scheme to encourage private developers to make further provision while at the same time withdrawing progressively from direct provision to complement this. The twin objectives of maximising the return to the taxpayer from the sale and encouraging the involvement of a range of private sector interests will best be met through a phased sale, with the intention that this should be spread over a period of about three years with the rate of disposal adjusted to market conditions.

  Wherever it is practical to do so, and in line with the above objectives I have asked the Rural Development Commission and English Estates to offer existing tenants an opportunity to bid for their premises.

  Rate Support Grant
  Mr. Ken Hargreaves
  To ask the Secretary of State for the Environment when the rate support grant supplementary report for 1989–90 for England will be published.

  Legal limit

  1982

  1983

  1984

  1985

  1986

  1987

  1988

  1989

  mg/100ml

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Per cent.

  Great Britain

  80

  33

  28

  26

  26

  24

  23

  21

  19(p)

  New South Wales

  50(1)

  40

  36

  33

  33

  34

  32

  31

  33

  The following table shows, for all drivers and riders killed whose blood alcohol level was known, the

  Specified blood alcohol level mg/100ml

  1982 Per cent.

  1983 Per cent.

  1984 Per cent.

  1985 Per cent.

  1986 Per cent.

  1987 Per cent.

  1988 Per cent.

  1989(p) Per cent.

  80

  33

  28

  26

  26

  24

  23

  21

  19

  100

  30

  25

  24

  24

  22

  21

  19

  18

  150

  21

  18

  15

  17

  17

  15

  14

  13

  200

  12

  11

  8

  11

  9

  9

  8

  8

  North Sea Rescue Services
  Mr. Cummings
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list year by year since 1980 the dates and locations and numbers of injuries and fatalities of crew members of fast rescue craft engaged in rescues in the North sea oil fields.

  Mr. McLoughlin
  The Department is aware of two incidents: these were both associated with the Piper Alpha oil platform fire in July 1988. Six personnel on two of the rescue craft were injured, two fatally.

  Mr. Cummings
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will list year by year since 1980 the number of successful rescues carried out by fast rescue craft in the North sea oil fields, indicating from where the craft were launched and the dates and location of where the rescues took place.

  Mr. McLoughlin
  The Department does not collect this data. However, information presented to the public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster showed that 126 incidents occurred of men falling overboard from an oil
  456
  Mr. Heseltine
  I have laid the supplementary report before the House today. The main purpose of the report is to correct the effects of an error in respect of road lengths in the London borough of Croydon used in the calculation of its grant-related expenditure assessments for 1989–90.

  The report requires the approval of the House. Subject to that, I propose to make the revisions to grant payments to reflect the report early in April. Copies of the report arid tables showing revised rate support grant entitlements are being sent today to local authority associations and to each authority.

TRANSPORT

  Drink Drivers
  Mr. Peter Bottomley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what information he has on the comparative reductions and levels of over-the-limit alcohol in dead drivers from 1982 in Great Britain, New South Wales and Sweden.

  Mr. Chope
  The table shows, for all drivers and riders killed whose blood alcohol level was known, the proportion who were over the legal limit. Comparative data for Sweden are not available.

  proportion who were over the level specified. The figures are for Great Britain only. Comparative data for Sweden and New South Wales are not available.

  installation between 1974 and 1986, and the most common means of recovery was by fast rescue craft deployed from standby vessels.

  Mr. Cummings
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will indicate the existing procedures and logging requirements for the repair and maintenance of fast rescue craft used in the North sea oil fields.

  Mr. McLoughlin
  The recording of the repair or the maintenance of fast rescue craft is a matter for the owner or operator of the standby vessel, but surveyors from the Department will examine the condition of the craft during surveys and general inspections.

  Mr. Cummings
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what plans he has to make changes in respect of fast rescue craft used in the North sea oil fields(a) to power the craft with diesel instead of petrol and (b) to have guarded propellers on such craft; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. McLoughlin
  When fast rescue craft were first developed all that was generally available for propulsion
  457
  were outboard petrol engines. New developments have made the use of diesel engines more practicable for the larger craft and their use is increasing. The phasing out of petrol engines and the use of guarded propellers will need to be considered in the revision of the present code of practice, but because of the range of duties a fast rescue craft is called upon to perform it is essential that design parameters should be as flexible as possible.

  Mr. Cummings
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport if he will indicate what training procedures exist for crews of fast rescue craft in the North sea oil field; and who is responsible for monitoring such training.

  Mr. McLoughlin
  Under the code of practice published by the Department, crews of fast rescue craft should attend a course in the operation of fast rescue boats which is offered by a number of training institutions. These courses are checked and endorsed by the Department. During annual inspections of standby vessels marine surveyors verify that sufficient numbers of crew members who have attended these courses are on board; and they often seek a demonstration of how the boats are handled.

  Road Accidents
  Mr. Mudd
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport how many accidents occurred, and how many people were killed or injured in those accidents, on(a) the M I between junctions 1 and 17, (b) the M6 between junctions 1 and 4, (c) the A34 between Oxford and Stratford and (d) the A423 between Oxford and Coventry over the period 20 December 1990 to 3 January 1991.

  Mr. Chope
  I shall write to my hon. Friend as soon as the information is available.

  Underground Structures
  Ms. Gordon
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport which Government Departments and associations of statutory or local authorities know the precise position of the principal underground services and utilities and, in particular, the position of sewers, water conduits, cables, pipes and wires belonging to the public utilities and how they relate to one another.

  Mr. Chope
  The requirements on persons with underground services to maintain records of their position vary according to the statutory powers or licence under which it was placed. The Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950 and utilities' enabling legislation require undertakers executing works to consult other undertakers whose apparatus is likely to be affected and the street authority before starting major works. There is a need to improve the consistency and availability of records of underground services and the New Roads and Street Works Bill currently before Parliament contains provision for this.

  Deeside Industrial Park
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Transport what is his estimate of the start date of the construction of a new entrance to the Deeside industrial park; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Chope
  Late 1994, subject to satisfactory completion of statutory procedures and the availability of funds.

AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

  Fishing Industry
  Mr. David Porter
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what is his policy on apportioning the British total allowable catch for 1991 to the individual ports; and how he negotiates a Scottish allocation.

  Mr. Curry
  As agreed with the industry, the United Kingdom 1991 white fish quota will continue to be distributed among the United Kingdom fleet in proportion to the track record of individual fishing vessels. Most pelagic quota is also distributed in the same way, although currently some vessels have a fixed share of certain pelagic fisheries and the non-sector, because of its small size, has received an allocation rather greater than its track record would warrant. Departments will shortly be consulting the industry over the methodology to be applied in distributing pelagic quotas in future. The industry will also be consulted as necessary on the distribution of Hague preference fish obtained by the United Kingdom at the December Council.

  Water Protection
  Mr. Carttiss
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food when he will publish the code of good agricultural practice on water protection as foreshadowed in the Environment White Paper "This Common Inheritance".

  Mr. Gummer
  Last autumn's environment White Paper "This Common Inheritance" stated that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food would be preparing a revised free advisory package of codes of good agricultural practice for farmers. I am pleased to announce that the first of these codes, which relates to the protection of water, has now been prepared in draft form for consultation in England and Wales. It contains practical and detailed guidance to farmers on how to avoid water pollution from farm wastes, fertilisers, nitrate, fuel oil, sheep dip, carcase disposal and pesticides. This draft code has been placed in the Libraries of the House, and is also available from the Vote Office.

  Livestock Protection
  Miss Emma Nicholson
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food what action he proposes to take to improve the protection of livestock in markets.

  Mr. Maclean
  Orders have been made under the Animal Health Act 1981, to come into force on 1 March 1991, which will lay down detailed welfare safeguards for farm livestock and horses in markets. This important legislation will create a new offence of causing injury or unnecessary suffering to animals in markets. Horses at markets and other places of sale will now be protected by specific controls for the first time. The new orders will introduce minimum ages at which calves and foals can be put through markets without their mothers. There will be a ban on selling calves more than twice in any 28-day period, and practices such as the use of electric goads on calves, young pigs, sheep and horses and the tying of poultry and calves will be prohibited. Among other new provisions are controls on handling, penning, feeding and watering animals.
  459
  This legislation has been discussed with market operators and other interested parties, and follows closely recommendations from the Farm Animal Welfare Council, to which I am very grateful. We are also issuing codes of practice which give further guidance to all those involved in markets on how best to safeguard the welfare of animals.

  In recent years, concern for animal welfare has become increasingly important in the design and running of today's markets. Everyone should realise that transport to and from market and the time spent there, can be potentially stressful for animals. The overriding principle behind the new orders and codes of practice is the need for particular care and consideration for all animals in these different environments.

CIVIL SERVICE

  Civil Service Pay
  Mr. Knapman
  To ask the Minister for the Civil Service if he will make a statement about the discretionary pay scheme for grades 2 and 3 staff in the home civil service.

  Mr. Renton
  In the fourth and last round of awards under the arrangements announced by my right hon. Friend the then Prime Minister on 23 April 1987, awards

  July

  August

  September

  1October

  November

  December

  2January

  Ff/£

  high

  10·06

  10·18

  9·96

  10·15

  9·90

  9·83

  9·97

  low

  9·56

  9·88

  9·75

  9·82

  9·74

  9·72

  9·80

  DM/£

  high

  3·006

  3·034

  2·981

  3·025

  2·936

  2·903

  2·926

  low

  2·929

  2·946

  2·904

  2·929

  2·887

  2·852

  2·888

  Lira/£

  high

  2195

  2255

  2225

  2267

  2205

  2180

  2200

  low

  2150

  2155

  2170

  2200

  2175

  2155

  2180

  Maximum £ deviation from central rate per cent.

  above

  —

  —

  —

  +2·70

  —

  —

  +1·05

  below

  —

  —

  —

  -4·15

  -4·25

  -4·67

  -4·04

  1 From 8 October 1990.

  2 To 13 January 1991.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give the inflow and outflow to and from and the net gain or loss to the reserves from the date of joining the exchange rate mechanism to the latest available date and for the equivalent period before joining.

  Mr. Maples
  Net changes to the reserves in the three months before and after sterling's entry to the ERM are as follows:

  $million

  Total change

  Level of reserves at end of month

  July

  -172

  38,842

  August

  +455

  39,297

  September

  -237

  39,060

  October1

  -488

  38,572

  460
  have been made to 21 grade 2s and 53 grade 3s. The total number of staff currently granted awards following four rounds of the scheme is 41 grade 2s and 157 grade 3s, respectively 29 per cent. and 32 per cent. of each grade. This is within the ceiling of 35 per cent. of each grade recommended by the Top Salaries Review Body.

  The full-year cost of these awards is approximately £565,000 or about 1·9 per cent. of the annual pay bill for the grades concerned. The scheme is due to be replaced by new arrangements in April 1991.

NATIONAL FINANCE

  Exchange Rate Mechanism
  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give sterling's range of variation against(a) the franc, (b) the deutschmark, (c) the lira and (d) within the 6 per cent. bands for each month since Britain joined the exchange rate mechanism and for (a), (b) and (c) for the three months before joining.

  Mr. Maples
  Sterling's variation against the franc, deutschmark and lira before and after its entry to the ERM, and the greatest percentage dievations from sterling's central rates against all the other ERM currencies since entry are as follows:

  Total change

  Level of reserves at end of month

  November

  -102

  38,470

  December

  -6

  38,464

  1 Sterling entered the ERM on 8 October 1990.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what are the top and bottom of the pound's bands within the exchange rate mechanism and the highest and lowest points within them reached by sterling in each month since membership.

  Mr. Maples
  Sterling's upper and lower limits against the other ERM currencies, and the highest and lowest points at close of business since sterling's entry to the mechanism, are as follows:
  461

  October1

  November

  December

  January2

  Currency

  Upper limit

  Lower limit

  High

  Low

  High

  Low

  High

  Low

  High

  Low

  Belgian/Luxembourg Franc3

  64·6

  57·3

  62·3

  60·2

  60·6

  59·7

  60·0

  59·0

  60·3

  59·6

  French Franc

  10·51

  9·32

  10·15

  9·82

  9·90

  9·74

  9·83

  9·72

  9·97

  9·80

  Italian Lira

  2,344

  2,079

  2,267

  2,200

  2,205

  2,175

  2,180

  2,155

  2,200

  2,180

  Dutch Florin

  3·53

  3·13

  3·41

  3·30

  3·31

  3·26

  3·27

  3·22

  3·30

  3·26

  Deutschemark

  3·132

  2·778

  3·025

  2·929

  2·936

  2·887

  2·903

  2·852

  2·926

  2·888

  Danish Krone

  11·95

  10·60

  11·54

  11·19

  11·24

  11·07

  11·14

  11·20

  11·27

  11·14

  Irish Punt

  1·169

  1·037

  1·131

  1·089

  1·100

  1·077

  1·098

  1·068

  1·080

  1·076

  Spanish Peseta

  203·6

  180·6

  190·0

  183·8

  186·2

  183·6

  185·0

  182·8

  184·8

  184·0

  1 From 8 October.

  2 To 13 January 1991.

  3 The exchange rate between the Belgian franc and the Luxembourg franc is fixed, with no margin of fluctuation.

  Value Added Tax
  Mr. Malcolm Bruce
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will provide figures for VAT returns for the Gordon constituency, or the Gordon district and Aberdeen district, for the last five years for which data are complete.

  Mrs. Gillian Shephard
  The figures for VAT returns are not available in the form requested except at disproportionate cost. It has been possible to provide details for the last two financial years for traders currently registered at the Aberdeen local VAT office which covers the north-east of Scotland from Montrose to Nairn and the Shetland islands. The figures are as follows:

  Year ending

  Payments by Traders £ million

  Repayments to Traders £ million

  Net Payments to Traders £ million

  31 March 1989

  129·3

  165·2

  35·9

  31 March 1990

  167·1

  204·5

  37·4

  Government Telecommunications Service
  Mr. Dunn
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will make a statement on the outcome of the Government telecommunications service project negotiation.

  Mr. Maples
  My right hon. Friend the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury announced in a written answer on 15 February 1990, at column 340, that negotiations would be opened with Racal Data Networks Ltd. (RDNL) to determine whether the company could satisfactorily supply an integrated voice and data telecommunications service for use by Government Departments, to be known as the Government Telecommunications Service—GTS.

  The Government and the company have now reluctantly concluded that it would not be possible to achieve agreement on the terms for the provision of such a service. The two parties have therefore agreed that the GTS negotiations should be discontinued. The decision was announced on 7 January 1991. The Departments concerned in the GTS negotiation will now be considering with the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency how best to meet future telecommunications requirements. This decision does not affect the existing service contracts held by RDNL which the company is continuing to implement—the Government data network —GDN—which serves 18 Departments and includes the NHS family health service network, and the voice network which RDNL is developing for the Department of Social Security.

  Economic and Monetary Union
  Mr. Robert G. Hughes
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he plans to submit draft treaty texts to the intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Maude
  My right hon. Friend submitted a document, "Economic and monetary union—beyond Stage 1: Possible Treaty Provisions and Statute for a European Monetary Fund", to the Luxembourg presidency on 8 January. This sets out legal texts designed to amend the treaty of Rome so as to allow for the establishment of a European monetary fund managing a hard ecu in line with the proposals first put forward by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when Chancellor. Copies have been placed in the Vote Office and the House of Commons Library.

  Government Staff
  Mr. Andrew Mitchell
  To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the number of staff in post in central Government departments at 1 October 1990.

  Mr. Mellor
  On 1 October 1990 there were 556,250 staff in post in central Government. Of those, 491,032 were non-industrials and 65,218 were classified as being in industrial work.

HEALTH

  Deaf School Leavers
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health (1) what steps he is taking to ensure that deaf school leavers are provided with communication support when being assessed under section 5 of the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986;

  (2) what consideration is being given to the implementation of section 3(b) of the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986 to ensure that deaf people have access to sign language interpreters and other communication support when being assessed for services by local authorities.

  Mr. Ashley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what steps are being taken to monitor the implementation of section 5 of the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986, particularly in regard to deaf school leavers.

  Mr. Dorrell
  The social services inspectorate has carried out an exercise to monitor the implementation of those
  463
  sections of the Act that are in force. The results of this inspection, and of the findings of a more specific study of the implementation of sections 5 and 6, were published last year in its reports "Developing Services for Disabled People" and "Developing Services for Young People with Disabilities", copies of which are in the Library. We expect authorities to provide communication support for all clients who require it as a matter of normal good practice, and our guidance on the implementation of community care has emphasised the importance of such services. Similar guidance is to be issued to assist authorities in the implementation of the provisions of the Children Act.

  Sign Language Interpreters
  Mr. Ashley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what action is being undertaken by his Department to address the shortage of registered sign language interpreters for deaf patients.

  Mr. Dorrell
  The Department provides grant aid to the Council for the Advancement of Communication with Deaf People, which arranges courses in communication with deaf people and maintains a register of interpreters. The Department has also, for a number of years, grant-aided the British Sign Language Training Authority. The availability of sign language interpreters to deaf people seeking health care is a matter for local health service management, who are best placed to determine and provide for the local need for such a service.

  Medical Research
  Mr. Dunn
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what action he proposes to take to help non-teaching hospitals that provide major service support for research by external funders.

  Mr. Waldegrave
  I am pleased to announce a £2 million scheme to help meet the service support costs of research in non-teaching hospitals. The scheme will give financial help to hospitals that provide service support for major levels of research activity by external funders including local and national charities and the Medical Research Council. Applications for support under the scheme will be invited for autumn 1991 and the first allocations made for April 1992. An NHS management executive letter will be issued to health authorities shortly and will give further details.

  Myelograms
  Ms. Walley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Health what equipment currently available under the NHS is capable of determining whether or not myodil dye was used in the past; what is the location of each scanner: and what is its current availability for use.

  Mr. Dorrell
  [holding answer 14 January 1991]: If myodil dye was used in the past for a myelograrn its clearance from the body will vary from patient to patient. Normal radiographic X-ray equipment should detect any myodil still present in a patient's body.

ENERGY

  Electricity Privatisation
  Mr. Morgan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what consultations he has had with the chairman of National Power and PowerGen concerning a staggered sale of the share capital; what estimates he has made of the difference in net proceeds from a 100 per cent. sale and a staggered sale; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  My right hon. Friend has decided to offer for sale 60 per cent. of the share capital of National Power and PowerGen next month, subject to market conditions. The chairmen of the companies have been informed of this decision, which reflects the Government's confidence in the long-term future of the companies and the wish to maximise proceeds in time.

  Energy Efficiency
  Mr. Martyn Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what resources are allocated for a campaign to encourage home insulation as part of the energy efficiency project.

  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  The Energy Efficiency Office promotes energy efficiency measures in the domestic sector through a range of initiatives including the new home energy efficiency scheme, which came into operation on 1 January, provision of targeted information to householders, and the best practice programme. Of the total budget expected to be available to the EEO of nearly £42 million in 1991–92, some £30 million is in support of these programmes.

  Electricity Cables
  Sir Dudley Smith
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy if he will institute a feasibility study in co-operation with the electricity industry with a view to improving the overhead cable system and making it less vulnerable, particularly in rural areas, to severe snow and storm conditions.

  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  A joint Department-electricity supply industry panel of inquiry chaired by the Department's chief engineering inspector was set up in January 1982 to investigate the adequacy, and so on, of overhead electricity lines following the very severe snow storms in December 1981 and January 1982 which seriously affected Wales and the west of England. As a result a programme of improvements was put in hand costing over £100 million, which included the strengthening of the more vulnerable overhead lines and closer control of tree growth. The snowstorm which affected the midlands area in December 1990 was exceptional, but the East Midlands Electricity company—the worst affected —is carrying out a review of the event and the Department's engineering inspectorate is monitoring this review.

  Electricity Prices
  Mr. Morgan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy when he next expects to meet the 12 chairs of the electricity consumer committees to discuss next year's forecast price increases for domestic consumers.
  465
  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  The functioning of the electricity consumers' committees is a matter for the Director General of Electricity Supply.

  Electricity Consumers
  Mr. Morgan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what information he has regarding the numbers of electricity consumers with average consumption slightly less than 1 MW, who have stepped up consumption just sufficiently to gain access to non-franchise purchasing terms.

  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  The criteria for franchise customers are set out in condition 2 of the second tier supply licences issued to suppliers. This makes it clear that the relevant demand calculations must be on the basis of the average of the three highest months of maximum demand in a 12-month period under normal operating conditions. It is for the Director General of Electricity Supply to oversee the implementation of licence conditions and to determine any disputes over whether the criteria have been met.

  Power Cables
  Mr. Morgan
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy if he will call for a report on the problem of ice accretion on power cables and the threat it poses to security of supply.

  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
  The phenomenon of ice accumulation on overhead electric lines and other structures is well understood technically. Weather conditions and their effect on overhead electricity transmission and distribution systems, including ice accumulation and electricity supply industry design standards, were exhaustively addressed in the joint Department of Energy-industry review into the widespread storm damage in the west of Britain during the winter of 1981–82. The phenomenon is not confined to the United Kingdom and occurs in other countries, including other parts of Europe, with similar climatic conditions to our own.

  The area of East Midlands Electricity was particularly badly affected last December. The company is carrying out a review of those events and the Department's engineering inspectors will be keeping closely in touch with it.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

  Levitt Group
  Mr. David Shaw
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry who is responsible for making an announcement, and at what time he expects it to be made, concerning the safety and security of money placed by investors with the Levitt Group.

  Mr. Redwood
  I understand that the provisional liquidators reported to creditors on Monday 14 January.

  Mr. David Shaw
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what information he has on the current position of the Levitt group and the safety of investors' moneys.

  Mr. Redwood
  [holding answer 14 January 1991]: I understand that the provisional liquidators reported to creditors on Monday 14 January.

  Auditors
  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry how many times company auditors have notified his Department of corporate fraud and irregularities.

  Mr. Redwood
  This information is not available in the form requested. To try to provide comprehensive information over a reasonable time period would involve disproportionate cost.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether the individuals criticised in the inspectors' report on Bryanston can still carry out company audits.

  Mr. Redwood
  In respect of accountants, yes, except for Mr. Keith Cunningham whose membership of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has lapsed. The accountancy firm involved was required to pay costs of £273,000 and reprimanded under the joint disciplinary scheme.

  Tottenham Hotspur plc
  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what inquiries he has made into the suspension of shares of Tottenham Hotspur plc.

  Mr. Redwood
  The suspension of shares is a matter for the International Stock Exchange.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what action he has taken or is proposing to take against Tottenham Hotspur plc for late filing of its annual accounts.

  Mr. Redwood
  Tottenham Hotspur plc has failed to submit accounts for the period ended 31 May 1990. The registrar has confirmed that the company has been notified of the default and appropriate action is being taken to secure compliance.

  Suspension of Shares
  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he has any plans to propose legislation under which within six weeks of the share quotation being suspended the existing board of directors will be required to offer itself for re-election.

  Mr. Redwood
  No. If the shareholders of such a company wish to dismiss some or all of the directors they may requisition the convening of an extraordinary general meeting for that purpose under the provisions of section 368 of the Companies Act 1985.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry whether he will bring forward proposals for legislation to require a company whose share quotation is suspended to call an extraordinary meeting.

  Mr. Redwood
  No. Section 368 of the Companies Act 1985 already gives a company's shareholders the power to requisition an extraordinary general meeting if they consider one necessary.

  Accounting Procedures
  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (1) whether he has any proposals for companies to write off purchased good will against profits rather than reserves;
  467
  (2) if he will propose legislation under which property companies would be prevented from capitalising the interest on their borrowings;

  (3) what proposals he has for defining mergers and eliminating the anomalies arising from merger accounts.

  Mr. Redwood
  Issues of this sort are better dealt with through accounting standards than in the law. The matters raised are encompassed within exposure drafts issued by the Accounting Standards Committee and the responses received will be considered by the Accounting Standards Board in due course.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what proposals he has for requiring every public company to establish an audit committee and to specify in the annual reports any changes in accounting practice and its implications for the future.

  Mr. Redwood
  The Government endorse the use of audit committees, but have no plans to impose them on companies through legislation. Companies must be free to decide for themselves whether such committees are appropriate to their circumstances.

  The existing requirements of SSAP2 in respect of the disclosure by companies of the accounting policies they have adopted and of SSAP6 in respect of the disclosure of the effect of prior period adjustments arising when an accounting policy is changed already cover the question of accounting policies.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what consultations he has had with the professional accountancy bodies about the establishment of a review panel to examine the accounts of listed companies and to establish an urgent issues task force to clear up areas of anomaly and clarify accounting guidelines.

  Mr. Redwood
  My Department consulted the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies fully about the implementation of the Dearing report, which recommended the creation of a review panel and an urgent issues task force.

  Mr. Austin Mitchell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what proposals he has to ask the Audit Commission to lay down guidelines for the accountancy profession on the auditing of company accounts.

  Mr. Redwood
  None.

  Export Credits Guarantee Department
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make it his policy that the Export Credits Guarantee Department should continue to be based in the Crown offices at Cathays, Cardiff; and if he will list any obstacles that would need to be overcome for such a policy to be implemented in the long term.

  Mr. Sainsbury
  After the proposed privatisation of its insurance services group, ECGD's remaining operations will continue to be based in London and in various locations in Cardiff. It is ECGD's intention that, in respect of these remaining operations, it should retain a significant presence in Cardiff for the foreseeable future. I am not aware of any obstacles likely to prevent this. As regards the location of the insurance services group following privatisation, this would be a matter for the new management and owners.

  Company Accounts
  Mr. Jacques Arnold
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry when he intends to authorise a person under section 245c of the Companies Act 1985 for the purpose of making applications to court under section 245b in respect of accounts which it is alleged did not comply with the Act.

  Mr. Redwood
  Last week I made an order authorising the Financial Reporting Review Panel Ltd, a subsidiary of the Financial Reporting Council Ltd, for this purpose. The authorisation takes effect from 1 February. The relevant provisions of the Act apply to accounts for financial years starting on or after 23 December 1989. The review panel will be able to apply to the court for a declaration that a company's accounts did not comply with the Act and for an order requiring the directors to prepare revised accounts.

  Research Council
  Mr. Michael Brown
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he will make a statement on the outcome of the Research Council on 21 December 1990.

  Mr. Leigh
  My noble Friend the Minister for Industry represented Her Majesty's Government at the meeting of the Council of Ministers (Research) in Brussels on 21 December.

  The Council agreed common positions on three specific programmes under the third framework programme for R and D 1990–94: "Environment, Telematics, and Marine Sciences and Technologies". It approved in principle the specific programme of life sciences and technologies for developing countries while asking the Committee of Permanent Representatives—COREPER—to consider further the technical annex of the programme. COREPER was also asked to examine the following programmes with a view to the possible adoption of common positions early in 1991: information technologies, communication technologies, industrial and materials technologies, and biomedicine and health.

  RENAVAL Programme (Plymouth)
  Mr. Michael Brown
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what measures his Department is taking as a result of the European Commission's approval of the RENAVAL programme for the Plymouth travel-to-work area.

  Mr. Leigh
  The RENAVAL programme enables the Department to introduce regional enterprise grants into the Plymouth travel-to-work area and this we shall do with immediate effect.

  The programme is designed to support our regional policies of increasing competitiveness, encouraging innovation and business development and improving the skills of individuals.

  Regional enterprise grants, up to £1 million in total, will be available to small firms employing fewer than 25 people for investment in new equipment and towards the costs of developing or improving products or processes.

  I am sure that RENAVAL and the help now available under regional enterprise grants will be of enormous benefit to small businesses in the Plymouth area. It is a useful addition to the support already available under regional selective assistance and the enterprise initiative.
  469
  The grants will be administered from our Plymouth office. Regional selective assistance continues to be available to larger firms and consultancy support continues unchanged.

  Life Companies
  Mr. David Shaw
  To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what information he has of the practice of life companies using policyholders' funds to acquire shares in a company to benefit the company and not the policyholders; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Redwood
  [holding answer 14 January 1991]: Life companies have freedom to invest policyholders' funds for the benefit of the policyholders subject to the prudential regulation of my Department. Policyholders' funds must be applied with the intention of benefiting policyholders although not all investment decisions will turn out to be successful with the benefit of hindsight. The application of policyholders' funds with the intention of benefiting policyholders is a requirement of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and failure to comply constitutes a criminal offence.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

  Czechoslovak Academic Links Project
  Mr. Wallace
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many applications have been received by the British Council for funding under the Czechoslovak academic links project; and how many applications have been approved to date.

  Mrs. Chalker
  To date, the British Council has received 65 applications for links with Czechoslovakia under the Czechoslovak academic links project which is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the know-how fund. Of these 15, have been approved.

  Mr. Wallace
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what funding has been made available by the Government's know-how funds for the links projects with(a) Czechoslovakia, (b) Poland and (c) Hungary in 1990–91; and how much has been allocated in respect of projects for each country to date.

  Mrs. Chalker
  The sums made available in 1990–91 under the know-how fund for the academic links projects in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary are £150,000, £150,000 and £100,000 respectively. To date £150,000 has been allocated under the Czechoslovak scheme, £143,000 under the Polish scheme and £94,514 under the Hungarian scheme.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

  Middle East
  Mr. Ian Taylor
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what advice Her Majesty's Government are giving to British citizens in the middle east.

  Mr. Lennox-Boyd
  As a precautionary measure against the risk of war and the possibility of civil disturbance and terrorist attack in some countries, the Foreign and 470
  Commonwealth Office has given the following advice to travellers and residents. The dangers to British nationals are being kept under constant review, and advice may change at any time.

  Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon

  Do not attempt to travel to these countries.

  Bahrain, Qatar, Riyadh, Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia

  Visitors: those with business in Bahrain, Qatar and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the cities of Riyadh and Tabuk should not be deterred from making necessary visits. They should register their arrival with the nearest British diplomatic mission and should tell the mission how long they expect to stay. Tourists and others whose visits are a matter of choice should defer their visits.

  British Community: dependants are advised to leave these areas before the deadline of 15 January which has been set by the Security Council for the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

  Elsewhere in Saudi Arabia; United Arab Emirates

  Visitors: those with business to conduct should not be deterred from making necessary visits. Others whose visits are a matter of choice should defer their visits.

  British Community: United Arab Emirates: dependants currently on leave or planning on taking leave should consider delaying their return until the situation becomes clearer.

  Elsewhere in Saudi Arabia: no reason for dependants to leave provided this is not contrary to employers' policy.

  Jordan, Yemen

  Visitors: travellers are advised to defer visits to these countries if they can.

  British Community: all British nationals whose continued presence is not essential should leave until the situation becomes clearer.

  Israel and the Occupied Territories

  Visitors: Travellers are advised to defer visits if they can.

  British Community: British nationals should consider leaving if they have no essential reason for staying.

  Algeria

  Visitors: Travellers should defer their visit if they are able to do so.

  British Community: British dependents are advised to leave Algeria until the situation becomes clearer; those who remain should keep a low profile and take sensible precautions against the risk of civil disturbance.

  Morocco, Tunisia

  Visitors: Travellers to Morocco and Tunisia should be aware of the risk of disturbances, particularly in cities.

  British Community: Should keep a low profile and take sensible precautions against the possibility of civil disturbances.

  Syria

  Visitors: Travellers should keep in close touch with events and keep their plans under review. They should notify the British embassy in Damascus of their arrival.

  British Community: Residents should maintain a low profile and avoid disturbances and public demonstrations.

  Iran

  Visitors: In the light of developments in the middle east

  471
  and the proximity of Iran to the area of possible conflict, visitors should keep their plans under review and stay in close touch with events. They should tell the British embassy in Tehran of their arrival. Travellers should consider postponing visits to south western parts of Iran.

  British Community: British nationals resident in the area close to the Iraqi border and the Gulf should consider moving themselves, or their dependants, to safer parts of Iran.

  Turkey

  Visitors: There is no reason not to travel to Turkey. Travellers should be aware that the situation in the south-east of the country might be affected if there were to be hostilities in the Gulf. Visitors planning to travel to the area are advised to inform the British embassy in Ankara. Travellers should also be aware that there have been recent terrorist incidents in the provinces of Diyarbakir, Elazig, Mardin, Hakkari, Siirt and Simok.

  British Community: British nationals resident in southeast Turkey are being advised to keep in close touch with the British embassy. Those who are particularly worried about the situation should consider moving away for the time being.

  Karachi

  Visitors: travellers should not be deterred from making necessary visits but should register their arrival with the deputy high commission.

  British Community: no change to the advice, which is to keep a low profile and take sensible precautions against the possibility of civil disorder.

  Bangladesh

  Visitors: given the uncertainty surrounding the situation in the Gulf intending travellers should consider postponing their journey unless they have substantive business to undertake. Any visitors to Bangladesh should keep in close touch with the British high commission.

  British Community: British citizens should continue to take special care particularly during the period 15 and 16 January. Those working for organisations with known British or American connections should also consider what additional precautions they should take both for themselves and their companies.

  Kaduna

  Visitors: travellers should not be deterred from making necessary visits but should inform the deputy high commission of their arrival. Overland travellers through Kano should maintain a low profile for the time being.

  British Community: are advised to keep a low profile and take sensible precautions against the possibility of civil unrest.

  Sudan

  Visitors: In the light of recent developments in Sudan travellers should visit the country only if their journey is essential.
  472
  British Community: All British nationals resident in the Khartoum area whose continuing presence is not essential are advised to leave.

  Egypt, Greece, Oman, Libya, Cyprus

  Visitors: no reason for travellers to change their plans in the light of recent developments.

  EC Council of Ministers
  Mr. Simon Coombs
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will publish in the Official Report a statement on the forthcoming business in the European Community Council of Ministers.

  Dr. Hampson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will publish in the Official Report a statement of forthcoming business in the European Community Council of Ministers.

  Mr. Garel-Jones
  The Fisheries Council will possibly meet on 17 January and may discuss 1991 total allowable catches and quotas, agreement between the EC and Norway, agreement between the EC and Sweden, agreement between the EC and the Faroes, agreement between the EC and NAFO, agreement between the EC and French Guyana, total allowable catches and quotas for Spanish and Portuguese waters, the 10th amendment to technical conservation measures, autonomous tariff quotas and tariff suspensions and the amendment to the structures regulation.

  The Agriculture Council will meet on 21 and 22 January and will discuss the review of the sugar regime and the beef balance sheet. Other items which may be discussed are organic agricultural production, GATT beef quotas, GATT agriculture, GATT accompanying measures, presentation of 1991 agricultural prices proposals, fish hygiene and bivalve molluscs.

  The Economic and Finance Council will meet on 28 January to conduct a multilateral surveillance of the economies of member states. It is likely that other items for discussion will include the abolition of fiscal frontiers and assistance to central and eastern Europe.

  Gibraltar
  Mr. Simon Coombs
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what support Gibraltar has received from the European Community's structural funds.

  Mr. Garel-Jones
  Gibraltar is to receive £237,223 from the United Kingdom's 1990 European social fund allocation to finance training and just under £2 million —2·8 million ecu—from the European regional development fund to assist in the conversion of a warehouse into small business premises. These are the first awards that Gibraltar has received from the structural funds.

SOCIAL SECURITY

  Blindness
  Sir Russell Johnston
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if his Department has any plans to recompense for the additional costs of blindness those
  473
  claimants who are registered blind aged over 80 years and whose income support currently makes no provision in relation to their additional problems.

  Miss Widdecombe
  People who are registered blind and aged 60 years or more automatically qualify for the higher pensioner premium, which provides an extra £17.05 a week for single people and £24.25 a week for couples on top of their personal allowances. In addition, blind people can qualify for the severe disability premium, worth £28.20 a week, if they receive attendance allowance, nobody else lives with them and no one gets invalid care allowance in respect of their care. There are no plans to change these arrangements.

  Food Vouchers
  Mr. Wareing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if food vouchers are used as a suitable method of paying crisis loans in circumstances other than where the need has arisen because of the claimant's loss of money due to recklessness.

  Mr. Scott
  The power to make a payment out of the social fund under section 32(2)(b) of the Social Security Act 1986 may be exercised by making a payment to a third party with a view to the third party providing, or arranging for the provision of, goods or services to the applicant.

  The method of payment is a matter for consideration in the circumstances of each individual case. Information relating to the ways in which local offices make payments for crisis loans in individual cases is not available.

  Mr. Wareing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security what percentage of crisis loans have been awarded as food vouchers for each month since April 1988(a) nationally, (b) regionally and (c) in each of his Department's local office areas.

  Mr. Scott
  The information requested is not available.

  Deaf People
  Mr. Wigley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security whether the new telephone line that will be set up to help disabled people claim benefits will include a minicom for deaf people.

  Mr. Scott
  The benefit inquiry line, which has been operating in Berkshire for a trial period of six months, includes the minicom facility for deaf people. Such a facility would be part of any extension to the system.

  Community Charge (Strathclyde)
  Mr. Watson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security if he will list in respect of the 1989–90 community charge rebate scheme for Strathclyde regional council(a) how many applications have been received, (b) how many applications have been approved, (c) to how many applicants payment of rebate has been made and (d) how much in total has been paid out in rebates.

  Miss Widdecombe
  The information requested is not available. However, in December 1989 Strathclyde regional council estimated that its expenditure on community charge rebates in 1989–90 would be around £100 million and, in November 1989, 520,000 claimants were in receipt of a community charge rebate. Claims from couples are counted as one.
  474
  Source: 1. Housing and Community Charge Benefit Management Information System November 1989 quarterly stock count of claims.

  2. Estimate of Community Charge Rebate expenditure prepared by Strathclyde Regional Council.

  Disability living Allowance
  Mr. Alfred Morris
  To ask the Secretary of State for Social Security at what age a child in normal physical and mental health will be regarded as not requiring guidance and supervision for the purposes of entitlement to the lower mobility component of disability living allowance; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Scott
  [holding answer 20 December 1990]: We have no plans to specify the age at which children normally cease to require guidance or supervision. The aim is to compare the requirements of a disabled child under age 16 with those of a child of the same age in normal physical and mental health. These reduce as children grow older and the Bill currently before Parliament recognises that, eventually, a point is reached when a child in normal physical and mental health will no longer require any guidance or supervision.

WALES

  Alcohol Misuse
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what factors influenced his decision on the timing of the announcement in respect of the criteria to be applied to applications from organisations seeking to develop local services in Wales for those involved in alcohol misuse.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  The criteria set for bids for funding projects to combat alcohol misuse were primarily influenced by the experience gained in operating a similar central funding initiative in respect of drug misuse.

  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what are the reasons for the delays from the initial announcements of plans for a campaign to tackle alcohol misuse and from the announcement of the amount of cash available for his Department to make details available and to invite applications from organisations concerned with the provision of local services in Wales in respect of alcohol misuse.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  Following the announcement that central resources were being made available to combat alcohol misuse, it was necessary to establish a framework within which expenditure would be utilised and to seek the views of local agencies as to how the resources might best be deployed.

  Health Authorities
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales whether any account will be taken of projected land sales in determining his Department's annual level of contribution to each health authority in Wales(a) in 1990–91, (b) in 1991–92 and (c) in subsequent years.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  At present, district health authorities in Wales benefit from the proceeds of surplus land and buildings, unless the facilities become surplus as a consequence of a centrally funded development. In these
  475
  cases, the receipts are used to offset the cost of the development. No account is taken of the expected level of receipts in determining each health authority's ,share of capital funds, and authorities which are able to realise land sales have therefore benefited directly by the amounts raised enabling them to develop and improve health services. These arrangements, including the treatment of the receipts from surplus mental handicap and mental illness hospitals which should contribute to the development of alternative patterns of care, are described in the land transactions handbook.

  Under the new arrangements proposed for capital funding for introduction in 1992–93, after a transitional period all proceeds from sales will be retained centrally and used to contribute to the cost of new developments. This is intended to ensure that the benefits from such sales should be used wherever they provide the best return in terms of health gain or improved efficiency. These arrangements are described in the consultation paper "The Health Service in Wales Implementing the White Paper: Capital Allocations" and copies are in the Library of the House. Because of the volume of capital developments that is currently in the pipeline or otherwise committed, and the time taken to complete new developments, the proposed arrangements would be phased in over a number of years. These transitional arrangements and details of the way in which it is decided that the new system should work will be announced in due course. However, for 1991–92, the current arrangements will continue to apply.

  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what proportion of their land sales will be retained by health authorities in Wales(a) in 1990–91, (b) 1991–92 and (c) in 1992–93 and future financial years.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  District health authorities are currently entitled to retain and use the proceeds from the sale of land and buildings no longer needed by the health service except in those cases where the property has become surplus as a result of a closure following the provision of a centrally funded scheme. In such cases proceeds are returned to the all-Wales provision. Most receipts are retained by health authorities. The proportion of proceeds retained by health authorities in any year will depend on the particular sales which are completed during that year about which it is not possible to speculate.

  These arrangements will continue in 1991–92. For 1992–93 and subsequent years, new arrangements for capital funding are in prospect. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer given to him today on that subject.

  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will list for each district health authority and special health authority in Wales for each of the last five years, 1985–86 to 1990–91,(a) the costs his Department considered in advance that the authority should achieve in efficiency savings, (b) the actual savings achieved and (c) the percentage of the previous year's (i) budget and (ii) actual expenditure represented by (a) and (b) in each case.
  476
  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  Financial targets in respect of efficiency savings to be achieved through cost improvement in the NHS in Wales were first introduced in 1989–90. Monitoring of health authorities' cost improvement programmes began in 1988. Estimates of the new recurrent savings achieved by district health authorities and the Welsh health common services authority in 1985–86, 1986–87 and 1987–88 are set out in the following table together with reported savings in 1988–89 and 1989–90 and the savings expected to be achieved in 1990–91. The cost improvement targets set for 1989–90 and 1990–91 are also shown. The equivalent information for the health promotion authority for Wales is not available.

  Table 1: 1985–86

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Recurring revenue efficiency savings achieved in 1985–861

  1984–85 recurrent revenue allocations

  1984–85 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  Per cent

  Per cent

  Clwyd

  824

  1·2

  1·2

  East Dyfed

  336

  0·8

  0·7

  Gwent

  797

  0·9

  0·9

  Gwynedd

  240

  0·6

  0·5

  Mid Glamorgan

  971

  1·0

  0·9

  Pembrokeshire

  107

  0·7

  0·7

  Powys

  205

  1·0

  1·0

  South Glamorgan

  1,176

  1·0

  1·0

  West Glamorgan

  361

  0·5

  0·5

  Welsh health common services authority

  10

  0·2

  0·2

  1 New recurring savings estimated to have been achieved in 1985–86 at the time an efficiency scrutiny of cash-releasing cost improvements in the NHS in Wales was conducted in 1988.

  Table 2: 1986–87

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Recurring revenue efficiency savings achieved in 1986–871

  1985–86 recurrent revenue allocations

  1985–86 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  Per cent

  Per cent

  Clwyd

  95

  0·1

  0·1

  East Dyfed

  602

  1·3

  1·3

  Gwent

  903

  1·0

  1·0

  Gwynedd

  234

  0·5

  0·5

  Mid Glamorgan

  1,045

  1·0

  0·9

  Pembrokeshire

  386

  2·3

  2·4

  Powys

  236

  1·1

  1·1

  South Glamorgan

  1,365

  1·1

  1·1

  West Glamorgan

  507

  0·7

  0·7

  Welsh Health Common Services Authority

  35

  0·8

  0·7

  1 New recurring savings estimated to have been achieved in 1986–87 at the time an efficiency scrutiny of cash-releasing cost improvements in the National Health Service in Wales was conducted in 1988.

  477

  Table 3: 1987–88

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Recurring revenue efficiency savings achieved in 1987–81

  1986–87 recurrent revenue allocations

  1986–87 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  (Per cent)

  (Per cent)

  Clwyd

  260

  0·3

  0·3

  East Dyfed

  518

  1·0

  1·0

  Gwent

  661

  0·7

  0·7

  Gwynedd

  654

  1·3

  1·3

  Mid Glamorgan

  1,563

  1·3

  1·3

  Pembrokeshire

  98

  0·5

  0·6

  Powys

  123

  0·5

  0·5

  South Glamorgan

  963

  0·7

  0·7

  West Glamorgan

  1,073

  1·3

  1·3

  Welsh Health Common Services Authority

  30

  0·6

  0·5

  1 New recurring savings estimated to have been achieved in 1987–88 at the time an efficiency scrutiny of cash-releasing cost improvements in the National Health Service in Wales was conducted in 1988.

  Table 4: 1988–89

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Recurring revenue efficiency savings achieved in 1988–891

  1987–88 recurrent revenue allocations

  1987–88 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  Percentage

  Percentage

  Clwyd

  909

  1·0

  1·0

  East Dyfed

  1,157

  2·1

  2·0

  Gwent

  1,791

  1·7

  1·6

  Gwynedd

  639

  1·2

  1·1

  Mid Glamorgan

  1,759

  1·4

  1·3

  Pembrokeshire

  311

  1·5

  1·6

  Powys

  146

  0·6

  0·6

  South Glamorgan

  1,027

  0·7

  0·7

  West Glamorgan

  802

  0·9

  0·9

  Welsh Health Common Services Authority

  8

  0·1

  0·1

  1 New recurring savings reported by health authorities.

  Table 5: 1989–90

  Target as a percentage of:

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Cash releasing cost improvement target

  1988–89 recurrent revenue allocations

  1988–89 revenue expenditure

  Recurring revenue efficiency savings achieved in 1989–901

  1988–89 recurrent revenue allocations

  1988–89 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  (Per cent)

  (Per cent)

  (£000s)

  (Per cent)

  (Per cent)

  Clwyd

  1,170

  1·2

  1·1

  710

  0·7

  0·7

  East Dyfed

  741

  1·2

  1·2

  1,116

  1·9

  1·7

  Gwent

  1,392

  1·2

  1·1

  1,347

  1·2

  1·1

  Gwynedd

  701

  1·2

  1·1

  492

  0·9

  0·8

  Mid Glamorgan

  1,638

  1·2

  1·1

  1,355

  1·1

  0·9

  Pembrokeshire

  279

  1·2

  1·2

  249

  1·1

  1·1

  Powys

  334

  1·2

  1·2

  267

  1·0

  0·9

  South Glamorgan

  1,870

  1·2

  1·1

  1,702

  1·1

  1·0

  West Glamorgan

  1,205

  1·2

  1·2

  1,069

  1·1

  1·0

  Welsh Health Common Services Authority

  87

  1·4

  0·9

  43

  0·7

  0·4

  1 New recurring savings reported by health authorities.

  478 479

  Table 6: 1990–91

  Target as a percentage of:

  Recurring savings as a percentage of:

  Health authority

  Cash releasing cost improvement target

  1989–90 recurrent revenue allocations

  1989–90 revenue expenditure

  Estimated recurring revenue efficiency savings in 1990–911

  1989–90 recurrent revenue allocations

  1989–90 revenue expenditure

  (£000s)

  (Per cent)

  (Per cent)

  (£000s)

  (Per cent)

  (Per cent)

  Clwyd

  1,282

  1·2

  1·2

  1,338

  1·3

  1·2

  East Dyfed

  824

  1·2

  1·2

  939

  1·4

  1·4

  Gwent

  1,518

  1·2

  1·2

  1,746

  1·4

  1·3

  Gwynedd

  761

  1·2

  1·1

  717

  1·1

  1·1

  Mid Glamorgan

  1,776

  1·2

  1·2

  1,679

  1·1

  1·1

  Pembrokeshire

  312

  1·2

  1·2

  344

  1·4

  1·3

  Powys

  367

  1·2

  1·2

  666

  2·2

  2·2

  South Glamorgan

  2,079

  1·2

  1·1

  2,016

  1·2

  1·1

  West Glamorgan

  1,312

  1·2

  1·2

  1,212

  1·1

  1·1

  Welsh Health Common Services Authority

  94

  1·2

  0·9

  50

  0·7

  0·5

  1Estimated new recurring savings reported by health authorities.

  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will publish a list showing how much has been spent(a) by the Welsh Office itself and (b) by each health authority in Wales on training for the people recently appointed by him to the new health authority boards.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave him on 14 January 1991.

  Bronllys Hospital
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will investigate Powys health authority's inability recently to find money for a replacement washing machine for ward D at Bronllys hospital.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  Powys health authority advises that no request has been made for a washing machine to be located on Defynnog ward.

  Llangoed Hall
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will order an investigation into Powys health authority's expenditure on a weekend at Llangoed Hall near Brecon.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  No; this is a matter for Powys health authority.

  Laura Ashley Factory, Clwyd
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will make a statement concerning the future of the Laura Ashley factory at Leeswood, Clwyd.

  Mr. David Hunt
  The WDA is continuing its efforts to work with Laura Ashley to find purchasers. Detailed discussions are currently taking place with at least one interested company. My Department is being kept closely informed.

  School Curriculum
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will make a statement concerning the national curriculum for pupils from the age of 14 years.

  Sir Wyn Roberts
  We intend to make a statement shortly.
  480
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will make a statement concerning the teaching of(a) arts and music, (b) technology, (c) history and (d) geography from the age of 14 years.

  Sir Wyn Roberts
  We intend to make a statement shortly.

  Industrial Development, Clwyd
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will make a statement concerning his plans to assist the development of the Warren Hall, Broughton, Clwyd site for modern industry.

  Mr. David Hunt
  I am advised that the Welsh Development Agency is exploring the possibility of a partnership development with the owners to bring the land forward for business use.

  Castle Cement Factory, Clwyd
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will visit the Castle Cement factory, Clwyd, to meet the work force.

  Mr. David Hunt
  As the hon. Gentleman knows, I met a delegation from Castle Cement on 18 December.

  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what action he will take concerning the proposed loss of jobs at the Castle Cement factory, Clwyd.

  Mr. David Hunt
  It is very much regretted that the company consider it necessary to take such steps. The Welsh Development Agency will take these proposed job losses into account in planning its future activities and will review its plans in the light of continuing developments.

  Roads
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales if he will indicate the initiatives taken to advance the construction of the relief road of Shotton and Connah's Quay and the proposed new road bridge over the River Dee.

  Sir Wyn Roberts
  The timing of the scheme is a matter for Clwyd county council as the responsible highway authority. Preparation costs have been accepted for transport grant support in 1991–92.

  Owens-Conning, Clwyd
  Mr. Barry Jones
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what action he proposes consequent upon the loss of jobs at Owens-Corming at Llay, Clwyd.

  Mr. David Hunt
  These job losses are very much regretted. The Welsh Development Agency will take these job losses into account in planning its future activities and will review its plans in the light of continuing developments.

  Water Charges
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Secretary of State for Wales what sanctions are available to him if the guidelines and criteria produced by the Director General of Water Services on methods of charging for water are disregarded.

  Mr. Nicholas Bennett
  [holding answer 14 January]: 1 refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer given to him on 14 January by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment.

SCOTLAND

  Noble Organisation
  Mr. Dunnachie
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has considered the terms of the judgment of dismissal given by the Court of Session on 7 December of the appeal by Glasgow district council in the matter of the provision of an entertainments licence to the Noble Organisation at premises in Duke street, Glasgow; and if he will make a statement.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  The terms of the Court of Session's judgment in this case have been noted. The Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 is to be the subject of a consultative review next year and interested parties will have the opportunity to submit representations on the operation of its provisions.

  Business Rates
  Mr. McFall
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is his latest estimate of non-payment of business rates for the years 1989–90 and 1990–91.

  Mr. Allan Stewart
  The information is not available centrally.

  Rural Communities
  Mr. Hood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what level of resources will be provided for the rural communities of Scotland in the 1991–92 financial year.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  The components of expenditure programmes which are relevant to rural areas are not separately identified.

  Gipsy Sites
  Mr. Hood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will publish in the Official Report a list of all established gipsy sites in Scotland, indicating when they were established at each site.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  The travelling people's sites run by local authorities in Scotland are listed in the 482
  table. In addition to them, it is estimated that around 240 pitches are regularly used by travelling people on privately run sites.

  Local Authority

  Location

  Established

  Permanent Sites

  Aberdeen

  Clinterty, Aberdeen

  November 1982

  Angus

  Tayock, Montrose

  November 1980

  Argyll and Bute

  Dunchologan, Lochgilphead

  December 1978

  Argyll and Bute

  Torlochan, Dunoon

  December 1984

  Banff and Buchan1

  Greenbanks, Banff

  May 1989

  Clackmannan

  Westhaugh, Alva

  December 1984

  Cumnock and Doon Valley2

  Auchinleck, Cumnock

  Early 1980s

  Cunninghame

  Merkland Bridge, Arran

  September 1982

  Cunninghame

  Redburn, Irvine

  July 1989

  Dumbarton

  Dennystown, Dumbarton

  July 1981

  East Kilbride

  Springbank, East Kilbride

  April 1990

  Edinburgh

  Duddingston, Edinburgh

  August 1983

  Falkirk

  Redding, Falkirk

  June 1985

  Glasgow

  Carmyle, Glasgow

  June 1985

  Glasgow

  Rodney Street, Port Dundas

  April 1990

  Hamilton

  Swinhill, Larkhall

  January 1987

  Inverness

  Longman, Inverness

  September 1985

  Kyle and Carrick

  Houdston Farm, Girvan

  February 1989

  Lochaber

  Aonachan, Spean Bridge

  September 1989

  Monklands

  Annathill, Glenboig

  August 1989

  Motherwell

  Mossend, Bellshill

  April 1982

  North East Fife

  Tarvit Mill, Cupar

  May 1988

  Perth and Kinross

  Double Dykes, Perth

  December 1982

  Renfrew

  Oldbarhills, Hurlet, Barrhead

  November 1989

  Tweedale2

  Kilnknowe, Innerleithen

  Early 1980s

  Temporary Site

  Stirling

  Craigforth, Stirling

  January 1984

  1 Seasonal site.

  2 Local authority caravan site.

  Opencast Mining
  Mr. Hood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland how many planning applications refused by local authorities regarding opencast mining have been upheld by the Scottish Office; and if he will give this information in percentage terms.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  Local authorities assumed responsibilities for approving proposals for opencast coal mining on 11 December 1987. Since then my right hon. Friend has determined seven appeals against refusal of permission and has upheld three (43 per cent.)

  Mr. Hood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has had from the Law Mining Company concerning its planning application for opencast coal reserves at Townhead, near Rigside, within Clydesdale constituency; and if he will make a statement.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  The company's planning appeal concerning its application to extract coal and fireclay by opencast operations at Townhead near Rigside is due to be heard at a public inquiry in Rigside village hall, commencing on 29 January. As this appeal is to be determined by the chief reporter, under delegated powers, the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that it would not be
  483
  appropriate for me to comment on the merits or otherwise of the proposals, but he may be assured that before reaching a decision the reporter will give all aspects of the matter the most careful consideration.

  New St. Andrew's House
  Mr. Darling
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what consideration he has given to removing the Scottish Office from New St. Andrew's house to alternative accommodation in Edinburgh; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Lang
  In the light of the work needed to remove asbestos from New St. Andrew's house and refurbish the building consideration is being given to a number of options for the longer-term accommodation strategy of the Scottish Office. No decisions have yet been taken.

  Mr. Darling
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the estimated cost of the renovation work required to upgrade the Scottish Office premises at New St. Andrew's house, Edinburgh recommended by the Property Services Agency report.

  Mr. Lang
  As part of the reinstatement of the building after removal of asbestos Property Holdings would propose to refurbish the building to a high standard. The report by PSA Building Management, which was commissioned by Property Holdings, sets out a number of options for additional enhancement of the building, the total cost of which if they were implemented would amount to some £5 million, excluding fees and VAT.

  Mr. Darling
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if it is proposed to evacuate all staff employed at New St. Andrew's house, Edinburgh while the asbestos is removed.

  Mr. Lang
  The work programme for the removal of asbestos is still under consideration.

  Mr. Darling
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the estimated cost of removing all asbestos from the Scottish Office at New St. Andrew's house, Edinburgh.

  Mr. Lang
  The report commissioned by Property Holdings estimates the cost of removing the asbestos and reinstating the building to an appropriate standard as between £6·3 million and £8·6 million, excluding fees and VAT, depending on the work programme adopted.

  Mr. Darling
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the estimated cost of the improvement to the ventilation system at the Scottish Office at New St. Andrew's house, Edinburgh.

  Mr. Lang
  A number of possible alternative ways in which the heating, ventilation and air conditioning in New

  1

  2

  3

  4

  5

  1990–91

  1991–92

  1991–92

  1991–92

  Poundages

  Pre-NNDR Reduction

  Poundages

  Poundages at Ratepayer Level

  Reduction to Ratepayer

  Borders

  36·0

  39·9

  37·9

  Central

  41·7

  46·2

  43·9

  Dumfries and Galloway

  38·3

  42·5

  40·4

  Fife

  461

  51·1

  48·6

  Grampian

  34·2

  37·9

  36·0

  Highland

  41·3

  45·8

  43·5

  484
  St. Andrew's house might be improved are under consideration; accurate cost figures cannot be given at this stage.

  Non-domestic Rates
  Mr. Bill Walker
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on non-domestic rates for 1991–92.

  Mr. Lang
  As a result of our policy of reducing Scottish business rate poundages to the level of the English national non-domestic rate, Scottish businesses will pay £58 million less in rates next year than they otherwise would have done. This is a reduction of almost 5 per cent. The total reduction due to this policy and our earlier decision to limit increases in poundages to no more than inflation from 1989–90 onwards is £230 million. That saving has been of great value to Scottish business and therefore to investment and employment levels.

  The reduction of £58 million is larger than had been allowed for in drawing up the spending plans we made last year and £48 million of it will be met by increased revenue support grant to local authorities. Local authorities are being asked to contribute the remaining £10 million through efficiency savings.

  The table shows the rate poundage which I intend to prescribe for each local authority in regulations that I shall lay before Parliament this week.

  I am aware that Scottish business would like us to make faster progress towards full harmonisation, but we have to balance the costs of funding this policy with the pressures on the taxpayer and with the level of community charges. The decision to reduce business rates and to increase revenue support grant next year beyond our original plans at a time when resources are scarce does, I believe, demonstrate the high priority that we give to it. We remain committed to eliminating the difference between Scotland and England over the same timetable as the national non-domestic rate is phased in south of the border.

  As last year, the reduction in poundages will be accompanied by an associated reduction in derating: from 35 to 32 per cent. Also as last year, this will apply across the board to all authorities in Scotland. However, a number of representations have been made to my Department suggesting, for example, that reductions in rates should be made differently in future, in order to give earlier benefits to higher-rated areas, or that a single level of derating for manufacturing and freight industry is particularly generous in those areas which have relatively low rates. I shall be reviewing these matters and our progress towards harmonisation, including the powers available to me, during the coming year to see whether a different approach might be adopted in future. In this context I will welcome the views of interested bodies.
  485

  1

  2

  3

  4

  5

  1990–91

  1991–92

  1991–92

  1991–92

  Poundages

  Pre-NNDR Reduction

  Poundages

  Poundages at Ratepayer Level

  Reduction to Ratepayer

  Lothian

  47·5

  52·7

  50·0

  Strathclyde

  46·0

  51·0

  48·5

  Tayside

  43·0

  47·7

  45·3

  Berwickshire

  7·5

  8·3

  7·9

  45·8

  2·4

  Ettrick and Lauderdale

  8·5

  9·4

  9·0

  46·9

  2·4

  Roxburgh

  9·4

  10·4

  9·9

  47·8

  2·5

  Tweeddale

  7·2

  8·0

  7·6

  45·5

  2·4

  Clackmannan

  14·9

  16·5

  15·7

  59·6

  3·1

  Falkirk

  12·2

  13·5

  12·9

  56·8

  2·9

  Stirling

  18·1

  20·1

  19·1

  63·0

  3·3

  Annandale and Eskdale

  9·1

  10·1

  9·6

  50·0

  2·6

  Nithsdale

  9·1

  10·1

  9·6

  50·0

  2·6

  Stewartry

  7·9

  8·8

  8·3

  48·7

  2·6

  Wigtown

  7·4

  8·2

  7·8

  48·2

  2·5

  Dunfermline

  10·1

  11·2

  10·6

  59·2

  3·1

  Kirkcaldy

  12·6

  14·0

  13·3

  61·9

  3·2

  North East Fife

  11·3

  12·5

  11·9

  60·5

  3·1

  Aberdeen City

  11·0

  12·2

  11·6

  47·6

  2·5

  Banff and Buchan

  9·8

  10·9

  10·3

  46·3

  2·5

  Gordon

  7·9

  8·8

  8·3

  44·3

  2·4

  Kincardine and Deeside

  6·5

  7·2

  6·8

  42·8

  2·3

  Moray

  8·2

  9·1

  8·6

  44·6

  2·4

  Badenoch and Strathspey

  6·3

  7·0

  6·6

  50·1

  2·7

  Caithness

  9·8

  10·9

  10·3

  53·8

  2·9

  Inverness

  7·5

  8·3

  7·9

  51·4

  2·7

  Lochaber

  11·4

  12·6

  12·0

  55·5

  2·9

  Nairn

  6·3

  7·0

  6·6

  50·1

  2·7

  Ross and Cromarty

  9·8

  10·9

  10·3

  53·8

  2·9

  Skye and Lochalsh

  9·4

  10·4

  9·9

  53·4

  2·8

  Sutherland

  7·1

  7·9

  7·5

  51·0

  2·7

  East Lothian

  13·4

  14·9

  14·1

  64·1

  3·5

  Edinburgh City

  13·1

  14·5

  13·8

  63·8

  3·4

  Midlothian

  13·4

  14·9

  14·1

  64·1

  3·5

  West Lothian

  11·8

  13·1

  12·4

  62·4

  3·4

  Argyll and Bute

  14·9

  16·5

  15·7

  64·2

  3·3

  Bearsden and Milngavie

  10·3

  11·4

  10·9

  59·4

  3·0

  Clydebank

  15·3

  17·0

  16·1

  64·6

  3·4

  Clydesdale

  13·2

  14·6

  13·9

  62·4

  3·2

  Cumbernauld and Kilsyth

  13·0

  14·4

  13·7

  62·2

  3·2

  Cumnock and Doon Valley

  13·4

  14·9

  14·1

  62·6

  3·3

  Cunninghame

  16·1

  17·9

  17·0

  65·5

  3·4

  Dumbarton

  14·9

  16·5

  15·7

  64·2

  3·3

  East Kilbride

  11·2

  12·4

  11·8

  60·3

  3·1

  Eastwood

  7·9

  8·8

  8·3

  56·8

  3·0

  Glasgow City

  20·9

  23·2

  22·0

  70·5

  3·7

  Hamilton

  14·2

  15·7

  15·0

  63·5

  3·2

  Inverclyde

  12·6

  14·0

  13·3

  61·8

  3·2

  Kilmarnock and Loudoun

  13·0

  14·4

  13·7

  62·2

  3·2

  Kyle and Carrick

  13·4

  14·9

  14·1

  62·6

  3·3

  Monklands

  14·2

  15·7

  15·0

  63·5

  3·2

  Motherwell

  12·9

  14·3

  13·6

  62·1

  3·2

  Renfrew

  14·2

  15·7

  15·0

  63·5

  3·2

  Strathkelvin

  12·6

  14·0

  13·3

  61·8

  3·2

  Angus

  10·6

  11·8

  11·2

  56·5

  3·0

  Dundee City

  16·9

  18·7

  17·8

  63·1

  3·3

  Perth and Kinross

  11·0

  12·2

  11·6

  56·9

  3·0

  Orkney

  39·3

  43·6

  41·4

  41·4

  2·2

  Shetland

  37·1

  41·1

  39·1

  39·1

  2·0

  Western Isles

  57·6

  63·9

  60·7

  60·7

  3·2

  Landfill Gas
  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland what support is being given to local authorities, other than urging them to act on the recommendations on waste management paper No. 27 "The Control of Landfill Gas" on sites other than those which are commercially viable.

  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  [holding answer 14 January 1991]: It is for local authorities to make my right
  486
  hon. Friend aware of their need to incur expenditure on the control of landfill gas, through their financial plans. Where authorities have identified gas control schemes in their plans, priority has been given to these schemes when consent allocations have been determined.

  Mr. Dalyell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will detail the landfill sites at which energy recovery is(a) now under way and (b) being considered for the future.
  487
  Lord James Douglas-Hamilton
  [holding answer 14 January 1991]: We are not aware of any sites in Scotland where energy recovery is practised. Information on current and planned operations may be obtained from the district and islands councils which are responsible for regulating waste disposal activities, but they may not be aware of future plans of private operators whose proposals may be commercially confidential.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

  Satellite Television
  Mr. Ashton
  To ask the Lord President of the Council (1) what would be the cost of installing satellite Sky television in a special viewing room in the House; and if he will make arrangements to do so after the Christmas recess;

  (2) what consideration has been given to making it possible to watch satellite television in the television rooms.

  Mr. MacGregor
  The fourth report of the Services Committee of last Session (HC 614) states that, while access by Members to satellite and terrestrial television should be accepted in principle, no action should be taken to implement the introduction of that facility until the feasibility and cost of installing a broad-band telecommunications network for the Palace is known. The report calls for urgent communications to identify the type and capacity of cable required for the transmission of all forms of electronic data.

  Text Telephones
  Mr. Alfred Morris
  To ask the Lord President of the Council what consideration has been given to the installation of minicoms, or text telephones, in the House to enable deaf people to contact their Members of Parliament and Members of Parliament to contact their deaf constituents.

  Mr. MacGregor
  Text telephones for the assistance of deaf persons are not in use within the House of Commons at present. I am arranging for the matter to be looked into.

PRIME MINISTER

  Government Achievements
  Mr. Sayeed
  To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the achievements of Her Majesty's Government since 1987.

  The Prime Minister
  Since 1987 the Government have continued to build upon the changes begun in 1979, to strengthen the economy, foster a spirit of enterprise and improve living standards.

  Sterling has been brought into the exchange rate mechanism of the European monetary system, reinforcing the Government's strict anti-inflationary policy. Output is 8 per cent. higher. Investment has grown faster than at any time since the second world war. Taxes have been reformed. Privatisation of 29 more major businesses has taken place and 24 per cent. of the adult population now own shares. The Government have exercised strict control of public expenditure—general Government expenditure
  488
  has been brought below 40 per cent. of GDP for the first time since 1966–67. Almost £30 billion of public debt will have been repaid by the end of the current financial year. Over 2 million more people are in work than in 1987.

  In the public services we have improved efficiency, safeguarded quality and enhanced safety. Key themes, reflected in the reform of the health service, in housing policy and in education have been to increase choice and to encourage people to take personal responsibility for their well-being and that of their families.

  The Government have striven to improve the quality of life of all the British people. A number of special initiatives have focused on those living in inner cities. The Government have played a leading role in developing environmental protection, nationally and internationally.

  The Government have maintained a firm commitment to national defence and the NATO alliance. We have supported and contributed to NATO's efforts to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union and with the countries of eastern Europe. The United Kingdom has played an important role in securing firm reaction of the United Nations in dealing with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We have played a positive role in the building of the single market in the European Community.

  Common Agricultural Policy
  Mr. Allen
  To ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his reply to the hon. Member for Holland with Boston (Sir R. Body)Official Report, 18 December, column 165, what further investigation of the common agricultural policy he expects the EC to make; and if he will make a statement.

  The Prime Minister
  The common agricultural policy is likely to be subject to a period of further reform as a result of renewed production and expenditure pressure and the outcome of the current GATT negotiations. The Commission's 1991–92 price proposals are likely to incorporate a first instalment of these reforms.

  GATT
  Mr. Allen
  To ask the Prime Minister, further to his statement on 18 December,Official Report, column 157, whether the remit for the EC negotiations in the GATT talks has been altered by the recent Heads of Government meeting.

  The Prime Minister
  The meeting of European Heads of Government asked the Commission, which negotiates on behalf of the Community, to intensify its contacts with other participants in order to resolve outstanding problems.

  Minimum Wage
  Mr. Chris Smith
  To ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to his oral answer of 13 December,Official Report, column 1108, on what basis he calculates the figure of a loss of three quarters of a million jobs through the establishment of a national minimum wage.

  The Prime Minister
  Officials in the Department of Employment have estimated that a national minimum wage set at half male median earnings will result in the loss of about three quarters of a million jobs. This estimate uses earnings information from the new earnings survey and information on the relationship between real wages and
  489
  employment set out in the published Treasury paper "The Relationship Between Employment and Wages: Empirical Evidence for the United Kingdom" (HM Treasury, January 1985).

  A detailed explanation of the method was placed in the House of Commons Library on 2 February 1990—"Estimating the Effect of a National Minimum Wage".

  Publicity and Advertising
  Mr. Michael
  To ask the Prime Minister, further to his reply on 17 December,Official Report, c. 15, if he will list the Government conventions regarding the use of paid publicity and advertising within which expenditure on advertising in the press, television and other forms of publicity is a matter for departmental Ministers.

  The Prime Minister
  The conventions on Government publicity and advertising have already been published. I refer the hon. Member to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy on 28 June 1990 to my hon. Friend the Member for Wanstead and Woodford (Mr. Arbuthnot) at column 311.

EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

  University Staff (Salaries)
  Mr. Strang
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what representations he has received on the current salary levels of university staff; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Alan Howarth
  My right hon. and learned Friend received a delegation from the Association of University Teachers on 11 December 1990. I myself received representatives of the union on 20 November. At these meetings a number of issues, including salary levels, were raised.

  Youth Service Organisations
  Mr. Hannam
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what representations he has received from youth service organisations concerning proposals for a core curriculum of activities.

  Mr. Atkins
  We have received a number of representations on the core curriculum following the first and second ministerial conferences with the youth service. The Government will take account of the comments received in responding to the recommendations of the second ministerial conference. I shall send my hon. Friend a copy of that response in due course.

  Educational Provision
  Mr. Leighton
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is his policy towards eliminating surplus places and rationalising educational provisions.

  Mr. Eggar
  It is for local education authorities to bring forward proposals for rationalising their school provision. My right hon. and learned Friend and his predecessors have repeatedly urged LEAs to do more to remove wasteful surplus places.

  Sport (Drugs)
  Mr. Menzies Campbell
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will meet the chairman of the Sports Council to discuss means to discourage the use of drugs in sport.

  Mr. Atkins
  I already meet the chairman of the Sports Council at regular intervals to discuss issues of mutual concern, including the misuse of drugs in sport.

  University Funding
  Mrs. Margaret Ewing
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what representations he has received from the Association of University Teachers on university funding.

  Mr. Douglas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what recent representations he has received from the Association of University Teachers on university funding.

  Mr. Alan Howarth
  My right hon. and learned Friend has received copies of the association's recent publications, and met a deputation from the association on 11 December.

  Vocational Education
  Mrs. Fyfe
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science when he last met representatives of the Business and Technical Education Council to discuss vocational education.

  Mr. Eggar
  I met representatives of the council on 21 November to discuss vocational education. My right hon. and learned Friend hopes to meet them in the spring.

  Schools Budget
  Mr. Cran
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what variation there is between local education authorities in the proportion of education budgets delegated to schools under local management of schools.

  Mr. Amos
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will make a statement on the proportion of the schools budget which local education authorities are holding back for central control.

  Mr. Fallon
  The proportion of the potential schools budget delegated to schools varies from 89.10 per cent. in the LEA delegating the most, to 77.97 per cent. in the LEA delegating the least. This wide variation is unacceptable and we are determined that LEAs should delegate more. We have recently proposed that LEAs should delegate at least 85 per cent. of the potential schools budget by 1 April 1993.

  Secondary School Libraries
  Mr. Atkinson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science when was the last occasion on which Her Majesty's inspector of schools investigated the state of secondary school libraries.

  Mr. Fallon
  Her Majesty's inspectorate's most recent report on secondary school libraries was published in January 1990 and covered 58 secondary schools in six local education authorities.

  Bradford City Technology College
  Mr. Cryer
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is the total amount, to the most recent practicable date, spent on grant aid by his Department on the city technology college in Bradford; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Eggar
  Total grant aid to Bradford city technology college up to 31 December was £7·8 million. This total includes management, capital and running costs.

  Teacher Recruitment
  Mr. Tredinick
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science when he last discussed teacher recruitment in Leicestershire; what were his conclusions; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Fallon
  Leicestershire local education authority requested grant support for £150,000 of expenditure on teacher recruitment in 1991–92; the authority was informed last month that this bid will be met in full, as part of the grant support announced by my right hon. and learned Friend on 18 December, at columns 122–23. A similar amount will be available in 1992–93. This funding reflects the Department's commitment to assist authorities in the development of initiatives to improve teacher recruitment.

  Sixth-form Colleges
  Mr. Ian Taylor
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many applications he has received from sixth-form colleges seeking to obtain grant-maintained status.

  Mr. Eggar
  None so far.

  Daily Worship
  Mr. Gregory
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is his estimate of the number of schools holding a daily act of collective worship; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Eggar
  Under the Education Reform Act all maintained schools are required to provide daily collective worship for all registered pupils, except those pupils withdrawn by their parents.

  Sport
  Mr. Hinchliffe
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will make a statement on the Government's policy towards sport in schools.

  Mr. Atkins
  Physical education, which includes sport, will be a compulsory part of the curriculum in all maintained schools for the first time under the requirements of the national curriculum. All pupils of compulsory school age will be required to participate in a programme of physical education throughout all the key stages of the national curriculum.

  As part of the Government's current review of their policies towards sport and active recreation, we are also looking at other ways in which children of school age can be encouraged to participate in sport both during and outside school hours, including through the further promotion of links between schools and local sports clubs.

  Further Education
  Mr. Turner
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what consideration he has given to the setting of targets for participation in full and part-time education and training for 16 to 19-year-olds; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Eggar
  My right hon. and learned Friend's objective is to raise both the proportion of 16 to 19-year-olds taking part in full and part-time education and training, and their levels of attainment. The Government are making good progress in both respects as a result of the recent school reforms, the introduction of pilot training credit schemes, and the many growing links between education and industry. They expect to see further improvements in participation rates in the 1990s as a result of the introduction of the national curriculum.

  English and Mathematics
  Mrs. Currie
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what proportion of 15 and 16-year-olds achieved an A, B or C pass in(a) GCSE English and (b) GCSE mathematics for the most recent year available.

  Mr. Eggar
  Of the pupils eligible to take GCSE examinations in year 11 in 1988–89, 45 per cent. gained grades A to C in GCSE English and 34 per cent. in mathematics.

  Deaf Children
  Mr. Ashley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what plans his Department has to research and monitor the literary attainment of deaf children in mainstream schools and special units.

  Mr. Fallon
  The Department has no plans to undertake any specific research in this area. However, unless statutory exceptions have been made, the literary attainments of deaf children in ordinary schools and special units will be assessed, as for all children, under the arrangements for the national curriculum.

  Mr. Ashley
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what guidance his Department has issued to inner London boroughs on the provision of special youth work provision for young deaf people to replace that previously provided by the Inner London education authority.

  Mr. Atkins
  No special guidance has been issued to individual inner London boroughs. Following the abolition of the Inner London education authority, the Department is providing interim support of £500,000 per annum for each of the financial years 1990–91, 1991–92 and 1992–93 to the Londonwide voluntary education organisations. Friends for the Young Deaf has benefited from this arrangement, as have organisations such as SENSE, PHAB and Gateway.

  TEMPUS Scheme
  Mr. Wallace
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether the European Council of Ministers intends to extend the TEMPUS scheme to promote the development of the higher education systems
  493
  in the countries of central and eastern Europe to countries in addition to Poland and Hungary; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Alan Howarth
  The European Community has already approved the extension of the TEMPUS programme to the former German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia in academic year 1990–91, and in principle to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1991–92. The Community would consider extensions to other central and eastern European countries if they requested it.

  Teacher Assessment
  Mr. Kirkwood
  To ask the Secretary of State for Education and Science what additional funding is to be made available to meet the additional cost of teacher assessment.

  Mr. Kenneth Clarke
  I shall support through education support grants £10 million of spending on school teacher appraisal in England in 1991–92 and at least £10 million in 1992–93. The figures for subsequent years will be set in due course.

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Worcester.

ECGD Insurance
Lord Taylor of Gryfe Lord Taylor of Gryfe asked Her Majesty's Government:
When they will announce decisions concerning insurance cover limits and premiums under the Export Credits Guarantee Department.
The Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry (Lord Hesketh): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry yesterday announced the Government's decisions with regard to the cost and availability of ECGD support for project and capital goods exports.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reassuring advice. Is it the case that the new terms will not place British exporters at any disadvantage compared with their overseas competitors?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, we believe that the portfolio management system strikes the right balance between the need to exercise proper control of the ECGD's exposure to high risk business and the need to provide a stable framework of support for project exports.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the CBI recently made allegations that Britain's export of goods to Eastern states, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, is adversely situated as regards the Export Credits Guarantee Department when compared with Germany and France? The latter two countries provide cover where we do not. If that is true, will the Minister assure the House that the Government will take sups to adjust the position, either by giving cover or by making a formal complaint to the European Commission?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, it is important to remember that we are facing a deficit to the Consolidated Fund of some £3 billion. In the final analysis that sum will have to be paid by the taxpayer. That is why there has been a review and why the Government believe that they must introduce an element of prudence rather than expose the taxpayer to unlimited expenditure.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, will the Minister answer the question: is this country at a disadvantage compared with Germany and France?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I assume that the noble Lord believes that the Government should allow the Export Credits Guarantee Department to back any project that comes before it.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Bruce of Donington did not say that. Will the Minister address the problem we are discussing? Is it not the case that 80 per cent. of the activities of the ECGD are about to be privatised? Is it not also the case that there is a serious problem as regards privatisation which concerns political risk insurance? Has the Department of Trade and Industry asked the Treasury to provide a subsidy, post-privatisation, for political risk cover? If that is not available, will not British firms be at a serious disadvantage both in Eastern Europe and elsewhere?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the reality of the situation is that some 90 per cent. of the sums that have not been repaid have been acquired on the project side of the Export Credits Guarantee Department. That side of ECGD is not affected by the privatisation.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, the Minister must try to answer the questions that we are putting. Will there not be a problem with political risk cover as regards that part of the Export Credits Guarantee Department that is to be privatised? If there is no subsidy from the Treasury, will there not be a problem and will British firms therefore not be at a serious disadvantage? Will the Minister please answer the question?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Williams, hopes to anticipate the market and what is to happen in the future. I am not in a position to make that judgment.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, did the assurance which the Minister gave earlier in reply to my Question affect the project group, which concerns the long-term project financing, or did it simply apply to that part of the Export Credits Guarantee Department which is to be privatised?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, it referred to the project group on the assumption that the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Gryfe, had an interest as regards the future.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, I believe that the fund for guaranteeing exports is £3 billion in the red. How many years does that figure cover? How much are the Government prepared to lose in order to guarantee exports?
Lord Hesketh: My Lords, I believe I am correct in saying that the figure covers roughly a decade. However, the assessment made at the initial allocation makes assumptions which the Government hope represent sound business in the case of the Export Credits Guarantee Department. My right honourable friend made an assessment that a further £2.5 billion may be needed in the decade ahead. That figure represents losses that may arise from contracts that have been agreed in the past.

Horse Racing Finance
2.43 p.m.
Lord Donoughue Lord Donoughue asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they have any proposals to ease the present financial crisis in the horse racing and breeding industries.
Lord Reay: My Lords, the initiative for dealing with any financial difficulties which the horse racing and breeding industries may face rests with the industries themselves. We understand that the Jockey Club proposes to submit to Her Majesty's Government a paper on matters affecting the finances of the industries. That submission will of course be given careful consideration.
Lord Donoughue: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Is he aware that the financial crisis facing both of those related industries is very severe, involving decision-makers and issues outside the industry itself, and that many racing establishments are for sale or closing and the jobs of thousands in the industry are at risk? Is he further aware that the betting industry generates over £4 billion of turnover on the back of the racing industry and ploughs back very little of that? Therefore, will the Minister and the Government inform the House when they will declare their views on the future safe and sound funding of the industry and especially when they will give their long-awaited response on the future of the Tote?
Lord Reay: My Lords, perhaps I may deal with the last question first. If the noble Lord was referring to the possible privatisation of the Tote, that is a matter which remains under active consideration but we have no plans for an early announcement. As regards what he referred to as the crisis in the industry, we are aware that representatives of some of the numerous industries involved have voiced concern about their financing. However, there are differences in the extent and nature of the financing difficulties which each industry faces and there are many views about how such difficulties might best be remedied. We are ready to consider on their merits proposals for measures which might assist the racing industries but, as I said in my original Answer, we believe that the initiative for action must rest with the industries themselves.
Lord Renton: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that, under the horserace betting levy scheme introduced nearly 30 years ago as a result of proposals put forward by a Conservative government, much help has from time to time been given to the horse racing and breeding industries? Has not the time come for much fuller use to be made of the scheme? Does he agree that that could be done without further legislation and that it is simply a question of the authority concerned trying to get more out of the scheme for the benefit of racing?
Lord Reay: My Lords, the 30th levy scheme for 1991–92, which has been agreed, will provide some £41.5 million for racing, which is an increase of £2 million over the current year. My noble friend
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correctly pointed out that the levy system has been in operation for over 30 years. We have no current plan of our own to legislate on it.
The Earl of Carnarvon: My Lords, is the Minister aware of the very serious situation facing British breeders regarding the value added tax differential between Ireland, France and the United Kingdom, which have rates of 2.3 per cent., 5.5 per cent. and 15 per cent. respectively? Is he also aware that Tattersalls, our major auctioneer, is likely to move to Ireland in 1993 as the market there will be so much more favourable for buyers of yearlings and who are not registered for VAT?
Lord Reay: My Lords, the Government understand the bloodstock industry's anxieties on this matter. My honourable friend the Minister of State at the Treasury is very much aware of the importance of the bloodstock industry and the problems which it may face after 1992 regarding VAT. Representatives of the Horseracing Advisory Council are currently involved in discussions with officials of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise and my honourable friend the Minister of State is happy to meet those representatives when the current discussions at official level are complete.
Baroness Seear: My Lords, if the noble Lord considers that this industry is suitable for taxpayers' support, can he think of any industry which would not have a claim to taxpayers' support?
Lord Reay: My Lords, the noble Baroness put her point well. We consider that racing cannot expect to be exempt from the economic restraints to which other industries are subject.
Lord Crawshaw: My Lords, can my noble friend confirm the figure mentioned by the noble Lord who asked the Question; that £4 billion is taken by the Exchequer from the punter and therefore indirectly from racing? Does he agree that a very small proportion of that sum, if channelled back into racing, might prevent the goose which lays that golden egg from being killed?
Lord Reay: My Lords, most of us do not want to see the golden goose killed. I am afraid I do not have figures on the rate of general betting duty to which the noble Lord referred. I shall look into the matter and let him know.
Lord Richard: My Lords, can the noble Lord confirm the VAT figures; namely, that they will be 2 per cent. in Ireland, 5 per cent. in France and 15 per cent. in this country in 1992? When will the Minister of State at the Treasury be in a position to inform us of any plans that the Government may have for trying to prevent horse breeding going across the Irish Sea or indeed the Channel?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I do not have with me the figures for which the noble Lord asks. So far as these are matters for discussion, they are under discussion at the present time and those discussions will continue.
Lord Plummer of St. Marylebone: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the answer he gave about VAT is almost exactly the same as that given to delegations in the 1970s? Is it not time that the Government did something about this matter of the varying rates of

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VAT between this country and southern Ireland in order to preserve the jobs of people in areas of low employment?
Lord Reay: My Lords, my noble friend makes the same point but I have nothing more to add. This is the subject of discussions with the industry at the present time and those discussions are still continuing.
Lord Donoughue: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that we are not discussing a tax subsidy to the industry? Indeed, I believe that this industry significantly subsidises the tax revenues. To return to the matter of the Tote, on which the noble Lord gave a fairly negative reply, will he speak to his ministerial colleague and tell him that after about two years of consideration it would be helpful if he would reply on the question of the Tote, which is at the heart of any future more satisfactory funding of the industry?
Lord Reay: My Lords, as I said, the privatisation of the Tote is a matter that is still under active consideration. I can make no statement now with regard to the time when an announcement will be made.

Veterinary Investigation Centres
2.52 p.m.
Lord Stanley of Alderley Lord Stanley of Alderley asked Her Majesty's Government:
When they intend to announce a decision on the future of the veterinary investigation centres, in particular Bangor, and what will be the criteria for any decision to close a centre.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Baroness Trumpington): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Minister will make an announcement shortly. When considering the possible closure of any one veterinary investigation centre, a number of factors would be taken into account.
Lord Stanley of Alderley: My Lords, I have to thank my noble friend for that Answer; but I fear that it will increase the anxiety of those who work in veterinary investigation centres. Before closing a centre, will the extra cost of transporting an animal —in particular the extra cost of fossil fuels—be taken into account, be it a BSE cow, an aborted ewe or, indeed, a cat or a dog? In my case the distance will increase from 30 miles to 210 miles.
Secondly, with regard to Bangor veterinary investigation centre, has my noble friend's department consulted the Department of Education and Science about the effect that the closure of that centre would have on the University College of North Wales? If her department has not done so, will she ask her right honourable friend to speak to her other right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science on this matter?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, with regard to the first part of my noble friend's question, as I said, no announcement has yet been made on any centre closures. We realise the importance that farming communities attach to the investigation service. As for
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the distances travelled, I remind my noble friend that some 90 per cent. of samples submitted to centres by veterinary surgeons are suitable for postal or courier submission.
In reply to the second part of my noble friend's supplementary question, the Department of Education and Science has not been consulted because the involvement in university education in the case of Bangor veterinary investigation centre is a minor aspect of its work. It is the responsibility of the UCNW alone to obtain the expertise that it requires from the most appropriate source available. Should Bangor be closed, officials would discuss with UCNW possible alternatives for maintaining liaison with the veterinary investigation service.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, will the Minister tell the House whether the Government or her department have had discussions with the British Veterinary Association or whether they intend to have discussions with the BVA and similar professional organisations?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, as I said, no announcement has yet been made; but that was an internal review. Initial discussions were held with the trade unions and during the review views were submitted from a number of interested parties including the British Veterinary Association and the National Farmers' Union.
Lord Gallacher: My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that any reduction in the number of veterinary investigation centres at the present time would send entirely wrong signals to the whole of the food chain? Does she further agree that such a reduction would deprive her ministry of an important source of resources in the event of further unhappy outbreaks of food problems such as we have encountered in the recent past?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, as I keep saying, no announcement has yet been made. On the question of emergencies, the service has proved that it has covered them very well. That cover will be maintained to deal with emergencies in the future.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, can the Minister tell the House whether the concentration of veterinary investigation services will apply over the whole of the United Kingdom including Scotland? Will she confirm that factors taken into consideration will include not only the numbers of livestock but also the distances involved? The noble Lord, Lord Stanley, mentioned a distance of 210 miles. It may well be that some pieces of animal can be posted but it is a little difficult to post a whole sheep. Does she agree that it is important that farmers have the animals investigated without an enormous amount of trouble, otherwise the whole chain may break down?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, veterinary investigation centres in Scotland are attached to Scottish agricultural colleges and not to the Department of Agriculture. Where the distance to the nearest centre is considered excessive for delivery of a carcass, as suggested by the noble Lord, a farmer may have the post mortem carried out by his own

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veterinary surgeon, who would then submit appropriate samples, or his veterinary surgeon can request a chargeable veterinary advisory visit from the nearest centre.
Lord Hylton: My Lords, does the Minister appreciate the very close connection between veterinary investigation centres and universities? That applies not only in the case of Bangor but, from my own knowledge, to Langford and the University of Bristol. Does the noble Baroness understand that that is very important for the training of vets and pathologists?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I most certainly do. I have not lived in Cambridge for so many years without realising that fact.
Lord Monk Bretton: My Lords, can my noble friend the Minister tell the House whether there is an intention to look into extending the free van service used to take samples to veterinary investigation centres that appears to exist in certain areas? If that service could be extended and possibly made available three times a week instead of twice, does she agree that it would take some of the heat out of this issue should a considerable number of veterinary investigation centres be closed?
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend's suggestion. As I keep saying, no decisions have yet been made. Therefore, I am unaware that there is any heat in the situation.

Miscarriage of Justice: Apology Proposal
3 p.m.
Lord Henderson of Brompton Lord Henderson of Brompton asked Her Majesty's Government:
Whether they will cause an official apology to be made wherever there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Lord Reay: My Lords, it is of course a matter of great regret whenever a miscarriage of justice occurs. However, we must be clear that questions of guilt or innocence are for the courts to decide, free from interference by Ministers. The courts are not subject to government control, and equally the Government are not responsible for their decisions.
Lord Henderson of Brompton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his expression of regret in such cases. Will he agree that an apology by the state for a miscarriage of justice need not and should not imply any criticism of the Judiciary? Will the Government take a leaf out of the Standing Orders of this House? Standing Order No. 30, which dates from at least 1626, states that the party offended should be given:
"a fit reparation and a full satisfaction".
That means a handsome apology. If that were to happen should we not feel much better for it?
Lord Reay: My Lords, as I said in my original Answer, every miscarriage of justice is a matter of great regret. It would be wrong to take any action that might lead to the Government being seen to take
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responsibility for the decision of the courts. The Government do not interfere with the safety of convictions but leave that matter to the courts. Therefore, it would be wrong to hold the Government responsible for convictions.
Lord Jenkins of Hillhead: My Lords, is there any reason why the Judiciary should not apologise occasionally?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I do not believe that that is a matter for the Government.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, does the Minister agree that there is considerable public disquiet about the way in which we investigate what appear to be miscarriages of justice and deal with them? Have there not been tragic examples of that during the past two years? Is the Minister prepared—either personally or through a colleague—to consult with the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack in order to ascertain whether the present procedure in the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, is satisfactory or whether another tribunal should be set up in order to deal with complaints of miscarriages of justice, many of which are most serious?
Lord Reay: My Lords, I acknowledge that certain cases have given rise to considerable concern. However, those cases relate to convictions which were secured during the 1970s and since then major reforms have been made. It is expected that the report by Sir John May will be published towards the end of the year. We hope that it will cover many such matters; and the Government will pay close attention to it.
Lord Airedale: My Lords, does the Minister accept that the expression "free pardon" given under the Royal Prerogative is not a happy expression? It is not a pardon at all; it is a total exoneration.
Lord Reay: My Lords, the expression "free pardon" is used in order to distinguish it from a conditional pardon. That pardon with conditions was used in the Middle Ages, the period from which both terms originate.

The Gulf
3.3 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Waddington)The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Waddington) rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation in the Gulf.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Today the UN Security Council deadline for complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait runs out; but Iraq is still in Kuwait and shows no sign of leaving. It is right that your Lordships' House should debate the consequences of her defiance.
First, we should remind ourselves of the basic facts. On 2nd August Iraq marched into Kuwait, a member of the United Nations, a small law-abiding state whose only misfortune was to have a rapacious, unscrupulous neighbour. The attack was unprovoked. Iraq's feeble excuse then was that it had been invited

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in by local revolutionaries after they had toppled the Al Sabah family. It was feeble indeed because not a single quisling came forward to give substance to the story. But a puppet regime was installed and on 8th August Saddam Hussein, dispensing with any claim to legitimacy, annexed the country. Your Lordships will note that at that time Iraq and Saddam Hussein made no mention of Palestine. There was no suggestion then that in some convoluted way the rape of Kuwait was designed to help the Palestinian cause. That cant came later. In the early days Iraq made little attempt to disguise the fact that the invasion of Kuwait was for the greater glory of Saddam Hussein.
International condemnation was instant, comprehensive and unanimous. The Security Council met on the very day of the invasion and it demanded the total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq and the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. That is still the demand today, and if Iraq implements the UN resolutions now she will not be attacked. If she refuses to implement them, she must face the consequences.
It has not been a case of the UN making demands and diplomacy thereafter playing no part. To suggest so would be a travesty. But the UN, the Arab League and the European Community were all rebuffed. So was Secretary Baker last Wednesday. So was Perez de Cuellar who, it was felt, with his uniquely high reputation around the world had a better chance than anyone else of making Saddam Hussein see sense. In Paris on his return journey he said, "I see no reason to have more hope than the day I left".
Yesterday, The Times summed up the problem neatly when it asked:
"what further peace-making, short of capitulation to aggression, can those who oppose war possibly expect?".
So diplomatic efforts have proved fruitless; and they have proved fruitless even though backed up by the economic and military pressures which have been on Iraq over the last five-and-a-half months.
Some say that those economic pressures, sweeping economic sanctions agreed back in August, should be given more time to work. But again we must face the facts. In these last five-and-a-half months sanctions have been almost universally observed with Iraq's imports of industrial goods, semi-finished goods and raw materials down by more than 90 per cent. and her exports of oil, from which she earned 90 per cent. of her hard currency before the invasion of Kuwait, brought to a halt. But Saddam Hussein, with complete control of the media and impervious to public opinion, stays put. He has stayed put in spite of sanctions. He has stayed put in spite of the diplomatic and military pressure. He has stayed put in spite of the deadline set for withdrawal by the United Nations.
So one has to ask those people who say that sanctions must still be given more time to work why they think that they will work in six months or nine months or a year from now when they have not worked already, and how much more murder and pillage they are prepared to allow Saddam Hussein to
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practise in Kuwait in the meantime. If we fail to stick to one deadline for withdrawal why should Saddam Hussein take seriously any other?
The prospect of war is horrible. The cost in human and material terms would be great. But think of the cost of waiting for another six months in the hope that sanctions which have not worked now by some miracle will work then. Think of the cost already incurred by our having waited these past months. In that time the Kuwaitis have suffered dreadfully. In these past months the Iraqis have butchered and brutalised those innocent people. The very fabric of their society is being progressively and systematically destroyed.
In August there were 700,000 Kuwaitis in Kuwait. Now there are perhaps 250,000. Their country has been vandalised. Everything movable and valuable, from cars and buses to vital medical equipment in the hospitals, has been stolen and taken off to Baghdad. In the face of this dreadful oppression, the Kuwaitis have shown magnificent fortitude, but for how long can they be expected to endure? If we do not act quickly there will not be a viable country to save: it will have been turned into a wasteland.
War is always evil, but there may sometimes be a still greater evil, and Christian theologians have recognised it as a sad necessity if just men are not to be crushed by the wicked. Saddam Hussein is an evil man. If he goes unchecked, will he not attack again? If he is not stopped now, do we not risk before long an even more terrible war in the Middle East involving even more terrible weapons?
The international community has set out its objectives and also what it is prepared to do to secure them. We decided, East and West, North and South, that if Iraq defied the UN, force would be used. The world is watching to see if we keep our nerve; and if we lose it there will be a terrible price to pay.
We have perhaps a better chance today of fashioning a really effective system of collective security than at any time this century. In the 1930s we tried to build collective security. The problem was that everybody then talked about collective security, but talk was all it was. Mussolini swallowed Ethiopia. Hitler grabbed the Sudetenland. We did not stop Hitler and Mussolini in the early stages of their aggression. There was always an excuse for doing nothing. War was too high a price to pay whatever the evil perpetrated. And later the whole world paid the price. We must never forget that lesson.
Britain has more than 35,000 sailors, soldiers and airmen in the Gulf, and there is not a home in the country which is not thinking of them today. They do not want war. We do not want war. None of us wants war. But our troops, deployed in the knowledge that they might have to fight, and who by their presence have already helped to deter Iraq from pursuing its conquest further down the Gulf, are trained, equipped, and ready to fight if need be.
We can only hope that, as time runs out, Saddam Hussein is contemplating how powerful are the forces

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ranged against him and even at this late hour will realise he has made a grievous mistake in trying to defy the whole international community.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in the Gulf—(Lord Waddington.)
3.14 p.m.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we are grateful for the opportunity to debate the Gulf crisis today and to the noble Lord the Leader of the House for his opening speech. A number of important events have taken place since we discussed the crisis on 17th December, notably on the diplomatic front. We must be grateful to all those who have made strenuous and genuine efforts to make contact with Saddam Hussein; that is, to get through to him and to his immediate advisers that war is really inevitable if he persists in treating the resolutions of the United Nations as if they are of no account, and that the consequences of that war would be disastrous not least for him and the unfortunate people whom he purports to represent.
If this crisis were a game of chess, it would have to be admitted that Saddam Hussein is a skilful opponent. He has made a number of astute moves whose purpose is to divert people's minds away from the cause of the crisis, referred to by the noble Lord, and the cruelties, miseries and worries which have followed, especially as regards the unfortunate people of Kuwait.
He has tried to portray himself as the leader of Islam in a holy war—a jihad. He has tried to blacken the West, especially the United States, depicting it as the enemy of Islam, concerned merely with oil and world domination. He has sought to connect the problems of Palestine with his invasion of Kuwait—the so-called linkage argument. However, if Amnesty International is to be believed—and it is a human rights organisation of the highest reputation —300,000 Kuwaiti citizens, including several thousand foreign residents, fled Kuwait with consequences which are still unclear. Amnesty International goes on to state that since the invasion on 2nd August, hundreds of unarmed Kuwaitis have been murdered, hundreds more have disappeared in detention and widespread torture of those unfortunate and innocent people is rife. The details are grim and sickening.
Let us face up to the truth. It is dishonest to say that all that is being done for the sake of finding a solution to the Palestinian problem. It is necessary to repeat those undisputed facts at the outset, for those facts prompted the Security Council of the United Nations to pass the resolutions condemning Saddam Hussein's actions and calling for the withdrawal of his army from Kuwait.
In all our debates on the matter I have made plain on behalf of my noble friends that we support those resolutions. We believe that the will of the United Nations must prevail. I repeat so that there may be no misunderstanding that unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait is the primary objective. Partial withdrawal, leaving Saddam Hussein with some of his spoils, will not be sufficient. As I said in our debate in
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September, that would enable him to claim victory. It would strengthen his regional power and standing and, most disturbing of all, weaken the position and significance of the United Nations. The longer-term consequences of that could be very grave indeed for the world.
We all abhor the possibility of war. No one of consequence or sense wants war. If the members of the United Nations who voted for the resolutions wanted war, they could have driven the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait before now and might have justified that on the authority of Article 51 of the United Nations. However, they have held back for five-and-a-half months. During that period several attempts have been made to arrange meetings with Saddam Hussein but it has been clear to everyone that that has not been easy. Nevertheless, we believe that all those efforts were fully justified and we should support any further serious moves to arrange talks with the Iraqi leadership.
We are deeply conscious of the significance of this particular day. I hope that the same can be said of Saddam Hussein and his colleagues in Baghdad at this moment. Today is the deadline. It is vital that we should be clear about its implications. Resolution 678 adopted on 29th November, partly at the instigation of the Soviet Union,
"authorises member states … unless Iraq on or before January 15th, 1991, fully implements"
the 11 preceding resolutions
"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement"
those resolutions
"for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security".
Therefore, that resolution gives authority for the use of force although it is not mandatory. It does not mean that military action must take place today. In other words, it is not an ultimatum date. On the other hand, it is equally true that a decision by the United Nations not to use force today or in the days to follow should not justify any belief or calculations that force is not to be used at all.
That brings me once again to the question of sanctions and their efficacy, which has been referred to at some length by the noble Lord. I have dealt with this subject at some length in previous speeches and I repeat today that we support the Security Council Resolution 660 which lays down that all states shall impose economic sanctions on Iraq. Incidentally, that is a mandatory resolution.
Once again I believe that everyone in this House would wish the objectives of the basic Resolution 660 to be achieved through effective sanctions and other pressures rather than by armed conflict with all its unpredictable cost in casualties, physical destruction and harm to the world's economies, not least the third world. The evidence we have been given showed that sanctions are having an effect on the Iraqi economy and the life of the community. We have been told that by Ministers at this Box and in another place, and by Ministers in the United States and also by other authorities.

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We have always argued that sanctions should be given the necessary time to work. On 17th December I referred to the strong body of opinion in the United States which includes Admiral William Crowe, General David Jones and others who take a similar view. They take that view because, like Mr. Edward Heath and my right honourable friend Mr. Denis Healey, they believe that giving sanctions more time to bite is preferable to the high cost of war in terms of casualties. I heard the two right honourable gentlemen make the same point on television once again yesterday.
Senator Sam Nunn, the chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee summed up that viewpoint in these words:
"The question is not whether military action is justified. I believe it is. The question is whether military action is wise at this time".
Saturday's debates in Congress reflected the different views in the United States. It is right that we should at least take them into account at this time. For example, we are told that there is nothing sacrosanct about the five-and-a-half months between 2nd August and 15th January. Is there a limit to the amount of time sanctions are given to work and make the Iraqi leaden hip see sense? The noble Lord, the Leader of the House, gave the view—I have not heard it asserted so clearly or so definitively as he put it today—that sanctions have in fact failed.
I put it to the House that we have not had a sufficiently clear assessment and analysis of the working of sanctions so far. Are they so complete a failure as to justify military action from today onwards? I know the House will be grateful if, when the noble Earl replies, he will give the Government's measured view of that matter. It must have been considered most carefully when the resolution authorising sanctions was passed by the United Nations.
Another important point which has not been discussed in recent weeks and about which no information has been given is whether sanctions are being breached seriously to any extent and if so, by what countries. Which countries, if any, are making sanctions unsuccessful and ineffective? In so important a debate and on so immensely significant a day, we should be enlightened on that point.
The other question which is very much in our minds is whether the diplomatic initiatives of the past few days have brought these matters home to Saddam Hussein. Is he aware that if he does not withdraw, the consequences will be disastrous for him and his people? The talks between Mr. Baker and Mr. Tariq Aziz in Geneva were a dismal failure. Mr. Baker said that in the six hours they were together Mr. Aziz said nothing to give hope that the Iraqi Government would take any action to meet any of the UN resolutions.
It is quite plain that no Iraqi representative of whatever rank has the right to express a view or propose any course of action other than Saddam Hussein. Mr. Aziz would not even take the risk of carrying President Bush's letter back to him. Nevertheless, as he left the meeting Mr. Baker said,
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"The path to peace is still open",
adding that the decision for peace rests with Iraq as all of us know.
We believe that Mr. Perez de Cuellar was absolutely right to fly to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein personally. It was clear that he went with the goodwill of the entire international community. Unhappily, he was not welcomed by Saddam Hussein, and the talks have been described as inconclusive. It was a most regrettable rebuff to the Secretary General and to the United Nations.
Furthermore, can the noble Lord say whether today's deadline means that no further initiative can be taken to arrange talks with the Iraqi Government? I find that difficult to accept. I am thinking specifically of the possibility of a French initiative supported by Algiers and other friendly Arab countries which has been discussed in the press over the past few days, and a possible visit to Baghdad by the French foreign secretary, M. Dumas. We shall be grateful if the noble Earl will bring us up to date on that point.
Some are saying that the sands have run out; and, as all of us fear, that is indeed very possible. But if there is still an honourable possibility of avoiding war, then we should support the initiative. After all, France is our friend, our ally and our partner in the Community. It would be a mistake at this stage to turn away from her.
Finally, even in this time of tension and uncertainty, we must look ahead and seek to define objectives that we as a country can support in the Middle East. The immediate aim is to implement the United Nations resolutions. The consequences of failure would, as many have said from the start, be disastrous for the United Nations and the world.
I was most impressed with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, on 17th December when he dealt with the need to tackle and resolve the Palestinian problem. There is now a general commitment to hold a conference in order to try to set the wheels in motion. That can only come about after the UN resolutions have been accepted and observed by Iraq. Under no circumstances should Saddam Hussein be allowed to get away with the argument that he invaded Kuwait, plundered the country and killed its people in order to solve the Palestinian problem. That must be constantly borne in mind.
There have been references to the creation of a UN security system in the Gulf. I note that Mr. Douglas Hurd said that Britain might make a contribution to it. He then went on to use some important words,
"if it turned out to be what was wanted in the area".
We must agree with that qualification, for it is the Arab states and Israel which must, as a coalition of interests, decide if and how they are to live together once the crisis is over. If there is to be a military presence, it should in the main be composed of forces from countries within the region. They should resolve their problem with the authority and support of the United Nations.
Before I conclude I must also take the opportunity to pay a very warm tribute to those who served in our

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embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait over the past five months. They served loyally with skill and devotion in immensely difficult circumstances, and we should be proud of them.
We also think of our soldiers, sailors and airmen in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. They are part of a historic enterprise in which 50 countries are taking part; 28 of those have forces in the region. Their presence there in itself should be sufficient to persuade the Iraqi leadership to yield to the United Nations. Let us hope and pray even at this late hour that common sense and compassion will prevail.
3.29 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Hillhead: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Leader of the House for his succinct opening. The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and I have had to speak in both our two previous Gulf debates on 6th September and 17th December, as well as today. One has naturally looked back over those debates to obtain some perspective on how our thoughts have developed. In both of them I endeavoured to urge on the Government a policy that I would call restrained determination. By that I meant that we should be careful to act under the resolutions of the United Nations at all stages and not get isolated with the Americans and practically no one else.
I suggested in September that the necessary feat of statesmanship was to keep together the power of the United States and the moral authority of the United Nations. We should also pursue every possible diplomatic means of securing Saddam Hussein's withdrawal from Kuwait. We should certainly not forget that Part III of the original Security Council resolution specifically enjoined seeking a solution by such means. So long as the Government acted in accordance with those principles I said that they would have our support.
I believe that they have so acted and as we come, therefore, with foreboding to the difficult moment of decision and action, I continue to support them. I do it essentially because I believe that the whole future of the United Nations is at stake. If it failed to deal with Saddam Hussein's invasion at a time when there was no excuse of a great power split in the world, that would be the end of the UN as a world authority as opposed to a talking shop. There is something to be said for a talking shop, but not quite enough. It should not be forgotten just how unusual is the present opportunity and therefore just how great is the present test.
For 45 years the United Nations has been hobbled by a great power split. Miraculously, that has been absent for the past five months. Who can tell, in this dreadful January of disappointment and dismay, how long it will remain absent? If the UN failed to exert its will in such uniquely favourable circumstances a similar enterprise could never be mounted again. It so happens that the leadership role of the United States would also be destroyed. The United States may be imperfect—everybody is—as a world leader. However, the world has a great deal for which to be
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grateful to the United States. It is the only world leader that we have got. No one else shows the slightest desire to take over. So, as it were, both the material and the moral power in the world would go at the same time. The world would be left unstable, chaotic and highly combustible.
This issue seems to me to transcend even the risks which are involved. There are of course arguments which can be deployed against the course on which we are embarked. They are not so much invalid as disproportionate to the central point. There are criticisms which can be made, and which are being freely made at the present time, of the diplomatic handling of the issue. No doubt the American Embassy in Baghdad sent out the wrong signals in July, just as the British Government did before the Falkland invasion. Perhaps too sharp a focus was placed on the bilateralism of the Geneva meeting between Secretary Baker and Tariq Aziz.
But there are always diplomatic errors in any complicated series of events. No one can have observed the dejection of the wise and experienced Javier Perez de Cuellar, whose Iraqi connections were good and whose mission seemed well-timed before it took place, and still believe that a diplomatic solution was near to our grasp. As the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, has said, no doubt even at this twelfth hour any further possibility should be explored and the French initiative in particular, but there is not much room for being sanguine.
There is the argument that because the United Nations has not acted with equal firmness against acts of aggression in the past it should not do too much about Kuwait. That is a quietist and peculiarly pessimistic argument. It means that improvement should never be sought because it would be unfair to the past to do so. Nonetheless, in my view we have undoubtedly neglected the urgent need for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and of the Palestinian problem in particular. I would no longer be too worried about the problem of linkage. That can become an over-refined issue in a rough and crude situation. We desperately need a Palestinian peace conference on its own merits. In my view the time has gone by when there was a danger of appearing to give it in return for Saddam Hussein's aggression. He now faces dangers which transcend that.
Then there is the "sanctions must be given more time", argument associated with the view that the Americans and us have boxed ourselves into a corner by choosing the 15th January deadline. To fix that date in November when it seemed, if anything, dilatory, may or may not have been wise. However, that is minor compared with the central question of whether the United Nations' coalition and the forces on the ground could be held in position long enough for sanctions to run for a year or more without there being a near certainty that, at the end of the day, all the resolutions of the Security Council would dribble away into the sand.
I cannot feel a lively conviction that sanctions will get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The realistic

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alternatives, diplomacy having regrettably failed so far at any rate, are to act now or to let him keep Kuwait and defy the world. For the sake of some authority in the world, even though with a heavy heart, I choose to act now.
3.37 p.m.
The Archbishop of Canterbury: My Lords, I have just come from a meeting of the House of Bishops of the Church of England which this morning gave sombre consideration to the grave crisis in the Gulf. It recognised, as I do, a responsibility to clarify the moral principles at stake and also the very pastoral responsibility of supporting those serving in the Gulf and their families. I am glad to say that it was able to reach an agreed statement which has now been issued.
I believe that in what I say briefly and personally I shall be reflecting the substance of the statement. My preoccupation with that meeting and my return to it means that, with the greatest regret, I shall be unable to stay until the end of the debate. When the House first debated the Gulf crisis on 6th September I said that we must be clear in our minds that this was not a clash between Christianity and Islam and neither was it anything to do with Islamic fundamentalism. It was to do with old-fashioned naked aggression. That remains my very firm view. It is a view which both Cardinal Hume and I expressed to the Prime Minister when we called on him last night. The cardinal and I stressed to the Prime Minister that we must all take special care to ensure that the substantial moslem minority in Britain does not become victim of any backlash that might arise if our politicians or our media carelessly confuse the Government of Iraq with Islam or Islamic fundamentalism.
I should perhaps add that while the Prime Minister was unable to give us cause for optimism, both the cardinal and I were deeply impressed by his cool, calm and responsible approach to the awesome decisions faced by him and the Government as a whole. We commend particularly the restrained words and tone used throughout the crisis by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, in marked contrast to some of the more strident noises that have occasionally emanated from Washington. The British Government plainly understand that the British people earnestly pray for a peaceful solution but also reluctantly accept that it may be necessary to resort to war in the interests of justice and long-term peace.
In the debate in this House in September, I warmly endorsed the words of the then Prime Minister that sanctions must be given a few months to work. In a speech to the General Synod of my Church in November I argued that a year of sanctions would be far cheaper in every way than even the shortest war. But I went on to say that if, for whatever reason, it became clear that sanctions were not going to work, it would be foolish to rule out the use of force in the last resort.
The sanctions have undoubtedly been effective in the sense that Iraq is suffering a virtually complete blockade on both imports and exports. In that sense they have been an astonishing success. I hope we will
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hear no more nonsense about sanctions being only a pipedream of woolly, liberal-minded do-gooders. But we have to face the fact that even these comprehensive and effective sanctions have not so far produced the faintest glimmer of movement from President Saddam Hussein. His forces maintain their brutal occupation of Kuwait, and the language from Baghdad has if anything become more, not less, threatening.
Some argue that while this is true we must nevertheless give sanctions more time to work their full effect on Iraq; in the end, they are bound to work. If there were really a simple, uncomplicated choice between the continuation of sanctions for, say, another six months and resort to war, I would without hesitation plump for sanctions—and so, I believe, would other noble Lords. If we could be sure that a further six months would do the trick, there would be no doubt about it. But, of course, there is no such simple, uncomplicated choice. The situation is complicated by factors that are not within the control either of the United Nations Security Council or of the states contributing contingents to the allied forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
There is first the continued brutal pillaging of Kuwait, confirmed beyond any doubt by, for example, the Amnesty International report, to which the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, referred. This is no small matter. But there are other telling factors: the volatility of the situation in the Soviet Union, for example, where no one can be sure what the situation will be even a month from now. This is a critically important matter when one remembers that it was the massively changed situation in the Soviet Union that made the United Nations Security Council intervention possible in the first place.
That is not all. There is also Israel, against which President Saddam makes blood-curdling threats. Can we be reasonably sure that Israel will continue its present unusually careful policy? I have to say that recent history suggests we cannot be absolutely sure. On top of it all, we must have regard to the internal situation in the states actively opposed to the Iraqi aggression and to the possibility—or probability—of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.
I wish the choice was a simple, uncomplicated one between continued sanctions and resort to war. I firmly believe that the sanctions must be maintained and that we must continue to support every diplomatic channel that has any reasonable chance of success. But we cannot avoid the fact that it may well be necessary to resort to war in the interest of peace in the longer term. I too reach that conclusion with a very heavy heart indeed.
There are some who recognise that resort to war may be necessary but who argue that the allied powers must not make the first strike. I find that argument irrational. The first strike was made on 2nd August when Iraq invaded Kuwait. There has been something like a state of suspended war ever since, for the United Nations has repeatedly made clear that Iraq must unconditionally withdraw.

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Perhaps I may add a word about that last phrase. The demand of the United Nations resolutions is that Iraq must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait, not that Iraq must unconditionally surrender. So we are not talking of the situation that arose in the last years of the Second World War. Many, and possibly most, people in retrospect—although there were those like Bishop Bell who said it at the time—believe that that was a serious mistake, not least because it virtually ruled out the possibility of internal revolt against the Nazi regime. The situation today is fundamentally different. We call for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, not for the unconditional surrender of Iraq.
I have only two more points to make. The first is that we must never overlook the religious dimension in this crisis, even though we may imperfectly understand it. That is an important rider to add. As my fellow Primate, the Archbishop of York, said in the debate in this House on 17th December, the worst possible scenario could occur if we went to war in such a way as to engage religious feelings and make it seem to Moslems that it was a religious war. That would be a recipe for reckless self-sacrifice on the part of Iraqis. It would provoke widespread support for them. It would make the winning of such a war immeasurably harder and it would make the subsequent establishment of a just peace in the region virtually impossible.
My second point is closely related. It if comes to war we must set out to achieve the United Nations objectives with the minimum amount of force necessary to do the job. Of course, we must also have regard to the safety of our own forces and not put them in unnecessary peril. But surely we must eschew the barbarities of, for example, carpet bombing centres of population. We must also be seen to be respecting Islam by observing the sacred nature of the holy places in Iraq and protecting them as far as possible from air attack. I remind your Lordships that Rome was declared an open city in the Second World War.
I say all this conscious of the grave difficulties that war presents for all christian believers. It has the power to dehumanise. The line between what is permissible and what is not is pushed ever further back. In a war in which the use of chemical weapons by the enemy is certainly a possibility, we must be resolute in our refusal to dehumanise in the same way. Then, although we believe that our cause is just, we must not suppose that all evil is in our enemies and not also in ourselves. If we have to go to war it becomes a duty to cultivate qualities of mercy and compassion and seize opportunities to express them, especially when the fighting stops.
Our prayers as christian people in these days should be urgent: first for peace and a solution without recourse to war; secondly, for those on whom the burden of decisions lies; thirdly, for combatants and their families; and, finally, for the creation of conditions which allow not us but those who live in the Gulf to build a future with the cancer of aggression cut
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out. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German pastor and great friend of Bishop Bell (who was killed by the Nazis in the last days of the war) once said:
"God is among us in our lives, and not on any side".
I believe that God works not by manipulating things from on high but in the end through our actions, words and prayers. It is for these I plead and for sympathy and understanding that we shall act with intentions of healing and justice.
3.52 p.m.
Lord Pym: My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. I am certain that the House will appreciate his counsel and advice. In the emergency debate on the Gulf which took place in September and also in the debate on the humble Address, I stressed the overriding importance of international agreement and solidarity and of patience. Both have been plainly demonstrated. On the former, I pay tribute to the tireless work of our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, and of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker. Both men have been immensely diligent and thorough in their consultations with allies. Indeed, it has been a continuous process and as a result the allies are firmly united. Therefore, I give the Government my wholehearted support on that aspect of the matter.
Every possible endeavour has been made to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw voluntarily from Kuwait, but like all dictators he categorically refuses to do so. He is even dismissive of the Secretary General of the United Nations. He has ignored the sustained build-up of forces opposite him and is impervious to any outlook except his own. Not only has he annexed Kuwait in defiance of all civilised principles, but he has also inflicted the most horrendous cruelty and brutality on the Kuwaiti people. A more inhumane tyrant would be hard to name. After all the efforts which have been made to obtain a political solution and their total rejection, the moment has come for the use of force. The military commanders must choose the most opportune moment to set about the task of removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait by force. I see no gain in further delay but only considerable disadvantage.
No one can predict how the course of the conflict will go, but those of us who have had the opportunity of visiting the Gulf have the fullest confidence in the allied forces and especially in the British contingent, the professionalism and training of which is second to none. Our forces will acquit themselves exceedingly well. Our hope for them in particular is that the task can be carried out quickly. There is a chance that that can be done. However, we cannot count upon it. Iraq is a ruthless, battle-hardened foe and remarkably insensitive to casualties. It will be a tough fight. But, as the three powerful opening speeches in the debate have shown, our nation will give our forces total support.
It goes without saying that the need for the use of force is regretted by everyone. But the world cannot become a peaceful, orderly place if dictators like Saddam Hussein are allowed licence to run loose. He

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cannot have noticed the huge change in the world between the time of his invasion of Iran and now. He cannot have noticed that the domination over the world by two rival super powers is now over. The Soviet Union has expressed itself no less appalled by the invasion of Kuwait than anyone else. At present it has huge problems of its own, but it has still given positive support to the 12 United Nations resolutions. It is that international accord that is the clearest possible expression of a major change in international relationships. Such a level of agreement has not been attained before. It is the maintenance of that degree of international agreement which is the top priority of diplomacy today.
For the first time since its inception, the United Nations has found itself, in the Gulf crisis, faced with a challenge which virtually the whole of the rest of the world condemned and demanded to be corrected. Faced with that challenge, the members voted overwhelmingly on 12 occasions to put the wrong right and by force if necessary. It has created a new international situation. The approach to war in recent days —in the interests of world order—has, if anything, strengthened world solidarity. That is largely due to the fact that the allies went the last mile for peace, as did this country during the Falklands crisis. When the overtures of the last mile are callously rejected, people everywhere understand that peaceful means to a solution are no longer available and that force has to be used.
I hope that the present crisis in the Gulf and the degree of unanimity about it in this House will bring home to those who have advocated the payment of a "peace dividend" the folly of paying it before it has been earned. I expressed warnings about this all last year, but I believe that the Treasury has now written the dividend into the public expenditure figures, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, explained so clearly in a recent letter to The Times. In my view that was an error and I trust and believe that it will be corrected in the next public expenditure round, especially in view of current events.
But, in any event, other dangers in the world are emerging all the time which may affect our defence requirements and those of our allies. Options for Change was dependent upon how world events unfolded—and, quite rightly so—but there is still a great deal of uncertainty about that—too much to make any final decisions on strategy possible. What matters today is that we give our forces all the backing they need. Not only is that crucial to their success in war, but it is also crucial to their morale. Therefore, I ask my noble friend who is to reply to the debate to give an absolute assurance that the requirements in the Gulf will be matched by all the necessary resources.
Whatever happens in the next few months, and however successful the allies are in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, the problems and the antipathies in the Middle East will be very great and perhaps almost certainly worse than they are at present. The plight of the Palestinians remains a central issue which it seems to me impossible to resolve unless Israel changes its attitude, and there is no sign of that happening. I see
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every reason to support the concept of an international conference on the Middle East; that is, if the circumstances can be created whereby it may be successful, otherwise I remain sceptical as to what it is likely to achieve. Many attitudes need changing.
However, such major issues are for discussion after Kuwait has been freed and the legitimate government have been restored. What matters at the moment is the regaining of Kuwait as rapidly as possible and with as few casualties as possible.
We must destroy Iraq's capability of making chemical and biological weapons and also its potential nuclear capability so that such ghastly threats are removed for good. I should like to echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn. For the future we must see that the nation states in the Middle East establish a deterrent force of their own to protect their interests and the world's main oil supply.
There is massive support in this House, in another place and throughout the country for the way in which our Government, the United States and our numerous allies have handled the unforgiveable act of aggression by Iraq. We back our forces to the hilt and wish them well in their awesome task.
4 p.m.
Lord Soper: My Lords, I am indebted to the most reverend Primate for the quality of his speech. He knows the respect and admiration that I have for him. If we disagree, as I dare say we shall, on the general topic of the liability of war, I hope that the controversy will not be without a sense of fellowship. I intend to say something explicit about the quality of Christian behaviour which is generally called pacifism. I am encouraged so to do because in this Chamber we are invited to take note of what is happening.
In doing so, it would be wrong to exclude not only the position of would-be pacifists within the Church but a very large and increasing number of Christians, would-be Christians and morally sensible people. It is necessary to include the position of the pacifists in our consideration of this sombre issue. That is the justification that I offer.
I am well aware of the fact that unless I speak with due humility, I shall destroy the nature and substance of what I shall endeavour briefly to put before your Lordships.
I derive my belief in pacifism from the reading of the spirit and teaching of Jesus. I find it in the Gospels. Jesus was invited to become a resistance leader and he refused the violence which would accompany such a project. He told people to put their swords back into the sheaths and stated that those who practised swordsmanship would perish by the sword. I cannot reconcile the teaching of Jesus with the spirit in which he went to his cross, confounding for the time being his zealous adherents and disciples but proclaiming a way that was radically and fundamentally different from the arbitrament of violence, even to cherish the most desirable causes.
I believe that it is sound scholarship to record that the early Christian Church was pacifist in spirit and in action. There is a theological application to that

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decision which is vital. We believe that the attitude of the early Christian Church was inspired by the pentecostal experience of the grace of God. It is intolerable to think that the first thing that the Christian Church did was to forsake that spirit and teaching, as they found it in Jesus. I can understand why they did it—and that has been not only the opportunity but the tragedy of the Christian Church ever since.
I cannot avoid the conclusion that whatever the cost and difficulties of applying it, Christianity began in a non-violent endeavour to produce the quality which would not only enable people to live individually with one another but which would rid society of the final terror of war. There I stand. I can do no other. That is not a claim that I would make on my own piety but it is a view derived from a reading of the Gospel and from a situation which is increasingly violent. That is something that should be recorded in a debate such as this.
Inasmuch as I believe that what is morally wrong can never be politically right, although it may take some time to achieve that purpose, I believe that we are in great danger of using a word of three letters to describe the phenomenon that has so radically changed over the last centuries so as to be almost unrecognisable in terms of what it meant in the age of the bow and arrow or the primitive age of the use of gunpowder in the West.
Although I have tried to do so, I cannot understand those who look upon the prosecution of war in this difficult situation and the prospect of victory as if it were almost ordained, as irreversible. We live in a world where the terminal effect of armed violence has to be feared. It cannot be calculated. When I read the deliberations and statements of those who claim to be scientists as to the repercussions even of a war that started locally, I find no comfort in the prospect that we should win it. If we did win, the result would be a devastation much greater than that which could be produced by other less violent means.
It is not exhibitionism on the part of those who believe in Christianity to record the fact that there is no inherent prospect of the finality of God's purposes on this planet: sooner or later it will be blacked off. Therefore, what concerns me, and an increasing number of people that I come across, is the way in which we, as a species, are likely to follow the dinosaur. A bunch of locusts will eat almost anything except another bunch of locusts and in the same way, humanity is within a distance of mutually destroying itself. It is no calculated emotionalism to back that view with feeble argument. In my judgment it is an ever increasing fear of a great many people other than those who profess the Christian faith, that the prosecution of war carries with it results that are incalculable except for the inevitable prospect that once started it would inevitably spread.
The fundamental iniquity of going to war has been recognised as a complete evil and, I would add, a very necessary corrective. I stand by pacifisim. I do not lie down under it; I do not sit under it. I have nothing but
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contempt for those people who profess the non-violent cause and then rest on their laurels, if they are assumed to be laurels, which they are not. I wish that I could make a like contribution to the heroism and courage of those who will be compelled to go to war.
There has been a curious recognition that parsons should not go to war or at least not have anything to do with the fighting process. We must recognise that refusal to take part in war is the introduction that we have to make to a correlative attitude of compassion and understanding for other people. I know something about it. I have been talking in the open air for 60 years. I have made many mistakes. I am not proud of it, but I am well aware of the fact that time and time again I have been impressed by the increased recognition that there must be a way of solving our corporate problems other than repetitive war.
I remember it, coming out of college after the First World War. Then on Tower Hill and elsewhere during the Second World War. Here we are again. It frightens me. It frightens me because I find that the arguments that sustain what has been said may in principle be recognisable and true. They are. I have no sympathy with Saddam's attitude and programme. He is a rogue. He is doing a great deal of evil. I should like to see some way in which he could be curbed, if not dismissed. Therefore, I make the following propositions which I believe to be consistent with my faith.
First, we should recognise that we are all sinners. One can think of Saddam as an example of total depravity, if one likes. But there is a good deal of original sin on our side as well. Therefore, the assumption that we cannot go into a conference with a sinner but recognise his place for the due admonition of his sins and repentance is impudence.
I do not know much about the Ottoman Empire, but I know that the first thing that happens in a war, as Winston Churchill said, is lying. As he said, it is an indispensable ally. I deplore the fact that I know little about what is going on and therefore I have to resort in what I believe to be a faith. Your Lordships have been patient and have listened. A number of ordinary people have written and spoken to me, as they have to my friends in other Churches. They say, "Please do something to help us get rid of this haunting fear that we are in for a total disaster".
The only thing that I can finally say, if your Lordships will allow me to say it—I shall say it anyhow—is that if we are obedient to the spirit and teaching of Jesus that will open a window however many other doors are shut. Out of that faith and obedience ultimately will come our salvation. If that sounds like a sermon, I have no apology to offer.
I am in need of the grace of God. That grace of God comes to me through Jesus Christ. I believe that substantially and eternally. If we are prepared to turn away from war as the absolute evil, we shall be able to enter into the daylight of a better world. That is my testimony. I offer it at this eleventh hour. Whatever happens tomorrow and the days after, I hope that we shall still face the issue which I have put before your Lordships, however imperfectly. I pray that we shall

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do it as soon as possible, not just for our own sakes, but for the sakes of our children and our children's children. We are on a temporary planet on which eternal life begins. I believe that whatever happens here, continues hereafter.
4.13 p.m.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, despite the deeply respected convictions of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, I believe that there is a consensus in the House that the United Nations resolutions on Kuwait must be implemented, if necessary by the use of force. There is also a consensus throughout the House on the cruelty, ruthlessness and dangerous irrationality of Saddam Hussein and on the need to give the utmost support to our armed forces in the Gulf.
What is not so clear to me, speaking for myself, is whether the crisis has been, and is being, well handled by the American and British governments, and whether this is the right moment to launch an offensive against Iraq. The right response to the invasion of Kuwait should surely have been to dispatch troops to the Gulf to deter further aggression by Saddam Hussein; to launch a long-term campaign of sanctions, holding in reserve the threat of force as a final resort; and to use diplomacy in full to have the resolutions implemented.
That has not been the course followed by the American and British governments. To begin with, it is true, the aim of the dispatch of troops was deterrence. But that changed. On 9th November, apparently after no consultations with his senior advisers or his allies, President Bush announced the dispatch of enormous reinforcements to the Gulf and a change in posture from the defensive to the offensive. We were told at the time, by the British Government as well as by the United States Government, that it was a policy of peace —that this was the way to ensure a peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis. If so, it was badly carried out and appears to have been a total failure.
We are bound to ask: if that was the aim of the two governments why was there an adamant refusal to contemplate any negotiations and an adamant public rejection of allowing Saddam Hussein any face saving? It is a strange way to go about peace. Why was there a refusal to make any move on Palestine, to which I shall refer again in a moment? Why were there public insults of President Saddam Hussein by President Bush? There were references to "kicking his ass", "a new Hitler", and so on. Why did the British and American governments systematically shut off all Saddam Hussein's possible avenues of retreat?
I am sure that in the future the United States' motives will be studied exhaustively by historians. They will pay tribute to the determination of many members of the United Nations to insist upon the insertion of the authority of the Security Council and the enforcement of its resolutions against a blatant act of aggression. But good historians have cold eyes. Some may also conclude that the Americans were, in
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addition, determined to eliminate, by force if necessary, the main threat to their oil supplies and to the security of their ally, Israel.
That conclusion is strengthened by the Americans' refusal of serious diplomacy—the refusal of any diplomacy at all indeed—and, in particular, their refusal, at this very minute, by opposing the French initiative, to make any forward move on the Palestine question. I agree with those who rightly say that Saddam Hussein's claim to support and speak for the Palestinians is completely bogus and had no part in his motivation for invading Kuwait. Nevertheless, the United States and the British governments seem gravely to have ignored the relevance of Palestine to the Kuwait crisis.
On 15th September I wrote to Mr. Waldegrave who was then in charge of Middle East affairs at the Foreign Office. I urged that the Security Council should take up the issue of Palestine, both on its own merits and because such a step would forestall the campaign on the issue that Saddam Hussein was bound to start. I wrote:
"Could we not bring forward, earlier than he intended, Bush's suggestion that the new "world order" should tackle the Israel/Palestine question? …The very launching of such an initiative—fully justified on its own merits—would surely have an immediate and profound effect on the Gulf crisis…It would greatly strengthen the unity and moral and political standing of the anti-Iraq coalition. Saddam Hussein's basic strategy would be undermined, and he might well decide to try to save face, arguing that Israel's withdrawal now justified his withdrawal from Kuwait".
I am sorry to say that this appeal, made before Saddam Hussein began linking the Palestine and Kuwait problems, was given a very cold reception by the Government. Indeed I have to say that in spite of a telephone call to his office and a follow-up letter, I have to this day received no reply to my letter. The reason is fairly obvious, I think. As a man of courtesy with wide knowledge of the Middle East, Mr Waldegrave could think of no way of replying except to express his complete agreement.
However, the noble Earl who is to wind up took a different view. He did me the courtesy of writing to me on 26th November, 10 weeks later, answering the same appeal when I made it in one of our debates. He gave two reasons why the Government rejected the idea. He said:
"It would enable Saddam Hussein to claim credit for helping the Palestinians".
The Government were prepared to refuse to do something justifiable on its own merits which might help to avert war because it would enable Saddam Hussein to claim credit for helping the Palestinians. That shows a strange sense of proportion. But it lies for example behind today's mistake by the Government in opposing the French initiative on Palestine, presumably for the same reason. They would say, "It might help to avert war and it might be justifiable on its merits but it would enable Saddam Hussein to claim credit for helping the Palestinians." That seems an indefensible position on the part of the Government.

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The second reason put forward by the noble Earl as official government policy was that my proposal would involve pressurising Israel. He said:
"I fully understand your concern to find a peaceful way out of the current confrontation, but we could not support the option which you outline. We have long maintained that if a solution to the Arab-Israel dispute is to be just and durable it must be freely accepted by all parties".
That is to say, it must be freely accepted by the Shamir Government. In fact, it means that the Shamir Government have a veto. It means that while the Government say that proposals for ending Israel's occupation must be freely accepted by the Israeli Government the Security Council's proposals for ending Iraq's occupation must be imposed by sanctions and war. Such double standards may not be so familiar in the West. But every Arab and indeed the whole moslem world are keenly aware of them. A great part of Iraqi propaganda is rubbish. But that part of it which deals with the double standards of the United States and Britain on Palestine is valid and damaging. It weakens the claim of the two countries to loyalty to the Security Council resolutions. It helps Saddam Hussein's bogus claim to be a friend of the Palestinians; it helps him to loosen the cohesion of the coalition.
Whatever the outcome of war if, as seems likely, it comes, the double standards of the two governments on Palestine will haunt them for many years to come. Let us suppose that we have a complete military success. When the dust clears, what will the moslem world feel about two christian countries, with their superior western technology and with the political, if not the military, support of Israel, refusing to lift a finger to help the Palestinians and inflicting massive casualties, military and civilian, on an Arab and moslem country?
How far have the Government considered the consequences of what they are proposing to do? Have they worked out what their policy will be to the new regime, post-Saddam, in Iraq? Will they help it against the territorial claims which will come from Iran, from Syria and perhaps from Turkey? Will they help the new regime against the inevitable uprising of the Kurdish people? What will they do if the Israelis, with their much greater power, begin massive expulsions, as is quite possible, of West Bankers into Jordan? How will they handle the oil crisis and the worldwide economic collapse which is likely to follow? It is hard to believe that the Government have seriously weighed up the pros and cons of immediate offensive action against Iraq. If they had they would surely conclude, even at this eleventh hour, that the wisest course is to show restraint, to play the crisis long and cool, and to give sanctions and diplomacy the chance they have not yet had.
4.26 p.m.
Lord Bramall: My Lords, as another Member of your Lordship's House who has been fortunate enough recently to have visited the Gulf and the splendid, well-equipped British forces out there, perhaps I may also offer a few observations on the
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very serious state of affairs we are discussing today. First, it does not surprise me at all that events have taken the course they have. We were, I believe, right to halt Saddam Hussein in his tracks, to gain consensus for our actions through the Security Council and to carry out the various deployments and the military and diplomatic pressures which we have done over the past few months.
However, given the fundamentally different perception of the criminality of the invasion of Kuwait between, on the one hand, the vast majority of the international community as reflected in the various United Nations resolutions and, on the other, President Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, driven on by his own equivalent of Mein Kampf, supported by extremists bent on confrontation with Israel and relishing the language if not the realities of a holy war, there could be little, if any, meeting of minds. Therefore, there could be no doubt that if Saddam Hussein, by force majeure, withdrew at all it would be at any time before five minutes to midnight, wrong-footing the alliance as much as he possibly could. By "midnight" I do not mean the somewhat arbitrary so-called deadline which is shortly about to expire. Still less do I mean that nebulous, quite indefinable and probably not even assessable future date when sanctions may be said to have worked. I mean when, and only when, Saddam Hussein believes that he is about to be struck by overwhelming and, in his perception, irresistible force; and he may still feel he has some time to run yet.
This is why it was highly unlikely that anything would come out of the Geneva meeting or, indeed, from the Secretary General's welcome but vain initiative. This is all the more so because for other practical reasons which have been fully explained by the noble Lord the Leader of the House—reasons of foreign policy—it was not deemed to be either right or feasible to link any Iraqi withdrawal to a simultaneous, let alone a before-the-event, conference on other outstanding United Nations resolutions on the area. That would be, I suppose, the one chance of a diplomatic breakthrough.
Of course, even a withdrawal at five minutes to midnight will produce its own problems, particularly if that withdrawal were to any extent staged, or only partial. However, it should not be beyond the wit of man, with so much at stake, even at that late hour to take advantage of such an undoubted step forward and then, from a position of increased strength, still backed by the alliance's formidable military power, to press for whatever further needed to be done in the interests of long-term stability in the area. So "five minutes to midnight" remains a possibility, provided Saddam Hussein is convinced that we are in earnest.
Unfortunately, it may well be that he actually wants some sort of conflict and that he does not have it in mind to withdraw until at least five minutes past midnight, after he has been attacked in strength. That would provide him with some excuse for his own people as to why, faced by the overwhelming power of outsiders and infidels and invoking the Israeli threat, real or imagined, he had been forced to throw in the

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towel and save his country and people from complete defeat and probable destruction. That may be the only way he feels that he can extricate himself with any honour. Therefore, we must also consider the possibility of that scenario. Of course, those "five minutes" could themselves be a highly dangerous period.
When we study the form book and note the assembled strength of the alliance with all its latest technology, particularly in the air and at night, we should not doubt that Saddam Hussein would find it very difficult once attacked, to control, supply, manoeuvre and even protect his forces in the open desert under the usually cloudless skies. His unsupported forces pounded from the air, frightened as they are bound to be in the face of such power and somewhat weary from an earlier encounter, could quickly be written down to manageable proportions. That would be the real incentive for him, or for someone else in Iraq, to call it a day if anything was to be salvaged from the wreck.
However, technology will triumph only if there is no complacency and if it is part and parcel of an effective strategic and tactical plan based on the well-tried principles of war; particularly surprise in timing and method and sufficient concentration of force to induce continuing confusion into the hearts of the enemy and its leadership. It would thus achieve its aim with the minimum of our own casualties—the whole controlled and directed at every level by highly professional and, on occasions, heroic leadership.
It also has to be faced that air supremacy by itself did not provide a panacea in Vietnam; though there, of course, the terrain was very different from the open desert. Even over the open hillsides of Korea and before that the rolling farmland of Normandy, despite the enormous value of unchallenged air interdiction without which victory might not have been possible, spirited ground resistance was still possible.
Therefore, although we are rightly putting great faith in the alliance air effort, if all goes exactly according to plan—in war, of course, it never does —the subsequent follow-up may be a great deal easier and quicker than some pessimists fear. But one cannot be certain that the whole operation will not take somewhat longer than extreme optimists may hope. As Winston Churchill once reminded us, you should never believe that war, any war, will be smooth, easy, or precisely controllable.
We should therefore, as I said in this House last September, be playing for high stakes, albeit in the pursuit of a most important principle. We therefore need, and I am sure we have assembled, the very best hand possible. Certainly, one of the Cabinet's most important responsibilities to the British people before hostilities actually start is, through our own chiefs of staff, to satisfy itself that the military plans of the alliance are sound and are likely to be achievable in a reasonable, sustainable period of time, and that the tasks given particularly to our own forces are consistent with their capabilities.
Here we must remember that there is a marked
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difference from the Falklands in that, instead of a clear-cut British chain of command combining the responsibilities for advice, planning and the carrying out of those plans, our chain of command in the Gulf above divisional level acts largely as adviser and observer to the United States decision-making process, with the main line of operational responsibility running from the United States headquarters in Saudi Arabia to Washington.
That is why it is more important than ever, as I suggested on 6th September, that our chiefs of staff and their supervisory commander-in-chief should keep in the closest touch on a personal and day-to-day basis with the United States joint chiefs of staff and their chairman, General Powell. This was common practice in World War II but, perhaps more significantly, it also occurred in a more comparable coalition war—Korea—when a very senior member of our own chiefs of staff (the late Lord Tedder who had only just handed over both as chief of the air staff and as chairman of the chiefs of staff committee) was sent to Washington to sit with the US joint chiefs to represent the British view, and vice versa.
That situation could be vital in the weeks ahead and I hope that the Government, in view of the large contribution that we are making to this operation, will consider something similar. After all, it would be no good in the unlikely event of things going wrong for the Government to say, "It wasn't our fault because it wasn't our plan." Nor could we default at the last moment if we were unhappy about certain orders given to our men. We have to get the planning and representation right in advance.
Of course, there is likely to be another important difference from the Falklands. The British people are likely to have to make more sacrifices and have the realities of war brought home to them more than they did in the Falklands, unless they, very sadly, lost relatives and loved ones in the battle. For, however long or brief the shooting war may last, there is bound to be a considerable impact on the economic life of this country, on oil prices, on financial markets generally, perhaps on taxation and on the smooth pursuit of business interests worldwide.
We may also have to face up to terrorist threats and action against British lives and property at home and abroad. But perhaps we should be satisfied that the burden of any armed struggle against tyranny, for the benefit of future collective peace and the preservation of international order and the United Nations, is borne more widely and not only by our professional fighting men far from home.
I expect that the Government will have made their appreciation of whether standing up to tyranny and blatant aggression now is better than facing it in other, perhaps worse, guises and situations in the future; whether doing just that merits the perhaps somewhat indefinable, but still inevitable, risks; and whether indeed we have gone the last mile for peace and explored every other practical alternative.
If the answer had been no to those questions, it would indeed have been right and still courageous to

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abandon any immediate thought of the use of force and to pursue the same objectives by some slower, less emphatic and, of course, much less certain means, however awkward that may be. But if the Cabinet's decision—and it is only the Cabinet, knowing all the facts and having all the information, which can take it —is to say yes to those questions, then I personally believe that there is now no practical alternative but to show the courage of our convictions. Then, at the proper moment, we should move up with confidence to that midnight point and, if still necessary, initiate warlike operations.
We must not flinch from the task, nor from the odd setback, as, incidentally, occurred early in the Falklands, nor in the face of a surely to be anticipated propaganda counter-attack against us and our allies perpetrated by every possible means—I hope not fuelled too much by our own media—nor from any terrorist activity aimed at British lives and property. We must be prepared to pursue our justified and military aims to a proper and reasonable conclusion. If the final decision is taken to use force to free Kuwait, the Government will be expected to show real leadership.
I hope it is not presumptuous to say that we heard a fine, fighting speech from the noble Lord the Leader of the House at the start of the debate. The nation will, not unnaturally, be extremely apprehensive and will, to a considerable extent, have to be geared up to war, however short we may hope that war will be. The nation will have to be rallied with the same sense of commitment, duty and confidence in the justice of our cause as Winston Churchill inspired the nation when power-hungry tyranny last had to be forcibly resisted, because the alternatives of not doing so were so much worse still.
I am completely certain of one thing knowing the Armed Forces as I do. I visited them recently together with the noble Lords, Lord Pym, Lord Mayhew and Lord Richard. I know that the Armed Forces when given the order—I hope that order will be based on a plan which reduces risks and our own casualties to a minimum—will act with the greatest resolution, courage and professional skill. They do not wish for a war in any way. They are the ones who would have most to suffer and most to lose. Nevertheless they will carry out their duty in an exemplary fashion and in a way which will make us feel immensely proud and not a little humble. In that context I wish to pick up on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pym. I hope that no one in Whitehall will be so remiss as to plan, let alone announce, severe future reductions in the Armed Forces while the outcome and aftermath of the Gulf crisis are still impossible to assess accurately. Not only would that be tactless and unfeeling beyond belief with so many servicemen prepared to give of their all to see us through, but with the situation in the Soviet Union also so confused, dangerous and uncertain it could also be highly irresponsible. There have in the past been too many similar instances of euphoria about peace in our time, which have so quickly proved to be false dawns, for us to be entirely
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comfortable about the way in which the so-called options for change seem to be developing. I trust that the House will receive some reassurance on that point from the Minister when he replies to the debate.
4.42 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, we are deeply indebted, not for the first time, to the noble and gallant Lord who has just spoken for giving us a clear picture of what a military conflict would entail, and the desirable measures which would need to be taken by Her Majesty's Government and by the people. Having listened to the opening speeches of the debate, which is our third debate on the Gulf, I am moved to feel and to suggest that although there are a variety of views on the matter—no doubt others will be expressed—in practice, there is only one choice. Either we accept the sincere views which, not for the first time, have been put before us by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, and say that war is the most unthinkable of evils and we must not wage it, or we must agree that it may well be necessary in order to fulfil the aims and purposes of the United Nations and of the allied governments to use the arbitrament of force.
I was moved, as I always am, by the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Soper. If we accept his view that means we accept, after these five and a half months, the annexation of Kuwait. One could argue that the Kuwaitis would be better off left under Iraqi tyranny and subject to continuous depredations upon their lives and property than they might be in the event of their country being the scene of a modern war. That is clearly not the view that our Kuwaiti friends tell us the Kuwaitis hold. However, if that is what the Kuwaitis feel, it is an argument which deserves respectful consideration. It may be that we ought to let Saddam Hussein have Kuwait. That is the ultimate consequence of the arguments that have been put forward which suggest that, under all circumstances, a modern war is something that we cannot fight. Or we have to say that the liberation of Kuwait, the defeating of aggression and the fortification of the strength and purposes of the United Nations are all important principles and that everything we do must be subordinate to them.
I am afraid that I shall now go over ground which I went over in this House on the previous occasion that we discussed the Gulf. I find it difficult to accept the belief that sanctions, even if prolonged for months, could now do the trick. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition asked for more information on whether sanctions were working and whether some countries were in breach of sanctions. Those are matters which will be of interest to the future shapers of foreign policy or to future historians. However, they are not relevant to the problem that we now face. It is probably true that sanctions are working to a considerable extent. The Iraqi people are getting poorer, more miserable; and they are being deprived of more of the staples of life. That position will get worse. However, does that prove that that position will assist in the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait? If one relies on sanctions to bring pressure on the civilian population, one must rely on

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them also to produce an internal upheaval; that is, getting rid of the government who are at fault and instituting a government who are prepared to make peace. What we know about the situation in a country run by a closely-knit police regime makes that a wholly unlikely hypothesis. Therefore we must come back to the fact that the purpose of the threat of war, the original purpose of sanctions and the purpose of diplomacy, is to persuade Saddam Hussein to change his mind and to go back on what he has said with repeated vehemence over the past few months. That means that we are not, as in the textbooks, imposing sanctions against a country or a people. We are imposing sanctions against a man. We have no experience of the success of that tactic, and as far as I can see we have no reason to be optimistic.
There is furthermore the point which I believe I made during the previous debate on this subject. Even if we were to rely on sanctions for a further period of months, they would require the maintenance of something like the present forces in the Gulf. As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, pointed out, although, strictly speaking, the present forces in the Gulf are more than would have been necessary to defend Saudi Arabia against further aggression, we cannot now, having got ourselves into this position, rule out the view that the further initiation of war is as likely to be undertaken by Saddam Hussein himself as by the allied forces. He will have, and has now, that option. He may exercise it against Israel; he may exercise it against one of our allies; he may exercise it against our own troops.
So long as we are involved in sanctions, we are acting in a hostile fashion. At the same time we are losing the initiative and handing it over to our adversary. That is quite apart from the strains which it is universally agreed would follow a long prolongation of the present stand-off, strains within allied countries—even within our own country and even more so in the United States—but more conspicuously among the countries of the region itself. Those strains would undoubtedly come to the fore and be exploited if there was seen to be the possibility of endless procrastination.
However, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, mentioned, there are other considerations which derive from the changes in the world scene since the United Nations originally met to deal with the situation at the beginning of August. At that time many people assumed—I was not among them—that perestroika and glasnost were here to stay, and that we could write off Europe as an area with which our armed forces need ever be concerned now or in the future. The events of the past few days have revealed the fact that whatever the outcome of the current problems in the Soviet Union—and it may be years before that outcome is clear—Europe is not an area of guaranteed stability. Therefore, it is undesirable that so much of the armed force of this country, the United States and to some extent of other Western European countries should be tied up a very long way away facing a third world dictator in a permanent stand-off.
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As the noble and gallant Lord rightly said, those are considerations which affect the budgetary attitude which Her Majesty's Government ought to take to the needs of the armed forces. They also have a direct implication for what is happening now, what should happen or what is likely to happen in the next few months.
In taking the view that we can accept either the attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, or that of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, I should also take the view that we are making too much of the lack of diplomacy, as though the reason Saddam Hussein was still in Kuwait was that no one had politely asked him to leave or even offered him a suggestion that there might be something for him if he did. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, was particularly guilty of that. As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, with his connections in the Arab world, well knows, there have not only been the much publicised meetings between Secretary Baker and Mr. Aziz, the journey of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of various amateur intermediaries, there has also been a constant stream of messages to and fro between members of the Arab League and the Government of Iraq, much of which has been reported. There have been the efforts of the Algerians and others and even, latterly, of the Yemenis, to try to put in hand some form of negotiation.
In response, we have received no suggestion that if this or that were done to save Saddam's face there might be an evacuation but, on the contrary, the proclamation of a holy war. The most reverend Primate was right to caution us that under no circumstances if war comes should we regard it as a war of religion. Nevertheless, it has been proclaimed by Saddam Hussein as a war of religion, and that is a fact of which we have to take notice.
I am sure that there have been weaknesses in our diplomacy. There are always weaknesses in diplomacy. However, the idea that because of a commitment to Israel or for some other extraneous reasons the United States and this country have been unwilling to seek peace is not demonstrable on the facts of the case and cannot be sustained.
I should have no objection to M. Dumas going to Baghdad or President Mitterrand going to Baghdad if there were the possibility of a French-mediated withdrawal from Kuwait. The fact that it happened on the 16th or the 17th of January rather than the 15th would not I think unduly upset any of us. However, I believe that the real reason why there has been some scepticism about the French approach—and perhaps this will be confirmed by the noble Earl when he comes to reply—is that it is difficult to see that anything is on offer or could be offered that has not already been turned down by Saddam Hussein. Therefore, to adopt that approach would simply be to cast another stone into the whirlpool without altering the situation to any extent.
As I said at the beginning, I remain deeply moved by the view that possibly the noble Lord, Lord Soper, is right and that war must now at any rate, if not always, be wrong. It does not seem to me that that is

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for us to say. So long as we are asked by others to recover the liberty of Kuwait and to defend the position that the United Nations has adopted, I believe that it is not for a former private soldier like me to argue with the noble and gallant Lord.
4.53 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, it may clarify the issue that we are debating today if I say straightaway that those of us who are critical of the general line that has been taken by the Government are debating the means only and not the end. The debate is primarily concerned with whether sanctions or war should be used in order to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. There is no question about our agreement on the end. I shall attempt later to meet head on the arguments which the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, has just put against the use of sanctions.
As part of the legislature of this country, when debating this issue we have a duty to weigh up the balance of the consequences of those two methods of securing the accepted end. We have a duty to our own fellow citizens now in the Gulf. We have a duty as members of the human race to the citizens throughout the world who will be affected by our decisions.
First, in weighing up those two alternatives we must ask the question: what will war bring? We may well agree that war is likely to get rid of Saddam Hussein and his forces in Kuwait. But what will be the consequences and what will be left there? We have heard a great deal—far too much—about war in this case being a clean strike, a surgical operation. Extending that metaphor further, it may very well be that that surgical operation will leave the patient dead. All the estimates of the means by which this war will be pursued suggest very strongly that few Kuwaitis will be left alive and little will be left of the past Kuwait.
I make no apology in going on from there to draw attention to the effects of the war, with its impact on oil prices and on the famine which now threatens at least 20 million people in Africa alone. They will be faced with death. We have to add to the casualties of war hundreds of thousands and possibly millions who will die in the third world as a result of the impact of war.
Much has been said about the effects on the environment and a new report on that subject has just been published by 10 scientists. I shall not go into it in detail. I believe that we all recognise that there is a very great danger that war in that territory will affect the environment not just of the area itself but of Europe, a great deal of Asia and possibly the world as a whole.
Then we must consider what will come out of the war. Nobody will argue that war in the Middle East will not lead to devastation in that area, followed almost certainly by another power struggle. Are we attempting to replace Saddam Hussein of Iraq with President Assad of Syria, the Turks or the Saudi Arabians? Are those regimes less brutal or less dictatorial than that of Iraq? Let us remember that the oft quoted United Nations Security Council
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Resolution 678 includes the objective: to restore international peace and security in the area. Is it possible that war can restore international peace and security in that area? I suggest that that is impossible.
There is one aspect of the consequences of war which has not been fully explored. I refer to the temptation that war, particularly if it removes Saddam Hussein, may very well give to nuclear proliferation. It would surely be quite logical for another dictator to say, "Before I go into my equivalent of Kuwait, I shall make certain that I have nuclear weapons because that is the only way in which I can guarantee that I shall be successful".
I ask the noble Earl who will wind up this debate to answer this question in the House. There have been reports that Saudi Arabia has already obtained nuclear weapons from the Chinese and that the defence ministry of Saudi Arabia is resisting the attempt of the United States to examine those weapons and the planes and missiles to which they will be attached. I do not know whether that is true. It has been so reported. I should like the noble Earl to clear up that issue and tell us whether the Saudis are believed to have nuclear weapons supplied by the Chinese.
But that is only an illustration of the danger that I perceive coming from the effects of the war. As has been mentioned on all sides, right across the world waves will be felt; economic waves, social waves and political waves, whose effects are incalculable. If we do get out Saddam Hussein by force of arms, what have we established? Yes, it is right to get him out, but if we have done it by force of arms surely we are accepting his own ethic that might is right, and thereby encouraging others to follow that ethic. If sanctions are abandoned and war is to be the alternative, will sanctions ever again be recognised as a means of solving international conflict? Will it not be the case —we have seen this already in the popular press and indeed at times in this House, even this afternoon—that the cause of sanctions will be discounted?
When one comes to consider the operation of sanctions, I say to the noble Lord the Leader of the House (perhaps my remarks will be passed on to him as he is not in his place at the moment) that his argument against sanctions does not hold up because sanctions have not yet been tried. At the beginning of this conflict, way back last August, and for some months afterwards it was said that the strategy was to use economic sanctions, a blockade and a military force used defensively. On 6th September the Foreign Office made the following statement. After talking about an adequate deterrent as essential to prevent further aggression it went on to say:
"We now have the machinery to ensure that sanctions work and there is very broad agreement that this is the right way forward. Only by ensuring that sanctions bite can we be optimistic of persuading Saddam Hussein to withdraw".
That was the original strategy. It was said openly and authoritatively that in order to work sanctions would require at least 12 months before they could have the desired effect. That period has been modified into 12 to 18 months. On 8th November that policy was

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discarded, so far as I know unilaterally and without consultation with the British Government or any other government. It was discarded by the United States Administration. From then on the United Nations was hijacked by the United States Administration to follow the totally new policy which had been initiated on that date when the President declared that he intended virtually to double the number of American forces in the Gulf. That meant that there would be no rotation and—he said it openly —the American force was now to be regarded as an offensive and not a defensive force.
I must say that the debate on this issue has been much more open and informed in the United States than in this country. During the past few weeks we have seen noted Americans who cannot be accused of appeasement—men such as Senator Nunn, former Secretaries of State for Defense James Schlesinger and Robert MacNamara and, as my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition added, the two previous chairmen of the Chiefs in Staff of the United States before General Powell—claiming that sanctions must be given time to work. The CIA has estimated that by April the Iraqi airforce will be badly damaged by sanctions. Dick Cheney, Secretary of State for Defense, said that sanctions will work if they are given time. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that his opposition to sanctions has been met by distinguished Americans. I quote only one of many who could be quoted. When Robert MacNamara gave evidence before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee he said about sanctions:
"With the embargo continuing, Saddam's strength— economic, political and military—Saddam's strength will decline month by month. Holding our own military forces in place without action may lead to some reduction in our own military readiness, but the effect of the sanctions during such a period will, I believe, weaken the Iraqis' military capability far mote rapidly than the harsh conditions of a desert deployment will diminish ours"—
Lord Beloff: My Lords, I am grateful for the words of Mr. MacNamara but I am afraid that they do not meet the point as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch. Robert MacNamara was saying that sanctions will weaken the military forces available to Saddam Hussein and perhaps the duration will weaken the military strength that we must put against him. That still leaves the prospect of a military confrontation. Mr. MacNamara does not say that at some point during sanctions Saddam Hussein will say that the game is up and leave Kuwait.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, strictly speaking that is not correct. Not only Robert MacNamara but many other Americans when testifying have suggested that in their opinion the weakening of the Iraqi military machine by sanctions will either lead Saddam Hussein to order a retreat from Kuwait or will lead to such weakness within the military force that it will itself turn against Saddam Hussein. That proposition has been put seriously by a number of experienced Americans. I suggest that we must not consider sanctions merely as a method of reducing the living standards of the Iraqi people. As I said in my previous speech on 17th December, they must also be assessed for their effect on the Iraqi military machine.
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I ask the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, to answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos. What is the Government's evidence of the failure of sanctions during the past six months? The British people and the world are entitled to know. We began with a policy based on sanctions which it was said would be successful only after at least 12 months. If it was right then why have the Government abandoned that policy? What evidence do they have to show not only that sanctions are having no effect but that they cannot have an effect during the period that was stated on both sides of the Atlantic as being necessary?
Lord Waddington: My Lords, I wish to make it plain that at no stage during the course of my speech did I say that sanctions have not worked in the sense of having a deleterious effect on the Iraqi economy. The question for this House is whether they have worked in making Saddam Hussein's position less secure.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (The Earl of Caithness): My Lords, I know that the noble Lord does not wish to mislead the House. However, he continues to quote with authority the period of 12 months for sanctions to work. Can he tell the House from where he obtained that figure?
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, the quotation comes from the American Administration. Last September it was said there, as it was said here, that sanctions were to be used in addition to military defence; and it was said that it would take at least 12 months for sanctions to produce an effect.
I did not suggest that the noble Lord the Leader of the House had said that sanctions have had no effect. I am asking the Government to tell the House and the country of the evidence on which they base their assessment that, whatever effect sanctions have had in the first five months of operation, during a period of 12 to 18 months they cannot be successful in achieving the effect for which they were originally imposed. If that is the case, what was the point of the original strategy? Why from August to November were we and the whole world told that the allies and the forces under the United Nations were in position to defend Saudi Arabia and that sanctions, plus the presence of those forces, would achieve the objective of the United Nations resolutions? Was that said simply to deceive a sufficient number of people in order to establish the coalition? What was the purpose of saying that? We are entitled to have that information from the Government tonight.
My principal case remains as it was previously. I was surprised that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition introduced the issue of Mussolini and Abyssinia. The first public speech that I ever made as a schoolboy was in calling for sanctions against Mussolini because of his invasion of Abyssinia. Who were those who appeased Mussolini? Who were those who preferred the Hoare-Laval Pact to the imposition by the League of Nations of sanctions? They were the predecessors of the present members of the Government. Those of us who have always consistently supported the concept of the League of

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Nations and then of the United Nations have been calling continually for sanctions as an alternative to military force and to appeasement, and equally so. That is still the case today—
Lord Annan: My Lords, is it not a fact that the people whom the noble Lord is praising for their devotion to the League of Nations and collective security opposed re-armament and, therefore, left this country in a powerless condition in 1939?
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, that is another debate but I say briefly to the noble Lord—
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, will the noble Lord—
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I cannot answer three people at once. Perhaps I may answer the noble Lord, Lord Annan—
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, was the noble Lord's first speech to his schoolfriends also 20 minutes in length?
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, my first speech was not to my schoolfriends—
Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone: My Lords, I had a very close relationship with my father, who was a Member of the Cabinet in 1935. I can assure the noble Lord that our failure to intervene in the Abyssinian dispute was based on military considerations and not on any desire to appease Mussolini.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, perhaps I may just reply to that. Only the following year we were faced with the Hoare-Laval pact, which was concocted by in Britain a Conservative Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Secretary of the Republic of France.
I have now been interrupted five times and I wish to conclude with my central point. As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, pointed out, the original strategy from the beginning of this issue was that sanctions plus defensive military force were to be used. We hoped that that would be accompanied by diplomacy. There have been diplomatic efforts by the United States, the United Nations, the Arabs and even President Kaunda but not, unfortunately, so far as I know by the British.
However, the alternative now is surely quite clear. If sanctions are to be discarded, as they have been since last November, and if military force is to take their place as the arbiter of political conflict, are we not destroying the hope which many of us had at the end of the cold war? We hoped for a new age and a new kind of world, a world in which we would strive for relations between nations to be based on the rule of law, a world in which national security would be a function of collective security supported by conflict resolution services and peace-keeping forces of multilateral institutions; for example, the United Nations and regional organisations using a new method of conflict resolution of sanctions rather than the old disastrous method of military force. As I pointed out, such force can and must bring catastrophe not only to the Middle East but also to the rest of the third world and to our world.
5.22 p.m.
Lord Walston: My Lords, on two points I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hatch. I agree with him when he, the first among any of the speakers this evening, reminded us of the effect of the Gulf war on countless hungry people in the third world. That is something which we are far too inclined to forget. We concentrate on our own problems and do not realise the effect that this dispute is having not only on their food supplies but also on their general economic development and their efforts to bring their standard of living closer in line with that of the West. I am most grateful to the noble Lord for reminding us of that.
I agree also with the noble Lord's opening comments. I and those of my colleagues with whom I have discussed this matter are in full agreement that the decision which must now be taken is the decision between whether to allow sanctions to continue for an indeterminate period or whether it is now time to resort to force of arms.
My own view is that on that matter we must be guided—and I say this without any undue humility —by those who have access to all the information which is necessary before reaching such a decision. For private individuals, as are most of your Lordships, that is denied. We do not have, and it is correct that we should not have, such information. Therefore, I will go along happily with the decision of those in this country, the United States and the Security Council to resort now, at some suitable period after midnight, to force of arms.
My criticism of what has happened so far is nothing to do with that but is to do with what can briefly be described as honesty. I have a nasty feeling that we are not being honest with ourselves or with the world at large in our reasons for going to war in the Gulf. Unfortunately, I did not note the words of the noble Lord the Leader of the House; but he spoke very movingly of the attack upon an innocent, harmless, defenceless, small country by its great neighbour. Undoubtedly that is something which we do not like, approve of or condone in any way. However, I do not believe—and I hope that I am right in not believing —that our foreign policy is based on emotions of that kind. It would be delightful if that were possible, but foreign policy must be based on pragmatism and on real facts.
If we look back not too many years, we did not take much action when Hungary was invaded by the Soviet Union. We did not take action over the West Bank. We did not take action over the virtual genocide of the Kurds. We are now showing no signs of taking any action over the movement of Soviet tanks in Lithuania. I am not saying that we should have done that, but it must be quite clear that we are not motivated by those high moral beliefs of dashing to the defence of the damsel in distress. Rather we are motivated by what is best for our own country, for the EC and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, reminded us, for the United Nations.
In view of the fact that this country and western Europe as a whole are no longer great world powers

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—and it is rather doubtful as to whether there are any great world powers—the United Nations is now our greatest and possibly only hope of establishing a new world order. That is the justification for supporting the action approved by the United Nations of using force in the Gulf at present. Therefore, I beg the Government not to try to obfuscate the issue by speaking of the moral need to go to the help of a poor, defenceless country. Rather it is the economic necessity of ensuring that the Middle East becomes once again a peaceful and prosperous area because of its importance to the whole of the western world and the third world also.
That leads me on to the second point that when a war is fought, there must be war aims. I am not very clear what are our war aims at present. Listening to most of the speeches—in fact, I think all the speeches—one would believe that our war aims would be satisfied once Iraq has moved out of Kuwait. It has been suggested by some that our war aims will be satisfied only if the war potential of Iraq has been destroyed. However, as yet, nobody has suggested how that could be achieved.
I again urge the Government to define our war aims so that when the war effort is successful, as we are all sure that it will be—though there is some dispute as to how long it will take—we shall know what we are hoping to achieve and we shall aim to achieve it.
I suggest that it is inevitable that there must be some peaceful settlement of the many troubled areas in the Middle East. That settlement should be largely directed and influenced by the Arab nations with the minimum of interference from the outside world; in other words, a Middle East peace conference. Whether or not that will enable Saddam Hussein to say, "Look what I achieved. Without me this would never have happened", is irrelevant when we are discussing war and peace, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and the welfare of tens of millions of people. If he claims some form of victory, so be it. I suspect that his words and claims will have lost a great deal of credibility by that time.
It is essential that we enunciate what the war aims are. I am speaking not only of the United Kingdom but also of the allied forces and the United Nations. If that includes, as I believe it must, a conference on a peaceful settlement of disputes in the Arab countries, let us say so now as clearly and as loudly as we can. If that leads to Saddam Hussein claiming victory and withdrawing, many lives will be saved. If, as I suspect, it has no effect on him, then we must go ahead. But we shall know in which direction we are going and what we wish to achieve when we eventually arrive.
5.32 p.m.
Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and my noble friend Lord Beloff, have already drawn your Lordships' attention to an important government policy affecting the morale of our troops in the Gulf: Options for Change. The effect is extremely negative. I hope to support what was said by adding some material from a slightly different angle.
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First, for the record, I shall give some background. Options for Change is a discussion document which was issued by the Ministry of Defence in July 1990 before Iraq invaded Kuwait. It was conceived in around March 1990 in response to demands for payment of what was called a "peace dividend", following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and of some of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.
The expression, "peace dividend" meant a cut in arms expenditure to reflect the reduced threat from the Soviet Union and its satellites as perceived at the time. I understand that the Government have not reached any conclusion as to exactly what the cuts in the military budget should be, or exactly where they should fall. But I have spoken to a number of senior serving soldiers whose perception of the Government's intention in this exercise—a perception shared widely by the men under their command— must be very bad for their morale at this time.
Perhaps I may refer particularly to the Army. The perception is that around one third of it is soon to be cut. It was originally suggested that the cuts should take place in 1995. Recently, for some reason that nobody can quite fathom, the date has been brought forward to 1993. I am afraid I must say that means men may be going into action in the Gulf who feel that they have as good as got their redundancy notices in their pockets. I would have thought from that dishonourable prospect alone that the Government should announce that the entire Options for Change exercise had been shelved indefinitely.
There is another reason why any of the options so far considered for change, or reduction of our armed forces, are unlikely to be wise; that reason is the situation which exists in the Soviet Union today. Surely events in Lithuania and Latvia must convince us of one of only two possibilities. Either Mr. Gorbachev, despite having taken more power than Stalin ever had, has lost control of the Soviet Union, or, he never was the man so many people in the West trusted him to be.
Of those two possibilities, the second would have the most serious implications for any proposed cut in our armed forces. I do not have time in this debate on the Gulf to detail the whole case which suggests that Mr. Gorbachev has always been more the servant and saviour of the Soviet communist system than its master intent on moving it towards democracy, as we understand that word. I should perhaps pick out a few points for your Lordships to consider.
The troops which have just gone into Riga are Spetznaz troops, under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. Even if Mr. Gorbachev was too busy over lunch to talk to Mr. Landsbergis of Lithuania two days before the army carried out its brutal murders in Vilnius—which may suggest that Mr. Gorbachev had lost control of the army—there can he no such excuse when Spetznaz troops are used in Riga. I repeat that Spetznaz troops are under his direct control and that of his interior minister, whom he has just appointed.

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One should perhaps ask why some 300 million dollars worth of food and other supplies per month are still being airlifted by Moscow to the regime in Afghanistan. One could also ask why the 12 billion deutschmarks paid by the new Germany to the Soviet Union to help it rehouse the 380,000 Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, appears to have been deflected to build military installations in the Western Ukraine. Why, also, did the Soviet Union approve a 20 per cent. increase in its military budget only two months ago?
Even if we leave those distressing military doubts aside, the signs of what is going on in Moscow are now very disturbing. The Interfax news agency in Moscow was forcibly closed two days ago, cutting off one of the main vehicles which the unofficial press had been using to communicate with the outside world. Mr. Sacha Podrabinek, the editor of Express Chronica, one of the most effective publications of the unofficial press, was attacked two days ago by the KGB while photographing its activity in crowd control. That attack would have been unthinkable even three months ago.
As I said, this is not the time to detail the whole picture from the Soviet Union today. Perhaps it might be helpful to do so on another occasion. But I hope I have said enough to show that not only is the continued existence of the Options for Change exercise in any form at all extremely damaging to the morale of our troops, it is also certain to be misconceived in its strategic detail in view of what is now happening in the Soviet Union.
I therefore join the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and my noble friend Lord Beloff in submitting a must urgent plea to the Government to say as soon as possible—which I am afraid means immediately—that Options for Change is an idea of the past.
5.39 p.m.
Lord Cocks of Hartcliffe: My Lords, perhaps I may begin by apologising to the noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal. I was not able to hear his speech due to a previous engagement. I apologise also to my noble friend Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos as I was not able to hear his entire speech.
I grew up during the war between 1939 and 1945. It is time that somebody said we should express our appreciation to the United States of America which, despite a great temptation to go into an isolationist stance with its enormous resources, area and population, has stood by the rest of the world during the course of this century. We would now be in a grave situation if it were not prepared to risk transient unpopularity for taking a stance on a matter of principle.
I was disappointed with the remarks of one or two noble Lords who introduced a rather cynical note into our reasons for taking strong action in the Gulf. I remind your Lordships that when this country moved into the Falklands after the Argentinians invaded, there was no substantial deposit of oil there. There are
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a few sheep and, I understand, a few shrimps offshore. There were no substantial mineral or other resources. We went into the Falklands on the principle that nobody should get away with aggression. That lesson has been learnt and we should remember it.
A number of noble Lords said that there should be an international conference on the Middle East. In that context the Palestinian problem has been mentioned. The conference must have a wider agenda than that: the plight of the Jews in Syria and the Christians in the Lebanon would certainly be worth a place. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walston. The plight of the Kurds should also be mentioned. What has been done to them in Iraq by Saddam Hussein is quite disgraceful and well documented.
My noble friend Lord Hatch mentioned the famine which is hitting the whole of the eastern region of Africa. If it is thought that the way through the problem is to have an international conference then it should debate far wider issues of much greater import than the comparatively narrow one put forward so far. On previous occasions in this House I have drawn attention to the problems of the Sudan where a fundamentalist military regime with a very narrow political and ideological view is jeopardising the welfare of the Sudanese people. Not only is the civil war endangering their lives; there is also a very real threat of famine and possible starvation facing millions this year.
It is a critical situation. On more than one occasion I have drawn your Lordships' attention to the plight of the very substantial Christian minority in the Sudan. There are very serious problems there as in neighbouring Ethiopia. I went to that country some years ago before the first very substantial famine. The writing was on the wall then. There is wide scale death and destruction caused by these factors. The ongoing civil war is consuming a very substantial part of the budget. The Relief Society of Tigray estimates that about two-thirds of the country's crop deficit has been caused by the war. In addition, since the fall of Massawa last month to the rebel group, the EPLF says that there is now only one port available for food aid to come into this handicapped country.
There are similar problems in Eritrea, reflected in the dreadful situation there. Famine, drought and economic insecurity reign. People are trapped in the enclave around Asmara because of the February takeover. There is a lack of water, food and power supplies which add to the difficulties. These three countries, with the addition of Somalia in the Horn of Africa, deserve international attention.
Apart from the difficulties of war in Somalia there is severe drought and potential famine. Somalia is becoming one of the most deeply divided African nations with inter-tribal difficulties. It is feared that even if the Barre regime should fall there will be a substantial outbreak of tribal war. Since war broke out in May 1988 it has been estimated that between 500,000 and 600,000 people have died, most of them unarmed civilians, killed by government bombs and

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execution squads. The Red Berets, Barre's personal body guard and likened to the Romanian Securitate, has been responsible for a number of atrocities.
These countries are adjacent to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East region which is the subject of today's debate. There are very serious problems here which should be attended to. How has the United Nations, representing the world community, responded over the past 10 years? Resolutions taken in the General Assembly of the United Nations over the past 10 years show that Ethiopia has merited four although it has an area of 50 times that of Israel. There has not been one resolution relating to the Kurds despite the atrocities perpetrated on them by the Iraqis in terms of the chemical and bacteriological warfare which has been referred to. There have been no resolutions on Eritrea. There have been three resolutions concerning Somalia, which has an area 30 times that of Israel, and two concerning the Sudan, an area 100 times that of Israel. There has been one joint resolution on the whole region over a period of 10 years.
When considering Israel and the Palestinian problem, in the same 10-year period there have been 19 resolutions concerning Israel including armaments and nuclear weapons. There have been 10 resolutions concerning Palestine. With Israel and Palestine broadly classified as the Middle East, there have been 16 resolutions. In effect we have had 45 resolutions on the Israeli-Palestine problem relating to an area the size of Wales with a population of fewer than 4 million. Over the same 10-year period, the entire Horn of Africa has merited 10 resolutions. When are we going to get a sense of perspective into this matter? When are we really going to tackle these problems as a world community? I entirely support the Government's actions concerning the Gulf and their deployment of forces. Much though I regret it, if it comes to the use of force, then they have my entire support. I hope that, in the fullness of time, these other problems to which I have referred will be addressed.
5.47 p.m.
Lord Ashbourne: My Lords, I reflected very carefully before deciding to speak this evening because it seemed to me that so many of your Lordships have much greater experience than I in the field of foreign affairs. I doubted whether I had anything meaningful to say which had not been said already. However, in view of gravity of the situation I felt it important to state briefly my support for the actions of Her Majesty's Government within the framework of the overall United Nations' position.
Already President Saddam Hussein has set his snare. He announced to the world that all hostages would be released: a ploy calculated to demonstrate that he is a reasonable man with whom the United Nations can do business. King Hussein his ever-faithful mouthpiece, was telling interviewers that all Saddam wants is a peaceful solution to Iraq's problems with Kuwait and the Palestinians' problems with Israel.
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When the House debated the Gulf situation on 17th December, the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition asked:
"can the Minister say whether the Government now believe that sanctions supported by Resolution 670, which authorises measures to tighten air embargo and deny entry to ships, are working well enough to justify a stay of military action?" —[Official Report, 17/12/90; col. 655.]
That was the question which perceptive Members of your Lordships' House were eager to hear answered because upon the answer your Lordships could reasonably make a balanced evaluation of what is likely to happen in the future.
I have searched through Hansard with great vigour and I cannot find an answer to that question. If I have overlooked it I apologise to Her Majesty's Government. I urge most earnestly the noble Earl who is to wind up this evening to answer that question with as much accuracy as he can because it is central to what we are debating this evening. If he does not answer it the only conclusion we can draw is that the Government cannot do so and are incapable of making a realistic evaluation of how sanctions are working. I hope that that is not the case. If it is, I urge the noble Earl to take immediate action to make sure that this grievous shortfall is rectified.
The proponents of sanctions like to conjure up the image of a noose steadily tightening around Saddam Hussein's neck; but it is unlikely to work that way. A more accurate image is that of a noose slowly fraying over time to the point where Saddam Hussein slips the knot. Experts like Mr. Robert Inman, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, believe that sanctions will strangle Iraq's air force and air defence capability within five to eight months, or somewhere between January and April of this year. But, says Mr. Inman, the history of sanctions in peace time is that, after some initial pain, the longer they continue the more the target adjusts. Noble Lords will judge for themselves the credibility of that view. I believe it to be a very accurate assessment of how sanctions work in practice, leaving the United Nations facing the stark choice of either going to war or letting the aggressor win. I believe that the allies have no option but to go to war, having exhausted every diplomatic option, and I commend to the House the resolution of Her Majesty's Government.
Finally, I wish to quote two verses of scripture from St. Mark, chapter 13, verses 7 and 8. About 2,000 years ago the Saviour of the World said:
"When you hear of wars and rumours of wars, do not be alarmed. Such things must happen, but the end is still to come.
"Nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. There will be earthquakes in various places, and famines. These are the beginning of birth pains".
Noble Lords will judge for themselves the validity or otherwise of those verses and the relevance of them to the situation in the Gulf today.
5.52 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, as it seems to me, Saddam Hussein has made his ultimate objectives completely clear. They are by one means or another to eject American forces from the Gulf and then to

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concentrate on the elimination of the Saudi regime, which he regards as traitorous to the Islamic cause. Indeed he has himself been talking of the necessity for a jihad, or holy war, for this purpose. Before a multitude of his supporters he has also gone so far as implicitly to accept the title of a modern Saladin. If he achieves this eminence he will no doubt also attempt to follow the example of his hero and throw the Israelis, in their capacity as Westerners, into the sea.
All this may, to some extent, be regarded as bravado, but whether or not it is, one thing is certain: he is now challenging the authority of the United Nations as the ultimate preserver of peace. It is quite true that the United Nations is, as was its precursor, the League of Nations, essentially a Western invention and has consisted increasingly of a number of new states resulting from the break-up of various empires; originally the Portuguese, the Spanish and the Ottoman, but, more recently, the British, the Dutch, the Belgian and the French. These new states can hardly be said, in the large majority, to be democratic. The majority have some kind of dictatorship or are one-party states, and it is perhaps unlikely that they will ever become democracies in the Western sense. If so, the United Nations is unlikely to work in a manner completely in accord with Western interests.
It follows, for instance, that the nature of the regime of any victim of aggression, however repulsive by Western standards, should have no bearing on the necessity of United Nations support if it is attacked. That may seem to some to be unjust, but it is the principle on which the world organisation must necessarily rest for so long as it consists of a number of independent sovereign states. It follows also that the United Nations must, in effect, preserve the status quo except in so far as it may be altered by peaceful means. It is finally clear that the United Nations, if it is to function at all in the sphere of security, must act on the basis of unanimity on the part of the five permanent members of the Security Council, even if their internal regimes differ substantially.
All this is not admittedly an ideal system. It remains true, however, that the failure of the United Nations to impose its authority in the case of aggression would result in a free-for-all, leading to a number of wars which could hardly be controlled. So far as can be seen, such a failure in the Middle East could well mean an attempt to form some kind of new expansive Islamic power based on the predominance of one of the existing Arab states, a kind of new Caliphate which would seek, above all, to combat Western values and reduce Western influence on the world as a whole.
The policy followed by the Government, therefore, commands my full support. Given Saddam's obvious intentions, it must be clear that he would not be induced to abandon them even if sanctions were maintained for another six months or a year, by which time of course the ability of the allies to induce him to do so by other means would have been seriously impaired. The moment to confront him with the use of force —even if this should result in war, which we
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must still all hope will be avoided, possibly by Saddam's unconditional acceptance of the latest French plan—is therefore here and now.
It may perhaps be said that it is unseemly for old men, who can only stay comfortably at home, to speak out in favour of a policy which may result in some of their young contemporaries dying in battle. I can only say that in 1918 I was in the army and was just about to go to France when the armistice came. I remember thinking that if I had to die it would at least be in an admirable cause. I can only hope that young men in a rather similar position today will also feel that they are risking their lives in a noble cause —in their case in support of the only organisation which is likely to ensure the future peace of the world. In other words, the only genuine war aim, for which the noble Lord, Lord Walston, asked, is an assurance that the United Nations will still be in a position to settle the frightful problems that will certainly present themselves when hostilities cease.
6 p.m.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, we have just heard the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, say that he was present during the Armistice of 1918. We also know that he was very much involved in the foundation of the United Nations in 1945. I hope that it gives him some satisfaction to see the United Nations working rather better now than it has for a long time.
For an immensely short time—if that is not a contradiction in terms—I should like to suggest to your Lordships why sanctions have failed. I can think of three instances of sanctions in the history of the United Kingdom. The first was at the siege of Calais in, I think, 1347 which was finally backed up by military force. Secondly, it is said by Admiral Mahan in his great book on sea power that Napoleon's armies were brought to an end by those storm-bound ships upon which the Grand Army's eyes never set. Thirdly, there was the great naval blockade of the 1914–18 war. All of those sanction policies—and a sanction policy is, after all, a blockade—eventually had to be backed up and enforced by military means. Sanctions kill women and children. They starve the poor and they make citizens suffer hardship for very much longer.
As I said in the previous debate, and as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, just said, it is very unpleasant for fat middle-aged men to encourage the use of war. During that last debate I told your Lordships that my wife has a godson who will be going to the Gulf. He is a young man. He is 23 year of age and he will be leaving tomorrow. His elder sister died and his mother is a very old and dear friend of ours. I spoke on the telephone to his mother this morning. I said with a certain amount of temerity that I would speak to your Lordships today on the matter. She said, "Please tell them that he goes to war not for glory but for peace and order in this world, and that he goes with my blessing." She hates to say that because he is her only son. My wife's godson is a beau sabreur of a young man. He is wonderful, good looking and dashing. He talks about the number of cans of beer which are put in the barrels of tanks before they are shipped out to Saudi Arabia in order to get round the no-drink rules.

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He also talks about a certain regiment, not a million miles away from here, having filled up jerricans full of Scotch whisky, and about all of those lovely things which P. G. Wodehouse would call "brutal and licentious" but which have been going on for a long time. Long may those harmless pranks continue. However, he is a good young man and his mother is absolutely satisfied that the reason he is going to the Gulf is justified. She believes that we must all give him and his colleagues our support.
That knowledge has made my support for Her Majesty's Government much stronger. I believe they have done about as much as it is possible to do in their slightly junior position in the coalition. However, it is a senior-junior position—if one can use that term—in which they can help the Americans who also do not want to go to war. Indeed, no one wants to go to war, but the threat is so great that it must be done.
There is a splendid piece in Livy's Book 6 about the siege of Saguntum, which is when the second Punic war began. The Roman ambassador goes to the Carthaginian general—I think it was Hasdrubal—and says, "I have in the sleeves of my toga peace or war; take the bit which pleases you (quid placet tibi)." Above all, we have tried to avoid war. None of us wants war, but we must do nothing other than give Her Majesty's Government, the United Nations, the President of the United States, and especially our own fighting, men, the maximum amount of support and good will that we possibly can.
6.5 p.m.
Lord Greenhill of Harrow: My Lords, I have already spoken once or twice on the subject in this House and especially on 17th December. I do not wish to take up your Lordships' time with a repetition of my personal views, to which the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, kindly referred, but I should like to make a few additional points.
Dictators have a convenient way of committing their long-term aims to paper. Hitler did so in Mein Kampf and he was not taken sufficiently seriously. Saddam Hussein has also done so. We are reminded of that by an interesting letter which appeared recently in The Times written by Mr. Aubrey Jones. He quoted Saddam as having said 10 years ago:
"we do not look on this piece of land (Iraq) as the ultimate limit of our struggle. It is a part of a larger area and broader aims—the area of the Arab homeland and the aims of the Arab struggle".
That is the statement of his ambition and it is one which is not without favourable reception in certain parts of the area. I believe that three factors follow from his words. They are, first, that he is obviously highly unlikely to withdraw from Kuwait without a fight. If he is compelled to do so, and survives, he will return to his ultimate aim in due time. Last August he thought that he could get away with a quick snatch and he has been encouraged to hold fast to his position by the confusion and disarray among his opponents.
Secondly, the United Nations Security Council must be the arena in which the alliance policy should be concentrated and decided. Individual initiatives, whether they be Algerian, French or whatever, should
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be brought together in the United Nations. It is too soon to comment upon the French plan—I do not know how much of a surprise it was to the other member of the Community—but the discussion and arguments upon it should be centred in the Security Council.
The third factor to be derived from Saddam's remarks is quite clear. In my view it is a mistake to go on pretending that there is no link between the invasion of Kuwait and the Palestinian problem. Israel has been, and is, a threat to Saddam's ambitions. I agree with the French that a conference on Palestine should be promised; but only after Saddam's physical withdrawal from Kuwait. A statement of his intention to withdraw is simply not enough. The promise of a conference should be made now and embodied in a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. That would be reassuring for moderate Arab opinion. One must sympathise with the dilemma of Israel, but it has flouted world opinion for an unreasonable length of time. A solution to the long-term middle East problems, not only those of Palestine, must be tackled if long-term world peace is being sought. A conference would appear to be the best way of starting that long process after Saddam has withdrawn from the whole of Kuwait.
I should now like to turn to an entirely different subject and ask two questions of the Minister who is to wind up. Is the Ministry of Defence satisfied with the understanding that it has reached with the media here concerning the reporting of the war? I remember attending a post mortem at the Imperial Defence College after the Falklands War when journalists and defence personnel went over the ground to their mutual dissatisfaction. Judging by the remarks of one of the leading editors of the papers here, the press expects further trouble now and gives the impression that it will welcome the opportunity of scoring off the military establishment. I hope that if that is the case, in the area of conflict the authorities there will follow the punitive actions of Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer during the Malaya emergency.
I should like to ask the Minister whether it is correct that television presenters and crews from the alliance will remain in Baghdad during the war. They must inescapably become instruments of Saddam. I wonder whether that is a situation that we should tolerate.
6.13 p.m.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I have two reasons for addressing your Lordships. The first is that slightly over 30 years ago in June 1958 I was sent in the ship that I had the privilege to command, H.M.S. "Cossack", from Singapore to Bahrain as an advance force of the Far East Fleet to safeguard Kuwait from being invaded by Iraq. This is not a new story, as I am sure your Lordships are well aware. On that occasion we experienced some difficulties. We were in such a hurry to get going that although we stocked up with ammunition, we did not take in all of the food that we should have done. It was an embarrassment to those

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who were there when we arrived to have to provide us with enough food to keep going in July and August 1958. However, that is by the way.
This is the first real chance for the United Nations to enforce its will against a dictator who has grabbed another nation. That situation was never possible in the days of the League of Nations and it has not until now been possible for this United Nations.
Secondly, I should like to congratulate our Government for having been so consistent in supporting the United States in its leadership of all the nations towards a coherent stance, firstly of protection of the other Gulf Arab states in the early days and latterly to demonstrate that the United Nations means what it says. The Government have behaved remarkably skilfully under two leaders without fumbling at any stage, and they should be specially congratulated
Having steadily moved to a position of unambiguous insistence on Saddam Hussein relinquishing Kuwait, using force if necessary, the United Nations must not fumble the final stages. At this point it is terribly important that we are not misled in any way by factors that may not exist but which people would like to see in existence.
I sympathise with those who ask that sanctions should be given time to work. But how can we tell when that would be? Experience over history has shown that blockades, however comprehensive, take a very long time before the blockaded countries admit that they are inconvenienced. That is the problem. I suggest that dictators, who are often misinformed by their lackeys, are less likely than democratic governments to know when sanctions are becoming intolerable. Therefore, how can we be sure that Saddam Hussein will ever admit that sanctions have been effective, that he understands that the United Nations means what it says, and that he will tamely order the evacuation of Kuwait? All the evidence shows that the dictator of Iraq will never make such an admission and certainly not during the next six months, which was the period mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch.
To my mind, the key moment for any rational man to have admitted that he had got to do something and tamely to order the evacuation of Kuwait would have been when the United States Congress voted to authorise its President to go to war when he thought fit. That must have been the most telling moment of all. One wonders whether he even knows that that has happened. He was not allowed to see the letter from President Bush. We do not know what he knows and what he does not know—and I do not suppose that he does either. Sadly, the sooner we take action, the better.
6.18 p.m.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I have spoken on a previous occasion and I have listened to the fascinating contributions that have been made this
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afternoon. There is very little left to say, but I should like to make a few brief observations on submissions that have been made.
I have not changed my mind since the last time that I spoke. Anyone who invades, rapes and murders the members of a small country must be resisted. While I have been quite critical of the United Nations, it is remarkable that it has been able to muster forces in the desert with the Desert Shield. It has shown itself to be a real force.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, wisely stated, for 30 years the United States of America pursued a virulent anti-Arab policy and shut its eyes to the irregularities and vulgarities, and the killing and slaying by the Israelis. The United Nations created the Israeli nation and it has a right to exist. Anyone who threatens Israel threatens the United Nations. However, Israel must also fall in and observe resolutions of the United Nations that call on it to get out of the Gaza Strip and lands that they occupy.
Having come from Wales to oppose Moseley and his fascists because of their anti-Simetic policies, which I found positively disgusting and so much like those of the late unlamented Adolf Hitler, after the Second World War I was shattered that many of the soldiers in my command who went out to the Middle East were slain by Israeli terrorists. Their parents and grandparents did not forget that matter.
As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, said, if we do not ensure that Resolution 242, moved by Lord Caradon—a great Member of your Lordships' House—is given the same status as the United Nations resolutions on Saddam Hussein, the United Nations, America and Great Britain will be guilty of a touch of hypocrisy. As the noble Lords, Lord Greenhill of Harrow and Lord Mayhew, said, while we and our American allies try to make Saddam Hussein leave Kuwait and ensure that he does not threaten anyone else, we must at the same time see that Israel is not allowed to threaten anyone. That is only fair.
I am worried about my countrymen and women in uniform who form part of Desert Shield. If anyone does anything stupid in the House, in another place or in any part of the world to endanger them and make their job more difficult, I shall be against them tooth and nail. I hope that Israel will behave itself.
In the United States and some parts of Australia people rightly demonstrate with banners. I have been to Australia. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke, and the Australian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Evans, support the Americans and the British Government over Desert Shield. That is wonderful. There are people who do not agree with the American, British and Australian Governments. I ask them why they do not want the people of Kuwait and Iraq also to be able to protest at what their governments are doing. They might think about that a little more deeply. It will be a wonderful day when this is all over and people in the Middle East can protest in the same way. At the moment that right is unknown.
The people who protest in this country have every right to do so. People also have every right to protest

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in the United States of America. They should understand that one of the fundamental things we are doing it the moment is to create that right for the people of Kuwait. Kuwait has been lost, but it has not been abandoned. That is what irritates Saddam Hussein. When this is over, I hope that we shall do all that we can to promote democracy in some of the Arab states where it is needed. That will be a good thing.
I hope that we shall see that nothing is said or done in any way to imperil the contributions being made in the Gulf by the British forces, our American allies and all our other allies. Some Arab states have made big sacrifices. I am talking about Jordan and one or two others. They are now suffering economically. I hope that the Minister will tell us what may be done to help them.
The one thing we can perhaps be thankful for above all else is that we do not now need a massive army on the edge of Eastern Europe, because if we did we and the Americans would be in a terrible position. I therefore hope that we will not too easily condemn Mr. Gorbachev, who has been mentioned today. I am hurt and a little angry about what has happened in Lithuania; but at the moment Mr. Gorbachev is on my side and therefore he is on the side of the uniformed men and women who form part of Desert Shield. I may not be especially sensible when I praise Mr. Gorbachev. I do so merely because my colleagues in the Gulf, in the Army, Air Force and Navy are my top priority. Winston Churchill has been often quoted. But he once said that he would be prepared to sup with the Devil on behalf of our democratic forces. I am in that category.
The most reverend Primate made a good speech. It was balanced and understandable. I hope everyone realises that sanctions have already made a contribution towards helping our soldiers, sailors and airmen, and they have in no meagre way weakened our potential enemy. Let us not criticise their effects too much.
I was proud to have served this nation as a young territorial in 1938. I went right through the war until 1946. I am aware that that applies to many Members of your Lordships' House. My country and its allies, the United States of America, are committed to removing Saddam Hussein. Kuwait is lost but not abandoned. We should see that Kuwait goes back to its proffer owners, and that its people one day have a proper democracy. Our people in the desert must know that the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians and the people of this nation have absolute confidence in them and are 100 per cent. behind them. I go so far as to say that I hope the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the noble Lord the Leader of the House will say to our Desert Shield commanders that from tomorrow, in collaboration with our American allies, they can decide when to act. They will know when the time is right to recapture Kuwait and remove Saddam Hussein in the name of democracy, at the least possible sad cost in injury and death.
6.28 p.m.
Viscount Mountgarret: My Lords, last September when we debated this topic I was one of those who commented that the longer our troops stayed out in the uncomfortable and unpalatable conditions of the desert the more their morale would be tested, and the sooner one took action against that evil man the better. Although that was possibly the right thinking at the time, I believe that it has been proved to be incorrect. Enormous efforts have been made by the Government, America and many other countries to show that the United Nations stands firmly behind its resolutions. They have been seen by the world to be trying every possible avenue to secure a peaceful solution to the crisis. That will stand the sane world in good stead when it becomes necessary, as I believe it now is, to evict that man from Kuwait.
Three points have been of concern to me. The first relates to our friends, if I may call them that—they sometimes are our friends—in the media. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, mentioned this point. It is right to repeat it. They have a powerful role to play. I have been disappointed to see that even the British—I emphasise "British"—Broadcasting Corporation has been somewhat reluctant to accept the Government's suggestions on how it reports the issues that might be before us in the next few days and weeks. That is rather sad. They have a tremendous responsibility. The freedom of the press is something treasured not only by the press themselves but by the country as a whole. However, freedom can only be exercised and enjoyed provided that it is exercised and enjoyed in a thoroughly responsible fashion.
If we were to see perpetrated through the media the euphoric examples of—dare I say it?—the body bags being brought home to the landing quays and so on, thereby generating concern among the relatives at home, the sweethearts and so on, that would sap the morale of our countrymen, of the Americans and of everyone taking part. If you sap morale at home you are going to sap the morale of the boys, and of course the girls, who are doing their best for freedom in the Gulf. I hope therefore that the Government will do everything possible to get the co-operation of the media and help them to understand that they have a very responsible role to play in the forthcoming days. Forget the selling of newspapers, forget the extra pennies they may make; it goes wider than that. I think the more responsibly they are seen to behave the more their standing will go up and the more newspapers they will sell in the future.
The other point which gives me some concern is the rather strange behaviour of our partners—is that the right word? —in Europe. We seem to have taken the attitude over the last few years that the be-all and end-all of life is to join our partners in Europe, economically, side by side and so on. It seems logical, of course. We are just an island off the edge of Europe, but I have been very disappointed over two specific things that have happened just recently. I hope very much that our Government and Ministers will think quite seriously after all this is over—and I hope it will be over soon—just how far down the road we go.

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Two weeks ago it was suggested—I do not think it would be appropriate to ask a specific question at this point but I suppose I ought to expect an answer—that ammunition supplies for our forces were at a rather low ebb. Perhaps it would not be appropriate to conduct an inquiry into that, but that being the case it seemed necessary to seek assistance from various countries in Europe, Belgium being one. I think I am right in saying, unless the reports in the newspapers were entirely incorrect, that Belgium turned round and said, "We are not sure that we are going to help you very much because we don't want to have this ammunition used in the Gulf." I think Belgium would do well to remember who went to war in 1939 to help that country.
I find that incident disappointing and I find the answer disappointing. I also find it disappointing that France should suddenly set up an initiative. The Secretary General of the United Nations, who after all represents the whole of the free world trying to deal with the problem, has just done the last thing he could do. He went to see Saddam Hussein, and was rebuffed. However sympathetic one may be to the principle of trying to go the extra mile, yard or whatever it is for peace—which I would of course support —it is quite wrong for France, as a member of a community, namely the United Nations, to go off on their own tangent and come up with ideas which may compromise the resolutions that have been taken. I find that a dangerous situation. If it were not for the tremendous United Nations support, on which I congratulate the Government and thank the Opposition and indeed all parties, the Americans would have had enormous difficulty in being able to lend support as they were requested to do by the Saudi Arabian Government. One has to consider whether or not this country and the free world are better served through being closely associated with that great continent and country across the Atlantic, as during the 1939–45 war. We should not forget that.
My last point concerns the present structure of our forces, referred to by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. The idea at the moment of a reduction, or combination, of regiments must be misguided, to say the least. I heard at lunchtime today—it is only hearsay and may be wrong and, if so, I apologise for misleading your Lordships—that the Brigade of Guards, of which I have the privilege of being a member, was concerned that one company of the first battalion of the Grenadier Guards has been uplifted, for want of a better word, out of normal regimental life and sent to the Gulf to assist some other regiment.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with that. But it shows the condition of our existing regiments. At the end of the day a battle or war is won by infantry, by men on the spot. You have your navy and other services to do other things. But at the end of the day it is the people on the spot, such as the infantry, who can win a war. It is only achieved by esprit de corps. If you take away the esprit de corps and the "family" you join and with whom you live you undermine the very morale that is so necessary. It is a dangerous step to
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take. It is necessary at the moment, when battalions and regiments are under strength. They cannot carry out their tactics in accordance with correct military procedure because they do not have sufficient men and therefore need additional help.
This must be the most inopportune moment for the Government even to consider reduction or combination of regiments. It is not only the Gulf with which we may be concerned. We do not know what events, regrettably, may occur in Russia for example. However, that is not a subject for today. We must try to keep the band of brothers, the regiment and its esprit de corps together. If we are going to win battles out there we want the maximum support and morale, together with the maximum "brotherhood" among those who are fighting for the benefit of the free world.
6.37 p.m.
Lord Hooson: My Lords, I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Mountgarret, that we need to maintain our relationship with the United States. I disagree with his reflections on the French initiative. It seems to me that this initiative, although taken at a very late stage, deserves our full support, and for this reason. It is exploring a possibility that we could, if the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, is right, be dealing with a man who is likely to act at five minutes to midnight or five minutes after midnight, and the French initiative would be exploring the possibility of holding out at the very last moment a way out for Saddam Hussein.
I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, and also with the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, when they say that you cannot readily dismiss the obvious link, in Middle Eastern eyes at least, with the problems of Palestine and a solution which involves dealing with Saddam Hussein because he has been built up, and has built himself up, for many years in the Middle East as a champion of Palestinian rights and so on. I shall come back to the French initiative in a moment, but when the noble Earl replies to this debate I think he owes it to the House to tell us what the British Government's reaction is to the French initiative at the United Nations.
It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, was quite right when he suggested that there was no halfway stage between the approach adumbrated in his dramatic way by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, the pacifist view, which I admired enormously as did the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, and the view expressed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, as to the practical steps to be taken at the present juncture. If the worst comes to the worst, I adopt the approach of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. It seems to me that the United Nations, which is a human organisation, depends in the end, like all human organisations, on some form of sanction, and even the application of a sanction depends upon the application of force, because there have to be warships and interference with normal traffic.
Surely at the present time we must consider whether there is any possible way of avoiding war, because the

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consequences of modern war, whether one is a pacifist or not, are dreadful to think of. We have heard today cogent and very strong arguments in favour of immediate war. All I say is that there are better arguments for trying to avoid it if we possibly can. We are concerned in the Middle East with an area that is relatively unstable and where there is a good deal of insecurity, and the possibility of establishing stability and security in the Middle East will be infinitely more difficult after a war than before.
I think it was the most reverend Primate who put forward the view, with which I entirely agreed, that if it comes we must not let war be depicted as a religious war. In the eyes of the Middle East, it will be very difficult to avoid any war that comes being depicted as a religious war. It is said that we should take great care at the present time to get this over with as soon as we can, because we do not know what insecurity may occur in Europe due to the uncertainties now applying in the Soviet Union.
The United States may find itself in great difficulty in the Middle East. It is one thing to put your foot down, as the late Nye Bevan once said about Suez. It is a very difficult proposition to pull it up again afterwards, and the United States may find that a great many of its forces will be tied down in the Middle East for far longer than it ever anticipated. That could affect the balance of power in Europe as well if there is uncertainty in the Soviet Union. That is why it is so important to explore every possibility of avoiding war.
I do not believe that sanctions alone will do the trick for the simple reason that the timetable for sanctions has in no way been co-ordinated with the timetable for offensive action in war. Given the character, the personality and the track record of Saddam Hussein, everything indicates that he is a ruthless and determined gambler. He plays for high stakes and is willing to gamble a great deal with human life, which he disregards. Given that personality on one side and on the other side the strict timetable introduced by the United States which virtually ruled out any diplomacy save the Molotov-Vishinsky diplomacy of no and the doubling of the United States forces in a massive response in the middle of November, which showed that it was taking a certain view, war has been virtually inevitable since the middle of November.
The only question that arises is whether, if the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, is right and Saddam Hussein is a kind of five minutes to midnight merchant, there is anything in the proposition now being put forward by France, which is the last opportunity to enable him in some way to get off the hook without total humiliation. It seems to me that when you have a gambler of this kind who has taken matters to the brink, he has probably come to the conclusion—because everybody assures me that he is a highly intelligent man, who must have very good military information at his disposal and who has been through a long war—that his life is forfeit anyway unless something dramatic happens and unless he makes a gesture which he has so far refused to make.
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If he is faced with total humiliation it is the end of him, because if he withdraws he will almost certainly not survive in Iraq itself. If on the other hand he has come to the conclusion that it is better to be an Arab martyr and he is willing to sacrifice himself together with a good deal of his nation and the flower of its manhood, the world is indeed faced with a very difficult situation.
Therefore, when Saddam Hussein said recently—this was quoted on television last evening by a distinguished diplomat; it was the first time I had heard it—that the whiff of the perfume of paradise was in his nostrils, it tended to confirm the view that he had cast himself in the role of martyr and was willing to take this step. That is a highly probable attitude of mind. It is a suicidal attitude of mind; it may be in his eyes a heroic state of mind. But it has tremendous consequences for us.
Therefore it is essential to explore the French initiative. From what I have heard on the radio and on television, the French have introduced the concept that the United Nations should announce that after a complete withdrawal from Kuwait there definitely will be a peace conference on the Middle East. As I said earlier, I entirely agree with the views already expressed that there is a linkage in Middle Eastern eyes, if not in ours.
Therefore it seems to me, the consequences of war being what they are, with its unpredictability and unforeseen situations—and I am a great believer in the accident of history theory—that wars rarely result in what the perpetrators or the defenders intend. The consequences are very different. So for all our sakes I do not think it is possible to avoid war if Saddam Hussein is determined on it. But it is very important that our Government give full backing to the last possible initiative which has been taken by France within the United Nations. If that is rejected, there is no other course open except that put up by the Government.
6.49 p.m.
Baroness Strange: My Lords, leaving Scotland yesterday in deep snow, there was not very much that I could bring in the way of flowers to grace your Lordships' House. So I brought what I could claw up from under the snow—some rather frosted Christmas roses and some good going sprays of bay leaves which did not seem to mind the cold. In the language of flowers, bay leaves represent victory and Christmas roses represent peace. We all want peace. The whole world wants peace except, it appears, Saddam Hussein who is a distinctly wily oriental gentleman. I feel that even he, for all his talk of fire, blood and death must sometimes have visions of peace in his heart. If this peace can only be achieved by victory, that must be our way towards it.
Last night I attended a meeting held by the organisation Free Kuwait. We were shown pictures of schools and universities that had been built in Kuwait and of beautiful artifacts collected in its museums,

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now all destroyed or dispersed. They told us of the suffering of their people. All this has been caused by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.
In November I went to Bangladesh on a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association visit. Bangladesh is a beautiful country filled—or rather over filled, but, that is a problem they are attempting to resolve—with kind friendly Bengalis. Apart from over-population, the Bengalis suffer from lack of natural resources and a tendency to attract natural disasters. Flood, famine, storms and sickness are never far away. Bangladesh was just beginning to recover from the terrible floods of 1988 when it was hit by the effects of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Not only have their oil prices shot up disastrously as they have for everyone, but there were 100,000 Bengalis employed in Kuwait, whose send-home earnings were virtually, with the help of international aid, keeping their country ticking over economically. Now, at a stroke, their earnings have ceased and most of the rice winners are now back home as unemployed rice eaters. All that has been caused by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.
We no longer have a British empire which acts as the peace keeper of the world, nor indeed are the Americans acting unilaterally in this matter. We are all part of a force of men of all nations and creeds acting under United Nations Resolution No. 678. I can tell my noble friend Lord Mountgarret that there is a Grenadier presence in the Gulf. However, when my noble friend said that we supported Belgium in 1939, I believe he meant to say 1914, as in 1939, of course, we supported Poland.
At this late hour our hearts are close to all our men in all three services who are waiting to fight for peace out there in the desert. They are ready and we can only send them our prayers to implement their high resolve, and to keep them safe. My prayer must be that of the 91st Psalm which states that the Lord,
"is my refuge and my fortress: my God; in him will I trust. Surely he shall deliver thee from the snare of the fowler, and from the noisome pestilence. He shall cover thee with his feathers, and under his wings shalt thou trust: his truth shall be thy shield and buckler. Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night; nor for the arrow that flieth by day; Nor for the pestilence that walketh in darkness; nor for the destruction that wasteth at noonday… There shall no evil befall thee, neither shall any plague come nigh thy dwelling. For he shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways".
6.54 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, as on the previous occasion that we debated this matter, I shall argue for delay. Before doing that, I hope I may state the obvious point that I detest and deplore Saddam and his regime as much as anyone. I do not believe that we should never fight on this issue. If we fight at any time that the Government judge to be right but that I judge to be wrong, I shall naturally show as full a support for our troops in the Gulf as anyone else. Delay is not the same thing as saying that we should not fight. I am for fighting if it is necessary; but not now.
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The United Nations resolution permits us to go to war, but it does not instruct, bind or enjoin its members to go to war at this or any other time. It simply authorises war to be undertaken by those members who judge it right to undertake it. If we go to war, it will not be a UN war. The distinction is rather obvious. There have been two major UN wars in the history of the Organisation: the Korean war and the Congo war of 1960. In both those wars tens of thousands of troops from multinational forces went into battle under United Nations command. In this war, if and when it comes, the troops will not be under United Nations command. They could have been and they could still be, but it does not look as if that will be the case. Each country must therefore judge for itself when it thinks it right to go to war, and must seek to persuade the others that the time it thinks right is the best time.
It is of course a United States led force that is in the region and the diplomacy of recent months, if one can call it diplomacy, has been led by the United States. The same position would apply in the event of a war. In recent months the United States has said one thing above all others and has said it loudly and clearly. The United States has said that it will not discuss anything with Saddam. The Americans have been ready to go anywhere at any time with or without notice in order to state once again what the United Nations resolution states; that Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait unconditionally. The Americans have given no hint that anything is going on behind the scenes. That may have been a mistake.
I turn now to sanctions. The Prime Minister has said today that sanctions are working well. However, he went on to say that they are not working well enough and that we must go to war because they are not working well enough. The Prime Minister has said that sanctions are working well. Let us remember that. How long is it reasonable to leave sanctions to work if they are working well? I must say that I have never heard anyone arguing in the abstract, when discussing the phenomenon of sanctions, that four or five months would be a long enough period to test them. I must say that it never occurred to me personally to think that a period of four or five months could ever be long enough to test sanctions. At the moment there is rather a large number of ex-secretaries of defence in the United States. I believe there are seven who are active in retirement. I may have that figure wrong, but all but one of those gave evidence to a Senate Committee on what should be done in this matter. All but one of them argued for a longer period to test sanctions. I agree with that position. I do not consider that a craven or a timid position. I believe that in adopting that position those men were drawing on their own experience which, God knows, is wider and graver than anything that has ever fallen to any of us, including Members of our governments. We should mark that position.
Would the sanctions not have more effect if allowed to continue? Did the Government ever have an estimate, before they agreed to impose sanctions in the first place, of what would constitute a reasonable

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length of time to test them? Did the Government decide that a period of four or five months would be about right, and that if sanctions did not work in that time, then bang! we would have to go to war? I have a rather concrete question to put to the noble Earl. I hope that it is not too late in the debate for him to answer it. Did the Government ever stipulate a period of four, or eight, or two, or 14 months to test sanctions? Will the Government share that knowledge with us? I believe that in an open democracy that would be a good thing. The Government obviously cannot have said that sanctions would never work, because if that had been their conviction they would have gone to war at once and urged the United States to do the same. As they believe that sanctions can work, and as the Prime Minister has told us that they are working, what is the reason for adopting a period of four or five months bearing in mind that the UN resolution does not enjoin war?
Today has been marked by the so-called French plan. I have not yet had an opportunity to see the full text but I understand that the main point is that linkage exists; it is not just a foolish and mischievous invention of Saddam Hussein, it is a fact. If Saddam Hussein's main objection to getting out of Kuwait is that the allies will not call a peace conference, then it is worth exploring that point further. I am at one with the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, in believing that it would now be right for the United States, this country and others to say to Saddam that if he gets out of Kuwait we shall do all that we can to achieve a peace conference. We would not do so before he leaves Kuwait, but we would do so after. I hope that I have not misinterpreted what the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, said, on the basis of his lifetime's experience. I learn from that, and from the experience of those American former secretaries of defence.
I have heard on the radio today that the Soviet Union supports the French plan. I have also heard —and ask the noble Earl whether he can confirm—that Saudi Arabia supports the plan. If that is the case, the question must arise whether we can launch an attack on Iraq from Saudi Arabia? We all remember that President Bush himself undertook not to launch an attack on Iraq from Saudi Arabia. Most of us read that to mean that he was not committing himself against launching an attack on Kuwait from Saudi Arabia. He was not committing himself not to launch an attack by sea, or by air from Turkey, for example.
Lastly, there is the question of the peace conference itself. The United Nations has been in favour of a peace conference since 1956—or it may even be since 1948. By definition, the Arab League favours a peace conference on the overall question of the Middle East, by which we mean in this context the Israel-Arab war. The European Community became committed to a peace conference very visibly and audibly through the Venice Declaration of 1981 or 1982. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Thatcher Government and it was he who did so much to bring that about. This country is committed to a peace conference.
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One then considers the position of the United States, which is not formally committed to a peace conference. However, in recent days, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there has been a shift in its position. Mr. Baker has said publicly, in the context of the possibility of America backing a peace conference, that Israel has to talk seriously to the PLO and to her neighbours. He said that the Israelis have the telephone number of the White House and when they are ready to do business they should ring up. That virtually signalled an end to friendly communications between the United States and Israel for the moment.
That seems to be the main condition that Saddam is now putting forward for getting out of Kuwait. Should we not count ourselves lucky that his main condition is something that has been our policy for decades? Does it not seem strange that simply because he has made it a precondition of leaving Kuwait, we should abandon what has been the policy of the UN, the European Community and this Government as a member of the European Community since the early 'eighties? Surely we cannot seem to be fighting simply to avoid calling a peace conference because it would involve righting two wrongs instead of one; because it would involve righting the wrong of Israel as well as righting the wrong of Iraq?
For all those reasons, I join with that shining host of American former defence secretaries in saying: "not yet."
7.5 p.m.
Lord Bonham-Carter: My Lords, today we have traversed well-trodden ground. At the end of this fairly extensive debate I am sure that your Lordships will not be surprised if I do not say anything very new.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, I simply say that, although there is a strong argument for us agreeing to a peace conference after Saddam Hussein has left Kuwait in accordance with the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, it is exaggerating the potentiality of such a peace conference to pretend that it will necessarily solve all the problems. The idea that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in order to achieve a peace conference is one of the least convincing that I have yet heard adumbrated.
The other point which has emerged from the debate and which we should bear in mind is that the Gulf crisis cannot be considered in isolation. It is not the only crisis which we face in the world. We are, after all, in a world on the edge of an economic recession. The crisis in Central and Eastern Europe still confronts us and the crisis in the Soviet Union grows more serious and alarming every day, particularly in its impact on the Baltic states, and is all too reminiscent of the events which occurred in Hungary at the time of Suez.
The trouble is that each of those crises works on the others. A sharp rise in the price of oil makes the prospect of a world recession even greater. It adds to the continuing economic problems of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. As I indicated, the crisis

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in the Gulf has made it far more difficult for the West to confront the USSR on the alarming events which are occurring in the Baltic.
The danger is that the drama and importance of the Gulf crisis will lead us to neglect the importance of the others. We cannot allow it to jeopardise the reforms which have taken place in Eastern Europe. We cannot allow it to halt the momentum towards a European single market, not least because European prosperity provides the best hope of avoiding a world recession. Nor, however, can we allow the United Nations to be defeated by Saddam Hussein.
It is easy to have sympathy with those who see the war as a worst option, who plead for more time to allow sanctions to work, who argue that no one can foresee the outcome of a war once it has been embarked upon and that our failure to act in the past to enforce UN resolutions, in particular those concerning the Palestinians and with reference to Israel, in some way disqualifies us from acting now. I agree with my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Hillhead that however delinquent we may have been in the past that does not justify our continuing on that course of error. The fact that we did not prevent Mussolini from invading Abyssinia did not relieve us of the obligation, under more difficult circumstances and very late in the day to resist Hitler. The fact that at the time of Suez we could do nothing to help Hungary does not relieve us—the United States and the European Community —of the obligation to do all that we can to avoid a repetition of that tragedy in the Baltic.
We have to consider—and it seems to me that some of those who have contributed to this debate have not considered it —what happens if Saddam Hussein wins. What will happen, unless he is persuaded by diplomacy or force to withdraw from Kuwait in accordance with successive United Nations resolutions? If we do not succeed in achieving that objective, the bright morning of 1989–90 will have been merely the prelude to a fateful and threatening evening.
The consequences of such a failure, which I do not think can be overestimated, would be truly devastating. Once again in the words of my noble friend Lord Jenkins, both the United Nations in those circumstances and the United States of America would be "fallen idols". The trend toward isolationism in the United States would undoubtedly be strengthened. The future of Israel would be in jeopardy. The price of oil would go up and in the face of that there is the likelihood of a world economic recession, with all its obvious consequences on the third world and Central and Eastern Europe.
But if as a result of the consequences of failure we have to contemplate the prospect of war we must be clear about our aims in that war. In that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walston. In our debate on 17th December, the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, set forth seven aims (as I calculated) which we should seek to achieve. I shall not repeat them. But we must repeat again and again that we are acting to enforce United Nations resolutions, to liberate Kuwait and not to
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overturn Saddam and to secure compensation for those people who have been monstrously ill treated and have suffered great loss to themselves.
In addition, I agree with many noble Lords that we should commit ourselves to a general Middle East peace conference. I also agree with those noble Lords who believe that the French initiative should not be rejected out of hand and should be pursued. But the purpose of the conference would be to establish a long-term structure for peace in that area, which would be guaranteed by the Security Council and would involve the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in the area. That may well be described as linkage. If so, I do not object to linkage. It seems to me, considering the situation that we face in the Middle East, that it is frankly impossible to exclude Lebanese and Palestinian problems from our calculations. In my opinion it is neither sensible, constructive nor wise to deny a connection which clearly exists and which all of us know exists.
Faced therefore with the prospect which I think almost all noble Lords, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, have accepted—namely, that force may have to be used—I return to a matter which I raised in the earlier debate and about which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, remarked in his speech today. I refer to the command structure, and in particular under whose command British troops will serve. To my question in the debate on the 17th December I received an answer which I can only regard as unsatisfactory. The noble Earl the Minister said:
"The British forces remain under ultimate UK command. The UK forces may be under the tactical control of the US commander where this makes military sense. Equally, the 1st Armoured Division may have a United States' brigade assigned to its tactical control. Within this context the Saudi Government's position as host will of course be respected. In accordance with normal practice between host states and allies use of British forces in combat operations would be the subject of joint decisions".—[Official Report, 17/12/90; col. 720–721.]
To me that is as clear as mud.
In addition, in last Saturday's Daily Telegraph there was a report by its defence correspondent which read:
"British troops in Saudi Arabia are in the middle of an internal dispute between the Ministry of Defence and the Pentagon over who will command them in an attack".
At this stage that seems to me to be a profoundly unsatisfactory situation. I should like to be told rather more explicitly than in the noble Earl's answer to my question on 17th December, first, what is meant in practice by respect for the Saudi Government's position as host, and, secondly, what is meant by:
"use of British forces in combat operations would be the subject of joint decisions".
I find the idea of joint decision-making in battle rather disturbing. I hope that the Minister will reassure me that it does not mean a divided command and that the dispute between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence has been satisfactorily settled. Those matters may be rather remote from the main thrust of this debate. Nonetheless, arriving as we do at this situation, I feel that they demand clarification.

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I end by saying that the situation to be faced, as other noble Lords have said, presents the United Nations with a unique opportunity to assert its authority. If it fails to do so, we shall suffer grave consequences. I agree most wholeheartedly with the most reverend Primate's words today, namely, that we may have to resort to war in the interests of preserving peace.
7.16 p.m.
Lord Richard: My Lords, this has been a sombre debate, as indeed one would have expected it to be. It has ranged widely from the severely practical speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, to the more idealistic pacifism of my noble friend Lord Soper. However, it is right to say at the end of the day that the overwhelming flavour of the House—if I may put it that way—is to support the Government in their present policy.
I regard this as a sad day. It is a sad day for all but particularly so, if I may remind the House, for the people who live in the region and the armed forces who now face each other there. I do not think that we should forget that it is the Iraqi people who will have to beat the brunt of the use of force and that when we in Westminster perhaps somewhat cosily talk about "necessary use of force" or how it is important to "take him out of Kuwait", we are in fact speaking of imposing upon the civilian population of a developing country in the Middle East a degree of hardship and suffering in that we are urging war upon them. That is what we are talking about and whether or not we are justified in doing so.
I am glad too that in this debate there has been far less talk of surgical strikes. What we have been talking about is not a surgical strike at all; if anything, it is a massive retaliation. With the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and the parliamentary delegation I went to Saudi Arabia in the early part of December. Like the noble and gallant Lord—let me echo what he said—I believe that no one who has been there, seen and talked with our armed forces could fail to be impressed by two things. One is their professionalism. That was clear to all. Secondly, there is what I would call their calm realism in the face of the task which at that time they certainly thought they would be called upon to perform. Let it be perfectly clear too that if war breaks out, as I now fear that it will, our armed forces will have the full and total support of the Labour Party and the Opposition in their endeavours. They are entitled to it, they deserve it and, so far as this party is concerned, they will get it.
I said that this had fittingly been a sombre debate and it could hardly be otherwise. It is true to say that for the most part the House has avoided any excess of enthusiasm for the coming battles. Wellington once said that there is no more mournful sight than a battle lost unless it be a battle won. How right he was! I have no enthusiasm for what is to come. On the contrary, I am appalled at the prospect. I am appalled too by the way in which some of the press have sought to treat the coming war. It is not an extension of the World Cup and should not be regarded as such. It is a dreadful task that this country and its allies are taking
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upon themselves. We have been discussing as grave a set of issues as any that has come before Parliament for decades.
I wish to examine two aspects briefly tonight. The first is the diplomatic manoeuvrings of the past few months and the question of whether there is any mileage left in the continuation of diplomatic efforts. Secondly, I wish to follow the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, in examining the possibility of sanctions.
Looking at what has happened in the past few months it appears to me that, at a diplomatic and political level, the tragedy is that both sides have boxed themselves in. One has done so perhaps by vain glory and the other perhaps almost deliberately. Today the Guardian described the diplomatic efforts during the past few months as "febrile". That is putting the matter a little high; but, nevertheless, there are unanswered questions. Until they are answered, it will be difficult for us to obtain a true picture of what has been going on.
I ask the noble Earl why the policy changed in November? Until then the forces in the Gulf were there in a defensive strategy. That is what we were told. In September and October we were told that sanctions was the path that we were to pursue. Indeed, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, today the Prime Minister said that sanctions are working well. At the end of October and the beginning of November what was it that suddenly caused the change from the defensive to the offensive strategy? I assume that Her Majesty's Government were consulted and in that case the decision is ours as much as the Americans. What was the change on the ground that had caused such a change in policy?
Perhaps as important, because the two are related, is the question: why was there a deadline in Resolution 678 of the Security Council? Inevitably deadlines cause intense problems if they are reached and passed. The difficulty is that if one passes the deadline and nothing has happened, the pressure to do something becomes almost irresistible: and in some ways that is the situation in which we now find ourselves. As a means of exerting pressure deadlines may be useful but not when they become the determinants of our whole approach and policy.
Surely our approach must have been based upon some appreciation of Saddam Hussein and his likely reaction. If so, that appreciation was patently wrong. Of course, one looks for some rationality on the part of the other side's leadership in any negotiations. At least one looks for rationality at the most basic level; that is the survival of his country. In that respect, we all appear to have been totally wrong. I confess that I do not understand Saddam Hussein's reactions. I do not profess to be able to work out what makes the man tick. If one looks at the situation even as late as last week all the elements for a settlement of the dispute appeared to exist and could have been put in place.
It is interesting to reflect on what was on offer when Mr. Baker and Tariq Aziz met in Geneva. In return for withdrawal from Kuwait, there were in reality (though perhaps not in formality; everyone says that

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there was no linkage but in reality knows that there was) the following propositions on the table for Saddam Hussein to pick up. First, there was a commitment to work for a Palestinian settlement via a UN-sponsored conference. He has told us that he is anxious to try to achieve that. Secondly, there was an undertaking that Iraq would not be attacked. Again, that is a matter that had been exercising his mind.
Not only was there that undertaking but when Perez de Cuellar went to Baghdad, the undertaking was buttressed by the offer of the interposition of a UN force in order to make sure that he would not be attacked. Thirdly, there was the question of negotiation of access into the Gulf. I find it impossible to believe that if Saddam Hussein had said that he would withdraw from Kuwait some accommodation could not have been reached. An arrangement such as a lease-back on the islands or one whereby he could obtain access into the Gulf was surely available. Fourthly on the table last week was the renunciation of Iraq's debts to Kuwait—debts which Iraq had run up because Kuwait was helping to finance the Iraqi effort in the Iran-Iraq war. Finally, there was an offer of greater consultation in the future on oil production in the area.
On the face of it, that should have been an attractive proposition. If one was standing back and trying to look at the matter objectively, it was a package which one would have believed anyone in Saddam Hussein's position last week would have been prepared to accept. That was particularly so when it was coupled with the most attractive proposition of all; that there would be no war. Yet he turned it down. Why? I cannot answer the question. He should have accepted the proposition, but he did not. I cannot fully answer the question as to why he turned it down but one reason might be that by then both sides were so over-committed that it was not possible for him to accept. The exits had been closed.
I am, too, slightly sceptical about the French initiative. It appears to show an enthusiasm for Gallic flexibility that is excessive even in our most immediate neighbours but there it is. If it is a runner the Government should be supporting it. If at this hour there is even a chance that we might be able to avoid war I do not mind whether it is wrapped up in the Tricolour or in any other flag. I therefore ask the Government for their opinion of the French initiative. Do they support it?
I seem to find myself in the position of asking the Minister a series of questions before he speaks. I apologise; but, given the nature of our proceedings and procedures, it is difficult to see how I can do otherwise. There are now two major questions that I should like him to answer. First, why the change at the beginning of November? Secondly, what do the Government think of the French initiative?
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the announcement that the French Embassy in Baghdad has been closed? Therefore, it appears that there is no longer a French initiative.
Lord Richard: My Lords, I did not know that. If that is the thinking behind the closure of the embassy then, clearly, the French initiative is dead. If that is not the thinking behind it but they are merely trying to protect their own nationals perhaps the initiative is still alive in New York. We shall see.
During my brief connection with the Foreign Office, I was taught that there are two basic principles of diplomacy. First, never box yourself into a corner with no exit behind you; and, secondly, just as important is that you should never box in the other side, unless you want to. I fear that the events of the past few months may be seen as the ultimate failure of Western diplomacy in this crisis. I have been irresistibly reminded—as I suspect have others —of July and August 1914: diplomatic negotiations, and a mobilisation of forces which seemed to take on a momentum of their own so that no politician of a major country was able to do what the Duke of York perhaps very sensibly did in the eighteenth century. He marched his soldiers up, and then marched them down again. At least he did not immediately fight a war.
Perhaps I may now turn to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, as regards sanctions and whether they would have worked. We have been told that 97 per cent. of Iraqi exports have been stopped. We are told that cash is drying up, food is becoming tighter and military spare parts are no longer available. Perhaps it is now a matter for the history books but if one action killed the policy of sanctions, it was the imposition of the deadline in resolution 678. The relationship of that deadline to a policy of sanctions, which up to November apparently was going well, in my view created immediate difficulty.
Realistically, the object of the sanctions policy was to produce a frame of mind in Saddam Hussein in which he would be prepared to negotiate sensibly and in return for his withdrawal from Kuwait, although there would be no formal linkage, there could have been an understanding along the lines I referred to
I should have preferred to see the continuation of that policy for the time being and I frankly regret the change. I remind noble Lords that in September we all said that sanctions would take a long time to work; that it would not be a quick policy; and that we should have to give them time to take effect. In September we did not envisage that time would have run out as early as January. I do not understand why a policy which was considered successful in October becomes impossible in November. Perhaps that too is now a matter for the history books, since in nine-and-a half hours' time the deadline will have passed and we may be at war.
I conclude regretfully that once one has changed the policy and ruled out the further use of sanctions, and a deadline has been imposed, I cannot see how it becomes possible to secure a successful outcome to this affair by diplomatic negotiations. The history of the past month has shown such a degree of intransigence and irrationality that I do not see how negotiations will succeed.

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But again let there be no mistake about it. Whatever may be the Labour Party's views about the continuation of a policy of sanctions and whether or not the Government were right to change that policy in November, if war takes place then our forces will have our complete and total support.
7.32 p.m.
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, today's debate comes at a moment of great tension. For five-and-a-half months we in the international community have done all in our power peacefully to resolve the crisis in the Gulf. The peaceful pressure was increased when the United Nations set a deadline back in November after which the international community would be empowered to use all necessary means to get Iraq out of Kuwait. That deadline expires tonight.
Your Lordships' House has shown great resolve today. We have shown that we will not accept Iraq's brazen and brutal aggression. We will not lose our nerve at this crucial moment. We will fight if we have to.
Of course there is much agonising when such a momentous decision has to be taken. We are rightly conscious of the seriousness of the situation, of the factors which might lead us to delay. These factors have been thoroughly aired today.
Many of your Lordships asked whether we had given peaceful pressures enough time to work. I remind the House that those pressures have been in place since the first days of the crisis. They have been in place for a full five-and-a-half months. On 2nd August the Security Council unanimously condemned Iraq. The noble Lord, Lord Walston, will recall that the council set out its first and basic demands: complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. Those remain our objectives. Thus the diplomatic initiative began immediately. For that reason I totally reject the somewhat surprising accusation by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, that we have refused diplomacy.
This was backed up by economic and military pressure. On 6th August the members of the Security Council agreed some of the most sweeping sanctions in the history of the United Nations. They have been almost universally observed. Iraq, for example, has not been able to export its oil. Before the invasion Iraq earned 95 per cent. of its hard currency from oil exports. But now Iraq is not able even to give its oil away. The offer made by Saddam Hussein to third world countries of free oil for anyone prepared to break the UN embargo was spurned. It was no doubt a tempting offer, but not one country took advantage. International opposition to Saddam Hussein has been rock solid. There is little evidence of leakage but—and this is the important point—there is no evidence that sanctions alone will achieve their primary objective: to get Iraq out of Kuwait.
Economic pressure was backed up by the threat of military action. At the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other states in the area, on 8th August Britain announced that we would send
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troops to Saudi Arabia to help in its defence and to deter further Iraqi aggression. The United States made a similar announcement the same day. Since then we have built up our British forces in the area to about 35,000. Having invaded and taken Kuwait through what the most reverend Primate called old fashioned and naked aggression, who could be sure that Saddam Hussein would not now be in Saudi Arabia if we had not acted so quickly?
The noble Lords, Lord Hatch and Lord Walston, and my noble friend Lady Strange asked us to consider the effect of Saddam Hussein's action on third world countries. In doing that we should ponder, and ponder deeply, what would have been the effect, for example, on the countries mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cocks, if Saddam Hussein had taken the Saudi oilfields.
The multinational force now comprises over ½ million men and women. On 27th November the Security Council—and let me emphasise that it was the Security Council and not merely the United States and the United Kingdom, about which there seems to have been some confusion by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew—decided to set a deadline for Iraq's withdrawal. After today the multinational force will be empowered to take military action.
When it adopted Resolution 678 the Security Council gave Saddam Hussein seven weeks to consider his position. It was intended to focus his mind powerfully. Five weeks after the UN vote there was no evidence that the message was sinking in and having an effect. President Bush decided in his effort to go that "extra mile for peace" that there should be direct talks with the Baghdad regime—a meeting intended for communication, not negotiation. Last Wednesday Secretary Baker met Tariq Aziz in Geneva. The meeting lasted six and a half hours with no positive result. As my noble friend Lord Mottistone reminded the House, Tariq Aziz even refused to take President Bush's personal letter to Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis were not prepared to move one inch.
The peaceful pressures—diplomatic, economic and military —became most intense in the last few days, immediately before the deadline expired. I should say to the noble Lord, Lord Richard, and others who have mentioned the point that there was no change in policy. There have always been three planks to the policy: diplomatic isolation, economic pressure and a threat of military action. I am sure that the House will agree that to be effective the threat of military action must be credible. That was the purpose behind our deployment of forces. It had to be recognised that if Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw force may have to be used.
The peaceful pressures went on. The United Nations Secretary-General the standard bearer of the international community, and a world statesman of uniquely high reputation —went to Baghdad in a last ditch attempt for peace. He saw Saddam Hussein. His brief was the 12 resolutions adopted by the Security Council between August and November. Saddam Hussein would not listen. In his talks with the

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Secretary-General he displayed an irresponsible calm. Even as the deadline was running out he would concede nothing.
Having heard the Secretary-General's account of his meetings in Baghdad, M. Poos, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, presided over a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the Community. It is worth repeating some of the conclusions of that council; I shall make a full copy available in the Library. One of them was that through the presidency statement of 4th January 1991, the Twelve had clearly indicated that if the resolutions of the Security Council were fully and unconditionally implemented, Iraq should receive assurance that it would not be subject to a military intervention.
A further conclusion was that on the occasion of the Rome European Council meeting on 15th December 1990 the European Community and its member states indicated that they remained completely in favour of convening an international peace conference on the Middle East at the appropriate moment. A further conclusion was that, sadly, the conditions for a new European initiative did not exist at that moment. Perhaps the fourth and most important point, which has not been mentioned, is that the invitation to Mr. Tariq Aziz to meet the ministerial troika remains on the table.
That takes me to a point mentioned by many noble Lords this afternoon regarding what has become known as the French initiative, and particularly what was said by the noble Lords, Lord Hooson, Lord Molloy and Lord Richard, and by my noble friend Lord Mountgarret. It was put forward a few hours after the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting and the conclusions that were agreed, of which I have mentioned but a few. The clear impression which the Prime Minister took from his discussions with President Mitterrand yesterday was that, like all of us, the President still hoped that hostilities could be avoided, but that, particularly in the wake of Iraq's totally negative response to the UN Secretary-General, there was no realistic prospect that Iraq could now be persuaded to take the essential step of withdrawing from Kuwait. Nevertheless we would entirely support a final appeal to Saddam Hussein to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and withdraw from Kuwait.
Negotiations are under way at this moment in New York and it would be wrong of me to pre-empt their outcome. Our anxiety, which I am sure is shared by all noble Lords in this House, is the need to be sure that any new initiative is wholly consistent with the UN Security Council resolutions and that it is likely to result in Iraq complying with them rather than taking the pressure off Saddam Hussein and his government.
I have further news which is not terribly good. They are but press reports and I have no final confirmation. One point, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Onslow, is that the French are pulling out of Baghdad. The second is that the French have had no response from Baghdad to their initiative. I cannot confirm that. They are merely press reports. It appears that all
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peaceful efforts have been fruitless. Some noble Lords argued that more time was needed to allow sanctions to work. Such arguments may sound neat and tidy but they ignore the terrible costs of further delay. Today we heard tribute paid to the courage and suffering of the Kuwaitis. The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, mentioned the Amnesty International report. It is essential reading for anyone interested in this subject. They have tried to withstand the Iraqi aggressor with great courage and dignity. Even in their hardship they gave food and shelter to foreigners in hiding in their country. But Kuwaiti bravery will not be enough to save the country from obliteration. Already their currency has been abolished and all their documents annulled. If action is not taken soon there will be nothing left to rescue.
Despite the force of that argument some noble Lords questioned whether we should wait a further length of time. As my noble friend Lord Beloff reminded the House, there is a link between sanctions and their enforcement by military means. Thus, we should be quite clear that extending the waiting period would mean abandoning much of the credibility of that military threat. If we miss our first deadline will Saddam Hussein take a second UN deadline any more seriously? That would mean relying almost completely on economic sanctions; but sanctions have not yet worked. They have been in full force for five months. It is becoming clearer that they will take a very long time to work. Let us not ignore the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead. He told the House that there are also risks in that their implementation might dribble away and the sanctions be weakened. As my noble friend Lord Ashbourne said, Saddam Hussein would then slip the knot.
It is also becoming clearer that as long as Saddam Hussein can intimidate his people and keep his army going he will stay in Kuwait. I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, who summed up the present situation so well. He said that we are at a uniquely crucial time. If we fail the test before us the future of the UN as a world authority is at stake. I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, with his vast experience, also stressed that important point.
In what I felt was a thoughtful and deeply moving contribution the most reverend Primate supported all necessary means in such a situation in order to protect the interests of peace in the longer term. I say to the most reverend Primate and the noble Lord, Lord Soper—whose views I respect but which I do not agree with—that we do not welcome the prospect of hostilities. War is grim. Our aim is to keep suffering to a minimum. We only wish we could rely on Saddam Hussein to play by the accepted rules of international behaviour and thus obviate the need for force.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, and my noble friend Lord Pearson asked specifically about Options for Change. It remains our intention to proceed with the restructuring of the Armed Forces along the lines envisaged by Options for Change. Naturally we are giving further thought and consideration to the detailed planning of the

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implementation of the proposed reductions. I shall draw to the attention of my right honourable friend the remarks I have heard today.
If we need to use force I can assure my noble friend Lord Pym that our forces in the Gulf will receive the support they need to see the job through. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, with his considerable experience, paid tribute to the excellence of our forces. In particular he stressed their resolution, courage and professional skills. I am sure that the whole House joins with the noble and gallant Lord in support of his words. There can be no household in this country that is not thinking of them and their families. Many noble Lords, like my noble friend Lord Onslow, have relations and friends in the Gulf. We wish them well.
Another point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, was the work done by our embassies in Kuwait and Baghdad. Once again we should pay enormous tribute to the work of our ambassadors and the Foreign Office staff, both UK-based and locally engaged, for their considerable work under difficult circumstances, especially the removal of the hostages in that crucial period.
The noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, asked two important questions regarding the media. The first was whether the MoD should follow the strict line of reporting it has done in the past. I appreciate the concerns of the noble Lord. The Ministry of Defence discussed carefully with reporters and editors those subject s which, if reported, would threaten the safety of our troops. The guidelines reflect that. We trust that the editors and journalists concerned will show due sense of responsibility. The other point which the noble Lord mentioned is equally important; namely, the television crews in Baghdad. We again appreciate the concern that news organisations in Baghdad may transmit Iraqi propaganda. We encourage those concerned to make clear the constraints and censorship under which their reports are filed. We cannot oblige British citizens to leave Iraq and Kuwait, but for their own safety we urge the people and organisations concerned to do so as soon as possible.
As we face the prospect of war we should be in no doubt about who is to blame. Saddam Hussein is the only aggressor. We should not forget that since 2nd August he has been waging war cruelly and continuously on Kuwait. Our objective is to reverse that aggression and to put right the crime committed by Saddam Hussein. We have continuously tried to reason with him. In that we have failed, for he has not listened nor shown any willingness to do so. For five and a half months Saddam Hussein has challenged collective security. With the deadline expired and Iraq still in possession of Kuwait, we must meet that challenge. If we do not, the world will be a much more dangerous place.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, the noble Earl has not answered many specific questions put from this side of the House. He raised one point in his speech which I would like him to ponder and answer. He denied what has been said by a number of noble Lords on this side of the House—that there has been a
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change of policy since last August. He said that the policy was based on three platforms. Is it not the case that last September the British Government said that forces were not being sent to the Gulf to fight either Iraq or Kuwait? How does that fit in with the noble Earl's claim that there has been no change in policy and that the military policy was established from the start?
The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, the noble Lord is right to say that I have not answered some of the detailed points. As usual, I shall write to the noble Lords concerned. In connection with the specific point he raised I shall of course ponder what I said at such a moment as this. Our intention has been to get Iraq out of Kuwait. That has been the reason for the three parts of our policy; the sanctions, the diplomacy and the military threat. It was to support that that we took the actions we did.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Killingholme Generating Stations (Ancillary Powers) Bill [H.L.]
A Message was brought from the Commons, That they have made the following Orders:
That the Promoters of the Killingholme Generating Stations (Ancillary Powers) Bill [H.L.] may, notwithstanding anything in the Standing Orders or practice of this House, proceed with the Bill in the present Session; and the Petition for the Bill shall be deemed to have been deposited and all Standing Orders applicable thereto shall be deemed to have been complied with;
That if the Bill is brought from the Lords in the present Session, the Agents for the Bill shall deposit in the Private Bill Office a declaration signed by them stating that the Bill is the same, in every respect, as the Bill which was brought from the Lords in the last Session;
That as soon as a certificate by one of the Clerks in the Private Bill Office, that such a declaration has been deposited, has been laid upon the Table of the House, the Bill shall be deemed to have been read the first time and shall be ordered to be read a second time;
That, since no Petitions remain against the Bill, no Petitioners shall be heard before any committee on the Bill save those who complain of any amendment as proposed in the filled up Bill or of any matter which arises during the progress of the Bill before the committee;
That no further fees shall be charged in respect of any proceedings on the Bill in respect of which fees have already been incurred during the last Session.
Avon Weir Bill [H.L.]
Brighton Marine Palace and Pier Bill [H.L.]
British Waterways Bill [H.L.]
City of Bristol (Portishead Docks) Bill [H.L.]
Commercial and Private Bank Bill [H.L.]
Darlington Borough Council Bill [H.L.]
Folkestone Harbour Bill [H.L.]
Greater Manchester (Light Rapid Transit System) Bill [H.L.]
Harris Tweed Bill [H.L.]
Llanelli Borough Council (Dafen Estuary) Bill [H.L.]
River Calder (Welbeck Site) Bill [H.L.]
River Usk Barrage Bill [H.L.]
Torquay Market Bill [H.L.]
Woodgrange Park Cemetery and Crematorium Bill [H.L.]
Read a first time.
House adjourned at eight minutes before eight o'clock.

  NON-TEACHING HOSPITALS: RESEARCH FUNDING
  NON-TEACHING HOSPITALS: RESEARCH FUNDING
  COMPANIES ACT AUTHORISATION
  COMPANIES ACT AUTHORISATION
  MR. SALMAN RUSHDIE
  MR. SALMAN RUSHDIE
  RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION: DISPOSAL OF PORTFOLIO
  RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION: DISPOSAL OF PORTFOLIO
  EC ENVIRONMENT COUNCIL, 20th-21st DECEMBER
  EC ENVIRONMENT COUNCIL, 20th-21st DECEMBER