Sitting of 6 September 1990

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock, notice having been given by MR. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 12 (Earlier meeting of the House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS
  DEATHS OF MEMBERS
  Mr. Speaker: I regret to have to inform the House of the deaths of Ian Reginald Edward Gow, TD., Member for Eastbourne, of Charles Patrick Wall, esquire, Member for Bradford, North, and of Allender Steele Adams, esquire, Member for Paisley, North, and I desire on behalf of the House to express our sense of the loss we have sustained and our sympathy with the relatives of the hon. Members.
  NEW WRIT
  For Knowsley, South, in the room of Sean Francis Hughes, esquire, deceased.—[Mr. Foster.]

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Resolved,
  That this House at its rising to-morrow, do adjourn until Monday 15th October; that at this day's sitting, Mr. Speaker do adjourn the House at Ten o'clock, without putting any Question; and that, at to-morrow's sitting, Mr. Speaker shall at half-past Two o'clock put the Question already proposed from the Chair.—[Sir Geoffrey Howe.]
  Mr. Speaker: No fewer than 98 right hon. and hon. Members wish to take part in this important two-day debate. Therefore, I think that the House will understand if I put a limit of 10 minutes on the speeches between 6 and 8 o'clock this evening. I ask right hon. and hon. Members who may be called before or after that time to bear that limit in mind.

  The Gulf
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Renton.]
  2.37 pm
  The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): May I first express our deep sorrow at the loss of a greatly loved colleague, Ian Gow, and our sympathy to his family; and also express our sadness at the loss of the two other hon. Members to whom Mr. Speaker referred, Mr. Adams and Mr. Wall, who were taken from us so suddenly, and extend our sympathy to their families, too.
  The Government have asked for Parliament to be recalled to discuss the grave developments in the Gulf over the last few weeks.
  In the early hours of 2 August, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, a peaceful, independent country and a member of the United Nations since 1963. It was a flagrant and blatant case of aggression.
  The United Nations Security Council responded promptly, demanding first Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, and subsequently restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. When after a few days Iraq had failed to respond, the Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions and later authorised the use of force to implement them.
  Meanwhile, in response to requests from King Fahd of Saudia Arabia and other Gulf rulers, the United States, closely followed by Britain, immediately deployed ground, air and naval forces to deter further aggression by Saddam Hussein, and in support of the Security Council's decisions. More than 20 other countries, including several Arab nations, have now sent or committed themselves to sending forces.
  British and other foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait have been caught up in the crisis, and are being used by Iraq as hostages in a way which has caused revulsion throughout the world. Embassies in Kuwait have been forcibly prevented from carrying out their duty of looking after their citizens.
  The Government have responded to this extremely serious situation vigorously and in close co-operation with our allies and friends. Our resolute response has received wide support in this country and elsewhere and the gratitude and appreciation of many Arab Governments.
  Hon. Members naturally wished to debate these matters at a convenient moment, and I welcome the opportunity to give the House a fuller account of events and of the Government's actions. Both my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence have just returned from visiting the area and are in a position to give first-hand reports to the House.
  I shall first say a word about the origins of the present crisis. In July, Iraq and Kuwait became involved in a dispute over oil pricing and production levels, and over Iraqi debts to Kuwait. Iraq's principal demand was that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates should cut oil production in order to maintain prices. Iraq also demanded it should not have to repay the loans of many billions of dollars received from Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war. As the dispute developed, Iraq deployed substantial numbers of troops to positions near the border with Kuwait.

  735
  Active diplomatic efforts, notably by President Mubarak of Egypt, were made to defuse the situation. As a result, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to bilateral talks in Jedda on 1 August, with the prospect of a further round of discussions in Baghdad. The Iraqi Government gave explicit and categorical assurances to the Governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they had no intention of invading Kuwait.
  Saddam Hussein introduced into this dispute the further question of Iraqi territorial claims on Kuwait. These claims are without legal foundation. The Al-Sabah family has ruled Kuwait since the 18th century, long before Iraq itself was created in the break-up of the Ottoman empire following the first world war.
  Kuwait's borders with the newly created Iraq were drawn in 1923. They were accepted by Iraq when it became an independent state in 1932. None the less, Iraq resuscitated its territorial claim against Kuwait in 1961, when British protection of Kuwait came to an end. British forces were despatched at the request of the ruler to protect Kuwait's independence and sovereignty. They were subsequently replaced by an Arab League force. The existing border was then finally reaffirmed between Iraq and Kuwait in 1963.
  That is the history. To return to recent events, despite having assured other Arab Governments and leaders that he had no aggressive intent, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi forces to invade Kuwait in the early hours of 2 August. They did so under the pretext of responding to a request for assistance from a non-existent revolutionary government, which they alleged had overthrown the Government of Kuwait.
  Saddam Hussein then established a puppet regime consisting of Iraqi officers. That so-called government have now disappeared without trace, and Saddam Hussein claims to have annexed Kuwait, which he now describes as a province of Iraq. History has many examples of perfidy and deceit. This ranks high among them and shows that nothing Saddam Hussein says can be trusted. Moreover, it is an outrageous breach of international law.
  Iraqi's actions raise very important issues of principle as well as of law. There can be no conceivable justification for one country to march in and seize another, simply because it covets its neighbour's wealth and resources. If Iraq's aggression were allowed to succeed, no small state could ever feel safe again. At the very time when at last we can see the prospect of a world governed by the rule of law, a world in which the United Nations and the Security Council can play the role envisaged for them when they were founded, Iraq's actions go back to the law of the jungle.
  The issue is one of importance to the whole world. It affects world security, world oil supplies and world economic stability. It affects the confidence of all small states, not only those in the middle east. We have bitter memories of the consequences of failing to challenge annexation of small states in the 1930s. We have learned the lesson that the time to stop the aggressor is at once.
  The international response has been swift and resolute and for that we owe much to the United States and to the co-operation of the Soviet Union.
  736
  On 2 August, the very day of the invasion, the Security Council adopted resolution 660 condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
  On 4 August, the European Community and its member states took measures to protect Kuwaiti assets, to freeze Iraqi assets, to embargo oil and to stop arms sales to Iraq. It also agreed to work for comprehensive economic sanctions in the Security Council.
  Two days later, as Iraq had failed to comply with the original resolution 660, the Security Council adopted a further resolution—661—which demanded the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Iraq under chapter VII. A committee of the Security Council was also set up to monitor and report on the implementation of sanctions.
  Subsequently, the Security Council has adopted three further resolutions. They declare Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void; condemn Iraq's actions against foreign nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, and demand that they be allowed to leave; and resolution 665 calls upon United Nations member states to take necessary measures against shipping to ensure the strict implementation of sanctions. As was pointed out at the time, that includes the use of minimum force.
  Not a single country voted against any of those resolutions, although the Yemen and Cuba abstained on some of them.
  Let me stress: our objectives are those set out in those resolutions—unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government. The preferred method is comprehensive economic sanctions, collectively and effectively implemented.
  Iraq is vulnerable to sanctions. Its economy is based almost totally on the export of a single commodity, oil, through a limited number of identifiable outlets. That is why the action of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in preventing the export of Iraqi oil through the pipelines was of such critical importance. Other outlets are being effectively blockaded, and the embargo on the sale of oil from Iraq and Kuwait is so far working well.
  Iraq is also heavily dependent on imports of food and other commodities; and it has limited currency reserves following the war with Iran. That is why it was so important to freeze Kuwait accounts and assets abroad on the very first day, and so prevent Iraq from exploiting them. Rigorous implementation of sanctions by the whole world is vital to make the policy work.
  The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey have shown great steadfastness, as have the Gulf Co-operation Council and many members of the Arab League. Saudi Arabia and other members of OPEC have helpfully agreed to increase oil production substantially to compensate for the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil on the world market.
  For a number of countries, backing sanctions will bring serious economic hardship. An international initiative to find financial and other ways to help them is already under way. I saw Secretary Brady yesterday to discuss that, and said that Britain would play its part; and while we must all contribute, it is only fitting that a special effort should be made by those who, for one reason or another, are not contributing to the multinational force in the Gulf.
  I have been dealing with sanctions and their enforcement. The question has arisen whether further

  737
  authority would need to be obtained from the Security Council for military action beyond that required to enforce sanctions.
  We have acted throughout in accordance with international law, and we shall continue to do so. Resolution 661, which called for comprehensive economic sanctions, expressly affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter. We hope that economic sanctions will prove to be sufficient. That is why they must be strictly enforced. But we are not precluded by reason of any of the Security Council resolutions from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law.
  Mr. Tony Benn: This is the nub of the whole debate. As I understand it, what the right hon. Lady has said is that the United Nations charter, and the resolutions that have been passed, have already, here and now, given her legal authority, if it comes to it and it is decided, to take military action against Iraq. I take it that, if we vote in the right hon. Lady's Lobby tomorrow night, she will claim that to be an endorsement of that view. Is that her view? She knows the real anxiety. People think that America may go to war and Britain, which is quite a minor part of the operation, will be dragged into it before the House resumes.
  The Prime Minister: The nub of the debate is to secure the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the legitimate restoration of the Government of Kuwait. [Interruption.] If the right hon. Gentleman will wait a moment, he will hear my view when I have finished this section of my speech.
  May I repeat what I have said? We have acted throughout in accordance with international law and we shall continue to do so. I pointed out that resolution 661, which called for comprehensive economic sanctions, expressly affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait. [Interruption.] This is from the resolution, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.
  We hope that economic sanctions will prove to be sufficient. That is why they must be strictly enforced. But we are not precluded, by reason of any of the Security Council resolutions, from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law.
  To undertake now to use no military force without the further authority of the Security Council would be to deprive ourselves of a right in international law expressly affirmed by Security Council resolution 661; it would be to do injustice to the people of Kuwait, who are unable to use effective force themselves; it would be to hand an advantage to Saddam Hussein; and it could put our own forces in greater peril. For these reasons, I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: If the Prime Minister is so sure about the rightness of her cause, why the reluctance to seek United Nations authority?
  The Prime Minister: I have made my position absolutely clear. May I repeat it? To undertake now to use no military force without the further authority of the
  738
  Security Council would be to deprive ourselves of a right in international law expressly affirmed by resolution 661; it would be to do injustice to the people of Kuwait, who are unable to use effective force themselves; it would be to hand an advantage to Saddam Hussein; and it could put our own forces in greater peril.
  I have full legal authority for everything that I say on these matters, and for those reasons I am not willing to limit our legitimate freedom of action. I have made the position clear, and there is nothing further that I can add. For the reasons that I have given, I am not prepared to limit our legitimate freedom of action. If right hon. or hon. Members think to the contrary, I am sure that they will have time to put their views. My views have been approved by the topmost legal opinions that we can get.
  Our first objective has been to make sanctions effective as a means of bringing pressure on Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Our second but no less urgent objective was to deter further Iraqi aggression. Saddam Hussein could have gone on to invade the north-eastern territories of Saudi Arabia and seize its oilfields. Had he succeeded in that, he could have taken the smaller Gulf states too. It is thanks to rapid action by the United States in sending forces to the area, and prompt support by Britain and France, that the aggressor has been halted.
  We have worked throughout in the closest possible co-operation with the United States. I have been in frequent contact with President Bush, and my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Defence have remained in the closest touch with their American colleagues. That pattern has been repeated at every diplomatic and military level. The President of the United States has given a lead that deserves the widest support; and the commitment of American forces has been on a tremendous scale.
  The House will be familiar with Britain's response, which of course is on a much smaller scale—and I will summarise it briefly. We have deployed a squadron of Tornado F3 air defence aircraft, a squadron of Tornado ground attack aircraft, and a squadron of Jaguar aircraft for ground support. They are stationed in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. They are backed up by VC10 tanker aircraft and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.
  One Royal Navy destroyer and two frigates are in the Gulf. A second destroyer is on its way, as are three mine clearance vessels. There are also a number of support ships in attendance. A limited number of ground forces are deployed to defend airfields and to provide security generally.
  That is already a valuable contribution to the defence of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but we believe some additional forces will be needed, and their composition is under consideration.
  I wish to stress three points about our armed forces. First, they have been deployed in the area at the request of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states—and, in the case of Bahrain, that Government have invoked our treaty of friendship.
  Secondly, they arrived quickly—a factor that contributed enormously to their effect, because the greatest need to deter was in the very early days of the crisis. Thai is a tribute to the efficiency, skill, and dedication of our service men and service women.
  Thirdly, our forces are part of a much wider international effort, including not only United States

  739
  forces but those of our European allies, of many Arab countries and others, including members of the Commonwealth. It is a truly multinational force.
  The plight of British and other foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait has shocked everyone. Every norm of law, of diplomatic convention and of civilised behaviour has been offended by the way in which those citizens have been rounded up, treated as hostages, and used as a human shield. It is strange for someone who claims to be the leader of the Arab world, a latter-day Saladin, to hide behind women and children. Through the United Nations and bilaterally, we have done everything possible to press Iraq to let our people go, just as theirs are free to go from Britain. There has been particularly good co-operation with other European countries on this matter. The International Committee of the Red Cross is seeking but has not yet obtained the right of access to all hostages held in Iraq and Kuwait, which they are entitled to under the Geneva convention.
  The recent release of some women and children is very welcome, and more are expected in the next few days. But they should never have been detained in the first place; and their release does not make the detention of their husbands, fathers and sons any less evil and reprehensible.
  Mr. Tony Banks: Has the Prime Minister seen the complaint in a letter to The Times today from one of the released hostages, which said that the British presence in Kuwait—the embassy—was not giving sufficient and proper advice to those people who remained? Secondly, it said that there has been no debriefing of those people who have come back from Kuwait. Will the Prime Minister tell us what action is being taken to debrief those who have fortunately been released? Thirdly, will she tell us why the British Airways flight was allowed to land in Kuwait five hours after the invasion had taken place? Why was it not warned and allowed to be diverted?
  The Prime Minister: I shall answer the hon. Gentleman's questions in reverse order. The British Airways flight landed, its passengers disembarked, and the crew handed over to a successor crew and went to their hotels. All that took place before the invasion: the invasion was later. I think that there will be a letter setting out the full facts—a legal letter, so I cannot go further into the matter. Some people would most strenuously argue against some of the misinformation which has unfortunately occurred.
  Secondly, with hindsight, people expected us to be able to give advice on things that we could not possibly foresee. Our embassy deserves praise. When it was suggested that our people should go to hotels, volunteers immediately went to those hotels to look after them. We did not know what would occur. There was no one there to meet them, so they returned to their homes. It is suggested that people should have been advised to try to escape. I do not know how the hon. Gentleman can think that we could possibly have given such advice. Will he recall that one of our citizens who tried to do that was shot dead? We have not even been able to recover his body.
  The third matter that the hon. Gentleman raised was debriefing. These people arrived back at 4·45 in the morning, having suffered terrible experiences. I and all my
  740
  right hon. Friends were concerned that somebody from the Department of Social Security should be at the airport to give immediate help if required, also doctors in case medical attention was needed, and that there should be someone there to get accommodation should that be needed. That was at 4.45 am. Had we attempted to debrief them then, we should have been extremely culpable. It would have been said that we were hard and unthinking. Many of those people have already reported, voluntarily, every single thing that they knew. Of course, we shall do everything that we can to ensure that we obtain as much information as possible because it may be helpful to others.
  The hon. Gentleman's criticisms are not well-founded, and I should like to thank our people in Kuwait.
  The recent release, as I said, is welcome, but these people should not have been detained. Their release does not make the detention of their husbands, fathers and sons any less evil and reprehensible.
  Our ambassador and his staff in Baghdad are doing their utmost to help and protect our people. In Kuwait, we and nearly 30 other countries have refused to comply with Iraq's utterly illegal attempt to close foreign embassies.
  Although our embassy is surrounded by armed soldiers, and its water and electricity cut off, our ambassador and his small staff of volunteers continue to offer what help they can to the beleaguered British community. The House—most of it—will join me in paying tribute to their work, and, even more so, to the courage and fortitude of all the British people in both countries who are living through this terrible time. Our thoughts go also to their families. We are all very grateful to the work done by the helpline run by my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood (Mr. Hayward) and others. It is splendid work, and we thank the many volunteers who have given their time and effort.
  Mr. Ronnie Campbell: The Prime Minister just mentioned the helpline. We all agree that it has been marvellous and has helped in all our constituencies. Does the Prime Minister agree, however, that the families of the people affected should be able to use "Freefone", so that obtaining the information that they need does not cause their telephone bills to build up?
  The Prime Minister: As well as the helpline—which, I believe, is turning itself into a charity so that we are better able to supply it with money voluntarily—there is a 24-hour emergency unit at the Foreign Office which I believe people can telephone without expense.
  The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. William Waldegrave): Not yet.
  The Prime Minister: They cannot telephone without expense yet; however, they are telephoning. People are on duty there for 24 hours a day, and are receiving many calls. We are doing everything possible in that regard.
  Mr. Robert Hayward rose—
  The Prime Minister: I shall give way to my hon. Friend; I hope that then I can get on with the rest of my speech.
  Mr. Hayward: May I thank my right hon. Friend for her comments about the efforts of the helpline and all its helpers? May I also clarify the position in relation to charitable trusts? We are in the process of forming such a

  741
  trust, and, if we have enough money we shall give assistance to those who face financial difficulties as a result of the actions taken in Iraq and Kuwait.
  The Prime Minister: I believe that I am right in saying that the Foreign Office is also giving some money to help the helpline in its very valuable work.
  We shall do our utmost to obtain the freedom of the hostages, keeping their plight constantly before the world. We shall not give in to threats and blackmail. We have made it known that we shall hold Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials individually responsible at law under the Geneva conventions—to which Iraq is a party—for any harm that befalls them.
  I believe that the House will agree that we cannot be deflected from the determined course of action on which we have embarked, and which alone will ensure that the aggressor is not allowed to benefit from his crime. Indeed, by taking hostages, and by his treatment of them, Saddam Hussein only increases the world's abhorrence and stiffens its determination not to let aggression succeed.
  Our resolve, and that of our partners and allies, to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government is absolute. There can be no compromise solutions which limit or diminish that objective, and attempts to devise them only postpone the moment when Iraq realises that there is no option but to withdraw.
  Mr. Dave Nellist: Will the Prime Minister give way?
  The Prime Minister: I would prefer to go on, because I am now biting into other Members' time.
  There are also some wider lessons to be drawn from these events. First, I believe that the whole House will welcome the prompt and effective manner in which the United Nations has responded to this crisis. At last we are seeing the United Nations act with the determination and purpose that its founders envisaged. I cannot remember a time when we had the whole world so strongly together against an action as now.
  Secondly, I would make particular mention of the part played by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. They have worked together to an unprecedented degree to ensure that United Nations action is effective. I believe that in this we are seeing the first results of post-cold war diplomacy: confrontation has been replaced by a new atmosphere of co-operation. We would never have succeeded in getting this response three or four years ago. We hope that the forthcoming meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev will further strengthen this new accord.
  Thirdly, some of the countries bordering Iraq are facing severe difficulties from the flood of refugees—Egyptians, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, already numbering hundreds of thousands—all fleeing from Saddam Hussein. Those countries, and the refugees themselves, need help until their passage home can be arranged. I can announce today an immediate contribution of a further £2 million to the relevant international organisations. That brings our refugee relief from this crisis so far to £5·4 million.
  Fourthly, we must not lose sight of other fundamental issues in the region, above all the need for a just solution to the Palestinian problem. Unfortunately, the Palestinians' support for Iraq's action in seizing the territory of another state has grievously damaged their
  742
  cause, but nevertheless these events must not stop us from trying to find a solution to this long-standing issue. Peace and security will not come to the region until it is solved.
  Ms. Clare Short: Will the Prime Minister give way?
  The Prime Minister: I should like to get on and finish my speech now.
  Fifthly, we will need to look to the future, the time when Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait, as it must, and the legitimate Government have been restored. There will then need to be arrangements to ensure Kuwait's security and that of other countries in the region. I believe that this will need to involve the United Nations, and it is not too early to plan for this situation now.
  Sixthly, while east-west relations have improved enormously, these events remind us that dangers can arise elsewhere in the world, and we must always have a strong defence and the capability to operate beyond the borders of NATO, for threats to our security can arise there just as much as in Europe.
  Seventhly, we must renew our efforts to outlaw not only the use of chemical weapons but their possession, and no effort must be spared to prevent Iraq from obtaining the materials or technology to manufacture nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Jeremy Corbyn: Will the Prime Minister give way?
  The Prime Minister: No. I am not far from the end of my speech and I intend to go straight through to the end of it.
  The crisis also underlines the importance of continuing international efforts to prevent the spread of ballistic missiles.
  Mr. Eric S. Heffer: Will the right hon. Lady give way?
  The Prime Minister: I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman, very specially.
  Mr. Heffer: Will the right hon. Lady explain why it was that, when the Kurds were gassed and chemical weapons were used against them—I know that this Government made protests—the United States, for example, ensured that that was not discussed in the Security Council at the time, when there should have been a great movement by the entire world against that terrible thing which Saddam Hussein did?
  The Prime Minister: There should, and we were one of the countries. Indeed, I think that we were the country that made the most vigorous protests in every forum where we were. That was quite right. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for bringing out the point that it was we who made the most vigorous protests.
  In the coming weeks we must persist in the determination that we have shown hitherto. There will be those who say that the international effort is costing too much and is not worth it. Some people will forget the awfulness of what Saddam Hussein has done. There will be calls for compromise, attempts to fudge the issues and blur the principles, attempts to undermine the virtually unanimous opposition of the world to what Iraq has done. Of course we prefer a peaceful solution, but that must involve Iraq's total and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the lawful Government.

  743
  Let us not forget that in Saddam Hussein we are dealing with a person who, without warning, has gone into the territory of another state with tanks, guns and aircraft, has fought and taken that state against international law and against the will of its people. A person who will take such action against one state will take it against another if he is not stopped and his invasion reversed.
  We are dealing with a person who has rejected the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution on the basis of the United Nations' resolutions.
  We are dealing with a person who plunged his country into eight years of war against Iran, costing the lives of countless thousands of Iraq's young men—and many hundreds of thousands more casualties—without achieving anything other than destruction and desolation.
  We are dealing with a man who has used chemical weapons even against his own people. Such a man must be stopped; and we shall persevere until he is.
  3.14 pm
  Mr. Neil Kinnock: May I, first, join the Prime Minister in her tribute to the late Ian Gow? Clearly he was not a political soulmate of mine, but from the earliest time that I met him—indeed, before he came to the House—I recognised him as a very likeable man and a man of considerable integrity. By killing him, his murderers showed not their strength in the face of democracy but their weakness.
  I and my right hon. and hon. Friends have, as the Prime Minister said, suffered two very severe blows in recent weeks with the death of Pat Wall, after a long and very painful illness, and the tragic death yesterday of Allen Adams.
  Pat was a man of courage and great humour and his ability to show both, even at a time of terrible illness, was an enormous tribute to him.
  Allen Adams was a young man who was well liked and well respected in the House, in his constituency and elsewhere. The suddenness of his death has left myself and my colleagues numb. We send our deepest sympathy and our great sorrow to his wife and, indeed, to Pat's wife and to Ian's wife.
  I thank you, Mr. Speaker, and the Prime Minister for agreeing to my request that Parliament be recalled to discuss the situation in the Gulf and its implications. This two-day debate will, I am sure, be wide ranging, as Members on both sides will want to raise a multiplicity of genuine and important concerns ranging from the most global to the most personal and local.
  For me, in my contribution, the main focus of the debate must be on the most effective ways of depriving the Iraqi dictator and his regime of any military, economic, political or other gain from their aggression and of preventing him from posing any future threat to the stability and security of the region.
  Our unrelenting purposes must be to ensure that Saddam Hussein gets out of Kuwait and legitimate government is restored in that country, that the hostages—all the hostages—are released, that our diplomatic staff, who have shown such great fortitude, be allowed to go about their normal business, and that the United Nations resolutions are unconditionally fulfilled and commitments
  744
  to stability and security in the region are put into effect. There can be no possibilities of concessions on any of those objectives.
  The aggression of Saddam Hussein, his treatment of innocents, the record of his regime and his oppression of the Iraqi and Kurdish people over many years forbid anything but that implacable attitude from this side of the House.
  As both I and my right hon. Friends have made clear, we consider that in the circumstances arising from the invasion of Kuwait the action taken in the United Nations and in the commitment of forces was right. In the very nature of Saddam Hussein's aggression, slowness or modesty in response would have been an invitation to him to continue over other borders and into greater excesses. If that had occurred, the task of achieving the purposes of the United Nations resolutions would have been even more complex, even more arduous and even more dangerous than it is now.
  If the only response of the world community had been economic sanctions and political condemnation, those actions and words, no matter how strong, would not have had the necessary effect in halting Saddam Hussein's military adventure. All that, to us, is self-evident. Cumulatively, it is the reason for the unprecedented firmness and solidarity of the actions of the United Nations and for the equally strong and equally common reaction of the British people.
  There is, of course, natural and justifiable anxiety about the crisis. It is felt most deeply—indeed, desperately—by those poor people whose loved ones have been or still are the hostages of Saddam Hussein. The feelings of those people cannot fail to have an effect on the thinking of all of us in the House. I am sure that Ministers and other hon. Members take the fullest account of the requests that we have had from the hostages and from their families that we should all be measured in our approach, careful in our use of language and persistent in efforts to restore the freedom of those people now held by Saddam Hussein.
  The feelings of concern among the people very directly caught up in the events, and in the wider public, are deep and realistic, as well they may be when the possibility of war remains and when it is widely understood that such a war could cause horrific devastation—at its worst, devastation on a scale and of a nature that the world has scarcely ever seen before.
  There are other pronounced feelings. They are not simplistic, nor are they bellicose, but they are feelings of great determination. First, there is the very deep-seated conviction that aggression must not pay. All personal encounters with the general public and all measures of opinion testify to that. Both the generation that experienced the 1930s and the 1940s and later generations like my own that did not witness appeasement and war are agreed, across the age barriers, on that.
  Secondly, there is a feeling that, while no advantages of any description arise from the action of Saddam Hussein, the co-operation between powers that were, until a short time ago, deadlocked in cold war offers a new prospect for international security. I believe that we in the House should not simply recognise these growing feelings—we should lead them by playing a full part in developing a new and practical design for international peace and order.
  Thirdly, Mr. Speaker, it is clear that, in response to Saddam Hussein's aggression, the British people—like the world community in general—share the overwhelming

  745
  conviction that intense pressure must be rigorously sustained against Saddam Hussein and his regime. Iraq's isolation must be complete. That course is supported not only as a way of avoiding or reducing bloodshed but as the best means of securing an acceptable and enduring outcome to the crisis. The widespread and, in our view, entirely correct approach is that sanctions should be given the fullest possible opportunity of working in order to make Saddam Hussein completely fulfil the requirements of the United Nations resolutions.
  There is a widespread and deeply held understanding that the support for securing the objectives, and the action needed to secure those objectives, involve a long haul. Strong sanctions can, of course, have a particular effect against the Saddam regime. Iraq has to rely on imports for well over 80 per cent. of its basic materials. It is dependent for well over 95 per cent. of its export earnings upon the sale of oil, 88 per cent. of which flows through just two pipelines, one through Turkey, the other through Saudi Arabia. In pursuit of the United Nations policy, we have to ensure, with the rest of the world community, that, for the duration, Iraq cannot sell anything to anyone, buy anything from anyone or raise credit from anywhere.
  That latter point has not, thus far, had the attention that it properly deserves. The fact is that Iraq, because of its oil wealth, is naturally regarded as a good credit risk. Indeed, so good is it that it is conceivable that—if effective action is not taken—Iraq could have access to substantial credit for a year or even more. That financial tap must be completely turned off. There must be no exceptions.
  Clearly, the besieging of Iraq has had and will have grave effects on other economies—most especially on its poorer neighbours and on those who have to rely for a significant part of their income on remittances of their citizens who have been working in Iraq and Kuwait. Substantial and speedy aid must be given to such economies, both for the relief of suffering and to ensure that the force of economic circumstances does not impel them into relaxing the embargo. I hope that, even before that form of support is fully installed, Governments will quickly and generously give help to refugees and private citizens will support Oxfam, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development and other aid charities in their efforts in the emergency refugee programmes.
  I was gratified to note in what the Prime Minister said this afternoon that additional sums are to be made available. I hope that the matter will be kept continually under review because the prospects of mass starvation and of disease as refugees go to the border must horrify us all.
  The need to help the poorer economies cope with the economic effects of the Gulf crisis is clearly an obligation on all the richer countries of the world. Mr. Brady's mission is welcome as a reminder to a variety of economies. I must also say that it is the particular duty of the strongest economies in the world—Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.
  Everyone will naturally understand the increasing pressures in the German economy as unification approaches. Everyone will also appreciate the desire of the Japanese people not to compromise their constitution. But as both countries are most certainly part of the world democratic community, as both have very direct interests in achieving the fulfilment of the United Nations resolutions and as both can take economic action without transgressing their constitutions, that action of support must be taken on a generous scale, and I trust that every
  746
  opportunity will be used by our Government and by other Governments to press that case and to achieve a constructive response.
  In the course of the weeks since the invasion of Kuwait, the issue of the extent of the mandate under article 51 of the United Nations charter has naturally attracted attention and raised important questions. The Prime Minister addressed herself to that question. Clearly it must be right for us to consider those questions in this Parliament. Even as we do so, there will, in the process of discussion, be absolutely no reassurance for Saddam Hussein. On the contrary, as far as I am concerned, the issue of this aspect of the debate is how his aggression can be dealt with most completely and conclusively. It is success that we are after.
  In the public discussion that has taken place thus far on this issue, two opinions have had greatest prominence. Some assert that there is no essential need for a further specific resolution of the Security Council because, they say, the
  "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence",
  specified in article 51 of the UN charter, gives all necessary authority for any future military action. Others say that there can be absolutely no further military action without an additional specific resolution.
  I believe that in the current circumstances, it is not wise to approach the matter from either of those two absolutes. Neither by itself fully addresses both the legal and the political issues at stake. It is those political issues which must unavoidably be taken into account by anyone who wants to ensure that the objectives of the United Nations and, I believe, of just about everyone in this House, are fully realised.
  Mr. John Butterfill: I am rather puzzled, the right hon. Gentleman having admitted that he requested the recall of the House, why there is nothing on the Order Paper in his name or in that of his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman)—[Interruption.] I put it to him that on the specific point with which he is dealing, he does not wish a vote to take place because he is uncertain that he would get the support of the majority of his hon. Friends—[Interruption.]—because they would be no more prepared to defy Saddam Hussein than they have been prepared in the past to defy the tyrants in the trade union movement.
  Mr. Kinnock: Because of the noise, I did not hear much of what the hon. Gentleman said in that intervention, but I do not think that I missed anything. I do not know what form of leadership in life in general he is used to, but I must tell him that if there is a Division tomorrow on the motion before the House, I shall most certainly be voting for the Adjournment. I have made that clear all along and there is absolutely no reason for me to change my view. If the hon. Gentleman will listen to the further development of my case, who knows, he may not only be in the same lobby as I, but be there for the same reasons as I shall be there.
  I was drawing the attention of the House to what I believe are essential political considerations. The first political consideration of great significance is that the forceful action of the world community, as the Prime Minister said, has resulted from the unprecedented agreement in the Security Council of the United Nations. I do not think that anyone underestimates either the

  747
  powerful effect or the great possibilities arising from that. The idea of a new world order is shifting from the realms of idealism into the realms of realism.
  But it must be said that if military action were taken when sanctions had been in force for only a matter of weeks or months, or when there had been no further provocation, or when there had been no further effort to achieve agreement to a mandate to attack, either in the Security Council or in the military staff committee, that military action could shatter the consensus that has been built.
  The new concept of international security would be jeopardised when it was scarcely more than a prototype. The prospects for gaining a new "security structure", which Secretary James Baker has advocated with strong and compelling conviction in his testimony before the Congressional Committee this week, would be greatly dimmed.
  In the Soviet Union and China, those forces that are most resistant to co-operation would gleefully enjoy and fully exploit the breakdown, to the disadvantage of leaderships that have come this far in the wake of the cold war. I believe that those crucial considerations and understood in the United States and here and among other countries. I believe that the scale of the risk of political and other losses is recognised.
  I do not believe that those considerations forbid all possibility of a strike being made at some time. There are, without question, other pressures present in these conditions, and it would be foolish to ignore them. Even the patent desire of the American leaders to achieve peaceful resolution could not and should not give us a false sense of security, especially in conditions of such speed of movement and considerable danger.
  All I do say is that, as we are the first generation ever to have been presented with what Secretary Baker has called the
  "opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order",
  of
  "enduring peace that is global in its scope",
  we had better appreciate the potential for progress in full. We had therefore better think very hard and politically before risking that potential on the basis of even the most distinguished and technically correct legal advice about the extent of article 51.
  Saddam Hussein throughout his life—since, we understand, his youngest days as a party functionary, before he discovered or invented a uniform to put on—has been a terrible force for destruction. He must be defeated, but everything possible must be done to try to ensure that in the course of defeating him we do not allow him to be the cause of destroying the beginnings of a new and better world order.
  The second political consideration relates to the implications in the region—the middle east and the Gulf area—of taking further military action without further United Nations authority. The fact that legitimacy, the standing of international law, is, in itself, not just a legal issue but an important political one, must not be neglected. With regard to the legalities, it is clear that military action under article 51 is lawful if the now exiled but "legitimate" Government of Kuwait call for it.
  Such action is lawful if Saddam Hussein launches further military aggression against any state or armed
  748
  forces. It is lawful if, at some time, the United Nations judges that the action taken thus far has been "inadequate" for the purpose of fulfilling its resolutions, in which case military action under article 42 of the charter could be taken, either by reference to the Security Council or the military staff committee, or both.
  Those who say that there cannot be a public declaration of the possibility of a strike do not take into full account the reason for the existence of the military staff committee. Given the military realities, if it were acceptable that a strike took place against an aggressive enemy, the process would be much more likely to go through the MSC than the Security Council.
  The lawful opportunities are without contention. In addition, there are those who say that, on the basis of legal advice, it could be successfully—"technically" is the word the Prime Minister has used—argued that the fact that armed attack has already taken place enables those who have come to the aid of Kuwait to undertake armed attack themselves whenever they deem it necessary. I ask those who hold that view—I know that many hold it sincerely, as a result of their professional experience of the law, and are taken seriously—to consider their position further. I ask them to recognise that, for the purpose not just of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, but, vitally, of ensuring durable security, it may not be enough to be able to argue, on the basis of legal advice, that a mandate already exists for an attack.
  Such legal advice that an inherent right of self defence exists may well be convincing to a Government, Parliament, a court of law or a newspaper in a democracy. It may be possible for calm consideration to take place and the pros and cons of interpretation to be put. That is one, among many, of the immense advantages of democracy by comparison with any other form of government. However, it is not only such bodies of opinion and judgment that have to be convinced in the current conditions. That is not a semantic point or a nicety, but a fact which, realistically, could determine the nature of the outcome of the crisis.
  The outcome that we seek—I think that this is a widespread ambition—and the outcome that is necessary for security in the Gulf and stability in the world, cannot be limited only to the liberation of Kuwait, the freeing of the hostages and the removal of Saddam Hussein's ability to mount further military aggression. The outcome that is necessary extends to completely depriving Saddam Hussein of any extra status or any gain to his reputation in the eyes of other Arabs, including those who, for reasons we understand, have long imbibed distrust of the western powers and those who associate with us.
  We should all like to be able to help to achieve conditions in which the judgment made by many Arab people was different. But we have to recognise the current reality that the potential consequences of taking action that does not have complete and unarguable United Nations authority include further turmoil, terrorism, an increase in nationalism and fundamentalism, and possibly the destabilising of strategic allies. These are the reasons why it is important strategically, and not because of an intractable dispute between both sides of the House over the precise legalities, that everything possible is done to ensure that, if further military action is necesssary, it should be taken under the full authority of the United Nations.
  The only existing but recent precedent must encourage consideration of that view. In the weeks following the

  749
  invasion of Kuwait the Labour party, through my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), repeatedly said that the powers of naval interdiction necessary to enforce a maritime blockade of Iraq would best be exercised through a specific resolution of the Security Council. The view was advanced by others, both in the Government and elsewhere, that it could be argued with sufficient legal authority that there was an adequate resolution already in place.
  On reflection, the Government wisely decided, to their credit, that an explicit resolution would give greater legitimacy and force to any necessary naval intervention. They rightly co-operated in securing resolution 665. That resolution was adopted on 25 August. Only two days later, on 27 August, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi tanker skippers to submit to the naval blockade. As I said earlier, the case that we make on appropriate United Nations authority is related not to any abstraction but directly to the effectiveness of action against the aggressor, Saddam Hussein.
  Mr. Bowen Wells: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the strengthening of United Nations authority in the way in which we are proceeding offers Saddam Hussein an advantage if he were to comply with the United Nations resolutions? The United Nations, so strengthened, could begin to settle some of the other middle eastern disputes, especially that with Israel, which are long outstanding. It would be in Saddam Hussein's interests as well to reinforce United Nations peacekeeping operations.
  Mr. Kinnock: That is a good point, tellingly made. It is one which we hope will have a wider impact, and it is interesting that in the House there is an even more general understanding of the validity of the argument that the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Wells) advances that there was only a few weeks ago. That atmosphere and that sense of strength of the international community are rightly being encouraged in the current circumstances.
  Mr. Nigel Spearing: My right hon. Friend is making an extremely powerful case for a new world political order for the 21st century after the east-west conflicts have been removed. Does he recall that the Prime Minister tells us consistently and persistently about the failure of appeasement before the second world war? Does the right hon. Lady recall that there was also a great failure in political collective security, which is what my right hon. Friend is advocating?
  Mr. Kinnock: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that intervention. I think that everybody understands, including the Prime Minister—I mean no disrepect to the right hon. Lady, but the period to which my hon. Friend has referred was a formative one for her, as it would have been for anyone of that age at that time—that in thinking—[Interruption.] It is extraordinary that we still cannot refer to a woman's age, even in this place, without getting a laugh. At the same time we can say anything that we like about a man's age. Is not that strange?
  The Prime Minister has drawn strongly on her abomination of appeasement—rightly, in my view—and her understanding of the failure of international resolve in the League of Nations before the second world war. As circumstances change, she may be among those who are
  750
  more than ready to subscribe strength to the idea of an effective, workable and enforceable international order. I believe that the right hon. Lady can be sufficently forward looking to make that position common between both sides of the House as it is patently of such good sense in terms of the welfare of this country, every other country and all generations.
  I am anxious to move on, as I do not want to take up the time of the House when so many hon. Members wish to speak. Many approaches have been postulated in the debate about the directions of policy and action that need to be followed in the conditions arising after the resolution of the immediate crisis. At this juncture, I simply say that, whatever happens after the immediate objectives of the United Nations resolutions have been achieved, it should be founded on the basic fact that the current crisis is a direct result of the invasion of Kuwait and of the wider threat posed to the region by Iraq. Consequently, our dual interrelated purposes must be to accomplish the clearance from Kuwait and to secure the dissolution of that threat.
  It is essential, therefore, that, after the primary objectives of the United Nations resolutions have been attained, there must be, first, a complete and sustained embargo imposed both on arms sales and on the provision of arms manufacturing equipment to Iraq. Secondly, Iraq's chemical weapons and its chemical weapon manufacturing capacity must be destroyed. Thirdly, provision must be made for the thorough and continual monitoring of the nuclear plant and weapons-making capability of Iraq. Fourthly—this is not an exhaustive list—Iraq must make reparations, especially to the poor countries that have been further impoverished by its aggression.
  I realise that there are those who, even though they want the United Nations objectives to be achieved, say that embargoes, weapon and plant destruction, and international monitoring and reparations are steps too far. To them I say that the nature and the scale of the actions to be taken following the achievement of the immediate UN objectives must relate to the nature and the scale not only of the proven aggression, but of the actual and potential threat in the region. Action to respond to and to prevent the extension of the aggression was and is justified. Action to prevent the continuation of the regional threat is also justified.
  It will not be vindictiveness—it will be a basic requirement of justice, order and security. It will not be an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country—it will be the legitimate exercise of preventive power by an international community which has suffered, and could again experience, the results of the most unwarranted form of intervention—the armed invasion and occupation of one country by another.
  The fate of Saddam Hussein may well—indeed, is most likely to—be affected by the implementation of such reprisals for his actions. There are many who would understandably include his downfall among their list, of publicly stated objectives. I think that it would be far better for them to understand that, however much we long for the ending of tyranny, we cannot include that among our motives in the case of Iraq, as that would amount to a determination to impose a form of government on what is an offending but, nonetheless, sovereign country.
  Saddam Hussein may well retain his position in his country in the wake of this crisis. However, he cannot be allowed to retain his power to jeopardise the region. The

  751
  crisis has been inflicted upon the world by the ambition and aggression of Saddam Hussein. No one will be unaffected by the economic effects of what the Iraqi dictator has done. Millions of people in his country and elsewhere are experiencing and will experience great misery because of his actions. Some, including refugee children, have already died and thousands have lost their liberty. The world must now impose its will upon Saddam Hussein. His defeat must be a victory for the international community. I know that I, my party and, I am sure, the great majority of the British people want to assist in achieving that victory.
  3.49 pm
  Mr. Edward Heath: It is natural, at a time of crisis, that the country as well as Members of the House should wish to see the House united in its view. I do not today, or tomorrow, see any difficulty about that.
  The view that has been expressed in the House and in the country about the invasion of Kuwait is unanimous. The outstanding characteristic of the crisis is that it has been handled by, and is under the control of, the United Nations. That is something which has not happened for many years.
  We may therefore forgive those who are somewhat sceptical or cynical at that event when they look back over the past decade and see the number of occasions when matters equally serious have occurred in which no leadership has been given by the United States or by Europe.
  As a result, we see a situation in which the President of Iraq may well have made a false judgment about the invasion of Kuwait. If his attack on Iran produced no very great reaction from the western world, and if his use of poison gas in his own country and elsewhere produced no very great reaction, why should the occupation of a small country such as Kuwait produce any great reaction? The fact that it has produced a world reaction—as I say, under the control of the United Nations—cannot fail to make an impact, not only on the President of Iraq, but also on his generals and his supporters in his own country.
  We therefore come to the question stated by the Leader of the Opposition to be at the heart of the matter—the use of articles 51 and 42. There is nothing new about that. There was argument about that at various legal levels, right up to the highest, at the time of the Suez crisis and there were those who always had doubts about some of the legal recommendations.
  My point of view today is that for practical purposes we can agree. I do not see why we should differ on legal questions of this kind. As I have said, the characteristic is that this is under the control of the United Nations and, for practical purposes, it is there that we wish it to remain and where it must remain. For those practical purposes, therefore, the United Nations must be the governing force.
  One must look at the practical questions. If, for example, Saddam Hussein were tonight to launch an attack on Saudi Arabia or on any other part of the Gulf, the response must be militarily immediate. There can be no question about it. We would be absolutely justified, with the Americans and our allies, in taking that action. What is more, I hope that we would, as far as we possibly could
  752
  in a month, be prepared to take it. Let us not think for a moment that it would be very agreeable or that the results would be other than bloody, because they would be, from many points of view, but that surely is unanswerable as a position.
  On the other hand, if there is no direct attack by the President of Iraq on any country, and he remains in his stationary position while sanctions go on, it is difficult to imagine a position in which we would launch a deliberate attack without at least having the authority of the United Nations. That seems to me, from the practical point of view, to be a perfectly clear situation and there is no need for the House to divide itself on that question when we are dealing with such practical matters.
  With regard to the other issues, I would ask that the Government, who have acted speedily and efficiently with America and her allies, should be cautious—as, perhaps, should the Leader of the Opposition, too—about the commitments that they make at this stage.
  One of the advantages of the House meeting a month after the start of this episode rather than when it began is that it is able to view the matter in better proportions and in perspective. No one can tell what the solution to the crisis will be. If Governments and Oppositions over-commit themselves, the possibility of reaching a solution that will be acceptable will be greatly diminished. I ask for caution in that respect.
  I refer to the situation in Kuwait in 1961, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister also mentioned. As Lord Privy Seal at the Foreign Office, I was responsible for negotiating Kuwait's independence. We always had a private understanding that, if there were to be any serious threat from Iraq, which was the only likely quarter, we would be in a position immediately to reinforce Kuwait because we were still in Bahrain, Aden and Cyprus and could quickly take action. That was always understood. Therefore, when, in the summer of 1961, the Iraqis started massing forces along the Kuwaiti border, we, in close conjunction with the Emir, took immediate action. The result was that the Iraqis withdrew. However, that was not a permanent solution, in Kuwait's view or in ours.
  The permanent solution was found by the Arab League—by the Arab countries themselves getting together and saying, "We must have a means of guaranteeing the security of Kuwait as well as that of other countries, and then we can ask the British to withdraw." Having reached such an agreement, the Arab League asked us to withdraw, and we did so. That was part of the understanding in respect of Kuwait's independence.
  I ask that we be careful in making absolute commitments, because on this occasion it is possible that Arab countries themselves will work out a solution to the security of their own region. That will not be easy, but it has been done on previous occasions. I refer to the disputes between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. They were sorted out, as were the disputes between the emirates, and between Bahrain and Qatar. They have been sorted out in the past two decades, and I hope that it will be possible for the Arab countries themselves to find a permanent solution to their stability and security.
  There is no doubt that that is what King Hussein of Jordan and many others want. I believe that such a development would be welcomed by the Saudi Government, who have themselves made plain—in a speech by the Saudi defence minister last weekend—that

  753
  they do not want to see an attack being made on Iraq unless those concerned are forced into taking such action because of an attack by Iraq itself.
  I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister raised the question of Israel and the Palestinians, because in my view it will not be possible to reach permanent stability and security in the middle east unless the question of the Palestinians and of Israel is first settled. I was pleased that the American Secretary of State said so himself in his speech to the congressional committee. He was quite clear and plain about the matter.
  If the Americans are now prepared to use all their power and influence to make Israel observe the United Nations resolutions—and resolution 242 in particular—in the same way that we are saying that the resolutions concerning Iraq must be observed—that marks a major change in American policy, which can contribute to the peace and stability that both the American President and Secretary of State have said they want to see in the middle east. Again, it will not be easy to achieve that, but it is an essential part of the solution.
  There are those who say that the two should not be connected—it is perfectly understandable that Israel is among them—but that does not alter the fact that many of the stresses and strains in the middle east are connected with the question of Israel and the Palestinians. Therefore, I strongly support the Government's action and I strongly urge them now to continue—as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in her broadcast on Sunday—operating sanctions. My right hon. Friend said herself that it will take some time to make them as effective as possible
  The one proviso that I have concerns Jordan. I personally feel that King Hussein has been badly treated by the American President and by some western countries. He is in no way responsible for the situation or for the crisis, yet his people and country are suffering above all at this particular time. It is not enough to say, "We'll give you some money." Jordan desperately needs food and equipment, but above all it needs an organisation to deal with refugees going into the country. It is not sufficient for us to say, "Well, the Red Cross can help or this or that organisation can do it."
  The present situation demands two things. First, a major airlift is needed, which should be centrally organised and ceaseless, like the airlift we organised to Berlin, so that we can get all these people out—incidentally, we could try to increase our staff in Baghdad to help the excellent ambassador there. Secondly, we need to deal with the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Jordan and to get them satisfactorily dispersed. That will mean dealing with a large number of countries. Many refugees come from Indonesia, from other Arab countries and some are from Europe. It is a major operation to arrange their dispersal and it will not be met by contributions to individual charitable bodies but requires a centrally, and highly organised, operation of aircraft and personnel. I hope that the British Government will give a lead to bring that about.
  4 pm
  Mr. Paddy Ashdown: It always seems to be my lot to have to follow the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) in debates on events such as this. It is a difficult task, because he says so much with which I profoundly agree. I do not think that there was a word in
  754
  his speech with which I would find fault. I hope that the Prime Minister will have listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman's words about calling on the Government to provide a lead on the issue of refugees.
  Having requested the recall of Parliament for the past two or three weeks, my colleagues and I are naturally delighted to have the opportunity to debate this important crisis. Anyone who has listened to the previous three speeches will recognise that this is a serious debate and that, so far, speeches have dealt with the issue with great seriousness and concern. I have a great deal to say which echoes the tone and much of the content of those speeches.
  The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein was a brutal and tyrannous act which contravenes international law, threatens the stability of the Middle East and poses a potent and immediate threat to the peace of the world. My party joins all the other parties in the House in expressing an implacable determination to ensure that Saddam Hussein is defeated in this aggression. The Prime Minister is right: there can be no compromises on the terms of the United Nations resolutions that Hussein's troops must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait, that Kuwait must be returned to its legitimate Government and that foreign hostages must all be freed.
  The Prime Minister has said that the Government's aims in this crisis are, similarly, those and only those laid out in the United Nations resolutions. In that, they are also fully supported by hon. Members on these Benches. The Government also receive and have received our unequivocal support for the actions that they took with the United States and others to respond to Saudi Arabia's request for help, by sending troops to join the multinational forces five weeks ago today. In our view, the swift and decisive action taken then by Britain the United States and others to put deterrent forces in place to prevent further aggression by Saddam Hussein was necessary and right.
  The fact that that action was later backed up by a United Nations resolution, which expressed international condemnation of Hussein and gave effect to the means by which sanctions should be enforced, has greatly strengthened the hands of those who now oppose Saddam Hussein and has given hope to those people who believe, as we do, in an enhanced role in the future for the United Nations in preserving world peace.
  The Government are entitled to feel satisfaction with their handling of the first military phase of this crisis. We are now in the second, political phase. We have to win this phase as comprehensively as we won the military phase, because it is only by building the strongest international consensus now that we shall establish the strength to ensure that sanctions can be made to bite later.
  I especially congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his recent visit to the Gulf, and on the care with which he has been concerned at all times to build up maximum international support for our position. He has remained calm and measured: the voice of reason on all occasions. He appears to understand the vital importance of this attitude in the more difficult political phase of the crisis. He has also been well aware that, however welcome, the close co-operation between this country and the United States, which has been necessary during this crisis, Britain's best interests are as a European power acting primarily in concert with our European partners in the long term.

  755
  I urge the Prime Minister to resist any temptation that she may feel to argue that this crisis is a reason for resurrecting a nostalgic illusion of a special relationship with the United States at the expense of fulfilling our destiny in a closely integrated Europe. In the political phase of this crisis, it is vital that we strengthen international—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I ask the House to give the right hon. Member a fair hearing.
  Mr. Ashdown: In this phase of the crisis, it is vital that we not only strengthen international consensus to provide a foundation for the actions that will be necessary over the next few months, but that we also effectively deny Saddam Hussein his most potent propaganda weapon. The world must know that this is not just a United States/British action. In our attitudes, we have perhaps done too little to stress the international nature of our operation. Frankly, we could be doing much more to emphasise the Arab components in the multinational force. It must be made clear that, if Saddam Hussein attacks, he will be fighting fellow Arabs as well as the western forces.
  I hope that no one will underestimate the courage that many Arab states have shown in standing up to Saddam Hussein, often at great cost to themselves. In the west, we should demonstrate that we are sensitive to the views of moderate Arab states and especially to their concerns about the future of the holy places.
  The United Nations has rightly chosen sanctions as the weapon to defeat Saddam Hussein. We are told, and the Prime Minister has just repeated it, that that is Government policy and United States policy. That is all very well, but sanctions must be given a chance to work. The Prime Minister has said that that may take a few months. Mr. Jim Baker, the United States Secretary of State, made it clear on Tuesday that it would take a considerable time, and that is what he asked of the American people. We must also provide a considerable time to allow sanctions to work. I doubt if they will really start to bite until perhaps the end of this year at the earliest, and will probably not develop their full effect until some time after that, but I repeat that they must be given the chance and the time to work.
  I think that it is right for us to contemplate what action we should take to fulfil the terms of the UN resolutions if sanctions do not work. As all three of the previous speakers have already said, that is the nub and heart of today's debate, bringing us full face with the issue of whether and in what circumstances force ought to be used.
  First, I agree with the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup—that, if any further aggression is initiated by Saddam Hussein, it should be clear that the multinational forces will feel free immediately to respond against him with the full measure of our military capability in the area. If such a response to Hussein's further aggression should open a military possibility of freeing Kuwait, well and good—the Government can be sure of the support of my party in any such action—but what about the use of force initiated by the multinational forces if sanctions in the end are seen to fail?
  Those who are not prepared to countenance the use of force in such circumstances must be prepared to countenance the possibility that Saddam Hussein will be
  756
  allowed to hang on to the ill-gotten gains of his tyranny—and that is unacceptable to my hon. Friends. We accept, then, that the use of force may have to be an ultimate option, but it must be just that—the last option.
  I have heard talk about pre-emptive strikes and surgical wars. I have learnt from bitter personal experience that when the armchair theorists and the Whitehall generals start talking of a surgical war, it is time to start running for cover. A war is never surgical for those who have to fight it—except in very specific terms, which I am sure are not encompassed in that phrase. It may just be possible to fight a contained war in the south Atlantic, but it is not possible elsewhere in the world, and I believe that it is specifically not possible in the middle east.
  If there is a war, I believe that it will have unimaginable and incalculable consequences. We shall place in jeopardy not just the lives of many thousands of human beings, but our chance for stability in the middle east in the long term and, possibly, our hopes for a new world order as well. Force, therefore, must be the last option and when it is used, it must be used on behalf of the community of nations as a whole.
  Mr. Dalyell: The right hon. Gentleman has military experience. Has he any clear idea—I ask this simply as a question—what the rules of engagement will be for someone holding the kind of rank that he held, who may have to make a vital decision in a very short time? Is there any clarity about those rules?
  Mr. Ashdown: I know that the hon. Gentleman has a special interest in rules of engagement. Let me tell him, as one who was at the other end of the decision by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to send the troops into Kuwait in 1961—I was among the first troops to land there—that I was perfectly clear about what my rules of engagement were: if someone attacked me, I would respond immediately. That seems to be so self-evident that we scarcely need a House of Commons debate to discuss it.
  As I have said, if there is a war the consequences will be incalculable. That is why I say that war must be the last resort, and must be undertaken on behalf of the community of nations as a whole. Measured force of last resort, supported by moderate Arab nations, by the European Community and by the Soviet Union, is one thing; a rash Anglo-American military adventure, undertaken unilaterally, would be another. I believe that the Government would find it extremely difficult to carry public opinion in this country—and international opinion abroad—if they were to embark on such an adventure without the backing of the United Nations.
  UN support is not of itself the main issue, although a UN Security Council resolution would be the most effective outward and visible sign that the world community shares a common resolve. To shatter that resolve through impatience would be foolish, and even a successful military outcome could nevertheless represent a serious political failure.
  Let me say this to the Government: our joint cause, the defeat of Saddam Hussein, stands its best chance if the Foreign Secretary continues to build a common resolve for future action, rather than threatening unilateral action on whatever basis. Let me make it clear that I do not say that we should avoid unilateralism because this is safer; I say that we should preserve international co-operation

  757
  and support because it makes us stronger. The unanimous, worldwide condemnation of Hussein, and the international support that we have for our actions, should be our greatest weapon in his defeat, and it would be an act of folly to sacrifice such a priceless asset.
  It is by ensuring that our actions remain the expression of the voice of the international community that we also provide the greatest degree of safety of our hostages. Saddam Hussein must be made to know that, for his treatment of our hostages, he will be held to account not just by Britain but by the entire world community.
  We must also recognise—as the Prime Minister suggested in a very welcome statement—that the middle east will never be the same again after this is over. I do not believe that the resolution of this problem can be achieved except in the context of the resolution of other middle east problems. Jim Baker, the American Secretary of State, implied as much when he spoke earlier this week. The fulfilment of UN resolutions in one area will be bound to give rise to legitimate demands that they be fulfilled in others too.
  We are not fighting for a re-establishment of the status quo in the middle east; rather, we should be aiming to establish a new structure for peace and stability in the region. The west may have a role in helping to bring such a structure into being, but our guiding principle must be that we leave the settlement of regional affairs to the nations in the region concerned.
  I cannot end without touching on the plight of the refugees now haplessly caught in the demilitarised zone on the Jordan-Iraq border. These are the innocent flotsam and jetsam of this terrible crisis: they are as much the children of Hussein's tyranny as are our children. It would be terrible if, in fleeing death from the tyranny of Hussein, any one of them found death in the desert because of our neglect. The Prime Minister has announced a welcome extra £2 million. Let me say to her that, as this country has led in the process of preserving peace and security in Saudi Arabia, I hope that we shall now lead in preserving the lives of those in the desert. I hope that the Prime Minister will pick up the suggestion made by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and that we shall send a massive airlift out there now to provide rescue for those unfortunate people.
  The outcome of this crisis will decide five things. It will decide the freedom of Kuwait, the future of Saddam Hussein, the long-term stability of the middle east, the means by which we provide for world peace in the future and how Britain will play its role in that effort. My hon. Friends and I believe that the most powerful weapon with which to free Kuwait, defeat Hussein, establish stability in the middle east and give the United Nations the role for which we all hope in the future is international action. If the Government act to ensure that Britain continues to play its part within that international framework, they will continue to receive our full support.
  4.19 pm
  Mr. David Howell: The speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was both clear and fine—it fitted perfectly this sombre occasion; her leadership is one which we all recognise and admire. So, too, was the speech of the Leader of the Opposition. He spoke well. Although there may be some difference of emphasis, I see in practice no difference between the two Front Benches in
  758
  their approach to this crisis. Both speeches suggested clearly what the objectives were, and are, of the world powers in this affair.
  In recent weeks it has been suggested in the media that the objectives of the world powers and of the allies are blurred, but in all the world crises that I can think of the objective has never been clearer than in this one. It is as defined in resolution 660: the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the state of Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, there can be no negotiation about that, because there is nothing to negotiate. That should be the limited and measured, but very clear and unquestioned, aim of all our efforts and endeavours and of all the material and financial resources mobilised worldwide—not just by the west, not just by the Americans—to force Saddam Hussein to shed his spoils and retreat to where he stood on 1 August.
  Should one go beyond that, as many would like, and insist on the overthrow of this monstrous man? My belief is that as far as the immediate United Nations objective is concerned, it is wrong to think in terms of higher and further missions and goals. Both my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition confirmed that belief.
  We may not like this most unpleasant man. He has the most repulsive habits. He is evil; he takes hostages; he is cruel; he has waded to power through a sea of blood. He has, if I may make a personal reflection, the rather unfortunate habit, when he makes a Cabinet reshuffle, of shooting or strangling the outgoing Ministers. He is not, of course, the only despot in the world who does that, so that in itself would be no reason for the United Nations or the world powers invading his country. We must keep clear the immediate aim that was laid down by the United Nations. The nations of the earth came together and defined that clear aim. That is what has to be achieved.
  Ahead lie matters for consideration. It is not too soon for the House to turn its mind to considering the issues raised by my right hon. Friend concerning the new security structure for the Gulf and the middle east. How do we cope with the chemical weapons capacity, and perhaps the emerging nuclear capacity, even of a defeated Iraq—even of an Iraq without Saddam Hussein but with some new gang or despot in Baghdad? There will be nobody except a despot in that area. These issues will be raised in setting up the new security structure. They were the kind of issues to which Mr. Secretary Baker turned his mind in his constructive and valuable comments to Congress yesterday and the day before.
  They open up the opportunity to confer again on and address the other problems of the middle east, of which the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) has constantly reminded us. These issues existed before the invasion of Kuwait and they will exist long after that issue has been resolved. The problems of the west bank and of the Palestinians in Israel will have to be addressed in the future, but I counsel against confusing those essential problems, which will have to be resolved, with the immediate and limited task set by the nations of the earth, through the United Nations, of getting the Iraqi dictator out of Kuwait.
  Mr. Bob Cryer: On the question of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, is it not important that the Government should express their strong and

  759
  continuing support of the United Nations nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the implementation of all its articles, including article 6, which means that the nuclear powers must themselves set an example by diminishing and removing their dependence on nuclear weapons?
  Mr. Howell: Certainly the diminishing of nuclear weapons and the pursuit of disarmament and weapons control has been a major objective of western Governments, with some success. The hon. Gentleman is quite right to say that, after the present crisis is over, the new security order ought to be one that mobilises renewed pressure—possibly with the backing of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—to insist on even more rigorous control not only of nuclear weapons but of the filthy and revolting chemical weapons—the so-called poor man's nuclear weapons—that are present in the middle east and threaten not only the middle east but all of us. These are matters to which we shall have to turn our minds in intense detail in the weeks and months ahead. At the moment, however, it is a question of uniting totally around the single objective of getting this man out of Kuwait.
  The second point that I want to make is simple. Again, it was emphasised in the clear speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. This is not now, nor has it been from day one—the beginning of all this—anything other than an international effort. It has been the aim of Arab propaganda, and of many of those with a deep and instinctive bias against the United States—saying that whatever it does is wrong—to depict the whole exercise as either an American, or an American-British, or an American-British-Zionist imperialist operation which is not supported by the wider international world. I believe that what is taking place is not just an American effort—although undoubtedly the Americans have had to shoulder the logistical burden and probably will have to continue to do so—and not just a western effort.
  We have seen the Soviet Union, after a slightly shaky start—understandably, because it is in a very weak state—beginning to give increasingly clear support for the task set out and the methods needed to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. We have seen the Arab nations themselves first combine together and secondly call strongly for the support of the western allies in both defending Saudi Arabia and in due course driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
  President Mubarak—one should not underestimate the difficulties that such a man faces, due to domestic internal pressures—has put possibly his life, certainly his political life, on the line. He, King Fahd and the other emirs, who, in a sense, are no more or less democratic in their positions than the despot in Baghdad—although he talks about it in other terms—have put their political lives on the line. They must see—and rightly would feel totally betrayed if they did not see—the fulfilment of the United Nations mission, with America and Britain playing their part in achieving that ambition.
  This is a totally international effort. Those who feel that they cannot send logistical support should be pressed, as they are being pressed—rightly so, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said—to make massive resource contributions. As the Leader of the Opposition reminded us, that most definitely includes the Japanese and the
  760
  Federal Republic of Germany, although the federal republic has huge extra imposts on its budget as the cost of unification grows and grows.
  This is the time for everyone to do more than put their hands in their pockets and make fine speeches. They must contribute to the international effort—approved and supported, we hope, at each stage by the United Nations. It must be an international effort at every level. I feel that this is the time not to make accusations against some of the backsliders, although there has been backsliding, but to encourage them and to insist that they should play a growing part in the joint international, world-based task of driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Any alternative, any bickering in our own ranks, any turning round and saying that people are not playing their part carries the danger of sending signals to Baghdad that the west is divided and of giving this wretched man more of an opportunity to continue on his way by trying to expose and expand those divisions.
  As to the means of fulfilling the objective on which we are all agreed, Saddam Hussein has excluded the prospect, if it ever existed, of voluntary withdrawal from Kuwait. He has annexed Kuwait, changed the Administration and dug in. He has indicated that he understands only one language—pressure and force. Short of the right pressures and forces being applied, within whatever time scale, he will not budge.
  The embargo on the high seas, vigorously applied by the world powers, may do the trick in the months ahead, but the long haul—this is why it is appropriate for the House to gather—may be an empty haul. As the months pass, it may not be possible, through the sea blockade alone, to achieve what the United Nations, the free nations and the other nations of the world have decreed—Hussein's ejection and eviction from Kuwait.
  That is why it seems to me that, although today we may believe so far so good, a grim crossroads lies somewhere ahead. I cannot see whether it will be months or even half a year away, but there will come a time when we must ask whether the sanctions embargo by sea has worked, what leakage there has been by the vast fleets of jumbo aircraft, which cannot carry oil but can certainly carry in supplies, and whether other subterranean networks are continuing to supply oxygen to the Iraqi regime. I suspect that more pressure than the embargo and the blockade will be needed.
  That amounts to the clear and obvious injunction that we must do nothing in the House, nor should the legislatures of other nations involved, to tie the hands of our Executives and Governments in dealing with and mobilising the necessary pressures in the months ahead.
  If this man is left in possession of Kuwait, the message is quite simple: violence will have won. All Arabs—and all despots around the world—will draw their own conclusions. The moderate Arab leaders whom I mentioned will fall and be destroyed and we shall open the way to a decade of endless violence, endless terror and endless world instability. In a few months' time, should Saddam Hussein still be in place, we would find ourselves walking around the rim of the volcano of nuclear and chemical holocaust.
  Someone said—perhaps I should be better educated historically—that all the great political decisions are a choice between the disagreeable and the intolerable. If the Governments here in London, Washington and elsewhere now have the courage, as I believe they have, to take

  761
  disagreeable risks—things cannot be done without some risks—to avoid the much darker and intolerable conditions that would ensue for years ahead, I for one will give them my wholehearted support.
  4.32 pm
  Mr. Denis Healey: The House will agree that Saddam Hussein will go down in history for at least one unique achievement: he has united all parties in the House of Commons, all permanent members of the Security Council and the overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations both on the objective of getting him out of Kuwait and on the best method of doing so—a blockade supported, if necessary, by appropriate force. I think that those are the words of the resolution.
  I believe that the blockade will be effective and will lead to Saddam's withdrawal, even if it is applied to oil alone, because 90 per cent. of Iraq's hard currency has been derived from the sale of oil, and 80 per cent. comes from the sale of oil carried by two pipelines, through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Even without the naval blockade, the closure of the pipelines is likely to be effective, provided, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) pointed out, countries do not give Iraq credit when it has no currency to offer.
  I hope that all Governments, including our own, have learnt something from their experience. Iraq owes about $80 billion to Arab and western Governments, divided roughly equally. It owes an enormous sum to the Soviet Union, although I do not think that figures are yet available, and the west has lost over $10 billion in recent export credits to Iraq. That includes the United Kingdom, which in recent years has given Iraq £900 million in export credits. In the main, that was for civilian goods, but it freed Iraq's hard currency for the buying of arms from various parts of the world.
  The combination of the blockade and the denial of credit is likely to work. Indeed, I gather that Iraq has already lost $3 billion of revenue in the short period during which the pipelines have been closed.
  The blockade is bound to take time to be economically effective. Most people believe that the minimum period will be four or five months. It might be politically effective in a shorter time, or it might take longer to be politically effective than to be economically effective.
  The most heartening feature of the past week is that the American and British Governments have accepted that it will be a long haul—that the blockade can work, but it cannot work within weeks and is much more likely to take months.
  Fortunately, because oil-producing countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have agreed to make good the oil lost to the world because of the unavailability of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, although there will be temporary difficulties with refining the right grades of oil from the crude available from Saudi Arabia and other countries, the direct economic effect of the crisis is likely to be very much less than the oil crisis in 1973—the first OPEC price increase—or the oil crisis in 1979 which was made worse by the Gulf war.
  In real terms, yesterday's price levels are still two fifths lower than in 1985, and it is worth bearing that in mind before we panic about the economic effects on the world as a whole. The economic effects for certain countries, however, are catastrophic, particularly Iraq's neighbours,
  762
  Turkey and Jordan, and for countries that previously relied for much of their revenue on remittances from people working in the Gulf who are now getting out as fast as they can, mainly through Jordan.
  I agree with all that has been said about the need to provide help to cushion the shock, and in particular to get the refugees through Jordan back home as fast as is practically possible.
  The success of the blockade and the whole operation depends on maintaining unity inside and between the countries concerned. That has been a remarkable and an unprecedented feature of the operation over the past five weeks, but it depends on Governments, singly or jointly, not carrying out a unilateral first strike against Iraq. I fully agree that we cannot rule out the use of force in certain circumstances, such as if we are or our allies are attacked, and possibly in certain other circumstances, but it is important for the House and for the public to recognise that the use of force against Iraq to get it out of Kuwait would be immensely dangerous both politically and economically in any other circumstances than as a response to attack. It could be absolutely disastrous if it did not take place within the framework of the authority of the United Nations.
  During my somewhat turbulent holiday over the past few weeks, which I enjoyed as much as I hope that other hon. Members enjoyed their holidays, I was able to read the views of military analysts in the International Herald Tribune, the Financial Times and The Times about what a war against Iraq would involve. I was happy to see that they all disagreed with one another. I share the view of the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) that nobody who has not fought in a war has much right to talk about what will happen if a war takes place. The one thing that one learns if one has been in a war—there are still a number of venerable gentleman present who were—is that sod rules. One never knows at the beginning how things will turn out at the end. Nothing ever happens as one expects.
  However, some general considerations should be borne in mind. First of all, in the desert, neither side should rely too much on the advantages of advanced technology. The right hon. Member for Yeovil will recall that our intervention to help Kuwait in 1961 was successful because we did not have to fight. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) will recall, because he was involved, that our troops were not acclimatised and that if they had been called upon to fight, there could have been a disaster. It is impossible to predict the consequences of fighting in those conditions, particularly if one has to meet the possibility of chemical attack.
  The idea of a surgical strike is a fantasy. Mr. Gerasimov, that master of our English language, mixed his metaphors to good effect when he said a couple of days ago that if we tried a surgical strike, our scalpel would turn into a club and have a boomerang effect. That was an entertaining mixture of images, but the House will see the justice of his point.
  The record of the United States in making surgical strikes is, frankly, not encouraging. We had the fiasco of the attempted surgical strike against Tehran to rescue the hostages, which ended hundreds of miles short of Tehran in the desert, when sand got into the engines of the helicopters. The Stealth aircraft was used first for a surgical strike in Panama and all the reports from Washington are that it was most inaccurate—about as

  763
  accurate, the Secretary of State for Defence will not mind me reminding him, as the V-bombers in their attempts to crater the airstrip in the Falklands.
  The surgical strike on Colonel Gaddafi was not terribly successful, although that was also carried out by F111 aircraft, which have also been deployed in the Gulf. It killed a lot of civilians, but did not kill Colonel Gaddafi and the intelligence, on which the raid was based was wrong, because Gaddafi was not in Tripoli but in his camp in the desert. A surgical strike requires not only extraordinarily accurate weapons but extraordinarily accurate intelligence, and I doubt whether we have that sort of intelligence on Iraq.
  It is said that the objective of the surgical strike should be to get rid of Saddam Hussein. My old friend Henry Kissinger suggested this in a recent article, but he might recall that he carried out a surgical strike on Cambodia. It was not particularly surgical, because he used a lot of aircraft without the authority of Congress to do so. The main result of the strike was to replace Sihanouk with Pol Pot, and the consequences of that disastrous blunder are still being felt, as the Foreign Secretary will know.
  Iran has already chosen the Iraqi Shi'ite Muslim fundamentalist whom it will promote to lead Iraq if Hussein is toppled. We must not assume that Hussein, horrible though he is, is the most horrible thing that could ever happen in the middle east. A few years ago, we were saying that Khomeini was so much more horrible that we would escort all tankers going to Iraq so as to protect them againt attacks by Iran. The attacks against ships going to Iran were just as numerous after the patrolling of the Gulf as they were before it, but at least we kept Saddam alive to fight another day. The most worrying factors about the idea of defeating Iraq in war are that it would leave Iran once again the dominant military power in the Gulf, and that could be a terminal setback for the present unsteady movement towards a more pragmatic regime in Tehran.
  Worse than that, the destruction of Iraq in war would inevitably unleash a large number of other conflicts. Quite apart from the risk of Iran trying to take the Kurdish areas, there are already signs that Turkey is again considering occupying the oilfields that it lost in 1923. One of the reasons for the current Turkish proposal to allow, for the first time, its troops to fight abroad is to free them for that purpose. There is an interesting article in the Financial Times today on that possibility. The possibility that Syria would turn east is also a real one.
  To destroy Iraq or to bring down the Iraqi regime could not be guaranteed to be in the interests of stability in the middle east. Moreover, a war largely conducted by the British and our American and NATO allies would produce a situation in which the monarchical regimes in the Gulf might find it difficult to survive. There would be a wave of Arab nationalism combined with a wave of Muslim fundamentalism.
  Most of the Gulf states rely on foreign labour and Arab labour from other countries not only for getting oil out of the ground—there are 350,000 Palestinians in Kuwait alone—but, in the lower Gulf, for a large part of their armed forces. In my day, that included some British forces—I am not sure that it still does. That is why Prince Sultan, who is the Minister for Defence in Saudi Arabia, told the press the other day that he did not believe that it was in
  764
  Saudi Arabia's interest to carry out a military strike against Iraq and that no such strike should be carried out without Saudi Arabia's agreement. That is why the Saudi Government did not allow the United States to base B52s in Saudi Arabia, although, according to the Arab press, it had asked permission to do so.
  I hope that the Foreign Secretary will talk to us frankly about his recent trip round the middle east. Oman is the one country which is comparativesly independent and still a good friend of Britain. In Oman, the Foreign Secretary was advised to rely on diplomacy and on economic sanctions, rather than on military force, to achieve his objective. Surely that is wisdom, not just for Oman, but for the other Gulf states and, indeed, for Britain and for the United States. I was glad to see that, in Amman yesterday, the Foreign Secretary—if he was rightly reported—did not rule out negotiations with Saddam Hussein, once Saddam Hussein leaves Kuwait.
  The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup was quite right to say that, if it was possible to produce more stability in the Gulf and in the rest of the middle east through the initiative of the Arab countries, that would be far better—even if they reached agreements of which we should not wholly approve—than trying to impose it by western force.
  I must raise another consideration. One cannot be sure what would happen if there were full-scale war between Iraq and its opponents in the Gulf. However, it is at least possible that a large part of the oil facilities on which the whole world depends would be put out of action for a long period by one side or the other. In that case, the world would face the prospect of $50 oil lasting for years, not for weeks or for months.
  In the present world economic situation, that would certainly produce a world recession and could produce the collapse of the fragile American financial system, as the hon. Member for East Lindsey (Sir P. Tapsell) will know. It is not an option to be considered lightly and if, in the end, we have to consider it at all, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn and the right hon. Member for Yeovil, the leader of the Liberal Democrats—I do not know whether, as an old man, I keep up with the changes of nomenclature—were right to say that it must be done under the auspices of the United Nations. If China imposes a veto in the Security Council, we could find a way of doing it through article 42, which deals with regional security.
  No action should be taken without the full public support of all our NATO allies, of all our partners in the European Community, of the Soviet Government and of many Arab Governments. I know that that is a lot for which to ask, but nothing less would suffice.
  We must remember that the Sovier Union is far closer to the Arab world than we are. It is about 300 miles from the Iraqi frontier to the frontier of the southern Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has a perfectly legitimate interest in the stability of that part of the world, and it must be involved in any decision regarding the pursuit of the United Nations resolutions. For that reason, it is important that the summit meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev reaches a reliable and clear agreement this weekend on some of those matters.
  I want to turn to the up side of what has hitherto been a rather gloomy story. If we can keep Soviet co-operation in defeating aggression in the Gulf and in increasing stability in the middle east, the way is open for a whole new

  765
  world of opportunities. As Gorbachev predicted in his first speech to the Communist party congress, the ending of the cold war enables us all to move, groping in the dark as it were, to an interdependent and integral world. We now have, for the first time in history, the opportunity to give the United Nations—a world organisation—the role envisaged for it by its founders. We may need it to develop that role not only in other parts of the middle east, but in Africa and in many parts of Asia, where the tension between Pakistan and India currently threatens to explode into war at any moment.
  Thank God we now have the opportunity to learn a lesson from a long concatenation of blunders by all the external powers in their policies towards the middle east. Not only the United States and Britain, but France and, equally, the Soviet Union have made blunder after blunder, from all of which they have gained nothing and lost much. Some of the blunders reflected the strains created by the cold war, such as the "Northern Tier" experiment, which led to the downfall of a moderate Government in Iraq, and the Russian support of Nasser and later of Syria. That factor is no longer there.
  However, there is one constant factor to which I must refer—the blind determination of all Governments in arms-producing countries to stuff arms down the throats of all the regimes of the middle east, regardless of their external or domestic policies and, above all, regardless of their stability. The result is that the arms we loaded on to the Shah of Iran in the belief that he would dominate the middle east and the Indian ocean fell, just like that, into the hands of a religious maniac. We found ourselves involved in trying to defeat the Khomeini regime with the help of Iraq. Incidentally, when Iraq invaded Iran, the matter was not raised at the Security Council and sanctions were not imposed.
  I hope that Iraq has learnt something from that invasion. Saddam Hussein has killed 1·5 million of his own people for absolutely nothing. In the agreement that he made with Tehran a few weeks ago, the last gain that he could claim from the war disappeared into thin air.
  Surely we can learn something from that history. There was no effective protest from Britain when the Syrian Government murdered between 10,000 and 30,000 people at Hama in 1982. There was only the mildest slap on the wrist for Saddam Hussein when he killed 4,000 Kurds inside his own country with poison gas in March 1988. The United Kingdom immediately doubled its export credits to Iraq.
  Mr. Waldegrave indicated dissent.
  Mr. Healey: It is no good for the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to wag his head. If he consults his friends in the Box, they will be able to confirm what I have said. At the Baghdad arms fair which followed in April 1989—just over a year ago—there were 17 British companies, 35 French companies and three Italian companies. None of us has very much to be proud of over that.
  When some Labour Members protested against those arms sales in the defence debate last October, we were told by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), who is a Minister of State, that we were talking claptrap. It was the same fatuous philistine who was chosen by the Prime Minister to tour the Gulf as a sort of John the Baptist to the Foreign Secretary.
  766
  There is not, and cannot be, any guarantee that arms which are sold to such regimes will not be used for aggression and will not be used against us. It has happened too often in the past.
  Mr. Jonathan Sayeed: Am I not correct in believing that the right hon. Gentleman was Secretary of State for Defence at the time when, in his words, we were stuffing arms down Iran's throat, when the Shah was in power, and that those arms later fell into the hands of Khomeini?
  Mr. Healey: It was a great mistake, and I have the sense to admit it. I did it because I was assured by the Foreign Office—[Interruption.]—that the Shah would be there for ever.
  I appeal to the Government to take up the suggestion made recently by Mr. Shevardnadze, the Soviet Foreign Secretary, to ask the General Secretary of the United Nations to organise talks between the major arms suppliers, the overwhelming majority of which were in one or other of the cold war alliances, to see whether we cannot now control the supply of weapons, at least to the third world.
  I refer not just to the weapons that we are particularly proud of possessing—nuclear and chemical weapons and missiles—but to conventional weapons generally. The bulk of the 20 million people who have died in wars in the third world since 1945 have not been killed by weapons of mass destruction. Enormous numbers have been and are still being killed, particularly in places such as Beirut, by small arms and hand-portable weapons. If there are to be more wars in the middle east as a result of instability, much of the killing will result from the use of such arms.
  We need international control of arms supplies, not just in the middle east but in Africa and Asia. Overwhelming evidence is now coming from United Nations organisations that arms imports are ruining the prospects of economic development in many of those countries.
  We must also try to deal with other local problems in the middle east, and I am glad that Secretary Baker, the Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and all who have spoken in the debate have asked for that to be done.
  There is no question but that one of the most urgent problems there is that of the Palestinians. Because the world, when it set up the state of Israel, made no provision for the Palestinians who were expelled initially into Jordan, that has been a source of continuing and increasing trouble. That trouble could reach crisis point again in the next year or so if the emigration of up to l million Jews from the Soviet Union leads to the expulsion of the Arabs from the occupied territories of Israel. It is an urgent and dangerous problem and I hope that we shall take advantage of the weather window which Secretary Baker seemed to open in his speech to get down to tackling that issue immediately.
  Mr. Tony Marlow: I have enjoyed the right hon. Gentleman's speech. Does he agree that a strength that Saddam Hussein gains throughout the Arab world is the perception that he, and perhaps he alone, can deliver a Palestinian state? lf, as a main plank of western policy, of United Nations policy, we were now to commit ourselves to resolving that problem, would not that undermine some of the strength of Saddam Hussein?
  Mr. Healey: Yes, and one reason why Saddam Hussein is playing that card is that 350,000 Palestinians are living and working in Kuwait, largely involved in producing oil. Indeed, Palestinians of stature are engaged all over the middle east in important managerial roles.
  A clear lesson resulting from this affair is that there is no answer to the problem—or to any of the multifarious problems which will torment the world with the end of the cold war—other than a multinational answer under the auspices of the United Nations. I was immensely encouraged by one sentence—there were many others—in the speech of the Prime Minister, when she said that she thought that the future security structure in the Gulf must be under the United Nations. I am glad that she seems to have dropped the ridiculous idea, made in a recent speech, that NATO should take it on.
  Like a diminishing band of colleagues in the House, I am getting on in years. I was born in 1917. My boyhood and youth were tormented by the failure of governments after the first world war to turn the League of Nations into an effective instrument of international security. When I left the Army in 1945 after the second world war, I believed, like many young men and women, that we really had a chance to do it under the United Nations. But Stalin destroyed that opportunity, and the last 40 years have been dominated by the cold war between the communist and western blocs.
  That war is over. The world now faces its third opportunity to create a world society. It has the instrument to hand. All the great powers have said that they want to use it. I pray to God that we do not fail this third time.
  5.6 pm
  Mr. Jonathan Aitken: I am grateful to have been called to speak, albeit unexpectedly. We have had an outstanding debate so far, in which the unity between the two Front Benches has been a most encouraging feature of the solidarity that we all feel at this time of considerable history and anxiety for the world.
  I have been a visitor to the Gulf for over 20 years, first as a young private secretary to our former colleague Selwyn Lloyd, latterly as a journalist, business man and Member of Parliament. I feel deeply for the peace-loving people of those Gulf countries who in this hour face the possible agony of war. We must be aware of the great anxieties that they feel.
  Two scenarios have been outlined in the debate, the first being the policy of patience—the patient long haul by which sanctions are applied—backed up by a blockade. We all hope that that policy of patience will bring down the monster who is dominating the world's headlines, Saddam Hussein.
  The problem with playing it long is that it might also mean that we do not win in the end, because there are many worries over the long haul. Its obvious disadvantage is that there could be gaps in the blockade. I am not full of admiration for the course that King Hussein has played in the crisis so far in his apparent reluctance to enforce sanctions.
  By playing it long there will be military problems. The American service men now in the desert, in that hostile environment, need their R and R—their rest and recreation—or after a few months troop morale will go stale and the American service men will not be able to perform key functions. However, there are no R and R
  768
  facilities in Saudi Arabia. There are no Budweiser beers, red light districts or worlds of Suzie Wong in downtown Dhahran.
  Therefore, there are anxieties that playing it long will place all sorts of pressures, not just on American service men, but on American political opinion. We are told by the media anchormen that American public opinion cannot stand the problem of many months of waiting for a result. I think that the anchormen may have underestimated the American public's resolve, but, nevertheless, playing it long, being patient, has worrying problems.
  Even more worrying are the difficulties involved in being impatient. I entirely agreed with the Leader of the Opposition when he said that there was enormous peril in a first strike policy. I do not believe that the American Government are contemplating such a policy, which would certainly lose that most precious of all assets at present, the international consensus and backing. It must be politically right to have the world united, as it is today. To throw that ace card away would be a foolish mistake.
  At the same time, we must recognise that, although there is political wisdom and desirability in keeping the international world united, with the United Nations totally on side and approving—the desirable first prize—should that option be available to us, we should not shrink from using the legal backing of article 51 of the United Nations. I am not sure that the Leader of the Opposition made that distinction in his speech. Article 51 enables this Government, the United States Government or any other Government to act with due legal sanction.
  I wonder how the scenario will evolve. One topic that has not yet been mentioned in today's debate is what is happening inside Kuwait at present. I believe that the resistance inside it is more formidable and forceful than generally reported. What the Iraqis are doing in Kuwait has all sorts of sinister signs and portents, and includes mining all the oilfields with high explosives. In what could be going on in Kuwait lie the perfectly justifiable seeds of a request from the Emir of Kuwait, under article 51, for military intervention—somewhere between the patient and the impatient scenario.
  Mr. Patrick Cormack: Is it not clear from what we have heard from the Kuwaiti ambassador and others that the country is being devastated and laid waste by the Iraqis, even as we debate?
  Mr. Aitken: There is no doubt that the position in Kuwait is more horrific than has generally been recognised. It is not surprising that Saddam Hussein, who has been so accommodating to the international television networks, has in no way helped them to gain admission to Kuwait to tell the true story of what is going on there.
  The central theme of the debate is what I think the Leader of the Opposition called being interested in success. What is success, and what does it mean? We know the United Nations list of priorities and demands, and I think that we all agree with them. As a House, we should discuss whether those requirements should also mean the fall of Saddam Hussein, which is immensely desirable. However, that is the business of the Iraqi people and not directly ours, which is to ensure that, at the end of the crisis, Saddam Hussein, or his successor, is so politically humiliated and militarily castrated that we cannot be faced

  769
  with this dangerous volcano once again, fearing that chemical weapons, perhaps even nuclear weapons in two years' time, could be used.
  The prize is great; it is not just ending the reign of a monster in Iraq or cooling the highly tense and volatile situation that exists today, but what several speakers have called maintaining the wider new world order. There is a glittering opportunity that out of this terrible act of aggression could come the chance to get justice for the Palestinian people and a settlement that would guarantee stability through a multinational force and a United Nations umbrella. Those are great prizes.
  If we stick to the solid and united front that we have shown in the House today, continue to back our allies in the Gulf as we have done, do not lose our nerve and show either too much impatience or go too slowly because we have become too legalistic and keen on the United Nations rubber stamping everything in every eventuality—which would simply be impossible—but strike a firm but middle line, there may yet be a good and sensible outcome to this terrible tragedy.
  5.15 pm
  Mr. Ernie Ross: Having worked for so long on one case of occupation and annexation, I am heartened by aspects of the Government's public response in the face of the current crisis. They have consistently cited the requirements of international law and insisted on the need for that law to be given teeth by the international community in order that the occupying power, in this case Iraq, should understand that no state may tear up the international order and expect to pay no price. They have given proper prominence to the authority of the United Nations and the need for consensus in the international community as a basis for action.
  The Government have insisted that their nationals and all civilians in occupied Kuwait are protected persons and have fundamental rights that must be protected. They have reminded Iraq that some acts against those protected persons give rise to individual criminal liability and that those committing such violations may be subject to the equivalent of war crimes trials.
  A position based on international law is not only the correct one in respose to violation by a state, in this case Iraq, but the only one holding any hope for a proper resolution of the conflict. Retaliatory measures or unilateral interventions that violate the law will do nothing to resolve the crisis. We must always remember, when citing the law, that illegal measures by states are illegal no matter what the reason for which they were undertaken, whether in pursuit of aggression or in pursuit of confronting aggression. There is no need to resort to measures outside the mandate that already exist for states to react to violations of international law. Despite the frequent bewailing of the inadequacy of the mechanisms of enforcing the basic rules of international law, we have found that there are a variety of structural mechanisms for dealing with states that violate international law and refuse to comply with United Nations resolutions.
  I welcome the imposition of stringent sanctions on Iraq and firmly support the role of the United Nations in directing the international community of states in the implementation of those sanctions. Other legal mechanisms of conflict, control and resolution that can be achieved through the forum of the United Nations include
  770
  various forms of negotiation, arbitration and litigation and, perhaps most appropriately on this occasion, the presence of United Nations forces. I hope that the crisis can be resolved peacefully, through the enforcement of the sanctions imposed through the United Nations, and that all those involved will confine themselves to actions that are unequivocally based on international law and consensus.
  All these points are familiar to me. I have frequently addressed them to the Foreign Office in the context of a different conflict in the middle east. For the past 18 months, I and others have been addressing the Government on the issue of the consistent and objective enforcement of the provisions of international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, as a means of providing protection for the civilian population of the Israeli-occupied territories and as a contribution to the search for a just, durable and peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
  We have always stressed the universality and the absoluteness of the minimum standards of behaviour of states laid down in major instruments of international humanitarian law—the Hague convention of 1907 and the Geneva convention of 1949. It has been our contention that the rules contained in international humanitarian law, if properly enforced, are sufficient to dissuade and prohibit states from carrying out an illegal agenda of occupation and annexation of the type that the international community now confronts in the form of Iraq.
  I have heard the view expressed that it is erroneous to make such a comparison because the circumstances in which Israel invaded and occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967 differ from those in which Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait this summer. I cannot agree with that view, but to argue it through now would be a distraction from a consideration of the fundamental functioning of the law between states.
  As I understand it, the purpose of the law is to lay down minimum standards of conduct for all states and to provide means of insisting upon those standards being applied, regardless of which state is breaking the law.
  Mr. Peter Archer: Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a distinction between the Israeli position and the position that we are debating? It takes two to make peace in the Israeli position, whereas in the circumstances that we are debating, one side wants peace and the other does not.
  Mr. Ross: I shall deal in a minute specifically with what my right hon. and learned Friend has said.
  The Prime Minister has made it clear that if the other side in the Israeli conflict accepted certain resolutions and renounced violence and terrorism, she would try to ensure that a peace conference would be held. That has been done; at least the other side has played its part.
  The situations in occupied and annexed Kuwait and in the Israeli-occupied territories are governed by international law and are quite properly the concern of the international community from a legal point of view. Both occupations have given rise to unanimous resolutions of the United Nations for the occupying power to withdraw, and these resolutions have been flouted by both nations. Indeed, Israel has flouted them for over 23 years.
  In both instances, the fourth Geneva convention applies. It confers certain fundamental protections on

  771
  civilians in the occupied territories. I have no doubt that, if the occupation of Kuwait continues, we shall have resolutions similar to the almost countless number that now exist, and which call upon Israel to respect the convention and to condemn its violations. Palestinian civilians who are under occupation are entitled to the protection that is provided by minimum standards of behaviour.
  In Kuwait, those minimum standards apply to the Kuwaiti population and nationals of many other states, including those of Great Britain. These protected persons are dependent for their welfare upon the firm resolve of the international community to ensure that legal provisions are enforced and implemented until the occupying power complies with the United Nations commands to withdraw.
  The major difference in legal terms between the Israeli and Iraqi occupations lies in the reaction of the international community, and especially that of the United States and Britain and its European partners. The difference lies in the willingness and determination of the international community, and especially of the states to which I have referred, to enforce the law against the perpetrator of the offence.
  In the middle east, failure by the international community to apply the principles and the rule of international law neutrally and consistently has led to the law falling into disrepute, at least to a certain extent. It may be said that the breakdown of these principles led the Arab regime into believing that it could break the law with impunity. We have discovered to our cost, and to the cost of many of our nationals, the ultimate implication of allowing any state to break the law that applies to states generally without paying the price of illegal actions.
  Had the west not tolerated other illegal actions in the middle east, by failing to act upon its frequent but only verbal condemnations, and had instead reacted routinely to violations of international law and United Nations resolutions in the way which we are now seeing, the stakes would have been raised. It would have been much more difficult for any other political leader in the area to contemplate and carry out such actions. States—especially those with vulnerable economies—would have known that they would face economic collapse if they contemplated going beyond the legitimate constraints of state action.
  The enforcement of international law thus has an exceedingly practical effect, as well as a humanitarian value, but only if it is implemented consistently and without regard to the identity of the violating state. International law is assailable only if it is selectively enforced and implemented to coincide with political expediency. Past weakness, with the consequent devaluation of the law, is one factor in the context of the current crisis.
  We have before us a problem and an opportunity. We have shown resolve to seek compliance with the only standards that all states have in common beyond language, culture and religion, and that is the minimum provisions of the law of war and the binding resolutions of the United Nations. We have seen the consequences of the wilful ignoring or idiosyncratic interpretation of international law. Regional instability, threats to national interests and threats even to world security arise when we permit departures from minimal rules.
  772
  Having cited the rules in the context of the dispute that we are debating, and acted upon them within the context of international consensus, we must show a firm commitment to the rules and not one that is based merely upon who is breaking them. If that commitment is not maintained in future, the future for international law and order will be at stake. If we do not provide the law with necessary and legitimate teeth in other contexts, we may never again cite it as a basis for action. Instead, it will be merely an excuse in the terms of a political agenda, and effectively there will be no law.
  I am not suggesting that two wrongs make a right—that, unless the international community takes action to restrain Israel from its violations, it has no right to restrain Saddam Hussein from his. I firmly support all efforts made within the terms of international law to restrain Saddam Hussein, but in future we must fulfil the same legal obligations without a hint of selectivity. If we fail to do so, and there is, in effect, only one right, there will be a great many wrongs. That will injure those in the middle east who have suffered most already—civilians suffering in time of war and belligerent occupation. These wrongs will necessarily have a fundamental effect on our own interests in future.
  In 1990, Britain and its European partners, and even the United States, have recognised the importance of international law. There was that recognition in 1945, which led to the framing of the United Nations charter. Similarly, in 1949, agreement was reached on the text of the Geneva conventions. They were seen as major instruments to govern the conduct of states in time of war and belligerent occupation. It is a pity that we have had to wait until certain more visible interests were involved to remember the importance of these principles and the utility of enforcing their contents. When the crisis is resolved in accordance with fundamental rules, we must not allow them to be forgotten again. Selectivity in enforcing the law, as we have seen in the middle east, can lead only to its devaluation and inevitable violation.
  5.27 pm
  Sir Peter Blaker: Some Opposition Members seem to be hypnotised by the concept of a surgical strike. I do not know to whom they are referring, as they have not been specific. There is one body from which I do not hear talk about a surgical strike, however, and that is Her Majesty's Government. It is time that someone paid tribute to the Government for the great skill with which they have handled what I regard as the most dangerous international crisis since 1945.
  The Government have not put a foot wrong. In particular, they have acted with great skill in the United Nations. Suggestions have been made by Opposition Members that the Government may not have paid much attention to the United Nations and the five resolutions of the Security Council. I have no doubt that the Government played an important role in securing those resolutions, and not least resolution 665, which was the most difficult to secure of them all.
  Several hon. Members have said that we are in a new phase at the United Nations. I have observed the United Nations for nearly 40 years, including two complete General Assembly sessions some time ago. We all know

  773
  that, until now, it has been bedevilled by being used as a forum for one nation to make points against another rather than as a forum for securing results.
  With the end of the cold war, we all agree that there is now a real possibily that we can make the United Nations a more useful place. However, it would be a great error to argue, as some have done, that the allied forces ranged against Saddam Hussein should take further military action only if authorised by the Security Council. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)—who, I regret, is no longer in his place—said that the use of force must be within the framework of the United Nations. We can all agree with that, because article 51 is within the framework, of the United Nations. The point is not whether the use of force, if it became necessary, should be within or without the United Nations; it is whether it requires a further Security Council resolution.
  I welcome what the right hon. Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) said on that point. He referred to a number of examples where force could be used legitimately without a further Security Council resolution such as, a request by Kuwait or further aggression. There could be other examples. To deny ourselves the ability to take further military action without another Security Council resolution would delight Saddam Hussein. It would certainly make him more stubborn and it would reduce the chances of achieving what we all want to achieve, which is the evacuation of Kuwait by peaceful means. That would be the perverse result of such self-denial.
  If, as I believe, the right hon. Member for Islwyn is saying that it is desirable that further military action has the backing of the United Nations, I can only agree with him. However, I emphatically disagree with the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), who said recently that further military action must have a further Security Council resolution.
  The House should be aware of why article 51 is part of the charter. It is not an unimportant article. It was greatly debated during the three years between 1942 and 1945 when the United Nations charter was in the process of gestation. The founders of the United Nations—who, in general, were the victors of world war two—believed it necessary to include such an article because they were not prepared, especially the major powers, to deny themselves the right to take military action against aggression or against a threat to peace simply because it might not be possible, because of the veto, to obtain the sanction of a Security Council resolution. Article 51 is essential to chapter VII, which deals with threats to the peace and with acts of aggression, and it was central in the minds of the founders of the United Nations.
  Mr. Archer: The right hon. Gentleman is accurate about the reason for article 51 being included in the charter. It was because there could be no certainty that there would be a general agreement among the United Nations. However, where a consensus is attainable, would it not be a step back to rely on the right of self-redress?
  Sir Peter Blaker: I agree with what the right hon. Member for Islwyn said—that it is desirable to have the clear backing of the United Nations if that is attainable. However, we should not deny ourselves the opportunity to act even if it is not possible to obtain a Security Council resolution. As the House will recall, we relied on article 51 for our action in the Falklands.
  774
  The Soviet Union recently suggested that there should be a comprehensive conference dealing with both Iraq's aggression and the question of Palestine. I do not know why it made that suggestion, which I believe is unwise. It would risk obscuring the main issue, which is to ensure that Saddam Hussein does not profit from his aggression. We must obtain his withdrawal and ensure that there is no possibility of further Iraqi aggression against Kuwait or its small neighbouring countries. Measures must be taken to deal with Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons capability, and a security regime must be established in the Gulf.
  Mr. David Winnick: Is there not a danger that in agreeing to an international conference—which I hope will not be the case—it would give the dictator of a criminal regime the status to say, in effect, that what he has done in Kuwait has led to an international conference to deal with all sorts of other issues? Those of us on the Labour Benches who were strenuously opposed to the Suez aggression in 1956 made it clear that we did not want an international conference, but an end to the aggression—which was supported at the time by France and Israel. Our view remains the same. The aggression that began on 2 August must be ended before there is an international conference to deal with all the other issues, including the position of the Palestinians which, at some early stage, must also be discussed and resolved.
  Sir Peter Blaker: The hon. Gentleman made a number of valid points. An international conference would enhance the status of Saddam Hussein. An additional, important point which was implicit in what the hon. Gentleman said is that it would enable Saddam Hussein to divert world attention to the question of Palestine and unite the Arabs behind him in opposition to Israel, which would be highly undesirable.
  The world faces enough problems over the Gulf without adding the question of Palestine in the same forum. Of course we must not lose sight of the Palestine problem, but if we attempt to treat both those issues in the same forum at the same time, we are in danger of failing on both. We must first concentrate on solving the problem of Iraq's aggression. If we are successful, we may then find the further momentum to tackle, as we should, the question of Palestine.
  5.38 pm
  Mr. Tony Benn: Many hon. Members have said that this is the gravest crisis that we have faced since 1945, and I share that view. In the light of that, can anyone doubt that it was right to recall the House of Commons so that we could debate the matter outside the television and radio studios and without relying upon the mass media? There has also been a demand—quite properly in a crisis—for a degree of unity, and that unity has been present in a number of important respects. No hon. Member supports the act of aggression by Saddam Hussein against Kuwait. So far as I know, no hon. Member is other than strongly supportive of the sanctions taken by the United Nations against Saddam Hussein and the resolution for their enforcement. We also have something else in common—none of us will be killed if a war breaks out.
  But as Members of Parliament, we have responsibilities which cannot simply be subordinated to the role of the

  775
  Government. This is not the place to deal with it, but under our constitution, military deployments, acts of war and treaties of peace come under the Crown prerogative. Parliament has no legal or constitutional right whatever to decide the matters that are before us for debate.
  But we have a duty to represent people. We have a duty to represent—as far as I can make out, some Conservative Members have done it with tremendous energy—British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait. We have a responsibility for them and their families. That has hardly been mentioned except as an instrument for denouncing, quite properly, the man who is detaining them. We have service men and women in the middle east, and perhaps more are to go there if the stories in today's papers are right. They and their families are entitled to have Members of Parliament to represent them. There are the refugees, thousands of them without water and food, and as human beings we have a responsibility to them. I might add that the tragic pictures that we have seen of people in the desert without proper food or shelter would be as nothing to what would happen if war broke out.
  As you know, Mr. Speaker, because we discussed it yesterday, I intend to oppose the motion tomorrow that the House should now adjourn. The motion to adjourn the House is usually a formal one. The House adjourns at night and meets again at 2.30 pm. But this is the one rare occasion when whether we should adjourn for another six weeks while events take their course is the real question.
  If anyone says to me, as some have said in the face of the crisis, that we should send a united message to Saddam Hussein, I remind the House that on 5 May 1940, when Hitler was at the gates, there was an Adjournment debate on the handling by the Government of the Campaign in Norway, and a vote. The then Prime Minister won the vote and resigned, and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister. So let us not be told that the duty of the House of Commons is to unite behind whatever the Government of the day does, because that is not what the House is there to do. We are here to represent people and to contribute our own opinions as best we can. I have no complaint of any speech made today about how we feel that the crisis should be handled.
  I will use plain language. I fear that the United States has already decided that, when it is ready, it will create a pretext for a war. That is what I believe. I acquit the Foreign Secretary of being in that hawkish clan because, in so far as one can penetrate the inscrutable corridors of power and the minds of their inhabitants, he seems to be a bit of a dove. But let me say this, too, without offence. Britain is a minor player in this game. We have had a debate today as though everything hinged on whether the Prime Minister decided to go to war. The Prime Minister, too, is a minor player in this unfolding tragedy. She decided to go in with President Bush, perhaps because of the transatlantic relationship, the so-called "special relationship", or as thanks for the Falklands, or because she did not want to get mixed up with the EEC.
  But she is a minor player and once she and the Cabinet decided to commit even a notional number of forces—including the RAF and the RAF regiment and now the troops—she was locked into what President Bush intended to do. It is important that we should not discuss, as if we
  776
  were in a position to decide the post-cold-war order, what the Prime Minister will be doing here and there. We are a minor partner in an American strategy.
  It must be known by now that I am opposed to a war against Iraq. I am opposed to action outside the United Nations. I believe that it would divide the Security Council. It might not exactly unite the Arab world, but it might bring many Arab countries together against us. The outcome of such a war could not be sure, because President Saddam Hussein would certainly have the capacity, were he to choose to do it, to destroy so many oil installations that, even though he himself might be destroyed, it would inflict a burden on the world economy and the middle east which could not be contemplated.
  Mr. Cormack: Nobody in the House is enthusiastic for war, but is the right hon. Gentleman saying that he is prepared to let Saddam Hussein keep his loot?
  Mr. Benn: No, I am not saying that at all. I said at the beginning of my speech that there is unanimity for sanctions. I share the view of, I think, either the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) or my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), that a country dependent for its revenue on oil cannot survive when its oil pipeline is cut.
  Sir Russell Johnston: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Benn: No, I shall not give way again.
  I believe, therefore, that the sanctions will be effective; but that has to be put against what would happen otherwise.
  I must also say something else to the House without in any way being offensive. Governments of any colour in any country are not the main practitioners of morality. America went into Panama and 3,000 people were killed. America went into Grenada. America supported Iraq when it attacked Iran. America did nothing when Cyprus was invaded and partitioned by Turkey. America has no moral authority, any more than any other super-power. The same would be true of the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, or wherever. It has no moral authority.
  Nor, might I add, because these things must be said and nobody else has said them, can we defend the Emir or the King of Saudi Arabia, neither of whom practise any democracy. I am not saying that they are not entitled to the protection of the UN charter—I have already said that they are—but, given the denunciations of the breaches of human rights in eastern Europe by Ministers, one might have expected one of them, in this dispute, to point out that a person found guilty of shoplifting in Riyadh will have his hand chopped off. Are we to live in a world where morality is seen as the product of a parliamentary majority?
  The real issue is this. Everybody knows it and nobody has mentioned it. The Americans want to protect their oil supplies. I think that I am right in saying that not one Member on either side of the House has drawn attention to what the former Attorney-General of the United States, Ramsey Clark, said on the radio last night. He said that the United States forced Saudi Arabia to accept its army there because it wanted to protect its oil.
  We are experienced as an imperial power and that will not shock the Conservatives. I am not asking anyone to be shocked, only to recognise the fact that stares us in the

  777
  face. America has benefited much recently from cheap middle eastern oil. It was reported in the Financial Times that it has reduced its oil production and increased its oil imports from 31 per cent. to 52 per cent. It has become hooked on this cheap fluid that now has to be controlled by the American army. That is honestly the position. The United States wants a permanent base.
  I have not had a distinguished military career like my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East, but I served in Egypt in 1945 and I still have my identity card saying that I was exempt from Egyptian law. I looked at it the other day. We had a base at Tel-el-Kebir in Egypt from 1888, when Mr. Gladstone put it there, to 1956. If one talked to any Egyptians, all they did was read a list of promises by successive British Governments about when we would withdraw our base. We withdrew in 1956 and were in again with the support of the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery)—he and I clashed at the time—within a few weeks.
  Then there is the arms trade. That has been brought out a bit. A couple of years ago, in Algiers, I met a former Egyptian Foreign Minister who told me that there had been a seminar in Cairo about the crusades and that during the crusades European arms manufacturers supplied arms both to Richard Coeur de Lion and to Saladin. Nothing has really changed. Arms manufacturers have made billions of pounds from selling instruments of mass destruction, partly to hold down those colonial people so that the sheikhs will supply cheap oil, and partly because it is highly profitable to sell arms. I shall not try to differentiate between Governments, because the Labour Government did it too.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East said that it was wrong, and I shall have to put footnotes to that effect on every page of my diary—but at the same time, we did it too. The arms trade is a corrupt trade. If our troops have to fight those of Saddam Hussein—I hope that that does not happen—they will be fighting against modern weapons in part sold by Britain, France, America and Russia for profit. That is a major issue.
  If we go to war—and there are those who think that we might—what will be our war aims? That is not an unreasonable question. Will it be to free Kuwait, to topple Hussein, or to destroy Iraqi weapons? My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition went further than the Prime Minister in setting the objective. She said that it was to arrest Saddam Hussein and to bring him before an international crimes tribunal. The Prime Minister said that on television. Are British troops to be sent in to fight before their objective has been clarified? The Government have never made clear what is their aim. However, it is clear that the United States, having helped to arm Hussein, is determined to bring him down and to establish a new base.
  I do not need to dwell on the consequences of war. They include a massive loss of life and possibly an air attack on oil installations. In the peculiar circumstances, we would to some extent, if not in every sense, be taking on Islam. Stalin is remembered for asking a very silly question. He asked how many battalions the Pope had. [HON. MEMBERS: "Divisions."] We should ask how many divisions the prophet Mohammed had. There are 105 million Muslims in India alone. We have some here, too. I am sure that the BBC World Service will explain that that has nothing to do
  778
  with the situation, but there are people who will see our action as an attempt to reimpose a white, rich control over an area once dominated by the British empire.
  The Prime Minister courteously gave way to me when I asked what I hope was a relevant question. She said three times—so she must have meant it—that she already has the legal right to attack Iraq and that no further stages are necessary. The only consideration is that that will be done not at her discretion but at that of President Bush. I say to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition that anyone who goes into the Lobby with the Government tomorrow night will be endorsing the view that no further action is needed to legalise an attack on Iraq.
  Those who vote with the Government tomorrow will be voting for giving the Prime Minister a free hand or a blank cheque. Those who vote against the Government will be accepting the view expressed in my early-day motion, which calls on the Government
  "to make a clear and unequivocal statement that it will not commit British Forces to offensive military operations against Iraq that have not been explicitly authorised by a Resolution passed by the Security Council, and under the provisions of the UN Charter, which deal with the use of force by the United Nations and under its military command."
  I referred to two points of view, but others may think that it is better to reserve judgment and not to vote at all. Even those who cannot go with my view may not want to give the Prime Minister a free hand between now and 15 October.
  Yet another view has been constructively touched upon by other speakers—the belief that peace is possible, but that one must take a broad view of the factors involved. One must look both at the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and UN resolutions relating to the west bank. One cannot pick and choose between Security Council resolutions. One must have both a Palestinian state and security for Israel. One must deal also with the oil companies that are busy exploiting the situation as much as they can.
  There has been a 7 per cent. fall in oil production worldwide but a 100 per cent. increase in its price. How is that justified? Thank God for Winston Churchill, who in 1914, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty, nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company for £2 million. His speech on that occasion made the strongest case for public control and ownership of oil companies that one can find. Winston Churchill said that countries were being squeezed by the oil companies.
  If there is to be a peace-keeping force, it would be better if it were Arab, but I turn to the longer, post-cold-war perspective to which our attention has been properly drawn by a number of speeches. One cannot have a new order for the middle east based on the redeployment of white power in the form of a permanent American army in Saudi Arabia. That will not work. One is no longer dealing with the natives who featured in Rudyard Kipling's poems but with a quite different world. For me, the United Nations is the General Assembly, not the bigwigs, permanent and rotating members who sit on the Security council. I personally would like to see direct elections to the General Assembly. They might only return one British Member of Parliament, but I would certainly be a candidate, if that were possible.
  We are always being told that we must come to terms with reality and that we must not live in the past. The fact remains that we live in a very small world of many religions. There are fundamentalist Christians. When

  779
  President Reagan spoke of an evil empire, he was declaring a Christian jihad against communism. Anyone who has visited America and listened to those Christian fundamentalists, who have not got into trouble and been removed, will know that they make their reputations out of their religious wars against communism. However, as right hon. and hon. Members know very well, the Americans stimulated Islam to defeat communism—but when communism changed, fundamentalism remained.
  We shall have to plan and share the world's oil. America has only 2 per cent. of the world's population but uses 25 per cent of the world's resources. That situation cannot be allowed to last, even if America has a big army. The real function of the United Nations is to act as the custodian of social justice. It should not serve just as a policeman. The first meeting of the UN General Assembly took place in Central Hall, Westminster in 1945. Then, Gladwyn Jebb was its acting secretary-general. Some people may remember that. I was just back from war. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East and a former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, know that the UN was the great hope to end wars. However, it was more than that. It was meant to promote social justice.
  Those right hon. and hon. Members who support the Government's interpretation of the law, and their readiness to use their discretion without referring back to the House again, will vote with the Government in the Lobby tomorrow. Those who oppose the Government will vote with us, while others should abstain. I urge caution, because many other western European nations are being very cautious and have not sent troops. Many of the non-aligned countries are not really behind the action being taken by America and Britain.
  It is time to try to take some of the hatred out of the situation. I shall never forget the day I was first elected to Parliament. No one ever does. It was 30 November 1950. That same day, President Truman said that he might drop an atom bomb on China. We were then using against the red Chinese the language that we are now using against Saddam Hussein. They were seen as worse than the Russians. Nevertheless, there was a Peace for China Committee, and China was later admitted to the United Nations. Whatever the Chinese Government may have done in Tiananmen square, no one wants a war with the Chinese, otherwise they would not have been given Hong Kong—[Laughter.] So much for the right of self-determination.
  Mr. Heffer: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that it is not just a question of giving the Chinese Hong Kong but that the Americans have just agreed that they should have a special relationship and make special economic arrangements with China, despite the events of Tiananmen square?
  Mr. Benn: I know that my hon. Friend, whom I much respect, will agree with me that morality and power march uneasily together in public life. At the time of the Suez crisis, the Father of the House and I clashed—something of which he generously reminds me occasionally. What was said then about Nasser is exactly the same as what is being said now about Saddam Hussein.
  780
  The Falklands may be too close for comfort. Not all that many people looking back, think that that huge expenditure was justified—[Interruption.] I do not think so. I have been in a minority before, and I might be in one now, but that does not worry me—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order.
  Mr. Benn: In 1986, there was the bombing of Libya which tried to kill Gaddafi—it killed his god-daughter, I believe. Our bases were used for that. Some people took the opposite view.
  I urge caution because it is not the hardware of military weapons that frightens me. A gun cannot go off by itself. It is the hatred which makes people want to use weapons. That is the fuel of war and in the past few months we have had the most vicious war propaganda pumped down our throats. The temper of peace, of which Pandit Nehru used to speak, is what we need, and we want to be cautious and to let it work its way through the United Nations. For that reason, Mr. Speaker—it would not have been possible without some help from the Chair—I intend to divide the House against the Adjournment motion tomorrow.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I remind the House that the 10-minutes rule on speeches will operate between 6 and 8 o'clock.
  6 pm
  Sir Dennis Walters: As the 10-minute rule applies, I shall not be able to deal with a number of the points made in an eloquent speech by the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn). He always speaks eloquently, but his conclusions are usually wrong. In any event, it is absurd for anyone who knows the middle east to compare Nasser with Saddam Hussein. Their records and their respective countries are totally different.
  Undoubtedly there is massive support in the House and in the country for the Government's policy on the Gulf crisis. The facts are abundantly clear. President Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait, which was a member not only of the United Nations but of the Arab League, was an act of blatant aggression. It was callous and unprovoked and was particularly beastly because for eight years, while Iraq fought for its life against Iran, Kuwait gave Iraq generous and unstinting support. Saddam Hussein's accusations launched at the Emir of Kuwait were a grotesque distortion of the truth. Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah is one of the most independent-minded and wise of Arab leaders.
  I have been a member of the Kuwait Investment Advisory Board—an interest which is duly recorded—for many years and I was therefore able to witness at close quarters Kuwait's munificence to Iraq during the war and, for much longer, the enlightened investment policies pioneered by the Emir. There are not many countries whose principal investment portfolio is the "future generations fund", which is precisely what its name indicates. It was established to support future generations of Kuwaiti citizens without having to rely on oil revenues.
  The Government obviously are right in what they have done and said. This act of aggression must not be allowed to succeed. Co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union has been the most encouraging aspect of the crisis, and it is essential that it should continue. Saddam Hussein's two crucial miscalculations were, first,

  781
  that a puppet Quisling regime would speedily emerge in Kuwait and, secondly, that the Soviet Union and the United States would immediately be at loggerheads about how to respond to his aggression.
  Hopefully, the economic action taken will have the desired effect. Sanctions should start to bite before too long, and bite severely. Eventually it is not unreasonable to expect that Saddam Hussein or his successor will be forced to comply with the United Nations resolution calling for the immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Should that not happen, we must accept that action, under article 51, will have to be contemplated.
  As has been said, the legitimate Government of Kuwait would be entitled to ask for the removal of the Iraqi presence from Kuwait. Should action become unavoidable, it is essential that the United States and the Soviet Union should act in concert. British and European Community diplomats should employ all their skills to help to cement the new Russo-American understanding.
  I shall now mention the wider scene in the middle east. It is simply not good enough for the United States and the world community to deal exclusively with one act of aggression. It would not be acceptable to the Arab masses, who cannot and should not be lightly dismissed, if the United Nations, under American leadership, dealt speedily with one outrage while allowing others to continue festering. Why is King Hussein, one of the best friends of Britain and the west, so disturbed? Why is the Arab world partially divided over Iraqi aggression? The answer is relatively simple for anyone willing to take an objective view of the area and its history. It is Palestine and the running sore of the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is still unresolved and where efforts to do so have been at best half-hearted and often contemptible.
  Twenty-three years have passed since Israel was called upon to withdraw from Arab territories occupied by force in 1967. United Nations resolution 242 is quite explicit, but Israel has not budged, and, what is more, it has continued to pursue a policy of savage repression against the Palestinian people on the west bank and in Gaza and no one has bothered to do much about it.
  In the past two years alone, 159 Palestinian children under the age of 16 have been slaughtered and thousands wounded. What has the international community done about that? Some years ago, Israel invaded Lebanon, and its artillery mercilessly bombarded Beirut for weeks on end. What did the international community do then? Some years ago Israel bombed Tunis—the capital of a sovereign state—which was a clear act of international piracy. Again, the international community failed to take appropriate action.
  Regrettably, the realities of internal American politics in the past have not allowed the United States to act even handedly in the area. This continuing exercise in double standards has created a seething and unfathomable sense of bitterness, frustration and anger in the Arab world.
  President Bush and Mr. Baker have rightly said that they want a stable middle east, but they will not get it unless they face up to this reality. Therefore, it was most encouraging that Mr. Baker seemed to recognise this fact when he told the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that
  "America accepted that regional stability in the Middle East must include a settlement of the Palestinian issue."
  Subsequent reports from Washington seem less encouraging, but I hope that the quotation I have cited
  782
  represents the authentic view of the American Administration and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who has just returned from an important and successful visit to the area, will be able to confirm that that is so.
  We now face a genuine opportunity for good and one for evil. For good, after Iraq has agreed to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States and the Soviet Union should jointly sponsor an international conference to deal with all the middle east's territorial and economic problems, especially the Palestinian problem, and the role of the United Nations should become genuinely effective.
  For evil, there exists a real danger that King Hussein may fall and be replaced by a fanatically anti-western fundamentalist regime. The King is facing gigantic economic and political problems, and needs major help and understanding—not the kind of idiotic comment that was made by some American senator or congressman the other day, describing him as a wimp.
  Should Jordan be destabilised, this could be the moment for which the Shamir Government have been waiting for in order to implement the transfer solution so beloved by Likud racialists: that is, to expel the bulk of the west bank population. Such a move would have catastrophic and irredeemable consequences for western interests, and for the whole of the middle east. Wars and chaos would rage. It must not be allowed to happen: the opportunity for good must be seized, and, after the Iraqis have been obliged to leave Kuwait and the Emir and his legitimate Kuwait Government have been restored, the Palestinian problem must be dealt with immediately. That unresolved cancer, which is at the root of almost all the dangerous turmoil in the middle east, must finally be tackled and resolved.
  6.10 pm
  Mr. Andrew Faulds: I hardly need to assure you, Mr. Speaker, that I share most of the sentiments expressed in that excellent speech by the right hon. Member for Westbury (Sir D. Walters), who is an old political friend of mine.
  No apologist could clear Saddam Hussein of his crimes. The Iraqi dictator has an appalling record of repression, torture and murder; he has brought upon himself the near-universal condemnation of the world community. His occupation of Kuwait was a criminal misjudgment which could drench that region in blood.
  I deplore the invasion of Kuwait, and pray that sanctions may succeed; but it is only fair to Iraq itself—not to the dictator—to state that there may be some validity in its claim to Kuwait, which lay in that region of the Ottoman empire and which was a British creation in the colonial post-first world war carve-up. Are we going to go to war every time some country in Asia or Africa or the middle east has a boundary dispute over the colonial boundaries that we drew? Of course we are not.
  There was a special factor in Kuwait, and that was American interest. The United States has jumped at the opportunity to benefit from Hussein's action. It has clear war aims; do not let us fool ourselves about this. The first is, in the memorable phrase of an American commentator,
  "to make the world safe for gas guzzlers".
  The Americans intend to control the supply of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to ensure their immense

  783
  consumption of oil. To do that, their second aim is to destroy the Iraqi regime and, by their continued military presence, to ensure a compliant successor. [Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order.
  Mr. Faulds: Oh, they can mumble away; they do not want to know, because they do not want to learn.
  The Americans intend to control the supply of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to ensure their immense consumption of oil. To do that, their second aim—I am repeating this for the benefit of those who did not want to hear—is to destroy the Iraqi regime and, by their continued military presence, to ensure a compliant successor. They are playing the role that we played earlier in setting up regimes which would conform to our requirements for the supply of oil.
  But their third aim is the most sinister: to bring about the dominance of Israel in the area. Even most Members of the House probably know nothing of the strategic alliance that Reagan set up between Israel and the United States. No one so far has mentioned it. Of course, one should never underestimate the ignorance of the House of Commons on major matters.
  Reports have it that Israeli politicians and strategists are urging America to war. Military commentators are urging, "Do it now," and, once the war starts, under the strategic alliance—which hon. Members should perhaps learn something about—and its web of options, there will undoubtedly be attacks by Israel on Iraq's strategic targets: nuclear and chemical sites and missiles and communications.
  Mr. John Marshall: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Faulds: No. I have 10 minutes, and I am going to use every moment.
  In leading their great moral crusade, what hypocrisy the United States Government display! Their aggressions since the last war have been flagrant: in Vietnam, the war they lost—America can lose wars: against Nicaragua: in Panama; and in the great military victory in one of Her Majesty's realms, Grenada. Why, when Israel invaded Lebanon, was no such stringent action, led by the United States, taken against Israel? Instead, the United States supplied Israel with its latest weapons to try out against the Lebanese civilians, who died in their thousands.
  What action does the United States pursue to bring to an end the Israeli Government's harassment, torture and murder of hundreds of Palestinians in the illegally occupied territories? What is the difference in moral terms between occupied territories in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, and occupied territory in Kuwait? What nauseating hypocrites American politicians are—and that, of course, applies also to some of our own home-grown variety.
  James Baker, the United States Secretary of State, is now attempting another gloss—the establishment of a new security structure. The purpose of the operation is to lead the world towards a middle east settlement to remove the region's threat to global order. Are the Americans going to induce Israel to give up the occupied territories? Are they going to cease to provide Israel with the newest armaments which give them control of the region? James Baker's scheme to remove the region's threat to global order
  784
  entails the removal of Iraq's chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles. What about Israel's nuclear and chemical threat, and its ballistic missiles? Are they to go to remove the region's threat to global order, or are they to remain in site to guarantee Israel's and America's control of the area? What utter, nauseous hyprocrisy this is.
  What about our Prime Minister's role in all this moral charade? She always has to be more macho than the male, of course. She leapt in to support the United States. She thrives on the whiff of grapeshot, but she really does not know the background to developments in the Gulf—or anywhere else in the world, come to that. She is ignorant of history, and unaware and unconcerned about the beliefs and cultures of people in the world outside. She committed British troops—with the support of the "Gotcha!" and gutter British press—but she delayed consulting the House of Commons. We are just to rubber-stamp her jingoistic jaunt. But, most significantly, she backed the United States Government's policy in the middle east without any reference to our EC colleaugues, which shows her disregard for our European involvement. Then she proceeded to insult most of them for not tagging on quickly enough.
  Can there be a resolution without war? The redrawing of a colonially imposed boundary would be a small price to pay for peace. It appears that Saddam Hussein has offered to link some Kuwaiti realignment with Israeli withdrawal in Palestine and Syrian withdrawal in Lebanon. Might it not be worthwhile to examine such an arrangement? But, better still, might it not be advisable, before war breaks out—as it will if we continue on this course—to respond to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal to hold a middle east conference where all these necessary steps could be pursued, and justice achieved for all the aggrieved parties: Lebanese as well as Palestinians, Kuwaitis as well as Syrians? It would make much more sense, and be juster and much more successful, I guess, than Mr. Baker's pursuit of a pax Americana—which might have very little "pax" about it.
  6.18 pm
  Mr. Julian Amery: Like the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) managed to inject the music of controversy into the debate, but without—as far as I could see—really disagreeing with the fundamental proposition that the Iraqis have to withdraw from Kuwait. It cheered us up, but it did not add a great deal to the debate.
  The right hon.—and gallant—Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) reminded us of the dangers of war. He was quite right: on that journey, men know where they start but not where they will end up. The right hon. Gentleman then treated us to a charming autobiographical account of his own ideological progress. He has occupied a distinguished career, which could, I think, be described as the triumph of intellect over consistency. If anyone is responsible for the debate that we are holding today—although I would not want to attribute too much to any one man—it is the right hon. Member for Leeds, East. We are discussing the crisis today because he initiated the dismantling of the British security system in the Arabian peninsula without ensuring that an alternative system was put in its place.

  785
  It is easy to see what I mean. In 1961, when the Iraqi dictator of the day threatened Kuwait, the British Government—the Macmillan Government—said, "Is this for real or is it bluff?" We could not tell. Intelligence reports gave us the troop figures, but we did not know what would happen. We said that we could not take the risk, so we put in the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. The Iraqi dictator retreated and was toppled. We could not have done that unless we had had a major base in Aden and facilities in Oman and Sharjah, an advance base in Bahrain and stockpiles in Kuwait.
  When, a month ago, the present Iraqi dictator concentrated his troops on the borders of Kuwait, the Americans had no facilities, even if they had had the will, to meet the crisis. Their nearest base was Diego Garcia, 2,000 or 3,000 miles away. There were no stockpiles and no facilities that they could have used, so Kuwait fell. We were lucky that Saddam Hussein did not push his luck further and go for the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.
  The lesson is clear. The states of the Arabian peninsula, friends as they have been to us over the years, do not have the resources, the population or the strength to protect the oil resources that are vital to the economies of America, Europe and Japan. They cannot defend those oil resources by themselves.
  I am sorry that he is not here, but I take issue with my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath). I do not believe that, by itself, an Arab solution would work. The Arabs are bitterly divided. They make European union look like federation. We could not rely on them to protect the oil resources. A great many of them are interested in the issue only because they hope to get some of the oil wealth for themselves.
  We—when I say "we" I mean the United States, which is quite rightly playing the leading role, Europe and Japan—will have to accept the responsibility for a regional organisation. I was glad to see that Secretary Baker gave his support to that concept. It has as yet to be developed, whether under the United Nations—that would be ideal—NATO, or an offshoot of NATO—perhaps. Something new is needed that includes those Arab countries that want to join us. But there will have to be an organisation with bases and facilities to protect those interests that are so vital to the role of the industrial world.
  I shall be told that this is neo-imperialism. I do not believe that it is. The states of the Arab peninsula never wanted us to go. King Feisal begged us to stay in Aden and offered to subsidise the maintenance of the British base, until the right hon. Member for Leeds, East rejected the proposal as turning British forces into mercenaries. There was a chance then, and there is a chance again today, for the industrial countries of the west and Japan to contribute both forces and finance in order to set up a regional organisation to protect those resources on which the industrial world depends.
  We in Britain are playing a supporting role. I do not believe that we should become too deeply involved militarily unless we are also involved in planning the strategy. However, we have unique experience of that part of the world. We have something else, too. Our continental European friends have not shown quite the response that I had hoped for to the crisis in the middle east. In December, we shall be talking to them about financial and political union. I hope that we shall drive home the lesson that there is not much point in talking about financial union if they are not prepared to defend the most
  786
  important economic interests of the west, and that there is not much point in talking about political union if they are not prepared to come together with us to meet the threat that faces us. Here is an opportunity for us to give the lead.
  6.24 pm
  Dr. David Owen: It may be useful to consider what Saddam Hussein is planning at this stage, because then we might be better able, in the words of the Leader of the Opposition, successfully to prevent him. He intends to sit tight. Having annexed Kuwait, he intends to absorb it fully into Iraq. He does not intend to provoke a conflict. He has already instructed his forces not to respond to any United Nations naval intervention on the high seas. He intends to allow his aeroplanes to put United States, Saudi and British aeroplanes on full alert by flying close to the border, but he will not cross it. Unless there is a miscalculation, he does not intend to provoke war; he will just sit tight.
  Some people say that sanctions will bring him down. I should like to be able to believe them. We must tighten the air embargo. At the moment, considerable air traffic is going into Iraq, so that sanction must be tightened. There are long borders around Iraq and there are traditional black market routes along which, over the centuries, goods have entered Iraq. This leader does not care about privation for his own people. His country had to put up with tremendous privation during the Iran-Iraq war. Given that, for humanitarian reasons, we cannot starve Iraq, it will be very difficult to make sanctions work. They will work only if there is the fullest support from the Soviet Union.
  Easily the most hopeful event is that at last the Security Council is working as it was envisaged that it would work. The creation of the military staff committee is immensely important. I hope that the United States will give up some of its anxieties about the military staff committee being made fully effective. I hope that the Soviet Union and China will be involved fully and absolutely in the implementation of the embargo. It would be no bad thing if the military staff committee discussed some of the problems of the multinational force on the ground in Saudi Arabia. There is no reason why they should not be discussed.
  Technically speaking, because of the way in which the military staff committee has been constructed, it will not be provided with a full mandate to discuss the United Nations embargo. However, it is operating flexibly and developing new techniques. It is massively important that President Bush is to speak to President Gorbachev on Sunday. It is understandable that President Gorbachev is faced with an immense dilemma.
  There are many who call for United Nations action and who rule out any other action. It is nonsense to rule out action under article 51. If Saddam Hussein is to be pressurised to come out of Kuwait, he has got to fear the possibility of a massive attack. Let us be clear about this talk of a first strike. The only first strike was that by Saddam Hussein of Iraq against Kuwait. Any action that is taken in consequence of that is secondary.
  I believe and hope that, by means of diplomatic pressure and in particular the involvement of the Soviet Union, we can make Saddam Hussein give up Kuwait by the further tightening of sanctions, economic pressure and more Arab unity. I believe, however, that that man would

  787
  prefer to give up Kuwait as a result of a military battle, and I am afraid that that is what eventually it will turn out to be.
  Some say that we have to wait indefinitely. Some of the speeches—I regret the speech of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath)—gave the impression that we could wait indefinitely. We cannot wait indefinitely. A very sophisticated army is building up in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf which is on full alert. It can be on nothing other than full alert, day after day, in the most appalling conditions. Some people believed that our task force off the Falkland islands could wait indefinitely for a diplomatic solution and for a UN peace settlement, which we now know General Galtieri had no intention of giving.
  There will come a judgment, and it may be before Christmas, when people will have to consider whether Saddam Hussein will give up Kuwait without force. All that has been said about using force is absolutely true, and nothing is truer than the comments of some of those who have experienced war. This will be a bloody fight, because there is little doubt that he will use gas. He used it at the start of hostilities, and frequently, against Iran, and he has used it against the Kurds. It will be difficult to combat.
  For all these reasons, it would be a tremendous advance for a new security order if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to use article 39 and do what happened in Korea, and for the United Nations to vest responsibility for a United Nations force in a United States commander. I know that the circumstances were different—Russia was not participating and China was represented by Chiang Kai-shek—but if one looks back from our new world and reruns 1950, one sees what a difference there would have been if a military staff committee had operated as it is now. What a difference there would have been if we had been able to involve Russia and communist China. Had that united action taken place, the Korean war would have been over in months and we would never have seen the Russian and mainly communist Chinese push.
  Historic parallels are always flawed and there are many flaws in this. It is almost impossible to believe that Gorbachev could endorse such a United Nations force under article 39, but the inconceivable has been happening in the Soviet Union over the past few months—more than any of us predicted—and it is worth going every mile to try to achieve that. That may mean giving Gorbachev an assurance that the United States will take very seriously the resolution of the middle east, involving the west bank, Israel and Syria. Syrian forces are on the ground as part of the multinational force, and Syria is not a moderate Arab state but a radical revolutionary Arab state. Gorbachev has the right to know that the United States will take the principles of international law and the authority of the United Nations fully into account—not overt linkage, because the problems are separate and different—in trying to get an Arab-Israeli solution as well.
  Gorbachev wants many other things from the western democracies. His economy is virtually collapsing around his ears. He is no longer a super-power and it is doubtful whether he could commit forces in a major way. If he cannot get over that article 39 threshold, and I understand why he may not be able to, we have at least the hope that he will understand why we may be forced, under article 51,
  788
  to take military action involving other Arabs at the request of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government and the Saudi Arabians. If we maintain the consensus that has developed among the multinational force—it is a historic miracle to have got those forces together—there might be military action that would not last very long and would not involve a great deal of loss of life.
  Listening to this debate, if I had been Saddam Hussein I would have been pleased to hear a few of the speeches that have been made. They seemed to be an invitation for him to go on sitting tight, spinning it out and letting people get generally exasperated. I pray that force will not be necessary, but history shows us that, when dealing with aggressors who have no regard to international law and to the lives of their own citizens, let alone citizens of other countries, one must be ready to use force.
  It would be a massive mistake if from this debate in the House of Commons came a message that Britain was not ready, in the right circumstances, backed by international law and the multinational effort of many different colours, creeds and beliefs, to uphold international law.
  6.33 pm
  Mr. Anthony Nelson: When the House met in emergency session in 1982 to debate the invasion of the Falkland Islands, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) made one of the most compelling and responsible speeches. If I may say so, I think that he did so again on this occasion. His speech was a timely if sombre reminder that we shall have to use resolve and patience in this crisis.
  The speeches of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition matched the overwhelming view and mood of the House and, indeed, of the public at large. Although there are undoubtedly differences of inflection in the legal interpretation of the UN resolutions, we should all pay respect to the alacrity and clarity with which the Opposition came to the support of the Government in supporting the United States and British deployment shortly after the invasion.
  As a House, we should pay a wholehearted tribute to my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ministers at the Ministry of Defence. They have worked extremely hard and have dealt with the issue sensitively, forthrightly and with a keen understanding of where the national and international interests lie.
  Arabs have been taking over each other's wells since time immemorial, but the stakes on this occasion are of a different order. It is not so much the sovereignty of Kuwait or the supremacy of the al-Sabahs which is paramount, although these are important to reinstate. There are greater issues at stake. Not only is there the security and independence of other Kingdoms in the Gulf region but there is the economic self-interest of the western world. The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) seemed almost to deride this as a criterion that we should not consider. It certainly is legitimate to consider our own sources of essential energy supplies. The cost would indeed be great if we were to allow a disproportionate amount of oil supplies from the Gulf to be vested in the hands of one aberrant and abhorrent dictator. The cost would be great for mankind and for the world. We simply cannot allow it to happen.

  789
  There is, however, a principle at stake which transcends even the regional or economic issues—the basic sovereignty and independence of nation states and the principle of self-determination embodied in the United Nations charter. If we stand aside and allow invasion and subjection to take place in wilful disregard of international law and civil liberties what country can proclaim its freedom and what hope can there be for a more secure world order?
  So far, the world has held together in this crisis. We all know that it will take time. It may cost lives, it will certainly cost money and public patience may wear thin as the possibility of humiliation eats away at public resolve. Those are the times for the House, which can lead public opinion, to say to the Government that they can count on us for support. As a House, we trust the individual judgments of the Prime Minister and of Ministers vested with responsibility.
  However, there will be a real problem if we voluntarily give away the right to take what military action is necessary under resolution 661. One of the considerations that the President in Baghdad will take into account—I am among those who have met the man and he does seem to change his opinions from day to day—is the likelihood of military action being taken against him. If we voluntarily relinquish that, we have to rely entirely on the hope of sanctions. If we then say, "Let us rely on secure sanctions," what happens in three, six or nine months? Let us suppose that we are here in a year's time and, against all probability, the status quo continues. If we return to the United Nations, does anyone seriously believe that the United Nations will agree unanimously, "Yes, we will go to war against Iraq next week"? Even if it did, what would be left of Kuwait by then? What is left of Kuwait already? That land has been laid waste and its assets have been raped.
  In my judgment, as in the judgment of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport, it may be in the near future that decisions have to be made of a pre-emptive nature and of a selective nature to back up secure sanctions with the firm use of military power. What counts is not just the deployment and possession of military power but being seen as being willing to use it. Saddam Hussein must understand that we, with others, will stand up for international rights. If we fail to do so, we shall be failing our people and any hope of a new world order.
  6.39 pm
  Mr. A. E. P. Duffy: This recalled Parliament—especially those hon. Members who have supported the arguments of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition—has a vital opportunity to clear its mind about what sort of fight we are engaged in with Mr. Saddam Hussein, and about what outcome we seek. It is vital that our American ally is also clear about these matters. Two of the aims of President Bush have been declared. The unspoken third poses an increasingly worrying prospect.
  The first of the stated purposes was to draw a line in the sand along the Saudi border. The second was to get Iraq out of Kuwait. So far, the path towards these goals has depended crucially on sustaining the international consensus that aggression shall not pay and the legal and moral basis for that, set out in the United Nations Security Council resolution.
  790
  Some voices, notably that of The Sunday Times on Sunday last, have asked what will happen when sanctions fail to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait. The Sunday Times went on to argue that there will then be no choice but a full-scale war aimed not only at the total defeat of Iraq but at the toppling of Saddam Hussein. I trust that the United States and the United Kingdom will contemplate such a course of action with great reluctance.
  As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, there is no such thing as a clinical action in warfare. My right hon. Friend knew combat conditions and there are still some hon. Members who knew not only combat conditions but combat roles. If there is one recollection above all that I carry with me, it is of the unpredictability of stratagems.
  Even an invasion of Kuwait would be fraught with great difficulty and risk, and an invasion of Iraq would mean a battle with the whole of its 1 million man army. American air superiority would be decisive after a time, but the ground war would be the main hazard. What is required is not naval or air forces, but land forces. The United States will not have enough land forces or tanks, and unless there are vastly increased land forces, in place and provided with stiff logistical backing, there will be problems. Those of us watching closely know how far that is going astray and how far behind is the timetable.
  The pursuit of any one of these aims would run the risk of there being a heavier toll on America and its allies than many people have assumed. Already, reinforcement and supply have encountered serious delay. I hope that the United States will entertain such options only after the gravest consideration. Therefore, I join those who have called for caution.
  Furthermore, Iraq is a good deal less vulnerable than has been assumed. Even our key weapon—sanctions—involves a prolonged confrontation in which twists, turns and pitfalls aplenty will test nerve and resolve. If it holds tight, the embargo could be decisive, given that Iraq normally imports 80 per cent. of its food. However, such a strategy needs time, and how much will President Bush give it? He has to calculate whether, with only an embargo and blockade, he can hold out for victory over Mr. Hussein.
  I have recent experience of opinion within North Atlantic Assembly circles, as I led a delegation to the middle east in the past two or three weeks which included representatives of 13 of our allies. The US senators and congressmen in that delegation said that they do not want unilateral action by their country. They want multilateral action. They want allies. They do not want to be left to go it alone.
  I notice that several of America's allies, and ours, while supporting what Mr. Bush says, would still like to draw a more distinct line. They would like to pause for breath between enforcing the UN embargo and deciding what to do about Mr. Hussein's regime. Is it not premature, at this critical juncture, to proceed on the basis of too flexible an interpretation of article 51? None of us will believe that Mr. Hussein is not aware of this. We know that, if he is smart, he will sit tight and hope that the resolve of his enemies will crack before his does. His speech yesterday suggests that he will try to exploit the gap between the peoples and the Governments of the Arab world.
  Mr. Hussein's appeal will almost certainly grow as the confrontation continues. Two strong currents flow through Arab politics—the secular nationalism that made

  791
  Nasser a hero in the 1950s and 1960s and an older but newly reviving faith in militant Islam. Usually, these currents flow in different directions. Mr. Hussein, sitting tight, will portray himself as a proud Arab under siege by the west, and will try to merge the Arabs behind him. To many Arabs, Mr. Hussein offers the prospect of two things they have long wanted—a rediscovery of Arab unity and the power to defy the west.
  So far, relations between the Saudis and the United States forces have gone well, but there are dangerous undercurrents. One must not underestimate the forces of conservatism that remain the bedrock of modern Saudi Arabia. The non-Gulf Governments in the Arab League—even that of Egypt—are uneasy about the growing western army in Saudi Arabia. The divisions among the Arabs may grow if they come to believe that America wants not just to free Kuwait but to overthrow Mr. Hussein. Difficulties will undoubtedly arise for the Prime Minister and the President if the Iraqis start mistreating hostages or if the Americans decide on military action before any United Nations discussion on the further use of force. How would American and British public opinion react to the bloody reality of a shooting war or to weeks of television of pictures of haggard hostages and their relatives?
  As Saddam Hussein plays his cat and mouse game with the hostages, the United States, Britain and their allies should make it their highest priority to maintain the international unity of purpose that is their most powerful and legitimate weapon. The time for negotiations is not yet ripe. Sanctions first have to bite and even diplomacy would be ill-timed and futile before full British and American military power is in place to back it up. Until that time, what is needed, as other hon. Members have said, is a steadiness of nerve and political determination, and avoidance of defeatism.
  If conflict becomes unavoidable, we shall have to gird our loins, because the alternative would be only a wringing of hands. As time goes on and appeasement proposals proliferate, the strains on our allies' unity will undoubtedly grow. All wars are popular for the first few weeks, but if shooting starts, much blood will be shed and it will not be just Iraqi blood.
  6.48 pm
  Mr. Richard Luce: I am glad to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) and to stress, as he said—he was, of course, right—that it is important that we take action with the greatest degree of international support. That is exactly what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have been endeavouring to do so vigorously over the past few weeks. I am sure that that will continue to be the Government's main objective.
  I cannot help but reflect on the speech of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn). I do not think—I hope that I am right—that Saddam Hussein will have heard of the right hon. Gentleman. I suppose that that is some consolation, because it would be very bad if his speech were the message which got across to Iraq as the clear message was that, in the right hon. Gentleman's view, aggressors should be allowed to get away with aggression. That is entirely unacceptable.
  792
  The right hon. Gentleman also has an instinctive prejudice against the United States. However, without the immediate reaction of the United States in deploying forces at the request of the Saudi Arabian Government, Iraqi forces would be in Saudi Arabia now. The price that we would have to pay for the pursuit of the right hon. Gentleman's policies would be wholly and utterly disastrous for the world. I watched the right hon. Gentleman's expression carefully as he spoke. Clearly, he was enjoying himself. I am not absolutely convinced that he was convinced by what he was saying, but that is a matter for him to justify.
  I want to join other colleagues in congratulating my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues on the skill, wisdom and resolution with which they have tackled this very difficult crisis over the past few weeks. We are embarking on a course in which there cannot be one hon. Member in the Chamber who does not want a peaceful outcome. However, many of us know that there is a real prospect that some measure of force will have to be used. When we are risking the lives of our own service men, it becomes all the more essential that we maintain our clarity of purpose in the exercise and that we keep our sights on the real objective.
  To that extent, I welcome most warmly the robust speech by the right hon. Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock), the leader of the Labour party. That, rather than the message of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield, is the important message going out from the House. The message from leaders of all parties is that aggression must not pay, and the Iraqis must take notice of that message. We all know what is at stake. In the interests of international order, we must demonstrate that aggression never pays.
  We also know that there are interests not just for the western world, but for the Japanese, for the Americans and for many others. We depend on the middle east for so many of our oil supplies. If they get into the hands of a tyrant who can control the supply and prices of the oil, he could hold the world to ransom.
  We should not forget that this country has many friends of long standing in the Gulf. Throughout the bulk of this century, we have worked closely with them, and it is right that we should continue to do so.
  We must keep our sights on the main objectives—the defence of the Gulf states, the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the re-establishing of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government. All of us in this Chamber agree that that must, if possible, be achieved by peaceful means, so we must hope that sanctions will work. The history of sanctions this century does not give us a very encouraging signal. Nevertheless, because it is possible for geographical reasons to exercise tight control on the supply of oil to Iraq, sanctions may bring results over a short time span.
  It would be fatal if we gave a message to the Iraqi leaders that, at the end of the day, we were not prepared to maintain a military option. We must send the right signal on that from this Chamber. It would be fatal if we were to tie the hands of the British Government, the United States Government or any other Government who are prepared to contribute militarily to the middle east. I am glad that many hon. Members have endorsed that, and that we agree that article 51 provides the umbrella. We wish to do all that with the fullest possible international support. We have achieved it so far and we must go on working for that aim.

  793
  The third objective is to secure the longer-term stability of the region. I am glad that quite a lot of the discussion has been on that issue and that many hon. Members have welcomed the excellent speech made by Secretary of State Baker.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) made an important speech on the Gulf. Until the early 1970s, Britain played the leading role in protecting the Gulf states. If they wished to call on British forces to defend them, we were there and ready to do so. That has not been our position for the past 15 years, but my right hon. Friend is right to look to the longer term in the Gulf and to say that we must have multinational arrangements, with as much United Nations co-operation as possible, and with Arab participation.
  However, to expect the Arab world to work on its own in the present context would be unrealistic. It was, of course, right in 1961 when we had that special link with Kuwait for us to be able to put in forces and to deter invasion. An Arab League force was formed soon after that, but in the current circumstances, with the strength of the Iraqi forces, it is not realistic to expect the Arabs to do it on their own.
  We must be ruthless internationally in the enforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and in dealing with the chemical problem. We must also be careful about the Palestinian issue. There is an indirect link. We must solve the problem of the Iraqi invasion before we can deal, as we must, vigorously and internationally, with the Palestine issue. So long as that issue is unsolved, we shall be sitting on a powder keg which could go up at any time.
  Other positive factors, such as the end of the cold war era and the sudden emergence and willingness of the United Nations, with some Soviet encouragement, to act more positively, are working in our favour, and we can build on them. It is important to bring the Soviet Union as closely into this as we can.
  Although many of us feel that European Community countries and other European nations have been slow to respond with contributions to the middle east, we must get across to our European allies the fact that we have exactly the same interest in seeing stability in the middle east, and that it is wrong to leave the whole matter to the United States.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence will speak tomorrow. There is a clear message for our defences in this country. We know perfectly well that, although we may have seen the end of the cold war era, the prospect of regional disputes is as strong as ever and we cannot risk diminishing the strength of our defence forces.
  The message going out today and tomorrow must be absolutely clear, and there must be no misunderstanding by Saddam Hussein. In 1984, I visited Iraq and had one hour with Saddam Hussein. It is not an experience that I should like to repeat. I was told then that he modelled himself on Nebuchadnezzar, who specialised in expanding his empire. Our message to Saddam Hussein must be that aggression will not pay. He would do better to spend his time recreating the excellent hanging gardens of Babylon.
  7 pm
  Mr. Peter Shore: Like other hon. Members, I do not rule out the use of force to prise Kuwait away from the Government of Iraq. But we have not reached the point when a decision on that must
  794
  be made, and it has been an error of the debate for the House to be considering, as it were, simply the status quo—effective universal mandatory economic sanctions—having in view, after that, the need for the use of force and circumstances, legal and otherwise, under which force might be used. We must address ourselves more realistically to the interim period, of some months, before we may be faced with the possibility of using force, when the battle for hearts and minds in the middle east and elsewhere will be waged fiercely.
  I hope that when replying to the debate the Foreign Secretary will comment on the fact that we have not heard anything about efforts being made to discredit Saddam Hussein in the middle east and in his own country. Do we have broadcasting mechanisms in Saudi Arabia, Cairo and elsewhere by which the exiled Kuwaiti Government can broadcast to their people in Kuwait, giving encouragement and answering the lies and arguments of Saddam Hussein, all the time pointing out the total lack of legitimacy of himself and his rotten party's rule in his country? We should be making that type of counter-move.
  If sanctions are to be really effective, we must look after those countries that are more vulnerable even than Iraq to them. We should be in no doubt that, for example, Jordan is in a state of acute crisis and that Egypt and Turkey are facing enormous difficulties and dangers. If the sanctions policy is not to be undermined, the international community must come to the aid of countries which are behaving well in terms of the United Nations collective endeavour but which are at great risk in their economies and even in their political systems.
  If we are to help those countries and sustain their will to enforce economic sanctions, we must be prepared to engage in burden-sharing for the cost of the whole operation. It cannot be met by the United States alone. The whole world community must contribute, and if that means that we as a country must face an additional special international security levy in the coming Budget, we—hon. Members on both sides of the House—should be prepared to accept it.
  Mr. Julian Brazier rose—
  Mr. Shore: I have only 10 minutes in which to speak and cannot give way.
  We must take effective action on the whole issue of oil. There has been immense disparity between the oil price as quoted immediately before August 2 and the price today. It has moved from $16 to about $30 a barrel. Now that we have an OPEC guarantee to make up the balance of lost production from Kuwait and Iraq on the world market, the time has come to examine international stockholdings of oil. We have 90 or more days' supply. We should try to operate on the market to bring down the price to a more reasonable level. It should now be not $30 but in the region of $25 to $27. We have large reserves, and we should use them.
  It is important for us to take seriously the economic problems that arise from the conflict, and I take a contrary view to that of some of my hon. Friends on this issue. The United States is not being the world's greatest beneficiary from what is happening. America is not the country that most needs middle eastern oil. Continental Europe, Japan and above all, third world countries which are not themselves oil producers are the main beneficiaries. We

  795
  recall the misery that was suffered as a result of the vast indebtedness that afflicted many third world countries in 1974.
  It is not a question of American imperialism grabbing the oil of the middle east. It is vital that the world in general—all of us, and above all the developing countries of the third world—has access to oil supplies at a price that exploits neither the producers nor consumers of oil. We should be thinking about such measures now, and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will deal with those issues when he replies to the debate.
  We would be wrong to allow ourselves to become involved too deeply in what I regard as the excessive legalisms of articles 51 and 42. The legal arguments are finely balanced and, like other hon. Members, I could make a decent case to justify the use of force under either article. We must consider the political judgment, wisdom and effectiveness of what we do, and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition adduced a good argument when dealing with that issue.
  If we get substantial agreement in the United Nations—it may fall short of unanimity in the Security Council—among the nations of the west, of the third world and of the Arab world, for the use of military action to free Kuwait, we shall then have every reason to pursue that course, if we must do so and if economic sanctions do not work.
  It must be said, in balancing economic sanctions with the possible use of military sanctions, that terrible things are going on in Kuwait. While we talk about the problems of mobilising military force and keeping troops at the ready, let us remember that the people of Kuwait fear not only the collapse of the state but the real meaning of annexation, which is a problem of population movement affecting Kuwait. There are only 800,000 or so Kuwaitis. Now that Kuwait has been declared part of the province of Basra, what is to stop Saddam Hussein moving people in large numbers out of Kuwait and replacing them—there is evidence that this is starting—with people from other parts of Iraq? Should we sit back and watch that being inflicted on the people of Kuwait? If we do, and if such a ruthless policy is undertaken, there will be no gain at the end of the day for us if Kuwait has been destroyed.
  I do not believe that it is possible to take seriously the United Nations as an institution if we do not accept that the meaning of collective security—above all in this post-cold-war age—means the willingness to use international force, economic or, if need be, military, to achieve the goals of international security and justice which many of us came out of the second world war determined to achieve.
  7.8 pm
  Sir Julian Ridsdale: This has been an interesting debate, marked by unanimity between the two Front Benches. It is a change to speak in the House without the need to use the slanging political phrases that we use too often against each other and to be able to apply our minds to perhaps the most serious situation that we have had to face internationally since 1945.
  I was at a NATO conference in Hamburg in 1988, and there was a party on board a British frigate. I asked a German general who was at that party where he was in
  796
  1936. I told him that I was in the second brigade of the first division. He replied, "It is curious that you should talk about 1936, because I was thinking about 1936 when I came on board this British frigate. I was only so high in 1936, but my father was a company commander of the German troops that went into the Rhineland. He had orders that if there was any sign of resistance on the part of the British or the French, he was to withdraw."
  That is a lesson that we should think about now. We should consider what is in our opponent's mind as well as some of our fears. That is why I was so encouraged by the immediate action taken by the United States President, having listened to the advice of our Prime Minister, when he reacted to the aggressive, Hitlerite seizure of Kuwait. I am certain that that decisive action preserved the independence and security of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.
  I am not an expert on middle east affairs, but for the past 10 years I have served with the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy), who is now president of the North Atlantic Assembly. In the endeavour to reach agreement and win the cold war against the Russians, we have been dependent on the weapon of nuclear flexible response—a nasty thing to have. We had to face the reality of what would happen if we used a flexible response. I hope most sincerely that, in exactly the same way, sanctions will fulfil their purpose in these circumstances. If we were to do away with the military option that is needed, I fear that we should not achieve victory in the crisis we face today without the shedding of blood.
  Let us remember the ghastly confrontation and the forces on each side of the cold war. We must pay tribute to President Reagan and our Prime Minister for having won the cold war without the shedding of blood. That would not have been achieved if we had not kept cruise missiles, Pershings and flexible nuclear response. That is why I advise the House that, horrid as it may seem, especially to those of us who have fought in war, prepared for war and faced the fact that we should have gone into the Rhineland, in these circumstances we must follow through decisively. We must realise that we won the cold war because we had a flexible response.
  President Reagan and our Prime Minister won the cold war at great cost to the American people. In 1980, America was the biggest creditor country, today it is the biggest debtor country in the world. We now live in a post-cold-war period and are trying, as we all wished when we established the General Assembly down the road from here in the Methodist central hall in 1946, to achieve peace in our time for the generations who suffered in the war. We had to suffer the awful period of the cold war and now, for the first time, the Security Council can act as many of us wished it to act at the end of the war. I am sure that that is the long-term solution for many of today's ills.
  I am optimistic that in the end we shall be able to prevent what is happening in the middle east without the shedding of blood. The military option is vital. How encouraging it is today that the five Security Council members are in agreement.
  The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who made an excellent speech, underlined the importance of our relations with Russia and China. If we can use our diplomatic skills through the United Nations and the Security Council we shall be able to deal not only with the middle east problem, but the much more serious problem of the proliferation of nuclear and chemical

  797
  weapons. If the matter comes under the Security Council, with all the great powers in agreement, I am hopeful that, without fighting a battle of Waterloo to preserve a pax Britannica, as we did in the 19th century, we shall now, with our deliberations and wisdom, be able to create a world in which the Security Council will solve some of our problems. We should do so collectively.
  There has never been a time when the world has been more interdependent than it is at present. It is important that those not taking military action on the ground should contribute financially to the grave burdens that the United States and many of the world's other debtor countries are playing today. I am sure that the richer countries will do that, but it is vital that we all do so together, or we shall all sink together.
  7.16 pm
  Rev. Martin Smyth: May I be allowed, first, to join the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and Mr. Speaker in paying tribute to colleagues who are now deceased? I sympathise with their parties and families on behalf of my hon. Friends and, as I believe everyone will understand, particularly on behalf of the people of Northern Ireland in respect of Ian Gow, who showed himself a solid Unionist, determined to maintain his position against all terror. It is apt that, on a day when we are dealing with one who, by terror and destruction, would seek to impose his mind and will on a region of the world, we should pay tribute to one who resisted terror in our own nation.
  I have been a little happier with some of the more recent speeches than with some that took place in the middle of the debate. I welcomed the general unanimity on the Front Benches as right hon. and hon. Members tackled the issue. The right hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) omitted to say that, if Saddam Hussein is modelling himself on Nebuchadnezzar, he is in for a sticky end.
  I noticed some confusion during the debate and among the advice given, and was reminded of the old statement to the effect, "I don't know what you are doing to the enemy, but you are certainly scaring me." In my judgment, some of the contributions gave more succour to President Hussein than they did to either the hostages or the men and women stationed in the Gulf region at present at the behest of our and other Governments. During this debate, we have a responsibility to give them succour. I know that, in these hours of uncertainty and torment, we dare not forget the welfare of those Britons and other nationals who are trapped in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. I am sure that all my colleagues will agree that their safety is paramount amid all the talk of hostilities.
  I put on record our tribute to Douglas Croskery, who was murdered while helping others in a brave bolt for liberty. I praise the efforts of my friend the hon. Member for North Down (Mr. Kilfedder) in seeking to help Douglas Croskery's family.
  Without any qualification, I express the general support of my party for the way in which Her Majesty's Government have responded to the crisis, which is, in the final analysis, a dispute between the forces of peace and international harmony on the one side and despotism, tyranny and subjugation of the liberties which we cherish on the other.
  798
  I suggest that those who have been ready to throw stones at the Americans might also have been the first to throw stones at them if they had not come into the fray on the side of Kuwait and the international community.
  As I see it, we have two clear choices. We either appease a dictator and allow both ourselves and the United Nations to fall into the same depths of mendacity and shame as our predecessors pre-1939 or we stand for those hallowed principles that we profess so vehemently in times of tranquility. Those who look back to 1938 and are reminded of the horrors that ensued must not be ignored, because the threat remains the same. A dictator, revelling in the cult of personality which he has constructed for himself, has run roughshod over the rules of international behaviour and morality which we, as a nation, are pledged to defend. The integrity of Kuwait has been violated. Are we to accept that as a fait accompli? Is it to be treated as another Czechoslovakia so long as Britain does not become embroiled in a conflict which, some say, does not involve us?
  Surely Britain's national interests cannot be regarded as so inward looking as some have suggested. Are we so selfish that we should turn our backs on the oppressed and bullied of the world simply to preserve our own position? Surely we are not involved merely because of the interests of our economy, or those of any other nation's economy and the oil industry. There are other issues at stake.
  Appeasement of a dictator breeds only the hunger for more territory, an insatiable desire for living space for a vibrant and thrusting state which the tyrant feels he has created. Here, the threat is compounded by a desperation to roll back the physical and psychological losses of an eight-year conflict. That leads inevitably to an irrationality that is blatantly oblivious to the codes of international morality.
  I am happy that the consensus that is emerging from the debate is that our nation must show the world that our resolve to resist aggressors shall not be weakened and that our love of freedom and national integrity are not merely the ostensible ramblings of a once influential world power.
  The politics of Saddam Hussein must never be allowed to become excusable in the world. His actions threaten more than a delicacy of relations between the powers in the middle east. The appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s was practised in the mistaken belief that both were basically honest and rational men who practised the accepted art of diplomacy, but with only a little more zeal, to achieve their objectives. We must not fall into the same naivety in our handling of Saddam Hussein.
  Over the past two years, many of us have warned those who have gleefully advocated the disarming of NATO and the world in the aftermath of the bi-polar cold war. Those advocates should stand corrected. The crisis in the Gulf should demonstrate to all that the world will never be immune from the threat of megalomania or the evil designs of the despot. Our nation, with its friends and allies, must remain on guard against that threat and those designs.
  The Foreign Office has, to this moment, faced the challenge of Saddam Hussein. I pay tribute to those who are representing our nation. They are few in number, but they have done tremendous things in seeking to be helpful, and under tremendous odds. The Foreign Office as a whole will need to have the courage and conviction that, in my judgment, has been so demonstrably absent from its

  799
  deliberations on Northern Ireland, where it provided a framework whereby British interests and the interests of Britons would be undermined.
  As we and the United Nations look into the future, we should take steps to have all territorial claims on neighbouring territory withdrawn. Such claims historically foster strife. In Northern Ireland, the claim inspires terrorists to implement the constitutional imperative of the Republic of Ireland. As we look to the future, those issues must be faced, as well as the crisis in the Gulf. We must stand on guard against all hostilities.
  7.26 pm
  Mr. Michael Heseltine: I take issue with the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) on just one small, cavilling point. That is his comment that, if Saddam Hussein had been able to hear our debate he might have taken comfort from it. I do not think that he could take comfort in any way from it. I believe that it reflects overwhelmingly the view of the British people that a great wrong has been done and that Britain is determined to play its full part in putting it right. That is the only conclusion that anyone who has listened to the debate could draw. It is positively healthy that there has been the occasional speech, representing a negligible quantity of opinion, in which a different view has been taken. The very isolation of those speeches indicates the strength of the overwhelming majority in this place.
  The Government's position I find exemplary. I have said consistently, as have so many others, that the Government have taken precisely the right view from the beginning of the crisis. However much we may have been out of touch during the past two or three weeks—we followed events as best we could, often only through the media of other countries—it is obvious that the process adopted by the Government has continued as it began.
  The position that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister set out this afternoon is clear and exactly right. It is completely compliant with resolution 661 of the United Nations. The Prime Minister has set out for none to misunderstand her interpretation, backed by the best legal advice available to her. She has made clear, on behalf of the British Government, what she believes the resolution to mean. It means that we shall apply mandatory sanctions, that we shall enforce them and that, within certain circumstances, as my right hon. Friend defined, that might need the use of force.
  It is necessary to have read only the occasional speech of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to know that the last thing that he wants, the Government want or our allies want is the use of force. No one can have any doubt, however, that in the mind of the Government, and presumably in the minds of our close allies, that context is not ruled out. It is not anticipated in any way in the short term but it is within our interpretation of resolution 661.
  We are an open society and part of the open world. If there are those in the United States who believe that we have misinterpreted the resolution and who wish to disown what we claim to be the meaning of the vote that they cast, they have plenty of time to make their position clear. They can start to do that now. They can react at once to what we are saying the resolution means by saying that, when
  800
  they voted for it they thought that it meant something else. If they do not do so, they cannot complain if we act upon the interpretation that we set out at an early stage.
  The issue is whether we should return to the United Nations for further clarification if sanctions do not achieve the desired objective. Powerful arguments were put by the Leader of the Opposition and reinforced by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). It is not that the law may be defective, but that there is a political dimension to the enforcement of that law which it might, on some subsequent occasion, be wise to pursue as opposed to legally necessary.
  I wish to put another view. We all want the sanctions to work—that is not in question—but let us suppose we reach a stage where it is perceived that they are not working. We are not playing cricket. The object then would be to win at the lowest possible, though doubtless awful, cost. A lonely judgment will have to be made by a limited number of people about whether their action, unheralded, would be more or less likely to secure the objectives of the original resolution. They would have to weigh that against the advance warning of a change of tactics that going back to the United Nations would imply.
  The announcement of a new dimension to the policy could provoke a first strike—or, as the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport said, a second strike, but from the Iraqis. Do we want that? I can think of no argument for saying that in a few weeks or a few months we should alert the Iraqis to a new dimension to our policy. Our task then will be to win quickly and decisively. That is the overwhelming reason why I hope that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in replying to the debate, will give no further assurances. All the necessary assurances have already been given in the clearest language. To do so would only undermine the strength and clarity of our position in a way that he would be the last person to want to do.
  The tragedy of the crisis is that it is dynamic and events are unfolding. I have agreed with the right hon. Member for Devonport from the beginning—I do not think that the Iraqis will launch an attack on us or move into Saudi Arabia, because that is the way for them quickly to lose. They will try to bust the sanctions. By now, they will be combing the world to find ways to do what sanctions busters have always done, which is to get around the sort of peaceful coercion that the United Nations has imposed. No one knows whether they will succeed, but that is their best chance of success.
  If that happens, the dynamics will unfold and the moderate Arab leaders will begin to wonder whether they can win. The advocates of fundamental Islam will latch on to a new hero who is likely to advance their cause. The kingdoms of the Gulf will begin to wonder whether they can contain the ever larger numbers of people injected into their societies to spread the word that their days are numbered. All over the world, people will begin to say, "It is the Americans, the imperialists, the western powers and no one else." Indeed, they will probably say that it is just the Americans. We have heard that today, but, to the source from which it came, it is always just the Americans. If the Iraqis got out of Kuwait as quickly as the Americans got out of Grenada or Panama, who would be complaining as loudly as we are likely to have to do?
  The most difficult point of the debate—it is not just enmeshed in this particular policy dilemma—is that the

  801
  reason why the Americans are hated is because they can act. They are prepared and they have the strength and the coherence to move decisively and quickly—
  Mr. Faulds: Even if they are wrong.
  Mr. Heseltine: That is a judgment that the hon. Gentleman must defend, as he did in his speech. This House overwhelmingly believes that, in this case, the Americans are right.
  The issue is whether the Americans want to be isolated, alone and the big brother. Like so many right hon. Members, I served as a Defence Secretary in the NATO alliance. I agree that the Americans hustled us along. We have been trying to get the initiatives right and trying to keep our nerve. It would be a brave hon. Member who said that we could have done it without them. I could not say, with my hand on my heart, that all the European members of the NATO alliance were always in such agreement that they could be relied upon. I remember the footnotes and the qualifications. I remember the phone calls from national Parliaments saying, "Don't do this, qualify that, hold back, wait a minute." It was always the Americans who took the lonely, tough decisions, and that is where we are today. They have taken those decisions, and because our Government were the first to back them, we have contained the appalling damage of the occupation of Kuwait.
  Now we want to try to help, but how? The way to help is to strengthen the American support. Other nations of like mind to ourselves should increase their commitment, whether military or financial, to the American endeavour. The greater the endeavour that we make, the more we can ask to be consulted and the more influential we shall be in—
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean): Order. I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but he has overrun his time.
  7.36 pm
  Mr. Peter Archer: I am sure that we all regret the fact that we did not hear the end of the speech of the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), but we understand that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, must enforce the rule across the Chamber.
  There is a clear consensus in the Chamber, as there should be at such a time. In enunciating the consensus, we are in the process of elaborating a principle that will play a great part in the future destiny of this planet. The purpose of the debate is to formulate what that principle is and what it is not.
  The principle is not that we are prepared simply to support the Americans. In this instance, our objective of resisting military aggression by Iraq is one that we share with President Bush, but it does not follow that our motivation is the same as his. For this purpose, it does not greatly matter. His reason may be that he does not share the political views of the Iraq Government, and nor do we. But I hope that we would not make it part of our foreign policy to overthrow Governments with whose views we politically disagree.
  It is fair to say that nothing has been said during the debate to commit us to that principle. Indeed, there are many influential people in Washington who are now questioning the sort of policy, typified in Vietnam, of
  802
  seeking to establish around the world miniature clones of Uncle Sam. Washington itself is now a very different place. However, that is not the issue in this debate.
  I do not believe that the principle is about maintaining the supply of oil. Indeed, our motivation should not be even to enforce human rights in Iraq. Some of us have sweated blood over many years to find ways to compel all tyrants and potential tyrants to have regard to human rights. We have had our successes when we managed to persuade enough people to care about human rights to do something about it. We have drawn attention to the victims of infringements in Iraq—the Kurdish people who have been treated with such inhumanity, and also individuals within Iraq.
  However, I hope that that is not the issue in this debate. I hope that we are not establishing the principle that we are prepared to enforce international law against Governments with a bad record on human rights but not against Governments with a better record. That is not the way to secure the observance of human rights.
  The principle that has emerged in the debate is that a flagrant breach of international law, by whomsoever, will be resisted by the entire international community. That is the new world order to which my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition referred. If it can be established that gross infringements of international law do not pay and that they will not be permitted, we will have begun the process of making the world safer—safe for small nations, safe for human rights, safe for human life.
  That is not a matter of dividing the world into good and bad guys. If we are classifying individuals, President Saddam is a bad guy by any standards: we would all agree on that. But that is not why he should be compelled to comply with international law. If we see someone stealing, we do not, before we decide whether to arrest him, inquire about his views on privatisation, Salman Rushdie or transubstantiation, nor about the standard of his morals. We arrest him because, unless the law is enforced against each and any individual, we are all at risk. That applies, and it must be made to apply, in the middle east, Africa, Asia and central and south America.
  Establishing the rule of law on a global basis is likely to be a lengthy and difficult undertaking, not because of the shortcomings of international law; there is in existence a substantial body of recognised international law. We need to do more in extending and clarifying it by agreements and conventions. We need to improve and to expedite the procedures of the various international courts and tribunals. In the process of that we may be building a consensus, as we did recently in Copenhagen, which will make it difficult for individual Governments to disregard it.
  But minds will be concentrated on all that only when everyone knows that international law will be effective and that decisions will be enforced. That is an urgent problem, and it is becoming more urgent with every day that passes. With the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the continual increase in the number of national Governments in a position to launch war on a devastating scale, the time left to us may be running out.
  It is not only in relation to military aggression that activities of nation states need to be brought within the rule of law. If the planet is to survive, a wide range of human activities can be safely regulated only on a global scale. Energy policy can no longer be confined within the

  803
  frontiers of nation states—not since Chernobyl, nor acid rain, and certainly not since the dependence of international economies on oil prices.
  But all that depends on the principle that activities which need to be regulated by international law are the concern of the international community, and that they will be enforced by the whole community. Today, we are discussing a situation in which we can take that first step towards establishing the principle because we have achieved a virtual consensus among the whole community.
  If that principle is to be established, it requires three conditions. First, the sanctions to be applied must be no more than are required for the purpose. No one in his right mind would want to resort to military action if there was a prospect of achieving results by economic sanctions, for reasons that have been fully ventilated in the debate, and also because that is the only way to achieve an enforceable international law. It is vital that economic sanctions should be made to work.
  That leads to the second condition. Those who seek to apply the sanctions should act, and be seen to act, with the authority of the international community if that can be achieved. This is not the occasion to embark on an analysis of article 51, but it is worth pointing out that it was included, that the right of self-redress was reserved in the charter, because it was recognised that it might not always be possible to achieve consensus. If that consensus can be achieved, to resort to self-redress would simply be a step backwards. So I hope that we will seek to proceed on the basis of clearly worded United Nations resolutions.
  The third condition is to recognise that, if the rule of law is to be maintained, it matters not only what people do but the reasons that they give for doing it. They need to say that they are acting to enforce legality, not for other reasons. I do not want to introduce a sour note, but I would have been happier if the Prime Minister had made fewer references to our allies, partners and friends. We are talking about the international community.
  This is only the first step. I believe that ultimately there is no alternative to securing a monopoly of war-making potential in the hands of an international authority. Anarchy in Britain ended in the 13th and 14th centuries, when the Government established a capacity for enforcing law and order which could not be challenged by any robber baron, or ultimately by any combination of robber barons.
  That was not the end of local government or pluralism. We may have come close to that in the past 10 years, but that is not because the Government can enforce law and order. The rule of law enforced by a single authority is not inconsistent with a full range of other powers to individual states and local communities within those states. That is not an objective that I have just formulated. I can quote the authority of Emmanuel Kant, William Penn, Jeremy Bentham, Richard Cobden, Lord Tennyson, Teilhard de Chardin and Clement Attlee.
  I recommend to the House a book by a former colleague in the House, Henry Usbourne. He is now well into his eighties but he is still reflecting on these matters. His book, "Prescription for Peace", will amply repay time spent in reading it. I believe that nation states as we know them will no longer have a part to play in the 21st century.
  804
  President Saddam has provided us with the opportunity to take the first step. I hope that that will be the message which goes out from the House tonight.
  7.46 pm
  Mr. Tony Marlow: We can all agree or we can have a debate. In this democracy we should not be fearful of having a debate. I have visited Iraq and the Gulf as a guest of the respective Governments, so the House will make its own judgment about whether I am better informed or biased.
  I agree with all that the Government have done to date. They have handled the matter brilliantly. We were right, when the United States found their interests threatened and felt that they had to go into the Gulf, to go along with them. The special relationship demanded nothing less, and we want to retain influence over events as they unwind.
  We are also totally right to insist on the enforcement of United Nations sanctions. Publicly, we are right not to rule out offensive action. But privately, I trust that we do not contemplate it. Some of my colleagues seem to believe that there is a switch which can be turned and out will go Saddam Hussein; that there will be victory marches in Whitehall by Christmas. War is much more difficult and dangerous than that.
  We have heard a lot about Britain's aims, but what about our interests? We have British citizens in Iraq and Kuwait whom we wish to bring home with dispatch. The cornerstone of our foreign policy is our relationship with the United States. We want to see the United Nations grow and flourish after the ending of the cold war. But, unlike Germany and Japan, we are not dependent on the oil of the Gulf and the middle east. Apparently, they have a constitutional embargo against supporting international action. Perhaps they just lack the constitution for it.
  The United States is highly dependent on oil from the middle east, and United States politics is heavily dependent on support of the state of Israel. It may be in the interests of the United States to consider offensive action and war, but it is not necessarily in our interests as well.
  There is a temptation to look upon these events and foreign policy as a moral issue. I hope that my country's foreign policy is moral, and that moral arguments can be used to sustain it. However, foreign policy is always dictated not by moral issues but by national interests, for the very good reason that different people have different moral outlooks. It is proper and one can ask a man to die for his country but I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, who has been brilliant throughout this difficulty, would not wish anyone to die for his personal views of morality.
  What is it about Saddam Hussein that may make it proper to contemplate an offensive war against him? His evil has been compared with that of Hitler. Many speakers in today's debate seem to have returned to 1939, saying that we were threatened then by a major country in Germany and had to stand up and fight against it. The present situation is not like that. As other right hon. and hon. Members have said, Iraq is a long way away. We are not the major player in this issue. We must consider our interests, so any comparison with Hitler does not ring true.
  Perhaps it is that we want to make the world a safer place, by proving that no nation can with impunity assault,

  805
  attack or take over its neighbour. Anywhere in the world? Indonesia, Indochina or Israel? Why have we decided, specifically in Britain's interests, to draw the line at Iraq?
  That brings me to the Arab question—the question that will be asked by the Arabs—not by the Egyptians, who are the second biggest recipients of United States aid or by the feudal overlords, with whom we have had good relations in the past for very good reasons—but by the Arab in the street.
  Israel has exploited, humiliated or imprisoned 1·5 million Palestinians, and has denied them human rights, for generations. The Israelis have invaded Lebanon and laid waste Beirut, and at a weekly whim have been aerially murdering a few Palestinian families in refugee camps. When Israel invaded Lebanon, the casualities were far greater than those reported when Iraq went into Kuwait.
  That is the question that will arise in the minds of the Arabs after the event as well. Israel annexed Golan and has a Quisling Government in southern Lebanon. Saddam Hussein may have chemical weapons, but Israel has nuclear weapons. The question asked by the Arabs will be why we are using force against Iraq when we have not used force against Israel. Is it because there are more Jews than Arabs in New York? If the Kuwaitis grew carrots rather than pumped oil, perhaps different attitudes would prevail.
  Mr. Cormack: My hon. Friend should go and join the National Front.
  Mr. Marlow: This is meant to be a serious debate.
  Let us consider the military scenario. There is an idea that there can be a quick, surgical strike, but I suggest that my hon. Friends read carefully the wise speech of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey). I am no military expert, but I wore a uniform for 11 years, and for all the ordnance and technology that the Americans have at their disposal, recent United States military experience has not been happy. Iraq's armed forces also have military technology and although—like any other forces—they probably have major weaknesses, Iraqi forces have just sustained eight years of war without flinching.
  Rather than turn tail at the first sighting of the United States Air Force, is it not more likely that they will turn towards Jordan and Israel? What effect would that have on the alliances that have been carefully built up? What then is the likelihood of the use of chemical or even nuclear weapons? What will happen to Arab opinion when the perception is that Arab blood is being shed by western imperialists selfishly seeking to secure for themselves cheap oil and seeking to destroy the only Arab state capable of standing up against Israel? How secure then will be the heads that wear the feudal crowns?
  There are many fundamental differences in attitude between Europeans and Arabs, but there is one of particular importance that we should bear in mind. We are British first and European second. The French are French first and European second. Any Arab—be he a Jordanian, Iraqi, Libyan or Moroccan—is an Arab first. If there is a war and blood is spilt, it will be Arab blood that is spilt. Supposing that the hawks predominate—and there seem to be plenty around me at the moment—and there is a magnificent military success, will we then see a United States army of occupation on Iraqi soil? How long would it remain there, and how would that stabilise radical Arab opinion? We have see the ayatollahs at work in Iran—what if they cross the Gulf'?
  806
  If there is no army of occupation, what then will happen to Iraq under whatever leadership then obtains? Iraq is rich in resources. It has oil, two major rivers, potential agricultural wealth, and 17 million people, many of whom have highly developed skills. If one takes away Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons potential—
  Mr. Cormack: What about the Kurds?
  Mr. Marlow: I do not support such action. What is my hon. Friend suggesting? I am saying that if Iraq is humiliated, that potentialy powerful and wealthy country will resent that humiliation and will be more aggressive in the future than it has been in the past.
  Sir Bernard Braine rose—
  Mr. Marlow: I cannot give way to my right hon. Friend because time is against me.
  If there is a war, peace must follow it. The second world war arose because of a lack of a proper peace after the first world war. Let us think ahead.
  Mr. Cormack: So my hon. Friend favours appeasement?
  Mr. Marlow: I am not concerned about appeasement, but about British interests.
  Psychologically, the Government are right to wave a big stick and not to rule out the use of force. However, the reality is that the use of force would solve nothing but would make things worse. It is easy to start a war but difficult to predict its outcome, apart from the deaths of thousands of people, the destruction of thousands of homes, and the legacy of many crying and desolate women and children in starvation. No British interests can be served by such a war.
  Sir Bernard Braine: Will my hon. Friend give way now?
  Mr. Marlow: I put it to my right hon. Friend, who seems more hawkish than I, that it is not his life that would be at risk but the lives of British service men. What have we to say to the young men who will be expected to put their lives on the line?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Member but he has run out of time. Mr. Dennis Canavan.
  7.57 pm
  Mr. Dennis Canavan: This is the first emergency recall of Parliament since the Falklands war in 1982. At the end of that debate, which was on a technical Adjournment motion, there was no vote, and afterwards the Prime Minister tried to use that as a mandate from the entire House of Commons for her subsequent conduct during the Falklands war, which included the dispatch of the task force and its deployment, the sinking of the Belgrano, and the escalation of a conflict which cost more than 1,000 lives. In retrospect, many people in this country realised that that was a needless conflict.
  The fact that the Prime Minister received a virtual blank cheque on that occasion meant that she was able to do more or less what she wanted. Three weeks or more after that initial debate, some right hon. and hon. Members managed to divide the House. About 30 of us voted against the Government in a subsequent debate on the Falklands. I do not regret my action on that occasion. My only regret is that we did not take it earlier, so that we

  807
  could have stifled at birth the myth that the Prime Minister had the unanimous consent of Parliament for her subsequent action.
  We should not make that same mistake twice. A full-scale conflict in the middle east could be far more destructive and devastating, and involve far greater loss of life, than any conflict in the south Atlantic—particularly when one bears in mind that it could escalate into chemical or even nuclear conflict at some future time.
  I hope that we are all unanimous in unequivocally condemning Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the destruction of human life that has taken place already, and the hostage-taking, as absolutely unjustified aggression. However, our response must be firm and measured, and it must have the support of the international community. There is widespread—well nigh unanimous—support within the international community, and virtually unanimous support in the House, for the use of sanctions, but they take time to have their full effect and there is therefore a need for patience and caution, especially in our attitude to the possible use of force.
  I should make it clear that I am not an absolute pacifist. I believe in the basic right of self-defence and the right to go to the defence of others who are the victims of unjust agression, but history and experience have surely taught us that in many instances the precipitate use of violence merely begets more violence. If force is to be used, it ought to be minimum force, and it ought to be used as a last resort.
  I am concerned about the possible use by the United States—and the United Kingdom might get involved—of some sort of pre-emptive strike action, which could make the situation worse rather than better. I am also concerned about the double standards of some people who rightly support the use of sanctions against Iraq in the present situation, and yet did not support the use of sanctions against South Africa. I am concerned about the double standards of people who rightly deplore the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and want to see the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as soon as possible, and yet did not deplore the Israeli invasion of the West Bank but kept strangely silent about it, and still do.
  Those double standards confirm my suspicions that the United States of America and the United Kingdom are taking stronger action over the invasion of Kuwait simply because of the threat to western oil interests in the Gulf. Oil is important, but people are more important, and an awful lot of people stand to get hurt or annihilated if there is a full-scale conflict in the middle east.
  There is more chance of the whole crisis escalating into a full-scale conflict if it is the perception in large parts of the Arab world that the heavy military build-up in the Gulf is predominantly an American, neo-colonial force, backed up by the United Kingdom and other American allies. In terms of Arab perception, it is very important that there is United Nations control and explicit United Nations approval for the conduct of the whole operation.
  I was very unhappy when I heard the Prime Minister earlier this afternoon, with her legalistic interpretation of article 51 of the United Nations charter. It makes me suspect that she may indeed be hell bent on trying to use her interpretation, or misinterpretation, of article 51 to resort to force without the explicit approval of the United
  808
  Nations. We have witnessed her warmongering jingoism before, and I for one do not trust her. I certainly do not trust her enough to give her another blank cheque, and that is why I intend voting against her and her Government tomorrow.
  8.4 pm
  Sir Bernard Braine: Timing is the essence of crisis management. It was absolutely right to recall Parliament now. To have done so earlier, before the blockade authorised by the United Nations Security Council had been put into place and when Saudi Arabia, with oil resources so important to the world economy, was wide open to attack, might not have commanded the unanimity that has been emerging in this debate.
  More than in any other crisis debate I have heard in the 40 years I have sat in the House, I was struck by the clear lead given by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the effective response of the Leader of the Opposition and the clear, effective and thoughtful speeches from experienced former Ministers—for example, my right hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), and the right hon. Members for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), and for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore)—from different parties but all of whom have had extensive experience of foreign and defence affairs. I now feel sure that we are moving towards a unanimous view which justifies the timing of the debate.
  The situation that we now face is fraught with grave dangers and, unlike others, I shall not speculate—nor is there time to do so—on what might yet happen. There are too many imponderables. However, I remind my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow)—whose speech surprised me—that in Saddam Hussein we are dealing with a man who has not hesitated to murder any individual who stood in his way, who has used poison gas to snuff out the lives of thousands of men, women and children in his own country—in Iraqi Kurdistan—and whose fruitless eight-year war against his Muslim neighbour, Iran, cost over 1 million lives. Who can say what he might yet do if he is not soon tumbled? But as a student of history, who has watched the passage of events from the sidelines, I know that one thing that one does not do is to announce in advance what steps one will take in an emergency to enforce the will of the United Nations, when one is dealing with a man of that kind.
  By now we should know where we in Britain stand on this grave issue. The United Nations resolutions are not negotiable. The aggressor must withdraw from Kuwait and make reparation for the damage inflicted upon that small state and that must be seen to be done, not at the behest of the Americans or of the British, but by the command of the world community.
  The taking of hostages is a crime under international law. Every single one of them must be released, and appropriate compensation paid. That is not merely the British or American stance, but the agreed position of the United Nations and of the Foreign Ministers of the 13 Arab League countries who met in Cairo last week.
  All this begs the question, "Where would we be if the Americans had not been prepared to act?" Would we have been able to do anything on our own, even if the desire had been there? We must keep all this in perspective.
  In as grave a crisis as any since the second world war, the firm stand taken by our Prime Minister in support of

  809
  President Bush, the diplomatic skills shown by our representatives at the United Nations and in the Gulf and, throughout, the calm and sensible approach of our Foreign Secretary, all deserve the highest praise. I like to think that I know what my constituents are thinking from what they write to me, and that view is very widely expressed. It can best be expressed to the world as a whole by this freely elected Parliament giving full endorsement to what has already been done to uphold the rule of law, and by giving our unanimous support to the Government in their determination to see this crisis through.
  I was sorry to hear the speech of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn). I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), who said that he was not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman really believed in what he was saying: there was a gleam in his eye and a smile on his face. He is an engaging person, and in a way I felt sorry about the speech since I did not think that it added much to our knowledge.
  Let me assure my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North that I know of no Conservative colleague who wants war to happen. That means that we must make our purpose clear. There can be no return to normality until Iraq disgorges Kuwait, releases the hostages and bows to the will of the United Nations. It would be fatal to give the impression that we would be willing to tie our hands in advance as has been suggested—laughable, but fatal. By all means let us not lose sight of our present objective, but we must never allow ourselves for a moment to forget that the world is now too small a place for dicatators anywhere to do what they like with impunity where their weaker neighbours are concerned.
  That brings me to a specific point. When I say that there can be no assurance of peace or stability in the middle east until Iraq's nuclear and chemical capabilities have been destroyed, I hasten to add—I think that this is in keeping with the spirit of our debate—that I do not see that problem in isolation. Some good may come out of this crisis. For there simply must be a fresh look at world security problems as a whole, and firm action will have to be taken with regard to the traffic in sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.
  It is shameful that European companies have supplied Saddam Hussein with the means of killing en masse, including his own people. It is obscene, and it must end. I hope that, as a result of this experience, the world as a whole will adopt a new posture, and I think that there is real hope of that: the changes that have taken place in eastern Europe and the new attitude of the Soviet Union give promise that we can look forward to a better world, if we are bold and resolute now and do not exhibit the weakness and flabbiness of the recipe advanced a short time ago by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North. We have an immediate problem, but let us never lose sight of what ought to be on the agenda for the future.
  For the moment, then, we must steel ourselves to face the prospect that the blockade may continue for quite some time. It will not be easy to maintain substantial forces in continuous readiness in the difficult conditions of the Gulf, but it must be done. We need to send a clear message to Saddam, and also to our friends, about where we stand.
  Last night, opening a book at random, I read the words that Winston Churchill uttered in the darkest days of the Second World War, in March 1942:
  810
  "We must confront our perils and trials with that national unity which cannot be broken, and a national force which is inexhaustible. We must confront them with resilience and ingenuity which are fearless, and above all with that inflexible willpower to endure and yet to dare for which our Island race has long been renowned."
  If there is to be a vote, I hope and trust that this Parliament, like its predecessors in times of great peril, will rise to the occasion and demonstrate to the world that our people have not changed.
  8.14 pm
  Mr. Stuart Bell: I am grateful for the opportunity of following the Father of the House, the right hon. Member for Castle Point (Sir B. Braine). He has referred to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), whom I am glad to see in the Chamber. My right hon. Friend mentioned Saladin, and he was in good company, because the Prime Minister did so as well. He also mentioned the question of the General Assembly of the United Nations being directly elected, and said that he would be a candidate.
  There has been talk of Richard the Lionheart too, and the right hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) mentioned Nebuchadnezzar in connection with his meeting with Saddam Hussein in 1984. I, too, think of Nebuchadnezzar and I wonder whether Saddam Hussein has read the Book of Daniel lately. That book tells us that Nebuchadnezzar was once so powerful that
  "all the peoples, nations and languages trembled and feared before him, but when his heart was lifted up and his mind hardened in pride, he was deposed from his kingly throne and they took his glory from him."
  Mr. Dalyell: He was a Kurd.
  Mr. Bell: As my hon. Friend says, he was a Kurd.
  I see Saddam Hussein more as the Ozymandias of the poem by Percy Bysshe Shelley:
  "My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
  Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
  Shelley describes the huge monument in the desert which had been broken and dislocated:
  "Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
  Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
  The lone and level sands stretch far away".
  I surmise that that will be the ultimate future of Saddam Hussein. However, at this moment we know that the lone and level sands stretch far away with the refugee camps of those who have come from Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, the Yemen and Palestine. All those people who were living and working in Kuwait had a certain standard of living—a life style, and savings in the bank, all of which disappeared in four hours with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
  My right hon. Friends the Members for Chesterfield and for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) have given quotations from the Labour Government of 1964–70. I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) in his place. He may recall a conversation which took place in, of all places, what was formerly Lockets, between the late Dick Crossman and Lord Jenkins of Hillhead. They were discussing public expenditure cuts, how to balance the books and the prospect of restoring the prescription charge. Crossman put forward the idea that, to save £12 million, we might be able to withdraw from east of Suez. We made that decision as a Government in 1967–68. We agreed to withdraw from east of Suez and from the Persian

  811
  Gulf, although it was the Government of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) who actually carried out that policy.
  We left a vacuum in the Gulf, which the United States sought to fill with Iran, making it a super-power there. As a consequence, the Shah was overturned and we had the Ayatollah. Twenty years later, there is another vacuum and a crisis waiting to happen.
  I was interested by a comment made in London yesterday by the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait. When asked why Kuwait had supported Iraq's military build-up, he replied that the Kuwaitis had supported the build-up because they had believed that Saddam would help to liberate occupied Palestine—"but, unfortunately, the Iraqi army was used against our country." That oil-rich state has poured thousands and thousands of millions of pounds into Iraq in the vain hope that Iraq would turn its gaze to the north and avert it from the south and from taking over Kuwait.
  We have heard a great deal today about the state of Israel and about how the problem between the state of Israel and the west bank of the Jordan should be resolved. When Secretary of State Baker referred to this he called it a "fester". It cannot be in the interests of the state of Israel that this problem should continue to exist. We live in a world of chemical and nuclear weapons and of long-range nuclear missiles which can be fired into Israel from a far distance.
  We should also examine what the Palestine Liberation Organisation has done in this crisis and think about the 350,000 Palestinians in Kuwait who overnight lost their livelihoods, jobs, security and money in the bank. After having lost all that they had, can they thank Yasser Arafat for that? What of the Saudi Arabians? Four years ago I was in Saudi Arabia with the hon. Member for Thanet, South (Mr. Aitken). We talked with the Saudi Arabian Government, who were concerned about the state of affairs on the west bank of the Jordan and deeply anxious about self-determination for the Palestinians in the area. After having poured thousands and thousands of millions of dollars into the PLO, what must have been their reaction when they saw Yasser Arafat go by aeroplane to Baghdad to support Saddam Hussein?
  When we talk about self-determination for the Palestinians, which is necessary even for the state of Israel, how do we place the PLO in that context? How can it have a role to play? How can we have a new state created on the west bank, linked to that kind of regime in Iraq coming in through Jorden to threaten and menace the state of Israel? That cannot be a consequence of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. There cannot be a linkage between the affairs of the state of Israel and the west bank of the Jordan and a resolution of this problem. They are separate problems and they need to be addressed separately. It is in the interests of the state of Israel that this problem should be resolved, but certainly not as a consequence of the dispute and certainly not with the PLO, whose deputy to Yasser Arafat during the last few days has said that in the event of a war the PLO would unleash upon the west a terrorist campaign the likes of which we had never seen before. That may be one of the unforeseen consequences, if there is a war in the area.
  812
  We have heard a great deal about United Nations article 42 and article 51, but it is clear that the Government and this Parliament cannot send tele-messages and greetings telegrams to Saddam Hussein saying what we will or will not do in a particular situation. It is not for us to do that; it is for us to keep him guessing about what the consequences will be if he defies the sanctions that have been laid upon him.
  Can anyone really believe, however, that the United States of America—subject to a pre-emptive strike on 7 December 1941 by Japan, without any warning or any knowledge that the attack was coming, for which Japan was to pay grievously—will launch a pe-emptive strike against Iraq? There would be no purpose in it. There would be no purpose in taking this issue out of the global consensus that we have entered into in this new, global village of ours. I believe that our Government believe that it will be a long haul and that sanctions will not work quickly. They will have to work hard and it will take a long time. The House is united in believing that a long-term attempt should be made to make sanctions work. At the end of the day, I believe that they will work.
  A time of crisis is a time of opportunity and as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) pointed out, the United Nations, after 45 years and the days of Stalin, now has an opportunity to show that there can be a new world order. The Father of the House, the right hon. Member for Castle Point, quoted what Winston Churchill said in 1942. In his final volume, "Triumph and Tragedy" about the end of the war, he said:
  "the great democracies had triumphed and so were able to resume the follies that had so nearly cost them their life."
  Out of this crisis we have to find long-term solutions and a sense of peace in the world for future generations.
  It is a time for patience, for diplomacy and, above all, for leadership—for the leadership of people weaned on a television diet of quick fixes and facile solutions, a diet that requires overstatement and oversimplification of complex issues, but which does not permit a nation state to assess its priorities or even its duties. There must therefore be statesmanship to persuade people that we are in for a long haul in the Gulf, that sanctions will work sooner or later, and that if it is to be later rather than sooner, so be it. Time is not on the side of Saddam Hussein. Time, like the justice of the cause, is on the side of the world community.
  I welcome the unanimity that we have seen today and the strong expression and analysis of the problems in the Gulf by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. The message from the House will be clear—that we are resolved, that we know what we are doing, and that in the long term we shall triumph.
  8.25 pm
  Sir Peter Tapsell: Saddam Hussein is an evil despot who has long maintained himself in power in Iraq by a tyrannical regime, run for the most part by a small group of his personal henchmen, drawn from his own home village. He has eliminated, often after torture, any of his political colleagues who have attempted to stand in his way. It is widely reported that immediately before the act of aggression against Kuwait he had a number of his senior officers executed who opposed this attack on a fellow Arab state. We are dealing with a monster: let us be perfectly clear about that.
  The debate has reflected the feeling in the nation as a whole, overwhelmingly, that this act of aggression against

  813
  Kuwait and its occupation has to be reversed and that Kuwait has to be liberated. I, like many hon. Members, spent most of the month of August abroad. I did not meet a single person of any nationality who was not in favour of bringing pressure to bear to ensure that Kuwait was liberated. I spent the first half of this week in my constituency. Every constituent whom I met said to me that we have got to get the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This debate has sent a clear message to Saddam Hussein, and the world, that Britain is united behind her Government in the steps that they have taken by giving full support to President Bush's magnificent leadership on this issue.
  The question one has to ask is how we are to achieve the objectives on which we are all agreed. I am not convinced that the long haul is a practical solution. I first went to Iraq 40 years ago. I have been there seven or eight times since. It is easy for those who have not been to Iraq to imagine that that country holds certain characteristics in common with western European countries. However, despite the great potential oil wealth of that country, the great mass of Iraqis still live in grinding poverty. They are much less subject to the kind of economic pressures that sanctions would impose than those that would face a more prosperous country. They have been through the ghastly war with Iran, for which Saddam Hussein was entirely responsible. Despite having endured all that, they cannot escape his rule because of the machinery of terror that he operates inside Iraq. Anybody who tries to criticise him is liquidated. I have an Iraqi friend in London whose brother was hanged by Saddam Hussein last year simply because my friend had made a critical speech about Saddam Hussein in London. He will stop at nothing.
  That is one side of the problem, but the other side is whether the American troops will be able to face month after month of sitting it out in the desert. I spent nine months in the desert at Aqaba when I was 19 and 20, but I had the advantage of having spent 10 years at boarding schools immediately before, so a warm slit trench in the desert seemed rather luxurious accommodation. Some of the specialist American technicians, who are used to operating the most advanced weaponry, have not had the advantage of having been at public school for many years before going to the desert and, although this is not a criticism of them, spending month after month in the heat and dust will take a considerable toll of their morale.
  The dust will also get into their machinery. We saw what happened when helicopters landed at Desert Strip One outside Tehran and were on the ground for only a few hours. There is no doubt that there will be great technical problems with advanced weaponry being on the ground in such terrain and climate for a long period.
  The right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) said that this is the most dangerous situation that the world has faced since 1945, and several right hon. and hon. Members have echoed that sentiment. I accept that it is a dangerous situation, but we must not make our position more difficult by exaggerating the dangers. I do not believe that it is the most dangerous situation that we have faced since the war. The Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis were much more dangerous because of the danger of confrontation between the two great powers of the world, America and Russia, and of nuclear weaponry being brought into play. Mercifully, as a result of glasnost and President Gorbachev, that danger does not arise.
  814
  Therefore, do not let us tell our constituents and ourselves that the situation is anything like as dangerous as some of the crises that we have had to face since the war.
  I hope that President Bush's meeting with President Gorbachev in a few days will clear the way for American military action, because it will not be in the interests of the United Nations for us all to continue with a blockade that may last for six or nine months.
  The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) spoke of the possibility of oil prices reaching levels which might put the American banking system in danger. There will be great economic strains on the world economy if this long haul is pursued. I am sure that the Prime Minister was absolutely right when she said earlier today that we must keep our options open under article 51 to use military force if that seems necessary, and I believe that it will become necessary. I hope that when that time comes, and when the American chiefs of staff are confident that effective and quick action can be taken, we will give full support to the Americans in that action.
  Many hon. Members have said that it is easy and ludicrous to be an armchair warrior. I understand that but, in the desert, air command is of dominant importance. It is not like Vietnam which, like many hon. Members, I visited many times and where I flew in choppers low over the jungle where one could not see the Vietcong. In the desert, even in Allenby's campaign of 1916 and 1917, the aeroplane was of vital importance. A tank cannot be moved in the desert without its being visible from a great distance, even to infantry on the ground.
  With modern aircraft dominating the skies, in a few weeks the American air force will be in a position completely to take out the Iraqi air force within a matter of days, as the Israelis did to the Egyptian air force in 1973. Once it has done that, the Iraqi tank force will be absolutely useless. Tanks are dependent on petrol, ammunition and water, and with an enemy dominating the skies nothing could be more frightening than to be an Iraqi tank commander, with his tank blowing up if a rocket lands anywhere near it. We should not exaggerate the military dangers that would be involved.
  The Americans intend to take military action. I think they will take it very effectively and will win. Saddam Hussein is a clear loser, and Arabs throughout Arabia are beginning to realise that.
  8.35 pm
  Mr. Jim Sillars: We support the action taken by the Government to invoke the United Nations procedures. We also support what the Government have done in respect of the naval blockade to support the Security Council's decision on sanctions. We also support action taken to engage in a multi-military organisation to protect Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi aggression, which, as I understand it—I stand open to correction—is an entirely separate matter from the United Nations Security Council decisions in respect of Kuwait.
  I wish to make three points. One concerns a matter raised by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who said that it is important that we try to take on board Saddam Hussein's tactics. He said that they probably are simply to sit tight, having, in a sense, annexed Kuwait, and to hold that territory. We must understand that when dealing with Saddam Hussein, as well as dealing with an evil individual, we are dealing with someone who

  815
  is by no means stupid and who has displayed considerable political ability inside the Arab world. He already has one political mark in his favour: he split the Arab League and, from his point of view, that was a considerable thing for him to have done.
  If we are dealing with a man of that capability who has decided to sit tight, we must, as a matter of tactics, consider the military option. It would be foolish for anyone on the United Nations side to rule out the military option.
  There is a link between maintaining the military option and the possible success of sanctions, and I shall explain how I see that link. If we said that the military option was not on, it would be seen by Saddam Hussein as a failure of a test of will of those under the United Nations umbrella. If that military option were seen by him to be withdrawn, not only he but other states in the international community would get a very clear message—that if it came to the crunch we would not have the will to sustain the pressure on him to withdraw from Kuwait.
  Hon. Members have rightly said that sanctions have perhaps a better chance of operating than when they have previously been applied, and they have mentioned the oil crop economy of Iraq.
  The Leader of the Opposition made the important point that credit facilities, from whatever source in the international community, should not be made available to Iraq. It will be difficult to tighten up this loophole. There is another downside to sanctions. They will result in a severe economic cost for all the member states which apply sanctions and the severest cost will be borne not by the United Kingdom, western Europe, Japan or the United States, which will be able to sustain it better than anyone else, but by the third world countries. They will be the weakest link in the application of sanctions. If the message is that, when the crunch comes, the military option will not be available, some of those states, for reasons that we cannot condemn, may crack. Once sanctions crack, without the back-up of a military option, Saddam Hussein will win the game in which he is engaged.
  My second point is about the role, status, power and influence in the world community of the United Nations. The Leader of the Opposition and I are of the same generation and come basically from the same ideological root. As I listened to him, I began to be carried away by his idealism about the emergence of a new world order. There is unprecedented unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security Council. However, I doubt whether a new world order will emerge, or even that we are seeing something like that emerging now.
  As hon. Members know, international law is made up of state practice, which is based on power, and upon treaties and conventions, but power is the key factor. Last week, on the BBC World Service, I heard Sir Anthony Parsons say "No" to the blunt question, "Is international law based on a moral code?" As he said, it boils down to power. The United Nations has tried to make moral law against genocide and aggression and for human rights, but when it comes to the crunch question whether it will agree to the enforcement of this law, the answer must be in the negative, because it is power that matters.
  We have to be frank about this. The United Nations Security Council has acted in the Gulf crisis not out of
  816
  some new sense of moral purpose but simply because of the fortuitous conjunction of state interests among the five permanent members and the majority of the rest of the Security Council with the United Nations charter. The United States and the west are involved because of oil. Some cynical United Nations official said that, if Kuwait manufactured tins of beans, we should not have seen the same reaction from the United Nations. The Soviet Union has developed a quasi-dependence upon the United States and the West, and particularly western Europe. China is paddling her own canoe so as to get back into the good graces of the United States and to resurrect the special relationship with it.
  Sadly, the agreement goes no further than this conjunction. That may sound cynical and I hope that I am wrong and that we are seeing something new develop, but I doubt it. It is unprecedented for the Security Council to take such a decision and it is fine that it has done so. However, what will happen in two or three months' time when the Security Council permanent members do not agree and a next step is required? The United Nations and the Security Council are still on trial, and the verdict has not yet been reached.
  My third point concerns the good speech made by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore). He told the Government that we must engage in a battle for the hearts and minds of the Arab people. Given Saddam Hussein's ability to split the Arab League, we have to admit that he is ahead of us on that. I shall try—I do not think that I can do it as I do not think that any hon. Member can—to put myself in the mind of the man in the Arab suit. How does he see debates such as this and western reaction? Unless we can understand that, we shall not win the propaganda battle for the hearts and minds of folk in the Arab world.
  The Arab sees people in the west, including us and the United States, as double-dyed hypocrites of the first order because we apply a different standard to Arab nations than we apply to the state of Israel. He has good grounds for taking that point of view. Tonight, we are telling Iraq that it should obey Security Council resolutions and that if it does not, sanctions will be applied against it until it does so, when the United States did not take that attitude to Israel.
  The hon. Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow) is a wee bit like Arthur Scargill in that his language is sometimes extravagant and his style goes over the top. He got a lot of barracking from his hon. Friends today. I shall try to speak in a quieter tone. We have to accept that the Israeli authorities treat the Arab people of the west bank and Gaza appallingly. They deliberately break bones and demolish houses in retaliation and incarcerate thousands of people in desert encampments. That is unacceptable in a civilised international community, but Israel has been allowed to get away with it. I have told Arab friends that I am appalled that they are not condemning Saddam Hussein and they have replied, "My enemy's enemy is my friend." I am told not to complain about that because westerners have operated on that principle many a time.
  I have to convey to the Government as best I can the feeling of my friends that, while the situation in Israel continues, the west will continue to feed people like Saddam Hussein with the ammunition that will carry them to the top. In the three or four months ahead, while sanctions are being applied, we should take the

  817
  opportunity to bring to the top of the world agenda the rights of the Palestinian people to a homeland and a state of their own. Unless we are prepared to do that and are capable of doing that, we may lose the critical war for the hearts and minds of the Arab people. My Arab friends have told me that the biggest problem in the middle east is that the Israeli-Palestinian situation poisons the whole atmosphere. We have to draw the poison if we are to get stability in the region.
  8.47 pm
  Mr. James Kilfedder: I find it strange and disappointing that so little has been said about the tens of thousands of refugees in Jordan. I was pleased to note that the Prime Minister announced further aid for the refugees, but more needs to be done. It is appalling that men, women and children are suffering and dying from heat, hunger and disease while the western world is spending billions on armaments and ignoring their plight. It is a shame that their plight has been so ignored. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) spoke of the airlift that should take place. More immediate action is needed and greater help should be provided.
  The leader of the Liberal Democrats used the term "flotsam and jetsam" in regard to the refugees and I believe that he used the term innocently. However, that sounded arrogant to me. Our hearts should go out to these people and some of the money that has been spent on armaments should be used to save their lives. More refugees will die in Jordan than have died so far in this crisis in the middle east. Food, medicines, clothing and tents should have gone out ages ago and must now go out immediately. If, instead of being Asian, Egyptian or from the middle or far east, those people had been English, Australian, American, German, French or Canadian, there would have been an outcry, and action would have been taken ages ago. We must not forget these people now.
  Much has been said in the debate about hostages in Iraq. For me, that term applies peculiarly to those who are incarcerated in the Lebanon. I refer to a constituent of mine—Brian Keenan—who has just been released. He was held as a hostage there for more than four years, and he has been to hell and back again. We can see the agony in his eyes and in his language. I pay tribute to his two sisters who campaigned relentlessly for his release. Our hearts go out to Brian Keenan. I know that some people in Northern Ireland resented the fact that use was made of his having a passport from the Republic of Ireland. However, I believe that the sisters were perfectly entitled to use any key to release him from his purgatory.
  We must think at this time about the other hostages who are still held there. We must think about Terry Waite, about John McCarthy and about the others. Greater pressure must be applied to Iran to ensure that those people, who have suffered so much for so long, are released without further delay.
  I find it disturbing that Iran has become an ally in the campaign against Iraq, yet Iran was indirectly—and some would say directly—responsible for the fiendish nightmare of the hostages, and for their years of imprisonment in conditions that are an outrage to humanity. We must also remember Mr. Cooper who has been imprisoned in Iran. His imprisonment is an insult to the rule of law.
  I refer also to Douglas Croskery, who was shot dead in Iraq near the border with Saudi Arabia and who was the
  818
  son of a constituent of mine. The sympathy of the whole House goes out to his mother, my constituent, Marion Croskery, to his wife, to his children, to his brother and to all the other members of his family.
  I spoke at some length with the ambassador of the Republic of Iraq about the necessity of an intensive search to find the remains of Douglas Croskery. He, as a Muslim, assured me that he and all the other Muslims in Iraq would be most anxious that the body should be found and returned for decent burial. The anguish of his wife, of his mother and of his family would be lessened to an extent if his remains could be brought back to the United Kingdom.
  I have a number of constituents who are detained in Iraq and in Kuwait at present, including one who is a student of 19. He went out on a summer exchange during the university vacation. When I saw the ambassador, I argued that, on humanitarian grounds, all the foreigners who were then detained in Iraq and in Kuwait should be released and that, as a first step, the children and women should be released on humanitarian grounds. I was glad to see that President Saddam Hussein is in the process of releasing the women and children.
  I believe that reasoned argument carries far more weight with the President and with the authorities in Iraq than do all the insults that I have heard. Words such as "cowboy", "dictator" and "outlaw", and similar expressions do not make President Saddam cower in the basement of his palace. His reaction would be to turn the screw and we should avoid that. It is all right to impress the British voter by talking tough, but it does not do anything to President Saddam.
  We now need less of the language of conflict and more of the language of diplomacy. I know that if people are prepared to talk, a way forward can sometimes be found. I was impressed by what the Iraqi ambassador said to me. He said that the Iraqis were prepared to engage in diplomacy and I noted what the Foreign Minister of Iraq said about the need to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
  As the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) said, we must consider the Arab perception of the situation. Whether right or wrong, the Arabs see the might of the United States poised in Saudi Arabia. Many Arabs regard the presence of foreign armies as a defilement of the holy places of Islam. I use the word "invited". However, some considerable time elapsed before Saudi Arabia invited them and I believe that certain pressure was brought to bear on the Saudi Arabians to invite the Americans into their land.
  It is now accepted by many people that Iraq will not invade Saudi Arabia. The Arabs also view the American presence as a means of obtaining relatively cheap oil for the western world. As has been pointed out in the debate, other countries have been invaded, but we have had no great reaction from America or from the west. If a precedent has now been established, let us ensure that we do not ruin the unanimity of the United Nations.
  Let us also ensure that we seek a settlement and that we pursue the policy of sanctions. I am sure that they will work and that they will bring a settlement in this region which will last for a long time to come. If war takes place, there will be a legacy of hatred which will last for decades to come. There will be instability and acts of terrorism, and I doubt whether the oil will flow as readily as it has flowed in the past. That is why I urge all concerned to cool it and

  819
  why it is necessary to defuse the present explosive situation. I hope that we shall have more diplomacy and less belligerency.
  I pay tribute to the Secretary General of the United Nations for his efforts on behalf of peace. I pay tribute also to King Hussein of Jordan, who is tireless in travelling the capitals of the world in search of a decent settlement.
  Billions of dollars have been spent on the armed might that is now assembled in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. I question whether that money might have been used to search for alternative sources of oil. It might have been better invested that way. Better still, those billions of dollars could have been used in searching for alternative sources of energy.
  We should think about those who are detained in Iraq and Kuwait. Let us do nothing which might endanger their situation. There appears in The Times today a letter from a woman who has come from Iraq. She fears that the words of the Government may act as kerosene in the heat of the present situation.
  8.59 pm
  Mr. Gavin Strang: The House has been united in its condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The speeches of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition fully reflect the views of the overwhelming majority of the British people. Indeed, they reflect opinion throughout the world. The world has not just condemned the invasion but, through the United Nations, has committed itself to taking effective economic action, backed by force if necessary, to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to see the freeing of the hostages unharmed.
  The main point of my contribution is to emphasise the supreme importance of the Government giving their full support to the United Nations in that role. That is the central thrust coming from hon. Members on both sides of the House, and I hope that the Government may be relied on to heed it.
  I do not believe that there is a viable alternative, not at this stage. When we see on our television screens, as we have seen time and again, leading republican senators speaking in terms of taking out Hussein, of destroying the Iraqi air force and of having learnt the language of surgical strikes, we must accept that the situation is not like that.
  In our heart of hearts we surely know that, if we were to go down the road of a United States-initiated attack on Iraq, perhaps supported by the British Government, it would not be an easy option. It might be possible within a reasonable time to destroy the Iraqi air force and their military and key economic installations, but it would not follow that Iraqi forces would withdraw from Kuwait.
  The most likely scenario in the use of military action to secure the withdrawal of Iraqi forces would be that of a prolonged ground war involving large losses. The remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and of the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) were pertinent in that respect.
  We cannot be certain of the consequences of taking military action. Indeed, we could not, as a result of military action, be sure of the political consequences. Many hon. Members, particularly on the Opposition Benches, fear that we could find the United States leading
  820
  us into a war which would be seen in due course as a war between western imperialism and Arab nationalism and fundamentalism. Before long, the fundamental issue of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait would be lost in the minds of many Arabs. It is crucial, therefore, for us to reject at this stage any idea of unilateral action by America, supported by other western countries.
  I listened with interest to the speech of the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine). I shall not get involved in the argument whether Security Council resolution 661, with its reference to article 51, gives authority for taking military action. I do not agree with him that it would be wrong militarily to approach the United Nations for such authority. The American forces are in such a state of readiness that there would be nothing to benefit the Iraqis making an initial strike against those forces.
  If, at the end of the day, military force is to be used, that should happen only through the auspices of the United Nations. If, sadly, sanctions were not working, the final bit of pressure on Saddam would be the very fact of the United States, Britain and other countries going to the United Nations for that authority. He would know at that point that he had a final chance to withdraw, and that otherwise he would encounter huge forces ranged against him.
  The most important point to make in this debate is to encourage the Government to do all they can to make sanctions work. As a range of other hon. Members have said, we are talking about economic sanctions. There is good reason to believe that we can make them effective and cripple the economy in Iraq, destroy the living standards of the people in Iraq and, in so doing, bring enormous pressure—as much as can be mobilised in the world—against the Iraqi leadership. That is not an easy option and it means using huge amounts of resources to help the countries in the front line.
  Other hon. Members have seen an interesting piece in this week's Newsweek International magazine, in which the Crown Prince of Jordan spells out just how dependent the Jordanian economy is on Iraq and the enormous consequences of sanctions for Jordan. It will be a huge task to compensate and seek to protect Jordan and the other countries in the vicinity, which are poor, from the effects of the sanctions, but it must be done. It will need action, money and commitment from the British Government, wealthier Governments and the world generally. It also means—I am glad that the hon. Member for North Down (Mr. Kilfedder) referred to it in his speech—that we must adopt a more radical and comprehensive approach to the desperate plight of the thousands and thousands of refugees pouring out of Kuwait and Iraq all the time.
  We had better be quite clear in our minds that we are talking about an economic embargo, not one aimed at starving the Iraqis. We must be clear that, when it comes to the crunch, we must allow food and medical supplies to move into Iraq.
  The remarks of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) were pessimistic. Unlike him, I believe that the crisis gives us a great opportunity in relation to the future of law and order in the world and the United Nations. We can look back on the incidents that have occurred and ask why no action was taken then, but our approach should be to look forward and consider the tremendous opportunity and achievement of having the

  821
  whole world united in taking effective action to try to ensure—indeed, we must ensure—that this aggressor does not succeed or benefit as a consequence of his actions.
  There is unanimity in the Security Council, and the Arab countries of Egypt, Syria and Morocco are lined up in the middle east in support of the decision. A tremendous opportunity has opened up for the world as a result of the new relationship between the Soviet Union—still an enormously powerful country with tremendous interests and links with various countries throughout the world—and the United States, the most powerful military country in the world. It is because of the change in the relationship between those two countries that the United Nations has been able to develop as it has and has progressed so far.
  If the United Nations action can succeed, what is being achieved is more important than the short-term outcome in relation to what happens in Kuwait, although the whole thing is destroyed if the United Nations fails. If its actions succeed, what is being achieved is bigger than one incident and could lay down a new world order and a new climate in which individual nation states recognise that if they take such aggressive action there will be a united world response.
  In his speech to the Trades Union Congress, the Leader of the Opposition said that Hussein had challenged the world and it was important that the world should share in his defeat. That sums up the position well. We could be moving into a great, important new period of international law and order. I trust that the Government will do all that they can to prevent the United States or anyone else damaging that opportunity.
  9.10 pm
  Sir Rhodes Boyson: I entirely support the Government's approach as it has been outlined today. The recall of Parliament is a constitutional issue, and it was right that Parliament should be recalled to discuss the events in the Gulf. It would have been remiss of us to fail to discuss the issue. Our serious debate has demonstrated the necessity and usefulness of the recall. Parliamentary democracy means that Ministers should be cross-examined by Opposition spokesmen and Back-Bench Members. Similarly, the Government must return to the House to be tested from time to time. That is an essential component of our constitution.
  There has been a debate throughout the country on the Government's policy. If the House does not meet, debate will be led by the media as if the House is redundant or even non-existent. In fact, the House sits for about nine months of each year to discuss many different issues, some of which are irrelevant to many people outside. When a major issue arises which is a challenge to the western world and its preservation, it would be thought by those whom we represent that if we did not meet our values would be shown to be different from theirs.
  There are precedents for this recall. Military issues such as Suez, the Falklands and the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia—the third incident did not threaten British troops at the time—have led to Parliament being recalled. Parliament has been recalled because of sterling crises. We have assembled on recall during the summer recess because of Northern Ireland problems. We did so when faced with the three-day week. It would have been remiss of us not to have assembled on recall for today's debate.
  822
  As others have said, there are those who look back to what was happening during the late 1930s. At that time I was a young schoolboy. In the later years of the war I served in the Royal Navy, and I continued to do so when the war had ended. Those in my generation will never forget the sanctions that did not work at the time of the invasion of Abyssinia. Sanctions were not introduced when the march into the Rhineland took place. The lessons of history must be learned. If we fail to learn them we shall be presented with the same lessons. Henry Ford may have described history as bunk, but history is a thread that runs through generations. We must remember that certain forms of behaviour bring certain responses.
  The issue before us is not confined to ensuring that Iraq gets out of Kuwait. We are concerned also with the fall of Saddam Hussein. We must deal also with the chemical warfare capacity of Iraq and its threat to develop nuclear weapons. If these issues are not dealt with, we shall have to pay the penalty in future. That will be the price of failing to learn the consequences of appeasement in the 1930s.
  Until recently, there was talk of a peace dividend following the end of the cold war. Suddenly, we are faced with the threat of a hot war. I do not believe that human nature has changed since the events that took place in the Garden of Eden. Irrespective of whether one is an evolutionist or a creationist, human nature is the one thing that is static. We are faced with a fallen world. Communists and religious fanatics have tried to transform this world in one generation after another but have failed to do so. The lessons of history must be learned, because if we fail to work with the grain of human nature it will react against us. If a cat is stroked in one way it will purr, but if it is stroked in another it will growl. We must examine human nature and decide how to make it work. We must try to ensure that it does not growl, as it were, at what is being done to it.
  The first task of Government is to ensure the preservation of the nation state against external attack. That task cannot be undertaken by an individual. The second task of government is to ensure the maintenance of the Queen's peace so that we can walk the streets of our country in security. Any country that cannot defend itself and cannot impose the Queen's peace upon its streets is not fulfilling its obligation to provide the basics for the nation.
  We have been taught a lesson—that not only do we need to maintain a strong defence force to protect this country, but that we need to do so to help our friends. It is no good passing resolutions and emitting nothing but hot air—we need weapons, ships for a blockade, air cover and so on. I hope that the lesson has been deeply learnt not only in this House but in the country. We must not disarm; we must maintain strong defences, both for our preservation and to play our part with our allies and with the United Nations to make life tolerable throughout the world. Dictators always say that they want to make life good, but it always becomes intolerable. Democracies try to make life tolerable, and the necessary components of that are the Queen's peace on the streets and the Queen's peace in external defence.
  It was right to recall Parliament, because parliamentary democracy means that Ministers must be responsible to Parliament. The country would not understand if we did not debate the crisis here when it is being debated outside. We would be redundant, although I do not know whether we would be entitled to redundancy pay. We do not want

  823
  the appeasement of the 1930s that my generation witnessed. Unless we learn the lessons of history, we will suffer.
  It is evident from today's speeches and the way that the Government have worked with the United Nations, America and our allies, together with our own strength, that the lessons of the 1930s have been learnt, especially by Opposition Members. People listening to the debate today will say, "Thank goodness the House of Commons was recalled; thank goodness it was so responsible in its support of the Government."
  Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Could you tell us your intentions about 10-minute speeches tomorrow? Will sympathetic consideration be given to those hon. Members who, understandably, could not be called today but who have sat through the debate?
  Mr. Speaker: Sympathetic consideration will certainly be given to those hon. Members who have sat through today's debate, but I regret that even then it is unlikely that I will be able to call all of them tomorrow. My sympathy is with them and I shall do my best.
  Mr. Dalyell: What about 10-minute speeches?
  Mr. Speaker: I look at each day as it comes. It is a fair to good bet.
  9.17 pm
  Mr. George Robertson: There were some, both inside and outside the House, who suggested that the recall of Parliament might be unnecessary, that it might be unproductive, that it could be nit-picking and that it might even be divisive. On the contrary, those who have listened to and watched the debate—and the World Service is carrying the debate live and in full to those listening in Iran, Kuwait and the rest of middle east—will have found it sober, serious, valuable and worth while. It has been part of the way a true democracy deals with such serious events.
  At the heart of the saga has been the remarkable and refreshing unity and solidarity of the world community in the face of such a breach of international law and of acceptable behaviour. The strength and purpose of the whole world, east and west, has been unprecedented, and notably it has included many in the Arab world who have rightly recognised the threat of brutal Iraqi adventurism. The United Nations has played—as it was always intended to do, but rarely has had the chance to do—the central part in dealing with this act of aggression. The fact that it has acted decisively and unanimously has produced order where there could so easily have been chaos. It has acted with speed and with measure to tighten effective sanctions against Iraq. In turn, that has strengthened its credibility and the credibility of international institutions.
  I add my tribute to that of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to our United Nations ambassador Sir Crispin Tickell and his staff who did so much to make the United Nations' work so effective. It is also right that we pay tribute to the arduous work that has been put in by our ambassador in Kuwait and his staff in such appalling circumstances and to the ambassador in Baghdad and his staff.
  It is important, and it does no harm at all, to reiterate just what was involved in the events that we are
  824
  considering. I realise that, as a trickle of freed hostages deliberately manipulated by Baghdad dominates our headlines, there is a danger that they, rather than the act of aggression which engulfed them, will become the issue. We cannot allow the natural joy and relief at the reuniting of families to overshadow the illegality and indecency of their being held in the first place, and the continuing outrage that the men and the remaining women and children are still being held.
  The naive and crude manipulation of the television screens of the world will, if we allow it to, divert attention from the way in which Iraq invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait on 1 August. Iraq invaded a friendly Arab nation state. Its troops pillaged it and now the Iraqi regime has annexed it. Iraq has forcibly held against their will thousands of foreign civilians, the uninvolved citizens of a dozen countries, and has compounded its flouting of international law which that represents by moving some of them to strategic locations in violation of even the Geneva convention's rules of war. It is instructive that that tactic brought condemnation even from among that small group of Arab friends that Saddam Hussein's regime has. Attracting condemnation is something that Saddam Hussein is used to, but to be attacked by Colonel Gaddafi for going too far is really some achievement.
  There is no doubt that Kuwait was only the beginning of Saddam Hussein's ambition: an ambition which threatened most of his neighbouring states—more, certainly, than just Saudi Arabia—and, in the process, threatened the whole world. To be the new super-power of the middle east, to be the military power and arbiter of events in that area. to have a stranglehold on the world's oil supply, was his obvious ambition, and that had to be stopped.
  Saddam Hussein and his regime started, conducted and lost an eight-year-long war with Iran at the expense of 1·5 million casualties and unimaginable horror. They have not only manufactured and deployed chemical weapons but have used them first in the battlefield against Iran and then, when that war was lost, against their own Kurdish population. This is a man and a regime who eliminate internal opposition by a process called grass cutting, by which any potential opponents are mowed down. It has been reported that more than 120 senior army officers were executed simply for raising their voices against the invasion. This is a man and a regime whose contempt for civil and human rights has produced a society of such cruelty and barbarity that torture, terror and bribery are the only intruments for retaining power. This is a man and a regime who can make, and literally have made, the flesh creep.
  The world watched, and at Halabja it even made the television screens, when the lethal gases were massacring the Kurds. But then trade mattered more than condemnation and punishment. The world watched as Farzad Bazoft, the journalist from the Observer, was murdered after a farce of a trial, but not one Iraqi diplomat was sent home. The world saw the nuclear triggers discovered at Heathrow and bits of the supergun emerge all over Europe, and heard the threats chemically to extinguish Israel, but the world went on trading and dealing with Saddam's Iraq.
  There is a great and shared culpability in the world that a man and a regime of such an accepted capacity for evil were provided with the means to perpetrate their aggression. We must collectively share that awful

  825
  responsibility for creating the monster which brought about this crisis. The weaponry which faces the multinational force in the Gulf and confronts British troops as well is not home grown. The tanks, rockets, warheads, chemical weapons, chemical plants and nuclear technology on which the Iraqis are still working have been imported. They all came from nations that knew where all that was going and the sort of regime to which it was going.
  Over the years, Saddam Hussein has built up a network of companies and contacts with the active connivance of many Governments, in feeding weapons, technology and know-how to the military machine that has caused so much trouble. On "Panorama" the other night, we saw how a company based in this capital, the Technology and Development Group, operates openly and without restriction as an arm of the official Iraqi military procurement operation. Its tentacles spread to many other countries. Such operations should be stopped in Britain immediately and banned for good—in the same decisive way that the Iranian arms procurement office in London was closed two years ago.
  This whole episode must teach us—it is an expensive lesson—that we must all take far greater care in future with the technology of death. The end of the cold war and the unique new collaboration between the Americans and Russians evident in the United Nations over the past few weeks should see the end of the cold war and the replacement of the apparatus of controlling strategic exports. We should complement the nuclear nonproliferation treaty with one covering chemicals and the deadly new high-technology weapons as well.
  The debate has rightly reflected the wide range of views that exist in this country. It is proper that we should rejoice in one thing alone in this country. I refer to our right as free representatives of our people to give voice to our diverse views. Would that it were the same in Baghdad. Some right hon. and hon. Members and others outside say that we should enter Kuwait right away and use force to liberate it, and argue that only by military force will Saddam Hussein leave that country. They do so despite the declared view expressed last week by General Norman Schwarzkopf, the American commander in Saudi Arabia, that there will be no war unless the Iraqis attack, and that of the Saudi Defence Minister, who also commented last week that no offensive action will begin in Saudi Arabia.
  If Iraq attacks, a response will have to be made. Any military threat must be met, resisted and repelled by the same world solidarity that we have already seen. However, let us be clear that a war in the Gulf would be a war such as the world has never seen before. Where there are chemical weapons and those mad enough, irrational enough or desperate enough to use them, there is no such thing as a "surgical strike". Where there are mustard gases and toxins such as sarin, tabun, and anthrax, the missiles to deliver them and the willingness to use them, there can be no such thing as a short, sharp conflict. Any war involving chemical weapons will bring suffering, casualties and death on a scale that we have not seen in a century, and which we had good reason to believe was outlawed for ever.
  A war in the Gulf, or any conflict that is not started by Saddam Hussein or conducted clearly within the authority of the United Nations, could have incalculable and irreversible political consequences in a part of the world
  826
  where future oil supplies might be the least of the resulting problems. Many right hon. and hon. Members drew attention to those political dimensions.
  There are those who say that the troops should be pulled out, while simultaneously condemning the Iraqi aggression and recommending that everything should take place under UN control. However, it is an irrefutable fact that only the United States could have taken action on a scale sufficient to protect Saudi Arabia from the grave and imminent threat that it faced after the invasion of Kuwait, when it could have been immediately overwhelmed.
  The United States and Britain, as well as the other 10 countries, have forces in the area because article 51 allowed, indeed dictated, that Saudi Arabia asked for and received international help.
  In the five weeks since the invasion no military action has been taken by any of the defending forces without the explicit backing of a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.
  There are those who say; do a deal—negotiate with Saddam Hussein. United Nations resolution 660 states that there should be negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, but only when Iraq has withdrawn unconditionally from Kuwait. A few yards of territory, an island here or there, a part of an oilfield or some financial gesture would not force the aggressor to retreat and to learn that armed invasion and annexation do not pay, and should never pay.
  There are those who have preached ultra-caution, but the reality is that only relentless continuing pressure and an unremitting tightening of the sanctions until the Iraqis know that there is no way out, will produce a just outcome. The sanctions are working; the noose is tightening; the friends are deserting and we have to stick with that tactic until it works.
  The majority of hon. Members here today reflect the vast majority in the country who believe that it is these unprecedented mandatory sanctions with the international solidarity that they represent and the pressure that they are putting and will continue to put on Saddam, that will bring about his defeat.
  Quite rightly the debate today has also looked ahead. We must be constructive about what we can do now. In so doing we are right to remind ourselves that Saddam Hussein is not Iraq and Iraq is not Saddam Hussein. We cannot and should not write off 17 million subjugated Iraqi people for the crimes and perversions of their dictator and his cohorts.
  Iraq is a terrorised, frightened, war-weary nation, but it is one where the germ of freedom and decency is still alive. There are people in Iraq—they must be remarkably brave and courageous peole—who represent an alternative to Saddam's regime. They must be encouraged and sent a signal from the world outside that their courage and sacrifice is worth while and that it is supported. The best way to send that signal is for the opposition leadership in exile to be given the same attention, recognition and moral support that we so willingly, rightly and successfully gave to the Walesas, the Havels and Sakharovs, when they fought for their freedom in eastern Europe. Our support would stiffen the resolve of those for whom opposition means risking liberty, sanity and all too often their lives and those of their families.
  The world must also ensure, as so many hon. Members have properly said during the debate, that help is given to those countries paying the heaviest price for the United

  827
  Nations campaign against Iraq. It is not merely the front-line states, like Jordan, with its appalling and urgent refugee problem, that we should be helping immediately and generously, but also Egypt, Syria and Turkey which are also paying the price. On top of those, and equally important, are the poorest countries on earth: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and so many of the African countries where the oil price rise is yet another savage blow to an already dire condition. Above all, we must make it clear that our overriding objective in this whole exercise, after the liberation of Kuwait and the full release of all the hostages, is real stability in the middle east.
  This rare display of unanimous United Nations support for international law must not be lost for ever, especially in a region which has for too long been a shop window for broken international laws.
  After 1990—like Europe after 1989—the middle east will never be the same again. One feature brought out in many of the speeches today is the new, valuable and constructive role that has been played by the Soviet Union in the United Nations, alongside the United States of America. The future role of the Soviet Union in both Europe and the middle east will be a major factor in the outcome for both regions. It is a significant and historic step forward, which we should recognise and welcome.
  Many hon. Members on both sides of the House have drawn attention to the way in which the world has now concentrated its concern on the part of the world affected by the invasion. That concern will not end; it will not go away, however the matter is resolved—even after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. The message of our debate today has been clear enough: we stay tough, we stay cool, we stay united—because, for as long as Saddam Hussein threatens his neighbours, he threatens us all.
  9.35 pm
  The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. William Waldegrave): Today the House has spoken for our nation as only the House can speak. The hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) spoke well in winding up the debate for the Opposition, and we have heard some other outstanding speeches, led by the magnificent speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Let me also pay tribute to the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition, and to the fine speeches of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), my right hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) and, of course, to the splendid speech of the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Sir B. Braine).
  The whole House is united on certain objectives. Aggression cannot be allowed to pay. A pirate state with a strong army cannot be allowed simply to loot resources that it may need because it has got itself into debt. Above all, once engaged as they are now engaged, the international forces of law represented by the United Nations cannot be allowed to be defeated. If that were to happen, anarchy would be loosed on the world.
  Some have said, "Why the excitement? There have been other invasions and other territorial disputes." They should remember this: never before, since the foundation
  828
  of the United Nations, has one member state attempted to obliterate another. That is the difference between this and many other crimes and problems of the past.
  The strategy formed by the United Nations and the allies of the legitimate Government of Kuwait is also clear and, I believe, has received the almost unanimous backing of the House. The first weapon to be tried was the economic embargo; second came the rapid movement of forces from an amazing variety of nations to defend the other vulnerable states. I was pleased that the hon. Member for Hamilton's speech did not contain that strain of anti-Americanism which, I thought, spoiled one or two speeches made by his hon. Friends. He paid tribute to the extraordinary effort which the United States has made, and which only the United States could have made. We have contributed; but 20 other nations, from literally every other continent of the globe—from Australasia, from Asia and, of course, from the middle east, including the majority of the Arab League—are there as well.
  Then comes the next stage. Who knows? We cannot rule out anything, as long as it is firmly based in international law. In the absolute unity that the nations have shown and that the House has shown today, we are all agreed that we should give no comfort whatever to Saddam Hussein.
  There have been some dissentient voices. After listening to the speech of my former neighbour, now the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn), I asked myself whether I would feel more secure in my arguments if he was agreeing with me, and came to the conclusion that I would not.
  Mr. Kinnock: Join the club.
  Mr. Waldegrave: I cannot refrain from repeating the Leader of the Opposition's sotto voce remark—"Welcome to the club".
  Let us pause for a moment—as did the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) in a useful intervention—to consider Saddam Hussein's strategy. It is pretty clear. He will try to divert us from his central act of aggression: he has been doing so with the inhumane and intolerable treatment of the hostages. He will find other strategies of this kind. He will encourage other people, some of them well meaning, to look for half-baked solutions, conferences, intermediary stages and means to divide those United Nations resolutions by two. We must be alert to that strategy. The hon. Member for Walsall, North did not fall for that strategy—nor, in a fine speech, as I have already said, did the right hon. Member for Devonport and my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker). The hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) did fall for it in his speech—understated, as is his wont.
  Mr. Faulds: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Waldegrave: No. The hon. Gentleman would try to divert us, but he would not succeed. I cannot give way to interventions; I have little time.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) said, rightly, that Saddam Hussein likes to liken himself to Nebuchadnezzar and spoke of the hanging gardens. May I direct the attention of Saddam Hussein, who may not be familiar with this verse, to the book of Daniel, chapter five, verse 21, after the deposition, which is referred to in verse 20;

  829
  "And he was driven from the sons of men; and his heart was made like the beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild asses; they fed him with grass like oxen."
  I must concentrate a little on one section of the Leader of the Opposition's speech, not necessarily because I disagree with it but because I am not sure that I understood it. Several hon. Members have said that clarity of speech is important here. There is no disagreement with the legal position as set out by the Leader of the Opposition. We totally share it. However, there are three international grounds for military action: first, article 51, after a request from Kuwait; secondly, a response to an attack—what after today we may call the Yeovil rules; thirdly, an explicit United Nations mandate. Any of those three would do. The Leader of the Opposition's legal analysis was entirely justified. Where we departed from him—perhaps we did, perhaps we did not—was when he and the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang) seemed to predict a scenario ahead of time that cannot be predicted. We do not know which of those grounds would be the best to use to bring about the objective that all of us share: to avoid the defeat of international order.
  The hon. Member for Edinburgh, East sketched one scenario where there was total unity for military action. That might be one scenario, but let us not predict in advance. We cannot rule out any action, so long as it is based—as it would be based, as the Leader of the Opposition made clear—on article 51 after a request from Kuwait.
  The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in his interesting speech—the former beachmaster at Salerno, and at Anzio, which was even more dangerous—speaking with the authority of having been under fire, made the same point. Just for a moment, I thought that he was going to say that we must go back for another resolution under any circumstances, but he did not. He said that we must get as much support as we can. That must be the objective of British, American and Arab League majority diplomacy. However, what we must not do is to take the further fatal step of predicting now that in every circumstance we must go back for a new resolution. That would be most unwise.
  Ms. Short: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
  Mr. Waldegrave: The hon. Member for Hamilton did not give way. [Interruption.] He was not asked to give way, but I shall give way to the hon. Lady.
  Ms. Short: The Minister said earlier that it would be a mistake to allow Saddam Hussein to stand on the moral high ground. He must know that the real danger is that many people in the Arab world believe that the west is deeply hypocritical because of its different evaluation of the situation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the situation in Kuwait. Does he not agree that the west could be accused of bias, that it needs to stand firm on international law and that it would be a disaster, unless there were further aggression, if there were to be any offensive military action without a United Nations resolution and without the agreement of the whole of the Arab world?
  Mr. Waldegrave: I have just explained why the opposite would be a disaster—a far more profound disaster that might endanger the whole operation and put the basis of international order at risk: that is, if we were to try now to play the game of prediction as to what exactly the
  830
  circumstances would be in which sanctions were presumably being judged by the wider community not to be working and we went for further action. We cannot judge that now. I shall return to the other issues in the middle east. That is vital. The hon. Lady has made a point with which I have more sympathy and to which I shall return in a moment.
  Let us not forget that the refugees are Saddam Hussein's refugees. It is a most attractive capacity of the western democracies to take all burdens upon themselves and usually to blame themselves for everything. We are already talking as if in some way we are responsible for those refugees. We are not: Saddam Hussein caused those children to die in the desert by driving out Palestinians, Egyptians, Indians and Philippinos who were working and supporting their families back home with remittances.
  We must act, and we must, above all, help the nations from which those people come to get them home. We do not want to institutionalise this crisis. We do not want another lot of Gaza camps with permanent refugees in the area. We want to help them to get home. That is why the money that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced today is going not to the non-governmental organisations in the ordinary way of a famine crisis but to a specific organisation designed to deal with this situation—the International Organisation for Migration, which was set up in 1951 to deal with displaced people. We have given it that money to help those migrants to get home.
  As my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) said, an airlift may be needed. We may have to help the poor countries from which many of the refugees come to finance that airlift, and we will do so. Several hon. Members said that we must help, and we will do so.
  Mr. Robert Hughes: I do not dissent from the proposition that the refugees are Saddam's refugees. While there must be a massive airlift to get them home, they must remain alive to be taken home. We have a desperate responsibility to do that for the refugees now and to sustain them.
  Mr. Waldegrave: We already are. The Overseas Development Administration has joined many others in the world in providing immediate aid, which is arriving. The refugees are trying to get home. That is what they want and it is the best way of preventing the tragedy from continuing indefinitely. We have given that money to the International Organisation for Migration as well as to the immediate humanitarian organisations—the Red Crescent, Red Cross, Oxfam and so on—to support them in the meantime.
  That brings me, naturally, to a subject of some interest to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to every taxpayer in this country—burden sharing, who is going to pay. After the titanic contribution of the United States, we have made perhaps the second largest contribution in terms of military aid. The French have also provided major military support, but it is legitimate to look to countries that have not provided very much on the military side, and that point was made by the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney. It is legitimate to say to them, "The world is under pressure: what will you do to help?" I shall go at some intolerable hour tomorrow morning to Rome, fortified by the support of the Leader

  831
  of the Opposition, to address in tactful style, I hope, with some of our colleagues the idea that, although no frigates are available, some money could be supplied.
  I must pay tribute to the Japanese, who have already talked in large sums. This is perhaps the first international crisis in which the Japanese, who are talking in terms of $1 billion, have started to put big money on the line. The fact that the Japanese, for the first time, are saying, "We share the responsibility with the rest of the world for seeing this matter through," seems a very important step forward. Others, we hope, will follow. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made that point very clearly in her speech.
  The hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) and other hon. Members referred to the underlying tensions in the middle east, which it is not unfair to say have contributed to regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein. It is easy to try to shift the blame from individuals and say that they are created by the conditions, and we must not fall for that, but it is noticeable that regimes in the middle east, with the great exception of Egypt, have become more radical since the Arab-Israeli wars and the further defeats and humiliations, as they were seen in so many parts of the Arab world, of Arab people. I am not saying that those wars were caused by the Israelis, but the conflict and injustices to the Palestinians that have emerged out of it have contributed to the situation.
  Three or four months ago, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary came back from the middle east and rightly described the whole region as a tinder box. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, the Leader of the Opposition, and the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, in a powerful speech, all made that point. The hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Ross) rightly pointed out that two wrongs cannot make a right, so although that situation has not been corrected, it does not undermine the rightness of the action that we are taking in regard to Saddam Hussein.
  The hon. Member for Warley, East made his point in his inimitable style but many others made it slightly more moderately and carried the House with them more. One factor that has emerged today is an extraordinary unity across the parties on the issue of the injustices done to the Palestinian people.
  Mr. Faulds: The right hon. Member has referred to me twice, and I am grateful to him for giving way. If he disagrees so much with the burden of my speech, would he care to make his own comments on the implications for the situation in the Gulf of the strategic alliance between Israel and the United States?
  Mr. Waldegrave: The interesting point about it is that it has no implications. What strikes me is what a small part Israel is playing in any of these events. That may lead certain people in the United States Congress to learn a lesson. Some people think of their relationship with Israel in terms of a strategic alliance, but they should realise that it is not particularly useful if it cannot be used in a crisis like this. In such a situation, the United States is bound to want invitations from the Arab nations, and to seek allies in the wider Arab world. The dog that has not barked in the night is interesting. Israel has kept out of this because,
  832
  as has been said, were it to be involved, the result would be consequences and instabilities that would be difficult to handle.
  With the support of the House, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary asked me to establish contacts with the PLO leadership after it had made the Geneva declaration and its London declaration about its new strategy in relation to a peace process. Therefore, along with many others, I was saddened by the way in which the PLO missed a wonderful opportunity, which it should have judged right.
  Palestine is a small country, resting on international law and suppressed by a stronger neighbour, and if the Palestinians had stood by that international law, they could have pointed out to the international community that they had supported this principle when it cost them a great deal and now they should be helped. Their already just case would then have been unanswerable in all the forums and Parliaments of the world. Many in the Palestinian movement are beginning to understand that, and are shifting their position. We understand the pressures on that disparate movement, but many hon. Members have, like myself and many of my Palestinian friends, have been disappointed by the position taken initially by the leadership of the PLO. We hope to see that position revised. I was glad to see that the Opposition did not pursue that line.
  The right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) made an interesting speech the other day. He did not, in a Saddam Hussein way, want to link the issues together, but he called for a conference to look at all the wider issues at the same time. Mr. Shevardnadze made a slightly similar speech.
  Mr. Kinnock: My right hon. Friend said it first.
  Mr. Waldegrave: I think that the right hon. Member for Gorton came first.
  Who knows what the correct conference structures will be? I beg the right hon. Gentleman—and I think that he shares this view—to agree that we should not be trying to introduce grand conferences and complicated issues before we have settled the issue of the sovereignty of Kuwait.
  Mr. Gerald Kaufman indicated assent.
  Mr. Waldegrave: I am gratified to see the right hon. Gentleman nodding. Resolution 660, in relation to Kuwait and to Iraq, refers to negotiations when people have returned to their own countries. That is fine. We could then negotiate about any underlying problems that may have contributed to the conflict in the first place. The same is true in relation to the far more complex and deeper issues of the Palestinians in relation to Israel. That must come afterwards and those who seek to drag across the trail the idea of grand conferences at this stage are contributing to what I call the Saddam Hussein strategy of trying to take our eye off the central issue of his aggression, off the central issue of obedience to international law and off the central issue of absolute concurrence with the Security Council resolutions. None of those points can be divided by two, and none is up for negotiation now. It is only when those resolutions are obeyed that other issues can be addressed.
  We hope—and I believe that this will be so—that the middle east will never be quite the same again and that the

  833
  whole world, even those countries that were not concerned and that have not been interested in the problems, will now focus on the underlying causes of conflict, of dissent and of danger in the middle east. If we can bring back, as I am sure that we shall, the Palestinian leadership into a position of diplomacy and of commitment to diplomacy, there will be progress. I hope and pray that that will be so.
  Mr. Nellist: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the central issue is not what he has just described? It is not about democracy. There was precious little of that in Kuwait even before the invasion. The central issue is cheap oil. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree with a former United States Assistant Defence Secretary? He said that it boils down to the great powers defending their interests and that if Kuwait grew carrots, we would not give a damn.
  Mr. Waldegrave: The central issue is of obedience to international law. The hon. Member for Coventry, South-East (Mr. Nellist) will find flip remarks from former politicians round the world. If Saddam Hussein and the current leadership of Iraq are allowed to win against the painfully assembled forces of international legality, the world faces anarchy. All that Saddam Hussein has to do is to withdraw. That is a clear issue.
  These events will define the nature of the world that will succeed the world in which I was brought up and in which I now live—the world of the cold war. This is a defining event. We cannot allow the forces of international law to be faced down and we cannot allow the United Nations, in its first rebirth, to be defeated. Ernie Bevin must be proud of what is happening now at the United Nations. This is what the founding fathers meant it to do. If, the first time that we have this unity, with the Security Council working as it is supposed to work and with the military staff
  834
  committee for the first time in its history meeting with a substantive agenda, we allow them to be defeated, the world will face unparalleled anarchy. That cannot happen.
  Aggression must not be allowed to pay. We must not let the message get out that the old stalemate of the cold war was the only way to keep peace. We hear backward-looking people—funny old Russian generals with rows of medals—say, "Those were the days."
  Mr. Canavan: And others.
  Mr. Waldegrave: Doubtless there are equivalents elsewhere. They say, "Let us go back to the safe old days of the cold war." If that is the message, what a depressing message it will be. Without the cold war, there is far more room for flexibility, for danger, for shifts, for movements and for changing alliances, so we need the structure of international co-operation and of international law.
  There is no question about on which side of the argument the House and the Government come down. Our hearts are out there with our hostages, but their safety and the safety of innumerable innocent people round the world depend on the strength of the House and its equivalents in the other nations of the alliance which is supporting international law. If anarchy is loosed upon the world, not only their lives will be at risk but innumerable unpredictable other people's lives will be at risk for ever.
  Some people doubt the staying power of democracy. I do not. Democracies are slow to anger but, once angered, they go on right to the end of the road. The message has gone from the House today that this British democracy is ready to play its part in that process. I do not doubt that the House and the British people will see it through.
  It being Ten o'clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Resolution this day.
  Adjourned accordingly till tomorrow.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

  Nuclear Power
  Dr. Thomas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement of current Government policy in respect of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom in the implementation of safeguards for nuclear material designated for peaceful uses through the continuous surveillance of nuclear facilities and materials.

  Mr. Baldry
  I have been asked to reply.

  The Government's policy continues to be that all civil nuclear material held in the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom safeguards under the Euratom treaty of 1957 and to the terms of the United Kingdom—Euratom—IAEA safeguards agreement of 6 September 1976—IAEA INFCIRC 263.

ENERGY

  Nuclear Incidents (Reporting)
  Dr. Thomas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what nuclear incidents his Department has reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency's incident reporting system since the United Kingdom joined in March 1986; and what is the average time gap between an incident being reported by the relevant United Kingdom operator to his Department and subsequently conveyed to the incident reporting system.

  Mr. Baldry
  In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Executive's nuclear installations inspectorate co-ordinates reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency's incident reporting system. To date 53 such events in the United Kingdom have been reported. The time gap between the incident being reported by the operator and its subsequent transmission to the IAEA is usually about three days.

  The primary aim of the International Atomic Energy Agency's incident reporting system is to improve safety by analysing the causes of unusual events and providing operational feedback to member states. Such events are therefore selected for reporting on the basis of the lessons that can be learned from them rather than the consequences associated with them. This system is, of course, additional to two IAEA conventions—on the early notification of nuclear accidents and on mutual assistance in the case of a nuclear accident—which were adopted by the general conference in September 1986.

  Wind Turbine
  Dr. Thomas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy if his Department has assessed the viability of the new wind turbine developed by Alastair Reed Associates, Glasgow; and if he will make a statement.
  600
  Mr. Moynihan
  My Department has not been approached by Alastair Reed Associates, and their wind
  turbine has not been assessed.

  Radioactive Waste Management
  Dr. Thomas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy what safeguards arrangements currently apply to United Kingdom-produced spent reactor fuel and reprocessed plutonium.

  Mr. Baldry
  All civil spent reactor fuel and plutonium is subject to Euratom safeguards under the Euratom treaty of 1957 and to the terms of the UK-Euratom-IAEA safeguards agreement of 6 September 1976—IAEA INFCIRC 263.

  Heating Conversion System
  Dr. Thomas
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy whether his Department or the energy technology support unit at Harwell has assessed the energy-saving potential of the TRI SOL heating conversion system; and if he will make a statement.

  Mr. Moynihan
  The TRI SOL heating system is the subject of a project under the European Communities' former demonstration programme for energy technologies. The project is expected to be completed in December 1990 and the results of an assessment of it should be available from the Commission of the European Communities in 1991.

  Hinkley Point C
  Mr. Dobson
  To ask the Secretary of State for Energy if he will publish the report of the Hinkley Point C inquiry before he announces his decision and before the House rises for the summer adjournment.

  Mr. Wakeham
  [pursuant to his replies, 2 July 1990, c. 431 and 20 July 1990, c. 760–61]: I have today decided to grant consent under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 and to direct that planning permission should be given pursuant to section 90(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to Nuclear Electric plc for the extension of the Hinkley Point nuclear power stations by the construction and operation of an additional PWR generation station to be known as Hinkley Point C.

  My decision on whether Nuclear Electric plc will be given the necessary financial approval to allow the project to proceed will depend upon the outcome of the review of nuclear policy scheduled for 1994 which I announced to the House in my statement of 9 November 1989.

  Copies of my decision letter together with the inspector's report are being placed in the Libraries of the House.

  A copy of my decision letter and the inspector's conclusions and recommendations will be available from the Vote Office.

AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

  Rendering Industry
  Dr. David Clark
  To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, pursuant to his answer to the hon. Member for South Shields on 23 July, if he will list the dates on which he had meetings with representatives of the United Kingdom rendering industry.

  Mr. Gummer
  As stated in my earlier reply to the hon. Gentleman, Ministers in this Department frequently meet representatives of the rendering industry. My most recent meeting with the industry was on 11 July, and I also visited a plant belonging to one of the largest United Kingdom renderers on the same day.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT

  India
  Mrs. Clwyd
  To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the total amount of United Kingdom bilateral aid spent on energy projects in India since 1980.

  Mrs. Chalker
  [holding answer 26 June 1990]: United Kingdom financial aid for energy projects, including coal mining and oil and natural gas, in India has been £477 million since 1980, including estimated expenditure for 1989. In addition, expenditure on technical assistance has totalled £31 million in the same period.

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, in pursuance of Standing Order No. 14: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lichfield.

The Gulf
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (The Earl of Caithness)The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (The Earl of Caithness) rose to move, That this House takes note of the developments in the Gulf and of Her Majesty's Government's response to them.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to give a full account of events and of the Government's actions. Iraq has illegally invaded, occupied and attempted to annex Kuwait; our armed forces have been deployed in response to requests for assistance to deter further aggression by Saddam Hussein and under Article 51 of the UN Charter in pursuance of decisions of the Security Council intended to bring about Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. British civilians together with others in Iraq and Kuwait are caught up in the crisis, and are being used as hostages. The Government welcome the full participation of your Lordships in this important debate.
Your Lordships will recall that in July Iraq and Kuwait became involved in a dispute over oil pricing and production levels, and over mutual obligations resulting from the production and sale of oil during the Iraq-Iran war. Saddam Hussein also introduced the question of Iraqi territorial claims on Kuwait. The claims by successive Iraqi governments that Kuwait, as part of the former Ottoman province of Basra, was an integral part of Iraq are without legal basis. Kuwait has enjoyed full and recognised independence since 1961 and is a full member of the United Nations.
As the dispute developed, Iraq deployed troops in forward positions near the border with Kuwait. Following active Arab diplomacy, notably by President Mubarak of Egypt, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to bilateral talks in Jedda on 1st August with the prospect of a further round in Baghdad. The Iraqi Government gave explicit assurances to Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they had no intention of invading Kuwait. Despite his assurances to other Arab governments and leaders, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi forces to invade Kuwait in the early hours of 2nd August. They did so under the pretext of responding to a request for assistance from a non-existent revolutionary government, which they alleged had overthrown the government of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein then established a puppet regime consisting entirely of Iraqi officers. He later claimed to have annexed. Kuwait, which he now describes as a province of Iraq.
The invasion was a flagrant breach of faith. It shows that Saddam Hussein cannot be taken at his
1796
word. It is equally a flagrant and indefensible breach of international law. The invasion comes at a time when events in Eastern Europe and the ending of the Cold War had opened up new opportunities to establish a just system for the settlement of disputes and conduct of affairs between nations: for the government of world events by the rule of law. This peaceful and hopeful process has been challenged by Saddam Hussein. This is why claims that the invasion of Kuwait is purely an inter-Arab dispute are not sustainable. It is an international issue, affecting world security, world oil supplies, and world economic stability. Let me stress that it affects the security and confidence of all small states, not only those in the Middle East. If Iraqi action is unchecked none of them will be able to feel secure, and unwelcome ghosts of the 1930s will be raised.
The world has responded with speed, unanimity and resolve. On 2nd August, the very day of the invasion, the Security Council adopted Resolution SCR 660 condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. On 4th August the European Community and its member states took measures to protect Kuwaiti assets, to freeze Iraqi assets, to embargo oil and to stop arms sales to Iraq. It also agreed to work for comprehensive economic sanctions in the Security Council. Two days later, when Iraq failed to comply, the Security Council adopted Resolution SCR 661 imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Iraq.
The Security Council has since adopted three further resolutions, declaring Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void, condemning Iraq's actions against the foreign community in Kuwait and Iraq, and authorising UN member states to take necessary measures against shipping to ensure the strict implementation of sanctions. As was pointed out at the time, this includes the use of minimum force.
Let us not forget that not one single country voted against any of these resolutions. The United Nations has been truly united. A clear objective has been agreed: to bring about the unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government. The means the world has chosen are universally implemented, comprehensive, economic sanctions. And full UN authority has been given for their effective enforcement.
Iraq is vulnerable to sanctions. Its economy is based almost totally on the export of a single commodity, oil, through a limited number of identifiable outlets. These can be monitored and if necessary blockaded. Iraq is also heavily dependent on imports, not only of food, but also of other commodities. And it has limited currency reserves following the war with Iran. That means that co-ordinated, determined pressure can force President Saddam to think again. Rigorous implementation of sanctions by the whole world is vital to make the policy work.
We pay tribute to the governments of countries in the region. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey have acted with wisdom and courage. Many members of the Arab League have shown great

1797
resolution, and we applaud the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council who have roundly confronted Iraq. They have backed the UN at great difficulty and risk to themselves. For a number of countries, supporting sanctions will bring serious economic hardship. We are already considering how the international community can help them—especially those not bearing the direct cost of military +deployment.
Britain has been in almost continual close consultation with the other permanent members and has played a full role in this remarkable international response. We have helped to steer those resolutions through the Security Council and we have helped to set up a United Nations Sanctions Committee to ensure that implementation is closely monitored.
We have also been active outside the United Nations. We have worked closely with the United States and with France and other partners in NATO, the Western European Union and other European Community countries to ensure that we have been working together for the same goals. The European Community countries, under the presidency of Italy, have co-operated particularly closely in protecting the safety of their nationals in Iraq and Kuwait.
But we must not forget the nationals of other countries. Some of the countries bordering Iraq are facing severe difficulties from the many thousands of refugees—Egyptians, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis—fleeing from Saddam Hussein. Both they and the refugees themselves need help until passage home can be arranged. We have already made available £1.4 million for refugee relief and we shall also be providing further help through the European Community. I can announce that we are making an immediate further contribution of £2 million to the relevant international organisations. This brings our total humanitarian relief so far to £5·4 million.
Our other, equally urgent, objective has been to deter further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia or other countries in the region. In this the United States has given a firm and rapid lead. American forces were sent very rapidly, and Britain's own forces followed soon thereafter. The Government have co-ordinated with our American allies in planning a collective defensive response to the military threat from Iraq in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and at the request of states in the region. We acted together. If we had not done so there is reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would have gone further.
The detail of the action we have taken will be familiar. We have deployed a squadron of Tornado F3 air defence aircraft, a squadron of Tornado GR1 aircraft to provide day and night anti-armour capacity and a squadron of Jaguar aircraft for ground support. We have also deployed a number of Nimrod air surveillance aircraft. One Royal Navy destroyer and two frigates are in the Gulf. A second destroyer is on its way, as are three mine clearance vessels. Those ships are accompanied by a number of support vessels.
1798
In all we have some 11 ships in the area, over 40 aircraft and 2,500 men. We expect to send additional forces. Their composition is under consideration.
So let there be no misunderstanding. That deployment, like that of the United States, is at the request of governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other states in the area. In the case of Bahrain, its government invoked our treaty of friendship. The deployment is for defensive and deterrent purposes.
Several of our European partners have since joined us, as well as a number of Arab and Commonwealth countries. We believe that the forces now on the ground in the region are sufficient to deter further aggression and that the threat to Saudi Arabia and to international oil supplies has been met. The costs of such a military operation are of course enormous. They must be shared by the community of nations, including those whose security we are safeguarding. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are already offering some support.
The Iraqis must now comply with the further international requirement for them to withdraw from Kuwait. How they do so is for them to decide. But comply they must. Sanctions are the means the world has chosen to press them. They are of course a peaceful means; but other means are available and it would be unwise and give Saddam Hussein unnecessary comfort to rule out their use.
We are all shocked by the Iraqi Government's action in rounding up foreign nationals for use as a human shield. It is abhorrent and a further breach of humanitarian law. We are all deeply concerned for their well-being. The Government are in constant contact with Iraqi representatives in London, New York and Baghdad and have made clear that if there are illegal actions against our people we shall hold Iraqi officials individually responsible. We have also been in contact with the International Red Cross, which shares our view that Iraq's action is in contravention of the Geneva conventions on treatment of civilians.
The recent release of some women and children is welcome. I am delighted that we have been able to arrange for transportation of so many women and children from Kuwait to Baghdad on their homeward journey. Let us not forget that these people should never have been detained. Their release does not make the detention of their sons, husbands and fathers any less reprehensible.
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
The Earl of Caithness: Our ambassador in Baghdad is doing his utmost to protect British citizens. In Kuwait we and some 30 other countries have refused to comply with Iraq's illegal attempt to close embassies and to prevent them offering protection to their citizens. Despite encirclement by Iraqi troops and other harassment, our ambassador, Michael Weston, and his small staff of volunteers continue to offer what help they can to the beleaguered British community. The House, I am sure, will join me in

1799
paying tribute to them and to the courage of all British people who are caught up in the terrible events in Iraq and Kuwait.
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
The Earl of Caithness: Our thoughts go also to their families. We cannot guarantee the safety of the hostages. In cases of hostage taking there can be no simple assurances. But their well-being would not be helped by our giving in to blackmail. Any concession leads to further demand.
I am sure the House will agree that we cannot give in to this sort of pressure. We cannot be deflected from the determined course of action on which we have agreed in order to prevent the aggressor benefiting from his crime. We may face a long task. Resolve and determination will be needed to make the sanctions work and to maintain international unanimity.
The Government will continue to play a full and constructive part. In the coming weeks we shall face distractions. People will say that the international effort is costing too much and is not worth it. People will forget the awfulness of what Iraq has done. There will be calls for compromise, attempts to fudge the issues and to blur the principles. Saddam Hussein will seek to undermine world unanimity.
Of course we are ready to seek a settlement. But there can be no negotiation until after the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, recognition by Iraq of Kuwait's sovereignty and independence, and restoration of the legitimate government. There is no question of any compromise on that
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
The Earl of Caithness: We must remember that if Saddam Hussein is allowed to benefit with impunity from this aggression the consequences will be enormous.
Real progress has been made towards a peaceful world order with effective international institutions underpinning national sovereignty and independence. Both East and West now see in co-operation and collaboration the prospect of a safer, better future. It is an historic opportunity. But it will not be realised if the world permits a clear act of aggression by a powerful state against a weak neighbour. That would in the long term only be an invitation to Saddam Hussein and other dictators of this kind to dare further deeds of aggression.
The world must maintain a clear resolve to prevent this happening. The Government have every intention of playing their part. We hope for, and are working for, a peaceful resolution of the crisis on the only acceptable basis—the reversal of aggression. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the developments in the Gulf and of Her Majesty's Government's response to them.—(The Earl of Caithness.)
2.53 p.m.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, we warmly welcome the noble Earl to his new office and wish him every success in it. We are also grateful to him for his comprehensive speech in which he set the scene for this most important debate.
I also thank the noble Lord the Leader of the House for his positive response to our request for this opportunity to discuss the crisis which faces the world following Saddam Hussein's illegal and indefensible action on 2nd August. He sent his forces into Kuwait, after informing President Mubarak and other Arab leaders that he had in mind no such intention, and the Iraqi Government still occupy that small independent state. There was no justification for that action. It was a calculated crime which, as the noble Earl has just said, will put at risk every small country in the world if not dealt with decisively by the international community.
Saddam Hussein launched his invasion because of his country's dire economic problems, because he wanted Kuwait's oil resources and for wilder reasons of ambition as well. We all know that the politics of the Middle East are complex and fraught with dangers. Arab nationalism, Moslem fundamentalism, the Palestinian problem and hostility towards Israel all contribute to the instability of the Middle East. Such factors are very much in our minds as we consider our responsibilities and the grim implications of an outbreak of war.
For all those reasons I most warmly welcome this opportunity for a debate in this House. It was necessary that the actions taken by the Government and described by the noble Earl were in response to, and in conformity with, the resolutions passed by the Security Council of the United Nations. We strongly support those resolutions and the part played by the Government in achieving them. Taken together they are a positive and constructive set of measures to deal with the crisis brought about by Saddam Hussein.
There was a moment when we appeared to be in danger of going along with the United States earlier than any other nation without United Nations authority. That may have been unavoidable in the circumstances. It was right that the United States should take a strong and firm stand at the outset but equally important that its actions should have upon them the stamp of the United Nations. That was also necessary if the United States was to secure the support of the international community as a whole.
In the event, an historic international agreement was reached. The United Nations achieved a greater degree of unity and a greater world significance than ever before in its history. Five successive resolutions designed to put pressure on Iraq to renounce its annexation of Kuwait have been passed by the Security Council. More than 20 nations, including Arab countries, have sent forces to the area to resist further Iraqi aggression. And, lastly, mandatory economic sanctions are in place.
What is the aim of this display of international co-operation? The objective is to enforce the rule of

1801
law, as the noble Earl said. Those of us who remember the well intentioned but timid efforts of the League of Nations in the thirties know how crucial this will be for mankind. On that occasion a dictator undermined and destroyed the League of Nations, misled and cheated democratic leaders, showed contempt for human life and plunged the world into a terrible war in which millions were killed. Incidentally, I remember seeing pictures of that dictator stroking the heads of small children.
Saddam Hussein does not have the resources or the power of that dictator of half a century ago, but he has many of the characteristics. He kills his own people—the Kurdish people—using chemical weapons, as his European predecessor killed Jewish people and all who opposed him. He calls for the support of the Arab people on the grounds of nationalism and on grounds of the Islamic religion—two years after the end of a war in which he played the major role and in which a million Moslems were killed. We in the West must look back at that war with some regret and possibly some embarrassment as well. But that is the menace which the United Nations has resolved to tackle and bring to an end.
There is one other major factor in this crisis for which we must all be profoundly thankful; that is the Soviet Union's condemnation of the invasion and the co-operative attitude of the Soviet Union in the Security Council.
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: Even if they do not agree in every detail, to have the two great powers on the same wavelength at this critical time must be of profound importance. Over the past month I have often thought about what might have happened if this crisis had broken seven to 10 years ago when the Soviet Union had a very different leadership. This understanding must be preserved and increased. We therefore warmly welcome the meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev in Helsinki this coming weekend.
There are those who believe that the outbreak of war is inevitable and there are others who think that it is desirable. President Mitterrand has said that,
"We are in a logic of war",
and we must accept that the build-up of forces in the Gulf set against the erratic leader of Iraq makes the threat of war very real. Dr. Henry Kissinger has argued the case for a pre-emptive military strike on the ground that the long haul of waiting for economic sanctions to bite could cause problems—a point mentioned by the noble Earl—especially the effect upon the people of the United States with memories of Vietnam. What view do the Government take of that proposition? It will be interesting to hear the reactions of the noble Lord the Leader of the House.
I do not believe at this moment that war is inevitable but the more that people in positions of authority say that it is inevitable the more likely they are making it. After all, the Security Council has not thus far resolved upon military action. The policy of
1802
the United Nations, supported by all 15 members of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, is to isolate Iraq through economic and diplomatic measures backed by force if necessary. Here again the objective is reasonable; namely, to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait without the unpredictable damage and grim consequences which an all-out war in the Middle East would inevitably bring.
In any event, it is premature to talk about military action before economic sanctions have been given the chance to work—a point made by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness. Of course we know that it will not be an easy operation. The economic blockade will work only if all the nations involved co-operate to make it effective, no matter how long it takes. It is the side with the resources, the side which fights for principles, that has time on its side. Iraq's economy is vulnerable to a blockade but a leakage here or a seepage there could delay or even wreck its effectiveness.
United Nations sanctions intend that all trade—oil exports, financial settlements and virtually all imports—will be stopped. The reality is that because of low oil prices Iraq could not pay its massive foreign debt bill nor buy essential imports. Now there should be no more loans from foreign creditors as there have been over the years. The Iraqis know what it is to suffer shortages and austerity in time of war; they have had that experience. But during the war in the 1980s there was no alternative. Today there is an alternative. The people of Iraq have an alternative; and that is to withdraw from Kuwait. That lies at the very heart of the crisis. That is the substance of the crucial Security Council Resolution 661; namely, that Saddam Hussein's aggression cannot be permitted to stand and that at the end of the day he, or whoever succeeds him, must order the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
But sanctions must be given some time to work; and I was glad to hear the Prime Minister say on Sunday that she fully recognised this. The Foreign Secretary repeated this during his tour of the Gulf. I believe that he said it in Saudi Arabia specifically to the Sheikh of Kuwait. Sanctions will work if the international community which supported the United Nations resolution persists in its determination. If it fails, one of two things will happen: either force will be used or the United Nations will collapse and go the way of the League of Nations. The latter is really not possible for the world at this time.
We have all noted with sympathy the efforts made by Perez de Cuellar and King Hussein of Jordan to find some basis for negotiation with Saddam Hussein. Thus far they have not succeeded. King Hussein has been a good friend of this country and we do not forget that at a time when he is placed in an acutely difficult position. It is prudent, in my view, to say no more than that at this moment.
The Secretary General was also right to talk to the Iraqi foreign minister to find out whether there was any hope at present that the Iraqi Government might yield to reason. That effort proved fruitless although

1803
the Secretary General has said that he will be available should Iraq show signs of change. However, it appears at the moment to be a bleak prospect.
I have sought to make it plain that we support the broad policies of the Government in this sad affair, but there are some questions that I must put to the noble Lord. I shall do so briefly.
First, I think that the House will wish to know the cost of the operation thus far and the estimated future cost between now and the end of the year. This is the biggest military operation since the Falklands campaign. My noble friend Lord Williams will go into greater detail on the military implications when he winds up. However, I hope that the noble Lord can give us some idea of the scale of expenditure involved because it has wide implications.
Secondly, I must refer to the whole question of the sale of arms to Iraq. I shall avoid detail, but the fact is that the West, including ourselves, has sustained and pampered Saddam Hussein for many years and all of us are reaping the harvest of our misjudgment. But more immediately and specifically, grave allegations are now being made that a London company, TDG, is the front for Saddam Hussein's arms network. I saw the BBC "Panorama" programme on Monday night, as no doubt did many other noble Lords. The charges made, as noble Lords will recall, were that the strategy of this firm is to buy into companies with weapon making capacity and that the company is used to procure nuclear and other advanced armaments technology. I must say that I found the evidence compelling. But a very serious allegation was also made; namely, that the Government have taken no steps to halt the operations of TDG. I have no doubt that since the programme and the articles which have appeared in the press Ministers have examined the charges carefully. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, will clarify the position in detail when he replies to the debate.
Thirdly, the noble Earl has referred to the totally unsatisfactory treatment of British and other nationals in Kuwait and Iraq—treatment which, as he said, is grossly in breach of international law and of civilised practice. They are all very much in our minds in this debate. We also welcome the humanitarian aid which the Government have given to help those who are suffering as a result of Saddam Hussein's action. Will the noble Lord give some estimate of the number who will remain in Kuwait and in Iraq after the current outflow has concluded? The clear statement of the United Nations is to be found in Resolution 664. But the danger is that this entire matter will be at the whim of Saddam Hussein and his obsession for false propaganda. Perhaps the noble Lord will also give us a little guidance on that.
Finally, we have noted that there has been discussion about the steps which should be taken when the crisis is over. Mr. Baker, the United States Secretary of State, told the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday that some security arrangements for the Middle East along the lines of NATO might be a solution, and other tentative proposals have been made by several people, including my right
1804
honourable friend Mr. Kaufman. No doubt the Government have this in mind. Perhaps the noble Lord will give us an indication of ministerial thinking upon it.
I think we can all agree that thus far the political parties in this country have since 2nd August been able in broad terms to agree with the policies pursued by the Government. In the face of a crisis with unpredictable consequences that is of the first importance. I hope that the leadership on all sides will make special efforts to make sure that this accord continues. Of course we need to know the Government's mind both in the short and in the longer term. We need to have a clear view of the Government's aims and relationships in the crisis. I assume that our aims are those embodied in the resolutions. I further assume that they are to persist strongly with sanctions; and both Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Douglas Hurd have underlined that in recent days. The economic squeeze appears to be tightening slowly but on no account can it be breached. We must hope fervently that it will succeed and that the people who have suffered much under him will unseat their wicked leader.
We do not want war. Even a limited war would be costly in terms of life, while an extended war would have unpredictable consequences in both human and political terms. But if Saddam Hussein persists in flouting the authority of the United Nations he is inviting the use of force under a Security Council resolution. It is only Saddam Hussein, with his vast ambition to challenge the West, to lead the whole Arab nation from the east to the west of Africa and not least to destroy Israel, who can turn war away. But the great tides of destiny and history are against Saddam Hussein. Let us hope and pray that they bring him down in peace and not in war.
3.11 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Hillhead: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, for the succinctness and dignity of his speech in opening the debate this afternoon. A redeeming feature of this long drawn out but menacing crisis is the remarkable degree of consensus which so far has been achieved and preserved in this country and in the United Nations. "Consensus" is not one of the Prime Minister's favourite words, but with a few exceptions she has done little to upset it. Mr. Hurd, in giving the Foreign Secretaryship a higher profile than we have been used to seeing under this Government, has played a notable role in maintaining it. So has Mr. Bush. We are lucky to have him in the White House—or even in Kennebunkport if he is not in the White House.
The main object of policy, compatible with not letting Saddam Hussein get away with it, must be to maintain that consensus both at home and abroad. Neither object may be easy to achieve but both are prizes of rare value. If we want a reverse precedent for the value of preserving substantial unity at home we have only to cast our minds back to the Suez adventure. Surely it must stand as the text-book example of how not to conduct a Middle Eastern

1805
adventure. It divided the nation perhaps even more than Munich. It also dangerously divided the Western Alliance, united the Arab states and most of the rest of the world against us and failed abysmally in its objectives. It can serve as a useful benchmark for what not to do. The case for preserving unity abroad is still more important.
The first is a British problem; the second is a global problem upon which will turn the outcome of these events. But of course to a substantial extent they are the reverse sides of the same coin. The best way to preserve the consensus at home is to maintain the consensus abroad. Therefore, it appears to me to be peculiarly foolish for some commentators to give the impression of looking almost hopefully for cracks both here and in the United Nations which will divide the sheep from the goats, the hawks from the doves, the men from the boys and generally enable those who like to denounce wets, wimps, liberals (with a small "l") and rational thinkers to feel better.
I read an article in last week's Sunday Telegraph—a paper which I greatly enjoy but which falls very much into that category—under the title,
"Time to trust the US and not the UN".
The article was rather better than the title. But I want to trust both: to have the power and will of the United States acting as a spearhead of the United Nations and under its authority. That appears to me to be the only way in which we are likely to obtain a satisfactory outcome, whether more or less peacefully or after a conflict.
The United States has fought two bloody conflicts during the 40 years of the Cold War. One—that is Vietnam—was effectively lost and was a disaster in its effects upon American self-confidence, American society, American finances and world inflation. The other—that is Korea—was won. It achieved its limited but vital objective of preventing the Communist takeover of South Korea and it enhanced American prestige and leadership capacity in the difficult decades that lay ahead.
It is no accident that the war that was won was fought under United Nations auspices and the war that was lost was not. It is greatly to be hoped that events in the desert will not repeat those in Korea to the extent of involving half a million American casualties or the insubordination (and eventual incompetence) of a commander such as MacArthur. Nonetheless, it is the locus classicus, just as Suez is the reverse, of an effective action carried out mainly by one great power under the authority of the international peace-keeping organisation.
At that time that authority was by accident just as great and as near to unanimity as it was recently and with a similar pattern of voting in the Security Council. The first vote, demanding North Korean withdrawal, was carried by nine votes to nil, with one abstention, which was Yugoslavia. The second vote, held two days later and authorising military action, was carried by seven votes to one. Yugoslavia had
1806
moved to dissent and India and Egypt had moved from assent to abstention. Nevertheless, it was a strong majority.
There were no vetoes on either occasion. That was as a result of an extraordinary piece of luck; in protest at the continued presence of nationalist China, Russia had walked out of the Security Council in the previous January. It returned a month later, so why it did not do so for at least a second vote defies interpretation.
But this time we have an even greater and more securely based piece of luck. We do not have merely the chance absence of the Soviet Union; we have its only slightly tentative support. We hope that on Saturday in Helsinki Mr. Bush may be able to solidify that and make this not only the first post-Cold War crisis but also the first time in history that the United Nations has been able to show what it can do when no longer hobbled by an automatic superpower split.
In these circumstances, surely it would be more undesirable that we should in any way encourage the US to take unilateral action in a way that would certainly make a range of countries—China without question, Russia maybe, possibly France and probably all the Arab countries except Kuwait—drop off as apples dropping off a bough. That does not preclude military action when and if sanctions are failing to do the job. But it precludes military action taken unilaterally or prematurely in order to show that the United States can still flex its muscles as a superpower, even though now without its symbiotic partner. However, it must be said that the Washington Government, even though urged in that direction by some former Secretaries of State, show very little sign of so acting. The British Government would be remarkably foolish if they were tempted to become an almost solitary trumpeter for such action.
There is one other lesson to be drawn from the Korean parallel. Again, in contrast with Vietnam, at that time the United States received very widespread assistance. Land troops were sent by 13 different countries. Britain and Turkey—perhaps a surprising pair—contributed the most. Some of the other contributions were fairly nominal. India, Italy, and three Scandinavian countries sent only a few field admirals. However, I do not recollect either President Truman or Mr. Attlee, with his full brigade in the most exposed parts of the front, denouncing the parsimony or the pusillanimity of those who did much less. They were thankful for what they could get, recognising a certain difference in national traditions. More importance was attached to keeping countries on board than to lecturing them for their inadequacies. I believe that we could have done without Mrs. Thatcher's strictures at Helsinki—a city which is assuming a frequent role in these events. I hope that Mr. Bush will be more persuasive there this weekend.
Anything to do with Chancellor Kohl seems to have an unsettling effect on the Prime Minister. It is easy always to be looking for the mote in other countries' eyes. The Americans could complain that we have no land forces on the ground, and, indeed, some congressional voices have been raised to that

1807
effect. No doubt we shall hear more of that. However, the way to maintain a united front is not for everybody to be uncomprehending of the problems of other countries.
It seems to me to be extraordinarily insensitive not to recognise first that the Germans are, to say the least, somewhat preoccupied with their Eastern problems at present and that they feel inhibited by their Basic Law from deploying forces outside the NATO area. That was reaffirmed in 1954 (when German rearmament was a most controversial issue) to reassure ourselves and Germany's other NATO partners. It is rather harsh to accuse Germany both of being a potential juggernaut and of paying too much attention to the speed limit she has placed upon herself in order to reassure other road users.
I do not believe that we should be wise to become involved too deeply in legalistic disputes about exactly how much can be done under Article 51 and without further authorisation. An article in The Times this morning suggesting that statements by the Kuwaiti delegate to the UN may have undermined that case shows what a quagmire that can be. The reality of the matter is that whether or not we legally need it, there are immense practical as well as moral advantages in maintaining a position in which the necessary majority in the UN is still with us. Not to be able to win a vote is at least half the battle lost, whether or not one can claim that the vote is legally unnecessary.
The problems confronting this Government and the governments of other countries with which we are associated are delicate and difficult. There are at least three propositions to be reconciled: first, Saddam Hussein must withdraw from Kuwait and in no way profit from his aggression; secondly, without the Americans being prepared to take special responsibilities on their shoulders, the excellent resolutions of the UN could prove little more than a wringing of hands; the equally valid third proposition is that the Americans acting alone—or with us alone in their support—would shatter the world consensus and produce such a wave of Arab reaction that we should probably be worse off at the end than at the beginning.
Therefore, the feat of statesmanship which must be accomplished is the maintenance of the marriage of United States power and United Nations moral authority. Either alone is inadequate but if they can be kept together we might begin to forge a new post-Cold War world order. So long as Her Majesty's Government try to do that, they will have our resolute support.
3.25 p.m.
The Archbishop of Canterbury: My Lords, I say at once that. I believe that the actions of Her Majesty's Government in response to developments in the Gulf have been sound. I join with those who preceded me in thanking the noble Earl for his objective account of that. Iraq's naked aggression against the state of Kuwait had to be vigorously resisted. With commendable speed, and to the surprise of many people, the UN Security Council that same day
1808
condemned the invasion and called upon Iraq immediately and unconditionally to withdraw all its forces.
Since then, the UN Security Council has passed four further resolutions. For virtually the first time since its inception, the UN has acted as its founders intended. That is a triumph for international order which should not be allowed to crumble.
Above all, we must give time for the sanctions to work. The Prime Minister said on Sunday that they must be given "a few months" to work. That is surely right. The pipelines are cut, Iraqi ports are blockaded and there is no way in which their oil can be exported. That is a more powerful sanction than any I can think of in modern times. It is certainly far more powerful, for example, than the sanctions against the import of oil by Southern Rhodesia where there was a great deal of leakage by both land and sea.
The wording of Resolution 661 is clear about the extent of the sanctions. They cover the sale or supply to Kuwait and Iraq of "any commodities or products". But they expressly exclude:
"supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs".
That is surely the right balance. The more extensive the sanctions, the more effective they are likely to be. But there must be no wish to cause needless suffering by the deprivation of medical supplies or essential foodstuffs. In this matter we must be prepared to err on the side of humanity.
Many of us know from our experience of the Second World War that a nation under seige can show remarkable resilience. There will be pressures for a quick strike against Iraq. Those have already been heard. However, unless the Iraqis take further aggressive steps, such pressures must be firmly resisted, at least until the sanctions have had time to work.
I am no strategist, so I shall not burden the House with further thoughts about the way in which the continuing crisis should be handled from day to day. However, I would like to call attention to several underlying factors that seem to me to be important.
We must be quite clear in our minds that this crisis is not a clash between Christianity and Islam. Nor is it anything to do with Islamic fundamentalism. It is to do with old-fashioned naked aggression. Of course, President Saddam will seek to exploit Islamic fundamentalism—we have heard him do so—and we must take care not to increase his opportunities to do so.
Nor should we overlook the fact that Iraq in fact has a better record of accepting Christian Churches than some other states in the region. The Anglican communities in Kuwait and Iraq are almost entirely expatriate. But there are significant numbers of indigenous Christians, in particular the Syrian Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox, together with the ancient Church of the East—the so-called Assyrian Church. In addition, derived from these communities, there are Churches which are now in communion with Rome. A Syrian Orthodox bishop and an Assyrian

1809
priest—both from Iraq—attended the Lambeth Conference two years ago. We should remember that these people are local, Iraqi citizens.
We should have in mind too the substantial Moslem minority in Britain. We must take special care to see that they do not become the victims of any backlash arising from careless confusion of the Government of Iraq with Islam or Islamic fundamentalism. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of Moslems in Britain are of Pakistan or Bangladeshi origin, and that both those countries have sent armed forces to the defence of Saudi Arabia.
A majority of the states of the Arab League and of the Islamic Conference Organisation have condemned the Iraqi aggression. More importantly, at their meeting in Cairo on 10th August the majority of Arab states called for a positive response to the Saudi request for Arab troops. That is a remarkable situation, not least because some of those states are under considerable internal pressure from those who are understandably attracted by Saddam Hussein's beguiling appeal to Arab nationalism and to legitimate Palestinian grievances.
We cannot disregard history, though we must not let ourselves become paralysed by it. We cannot just set aside the role of the Western powers in the Middle East, especially the role of Britain and France, in fixing the boundaries of that part of the world after the First World War. It was a regrettable chapter of contradictory and therefore inevitably broken promises, not only for the Arabs but also for people like the wretched Kurds who found themselves spread over four states and who have suffered abominably, most recently from Iraqi chemical weapons. Of course, the Arabs were no angels in the process of constructing the modern boundaries of the Middle East; they were and are just as liable to the temptations of human greed as any other group of people. But, in looking at the map of the Middle East today, we cannot disregard the fact that we played a central role in constructing it. Nor can we disregard the suspicions in Arab minds that arise from our earlier role.
I must say a word about two groups of hostages. Two weeks ago we heard with great joy of the release of Brian Keenan after four and a half years of cruel captivity as a hostage in Lebanon. I doubt if there are any Members of this House who were not deeply moved by his grace, courage and humour. But there are other hostages in Lebanon, including John McCarthy, Terry Waite and Jack Mann and, of course, many hundreds of Lebanese of all persuasions. The turbulence in the Middle East causes extra distress for their families, though I am happy to say that there is also some cause for optimism that their anguish will be over before long.
There is also that large group of hostages held in Kuwait and Iraq in flagrant contravention of international law. Their detention plainly causes great distress to their relatives. Everyone in this House will share that distress and pray that their nightmare is quickly ended. It also poses another grave problem for
1810
the British and other governments. It must weigh heavily upon Ministers. But I am bound to say—in agreement with the noble Earl in his speech—that while their plight must obviously be a major factor in the Government's reckoning, in the last resort it cannot determine policy, for that would encourage any future aggressor to behave in the same barbarous way. Every possible step must be taken to ensure their safe return. That is another proper reason for making it plain, as the Prime Minister has done, that we are determined to give time for the sanctions to work.
We have a legitimate concern regarding these British subjects. But we cannot overlook the fact that many hundreds of thousands of other people of various nationalities have been displaced from Kuwait and Iraq. Jordan in particular has been faced with a massive influx of people fleeing across its border with Iraq. Many of the refugees are from the poorest countries which have little capacity to help them; for example, Egypt, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Most of the refugees are Moslem people. We must never forget that they are the most numerous victims of the aggression to date. Our reaction to their plight tests our claim to moral principles. I applaud the powerful presentation in today's Independent on this theme. The world needs not only policemen but prompt and effective Samaritans.
The co-ordination of disaster relief is seen once again to demand the most vigorous attention and a higher priority in the international community. Meanwhile we must hear more of what is being done. I am grateful for the figures given to us by the noble Earl in his speech. We must hear more of what we can support. We must never allow the plight of these people to be relegated to the sidelines. If ever there was a place for a religious leader to sound an unqualified moral imperative in a debate, it is here.
Finally, the Christian churchman who contributes to a debate of this grave character may be expected to give, albeit briefly, some wider religious justification for his words. The Christian has a built-in resistance to the use of force. We are given only one mandate. We are to be peacemakers. But the Bible insists that we live in a world in rebellion against its own best interests, a world which has rejected the order given to it by its creator. Christianity does not lack realism about the intransigence of conflict. The scriptures speak of our responsibility for seeking justice and the well-being of creation in the world as it exists. The hard fact is that the use of force is caused as much by human virtues—our sense of justice; our belief in the difference between right and wrong; our readiness for self-sacrifice on behalf of others—as it is by any of our failures.
A call for prayer will always be a call for peacemaking, and I issue a call for that spiritual weapon at this time of crisis for so many. No matter how turbulent the world or how painful the choices, it is through the grace of God that we are made instruments of peace in the ambiguities of a world made dangerous by human folly and wickedness.
3.39 p.m.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, the House will have particularly welcomed the robust and predictably sensible and humane speech of the most reverend Primate. The debate so far has been harmonious. I hope that I shall do nothing to disturb that.
I do not believe that Her Majesty's Government or the United States Government could have done other than they have. All experience in international affairs demonstrates that to show weakness in the face of aggression, such as President Saddam Hussein has committed against Kuwait, stores up much bigger trouble for the future and much greater danger. We have some unhappy memories of that kind of policy.
We can all see what the probable consequences of weakness would be. Those are the central issues which must guide our policies. If the United Nations resolution is flouted and President Saddam Hussein successfully resists world opinion, certain things will inevitably follow. He and Iraq will be the masters of the Middle East. Neither the Gulf states nor Saudi Arabia and Jordan could long survive the consequences of their present policy. Iraq would inevitably bring pressure on them. In the light of the leadership that Egypt has shown among those Arab states opposed to the Iraqi policy, its own regime would be seriously at risk. It would not be long before Iraq turned its attention to Israel via Jordan, bringing the probability of war and the near certain involvement of the United States and probably others too. President Saddam Hussein would be undisputed controller of Western oil supplies, with his hand on the windpipe of the world. I do not believe that that is a situation which we can conceivably contemplate let alone accept, however grave the measures we may have to take. There is no way in which the world can allow the Iraqi president to succeed.
But in this rather gloomy scenario there are certain encouraging features. As the Leader of the Opposition said, a year or two ago it would have been inconceivable that the United Nations Security Council could have unanimously passed a resolution in the terms that it did or countenanced the use of force to maintain the blockade. Nor, a short time ago, would we have witnessed the outright condemnation of this aggression by the Soviets and in particular by President Gorbachev himself. Having said that, at this juncture it is by no means certain that the United Nations measures will be successful. Will the sanctions be effective? Will there be widespread evasion? How long is it likely to take before the sanctions have sufficient bite seriously to compel President Saddam Hussein to accept the United Nations resolution for a total withdrawal from Kuwait? Does the free world have the patience and the stamina for a long haul?
Such experience as we have of sanctions shows that, on the whole, they take a long time to bite and that there are always those who, for money, are prepared to evade them, sometimes very successfully. There is some evidence that this is already beginning to happen. The longer it takes, the more likely it is that the immediate urgency and resolution which have been created over these past few weeks will disappear.
1812
There may well be a shrugging of the shoulders on the part of some countries in the United Nations and a tacit acceptance of what they will regard as a fait accompli. We can already see in some of the comments made recently by prominent people, notably Mr. Jesse Jackson, that there is talk of concessions, and a number of people have made it clear that in no circumstances would they support military action. The fact remains that, in spite of these difficulties, we have obviously to give time for sanctions to work and do everything in our power to make sure they are successful and that a peaceful solution is arrived at.
But what if, after a reasonable period, it is clear that sanctions are not succeeding and are not likely to be successful? Is President Saddam Hussein to be allowed to get away with it? If he does, the whole credibility of the West, and more particularly, of the United States, will crumble, with all the consequences that I have forecast. In those circumstances, is it likely that the United Nations Security Council would specifically authorise the use of force; and, if not, should the United States and other like-minded governments, if there be any, rely on the existing resolution as sufficient legal and moral authority?
In either of those events, and particularly in the second case, I suspect that a number of countries, at the present time prepared to support what has so far been done, would campaign vigorously against using force in any circumstances. It would be reasonable to assume, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, did, that a large part of the Arab world would unite against what they would be encouraged to see as American aggression. And we have to remember, if we are realistic, that American policy in the Middle East for the past 40 years has been perceived to be anti-Arab and pro-Israel. For all those reasons, if we can possibly do so the use of force should be avoided.
There is no doubt then that there are difficult decisions ahead. But in the short term there are a number of things that can be done. First of all, we must be as sure as possible that there are no loopholes or evasions to the sanctions or the blockade. We must deal firmly with those who are evading them. Secondly, it must be explained in the most stark terms to the governments of the United Nations what the consequences of a United Nations failure would be. That is the job of all responsible governments and should not just be left to the United States. Thirdly, we must in no circumstances, now or in the future, rule out the use of force. To do so, as some would seem to advocate, is to remove the strongest single pressure on Iraq. It would, in effect, be a clear sign to the Iraqis that the international community is in the end not prepared to face up to the logic of its moral and legal position on the total unacceptability of the conquest by arms of a sovereign country.
I very much hope that on Sunday President Bush and President Gorbachev can come out clearly and publicly in agreeing that the United Nations resolutions must be obeyed and that necessary steps, whatever they may be, will be taken to ensure that they are obeyed.

1813
I should like to touch on one other matter which, although perhaps not immediately relevant, is something on which the European Community might usefully reflect. This crisis has shown up how far removed the 12 countries are from achieving a closer political association. If the Prime Minister or President Mitterrand had waited until the Community had decided what its policy was and what its actions should be, the United States would have found itself wholly alone, its chief allies unable to make up their minds quickly enough to have any influence on events.
This crisis is essentially a matter affecting the security of the Community as a whole—not, it is true, its security in terms of East-West relations, but certainly its security in the long term not only in terms of oil supplies but in terms of peace in the Middle East. For those of us who believe, as I do, that, if the Community is to have any influence in world affairs and that after 1992 there must inevitably be a closer political element to match the economic integration, there are urgent lessons to be learnt from the past month.
In the future, the Community must concern itself with its own security and, though this is not the moment to develop that theme, there are, it seems to me, ways in which that could be done in association with an evolution of NATO in a rather different form from what it is now.
In sum, therefore, I believe that the Government have acted absolutely correctly: that to allow the actions of President Saddam Hussein to prevail would be an unmitigated disaster leading to infinitely more serious trouble in the future. I believe that we should give sanctions a good chance but, if they do not succeed, we should not exclude the need to take military action. The responsibility for that and its consequences would lie wholly with the Iraqi Government and not with those seeking to uphold the recognised standards of civilised behaviour.
De Tocqueville once said:
"A democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the face of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy and it will not await their consequences with patience".
That will be the Iraqi hope. De Tocqueville's words should be a warning to us and an imperative to prove him wrong.
3.52 p.m.
Lord Callaghan of Cardiff: My Lords, I am sure that if de Tocqueville had continued the thought expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, he would have gone on to add that, in a democracy where people and Members of Parliament are free to speak their minds, a government can only be strengthened by the kind of debate which is taking place in this and another place this afternoon, and that the expression of our opinion here is bound to strengthen the Government in the policies which they are following. So much then for de Tocqueville.
I should like to add my congratulations to the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, who has now joined the Foreign
1814
Office. He has joined a very fine office which is often blamed for things which are not its responsibility. However, I am bound to say that so far as concerns this particular crisis, I feel that the Secretary of State for foreign relations and his team have done all that could be expected of them. They deserve our support. It seems to me that they have combined firmness with caution in the proper degrees. I hope that they will continue to do so.
The importance of this debate as I see it is that the Government should answer questions—the kind of questions put by my noble friend, whose sentiments I agree with, to the Government Front Bench this afternoon. I believe that we should also, without too much niggling, give the Government the backing which is needed in what is the most critical situation we have had to face for many years. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, that to some extent it resembles Korea. I have a personal recollection of that time as I was Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty. There was hesitation for a day or two before the United Nations resolutions were passed.
At the time, my room was next to that of Lord Mountbatten. I well remember one morning when my door was thrown open and he strode in—Lord Mountbatten always strode, he never walked. He told us—and how our hearts rejoiced when we recognised this first great challenge of an armed aggression after World War II (which we had hoped was the war to end all wars)—that Harry Truman was going to respond in the way that President Bush has now responded under the aegis of the United Nations.
There are indeed many parallels, but I shall draw one more. I say this in all friendliness to the Government Front Bench. One of my worries in recent years has been the diminution in the consultation which takes place between government and opposition on matters which are of great international importance. One of the things which was certainly true of the days of Korea was that there was the closest consultation between government and opposition on the steps that the Government were taking. I fully remember that fact. On this particular issue I hope that the Government will take the Opposition into their confidence on the steps which they may feel it is necessary to take. They can only be strengthened if they do so.
In my view the next most important action we must take—indeed, we are already doing it—is to isolate Iraq as completely as we can. The first steps have been taken in that direction, but it is important that they should be strengthened. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, correctly asked the question, "Will sanctions work?". I am sure that the Prime Minister is right when she says that they must be given the time to work. As the noble Lord said, our experience is not always hopeful. However, on the other hand, we must remember that Rhodesia had in South Africa a giant friendly neighbour which was in no way assisting; but the nations which are now on the borders of Iraq have

1815
every reason in their own self-interest to assist in the maintenance of sanctions. I trust that they will do so. There is that difference in the situation.
I agree with what I think lay behind the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington; namely, that where a government, an administration or a regime has—as is apparently the case in respect of Saddam Hussein—the support of the great majority of its people for various reasons, either anti-colonialism, because the Americans are there, or for all the other reasons which have been given, then sanctions may cripple its industry. However, a country can stand a very great deal without buckling so long as public opinion is there. I have seen no signs as yet to suggest that public opinion in this respect is crumbling. Therefore, sanctions will have a value; but they will have only a limited value.
Therefore, we must consider what are the alternatives. The options are clear: we either concede and say that aggression can succeed in the long run if the aggressor is firm enough, or we must say that there is an alternative which we shall follow. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, as to what the answer to that question will be. We cannot rely wholly upon sanctions; but we should not turn immediately to armed conflict.
It seems to me that we must now pursue a political initiative—the Foreign Office would call it a diplomatic initiative—to a very great extent and use our enemies as well as our friends. Was it not Winston Churchill who said when Stalin came into the war that he would sup with the Devil if it was necessary in order to beat Hitler? I am not comparing Saddam Hussein with Hitler; indeed, I could think of other comparisons. I believe that we should use his friends in order to convince him that we mean what we say and that we do not intend to go back. I am thinking of countries such as Algeria and Libya—and let us not be too hard on King Hussein of Jordan. We all know that he constantly has to walk a tightrope if he is to preserve his kingdom intact. I am sure that after he left Mrs. Thatcher he was in no doubt about the firmness with which we are pursuing the matter. He can convey that fact to Saddam Hussein.
Sanctions are not going to work within the next few weeks; if, indeed, they work at all. They must be given a long time in which to work. What is important is that Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, following the meeting between President Bush and Mr. Gorbachev, should be absolutely convinced of what the alternative is if Saddam Hussein does not withdraw. They can then give their impressions to Saddam Hussein. Whether that will influence him, I do not know; but I am certain that we should use those instruments, messengers and vehicles to convey to Saddam Hussein that there is no escape for him from that dilemma unless he withdraws from Kuwait, ceases to play cat and mouse with the hostages and allows Kuwait to determine its own future. A great political initiative is needed now to support the policy of sanctions which is necessary and which may deliver a blow at him but which I am not at all sure will bring him down.
1816
I have little else to say. We have obviously to strain every effort to achieve our ends by peace under the United Nations. I hope that we shall not be faced with the dilemma as to what we do if support is withdrawn from the United Nations. I do not know that it is necessary to answer that question at present, because every effort must be made to ensure that what has happened so far is continued under the umbrella and the aegis of the United Nations. That is where the effort is required rather than contemplating what we do if we fail to obtain support. Many of us know what decision would have to be taken at the end of the day, but we must strain every effort to achieve our ends through the United Nations and by peaceful means.
There is no doubt that the long-term independence of those Middle East states depends upon the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. I do not know whether I am in order when I refer to this, but if there is a vote in another place I do not believe that it will reveal a basic difference. There are some people who are never happy unless they are in a small minority somewhere. I am sure that one day in the years to come a statue will be erected to my friend Mr. Tony Benn in that mausoleum which is reserved for those whose intellectual agility is only exceeded by their self-righteousness. Let us not think that the vote in another place will be of great significance, because I have no doubt of the overriding national unity of the country in the handling of the situation.
I agree with the concluding remarks of the noble Earl, which I thought had been drafted with great care and which will repay reading. If the Foreign Office follows that line there need be no doubt about the support that it can get. So far as Saddam Hussein is concerned, at the end of the day, sanctions having been fully applied, if our political initiative does not succeed in persuading him that he has no way out except the right way—namely, to withdraw from Kuwait—if all those matters fail to move him, then the peace cannot be kept, and he will have to yield to armed force what he will not yield to morality and to reason. But if we can maintain a firm, united front; if he is clear about our resolve in this matter and our determination to see it through to the end, that in itself is our best hope of ensuring that we can secure his withdrawal without an armed conflict.
4.14 p.m.
Lord Bramall: My Lords, after the magnificent speeches from such distinguished noble Lords, what hope is there for a simple soldier? Perhaps, to keep my end up, although I feel diffident about mentioining this, I should say that I reminded your Lordships' House during the debate on the defence estimates on 17th July that the Middle East might explode at any moment; that it was not difficult to imagine a scenario in which our armed forces might be needed in some capacity to counter or balance a pervading threat; and that if that happened, it would not be a question of meddling in affairs that did not concern us, because we would perceive that our interests were much affected and because the result of not becoming involved was likely to be more serious still.

1817
First, I should like to add my congratulations to the Government, especially the right honourable gentleman the Foreign Secretary, on the handling to date of the Gulf crisis. Equally, I have not the slightest doubt that the Government will have been well advised on the military side by the United Kingdom chiefs of staff. It is a question of so far, so good, with some important achievements which should not be underestimated whatever the future holds.
Unhappily, in practice international law so often seems to be governed less by any binding set of rules, even the United Nations Charter, than by what is acceptable, particularly what one can get away with internationally. It was vital—I agree with the Minister—that someone as power hungry as Saddam Hussein should not be allowed to get away with annexing a sovereign state of 70 years' standing and pinching something which did not belong to him, a perception, it is important to remember, not just of the Americans and ourselves but of virtually the whole world (a unanimous Security Council having declared the action invalid and imposed mandatory sanctions, to which it has subsequently given teeth), the majority of the Arab League, the entire European Community and the Soviet Union, without whose co-operation our crisis management might have looked very different, as the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition has reminded us.
After all, many of us remember all too clearly such sinister, high-handed behaviour in Europe in the '30s, each occasion with its own similarly trumped-up excuses and justifications, and how bitterly we came to regret that we had not been in a position to blow the whistle earlier. The important thing is that as a result of this remarkable and almost unique degree of unanimity—the incredibly rapid and powerful American response to the Saudi Arabian request for help, backed by valuable contributions from ourselves, the Arab world and the Soviet Union among many others—Saddam Hussein has not got away with it in the sense that he has been pulled up sharply in his tracks. The situation has been somewhat stabilised, apart from the appalling problem of the refugees. The territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia has been secured. The blockade of Iraq's ailing economy is being made increasingly effective. Iraq is balked from moving offensively in any direction without paying a terrible price which its dictator would be most unlikely to survive.
In short, Saddam Hussein is increasingly isolated: condemned by the United Nations; alienated from other Arab leaders: rejected by his one-time ally; and manifestly worried enough to want to bargain and negotiate to some degree. Hence his posturing on television and his despicable manipulation of the hostages. Any visions that he may have had of Middle Eastern and Arab domination, and of an inexorable march towards a war with Israel, have, if we continue to play our cards wisely, been thwarted, at least for the time being and perhaps for the foreseeable future. That gives a firm base, as has been said, for tough diplomacy and a chance to achieve a just and lasting
1818
solution. Saddam Hussein is weaker than when he started on his latest adventure, even though he has launched a well-conducted propaganda offensive designed to divert attention from the immediate issue and to whip up Arab nationalism against outside interference and towards the traditional Arab struggle against Israel. We would have predicted this, and it is something that we have got to learn to live with and counter as we can.
However, now we come to the difficult part because, of course, Iraq is still in Kuwait and shows no signs of handing it back unconditionally. Saddam Hussein still has numerous hostages and that is perhaps an even more worrying card in his pack because of the isolation of the males. The substance of this debate—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—is what we do now. Here I am sure that most noble Lords will advocate cool heads and considerable patience, for there is still much to do and some way to go to increase Iraq's isolation in the United Nations—it is still, after all, essentially their problem—in the Arab world, which has a major stake in cutting Saddam Hussein down to size, and through all possible means of diplomatic pressure, before having to decide whether any further offensive action (other than reacting to his attacking Saudi Arabia) would have to be threatened and, if necessary, taken.
I hope that we can discount the argument that because troops have been deployed they automatically have to do battle. We have grown up since the days when the younger von Moltke told the Kaiser that he had to go to war because the mobilisation plans were too far advanced to stop it. In fact, military force plays a major part in powerful diplomacy. As that great Chinese general and military theorist of over 2,000 years ago, Sum Tso, reminded us, the best general may be the one who achieves his political and strategic objectives without having to fight.
However, in the meantime—and here I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—it cannot be bad from the point of view of crisis management that Saddam Hussein has the possibility of such damaging action hanging over his head, as he is persuaded to ponder the folly of his ways. For he must realise, as General Galtieri had to learn the hard way, that in this world if something or some principle is important enough, it may have to be fought for.
If offensive action is to be considered in the light of the international scene at the time, may I as a former military man make a plea not to underestimate the scale of the task? The noble Lord, Lord Deedes, reminded us in the Daily Telegraph on Monday of Winston Churchill's heartfelt words about never, ever, ever believing that war will be smooth or easy or precisely controllable. The situation in the Gulf has some special problems of its own, both political—on which others are more qualified to judge—and military. The desert can be a harsh environment to the unwary and those not used to operating in it or over it. The Iraqis may not be the greatest army or air force in the world and their success against Iran, at least in offensive operations, was strictly limited.

1819
Nevertheless, we cannot sweep aside, as we have heard some Americans do with macho sentiments and expressions of contempt, the battle experience accumulated in nine years of war. For in the training of a soldier there can be no substitute for actually being shot at by modern weapons and no greater spur than fighting with your back to your homeland. This would be in complete contrast to the Argentinians who have not had a war for a hundred years. The last people who ignored such experience were the Chinese when they failed to teach the North Vietnamese a lesson in the early 1980s.
America, of course, has all the latest technology at its command. With the cloudless skies and lack of cover in the Gulf area, the battle in the air, in which the Americans are immensely strong, could be decisive. But technology will only triumph if there is no complacency and if the tactical plan takes full account of the well tried principles of war and the other prerequisites which make all the difference between winning and losing battles.
I have particularly in mind, apart from the early winning of the air battle, the need for up-to-date and accurate intelligence, both comforting and disquieting; for selecting and maintaining a clear-cut political aim—so lacking in the Suez operation—within which the military can work and develop their own plans. For instance, would the aim be to re-occupy Kuwait or should the release of the hostages and the toppling of Saddam Hussein be just as important? Or would we merely confine ourselves, as Dr. Kissinger advocates, to the destruction of his military assets from long range, being ready to counter-punch when and if he reacted?
In an open debate like this it would be quite wrong to speculate, for an equally important principle of war is that the opposition must be kept constantly surprised and mystified, not only about future intentions but in the course of any offensive itself. None of this would be helped if the media persist in their determination to bare all possible military options to public scrutiny well in advance.
Then if a decision is made to strike, it would have to be made with sufficient concentrated force to put fear into the hearts of the enemy and induce confusion in its leadership. This will not be pleasant, but with such battle-experienced opponents it will be the only way if casualties are to be kept to a minimum and the business completed within an acceptable period of time. Because it will not be pleasant, there is a need not only for maximum international backing, vastly preferable under the United Nations' auspices—and many noble Lords have made this point—but also for a carefully considered programme of psychological operations to support and complement the tactical plan and to combat, where possible, the inevitable propaganda reaction of Iraq. If it were to be felt that in the process the international heat would become too great, it would be better to stay out of the kitchen in the first place. I think that Suez probably taught us that lesson.
1820
Finally, there will have to be a proper chain of command with a good, experienced commander-in-chief to take charge of implementing the general strategy. We cannot win battles by committees, let alone by the military committee of the United Nations. Once the political guidelines and policy on the use of force have been established at governmental level and in the United Nations, the commander-in-chief, whoever he is—and he would have to be an American—and his subordinates must be allowed to fight their battle on land and sea and in the air with as little interference as possible, otherwise, there will be chaos.
All these matters seem obvious enough, but World War II, when they were perfected and commonly practised, is long past. More recent history has shown that they can be easily forgotten. I believe that our Chief of Defence Staff or one of the chiefs of staff should be sent to satisfy himself on how much these important principles have been taken into account in any future American planning, just as was done frequently in World War II. For if they are not diligently followed, an attacker could find himself enmeshed in a longer struggle with much wider ramifications than he bargained for.
So, while hoping above hope, as I know all noble Lords do, that time is on our side, that tough diplomacy on a broad basis backed by effective sanctions and the threat of force will do the trick, the use of force cannot be ruled out for a number of reasons, always provided that the international climate can be held sufficiently tolerant. But we should be under no illusions that we shall be playing for high stakes, particularly political. That makes it all the more necessary not only that we should weigh up the advantages and disadvantages carefully, dispassionately and objectively, but that we should do all we can and use all our influence to see that the Americans do so as well.
Offensive action authorised by the United Nations, with a much better political climate for success, is something to which we would be bound to subscribe with all the force we could muster. But we should not at this stage commit ourselves to further offensive action outside the United Nations unless and until we are convinced that the selective aim is worth the risks and economic costs; that the international climate is at least likely to be tolerant of such action; and that the plans—not taken on face value but vetted by our own chiefs of staff—were felt to be sound enough to ensure the achievement of the aim within a reasonable period of time. We cannot afford a repetition of the Suez fiasco, when the first two criteria at least were not present. Meanwhile I warmly support the actions of the Government.
4.20 p.m.
Lord Pym: My Lords, I am sure that the House appreciates the authoritative speech made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. I thought that his reference to a quotation from Churchill's book, My Early Life, was particularly apt at this juncture.

1821
It is difficult to exaggerate the gravity of events that have occurred in the past month and their long-term consequences. The annexation of Kuwait is an act of aggression that threatens the prosperity of the whole world. It is not any little local difficulty. It is a painful reminder that the habit of aggression has not yet been broken. I hope that those who enjoy spending a so-called peace dividend that has not yet been earned will take this lesson to heart.
One of the major issues for the future that has been brought to a head by this conflict is the stance of NATO and the extent to which it should become involved out of area, which is where the main threat to NATO countries always appears to exist. The experience of this crisis may help to solve that question.
It is difficult to exaggerate also the competence of Her Majesty's Government in dealing with the Gulf crisis, and I join with others in congratulating my noble friend and his colleagues, particularly the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, on the handling of the matter so far.
In recent days the plight of the hostages and refugees has understandably dominated the media. The fate of many of them still hangs in the balance. That is a grim condition and one which points out the sheer brutality of the action taken by Iraq. We are all concerned for the hostages, but that concern cannot disguise the profound implications of Iraq's aggression, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington.
The first implication is the threat to the world's principal oil supply. The idea that that supply should be in any way dependent upon a tyrant like Saddam Hussein is plainly intolerable. He is a proven aggressor who attacked Iran and, having failed there, went for a softer target. Without the resolute response of the United States, supported by Britain and later by others, who doubts that Saddam Hussein would have continued his assault into Saudi Arabia and beyond if nobody stopped him? The effect of that situation on the world economy would have been catastrophic and millions of ordinary people would have suffered. That danger has been prevented and credit for that should go where it is due.
However, Saddam Hussein is still in occupation in Iraq, and, like all aggressors, shows no signs of retreating voluntarily. But retreat he will have to, and through the United Nations the world has passed Resolution 660 to that effect. The international accord reached on this issue is unique and gives practical expression to the anger felt by virtually everyone at what Iraq has done. Its occupation of Kuwait must not be allowed to stand—and that can be described as a world decision.
One then asks how that objective is to be achieved. Despite the provocation and illegality of Iraq's action, it must be right to explore every peaceful alternative before force is used. Nobody wants to fight if it can be avoided. Unfortunately, bitter experience shows that
1822
in the end force is invariably required in order to dislodge an aggressor. Therefore, we all know the probability and we face it with equanimity.
The position in regard to the Falklands was local and not in any way comparable. It was my principal responsibility to try to find a peaceful way out of that situation and I took that process to its ultimate limit. However much I hoped it would be successful I never believed that it would be, because Galtieri and the Argentines had boxed themselves into a position that knew no alternative. Saddam Hussein can similarly be said to have boxed himself in, but in this case there is a real chance that force can be avoided by the rigid imposition of sanctions.
The key issue is whether sanctions can be made effective in practice. Unlike almost every other case where sanctions have been an option, it is possible to make them bite against Iraq. Iraq's economy is peculiarly vulnerable to sanctions and the surrounding countries and the international community have resolved to apply them thoroughly. I should like to mention Turkey in that connection because she has much to lose but is as robust as anyone, as is Egypt. If sanctions are maintained effectively for long enough they are bound to have their effect, but it will take time. That means that the maintaining of support of public opinion in all our countries takes on a new and special importance; indeed it will be crucial. Any taint of trigger-happiness would be inimical to the sanctions option and must be avoided.
In the age of the media, which always yearns for constant and continuous activity, public support for a long wait is difficult to achieve. Patience is not newsworthy, but in this instance it must be made more newsworthy. I am confident that public support for a long haul can be won in the United Kingdom if the Government, supported wholeheartedly by Parliament, set their minds to it. The degree of unanimity that has been expressed so far is an immensely encouraging sign for achieving that objective.
No one can predict how the crisis will develop whether sanctions succeed or not. All kinds of questions will arise in judging how effective sanctions are proving to be or what provocation would or would not justify military action, and so on. In my view those questions cannot be answered in advance. In the coming weeks we must watch how events unfold and take necessary decisions in the light of circumstances at the time. The vital need is for Ministers to keep the nation up to date on a daily basis. Like the Falklands, this is a television serial played for real, but this time we are dealing with a global crisis.
The international accord is very heartening. The scale of it is new and everything possible must be done to maintain it. However, to suggest that decision-making in future should literally be handed over to and rest with the Security Council is quite unrealistic. That would give a veto to some countries over the vital interests of other countries, which is an entirely different concept from reaching international accord. I have no doubt that the United States, Britain and virtually every other country will continue to strive

1823
with wholehearted and genuine endeavour to maintain the widest possible degree of international agreement, the central importance of which is self-evident.
There is another reason for playing this hand long and with great care. The Gulf will remain a key region in the world for decades to come. After this experience, however it works out, the West will want to ensure that its main source of energy is protected safely. That is bound to mean a military presence of some kind. There is no point in arguing over earlier decisions to leave the region: what matters is that its stability should be secured in the long-term future.
Unfortunately, it is inevitable that divisions within the Arab world will continue and they may worsen. The tensions caused by this crisis are all too apparent. There are new and very deep ethnic problems. At the same time the running sore between the Arabs and the Israelis is permanent and in my view ineradicable in the near future. It has already been suggested that a new attempt to solve that problem should be made now. I do not think there is any harm in that course but I cannot see that it can succeed. I hope that I am wrong, naturally. This fundamentally destabilising factor in the Middle East is likely to continue. The West will need some military presence and of fundamental importance will be the basis upon which that presence is effected. I think that that basis, and the willingness of Arab countries to accept western military support on a semi-permanent footing, will be heavily affected by events in the coming months and the way in which they are handled. The overriding objective of policy is to secure energy supplies—under the rule of law, of course—and if that is to be done economically and effectively it has to be done in partnership with Arab countries. We would be wise to be aware of this factor as choices and decisions are made in the months ahead.
In the end military action may prove unavoidable to recover Kuwait, in which case we shall play our part, minor though it will be. In that event I am certain that our forces will acquit themselves with characteristic professionalism and effectiveness and with honour. But at this early stage in the crisis we must be certain that we have tried every alternative and tested it to the limit; and for the immediate future that means making sure that sanctions are fully, strictly and rigidly applied and then waiting patiently while taking the British people fully into our confidence.
4.31 p.m.
Lord Richard: My Lords, no one who has listened to this debate so far can fail to have been impressed at the seriousness with which the House is approaching what on any view of the matter is an extraordinarily grave situation. Nor can anyone fail to be impressed at the degree of agreement that there is between both sides of the House on how to approach this matter—at least at this stage; and no one certainly could underestimate the seriousness of what has happened in the Middle East since the beginning of August. The overt aggression by Iraq, the acquisition by force of a neighbouring country, the menace of further aggression into Saudi Arabia, the threatened use of
1824
chemical weapons and, finally, the taking of some thousands of hostages—all these make the actions of Saddam Hussein totally and utterly repugnant and unacceptable to world opinion.
Nor should we forget in the arguments now under way over the presence and possible use of the forces in Saudi Arabia that the starting point for this crisis was in Baghdad and not in Washington or Riyadh and that it is primarily in Baghdad that this crisis will have to be resolved. No doubt the calculation was that Iraq would get away with it after some ritual attempts at condemnation in the Security Council and in the Arab League and that after a decent interval it would be business as usual for everybody. I cannot believe for one moment that Saddam Hussein foresaw or took into account the depth of world outrage or the strength of world reaction.
It is indeed the nature of that collective reaction and its likely consequences that is perhaps the one promising feature of this whole sorry mess. Certainly so far as the UN is concerned it has rarely acted so decisively, so quickly or so unanimously. The five relevant texts in the five resolutions, 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665, are a clear indication of just how far the world has moved in the last five years. Possibilities for joint action, hitherto impossible to achieve, now may be practically attainable. The five permanent members meeting as they now do regularly, and what is much more important than just meeting, agreeing on joint courses of action, are beginning to perform the functions allotted to them under the charter. As yet the plant is still tender but with careful husbandry, I am reliably informed, it will grow. Certainly it would be foolish in the extreme to throw away this unprecedented degree of international consensus.
In assessing this international reaction it is crucial to distinguish the various elements of the crisis. First, there is the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq; secondly, there are the mandatory sanctions imposed by the UN and the possibility of using force as appropriate in order to support those sanctions; thirdly, there are the threats to Saudi Arabia and the international response to those threats; and, fourthly, there are the problems caused by the taking of the hostages. Of course these four to a certain extent inevitably overlap but in respect of each it is important to ensure that such action as is taken is taken in accordance with the charter of the UN.
So far as the annexation of Kuwait and the imposition of sanctions is concerned, may I join with others in this debate who have expressed the view that the Government have behaved sensibly and prudently, and I support them, save only in one respect which they have put right. It was necessary for there to be a further resolution authorising "some" force to be used in order to bolster sanctions. The Government and the United States finally recognised this and they got the appropriate resolution from the Security Council. It were better that they had done it a little earlier.
The sanctions imposed by Resolution 661 are unique and comprehensive and they must be given time to work. I am impressed by the way that the world community has so far applied those sanctions.

1825
The seepage of some goods through Jordan or the odd ship that escapes the blockade in the Gulf cannot replace the flows of trade which Iraq formerly enjoyed. The important factor is the cutting off of the oil, and this has been almost total.
We now seem to have ships aplenty to enforce the blockade. Indeed if the story in last week's press of two Italian frigates scattering a United States carrier task force is correct, it is perhaps high time that the ships playing around in the Gulf came under some joint command, if only for self-protection.
Nor is it valid to argue that the UN is incapable of providing that necessary structure. Of course it is capable. Different countries have co-operated effectively in UN peace-keeping forces. There is absolutely no reason why navies should not similarly co-operate, particularly since most of the ships come from NATO countries themselves.
So the sanctions policy is well launched. We all seem to be agreed that it must be given time to act. In my view, it is just not feasible at this stage to put a time limit on how long this policy should be given. I note from the resolutions that the Secretary General of the UN has to report to the Security Council within 30 days of the passage of the sanctions resolution. I think that the 30 days run out today, or they may have run out yesterday. The sanctions committee has to begin its operation. We are clearly in for what somebody has called a long haul, and it is better that we should recognise this earlier rather than that it should come upon us as a surprise later.
It seems now too that talk of a quick surgical strike by the US forces in Saudi Arabia has subsided. I am delighted at that. It would be neither quick nor surgical—and what of the aftermath? Who is supposed to run Iraq—a western viceroy or an Arab puppet backed by a permanent western occupying force, which the Wall Street Journal has apparently been advocating? In the long run I can think of nothing more destructive to western interests in the Middle East than such a scenario.
Moreover, such a unilateral strike at this stage would almost certainly be illegal under the charter. This is not the time—and I accept this—for a long or detailed legal argument about the minutiae of Article 51 or the rights of self-defence. Suffice it to say that the charter is clear as to the limits of the exercise of that right of self-defence. The whole tenor of Chapter 7 is that the Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and member states have so agreed that by accepting the charter. So in my view further action by the multi-national force in Saudi Arabia to expel Iraq from Kuwait by military means would now require a further resolution of the Security Council itself.
As to the forces in Saudi Arabia, they are there at the invitation of the Saudi Government to help neutralise an external threat. As such, the presence of that force is perfectly legal. Moreover one should not forget that the United Nations has not yet even discussed this force. It is not there under any
1826
resolution of the Security Council. It is there in response to the request of the legitimate government of Saudi Arabia. Its use therefore at this stage would be limited to the defence of Saudi Arabia against any external aggression by Iraq and to deterring the possibility of any such aggression. May I say that so far it seems to have performed this function admirably. Iraq has not invaded Saudi Arabia and the more that the build up has proceeded the less likelihood there seems to be of overt Iraqi aggression. So may I make it clear that from my point of view I thoroughly approve of British participation in that multi-national force, the object of which, as the Government have made clear, is to deter possible Iraqi aggression on Saudi Arabia.
So where do we go to from here? There are times, I am afraid, when one just has to wait and allow a policy, which is perhaps undramatic and even painstaking, to continue. I see no practical alternative to the pursuit with all our vigour of the policy agreed to by the Security Council in Resolution 661, the policy of sanctions. Provided this policy is pursued comprehensively and with determination by all, there is no reason why it should not succeed. The aim is a relatively simple one and again I think that one should be clear about it. It is to get Iraq out of Kuwait and restore that country to its rightful government.
Until sanctions are effectively applied, it is impossible to know whether they will succeed. Certainly negotiations at this stage are unlikely to produce anything; nor is it clear precisely what it is that one could negotiate about. Eventually there will have to be discussions, but not yet. The time is not ripe for any negotiation. Unless therefore there is some new factor introduced into the situation, as, for example, an act of further aggression by Iraq, the present policy is the one that we have to pursue.
I should like to say one or two words about the possibility of unilateral action by the United States, possibly followed by Britain. Satisfying though the thought of that seems to be to some, it is going to be neither swift nor without cost. It could well alienate that Arab opinion which is at present supporting the UN resolutions. It would prove highly embarrassing to the Soviet Union and set back the recent favourable developments in superpower relationships. It would cast the West once again as the unwanted interloper in the Middle East, concerned more for our oil supplies than for international law, and it would jeopardise the emerging consensus at the United Nations. I find it hard to believe that these risks are worth running unless absolutely unavoidable.
After a reasonable period of time we must collectively assess the efficacy of the sanctions policy. If they seem to be working we should continue with them; if not, we should ask the Security Council to take further steps under Article 42 of the charter, which deals specifically with this type of situation and envisages the use of force.
I do not burke at the possibility of the use of force in this matter. It seems to be a possibility which in the long run, if sanctions do not work, may become inevitable. I hope it may never come to the use of such

1827
force, but if it does I merely say that it is essential that it is applied collectively by the world community as a whole. I suspect too that this may be one of the messages which President Gorbachev may be giving to Mr. Bush this weekend. I hope that our Government will be saying the same.
4.45 p.m.
Lord Walston: My Lords, I must start with an apology to your Lordships and to the noble Lord the Leader of the House. I have to be home early tomorrow morning and unfortunately British Rail does not run a late-night service to my part of Somerset. It is therefore unlikely that I shall be here at the end of the debate, for which I repeat my apology and my personal regret.
My main reason for intervening in this debate is in order to make it clear that my colleagues in the Social Democratic Party and myself are wholeheartedly behind the line that the Government have taken and are taking at the present time. In that we are not alone, as is quite clear from the speeches to which we have listened. All your Lordships who have so far taken part in this debate feel the same about this. The support is not only for Her Majesty's Government but for the United Nations. We must never lose sight of the fact that this is not simply an operation of the United States, backed up by the special relationship of the United Kingdom, but it is a United Nations initiative, and it is remarkable and encouraging that at this stage it has been possible to get a virtually unanimous consensus in that body.
I would remind your Lordships that these things do not just happen because of one or two convincing and fine speeches by people in the United Nations itself in New York but are the result of a great deal of spadework, persuasion and behind the scenes activities which have been most efficiently and effectively carried out so far as we are concerned by our frequently maligned officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and particularly by, if I may single him out, Sir Crispin Tickell in New York, who has clearly worked extremely hard and effectively. Of course one must also not forget our own Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who has played an important and valuable role in this sad business.
This consensus of the United Nations is something that we must maintain at all costs. There will be as time goes on a certain fissiparous inclination to move away from the centre and to start off on one's own if the results do not come as quickly as people hope they will and at one time misguidedly thought they would. Our efforts now must be concentrated to ensure, among other things, that the consensus of the United Nations is maintained throughout, no matter how long it may take to achieve the results which we all desire and which have been laid down by the United Nations itself.
As other noble Lords have said, I hope that the meeting of President Bush and President Gorbachev at the end of this week will fortify and reinforce the new relationship that is now developing between East and West. The Soviet Union has a vital part to play in
1828
the solution of this problem—the immediate solution and the long-term solution—and the more they can work together with the United States and other members of the United Nations the more likely it is that we are going to succeed in achieving a reasonable and permanent settlement of the problems of the United Nations.
Of course we must not forget either the importance of Arab participation. That has been achieved despite what President Saddam Hussein tries to say. It is remarkable that virtually all the Arab countries are united in working with us in the United Nations for the return of Kuwait to its legitimate rulers and for the preservation of the integrity of Saudi Arabia.
One should make special mention here of the dilemma in which Jordan finds itself in a very special geographic position and one which I think all of us will realise is a legitimate reason for the somewhat ambivalent attitude that the King of Jordan has been forced to adopt in his own country.
As your Lordships have said, the struggle will be a long one and it will require months of patience and months of stubbornness if fighting is to be avoided—and that is clearly the hope of all of us. However, it may come to fighting, and if it does come to that then the fighting will have to be supported to the full. Clearly, our efforts at this stage must be directed towards all activities which are going to make fighting less likely. The full implementation of sanctions is the only way in which this can be done. Sadly, sanctions, even without fighting, will entail suffering for millions in Iraq itself: innocent people whose leaders are drawing them into this appalling situation.
Then there are our own hostages, and—dare I say it?—those who are even more important because of the numbers who are not hostages. I refer to the foreign workers who are now destitute and to whose plight the most reverend Primate rightly referred. I cannot do more than underline what he said: that there are hundreds of thousands—possibly millions—of innocent people involved whose only error has been that they went from their own countries—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines, etc.—to Kuwait, and to a lesser extent to Iraq, in the hope of finding a better life there and of being able to send some money back to their dependants in their own countries.
Their plight, as the most reverend Primate reminded us, is devastating. The only comparison which comes to mind is the plight of the refugees at the end of the Second World War, who were struggling to escape from the horrors that lay behind them. It was good to hear from the noble Earl in his very fine speech that the British Government are giving aid to such people. But it is not only money: a question of organisation is involved. There is the bringing together of people who are used to dealing with refugees, to dealing with hunger and, in particular, to dealing with thirst in that terrifying heat of the desert in that area. We need people who know how to organise. The money is probably available. The aircraft, we are told, can be chartered with no difficulty. Landing rights in Jordan are no problem at

1829
all; but it is the organisation there which is at present lacking. No blame attaches to those who are valiantly attempting to deal with the task, but I believe that we can here play a very valuable part in relieving this terrifying human suffering and death.
I would also remind your Lordships of other sufferers who, as the weeks and months go by, will feel more and more the effects of the Gulf disturbances. Those are the countries of the third world, particularly in Africa, which are already swamped by their enormous debts on which they cannot afford to pay interest at the present time. With the rise in oil prices now, they will be sent still further into economic decline if at the same time, as is happening already to a certain extent, some of their trade will be cut off. Their plight will indeed be bad and, while not bearing comparison with the plight of the refugees at the present time, will be made much more difficult in the months and years ahead. I therefore ask Her Majesty's Government, even in the midst of this crisis, to give thought to the problems of the third world and to renew all their efforts with regard to the debts of these countries so that there will be some hope of minimising the increasing hardships which will inevitably otherwise strike those who are innocent bystanders in this matter.
I should like to make one minor final point. We had a concrete example of the efforts of the President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, with Saddam Hussein over the release of the British nurse some months ago. No mention has been made of President Kaunda during all the talks that have been going on or in the articles which have been written. I would ask Her Majesty's Government whether any approach has been made to President Kaunda, and whether there is any likelihood of his being able to play any part at all in Iraq in bringing sense into that sad and about-to-be-defeated country so that the suffering which is looming over the horizon can be mitigated in the weeks ahead.
4.56 p.m.
Viscount Tonypandy: My Lords, it is eight years ago that Parliament was summoned back from the Recess because of military action involving our own forces. I never will forget the high sense of drama in another place, especially on the first day of the Falklands debates. The House was united; both sides called for actions, not words. The country was united, but that was an issue which concerned our country alone. Today we have been recalled because there is a watershed in world affairs. What happens to the United Nations is now at stake; and what happens to the United Nations will decide human rights across the world for generations yet unborn.
In listening to the restrained speeches from people holding high office in our land and from those who have held high office in our land, I have been deeply moved. I am conscious, as I am sure the House is conscious, that our words, not only in another place but spoken here, will be examined with care not only in these islands but especially in Iraq. The voices will be heard and they will be looking for signs that people
1830
seek to have an excuse to break away. I believe in my heart that it was a happy, fortuitous chance for humanity that the Prime Minister was due to meet President Bush just at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. The fact that the meeting took place at that time enabled speedy action to be taken. I am convinced that Saudi Arabia would have been lost within a few weeks if President Bush and Mrs. Thatcher had not been quick in getting the United Nations to realise the challenge that was before it.
As my noble friend Lord Callaghan said, we have to capture the minds of people not only here but outside. The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury was wise to remind us of those poor human creatures on the borders of Iraq and Jordan. God help the poor things in their misery. Who is holding out the hand of help to them? It is not Iraq but the western world and part of Arabia itself. The very fact that the majority of the Arab countries have had the moral courage to denounce the invasion of Kuwait, combined with the attitude which I hope we shall continue to adopt towards the refugees, will help to capture what is so vital for us—the opinion of the ordinary people in the Middle East as well as in the West.
I hope that the House will allow me to say a few words about the hostages, some of whom are our own people. I listened with tender feeling to the heartfelt cry of those who escaped and who have come home. I listened carefully to the words of the organisation that has set itself up to help the families of hostages. However, I should say to that organisation that no one has a monopoly of concern about our people who are still in Iraq and Kuwait. I am satisfied that Her Majesty's Government and the diplomatic service will stretch every nerve they can to see that our people are brought out.
The most reverend Primate recited some of the names of hostages. I know one of those names very well. It is the name of one who represented the most reverend Primate. We know that no effort is being spared. Some people may want dramatic action, but that could make the situation of the hostages worse. What is required is patience and more patience. There has been an attempt to try to involve little Israel for propaganda purposes. I am satisfied that the rest of the Arab world knows that that is just a propaganda ploy.
We have listened to experts. I am an ordinary Member of this House. I do not claim to be an expert. I heard the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, speak from his great experience of commanding our forces. He made a remark which had a great appeal for me. It concerned the question of the media and the sense of responsibility that is required not only from politicians but also from those who speak to the world in our name through the media. On Tuesday the Daily Telegraph referred to,
"The mindless neutrality of some television reporters who seek to advance a media cause contemptuous of any national or public interest".
I believe there is an obligation on us all to maintain a rigorous self-discipline when our emotions are stirred

1831
by the hostages and by the threat to the Middle East. I hope that we shall guard our tongues carefully. That applies as much to the media as it does to us.
As I left this morning to come to your Lordships' House, I listened to the radio just after the eight o'clock news. Someone asked why Parliament was meeting today. The reply given was that Parliament was meeting to find out whether Mrs. Thatcher was a hawk. I felt angry when I heard that because even in the war years Mr. Churchill knew that Parliament was the guardian of our ultimate liberties and our rights. It is right for us to meet. It is equally right that we should meet to strengthen the hands of those who are acting on our behalf. I believe that there will be no entry into military activity without the House having its say. However, I should like Iraq to know that there are no Benches in the high court of Parliament where there will not be support for action if there is no response to sanctions.
As I take my seat I remind myself and the House that it is true that a nation will close ranks. There is a closing of ranks and those concerned will be made to suffer. They must be made to suffer until Iraq withdraws. Above all, it is our task to win the hearts and minds of the people involved in this affair. We must persuade them that we wish them no harm and that we seek only to protect the rights of the rest of the world that Saddam Hussein has threatened by the activity that he has undertaken. I hope that there will not be a vote in another place, but if there is let that not be misunderstood abroad. I believe that the British people are overwhelmingly united in a determination to see that aggression will not pay.
5.10 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy: My Lords, I have two propositions to put forward. The first is that war involving the West in the Gulf need not happen. The second is that it would be wrong to renounce the use of armed forces, in any particular circumstances, beforehand.
My first proposition supposes that Saddam Hussein will not precipitate hostilities himself by making a further attack. That is possible but less likely since the arrival of the armed forces of other nations in neighbouring countries. Here the Americans must be congratulated on the speed of their deployment in Saudi Arabia.
On the second proposition, that it would be wrong to renounce force, we should remember that the Charter of the United Nations positively prescribes action with armed forces in Chapter 7—Article 42—when peaceful means have been exhausted. I hope that it will not come to that. However, that remedy was built into the charter and must certainly have acted as a deterrent in the last 45 years.
The procedure in that part of Chapter 7, and therefore at that stage of United Nations supervision, is obscured by the fact that the role of the Military Staff Committee, and its special agreements on armed forces with member states, has never been allowed to develop as required by the charter. From the outset in 1946 the Soviet Union prevented that part from being
1832
carried out although the Soviet delegation had agreed upon those provisions in the negotiations on the draft of the charter. The Military Staff Committee has had its prescribed periodic meetings over the years but the Soviet representative has always made sure that nothing is done. I was glad to note the interest expressed recently by Mr. Gorbachev in reversing that policy and in exploring the Military Staff Committee's potential. However, that must be a matter for the future.
Perhaps the most important reason against publicly renouncing the use of force beforehand is that it would play into the hands of a dangerous dictator. He should be kept guessing. Saddam has played cat and mouse tricks with foreigners, whom he has made hostages, and is capable of every kind of ruse and deception. Nothing should be done which would unnecessarily relieve the pressures upon him.
The situation in the Middle East today has many similarities with the aggression in Korea in 1950. The United Nations' action then is the closest precedent. The United States acted immediately, having forces nearby in Japan, under a United Nations' umbrella of approval. Other countries sent armed forces to join them, in Britain's case as soon as we could.
The invasion of South Korea happened during three years which I spent, as a diplomatist, in our permanent mission to the United Nations in New York. I well remember the emergency meeting of the Security Council at Lake Success on a Sunday morning—26th June—40 years ago. Picture three of us in the small British delegation arriving in jeans or the weekend equivalent, clutching telephone messages and telegrams. Our chief, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was not with us. He was crossing the Atlantic on retirement leave. At that meeting, and those which immediately followed, resolutions were passed condemning the aggression and providing United Nations' approval for armed intervention.
Resolutions are not enough. The United Nations would have been powerless if the United States had not acted quickly and decisively. That is what happened again in the Middle East last month. Fortunately, the action was not to join in a continuing war, as in Korea, but to occupy defensive positions in a neighbouring country and so reduce temptations to commit further aggressions.
There had been no Soviet veto over Korea because the Soviet delegation absented itself for several weeks in an argument about Chinese representation. When it returned five weeks later the Soviet attitude was that the resolutions had been invalid in its absence. Nevertheless the rest of the world supported what became a United Nations force and its operations. Those operations were successful in ensuring that aggression did not pay.
The Security Council had acted under Chapter 7 of the charter. The United States led the way, with the blessing of the United Nations. In this country the Labour government of the day firmly supported what was done.

1833
Those who harbour any doubts about how the Americans have acted since 2nd August should remember that. Forty years may seem a long time ago—though not to me. Korea is the precedent with the greatest similarity. The emergency meetings of the Security Council in 1950 have vividly been recalled to my memory. I attended them all as a member of the British delegation.
Now there has been another flagrant case of armed aggression and the world is even more united against it. It is especially significant that the Soviet Union, with a government encouragingly different from that of the 1950s, is part of that majority, which also includes most of the Arab and Islamic countries.
I followed with sympathy the emergency meetings in New York last month and I rejoiced in the results. In particular I congratulate those concerned in reaching the later resolution of 25th August calling for enforcement of the trade embargo which had already been agreed. I note that the only note of criticism in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, was that that should have been done much sooner. With respect, I put to him another consideration—the need to obtain and keep the wide support which had been gained for the earlier resolutions. I am sure that time was needed to enlighten and persuade those members of the Security Council who would not have been prepared to support the use of force on the earlier occasion when a resolution was necessary on a trade embargo.
There is unprecedented unanimity in the United Nations on action towards the aggressor. In my view the sequence of events in response to the unwelcome events in the Gulf has followed an exemplary course.
But what happens now? Time will be needed to enable the embargo to become effective. Patience will be called for. In Chapter 7 of the charter, dealing with acts of aggression, Articles 41 and 51 now apply. Article 41 provides for measures not involving the use of armed force—which must be given every chance to succeed—including the embargo.
As regards Article 51 on the right of individual and collective self-defence, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have invited friendly nations to help defend them. If the response had not been immediate, especially by the United States with its superior military aircraft, Saddam may well have been tempted to go further and invade the oilfields near the Gulf. The Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia has made clear publicly that United States' forces are in his country to defend against an attack like that on Kuwait.
I detect that some smaller Gulf states would like to see more positive action in the not too distant future. Their governments will probably not feel safe until Saddam has been removed. Can one blame them? It must seem to them that there is a monster on their doorstep.
My noble friend Lord Carrington has cogently given the reasons why every effort must be made to enforce worldwide sanctions. I shall go on from there. The next stages in countering aggression prescribed in
1834
the charter are set out in Articles 42 to 47. However, one has to ignore the provisions concerning the inoperative Military Staff Committee, for reasons which I have explained.
Under Article 42, if peaceful measures under Article 41 have proved inadequate, armed forces can be used to the degree necessary to restore peace and security. It will not be easy to obtain agreement in the Security Council on when that stage has been reached or what action to take, while maintaining security on any military plans.
Article 41, with the embargo and similar measures, must therefore be fully applied in the coming weeks and months. Virtually the whole world is of one mind on this and that unanimity is worth preserving. This will be a test of stamina for the United States and others with armed forces holding present positions. It will be expensive for them and for other countries for whom the embargo is damaging. It will be infinitely tedious and uncomfortable for the armed forces concerned. In time there will be effects from all this on the media and public opinion in the countries bearing the brunt of the United Nations' effort. We must be ready for some disillusionment and impatience.
I applaud warmly the Government's actions in dealing with the Gulf situation in concert with other countries and through the United Nations. I have the greatest confidence in my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, and I am sure that his very recent tour of the Middle East countries will have done nothing but good. I wish our Government well in maintaining wide condemnation of the invasion and the illegal annexation of Kuwait and in seeking effective ways of penalising aggression and bringing peace to the area.
5.22 p.m.
Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, like every other speaker so far in this debate, I condemn the Iraqi invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait. I condemn the taking of Western hostages. That is a cruel, cynical and cowardly way of trying to manipulate events and distract those nations concerned from their determination to re-establish international order. But above all I condemn Saddam Hussein and his regime for a decade of the grossest violations of basic human rights within his own country, and for the dissipation of his country's oil wealth on a cruel and useless war which lasted eight years.
But as my noble friend Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos said, in making these condemnations should we not examine our own record and those of our allies in our past dealings with Saddam Hussein? Is it not the case that we were perfectly aware of the brutality of his regime and knew that he was the aggressor in the war with Iran? Contravening international conventions, he used chemical weapons in that war and gassed Kurdish women and children who were the innocent victims of his brutality.
What sanctions did we impose then? None, my Lords. We got no further than sponsoring a resolution in the United Nations sub-committee on human rights

1835
condemning those appalling actions. Meanwhile, along with many other countries, we participated in a grotesque arms sale bazaar in which we provided Saddam Hussein with the wherewithal to take aggressive military action against neighbouring countries.
I fully recognise the importance of our export trade. However, are there not cases where commercial interests should be subordinate to the interests of peace and stability in the world? And is this not just such a case? There are certainly lessons to be learnt from the excessive arms sales to Iraq which have undoubtedly contributed to this crisis.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said, Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to get away with it. But it must be the hope of everyone that the present impasse can be solved by the imposition of sanctions and by diplomatic means, and that military action will prove unnecessary. Those who are more expert than I on military matters have already referred to the terrible loss of life which would probably occur. It is hard to contemplate, quite apart from the huge financial costs involved.
Moreover, the outcome of war, even if successful in pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, could be very uncertain in its long-term effects in the Middle East. Therefore it is vital to ensure that economic sanctions are effectively enforced and that no way round them is possible.
The Iraqi economy is already weak and will become weaker as the effects of the blockade start to bite. As has already been said, there can be no predetermined time limit on the use of sanctions. Effective sanctions are the world's best hope in either forcing Saddam to climb down or—perhaps less likely—in leading to his removal by those within Iraq who become increasingly concerned about the costs of his intransigence if he refuses to climb down.
But adopting that approach will require calm and patience and the maintenance of the world-wide consensus that has emerged against the Iraqi invasion. Firm but skilful diplomatic action is needed too, particularly joint action by the USA and the Soviet Union, in order to maintain the consensus and, when the time is ripe, to negotiate without concessions with Saddam Hussein.
It is imperative that all such activities take place under the auspices of the United Nations. I shared the concern of many commentators when the United States and the United Kingdom seemed to rush into the blockade without returning to the UN for Security Council endorsement of that action. However, I greatly welcome the fact that the USA and all the countries involved are now operating under the terms of UN resolutions.
It is an unfortunate distraction, however, that may play into the hands of Iraq for the Prime Minister to refer to the United States as the world's policeman. There can be only one global policeman and that is the United Nations. There has never been a better time to use the UN as the mechanism for ensuring international order. The bad old days of the Soviet
1836
veto have gone. The UN's status has grown, for example, through its successful operations in Namibia and in helping to bring about peace between Iran and Iraq.
I recognise the concern of the US and UK Governments in making decisions in a crisis through United Nations committees because of the extra time and effort involved; but it is a price that is well worth paying. Most important of all, if it looks as though military action is needed, it must be endorsed by the UN. Chapter 7 of the Charter, and in particular Article 42, gives the Security Council sweeping powers to take such action. No doubt the United States, along with the United Kingdom and others, could achieve a military victory without the United Nations. But, as my noble friend Lord Richard so ably pointed out, it might also lead to serious instability in the longer term which could threaten people's livelihoods, and even people's lives, in the Middle East and elsewhere.
More immediately, only by operating through the United Nations will it be possible to maintain the broad consensus which currently exists and which includes massive third world support for the line which has been taken so far. It would be a great pity if failure to operate under the UN made it possible for Iraq successfully to portray the United States with, say, Britain and France as the aggressors.
Because it is important to maintain the consensus, like the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, I regret the misconceived attack in Helsinki last week by the Prime Minister on our European allies. It is inevitable that in the democracies of Europe there will be some differences in the nature, style and timing of responses in a crisis of this kind. Publicly berating Chancellor Kohl for failing to adopt measures which would be contrary to the constitution of the Federal Republic is not the right approach. What is appropriate is a request for a substantial financial contribution from the Germans and from the Japanese towards compensating those poorer Middle East countries which are suffering economically as a result of the crisis. I very much endorse the Prime Minister's part in seeking that.
The final issue to which I should like to refer concerns the position of Jordan. Jordan's long frontier with Iraq and its great dependence on Iraqi oil make things difficult enough. In addition it has to contend with large numbers of Palestinians, making up 70 per cent. of the Jordanian population, and there is now a growing influx of refugees from Iraq and Kuwait. The position of King Hussein, as others have said, is precarious. Were he to be toppled it would probably make the situation much more unstable. King Hussein may have been reticent about strong criticism of Saddam Hussein, and he may have been somewhat equivocal about sanctions. The British Government apparently believe in putting the maximum possible pressure on him to distance himself completely from his neighbour and to demonstrate his commitment to sanctions. Only then will they contemplate aid. But, as my noble friend Lord Callaghan implied, if the king responds to such pressure, he could jeopardise his own position further. Surely the French Government, who

1837
are apparently in favour of immediate aid to Jordan and doing all that can be done to keep King Hussein in power, are right.
Of course for those of us who have long sympathised with the Palestinian cause, it is distressing to see demonstrations, sometimes violent, by Palestinians in Jordan in favour of Saddam Hussein. But perhaps we should search our consciences as to how it came to pass that the Palestinians have been reduced to such rage and despair, to such desperation, that they end up supporting a brutal dictator because he appears to have taken on the western world. The American record in dealing with the Palestinian issue has not been a good one and we have perhaps fallen in too readily behind the United States. A statement by the Americans that the Palestinian problem has not been forgotten, and that new steps to resolve it will be taken when the Gulf crisis is over and Iraq has withdrawn from Kuwait and adhered to the United Nations resolutions, might be helpful. Among other things, it could serve to diminish the threat to King Hussein.
However, more direct and immediate support should be given in the shape of economic aid to Jordan and in the form of an international relief operation to help the Asian refugees suffering in the Jordanian desert. Quite apart from King Hussein's problems of survival, there is now a real prospect of a human disaster on a massive scale. There are some 50,000 refugees waiting to be repatriated to their own countries within Jordan and another 50,000 to 60,000 in camps on the border waiting to get into the country. Those people are living in terrible conditions without enough food, drink or shelter, and disease is now spreading in the camps. For humanitarian reasons there must be a major international relief programme before the situation deteriorates any more. I welcome commitments made by the EC and our own Government.
Let me end by saying that the intended meeting at the weekend between the presidents of the United States of America and the Soviet Union is good news. I hope that the bipartisan stance that has been adopted by the superpowers will continue. I hope also that it will be possible to maintain a bipartisan position between the Government and the Opposition in the UK. Above all, I hope that everything will be done to avoid war. However, should future Iraqi actions make war inevitable, I hope that it will follow from a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations which alone can represent the views of the many and diverse nations of the world, as it has done so far in this crisis. Only by operating through the United Nations is it likely that real and lasting peace and stability can be achieved.
5.34 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, some of your Lordships may possibly recall that in our debate on 17th July on the Defence Estimates I said (at col. 832 of Hansard) that the end of the cold war would not only mean that war between the five permanent members of the Security Council was now unthinkable but,
1838
"They will all have at least one major common interest … namely, to contain some Middle East explosion".
My conclusion in substance was that it was quite possible that the United Nations would now at last function as we, the original drafters of the charter, imagined that it should function; namely, to decide whether a breach of the peace or act of aggression had occurred, and to see to it that the culprit was by one means or another duly brought to book.
I confess that I had no idea that the explosion would come within a fortnight. I had rather thought that it might in some way be connected with Israel, as of course it still may. But come it did, and the immediate action of the United Nations was splendid. All agreed—East and West, North and South—that the aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and eventually that force might be employed to impose what amounted to a blockade of Iraq if it continued to disregard the decisions of the Security Council. Further than that the United Nations has not as yet gone, and it is unfortunately questionable whether it ever will.
Faced with an evident threat to its ally, Saudi Arabia—had not Saddam Hussein declared his intention of waging a Holy War for the liberation of Mecca and Medina?—the United States immediately dispatched forces as it was entitled to do under Article 51 of the charter. These forces have now been reinforced by two squadrons of British Tornadoes, and by a small contingent of Arab troops from Egypt, Syria and I believe also Morocco. A number of allied warships have also joined the powerful American fleet now in the Gulf. This hastily assembled force, overwhelmingly American, has already evidently achieved its primary purpose of preventing an attack on Saudi Arabia by Iraq, and it is believed that in another month or six weeks at the rate of reinforcement already envisaged it will probably be strong enough at least to reoccupy Kuwait by force of arms involving the possible overthrow of Saddam Hussein by means of war.
Obviously it would be greatly preferable for the objectives of the United Nations to be achieved by means of the sanctions already agreed, and perhaps they could be further extended with United Nations approval by, for instance, the forcing down of any aircraft from Libya, Tunis, the Sudan, Yemen or elsewhere now engaged in running the blockade. But there are doubts about the length of time before sanctions can be effective.
I should have thought that it is also obvious that the United States, if only for financial reasons and pressure of public opinion, cannot be expected to keep 80,000 men and a very large number of the latest fighters, bombers, tanks, missiles and attendant services indefinitely in a waterless desert at a distance of some 6,000 miles. But it is further obvious that to withdraw these troops before the objectives of the United Nations have been achieved, or at least some acceptable solution has been arrived at, would in effect be a victory for Saddam Hussein. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made the point; I entirely agree with it.

1839
On the other hand, going to war without the specific authority of the United Nations obviously has great dangers. Those have been recently outlined (in a rather exaggerated way) by Mr. Geoffrey Kemp of the Carnegie Endowment and a former member of President Reagan's National Security Council, as follows:
"As for this suggestion that the United States could fight some kind of four-hour air war and decapitate the Iraqi economy and military machine, I don't know of any genuinely informed person who now believes that is possible.
"What you would be talking about would be an aerial bombardment of several days' duration. Unless we had a clear provocation, such as an Iraqi attack, such bombardment would also destroy the international consensus Bush has painstakingly created. It would … cause untold political damage in the Arab world, to the point of toppling several regimes currently favourable to the US. These would, quite likely, be replaced by new regimes, just as hostile and just as keen on acquiring modern weapons as Saddam Hussein's".
Whether we like it or not there is no doubt that a large section of Arab opinion—that is not only in Libya, the Sudan, Yemen, Jordan and some other states but also to a lesser extent in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia—sees in Saddam Hussein a kind of modern Saladin destined to overthrow the stranglehold imposed by the infidel West during the past 200 years on an Islamic Middle East together with some vague thoughts of a possible Caliphate. Such is the doctrine preached by the Ikhwan-al-Muslimin, or moslem brotherhood, which is particularly powerful in Egypt and of course represents the American action as having nothing to do with treaty obligations and everything to do with the protection of its oil.
The dilemma facing the West in respect of the possible eventual use of military force is consequently acute, and I can offer only the following personal suggestions on which I should welcome some governmental comment. First, sanctions might perhaps be strengthened as suggested and at any rate should be given some time, possibly a few months, in which to work; in other words, to result in the evacuation of Kuwait by the Iraqi army. I believe that there is strong majority support for this in western public opinion.
Secondly, if the Americans nevertheless eventually feel that they can wait no longer and must therefore take military action, they should make every effort at least to ensure that the Russians and the Chinese do not veto but rather, if necessary, abstain on any decision of the Security Council authorising them to act, even if their Arab allies should be reluctant to go along. The council's decision would then, if passed by the requisite majority of nine, still be binding on all concerned.
Thirdly, the ensuing military action should, if possible, at any rate be declared to be limited to the re-occupation of Kuwait, which would no doubt in itself result in the disappearance of Saddam, and should not therefore involve the mass bombing of Iraqi military and industrial installations. That would have a deplorable effect on Arab opinion generally, and incidentally no doubt result in the killing of a number of the many thousands of western hostages still remaining in Iraq.
1840
Fourthly—and more doubtfully—provided that the integrity of the re-occupied Sheikhdom is ensured, its administration might for a term be left in the hands of those Arab states which had participated in the re-occupation. Fifthly, the essential thing is for world peace to be assured by continual co-operation between the five permanent members of the Security Council. If that is not forthcoming, the future is rather sombre. Saddam Hussein might indeed be toppled but his fall in such circumstances could have far-reaching and unpleasant effects.
5.45 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, concern for the hostages has been expressed by my noble friend the Minister, by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition and by many other noble Lords. Indeed, it was expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in his most interesting speech. Such concern is the sole burden of my speech.
One starts with common ground; that the response of the multi-national force to any legitimate request to remove the Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait may not be determined by the hostage situation. It is a situation in which, contrary to accepted tenets of public international law, our women and children are put to great hardship. Some are home but others remain in the anguish of the turmoil. What about them? What about the men—the husbands and the fathers—and the disruption of family life in breach of one of the universally accepted fundamental freedoms of mankind?
But the situation does not end there. These hostages are taken and kept contrary to Resolution 664 of the 18th August; items 1 to 3 of the Security Council. They are kept in breach of Article 3(1)C of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. That explicitly prevents the taking of hostages in extant circumstances in Iraq. Iraq was a signatory to that convention in 1949 and acceded in 1956.
The question is: should anything be done, and if so what, to alleviate the appalling situation? For your Lordships' consideration it is proposed that the United Nations by convention should formally condemn hostage taking as a crime against humanity and invest the International Court of Justice with plenary jurisdiction to adjudicate, convict and sentence, the enforcement of the orders of the court being available to any aggrieved state and without derogation from the right of any sovereign state to initiate its own proceedings if so advised. Under the 1949 convention to which reference has been made no judicial machinery or enforcement machinery has been set up to deal with the situation. Under the proposals which I am advancing, there would be in place permanent judicial machinery with means of enforcement.
I suggest that a convention should be drawn up along the lines of the Genocide Convention 1948 which took effect in 1961 to render hostage taking, keeping, or use for any purposes, a crime in public international law.

1841
On the basis of the principle of jurisprudence, it was established in the International Court of Justice that,
"basic rights of the human person are owed to the international community as a whole",
not as between one state and another.
If appropriate resolutions along those lines were tabled and carried in the United Nations as a matter of urgency, a clear signal would be made. The noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition referred to the whim of President Saddam Hussein. Is that not the present position put in a sentence? I think I remember the noble Lord's words accurately. Should we leave this at the whim of President Saddam Hussein or should we go back to the United Nations and try to tighten up this matter and try to set up, within the international community, an effective jurisdiction within the international court with some effective powers of enforcement and so produce some deterrence? Could that in any way operate to the detriment of the hostages? Assuredly it could not. It could only alleviate their position. It would assuredly not expose them to any greater danger than that in which they remain at the whim of the dictator.
The Genocide Convention prohibits acts committed to destroy in whole or in part national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. It does not touch upon hostage taking. However, the importance of the drafting of that convention is that it sets up an international court of justice as the means by which an adjudication should be made and by which enforcement can take place. I suggest that precedent should be carried into this new convention to, so to speak, tighten up the machinery. Prisoners of war have protection. They cannot be used as hostages under the convention. However, hostages have no protecting power. There is no convention; there is no judicial machinery in place; and there is no system of enforcement or deterrence.
It is a distressing and worrying situation which has aroused considerable anxiety among many of your Lordships. Any comment—adverse or benign—on the proposals which I put forward tentatively would indeed be welcome.
5.55 p.m.
Lord Bottomley: My Lords, it is a pleasure for me to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. He will not be surprised to hear that I agree substantially with all that he has said.
It was my privilege to be a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations in October 1946. The leader of the delegation was the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, whom we heard earlier, was also present. He will recall the scenes of the opening of the General Assembly by President Truman. They were wildly enthusiastic. There was a procession of cars to the City Hall, New York, where a civic reception was held in beautiful weather outside in the square. That was followed by lunch at the Waldorf-Astoria. After lunch we were whisked to the assembly. Hundreds of cars were involved. Police and motor cycles surrounded the
1842
building. Thousands of people lined the route and paper streamers came floating down from the buildings.
It was my responsibility to watch British interests in the developing world. Our hopes were high and we felt that at long last we could live in a peaceful world. There has since been much criticism of the United Nations not doing enough to fulfil those hopes.
However, the United Nations, through the various agencies, has done much to improve peaceful relations between states. There are 15 specialised agencies, the best known being UNESCO, the World Meteorological Association, the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agricultural Organisation, the World Bank and Technical Assistance. There was an attempt to form a world trade organisation. I led the British delegation to the Havana conference, but regrettably the Soviet Union took no part and the agency was not formed. I believe that the time is now opportune for the United Nations to have another try, particularly now that the Soviet Union is being so co-operative. However, from that conference came the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The crisis in the Gulf has brought the United Nations into effective action. Four times in the past the United Nations has been called upon to take military action; that is, Korea in 1950, Egypt in 1966, the Congo in 1960 and Cyprus in 1964. We hope that war will not happen as a result of the present crisis, but it is very reassuring that the United Nations has taken most effective action on this occasion.
The United States is playing a leading part in trying to stop Iraq from keeping its ill-gotten gains. Britain too is playing its full part. The United Nations makes three demands: Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; and the safety and freedom of foreign nationals held as hostages. The United Nations Security Council is united in supporting those demands. Twenty nations, most of them Arab, have sent forces to resist the Iraqi invasion.
The economic blockade is having its effect upon the Iraq economy. President Saddam is taking the only two forms of action possible to counter that. One is the keeping of foreign hostages, and the other is to divide the forces against him. President Bush recognises this, but regrettably our own Prime Minister does not. Her attack on our European partners for their slow and patchy response to the Gulf crisis was a mistake. Six out of nine members of the Western European Union are sending forces to the Gulf.
It is pleasing that the Commonwealth is playing its part. Australia has sent three warships to the Gulf; Canada is sending three ships and 800 sailors. New Zealand is sending two transport aircraft and a civilian medical team. Pakistan is to contribute 5,000 troops and Bangladesh 1,200 troops to the force in Saudia Arabia. Iraq is holding hostages from 10 Commonwealth countries.

1843
The Gulf crisis is the first test of the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to work in unison in the interests of peace and stability. It also offers the United Nations the opportunity of playing its rightful role of enforcing the international rule of law. These are vital issues which could set the pattern of international behaviour for the years ahead.
6.2 p.m.
Lord Alport: My Lords, our writs of summons enjoin us to be available to give our views on matters affecting the security of the realm. I welcome this opportunity to declare wholehearted support for the measures so far taken by the Government against Iraq's aggression. At the same time I should like to express appreciation, as other noble Lords have done, for the wise and balanced way in which the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State, Mr. Waldegrave, have set out our policies and conducted our relations with our allies and with the United Nations.
Perhaps I may add that I warmly admire the way in which the right honourable gentleman the Leader of the Labour Party handled the difficult role as head of parliamentary Opposition at a time when the nation is faced with the issue of peace or war. A sense of national unity enabled Great Britain in the past to face and overcome great danger. It is perhaps a pity that it takes a major crisis to quell the factionalism of our party political system and to remind us that we are one nation.
The sense of unity created by the imminent threat of war is one thing. The problem is how long it will last if we face the economically and psychologically debilitating prospect of a long period of stalemate. That will affect all the countries of the alliance. The economic consequences of sanctions will become increasingly damaging. Even now, as other noble Lords said, there is urgent need to rescue Jordan from impending disaster. Popular resolution will be undermined by harrowing stories of the plight of hostages and refugees. Peace movements will become increasingly influential. Soon the significance to international order of Iraq's attack on Kuwait and the danger it presents to energy supplies, on which the industrial world depends for its stability and the living standards of its people, will be forgotten. That will be the time when the alliance against Saddam Hussein will begin to disintegrate. That is what he is banking on.
There may be some sudden incident which makes hostilities inevitable. Alternatively, when the build-up is complete, the Government of the United States may face irresistible pressure to bring the situation to a head by a pre-emptive strike. There are those who believe that force is the only solution; perhaps in the outcome they will prove to be right. But others in the United States and here see in the creation of a worldwide alliance, based on resolutions of the United Nations and determination to resist armed aggression, an event which would have immense significance for world peace if it could be successful without resort to war. President Bush's national security adviser is one of these.
1844
I am sure that there is growing consensus within the alliance that this opportunity of creating a new world order in international affairs must not be lost by a failure of determination to take the long road of sanctions and diplomatic and psychological pressure. One observer said that talk of a new world order may be premature. It may be too soon to say whether the international alliance against Iraq will do its job. But it is certain that if President Bush ditches the consensus before the Arabs are convinced that it is necessary he will make the world a more dangerous place.
It may be that a policy that involves a protracted period of stalemate does not appeal to the more bellicose elements in the United States Congress or here. For my part I hope that Her Majesty's Government will use their considerable influence to prepare public opinion generally to take the long road. If war comes we shall play our part. But while there is a chance of turning the crisis in the Middle East into an opportunity to establish a more effective way of solving international problems and maintaining peace in the future, that opportunity must not be lost.
6.7 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, asked for comments on his proposal for a convention against hostage taking but, like jesting Pilate, he did not stay for an answer. My comment is that, desirable though it may be, the length of time it would take to pass such a measure through the United Nations—which would require a meeting of the Assembly as well as the Security Council—with the various questions that one could imagine raised by particular countries with particular circumstances, would make it something hardly directed towards alleviating, still less solving, the present crisis.
When we embark upon a consideration of this matter we are in danger of a little too much unrealism. We are a little too content with phrases and aspirations. It is difficult to do more—I hope no one would wish to do more—than support the Government in the steps they have taken. One must assume in an international matter of complexity that the information that the Government have at their disposition is greater than that available to the ordinary Member of your Lordships' House or the other place. This particularly relates to sanctions. On the face of it, remembering the discussions that went on in the mid-1930s regarding sanctions against Italy, general consensus has always been that sanctions in themselves cannot function against a government who would prefer to use forcible methods rather than accept defeat.
It may be that Iraq is unusually susceptible to sanctions. It may be that it has a peculiar economy with its heavy dependence upon a single export and the importance of imports. But one has yet to see clear evidence that it could work on anything like the timescale which many of us hope will be sufficient. Therefore it becomes essential that diplomatic pressure and a display of diplomatic firmness should be allied to sanctions and that no possible loophole

1845
should be left for either President Saddam Hussein or his friends to have any illusions about the intentions of the international community.
We are facing something rather unusual. I have been very struck by the frequency with which Saddam Hussein has been compared with Adolf Hitler. For my mind, apart from the fact that, like Hitler in his time, Saddam Hussein cultivates a moustache, I see no resemblance between them. Hitler—a demonic figure and a figure with whom the House would not expect me to have much sympathy—was the leader of a great and powerful nation which prepared itself for war and went to war. It did not depend upon other people for its armaments and technology. It was self-supporting. As was pointed out in the speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, a speech which we must all applaud, and also in the speech of his noble friend Lady Blackstone, that is not true of Iraq.
Iraq's military power is wholly the product of western folly, western assistance and western technologists. After all, what were some of the people now being detained working on in Iraq if they were not working in pursuit of Saddam Hussein's military objectives? Had it not been for the then condemned decision of the Government of Israel nine years ago to bomb the Iraqi reactor, we would now be facing not merely a government with chemical weapons but possibly a government with either nuclear weapons available to them at once or in the very, very near future.
What must puzzle us and cause us to think about our conduct not merely now in relation to the crisis but in the years to come is how it came to pass that with all the warnings we had we did not face up to what was going on in Iraq. Several noble Lords drew attention to the use of poison gas against Iraq's Kurds. It was pointed out that the Iraqi regime, with international co-operation, was devoting enormous resources to military development. If we in the West have been so unwilling to face facts of this kind—the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said that we were arming someone who could be in a position to put his hand on the windpipe of the western and indeed of the world economy—what trust do we have in ourselves that we will know what to do when and if we bring this crisis to a successful conclusion? But we can at least make certain that we do not leave any illusions about our determination.
I should like to echo, because it should not merely be a party matter, the point made by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition about a company in London acting as a centre for the procurement of arms. I should like the noble Lord the Leader of the House to tell us either that the "Panorama" journalists, The Times newspaper and so on got it wrong or that this company has been closed and that its operations have ceased. It should have ceased operations on the very day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, not because by then it was impossible to get further arms supplies from this country or from elsewhere in Western Europe but simply as an illustration that we
1846
had woken up to the enormity of what was going on. Such actions are essential if we are to accept that things will be different in the future.
There is another way in which it is absurd to point to parallels between Iraq and Nazi Germany. Iraq is not a country. As the most reverend Primate pointed out, Iraq, like Jordan, is a creation of the external influences playing at the end of the Second World War upon what had been the Ottoman Empire. All kinds of other political boundaries were thought of, were feasible and could have come about. As it happened, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and other countries in the Middle East settled down with recognised boundaries and with an accepted status, ultimately as members of the United Nations. We have to treat them as though they are countries with, as it were, a long independent pedigree. But that does not mean that they see themselves in that way. That is one of the great differences between the position in Europe and the position in the Middle East at the time of the Second World War.
At that time we had in this country as honoured guests the Queen of Holland, the King of Norway and their governments. There was no question but that Hitler would be turned out and that the legitimate governments would be restored. People do not look at the governments of the Middle East—and perhaps quite rightly—in the same terms. Therefore, whatever happens, we shall not be able to put the clock back.
However, there is a way in which we may benefit from the shock and what I fear may be a long drawn out and far from pleasant experience. There will at last be some understanding of the major elements of interdependence in the world. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has been criticised by more than one speaker for her remarks about our European allies. I understand why they made that criticism. I nevertheless point out that there are three countries—Germany and Italy, which were criticised, and Japan, which was not at that time mentioned since it was not relevant at that meeting—whose dependence on Middle East oil is very much greater than that of the United States or of the United Kingdom. While acknowledging the inhibitions, moral as well as constitutional, on German military action in the Gulf, it is nevertheless important that those countries should accept at least verbally that they have as much if not more interest in preventing the oil of the Gulf being controlled and manipulated for political purposes by regimes whose attitudes and conduct none of them would venture to palliate.
I think that perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, made too much of the fact that we should have been opposed to Iraq because of its internal regime. It is not a question of an internal regime, however awful, otherwise the international scene would be even more difficult than it is. It is the fact that if you have a government which is really an army in power, which is a military machine and nothing else—in that sense, I suppose, Saddam Hussein, when he compares himself to Sennacherib or Nebuchadnezzar, is on the right track—and which is capable of being used with ruthless effectiveness to conquer countries

1847
and, as we see in the case of Kuwait, to plunder countries, then there is a challenge to the international community. Whether or not, as we all hope they will, economic sanctions can work against that kind of country is something which we shall learn. However, my conclusions would be the same as those expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington; namely, that we should not say in advance that that is the only course which we can follow.
6.21 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I should like to preface what I have to say about the Motion before us by expressing my very deep and personal regret for the tragic irony that, in the week in which we have been recalled to discuss the subject which very much revolves around the United Nations, we have heard with deep sorrow of the death of Lord Caradon. I was privileged to work with him in Cyprus, in West Africa, in the West Indies and at the United Nations. I know that if he had been here today he would have made a valuable contribution to our deliberations. I say that because, above all, Lord Caradon was a man who believed in the United Nations, who served our country to the utmost at the United Nations and who leaves behind sorrowing people in many parts of the world, including, in particular, the citizens of the third world.
Despite the unrepresentative character of our House, we have a tradition of looking beyond the parochial view as seen from this country. I believe that this has been shown this afternoon and it is a tradition which I should like to continue in what I have to say. Surely it is essential in these dangerous days for us to rise above the chauvinistic paranoia of much of the populist media of this country and see how the situation looks and how the actions of our Government and of our country look from outside Britain, especially when we claim to be leading what is basically a moral crusade.
Let there be no doubting the fact that Saddam Hussein is a cruel and barbarous dictator. His aggression in respect of Kuwait is a breach of international law and order. His treatment of British hostages and of many thousands more hostages from many parts of the world, especially those from Asia, has been of the utmost disgrace. Above all, he has flouted the authority of the United Nations and the United Nations' response to that flouting was essential.
However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, has already pointed out, Saddam Hussein demonstrated his cruelty when he used poison gases on his own people, including the Kurds. When he turned his poison gases on to the Iranians, some of us protested, but in vain. At that time he was armed, financed and diplomatically supported by, among others, Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States, just as Hitler and Mussolini had been armed and supported in the 1930s when they were rising to power.
The Earl of Onslow: Nonsense!
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, what is different if we are looking at the validity of a moral crusade? What is different on moral grounds now? To many people in the world we appear to be hypocrites. Have there been any words of contrition that we and the West in general—including the French and the Germans—gave the arms, the financial power and the diplomatic support to Saddam Hussein when he was murdering his own people and when he was using these weapons of terror in Iran?
Has there been any help given to the opposition in Iraq which was the first target of Saddam's terror? Is there any help being given to that opposition today? Why this change in our moral standing and in our moral claims? One United States senator put it very succinctly when he said that if Kuwait had been growing carrots the Western world would not have been concerned with the takeover of that country by Iraq. Quite clearly there is a concern about the control of oil and surely this, on moral grounds, is the operation of double standards.
To those outside this country and outside the West and Europe—and to some inside—the claim that aggression should be met by sanctions, by force and by international action seems somewhat hypocritical when one recalls the invasion of Panama less than a year ago, the invasion of Grenada, the invasion of Afghanistan, the bombing of Libya, the war in Vietnam and perhaps, above all, the fact that the State of Israel still occupies territories which she took 23 years ago. That action, as your Lordships may remember, was met by Resolution 242 of the United Nations which declared that the occupation of territory by force could not be tolerated.
What has been done since that resolution was passed? Again, unfortunately, to the Arab masses, the West is seen to be supporting autocratic, tyrannous and ostentatiously wealthy oligarchs, plus of course the oil companies. Saddam has been and is able to pose as the champion of the poor Arabs and of Arab nationalism against the attempts of the West to establish a new form of oil imperialism. Of course that claim is nonsense; but it is insidious propaganda. Above all, it tends to destroy the moral appeal upon which not our case but that of the United Nations rests. It debases the acceptance of United Nations authority. Saddam must be persuaded or compelled to leave Kuwait, but this must be achieved by United Nations authority and not by the military might of the United States.
We are living at a time when for the first time for 40 years an opportunity has arisen to see the United Nations as a world authority. We and our children depend greatly upon the way in which that authority is built up and accepted. Now that there are no longer superpower vetoes and tension between the two superpowers whenever international law is breached, it is from the third world—we have been given an early warning by recent events—that will come the conflicts that may threaten international peace and order. In the future it will be British civilians who will depend

1849
upon the strength of the authority of the United Nations. World peace will depend upon the same factor.
The sole objective of the United Nations is the keeping of the peace. That is why so many of us have argued for so many years that the main weapon of the United Nations should be sanctions, if necessary supported by a United Nations peace-keeping force. From the point of view of a second-class power such as Britain has now become and the safety of our citizens and international order, the opportunity exists to build up the United Nations as that world authority. That cannot be done so long as those who do not have clean hands, so far as, in the present instance, Iraq is concerned, take the law into their own hands.
War, however it comes, would mark the failure of the United Nations and probably its collapse. It would destroy the opportunities which are now open to us to achieve a new world order and authority. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will never be tempted to take any form of military action without the full authority of the United Nations, because if we do we shall be committing suicide and leaving the world in disorder and without authority. We should be undermining the international authority which now exists.
It is not enough merely to meet the present military challenge to world order. The future of the Middle East depends upon the United Nations being used actively by our Government, the United States Government, the Soviet Union, and all its members to achieve a genuine Middle Eastern settlement. That settlement must include human rights for the Arabs in all their territories where they so desire them. It must include the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, as the United Nations laid down some 23 years ago, plus United Nations guarantees for the protection of the Israeli state as it was drawn by the United Nations and the establishment of a Palestinian state so that Palestinian citizens have the same rights as citizens of other states. It must be the United Nations, not the United States or the West, that controls that oil rich area and acts there as the guarantor of national sovereignty and the peaceful trade in oil.
I should like to suggest that we must think even more deeply; we must think about the use of that oil in the western world, especially in the United States, and its effect on the environment and the fixation with cheap oil of so many people in the West. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Ezra, will deal with that issue and I am sure that he can do so better than I.
I conclude by asking the noble Lord the Leader of the House three questions of which I have given him notice. First, if aggression demands international response, as I believe it should, what action did Her Majesty's Government take over the invasion of Panama, Grenada and Afghanistan and the bombing of Libya? Secondly, if the occupation of foreign territories by force should be met by international sanctions supported by military force, as I also
1850
believe, do Her Majesty's Government apply that principle to the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, to Indonesia's seizure of East Timor or to Israel's conquest and annexation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights? Thirdly, as the Prime Minister and her Government have so vigorously repudiated sanctions as a method of international action against apartheid in South Africa when so many of us have proposed that that is the only peaceful means of securing change, what has caused their volte face in the case of Iraq? Perhaps I might ask a fourth question of which I did not give notice: can the noble Lord the Leader of the House assure the House that Her Majesty's Government will not participate unilaterally in any military offensive without a specific request from the United Nations?
6.37 p.m.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, I have listened with interest to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby. Some of what he says is right, but we do not live in a pure world. The world is complex. All sorts of things occur, and none of us is blameless. One thing is certain: Saddam Hussein does not give a damn for the ideals of justice, the United Nations or anything else. The only thing that he respects is power. The United States, mixed up though she might be, provided that power and has given us the chance to do something about the situation.
I should like to talk for a little about the role of Europe in the present crisis. I am my party's representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union. I greatly admire the work done by the Council of Europe. For example, it has long been greatly concerned with the enormous increase in the population of the Maghreb on the North African coast which will double within 20 years. Those people on the south coast of the Mediterranean are poor and becoming poorer. Without a doubt, they provide wonderful ammunition for a dictator such as Saddam Hussein, posing as a great religious leader. Of course poverty is a splendid thing for him to work on.
Many good things spring from the Council of Europe. For example, there is the desire of the newly emerging democracies of the East to belong to it. It will be an influential body.
I am also a member of the Western European Union, the first attempt to set up a defence system within Europe, superseded by the very effective NATO but now—as it has been for many years—more or less set aside. It had a small success recently during the previous conflict when minesweepers went to the Gulf. However, I believe that our efforts in Europe are worthy of criticism. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who has been frequently referred to in this debate, with his usual rather brutal common sense, which I greatly admire, put his finger on the spot. He said that if we had to wait for Europe to make up its mind in its present state of organisation, Saddam Hussein would have been through Saudi Arabia by this time.

1851
We depend entirely on the monolithic power expressed by the United States in its willingness to take a risk to put the essential military stop to the ambitions of Iraq under its present leader. I believe that in Europe we must do a great deal in order to have a proper European pillar of the Atlantic alliance. We must have an organisation like NATO where action can be taken, where the objectives are set out and there is some form of command or action structure which can act, as the United States was able to act, at once in the Gulf. It used its immense power—its considerable air power allied to its sea power in the aircraft carrier groups.
Thus we are now in a position where perhaps the Prime Minister's strictures on Europe might be justified even for ourselves. I know that we have done more than others, but the evidence now coming out of America, expressed by Congressmen and others is that they feel that the American boys, sweltering in the heat of the Gulf and in danger, need more support from us. I believe that that is true. I support everything that has been said in this House. It is a personal opinion, probably backed by other members of my Party, that we and the rest of Europe should send ground forces, infantry and tanks on the ground into Saudi Arabia, wherever they are wanted, in order to support public opinion in America for the long haul. The more we are seen to be backing them, the more we are seen to be an international, United Nations force, the more America will sustain its major part in the objective which we have set ourselves. That could lead to the first real sign of a United Nations which can keep the peace. It will be a long, difficult, dangerous and perhaps even a bloody struggle. But if the United Nations holds together and succeeds in this enterprise, we can succeed in the future in keeping the peace.
We are not perfect nor has the conduct of the West been perfect towards Iraq. When Mr. Wilson, as Prime Minister, appointed an arms salesman for the British Government I, as one who was brought up in the 1930s to be politically interested, was shocked to the core. People like Basil Zaharoff are known as the merchants of death. That we should enter into this I thought was appalling. I still think that we must control this trade; we can see where it is leading us.
I support everything that the Government have done so far. I believe that we are on the right lines. If we stick with them, out of this trial great good can come.
6.45 p.m.
Lord Elibank: My Lords, while the attention of this House and of the public outside has been focused on the military and political aspects of the immediate crisis, it might be worth spending a little time looking at the general background and longer-term considerations of the position in the Gulf.
I had the pleasure of spending three years in one of the Gulf states working there, though not, as it happens, in Kuwait, to which I was an infrequent visitor. The recent crisis has brought vividly to my
1852
mind some of the opinions, observations and recollections that I formed at that time. They may be of interest to your Lordships.
The principal impression that any visitor to the Gulf receives immediately on arrival is of the strong, all pervading force of the Moslem religion. I think less of the splendid mosques which are dotted around the coast of the Gulf and more of the sight of a common labourer putting down his trowel or spade or descending from his lorry, unrolling his prayer mat, turning towards Mecca and saying the relevant prayers in the heat. This is often in a temperature of 100 to 120 degrees and he does it with a total lack of self-consciousness or ostentation. Then he resumes his task and carries on. I found this in a quiet way an impressive demonstration of the fundamental strength of Islam in the area.
Another impression I received from talking to the Arabs in that country was that men of my own age or younger could well remember when the Gulf was no more than a desert with wandering groups of Bedouin moving from site to site concentrating almost exclusively on survival. Around the coast were dotted a few isolated fishing villages. As your Lordships will know, the Gulf now has a number of modern, clean, well run cities, small in size but offering most of the amenities we have come to expect in the West.
The other curious feature of the Gulf states which they all share to a greater or lesser degree is what I can only describe as a series of racial planes gyrating around a common axis. These planes gyrate perfectly freely and in harmony, but they rarely touch except on strictly business matters. At the top is the ruler with his family—the ruling family, the recipients of the oil revenues. One plane lower are the Arab nationals of the country. It is interesting to contemplate that those two groups together will generally make up substantially less than 50 per cent. of the residents of that state. In the country in which I worked, they made up only 20 per cent.
Below that plane comes another layer of Arabs from outside the Gulf, often Egyptians and Lebanese, men of considerable education and administrative experience who, in many ways, serve to run the administration on behalf of the ruling family. Below them are the Western expatriates who are out there on contracts, making good money and having a good time but who are there for a strictly limited period. Below them in the hierarchy are the Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who for the most part run the shops and minor services. At the bottom, the men who do the manual work, who labour in the sun, are nearly all Iranians.
That is the structure, lubricated by the oil wealth from the top, filtering down to the bottom planes. In times of prosperity all are happy, all derive benefit to a greater or lesser extent from the oil revenues. In times of recession, the numbers of foreigners shrink and the state absorbs this. They return promptly enough when the money also returns.
There is a subsidiary aspect of the administration which is relevant to the present situation. The security

1853
forces, the army and the police are almost exclusively manned by foreigners. A member of the Royal Family will be the titular head, but the officers and rank and file are what we would know as mercenaries. They are disciplined and well organised, but they are mercenaries none the less. They could adequately control a situation within the state in normal circumstances, but one asks whether they would fight if presented with a determined aggressor. The answer is that they probably would not.
Sooner or later the Government of Kuwait will have to be re-established in one form or another. That may not be simple to achieve. If the United Nations is in a position to do so within the next six months, there will be no problem: the ruler and his family will return and they will resume their various offices of state. However, if that process is delayed, it is likely that usurpers, pretenders to the throne, will secure the backing to a greater or lesser degree of other Arab states. The international community and our Government in particular may be faced with making difficult empirical choices as to whom to back.
It has been suggested that some form of western democracy should be imposed upon Kuwait. An experiment with democracy has been tried and withdrawn and I do not think that that is a productive line of thought in 1990. As I understand the situation, the Arabs are well versed in and very happy with the process of consultation, which they employ in great measure. However, the formal voting democratic process is alien to them and any attempt to enforce it, given the racial background that I have described, would be very likely to lead to chaos. If it is proposed to establish some form of western democracy in Kuwait or to force it upon the ruling family, I humbly recommend to Her Majesty's Government that such a proposal should be treated with the greatest of care.
I have endeavoured to show that, although we can handle the current crisis, it will not be the end of matters in Kuwait and probably not in the other Gulf states. We should be aware of the basic problems and racial tensions which may arise in those countries and we should be prepared to act wisely when another crisis arises, as is very likely.
6.55 p.m.
Lord Clinton-Davis: My Lords, as a relatively new Member of this House I could not fail to be other than enormously impressed by the quality of the debate, its dignity, its calm, its moderation and its continuing interest, not least the very thoughtful and interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Elibank. It is interesting to note that the debate has been graced by a former Prime Minister, three former Foreign Secretaries (although one of those was also Prime Minister), a former president of the European Commission and two former ambassadors to the United Nations. That is a formidable list of participants.
It is not unexpected that this House should have shown a united resolve in regard to the fundamental issues, a unity in its abhorrence of Iraq's naked
1854
aggression and a resolve to uphold the international consensus which is reflected in the United Nations Security Council resolutions, sustained by economic mandatory sanctions. In accordance with those resolutions, we should continue to demand the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, the release of foreign nationals who continue to be held hostage in complete denial of international law and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Whether one goes along entirely with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Elibank, the future shape of that country must remain a matter for conjecture. It is, however, right that he alluded to it, but that is not something which, I suggest, we need concentrate upon now.
Despite the consensual approach, it would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that over a very long period Saddam Hussein was given numerous wrong signals. We in the West displayed a relative indifference to the appalling plight of the Kurds, subjected as they were to the most inhumane treatment at the hands of Saddam Hussein. That situation helped to convey the view that if he could get away with that, if he could get away with chemical warfare against the Iranians, he could get away with anything.
The connivance of the West—and this country was not the only one responsible by any manner of means—in the build up of Iraq's deadly weaponry is something that we should learn from and remember. The matter has been put very well in the editorial in the Guardian today.
"But if, as James Baker has said, an aggressor needs stopping in his tracks, why did the Western allies covertly favour this one for so long? The persistent British failure to clamp down on Iraq's shopping expeditions for arms-related technology is baffling. British firms were encouraged to attend last year's Baghdad arms fair. Export licences were granted for dubious items. Export credits were not withdrawn. The Iraqi-backed Technology and Development Group in London functioned without visible hindrance or scrutiny".
Those are important matters of the past and we must learn the lessons of history.
The noble Lord, Lord Beloff, referred to the almost universal condemnation nine years ago of the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear capacity. I believe that if that had not taken place despite the opinion of the world at the time, the prospects of this Gulf crisis would have been immeasurably more depressing than they are—and they are pretty depressing at the moment.
I hope that we shall not have here any more purposeless attacks by the Prime Minister or anyone else—although as far as the Government are concerned it appears to be confined to the Prime Minister—on our allies in the European Community just at the moment when a consensus had been patiently worked for and obtained.
Whatever the mistakes of the past were, I believe that the United States was absolutely right to act in the way that it did when Iraq was poised to attack Saudi Arabia. Time was of the essence. It was not possible to wait for a resolution of the Security Council in those circumstances. It was equally right, albeit a little belated, to seek the support of the United

1855
Nations subsequently for the action that had been taken to protect Saudi Arabia and to mount and enforce an effective blockade. I believe it remains right that we should strive might and main to maintain that international consensus, and indeed to broaden it, because there are still laggards in that respect; and indeed to seek to procure the approval of the United Nations for any further steps that might need to be taken. I do not believe that it is sufficient simply to assert that Article 51 should suffice to confer on us the right to engage in further action should it be established to be necessary in the light of the possibility that sanctions are not working.
Like my noble friend Lord Richard, I would say that this is not a question of legal quibbling. The Government's position may be right in law but this is not just a matter of law. It is the political approach that also matters. Therefore, I would argue that the authority of the United Nations must be sought if it is deemed necessary to move further. But that is not to say that if there is an overwhelming view that sanctions are not working and that further action is required we should simply say that the United Nations has not sanctioned further action and consequently that nothing further can be done, due perhaps to the unprincipled exercise of a veto by one member of the Security Council, for that would be to convey all the wrong messages, not least for the future of the United Nation; itself.
It is difficult if not impossible to consider all the possible scenarios that might develop, but I should like to underline a number of issues. First, I believe that we must continually endeavour to make sanctions work. They must be given a reasonable amount of time, as my noble friend Lord Callaghan argued, and it is wrong to accept, as seemed to be the situation a week of two ago, that war is absolutely inevitable. I believe that we must try, as my noble friend Lord Callaghan also argued, to widen support particularly among those who are at present opposed to the United Nations Security Council resolutions. We must strenuously resist any weakening of the consensus that has been so worthily negotiated—and that will become increasingly difficult to achieve over the course of the next weeks or months. I think too we must hope that in the due course of time it will be the Iraqi people who will exact their judgment on their present leader.
But, most important of all, we have to avoid at all costs sham solutions, easy compromises which fall short of the objectives that have been currently set by the international community, for that would simply give Saddam Hussein time to build up his capacity to menace peace once again and perhaps much more formidably than even at the present time. In his guise as the new Saladin he would assert that he was seeking to unite the Arab world in his quest to get rid of all western and other infidels as he would put it—a really bogus claim from someone who has engaged in the mass slaughter of his fellow Moslems. It would be infinitely dangerous if we were to try to paper over cracks in search of some easy solution, because all that
1856
would do would be to erode the authority of the United Nations quite as conclusively as that of the League of Nations was stripped bare in the 1930s.
I believe that the current crisis does not diminish but enhances the need in due course for international action to deal with the whole continuing crisis in the Middle East. These problems will persist but I believe, contrary to the impression that was given by, I think, my noble friend Lord Hatch, that these are secondary at present to the aggression of Iraq. For surely one thing which this aggression has revealed is that the Israeli-Arab conflict is not even the main conflict in this region. The Gulf crisis is about a dictator's threat to exercise a stranglehold over 40 per cent. of the world's oil reservoirs; it is about a grave threat to all moderate opinion in the Middle East; it is about the impossibility of seeking to pacify the lust of a dictator. The Gulf crisis has also had incalculable consequences for the position of the PLO. It is indeed difficult to conceive that the PLO can today be an active participant in a future Middle East peace process. It has given unequivocal support to Saddam Hussein and I believe that that extraordinarily unwise action from its point of view has cost the PLO and indeed others a great deal. It has squandered its credibility. It has undermined gravely (let us hope only temporarily) the doves in Israel who have constantly called for dialogue with the PLO—a PLO now revealed as totally perfidious, totally untrustworthy.
The PLO's actions have given comfort only to the extremists and it is inconceivable today that Arafat would be as warmly welcomed as he was in the past in any European capital, in Washington or even in Cairo. Who today will support the PLO financially and militarily? But ultimately there is no substitute for a peaceful solution to the historic conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and for that purpose principled partners will have to be found.
Amidst the current crisis we must become increasingly conscious of the horrendous plight of the refugees, notably those flooding into Jordan, and we have to respond generously. If we are to confront yet another refugee problem on a scale which might well dwarf those of the past, and if this situation were not to elicit an adequate response on the part of the wealthier nations, we should surely be facing an utterly calamitous situation in the future, whatever may be the outcome of the present difficulties in the Gulf.
The European Commission has today announced the allocation of £15 million (or is it 15 million ecu?) of aid. That can only be a start and we have to be prepared jointly or severally to add to that figure. So far the United Kingdom has announced the payment of a donation of some £500,000, which is almost derisory. I hope that that is only a first instalment. It is no less important to respond to that call for justice and help than to respond to the call which has been made by the United States to its partners to help financially in the military operations that it has justifiably undertaken.
7.9 p.m.
Lord Weidenfeld: My Lords, the Government's firm handling of the Gulf crisis and the consensus in your Lordships' House on our common objectives are of course very reassuring, but this objective to restore the status quo ante in Kuwait is, and must remain, our unqualified priority. I say that because any exiguous concession would help Saddam Hussein to see himself, as well as to be seen by his supporters and even some of his more volatile opponents, as the triumphant victor in a holy war. If Gamal Nasser could emerge after his defeat in the Six Day War as a hero, Saddam Hussein would certainly be hailed as a saviour if he kept but the tiniest fraction of his loot. Worse still, we could then face in quick succession the subversion or overthrow, most probably from within, of Arab regimes from Morocco and Egypt to the Gulf Emirates and indeed the Saudi kingdom. No amount of American or worldwide readiness to help those regimes could staunch internal change, a change that could be plausibly masked by the rise of populist governments or even feudal figureheads picked from among disgruntled scions of junior beds of various princely families.
Moreover, any compromise that would reinforce Saddam Hussein's hold over his or any other Arab nation would only accelerate his lethal weapon-forging drive so that in two, or three years, or even earlier, the world would have to face not just a few thousand hostages and temporary energy dislocation but the spectre of fully fledged chemical, bacteriological and atomic war. Those who understandably wish to avoid a military end to this crisis must realise that only credible strength and unshakeable resolve will force Saddam Hussein to quit Kuwait. The slightest doubt, the subtlest semantic encouragement, will not only harden his stance but endanger and erode the so far astonishingly strong international consensus.
We should not be side-tracked into a wider discussion, attempting to fuse and confuse the issue of Kuwait with the broader agenda of the disastrously unsettled Middle East. Saddam Hussein has talked, and will talk again, of the inequitable distribution of Arab wealth, the corrupt feudal regimes and the suffering disenfranchised branches of the Arab nation, in order to justify his wanton raid on Kuwait and lump it all into his agenda. There is only one immediate issue on our agenda, and that is the unconditional Iraqi retreat from Kuwait. When your neighbour's house is occupied by gangsters and its occupants held hostage at knifepoint, you do not engage in Hegelian disputes about the ills of humanity or the double standards of public morality. Your sole task is to dislodge the felons and bring them to justice.
Whatever the outcome of this crisis and Operation Desert Shield, the Middle East will never be the same. There are terrible problems from the threat of fundamentalism and terrorism to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the plight of the Kurds, the tragedy of Lebanon, and they must one day, the sooner the better, have to be addressed by the world community. But if we address ourselves to that agenda now there is no one less qualified to pose as guardian of justice
1858
and equity in the region than Saddam Hussein. He is the worst offender against all the values of a civil society.
As the ruler of an oil-rich country, he can hardly speak for his oil-poor and population-rich Arab brethren. He squandered Iraq's wealth on lethal arms and reckless war adventures. He practised torture; he helped and hid terrorists. He is solely responsible for the suffering and the mounting danger to wretched refugees and innocent families whose breadwinners went out to help his country with their skills.
Some noble Lords have chosen to refer to one issue, the Palestinian issue, from the welter of many other Middle East problems. This tragic problem, which remains unsolved, has now acquired a new dimension posed by the worsening instability of the Hashemite throne. The large and probably permanent influx or reflux of Palestinians from the Gulf has now turned Jordan quite unmistakably into a Palestinian country. In the long run that is a factor that might eventually help rather than hinder a regional solution embracing all that was once the British Mandate of Palestine.
I have just returned from Jerusalem and have spoken to leaders of government and opposition, and I can assure your Lordships that the Israeli Government and people are calm but watchful, determined not to aggravate the crisis. When the dust settles, I think there is a firm resolve in Israel to regenerate the peace process. If the world community succeeds in redressing the evil aggression in Kuwait, Israel's readiness to take major risks for peace will be commensurate with a growing sense of restored confidence that will result through a proper vindication of international law and a thorough defeat of the current aggressor.
At the same time I hope that some noble Lords here who have spoken on the subject will realise the great problem of finding now valid interlocutors on the Palestinian-Arab side whose intentions are peaceful and whose record is reassuring. Yasser Arafat's unequivocal stand, shoulder to shoulder with Saddam Hussein, and his break—dare I say treacherous break?—with his Gulf and Saudi sponsors, the now united front of pro-Iraqi PLO notables, from Bassam Sharif to Abu Abbas and Abu Nidal, all this should give pause to all those who are well intentioned peacemakers, observers, opinion formers or even Foreign Office Ministers, who have tried time and again to induce Israel to sit down trustingly with the allies of the guilty man of Baghdad.
Our support should be extended to those Arab leaders who, at the recent Cairo meeting of the Arab League, reaffirmed their stand against Saddam Hussein. Some indeed have registered their claims for future compensation and squarely faced up to their responsibility. And of course our backing must be given to the Prime Minister whose forceful voice rang out for justice not only for the people of Kuwait but also against those who have committed crimes against humanity.
The sacrifices that may well lie ahead of us pale before the horrid prospect of another round later,

1859
begotten by appeasement. Only a firm stand now will ultimately pacify the region and allow us in Britain, Europe and the world at large to reap the benefits of the momentous happenings of the past 12 months: that year which saw truce turned into peace between the superpowers and the effective end of the great European civil war which darkened and dominated three-quarters of the 20th century.
7.17 p.m.
Viscount Mountgarret: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, in his speech—I am sorry that he is not here to correct me, but I believe that I interpret something of what he said—suggested that this country in particular, and maybe the United States, were in danger of acting in a manner that could be described as humbug, at one moment seeming to be supportive of the Iraqi nation and helping it with weaponry, assistance and so on, in its war against Iran, and on the other hand, when it appears to suit us, not seeming to think it behaved very well towards the nation of Kuwait.
It is important that one gives the lie to that interpretation, because that is not so. It all stems from what is known as the balance of power, in which we have had since 1815 a considerable amount of interest, particularly in that part of the world. I am sure that your Lordships will remember the prolonged issue of what was called the Eastern question, and all that sort of thing. I believe that all we were doing in so far as Iraq was concerned in the war against Iran was trying to ensure that neither country defeated the other. As long as they wanted to go on battling against each other that was their prerogative.
It would not have been in the interests of the balance of power in that part of the world if either one or the other country had succeeded in its quest. Therefore, it is not correct to suggest that we are behaving in a manner that could be described as humbug by now insisting upon Iraq's total withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the democratic government there, which has been manifested by the United Nations' resolution.
There can be no turning back on that. The United Nations cannot turn back on that. It cannot agree to even parts being taken away by saying to the Iraqi nation, "You can have that island, and that will be fine, so long as you let the government come back to the remainder of their country." That in itself would be giving in, and that is what I think President Saddam Hussein is playing for.
What is the object? The noble Lord, Lord Elibank, referred to the fact that when all this unhappy affair is finally settled—and we hope it will be soon—that part of the world will never be the same again. There may be further crises, and so on. I have no doubt the noble Lord is absolutely right. We must show—and by "we" I embrace the United States and the major Western powers—that we are determined not to permit such a violation of sovereign nations and their territories and the people who propose to act in such a fashion must realise that the full force of international law will come down upon them. In that case I would agree with the
1860
noble Lord, but I think that if we can take firm action, should that prove to be absolutely necessary, the danger to which he referred might be somewhat less.
The noble Lord may think I am suggesting that perhaps there is no alternative to the use of force, but I do not believe that at this stage. The most reverend Primate rightly referred to the question of sanctions and expressed the feeling, with which I am sure many of your Lordships agree, that a more peaceful and humane method such as the utilisation of sanctions would work. On the other hand, my noble friend Lord Carrington said that that was all very well but asked how long we were prepared to wait and how long sanctions would take to be effective.
I am sure we all know the old song "There's a hole in my bucket". It seems to me that Resolution No. 665—the last one, I believe, made by the United Nations—also has a hole in it. The resolution was a most remarkable one because it showed that for the first time all the members of the United Nations were in agreement. That is the first time such a thing has happened since the end of the last world war, and it is a major achievement. However, there is a glaring and gaping hole. The resolution basically calls upon member states to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping. So far so good; but there are other means of getting supplies through by land or by air. That is the hole in this sanction. If we are going to rely on sanctions being effective, as I hope very much they will be—and quickly—then surely the United Nations must be asked to go further. It must be asked to ensure that all methods of shipment, whether by land, air or sea, of any goods, food and equipment into Iran are effectively blocked by whatever methods are suitable.
Failing sanctions, I am afraid that one has to revert to the use of force. I was very gratified to hear the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, indicate that the action taken by the United States, and also ourselves, in the initial stages of this crisis was correct and that it received the full support of the United Nations afterwards. If force has to be used there is no way that the United Nations could get together and make a resolution which says, "This is the end of the line: we are now going to use force." We cannot even say in Parliament here that we are going to use force or to join with those who wish to use force. That cannot be done. Surprise is the element of success in any of these unhappy matters. Her Majesty's Government must be able to feel absolutely satisfied that Parliament will give them the necessary authority so that if, and only if, it becomes necessary to use force in their view, such force will be used and will have the backing of both Houses of Parliament and therefore of the British nation.
That is absolutely essential. We can try sanctions for a while. However, if that period goes on too long, an element of morale will be missing. The troops can be rotated no doubt but their morale will be sapped. And even if morale is not sapped, because the troops can be taken home again for a rest, rather as is done in Northern Ireland, the people of the principal nation concerned, the United States, will also lose the spirit and the fire in their bellies needed to deal with this man

1861
if necessary. I feel that a time limit should be placed on the period during which the sanctions route can be followed.
Finally, I should like to echo something said by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis. If, by good fortune, we can get the agreement of the United Nations that whatever action is taken meets with its full approval, I feel that all members of the United Nations have a responsibility to contribute to the cost of the whole exercise. It seems to me very unfair for the world to look to that large country, the United States of America, to pick up the bill for the whole exercise off its own bat. If it is to be a United Nations exercise, then all the nations should assist financially. Otherwise, if one day another crisis should occur, that great country might not feel prepared to put its head in the noose of acting as the world's policeman. I plead for someone within the United Nations to put forward that point.
If we have to use force, then the circumstances of the unfortunate hostages must be borne very much in mind. It is wrong that they should be so used. It is wrong that civilians should be used, as seems likely, to defend sensitive military targets on the ground. But there is no excuse for those who may feel it necessary to implement the use of force ignoring that fact. If possible, should such action become necessary, ways ought to be thought of whereby damage could be inflicted upon the perpetrators of this violation other than initially in sensitive areas where civilian lives may be lost.
In that event more military lives could be lost. I can only say that if that were to be the case, however regrettable, it has to be remembered that those who gallantly decide to join the forces of their country are effectively putting their lives at risk if and when that should be necessary. Therefore, it is slightly more acceptable that those lives may be sacrificed than those of innocent civilians who should never be in this position in the first place. I just ask that perhaps that might be borne in mind.
7.30 p.m.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I rise to offer strong support for the general line taken by the leader of my own party here. Indeed, it was a line taken by all the leading speakers. After all these years I cannot remember a more impressive set of speeches than those that opened this debate.
I may be asked whether I have anything useful to contribute to this debate. I may be asked whether I know the Middle East, for example. However, I shall not answer that. I shall treat that as an irrelevant question. I wish to discuss public opinion which may be important when crucial decisions have to be taken a little later on. All the leading speakers are agreed that we must not give way to this awful dictator and that he must be compelled to leave Kuwait. We are all agreed that we must try to avoid war and to use sanctions to the uttermost. I believe we all accept the possibility that the sanctions may not work. The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, seemed to take a particularly
1862
pessimistic view about that. However, we all appeared to agree that sanctions will not work very quickly and therefore that support may fall away. We all agree therefore that there may be a situation where we have to use force against this dictator. I believe that is accepted by all the leading speakers.
However, at that point the speakers become statesmanlike. They refuse to discuss what should be done in a situation where the United Nations was perhaps not ready to give support. There may be majority support, but that may be vetoed in some way. What would happen then? There seems to be general agreement that we should not let Saddam Hussein get away with this. But how do we propose to act? Do we propose to act without the United Nations?
I wish to offer a personal general reflection. I hope I can do this as a mere groundling in the sense that I have no responsibility in this matter, and my words will not be followed widely all over the world. It would be an appalling situation if a victim nation called for rescue from the great powers that were in a position to rescue it but those powers were unable to do so because of the existence of the United Nations. That would be like saying in 1914 when Belgium called for our support—let us suppose that there had been a United Nations then—that we could not obtain a verdict from the United Nations in time and therefore we could not do anything. I conclude that in such a situation one must go ahead. I refer to "one", but I leave that matter open. If one or more great powers decided that force had to be used to evict this dictator from Kuwait although there was not support from the United Nations, I would not find it in my heart to blame them. That, however, is just my personal attitude.
I am not one of those who automatically supports this country—perhaps that is because I am Irish—when it becomes involved in wars. I was very unsympathetic to the Falklands war, for example. Looking back, that war may have been inevitable at the finish, but I felt it was an unfortunate happening. I derive no satisfaction from thinking about the Falklands war. Looking back, I regret that I did not say that at the time. All I did was to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, on his lone stand. That seems rather a feeble response although I hope he appreciated it. I believe I was the only person to pay him that tribute.
I can look back further than most people, although not as far as the noble Lord, Lord Houghton. I can look back to 1935 to a situation that was not dissimilar to the situation of the present day. A dictator had invaded a country whose regime was not attractive. I refer to Abyssinia. At the time the great powers made sympathetic noises. They talked about sanctions and began to play with sanctions. But then nothing happened and everything fizzled out. The dictator got away with it. We do not want that to happen again. I feel that in the last resort we must impose sanctions and, if necessary, use force.
My mind also goes back to the Labour Party conference of 1935. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, may have been present. I had not even joined the

1863
party; but I joined it the following year as I was somewhat influenced by the conference. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Mellish, was a boy member of the party at that time. At any rate, I remember that debate very well.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, I joined the party in 1931.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I remember George Lansbury speaking as the great pacifist leader of the party at that time. He recalled that Jesus Christ said in the garden that those who take the sword will perish by the sword. I am sure that if the noble Lord, Lord Soper, were with us he would use the same words today. However, Mr. Bevin said that he was not going to stand for George Lansbury hawking his conscience all around Europe. Therefore the pacifist line was defeated. I make my following remarks by way of an appeal to any pacifists or people who are not complete pacifists but detest the thought of war in any circumstances, even if they thought it was justified in theory. I can only speak for my own party and not for others. I welcome the existence of the pacifist tradition. It would be a bad day if that died out altogether and if the horror of war were ever muffled or snuffed out.
However, war was necessary against Mussolini and Hitler and it could be necessary now. We must of course work overtime to try to prevent it occurring. I feel that in the last resort this man must be defeated one way or another; but it is to be hoped without war. If it came to war, I hope he would be defeated with the support of the United Nations. I share the hope expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, at the end of his speech. I believe he said that we are now on the edge of great events. If we fail here the idea of a peaceful world will be put back for many years. If we succeed, it may advance at a very rapid pace.
7.37 p.m.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, I speak very much as an independent and I base my views on the fact that I have lived a rather long life that has taken me through the late 1920s, the whole of the 1930s, the Second World War and 37 years in another place. That experience gives me the right at least to express a view. I do not take any party line, and I have not done so for a long time. I speak as a man who has lived through the past 60 to 70 years.
I lived through the period when the League of Nations was an all-important factor. We hoped and prayed that it would result in the coming together of the nations of the world and that it would solve a lot of problems. What a farce that idea was! The League of Nations was utterly and completely smashed by Hitler. It was completely destroyed. Many countries talk about peace now, but no country helped to resuscitate and restore the League of Nations. It was completely destroyed by Hitler. I lived through that period.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, the noble Lord appears to think that the League of Nations was
1864
destroyed by Hitler. However, it was destroyed through the failure of the great powers to stand up to Mussolini.
Lord Mellish: My Lords, Mussolini and Hitler were both hooligans anyway. All I know is that the League of Nations was destroyed through the inactivity of the great powers as regards any collective action against a bully. That is the point I am making.
Then there was the Second World War, in which I played a very small part. There is one point which arose during that war which should be remembered, certainly by the noble Lord the Leader of the House and others in the Government when talking about future action against Saddam Hussein. When I was an officer we used to consider an appreciation of the facts—what was the enemy like? We tried to get inside him, to find out what he was aiming for and what his attitude was. I have tried to do that with that wretched man Saddam Hussein.
What an extraordinary man he is. He is an Arab. So far as I know he has never been outside his own country. He knows nothing of democracy and western values. They are nonsense to him. He is an Arab, a fanatic and a nationalist.
I thought that the speech made by the Prime Minister the other day was rather sad. Understandably—she was talking to a television audience—she said that if we win the argument, as we shall, we shall take Saddam Hussein before a tribunal and he will be dealt with in the manner of Nuremberg. I understand why she said that, but why in heaven's name did she say it now? We are dealing with a madman. We are not dealing with an ordinary man who balances arguments. He is a tyrant and a nationalist who believes in a so-called Holy War. He places no value on life as we in this House know it. Life is unimportant to him. To him Christianity is a farce. He sees life from an Arab point of view. That is why I beg the Government to recognise who and what we are dealing with. We are not dealing with a sane man.
We in the West should recognise what good has come out of this terrifying situation. First, unlike the League of Nations, we have seen the United Nations come to life. It worked.
Right from the word go, since 1945, I have been a believer in friendship with the United States. I shall put on record why. I want the strongest nation in the world to be my friend because I am British. Anybody who objects to that is a fool. It is essential that we have the United States as an ally. We should not ignore them, as some people in this House and in another place would like. I believe that we have a restraining influence on America. The United States certainly has a restraining influence on us. The Americans have committed their blunders. Vietnam was a disaster; so was Suez. These things happen. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, is not here. The whole of the history of the British in the Middle East is very murky indeed.
Having said that, there is no point in going back. We have to face the present, and tomorrow. That is why I want to say, first, that I understand that one

1865
good thing that has come out of the argument is that the United Nations has come to life. The United States and Britain are allies and friends. We are both in the field. Does anybody deny that we stopped Saddam Hussein from invading Saudi Arabia? Is there anybody in this House who has the temerity to argue that Saddam Hussein would not have gone into Saudi Arabia and the Americans there with their ground forces and the British with their aircraft are unnecessary? Of course he would have gone in. He would have destroyed Saudi Arabia and smashed it into the ground, just as he did with Kuwait.
That is the sort of man we are dealing with. We are not dealing with a rational person. I impress upon the House that the only thing that that man understands—because he is an Arab and a nationalist and does not understand democracy—is force of arms. That is his world.
I was asked recently how I define democracy. I define democracy as giving the opposition the right to oppose. Let us relate that to the Middle East. Has Saddam Hussein ever allowed an opposition to oppose him? He would destroy it overnight. He destroyed the Kurds and has destroyed everybody who opposed him. He destroyed Kuwait. Why? Because it was a threat to his oil income. That was why the Americans and the British went in to stop him going further.
You can make any argument you like about not upsetting our allies. I have to say that we have learnt that some of our allies are not worth much. They can pass resolutions in the United Nations and put their hands up, but when it comes to action that is a different matter. I shall not mention names because I recognise that although I carry no authority it would not do any good. However, I believe that Members of this House know who I am talking about. But the Americans, with all their faults, are the best allies to have in a crisis of this kind, and I am very glad that we have joined them.
Next weekend President Bush is meeting Mr. Gorbachev. I hope and pray that the one thing that Mr. Bush will say to him is "Sanctions will not work. We have to go to war. We want your support". I hope that Mr. Gorbachev says in reply, "Yes, I accept and understand that. Not only do I understand it but I support you". That is what I hope will come out of next week's conference, not a lot of argy-bargy, waffle and moonshine. We want definite action from them.
I can say to the Americans, because they are our friends and allies, that we need them to understand the situation. In dealing with Saddam Hussein we are not dealing with a normal man. We are dealing with someone who will destroy the whole of the Middle East and if he could eventually he would take over the whole of the rest of the world. That is how stupid he is. People may laugh at him and sneer and jeer at him, but a million men have already lost their lives in his war against Iran. We are dealing with an extraordinary character.
1866
To those in this House and the other place who say that Britain should be defenceless I say how stupid they are. If ever it reaches the stage when pacifism is the order of the day and we have no armaments, they are dafter than I think it possible for them to be. However, there are some people who say that. They bandy the word "peace" about as if they were the only ones who believed in peace.
One point that has come out of all of this is that the defence of the realm is imperative for this country more than ever before. The situation in Russia has changed and the Russians are no longer our enemies. But what about the Middle East? What if we had sent no aircraft and had taken notice of the so-called pacifists in this House and elsewhere? What a state we should be in. That is one point; it has destroyed the pacifist argument.
Secondly, above all else, the United Nations has now been given a strength that it must not lose. However, we must remember, having unanimously agreed that Saddam Hussein is a rotter, that we must deal with him in a way that he understands. Sanctions are right to start with, but it will not end there. It cannot end there with him. He knows that if he is defeated there will be a Nuremberg-style trial. As a result, so far as he is concerned he will be determined to fight it out. Any idea that we can turn away from that is madness in itself.
I end on this note. I believe that the time is well overdue and we should recognise that sanctions have only a limited purpose. Saddam Hussein is now using the hostages to bolster his illegitimate regime. The one thing that he understands and dreads—and I speak as one who knows a little about the Middle East—is force. He understands it because he has lived by it, traded on it and won on it. This time he will not win.
7.50 p.m.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mellish, spoke about Saddam Hussein's outlook. I should like to develop that theme a little. To illustrate the noble Lord's point perhaps I may tell the House that it is reputed that, at an Iraqi cabinet meeting to discuss the Baghdad by-pass, the Minister of Transport suggested to Saddam Hussein that it should take a different route. Saddam Hussein said, "Come outside and let us discuss it; I have some maps". They went out. There was a bang and the Minister of Transport has never been heard of again. Mrs. Thatcher certainly did not treat Cecil Parkinson like that when he was Minister of Transport. I am trying to suggest to your Lordships that it is essential to understand the danger of this sort of regime.
In the Mohammedan religion there is no sentence such as, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and render unto God the things that are God's". That failing has meant that all Moslem regimes from the death of Mohammed until now lack an authority—I use the word "authority" in its Chalcedonian sense. When the Prophet died people did not know what to do. They chose a caliph. Of the first three caliphs who lived in Mecca one or probably two were certainly assassinated. There was an

1867
argument and there was no legitimacy. The caliphate was then hijacked to Damascus—again with no legitimacy. That Umayyad caliphate was hijacked to Baghdad—again with no legitimacy. Because there was no legitimacy in Moslem regimes and because they could not make that difference between "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" and "Render unto God that which is God's", there has always been a deep instability in all Moslem regimes.
For instance, consider the Ottoman sultans. Let us assume that Suleiman the Magnificent had around 120 sons, which I think he did. One of them was chosen and the rest had a bowstring put round their neck because the remaining sultan was frightened about what his brothers might get up to.
We have now established at least I have established to my own satisfaction—that this regime is deeply unstable. We are now applying pressure on it because our peace aims should be: unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the re-establishment of the ruling family and the disarmament of Iraq in chemical, conventional, gas and nuclear capability. If that were to come about it would enable us to address ourselves more directly to the Palestinian question. That must be our aim.
That will not come about without very considerable resistance. If sanctions work, the internal regime in Iraq will collapse. When a hundred years ago an Indian state collapsed—the raja-ate collapsed and the doctrine of lapse applied—the solution was very simple. A squadron of Sindhi regular cavalry and a young man who could speak classical Greek and Latin were sent there and, lo and behold, the place was governed.
What we shall be left with if we are not careful is simply a bubbling cauldron of inchoate hate between the Tigris and the Euphrates. I suggest therefore to your Lordships that we have to think beyond what our absolutely correct aims should be. If we do not do so, we shall end up with an American or Western presence in the Arab world for a very long time. If that presence is there it will be dangerous.
Again, on an historical note, Gladstone, who was by no means a warmonger, said when we went into Egypt to stop rioting in Port Said to support Baring's Bank order (which was what we went into Egypt for) that we should be out of there in six months. The Life Guards went in in 1882. They took part in the moonlight charge at Kassasin and were the last squadron to be withdrawn in 1956. That is how long Gladstone's "six months" was.
So we have to be extremely careful about what happens when our aims have been secured. If we are not careful we shall not know what we are doing. That is all I want to say and I hope that it will be borne in mind.
7.55 p.m.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I am sure that the Government must feel very satisfied indeed with the degree of satisfaction and approval that has been expressed so far in the debate over the Government's handling of this crisis. I wonder,
1868
however, whether the nation is fully braced or is even briefed on the test of faith and courage which may yet come upon us.
In all the government speeches that have been made since this crisis opened—and I have listened to most of them—for me the most notable moment was when the Prime Minister last Sunday had to introduce a diversion about war criminals into an otherwise admirable statement in the David Frost programme. Why did she have to bring in that subject? We are still messing about with the tag end of war criminals of 50 years ago. Why then threaten evil-doers in a war that is yet to come that they may be brought to trial and judgment may be passed upon them? We do not want another Nuremberg at the end of this crisis.
After all, war criminals are brought to book only if they have been conquered. The victors are never war criminals. War criminals may be pursued by victors to the end of the earth and the end of time but there is no justice in it. It is a matter of what victorious parties in war can inflict on the other side. Let us forget evil-doers in this situation. A war has not yet come. I believe, however, that we have to be braced for it.
The noble Lord, Lord Beloff, and my noble friend Lord Hatch opened the cupboards of history. They did not have to probe very far before they came upon a few skeletons, some of which were recognised as British and others as American. Of course there are plenty of others. The cupboards of history are absolutely stacked with skeletons. We must never underestimate the extent and indestructibility of original sin. We must also regard hypocrisy as endemic in the human race. We live in an imperfect world today and history is the story of the imperfect world of yesterday. We must leave the past to bury its dead.
We cannot be deflected now because of feelings of guilt or shame for our actions in the past. If that were true, how could Germany ever have lifted its head again? Germany is taking its place in the nations of the world. We look upon Germany as the most prosperous nation in Europe today. We are trying to build a new Europe with German participation, being fully reconciled with today and overlooking the past.
A word about sanctions will be worth while. The matter of sanctions was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the noble Viscount, Lord Mountgarret. Sanctions do not have an impressive history. The first sanctions that I remember were placed on Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia before war broke out in 1939.
There was then a time when we thought that we were going to put an impediment in the aggressive activities of Mussolini by sanctions. But because oil was excluded from sanctions, they were no good. We have to consider what the likely outcome of sanctions will be. We have had sanctions in South Africa against the export of arms. We have had sanctions against Rhodesia which were intended to bring Ian Smith and the white people of Rhodesia to their knees in weeks rather than months. But in South Africa and Rhodesia it was internal insurrection that brought about the end

1869
of the regime that we felt should be replaced. I believe that sanctions will give time for an internal uprising in Iraq to change the course of its Government by finding a fresh one.
However, we are told that we must leave sanctions in force long enough to bite. To bite what, my Lords? To bite whom? Who will suffer; and what are they going to suffer? We say that we must not apply sanctions to medical supplies and to other aids to curing illness. The Yemen says, "You cannot apply sanctions to food. You must provide the lifeline of people even though you have imposed sanctions." What are sanctions to be then? Are they to be economic sanctions? The only time we starved people into submission was when we maintained the embargo, the blockade, of Germany long after she had capitulated. Then children and women—and pregnant women—suffered grievously from the maintainance of the embargo on German consumption of food while we began to sort out the future. Why do we exclude medical supplies? If sanctions are a failure, we are told that we must then consider the military option. In other words, if sanctions do not succeed, then we shall start to kill. If we kill people if sanctions fail, are we to exclude medical supplies from sanctions when they are imposed? Where is the logic in that? Are we using sanctions to bring people to their knees, or are they merely an economic irritant?
I do not suggest that we should be excessively rigorous in our application of sanctions. We do not want to hurt people after all. What are we after? I have a very sceptical approach to the idea of the success of sanctions. I believe that they will not of themselves succeed. However, they may bring about sufficient discontent with the regime in Iraq to give rise to internal movement for replacement.
I refer to the military option. It irritates me a little even to hear the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs refer to the military option. We have a mandatory summons from the United Nations to a country to vacate territory that it has taken possession of unlawfully. If the mandated direction of that nation to quit is not obeyed, then we have presumably to consider the military option. If there were to be much haggling about whether there shall be enforcement of the mandatory direction of the United Nations, it brings a new approach to the authority of the United Nations.
I believe that this issue will develop into the promotion of the United Nations as a pinnacle of a new world order or it will destroy it altogether. We may have to fight on that issue for a long time. The nation must be well braced for the ordeal.
The aim of sanctions, and therefore our war aim—or is it?—must be to achieve unconditional withdrawal from this illegally possessed territory. Does that mean eventual unconditional surrender? Does unconditional withdrawal defied become a war for unconditional surrender? That means war on a national scale. It means the destruction of a nation. It means the subjugation of its leadership and its government. That is conquest. If that is to be
1870
undertaken in order to secure compliance by Iraq of the direction of the United Nations, it must be undertaken under the authority of the United Nations. I do not believe that any country or any combination of countries can assume the mantle of the United Nations for a war which might lead to quite unpredictable consequences.
Where Russia will be in all this is an open question at the moment. We may see a conflict on an almost global scale in which Russia is neutralised—that is, unable to take the side of the United States and fearful of upsetting the United States if it takes the side of its erstwhile friends and has regard to the very substantial population of Moslems within the boundaries of the Soviet empire. All of Russia's armoury—its submarines, nuclear weapons, tanks and the rest—may be put in wraps because they cannot be used. However, if Russia were to say, "These weapons are available to the United Nations as may be needed," as with the United States, Britain, France and others, and if we are to join in a United Nations attack upon this evil act of the Iraqis, then I believe that the war would end before any shot was fired. But shall we achieve that? It is a very crucial meeting indeed that will take place this weekend.
If it is left to the United States and Britain, with few others playing any active part, then I am afraid that the propaganda against this unity for war purposes may lose a good deal of its authority and it may not receive the blessing of the United Nations. It is not easy to fight a grievous war for the high moral line and that indeed is what we shall end up doing if we are to achieve the real purpose behind the stand that we now take.
In conclusion I ask this. What about our lines of communication to the Arab world and in particular to Iraq on this issue? They are very important. I agree with my noble friend Lord Callaghan that it will not be the effect of sanctions which influence the situation. I do not think that people change their minds under such a threat; they will endure rather than do so.
However, their minds may be changed by the pressure, inducement and encouragement of friends and others alike to submit to the authority of the United Nations. Often people will submit to what they recognise to be a higher authority. If only we can secure that as our aim, we may come to the threshold of a new epoch when disarmament as a term is irrelevant because the armaments that countries will need will go no further than those for the maintenance of internal order and a safeguard against surprise attack.
For the rest, it will be the combined mobilisation by the United Nations of all those not involved in the original misdeed in order to persuade the evil doer to change his mind or to have it changed for him by the combined enforcement of the rest of the world. That is how I see the situation. Anything less than that will not be worth fighting for.
8.11 p.m.
Earl Attlee: My Lords, I thank the Minister for supplying the background notes which I am sure all noble Lords found most useful. During the Falklands conflict the Social Democratic Party was in the vanguard of those supporting Her Majesty's Government. I am happy to say that during the present trouble in the Gulf we fully support Her Majesty's Government. I have visited the Falklands and various army units. There it was said, "The Falklands situation was wonderful because we knew that the Prime Minister was backing us. We knew that she would not turn and we knew that she would not let us down. Through her came the support of the Cabinet, both Houses of Parliament and the whole of the country". That support was important to our services in the Falklands and it will be important to our troops in the Gulf.
In the Falklands there were as many merchant ships as there were Royal Navy ships. It was only by chance that we had an aircraft carrier. At that time we were talking about defence cuts and today we are talking about them once again. The United States is appealing to its allies to supply merchant ships. However, the trouble is that our merchant fleet is being vastly depleted year by year. Too many of our ships, such as the roll on, roll-off ferries, do not ply under the Union flag. Without that we could be in dire straits. I urge the Government not merely to say that they will not make cuts in defence now and will wait. We must not have defence cuts at all; we must keep our deterrents in both nuclear and conventional arms.
The Butcher of Baghdad is well named. I do not believe that Adolf Hitler had such a name. He was known as the Paper Hanger and by other names but he did not have a name similar to the Butcher of Baghdad. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, was right in saying that there is no comparison between Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein. It appears that Saddam Hussein believes that God is on his side. But that is his God and all that he has. I believe that we have God on our side—the Christian God, the Jewish God and, as regards many countries, the Moslem God. In addition I believe that we have right and might on our side. We must show that we—that is, the Americans, the United Nations and our allies—are willing to fight if we must. We must let the Iraqis know that we are willing to fight.
We have heard a great deal about sanctions and whether they will work. At least we must go through the motions. However, I do not understand how we can negotiate with a man whom people claim is mad, whom we cannot trust and who breaks his word. He is a man who on one day says, "I have no intention of invading Kuwait", and two or three days later does just that. How can we trust and believe a man who takes innocent women and children as hostages? The answer is simple; we cannot.
As I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, I was reminded of a Bateman cartoon published at the beginning of the war. It was of troops on the march and an old fuddy-duddy saying, "Look, everyone is out of step but our Johnny". The noble
1872
Lord referred to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. He was wrong. In Cyprus there was extant the Greek army. The Turkish army went there to protect Turkish Cypriots from being murdered and massacred. Today there is a United Nations force in Cyprus. From what I could see when I was there I understood that its job was to ensure that Greek Cypriots did not cross the line to murder their fellow citizens in the north.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, is not present to hear my comments. He said that we must not do anything militarily without United Nations sanctions. As everyone who has read anything knows, we already have those sanctions. Under United Nations rulings we are entitled to use force if we must. I hope that it will not come to that but in my view it will.
I understand that in another place there will be a Division on the issue. I believe that to be good because it will show massive support of the action taken by Her Majesty's Government. In one way I am sorry that there will not be a Division in this House. If there were I doubt that there would be sufficient noble Lords to produce Tellers in the vote against Her Majesty's Government.
8.19 p.m.
Baroness Strange: My Lords, when I saw the clans gathering at Balmoral last week I guessed that the fiery cross was to be raised and that we should be meeting here soon. One of the most amazing things about this House and quite one of the nicest is to find that even on great occasions of moment, when all the wisest and grandest people in our land give us the benefit of their wisdom and make splendid speeches, they can find time and patience in their hearts to listen to simple soldiers or gallant and fearless field marshals and poetical peeresses.
When I first came to your Lordships' House people asked me what I was going to talk about and what I could possibly contribute. I said that I was going to talk about goodness and about ordinary people carrying on the business of their daily lives. That is not much of a contribution, particularly from someone who is still trying to find her own goodness, but it was the best I could do.
When we were young we sometimes came in contact with infectious diseases. When we did that we were put in quarantine because the disease spread. Evil is like an infectious disease. It is pervading, pernicious and once given into it grows. That is why we must not allow ourselves to be browbeaten by Saddam Hussein's manipulation of human lives as a bargaining power.
We have all been stirred by the courage of that poor little boy Stewart standing firm and brave with his arms crossed on television. "What great big teeth you have, grandmama. What a great big moustache you have, grandmama". We all know—and grandmama wolf knows too—that outside the good woodcutter is waiting with his sharp steel axe. We all hope and pray that the wolf will let the little Red Riding Hoods of this world—every single one of the foreign nationals whom he is holding hostage—go home happily and

1873
well and that he will then disgorge poor grandmama (or rather Kuwait), which he gobbled up to begin with and against whose continued occupation all our forces, the United Nations and, indeed, most of the Arab countries who are on the side of goodness and right are standing firm. In that case perhaps the woodcutter will not need to use his axe and the wolf can go safely back to his own part of the wood.
That is what we are all praying for. I believe that there are two hopeful signs. The first is the solidarity of the United Nations behind the United States, Britain and Egypt and all the other nations which are sending out troops to stand firm on the side of right. Indeed, if they had not moved as swiftly as they did, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states around the Gulf would also have been invaded.
The second hopeful sign is the meeting this weekend in Helsinki between President Bush and Mr. Gorbachev. To find two great military powers which have been eyeing each other through chinks in the Iron Curtain for so long combining to keep the peace is heartening and encouraging. As long as we have right on our side, keep no truck with evil and all hold together we may yet in the eleventh hour prevail in peace.
I have been fortunate enough to meet many of our armed forces. It is all very well for us here to say what should or should not be done. Those forces are at the sharp end and will bear the brunt of it. Many of your Lordships will know from personal experience what that means. We are all proud of them and our hearts and prayers are with them that they will not be needed.
Two days ago I spoke to the station commander at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. He said, "Everybody is aware of what we are doing. We are acting according to a set pattern. If I say that we are enjoying the challenge, do not get me wrong. We are just trying to face up to things and get on with the ordinary business of our lives and do what has to be done". That is courage and that is goodness.
I hope that the right reverend Primate will excuse me if I quote from the 37th Psalm:
"I myself have seen the ungodly in great power, and flourishing like the green bay tree.
I went by, and lo, he was gone; I sought him, but his place could nowhere be found.
Keep innocency, and take heed unto the thing that is right; for that shall bring a man peace at the last".
8.24 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I have thrown away the first part of what I was going to say, partly because other people who are much more qualified than I have already said it and partly because I want to refer to one or two cuttings in the newspapers. Your Lordships may hope that because I have thrown away the first part and shall be referring only to cuttings my speech will be shorter. I hope that that will be the case but I cannot guarantee it although I shall not speak longer than my allotted 15 minutes.
Some harsh words have been said about the right honourable Tony Benn this evening. He might
1874
perhaps be called the intelligent man's Arthur Scargill. Mr. Benn seems to me to have hit the nail thoroughly on the head in an article written by him in today's Guardian. The issue which is not perhaps dividing us but which we are distinguishing here this evening is what will happen should we be unable to carry the United Nations with us. In other words, do we stand with the United Nations or do we go ahead regardless?
There have been differences of view on that issue. The majority view seems to be that we must face the problem when we reach it. That is comfortable because it means that we do not have to make difficult decisions or discuss difficult problems this evening. However, it is a matter which we should face and it is a matter of the utmost importance. The view I hold is that we should not go ahead or beyond the point at which the United Nations will come with us.
That is an entirely different view from those who say that we should go ahead under any circumstances. We have had differences of view upon that. My noble friend Lord Longford, who was kind enough to pay tribute to my somewhat solitary stand at an earlier stage in these proceedings, came to a different conclusion to that reached by my noble friend Lord Houghton. He takes the view that in all circumstances the United Nations decision is the important one. That point was made with great clarity by my noble friend Lord Hatch.
Why do we come to that view? First, I quote from the article by Tony Benn in this morning's Guardian:
"Are British forces to be used to take offensive military action without the authority of a specific Security Council resolution?".
He refers to a specific resolution and not a generality from the constitution. He refers to a specific decision by the Security Council on this dispute. The view that I take is that on this issue Mr. Benn has put his finger on the point and it would be fatal for us to get into that situation.
I take that view because in my experience wars take different directions in the course of their formation. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, with much greater authority than I, said that. If the United States and Britain continue to take the lead, as they are now, and worse, if they launch an attack without specific United Nations support, they will be seen by other Arab states to be imperialist. The nature of the conflict will change as the nature of conflicts so often does. The casus belli would be forgotten, as Saddam Hussein hopes. What began as a militant implementation of United Nations decisions will be seen by most Arabs as no more than two Anglo-Saxon powers reasserting oil-inspired colonialist economic imperialism of the West. The view that the United States assault is ipso facto benign is not widely shared outside that country.
Therefore, the message that I have, for what it is worth—and it has already been uttered by one or two of my noble friends on this side and I believe I detected it also in a note of caution uttered by none other than the noble Lord, Lord Beloff—is, easy does it. The time for irrationality is long past. Let us have sanctions by

1875
all means, but calls for the toppling of Saddam Hussein may well come from anywhere. Ideally they should come from Iraq itself, as the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, suggested, but they should certainly not come from us.
Wars have their own momentum. In 1990 an Americo-British reinvasion of Kuwait could end in our civilisation being in a weak and difficult situation. It may even have the effect of breaking up the detente currently existing between the two great powers. That is the most precious thing we must hang on to in all circumstances. I therefore share the view taken by the two presidents at the weekend; it is vital that that detente shall remain.
The weaponry available today and within reach has become too dangerous. As some noble Lords asked: who is responsible for that? Certainly Saddam has displayed murderous ruthlessness. But even if, as is suggested, there are resemblances with Hitler, Kuwait is certainly not Czechoslovakia, and this is not even 1956 let alone 1938.
At that time I carried a banner which said, "Chamberlain must go". With considerable reluctance I had decided that the time had come to fight. Now is not that time, and I question whether, for the great powers, it can ever come again. World policemen in the circumstances of today must hold the ring. Their job is not to retaliate in strength, except on behalf of and with the United Nations. Still less is it to go in with the purpose of teaching the natives a lesson, as we used to. Those days are long past. In the circumstances which exist today, the great powers have a special responsibility: to see that our world remains inhabited and inhabitable. That will not be easy.
8.32 p.m.
Lord Ashbourne: My Lords, it is getting late and I intend to be extremely brief. Your Lordships may regard it as something of a bonus because I intend to be back in my seat within 120 seconds.
I have a question to ask the noble Lord who will be winding up the debate for the Government. It is this. In view of President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, do the Government still intend to proceed with the far-reaching defence cuts announced by the Defence Secretary on 25th July? That is a subject which clearly worried the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, earlier in the debate. If the Leader of the House can answer my question, I shall be very much in his debt.
8.33 p.m.
Lord Ezra: My Lords, in the course of this important debate, noble Lords have dealt with the political, military, economic and social issues connected with the crisis in the Gulf. Closely intertwined with all those issues is the question of oil supplies and energy policy. As the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, indicated, that is the aspect on which I should like briefly to concentrate.
This is the third oil shock from which the world has suffered in the past 20 years. The previous oil shocks—1973–74 and 1978–79—created serious economic, financial and political repercussions. Indeed, the 1979
1876
oil shock led to the world's worst economic recession since the end of the war. It is therefore relevant to consider what impact the present oil shock will have. So far the indications are that it may not be as bad as previous ones. Although the price of oil has doubled compared with roughly where it stood early in July—then 16 dollars a barrel and now 30 dollars a barrel—nevertheless in real terms it has not yet reached the levels of the previous oil crisis.
In terms of supply, we have a situation in which there will be no movement of oil from either Iraq or Kuwait. That amounts to about 4 million barrels of oil a day, which represents around 9 per cent. of the total world oil requirement of 52 million barrels of oil a day. In substantial part that will be met by increased supplies from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. There also happen to be fairly large consumer stocks. It may be felt that from the supply side the situation is manageable. However, the International Energy Agency of Paris, which represents all the major consuming countries, recently issued warnings that while the situation may look a little better at present, with the onset of winter matters could become very tight. Furthermore, if there were any untoward developments in the Gulf—if the situation developed into military action, for example, which most would deplore—that could lead to a much greater increase in oil prices and much more serious repercussions.
The point I wish to lead to is this. We have had a period of almost 20 years in which to consider the impact of what we call oil shocks from the Middle East. Yet here we are in 1990 with another oil shock and still liable to suffer considerably as a result. In the virtual certainty that this will not be the last of these perturbations in that area, is it not time to devise with our allies and friends an energy policy which will minimise the impact of these shocks?
There are a large number of reasons why we should be embarking upon such a policy. Environmental considerations are such that we should also be increasing our efforts to improve the efficiency with which we use energy. It is quite clear from the problems we face over oil supplies that we should also be increasing our efforts to diversify sources of energy. The fact is that while during periods of crisis such as the present one there is a great deal of interest in the subject—I have been involved in this business for many years and remember the immediate post-war situation when great attention was paid to energy efficiency; it was then known as "fuel efficiency"—after those crises, when we have a period of relative stability or weakness in prices, the interest diminishes.
It is certain that when—as we hope not before too long—the present crisis is resolved and the oil starts flowing again from Iraq and Kuwait, we shall enter a quieter period when interest will again diminish until the next oil shock. I therefore recommend that among the various measures we should be taking in the light of the present crisis is one that should seriously address itself to the question of energy policy, bearing

1877
in mind the need to diminish the impact of these regular shocks arising from the perturbations in the Middle East.
In today's Financial Times there is a report that the French Government intend to introduce substantial measures of fiscal incentives to those undertaking energy efficient operations, both in the industrial and domestic sectors. They are also looking at other ways in which the impact of the present situation could be diminished. I suggest that that should not only be done on a national basis, but that we, who are in a strong position in energy terms having access to a whole variety of sources of energy, should initiate immediate discussions in the EC and within the International Energy Agency to examine this aspect of the problem; not only with a view to mitigating the impact of the present oil shock, but of making sure that we diminish the impact of any future shocks.
8.39 p.m.
Lord Greenhill of Harrow: My Lords, I was in two minds about whether to speak today until my former colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, who is at present in Europe, got in touch with me. I decided then to speak. Much of what I shall say also reflects the noble Lord's views.
Several speakers have paid tribute to the excellence of today's debate. I agree with them. I hope very much that when the time comes to show on television the debates in both Houses a fair period of time will be given to the speeches that were made during the first two hours this afternoon.
There has not been a more complex or more dangerous situation in the past 40 years than the one which faces us today. The successful passage of the resolutions through the Security Council may well be a milestone on the road to genuine collective security. The permanent members deserve much credit for the action which was rapidly taken but there are other countries, both strong and weak, which have a responsibility to follow the permanent members' lead. The noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, drew attention to that point. Like several other speakers, I agree with the noble Lord.
We must recognise that the action in the Security Council has been made possible by the great change in the relationship between the two superpowers. This change has virtually removed, without significant bloodshed, the danger of war arising from European conflicts. We are now faced with a crisis of comparable danger which has been on the horizon for many years but has been ignored. I am a little doubtful of building too many hopes on the Helsinki conference at the weekend. We would be wise to see what really happens and to await the statements which are made thereafter. They may well fall short of what we would hope.
The main issue for us in this new crisis is whether collective security can at last be established. It eluded our predecessors in the 1930s and in our own time we have striven in vain to create it. The Prime Minister's insistence on this issue is entirely correct. A world in which an independent state, recognised by all of us as
1878
such, can be swallowed up by one aggressive and envious neighbour is fundamentally insecure. When the aggressor has at his disposal weapons of mass destruction, the situation is indeed dangerous for all members of the United Nations, especially the weak. Saddam has shown himself to be a thoroughly evil man. It is not idle to assume that if he succeeds in outmanoeuvring the United Nations by negotiation or even by force of arms, the peace of the world will remain at risk for generations.
But we must recognise that some states involved in this crisis may find different issues which they consider of comparable importance. They are entitled to ask for some indication that those issues will be the subject of negotiation within a stronger United Nations in the future. I would summarise these issues in the Middle East as follows: first, the age long struggle for control of the Persian Gulf; secondly, the desire to control their gigantic oil resources or at least an equitable share of them; thirdly, the aim to destabilise and remove traditional regimes derived from past Arab society which, with notable exceptions, have given examples of outrageous extravagance; fourthly, the objective of replacing those regimes with other forms of political control not necessarily more democratic; fifthly, the widely felt ambition of welding the "Arab nation" into a more cohesive political unit; sixthly, rivalries between the principal actors in the area who for religious or national ambitions wish to emerge on top. Above all, there is the Palestinian issue—and who can deny the crimes committed by all involved? The less said about this at the moment the better, but the potential political turmoil could be horrific.
It follows from all this that the extension of the present crisis into a military conflict will bring these issues to the fore in an unforeseeable way and before we are in a position to resolve them. We are right to go for collective security and are more likely to achieve it by political solidarity in the United Nations together with a system of watertight economic sanctions. But we know the fallibility of mandatory sanctions. Rhodesia has been mentioned. It was not only the South African territories which enabled the Rhodesians to evade sanctions. Sanctions were evaded by members of the Security Council.
Successful sanctions carry one very great danger. A powerful and desperate man like Saddam, if he finds himself cornered, may suddenly lash out. We must be ready for anything. That is when the little resolutions of the Security Council, to which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, referred, which would be necessary before there was any reaction, would be hopelessly inadequate to meet the situation. Those who are seeking diplomatic solutions must think not only of the immediate situation but of the consequences of accepting that a well armed bully must always win.
When I realised yesterday that sad reasons would prevent the noble Lord, Lord Home, from being present this afternoon, I looked back at a speech on the United Nations which he made in Berwick in 1970. It dealt, inter alia, with the seizure of Goa by India.

1879
The seizure was condoned by several members of the United Nations Security Council. The noble Lord said:
"Whatever the provocations suffered by India, or the excuses made by her, or for her, there is no doubt that her actions were a direct breach of the charter and of international law. When the United Nations approves that, as Adlai Stevenson said, 'It could be the beginning of the end"'.
The United Nations is unlikely to approve of what Saddam has done but if, by feebleness, it does so, the effect will be as Adlai Stevenson and the noble Lord, Lord Home, predicted; namely, the beginning of the end.
8.50 p.m.
Viscount Caldecote: My Lords, this has been an encouraging and constructive debate, with very few discordant notes, on a most difficult and dangerous situation. It has been encouraging because of the wide measure of consensus throughout the House. I believe that the Chamber welcomed and supported the speech of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition just as much as it did the speech of my noble friend Lord Caithness who described the Government's policy so well and succinctly.
The consensus has been particularly notable on the need to give sanctions time to bite. But if sanctions are to be effective, they must be vigorously enforced—by force if necessary. It is worth remembering that previous attempts at making sanctions work failed because we could not or were not prepared to use the necessary force to enforce them. Whether sanctions in this case are successful or not is literally a matter of life and death. If they fail, as my noble friend Lord Carrington made clear, there are only two alternatives: the use of force, probably within six months, or allowing President Saddam Hussein to get away with aggression and the high probability of armed conflict within two to three years at a time of his choosing. Either will lead to the deaths of tens or even hundreds of thousands of people. Therefore the effective enforcement of sanctions is truly vital.
I ask my noble friend the Leader of the House whether in his reply he can give us the assurance—I hope that he can do so—that Her Majesty's Government have fully adequate powers to apply and enforce effective sanctions both within the United Kingdom and in support of our allies. If there is any doubt about the adequacy of the Government's powers, I am confident that the whole House would give united support to any action, legislative or otherwise, which the Government feel is necessary to provide those powers.
Some months must inevitably elapse before we know whether the sanctions are effective. I hope that this time will be well used to make any modifications which are needed to the equipment that our armed forces would have to use if sanctions fail so as to make them suitable, fully effective and efficient in operation in the exceptionally harsh desert environment. Much was achieved in that way to meet the requirements of the Falkland Islands campaign. Modifications were very quickly made to aircraft and other equipment which in peacetime would have taken years to
1880
accomplish. I hope that that example will be followed in this case. Everything possible must be done to provide the best possible support for our armed forces, if sanctions are found not to be effective. I hope that my noble friend who will reply to the debate will be able to give us that assurance. The money may be wasted, but it is a small price to pay for a good insurance policy. The old motto of the Royal Naval Gunnery School is still true:
"If you want peace, prepare for war".
Finally, I should like to pay tribute to Her Majesty's Government, and especially to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, for their firm and dignified response to the Iraqis' unacceptable aggression. I know that all of us wish the Prime Minister and the Cabinet very well in discharging their extremely heavy responsibilities at this time.
8.54 p.m.
Lord Bonham-Carter: My Lords, as we near the end of this long and extremely interesting debate, it is difficult to try to pay tribute to the many interesting speeches which have been made in an extremely constructive fashion. However, looking at the debate overall, it seems to me that there have been three themes which have run through the discussions in which we have engaged. They can be named as the importance in this very difficult and complex situation of legality, unity and patience. I believe that it is on the basis of those three themes, all of which support each other, that there is a possibility that the conflict in which we are engaged may be resolved.
The dispute between the United Nations and Iraq is, as was impressively expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, a matter of the utmost importance. It is also true, in my view, that it has an importance which goes beyond itself. I say that because, as many noble Lords have pointed out, it is the first major international dispute which has taken place since the end of the cold war. That fact has transformed the way in which disputes of this kind can be handled.
As many noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, pointed out, had Kuwait been invaded by Iraq in the days of the cold war we know only too well what would have happened. The matter would have been brought before the Security Council. The two blocs would have split. There would have been a Russian veto and the United Nations would have been rendered impotent. However, that is no longer the case. The scenario which we are facing is in that sense new, different and encouraging. The Security Council met, decisions were taken and the necessary resolutions were passed. Those involved in reaching those decisions and in passing those resolutions deserve our thanks and our congratulations. There can be no going back on those resolutions. There can be no going back on the demand for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and on the demand for the freeing of hostages by Iraq. There can be no going back on the imposition of sanctions enforced by blockade until those two actions have been taken, and there can be no going back on the build up of military forces.

1881
I believe that we should acknowledge with gratitude and respect the speed and the determination with which President Bush reacted to a flagrant breach of international law and to the illegality with which we are confronted, perpetrated by Saddam Hussein. In addition—and, so far as I know, this has not yet been mentioned in the debate—we should welcome the particularly constructive testimony which Mr. Baker made before Congress which was reported in yesterday's press.
As the noble Lords, Lord Cledwyn, Lord Clinton-Davis and Lord Beloff, said, we cannot honestly congratulate ourselves on having been among those who profited by supplying Saddam Hussein with the formidable array of arms and technology with which he threatens, and has threatened, the safety of the states of the Gulf, the oil supplies of Europe and, to a lesser extent, the oil supplies of the United States. I hope that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will touch upon that aspect in his reply.
We have here an opportunity. It is crucial to the future peace of the world that the measures which we have taken should succeed. As I have said, there is more to the invasion of Kuwait than appears to be the case at first sight. Now that the cold war is over, as was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Gladwyn, we have the opportunity to make the United Nations work as it was originally intended; namely, to establish its credibility as an agency which is able to deal with unlawful aggression and able to enforce and maintain peace. If in the Gulf, through the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq, the United Nations can achieve that end, we will have secured a major advance in establishing a more peaceful international order.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that the analogy drawn between Saddam Hussein and Hitler is misplaced. If one must draw analogies, which in international affairs is dangerous, the analogy is much closer to Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia where, had sanctions been pursued—oil sanctions in particular—and had we in this country been prepared to close the Suez Canal, there is little doubt that that act of aggression would have been stopped, and had that been so the first domino which fell, and which led to World War II, would not have done so.
Another danger which confronts us in addition to those that I have mentioned, and the chief threat to our success, is disunity—the disintegration of the coalition, which is a fragile coalition, which has been so carefully constructed by diplomacy. Much will depend upon the ability of the Arab states to withstand populist pressure, claiming a direct relationship between the invasion of Kuwait and the Palestinian problem; a direct relationship between the invasion of Kuwait and Israel, and hence representing the whole affair as a kind of American/Israeli conspiracy.
In that battle for men's minds, which is as important as any battle in the whole matter, Mr. Baker's testimony is important. But it is crucial that
1882
the operation is described as a United Nations operation, following a United Nations resolution that has nothing directly to do with Israel, the moslem faith or any American/Israeli connection but everything to do with preventing illegality and aggression. It is about legality and enforcing international law. Hence the importance of having attained United Nations backing for the blockade; hence, whatever the precise interpretation of Articles 51 and 42, about which there is legitimate controversy in the highest quarters, if in the end force has to be used—we must all face the fact that in the end force may have to be used if we are to hope to maintain unity, which we have so carefully brought together, we must be meticulous in maintaining legality in accordance with the advice of my noble friend Lord Gladwyn. Perhaps I may add that that unity is not confined to the unity of Arab states; it extends to the unity of the European response to the invasion of Kuwait.
Of course the Prime Minister was right to say that the European reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was sluggish and fragmentary. But what was the reason for that sluggish and fragmentary response? It was that the institutions of Europe, including NATO and the WEU, proved inadequate to provide a quick or unanimous response. The Prime Minister can hardly complain about that. What, for example, has been her response to the French Prime Minister's call on 2nd September for the development of a common European foreign and defence policy? It is only by the development of some such common European foreign and defence policy and by the establishment of some machinery by which that can be achieved that Europe will be able to respond to such events quickly and unanimously and the United States will not have to remain for ever the world's policeman.
There is no point in present circumstances therefore in our making invidious comparisons about which of the European powers has or has not contributed most and which has or has not been most staunch in support of the United Nations. Still less is there any point in casting oblique criticisms against Germany, which is after all prevented by its basic law, in which we played a considerable part, from military activity outside the NATO area. Nor does European unity end with the members of the European Community.
We should not forget—as far as I know this point has not been mentioned during the debate—the serious impact the Gulf crisis will have on the countries of central and eastern Europe. It will have a major adverse effect upon their economic problems, which are already acute, and make them more intractable. Hence it may also endanger the political reforms upon which they are engaged.
For example, Poland will have to import large quantities of oil at a much higher price than heretofore. There are several thousand Poles in Iraq and Poland has an important export trade with Iraq. I give that as one example, because so much depends upon the successful evolution of central and eastern Europe that when we consider the problems of the Gulf we should not forget that aspect.

1883
Nor should we forget our obligations to the refugees to whom the most reverend Primate referred and whose conditions were portrayed in such alarming and moving terms in the Independent this morning. I hope that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will be able to tell us of some steps that we are taking to deal with that potential tragedy.
Finally, if success depends upon unity and unity is buttressed by legality it will also demand patience on our part, whatever de Tocqueville may say about the capacity of democracies to exercise that virtue. The temptation to engage in a quick surgical strike, particularly in the light of the history of surgical strikes which have been neither surgical nor swift, should be avoided. However I guess that there would be no quicker way of destroying the coalition, consensus and unity that have been achieved than by engaging in such an operation.
As Sir Michael Howard in an article in The Times argued most powerfully this morning:
"the dangers of initiating war—initiating rather than accepting it if forced upon us—are thus much greater than those of remaining at peace".
As I interpret the remarks of the Foreign Secretary, that is the view which he holds. I believe that it has the overwhelming support of the country.
No one listening to the debate in this House today could doubt the determination of your Lordships to see that the UN resolutions are enforced. When they are, and when and if success is achieved, that will be the time to look once more at the situation in the Middle East, which has continued unsolved and unaddressed seriously for far too long. The opportunity that will then be available must be taken to examine the continuing problems that have plagued this continent ever since the end of World War II.
9.9 p.m.
Lord Williams of Elvel: My Lords, we have come to the end of a long debate and I shall take as little time as possible. However, we have covered a great deal of ground and I wish to go over some of it. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Tonypandy, who knows better than any of us, is right that we have met today in an opportunity to discuss the issues. I echo the thanks of my noble friend Lord Cledwyn to the Government for making sure that we met today. I also echo the remarks of many noble Lords such as my noble friend Lord Longford and the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, in saying that we have had some distinguished speeches and contributions in the course of the debate. Although there has been general unanimity, nevertheless in my view—and I hope I am not transgressing—the quality of the speeches has been high. I welcomed the intervention of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury who gave what I would describe as the speech that a proper Christian leader should give to encourage us in the moral values of which we should be reminded. The whole debate has been excellent and worth while.
That leads to my first point. The debate has indicated to the Government the almost unanimity of the House in supporting their actions in the present crisis. I wish again to echo what my noble friend Lord
1884
Cledwyn said when opening from the Dispatch Box, that we support the Government in their actions so far in the crisis. I wish that to be made crystal clear and for the message to go out from this House to whomever wishes to hear it.
We have a cross-party consensus that is welcome. I only add one small thought which the noble Lord the Leader of the House might like to take on board. My noble friend Lord Callaghan made the point that it would be useful if there were consultations between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition as well as leaders of the major parties on a Privy Council basis in conditions of this nature. When we have such problems we should make sure that we all understand the ground rules and those matters that the Government cannot mention in Parliament but wish to have brought to the attention of parliamentarians. Then the Opposition can play their proper role without transgressing any frontiers. I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, will convey my noble friend's message to the Prime Minister. It is extremely important for that to happen.
We then have to ask why there is so much support for the Government's view. It is clearly right. We start with what the noble Lords, Lord Carrington and Lord Mellish, as well as others, were absolutely right in saying: that aggression of this nature cannot be tolerated. It is not just a question of whether we negotiate this or that. It is not just a matter of Czechoslovakia, then Poland. There is a point at which we must say, "We cannot tolerate this type of aggression". That point has come. Clearly we all support that position. I believe that nobody in this House has in any way criticised it.
Secondly, we all agree that the treatment of expatriates, hostages, guests—call them what you will—is in breach of any form of international law. The 1949 Vienna Convention relates to diplomats and the Geneva Convention relates to persons who are held against their will who have no diplomatic immunity. Those categories do not necessarily include people whose skins are white. The most reverend Primate was correct in drawing our attention to the refugees who are subsisting in conditions of absolute horror in the neutral zone between Iraq and Jordan, and for whom we as a civilised country have a moral responsibility. I echo the words of other noble Lords in asking the Leader of the House whether he will be able to say something about the government attitude towards that problem.
The support that this House gives to the Government is based upon our collective belief that the United Nations is for the first time since Korea acting as an effective body in the post-cold war period. We wish the United Nations presence to continue and be effective. My noble friend Lord Richard was very eloquent on that point. The noble Lords, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead and Lord Campbell of Croy, mentioned Korea. It is an interesting parallel. Both noble Lords made the point that any action that we, the United States or anybody else may take gains credibility and strength from the fact that it is under an umbrella of

1885
that nature, and unilateral action loses credibility if it is not under such an umbrella. That is a point that we should like to stress to the Government.
Our support for the Government will continue, but there are two provisos. The first is that what is proposed and what the Government do have the continued support of what I regard as the world community. That is a broad phrase which requires definition. We all know that the policy of sanctions is in place. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pym, and my noble friends Lord Richard and Lord Clinton-Davis that sanctions can and should work. My noble friend Lord Houghton of Sowerby cast some doubt upon whether they have worked in the past or would work in the future. Financial sanctions—for example, stopping Iraqi trade by cancelling letters of credit in private banks—could work more effectively than the physical blockade, but nevertheless I believe that the sanctions, the blockade, can work.
As many noble Lords have stated, we must envisage the possibility that sanctions do not work. Somebody has to say that sanctions are not working. I ask the Government who that somebody is. It is no good for myself, my noble friends or any noble Lord opposite to say that we do not believe that sanctions have worked and therefore we are going to do this, that and the other. The United Nations Security Council has imposed the sanctions. It would be very odd if unilateral decisions were taken that sanctions had not worked without taking the view of the Security Council.
It would be quite impossible. Arguments would arise such as that the United Nations Security Council had passed a resolution and it had not been given enough time, and so on. What happens when we ask those questions of the United Nations? The answer is that the matter should be discussed by the Security Council. Therefore, whether or not we are legally entitled to take military action under Article 51 or whether or not we have to wait for resolution under Article 42 seems to be a question of theology. In practice, if a resolution exists which imposes sanctions, the people who have to decide whether those sanctions have succeeded will be the people who imposed the sanctions in the first place, namely the United Nations Security Council.
The discussion which took place in another place this afternoon about whether Article 51 was justification for force or whether Article 42 needed to be called upon was perhaps less relevant than it might be. Furthermore, I agree with my noble friends Lord Richard and Lord Clinton-Davis that politically you have to have the support, in one form or another, of the international community. Whether it is by one resolution or another, it has to happen. Otherwise, we lose all our credibility in the Arab community in the Middle East and that, as everybody in this House recognises, would be fatal.
The second condition—I said that there were two conditions on which support from this side will continue—is that the Government be steadfast in restraint and keep going with sanctions. The noble
1886
and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, referred to the difficulty of war. Once you engage in war the problem is that you never know quite what the outcome will be. Quick talk about surgical strikes and all the rest of it simply does not recognise the dangers that any power gets into when it puts its tanks across somebody else's frontier. That is a point that we must bear in mind.
I am not saying that we do not have to do it at the end of the day, but we must be very careful before engaging in that procedure. We recognise that while sanctions are operating there will be, as many noble Lords have pointed out, a period of difficulty when we have to keep morale going. As the most reverend Primate pointed out, countries under siege have an extraordinary ability to resist, and there is no doubt that President Saddam Hussein does not care whether his population starves. He does not care whether a million Egyptians who are at present in Iraq starve. He does not care whether the hostages starve as a result of what is happening. As one noble Lord put it, he may lash out.
We know that Iraqi grain supplies are sufficient till next spring, so we are, as has been said in the United States, in for a long haul. But it is up to the Government—and we will support the Government—to keep British public opinion going in that long haul, because nothing could be worse than being pushed by an impatient media, an impatient government or impatient public opinion into action that we would subsequently regret.
While we wait, there are some defence matters. My noble friend Lord Cledwyn intimated that I would be touching on these and perhaps I may put them to the noble Lord the Leader of the House. First, I should like to congratulate, as no other noble Lord has done, the British armed forces on making themselves ready very quickly, at very short notice, to go out to the Gulf. It was operationally a very extraordinary logistical achievement. There was one unit which had four hours' notice to go out and it was able to achieve an orderly transition from its base in the United Kingdom to a completely different environment.
We ought also to congratulate the United States, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, did, on its ability and its achievement in transporting large quantities of troops and material into the Gulf in a logistical exercise which so far as I know is quite unparalleled in modern times.
But then the questions start. What, for instance, is the command structure in the Gulf? We know that at the moment the national forces are under national command but, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, asked—and if I quote him too much it is only because I was a subaltern under his command as company commander when I was doing my National Service, so we have a long friendship and I have had a long tuition under his authority; if I quote him too much, I beg your Lordships' pardon—what is the command structure when we come to force? You cannot fight a war by committee. You cannot fight a war by a bunch of people of different nationalities sitting around a table and casting lots or votes. What will happen?

1887
Secondly, what troops are going to he provided when the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, says that further forces are being considered? Are those going to be troops on the ground? Are they going to be tanks? What is the Government's intention there? If the Government's intention is to put troops on the ground with tanks and all the support services that they require, how are these people going to be trained? So far as I know, apart from some joint exercises with the Oman Government our troops do not have any desert training, and fighting in the desert is quite different from fighting on Luneburg Heath in Northern Germany.
Then I reiterate the question that my noble friend Lord Cledwyn put: are we still by one method or another selling arms, or near arms, to Iraq? What is happening to Technology and Development Group—this dreadful, fraudulent company that a regime that we all deplore has set up?
Lastly I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House what happens if the funding of our Gulf operation is borne, and has to be borne as it is at the moment, by the Ministry of Defence without resort to the Contingency Fund which paid for the Falklands expedition? Does that mean that the procurement of weapons under our options for change arrangement is cut back even further than it was when the Defence Estimates were debated in this House?
I just wish to conclude by joining with a number of noble Lords—the noble Lords, Lord Elibank, Lord Weidenfeld, Lord Beloff, my noble friend Lord Hatch, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, who I thought made a very interesting contribution—in believing that whatever the outcome of this crisis, we cannot go back to where we were before it. There is the presence of chemical and possibly nuclear installations in Iraq. There is the Palestinian problem. There are all sorts of problems of Arab nationalism that the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, described.
Perhaps even in these rather dark days when the crisis is with us we should look beyond that and join with the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, in talking a bit about Secretary Baker's ideas of general settlement in the Middle East. If that can be achieved—and I accept the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pym, made that that is a big "if"—it would be an enormous result from this grave crisis.
For those of your Lordships who are historically minded—the most reverend Primate brought us into this—it would remove the last legacy of the Ottoman Empire, whose demise not only sparked off the First World War but left a series of colonial and post-colonial states in the Middle East with disputed boundaries which continued to cause problems even when those states became sovereign in their own right. Even after death the Ottoman Empire seems to have a scorpion sting in it because of course that part of the world now controls 60 per cent. of our global oil reserves.
We hope for the best, we fear the worst, and this is all we can do. From these Benches we wish the
1888
Government well in their endeavours and we continue to support them. I hope that they will take encouragement and comfort from this message since it is not only the message of the Opposition but I think the overwhelming message from your Lordships' House this evening. We wish them success because so much of our future depends on it.
9.29 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord Belstead): My Lords, the crisis in the Gulf since Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2nd August is a matter of the utmost gravity. The opportunity to hear the views of so many of your Lordships with great experience of international affairs is of great value to the Government. I have taken on board the point that was put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, and I shall indeed draw the attention of my colleagues in the Government to what the noble Lord said. I welcome also the degree of support expressed for the actions that the United Kingdom has taken. It was expressed in the first speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, and again by the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Elvel, in winding up for the Opposition. It has also been expressed by others of your Lordships. I am grateful for the degree of support which has been expressed throughout the entire House.
Very briefly, because this is ground we have been over before, in the early hours of 2nd August Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, a peaceful, independent country and a member of the United Nations: a blatant case of unwarranted aggression. The United Nations Security Council has demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal and subsequently the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. When Iraq failed to respond, the Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions and later authorised the use of force to implement them.
Following requests from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf rulers, the United States, closely followed by Britain, deployed ground, air and naval forces in a number of Gulf countries to deter further aggression by Saddam Hussein and in support of the Security Council's decisions. Many other countries, including several Arab countries, have followed suit.
British and other foreign citizens in Iraq and Kuwait have been caught up in the crisis and are illegally held by Iraq as hostages. Embassies in Kuwait have been forcibly prevented from carrying out their duties of looking after their citizens. It is a stunning series of events. A powerful country, with a large and battle-hardened army, has quite literally sought to abolish another sovereign state and member of the United Nations, laying claim to that country's enormous assets. It was a deed of lawlessness and brute force, thinly disguised in deceit and previous false assurances.
It was impossible to allow this act to go unchallenged, and once again I express the Government's appreciation of the support of your Lordships on that fundamental point. It was clearly a threat to other states in the region. With units of the

1889
Iraqi army deployed very rapidly to the Saudi border, it is not unreasonable to believe that, as my noble friends Lord Pym and Lord Campbell of Croy pointed out, Saddam Hussein had designs on the oil-producing facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia and possibly some of the other small Gulf countries. The attack on Kuwait was therefore also a threat to international stability, oil supplies and the international economy.
It was also a breach of international law and essential principles in the conduct of peaceful relations between states. If unchallenged, it would have threatened the security and confidence of small states everywhere. I think I am right in saying that this was a point on which the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, put his finger and indeed the point has been echoed again and again from all sides. A very large number of your Lordships have made clear your agreement with the analysis that I have submitted. So, too, has the overwhelming majority of the international community.
I believe that the rigorous action of the Government, in close co-operation particularly with the United States, has been influential in shaping the international response. As well as the United States, we have been in close contact with France and our other European allies in NATO and in the Western European Union, together with our European Community partners. We have all been working together for the same ends.
With the co-operation of the Soviet Union, the five permanent members have been able to give a clear lead to the United Nations. It is worth repeating the point made by my noble friend Lord Caithness in opening the debate when he said that five very important resolutions have been passed without a vote cast against. That is a truly remarkable achievement.
Many of your Lordships have referred to the new authority that the United Nations has assumed. The noble Lord, Lord Bottomley, said this had been assumed in view of the new Soviet attitude. As the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and the noble Lord, Lord Richard, said, this seems to confirm that at long last the United Nations and the Security Council are able to play the role originally intended for them.
The noble Viscount, Lord Tonypandy, spoke movingly of the crucial importance of the crisis for the authority of the United Nations. I believe that Saddam Hussein's act of lawlessness has strengthened the determination of the rest of the world, born of recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, to live by the rule of law.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, asked about the Government's intentions for the future. The United Nations has set a clear objective which is unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and the restoration of the independence of Kuwait and of the legitimate government there. We have agreed also on a method of bringing this about peacefully by means of
1890
comprehensive economic sanctions universally applied. We have United Nations authority for the use of force, if necessary, to achieve those objectives.
Your Lordships have also expressed support for the Government's action in deploying forces as part of the collective defence of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other states in the region under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Some 20 states have now committed themselves to joining this effort. I repeat that these are defensive deployments. Their purpose is to deter further aggression. Military deterrence must now be maintained. It is complementary to the economic pressure of sanctions and it would surely be wrong to rule out the option of another means of bringing about Iraqi withdrawal if sanctions do not work. British forces will remain available as long as they are required.
The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, said that the power of the United States and the authority of the United Nations must keep in step and warned against what he called unilateral military action. That is a matter which other noble Lords have spoken about and which the noble Lord, Lord Bonham-Carter, followed up in his speech from the Liberal Benches towards the end of the debate. May I say to all your Lordships who have spoken about the difficult matter of the need to make sanctions work—the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, devoted part of his speech to the difficulty of sustaining long-term sanctions—that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and President Bush have stressed that we must give sanctions time to work. As I have said, we are aiming, along with our United Nations colleagues, for Iraqi withdrawal peacefully through the effect of comprehensive sanctions. We have acted throughout in accordance with international law and we shall continue to do so.
Resolution 661 calling for comprehensive economic sanctions expressly affirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the charter. We hope that economic sanctions will prove sufficient. That is why they must be strictly enforced. But we are not precluded by reason of any of the Security Council resolutions from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with the rules of international law. I simply say to your Lordships that to undertake now to use no military force without yet further authority of the Security Council would be quite simply to deprive ourselves of a right in international law already expressly affirmed by Security Council Resolution 661. It would, incidentally, hand a gift to Saddam Hussein with the possible grim consequences outlined early in his speech by my noble friend Lord Carrington.
My noble friend called for us to explain clearly to all other nations the consequences of allowing Saddam Hussein to get away with his aggression. In that case, my noble friend said, Saddam Hussein would be master of the Middle East with his hand on

1891
the windpipe of the world. Those are words which in the coming weeks, and possibly months, we should not forget.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, asked me a series of questions. The first concerned the cost of the operations on which forces are now deployed. The noble Lord will perhaps forgive me if in a constantly developing situation I cannot give him a figure this evening. The costs will be substantial. There is the question of whether they should be shared. However, I give an undertaking that we shall not be deterred from bearing our share of the international burden.
The noble Lord then asked me a question about arms sales to Iraq in the past, a matter which was picked up again by the noble Lord, Lord Williams, and other noble Lords in the context of the "Panorama" programme of a few days ago. Our stand on arms sales to Iraq has been among the toughest in the world. Our policy has been to refuse all exports of military equipment and associated technology which breach our published guidelines. We have had guidelines on this matter along those lines since 1980 although the guidelines were reflected in a publication in 1985.
Several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Beloff, asked about the company called TDG. I should like to give an assurance to the House this evening that we shall act swiftly and vigorously to deal with any evidence that TDG has broken the United Kingdom law. We have been refusing export licences for any lethal weapons with a war-making capacity. We are aware of TDG's activities. I would only add this evening that, as your Lordships will be aware, the Government have not been afraid to act in the past to counter any evidence of illegal Iraqi arms procurement in the United Kingdom.
Perhaps I may add one further point associated with that area before I continue. I attach importance to emphasising that Britain can claim to have taken a lead in drawing attention to Iraq's human rights abuses, including the use of chemical weapons. We were active in securing the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 612 and 621 which condemned the attack in Halabja, and we were the only country to name Iraq at the Paris conference on chemical weapons in January of last year. Strict guidelines have been in place to prevent the sale of chemical weapon precursors to Iraq.
The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury made the point that we should not confuse the moslem community in the United Kingdom with the activities of Saddam Hussein. I should like to endorse the most reverend Primate's words on that subject. Saddam Hussein has broken many of the principles of Islam and has persecuted Shia leaders in Iraq.
The most reverend Primate also pointed out that Britain and France have a historical responsibility in the area. The historical legacy is to be acknowledged.
1892
However, the crisis is the result of naked Iraqi aggression. Iraq acknowledged Kuwait's sovereign independence as long ago as 1963.
The most reverend Primate also mentioned the question of disaster relief, a matter which was picked up by several of your Lordships and by the noble Lord, Lord Williams, at the end of the debate. Perhaps I may just say to the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that although normally the noble Lord is meticulous with statistics perhaps for once on this occasion the statistic that he gave of £½ million was not quite right. At the beginning of the debate my noble friend Lord Caithness announced that we are giving a further £2 million to assist with disaster relief, that the total we are giving now comes to £5.4 million, and we are certainly going to be ready to consider our further assistance when it becomes clear what are the proposals of the European Community for further help.
The other point mentioned by the most reverend Primate concerned the question of hostages. There can be no defence for the taking of civilian hostages and using them as a human shield. I think that in this House we are all united on that point. As the noble Lord, Lord Williams said, it is a breach of basic human rights and indeed of international law and a contravention of conventions on the treatment of civilians.
In that context, I should very much like to read the speech of my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway who made interesting suggestions for a new law on hostage taking. We cannot allow such blackmail to deflect us from the peaceful course that we have chosen. Making a concession to a blackmailer only invites a further demand. The most reverend Primate, who I know speaks poignantly on this subject, earned all our respect when he said that in the last resort the plight of hostages, however heart-rending, cannot determine policy.
I should like to express my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Callaghan, for his generous words concerning my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and the very difficult work which posts abroad are doing so far as concerns the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The noble Lord made the point that a country which is subject to sanctions can be unexpectedly resilient. The noble Lord called for what he described as a political offensive. I should like to assure him that our diplomatic efforts will continue, regular and high level exchanges of views with partners and allies will go on and the need to do all we can to ensure the effectiveness of economic sanctions will continue to be pursued.
During his speech the noble Lord mentioned in particular the problems facing Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan is a long-standing friend of Britain. We have made clear our readiness to assist him with the consequences if Jordan fully implements United Nations sanctions.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, spoke about military operations needing to be set within a clear political framework. He said that it was essential

1893
that close military links should be maintained both in the Gulf and between nations contributing forces to the multinational force. That was a point which was picked up again by the noble Lord, Lord Williams, in his closing speech. I should like to thank the noble and gallant Lord for giving us his military perspective and identifying the important questions in the way that he did.
We are closely coordinating our activities with the host countries and other contributors to the multinational force. Chiefs of staff of the Western European Union countries have already met to discuss the practical aspects of co-operation. In that context the noble and gallant Lord's speech will be read with considerable interest and I hope also with considerable urgency.
I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Pym in his comments on the effects of carrying out sanctions, which are costing Egypt and Turkey—and indeed other countries—clear. We are now looking with our friends and allies at what we can do to assist those countries with the consequences of their decision to apply sanctions.
My noble friend also pointed out that a continuing Western presence on possibly a semi-permanent basis may well be necessary for the future. Without embarking on the future this evening, I shall just say that we have made clear that our forces will remain in the region while they have a job to do and while the host governments wish them to be there.
The noble Lord, Lord Hatch, asked three questions of which he was good enough to give me notice. The essence of them was: why are we supporting sanctions and international action against Iraq when, so the noble Lord asserted, we had not done so in a list of countries which the noble Lord gave to the House? I hope that the noble Lord will not think that I am being unreasonably unhelpful when I say that to draw such comparisons is not profitable at the present time. No two situations are alike. However, in this case the United Nations Security Council has unanimously taken the view that we must respond to an unprecedented attempt to occupy, annex and remove from existence a sovereign state and a full United Nations member.
My noble friend Lord Mountgarret said roundly that he thought there was a hole in the sanctions and called for all methods of movement, including land and air, to be blocked. All countries bordering Iraq, with the exception of Jordan, have stated that they will
1894
not allow land shipments across their borders. I agree with my noble friend: we are and should be aware of the ways in which aircraft may be used in order to break sanctions. I should like to give my noble friend an assurance that we are studying ways in which an air embargo might be enforced.
My noble friend Lord Caldecote asked a similar question as to whether the Government had adequate powers to apply and enforce sanctions. Following the assets freeze, sanctions measures were introduced by us on 8th August. We believe that the Iraq and Kuwait United Nations sanctions order of 1990 and our export of goods control order of 1990 provide adequate powers to enforce sanctions. We have also taken necessary steps to ensure that so far as we are able our controls are not circumvented.
I believe that we shall need to keep a very firm grip on the issues in this crisis. Iraq is the aggressor and under the first Security Council resolution, SCR 660, must withdraw unconditionally. The time for any negotiations is after that. But to achieve this we shall need a sustained effort which will involve crucial decisions. For instance, Saddam Hussein must not be able to use hostages to secure concessions which would be to reward further criminal action by the aggressor.
This is a major challenge to peace and the ability of the international community to deal with it. Since 1980, Saddam Hussein has attacked two neighbouring countries. Although he claims to want to develop his own country, he has squandered its financial and human resources.
I believe that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition was absolutely right to remind the House that Saddam Hussein also rules Iraq by ruthless oppression. That country's record of human rights is among the worst of any country in the world. Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians, who are his fellow Moslems. His expansionist ambitions must be checked. However, as my noble friend Lord Carrington said, let us remember how much more dangerous such a crisis would have been until a year or two ago, entailing possibly the risk of superpower confrontation. The strength of the international response means that Saddam Hussein's aggression can be reversed; and it must and it will be, for if not, the world will become a far more dangerous place.
On Question, Motion agreed to nemine dissentiente.
House adjourned at six minutes before ten o'clock.