Sitting of 25 January 1983

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
Oral Answers to Questions
  EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

    School Curricula
    Mr. Hooleyasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will meet the chairman of the Manpower Services Commission to discuss the curriculum offered in local authority schools and colleges.
    The Secretary of State for Education and Science (Sir Keith Joseph): I am in regular contact with the chairman of the Manpower Services Commission about matters of common interest. Officials of this Department and Her Majesty's inspectors are also in constant contact with commission officials about the content of the education and training within the commission's own schemes, and the relationship of that to school and college curricula.
    Mr. Hooley: Does the Secretary of State agree that while it is perfectly proper for the MSC to commission courses and training in colleges of further education, it is not its business to interfere in the curriculum nor to give those colleges directives on how and what they should teach?
    Sir Keith Joseph: The MSC fully understands its role, and when the steering committee establishes the criteria it will negotiate with some of the many authorities that have bid to participate.
    Mr. Kinnock: Is the Secretary of State prepared to guarantee that the criteria set by the steering group will be observed by the MSC, that the scheme of technical and vocational education will apply to the whole ability range, that everything will lead to nationally recognised qualifications, and that local education authorities will be responsible for admission to the scheme? If he is prepared to guarantee that, will he tell us why the Government are bypassing the education service in providing 10,000 places for the 4·5 million children in the generation of 14 to 18-year-olds and not giving resources to those many comprehensives in Britain that are already undertaking the City and Guilds Foundation Course, the Technician's Education Certificate and the Business Education Certificate, which are good vocational schemes?
    Sir Keith Joseph: The hon. Gentleman will find that all the factors that he listed are in the original MSC policy announcement and will be considered by the national
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    steering group. The MSC took this initiative at the Prime Minister's request because many local education authorities are already providing a technical element in comprehensive education and the Government judge it advantageous for Britain that that should be accelerated and enlarged.
    Mr. Greenway: Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is always room for stimulation in the discussion of what is required in the curriculum? Within the apparatus that we have for running schools through local authorities, is it not clear that a useful initiative has been taken?
    Sir Keith Joseph: Certainly. It is in order to encourage an activity within the curriculum which many local education authorities are already practising and would like to enlarge.

    Technical and Vocational Education
    Mr. Madelasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will make a statement on his discussions with teacher associations and other educational interests concerning arrangements for technical and vocational education, referred to in his answer to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Foster) on 7 December, Official Report, c. 707.
    Sir Keith Joseph: Meetings have already been held with several of the teacher associations, and others will take place shortly. I have been encouraged by the constructive response so far.
    Mr. Madel: Does my right hon. Friend agree that teacher associations and others should welcome the additional resources which the MSC will put into techincal education and in-service training as a means of overcoming the teacher shortage in certain subjects?
    Sir Keith Joseph: Yes, that is right, and it is associated with the Government's initiative to provide some extra money for in-Service training, particularly in shortage subjects.
    Mr. Kinnock: Following those answers, is the Secretary of State prepared to tell us that the 10,000 children who over four years will be in the technical and vocational initiative will not come from those schools that are already providing adequate standards of pre-vocational training and education?
    Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the original guidelines of the MSC scheme did not include what are now the steering group's criteria'? Again, will he ensure that those criteria are included as a pre-requisite for the operation of the new scheme?
    Sir Keith Joseph: The fact that the MSC formed a national steering group shows that it is anxious to make this initiative as practical and sensible as possible. The MSC's initiative has been greeted by bids from nearly two-thirds of all the local education authorities, and the decision about which to accept will be for the MSC, working on the national steering group's criteria.

    Ethnic Minorities
    Mr. Proctorasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will estimate the level of expenditure on the education of ethnic minorities in 1982ߝ83 and 1983ߝ84.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Dr. Rhodes Boyson): Ethnic minority children receive most of their education alongside other children in their ordinary classrooms. The expenditure on them cannot be separately identified.
    Mr. Proctor: Does my hon. Friend accept the conclusions of the Conservative political centre's report last year, "Realism about Race", which showed that expenditure on reverse discrimination would be counter-productive to good race relations in this country?
    Dr. Boyson: I have not recently read that publication. However, the aim is for all children in schools, whatever their racial origin or background, to receive an education that will equip them to lead a full and useful life in British society.
    Mr. Tilley: Why cannot the Minister rebut a little more forcefully the thinly veiled prejudice of his Back Benchers on this issue and admit that a great deal of racial disadvantage exists in our education system, to deal with which expenditure will be necessary? On that specific aspect, will he say how soon he expects the Swann report to be finished and the Government to take action on it?
    Dr. Boyson: In the money for grant-related expenditure that goes to all local authorities there is a sum to deal with children from ethnic backgrounds, so extra money is already going in. On the hon. Gentleman's second point, there is extra money. He may not be able to add it up, but it is there. Finally, we are expecting the Swann report this summer, and it will be looked at and discussed as soon as it comes out.
    Mr. Stokes: I agree with all that my hon. Friend has said, but will he take the greatest care to see that the special teaching of immigrant children in no way holds back the progress of the rest of the children, including the vast majority of English youngsters?
    Dr. Boyson: I believe that the aim of all heads and teachers with ethnic minority children in their classrooms is to ensure the progress of both groups until they can be properly integrated and taught together. The ethnic groups, with their language and numeracy problems, can then move in with the original children—as it were—in the school, and be absorbed and taught as members of the same society.
    Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Does not equal opportunity mean that disproportionate amounts of resources may be allocated to different children according to their needs? If the needs of certain members of the ethnic community show that they are disadvantaged, does it not mean that, to provide equal opportunity, they should be given more resources to overcome those disadvantages so that they can compete effectively? Would that not quell the doubts of the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes), because the white children in the class would also have a full opportunity to benefit?
    Dr. Boyson: If the hon. Gentleman had listened to my answer to his hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley), he would have heard me say that extra money was given in grant-related expenditure to authorities where there were immigrant children. That meets the point that the hon. Gentleman put to me.

    School Closures
    Mr. Sainsburyasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether he takes into account the effective use of energy when making decisions about school closures.
    Dr. Boyson: My right hon. Friend takes account of all relevant factors, including the premises-related costs of maintaining the schools concerned.
    Mr. Sainsbury: Does my hon. Friend agree that far too many school buildings—particularly temporary buildings—are inadequately insulated and that that leads not only to classrooms being too hot in summer and to cold in a normal winter, but to a considerable waste of fuel? Will he therefore ensure that when local authorities consider any proposals for removing temporary buildings, or even closing schools, they take into account the revenue costs that could be saved by using better insulated buildings, and also the capital costs that they should incur to ensure that the buildings that are retained in use are properly insulated?
    Dr. Boyson: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. The guidance that we give to local authorities under section 12, which deals with schools and buildings which should no longer be used, is that temporary buildings and the buildings to which my hon. Friend referred should be considered for removal when there are falling rolls in an area. Similarly, in 1980ߝ81 we put in £25 million for energy conservation, which, as a matter of interest, was six times more than the Labour Government provided in 1978–79.
    Mr. Teddy Taylor: Will my hon. Friend urge local authorities to excercise great care and caution in putting in insulating materials, bearing in mind the example of a school in Southend which has been out of action for nine months because of fumes from such material?
    Dr. Boyson: I am well aware of the problems of that school. The papers on that subject arrived on my desk some time ago. As my hon. Friend drew the attention of the House and the whole country to the matter at the time, I am sure that from now on everyone will bear the matter even more in mind.

    School Curricula
    Mr. Newensasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will make additional resources available to enable education authorities to maintain the quality of education and choice of subject in schools in which staffing numbers are significantly reduced as the result of a fall in the school roll.
    Sir Keith Joseph: The rate support grant settlement for 1983–84 will, if costs are contained, provide for some improvement in pupil-teacher ratios. Where pupil numbers are falling, local education authorities should rationalise their school provision in the interests of the curriculum.
    Mr. Newens: Yes, but does the right hon. Gentleman not recognise that falling school rolls result in a reduction in the number of classes regarded as viable for minority subjects, which may reduce the number of those classes below the level at which the employment of a teacher for such minority subjects is justified? Is it not essential, therefore, that some guidance should be given to remove

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    the lower limits of minimum size of classes at A-level, so that if necessary there can be classes of two or three children, to maintain the possibility of children in schools with declining rolls having the opportunity to study a second language, all the science subjects, and so on?
    Sir Keith Joseph: I agree with the hon. Gentleman's objective, but local education authorities have the difficult task of reconciling the protection of the curriculum, including minority subjects, with falling rolls. We have a record pupil-teacher ratio, but I recognise that the job of LEAs is difficult, and of course there are ways, including combination of classes in consortia, or taking out surplus places through a rationalisation of schools, to meet the problem that the hon. Gentleman identifies.
    Mr. George Cunningham: As investment in education is one of the most valuable long-term things that we can do, why does the Secretary of State not make use of the circumstances of falling rolls to maintain that investment at a time which the Government at least regard as extremely difficult?
    Sir Keith Joseph: Because the Government have judged and publicly proclaimed their view that some restraint in Government expenditure is essential if we are to have a revival of the economy and jobs.
    Dr. Hampson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his concentration of additional resources in particular problem areas is greatly welcomed, as, for example, the £2 million that he has put in to help the department of practical curricula for low attainment pupils? People in Bradford are very grateful for that. Will he say how long that scheme will run as a pilot scheme before it is extended?
    Sir Keith Joseph: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I remind the House that nearly two-thirds of the local education authorities put in a bid for a share of the £2 million for pilot projects for lower attaining pupils. The scheme is for pilot projects, and we hope to learn from it continuously once it starts in September of this year.
    Mr. Dobson: Does the Secretary of State accept as facts the figures in the survey by the National Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers—a survey of 80 per cent. of education authorities—which showed a narrowing of curricula, increased use of non-specialist teaching, bigger classes, bigger teaching loads, and a massive increase in primary schools of mixed age teaching, including, in Lincolnshire, mixed age teaching covering 4½year-olds and 11-year-olds?
    Sir Keith Joseph: It all goes to show—to the extent that it is true, and I am sure that much of it is true—the importance of local education authorities getting on with the difficult but necessary task of taking surplus places out of use so as to rationalise education provision, while protecting the curriculum.

    Free Milk
    Mr. Campbell-Savoursasked the Secretary of State for Science how many schoolchildren received free school milk in 1981ߝ82.
    Dr. Boyson: This information is not collected by the Department.
    Mr. Campbell-Savours: Has the Minister examined the results of the five-year clinical trials in Glasgow into
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    the fluoridation of milk, and similar research that was carried out in Budapest, which showed a 75 per cent. reduction in the incidence of tooth decay in children? May we have a national scheme that will call upon more than the existing 20 per cent., or £10 million, of the £50 million allocation that has been made available by the European Community, especially in conditions of ever-increasing dairy surplus in the Community?
    Dr. Boyson: This is probably more a question for the Department of Health and Social Services than for me. All I can say is that when I was a head teacher in the east end of London everyone, including the staff, had free toothpaste when fluoridation was tried by a British firm. If the hon. Gentleman raises the matter with the DHSS and sends a copy of this fascinating report to me, we shall all be delighted.

    Kilburn Polytechnic
    Mr. Eggarasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if he will pay an official visit to Kilburn polytechnic.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. William Waldegrave): Neither my right hon. Friend nor I have any plans at present to visit Kilburn polytechnic.
    Mr. Eggar: My hon. Friend will be missing a great deal if he does not visit the polytechnic. Will he confirm that the lecturers at Hendon Police college are employed by Kilburn polytechnic? Is he aware that, as a result of the unreasonable and unprofessional conduct of a lecturer at Hendon Police college, Brent council is threatening to withdraw all lecturers from the college? Can he further confirm that there is no longer any justification for a link between Kilburn polytechnic and Hendon Police college?
    Mr. Waldegrave: I am aware of the dispute surrounding the teachers at Hendon Police college, and I confirm that the present arrangements are a matter of history. There is nothing to prevent either party from proposing new arrangements.
    Mr. Freeson: I am sure the Minister is aware, and will he remind the hon. Member for Enfield, North (Mr. Eggar), that as a matter of courtesy, and in accordance with the convention of the House, when hon. Members wish to pursue matters involving another hon. Member's constituency, they have the grace to contact that hon. Member? Kilburn polytechnic is in the constituency of Brent, East.
    The Minister or the Secretary of State would be very welcome at Kilburn polytechnic so that we might discuss a possible increase in the allocation of expenditure to expand the provision of that college, which the local education authority wishes to undertake and which I wish to back. Will the hon. Gentleman undertake to make such a visit and to open discussions to enlarge the resources, and let Brent get on with the job of negotiating a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the matter referred to by the hon. Member for Enfield, North?
    Mr. Waldegrave: The hon. Gentleman's first point is not for me. If the college or the local authority were to invite me, I should of course be happy to try to visit the polytechnic.
    Mr. Christopher Price: Does the Minister agree that it must be a matter of concern to the House and to the

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    community if several police cadets are found to have the racist attitudes that were displayed in the essays that led to the difficulties between the Police college and Kilburn polytechnic? Does he agree that no college should tailor its curriculum just because an organisation such as a Police college finds it unsatisfactory?
    Mr. Waldegrave: The origins of the essays are also disputed. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree that there is some anxiety about the release of information from examination papers without the permission of the college or the students.

    Youth Service (Thompson Report)
    Mr. Kenneth Carlisleasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science when he expects to make his decision on the Thompson report on the youth service; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. William Shelton): I announced two decisions on the Thompson report in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Skeet) on 17 December 1982. My right hon. Friend has now decided to extend the period of consultation on other matters in the report to 31 March 1983.
    Mr. Carlisle: Although it is right to have proper consultation on this important matter, is my hon. Friend aware that many people want a speedy decision on the Thompson report? Is he further aware of the great public support for the youth service and the considerable voluntary effort that goes into it? Therefore, effective action is required. Will he especially look after the interests of 11 to 14-year-olds? It is important that that group of youngsters have good occupation off the streets, but often their needs are not catered for.
    Mr. Shelton: I welcome my hon. Friend's support for the youth service, and that is echoed throughout the country. We are aware of the great interest that has been aroused by the Thompson report. My hon. Friend was correct to mention 11 to 14-year-olds, whose case was raised in the report. I hope that the youth service has taken note of that. We shall do whatever we can to implement what was proposed in the report.
    Mr. Greville Janner: Does the Minister accept that there is a drastic shortage of facilities for youngsters, which is only partly catered for by existing youth service organisations because they do not have the resources or the support that they need? Is he aware that those resources are especially important today when unemployment among young people is so disastrously high? Will the hon. Gentleman announce a decision, to enable the youth service to have the security of knowing that it is supported by the Government and that it will not be allowed to fail through lack of funds?
    Mr. Shelton: The youth service should be well aware that it is supported by the Government. The funding in 1981–82 was £86 million. The figures that we have to date for this Government show higher spending in real terms per capita on youth than in the years of the Labour Administration.
    Mr. Freud: If the youth service is well aware of that fact, will the Minister ask his right hon. Friend to appoint a Minister with special responsibilities for youth matters?
    Mr. Shelton: As the hon. Gentleman knows, that was one recommendation of the Thompson report. We have extended the consultation period until the end of March. As soon as possible after that date we shall announce our decisions.
    Mr. Haselhurst: Will my hon. Friend try to bring finality to the reorganisation and revitalisation of the youth service, in the knowledge that we have had talks about talks about consultations about consultations for as long as anyone can remember?
    Mr. Shelton: I understand my hon. Friend's point. However, the Government have done something about it. We have set up a review group—[Laughter.] I am sure that the youth service will be distressed by the ribaldry of Labour Members in greeting the setting up of review group. It is a serious review group, and it has made serious recommendations. The time that we allowed for consultations—two months—was not enough, so we extended it to the end of March. About 25 organisations have not yet written to us, including the two local authority associations, so we are waiting to hear from them. It is not a matter for laughter. We are doing something about it at last.
    Mr. Whitehead: Does the Minister not realise that the ribaldry on the Government Benches is about the Government's review of a review of a committee? Will he now say to the House that the Government accept the central principle of the Thompson report—the importance of social education—and will he say that there should be statutory back-up, as Thompson recommended? If he cannot do that, does he accept that many hon. Members will believe that the Government are stalling until a leisure committee of the MSC is set up?
    Mr. Shelton: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not expect us to reach decisions without consultation, especially when we have not received—[Interruption.] The review group reported at the end of October, which is not very long ago. We have not yet received the comments of the local authority associations, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would wish us to do nothing until we have received them.

    Nursery Education
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether he will provide additional money to local authorities to enable them to extend the level of nursery education provision; and if he will make a statement.
    Dr. Boyson: The Government's expenditure plans allow for some expansion in the total of nursery education provision by local education authorities. Nursery education is a discretionary provision and each authority must decide what priority it gives to it.
    Mr. Skinner: Is it not a fact that during three and a half years of Tory Government nursery education as administered by local authorities has been run down, but that private nursery education, where people have the money to buy, has followed the Prime Minister's instinct about freedom of choice? Tories do not care about those areas where working-class people need a state nursery education system for their children. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that is verified by the fact that

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    yesterday he announced in a written answer that nursery school teachers had been sacked by the Government in the past three and a half years, when there is a crying need, mainly in the north of England, but also in other regions, for expansion?
    Dr. Boyson: We should examine the figures from the beginning. At the moment, 22 per cent. of children aged three and four receive nursery education, whereas in 1977 only 15 per cent. did so—an increase of 7 per cent.—and there are now 12,000 more children of that age receiving nursery education.
    That hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) may not like it, but there were more children in nursery schools in January 1982 than in January 1981. When figures for January 1983 are available, I shall be delighted to send them to him. The hon. Gentleman and his family must have influence on the Labour-controlled council in Derbyshire. This year the council has asked for and received £118,000 for nursery school building programmes. The hon. Gentleman should lobby the council to ensure that Bolsover receives its fair share.
    Mr. Greenway: Does my hon. Friend agree that play groups are also important and do good work? Does he have any figures for the number of children under five who attend play groups?
    Dr. Boyson: I do not have any such figures. I knew that the hon. Member for Bolsover would ask about nursery schools, but I did not know that my hon. Friend would ask about play groups. I understand that the number has increased. The increase in the number of play groups and housing associations since the second world war has been the biggest advance in a free society that has been carried out by people themselves.
    Miss Joan Lestor: Would the hon. Gentleman care to review what he has just said about nursery school places, as many local authorities which hitherto provided a full-day placement for children now provide a part-day placement in order to spread the availability of nursery education? Does he agree that the distribution of nursery school places throughout the country varies enormously from area to area and that unless and until the Government give local authorities the statutory duty to make such provision, many children, usually in poorer areas, will continue to be deprived of this facility?
    Dr. Boyson: I am sure that the hon. Lady will be pleased to know that two-thirds of nursery school provision in Britain is in city and deprived areas. The bulk of the money is spent, and the bulk of nursery school teachers are required, in those areas. That applies especially to ethnic minority groups, which must be enabled to be brought up to a normal standard of class tuition as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Dobson: Does the Minister agree that, under the ludicrous rate support grant system, some authorities provide nursery education which they want to expand but do not have the funds to do so, while others provide no nursery school education, yet receive rate support grant as if they did?
    Dr. Boyson: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman consults the AMA and the ACC. He will discover that they strongly support discretionary powers of that type. They would be the last to agree with him that more powers should be taken away from local education authorities.

    Higher Education (Parental Contributions)
    Mr. Marlowasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science which other European Community countries operate a system which includes parental contributions for adult students maintenance in higher education.
    Mr. Waldegrave: The latest available information shows that all European Community countries include a parental means test within their student support system.
    Mr. Marlow: Although that may be so, will my hon. Friend tell the House whether such a test is as far-reaching as that which applies in the United Kingdom? Will he also tell the House—I know what difficulty he has—how much longer the present iniquitous system will endure, whereby the children of the rich and poor effectively receive full support at university whereas those in between, who are largely the children of Conservative supporters, do not?
    Mr. Waldegrave: We are the only European country that has a non-means-tested element in our student support system—the minimum award. In that sense, our system is less means-tested than others. I am fully aware of the problem that my hon. Friend raised, but the £150 million or so that would be involved in abolishing the parental contribution is beyond the immediate capacity of the Government to provide.
    Mr. Spriggs: Is the Minister aware that students from the St. Helens constituency who attend university suffer in two ways? First, is he aware that many of them suffer from a complete lack of parental contribution because of high unemployment in that constituency? Secondly, is he aware that when students do not receive that contribution, they are forced to find part-time work? How can they hope to make a success of higher education if they have that problem on their minds all the time?
    Mr. Waldegrave: Finding part-time or full-time work during vacations has always been a part of student life. I do not want to argue against that. I am well aware of the problems that the hon. Gentleman has raised, but I must repeat that the student award settlement that we have agreed is the best that is possible in the circumstances.
    Mr. George Cunningham: Is it not unprecedented for the Government to promulgate a statutory instrument on this subject that is legally defective, to discover, through no effort on their part, that it is legally defective and to refuse to inform local education authorities that it is legally defective three months after discovering the fact? When will the Minister do something about that?
    Mr. Waldegrave: I am not sure that that subject is within the scope of this question. However, guidance to local authorities on the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised will be issued shortly.

    Overseas Students
    Mr. Teddy Taylorasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is the most recent estimate of the additional cost to public funds of permitting students from the Commonwealth to enjoy home fee status.
    M. Waldegrave: At least £100 million.
    Mr. Taylor: Is my hon. Friend aware that there is much unhappiness among all parties and in British

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    industry about the effect of charging young people from Commonwealth nations the full economic fee? Is there not a case for ensuring that young people from the new and old Commonwealth are treated at least as favourably as students who come from France's overseas territories? How can my hon. Friend justifly charging a student from British Guyana £6,000 a year to become a doctor whereas if he comes from French Guyana he must pay only £400 a year?
    Mr. Waldegrave: As my hon. Friend knows, the Government are urgently reviewing the results of the Overseas Students Trust review and hope to present the House with proposals soon. With regard to the relationship with European Community students, the balance is probably somewhere in Britain's favour, as the number of British students going to EC countries is more or less balanced by the reverse trade.
    Mr. Christopher Price: As several Commonwealth students who thought that they were overseas students have been turned into home students by the decision of the other place just before Christmas, how is it that, nearly at the end of January, the Minister still answers a parliamentary question by saying that he does not know how much money is involved for universities and local education authorities and that he does not know how many students are involved? Is he aware that some universities and some local education authorities do not know whether they must repay fees over two years? Does he realise that the Government's incompetence is causing critical financial problems?
    Mr. Waldegrave: It is a little hard to say that this is a case of incompetence. Even Governments of the hon. Gentleman's party have sometimes received legal decisions that are inconvenient for them. We shall issue guidance to local authorities and other interested authorities shortly.
    Sir William van Straubenzee: I appreciate that the study is being pursued urgently, but is my hon. Friend able to help the House a little further by giving some idea of when he and his colleagues will make a joint decision on the matter so that there may be some rationalisation of financing overseas students in our universities and colleges?
    Mr. Waldegrave: Those matters are being discussed urgently. The Government are well aware of the anxieties that were expressed in a letter from Sir Peter Baxendell and others in The Daily Telegraph today.
    Mr. Whitehead: When will the Government give an answer about the attempt to rationalise matters after the Scarman judgment? Will it be this academic term, this academic year or when?
    Mr. Waldegrave: Well before the end of this academic year.
    Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: Does my hon. Friend agree that by hard work, including tailoring courses to suit overseas students, Lancaster university now has more Commonwealth students than it had in either 1980 or 1981? Is he aware that within that total there are fewer Malaysians? Will he make further attempts to attract Commonwealth students, whom we value so much?
    Mr. Waldegrave: As my hon. Friend knows, I have twice visited Lancaster university and had discussions with
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    the vice-chancellor. I have been very impressed by the successful effort that the university has made to attract more overseas students. I well understand my hon. Friend's reference to Malaysia. Discussions are taking place with other Departments.

    School Books
    Mr. Andrew F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what is his Department's current estimate of the number and cost of school books that will be bought in the current year.
    Dr. Boyson: Provisional figures for the financial year 1981–82 show that local education authorities in England spent £56 million on books for primary and secondary schools in that year. Expenditure figures for the current financial year will not be available until the autumn.
    Mr. Bennett: Is the Minister aware that at a recent meeting that I had with geography teachers they said that they had never had so little money to spend on the purchase of new books and the replacement of old books, and that they had never known a period in which geography books were becoming obsolete so quickly because of the Government's industrial policy? Is there a school that has geography books which accurately describe, for example, the present industrial distribution of the British steel industry?
    Dr. Boyson: The sum provided in the rate support grant to local authorities for books and other equipment this year in real terms per pupil is exactly the same as in 1978–79 when the Government took office. It is for the schools to decide how they should use the money to the maximum advantage. If geography is changing at the speed that the hon. Gentleman suggests, we had better wait for a while before we order the next set of books.
    Mr. Marlow: Will my hon. Friend set up a survey to compare the money spent on books in the public sector with the money spent in the private sector? Many people believe that the private sector buys fewer books and that they are looked after rather better.
    Dr. Boyson: I do not think that we have any figures that touch on my hon. Friend's supplementary question. We could undertake a rough sample and we would be prepared to do so. I sometimes wonder whether the English and mathematics books that are used in schools—I am not referring to geography books or science books, which are the subject of rapid changes—last as long now as the books of 20 years ago.
    Mr. Dobson: Does the Minister recall that last year the Secretary of State told the House that he was allocating an extra £20 million to local authorities to be spent on school books? Have the authorities spent the moneys on school books or have they spent them on something else, in the sacred name of local government autonomy?
    Dr. Boyson: I note that the hon. Gentleman has little faith in local authorities today. He has just made his second attack on them. I presume that he is attacking Labour authorities as well as Conservative ones. I know that the Government move very fast, but it is a little too early for us to have the expenditure figures, as the financial year has not yet ended.

    Initial Teacher Training (Manchester)
    Mr. McNallyasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what alternative proposals were put forward by the Roman Catholic authorities concerning initial teacher training prior to his final decision to close such courses at De La Salle college, Manchester.
    Mr. Waldegrave: The Roman Catholic authorities did not put forward alternative proposals, other than to argue in favour of the retention of all seven of their colleges and the redistribution of an increased number of students among them.
    Mr. McNally: Does not the Minister think, on reflection, that if he had not handled the decision to close the De La Salle college in such a high-handed and cavalier manner he would not have received such a reaction across the denominations in the north-west and in early-day motions in the House? Does he accept that it is a mark of the failure of his Department that the managers of the college have now taken recourse to legal action, which I understand they will be pursuing this afternoon? They are taking legal action against the Department because of its mishandling of the closure.
    Mr. Waldegrave: I hope that the delegations which saw me, and which discussed the issues involved with great courtesy, do not regard their reception as highhanded. It would be astonishing if any college welcomed its own closure. One of the sad features of the present situation is that we have to seek the closure of some colleges.

    Head Teachers and Senior Staff
    Sir William van Straubenzeeasked the Secretary of State for Education and Science whether any institutions other than those named in his announcement of 6 December 1982 have so far submitted bids to be the national centre for management training for head teachers and senior staff in schools.
    Sir Keith Joseph: A proposal has been received from University college, Cardiff. Twelve other organisations, apart from those named in the announcement, have expressed interest in making a bid to house the centre.
    Sir William van Straubenzee: Does my right hon. Friend understand that this is a most important and very welcome initiative on his part? Can he say in the broadest terms when he hopes to make a decision on the location?
    Sir Keith Joseph: Discussions are taking place with those organisations which bid. I cannot give an exact date, but I hope that a decision will be made before Easter.

    Computers
    Mr. Dykesasked the Secretary of. State for Education and Science if he is satisfied with the ways in which computers in schools are being used for educational purposes.
    Mr. William Shelton: Schools are using microcomputers in a great variety of ways and I believe that good progress is being made.
    Mr. Dykes: Does the experience of the past year and a half show that perhaps more sophisticated machines should be installed for next year to give a wider range of experience?
    Mr. Shelton: No, I do not agree with my hon. Friend. I do not think that there is a major problem with hardware. If a problem exists, it lies in the sophistication of some of the software that has been provided.

  PRIME MINISTER

    Engagements
    Ql. Mr. Greville Jannerasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 25 January.
    The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House I shall be having further meetings later this evening.
    Mr. Janner: In view of the growing financial crisis, as evidenced by the latest unplanned fall in the value of the pound against the dollar, and as the situation is likely to worsen during 1983, with increasing unemployment, can the Prime Minister confirm that she is now considering calling an early general election?
    The Prime Minister: No, Sir.
    Mr. Neubert: Has my right hon. Friend had a chance to study the excellent report by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis on his proposed measures to combat the level of crime in London, which reveals, among other factors, that the number of demonstrations requiring the attendance of 100 police officers or more has in recent years risen from an average of one a week to one a day?
    Mr. Cryer: That is because we have a Tory Government.
    Mr. Neubert: Is it not clear that people such as the Leader of the Opposition, who has endorsed the candidature of Peter Tatchell, and the CND, will encourage the taking of politics on to the streets and will do no good to law and order in London, or to themselves?
    The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend and I am glad that the proposals of the Metropolitan Police were received so well yesterday. I believe that the Metropolitan Police are doing an excellent job.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: On exchange rate policy, is the Prime Minister still adamant for inactivity?
    The Prime Minister: At the moment exchange markets are very active because of uncertainty about the price of oil. Naturally we are affected as an oil currency. There is very little that Government can do at a time like this to stop the uncertainty in the markets or the fluctuations that that causes.
    Sir William Clark: Does my right hon. Friend agree that irresponsible speeches by Opposition Members, especially the shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, do no good at all in maintaining confidence in sterling? Would it not be a good idea if the Opposition sometimes tried to defend Britain rather than their own political ambitions?
    The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend that the underlying financial position of sterling is strong. If we hold to that, it will tell in the end.
    Mr. Foot: I understand that the right hon. Lady does not wish to make a statement on exchange rate policy, but

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    will she at least give us a guarantee that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not attempt to deal with it by the foolish methods that he was using a couple of weeks ago?
    The Prime Minister: My right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated the other day in his speech that he thought there was no good reason either for the exchange rate to fall or for interest rates to rise.
    Mr. Ian Lloyd: On my right hon. Friend's way to the House this afternoon did she see posters announcing that the pound had fallen into a black hole? She will be aware that over the weekend OPEC seems to have fallen into something similar. She will have observed that about $45 out of every $64 received from the production of a barrel of crude is entirely attributable to the taxation imposed by Governments. When the producer Governments begin to reduce their tax take, as they undoubtedly will, to meet the market situation, will she use all her great authority to ensure that consumer Governments, including our own, do not increase their take?
    The Prime Minister: I believe that my hon. Friend is broaching matters that are more likely to be considered in about March this year. I believe, in general, that a fall in the price of oil, although the speed of change causes difficulty, is beneficial to the world economy in general.
    Mr. Strangasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 25 January.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Strang: Turning to the important question of the American cruise missiles, will the Prime Minister give the House and the country a straight "Yes" or "No" answer to this question? Will the British Government have the right to veto a decision by the American President to fire the British-based cruise missiles?
    The Prime Minister: The position is exactly the same as it has been for the past 30 years.
    Mr. Canavan: "Yes" or "No".
    The Prime Minister: The use of United States bases in the United Kingdom in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstnaces prevailing at the time. It is the same rule as existed under the Labour Government, and has existed for the past 30 years. I am aware that concern has been expressed about the effectiveness of the arrangements and I have satisfied myself that they are effective.
    Mr. Fairbairn: Has my right hon. Friend had the opportunity of seeing the eye-witness reports of the atrocities committed by Russian officers in Padkhwab-E-Shana, Afghanistan, in murdering 105 Afghan patriots? Has she also seen the reports of torture by those officers in Kabul prison? Will my right hon. Friend bring these matters urgently to the attention of the appropriate authorities and will she remind the unilateralists inside and outside the House that those are the people to whom they would commit our civil liberties and our human rights?
    The Prime Minister: I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for bringing this matter to our attention. I have recently had eye-witness accounts from some of the resistance fighters in Afghanistan of the terrible murders
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    that they have witnessed, some in their own village. We should always keep that in mind. We shall do everything possible to help the people of Afghanistan to rid themselves of the occupying force.
    Mr. Maxton: Does the Prime Minister agree that it is an appalling indictment of her Government's attitude to the Third world and to aid to developing countries that the press interpreted the move of the right hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Raison) from the Home Office to be Minister for Overseas Development as a demotion and a punishment?
    The Prime Minister: I am not responsible for the attitudes of the press. I think that my right hon. Friend is absolutely the right person for that job. I regard it as an extremely important job, which he will do supremely well, as he did his previous job.
    Mr. Tapsell: Because of the often exaggerated view of sterling as a petro-currency and its bearing on our exchange rate, should not greater emphasis be given to the fact that the £7 billion of revenue from North Sea oil in the present fiscal year is less than 3 per cent. of our gross domestic product; that it provides only 6¼ per cent. of the Government's total revenues and that, contrary to the Treasury forecast in the autumn statement of a deficit, it now seems likely that there will be a surplus on our balance of payments in 1983–84 of £1½ billion?
    The Prime Minister: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, particularly for putting the oil revenues into perspective, and also the percentage of the GDP. I had the same figures, which I was hoping to get out. My hon. Friend has done my job for me.
    Mr. Ron Lewis: As it has been widely reported that the Prime Minister never uses British Rail, and arising out of the "serpent" or Serpell report, will she give an undertaking that there will be no Beeching-style cuts for as long as she is Prime Minister?
    The Prime Minister: I give an undertaking that the report will be studied fully and carefully and premature concluions will not be reached.
    Mr. Bill Walker: Does my right hon. Friend agree that freedom, democracy and the rule of law have never been cheap and that one of the things we enjoy in the House is the right to table questions to Ministers? The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has placed more than 300 questions to Ministers on Falklands matters at a cost to the public purse of more than £12,000. [HON. MEMBERS: "Quite right".] Is she aware that this could not happen in Argentina or Russia?
    The Prime Minister: I propose to stand up for those rights, but I sometimes wish that they could be less prolifically used by certain people.
    Mr. Dalyell: Is it not true that any cost concerning questions that I have placed on the Order Paper relates less to policy issues or to obtaining easily available facts than to the great cost of many Ministers and officials getting together to try to synchronise their answers to hide the truth?
    The Prime Minister: I am not sure that that question was addressed to me. If it was, the answer is "Nonsense".

    Job Creation
    Mr. Wigleyasked the Prime Minister what new proposals she has for reducing unemployment levels.
    The Prime Minister: There are no new answers, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, only the right products and services at the right prices. The way to reduce unemployment is for British firms to win markets and create jobs, and some are doing so. Last week, for instance, I visited a small firm that started only three years ago and now employs almost 200 people, made a £1 million profit last year, and is a market leader. The best way to help the unemployed is to keep down wage settlements, keep down inflation, and let industry be profitable and competitive.
    In the meantime, we have allocated nearly £1½ billion to special employment and training measures this financial year and about £2 billion next year.
    Mr. Wigley: Does the Prime Minister accept that in every community in these islands there is work that needs to be done, houses that need to be built, roads that need to be improved, home helps needed for the elderly and clinics for the disabled? Does she not realise also that there are people who are capable of doing this work who want to do it? In these circumstances, is it not crazy to pay £15 billion to keep people idle rather than pay them to do this work?
    The Prime Minister: There is always work to be done. The pay for that work ultimately has to be found from profitable industry and commerce. If we put too heavy a burden on them they will no longer find themselves competitive, and instead of supplying wealth may well become consumers of it by way of subsidies. That is the dilemma. With regard to certain work in local authorities, that is exactly why we have programmes such as the community enterprise programme. That is why the £150 million was announced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the last Budget—to help ensure that such work is done and that people can take the opportunity to do it.
    Mr. Marlow: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one way, perhaps a small way, of reducing the numbers of unemployed would be to improve yet further our relationships with the Arab world? With that in mind, does she know yet when the delegation from the Arab League is coming to the United Kingdom and who will be in it?
    The Prime Minister: No, not yet, Sir. We are continuing discussions through King Hassan of Morocco.
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    We are working hard to find a solution. I hope that soon we will be able to receive a delegation from the Arab League.
    Mr. Stoddart: Did the Prime Minister read in this morning's Hansard the figures given to the House by her Minister for Trade, which show that, in non-oil goods, our exports were £2 billion in deficit and, with the EC, nearly £5 billion in deficit? Does that not show that, under this Government, British manufacturing industry is being destroyed underneath our feet, and that North Sea oil, under her Administration, is proving a curse rather than a boon?
    The Prime Minister: Economies do change, and the amount produced by manufacturing industry changes. The numbers employed in certain industries change as new technology comes in and new products are produced. We have problems, as in the world over, in steel, engineering and shipbuilding. I find it a mystery that the hon. Gentleman should cut out things such as oil and gas products, which are a significant part of our economy.

    United Empire Loyalists (Bicentenary)
    Sir John Biggs-Davisonasked the Prime Minister if she will consult the Prime Minister of Canada about the possibility of a joint celebration in the United Kingdom and Canada of the bicentenary of the United Empire Loyalists.
    The Prime Minister: This is an important occasion for the United Empire Loyalists and I wish them well. I am sure, however, that they will be able to organise a really special celebration of their bicentenary without such an initiative on my part, especially when they have the support and help of my hon. Friend.
    Sir John Biggs-Davison: Recalling our postal celebration of the bicentennial of the American revolution, should we not commemorate with a special issue—
    Mr. William Hamilton: Reading.
    Sir John Biggs-Davison: It is far quicker that way. Should we not commemorate with a special issue the bicentenary of those North Americans who gave up everything and moved to Canada because of their loyalty to the Crown? Will my right hon. Friend speak to the Post Office and to Mr. Trudeau?
    The Prime Minister: Under the Post Office Act, the Post Office is responsible for choosing subjects for celebration stamps. While the chairman recognises what my hon. Friend has stated, he regrets that the programme for 1983 and 1984 is already full.

Wages Councils Act 1979 (Amendment)
3.31 pm
Mr. Robert C. Brown: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to repeal section 16 of the Wages Councils Act 1979.
As this is the second time in three months that I have introduced the Bill, I do not intend to belabour the House with the statistical arguments that are already well set out in columns 231 and 232 of the Official Report of 19 October 1982. The International Year of the Disabled has been and gone. During that year, many pious intentions were expressed and many worthy schemes of positive help to the disabled were started. Yet the one positive step that the Government could have taken was neglected. That was an end of the legal discrimination on wages that is enshrined in the law.
Section 16 of the Wages Councils Act 1979 provides for disabled workers to receive less than the statutory minimum rate laid down in any wages council. Wages council rates are notoriously low. The Act provides for an even lower rate. I ask for leave to introduce this Bill to end such legal discrimination against disabled people. I have a number of reasons.
First, the Wages Councils Act provides for the establishment of a wages council where it is believed that reasonable minimum wages are not being paid. It therefore makes nonsense for the Act then to provide for a lower wage which, by definition, would be unreasonably low. Secondly, the exemption puts more work on to the wages inspectorate which, because of Government cuts, is already hard pressed to do its real job of preventing unemployment. Most important, the worker who suffers the lower rate does not have to be registered as disabled but simply has to appear to be disabled. There are no medical requirements. It is simply the opinion of the employer and the inspector, neither of whom is qualified to judge the extent of the disability. The existence of
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section 16 in the Act provides a charter to employ unskilled labour at even cheaper rates than the paltry sums laid down in the wages council orders with the ever-present threat that if the worker does not agree he or she could be out of a job.
Disabled people are part of our community. They suffer from a handicap that is itself enough of a burden without the added indignity of the legalised discrimination contained in the Act. I do not wish to claim a monopoly on the Opposition Benches of compassion for the disabled. I wish, however, to remind Conservative Members that my Bill stands no chance of success unless the Government are prepared to accept it. I appeal therefore to Conservative Members to bring pressure to bear on their ministerial colleagues, particularly the Prime Minister, to accept the Bill, which is simple and short, and which would take no time out of the legislative programme. Indeed, it could go speedily on its way to the other place following discussion lasting a few minutes on a Friday afternoon.
Compassion and sympathy for the disabled mean nothing unless hon. Members are prepared to act. I urge the Government to do just that, or to face the charge which I am entitled to make of gross hypocrisy.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Robert C. Brown, Mr. Jack Ashley, Miss Betty Boothroyd, Mr. Neil Carmichael, Dr. John Cunningham, Mr. Don Dixon, Mr. A. E. P. Duffy, Mr. Michael English, Mr. James Johnson, Mr. Giles Radice, Mr. George Robertson and Mr. Frank R. White.

Wages Councils Act 1979 (Amendment)
  WAGES COUNCILS ACT 1979 (AMENDMENT)
  Mr. Robert C. Brown accordingly presented a Bill to repeal section 16 of the Wages Councils Act 1979: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 4 February and to be printed. [Bill 65.]

Falkland Islands (Franks Report)
3.37 pm
The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): I beg to move,
That this House takes note of the Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors on the Falkland Islands Review (Cmnd. 8787).
Mr. Speaker: I have selected the amendment in the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition.
The Prime Minister: The House will recall that six days after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands I announced in reply to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) that a review would be held of the way in which the responsibilities of Government were discharged in the period leading up to the invasion.
Following the liberation of the islands, I consulted the Leader of the Opposition, and Privy Councillors in other Opposition parties, about establishing a Committee to undertake the review. These consultations led to agreement both about the terms of reference of the review and its membership under the chairmanship of Lord Franks. Later, the House agreed without a Division a motion to approve the establishment of the Committee.
On that occasion the Leader of the Opposition, who proposed the names of two of the six members of the committee, said:
"The inquiry will deal with a serious and important matter, and it will be of great benefit to the country if the matter, is probed in the way in which the House is determined that it should be. I believe that the names of those appointed to the Committee are the Guarantee that that will be so."—[Official Report, 8 July 1982; Vol. 27, c. 476.]
The committee had access to all relevant Cabinet and Cabinet Committee papers and to a comprehensive collection of reports from the intelligence agencies. It saw not only the papers of the present Administration but those of previous Administrations also. Each member of the committee read these papers personally, and did not rely on summaries or extracts. They had access to and saw far more papers than anyone else has seen, and interviewed more people.
I shall follow the structure of the report, Mr. Speaker, dealing in turn, first, with the fundamental nature of the dispute and the way that successive Governments tried to deal with it; secondly, with the period preceding the invasion and some points that have been made about the Government's actions during that time; thirdly, with the main conclusions of the report and the Government's reactions to them. Throughout I shall try to follow Lord Franks' advice that his report should be read as a whole, and his warning against the dangers of hindsight.
The fundamental dilemma is plain from the report. Argentina was interested in only one thing—sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and, if it could get it, over the dependencies as well. Successive British Governments recognised that any solution had to be acceptable to the islanders and sought to achieve that solution by negotiation. The inherent contradiction was evident. No solution which satisfied the Argentine demand for sovereignty pure and simple could possibly be reconciled with the wishes of the islanders or of this House.
Chapter I of the report—a valuable historical analysis of the period from 1965 to 1979—illustrates clearly the recurrence of certain features in the policies pursued by
790
successive British Governments, in the intelligence assessments they received and in the military assessments prepared by the chiefs of staff.
The year 1967 was a landmark in that the then Labour Government were the first British Government to state formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the islanders were respected. Following agreement at official level with Argentina on a memorandum of understanding, Lord Chalfont visited the islands to explain the policy that the Government had been pursuing.
In the light of the reaction both in the islands and in this country, the Government decided not to continue to attempt to reach a settlement on the basis of the memorandum. Nevertheless, it was recognised even at that stage that
"failure to reach an understanding with Argentina carried the risks of increased harassment of the Islanders and the possibility of an attack."
The Government therefore decided to continue negotiations, while making clear the British attitude on sovereignty, and that the islanders' wishes were paramount. Talks were resumed in 1969.
Following the change of Government in June 1970, a communications agreement was signed, but Argentina pressed for talks on sovereignty and in 1974 attention turned to the possibility of condominium which was explored with the islanders and then dropped.
Towards the end of 1973, the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentina attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were signs that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands.
In 1974, official military action was considered unlikely as long as Argentina believed that the British Government were prepared to negotiate on sovereignty, but the JIC did not rule out that military action. In December 1974, an Argentine newspaper mounted a press campaign advocating invasion of the islands. This pattern of hardening Argentine attitudes, the possibility of military action and a press campaign advocating it would be seen again.
This historical background is important because a good deal of recent comment has suggested that the circumstances in early 1982 were entirely new.
In 1975, lease-back was proposed for the first time. It was an Argentine suggestion in response to a British proposal for joint development of economic resources of the south west Atlantic. The Argentine Foreign Minister also proposed that Argentina should occupy South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. That proposal was unacceptable to Britain, and the absence of talks on sovereignty was unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that, there were no negotiations.
The economic survey by Lord Shackleton in 1975ߝ76 provoked a hostile Argentine reaction and relations deteriorated sharply in 1976. Our ambassador was told by the Argentine Foreign Minister that if the British Government refused to resume negotiations
"we were rapidly moving towards a head-on collision … in the end he could only see one course open to Argentina irrespective of what Government might be in power. … Fortified by the support of the entire Argentine nation as well as all the other nations of the world assembled in New York, his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome."

791
That was in 1976. No stronger threat was issued by an Argentine Foreign Minister throughout the period covered by the report. Ambassadors were withdrawn and newspapers in Buenos Aires advocated invasion, although in veiled terms.
In January 1976, the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that as the sequence of Argentine measures proceeded the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer. The pattern was similar to that in 1974 and was to be seen again.
On 4 February 1976, shots were fired at the unarmed research ship RRS "Shackleton" 78 miles south of Port Stanley, and an unsuccessful attempt by the Argentines was made to arrest her.
A week later the then Minister of State at the Foreign Office went to New York for talks with the new Argentine Foreign Minister at which, according to the report, he was instructed by the then Foreign Secretary to ask what proposals the Argentines had about discussions on sovereignty. Again, this is worth noting, for the Argentines were to be asked a similar question in September 1981, to which the Franks report also refers.
In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options, the first of four such papers. According to the Franks report, all were similar in scope, and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitation of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued:
"It would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful".
In December of the same year an Argentine military presence was discovered in the British territory of Southern Thule. The Labour Government took no steps to make that fact public, and it did not become known to the House until May 1978—some 16 months later. Formal protests were made to Argentina at the time, but the Franks report states that the Argentine expectation had been that the British reaction would have been much stronger.
A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area.
There was evidence at that time of an Argentine contingency plan for a joint air force and navy invasion of the Falkland Islands, but later intelligence suggested that that plan had been shelved—not because of any action by the then British Government, but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third world or the Communist bloc.
In February 1977, some two months after the discovery of the occupation of Southern Thule, but without referring to it, Mr. Crosland told the House that the time had come to consider with the islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate existed for further talks. At the same time, he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the
792
lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?
In July 1977, the then Labour Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), presented a paper to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee which, as the report states
"argued that serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources".
The committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going. The report continues:
"Broadly speaking, the Government's strategy was to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the Dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina".
In view of that, it was surprising, to say the least, that in December 1980 the then shadow Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore), condemned the lease-back proposal when it was put to the House by my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary—some advertisement for collective decision!
We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be "looked at separately" from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded.
Franks uses a similar phrase to that used to describe the position at the end of 1973—
"the Argentine position was hardening."
Indeed it was. Argentine naval units arrested seven Soviet and two Bulgarian fishing vessels in Falkland waters. Shots were fired at one of the Bulgarian ships and there were orders to sink the vessel if necessary. The British Government were officially informed that there would be a similar riposte to intrusions by any other flag carrier and at any other place.
The JIC concluded that if negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded that there was no real prospect of their resulting in a transfer of sovereignty, there would be
"a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action".
Invasion of the Falklands was, in the JIC's view, unlikely but "could not be discounted". That was a situation of unparalleled tension in the history of the dispute. Nothing comparable existed in March 1982, as the report itself points out.
I wish to say a word about the despatch of one nuclear submarine and two frigates to the south Atlantic by the Labour Government in November 1977. According to the report, Ministers accepted that
"Such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack".
Mr. Tam Dalyell rose—
The Prime Minister: I wish to continue, as I am in the middle of making a point.
According to the report, Ministers accepted that such a force could not deal with a determined Argentine attack. What, one must ask, would that force have done if, wholly without air cover, it had met such an attack?
Mr. Dalyell rose—
The Prime Minister: When I finish this section. I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman.
Further, the report found no evidence that Argentina ever came to know of its existence. So I hope that the right

793
hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) will tell us in the course of this debate what he meant when he told the House on 30 March last year that
"when the fact"—
of this force—
"became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed".—[Official Report, 30 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 168.]
Mr. Dalyell: If the Prime Minister is correct in saying that nothing comparable existed in March 1982, why is it that in paragraph 152 the Franks report refers to a telegram on 3 March from the ambassador in Buenos Aires, on which she wrote
"we must make contingency plans"?
How does the right hon. Lady square that?
The Prime Minister: I can square that easily. The hon. Gentleman will find a paragraph in the report dealing with press reports at that time suggesting that, while early action was thought to be such items as withdrawal of services, matters would become urgent as the 150th anniversary approached and that there could well be an invasion at that difficult time later in the year. The report said in paragraph 327:
"At that time there were signs of growing Argentine impatience, in the form of the bout de papier and the accompanying hostile press comment in Argentina, but in other respects the circumstances were different from those obtaining at the time of the 1977 talks. 1977 was a tense period in Anglo-Argentine relations and there was a sharper risk of Argentine military action".
There were further negotiations with Argentina in February 1978 in Lima, in December 1978 in Geneva, and in March 1979 in New York. On none of those occasions was a force deployed.
Mr. Dalyell rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must allow the Prime Minister to continue.
The Prime Minister: Chapters 2 and 3 of the report cover the period of the present Government. As with each previous Government, the full range of policy options was put to us at the outset. The second half of 1979 saw a visit by my right hon. Friend the present Financial Secretary to the Treasury to the islands, two exploratory meetings with Argentine representatives, the restoration of ambassadors and the formulation of proposals to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee, including both political and military assessment.
In exchanges in the House on 18 January, the Leader of the Opposition, referred to what he called the
"collapse of effective Cabinet government".—[Official Report, 18 January 1982; Vol. 35, c. 175.]
The fact is that in 1980, when the policy was being decided, there were no fewer than seven collective and often lengthy discussions of our policy towards the Falkland Islands, four in the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee and three in Cabinet.
In January 1981, a further meeting of that Committee—the eighth collective discussion—was held to review the position in the light of the islanders' reactions to the lease-back proposal and the comments in the House on the statement in December 1980 by my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary. The Committee endorsed Lord Carrington's proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. It agreed to the early
794
talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented. Those talks took place in New York in February 1981.
Thereafter, the policy having been decided in those eight collective meetings, my noble Friend kept his colleagues informed in detail through minutes circulated to all members of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee. That is a well-known habit and custom of successive Governments once the policy has been determined.
To reassure the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, let me tell him that Cabinet government flourished so well in 1981 that there were 18 meetings of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee, to say nothing of all the other Cabinet and Cabinet committee meetings.
In 1982, following the New York talks, a meeting of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee was planned for 16 March. It did not happen because my noble Friend wanted to consult the islanders on the response he was proposing to send to Mr. Costa Mendez about the unilateral Argentine communiqué following the New York talks; and the Island Council was meeting on that very day to discuss this matter.
The South Georgia incident, which changed the whole situation, began on Friday 19 March, and the Cabinet discussed that incident at its next meeting on 25 March.
There has also been comment, both in the report and outside, about the decision on HMS "Endurance".
Mr. James Callaghan: I am much obliged to the right hon. Lady and I shall take up tomorrow the point she made. Is she not jumping rather quickly from January 1981 to March 1982? Does she not think that the Cabinet or the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee should have reviewed the policy when the ambassador wrote to the Foreign Secretary and said "All we seem to have is a state of Micawberism"? Should they not have reviewed the policy in the light of what the chiefs of staff had to say in August 1981? It really was a collapse of government that she should not have permitted a meeting between those two times.
The Prime Minister: A discussion could have been permitted at any time. A paper could have been submitted at any time, but we had eight discussions while the policy was being formulated. Lord Carrington carried out the policy and kept each and every member of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee informed through minutes which are detailed in the report. Another meeting when things were changing had been expected on 16 March. I have given the reason why it did not take place. I shall refer to the reviews of the chiefs of staff later in my speech.
This was a collective Cabinet decision resulting from the 1981 Defence Review—to withdraw "Endurance" at the end of her 1982 deployment. "Endurance", as the Argentines well knew, has a limited defence capability and was only on station during the Antarctic summer months each year. Her presence in the South Atlantic at the time did not stop Argentina launching her invasion any more than her presence in the area deterred the Argentines from attacking RRS "Shackleton" in 1976.
Nevertheless, my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for Defence said on 7 April 1982, and the Franks report now states, that the decision to withdraw "Endurance" could have provided the wrong signal to the

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Argentines—one of a number. As the House knows, we have now decided that "Endurance" will continue in service.
It has been suggested that a large task force or a smaller force of ships should have been sent earlier than they were. Assessments by the chiefs of staff of possible military responses to the Argentine threat were received throughout the period under review and were similar in scope and content.
When the present Government first considered the position in 1980, we had a military assessment before us. The latest one reached me on 26 March 1982, in response to a request for contingency plans. It was virtually indentical to the assessment made in September 1981, and that was similar to the one prepared in 1977 which, according to the report, in its turn, was similar to that of February 1976.
Dr. David Owen: If the Prime Minister is referring to the JIC report she ought to refer to the report presented on 9 July 1981 which warned that the Argentine might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances, military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands could not be discounted. Surely that was the rather more important JIC report.
The Prime Minister: I quoted the JIC reports up to the period with which I am now dealing. I shall quote that JIC report in association with this period about which I am now dealing.
The right hon. Gentleman will have noticed that the purpose of my quoting many of those reports is to understand the similarities of warning and progression. A constant similarity in the report of the chiefs of staff was not surprising because the fundamental circumstances of the distance of the islands, the airstrip, and Ascension Island did not change.
All the reports of the chiefs of staff—I shall deal later with the intelligence reports—were substantially similar. The one I received on 26 March was similar to the previous one in September 1981. That was similar to the one in 1977, which in turn was similar to that in 1976 which was also very similar to the military assessment before us when we formulated the policy with regard to the Falkland Islands at the beginning of 1980 in the Cabinet and in the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee.
The Franks report itself points out that, although from 1975 the Argentine threat of military action increased, no Government were prepared to establish a garrison on the Falkland Islands large enough to repel a full-scale Argentine invasion, or to provide an extended runway for the airport, with supporting facilities.
The 1981 paper by the chiefs of staff, having recognised the strength of the Argentine air force, concluded that
"to deter a full scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising an Invincible class carrier with four destroyers or frigates plus possibly a nuclear powered submarine, supply ships in attendance and additional manpower up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison."
"Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of the country's naval resources. There was a danger that its depatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter."
There followed an extremely important sentence:
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"If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake them. The paper concluded that to deal with a full-scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and that the logistical problem of such an operation would be formidable."
That was the advice that continually reached me.
The Franks report concludes that it would not have been appropriate to prepare a large task force with the capacity to retake the Falkland Islands before there was clear evidence of an invasion. I agree—and of course as soon as the evidence became available, on 31 March, that preparatory action was taken.
Some argue that a small force should have been deployed earlier, as had been the case in 1977. Franks states clearly that the situation at the time of the New York talks in February 1982 was quite different from the situation in November 1977, the time of the deployment of a submarine and two frigates. I have already described the differences.
In November 1977 there had already been bellicose military action by Argentina in Falkland waters and an explicit threat to any of our ships which might enter those waters.
As Franks also concludes, the situation in February 1982 did not justify a similar, small naval deployment, but I would like to put another argument. To have sent two or three frigates at that time, without air cover, knowing as we did the strength and efficiency of the Argentine air force would have put men and ships in great danger— [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh".] Oh, yes. To have stood them off several hundred miles away would not have helped against a full-scale invasion.
Then it is said that one or more nuclear submarines might have been sent on 5 March. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) has said that it was quite clear that the Argentines had by then given up hope of a negotiated settlement. Not so. At the talks in New York, Argentina had proposed a programme for monthly meetings, and that programme was specifically endorsed even in the unilateral communiqué issued in Buenos Aires on 1 March. The prospect was of continuing negotiations for several months ahead, not of an imminent military threat.
The committee questioned my noble Friend on this point, whose concern was that if a submarine was sent and the fact became known, this would have jeopardised his objective of continuing negotiation. The committee found that this was not an unreasonable view to take at the time, and, as the House knows, the decision to sail the first nuclear-powered submarine was taken early on 29 March.
The Franks committee consider that there was a case for taking this action at the end of the previous week. This is a fairly fine judgment and depends on the interpretation of the developing situation in South Georgia which the Government had been trying to solve by negotiation.
Mr. Edward Rowlands: Will the right hon. Lady confirm and remind the House that in November 1977 the chiefs of staff advised that covert submarines plus frigates 1,000 miles off was an effective and adequate force to deploy given the situation with which we were then dealing?
The Prime Minister: Paragraphs 65 and 66 are the relevant paragraphs, and I have quoted from them. They state:

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"In the light of the intelligence assessment Ministers decided at a meeting on 21 November 1977 that a military presence in the area of the Falkland Islands should be established by the time the negotiations began in December. The objective would be to buttress the Government's negotiating position by deploying a force of sufficient strength, available if necessary, to convince the Argentines that military action by them would meet resistance. Such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack, but it would be able to respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression. The Committee agreed that secrecy should be maintained about the purpose of the force. One nuclear-powered submarine and two frigates were deployed to the area, the submarine to the immediate vicinity of the Islands with the frigates standing off about a thousand miles away. Rules of engagement were drawn up.
Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence."
But, of course, the covert presence of a nuclear submarine would not have deterred the eventual Argentine invasion. Had the junta known that we had despatched a submarine, its response could well have been to launch an airborne invasion supported by ground attack aircraft, a method, as the chiefs of staff had advised, well within its capability. Moreover, I remember that some Opposition Members criticised the sinking of the "Belgrano" by submarine after several weeks of actual hostilities. What would their attitude have been had Britain fired the first shot, had Britain attacked a ship on the high seas before hostilities? They would have been the first to condemn and to demand an inquiry, and we should have lost all support from our allies and the international community and should never have secured the passage of the famous Security Council resolution 502 which dominated international opinion for so long.
I can only repeat that had the two frigates been in the area when that invasion was mounted, I should have been very fearful for the safety of the crews, given that they would have been without any air cover with a formidable Argentine air force only 400 miles away.
Mr. Denis Healey: The Prime Minister's argument is interesting, and we shall consider it, but it fails to explain something for which I believe she deserves some credit. Following the warning from the British ambassador in Buenos Aires on 3 March, she herself asked the Ministry of Defence for contingency plans to deal with the situation. If we accept the right hon. Lady's argument, she knew that nothing was worth while except sending the sort of force which the chiefs of staff had previously advised her would be necessary to deter a full-scale invasion. Was that request an idle and capricious one, is that why she chose not to follow it up, or did she believe, as the Franks report says, that timely action on a smaller scale at that moment might have deterred action by the Argentines?
The Prime Minister: I once again asked for advice from the chiefs of staff in the situation which faced us about which I read in a press report. That is fully set out in paragraph 139 of the report. There were a number of press reports, but I saw the La Prensa report. Paragraph 139 states:
"La Prensa speculated, after conversation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, that, if present tactics were unproductive, a first step might be to cut off services to the Islands followed by a progressive cooling of bilateral relations."
The intelligence reports also suggested first steps of that nature, and that we would expect a whole sequence of actions to be taken long before further military assessment. Paragraph 139 continues:
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"Sr. Ronuco quoted sources saying that Britain would have no more than three of four months to acknowledge Argentine sovereignty and agree on an early date for the return of the Islands to Argentina. There would be no flexibility in Argentina's minimum demand for restitution of sovereignty before the 150th anniversary".
There were two issues in that press report—which were referred to in others, including a report in the Buenos Aires Herald—in line with the JIC assessment and many previous assessments, which is why I frequently quoted them, suggesting that when things gradually got worse between Argentina and the United Kingdom a series of actions of mounting seriousness would be taken, but the likelihood was that we would have a good deal of warning. That press report suggested that the first step would be the cutting off of commercial supplies and services. Secondly, it highlighted that only a few months were left. In that position, I felt that I should again seek the advice of the chiefs of staff.
I have said that that was the same fundamental advice, and it was inherent in the fundamental situation that even to deter we needed a force with an aircraft carrier, about four frigates and a nuclear submarine. It was also clear that if such a force was sent and it actually arrived, it would not be sufficient to throw the invader off the islands. There was a fundamental difficulty, but I felt that it would be totally and utterly wrong to send less than was sufficient.
The advice reached me on 26 March, by which time there were changes in the South Georgia incident. On 29 March we sent a nuclear submarine, and on 31 March we sent seven warships from off Gibraltar. They were not to act on their own. They were to await the full aircraft carrier force. In view of the chiefs of staff advice that a deterrent force would require an aircraft carrier, and that to win would require a much bigger force, I was anxious that we should not put people in jeopardy. We should have sufficient forces to protect them the whole time.
Mr. Douglas Jay rose—
The Prime Minister: I shall not give way. I have given a long explanation. May I continue?
Mr. Jay rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister has said that she is not giving way.
The Prime Minister: It is obvious, but seems to need repeating, that the real cause of the conflict was not the misdemeanours of British Governments, nor of civil servants, nor a failure of machinery, nor of intelligence, but the decision and the gross misjudgment of a military junta to take by force British territory inhabited by people who had always wanted to remain British.
Mr. Jay: If the Government made no mistakes, why did Lord Carrington resign?
The Prime Minister: The reasons for Lord Carrington's resignation were set out in his letter which was published in full. The Franks report says many times that the view that he took was reasonable in the circumstances at the time. Many people are seeing that decision with hindsight. The Franks report attempted to judge the position as at the time.
Throughout this account I have referred frequently to intelligence assessments. In November 1979 there was a reassessment of the Argentine threat in language similar to that which had occurred several times previously.

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A further assessment was made in July 1981. That assessment reviewed the options open to the Argentine Government if they decided to resort to direct measures in the dispute. It took the view that it was likely that in the first instance Argentina would adopt diplomatic and economic measures, including the disruption of air communications, of food and oil supplies. Next, Argentina might occupy one of the uninhabited dependencies, following up its action in 1976 in establishing a presence on Southern Thule; next, a risk that it might establish a military presence in the Falkland Islands themselves, remote from Port Stanley. In the committee's view, harassment or arrest of British shipping would not be a likely option unless the Argentine Government felt themselves severely provoked.
As in 1979, the assessment noted that there was no sign of diminution in Argentina's determination eventually to extend its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands area, but that it would prefer to achieve this objective by peaceful means and would turn to forcible action only as a last resort.
The final paragraph of the assessment stated that, if Argentina concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forcible measures against British interests, and that it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances, military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion could not be discounted.
I have described this assessment in some detail because it dealt with the responses that Argentina would be likely to make in the order in which it thought they would occur. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East, the then shadow Foreign Secretary, has selectively emphasised the final possibility ignoring all of the measures which the assessment thought would precede it. At the end of previous JIC assessments there has always been the phrase that invasion could not be discounted.
The principal suggestion made by Lord Franks for the future is that the machinery within Government for intelligence assessment should be reviewed. The committee expressed the view that, during the period leading up to the invasion, the Joint Intelligence Organisation might not have given sufficient weight to the diplomatic and other indications that the Argentine Government's position was hardening in the early months of 1982, as compared with intelligence reports.
The committee also suggested that the independence of the Joint Intelligence Committee should be emphasised by having its chairman appointed by the Prime Minister as a full-time member of the Cabinet Office, with a more critical and independent role.
These are matters which it is our custom not to discuss in public for obvious reasons. We have to remember that anything which we say on this subject is certain to be studied very closely by foreign Governments. We have therefore to be sure that nothing we say makes the tasks of our own security and intelligence people harder, or those of our adversaries easier. We must therefore avoid any reference to our own operations and techniques or those of our allies, but the House will expect me on this occasion to comment on the Franks' observations on the composition of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
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I think it right to accept the proposal that its chairmanship should be held by a member of the Cabinet Office who is able to give more time to supervising the work of the assessments machinery. I therefore intend to appoint as chairman of the JIC an official of the Cabinet Office who will be engaged full time on intelligence matters. He will have direct access to the Prime Minister in the same way as the heads of the security and intelligence agencies.
Mr. Dalyell: Mr. Ure recorded that the Cabinet Office had said that the Prime Minister would like the next Defence Committee paper on the Falklands to include annexes on both civil and military contingency plans. By asking for military contingency plans on 5 March, how can the Prime Minister say that this crisis came out of the blue to her on Wednesday 31 March?
The Prime Minister: As there had been military contingency plans for a long time of the kind that described the number of ships that would need to go to the area in certain circumstances, I fail to see how the hon. Gentleman's question has any significance. That paragraph arose from my comment on a press report that I saw and to which I have referred. It said, first, that if any action were taken it would be commercial action, but that we were in jeopardy possibly. There is nothing as dangerous as the previous press report in the Cronica in about 1974 or reports of threats of invasion in 1976. I saw the press report and said that we must look at contingency plans. The press report was dated 3 March. It was communicated to the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence which referred to it at the meeting on 5 March.
The Ministry of Defence considered its previous documents and altered them in the light of the changing position. The contingency plans came to me on 26 March. In view of what I had seen, it seemed reasonable to ask for contingency plans. Although an invasion was not imminent, and Franks agreed that it was not and that we could not have known that one was imminent because the decision to invade was not taken, it seemed reasonable to take the view contained in the press report that there might be considerable danger in several months, and to seek the advice of the chiefs of staff and to decide what action should be taken.
The advice came. It still contained the fundamental dilemma which did not change because of the geography.
Mr. Andrew Faulds: On this point—
The Prime Minister: I shall not give way. I am coming to an end. I have dealt at some length with the comments made.
Mr. Faulds rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister has made it clear that she is not giving way.
Mr. Faulds: On this point—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister must be allowed to continue.
The Prime Minister: I shall finish shortly.
I have dealt at some length with the comments made in the Franks report and by others outside. But the report sets them all in perspective. I quote:
"There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion—which would be purely hypothetical—that the invasion would have been

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prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our Report. Taking account of these considerations and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticsm or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982."
That is the unanimous conclusion, taking into account all the considerations and all the evidence. The question which the Opposition must answer is, do they accept or repudiate that conclusion? After all their efforts to paint in stronger colours this or that aspect of the account, do they accept this independent committee's final verdict? The House and the country will expect from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition a clear answer to that question, which is not given in his amendment.
As a result of the events of last year and of the Franks report, the performance of Government machinery, of Ministers and of officials has been subjected to the closest scrutiny. That is our way in this democracy, and rightly so.
But I now pay tribute again to the outstanding service which my noble Friend Lord Carrington has given to this country, and also to the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) and my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), whose skill in handling the New York talks in February 1982 is specifically acknowledged in the report.
Officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in the Ministry of Defence and in the intelligence organisation have been subjected to much criticism. The Franks report attaches no blame to the individuals and makes it equally clear that the mass of allegations made against the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were quite unjustified.
I would add that the Department which has been subjected to that criticism was the same Department which so brilliantly mobilised opinion and so skilfully promoted our cause at the United Nations, in the United States, with our other partners and allies and across the world. That needs saying and I am glad to say it.
Mr. Tony Benn: Will the Prime Minister give way?
The Prime Minister: I shall not give way. I have nearly come to the end of my speech.
I pay tribute as well to the work of the Ministry of Defence, which played such a notable part in the mobilisation and servicing of the task force.
It is not surprising that a thorough inquiry over six months by a committee with the distinction and calibre which has produced this report should have observations to make on the handling of this or that aspect of events. That would have been so whatever the subject of the inquiry. I believe that the Government can legitimately take pride in the final verdict of this review. Where it points to the need for change, change will, as I have indicated, be made. For it is now the future that matters—and in particular the future of the Falkland Islanders. The Government are determined, as are the British people, that everything necessary shall be done to secure for the islanders what they themselves want and deserve—a life of freedom and peace under a Government of their choice. That prospect was shattered last spring. It is now restored, and we shall do everything within our power to ensure that it is never again imperilled.
4.33 pm
Mr. Michael Foot: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:
"notes that the Report of the Falkland Islands Review confirmed the failure of Her Majesty's Government to give adequate priority to the Falkland Islands in its defence and foreign policy, its failure to consider the problem in Cabinet or the Defence Committee of Cabinet in the fifteen months before the invasion took place, and its failure to respond adequately to a risk of invasion which it knew to exist."
In my remarks I shall seek to traverse the same ground as the Prime Minister traversed, although not in the same order.
I must begin, in view of the right hon. Lady's concluding remarks, by saying how touched we are by her tribute to the Foreign Office and those in it. Some of us can remember the furious campaign that was conducted in some of the newspapers that have been the most prominent supporters of the right hon. Lady—The Sun, the Daily Mail and others—against Lord Carrington and those who were associated with him. It was a foul and loathsome campaign. The right hon. Lady would have done herself much more credit if she had repudiated it much more forcefully at that time, instead of allowing it to persist.
This affair raises questions about who was responsible for the invasion. We have no doubt that the chief responsibility and guilt for the invasion rests on General Galtieri and those in Argentina who supported him. We have never wavered from our view that the responsibility was theirs, but of course others with responsibility must have been involved, particularly as the Foreign Secretary and some eminent members of the Foreign Office resigned. It is not every day of the week that the Foreign Secretary resigns, not even under this Government.
I know that we always look a little sceptically, wonderingly and with solicitude at the new Foreign Secretary. We often wonder how long he will survive. Sometimes when I see him wandering round the place I am reminded of the account of the Minister who served in Constantinople, who said that he never left the sultan's presence without making sure that his head was still upon his shoulders. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman has to make sure of that too. The right hon. Lady has a special faculty for shifting the blame for some of the events for which she should take responsibility on to other shoulders. We must look at the debate in that sense.
I hope that the House will forgive me if I, too, quote fairly extensively from the report. I refer to the memorandum of 12 October 1979, which is referred to in paragraph 75. Anyone who reads that will see how it compresses the tragedy into a few sentences. The report states:
"On 12 October 1979 Lord Carrington circulated a memorandum to the Prime Minister and other members of the Defence Committee with a view to discussion by the Committee at a meeting the following week. The paper restated the options set out in Lord Carrington's minute of 20 September. It pointed out that the 'Fortress Falklands' option and the option of continuing talks but without making any concessions on sovereignty both carried a serious threat of invasion. One of the annexes to the memorandum was a paper on the Argentine political and military threat, which assessed that, if Argentina concluded that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forceful measures including direct military action. It pointed out that Argentina had the capability to capture the Islands. Lord Carrington recommended that talks with

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Argentina should be resumed at ministerial level to explore, without commitment and without seeking to rush matters, political and economic solutions."
That was the considered view of the Foreign Office after the first major assessment undertaken by the Government on the subject. That was the view that Lord Carrington and the Foreign Office wished to have discussed fully at the beginning of the Government's tenure of office. In the next sentence or two—I do not blame the right hon. Lady for this, although it is a matter of interest—it is said that the matter was not discussed at that meeting as other urgent and pressing matters had to be discussed.
The right hon. Lady claims that that document, which must have been a governing document within the Department and in the Foreign Office, was persistently discussed during 1980. She claims that the Government were persistently examining these matters all through 1980. I should like to know at which meetings and how often that document was discussed, with its statement that the present developing situation carried
"a serious threat of invasion."
When the right hon. Lady says, as she did in her speech a few minutes ago, that all options were put at the outset, I should like to know when that document, stating that there was a serious threat of invasion, was put to the Cabinet or to the Defence Committee.
Now I come to the other end of the timetable, the intelligence questions to which the right hon. Lady referred. I do so for a reason which I hope will become fully recognised in a moment. The right hon. Lady made many references to the intelligence reports and the way in which they were made to the Government. All of us can remember that in the debates at the time of the invasion there were many discussions on whether the intelligence work had been done properly. The Franks report does not include any strong condemnation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which did its work pretty well. Everyone who read most of the warnings that it gave even up to March 1982, would, I believe, concur with that.
In paragraph 309 the report says:
"In March 1982 it was agreed that a new assessment should be prepared,"—
the right hon. Lady referred to an earlier assessment, but I do not think that she referred specifically to this new assessment—
"and work was started on it. It was thought, however, that it could most usefully be presented to Ministers in the context of a more general consideration of Falkland Islands policy,"—
if it was thought that it should be presented in a wider context that was the right way to proceed, because it appears that often the more general indications of what was happening in Buenos Aires were discounted—
"which they were expected to discuss at a meeting of the Defence Committee on 16 March. In the event, as we have explained," —
that is, the Franks committee—
"that meeting did not take place, and the new assessment was never completed."
The right hon. Lady referred to that missing meeting of 16 March. Anyone who reads the report will hunt again and again to discover exactly why it should have been postponed. There were people in the Foreign Office and in the Joint Intelligence Service who wanted to secure it.
It was said by the right hon. Lady today that the meeting was postponed because the Foreign Secretary was awaiting further information about what might be happening in the
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Falkland Islands themselves, but if we consider those dates, the problem, the new assessment and the people who were asking that that new assessment should be considered, it seems strange that there should have been another postponement. That report, like so many other reports to which the Franks report refers, should have been considered by the Cabinet and by the Overseas and Defence Committee during that period.
The same applies to the reports by the ambassador in Buenos Aires. All of us who have read the report and, indeed, everyone, must be impressed by the reports that came from Buenos Aires and by the warnings given by the ambassador. Paragraph 104 must be of special interest to the right hon. Lady, because it was the ambassador who led her at a later stage to say:
"We must make contingency plans,"
but the ambassador in Buenos Aires reinforced in the latter part of 1981 the assessment that the Foreign Office had been making ever since the end of 1979.
Paragraph 104 says:
"When he was informed of Lord Carrington's decision not to pursue a public education campaign, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires protested strongly in a letter to Mr. Fearn on 2 October 1981. He said that, as he understood it, the decision was to have no strategy at all beyond a general Micawberism."
That phrase has now become famous. It might almost be substituted for the phrase, "the resolute approach".
The same paragraph says:
"There was a clear risk that the Argentines would conclude that talking was a waste of time. The Ambassador said that 'talks for the sake of talking' were something the Argentines conceded to the British and not vice versa; and he was dubious about their being ready to concede them any longer."
That was a warning that should have been presented not merely to the Foreign Secretary but to the Cabinet and to the Overseas and Defence Committee at least. The right hon. Lady must acknowledge that, because it was she who, a few weeks later when she received another report from the same ambassador, made her famous comment:
"We must make contingency plans".
One of the contingency plans which the right hon. Lady might have made in that moment of extremity was to refer the matter to the Cabinet, but she did not do so. There is no evidence in the report that those contingency plans had any effect. Indeed, we can also discover from the report that many contingency plans had been made in various Departments and they were awaiting a meeting at which the proposals for the contingency plans could be brought forward.
Mr. David Crouch: May I take the right hon. Gentleman back to the beginning of chapter 2, which he quoted at some length, and to paragraph 75 and Lord Carrington's reference to the possibility of invasion? The right hon. Gentleman is repeating history to the House. Will he acknowledge that that was within five months of the Government taking office and was the fourth initiative taken by the Government, the first having been taken within one month, when a Minister of State met the deputy Foreign Minister, and the second a month later, when he went to the Falkland Islands? There was no lack of urgency in dealing with a serious problem.
Mr. Foot: I am not in any sense criticising the Foreign Secretary for having brought forward that assessment at that time in 1979. Far from criticising him, I was citing that paragraph to show that right at the beginning of this Government's tenure of office they had a full, proper, careful assessment presented to them by the Foreign

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Office, although we do not even now know at what meeting that assessment was discussed. I am not criticising the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, I am doing the opposite. I shall come to his further defence on another matter on which he needs not my defence but that of others.
I quoted to the House last week the appeal that came from the Falkland Islanders on the whole question of the withdrawal of HMS Endurance. The matter cannot be disposed of in the peremptory and trivial manner in which the right hon. Lady did so, particularly because on this question she has a special responsibility of her own, to which I shall come in a moment.
I hope that I shall be pardoned for reading to the House again what the people in the Falkland Islands said when they got the news that the decision had been made by the Government to withdraw HMS Endurance. They said:
"The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS 'Endurance' from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of Islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision."
There were quite a number of people in the country and in Parliament who were in favour of trying to back the Falkland Islanders in an attempt to have the decision reversed. They used proper parliamentary methods to do it. As all of us can remember, there was over a period of weeks a whole series of early-day motions signed and resigned and placed on the Order Paper. I am glad to say that those had some effect in one quarter at least. They did not have any effect upon the Secretary of State for Defence, but they had some effect upon the Foreign Office. Lord Carrington cited those early-day motions in the appeal that he made to the Government to change their mind about HMS Endurance.
There is also the case that was made by Lord Hill-Norton in the debate in another place on 16 December 1981. The right hon. Lady and the Franks report have warned us against hindsight. This is not hindsight; this is what was said before. It was a warning that was given to the former Secretary of State for Defence in particular. Few Conservative Members can disregard Lord Hill-Norton's opinion. He said:
"What I have no doubt about is that the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from this station next year, after 27 years of continuous Antarctic patrol, without replacement by another of Her Majesty's ships suitably fit and fitted, is a grave mistake. The consequence of it will almost certainly be disastrous in the political, military and economic fields alike, and equally probably it will be irreversible."
Even at this late date the Prime Minister talks about the limited capacity of HMS Endurance, but all that was dealt with by Lord Hill-Norton. He went on to say:
"Therefore, to conclude, it is my view that to withdraw the 'Endurance' would be the clearest signal imaginable"—
The right hon. Lady talked about signals a few minutes ago. She dared to ask us what sort of signal that was. What sort of signal was hers?
"Therefore, to conclude, it is my view that to withdraw the 'Endurance' would be the clearest signal imaginable of our lack, or loss, of interest, not only in the Falklands but in the whole area. Make no mistake about it, that signal will at once be read, with anguish by our friends and with delight—as the noble Lord, Lord Morris, has quoted—by any potential opponent."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 December 1981; Vol. 426, c. 220ߝ22.]
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The Prime Minister has a special responsibility in this matter. When her Ministers are attacked, she sometimes rushes to their defence. She rushed to the defence of the previous Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for St. Ives (Sir J. Nott). On 9 February 1982 my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) asked:
"On a related question, is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decisions to withdraw and pay off HMS 'Endurance' when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences? Is she further aware that this stale old proposition was put to me on more than one occasion when I was Prime Minister and after considering it I turned it down flat? Will she please do the same?"
Several weeks later the right hon. Lady did the same, but a war started before she changed her mind.
The right hon. Lady, with her usual determination to come to the aid of Ministers under attack, said:
"I recognise that this was a very difficult decision for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence."
It was all his decision apparently.
"The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there are many competing claims on the defence budget, even though we are increasing it substantially. He will also know that the defence capability of that ship is extremely limited. My right hon. Friend therefore felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority."—[Official Report, 9 February 1982. Vol. 17, c. 856ߝ57.]
The Government thereby saved about £3 million on the Budget.
How does the right hon. Lady think her reply and the words of Lord Hill-Norton in another place were received by those in Buenos Aires if they were studying these matters? I hope that there will be no further talk from the right hon. Lady about signals to Argentina. The right hon. Lady had every chance of changing her mind long before. All she had to do was listen to the opinion that was coming from so many different quarters in the House, in the country and from the Falklands. That was the way in which she could have sent a signal. What she did was to send the wrong one. She should have had the honesty to get up and admit it.
Mr. Churchill: Has the right hon. Gentleman forgotten the signal that was sent by a Socialist Government in the mid-1970s, when they announced that they were scrapping HMS Endurance? Does he not recall the circumstances in which HMS Endurance was reprieved? It took the firing on a British ship—RRS Shackleton—by Argentine forces before the Labour Government decided to reprieve HMS Endurance, and that was done only on a year-by-year basis.
Mr. Foot: If what the hon. Gentleman says is true, how much greater is the guilt of the right hon. Lady? It was not only once that she had to learn the lesson; it was twice. The right hon. Lady might have learnt something had she consulted the hon. Gentleman on the matter. What he has done is to confirm my case. The right hon. Lady ought to understand by now that it was a grave mistake, as Lord Hill-Norton said in the other place.
My claim against the Government is that the proper conclusion to be drawn from all these events is that matters that should have been brought to the Cabinet and the Defence Committee were not properly brought there. Anybody who looks at the case will see that that is confirmed.
During the critical months of 1980 and 1981, right up to the time of the invasion, the wise judgment of the

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ambassador at Buenos Aires never reached the Cabinet or the Defence Committee. The important forecasts of the Joint Intelligence Committee, some admittedly varied, never reached the Cabinet. The considered views of Lord Carrington over a long period never reached the Cabinet and were never discussed at the Defence Committee during the whole of the period. The attitudes of the Secretary of State for Defence conflicted with those of the Foreign Office on some crucial questions. The whole issue of deterrence turned partly on an estimate of their two judgments. Therefore, it is not possible to deal with those two judgments by letters of the kind to which the right hon. Lady has referred. The only proper place for dealing with such matters was in Cabinet.
The right hon. Lady asked for verdicts, and paragraph 291 of the Franks report is a verdict on the way in which the Government were run. It says:
"Officials in both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence were looking to Ministers to review the outcome of the contingency planning they had done in view of a potentially more aggressive posture by Argentina."
The right hon. Lady attempted to explain that Argentina's posture was becoming less hostile, but that is not exactly the judgment of the Franks report. The report continues:
"In the event, Government policy towards Argentina and the Falkland Islands was never formally discussed outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after January 1981. Thereafter, the time was never judged to be ripe"—
and the person who has the responsibility and the power to decide what meetings shall take place is the Prime Minister—
"although we were told in oral evidence that, subject to the availability of Ministers, a Defence Committee meeting could have been held at any time, if necessary at short notice. There was no meeting of the Defence Committee to discuss the Falklands until 1 April 1982"—
a most appropriate date—
"and there was no reference to the Falklands in Cabinet, even after the New York talks of 26 and 27 February, until Lord Carrington reported on events in South Georgia on 25 March 1982."
That is what I described last week as the collapse of Cabinet government. That is the bare truth of the matter. It is the reason why the Government, the Cabinet, did not respond properly to the demands of the House of Commons. It is the reason why the Government did not make a proper judgment on what was occurring. It is the reason why, after the first assessment at the end of 1979—it was a perfectly proper and wise assessment by the Foreign Office, which, apparently, was not even discussed in the Cabinet—the Cabinet made no such full estimate of the problem with which it had to deal.
Mr. Michael Mates: The right hon. Gentleman is making a serious charge about the breakdown of Cabinet government. So that we may get it into perspective, perhaps he will tell us what went on when he was in Cabinet. For example, when he was the deputy leader of the party, was he told about the deployment of the frigates and the submarines to the south Atlantic in 1977? Was he at any time during the whole of the Labour Administration told about the Chevaline programme?
Mr. Foot: We had meetings three times a week to discuss those matters. No charge is made by Franks or anyone else against the Labour Government for the failure to call proper meetings. Indeed, it is remarked how we called meetings much more frequently. The difference is
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that under the Labour Government not a single life was lost to protect the Falklands. What happened as a result of the right hon. Lady's Government and the way in which they conducted their affairs was that there was hopeless mismanagement and, I repeat, a collapse of Cabinet government, and a failure to decide these matters properly.
It is not only what happened in the past that concerned the Franks committee and was the reason for having an investigation. I agree with the investigation that has taken place, and in my view it has been extremely thorough and exposes foreign policy issues, defence issues, and the interlinking of those issues, better than anyone could have expected, but I do not agree with the final sentences. Most people who have read the report will confirm what I say. The last two sentences might have been better if they had said that the operation had been a great success, but unfortunately the patient died, because that is the fact of the matter. In fact, it was not a success.
Somehow or other, there has to be a conclusion about the responsibility. If we do not make the proper deductions about the conduct of Cabinet government in this country, the same mistakes will be made again on this and many other issues. I hope that the House and the country will be a good deal wiser in dealing with this problem in the coming weeks, months and years, but we shall not do so if we make the wrong deductions.
One of the most important comments on the Franks report and the developing situation was made by a person to whom the right hon. Lady will take no exception. I say that because sometimes she speaks as though Fortress Falklands is the only policy that is necessary. Her right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary does not always speak in those terms, and I dare say that a divergence may develop between them, and the right hon. Gentleman's spokesman in the House of Lords has not accepted that doctrine. Indeed, Lord Carrington himself made a speech about the possibility of securing a treaty in the future that could deal with these problems. I do not say that he is asking for it immediately—no one could ask for it immediately—but I believe that we should look at this report and decide how to advance from here.
I hope that the right hon. Lady and the Foreign Secretary will respond to what is said. If they do not respond to what we say in the House about it, perhaps they will respond to what was written by Sir Nicholas Henderson in The Sunday Times last week in an extremely perceptive and wise article. Certainly, the right hon. Lady cannot discount the opinions of Sir Nicholas Henderson. He was closer to some of these events and the events in New York than anyone else. He probably knows as much about the complicated and interweaving diplomacy of these matters as anyone else.
This is what Sir Nicholas Henderson said, and this is the advice that I give the right hon. Lady. I hope that she will not deride it. Indeed, I hope that she and the House will be prepared to act upon it. He wrote:
"I do not think, however, that we should underestimate the international difficulties that lie ahead for us. The Europeans will be providing the Argentinians with plenty of the most modern arms including exocets. Washington will be fortifying relations with Buenos Aires. We will be under pressure from our Community partners and from the USA to negotiate. At the non-aligned summit due to be held in New Delhi in the spring and at the next United Nations General Assembly we must expect awkward resolutions calling for renewed negotiations. It will no doubt be pointed out that Her Majesty's Government has gone

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about the world for years urging everyone to settle differences by negotiations and we can expect to be asked to follow our own advice."
He went on to say:
"It is, of course, much too early to try to foresee what form the negotiation might take or what it might be about".
I do not dissent from that.
"Although I have no official role now whatever, I am sure that in some way at some stage the problem will have to be internationalised. Other countries will have to be brought in, not least to remove the prospect of an indefinite security".
That is the problem that we face in this country. Partly, it is the problem of the Falklands which we have always had to face, but partly it is made more intense, and it is more necessary that we should act wisely, because of what has occurred. If we do not act wisely and learn from these events, and learn from these reports, there will be other events in which other people are killed in the Falklands, whether they are Falkland Islanders, Argentines or our own people.
It was bad enough that we made mistakes that led to deaths. It would be even worse if, having learnt some of the lessons, we turned aside and did not heed them. I therefore urge the right hon. Lady, as long as she holds these responsibilities, not to think of trying to blame someone else for her own faults, but to recognise that she and the Government should show some wisdom and magnanimity in dealing with this problem.
5.8 pm
Dr. David Owen: Listening to this debate, I wondered what people outside, and perhaps particularly those who went down into the southern Atlantic and risked their lives, and some of those who came back severely injured, must have thought. The Prime Minister did not seem able to concede at any stage any error, any possibility of any misjudgment. Nevertheless, listening to the Leader of the Opposition, one was driven to conclude that he seemed to believe that the Franks report did not exist. He virtually gave the impression that the Government were responsible for every aspect of the situation. The right hon. Gentleman launched a vitriolic attack on all aspects of the judgment, ignoring the fact that two of his right hon. Friends were signatories to the report.
I do not agree with substantial parts of the Franks report, but anyone who pretends that the issue in 1982 was easy simply has not lived through such experiences. When I read the Franks report, I think, "There but for the grace of God go I." The attempt to try to make political polemic out of the issue is useless. The Leader of the Opposition can make criticisms—there are serious criticisms to be made—but the temper of the debate and the way in which we criticise is important.
The Prime Minister would have carried more conviction if she had admitted that she was wrong about HMS Endurance, and that when her Foreign Secretary asked three times for a reconsideration of the previous Cabinet decision on it she should at least have insisted that the issue went to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee. It cannot be right that, on an issue of such importance, a Foreign Secretary should be overridden purely by an exchange of letters. The report found that the Prime Minister was wrong about that. It is to the credit of the former Prime Minster that when he was faced with a conflict of opinion on this matter in similar circumstances, he found decisively and repeatedly with the Foreign Secretary and against the Defence Secretary.
Mr. James Callaghan: I wish to get the facts right. I know how tempting it is constantly to interrupt, but it would be absurd if the view of the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill) were to catch attention, as I am sure the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) would agree. The Ministry of Defence's proposal, made during the lifetime of the Labour Government, to pay off HMS Endurance was never made public. The decision to continue using HMS Endurance was made well before the attack by the Argentines on the Bulgarian trawlers. The hon. Member for Stretford was wrong on both those facts.
Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman will make his own speech tomorrow, but he is quite right. The decision to continue HMS Endurance was made on repeated occasions. Such a decision was made in October 1977 and in 1978 we made a further decision to continue HMS Endurance for two years into the first year of the life of the present Administration. I believed in 1977, and I believe now, that withdrawal of HMS Endurance would be substantially misread by the Argentines. That was a consequence of the decision to discontinue HMS Endurance's operations, but it would be pushing the point to far to claim purely that that action precipitated the invasion.
We should focus on the crisis that existed following the breakdown of the talks in New York. Franks was right to say that there was not a strong enough case to deploy a naval force to the south Atlantic before the talks in February 1982. That judgment was right. The crucial moment when the position changed was when the Argentine negotiator, the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister in New York, was disowned, a unilateral communiqué was put out in Buenos Aires and our ambassador there drew attention to the press interpretation of the report. [Interruption.] It is the tone of the speech that will be listened to outside. The right hon. Lady then faces the question—
Mr. Frank Dobson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would it be possible for you to bury the rules of the House to allow the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) to stand in the middle of the Chamber to facilitate him facing both ways?
Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that this serious debate will not have trivia like that.
Dr. Owen: In passing, Mr. Speaker, I may say that I have long believed that cross-Benches in the House would make for a much more informed and balanced debate. I look forward to the day when they are introduced.
To return to the Prime Minister's responsibility, the ambassador's report triggered a response from her. However, the argument for putting the whole weight of blame of this point on the Prime Minister falls down. I admit that I was surprised to read in the Franks report that the Prime Minister had responded by saying:
"We must make contingency plans."
I am even more amazed that, the right hon. Lady having made that comment, no contingency plans were made. It is extraordinary that Franks has not revealed what happened within the Government apparatus at that point. We are not told the terms of the Prime Minister's private

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secretary's letter or whether there was a follow-up procedure when letters of the Prime Minister were not responded to.
It is amazing that any period longer than five days could go by without the Prime Minister's private secretary going to the private secretary of the Foreign Secretary and asking him for a reply. Franks does not reveal any of the exchanges that took place over the proposed meeting on 16 March. The Franks report did not even mention that it was postulated that there would be a meeting on that date. My memory of the report may have served me wrong on that point, but the reason why that meeting did not take place was certainly not examined.
The Foreign Secretary must take some burden of responsibility at that stage. The fact that he resigned honourably and rightly does not exclude the right of the House to examine why, when on 5 March he, as Foreign Secretary, was told by his officials that a naval deployment had been made in 1977, he did not follow up that matter more carefully. Why was the matter only mentioned to him by officials and a detailed paper on the circumstances of the 1977 deployment not presented? The extreme relevance of those dates—5 and 8 March—is also related to the Prime Minister, because she spoke to the then Defence Secretary on 8 March and asked him how long it would take to get ships down to the southern Atlantic.
The Prime Minister has a misconception about the use of nuclear submarines. The House, and indeed the world, needs no reminding of the strength and power of the nuclear submarine after the sinking of the Argentine vessel Belgrano by HMS Conqueror. It is a fact that in 1977 the chiefs of staff were insistent upon having surface ships as a means of communication to the submarines. When I objected to surface ships being in and around the Falklands, they were content for them to be deployed to the south Atlantic where the ships could communicate with the submarines out of range of Argentine aircraft. The Prime Minister spoke of not wishing to send surface ships for fear of what would happen, but no one asked that our surface ships should be deployed around the Falklands within the range of Argentine aircraft. The key question is what would have happened had a nuclear-powered submarine been deployed.
It was said that the submarine was impossible to deploy quickly, but that was exactly what was done in 1977. The news of its deployment was never leaked, which is surprising. Many believed that the information would be leaked. We had whole ships' companies away in the south Atlantic, missing Christmas at home, and still the news did not leak upon their return to port. It is a credit to the Navy that that was so.
The fact that that submarine was deployed should have been brought forcefully to the attention of the Foreign Secretary by the Foreign Office. One reason, I suspect, why that did not happen was that the Foreign Office was unenthusiastic about the initial deployment in 1977. It had to be extracted from the Foreign Office that there was even a deterioration in the then military position. That point should have been brought out in the Franks report. The way that the report deals with the position in 1977 is a disgrace and one wonders why one bothered to give evidence to it on what happened then. There were important facts on the way that decisions were made at that time.
Mr. Michael Latham: As he was Foreign Secretary in 1977, can the right hon. Gentleman answer two questions? First, how does he deal with Lord Franks' point that the Argentines did not know that this submarine had been deployed and that, therefore, it could hardly have been much of a deterrent? Secondly, how does he answer the points in paragraph 53 of the report that HMS `Endurance' discovered that Southern Thule had been invaded by the Argentines on 20 December 1976, but that it did not become known in Britain until May 1978?
Dr. Owen: My predecessor took the decision not to announce it. It was the right decision and I maintained it through 1977 on the ground that it would provoke the negotiations—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] That was the feeling. It was believed better to present the Southern Thule incident as part of a scientific endeavour and to persuade the Argentines to present it in that way. They eventually agreed to do that.
Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop: Untrue.
Dr. Owen: It is not an untruth. They were extremely complicated negotiations and we were trying to reach a settlement, knowing how vulnerable we were in the south Atlantic. However, it may have been wiser to make that known. That is an open argument.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: More truthful.
Dr. Owen: It is not a question of being more truthful. Many decisions are not made public for sound and sensible reasons. One of them was the decision to deploy naval vessels in November 1977.
It is well known to the House that there is minor disagreement between myself and the former Prime Minister about whether the Argentines knew. I believe that they did not know. They were not told. I gather that a book will shortly be published by Simon Jenkins and Max Hastings which states that Sir Maurice Oldfield might have told them. He was then head of MI6, but has since, sadly, died. I do not believe that he would have told the Argentines when he knew it to be in contradiction to my policy. Although he was answerable to the Prime Minister, he was under the executive authority of the Foreign Secretary. I do not know the circumstances, but I made every effort to ensure that the operation was covert. I do not believe the Argentines knew. This is a side issue that has often tended to draw attention away from the real significance of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine below the surface so as to be in a position to intervene if matters deteriorated. I regret some of the clouding that has taken place.
Sir John Nott: If we leave aside for the moment the question whether the Labour Government at that time would, had the bluff been called, have given rules of engagement to the submarine that would have entitled it to sink an Argentine ship on the high seas before a shot had been fired, did the Labour Government consider how they would deter an airborne invasion of the Falkland Islands, which was wholly within the capability of the Argentines? They were only 400 miles from the islands. How was that threat to be deterred in 1977?
Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman poses two important questions, but it should be understood that the Labour Government acted throughout in fullest consultation with the chiefs of staff and often implemented papers presented by the chiefs of staff. As to the right hon.

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Gentleman's specific question, on 21 November a meeting was held, under the chairmanship of the then Prime Minister, consisting of the then Secretary of State for Defence, myself as Foreign Secretary and the chief of the defence staff. Detailed rules of engagement were drawn up for that submarine.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: What were they?
Dr. Owen: I shall reveal them to the House since I have been challenged by the former Secretary of State for Defence. The rules were quite explicit: if Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire. It was to torpedo the ships. I did not criticise the decision on the General Belgrano—it was a difficult decision—because when one is faced by a threat to a vital national interest there is no point in having armed forces if one is not prepared to use them. That was certainly the view of the four people who met and took that decision.
As to the right hon. Gentleman's point about an airborne invasion, he is of course quite right. However, at the time we believed that we were more likely to face a naval invasion. The signs were that the Argentine navy was pushing military action in order to strengthen its position in the junta, which is what happened on this occasion. The advantage of a submarine is that one need not declare it. Had the Prime Minister deployed a submarine, when President Reagan telephoned General Galtieri, he could have said, "There are serious forces deployed in the area and Britain will not hesitate to use them." The Prime Minister might even have decided to hold her hand, not to inform President Reagan and wait. As the ships started to come towards the Falklands, she could have issued a serious warning—when they were 200 miles away from the islands—that they would enter an exclusion zone of 100 miles, or 50 miles as we projected, where their ships would be sunk. Had that happened, I believe that the Argentine vessels would have turned round. A mistake was made in not deploying a submarine.
I wish to try to get away from a party political battle about the issue and to debate the wrong decisions that were taken. If the former Prime Minister had been Prime Minister in 1982, he would have deployed a submarine in March. I make that judgment of a man whom I know and respect. Like the Prime Minister, he would have responded on 3 March. He would have asked for immediate contingency measures and I hope that I too, would have responded fairly smartly. The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee would have met—with much the same people—and it would have come to the same conclusion, to deploy a force in the south Atlantic.
However, not every leader of the Labour party would have responded in that way. There is not the slightest chance that the present Leader of the Opposition would have responded in that way. That is only my judgment, but this needs to be said. Had the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) been Prime Minister, he would have deployed the ships. However, some hon. Members on the Opposition Front Bench would not have deployed them. Some hon. Members on the Conservative Benches might have handled the crisis better than the Prime Minister. She has received much praise during the past few months—deservedly so—for her conduct of the war. But to try to pretend in the debate that this national humiliation
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had nothing to do with her and that there was no fault is nonsense. What a difference it would have made if she had admitted just once in her speech that she had made a mistake, even on HMS Endurance. That is the real indictment of the Prime Minister. We often wonder whether she believes that she ever makes a mistake. She believes that she alone governs this country, but the Cabinet is there. Why did not the Foreign Secretary go to the Cabinet? He knew that once the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence had made up their minds, he would be overruled yet again.
The most important issue is winning the peace. The Prime Minister earned praise for her role in the war, but let us examine her record on the peace. Not one millimetre of magnanimity nor one centimetre of sensitivity has come from her. She has flounced around the world, damaging and criticising those who came to our aid during the war. Her reaction to the American decision at the United Nations was hysterical. Her lack of support for the French in their decision to sell arms again to Argentina, and her scant regard for the remarkable support that w e received from the French throughout the crisis, is not designed to win friends and influence people.
Then we come to Fortress Falklands. The Prime Minister rejected Fortress Falklands in 1979, 1980 and 1981. She even rejected it during the negotiations before the events that led up to the war. Yet now that victory is won, without the slightest magnanimity, she embraces Fortress Falklands, embraces paramountcy and refuses to negotiate. What is she landing us with—a massive military commitment, millions of pounds and more. If this course is pursued, she will land Britain with another humiliation. One day the forces of Latin America—not just Argentina—will be sufficient to inflict a humiliation on us. Argentina also has in-flight refuelling. It can interfere with flights from Ascension Island to the Falklands. It can interfere with shipping. It had two diesel submarines that went around the area throughout the war, presenting a constant threat to HMS Invincible let alone many other ships. It is a fool who believes that we shall he able to withstand the present stance of no negotiations, Fortress Falklands and paramountcy for the Falkland Islanders.
It is the role of the House of Commons to defend the real interests of the Falkland Islanders. Throughout our support for the Prime Minister during the war in the Falklands, my right hon. and hon. Friends and I reminded her of the need to negotiate. The only area of major disagreement was that I did not believe that enough effort was being given to negotiation. At least I had the grace to admit that the final negotiation position was reasonable. We started to differ again when I said that it was unwise so quickly to take those suggestions off the negotiating table. The Prime Minster would have been wiser in the first few weeks of victory to have said to Argentina, "Let us put this behind us and look to the future." That is what magnanimity in victory means. The Prime Minister says that all those people could not lose their lives and be scarred for us to reopen negotiations.
It was a fundamental principle that the cross-party support for the war came from the determination to resist aggression and to act under the United Nations charter in self-defence. The Prime Minister quoted that charter often, but she forgot it the day that the Union Jack was again raised above Port Stanley. She has paid scant regard to the other responsibilities in the charter such as that to pursue a negotiated settlement. She had only to say before

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the United Nations debate that she was ready at some future date to open discussions with Argentina and our friends would have stayed with us. She would not have had the United States voting as they did. I know that because I was in the United States shortly after the debate took place.
The Prime Minister refused adamantly to countenance any commitment to any future negotiations at any future date. I agree that the time was not right then, that the wounds had not healed and that the state of war still existed, but the Prime Minister has never yet shown that she believes that there will come a time, not too long in the future, when she will be prepared to discuss the long-term future of the Falkland Islands, not only with Argentina but with Latin America. If she says that now, I and the world will be delighted. Something of lasting value will have come out of this debate.
The Prime Minister: May I make sure what the right hon. Gentleman is proposing? As I emphasised in my speech, for years the House has taken the view that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. They wish to remain British. It seems that the right hon. Gentleman is proposing that we enter negotiations to hand over sovereignty.
Dr. Owen: The Prime Minister must speak for herself. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer".] I shall answer. I may do many things, but I do not duck questions. I have never used the word "paramountcy" although I frequently answered questions about the Falkland Islands for two and half years from the Dispatch Box. The Conservative Opposition spokesmen then adopted an hysterical stance similar to that of Labour Opposition spokesmen when the Financial Secretary to the Treasury spoke from the Dispatch Box on the Falklands. I have never been committed to paramountcy. I always talked of the best interests or the long-term interests of the Falkland Islanders. I said that we must pay the greatest respect to or have the fullest regard for the interests of the Falkland Islanders. The commitment to paramountcy is already around the Prime Minister's neck in regard to Gibraltar and Hong Kong. I beg her to be careful about her use of that word.
It is important to reflect the interests of the Falkland Islanders, but they are 1,800 people. There are parish councils in Britain with a larger population. We respect the views of parish councillors, we take them into account, but Parliament has not yet given up its responsibilities to parish councils and others, although the Prime Minister dictates to metropolitan county and borough councils. She has not the slightest hesitation in overriding the views of the Cabinet. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about sovereignty?"] I am prepared to discuss sovereignty. I have never backed away from it. We should be prepared to discuss it. I urged the Prime Minister to examine the three-flag proposition during the war.
The Prime Minister: As far as I can see, the right hon. Gentleman will substitute his judgment of the islanders' interests for their wishes.
Dr. Owen: No, not at all. [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes".] It would not be my judgment or even that of the Government but that of this House. I would never put the
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judgment of the House in hock and say that it could not judge what it thought, having listened to the Falkland Islanders and having considered all the facts. I used to say to the Argentine Foreign Minister that, to persuade the House of Commons, it was crucial to persuade the Falkland Islanders, because if 90 per cent. of them opposed any move so would this House.
The Prime Minister talks about sovereignty as though she has never offered it. The Minister offered it in 1980 and it was withdrawn. The withdrawal confirmed the Argentines' belief. They always used to say that any British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, would offer sovereignty until either the Falkland Islanders or Parliament said "No".
If anything good can come out of the debate—I am not sure that much good will come out of the Franks report as it is a dismal report—I hope it is that the Government will not box themselves into a "no talks, Fortress Falklands" stance. That would be folly. It is a folly that has been rejected by successive Governments.
The House has a duty to say to the British people that we fought against aggression, not for a flag. We fought for principles of freedom and for respecting the views of the Falkland Islanders. Nevertheless, the judgment lies in the House of Commons. It is here that the extremely difficult decision about the future of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and Hong Kong will have to be taken. The sooner the Prime Minister forgets this word "paramountcy" the better.
5.36 pm
Mr. John Peyton: During the Falkland Islands campaign I listened to all the speeches that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) made. He always speaks with clarity, moderation and courage. I warmly agreed with the first part of his speech today.
The right hon. Gentleman began by referring to the facile pretence that the handling of the issue was easy. He added, amid considerable barracking, but with great humility, "There but for the grace of God go I." Most of us sympathise with his sentiments. To sum up his speech, I believe that it would have come much better from the Leader of the Opposition than did his own speech.
When the right hon. Member for Devonport went on to call for magnanimity, he left us feeling a little vague as to what he meant. Magnanimity is one of those qualities with which none of us can quarrel but which we all know the difficulty of exercising now. We must bear in mind the regime in Argentina, which is hardly attractive. It can make no great claim to reliability, integrity or honesty. I found that part of the hon. Gentleman's speech a little difficult to follow.
I shall now deal with inquiries in general. I do not believe that any country that has for a short time rejoiced, and shown some pride, in a magnificent achievement would have travelled to the business of inquisition with quite the same speed or zest as we have done. It is obvious that many people have been disappointed not to find that which they expected from Lord Franks and his colleagues: a verdict of guilty. They plainly desired it. They predicted it and they may even now be slightly embarrassed by its absence.
We are so addicted to these probing exercises. Over the years that I have been in this place I can recall many of them. However, I remember few that have done justice to individuals or conferred much benefit upon the public. I

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am not advocating the use of whitewash when I say that far too often we forget, especially those facile television inquisitors, that government is not easy. The Government who have produced all the right answers to all the questions they faced have never yet existed. This ceaseless probing for fault and error is probably more effective in prompting self-defence than in securing improvement. Nor do these processes accord a sure basis for a strong public morale. It should be remembered that no nation goes unscathed from the constant suggestion that it is always in the wrong, from the constant accusation of failure.
I have no hesitation in saying that we in the House, and the nation as a whole, are deeply indebted to Lord Franks and his colleagues. I had great misgivings when the committee was set up but I must now pay tribute to it and say how surprised and pleased I was that those men were able to withstand the pressure which was upon them to allow the clarity of hindsight to become the basis of condemnation. Instead, they managed somehow to have in mind the constraints imposed upon the Government by history, by current events, not least of all by Parliament, by the odious nature of the Argentine regime and, above all, by the great distances involved.
One of the decisions that we have to make today is whether we shall have an inquest upon an inquest. Either we accept the Franks report and face all the problems—they are difficult enough—that lie ahead of us. Let us escape for once from that unhealthy preoccupation with what is past and let us look instead at the future. Alternatively, we embark upon endless and rancorous debate. There will be a mixture of gain and hurt. Some individuals will gain, perhaps, and others will be hurt. I cannot believe that such a process, if continued indefinitely, could result in profit to the nation or credit to the House of Commons.
If we decide to sustain the bitter search for error and for guilt, let the process be widened and lengthened. Let us look deeply into the past, into the role of Parliament and into the influence—this is important—of the media. Let us examine also our time-consuming procedures, which we so much cherish but which so often are a bar to any effective or prompt action. Let us dwell on our habit—Sir Nicholas Henderson commented on this—of turning away from the intractable and the unwelcome in the confident but misplaced hope that it will go away.
I have had the privilege for a long time of representing a west country constituency. I make no apology for making use of this occasion briefly to express my pride in what was done there in equipping, assembling and dispatching the task force in an amazingly short time. I refer especially to the performance of Westland helicopters and to the astonishing operation that was launched from the Royal Naval air station at Yeovilton. I am proud to have the opportunity of applauding the courage and sacrifice of those who fought. I invite the attention of those who have spoken in the debate, those who intend to speak in it and those who listen to it to some words from those who were in the South Atlantic.
A naval captain who subsequently received the CBE wrote to me:
"I am proud of my South Atlantic medal; but the CBE makes me think. First of my Naval Party who did it all. Second of my mistakes—there were many—and how lucky I was they did not come home to roost. Third of all those not honoured who did so much more than I. Above all one remembers those superb young sailors who fought and died and have no grave but the sea."
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He continues:
"One relearnt a lot one had forgotten since 1945, in particular the nature of war. One reads of brilliant victory; but when there one is much more aware of one's own errors, the mistakes, disasters, the horror and the friction. However as always the side best able to surmount these things wins—and we did."
I wonder whether it is too much to hope that the humility, the courage and the generosity of those words might find an echo in the House today.
I bring my remarks to a conclusion by quoting a further passage from a letter written by the chaplain to HMS Hermes. He wrote:
"I have no idea what the future may hold for us here in the South Atlantic. I do know that it has been my privilege to minister in god's name to a remarkable group of people, some of whom who are only 16½ years of age, whose professionalism, courage, devotion and compassion—not to mention their own distinctive sense of humour, which, alas, I doubt I could use at the Women's Guild—has for me returned, for the highest reasons, the Great back into Britain."
At the end of such a saga there must, inevitably, be a legacy of deep sadness as well as pride. My plea—I do not know how I can give it the force that it deserves—is, let us not add to that sadness by for ever carping, by raking over the ashes of the past. There are problems enough ahead and we will best discharge our duties by considering them.
5.50 pm
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: I agree with the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) when he said that we shall best draw what benefit there is to be drawn from the Franks review and from this debate upon it, if we lift our eyes to a wider and sometimes distant horizon and are not afraid to identify causes which lie comparatively remote from the anxious and crowded days of the last period before the Argentine invasion last year.
The crucial point in the story which the report unrolls is reached remarkably early. Indeed, it is reached right at the start, where the report records that in 1964 the British Government declared that
"the question of sovereignty over the islands was not negotiable."
On the following page the report records that
"in March 1967 the British Government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the islands."
It is not recorded by the review whether that decision was submitted to or taken by the Overseas and Defence Committee of the Cabinet or by the Cabinet. What is certain is that it was never submitted in advance or at the time either to the House or to the country. Indeed, it was only in the following year that it came to knowledge that so profound an alteration in British policy as was marked by those two declarations had in fact taken place. Clearly, those who took that decision, whoever they were, were aware of its high sensitivity and were extremely doubtful whether it would carry support or even acquiescence in the House or out of doors. It was no doubt for that reason that they attached to it a rider of a familiar character which I want to examine a little more closely.
The proviso was:
"provided that the wishes of the islanders were respected."
We are perhaps so familiar with that formula—we have met with it in so many contexts—that there is a danger that we misunderstand its meaning and its implications. In making my point here, there is a risk of what I halve to say being mistaken for mere verbalism when in reality it is all but verbalism. I shall give a hypothetical case. Suppose that Britain said that, if the inhabitants of the Orkneys and

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Shetlands desired not to be part of the United Kingdom but to be part of a Scandinavian confederation, this country would place no obstacle in their way. That is one proposition. Contrast with that another proposition—that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to negotiate the transfer of the Orkneys and Shetlands to a Scandinavian confederacy, but will not do so except with the consent of the inhabitants of those islands.
One might carelessly suppose that those two statements are equivalent. In reality the two statements are opposite. When the world and the islanders hear the first statement, they hear a declaration that the United Kingdom will defend its integrity and its own, though not of course in defiance of the principle that
"the Queen wishes no unwilling subjects."
When the world hears the second statement it says, "Now we understand. We get the message. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to be rid, if at all possible, of those troublesome islands, but of course there is a proviso or a catch along the route." No doubt contrasting in its mind the relative magnitude and the relative power of the two parties—Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the relatively few islanders—the world might conclude, and it might not be mistaken in concluding, that means would be found for removing in one way or another that obstacle from a path which it was evidently the desire and the intention of Her Majesty's Government to follow.
That is what was done to the Falkland Islands in 1967, and never revoked from that day until 1982. Lest it be thought that these are reflections ex post facto, I shall trouble the House with some words I spoke at the beginning of 1969 on precisely that subject. I said:
"It sounds all very well for the Government to promise that they will not cede the islands against the wishes of the inhabitants. In fact the effect of this is to put the islanders themselves in the jaws of the nutcracker. That handful of isolated British people are thereby made the sole impediment to a vaunted settlement with Argentina and to compliance with the decolonisation mania of the United Nations. Thus the entire pressure of the world—the United Nations Organisation, Argentina and Britain herself—is concentrated, like a pyramid inverted upon its point on to the unlucky islanders. To tell them in these circumstances that they shall not be sold up against their will is a cynicism suitable for a nation bent upon demolishing its own assets."
If illustration is needed of the "cynicism" to which I referred, it can be gained from a reading of the pages which follow in the Franks report, with the variation of vocabulary used about securing the consent of the islanders to what everyone knew was contrary to their wishes: they were to be "educated"; the matter was to be "made clear" to them; at times they were only to be "consulted"; their wishes were to be "paramount"; they must be brought to an understanding of "their interests"—all the enginery of power, brought to bear against the sole condition imposed and maintained by Her Majesty's Government, of both parties, upon what they wanted to do.
There were only two possible outcomes. One was that we would cheat Argentina by continuing to negotiate when we knew that negotiation could not have the end that we were holding out to it. Hon. Members will find plenty of commentary on that theme in the quotations in the report. The alternative was that we should find a way of putting the screw on the islanders so as to break their will and
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obtain from them or appear to obtain from them a declaration contrary to their true wishes and their true mind. That was the story that occupied the intervening years between 1967 and 1982. It was a course of action which foreseeably—and which it was foreseen—would result in armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina.
Mr. Crouch: Is not the right hon. Gentleman exaggerating when he talks about breaking the will of the islanders? Is that not something which he, as a right hon. Member of the House, has sought to do regarding a great many people of this country who believe that we should be in Europe when he does not believe that we should be part of the EC? Is that breaking their will or is it trying to educate them to another point of view?
Mr. Powell: I do not think there is any analogy, and I do not believe that the House will think there is any analogy, between the conduct of a national debate as to the policy of the United Kingdom, and Her Majesty's Government and the opinion of the whole world bringing pressure to bear on the tiny population of a dependancy of which it appears from their own statements that the British Government are anxious to be disembarrassed.
There is a lesson which follows from this course of events, as displayed in the Franks report, unrolling inevitably from that commencement 15 years ago. It is that if this nation intends to maintain its territory, sovereignty, or interests, it cannot make that intention conditional. There is no such thing as conditional maintenance of sovereignty or conditional defence of territory. The inherent contradiction of saying, "We will let this go, but not against the will of a tiny and insignificant minority," is an insincerity which has drenched the relations of this country with Argentina over the past 15 years and led to the events of 1982.
The Prime Minister, responding last week to a supplementary question, made a remarkable formulation. The right hon. Lady said:
"The Argentines wanted transfer of sovereignty and no British Government were able or willing to accept transfer of sovereignty or to consider it unless it was acceptable to the islanders themselves."
I draw attention to the words that follow because they are significant:
"That was the dilemma. It affected both Governments. Parliament and Governments of both parties have insisted that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. That put us in a difficult position. Now we have to honour those wishes."—[Official Report, 18 January 1983; Vol. 35, c. 182.]
I wonder, with great respect, whether the Prime Minister has fully understood the implications and the consequences of the nature of the pledge, of the form in which it was given, and of the context in which it was given, and how totally different it is from a pledge that those who do not wish to be surrendered will not be surrendered except upon their own initiative. If we are to defend our own, we can do that only as an act of genuine national will, based upon a decision of this House and based upon the conscious decision of a Government and defended by that Government.
This is not a debate about Northern Ireland—and yet it is a debate about Northern Ireland. It will not have escaped the notice of hon. Members that the same formula, with its same inherent vice, has been applied, and applies to this day, to the integrity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The similarity of the forms

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through which both matters have run is striking to anyone who studies it. I draw attention only to the fact that in 1938 Her Majesty's Government were invited to state that they would be glad to see a united Ireland provided, of course, that it was with the agreement of the inhabitants of the North. The matter never came to the Cabinet then, because the formula proposed did not, in the event, meet the wishes of the Government of the Irish Republic. It stood over, so to speak, until after the war.
It is now known, from the archives that have recently become available, that in 1952, the Prime Minister of this country let it be known in the United States that he was
"longing to see a united Ireland"
which he hoped would join Britain and the United States in "collective defence arrangements" but, of course, that this would be
"only under conditions that would permit both sides to express their will freely."
The consequences of the inherent conflict we create by a conditional and qualified assertion of our right have been, in the context of Northern Ireland, a long, wearing and terrible war. That has been the consequence of the world being informed, as we informed the world over the Falkland Islands, that we would be glad enough to be rid of an embarrassment if only arrangements could be made to secure the consent upon which we had made the transaction conditional. [Interruption.] If we are to learn from the report, we must not restrict what we have to learn from it to its immediate subject matter.
The outcome in the case of the Falkland Islands was a bombshell, a thunderbolt, not the wearing, lengthy and draining sequence that has followed inside the United Kingdom itself. Events came to our rescue in the Falklands. The violent invasion took the matter out of our hands and posed the question to this House and to the nation in the simple terms, "Will you, in circumstances where you can—even though you only barely can—defend and uphold your own?" That was the question. The House answered, "Yes", the nation answered, "Yes", and we achieved it.
Let us not now go back into the entanglement, from which we were providentially freed by the events of last March and April, of pretending that there is such a thing as a conditional and contingent maintenance of our right and sovereignty.
6.6 pm
Sir Frederick Bennett: One does not need to refer to the whole of the speech of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) to try to realise the point that he makes. The right hon. Gentleman quoted the remarks of the Prime Minister. I can only say that I listened carefully when she made that statement. With the best will in the world, and trying to follow the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes, there is not one word in the Prime Minister's answer that could possibly lead hon. Members or anyone else to doubt that she meant exactly what she said—that there could be no question of disregarding the paramountcy of the wishes of the islanders. I should have thought that that was abundantly clear to most of my hon. Friends. In fact, in some quarters, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been blamed today for being too firm on that subject.
The Leader of the Opposition began today rather generously by saying that, after all, we had to confess that most of the blame for what happened lay at the door of
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General Galtieri. That was, I must admit, one of the right hon. Gentleman's better understatements. It would not be a bad idea if I spent a few moments recalling what led to the invasion of the Falklands. I intend to quote only one paragraph of the Franks report. If hon. Members were to concentrate solely on going through paragraph after paragraph to try to discover things that could have been done differently, this would surely divert public attention from what was, in every way, the correct response to an unprovoked act of aggression. That seems to have been forgotten to a large extent in the debate so far.
Without overrating one's own importance, I was in Washington the day before the invasion. I received a briefing from a senior State Department official, together with a United States senator, who, like me, was going to South America that evening. There is no doubt, as Franks admits, that the Americans did not anticipate the immediate invasion that took place. All the rumours to that effect have been disproved and no evidence has been given. The State Department would hardly send one of its precious senators to South America for a weekend if it thought that he would be involved in a problem.
When I arrived in Chile the following day, I found, talking to people in the street and to members of the Chilean Government, that they had no idea that an invasion of the Falklands was imminent. However, there was a general unease that General Galtieri was about to carry out some mad act or other. The reason for that belief was that for two days we had seen television broadcasts to rioting mobs in Buenos Aires, in which 2,000 men and women had been arrested by the police, and the Government appeared to be tottering.
Everyone to whom I spoke said that under those circumstances the only way that the junta could now save itself was to engage quickly in some foreign adventure. That is a fairly historic way to save oneself. The only thing that seemed to be in doubt in the minds of my Chilean friends was whether it would be Chile that would be attacked over the Beagle Islands, or whether it would be Britain. That Galtieri would be driven to some mad act became increasingly certain every time riots took place in Buenos Aires.
I woke up the following morning in Santiago to find that the invasion had taken place. As far as I can ascertain, or have any belief about the matter, the decision to invade was an eleventh hour one. I am willing to bet that the final initiative was taken without the knowledge of Galtieri, but on the initiative of the naval chief, and Galtieri went along with it. That was the way that the Argentine junta had been running its affairs for a long while. It was a kind of oligarchic dictatorship in which the three services had wide discretion.
Let us now stop nit-picking about what could or could not have been done, and do what the Prime Minister recommended earlier today—play fair and treat the Franks report as a whole. I say this because the question whether HMS Endurance should have been moved has been asked over and over again in speeches. However, the report says that it has no reason to believe that the course of events would have been any different if HMS Endurance had been moved or not.
I am one of those who can say this because I was one of the Back-Bench Members who signed an early-day motion urging that HMS Endurance should not leave, as I did under rather similar circumstances under the previous Government. I am not one of those who believe that had

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the Government, and my right hon. Friend the then Defence Minister, changed their minds, or changed them earlier, the course of events would have been different.
One point that has not been mentioned today is that if we are to look at what really brought the circumstances about, other than the madness of a dictator, we should look at paragraph 278, which says:
"Argentina's growing military power coincided with an increasing concentration on the part of the United Kingdom on its NATO role and the progressive restriction of its other defence commitments. Even before the Defence Review published in 1966 the South Atlantic had not been a major area of deployment, but the decisions taken in 1967 to withdraw the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, and the frigate on station in the area, and in 1974 to terminate the Simonstown agreements, marked the lower priority attached to a British defence capability in the area. As the Argentine threat grew, in deciding to maintain only a token presence in the area, in the form of a small detachment of Royal Marines and in the summer months HMS Endurance, successive Governments had to accept that the Islands could not be defended against sudden invasion. These decisions were taken in the light of wider strategic interests, but it is likely that they were seen by Argentina as evidence of a decreasing British commitment to the defence of the Islands, however strongly that commitment was publicly asserted."
I do not think that the right hon. Member for Down, South, who for part of his speech was prepared to accept the historic trend of events, could quarrel with that. This country, and this Parliament, made a decision that we would in favour of our NATO role, restrict our defence commitments in other parts of the world, whether that was east of Suez, with the instability that has followed, or in the south Atlantic.
Every hon. Member, past and present, has some responsibility for the fact that a logical sequence of events took place, especially as Argentina does not have, and has not had for a considerable time—if it ever had—a reasonable Government that could operate as we do.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) was right. The British public does not want us to go through a post mortem to try to find out what the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) or the previous Prime Minister, or this Prime Minister, should or should not have done. At any time in any conflict that we have ever engaged in, it would have been possible to have post mortems, and to find that things could have been done in a different way. The British public is not interested in that; and that is one reason why public opinion polls are holding up so well in favour of the party that I serve.
The great British public has a more genuine and heartfelt appreciation of where this country's true interests lie than hon. Members on the Opposition Benches. The people know what it was about, and know perfectly well that we saw there a threat not just to our own national peace and security but to a much wider thing—the concept that aggressors must not be allowed to get away with aggression in the way that they did before, in the last war, which led to an appalling conflict.
The general public knows what Her Majesty's Government are trying to do, with or without the report. The Government want to defend the principle that we have the right to defend our people, our national sovereignty and our national territorial integrity. Beyond that, the real place in history that the Falklands conflict will take, in recording an event of real significance, is that this Government and this Prime Minister gave a warning to the world at an opportune moment in a dangerous decade that
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the West would not indefinitely be pushed around and that we were prepared to act in defence of the interests and of the beliefs in which we have faith.
The public is grateful for that, and that is why the Conservative party is enjoying the confidence that it is in the country. The public is not interested in trying to look through the small margins to see whether somebody could have done something different. It knows what it is all about and is pleased at what took place.
As for magnanimity, I find the readiness of Labour Members to negotiate with the Government in Argentina, which they have bitterly resented over the years, from which they have withdrawn ambassadors, and with which they have wanted to have nothing to do, amazing. Over and over again we have been told how appalling these people are, that they are untrustworthy, and that they have killed untold thousands of people without trial. However, today right hon. and hon. Members are urging us to be magnanimous and to negotiate with the very people whom, in another type of debate, they would be criticising as Fascist dictators of the most contemptible kind.
6.19 pm
Mr. Tony Benn: I have a feeling that many people reading the Franks report will ask themselves questions different from those asked in the debate. They will not be interested in the Ulster parallel. I doubt whether some of the points about the organisation of Cabinet government will concern them. They will ask two questions: first, could the bloodshed have been avoided? Secondly, what are the lessons that will make it less likely that there will be another war? They are not interested in either the damaging or the saving of the reputations of Ministers or Governments.
I well remember a Cabinet meeting on 11 December 1968, and the preliminary meeting a week earlier, when we considered the then view of the Foreign Office. It is mentioned in paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the report, which refer to the agreement on the text of the memorandum of understanding, and states:
"The Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final settlement will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed."
That was the view of the Foreign Office and the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Stewart. My only question is whether the Cabinet at that time might have envisaged a rather different future for its Falklands policy if it could have anticipated what happened.
The second factor in the minds of many people who have no particular allegiance to either party is the feeling that we are discussing a political failure which has been masked by a costly military success. We speak about the military action, but it cannot be other than a failure that the invasion had to take place, because, even with the military success, there is no solution in sight. This is not the occasion for self-congratulation by the Prime Minister, any Government member or, indeed, any hon. Member in the House.
I am trying to put my point mildly, because I do not want to incite anger. However, there has been deep public resentment at the Prime Minister's apparent readiness to make political capital out of the sacrifice of those who died and to examine the Franks report only to see whether it exonerates her, rather than whether it throws light upon the problem. News management has been used directly in both instances, and people are beginning to see through it. I

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make no criticism of Bernard Ingham—he worked with me at the Department of Energy, and I know what skills of news management he is capable of bringing to bear on behalf of the Prime Minister—but I have never been able to advise anyone on how to achieve a good press, so I should not ask people to take my advice on that.
The Franks report is unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, it was given the wrong terms of reference. It should not have ended its remit on 2 April, because the main events of that great affair occured after that date. My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has made much in his speeches of our wish to know what was the Government's strategy on negotiation or military action after 2 April. Did they ever try to negotiate, or was the task force always sent to reoccupy the islands? Franks—who was either not allowed, or did not wish, to pursue that matter—cannot advise us.
Secondly, the weakness of Lords Franks is that he did not ask himself the right questions. Anyone can ask a funny question and receive an answer that pleases the establishment. Lord Franks should have asked himself whether the war could have been avoided, but he did not bother to do so. The question whether the Government could have anticipated what happened at 2 am on 2 April is a minor question compared to a study of the evidence and a considered judgment on whether the war could have been avoided.
Thirdly, Franks' conclusions do not follow the evidence. That is clear to those who managed to read the whole report and did not receive only the press release about the final paragraph, which was put out in time for the newspaper deadlines.
This is the only time in my political life that I have ever been given a glimpse of the workings of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the intelligence community, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister sooner than the 30-year rule allows. If ever there was a case for a freedom of information Act, it is that the information available to Parliament and the public in the Franks report gives us a real insight into the strengths and weaknesses of government as it operates in such circumstances. I know much more now about what happened in relation to the Falkland Islands when I was in Cabinet than I did at that time— [Interruption] Of course, not all hon. Members are members of the Defence Committee. I attended the Defence Committee meeting on 21 November 1977—but only for item 2, because it related to whether there should be a grant of Argentine rights within 3 miles of the Falklands. The Prime Minister may have read the minutes of that meeting. She knows that an Energy Minister would be brought in to deal with that point, but not with the military aspects. It is highly beneficial to know how decisions are reached. I hope that those who resist a freedom of information Act will now recognise that we have learnt something from the Franks report.
What does the evidence really reveal? It is not the little secrets that are interesting—it is never the details of who said what that appear in personal reminiscences. What is interesting is the way in which Ministers, Parliament and the public confront and deal with major options. It is about whether people even understand the big issues and can disentangle them from the smaller issues. That is where Franks is so helpful. We have seen the text of papers similar to those that Lord Stewart gave to the Cabinet in 1968.
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Three options were open to the Government, as they were to their predecessors. The first option was that of real negotiation about sovereignty. That was rejected. The second was the military option of trying to provide a base in the Falklands so that they could not be occupied, or from which one could later displace the enemy if they were occupied. That option was at first ignored. The Government cannot say that they did not know the position. They were told it by Lord Carrington two and a half years before. That military option was first ignored, then improvised, and then executed in a way that was costly in British lives and to the families who were bereaved.
I did not like the way in which the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) spoke as if the sacrifice of life somehow raised the morale of a nation—[Interruption.] If I misjudge him, he will correct me. There has been too much talk that it was the fighting, rather than the broader questions, that restored the morale of our people. That idea is foreign to a democratic society.
Mr. Peyton: The right hon. Gentleman is a master of misinterpretation, and he has exceeded himself on this occasion. I disavow everything that he has said.
Mr. Benn: I am glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. If I did him an injustice, I apologise—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw".] I have withdrawn, and I did so happily. One must not underestimate the extent to which the theme of blood lost in battle has been played during the past nine months as a means of restoring the nation's pride and morale. It has been played by Conservative Members.
The third option was that of neglect—to let the matter slide. It was the option of hoping for the best, despite the warnings—the Mr., or Mrs., Micawber option. During the whole of the last year before the invasion the Prime Minister said that we did not need to discuss the issue. Why not? It was because of the Government's decision to do nothing and hope for the best. They were set on the one option that Lord Carrington said might lead to war.
I do not wish to break my rule of not dealing with reputations, but I must tell the Prime Minister that she emerges from the report as someone profoundly uninterested in the Falklands. She would not negotiate nor prepare for military action. She let the matter slide. At the end, when her policy of neglect went wrong, she asked us to accept that she was the heroine of the hour.
I understand why the Prime Minister went to the Falklands. I know how the date was set. It was after she knew what was in the report and before it was published and before the islanders knew what was in it. Had the Falkland Islanders read about what was going on during the period of her Government, they would not have given her quite the same welcome.
The difficulty with this debate for the House of Commons is that these choices are still with us. This is not something that we can leave in the past and say, "There has been a victory." We must face the fact that only two options are left. The "let it slide" option was taken and failed. That leaves only the "fortress" option or the route of negotiation. When I listened to the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister—I know there was rhetoric at the end—I heard nothing about the future and nothing analytical as to how Parliament should determine between the two courses that are now open.

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Looking at the military option, the Prime Minister has said that even if forces had been sent before April 1982 the invasion could not have been stopped. I wonder why she continued supplying arms to Galtieri after she had received those warnings from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Franks did not deal with that point. What the right hon. Lady has said about justifying her failure to prepare militarily also applies to the military option now. Unless we keep such a massive garrison on the Falklands so that the engagements of April and May 1982 could be repeated, the arguments against those early contingencies, which the right hon. Lady said would have been absurd, apply equally now in the light of what has happened. It would not have worked before April 1982.
I do not want to join in the Endurance argument. That argument attracts the interest of hon. Members because Endurance alone would not have been sufficient. I do not believe that the task force should have been sent a year earlier, because it would not have been acceptable and would not have solved the problem.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop rose—
Mr. Benn: The House may not like what I have to say, because it thinks it has a military victory under its belt, but the peace option must now be faced, long urged by Foreign Secretaries of different parties and reinforced by United Nations' pressure.
I want to read one passage from paragraph 73 of the report. Lord Carrington's minute sets out three options:
"'Fortress Falklands'; protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; and substantive negotiations on sovereignty. Lord Carrington recommended the last option on the ground that it was in the British interest and that of the Islanders themselves to try to find a way forward through negotiation."
Let there be no more talk of treachery directed at us by Conservative Members. Their own Foreign Secretary told the Prime Minister after he had examined the matter that the right course for Britain and the islanders was to negotiate on sovereignty with a view, inevitably, to some concessions.
On May 20 the Government in their peace plan came hesitantly back to the Carrington view and withdrew that peace plan the same day. We now know that the continued garrison will be costly, will deny viability to the economy of the islands, will involve the risk of conflict, will isolate us internationally and will meet American opposition. Although President Reagan helped us further than I thought he would, he will not allow the Prime Minister to wreck his little set-up in Latin America once more by disturbing for a second time a military dictator with whom he hopes to negotiate other economic and military deals.
Five points should be part of that peace option. One is a United Nations mandate for the Falklands. That does not involve direct negotiations with the Argentines. The United Nations should be told that we are prepared to administer the islands as a mandating power for one or two years and will cede sovereignty to the United Nations.
Secondly, we should accept during the mandate period an Argentine observer, exactly as the Prime Minister said on 20 May when it was one of the proposals put forward.
Thirdly, there should be a withdrawal of British forces. The House will not accuse me of having been inconsistent on that question from the beginning.
Fourthly, there must be a grant or an award to the Falkland Islands Council. I set the figure at £400 million.
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After all, we are spending about £1 million a day on the garrison. The Falkland Islands Council should be allowed to use that money for one year either to develop the islands or to provide resettlement for individual Falkland Islanders who wish to leave.
Fifthly, there should be established a United Nations award on sovereignty and a continuation of the mandate for that purpose. That is an honest, straightforward and logical continuation of the argument that began in the Foreign Office and which some of us argued in the House throughout the war. The great body of British opinion will come to that view and the Government will not be able to play for ever on the jingoism of the past few months.
I believe this matter was badly mishandled by all Governments and that the war need never have happened. Service men were sent to their deaths unnecessarily. The basic problems remain. History will judge us harshly. Today, as a year ago, the Government are failing to look ahead to what the rest of the world knows to be true. In a nuclear age, disputes must be settled by negotiation. It is not possible to resort to force to settle arguments and then elevate what has happened as a principle to sustain national virility.
The House should today begin to turn its mind—the Prime Minister should have done so in her speech—to the way in which we can provide a peaceful and stable settlement for those islands in conjunction with their geographic neighbours.
6.38 pm
Mr. Humphrey Atkins: An interesting feature of this debate is that with the exception of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), who did not refer very much to the Franks report, all the Opposition speeches have condemned the report as being inadequate in one form or another.
I began to feel sorry for the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) who has been attacked from right, left and centre. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) went further than most by saying that the Franks committee had been given the wrong terms of reference. I have had a brief look at Hansard for 8 July, and I do not remember him saying that then. I do not remember him voting against the motion. No doubt he thought of that later.
He went on to say that he thought the conclusions did not follow the evidence. That is probably because he did not read it. He said at one stage that the Franks committee had not addressed itself to the right question. He said that nowhere had Franks addressed itself to whether this conflict could have been prevented or not. I invite him to study paragraph 335 onwards, including the heading immediately above 335, which asks that question.
Mr. Benn: To ask whether the Government could have prevented the invasion is totally different from asking whether the war could have been avoided. Could the policy have been such that the situation would not have arisen? I think that the right hon. Gentleman recognises that difference.
Mr. Atkins: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has studied the report. I take a different view of the Franks report. There is no doubt that the Franks committee carried out its remit impeccably. The inquiries it made were immensely detailed. Paragraphs 4 and 5 show that its

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members saw every paper, minute, document, report, assessment and file that had relevance to the events of the last few years. They took oral evidence from a long list of people, and that is detailed in annex E. I was one of those people. They took written evidence from an even longer list, which is detailed in annex C. There is no doubt that this was extremely hard work. They were asked to complete their task in six months. They held many meetings—42, I believe—and had a mass of material to read. I suspect, though I do not know, that these six men did practically nothing else during the whole period of their inquiry.
There can be no doubt that these six men know more about the events leading up to 2 April 1982 than anyone else in the country. Anyone who seeks to challenge what is in the report ought to have his own credentials closely examined to see whether there are any grounds for supposing that he knows more than those six men.
It is clear that the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East does not, because he told us that he was interested to learn how the decisions in the Cabinet of which he was a member were arrived at. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has now learned something.
Those six men were unanimous in every word that they wrote. We are well accustomed to that not being the case. We have all seen reports by Royal Commissions, committees of inquiry and review bodies of all sorts that contain majority and minority reports. That is not so in this case. Those six men all signed the report, and that adds even more weight to their findings.
I am glad that the members of the committee addressed themselves to the two questions to which, in the debate on 8 July setting up the review, I felt the country would want the answers—why we were not warned, and whether anything could have been done to prevent the invasion.
The answers to both questions are quite clear. Paragraph 266 clearly states:
"The evidence of the timing of the decision taken by the Junta shows that the Government not only did not, but could not, have had earlier warning".
That is the result of the committee's inquiry into precisely what happened. Its view is that the Argentine Government took the decision.
The second answer, which has escaped the notice of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, is contained in the early part of paragraph 339, which states:
"if the British Government had acted differently … it is impossible to judge what the impact on the Argentine Government … might have been. There is no reasonable basis for any suggestion—which would be purely hypothetical—that the invasion would have been prevented if the Government had acted in the ways indicated in our report."
It is proper to draw attention to the word "reasonable", because the committee clearly states that there is no reasonable basis for assuming that the invasion could have been prevented by the Government doing anything else.
Mr. David Ennals rose—
Mr. Atkins: I should like to continue with my speech.
Annex A, which has not so far been mentioned, deals with the many rumours, assertions and speculations that were flying about the country from 2 April onwards. I cannot tell why those rumours were given credence by the media, except that I get the impression that nowadays more credence is given to rumour and speculation than
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used to be the case. I hope that I am wrong, but there is no doubt that a good deal of credence was given on this occasion, which I believe was damaging to the country.
I am delighted that the committee examined the 10 principal assertions and found without exception that all of them were untrue. That has been helpful. However, one set of comments widely made in April and since, not only in the media but by several hon. Members as well, is dealt with in another part of the report. Those comments concern the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
The House knows that I held the office of Lord Privy Seal for just six months up to 5 April 1982. In that time, I did not get to know all members of the foreign service—nothing like it—but in the areas for which I held responsibility, I met a great many, of high rank and low, at home and abroad. I have great admiration for those who serve their country in this way. They are intelligent, hardworking men and women, and I can confirm absolutely from my own experience what the report says in paragraph 284:
"On every occasion that a new government—or new Ministers—came into office a full range of policy options was put before them. In every case Ministers made a decision of policy".
Mr. Michael English: That statement is also made in paragraph 71. Why do the listed options there not include the option of offering to put the issue before the International Court of Justice? Surely that is an option, even if we think that our case is weak. Why do both Argentina and ourselves not wish to do that?
Mr. Atkins: I was referring to the quality of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to the fact that, contrary to what some people have said, it is not the practice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or its members to pursue their own policies. It is their business, just as it is the business of civil servants in all Departments, to put the options before Ministers and for Ministers to make the choices—
Mr. English: But not a full range.
Mr. Atkins: That is precisely what happened in this case. When I arrived at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, those options were put before me. I discussed them with my colleagues. Therefore, it is nonsense to suggest that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office runs British foreign policy, and it is right that someone should say so.
It is easy to poke fun at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. People have been doing it for decades, probably for centuries. I expect that partly arises from the fact that it is a separate service from the home Civil Service, as a result of which it attracts attention.
There are two good reasons why it must be a separate service. First, its members must serve abroad, and the vast majority of people working in the home Civil Service do not want to go abroad. Secondly, there is the language problem. Even if home civil servants were given terms of service abroad, there are many countries where they would be no use until they learned the language, and that takes a long time.
There is a case for helping Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials to become more aware of the country they represent when abroad, because it must be easy to get out of touch. On one occasion I remember being asked to approve the appointment of an officer, not of very high rank, to a post abroad, and I discovered that it was his fifth

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consecutive foreign posting without a spell in this country. I queried that, and there were reasons for it. That illustrates the difficulty into which Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials can get. It might help them represent us abroad if during their careers they had a spell—perhaps one or two years—at the right level in a home Civil Service post. I made that suggestion to the permanent undersecretary, who did not disagree with it. I hope that will happen, because I believe that it will help those officials.
The advice that we all received was not only as good as, but probably better than, the advice given to the Foreign Minister of any other country. That advice properly took account of one essential fact in our democratic process of government. No Cabinet, no Minister and no Department of State can carry through or even initiate any new policy unless Parliament agrees. It is relevant to the Falkland Islands, because we have only to read annex F of the report to see that when my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reported to the House on the Falkland Islands on 2 December 1980, my calculation is that out of the 17 supplementary questions asked, 13 were thoroughly hostile to what he had been doing. Ministers and civil servants recognised the impossibility of pursuing leaseback. It meant that the Government's options were and remain narrowed because of the antagonism of the House.
Mr. Ennals: I do not want to become entangled in an argument about the Foreign Office, because I have great affection for it, having served there. As Lord Privy Seal during the six months leading to the invasion, is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that sufficient messages were sent to the Argentine Government so that they knew that if there were an invasion it would be resisted with the strength with which it was resisted?
Mr. Atkins: If the right hon. Gentleman is good enough to read the report he will find that those messages were sent on 23, 25 and 31 March. The view of the Franks committee, without qualification, is that the Argentine Government well knew our position.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right when he made what was virtually his first pronouncement about the Falkland Islands after he assumed his office. He said that time was needed. We need time to consider the position now. I believe that the Argentines need time. They may need time to have a new Government. They have had one since the invasion. They may find that a different form of government is more agreeable. They will have to settle down to rational thought following their defeat. The rest of the world and the United Nations need time. A little education of some nations would do no harm. More than anything else, the Falkland Islanders need time. Their lives have been changed drastically by the events of April to June and will never be the same again.
I do not know what the islanders will think, as the months and years go by, about the position in which they now find themselves. I believe that it would be a great mistake to make any attempt to get them to decide quickly. We all need time, and during that time we have no alternative but to maintain, even at considerable cost, the status quo. I have no doubt that there is a way forward. This is not the occasion to discuss it in detail, and frankly,
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I am not yet ready to do so. I believe that today we should confine ourselves to welcoming the report, to taking note of what it says and to applying its lessons for the future.
6.53 pm
Mr. Edward Rowlands: When I spoke in the debate in April 1982, in common with many other right hon. Members on all sides of the House, I called for action to free the Falkland Islanders. I am deeply glad and relieved that action resulted in the freedom of the islands and the islanders. I am saddened by the fact that it meant war and that more than two dozen of my young constituents, and young constituents of other hon. Members, had to go and fight.
Efforts were made to avoid that war once the invasion had taken place. Once those efforts failed, I have no doubt that, given the principle and the issues, it was right to fight. The skill, bravery and professionalism of our soldiers and sailors in fulfilling that duty and those responsibilities has been rightly and justifiably admired by everyone.
Tonight we are debating another set of responsibilities—not the conduct and management of the war, but the mismanagement of the peace leading to the war.
The Franks committee was asked to look into a series of specific events before the invasion and to look further back at the earlier issues and policies. I should like to do that also. It emerges from the report that there was common ground between successive Governments and that it was perfectly honourable to endeavour to avoid a Fortress Falklands policy. I had four years on the treadmill of British-Argentine negotiations to try to avoid that policy. It meant biting one's tongue, pulling one's punches and compromising one's instincts at times. One was negotiating with a pretty nasty bunch of people on many occasions.
I still believe that the general policy that we adopted, and which was adopted by the Government before us and the one that followed, of trying to avoid a Fortress Falklands policy and to find somehow a way of bridging the almost irreconcilable gap between the sides was perfectly honourable and reasonable. Fortress Falklands would have led to immeasurable and unpredictable financial and military consequences. I find it sickening and offensive that that policy was followed even further by the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister and the Government.
If one listened to some of the things that the Prime Minister has been saying recently, one would not believe that she belonged to that Government that justifiably and understandably tried to resolve the problem by offering the freehold of the territory lock, stock and barrel to Argentine. This afternoon when the Prime Minister was chiding us—as she chided me in April 1982—about Southern Thule, one would not believe that she had done nothing to restore the territorial sovereignty and integrity of that uninhabited island. What evidence is there in the report that the Government did the slightest thing to remove the Argentines from that uninhabited island? There is no evidence to suggest that she ever showed the slightest interest in it. Many of us believe that her passion for the Falkland Islands was discovered on about 2 April 1982. The evidence contained in the report suggests that her intervention and her involvement in the decisions preceding the run-up to the disasters of April 1982 were few and remarkably disinterested.
Mr. Michael Shersby: From his intimate knowledge of the matter, is it the hon. Gentleman's opinion that the Argentine mission on Southern Thule was, as stated by Lord Goronwy-Roberts in the House of Lords in 1978, a scientific mission or a military presence? If it were a military presence, why did his Government do nothing to remove it?
Mr. Rowlands: Throughout the difficult negotiations that took place when we endeavoured to resolve the Southern Thule dispute, the Argentines never described the presence as anything other than scientific. That is why we turned to extending the principle of the Antarctic treaty in 1978.
We decided not to go to war over Southern Thule. The point I make is that, between May 1979 and April 1982, neither did the Government. Their present position on these matters is newly discovered.
I want to leave what may be common ground and the question whether successive Governments may or may not have tried to avoid a war and our present position, and look at the basic task that the Franks committee was given—to look at the events leading up to April 1982 and to decide how the Government managed those events.
I have read the report in detail. For four years I was involved in negotiations similar to those in which the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce) and the right hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) were involved since 1979. I read the account with great interest, relating it to my own experiences. The narrative in the Franks report justifies the conclusion that there was a fundamental failure of crisis management in the fateful early days of March 1982. In part that failure of crisis management, which Franks was asked to investigate, derived from the way in which the Government acted and made decisions. I shall justify that statement by reference not only to Franks but to my experience.
The first months of 1982 were months of considerable tension and were fraught with potential conflict. The general who had come to power in Argentina, combined the power of president and commander of the armed forces. He set up if not an unprecedented, certainly an offensive, public press campaign with threats that the new regime intended to use force to resolve the issue. We were not aware of the next factor, as we were not told about it—I do not complain about that. The problems in South Georgia did not break out in March 1982, but were there throughout the first three months of the year. This is all stated in Franks.
Behind the scenes, through political and diplomatic machinery, a strident demand was being made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires that we should agree to a rigid and detailed timetable for holding sovereignty talks. It was also the 149th anniversary year. The regime had made it clear publicly and privately that there would not be a 150th anniversary. All those factors added up to growing tension and crisis. I was much more afraid in the first three months of 1982 than when I held responsibility in the summer and spring of 1977. Do not let us cover up all the comparative analysis, but let us state that the first three months of 1982 by any standards looked serious.
As the Franks report states in paragraph 302, insufficient weight was given to that collection of events and "the changing Argentine attitude". I agree with the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins). I have a
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high personal regard and affection for the officials who served with me in the Foreign Office for four years. I have no complaint. We should not hide behind officials. Not just the officials but Ministers gave insufficient weight to the changing Argentine attitude. From January 1980 through to the early months of 1982 there was no meeting of the Cabinet to discuss the issue and no meeting of the Overseas and Defence Committee to review the changing situation and the growing tensions. There was no meeting to discuss what the hon. Member for Shoreham was going to do at the February talks in New York.
A question has been asked about what pattern of Cabinet Committee government we adopted on those issues. Before every major round of talks there was a full-scale meeting of the Overseas and Defence Committee chaired by the Prime Minister, who examined the policies submitted by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Before every set of talks in which I took part the Overseas and Defence Committee met to discuss in detail what my remit should be—and rightly so. Even if there was no fundamental change of policy, there was a review of the situation before every round of talks. There was one before my visit in February 1977 and one in the middle of the year before officials went to Rome, and three meetings in November. We were making plans for the negotiations. There was another meeting in February 1978. However, as the Franks report reveals, there was no discussion in the Cabinet when during the first three months of the year there was a mounting crisis.
That is Cabinet Committee negligence by any standards. When one reads the Franks report one realises how much of a crunch the February talks were. It was not an ordinary round of negotiations. They had been preceded not only by the virulent press campaign in Argentina but—none of us knew this until the Franks report revealed it—by the stiffest set of demands that had ever been made. I have more sympathy in retrospect for the hon. Member for Shoreham when he had to go to the talks, the runup to which had been a detailed demand about the timescale for the talks. I am glad to say that in my four years of negotiation I never came under such pressure.
There was no Cabinet Committee meeting and no review to consider what would happen if the talks broke down or what would happen if, understandably, Ministers felt that they could not go anywhere near meeting the Argentines' demands. That is why the comparison with 1977 is not only valid but pertinent when we discuss how things went wrong in early March 1982. Having read the Franks report I am more convinced than ever that the comparison between 1977 and 1982 is valid.
The reason why we chose to send the force in November 1977 was, as the report states, to buttress the negotiations. It was not sent there to deter Argentine action before the talks. It was sent there not to wield a big stick, fly the flag or demonstrate that we were virile in our assertion of sovereignty, but because we feared that the talks would break down or the junta would disown the outcome of the talks. The purpose was clear and specific.
The right hon. Lady was saying before I intervened that we could not send a force because of this or that danger. The chiefs of staff advised us on the mix of the force. We did not advise on the mix. They told us the combination of the force, which has being sent for the purpose to which we had agreed. The purpose was that if the talks broke down or if the junta disowned the outcome of the talks and denounced them, we would not be totally unprepared and

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the islands would not be totally unprotected. It was a good old boy scouts' principle—to be prepared for trouble because we sensed that there would be trouble. It was not meant to do anything other than that.
When the trouble did not arise, when the negotiations did not break down, when we had agreed a communiqué and I knew that the junta would not denounce or disown it—we checked that—and when we agreed at New York that we would jointly report progress to the United Nations, it was only then—on 19 December, I believe—that I had the onerous duty of telegraphing home to the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) that I believed the task force could be quietly withdrawn because it had served its purpose. Its purpose had been to be there if and when the talks broke down or the junta denounced the outcome.
Mr. Mates: The hon. Member is making much point of the sending of the task force in 1977. He is also by implication criticising the present Government for not having done the same thing before the talks in February 1982. What does he say to the specific remark in paragraph 328 of the Franks report:
"It was believed that the round of talks in December 1977 could lead to a breakdown of negotiations. The circumstances leading up to the February 1982 talks were different, and we consider that they did not warrant a similar naval deployment"?
Mr. Rowlands: If the hon. Member will allow me to complete my remarks, I think I will answer the point.
Mr. Mates: Do you disagree with Franks?
Mr. Rowlands: The House is passing a judgment. I do not agree with every single word of it. I hope I have deployed an effective case to show that the first three months of 1982 were very serious, whatever comparison one wants to make with 1977. I was explaining the purpose of the November 1977 operation because much disinformation and misinformation have been put out about it. I was explaining clearly and straightforwardly the purpose and point of that operation.
I was about to say that what we feared, the nightmare of any negotiator in negotiations between Britain and Argentina, the very thing that concerned and frightened us in November 1977, happened on 1 March 1982. It happened as vividly as anyone could imagine. The "fruitful and positive" communiqué, as I think it was called, was signed. The Argentine delegation had not even got out of New York before the junta had disowned the talks and issued a unilateral communqué. By comparison, if that had happened in 1977 we would certainly have required the deployment that was made and no doubt I would have been telegraphing for reinforcements.
More important, in the early days of March 1982 it was crucial that there should be cover and protection. Instead, what happened? Lord Carrington had a brief conversation with officials during which the 1977 experience was referred to and dismissed. He asked himself the wrong question and drew a hopelessly wrong conclusion about the 1977 operation. Never again in those crucial early days of March was the option of deploying some sort of submarine cover for the islands ever taken up.
On 3 March the Prime Minister scribbled on a telegram. Reading very much between the lines of the report I think
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she was referring to civil contingency plans for the islands. It is not clear, but in the context it seems they were as much civil as military.
The Prime Minister: That is not true.
Mr. Rowlands: In that case I withdraw it. If they were civil and military, fine. It does not matter. It was only that one sensed that the contingency plans were civil, but it is not basic to my case or argument.
Did the Prime Minister call her Ministers together? Did she summon them and say, "For goodness' sake, I have seen these telegrams and they are worrying me"? Did she say, "Let us have an urgent meeting of the Overseas and Defence Committee"? Five days later the letter went out formally from her office; such is the urgency she managed to instil in her office about the contingency plans. Even the Franks report uses cautious terms, saying that it would have been better and to advantage if Ministers had got together and considered this option in detail.
The report says that 5 March was the last day when it would have been possible to deploy anything in the light of subsequent events. I do not agree with that, because no one knew what was about to happen. It emerges from the report that there was a total breakdown in the normal Cabinet Committee type of responsibility.
Mr. Dalyell rose—
Mr. Rowlands: I should like to complete my case. My hon. Friend will have ample opportunity to speak. I do not want to speak for much longer.
When situations like this are beginning to emerge, it is surely the role of a Prime Minister to bring Ministers together or even to knock heads together. I recall my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) once observing that the Foreign Office believed that diplomacy would get one everywhere and that the Ministry of Defence did not believe in moving anything anywhere. More than once, in the context not only of the Falklands but of Belize as well, I was usually one of the victims of his head-knocking operations.
In early March things needed to be moved. It had been found that diplomacy certainly could not get us what we wanted, despite the pleas to the President of the United States. The decision not to take any action in early March and not even to consider it at any ministerial meeting meant that the islands were left unprotected and the Government were caught unprepared.
The other thing that emerges from the Franks report when one reads the account of the last half of March is of a ship of state rudderless, lurching, drifting, as the low farce of the South Georgia scrap merchants' episode turned into the full-blown tragedy of the invasion itself. Messages were drafted but not sent. The Endurance was sent to South Georgia; then it was recalled and was found somewhere between South Georgia and the islands. Press talk of a nuclear submarine that never was scuppered the valiant diplomatic efforts behind the scenes to defuse the growing crisis. Still the Cabinet and the Overseas and Defence Committee did not meet.
For me anyway one overriding impression comes out of the report. It is of a highly personalised system of government that has been adopted in the last three years—the Foreign Secretary doing his thing and the Prime Minister doing her thing. Very rarely do they seem to come together. They certainly do not come together

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within the structure of Cabinet government and Cabinet Committee government. The Prime Minister has fostered the image of a highly personalised government and decision-making process. When in March 1982 that led us to a disaster in war she cannot blame us for saying that we must hold her personally responsible for the conduct of the peace leading up to the war.
7.18 pm
Sir Anthony Kershaw: The hon. Member for Methyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) has spent the last half hour working hard trying to find differences between the last Administration and this one, but I do not think that he has succeeded in doing so. It is impossible to prove, but I have a strong suspicion that even if slightly different policies had been used in the way of crisis management the results would have been no different. Nevertheless, I believe that both Governments followed largely similar policies. They took more or less similar advice and found themselves up against the same difficulties except on one point, on which I shall seek to enlarge later.
Of course, after a nasty surprise such as we had—and there was every excuse for being surprised—the search for a scapegoat is natural. However, to the Labour Party's chagrin the Franks committee has found none. It was widely suspected at first that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would be found wanting—after all, its Ministers did resign—but it was not. If we read the Franks report, we find that its advice was steadily correct and that Governments of both complexions followed it. It could be argued that the Ministry of Defence was a bit slow sometimes and apparently unaware of political considerations, but, after all, that is not exactly its remit.
The criticism which has been seized upon this afternoon and which I find trivial is that of HMS Endurance. That pass was sold a long time ago. For many years there had been a notable lack of enthusiasm about that part of the world. We gave up Simonstown and there was an absence of reaction to the Argentine provocation at Southern Thule. And then there was the very small military contingent we put in. Such things had long ago given the impression that we were not sure whether or why we wanted to be in the Falkland Islands.
We should have asked ourselves questions about it sooner. Perhaps it would have been a good idea if the matter had been examined in a Select Committee such as we now have, but it never was, and many hon. Members were, and still are, rather ignorant about the subject. I suppose that there is some strategic interest in the Falkland Islands. After all, two famous sea battles were fought there and it is possible to imagine the closing of the Panama canal, which would give the Falkland Islands some importance. However, such considerations must be fairly far down the list.
Do the Falkland Islands have an economic interest? If they have, it has hardly been discoverable up to now. We have done little about it. I am not one of those who think that the Antarctic will be an E1 Dorado in a short time. Do the islands have a political interest? Obviously not, because the occupation and possession of the Falkland Islands do little to help our relations with South America and the other states there. In fact, our possession of the islands is a hangover from our imperial past—the sort of hangover which in the past we found it easy to divest ourselves of.
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The position is now different because we have acquired a kind of moral reason for staying in the Falkland Islands, and that is the protection of our kith and kin from a particularly nasty dictatorship. The reason for staying in the Falkland Islands is that of bad government in Argentina, which has forced us into the position which makes it appear that 1,800 islanders have a kind of veto upon British foreign policy.
That brings me to the second difficulty. Most of us—I include myself—simply did not understand the sort of people that we were up against. The Argentine army is a ladder to success for the poor boy. Like the medieval church in Europe, it is almost universally recruited from disadvantaged classes and enjoys only a barrack room education. The officers come almost exclusively from that class of society which in almost every country forms the hard core of Fascism. The result is an officer corps financially on the make, politically illiterate, never at war except against its own people and a disgrace to the profession—nothing more than a Mafia in fine uniforms. To negotiate sovereignty or anything else with such people is hopeless and destined to fail—ask Chile, Brazil, or any of its neighbours.
But what would have been said if we had steadily refused to negotiate at all? We would have been heavily attacked both at home and abroad, and with some justice. Still more would we have been attacked if we had dispatched a task force sufficient to the job. One can imagine the uproar at the United Nations. Here at home we would have been bitterly divided. I doubt whether any Government could have long sustained a large task force in the Falkland Islands without the trauma of war.
I do not blame the Foreign Office or successive Governments for trying to negotiate. They could not have done less. We were wrong about the Argentines. They were and still are not to be negotiated with. Therefore, we have two choices—the Fortress Falklands or evacuation. It has been suggested this afternoon that the United Nations might take over, but there is not much future in that. They would not defend the islands. Indeed, they would probably give them away to Argentina very quickly and the Argentines would soon move in.
It has been further suggested that our NATO allies might take some interest in the matter and that the Argentines would hesitate to engage other countries as well as Britain. That is not realistic. I cannot see German troops being deployed in the Falkland Islands. One has only to put that proposition to see how hopeless it would be.
Perhaps powers interested in Antarctica might play some part so that we would be solid with them, but I see grave difficulties there. I cannot see Japan undertaking the defence of the Falkland Islands. We do not trust the Argentines: they will shortly arrive, whatever kind of pretend regime is erected, unless British troops stay there, and we must therefore keep troops there for the time being.
There is the difficulty that the more we implement the Shackleton report, the more money we spend there, the more people we persuade to go there, the more difficult it will be to get out. Perhaps one day an Argentine Government will emerge with whom we can negotiate, but so far that is not apparent and the House would delude itself if it thought that there was any clever way of getting out of our difficulties.
Fortress Falklands is the only policy left, with all its expense and diplomatic drawbacks with South America

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and the Third world. However, it is not all drawback. Because of the Government's action, which was supported by the House, our NATO allies and potential enemies—the world—know that we are people of our word. They also know that there are no better fighting men in the world.
7.26 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell: I have not commented in public on the Franks committee or accepted television or radio interviews as I believe that this debate in the House is the proper place for witnesses, who were asked to give oral evidence to Franks to put their view. I should like to comment on the courtesy of Lord Franks and his colleagues when I gave oral evidence before them on 22 October and to comment on the exceptional and exquisitely skilful drafting of the report. I do not know who did it—whether it was Lord Franks, Sir Patrick Nairne, or the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Rawsthorne. It persuades me that the committee's work is worthy of far more than instant comment the day it was published.
I should like to put it on record that I do not in any way share the criticism that has been made of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) or Lord Lever in their work on the committee by some sections of my party who, on other matters, have agreed with me in this issue. I have no doubt that they both worked extremely hard and conscientiously, although I had doubts as to whether a member of the shadow Cabinet should be a member of the committee. However, any doubts that I had I should like to withdraw. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South worked jolly hard on the committee. It may be that the committee's terms of reference should have been different and that they should have included the conduct of the war but that was Parliament's decision and not a fit subject for criticism of Lord Franks.
Before I embark on what some will see as a rather cynical and unpleasant interpretation of events, but none the less one which goes some way to explain the astounding lack of ministerial meetings, and explains paragraph 147 and why on 5 March the Prime Minister's request for contingency plans was not followed up, and why this unpleasant explanation that I offer about paragraph 152—the Prime Minister's reaction to the ambassador's letter of 3 March—was not pursued, may I tell the House that I have given notice to the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) that I shall refer repeatedly to what I see as his key role in the events. First, I register a query of fact in connection with page 92. Assertion number 7 to which the right hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins) referred, saying that the assertions had been dismissed, says:
"On 11 March 1982 an Argentine military plane landed at Port Stanley to reconnoitre the runway. The incident was reported by the Governor as suspicious".
I have no means of knowing what other witnesses said to Franks, but when I went before the committee on 22 October I referred to the Hercules incident, and suggested that it had been reported to London on 12 March, although, to my knowledge, by others than Governor Hunt.
Let us consider how the Franks committee dismissed that assertion—incidentally, reported in the clear by
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"Latin American Weekly Report" of 19 March, specifically in terms of a try-out for the invasion. Franks says:
"He"—
that is, Governor Hunt—
"has subsequently confirmed that the landing was preceded by a 'May Day' call and that, after the aircraft landed, fuel was seen to be leaking from it".
If you, Mr. Speaker were in the crew of an aircraft and you had a genuinely leaking fuel tank, would you take off that very afternoon to the south Atlantic without waiting for repairs or doing something about it? I suspect that anyone would try to strip the engine, or at least wait for repairs. I say that because I have first-hand evidence from Patrick Watts, who shares few of the views that I have put forward, who actually saw the crew of the aircraft go to the house of the Argentine superintendent, Mr. Gammon, have coffee and cakes, or whatever, and two hours later go back into the aircraft and take off. That is not exactly the action of people who have serious leaking tanks.
I knew also at the time that I gave evidence that the Hercules had landed in 1981 at Port Stanley, but I am also told that the Hercules which landed in March was fully laden and far heavier than any previous plane. I simply give that as an example of some dismissals in the report which are too easy and which have been truncated to the point of distortion. The fact is that the Hercules incident was one of a number of serious warnings that had been given in early March. Franks is wrong to dismiss it.
There is another matter that needs some explanation. On page 82, paragraph 300 says:
"5 March was about the last moment at which, given that the invasion took place on 2 April, it would have been possible to sail a deterrent force to be in place in time".
As Franks himself says, the SSNs could have got down there at a speed of 28 or 29 knots in 13 or 14 days. Is it suggested that, had they been there, the invasion would have taken place by Hercules and not by sea?
I know that there are references to airborne landings, but, after all, airborne landings presumably would have needed the airstrip, and the marines who were there could easily have blocked that or used the mines that they had available. Therefore, explanation should be given about a number of rather important details in the Franks report. The suggestion is that there were all sorts of warning signals.
I say bluntly to the Prime Minister that, if nothing else, the Franks report reveals the extent to which, in some respects, she has misled the House and the country.
On Tuesday 26 October, in answer to question No. 1, the Prime Minister confirmed what she had said to George Gale in a major interview in the Daily Express that the Falklands crisis—not South Georgia, or anything of that kind—had come out of the blue on Wednesday 31 March. She put that on the record. She said "out of the blue". On page 43, paragraph 147, referring to Friday 5 March 1982, says:
"Mr. Ure"—
that is John Ure, the superintending Under-Secretary for North America and South America—
"recorded that the Cabinet Office had said that the Prime Minister would like the next Defence Committee paper on the Falklands to include annexes on both civil and military contingency plans".
A Prime Minister who claims that the crisis came out of the blue on Wednesday 31 March was asking for military contingency plans 26 days earlier. By what semantics of the English language can that be explained? I hasten to add that if there is an explanation for joint

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theatre plans and paragraph 109, either the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister, in winding up, should give it. I ask that as a direct question. If I am wrong, there should be an explanation. If the Prime Minister did not follow that up, by negligence, it would be entirely out of character.
Why did the right hon. Lady not put the Falklands in the first week of March on the agenda of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet? Certainly that needs to be explained, because the Prime Minister's harshest critics could hardly say that she was lazy in such matters. Moreover, she knew from the very week when she entered Downing Street that the Falklands presented one of the most potentially dangerous situations that she inherited. I understand that the Cabinet Secretary—the late Professor John P. Macintosh, and others have told me—briefs every incoming Prime Minister on the really thorny issues, and it is inconceivable that she was not briefed on this matter.
Was the Falklands a subject of which the Prime Minister knew nothing? The charitable explanation would be that a busy Prime Minister could hardly be expected to know about every crisis. However, the Prime Minister has had an all-pervasive, ever-present human reminder of the critical nature of the Falklands issue ever since she crossed the threshold of Downing Street. At the last reshuffle of Ministers, it was widely reported that the hon. Member for Eastbourne would become a Minister of State, if not propelled into the Cabinet itself. When no such event occurred—I gave the hon. Gentleman warning that I would refer to this matter—one of the Prime Minister's senior colleagues gave an explanation in public print on 9 January:
"Why on earth should he move—he is at the moment the most powerful MAN, repeat Man, in the Conservative Party".
If no one else knew very much about the Falklands and the dangers lurking in the situation, the hon. Member for Eastbourne knew a great deal about them, because he went there in the autumn of 1978, in the congenial company of my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Lambie), and he knew the importance and significance of the situation. And she knew full well.
The Falklands may have been a faraway, peripheral issue even for the right hon. Member for St. Ives (Sir J. Nott)—the then Secretary of State for Defence—the chiefs of staff, the Foreign Secretary and many of the officials in the stratosphere of the Foreign Office, but the hon. Member for Eastbourne and the Prime Minister knew exactly what the score was. If there was one thing on which those two were not ignorant, it was the Falklands.
The Prime Minister and the hon. Member for Eastbourne must have been sensitive to the position described in paragraph 95 of the Franks' report. The final paragraph of the JIC assessment of 9 July 1981 stated:
"If Argentina concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, there would be high risk of resorting to more forcible measures against British interests, and that it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances, military action against British shipping or a full scale invasion of the Falkland Islands could not be discounted."
I do not share the views of some speakers about the supposedly incompetent actions of the Prime Minister and her Cabinet. With the hon. Member for Eastbourne at her side, the Prime Minister knew exactly what she was doing from an early stage. He and she had that litany of information, described by Franks that never reached the Cabinet.
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My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was right to draw attention to paragraph 291 of the Franks report, which uses the words "never formally discussed".
My right hon. Friend said that that was unbelievable. The paragraph also referred to "no meeting until 1 April". The cynical view that I advance at least has the merit of explaining why the subject was not discussed for 15 months with Cabinet colleagues.
There are two possible reasons for that, or a combination of both. The hon. Member for Eastbourne and the Prime Minister turned their Nelson's eye to the warnings in the belief that it was too expensive and impracticable to maintain a substantial garrison and that, come the inevitable exhaustion of Argentine's patience, they would have to negotiate on behalf of the Falkland Islands as best they could, whatever the taunts of their own Right wing, abetted by the cynical support given by both parties when in opposition to the Falkland Islands committee lobby during the past 17 years. That would have been a reasonable position if they had not launched a task force.
The alternative scenario is that the Prime Minister and the hon. Member for Eastbourne decided early in March that they were not averse to lying "doggo" and letting things run, to savour the discomfiture of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary need not look disbelievingly at me. I spent the 1960s as Parliamentary Private Secretary to the late Dick Crossman and I know only too well how one major Department can conspire against another in government. That happens in all Governments.
The hon. Member for Eastbourne and the Prime Minister were not over-concerned about the discomfiture to Lord Carrington but if things went wrong they did want to ensure Britain would appear as an injured party if Argentina took military action.
I am not alone in that view. Hugo Young of The Sunday Times perceptively reported:
"A Cabinet Minister had explained that the purpose of the apparently intense search for peace was to make the British understand why they had to go to war."
Later he said:
"On the whole, the Minister said it was a great relief to the Cabinet that by the time the British settlement offer was made, the Argentinians were in no mood to talk."
The question that arises throughout is how serious and sincere were the Government in their efforts to avoid having to regain the Falkland Islands by force? From a very early stage, the Prime Minister and the hon. Member for Eastbourne—[Laughter]—perceived an opportunity, having established Britain as an injured party, to test our military preparedness. No other explanation of 5 March exists.
Before hon. Members laugh again at the important role that I ascribe to the hon. Member for Eastbourne, may I say that I was one of the few hon. Members to take the trouble to visit the Prime Minister and went on 21 April at her invitation. She said, very courteously, that she would see the awkward squad right away. Who was there? The hon. Member for Eastbourne—[Laughter]. Do not underrate him, because he knew exactly what was happening in the Falklands.
Even the Franks report wonders aloud why the Prime Minister's note of 5 March was not followed up. Whatever explanation is given—it may be different from that which I put forward—some explanation must be found. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has asked that question, as did the right hon. Member for Plymouth,

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Devonport (Dr. Owen) in The Observer. They have not received any reply. At least I am giving a coherent, if cynical, explanation. If it is wrong, let there be an answer in the speech in reply to the debate.
In the Franks report, which for its drafting skill, unlike many of its critics, I have come on fourth reading greatly to admire, there is a litany of occasions when Franks reveals that, knowing what they did, there is no other explanation why the Prime Minister—with the hon. Member for Eastbourne at her side—failed to warn or to act and was content to allow nothing to be done. It might have been fine had they not contrived to give the impression of taking a malleable attitude and then adopting the astonishingly hard attitude of dispatching the task force. In life and diplomacy it is accepted that one can take a compromise position after a hard line. However, it is bordering on the criminal to take a hard line having given the impression that one will take a soft line. That, to borrow the phrase that I used to the Franks committee, and which I pinched from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner), is "luring the Argentines on to the punch."
Let us examine paragraph 152 on page 45. On 3 March—the day after the breakdown of the talks—the British ambassador in Buenos Aires reported further comment in the Argentine press on the unilateral communiqué. When the Prime Minister saw that telegram, she wrote on it:
"We must make contingency plans."
Let it not be said that paragraph 147 or 152 was the usual business of the Cabinet Office wanting something and asking for it in the Prime Minister's name. The point is that, the Prime Minister, in the first week of March, was personally involved or she would not have written notes asking for contingency plans. Is that the action of a Prime Minister for whom the crisis was to "come out of the blue" on 31 March? Hardly!
Paragraph 153 states that on 8 March the Prime Minister—the same Prime Minister for whom the crisis was to come "out of the blue" on 31 March as she confirmed to the House—spoke to the then Secretary of State for Defence and asked him how quickly Royal Navy ships could be deployed to the Falkland Islands if required. A Prime Minister who supposed that there was no possibility of an invasion in the near future would not have asked her Defence Secretary that question. However, we should consider the reply. Incidentally, it took four days in the middle of the week. It was:
"Passage of time for a frigate deployed to the Falklands, which would require Royal Fleet Auxiliary support, would be of the order of 20 days".
Twenty days would take her up to 28 March. The Prime Minister, solemnly warned of the need to make contingency plans which she had accepted three days before, on 5 March could have had frigates and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in the Falklands by Sunday 28 March.
In a perceptive article in the News of the World on 23 January, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said:
"I have not noticed any reluctance on her part previously to impose her political will on the Civil Service".
That is an important and accurate statement. By doing nothing, she is acting out of character.
That brings me to another of the Prime Minister's untruths. On Sunday 28 March Jim Slater and Jim Jump
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gave my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) and me photostats of letters from Michael Flockhart, the shop steward on the RFA Fort Austin that complain of the decision to send his crew to the south Atlantic after five and a half months in the sweltering Gulf. How did the barpersons of Gibraltar have better information than the Prime Minister about the destination of the fleet, some of the ships of which were carrying nuclear weapons to a potential theatre of fighting, according to the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) in an interview on "Newsnight"? The answer is that the Prime Minister knew everything that the barpersons of Gibraltar knew and more. She should be challenged for misleading the House by telling us that the invasion came "out of the blue" on 31 March. The barpersons of Gibraltar, the crew of the RFA Fort Austin and the submarines knew about it three days earlier.
In my oral evidence to the Franks committee, I told Lord Franks that he had a duty to make it clear whether he believed that the Prime Minister, to use a phrase which I told Lord Franks that I had borrowed from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover, not being averse to a fight, should such a situation develop lured the Argentines on to the punch. This is a question which Franks did not face.
But references to the Franks report, which I shall telescope for reasons of time, give substance to that cold view of the Prime Minister's behaviour, that she was not averse to a fight. It is up to her to answer these points if I am wrong. Paragraph 157 concerns personal messages from Lord Carrington to Alexander Haig that were sent on 8 March. Did she know nothing about that? Paragraph 155 refers to the draft telegram from Lord Carrington to Senor Costa Mendez on 18 March. Did she know nothing about that? Paragraph 169 refers to Foreign Office and Defence Ministers agreeing, on 20 March, that HMS Endurance should sail to South Georgia. Paragraph 187 refers to Lord Carrington's minute to the Prime Minister on 24 March. In a major interview with Mr. George Gale, the Prime Minister was asked:
"Did the Falkland crisis come at you more or less out of the blue?
Mrs. Thatcher: Out of the blue."
That is not true; there is no other word for it.
We must examine the nature of a just war. One characteristic is that all solutions should be tried. In this case, that did not happen. Moreover, proportionality is important. All this has been for 1,800 people and we are further from a solution than ever before. The conditions of a just war were not fulfilled. The diplomatic channel was not exhausted.
That is in keeping with the Prime Minister's behaviour after 2 April. Why, when one knows that the American Secretary of State is in mid-air on his way to discuss peace on 7 and 8 April, does one take the provocative step of announcing a military exclusion zone which is to go into force on Monday 12 April, by which time the submarine Spartan would have got down there, without hearing what Alexander Haig had to say? Either it had been decided that there was little or nothing that the British Government could do to prevent an invasion, in which case the Government should say so, or, in their private thoughts, the Prime Minister and the hon. Member for Eastbourne—the most important man in the Conservative

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party—decided to let Britain become an injured party in the expectation of a righteous little fight from which the Iron Lady would derive personal and political advantage.
If that is a great distortion, we must examine circumstances a little later on. That is why Franks' terms of reference were unsatisfactory. Why have I asked so many questions about the General Belgrano? Because the answers have been contradictory. The reasons for its sinking are untrue and have been changed. I am not asking for a lot, just for an explanation why the Prime Minister, behind her Foreign Secretary's back—he never denied that he knew nothing about it and was in New York at the time—and without warning the American Administration who were deeply worried by then about hemispheric relations, and in the knowledge that there was a decision by the army council in Buenos Aires to withdraw from the Malvinas and it now transpires, from the fleet air arm pilots of Aviacon Naval who have accused Anaya of treachery to withdraw the navy from the Falklands that was endorsed by Peru and the Americans. The Prime Minister who was at Chequers personally ordered the Conqueror to torpedo the General Belgrano on Sunday 2 May at a time and in a position when it has now been established by parliamentary questions the General Belgrano and her escorts were no immediate threat to our sailors.
We should have a point-by-point reply to those allegations that have now been taken up by some sections of the press, such as Tribune on 7 January. There may be an answer but it has not been forthcoming. All the evidence can be found in c. 897 of Hansard for 21 December 1982.
The difficulty is that it was not a case of buttressing negotiations by using force. The decision to send a task force circumscribed negotiations. In reality there may have been no way of preventing an Argentine swoop, but it was a way of postponing the conflict of interest.
We are now talking about a bloody nose. What does that mean in reality when it is stripped of rhetoric? A bloody nose could be interpreted as sending commandoes to the south American mainland or carrying out a bombing raid.
Mr. Julian Amery: Right.
Mr. Dalyell: The right hon. Gentleman says "Right". In that case, we should discuss with the United States Administration taking revenge or striking before attacking the South American mainland. Ironically, it is not now Britain but Argentina that has the strength as we face the continual threat and heavy costs. The ball is at its feet. That point was made movingly by James Cameron and Paul Rogers, on Channel 4 on Saturday evening.
On reading between the lines in the Franks report, one has to draw the conclusion that there should be an inquiry, along the lines, possibly, of those which followed the Crimea war and the Boer war, into the entire conduct of what happened in May and June 1982. There were many opportunities when an honourable peace could have been had for the asking. What do we have? We have the legacy of Fortress Falklands. We have opted for a military solution when such a solution is no solution at all.
I conclude my cynical and possibly unpleasant speech. I fear that I am the first hon. Member who has given any sort of coherent answer to the questions that have been asked by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Member for Plymouth,
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Devonport (Dr. Owen). They have properly asked the questions and I have given answers. If I have not given the right answers, someone must explain what the truthful answers are. There are many questions surrounding the Belgrano and other incidents in the Falklands war. As before and now today, we find that the idea of reconciliation and some constructive solution is not in the Prime Minister's vocabulary. She must give some answers.
8.1 pm
Mr. Julian Amery: I hold myself lucky to be called after the Philippic that we have heard from the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell;). He has lifted the veil on a deep conspiracy, and a very worrying one. I should have thought that with his experience of the House he would know that the Government Front Bench is entirely decorative and that our affairs are really run by a committee of Parliamentary Private Secretaries.
Mr. Dalyell: Just one, and a very special one.
Mr. Amery: No doubt my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) plays a prominent role. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be replying to the debate tomorrow evening. No doubt my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne will be able to inspire the proper reply to that to which the hon. Gentleman has just treated us. I wish it were as complicated as his.
When I obtained a copy of the Franks report, before reading it I consulted a wise and valued friend who I knew had already perused it. He said to me, "It is a question of 'Albert and the Lion'". Those who are familiar with that cautionary tale—it was popular in Lancashire many years ago—will remember that Mr. and Mrs. Ramsbottom took their little boy, Albert, to the zoo at Blackpool, where, whether through negligence on the part of the parents, inadvertence or because the bars of the cage were too wide apart, Albert was devoured by a lion called Ponto. There followed an inquest at which the magistrate said that no one was really to blame.
Mr. Stuart Holland: The right hon. Gentleman is mixing his Hilaire Belloc with the tale in question. Ponto is the lion in the other story by Hilaire Belloc, "Jim".
Hon. Members: "Wallace".
Mr. Amery: I think not, but I am ready to discuss the matter with the hon. Gentleman. I think that the keeper said "Down Ponto, down".
Mr. Stuart Holland rose—
Mr. Amery: No, I shall not give way.
On first reading the Franks report I was inclined to think that no one was really to blame. When I read it again more carefully, I had to admit that it was a devastating indictment of this Government in particular and of the previous Government. But, rather worse than that, we are all to blame. The report puts its finger on a schizophrenia which has bedevilled the conduct of British foreign policy for more than a generation.
Before the second world war we said that Hitler must not be allowed to take over Austria and Czechoslovakia. Everybdy was agreed on both sides of the House, and in all parties. But very few people were prepared to vote the

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necessary defence credits. Everyone was agreed that Nasser should not take over the Suez canal—Hugh Gaitskell just as much as Anthony Eden. However, very few were prepared to keep a garrison in the canal zone.
There were two options from the beginning for the Falklands. One option was to surrender sovereignty on the best terms that we could get. I think that Lord Carrington was right when he said that that option was never open to us. The sense of responsibility towards the islanders would have forbidden it. Abhorrence of the different Fascist or military juntas in the Argentine would have also forbidden it. Our interests in the Antarctic and the development of it would similarly have forbidden it. That option was never seriously open to us politically.
The other option was to defend the islands. No Government, Labour or Conservative, did anything about that between 1964 and 1982. We never lengthened the runway. The only aircraft on the island when the blow came was the Governor's private aeroplane. We did nothing about the harbour. There was no ship ready to defend the island except HMS Endurance, which had been scheduled for withdrawal. There was a purely token garrison with no stockpile of weapons or reinforcements. I think that most hon. Members were in the Chamber for the debate on 2 April. I think they will remember the state of our communications with the islands on that day.
Successive Governments willed the end—"The Falklands must remain British and the wishes of the islanders are paramount"—but no one was prepared to vote the means. And so we fell back on negotiations. Negotiations make sense if one is trying to achieve a definite aim, but if the negotiations are aimless they get nowhere. I allowed myself, in a private colloquy, to say that in this instance and in others Lord Carrington had mistaken diplomacy for foreign policy. I said it in private but nothing that one says in private nowadays stays private for very long. He replied during the weekend and said, "The trouble about Julian is that he mistakes nostalgia for reality."
Mr. Frank Hooley: Quite right too.
Mr. Amery: I shall consult the House on its opinion. We can consult reality only too well now, but I put it to the House that capital costs and the running costs of building a runway to Lord Shackleton' s prescription, of having a squadron of aircraft, of having the odd ship on patrol—perhaps a nuclear submarine—and of having a battalion of troops on the island over 10 years would have cost between 3 and 5 per cent. of the bill with which we are now landed. It is all very well to talk about nostalgia, but we must remember what the Treasury has lost and the number of lives that have been lost.
I think that realism is on my side. The tragedy flows from thinking that diplomacy is a substitute for foreign policy. However, I must make an admission. The negotiations kept everything going for about 15 years. They were helped by repeated changes of Government in the Argentine. There was General Lannusse and President Campora, the latter being the first dentist to become a head of State. There was General Peron and Mrs. Peron and then control returned to juntas. There was President Viola and then President Galtieri.
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But the policy of negotiation and being ready to discuss sovereignty carried in itself the seed of its own destruction. Once it was clear that the Government were prepared to negotiate over sovereignty if they could overcome the hurdle to which the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) referred, the Treasury was reluctant to produce any money for sensible plans such as the Shackleton plan. The Ministry of Defence, with its hard-pressed budget, did not see why it should defend a commitment which we might at any moment give away. The Falklands Island Company, instead of reinvesting its profits, tried to repatriate as much of them as it could. We were on a slippery slope. Shackleton was turned down first by the Labour Government. I am glad to say that the Conservative Government of which I was a member did not do it, but the present Government did and were prepared to discuss sovereignty with the Argentines. We hid behind the islanders.
The readiness to discuss sovereignty bred a curious insensitivity. I am sorry to introduce a rather ugly parallel, but I am sure that hon. Members will have read of very old people who, with age, become insensitive and, in deprived conditions, while they sleep have their feet eaten away by rats and do not even notice. That was my impression when I attended the debate in the House on 2 April. No one had the faintest idea of what was going on. The tapes said that the islands had been occupied by the invaders. The then Lord Privy Seal, at 11 am, and the Leader of the House, as he then was, at 2.30 pm, could not confirm it. They were in touch with the governor, they said, yet the governor had been in the bag for about five hours. A curious insensitivity weighed over the whole affair. It was the result of trying to pursue a policy of keeping the ball in the air without making up our minds whether we wanted to keep the islands or to get rid of them. For political reasons it was impossible to get rid of them. Yet it would not have been difficult to defend them.
The Franks report attaches a great deal of importance to the date of 2 April and states that the Government could not be blamed for not expecting the invasion on that day because all the indications were that the invasion would come in midsummer. But politics is not like grouse shooting. The likes of General Galtieri do not say that they will not start shooting until 12 August.
It is a strange doctrine that decisions of the Government should be dictated by intelligence or, indeed, by diplomatic assessments. Intelligence is like a fieldglass. It helps one to focus more clearly, on what one can see but the business of a statesman is to judge what is on the other side of a hill. We have been singularly bad at this over the years. Lord Halifax was an absolute child in his assessment of Hitler. It took Sir Anthony Eden quite a long time to find out about Nasser. Lord Carrington was a little slow in getting on to the nature of General Galtieri. Of course, Galtieri would not have been a suitable member of the Turf club or even of the Carlton club, from which I understand Lord Carrington has resigned, but it is the job of the Foreign Secretary to try to get into the minds of the people with whom he has to deal.
Surprise has always been the weapon of dictators. We had no inkling as far as I know, of the invasion of Austria by Hitler, or of Czechoslovakia, or of Albania by Mussolini. The intelligence people would say that it could happen and that the possibility could not be discounted, but no one told us on the day before that it was going to happen.

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When General Galtieri came to power in December 1981 that was the moment when the Government should have said that we had better begin to take steps to preserve the islands, even without having done what they should have done, without the airfields and so on. That was the time to send reinforcements, to send a batalion group or perhaps a nuclear submarine, and to have anti-aircraft weapons deployed.
In January, there was plenty of time. February was already a little late. It was the middle of March by the time that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister wrote the minute about contingency plans. It was already very late then with 20 or 30 days' sailing time between Britain and the Falklands. So we came to the sorry farce at which we assisted of 2 April and what Lord Carrington rightly described as a national humiliation.
What about the future? My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said that, for the time being, Fortress Falklands is all that we can expect, and she is absolutely right. What surprises me is that, in spite of the response which her handling of the task force and the operation of the task force itself evoked from the country, all the defeatists who did not want the task force to go, who criticised all through, are raising their heads again, are saying that the expense will be terrible and that as a result we shall have no contact with Latin America.
Surely we have to face the fact that, having incurred enormous expenditure to liberate the islands, the cost of maintaining Fortress Falklands ought to be pretty modest in terms of a proper runway, a stockpile, a squadron of aircraft and perhaps a slightly larger garrison, but nothing beyond our means when compared with what we have spent. Those who criticise what was done are saying, "Do not try to defend it." "Negotiate" is the great cry. We hear it with industrial relations. We heard it with Hitler and Stalin. We get it today, with Andropov. Those who are crying that from the rooftops have forgotten nothing and have learnt nothing.
But what about the opportunities? Should we not think about them? The Falkland Islands are the gateway to the untapped wealth of the Antarctic and the south Atlantic over which we have extensive claims. We should have links with the mainland, yes, but I do not suppose it will be impossible to have links with Chile. We had them before Argentina came in on the act. The normal communication with Latin America in the main, was from the Falklands to Chile. I do not see why in due course we should not produce, and perhaps take the lead in creating, a south Atlantic community in which Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay and the riparian African States might all take part.
The fundamental lesson that I should like to stress is that world war 1, world war 2 and Suez all ensued from our determination to stand by a principle and our failure to build up the strength to stand by that principle. We willed the end, but we failed to will the means. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has redeemed us from this national humiliation by her superb leadership in the actual conflict with Argentina and by the fantastic performance of our armed forces. Without her, with all respect to my right hon. Friends on the Government Front Bench, and equally to right hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches, I am not sure that we would have pulled it off. She saved us from disaster.
But may I say this to my right hon. Friend? One can make mistakes at home and put them right. It costs money,
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but the errors can be retrieved. Mistakes abroad can be—this one nearly was—irreversible. I commend thoroughly my right hon. Friend for wearing the apron of good housekeeper in domestic politics. When it comes to matters abroad, I hope that she sticks to the armour of the Iron Lady.
8.19 pm
Mr. Frank Hooley: On page 103 of the Franks report, there is the record of an exchange between myself and the right hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley). I put the question to the right hon. Gentleman:
"Is not the Government's argument that the interests of 1,800 Falkland Islanders take precedence over the interests of 55 million people in the United Kingdom?"
He replied:
"There need be no conflict between the two, especially if a peaceful resolution of the dispute can be achieved."
In fact, there is a fundamental conflict between the two. Any reading of the Franks report as a whole bears this out.
The United Kingdom has no overriding diplomatic, military or economic interest in the possession of the Falkland Islands—none whatever. There is a major conflict of interest, as it is perceived by the Falkland Islanders' between the people and the Government of this country. The Franks report contrasts usefully the period of 1965–79 with the subsequent period of the Administration now in office. In the period between 1965 and 1979, there were four Governments and three Prime Ministers. By a process of skilful diplomacy and cautious defence, they carried forward, inch by inch, the situation over the Falklands between the United Kingdom and Argentina and avoided the catastrophe that has occurred under this Government.
There were a series of agreements in that area. In 1971, there was the communications agreement, which carried with it not only important agreements on communications between the islands and Argentina but also agreeement in matters of health, education and travel and a good many other issues. In 1972, there was the airstrip agreement which was important for the well-being of the Falklanders. In 1974 there was the petroleum products agreement under which Argentina expended money on providing a service for the supply of oil for the Falkland Islands. In 1976, there was the wide-ranging Shackleton survey on the economic development of the Falklands.
In 1978, not long before the present Government took office, there was a further agreement on scientific co-operation which was, I believe, negotiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands). Within that period, despite setbacks and difficulties, there was some inching forwards towards a modus vivendi between the United Kingdom and Argentina on various issues. It was very small—perhaps, some would argue, insignificant. Nevertheless, there was a series of agreements in this difficult and controversial territorial dispute.
In the period between 1965 and 1979, it was made abundantly clear that sovereignty was an issue for negotiation. This is shown clearly by the Franks report. In 1967, the sovereignty issue was made a negotiable issue. Paragraph 22 of the Franks report refers to this. In 1968, sovereignty again was made a negotiable issue. Paragraph 23 points that out. In 1977, sovereignty was again put on the table by the United Kingdom as a negotiable issue.

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Paragraph 60 refers to this. In 1977 again, the lease-back proposition—I am not sure whether for the first time—was brought significantly into the argument as a possible settlement. Paragraph 61 refers to this.
At the same time as these negotiations, incorporating agreements between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments, there were some signs on the part of successive Governments that the defence of the islands was in the mind of the Government of the day. That was the reason for maintaining HMS Endurance on station, and for sending the submarines and ships referred to in paragraph 65 of the report.
There was a cautious and skilful diplomatic effort, and I repeat that this was under a series of Governments. I am not claiming that a Labour Government had special insight in these matters—there was more than one Government, and there were three different Prime Ministers. However, there was a period of sensible and skilful diplomacy without abandoning, and without giving the world the appearance that we would abandon, the defence capability of this country if there was open and active aggression on the part of the people with whom we were negotiating. It was probably this combination of diplomacy and defence which, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, meant that in this period of 14 years not one person was killed in the dispute.
The Franks report goes on to describe the period from 1979 to 1982. There was a process of diplomacy, but there were no agreements. I cannot recall, from my reading of the Franks report, any agreement on any point being reached with the Argentine Government during that time. It is true that there was a ventilation of the lease-back proposition but, after a rebuff in the House, it was not pursued seriously by the Government. On the diplomatic front, unlike in the earlier period, the Government made no progress in terms of agreement, and no progress in coming to any modus vivendi, in diplomatic terms, with the Argentine Government.
In other respects, such as defence and certain other political matters, the Government took a series of steps—at least 10 of them are catalogued in the report—that gave the impression, or must have given the impression, not merely to Argentina but to the world, that whatever our diplomacy meant, we had no serious intention of continuing to hold the Falkland Islands, and that, come the crunch, we were putting ourselves into an impossible position because we would have neither the capacity, nor, it appeared, politically the will, to defend the Falkland Islands.
There was a basic contradiction within our posture with the Government on the one hand proclaiming that the wishes of the Falklanders were sacrosanct but on the other hand taking a series of decisions that undermined the United Kingdom position vis-a-vis the islands. I shall list those actions as they are listed in the report.
There was the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, a decision which has been amply ventilated in the debate and which I shall not pursue. There was the rundown of the surface Navy, which led to the sacking of a junior Minister and a ferocious argument about defence policy, which is continuing. There was also the sale of HMS Invincible.
With great respect to my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), his argument is undermined
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by the sale of HMS Invincible, because how the Prime Minister could seriously have postulated a deliberate war at the moment when she was selling off one of the essential armaments for that war, seems to me to be—
Mr. Dalyell: From 5 March.
Mr. Hooley: From 5 March or not, I do not think that even my hon. Friend is claiming that the Prime Minister was so clairvoyant that she could foresee the exact date on which war would break out. To sell Invincible when there was the possibility of a war with Argentina was an act of barminess beyond my comprehension. There was the decision to withdraw Endurance, the rundown of the surface Navy and the failure to deploy any naval forces, even though the Cabinet and the Prime Minister knew that that had been done on a previous occasion.
There is a great deal of inconsistency in the Franks report. He said that in 1977, when ships were deployed, the Argentines knew nothing of it. He then said that had the Conservative Government deployed ships, the Argentines would have been bound to know about it. That is an odd argument, for which Franks must answer. The Government were willing to sell arms to Argentina and also to train Argentine personnel in Britain. That was extraordinary behaviour when Argentina was one of the three countries with whom we had a territorial dispute.
There were other non-military failures. The Government did nothing about the Shackleton report, which was surely a signal to the Argentine Government that Britain was not concerned about the future of the Falkand Islands. There was the failure to do anything about the runway on the islands, which had civil, economic and military implications. But the most vicious and deliberate act of policy was the British Nationality Act—a most evil piece of legislation that must surely have been interpreted by the Argentines as meaning that Britain no longer cared a damn about the Falklanders. We deprived them of the one thing that cost us absolutely nothing, which we could have allowed them to retain without any difficulty whoever governed the islands—their nationality. The Government deliberately deprived them of that, yet expected the Argentine Government to draw no conclusions.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) drew attention to the total failure in January 1981 to convene the Overseas and Defence Committee. Although the Argentines would not know a great deal about that, it was nevertheless a serious failure of government.
There were 10 failures—Endurance, the rundown of the Navy, the sale of Invincible, no deployment of the Navy, arms sales, military training, no action on Shackleton, no action on the runway, the British Nationality Act, and no action on the Overseas and Defence Committee—yet Franks concluded that the Government were not responsible for the disaster.
As an essay in logic, the report is a remarkable document. If Franks had left its narrative and reached no conclusion, it would have read more powerfully and sensibly. But to reach the conclusion that it did, after narrating all the items to which I have referred, was incredible.
What stands out is that, on the major issues of policy, the Prime Minister cannot be exonerated. The British Nationality Act was a major act of Government, in which she was implicated. It was her job to convene the Overseas

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and Defence Committee. The policy on the Navy was part of her defence strategy. She must have known about the arms sales and the military training. There is a powerful degree of prime ministerial responsibility in all those matters, which contributed to a disastrous war. That was the first time this century that this country went to war absolutely alone. The Prime Minister must accept the responsibility for that disaster.
Two other themes run through the Franks report. The first is the behaviour of the Falkland Islanders themselves. They were intransigent and unco-operative and made no effort whatsoever to appreciate, meet or accommodate the clear problem which existed between the United Kingdom and Argentina. That is a clear example of the white colonial settler mentality that led to war in Kenya and civil war in Rhodesia.
The overseas kith and kin argument means that somehow the metropolitan home country owes people a living and must sacrifice money, lives or anything else to preserve their immediate interests. That is not a policy or attitude that the House should endorse or confirm.
I have the honour to represent 65,000 electors. I shall not support the proposition that the sons, husbands and brothers of those 65,000 electors shall be sent to die to satisfy the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. Of course we have an obligation to the Falkland Islanders. We had an obligation to maintain their nationality, which the Government cynically threw away. We have an obligation to protect them as far as is feasible, to look after them and to come to some sensible agreement in the circumstances in which they exist.
Some hon. Members may preach to me about the high moral responsibility of this country to islanders overseas, but what happened to the high moral responsibility for Diego Garcia? What happened to those wretched, unfortunate people who were no threat to this country at all but who were cleared out and dumped somewhere else and who had to beg and argue for any reasonable compensation for the bestial way in which they were treated? There was not much high moral principle then.
We must consider carefully what our future obligations are to the Falkland Islanders. I believe that there are three. First, they have an absolute right to British nationality and nothing must be allowed to undermine that. Secondly, if in the future this country comes to some accommodation with Argentina, we must make sure that the Falkland Islanders exercise a free option as to whether they wish to stay in the Falkland Islands, come to the United Kingdom or go elsewhere. Thirdly, we must be generous and forthcoming in any financial compensation which may arise from those decisions. We do not have an obligation to maintain the Falkland Islands as a 19th-century colony in perpetuity simply because we repeat parrot fashion that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders are paramount.
I represent the wishes of 65,000 electors. They are the people whose wishes are paramount, and I must balance those wishes against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders.
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Has the hon. Gentleman asked those 65,000 electors for their views on the Falkland Islands? How did he do it, and what was the result?
Mr. Hooley: From the conversations I have had, I am quite sure that they did not want their sons, brothers and husbands to die in the South Atlantic. I am prepared to stand by that judgment.
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The United Nations is mentioned in the Franks report. Paragraph 51 states that the General Assembly resolution of December 1976 asked the United Kingdom to
"facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the wellbeing of the population of the Islands".
That resolution was carried by 102 votes to one, that one being the United Kingdom. The significance was not the 102 votes in favour but the 35 abstentions. On that occasion, not one ally or friend came into the lobby with us. No member of NATO, the European Community or the Commonwealth was prepared to take the stance that we took on the Falkland Islands. That was just as true last autumn, although there were one or two exceptions.
One of the tragedies is that successive Governments did not make a serious attempt to use the machinery of the United Nations to resolve this particularly difficult dispute. There have been endless propositions since the war about how the United Nations might be used, but it was never seriously used beforehand.
On any sensible reading, the Franks report is an indictment of the indecision and incompetence of the Prime Minister. It is a warning that the price of empire is blood and treasure. Unless we abandon the few pretensions to empire that still exist, more blood will be spilt and more treasure wasted. The only sensible conclusion to draw from this disastrous episode is that in the future we should pay more attention to the advice, help and assistance that we can obtain from our allies and friends as well as more serious attention to the considered opinions of the international community.
8.42 pm
Sir Nigel Fisher: The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Mr. Hooley) was probably right in saying that successive British Governments gave Argentina the impression that we would not defend the Falkland Islands if and when it came to the crunch. We tried to string them along, and succeeded for a long time, but eventually the Argentine junta lost patience with our delaying tactics and chanced its arm with the invasion.
Like all hon. Members, I have read the Franks report with great care, and it seems to me that the Opposition have a problem. They can either attack the report as an establishment cover-up, as some hon. Members have done, or they can only criticise the Government on the relatively minor points to which the Franks committee drew attention.
To attack the report as a cover-up would be insulting to Lord Franks and to the much-respected Labour Privy Councillors who signed it. I am personally delighted—because he is an old friend and because I thought that he was so good—that Lord Carrington and the other two Foreign Office Ministers were completely and unanimously exonerated by the report. Their insistence on resigning was honourable, just as that of Lord Crathorne was honourable some years ago over the Crichel Down episode, but it was not justified on the merits. The only result is that we have lost the services of one of the best Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries that in my experience we have ever had, as well as the services of the two other able ministers concerned.
In my view—I know that it is not shared by Labour Members—the Prime Minister also emerges, as I expected she would, vindicated and virtually unscathed from the inquiry. I pay my own tribute to her courage, determination and leadership from the time she took

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charge of the operation after 3 April. In retrospect, I believe that I was wrong and the House was wrong to have criticised Ministers as violently as most of us did on 3 April. I rather regret parts of my speech.
In mitigation of that mistake, I believe that many hon. Members, including myself, can claim that we were right on one point. Many of us had begged the Ministry of Defence, publicly and privately, not to withdraw HMS Endurance. It gave the wrong signal to Argentina, and was one of the few mistakes made by the Government in the lead-up to the invasion. It was not Lord Carrington's mistake. He had asked three times for the retention of HMS Endurance in the south Atlantic. It was the mistake of my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for Defence who insisted on that rather petty economy.
The only other criticism of Ministers that I venture to make is that, like the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, I was surprised to read that the Overseas and Defence Committee of the Cabinet did not discuss the Falkland Islands over a period of 15 months. It seemed odd, to say the least. It was not my experience when I occupied a junior position 20 years ago in the Colonial Office. The Committee met frequently then and often on rather less serious matters. But even if the Committee had met, I do not believe that the invasion could have been foreseen or prevented at the date when it took place. That seems to be the point and the vindication of the Government in the Franks report.
I turn now to the future. Although I yield to no one in my support of the islanders, I cannot envisage any real development of the islands' economy—the fisheries potential, which is probably considerable, and the oil potential, which might be considerable in the future—without an eventual arrangement with Argentina. No commercial firm would start boring for oil and putting up an oil rig if it could be swept away in a lightning raid by the Argentines.
The last chance of achieving an agreement with Argentina before the Falklands war was through the leaseback proposals put forward by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in 1980. I urged then that the proposal should be considered favourably by the islanders, and I sent messages to the Falkland Islands to that effect. I did that genuinely because I felt it to be in their own interests. The lack of a positive response from them and the consequently hostile reaction in the House killed that proposal politically. I believe, still, that something along the lines of lease-back will have to be resurrected if there is to be any long-term economic development of the Falkland Islands.
Unlike my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), I do not believe that 'Fortress Falklands' is a viable or constructive policy for ever, or that the cost of such a permanent military commitment should be borne indefinitely by the British taxpayer. Nor have I ever believed that the wishes of the 1,800 islanders should be paramount, if that implies a veto for all time on the defence and foreign policy of Great Britain. It is an unrealistic concept. I am sorry to disagree with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in that basic attitude and with many other of my hon. Friends.
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I accept that there can be no question of an arrangement with Argentina for several years to come. But, as Sir Nicholas Henderson wrote in the Sunday Times this week, quoted by the Leader of the Opposition today:
"Without a negotiated settlement with Argentina, the economic development of the islands will remain stultified; and Britain will be saddled with a continuing military threat that can only be met by a considerable diversion of our military resources."
As the Leader of the Opposition also quoted, Sir Nicholas went on to say:
"in some way, at some stage, the problem will have to be internationalised. Other countries will have to be brought in, not least to remove the prospect of an indefinite security problem".
I wonder whether the creation of a south Atlantic treaty organisation might be the answer and should be considered in the long term, although I acknowledge that it would pose its own problems, such as whether South Africa should be included or excluded. There would no doubt be many difficulties, but there would be internationalisation and South American and other countries involved would be brought in. Those matters are for the future consideration of the British Government of the day. Meanwhile the present Government deserve the support of Parliament for their effective handling of a very difficult problem.
8.52 pm
Mr. Bruce George: An arrogant and misguided American politician said a few centuries ago that there was evidence that American institutions had reached the peak of perfection known to man. Listening to the Prime Minister, and reading Franks and the White Paper on the future defence of the Falkland Islands, I feel that that sentiment has been transmitted to this side of the Atlantic.
In my interpretation of events I am guided partly by Franks. We must remember that within that document is not the whole of human knowledge on Anglo-Argentine relations. In it we are not privy to much information. However, a great deal of information is available from other sources with which we can supplement our analysis. I have read the document carefully and am not entirely persuaded, because I believe that there was a series of failures.
The fact that war took place at all was a failure. It was a failure of intelligence and a failure to respond to intelligence. It was a failure of institutions, decision making and communications. The price of that failure was high in terms of lost lives, equipment and resources that would have been better deployed elsewhere, damage to our relationship with other countries and damage to our allies and their relationships with other countries. It is damage past, damage present and damage in the future. Could it have been averted? Contrary to Franks, I argue that it could and should have been.
One of the few advantages of war is that it gives us an opportunity to modernise the institutions that otherwise would not have been modernised. There have been major reforms after investigations. Wars such as the Boer war and the Crimean war provided a stimulus and created greater efficiency in our military structures. However, if one views the last war thinking how clever one was, there is no impetus to look carefully at the changes that need to be made to economic, military and political institutions. The will is not there. Few changes to intelligence will be

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mounted, we have heard. If one looks dispassionately at the evidence, the conclusion that one reaches is not foursquare with that of Franks.
For success in military ventures the rewards historically have been high. For failures the rewards have been disastrous, ranging from execution to courts martial, but we as a nation have a capacity to learn from our mistakes. I hope we shall reappraise and learn, but this document, far from being a stimulus to reform, might retard it. Are we to believe the central thesis in paragraph 339:
"Taking account of these considerations, and of all the evidence we have received, we conclude that we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government"?
Is one to believe the other central thesis in paragraph 261, that the Government could not have known that the invasion was about to happen? I am not convinced.
Franks had an advantage over us in that he had access to much information that we do not have. Can one believe Franks, that a ramshackle regime that had not fought a war for over a century could do something that no other military system had been able to do, and conceive, launch and successfully prosecute an invasion within a day and half from a standing start? That is impossible. If anyone believes that, he must have a degree of naivety that is mind-boggling. If we were talking about a finely constructed military machine, it might be possible, but I very much doubt it. We are talking about a military system that has not been used for generations other than to put down and to kill off the indigenous population in the last century, and its own citizens in the last decade. That regine quite simply was not capable of carrying out such a momentous decision so successfully and so quickly.
The truth must be that plans were being discussed for many years, and certainly from the beginning of last year. I see the events from 1 January up to the invasion as the gradual unfolding of a plan. It may not have been a sophisticated master plan but nevertheless there is ample evidence that there was an intention to invade, and many of the events must be interpreted in that light.
The fact that the Argentines were able to invade and surprise us is a clear indication of the failure of our intelligence services to respond. According to the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), if anything was said, someone would get to know about it. Is that the case? The Argentine junta clearly believed that it could keep its cards close to its medallioned chest, and it succeeded. As a nation we have shown during the last few years a chronic inability to hold on to our own secrets, a stupidity matched only by our inability to find out anybody else's secrets. That anyone in a regime such as Argentina could keep from our intelligence services a momentous decision to invade is something that I regard with incredulity.
There was a failure of intelligence. It may not have been of the magnitude of the failures in relation to Pearl Harbour, the Yom Kippur war, the invasion of South Korea or the fall of the Shah, but it stands pretty high in the list of intelligence failures.
If one analyses those failures, some similarities appear. The greatest similarity perhaps is that the fault lies not so much with the intelligence gatherers as with the consumers of intelligence. So many signals were passed to the intelligence services and to those people supposedly superior to them that they could not interpret them. Signals to invade rarely appear in neon lights. The information
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rarely comes packaged in a coherent recognisable form. It is often contradictory and comes from different directions, and an adversary can try deliberately to mislead. The failure of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Cabinet Committee, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and her advisers to pick up the many warning signals leaves the Prime Minister much more culpable than this document would have us believe.
Information flowed in but there was a failure of the system to analyse and dissect, to respond and act. I understand that NATO has about 700 indicators to watch for which can result in various stages of alert. That is based on the principle that no aggressor can launch an invasion without taking fundamental preparatory steps which it is the task of intelligence to identify and transmit to the military and political decision takers. That is an activity which we were completely unable to undertake.
Some of those signals have already been mentioned and I shall deal with them briefly. Obviously the 150th anniversary of our retaking the islands was a sign that something was going to happen, as was the junta's desperate economic, political and constitutional crisis—a crisis of its own making. Such crises would almost invariably lead to a diversionary action which, as has happened so often before in world history, takes the form of a diversionary war. There are the warnings in public statements and informed newspaper reports and by bodies such as the semi-official Islas Malvinas Institute, which all pointed to the possibility of military action should negotiations fail.
The list of reports that I have seen differs from that which the Prime Minister quoted from earlier. One could see that if negotiations failed there was a likelihood of a military response. The Government were too clever by half in looking at the statements and wrongly interpreting them as being ancillary to Argentina's diplomatic effort. It is like reading "Mein Kampf' wrongly. The message was there. Argentina was going to invade, it virtually told us time and time again, and we failed to see it coming. That is a chronic failure.
One does not have to be a reader of Spanish newspapers. One can look at the "Latin America Weekly Report" of 12 March 1982. It said:
"The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, if Britain fails to make concessions. These include initiatives in the United Nations, a break in diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, an invasion of the islands".
Other editions gave equally clear warnings. One can see numerous instances which in isolation may be of no consequence but which together should surely have shown even the dimmest intelligence officer that this was not the normal crisis, the normal huffing and puffing of an Argentine Fascist dictatorship, but that something different was coming.
Not having access to much of Lord Franks' information, I spent an interesting day looking at the public record office files of the 1952 "task force" and the Hope bay incident. That was an incident very much like that of the scrap merchants over 30 years later. I believe, as did the Governor of the Falkland Islands, that that could have been the prelude to an invasion but firm action by Churchill's Government scotched such a possibility, as did action by the Government of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) a few years ago, in 1977.

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Another obvious signal which Lord Frank dismisses is the Hercules C130 landing at Stanley. He asks why that should have been done when the properties of the runway were known. But I spoke to people on the Falkland Islands and they knew that it was very different—that it was not a diversion by a group of pilots in distress but a dummy run. Senior officers wandered round the airfield and the town. That by itself was not a devastating signal but in conjunction with everything else it was one which the Government should have picked up.
Lord Franks dismisses the maps, two of which I have in my possession. Five hundred maps were left in Government House. They were not forgeries. Perhaps, as Lord Franks said, they were not bought in one go, but surely someone should have noticed that the supply of Falkland Islands maps from official sources was diminishing. We all know where they ended up.
One should also look at the stepping up of diplomatic activity in an attempt to divert attention. The diplomatic activity was an attempt to build up support among several non-aligned nations. Did we spot that that was not merely an attempt at diplomacy but an attempt to justify an invasion that was obviously to follow? We knew that in January the Argentine ambassador was recalled to Buenos Aires, not for discussions with the Foreign Minister but for well-publicised discussions with President Galtieri, and we all know what was on the agenda. Was that noted?
There were many warnings from intelligence services, even contained within the Franks report. Did anyone believe that Davidoff was an isolated entrepreneur, acting on his own? No, he was part of the conspiracy. He visited naval headquarters, and certainly he sailed to South Georgia in a Navy ship. So the incident of the scrap merchants was part of the process that unfolded in the months before the invasion.
Then there is the matter of navy manoeuvres. According to Franks, our naval attaché learned about them from reading press reports. There were many factors that were obvious, and I cannot understand how anyone can argue that the Government had no warning.
When one considers the immediate events before the invasion, one sees the signals coming thick and fast. According to paragraph 193, the Argentines were going to intercept HMS Endurance. There was the withdrawal of half a billion dollars from the City. How can one mislay half a billion dollars? Again, Franks is rather dismissive of that. However, there is an organisation called the Economic Intelligence Organisation and Committee which supposedly performs a financial JIC role, and it should have informed the Government that Argentine funds were being withdrawn. That is another signal that was ignored. The Government ignored—not deliberately, but for other reasons—many signals that should have been picked up.
There was guilt in terms of omission. Why did we not pick up signals of movements of men and material in Argentina? Were there unusual procurement purchases? Was there, as I am sure there was, additional signalling between the military? Were there meetings of senior military officers? Did we pick that up? Were there unusual and additional meetings of the junta? Was there additional military traffic near the ports and airfields? Of course there was. Was the information passed on? I very much doubt it.
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Here we have a catalogue of failure that as yet may not have been exposed, but undoubtedly in the months that lie ahead there will be revalations, either from the United States or from Argentina, that will totally discredit these theses. Once one knocks down the one thesis that the Government did not know about it, or should not have been expected to have known about it, the whole edifice crumbles. This was not a re-run of old crises. There was not an absence of signals: there was an overload of signals. It was a failure of intelligence. It was a failure of institutions. It was a failure in political response. Thank God it was not a military failure.
Few changes are planned. We should not expect too much from the institutional changes, but as one observer, who is an expert on intelligence throughout the world, has written:
"The use of intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and inclinations of the authorities above it".
The blame lies with the authorities above it, with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Cabinet advisers, and the Cabinet Committee. They may not be culpable now in the public eye, but I believe that at some stage they certainly will be.
9.8 pm
Mr. Michael Mates: The hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) made the theme of his speech the failure of intelligence. Of course, he speaks almost entirely with the benefit of hindsight, which he did not acknowledge. However, he did acknowledge, very modestly, that he did not have available to him information that was available to the Frenks committee. Yet, having made that modest remark, he now alleges, without the evidence to back it up, that the Franks committee got the intelligence aspects of the report entirely wrong. I know which of the two sources I prefer to place reliance upon.
The Franks report does two things, and it was necessary that both of them should be done. The first is that it is a report, not just to Parliament, but to the nation, about a sequence of events in which, alas, many British lives were lost. We owe it to the nation, to all those who went down there, and to the relatives and friends of those who have not returned, to give the fullest explanation of the events that led up to that dreadful tragedy, and we owe them an honest assessment—the best possible—of whether it could have been avoided.
There is no equivocation in the report of those six good men and true. Those who call the report a whitewash and say that the six men were not the right ones to conduct the inquiry, beggar belief. All of them are men of the greatest eminence in their areas and all of them had a perfectly simple mission—to get at the truth and to make the best judgment they could about it. They have done that, and rightly so. Much to everyone's relief, the case has been explained. That is, therefore, a good thing.
The second thing that the report has done is to lay several wild rumours and allegations to rest. I am especially pleased that the annex to the Franks report catalogues some of the worst and wildest rumours, because ministers at the time could not challenge the rumours of incompetence, dishonesty and duplicity that were circulated, especially against Foreign Office staff. All of those lies have been firmly nailed. It has been shown—I am not making a party point—that all those who

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had been involved in the tortuous business of trying to sort out the Falklands problem during the past 15 years acted honestly, effectively and to the very best of their abilities.
I shall touch on only one aspect of this long and complicated saga where perhaps an examination, which has not yet been heard in the House today, will help. I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) is not in his place, because the subject formed a large part of his speech. It is the comparison that is made between the 1977 negotiations and the dispatch of the frigates and the submarine by the then Labour Government and the 1982 negotiations and the alleged and implied failure of the present Government to take the same action.
Earlier in the debate I referred to the paragraph in the report which said that the two events were not similar and that there was no justification for sending a military force at the time. However, the speeches of the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Member for Devonport implied that, at the very least, a bad decision was taken not to deploy something very shortly afterwards. I hope that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) will touch on that matter tomorrow and answer some of my questions.
The right hon. Member for Devonport, who at the time was Foreign Secretary, went even further. He said that two frigates were despatched to a distance of 1,000 miles over the horizon and out of Argentine range. That was good advice. He said that the nuclear hunter-killer submarine went to the heart of the matter and was given instructions about what to do and rules of engagement. He spelt out those rules. I shall not quibble about the distances. He said that if the Argentines approached the Falkland Islands they would be blown out of the water at a distance of 50 miles. He implied that that would have been a prudent decision for the present Government to take in early March of last year after the breakdown of the talks and after the repudiation by the Argentines of the communiqué from New York.
I ask the House to consider what the position would have been had we sent a submarine at the time—I am not going into the tactics, but the principle—with some rules of engagement. Had those rules of engagement said that it would open fire on an invasion force at 100, 50, 20, or 10 miles is not the point. The point is that once we had committed ourselves to doing that, we would have been the first to take covert and aggressive action.
Mr. Dick Douglas: The hon. Gentleman is referring to paragraph 329 of the report, which states:
"Lord Carrington also told us more generally that, although the situation had become more difficult, he did not believe that the prospects of continuing negotiations at that time was hopeless."
The last sentence states:
"With hindsight he wished he had sought to deploy a nuclear-powered submarine to the area at an earlier stage, but on 5 March it did not seem to him that the situation had changed".
If the Government had done that, the position would have been exactly the same as that described by the right hon. Member for Devonport.
Mr. Mates: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point and I am not trying to argue with him. I am trying to trace the probable consequences had that taken place. That is the real point, because only one thing came out of the despair
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and the dreadful position on 3 April—no one could point the finger of aggression at any of us. The aggression was entirely General Galtieri's.
Mr. Healey: The world could have pointed the finger of aggression at us in 1939 because we failed to take action in the preceding years that might have prevented the second world war. The point that the hon. Gentleman still has not noted—it was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—is that the Government sent a submarine on 29 March when they did not know that a full-scale invasion would take place. Presumably they believed that the submarine could be useful in relation to South Georgia. I think that General Mates has got his knickers in a twist over this.
Mr. Mates: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his incorrect form of address. I am being generous in giving way to distinguished hon. Members, and I hope that I shall not get a rocket for speaking for too long, but I wish to reach the end of what I am trying to put across.
Nuclear submarines can undertake useful roles. No one argues that. Their greatest use stems from the fact that they can remain submerged for long periods, in secret and unknown to a potential enemy. But that is different from sending a nuclear hunter-killer submarine, with rules of engagement which presumably would be carried out, so that the first shots in the war would result in the blowing out of the water of an Argentine ship on its way possibly to invade the Falkland Islands.
I beg hon. Members to get into perspective the sinking of the General Belgrano. By that time British lives had been lost and the Argentines were on the islands, yet there was uproar and it was said that we had over-escalated the matter and that hundreds of people had been killed in exchange for only a handful of British lives. What the Labour Government said that they would do in 1977 would not have been an act subsequent to invasion or the considerable loss of British lives, but the opening shot in a war. There is no alternative with a nuclear submarine. One can no longer fire a shot across the bows, because the shot corrects itself and hits the ship. The nuclear submarine could not have been a warning or a deterrent. It was there to act violently or to do nothing.
Had a submarine, with the rules of engagement which the then Labour Government say they ordered, opened fire on an Argentine ship—however small—and sunk it would we have been able to carry out the brilliant diplomatic manoeuvre that Sir Anthony Parsons achieved that night in New York when he obtained a resolution from the Security Council upon which all of our foreign policy hung for the following months? That would have been out of the question. International opinion would have been outraged on learning that the first event had not been a landing on the Falkland Islands by the Argentines, but the sinking of an Argentine ship by a British nuclear-powered submarine. Those who are trying to argue that this was a sensible way to bring international opinion with us in a struggle against an unreliable and unpredictable aggressor have their facts wrong. That is my main point about today's debate.
Like other hon. Members, I shall now deal with the future. We are faced with Fortress Falklands. There is no choice at the moment. We may have opportunities to amend that as the years go by, but in the meantime we must make sure that it is clear to the Argentines that any

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attempt at an exercise against our sovereignty of the Falklands or its dependencies will give them a bloody nose. The rest of the world must also know that. I rejoice in the fact that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was so robust about that recently.
I ask the House to take the excellent advice that was given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Atkins). Before any firm decisions are taken, we must wait for some of the temporary wounds to heal. Ours are perhaps to our pride that the Argentine invasion should have taken place, theirs are the defeat and the chaos that will exist in that poor country for as long as the junta is in power.
We should wait for a couple of years for the world to put the events in the Falklands into a better perspective so that we can then decide how to proceed in concert with our allies and friends. It was only because we acted in the way that we did throughout the campaign—with complete integrity—that we have those friends, who I am sure will help us in the final analysis.
9.21 pm
Mr. Michael Meacher: The Prime Minister again quoted the conclusions of the Franks report today, but it is now widely accepted if press reports are to be believed that Franks' conclusions are greatly at variance with its own evidence. If that is so, the real question is what the conclusions should be.
The answer to be found in the fundamental political realities that have underpinned the Falklands crisis in the past 17 years is that there have been only two ways out of the Falklands impasse. The central question then is, if the preferred route became blocked, was sufficient effort made to unblock it? Even if it were, was the second option fully and properly adopted, whatever may have been the implications in terms of cost and commitment? The case against the Government and for reflecting what many people regard as the whitewash of Franks' bland exoneration is that careful reading of Franks' own narrative makes the answer to both questions in the negative.
The first of those options was always to encourage the self-sustaining economic development of the islands. The Shackleton report made it quite clear that a precondition for that was some type of negotiated settlement with Argentina. Any serious long-term investment in the islands, especially the exploitation of their main resources—oil and fish—could not be brought about unless there were an end to the continuing political uncertainty. For that, the lease-back solution was the only serious runner.
The only other option was to face up to the continuing military threat that Argentina was bound to pose, which could be met only by a sizeable diversion of military resources, with implications—however regrettable—of a massive and permanent subsidy from the British taxpayer.
It is not surprising that both Labour and Conservative Governments have opted for the former alternative. As we know now, Lord Carrington did so and remained of that view throughout the end of 1979 and 1980. There is a serious political charge that must be levelled at the Government and it is one that the Franks report glosses over complacently. The charge is that the Government backed off from lease-back far too readily and failed to
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launch a major public education campaign against their critics as they should have done. Having backed off from lease-back and failed to grasp the nettle, they failed also to meet the requirements of the other alternative.
Indeed, as anxiety grew over the mounting confrontation, it was decided to withdraw Endurance. Thus the Government decided simultaneously to continue to negotiate yet to concede nothing, and at the same time to drop their guard. I suggest that that is the source of the muddle and the drift that led ultimately to war.
In the light of what we all know, the responsibility for this calamitous slide cannot be lightly brushed aside as the Prime Minister might like. First, there is the allegedly fearful mauling which it is said the right hon. Lady gave the then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, at the OD Committee in November 1980, which emasculated his brief and prevented him from going on the important visit that he paid to the Falklands with a clear mandate and firm Government support for a settlement of the sovereignty issue. Had the Minister been given a firm mandate and reasonable terms by the Prime Minister, many islanders have said to friends that they believe that he might have gained even majority endorsement on the Falklands at that time for lease-back. That was one extremely important opportunity for a negotiated political solution that was spoilt.
Secondly, there was ministerial failure to respond to advice which we now know was given clearly by the Foreign Office in the middle of 1981. The Franks report states:
"the only feasible option was lease-back preceded by an education campaign both in the Falklands and at home".
Why was that not done? Why did Lord Carrington, who favoured that option himself, believe that there was no prospect of carrying the lease-back proposal at home? Was that because he knew that if he carried it to the Cabinet it would run straight into the flat opposition of the Prime Minister?
A Mr. Ure, the senior Foreign Office official, added that if an education campaign was unacceptable,
"consideration should be given to preparing fuller contingency plans for the defence and development of the Islands".
We must ask again why that was not done either. Was that because the Prime Minister was not prepared to expend any political or military capital on what she then regarded as a marginal issue? We understand that if she had gone for lease-back she would have run straight up against her own party. On the other hand, if she had gone for Fortress Falklands at that stage it would have made a pretty bad dent in her public expenditure cuts. However, neither of those considerations can possibly condone the political failure to choose neither one nor the other, but instead to adopt a high-risk non-policy drift which led to war, and which at that time was predicted to lead to war.
Thirdly, there was no Cabinet or OD Committee reappraisal of this astonishing state of drift for a whole 15 months after the collapse of lease-back in January 1981. That is almost unbelievable for those of us who read about these matters now. Why did that reappraisal not take place? The reason is clear—that the Prime Minster did not want the subject on the agenda and the responsible ministerial chairman knew that it would be a waste of time because it would run straight up against the Prime Minister's opposition.
This is a serious charge. Such an erosion of Cabinet government would not matter if the results were not

865
serious. They were extremely serious. Ever since September 1981, the chiefs of staff had contingency military plans in the event of aggression by Argentina. According to Franks, they were never considered by Ministers at any stage. It is useless for the Prime Minister to write, as has been mentioned several times in the debate, in March 1982,
"We must make contingency plans",
if, at the same time, she runs her Government in a manner that results in contingency plans already made never being considered by Ministers. That is surely the main point.
Franks says:
"Officials were looking to Ministers to review the outcome of the contingency planning they had done".
The failure to accomplish this, with all the enormously serious consequences that flowed from the failure to consider those plans, can only be placed at the door of the one Minister who was directly responsible for the OD Committee—that is, the Prime Minister. For these reasons, I believe that the cause and responsibility for the events that led up to the Falkland conflict derive ultimately from political failures that go far deeper than simply misreading signals in the last month beforehand, serious though that may have been.
Even at that stage, in March 1982, culpable political mistakes were still made. Had they not been made, contrary to the received wisdom of Franks, there is reasonable expectation, although not, as Franks wants, absolute certainty—there never is that in this world—that war would have been averted. One must ask why, in particular, the invasion was brought forward by Argentina when we know now that it was intended for later in the year. Instead of an unprovocative public front to Argentina, combined with the dispatch of a deterrent submarine when the Argentine negotiator, at a crucial point at the beginning of March, was repudiated, which was clearly what was needed, along the lines of what happened in 1977, the politics of the situation this time was handled completely wrongly. We had a submarine—
Mr. Mates rose—
Mr. Meacher: I am sorry; I am not giving way. I recognise that the hon. Gentleman spoke at length on this matter and that we could argue the issue. I have said, however, that I wish to be brief. On this occasion, a submarine was dispatched on 29 March. Not only was that very late, but there was also the provocation that news of it immediately leaked, which must undoubtedly have helped to precipitate an immediate invasion.
The most serious political charge against the Government's handling of the whole episode remains what I think it has always been—that a military triumph cannot in any way offer an escape from a political impasse. With 1,000 dead and £3 billion either spent or committed, the Government will still be forced to adopt one of the options which they should have grasped more readily three years ago. If they had grasped it then, there is reasonable expectation that war could have been averted. It is that which should be the chief lesson of Franks for the nation.
9.33 pm
Sir John Biggs-Davison: The Franks report unanimously exonerates Her Majesty's present advisers. The terms of reference, however, authorised the Committee of Privy Councillors to take account
"of all such factors in previous years as are relevant."
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Since the acts and omissions of Ministers and, in particular, of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who has been subjected to a good deal of extravagant abuse by the Opposition, have been called in question, I should like to make some remarks about some earlier Governments before trying to say something more constructive for the future.
Paragraph 70 of the report states:
"The Labour Government made clear in 1977 that sovereignty was an issue for negotiation".
Of course, that Labour Government was not the only Government to place sovereignty on the negotiating table with Argentina. The difficulty about negotiations on sovereignty is that they are meaningless unless it is presumed that in certain circumstances the sovereign power is prepared to abandon sovereignty. That point was made by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), who took us back to 1968. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) also took us back to 1968. The right hon. Member for Down, South, made the point that respect for the wishes of the Falkland Islanders was not, and may not be, a sufficient safeguard of British sovereignty in the Falkland Islands and the dependencies and of British interests in the south Atlantic.
I have memories of 1968. I can remember the small hours of 29 March, partly because it was a rare occasion when I was beckoned to sit on the Front Bench—the hour was late—and because the late and loved Goronwy Roberts, who was in the unfortunate position of being put up to explain the unacceptable policy of his masters, repeatedly refused my repeated requests for an assurance that sovereignty would in no way be ceded against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. At that time the Labour Government were not even willing to say that they would have regard to the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. They would not give that assurance.
The Franks report, in annex F, quotes Hansard and a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House who were highly critical of the idea of lease-back. The right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore) who was recently in the Chamber, was one of those who opposed the lease-back idea. I believe I am right in saying that the right hon. Gentleman was his party's official spokesman on foreign affairs between 1979 and 1980.
We now come to more recent dates. On 22 January the right hon. Gentleman was questioned in the BBC 2 programme "Saturday Briefing" and said:
"It has been party policy, expressed publicly and in successive annual conferences and various documents, that in no circumstances would we cede sovereignty to the Argentines while they remained as they are … It is inconceivable that we should do so."
If it had been anyone else I should have been surprised to hear those words, but it seems that the right hon. Gentleman is as strange in his statements on sovereignty as he is in his statements on sterling.
I was much moved by the appeal by my right hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) that we should look forward and learn the lessons for all of us. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said, we are, in a sense, all at fault in this matter. The most important lesson to be learnt is, alas, one that we should have learnt already. Repeatedly, in what Churchill called this terrible 20th century, we have had to learn, at a high cost in blood and treasure, that aggression is deterred, not by words, and not by negotiations, so much as by the certainty of a resolute response. All the

867
impressions given, and all the signals—to use the "in" word, of which I am becoming tired—did not impress upon Argentina that a response to aggression would be resolute and effective.
There were those who said that the Falkland Islands could not be retaken. In that splendid operation, which has redeemed at high cost the mistakes of the past, it was done. Now there are those who say, and some of them are the same people who said that we could not retake the Falklands, that we cannot hold them. Two facts have a bearing on this. One is that until the invasion the Falklands were never a drain upon the public purse of this country. They were never a burden on the taxpayer. They were a net gain in normal times.
Secondly, with regard to the military cost, this repeated use of the phrase "Fortress Falklands" is intended to convey the impression that there is to be an enormous drain on the armed forces of the Crown. However, what is required is up-to-date early warning systems, a modicum of missiles and the troops to operate and protect them, and immediate air access, hitherto not provided because of dereliction by successive Governments who did not follow the recommendation of many hon. Members and of the Shackleton report.
A book has been published in Argentina called "Los Nombres de la Derota," which means "names of defeat". It is said to be wholly based on a long interview with an officer widely assured to be General Leopoldo Galtieri. It says:
"Perhaps the most important error was not to have considered as probable the real magnitude of the British military reaction."
That was the error of Galtieri. In a sense, it was the error of this country as well.
To a degree I agree with those who have said, from different points of view, that the wishes of the islanders are not the paramount consideration. Wishes can waver, and can be made to waver. What should be paramount to a British Government is British interests in the islands, which command Cape Horn and are the gateway to the Antarctic. In this connection, my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Sir N. Fisher) proposed certain possibilities for the security of the South Atlantic region but he freely admitted that these possibilities were not practical politics today.
In 1968, to return to the year that I know so well, some of us were successful in scotching the then Government's manoeuvres to surrender sovereignty. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) was Secretary of State for Defence. In reply to a parliamentary question of mine he said:
"These Islands do not have any contribution to make to our future strategy."—[Official Report, 3 December 1968; Vol. 774, c. 443.]
That statement was one of those not lost upon Buenos Aires. Let us suppose that the USSR, or a potential enemy was in possession of these islands or, perhaps with the connivance of a future Argentine Government, could enjoy facilities in these islands. The whole world would see the point and would perceive the folly of such words and of such an approach.
9.45 pm
Mr. Stanley Newens: I agree with the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison) that we should learn a lesson from what occurred in the Falklands
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last year. Right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House have given their impressions of the lessons that should be learnt from the Franks report.
When I read the report, I was struck by the parallels and similarities with the diplomatic and international events that preceded the outbreak of previous wars, especially that of 1914–18, or even the Franco-Prussian war. Albeit with hindsight, there appears to have been a dismal inevitability about the Falklands hostilities. The eventual clash of arms appears to be implicit in the unfolding of the events that proceeded it.
The Prime Minister has based her claim that no blame for what happened attaches to her essentially on short-term arguments. My hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) dealt effectively with that claim. The report concluded that
"we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982."
But judgment of the Government's responsibility cannot be based on the conduct of affairs during the period immediately preceding the invasion, but must be made over a longer period. The report makes it quite clear that Ministers, officials and persons with special knowledge of and interest in the area all stated that they did not think that the invasion was likely. But according to paragraph 40 of the report, the JIC as far back as 1975, when it prepared a new assessment, stated:
"a deliberately planned invasion of the Falkland Islands in the near future still seemed unlikely but could not be wholly excluded".
From that time, that remained the position. The problem did not go away, and it was not resolved.
Any Government should have known that invasion was always on the cards. Any Government had to act on the basis that that invasion might take place. The question is whether the Government, when they took office in May 1979, behaved in a manner that was likely to minimise the possibility of a war materialising. Since that date, diplomatic representation has suggested to observers that Britain would welcome the opportunity to shed the problem, but was unable to persuade the islanders that they should accept that. That is perfectly clear. The conclusion of intelligent Argentine observers must inevitably have been that the Government were inhibited by the islanders and by hon. Members from following the policy in which they truly believed. They really wished to dispose of the islands.
The Prime Minister recognised that the Argentine junta wanted sovereignty. It was an encouragement to the junta's aspirations that the British Government made no clear statement that they were not prepared in the last analysis to hand over the islands. In that respect, the Government stand condemned.
The question was whether the British Government, if an attempt was made by the junta to resolve the issue by force, would put up any resistance. It is quite clear that all the signals indicated that the British Government were unlikely to resist.
The 1981 Defence Review proposed the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, which is dealt with in paragraph 114 of the report. Lord Carrington wrote to the then Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for St. Ives (Sir J. Nott), urging the retention, but it was rejected. As a

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result of that rejection, it was quite reasonable for the Argentine junta to conclude that Britain was withdrawing from the area.
Dr. Alan Glyn rose—
Mr. Newens: This brings me to a vital point that is not dealt with in the Franks report.
Throughout this period no attempt was made to limit the supply to Argentina of arms that could be used for the invasion of the Falklands. On the contrary, British arms manufacturers vigorously sought contracts. I have been opposed to arms supplies, and hon. Members will have heard me voice my objections on many occasions. For reasons other than objections to the human rights policy of the Argentine Government, one would have thought that the British Government would have stemmed the supply of arms to Argentina had they been concerned about the Falklands issue.
The list of arms supplied to Argentina is devastating—the former aircraft carrier Colossus, six minesweepers, one type 42 frigate, Seacat ship-to-air missiles, 12 Sea Dart ship-to-air missiles, 22 Tiger Cat surface-to-air missiles and so on.
In addition, we supplied components for a variety of military equipment that the Argentines bought from other countries.
During the war, some British Service men were killed by equipment manufactured in this country. The Government bear a heavy responsibility for allowing those arms to be supplied, knowing that they would be used ultimately against British Service men.
The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), while in office, attempted to persuade the head of the Argentine air force to buy arms from this country. I took a strong stand against that, as did many of my hon. Friends.
Mr. Dan Jones rose—
Mr. Newens: President Carter's decision to ban arms supplies did not lead to any move in Europe to do likewise. Instead there was a rush to take advantage of the opportunities that would thereby arise to gain contracts.
The Prime Minister argued that the sending of one or two ships just before the invasion would have exposed them to an appalling threat, but that threat was fuelled by the supply of arms from this country. The Government must bear the full responsibility for that.
Even more condemnatory of the Government is the fact that since the end of hostilities they have refused to take effective action to prevent the supply of arms and components to Argentina. At present, six frigates being
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built by Blo'hm and Voss in Hamburg have been supplied with Rolls-Royce engines, Hawker Siddeley engine room controls and David Brown gear components, all from this country. In addition, I understand that only last week the Dutch radar firm was putting pressure on British components suppliers to speed up that supply so that those warships could be sent to Argentina in February.
If the Government are not to be condemned, why have they not changed that policy, even at this late stage? The Italian firm of Aermachi supplies jet trainers with British engines. A number of my hon. Friends have already mentioned the Exocet missiles, whose plastic nose cone is manufactured by British Aerodynamics, and whose optical equipment—which enables it to skim the surface of the sea—and radar equipment have been supplied by subsidiaries of the British-based firm of Philips.
The Government, who maintain that supply of arms and refuse to cut it off, cannot divest themselves of the responsibility for what occurred previously or what may occur in the future. The supply of arms to Third world countries, dictatorships and countries with appalling human rights records is criminal. In fact, we are sowing dragon's teeth which will produce a harvest of death in many countries, and we should not be surprised if we reap some of that harvest, as we did in the Falklands.
The Government's attitude to the policies pursued by Argentina never gave the slightest sign that they condemned the appalling infringement of human rights perpetrated by Argentina, nor had they any reservations about its undemocratic character. In fact, the Government were prepared to join Argentina in giving a clean bill of health to the E1 Salvador elections at the behest of President Reagan. The Government have never shown any sensitivity about unprovoked aggression in the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia. They supplied arms, and are continuing to do so, to Indonesia. They never showed any sensitivity about the plight of the islanders in Diego Garcia.
We had to take a firm stand against the aggression committed against the people in the Falklands. I have never made any bones about that, despite my views. However, the facts that I have endeavoured to outline, and those that my hon. Friends have marshalled, far from exonerating the Prime Minister and the Government from responsibility for the events that led to the Falklands war, make it clear that that war arose out of the policies that they pursued. What is worse is that the Government are still permitting that supply of arms and by adopting a Fortress Falklands policy they have clearly not yet learnt the lessons that they should have learnt.
Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Major.]
Debate to be resumed tomorrow.

Nuclear Bases
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Major.]
10 pm
Mr. Bob Cryer: I am pleased to have this debate, although it is no substitute for a full debate in Government time on disarmament and the disarmament negotiations that the Government are pursuing from time to time.
The number of United States nuclear bases in this country has grown stealthily year by year. In December 1980, I asked for the parliamentary basis of their presence, and I was told that, among other things, it was the North Atlantic treaty, which was debated on 12 May 1949 when Ernest Bevin and Winston Churchill vied for the title of "cold-war warrior". Neither mentioned storage or deployment of nuclear weapons. Bevin claimed that NATO would
"provide for a reduction in the cost of armaments through comprehensive arrangements."
Rab Butler, winding-up, urged the Ministry of Defence
"to pile up more armaments."—[Official Report, 12 May 1949; Vol. 464, c. 2018, 2113.]
That has certainly been done over the years since 1949.
Other treaties quoted in the December 1980 answer, which allowed an American nuclear presence in our country, received scant parliamentary attention. The exchange of notes relating to the sale of tobacco, which gave more housing and community facilities to United States troops, was noted only in what I suspect was a planted parliamentary question on 8 June 1956.
The memorandum on the Fylingdales early-warning system was debated only in a private Member's motion in March 1960. It was never debated in Government time. I was told in a parliamentary reply that no central record of the treaties and notes is held by the Ministry of Defence. The House of Commons Library, on a somewhat smaller budget than the £14 billion that the Ministry of Defence has each year, managed to dig them out for me in less than an afternoon.
Included in that list is the agreement reached by Attlee and Truman in October 1951 when Parliament was not sitting because of the general election. The agreement was not therefore debated and approved by Parliament. The agreement allowed the use of United Kingdom bases by the United States and stated that operational control of the bases
"would be a matter for joint decision between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."
That is a meaningless phrase which gives the United Kingdom Government no right of veto. The Prime Minister relied on the wording again this afternoon. As we know, her attitude is based on lickspittle subservience to the cold war attitudes of Reagan's Government.
On 18 June 1980, I asked the Secretary of State for Defence to list the number of bases operated, in whole or part, by the United States forces in the United Kingdom. I was given a total of 12. Further questions produced a total of 39, yet a further parliamentary question produced three more, including the largest underwater base operated by the United States.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has claimed that there are over 100 United States bases. Many of them must be linked to the deployment of nuclear
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weapons by the United States in our country, but, typically, the Ministry of Defence operates in a furtive and secretive way when giving information properly requested by hon. Members.
Winston Churchill, for example, was astonished in 1951 that £100 million was spent secretly on the atomic bomb
"without Parliament being made aware of it."—[Official Report, 23 October 1952; Vol. 505, c. 1271.]
However, that great democrat decided that secrecy was the best policy and he continued to make decisions behind closed doors.
Recently, operation Chevaline meant that £1 billion was spent without reference to Parliament on updating Polaris. The same policy of secrecy as that of the previous Conservative Government was continued. The reason for all that secrecy is that it is claimed that the Soviet Union is a mighty and growing power. That was claimed in a debate in 1949 and is part of the mythology that is used to justify, Trident, cruise and the United States nuclear bases on our soil.
I glean facts from documents provided by other institutions, including the Ministry and pro-NATO organisations. SALT II gave strategic warheads in the United States as 11,894 and in the Soviet Union as 6,005. The current Institute of Strategic Studies publication on military balance states that the United States has 9,268 and the Soviet Union 7,300 warheads. In reference to theatre nuclear weapons, the term of "arriving warheads" is used. The figure for the Soviet Union is 1,085 and for NATO it is 563, due to the deployment over the past two years of SS20s.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suggests that NATO outnumbers the Soviet Union in tactical nuclear weapons by 7,000 to 3,500—2:1. However, the Ministry of Defence will not reveal the precise number. It can challenge my figure if it wishes. The number of strategic and theatre warheads, both types of which are targeted on the Soviet Union—only strategic warheads are targeted on America—is for the United States 9,831 and for the Soviet Union 8,385.
I give that background information to counter the constant propaganda by the Government that the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of money spent by the Soviet Union is growing, so cruise missiles must be sited in our country. The Government have accepted without question the siting of those cruise missiles on yet further nuclear bases operated by the Americans. That will be part of the escalation that the Government are planning through the purchase of Trident, which means that more missiles will be targeted on the Soviet Union from the United Kingdom, as if, for some reason, there are not already a massive number of nuclear weapons on both sides. That is the one thing that the world has been able to achieve—a massive overkill of the world's population. We cannot feed the people, we cannot clothe the people, but we can kill them with the greatest efficiency known to mankind.
The figures that I have given are from a pro-NATO source. The truth is that the figures for the Soviet Union are based on guesswork. In answer to a question that I asked in 1980 the then Secretary of State for Defence said:
"Since the Soviet figures are so unreliable, we have to make our own estimates of its expediture and this is done in great detail every year by assessing the cost to the Soviet Union of all known items of spending, and aggregating them for purposes of comparison according to the NATO defintion of defence expenditure".—[Official Report, 7 July 1980; Vol. 988, c. 54.]

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Senator Nino Pasti put that guesswork into its context. He is a former member of the NATO Military Committee and former deputy supreme allied commander for NATO nuclear affairs. He wrote in the CND magazine Sanity in 1979 as follows:
"The truth is that NATO forces, both conventional and nuclear, are stronger than those of the Warsaw Pact countries. During the last ten years the Soviet Military budget has remained stable. My colleagues were unhappy abut this situation, because they could not justify increases in their own expenditure. So they invented a 'pricing' system. It is easy to see how the figures were inflated to show higher Soviet expenditure".
However, on those guesses, 160 cruise missiles are being accepted by the Conservative Government. There is no right of veto over their use. The United States could use cruise missiles without our agreement in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time. There is no physical control—the so-called dual key method. That has been admitted by the Government on several occasions, although I would not accept cruise missiles with that right of veto anyway.
I wish simply to draw attention to the fact that there is neither an agreement for a veto over the use of cruise missiles nor physical arrangements for such controls.
There is no verification of the use and deployment of cruise missiles. That is one of the advantages much vaunted by the United States. The Prime Minister herself makes it clear that if we are to have arms reduction there must be means of verification on both sides. Yet the Government are proposing to accept a weapon not easily subject to verification.
The Pentagon strategists are talking of a limited theatre nuclear war in Europe in which cruise might well be used. The Daily Mail, not a usual source for comments in support of the campaign for nuclear disarmament and Labour Party peace policy, on Thursday, 5 November 1981, under the heading
"Haig's nuclear warning shot",
said:
"If Russia made a conventional attack on Europe, the West could fire a nuclear rocket as a warning 'shot across the bows.'
This was revealed yesterday by the United States Secretary of State Mr. Alexander Haig in evidence to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. Haig said that President Reagan was 'precisely right' when he said in a recent interview that a nuclear conflict with the Soviets might be confined to Europe."
Of course, the Secretary of State for Defence in the United States tried to cover that up but the fact is that Mr. Haig, no longer Secretary of State was head of NATO and is a credible source of Pentagon and NATO thinking.
Cruise may be fired by accident, computer error or the sort of sequence of events that led to the shooting down of an RAF Jaguar fighter near the Russian border on 25 May 1982 by an RAF Phantom. Then cruise, released by accident in a sequence of events about which we would know nothing because we are not privy to the operation or control of these weapons, and flying under radar, might produce a launch on warning retaliation by the Soviet Union.
If the Minister says, as he probably will, that the massive stockpile of nuclear weapons has kept the peace, he must answer the question why nuclear weapons have increased year by year. If the possibility of mutually assured destruction was reached in the early 1960s when both sides could knock out major cities and destroy people in millions, why is it that the number of nuclear weapons has increased steadily on both sides year by year, with the
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West taking the lead in almost every case in numbers and technological innovation? Why would the advent of cruise not spark off yet a further escalation? Indeed, the Soviet Union has promised that it will develop and install cruise missiles if the West does so, particularly when the United States and NATO are armed to the teeth.
It is interesting, too, that in the Franks debate the Prime Minister has made it clear that sending ships to the Falklands before the Argentine invasion might have provoked the very invasion that she claimed she wished to avoid. That is a very strange contrast to the decision to arm ourselves with Trident and cruise without the possibility, it is believed, of provoking a similar conflict which she is trying to avoid. Why do the Government not press NATO to accept the offer by the Soviet Union of no first use of nuclear weapons? Why will they not accept the parity between Russian missiles and French and English missiles offered by Mr. Andropov? Why will they not seek a real zero option and reject the deployment of a means of mass extermination as a way of negotiating the first step to a nuclear-free zone in Europe?
May I remind the Minister that the majority of the world's nations are non-nuclear? We should join that majority. Any of these steps would demonstrate support for an extremely important treaty which has been largely ignored by this Government and previous Governments—the United Nations non-proliferation of nuclear weapons treaty, article 6 of which says:
"Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
That is already many years overdue. Some of the signatories to that treaty are asking why the nuclear nations have not taken action to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Cruise is a step in the direction of escalating the number of American nuclear bases here and the general number of nuclear weapons in the world. That is why the women of Greenham Common are right to demonstrate in their bold, courageous and peaceful way against those nuclear weapons in an effort to stop their installation in Britain.
The Guardian poll on Monday, 24 January showed that a majority disapproved of Britain accepting cruise—61 per cent. disapproved while 27 per cent. approved. Forty per cent. said that prospects for world peace under the Government were worse while only 30 per cent. thought them better.
Paragraph 106 of the defence White Paper for 1981 said:
"We still have no reason to believe that Soviet leaders are specifically planning to attack NATO."
Yet the Government are massively increasing nuclear weapons, both on their own and in conjunction with the United States.
In complete contrast, the Labour Party's policy, passed by a two thirds majority at the annual conference in October 1982, involves the closing down of all nuclear bases, British or American, on British soil or in British waters. We shall join Canada and Norway in NATO in rejecting the deployment of nuclear weapons and link up with the massive and growing peace movement of the United States in rejecting the growing threat of the use of nuclear weapons. That is not to say "Yanks go home". I am proud to say that I took part in a massive demonstration of 1 million Americans in June on the opening day of the

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United Nations second special session on disarmament. They represented the voice of America in wanting to freeze expenditure on nuclear weapons and say "No" to further expenditure. Those are the people with whom we would link up and the growing strength of the peace movement in Britain, Europe and America can no longer be ignored.
10.16 pm
The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker): The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) has this evening raised issues of great importance. He will not expect me to agree with his conclusions, but none the less I welcome the opportunity to set out why those conclusions represent a threat to the peace and freedom which we have enjoyed in Britain since 1945.
Britain's security is the first duty of the Government. That security depends on our ability, together with our NATO allies, to deter aggression—to prevent war. It is essential for the success of deterrence that any potential aggressor should understand without any doubt that the United States is fully committed to the defence of Western Europe. The deployment of American forces in the United Kingdom, as in other European countries, is the most visible proof of the United States' readiness to identify its national security with Britain's and to defend it similarly.
Since the beginning of the North Atlantic alliance in 1949, all successive British Governments, including that in which the hon. Gentleman served from 1976ߝ78, have agreed to and welcomed the continued stationing of American forces at bases in the United Kingdom. The use of these bases is governed by an agreement reached by Mr. Attlee and President Truman in 1951 and reaffirmed by Mr. Churchill and President Truman in a joint communiqué in 1952. I shall refer later to that agreement.
The combination of an ability both to defend its territory and to threaten a response to aggression involving if necessary the use of nuclear weapons has formed the basis of NATO's policy of defence by deterrence for more than 30 years. During all that time we have had peace in Europe. To continue to keep the peace, we together with our allies, must ensure that we have adequate forces, both conventional and nuclear, to demonstrate to a potential aggressor that he has nothing to gain by aggression.
At the same time, we have worked and are working for significant, balanced and verifiable reductions in the arsenals of both East and West. The Governments of NATO believe that genuine arms control and disarmament will enhance the prospects for security and peace. In the current arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, the Western position with regard to both strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces is based on a desire to see significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both super powers. Indeed, for the first time the Soviet Union is discussing actual reductions in nuclear weapons. In the INF talks the West has consistently supported the abolition of an entire category of nuclear weapons—the longer-range land-based missiles which are of most concern to both sides—but security and peace could not be maintained if the West were to follow the path of one-sided disarmament and thus provide an inadequate balance to the military might, both nuclear and conventional, of the Warsaw Pact. There should be no doubt that our purpose is peace, and
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we are most likely to keep it. The lessons of history, not least the lessons of the 1930s, are against the one-side disarmers. The policy that the hon. Gentleman proposes would remove the incentive for the Soviet Union to join the United States in agreeing substantial reductions in nuclear weapons and would positively harm the prospects for peace, as did Western disarmament in the 1930s.
That commitment both to deterrence and disarmament was most clearly reflected in the decision taken by NATO's Foreign and Defence Ministers in December 1979 to modernise its intermediate range nuclear forces, while at the same time seeking through the process of negotiation with the Soviet Union genuine reductions in armaments, which would enable the West to restrict or perhaps even cancel the deployment of new missiles. I remind the hon. Member that at the time of the "twin track" decision the United States undertook to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, and this has now been done. There was no equivalent response from the Soviet Union. The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles—if it takes place because of lack of agreement in the disarmament talks—will not lead to any increase in the numbers of warheads in Europe. Further warheads will be withdrawn by the West to match the new deployments on a one-for-one basis. In addition, NATO is at this moment conducting a thorough review of its shorter-range nuclear weapons systems to ensure that the size and composition of those forces is no more than is required for the purposes of deterrence.
Before I examine the prospects for progress in the arms control negotiations, I remind the House of why NATO reached the decision to introduce the cruise missile in several European countries, and in the Federal German Republic the Pershing II, in the absence of agreement in the disarmanent talks. There are two reasons.
Since the 1960s, NATO's intermediate range nuclear forces have consisted of British and American aircraft stationed in England. The British aircraft—the Vulcans—are no longer operational. The remaining aircraft will, over time, become increasingly vulnerable to new Soviet weapons and the Soviet ability to strike at airfields far from their homeland. So the first reason is that NATO's existing intermediate range nuclear forces are ageing. If we do not modernise our forces we shall be disarming ourselves one-sidedly by default.
Secondly, the Soviet Union has been building up a formidable intermediate range nuclear force, the most disturbing element of which is the deployment since 1977 of SS20 missiles. These missiles are sophisticated, mobile and extremely accurate. Each has three warheads and can strike three different targets. Each has sufficient range to strike targets throughout almost all Western Europe from bases deep within the Soviet Union but outsde Europe. Their steady deployment has produced a growing imbalance in capabilities between NATO and the Soviet Union. Today there are 333 SS20s, of which about two thirds face west, and 275 SS4s and SS5s—older missiles with a shorter range—are operational in the Soviet Union. Together with the warheads on the older missiles, there are now some 1,000 warheads on intermediate range nuclear missiles threatening Western Europe. NATO still has no comparable missiles—I repeat, no comparable missiles. It was against that background that we and our allies decided that to maintain a credible deterrent at this level a modernisation of our own intermediate range nuclear force capability was necessary.

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I shall now deal briefly with the other aspect of our security policy, that of the vigorous pursuit of realistic measures of arms control and disarmament. I say "realistic" because the disarmament I want is that which maintains and, if possible, increases, our security, not the sort proposed by the hon. Gentleman. His disarmament would tear up all that has been achieved ever the years and imperil our security for no good reason. Our approach to the INF talks in Geneva is an example of our policy to maintain forces strong enough to deter aggression, while at the same time seeking to reduce them in a fair and balanced way. It is clear that the alliance's determination to take the necessary steps to maintain effective intermediate range nuclear forces has brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. In fact, it has not only brought it to the table, but has persuaded it to start talking about reductions.
The Soviet Union would not have been persuaded to contemplate reductions in its massive SS20 missile force if NATO had not stuck to its 1979 decision. If Britain had adopted the Labour Party's policy, or if the Soviet Union believed it likely that we would do so, the Soviets would not be negotiating now. So far, what the Soviet Union has offered is inadequate and unacceptable, but at least it is now for the first time talking about reductions. Only by remaining resolute in our approach shall we have a chance to obtain the agreement that we want.
I do not have time to go into the details of the negotiations. The talks resume in Geneva this week, and the negotiating table there is the right place for such matters to be discussed. The United States, on behalf of its allies, will be seeking to clarify what Mr. Andropov's widely reported offer amounts to. For our part, we continue to belive that the zero option—no missiles on either side—is the best objective. But the alliance will be ready to consider seriously any fair and sensible proposals.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in the House:
"The best balance between the Soviet Union and NATO is zero … One hopes to achieve the zero option, but in the absence of that we must achieve balanced numbers."—[Official Report, 18 January 1983; Vol. 35, c. 167ߝ68.]
President Reagan has made it clear that any sensible proposals will be studied carefully. Equally, we shall be impatient of proposals that are designed, not to make progress in the negotiations, but to play to the gallery with attractive but bogus packages.
At Geneva we have had results, but if no concrete results emerge the Government will proceed with their plans for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in the United Kingdom. The first of those missiles will become operational at RAF Greenham Common at the end of this year. Deployment of missiles at RAF Molesworth will not begin for some years yet. There will be an important British presence at each base. A senior British officer and supporting staff will be stationed permanently at each base, and a substantial proportion of
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the cruise missile security force will be British. That force will provide security for the missile vehicles both on and off base, and British Ministry of Defence policemen will control entry to the bases.
Some of the anxiety that is felt by some about cruise missiles is the result of misinformation spread by the one-sided disarmament organisations. It has been alleged that the only possible justification for such a missile is that NATO is seeking a first-strike capability in Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth. NATO is and always has been a totally defensive alliance pledged never to use any of its forces except in response to an attack. Anyone who knows anything about the cruise missile knows that it is totally unsuitable, because of the speed at which it travels, for such a first strike.
Equally, there is no substance in the suggestion that the deployment of cruise missiles is designed to make possible the fighting of a limited nuclear war in Europe, or that the basing of cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth makes this country more of a target.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the control of cruise missiles and an agreement made between Mr. Attlee and President Truman, which was endorsed by Mr. Churchill and President Truman.
That arrangement has been held to be satisfactory by Governments of both parties for the past 30 years and more, including the Government in which the hon. Gentleman served. It has been examined and found satisfactory by no fewer than eight Prime Ministers of both main parties. It covers the use of bases for all American forces in the United Kingdom, including the nuclear capable F-111 aircraft that have been based here for more than 10 years. It will also cover the cruise missile bases. It provides for joint decision, not just consultation or an American decision alone.
NATO's decision to deploy American Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe enhances deterrence by demonstrating to the Russians that the United States sees the defence of Europe as indissoluble from the defence of America. I recommend to hon. Members the remarks made by President Mitterrand during his recent visit to Bonn. The President emphasised repeatedly the importance of cohesion between the European allies and the United States, and said:
"Whoever would bet on uncoupling the European continent from the American continent would, in our view, put in jeopardy the balance of forces and the future of peace."
That was a Socialist president speaking.
Neutrality has never provided an adequate safeguard against a determined aggressor. The maintenance of our defences in conjunction with our allies remains the best way to preserve peace and offers the best prospect of success in negotiating substantial reductions in armaments in both East and West.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at half-past Ten o'clock.

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Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Derby.

Telemessage Service
Baroness Lane-Fox: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many telemessages have been sent since the introduction of the new service.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, British Telecom regard the telemessage service as competing with private priority mail services, and therefore information about the service is commercially sensitive. However, I can say that since the ending of the inland telegram service on 1st October 1982 the volume of telemessages sent has doubled and is rising rapidly.
Baroness Lane-Fox: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his reply, can he say to what extent telemessages are proving a substitute for the telegram both for commerce and for hatch, match and dispatch requirements? Further, may I ask whether the existence of the service could be better publicised, including, for instance, the 24-hours guaranteed delivery of the message, which compares favourably with the rather different condition in the present postal service, even if it has recently improved?
Lord Glenarthur: Yes, my Lords, telemessages are proving to be an adequate substitute for the telegram, and I think the increase in their use which I have described reflects this. British Telecom have not assessed the contents of messages or class of sender. However, at present special greetings cards account for 25 per cent. of telemessages sent. The indications are that business messages have been increasing more rapidly than social messages.
As to the second part of the noble Baroness's supplementary question, I can confirm (if this was the assurance she was seeking) that British Telecom will refund the cost if delivery does not take place on the next working day. Although British Telecom have taken some fairly substantial steps to advertise and promote the activity, if it is felt that insufficient advertisement has taken place I am sure the chairman will take note of what the noble Baroness has said.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: My Lords, when the noble Lord informs your Lordships that the number of telemessages has doubled, what has doubled—the number of overnight telegrams, or the number of telegrams which arrive on the same day? What figure has doubled?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am not able to give a figure because I am afraid British Telecom regard that
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matter as commercially sensitive, there being competition with priority mail services. However, the volume of messages sent since October 1982 has doubled, and is rising.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: My Lords, does the noble Lord mean that all types of messages have doubled?
Lord Glenarthur: Telemessages, my Lords.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, does the noble Lord mean that the number of telemessages has doubled since they were introduced, which was nought? They have doubled from what figure?
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, from the figure of the number of telemessages sent in October 1982.
Lord Hale: My Lords, would the noble Lord suggest that this would be a convenient time to take the opportunity to look at the services that the old Post Office used to render in its finest past? I used to rejoice in a service called the night telegraph letter which enabled me to wire my London agents at the end of a day's business and to have the message delivered to them in the morning to enable them to carry on with the London agency work. There were many other beneficial services which have now gone and which really could be looked at and the opportunity taken to revive them.
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the telegram service which British Telecommunications ran was losing a colossal amount of money, and that is why the Government took a keen interest in it and decided to help encourage British Telecom to produce a slightly more worthwhile and slightly more financially rewarding form of message. I quite agree that there are, of course, losses as a result, but the noble Lord might like to know that he can arrange for his telemessage to be sent up to eight o'clock in the evening and it will be delivered by first-class mail the next day. If it is not, his money will be refunded.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, is the defence of "commercially sensitive" going to be used by the Government on every possible occasion—on economic policy, on the state of the pound and on other matters?
Lord Glenarthur: Of course, my Lords, this is not a matter for the Government but for British Telecom. I am afraid I cannot provide the figures for which the noble Lord asked earlier.

Energy Tariffs: Relief to Industry
2.43 p.m.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when they expect energy-intensive industries in Scotland to enjoy tariff reliefs comparable with those available in England and Wales since March 1982.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, the energy measures introduced following the March 1982 Budget all applied in Scotland. These included a price freeze for industrial gas contracts and foundry coke prices and the widening of the boiler conversion scheme.
A contracted load management scheme to assist large industrial consumers with electricity demand in excess of six megawatts was also announced. This scheme enables substantial discounts to be given to companies which are willing to reduce their load at short notice. In Scotland nine consumers have taken up this offer, and this is about the same level of take-up as in England and Wales.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, in thanking my noble friend for not falling back to the protective line of what is commercially sensitive, may I ask whether he is aware that, despite all that he has said, the fact is that the best discounts available to Scottish industry are about 6 per cent., as against up to 20 per cent. in England? Secondly, on the interruptible scheme, to which my noble friend referred, the conditions are much harsher in Scotland than here.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I was given to understand that price discounts in Scotland vary according to the characteristics of the consumer's electricity usage. I understand that the average price discount is about 10 per cent. This is considered as commercially possible, and, indeed, is the average discount. My noble friend and the House will know that the final figure is normally arrived at, especially for the very large users, in the course of negotiations between either the North of Scotland Hydro Board or the South of Scotland Electricity Board and the individual user concerned.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that further reply, but is he aware that the South of Scotland Electricity Board has a greater margin of unused and spare capacity than comparable areas elsewhere? Therefore, it should have a greater capacity for helping energy-intensive industrial users. Is he aware that his figures are by no means good enough? Discounts are up to 20 per cent. here, and he quoted 10 per cent. in Scotland.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I did not say "up to"; I said "average". I do not know what the average figure is elsewhere, as envisaged by my noble friend, perhaps in England and Wales. I have forgotten what my noble friend's second salvo was. Could he please remind me?
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for giving me a further opportunity. Is he aware that the South of Scotland Electricity Board has a greater amount of spare capacity than comparable regions elsewhere? Therefore, it should be in a better position to help energy-intensive industrial users.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for filling the spare capacity in my brain—at least, in my memory; I do not know in what other departments. I stress again that if any major industrial users feel that they are hard done by or that my noble friend's figures give them room for asking for further or better terms, that is entirely a matter for the South of Scotland Electricity Board and the individual user.
Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, in deciding whether or not these concessions should be made, can the Minister tell the House what consideration is given to the excessively high levels of unemployment, particularly in Wales, and the parlous position of the Welsh economy?
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I cannot give the noble Lord any indication of what the policies would be outside Scotland. I think that probably, broadly, the same parameters apply for deciding or negotiating a price between large industrial users—those users taking in excess of six megawatts as their peak load—and the various generating boards. As the noble Lord will be aware, in Scotland we have two boards. There will be many differing factors—I should have thought in excess of 20—in any particular negotiating case.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that an unfavourable differential between the Scottish and English electricity arrangements can only be an incentive for Scottish industry to move back to England?
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I hope that the incentives given, and the figures arrived at, are not out of line taking the United Kingdom as a whole. However, if my noble friend has a particular point perhaps he could take it up with the board; but I should certainly be grateful to receive any information that he has.

International Development Association: UK Contributions
2.48 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what contributions they have made to the International Development Association in each of the past three years.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead): My Lords, I assume that the noble Lord means the deposit of promissory notes, rather than their encashment over some years as needed to meet our share of actual expenditure by the association. But I shall give the figures for both. In 1979 notes for £158,257,192 were deposited. In 1980 none were deposited because of the delay in starting up the sixth replenishment. In 1981 we put in notes for £184,991,600, actual drawings on these and earlier notes by the association were £41.58 million in 1979, £51.44 million in 1980, and £100.95 million in 1981.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply. May I first ask one technical point? Are those gross figures or net figures taking inflation into account? Does the noble Lord recall that in the debate on the gracious Speech I asked the same question and his answer then was that Britain had fully met its obligations under the IDA? That can mean many things. At the same time, is the noble Lord aware that at that time the then President of the World Bank, Mr. Clausen, referring to a cut of 35 per cent. in the budget of the IDA, said:
"This is not a trimming programme; this is an amputating programme"?
What I am concerned about is this. We know that the United States has cut its contributions to the IDA. Has Britain followed suit or not?
Lord Belstead: My Lords, I am almost certain that the figures which I gave are gross figures. If by any chance I am misleading the noble Lord I will write immediately to put that right. But I am pretty sure that they are gross figures.
So far as the second question which the noble Lord asked me is concerned, yes, it is the fact, as the noble Lord says, that the United States has reduced its contributions to IDA 6. But Her Majesty's Government have taken the lead among non-United States donors in agreeing to waive the pro-rata arrangements in respect of the second and third instalments of their contributions to IDA 6, thereby giving the IDA additional commitment authority to help tide it over the funding shortfall resulting from the United States action. In my view, this not only fulfils our responsibilities in this country to the IDA in full, but it is an action of which we can be proud.
Lord Oram: My Lords, is it not the case that over the years IDA funds have resulted in contracts to the United Kingdom worth more than the actual financial contributions to those funds? Therefore, is it not in this country's interest, and particularly in our trading interest, that all contributions to IDA should be paid promptly and in full? Although we welcome the ultimate decision of the Government last year, was it not the case that they delayed payment of part of the contribution because of the failure of the United States to meet its obligations? Will the Minister assure the House that in future the Government will continue what he calls "taking the lead"; that is, following the Scandinavian countries —who did pay promptly last year whereas we did not?
Lord Belstead: My Lords, the difficulty of course about the second and the third years of IDA 6 is that the pro-rata arrangements between the non-United States donors to the IDA and the United States broke down because the United States donations did not allow for those pro-rata arrangements to work. I assure the noble Lord and the House that Her Majesty's Government were among those who took the lead in agreeing to waive the pro-rata arrangement. I believe we have fufilled our contributions in full.
As regards the first part of the noble Lord's supplementary question, certainly our procurement benefits are substantial for United Kingdom goods and services as a result of the operations of the IDA, but I am not advised that we actually get more than we give.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord again for what is a considerably reassuring answer and I hope that he will use all his influence to continue that lead. I should like to add one small caveat. My noble friend Lord Oram mentioned the return that we get from our contributions to the IDA. Is the noble Lord aware that in the other place very recently it was stated that for every £11 that we contribute to the IDA, Britain receives back in contracts and agreements £14? Therefore, it is good business and I hope that the Government will recognise the part that it could play in the recovery of the British economy.
Lord Belstead: My Lords, I must make it clear that I am advised that the figures which the Government have do not equate with the figures which the noble Lord has put to me. Nonetheless, I should like to say two things. First, I agree that it is good business for the Government. Secondly, we certainly support the concept and the workings of the IDA.

Voluntary Service: Encouragement in Schools
2.55 p.m.
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps are being taken in schools to inculcate a spirit of service to the wider community.
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, most secondary schools already provide opportunities for pupils to engage in community service, and in both primary and secondary schools pupils are encouraged to show consideration for other people and for their environment.
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his reply. I noted that he used the words "community service". Would he agree that the words "community service" are unfortunate when used in the context of magistrates' courts, deter children from taking up community help and community work, and indeed are misunderstood by both children and adults? Can he possibly take steps to see whether this term cannot be changed?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I would be sorry if what my noble friend has said were so. I have had inquiries made and I am not aware of any evidence that such an effect is at all widespread. The arrangements for community service by offenders are well established and have a most valuable part to play. Voluntary community service by young people has a splendid record in this country. However, I do not wish to appear complacent and if my noble friend has specific instances in mind I would be very glad to look into them if she would let me have the details.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady

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Trumpington, is very valid? Would he be prepared—as I think he said he would—to look into the matter? Is he further aware that the spirit of voluntary service, in which I am very much involved, is certainly high in our secondary modern and comprehensive schools, but it begins to wane when students reach that period where they have to start looking for gainful employment? Will he bear that point in mind as well?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, as I said to my noble friend Lady Trumpington, I really have not had any evidence that community service is looked upon as a punishment, putting off younger children who wish to do it. Of course, there are a number of factors which contribute as children grow up—they tend to have boy and girl friends, motor-bikes, video players and so on. All those things rather put them off community service as they grow older.
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the fact that I am the wife of an ex-headmaster and I have concrete evidence that the term "community service" is misunderstood? But is he also aware that I would like to congratulate the children who in many, many cases collect a great deal of money and do a great many valuable jobs which are greatly appreciated by the community?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I do not think that there is a great deal more that I can say to my noble friend, but perhaps if she will give me the name of the school of which her husband was the headmaster we could take some action.
Lord Beswick: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that, using the term "community service" in its widest context, such teaching could be absolutely wonderfully rewarding? Is the noble Earl also aware that the constant denigration by the Conservative Party and by the Conservative Government of service in publicly owned industry is bitterly disappointing to those who are engaged in that industry, bad for morale and bad for the national effort?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I think that is somewhat wide of the Question.
Baroness Macleod of Borve: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that, whether it is encouraged in schools or not, there is a great wealth of public help given by young people in this country? I have knowledge of the situation as regards hospitals and I also have personal knowledge of young people who came forward recently at Christmas-time to help the single homeless in London. Is my noble friend aware that one only has to ask young people if they will come and help, and they do so?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, yes, I am very well aware of the enormous amount—I had better be careful with my words—of, I was about to say "community service", but I will now say "service in the environment", that is done by young people.
Baroness Masham of Ilton: My Lords, is my noble kinsman aware of the excellent work which is done in
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many of our schools through the Duke of Edinburgh Award Scheme, and that one of its categories is service? Is he also aware of the very great service that the teachers give in helping the children with the Duke of Edinburgh Award Scheme?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, this is positively embarrassing and looks like a plant and a put-up job, because I am sure that my noble kinswoman is aware, though Members of the House may not be, that I am county president of the Duke of Edinburgh Award Scheme in North Yorkshire and very well aware of the amount of work that it does. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all those—the teachers, assessors, adjudicators and others—who give help in this way. But I should not like to pick out in particular the Duke of Edinburgh Award Scheme, because there are many national voluntary organisations which include community service within their activities. I cannot mention them all, but, to name just a few, there is the National Association of Youth Clubs, the National Youth Bureau, the Scouts' Association, the British Red Cross Society and St. John's; and two which I should particularly like to single out, which are solely concerned with this aspect of work, are the Community Service Volunteers and the Youth Volunteer Force Foundation. I should like to pay tribute to those many thousands of people throughout the country who give their spare time to help in this sort of work.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that for the past three years in Northern Ireland a very important pilot scheme to extend and develop community service there has been operating, and that this scheme has helped to form links between teachers and the youth and social services in order to interest children in projects to do with the community? Would the Minister not agree that his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should start to support this particular scheme and that we should also all start to give serious thought to including community services within the curricula of our schools?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ewart-Biggs, for drawing our attention to that work in Northern Ireland. I have just given a very long list of organisations that help, and I think that throughout the country there is a splendid record of help to the community through these voluntary organisations.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, again using the term "community service" in its widest sense, will the noble Earl agree that one of the best encouragements to young people in this regard and, indeed, to older people, would be if the Government themselves set an example?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, I think that by way of grants the Government indeed help a number of these bodies.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, would the noble Earl agree that it would satisfy the objections raised by his noble friend Lady Trumpington if the term were

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changed from "community service" simply to "voluntary service"? In view of the fact that he referred to work in the children's environment and the noble Baroness referred to the work in the community, can he say whether this includes the world community? I ask this question because when there was a Ministry of Overseas Development one of its committees was assisting schools in matters like twinning with schools abroad and introducing children to other cultures. Is this still part of the Government's policy, or have they simply withdrawn from that effort?
The Earl of Swinton: My Lords, as to the first part of the supplementary question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, yes, I think that the words "voluntary service" have much to recommend them. As regards the second part and the worldwide aspect of voluntary service, I think I am right in saying that the Community Service Volunteers are similar to Voluntary Service Overseas. I think the latter tends to go more into the foreign aspects, whereas the Community Service Volunteers are more concerned with community service in this country.
Lord Derwent: My Lords, are not both Starred Questions and supplementary questions, as laid down in the Companion to Standing Orders, supposed to be a search for knowledge and not supposed to express a point of view?
Lord Nugent of Guildford: My Lords, can my noble friend the Leader of the House agree that the four Questions on the Order Paper today are models of brevity and conformity with the rules of order, and much to be welcomed?
The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, I think that that is an expression of opinion which each noble Lord will interpret as he wishes.

Business
3.5 p.m.
Lord Denham: My Lords, with the leave of the House, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available this evening at 7.30 p.m. It may also be helpful if I remind your Lordships that the House will meet at 2.15 p.m. tomorrow, on Wednesday, 26th January. If I may return to the subject of dinner tonight, it will be at 7.30 p.m.

Plant Varieties Bill [H.L.]
Read a third time: an amendment (privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

Statutory Sick Pay Up-rating Order 1982
3.7 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, I beg to move that the draft
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Statutory Sick Pay Up-rating Order 1982, which was laid before the House on 16th December 1982 be approved.
The purpose of this order is to raise the rates of statutory sick pay and the levels of earnings which will determine the rate of statutory sick pay to be paid. This will fulfil commitments made both here and in another place that the figures in the Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982 would be increased before the scheme comes into effect on 6th April this year.
Your Lordships will be aware that the Act provides that SSP rates should normally be increased in line with prices. In the 12 months to October 1982, the general index of retail prices went up by 6·8 per cent. However, the increases to be effected by this order are significantly greater than that; they are, in fact, increases of 8·8 per cent. The reason for this is explained in the report to Parliament by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Services which was laid before Parliament at the same time as the draft up-rating order. It is, in essence, because the rates in the Act were based on the November 1981 sickness benefit rates. As your Lordships will know, these rates were based in turn on a forecast of the movement in prices over the 12 months to November 1981 which was 2 per cent, less than the actual movement in prices over that period. That shortfall was made good for sickness benefit. It is important to get the starting rates of SSP right, so in this special situation we considered that we should increase the SSP rates by an extra two percentage points.
The rates have been rounded to the nearest 5p in line with normal social security practice. I can assure your Lordships that this will not cause extra problems for employers who will, in most cases, have to work in daily rates. To help employers we are publishing daily rate tables in the contributions tables to be sent to all employers next month.
The two higher earnings levels, by reference to which employees will qualify for the different rates of SSP, have been increased by the same percentage to keep the same level of incentive for employees to go back to work. However, they have been rounded down to the nearest 50p, in line with our practice when setting the lower earnings limit for national insurance contributions. And that, of course, is the lowest earnings level for SSP.
Thus employees who earn £65·00 or more a week will qualify for the new higher SSP rate of £40·25 a week. People who earn at least £48·50 but less than £65 will qualify for the middle rate of £33·75, and those who earn at least the lower earnings limit—which will be £32·50 from 6th April—but less than £48·50 will qualify for SSP of £27·20.
Your Lordships will wish to know that in future we intend to increase the SSP rates and earnings levels in line with the actual yearly increase in prices as of October in the year concerned, although, as your Lordships will be aware, when deciding on the increase in any particular year the Secretary of State must also take into account the general state of the economy and any other special circumstances which may obtain at the time. Deciding on the use of the October figures means that the review will take place, and the new

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figures will be announced, before the end of the year. It will then be possible to include the figures in the contribution tables which are sent to employers early in the new year, so that employers will have reasonable notice of the new rates before they come into effect each April. The rates and earnings levels will be included in the department's leaflet NI 208.
It is claimed that employers—especially small employers—will not understand the scheme and will—either through ignorance or malice—not pay SSP when it is due, or pay the wrong amount. The department has therefore issued a guide to employers; this has been praised as a simple and clear guide to the scheme. Officials have also mounted an education programme providing speakers for seminars and answering queries from employers. The private sector is also playing its part in spreading awareness of the new scheme through provision of training, management aids and record keeping systems. All the indications are that most larger employers—who employ the majority of employees—are already taking steps to ensure a smooth implemetation of the new scheme.
In the three months before the scheme's introduction we shall be making special efforts to reach small businesses, who need a shorter preparation time. In co-operation with organisations representing small businesses, the department has prepared a simple record sheet to help small firms work out SSP entitlement and keep records. It is entirely optional — more sophisticated and more wide-ranging systems are being made available commercially. But the deparment's basic form will be available to firms which wish to make use of it, and it will greatly help them operate the scheme correctly and with the minimum of extra administration.
The contribution tables which will be distributed to all employers in early February will contain information about SSP additional to that in the employers' guide. There will also be a general message reminding employers about the advent of the scheme and action that they should be taking by way of preparation. A national publicity compaign has now been launched at a cost of no less than £750,000. As I have already indicated to your Lordships, the SSP scheme will come into effect on 6th April this year. The increased rates and earnings levels in this order will allow the scheme to start off on the right footing. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 16th December be approved.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
3.14 p.m.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, although we must all welcome any increase, however mean and inadequate, in sickness benefit, I would not want your Lordships to think that we on this side of the House have relaxed in our objection to the whole scheme. However, your Lordships will be relieved to know that I do not propose this afternoon to repeat all that was said when the legislation was going through the House. The noble Minister has made it clear that this small increase is related to the retail price index. I want to submit to your Lordships that the retail price index is not always the best guide to the cost of living for the
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poorest people. The poorest people often do not have mortagages; they do not benefit from the changes in interest rates.
I would also remind your Lordships that, for the purpose of calculating the retail price index, national insurance contributions are not included. Under the legislation to which this statutory instrument refers, people on unemployment and sick pay are going to have to pay insurance contributions instead of having their cards franked, as happened under the previous system. I want to ask the noble Minister whether he is going to take into account the fact that these considerable sums will have to be paid, for those in receipt of the lowest sum, out of £27.20. Therefore, the money they actually receive is going to be considerably less than £27.20—which is small enough.
I must also ask the Minister what consideration the Government are giving to the fact that these benefits are being brought into income tax, so that by the time the recipient has paid national insurance contributions, which he did not have to do previously, and by the time he has paid income tax, which is an innovation, how much is he actually going to be left with? I should like to remind the noble Minister that he is not statutorily tied to the retail price index. If he will look, as I am sure he often does, at Section 7(4) of the Act, it says:
"the Secretary of State shall estimate the general level of prices in such manner as he thinks fit."
This seems to give the Minister power to look at the price index as it affects the poorest people and not to be bound by the RPI, which has a very wide relevance but is often unfair to the elderly and to the sick. I am especially concerned about the question of national insurance contributions and about the taxability.
I was glad to know that much publicity is going to be given to these new rates, and I hope that that will be effective. In that connection, I must lastly ask the noble Minister why this minuscule piece of paper which describes the up-rating of statutory sick pay costs 75 pence. Surely that is not a question of fair dealing or fair trading.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for his clear explanation of the purpose of this order. We on these Benches did not approve the transfer of the first eight weeks of sick pay to employers, for reasons which we set out when the Social Security and Housing Benefits Bill was before the House. We did not approve either of the three levels of benefit, since there is no such differentiation in national insurance sickness benefit. However, the Bill became law, and we all understood that the levels of benefit would be up-rated before the Bill became effective in April of this year.
This order provides that up-rating. In his report the Secretary of State reminds us, as indeed did the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, that the original statutory sick pay rates were based on the sickness benefit rate in November 1981. That was done, according to the Secretary of State,
"to ensure that employees as a whole would receive the same extra income from the statutory sick pay scheme after tax and national insurance contributions had been deducted as they would lose by the withdrawal of State sickness benefit, if that were taxable."

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Therefore, the original statutory sick pay figures were based on the November 1981 national insurance sickness benefit figure.
The statutory sick pay figures will be up-rated by this order, as the noble Lord explained, by 6.8 per cent. to account for inflation between October 1981 and October 1982, and 2 per cent. to account for the under-estimate which is admitted in the November 1981 sickness benefit figure. That is a total of 8.8 per cent. But sickness benefit was up-rated by 11 per cent. last November, 9 per cent. for estimated inflation and 2 percent. for the November 1981 under-estimate. So there is an admitted over-estimate in the 1982 figure, and we have been warned that there may be clawback next year.
My question is whether the discrepancy between the sickness benefit up-rating of 11 per cent. and the statutory sick pay up-rating of 8.8 per cent. will not break the link between the two, to which both the Secretary of State and the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, have referred. Does this not mean that statutory sick pay has fallen behind sickness benefit, at least until the next up-rating? Will it not be better to be on sickness benefit than on statutory sick pay? And will it not be better to be sick when there is a strike, because in those circumstances you get sickness benefit and not statutory sick pay? I should be grateful if the Minister could clarify those points, although in principle we have no objection to the order.
Lord Kilmarnock: My Lords, from this Bench I, too, wish to thank the noble Lord for explaining the purpose behind the order with his customary clarity, and I wish to raise only two points. First, it may seem generous to up-rate sick pay by 8.8 per cent., but surely it is to give with one hand and take with the other to up-rate the threshold by the same amount, incorporating the 2 per cent. benefit shortfall of 1981 in the threshold figure? I can see no justification for incorporating that 2 per cent. in the threshold figure, particularly as the Government are planning in future to up-rate the threshold simply by the increase in the RPI. Perhaps the Minister would comment on that.
My second point is that surely this illustrates how badly in need of reform is our social security system. Schedule 1 paragraph 2(c), of the 1982 Act disqualifies from statutory sick pay those earning under the lower earnings limit of £32.50 a week, and that is reiterated in the Secretary of State's report. We all know that many people in low-paid jobs prefer not to pass that limit in order not be "clobbered" by the savagegly regressive contribution of 9 per cent. of earnings immediately they earn that extra £1 or £2. The ground of their disqualification is that they have not contributed. Would the noble Lord not agree that it is absurd that someone earning £33 should qualify for statutory sick pay while someone earning £32 should not?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am obliged to your Lordships for the reception that has been given to the order. I will deal with a few of the points that have been raised, because your Lordships are doubtless anxious to get on to the next business.
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The noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, wondered whether we were right to use the RPI as the historical basis for up-rating in this matter. Much is said about the suitability of the different price indices for this purpose. The fact of the matter is, however, that if one looks at the different movements of the different indices over the years, one finds precious little to choose between them at the end of the day. We thought this particular index was the right one for this matter; that is why we chose it and why we have taken account of it in this up-rating. Noble Lords pointed out that my right honourable friend is not obliged to stick precisely to the figures shown by the increase in this index, but that is a feature of the original legislation, to which Lady Jeger drew attention.
As for national insurance contributions, at the bottom end of the scale, which we are considering today, wage-earners will not be required to pay national insurance contributions at all, whether on their earnings or on the statutory sick pay that they would have been getting; so that point does not arise. I am sorry that the noble Baroness found the document she showed me rather expensive. The cost of these documents is related to the number of copies they expect to sell, and that may be a reflection on the arcane nature of this matter. The noble Lords, Lord Banks and Lord Kilmarnock, raised some detailed points. In view of the following business perhaps they will forgive me if, on this occasion, I write to them with the answers.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

"Falkland Islands Review" (Cmnd. 8787.)
3.25 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young)The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young)rose to move that this House takes note of the Falkland Islands Review (Cmnd. 8787.).
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I wish at the outset to express, in rather more specific terms than was possible in last week's Statement, my gratitude, and, I am sure that of the many speakers in today's debate, to the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his colleagues, particularly the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson, and the noble Lords, Lord Barber and Lord Lever of Manchester, for all the time and effort they put into producing their formidable report within such a very tight schedule. Indeed, the fact that a majority of the committee were Members of your Lordships' House only underlines the point I made in the debate on the humble Address last November; that this House has played a responsible and not inconsiderable role in the momentous events surrounding the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands last April.
We all, of course, await with great interest the speech of my noble friend Lord Carrington. I would simply say at this stage that the House has not seemed the same place without him over the last 10 months. I hope we shall hear from him often in the near future. There are others, too, on today's list who played important roles both before and after the invasion. I am thinking particularly of the noble Lords, Lord Stewart of Fulham, Lord Chalfont and my noble friend Lord Buxton of Alsa. But, more generally, the

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list reflects, as has been the case with all our debates on the Falklands. an impressive wealth of expertise and experience. It will, I know, be an extremely important debate. If, as I fear may be the case, I am unable to answer all the points made when I come to reply to the debate later tonight, I certainly undertake to read the debate in Hansard, to draw the attention of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister to specific points and, where appropriate, to write to noble Lords.
I wish briefly to refer to the way in which the committee under the noble Lord, Lord Franks, went about their work. First, their terms of reference were agreed on an all-party basis. The membership represented a wide range of backgrounds. The committee had access to all relevant Cabinet and Cabinet Committee papers and to a comprehensive collection of reports from intelligence agencies. They saw not only the papers of the present Administration but those of previous Administrations as well. The committee invited all those with relevant information to submit it, and they took a wide range of oral evidence. They saw, among others, all Prime Ministers since 1965. These arrangements demonstrate that the committee were in a unique position of authority to comment on the matters covered by their terms of reference.
I shall now follow the structure of the report, dealing in turn, first, with the fundamental nature of the dispute and the way successive Governments tried to deal with it; secondly, the period preceding the invasion and some points which have been made about the Government's actions during that time; and thirdly, the main conclusions of the report and the Government's reactions to them. Throughout, I shall try to follow the advice of the noble Lord. Lord Franks. that his report should be read as a whole, and to remember his warning against the dangers of hindsight.
The fundamental dilemma is plain from the report. Argentina was interested in only one thing —sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and, if they could get it, over the dependencies as well. Successive British Governments recognised that any solution had to be acceptable to the islanders and sought to achieve that solution by negotiation. The inherent contradiction was evident. No solution which satisfied the Argentinian demand for sovereignty could possibly be reconciled with the wishes of the islanders or of this Parliament.
Chapter 1 of the report—a valuable historical analysis of the period from 1965 to 1979—illustrates clearly the recurrence of certain features in the policies pursued by successive British Governments, in the intelligence assessments they received and the military assessments prepared by the chiefs of staff.
1967 was a landmark, in that the then Labour Government was the first British Government to state formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the islanders were respected. Following agreement at official level with Argentina on a Memorandum of Understanding, the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, visited the islands to explain the policy which the Government had been pursuing. But, in the light of the reaction both in the
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islands and in this country, the Government decided not to continue to attempt to reach a settlement on the basis of the memorandum. Nevertheless, it was recognised that,
"failure to reach an understanding with Argentina carried the risks of increased harassment of the islanders and the possibility of an attack".
The Government therefore decided to continue negotiations, while making clear the British attitude on sovereignty and that the islanders' wishes were paramount. Talks were resumed in 1969.
Following the change of Government in June 1970 a Communications Agreement was signed, but Argentina pressed for talks on sovereignty and in 1974 attention turned to the possibility of a condominium, which was explored with the islanders and then dropped. Towards the end of 1973 the Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentine attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were indications that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands. In 1974 official military action was considered unlikely as long as Argentina believed that the British Government were prepared to negotiate on sovereignty, but the JIC did not rule it out. And in December 1974 an Argentine newspaper mounted a press campaign advocating invasion of the islands.
This pattern of hardening Argentine attitudes, the possibility of military action and a press campaign advocating it, would be seen again. This historical background is important because a good deal of recent comment has suggested that there was a new situation in early 1982. I shall come to that later.
In 1975 leaseback was proposed for the first time. It was an Argentine suggestion in response to a British proposal for joint development of economic resources of the South-West Atlantic. The Argentine Foreign Minister also proposed that Argentina should occupy South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. That proposal was unacceptable to Britain and the absence of talks on sovereignty unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that there were no negotiations.
The economic survey by Lord Shackleton in 1975–76 provoked a hostile Argentine reaction and relations deteriorated sharply in 1976. Our Ambassador was told by the Argentine Foreign Minister that if the British Government refused to resume negotiations,
"We were rapidly moving towards a head-on collision … in the end he could only see one course open to Argentina irrespective of what Government might be in power".
Fortified by the support of the entire Argentine nation, as well as the other nations of the world assembled in New York, his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome. No stronger threat was issued by an Argentine Foreign Minister throughout the period covered by the report. Ambassadors were withdrawn and newspapers in Buenos Aires advocated invasion. though in veiled terms.
In January 1976 the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely, but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that, as the sequence of

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Argentine measures proceeded, the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer. The pattern was similar to 1974 and was to be seen again. On 4th February 1976 shots were fired at the unarmed research ship, "Shackleton", 78 miles south of Port Stanley, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to arrest her. A week later the then Minister of State at the Foreign Office went to New York for talks with the new Argentine Foreign Minister, at which, according to the report, he was instructed by the then Foreign Secretary to ask what proposals the Argentines had about discussions and sovereignty. Again, this is worth noting, for the Argentines were to be asked a similar question in September 1981, to which the report also refers.
In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options. It was the first of four such papers. According to the report all were similar in scope and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued,
"It would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful".
In December of the same year, an Argentine military presence was discovered in the British territory of Southern Thule. The Labour Government took no steps to make that fact public and it did not become known to Parliament until May 1978—some 16 months later. Formal protests were made to Argentina at the time, but the report states that the Argentine expectation had been that the British reaction would have been much stronger.
A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area.
There was evidence at this time of an Argentine contingency plan for a joint airforce and navy invasion of the Falkland Islands but later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the then British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist bloc.
In February 1977, some two months after the discovery of the occupation of Southern Thule, but without referring to it, Mr. Crosland said in another place that the time had come to consider with the islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate existed for further talks. At the same time he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton Report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?
In July 1977 the then Labour Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, presented a paper to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee which—and I quote from the report:
"argued that serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily
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indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources".
The Committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going. The report continues:
"Broadly speaking it was the Government's strategy to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina."
In view of this, it was surprising that in December 1980 the then shadow Foreign Secretary, Mr. Peter Shore, opposed the leaseback proposal when it was put to another place by my right honourable friend the Financial Secretary.
We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be "looked at separately" from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded.
The noble Lord, Lord Franks, uses a similar phrase to that used to describe the position at the end of 1973. He said, "The Argentine position was hardening". Indeed it was. Argentine naval units arrested seven Soviet and two Bulgarian fishing vessels in Falkland waters. Shots were fired at one of the Bulgarian ships and there were orders to sink the vessel if necessary. The British Government were officially informed that there would be a similar riposte to intrusions by any other flag carrier, and at any other place.
The JIC concluded that if negotiations broke down or if Argentina concluded that there was no real prospect of their resulting in a transfer of sovereignty, there would be,
"A high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action".
Invasion of the Falklands was, in the JIC's view, unlikely but "could not be discounted". This was a situation of unparalleled tension in the history of the dispute. Nothing comparable existed in early 1982, as the report itself points out.
But first a word about the dispatch of one nuclear submarine and two frigates to the South Atlantic by the Labour Government in November 1977. According to the report, Ministers accepted that,
"such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack".
What, one must ask, would that force have done if, totally without air cover, it had met such an attack? Further, the report found no evidence that Argentina ever came to know of its existence. There were further negotiations with Argentina in February 1978 in Lima, in December 1978 in Geneva, and in March 1979 in New York. On no occasion was a force deployed.
Chapters 2 and 3 of the report cover the period of the present Government. As with each previous Government, the full range of policy options was put to the Government at the outset. The second half of 1979 saw a visit to the islands by my right honourable friend the present Financial Secretary, two exploratory meetings with Argentine representatives, the restoration of Ambassadors, and the formulation of proposals to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee, including both political and military assessments.
In recent days there have been references to what has been called "collapse of effective Cabinet Government". The fact is that in 1980, when the policy was being decided, there were no less than seven collective, and often lengthy, discussions of our policy towards the Falkland Islands, four in the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee, and three in Cabinet.
In January 1981 a further meeting of that committee—the eighth collective discussion—was held to review the situation in the light of the islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in both Houses on the Statement of December 1980. The committee endorsed the noble Lord, Lord Carrington's, proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. They agreed to early talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented. Those talks took place in New York in February 1981. Thereafter, the policy having been decided in those eight collective meetings, my noble friend kept his colleagues informed in detail through minutes circulated to all members of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee.
In 1982, following the New York talks, a meeting of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee was planned for 16th March. It did not take place because my noble friend wanted to consult the islanders on the response that he was proposing to send to Mr. Costa Mendez about the unilateral Argentine communiqué following the New York talks; and the Island Council was meeting on that very day to discuss this matter. The South Georgia incident, which changed the whole situation, began on Friday, 19th March, and the Cabinet discussed that incident at its next meeting on 25th March.
I turn now to say something of HMS "Endurance". It was a collective Cabinet decision, resulting from the 1981 Defence Review, to withdraw "Endurance" at the end of her 1982 deployment. As the Argentines well knew, "Endurance" has a limited defence capability and was on station only during the Antarctic summer months each year. Her presence in the South Atlantic at the time did not stop Argentina launching its invasion, any more than her presence in the area deterred the Argentines from attacking RRS "Shackleton" in 1976. Nevertheless my right honourable friend the then Secretary of State for Defence said on 7th April 1982—and the report now states—that the decision to withdraw "Endurance" could have provided the wrong signal to the Argentines. As Parliament knows, HMS "Endurance" will continue in service.
It has been suggested that a large task force, or a smaller force of ships, should have been sent earlier than they were. Assessments by the chiefs of staff of possible military responses to the Argentine threat were received throughout the period under review, and were similar in scope and content. When the present Government first considered the position in 1980 we had a military assessment before us. The latest one reached my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on 26th March 1982, in response to a request for contingency plans. It was virtually identical to the assessment made in September 1981. That was similar
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to the one prepared in 1977 which, in its turn, was similar to that of February 1976.
The report itself points out that, although from 1975 the Argentine threat of military action increased, no Government were prepared to establish on the Falkland Islands a garrison large enough to repel a full-scale Argentine invasion, or to provide an extended runway for the airport, with supporting facilities. The 1981 Chiefs of Staff" Paper, having recognised the strength of the Argentine airforce, concluded that,
"o deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, comprising an Invincible-class carrier, with four destroyers or frigates, plus possibly a nuclear-powered submarine, supply ships in attendance, and additional manpower up to brigade strength, to reinforce the garrison".
Such a deployment would be very expensive and would engage a significant portion of the country's naval resources. There was a danger that its despatch could precipitate the very action that it was intended to deter. If then faced with Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands on arrival, there could be no certainty that such a force could retake them. The paper concluded that to deal with a full-scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and that the logistical problem of such an operation would be formidable.
The report concludes that it would not have been appropriate to prepare a large task force with the capacity to retake the Falkland Islands before there was clear evidence of an invasion. As soon as the evidence was available, on 31st March, that action was taken. Some argue that a small force should have been deployed earlier, as had been the case in 1977. The report states clearly that the situation at the time of the New York talks in February 1982 was different from the situation in November 1977, the time of the deployment of a submarine and two frigates. I have already described the differences. In November 1977 there had already been bellicose military action by Argentina in Falklands waters and an explicit threat to any of our ships which might enter those waters. The report also concludes that the situation in February 1982 did not justify a similar naval deployment.
However, I should like to put another argument. To have sent at that time two or three frigates, without air cover, knowing, as we did, the strength and efficiency of the Argentine Air Force, would have put men and ships in great danger. To have stood them off several hundred miles away would not have helped against a full-scale invasion.
Then it is said that one or more nuclear submarines might have been sent on 5th March. It has been stated in another place that by then the Argentines had given up hope of a negotiated settlement. In fact, at the talks in New York Argentina had proposed a programme for stepping up the tempo of meetings, and that programme was specifically endorsed, even in the unilateral communiqué issued in Buenos Aires on 1st March.
The prospect was of continuing negotiations for several months ahead—not of an imminent military threat. On this point the committee questioned my noble friend Lord Carrington, whose concern was that if a submarine was sent, and the fact became known, that would have jeopardised his objective of

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continuing negotiation. The committee found that that was not an unreasonable view to take at the time.
As the House knows, the decision to sail the first nuclear-powered submarine was taken on 29th March. The committee considers that there was a case for taking that action at the end of the previous week. This is a fairly fine judgment, and it depends on the interpretation of the developing situation in South Georgia, which the Government had been trying to solve by negotiation. But, of course, the covert presence of a nuclear submarine would not have deterred the eventual Argentine invasion. Had the junta known that we had despatched a submarine, their response could well have been to launch an airborne invasion, supported by ground attack aircraft—a method, as the chiefs of staff had advised, well within their capability.
Moreover, I remember that there was criticism in some quarters of the sinking of the "Belgrano" by submarine after several weeks of actual hostilities. What, then, would have been the attitude of the critics if Britain had fired the first shot, if Britain had attacked a ship on the high seas? There would certainly have been a demand for an inquiry, we should have lost support from our allies and the international community and we should not have secured the passage of the famous Security Council Resolution 502, which dominated international opinion for so long.
Throughout this account I have referred to intelligence assessment. In November 1979 there was a reassessment of the Argentine threat in language similar to that which had occurred several times previously. A further assessment was made in July 1981. That assessment reviewed the options open to the Argentine Government if they decided to resort to direct measures in the dispute. It took the view that it was likely that, in the first instance, Argentina would adopt diplomatic and economic measures, including the disruption of air communications and of food and oil supplies; then, Argentina might occupy one of the uninhabited dependencies following its action in 1976 in establishing a presence on Southern Thule; and then a risk that it might establish a military presence in the Falkland Islands themselves, remote from Port Stanley. In the committee's view harassment or arrest of British shipping would not be a likely option unless the Argentine Government felt themselves severely provoked.
As in 1979, the assessment noted that there was no sign of diminution in Argentina's determination eventually to extend its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands area, but that it would prefer to achieve this objective by peaceful means and would turn to forcible action only as a last resort. The final paragraph of the assessment stated that if Argentina concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forcible measures against British interests, and that it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands could not be discounted.
My Lords, I turn now to the principal suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Franks, for the future;
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namely, that the machinery within Government for intelligence assessment should be reviewed. The committee expressed the view that during the period leading up to the invasion the JIC organisation might not have given sufficient weight to the diplomatic and other indications that the Argentine Government's positions was hardening in the early months of 1982, as compared with intelligence reports. They suggested that the independence of the JIC should be emphasised by having its chairman appointed by the Prime Minister as a full-time member of the Cabinet Office, with a more critical and independent role.
These are matters which it is our custom not to discuss in public, for obvious reasons. We have to remember that anything which we say on this subject is certain to be studied very closely by foreign governments, and we must be sure to say nothing that makes the tasks of our own security and intelligence people harder, or those of our adversaries easier. We must therefore avoid any reference to our own operations and techniques, or to those of our allies. But I may on this occasion comment on the committee's observations.
The Government think it right to accept the proposal that the chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence Committee be held by a member of the Cabinet Office who is able to give more time to supervising the work of the assessments machinery. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister therefore intends to appoint as chairman of the JIC an official of the Cabinet Office who will be engaged full-time on intelligence matters. He will have direct access to the Prime Minister in the same was as the heads of the security and intelligence agencies.
I have dealt at length with the comments made in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and by others outside. The report sets these comments in perspective, and it sets out their unanimous conclusion taking into account all the considerations and all the evidence. The question which the opposition must answer is this. Do they accept or repudiate that conclusion?
My Lords, as a result of the events of last year and of the Franks Report, the performance of Government machinery, of Ministers and of officials has been subjected to the closest scrutiny. We should all like, I am sure, to pay again our tribute to the outstanding service that my noble friend Lord Carrington has given to this country, our tribute, also, to the work of my right honourable friend Mr Atkins and my honourable friend Mr Luce, whose skill in handling the New York talks in February 1982 is specifically acknowledged in the report.
Officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence organisations have also been subjected to much criticism. The report attaches no blame to the individuals, and makes it equally clear that the mass of allegations made against the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were quite unjustified. I would add that the department which has been subjected to that criticism was the same department which so brilliantly mobilised opinion and so skilfully promoted our cause at the United Nations. In the United States, with our other partners and allies and across the world. That needs saying, and I am glad to say it. I pay tribute, too,

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to the work of the Ministry of Defence, which played such a notable part in the mobilisation and servicing of the task force.
It is not surprising that a thorough inquiry over six months by a committee of the distinction and calibre which has produced this report should have observations to make on the handling of this or that particular aspect of events. That would have been the case whatever the subject of the inquiry. I believe, however, that the Government can legitimately take pride in the final verdict of the review.
Moved, That this House takes note of the Falkland Islands Review (Cmnd. 8787.)—{Baroness Young.)
3.57 p.m.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, first I warmly endorse the thanks expressed by the noble Baroness to the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his colleagues for giving their time and the benefit of their great experience in producing what is, without doubt, an historic report.
The noble Baroness the Leader of the House has made a carefully constructed speech in which she has sought to exonerate the Government from blame for the events of last April. What she did was to enlarge on the statement made by her right honourable friend the Prime Minister on 18th January when she rested her case on the conclusions of the Franks Report. The noble Baroness in her speech did not deal with the criticisms which are implicit in the report before us. It seemed to me that the only criticism she could make was against my right honourable friend Mr. Peter Shore. We all understand this perfectly well. The conclusions, taken in isolation, appear favourable to the Government but the substance of the report, if carefully analysed, raises questions of the utmost gravity which the noble Baroness has not answered. These must be asked in this debate if it is to be an effective one.
Before I proceed to the report I should like to make one thing quite clear; namely, that nothing that I or any of my noble friends may say in this debate excuses in any way or condones the act of unprovoked aggression committed by the Argentine régime on 2nd April 1982–the act which led to war, the act which was rightly condemned by a resolution of the United Nations, an act committed by men who were not fitted to lead a civilised nation. We have no quarrel with the Argentine people and we wish for nothing but friendly relations with them. The links between the Welsh community in Patagonia (where I have many friends) and, indeed, with Wales are strong, and as strong as ever they were. We are anxious to be friends with the people of the Argentine and with other South American countries.
As I have said, the Government have relied upon the conclusion of paragraph 339 of the report, which attaches no blame or criticism to the Government for the junta's decision to invade the Falklands, but there is an ambivalence in the paragraph itself, for it also says:
"we have pointed out … where different decisions might have been taken, where fuller consideration of alternative courses of action might, in our opinion, have been advantageous, and where the machinery of Government could have been better used."
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The report goes on to say:
"if the British Government had acted differently … it is impossible to judge what the impact on the Argentine Government… might have been".
That, of course, is true; but one thing is certain. It could not have been worse than what actually happened. As I read the report, the main charge against the Government relates not so much to the actions they took as to their failure to take positive action, especially during the crucial first three months of last year, after the change of Government in Buenos Aires, the activity in South Georgia, the reports of increasing tension in the Argentine itself and the reaction of the junta to the conclusions of the talks between Mr. Luce and Senor Ros, to which I shall return later and to which the noble Baroness has just referred in her speech.
The report makes plain that the possibility of the use of force by the Argentine had existed for several years, and that the present Government acknowledged this as far back as October 1979. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, circulated a memorandum on 12th October 1979. May I say I am delighted, and so are my noble friends, to see him in his place. We much look forward to hearing his speech. I should also like to endorse the tribute paid by the noble Baroness to him for his services to this country. This is what the report said in paragraph 75:
"… if Argentina concluded that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forceful measures including direct military action. It pointed out that Argentina had the capability to capture the islands."
This was not the only warning issued by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. The more I ponder over the report, the less reason do I find for his resignation. The noble Lord sent the Defence Committee nine minutes on the Falklands between May 1979 and February 1982. Notwithstanding this—and the noble Baroness referred to the minutes—the situation was allowed by the Government to drift. If one brings all the factors together, we saw a growing impatience in the statements emanating from the Argentine Government; we saw the increasing domestic instability of that Government; we saw the riots which were taking place in the streets of Buenos Aires, and the attractions of a diversionary adventure with an appeal to nationalism. All those things were there plainly to be seen. I see no evidence that this Government took positive action to reduce the risk of invasion in the crucial months of late 1981 and early 1982.
Let me repeat that I do not overlook or dismiss the Government's diplomatic activity. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, together with Mr. Ridley, Mr. Luce and Foreign Office officials—notably Mr. J. B. Ure, whose brilliant analysis impressed me enormously—tried hard to find solutions in extremely difficult circumstances. Their activities are clearly described in the report in paragraphs 71 to 137. Their task was not an easy one; it was extremely difficult for reasons of which the House is aware, as Mr. Callaghan and other Labour Ministers, including Mr. Edward Rowlands, in the previous Administration, confirm. The questions of sovereignty and the paramountcy of the Falklanders' wishes were the substantial obstacles.
Furthermore, the developing gulf between the military junta of General Galtieri and their foreign

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affairs spokesmen made negotiation an uncertain business at that time. That in itself was a straw in the wind. When military Governments move away from their civilian and professional advisers, it is time to sit up and take notice. One feels that when "leaseback" ceased to be a serious negotiating position, the diplomatic ship drifted thereafter without a rudder. Our ambassador in Buenos Aires, who also performed outstanding service, used very strong language when he said that the decision not to have an education campaign was,
"to have no strategy at all beyond a general Micawberism".
That was his comment. That was the considered view of our most experienced diplomat on the spot. It seems to me that the Franks Committee did not pay sufficient regard to his observations.
From then on, negotiations on a possible settlement became increasingly aimless until, to all intents and purposes, they broke down after the New York talks on 26th and 27th February 1982. This seems to me to be the conclusion that one can draw from paragraph 133 and the paragraphs which follow. The joint communiqué of 1st March was rebuffed by the unilateral communiqué of the Argentine Foreign Ministry. This was interpreted by the Argentine press as a serious worsening of the position. This interpretation was correct, and the month of March was a crucial period, and I fear one in which a huge mistake was made.
While this unhappy diplomatic sequence was developing, other things were happening which had a profound effect upon the ultimate tragedy. These were, in my view and in that of many noble Lords throughout the House, the events which conditioned the minds of the leaders of the junta to the idea that Britain was not really in earnest about the Falklands. I want, if I may, to deal with these because they are extremely important in this debate. I want to deal with them one by one. Each of these events, which are well known, might not in isolation have created a belief that we were lukewarm about asserting sovereignty and self-determination. But taken together, they make a strong case for believing that we would not fight in the last ditch to defend these islands. It was a mistake on our part and it was a mistake on their part.
Let me enumerate the events briefly: first, there was our tepid reaction to the recommendations of the survey made by my noble friend Lord Shackleton in 1975, and the then Government must take responsibility for that. Secondly, when, during the passage of the British Nationality Bill, an attempt was made in this House to secure full nationality for the Falklanders, this Government resisted it.
Thirdly, there were a number of defence decisions to make economies, to sell HMS "Invincible", and—perhaps most significantly notwithstanding what the noble Baroness said—there was the Government's decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance". There are a number of references to this in the report, as noble Lords will have noted. Paragraph 114 sets the scene very clearly. In view of what the noble Baroness has said, I feel that I must read it out:
"One consequence of the 1981 Defence Review was the decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance" at the end of her 1981–82 deployment. Lord Carrington wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence,
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Mr. Nott, on 5th June 1981 on several aspects of the defence programme, including the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance". He pressed for her retention on the ground that, until the dispute with Argentina was settled, it was important to maintain the British Government's normal presence in the area at the current level; any reduction would be interpreted by both the islanders and Argentina as a reduction in Britain's commitment to the islands and in its willingness to defend them. Lord Carrington also pointed out that the hydrographic survey tasks HMS "Endurance" undertook and the operation of her helicopters over a wide area of the British Antarctic territory were an important aspect of the maintenance of the British claim to sovereignty. Although HMS "Endurance" was nearing the end of her normal working life, it was essential that she should be replaced by a vessel of similar type for Antarctic work. This approach was followed up by a meeting of officials on 10th June 1981, following which Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials judged that there was no prospect of the decision being reversed, and so reported to Mr. Ridley. The decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance" was confirmed in Parliament on 30th June 1981".
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, deserves full credit for his warnings on 5th June 1981, 22nd January 1982 and 17th February 1982 that:
"Any reduction… would be interpreted by both the islanders and the Argentine as a reduction in Britain's commitment to the islands and in its willingness to defend them."
It was, in the noble Lord's view and that of his colleagues in the Foreign Office, as serious as that. But he might as well have been speaking to a brick wall. Mr. Nott obstinately refused to budge and he was supported by the Prime Minister, and he must have been supported by the majority of his colleagues in the Cabinet right up until the last moment. I have not heard this rebutted at any time. If a rebuttal is to be made, let it be made by the noble Baroness when she winds up this debate later.
This was a major error of judgment by the Government at a crucial moment in the developing crisis. If only the Government had had the sense to keep quiet about it at this key period it would have been something, but the reaction in the Argentine was reported in a letter from our embassy in July 1981, which said that several newspaper articles highlighted the theme that Britain was—and I quote—"abandoning the protection of the Falkland Islands". That, unmistakably, was the view of the Argentine Government at that time.
The Franks Committee concede that this and other mistakes were committed by the Government, but they appear to argue that they come within the range of pardonable error—everyone makes mistakes and hindsight is all very well, and so on. Then the Government say that if none of the mistakes had been made no one can be certain that that would have prevented the invasion. That is just what the noble Baroness has said in her speech. I believe that is the essential weakness about the report's conclusions. There is an equally good case, and I believe a stronger one, for saying that if none of the mistakes which the report criticises had been committed, then the invasion would not have taken place.
Once the warning lights began to show, a more determined policy could have deterred the Argentine Government. They should have been warned far more clearly against the use of force and told that any such efforts would have been resisted. A military capability should have been prepared and a nuclear submarine sent to the South Atlantic at the beginning of March. The intelligence effort should have been

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intensified and early diplomatic support should have been secured from the United States and from our partners in the Community. There was a lack of purpose, a lack of co-ordination and a lack of urgency on the part of the Government at this time which is frightening to contemplate. The grave warning of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to the Prime Minister on 14th September 1981 was not heeded at all. From that time onwards until the crisis was upon us, the Foreign Office seems to have lost heart, probably due to the Prime Minister's clear lack of attention to the problem and to the Defence Secretary's preoccupation with economies.
One of the most damning indictments of this Government is their failure to convene a meeting of the Overseas and Defence Committee of the Cabinet in the months leading to the crisis. The noble Baroness tried to patch this up with references to meetings. If she reads the report again she will see that there was no meeting of the essential Cabinet committee, namely, the Defence Committee itself. Given the growing weight of evidence that the Argentine was becoming more intransigent, and especially after the South Georgia incident, it is inconceivable that the Government could be so inept. The Prime Minister had a momentary spasm of interest on 3rd March (paragraph 152) when she wrote on the telegram from the ambassador: "We must make contingency plans". But nothing transpired and there was little response from the Foreign Office or the Defence Ministry. What is surprising is that the Prime Minister herself did not follow it up. If the contingency plans were needed it was for her to follow them up. This was four weeks before the invasion and action then might have saved the situation and avoided war.
Of course, the Prime Minister should have called a meeting of the Defence Committee immediately she concluded that contingency plans were needed. The chiefs of staff, as we are told, had had a paper prepared on the military options since September 1981. There is no evidence that they had the opportunity to put this to the appropriate Cabinet committee presided over by the Prime Minister. There is clear evidence in the report of the Prime Minister's complete failure to coordinate the actions of the departments concerned. The Defence Committee is a Cabinet committee for which she is responsible. It was her duty to call a meeting and to receive advice from Ministers, from the JIC and from the chiefs of staff, and to make a considered assessment of the position. This was not an error of judgment. It was more than that: it was a failure to conduct the affairs of the Government and the country in a competent way.
The joint intelligence organisation of the Cabinet has come in for the brunt of the criticism. The noble Baroness referred to this and so I will pay some attention to it now. Perhaps some of the criticism is justified; I cannot say. Their assessment staff is charged with failing to read Argentine newspaper reports and public comments which predicted what would happen and which were couched in aggressive and warlike terms. It is, of course, necessary to pay attention to what newspapers say, especially in totalitarian countries where newspapers tend to be controlled. One of the many advantages of living in a free country is that you do not have to believe everything you read in
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the newspapers, but in these countries the situation is different. What was printed in Buenos Aires was important because the press there was controlled. Air-Commodore Brian Frow, until recently a member of the Joint Intelligence Staff, has said that:—
"it is ridiculous to say that the indicators were not there".
We are now informed that the JIS is to be reorganised, and I am sure that is right and proper, but they should not be made scapegoats for the errors and omissions of senior politicians. Many commentators have tended to blame the inadequancy of the intelligence services. This is grossly unfair. What is Government in this country about? It is about ministerial responsibility. Although one sympathises with hard-worked and hard-pressed Ministers, this principle cannot be evaded. It is also about the "buck-stopping" in the Cabinet Room at No. 10 Downing Street. That is what Government in a parliamentary democracy is about. If, as The Times wrote in its leader on 19th January,
"the nerve centre of British Government has been over-tranquillised by the soft embrace of so long a peace".
who is to blame? The Times then goes on to point out that the Defence Committee did not meet until the day before the invasion and that the question of Argentina and the Falklands was not discussed outside the Foreign Office after January 1981, as if that was the fault of the JIS. As I have said, this was the plain fault of Ministers and of the Prime Minister most of all. The Prime Minister—and I am glad to be able to say this—certainly does not lack courage or resolution, but she lacked the ability and the foresight to orchestrate her team effectively at a time of growing national emergency. Had the Prime Minister shown the same energy and drive during the months up to 2nd April that she demonstrated in the weeks which followed, I doubt very much if there would have been an invasion.
The report is splendidly written and constructed, and there are many points to which I should have liked to refer if time was available. But there are some weak points in it, too. Paragraph 263 says that—and I quote.
"the actual order to invade was probably not given until at least 31 st March and possibly as late as 1st April".
How can they say that and how do they know? You cannot base the certainties of the conclusion on possibilities and probabilities of that kind. But that is not the central point. It is not whether the order to invade was given on either of those dates; it is the fact that an invasion force was ready with men, armaments and all the mateŕiel of war. They had been prepared by the Argentines and they were there to do the job of aggression. This kind of operation is not launched without a long period of planning and preparation; and this kind of preparation is not done during a few days of March. They had planned and prepared for it when the New York talks on the negotiating position were being held. This explains the sharp unilateral response which followed, to which I have referred. Britain was not then dealing with a Government which could be trusted to negotiate in good faith.
Sir Nicholas Henderson, who was our Ambassador in Washington throughout the crisis, had this to say in his important article in the Sunday Times on 23rd January 1983. He said—and I really think it should be quoted—that Mr. Haig said,
"that from the talks he had had with Galtieri, he realised that the junta had been bent for some time on the invasion, confident that

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the British would not react with force—a conviction based on their view as military dictators that, in Haig's words,
'no democracy could or would respond in that way'.
"From the talks he had had with the junta in Buenos Aires during the shuttle, Haig had deduced, so he tells me, that they had decided upon attack some time in advance"—
of course, they had decided some time in advance—
"and that the scrap merchants were disguised service personnel deliberately sent to South Georgia as agents provocateurs."
"This does not tally with the Franks view that the decision to invade was a last-minute one and that the incident of the scrap merchants was seized on to escalate the situation rather than the first stage of a scenario leading to the invasion of the Falklands".
That is the assessment of our ambassador in Washington—an assessment, one has the right to assume, which was conveyed to our Government in this country.
The report also refers to the Foreign Office meeting of 5th March and the official advice against a naval deployment on the lines of the response of the Labour Government in 1977. This was not good advice in the climate that had been built up; the storm warnings were up by then and, as the report itself argues, the dispatch of such a force, at the same time as a warning to Buenos Aires that an attack on the Falklands would be resisted in strength, could have prevented all the subsequent trouble.
Comparisons have been made between the actions of this Government and of previous Governments. That is fair and it should be done. But the incontrovertible evidence of the report is that, under the present Government, Ministers, with their officials, have met less frequently and regularly than under previous Labour or Conservative Administrations. There is no other way to explain the inexcusable gap of 15 months during which the key committee, the Defence Committee, was not convened to discuss the Falklands. It is an omission which must be condemned in the severest terms by this House.
I fear that the report is a sad and sorry narrative, and today we are left with,
"no alternative to the policy of 'Fortress Falklands'",
for the foreseeable future, as the Prime Minister herself has said—the very policy which successive Governments strove to avoid. They wished to avoid it because it is expensive—more than we can afford—and because we all know that the existence of the Falklands community in the longer term as a happy and secure one must depend on a measure of understanding and co-operation with the mainland, and that includes the Argentine.
I am glad that the Argentine Government repeated yesterday that there is no truth in reports that they are taking further military action against the islands. If they were to do so, it would certainly turn the clock back much further again. The hope must be that, when the dust has settled on the recent unhappy events, some new understanding based on mutual trust can enable a permanent solution to be achieved. The sacrifice which was made demands a decent pause and the moment is not now. But the time will come when statesmanship and clear leadership will be essential to resolve this tragic and difficult problem, once and for all.
4.22 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I believe that most of your Lordships will hold that, given its rather narrow premises, or terms of reference, the conclusions of the excellent and, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Young, described it, formidable report of my noble friend, whom we are so glad to have with us today on these Benches, are probably about right.
But what the report clearly also shows—and at this point I may say that I would go along with some of the criticisms, not of the report but of the Government, which were made by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn—is that successive British Governments, and I repeat "successive British Governments", since 1965, at any rate, have been struggling with a situation which, except on one assumption, and I repeat "except on one assumption", to which I shall come in a moment, was bound to get worse and, indeed, to end in confrontation, leaving us with the sole option of suffering national humiliation or of maintaining our position in the South Atlantic by preparing for the possibility of war and, if necessary, of waging it.
In the event, of course, we did not—and I think that the noble Baroness made the reasons pretty clear—so maintain our position; and when I say "we" I mean successive British Governments. Nobody realised this dilemma better than the much abused Foreign Office officials, and the advice which they gave one Government after another was throughout impeccable. But such advice had to conform to general policy directives laid down by the Government and it was these, as I personally see it—and I repeat "as I personally see it"—which have landed us in the present mess.
Let me illustrate this important point as shortly as possible. Whatever the advantages gained as a result of the brilliant Falklands campaign—and among them must certainly be reckoned the defeat of what was clearly an act of aggression, the demonstration of what this country is capable of doing in an emergency and a steep, if possibly temporary, increase in national self-confidence and morale—there is no doubt that, on balance, the whole affair, with the exception, perhaps, of Suez, was the chief misfortune that we have suffered since the last world war.
Some £2 billion, which we could ill afford, already expended; some £500 million to be allocated annually for what seems years ahead to the defence of those islands against the Argentine, rather than to the defence of these islands against Russia; no negotiated settlement in sight or, indeed, so far as we understand at present, ever contemplated; the possibility, therefore, of another war with a re armed Argentine always in the offing; the position of the Falklanders no better, certainly, and possibly worse, than it was before the war—well, my Lords, if anybody thinks that all that represents, on balance, an advantage to this country and to our allies, he is incapable of serious thought. Fortress Falklands, in other words—and here I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn—is a rather crazy conception.
This brings me back to the factor, not reflected in my noble friend's conclusions, which, as I see it, was really responsible for the conception of a Fortress Falklands ever appearing on the map. All through the Franks Report there are references to what—as was

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said by the noble Baroness, Lady Young—was originally an Argentine proposal; namely, that we, for our part should concede Argentine sovereignty in principle and that the islands should be, as it were, leased back to us for a number of years, not usually specified but thought to be somewhere between 15 and 20, during which period economic links with the mainland would be fostered, provision made for some kind of joint exploitation of the surrounding waters and, no doubt, some kind of special régime for the islanders, when eventually the islands were incorporated in the Argentine, worked out.
At the end of this period, any islander who did not wish to remain in the Falklands might be well subsidised and thus enabled, with his family, to migrate to any country that he might desire. At this point, I might draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that, even now, there are about 10 times as many British subjects living quite happily in the Argentine as there are living in the Falkland Islands, there being thus no particular reason to suppose that, after some 15 or 20 years, those who chose to remain would be any less well off than their compatriots on the other side of the sea.
Why, therefore, in spite of the fact that Her Majesty's Government agreed formally in, I think, 1967 and again in 1977 that the negotiations should include the question of sovereignty, was the leaseback scheme never advanced or supported by Her Majesty's Government? We all know the answer. It was because it was flatly rejected by the islanders, strongly supported by their friends in Westminster, more especially in what we in this Chamber call "the other place". If you glance at the record of the debate there on 2nd December 1980, given in Annex F to the report, you will see that no less than 12 speakers denounced the leaseback scheme, mostly in rather violent terms. Only one speaker, apparently, gave it any support, and that only indirectly.
In view of this demonstration of popular feeling—because that is what it was—the Foreign Office, though clearly reluctantly, abandoned its plan to persuade or, as it was then termed, "educate" the islanders that leaseback was nevertheless in their own long-term interests: which, of course, it was. Therefore, the one chance of ever arriving at an agreed, peaceful solution of the dispute unhappily vanished into thin air.
The real, underlying reason for this was the constantly stated resolve of the Government—backed, admittedly, by public opinion in this country—not to put forward or accept any solution which was unacceptable by or, as was usually said, not in accordance with the wishes of, the islanders. The other proviso which was occasionally used—but less frequently, I think—concerned the interests of the islanders, which was clearly capable of a rather different interpretation. But eventually the wishes of the islanders prevailed.
I suggest that when and if negotiations are resumed, presumably with a new and democratic Argentine Government and, as we on these Benches would see it, with a new Government at Westminster, the negotiations should be on the assumption that it is the interests rather than the wishes of the islanders which we must be prepared to defend, and that these interests
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simply must be considered in relation to what are the interests of this country, the European Community, the North Atlantic Alliance, the USA and, indeed, the entire Western world. In other words, we must take the responsibility of being the interpreter of all these interests. True, no British Government, we can be quite sure, would agree to any solution which simply handed over the 1,700 islanders to a rather odious military dictatorship straight away—or, indeed, ever. We have very properly just rescued them from such an unpleasant fate. But a gradual transition to Argentine rule at the end of, say, a 20-year period, when the situation may well be entirely different and when, in any case, any islander who did not want to remain should have every inducement to settle elsewhere, is quite a different matter.
To conclude, I would simply ask your Lordships not to reject such ideas out of hand as an attempt to sell worthy British subjects down the river—as they will, no doubt, be represented in certain organs of the press—or to abandon the fruits of victory over an aggressor which, as such, were rightly popular in this country and indeed with all the friends of democracy all over the world. After all, our main concern, surely, must always be to strengthen, not weaken, the North Atlantic Alliance, upon which our whole future, and therefore the future, presumably, of the Falkland Islanders themselves, depends. To maintain that a Fortress Falklands would do anything to strengthen this alliance is a sad illusion. The passage round the Horn is not the most important of the sea lanes which would have to be safeguarded in the terrible event of World War III, and it is for the Americans rather than for us to safeguard these lanes, other than those across the North Atlantic, where our forces would be at full stretch and quite incapable of additional deployment in the South Atlantic.
My time is now up, but let me say a final word. I hope that the Falklands will not become an issue in the coming electoral campaign, for things could then be said on both sides which may be regretted and may make more difficult a negotiated settlement which, despite the recent utterances of the Foreign Secretary, is both inevitable and essential. The best hope, perhaps, would be to allow the Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials, who have been so unjustly attacked in recent months and who have been so clearly justified in this report, to prepare, behind the scenes, the grounds for action by what even by this autumn may well be new Governments both here and in the Argentine. In foreign affairs one must always work for the best while preparing for the worst, but the Falklands case is one in which reason can and must prevail.
4.36 p.m.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, in common with others of your Lordships who have spoken, I also welcome the Franks Committee report and am grateful for the care, the speed and the thoroughness with which they have tackled a difficult and complicated subject. I am sure that the Prime Minister was right to set up the inquiry, for the invasion of the Falklands Islands came as a great shock to the British people and it is proper that there should have been an investigation into its origins.

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I have been so personally concerned with all this that it is difficult to be objective. But in the remarks that I make—and I fear they may be rather longer than I usually make when I address your Lordships—I shall certainly try to be objective, for surely the object of this inquiry has been not so much to apportion blame but to learn what lessons there may be in the conduct of government over the years so that, in the future, confrontations of this kind can be avoided. Nevertheless, I think I would be less than human if I did not feel it right that the welter of accusation and innuendo, spoken and printed, at the beginning of April last year should be examined and the truth be told.
At the time it was said that the Foreign Office and I had been guilty of culpable negligence: that we had been seeking to dispose of the Falkland Islands, regardless of the wishes of the islanders or Parliament, and that I had deliberately ignored firm evidence of an Argentine invasion. All this, and much more, was reported as fact and not as speculation. These reports make ugly reading and, if not forgotten, they are at least better buried. Annex A to the report disposes of them, and such comments as Lord Franks makes about possible alternative courses which the Government could have pursued are far removed from the tone and content of the accusations of last April.
The conclusions of the Franks Committee are that the Government did not and could not have foreseen the invasion, and that the Government could not be blamed for the unprovoked aggression of the Argentine Government. But the Franks Committee does say that some issues could have been handled differently, though they go on to say very fairly that even if they had been handled differently it is purely hypothetical to suggest that it would have made any difference. In the course of my remarks I wish to suggest that in three of the instances in which the Franks Committee suggests that another course should have been taken it could very well have made matters worse if we had done so, rather than better, and have had the opposite effect to that which was intended. But of course I am in exactly the same position as the Franks Committee, and what I say must necessarily be hypothetical.
I think it right to explain to your Lordships that the decisions which we took were not taken lightly. It was becoming clear in 1979, when the Conservative Government were elected, that the Argentine was going to press strongly for a resumption of negotiations, and I pointed out to my colleagues that there were three possible courses of action. I might, in passing, say that I believe we were the first Government ever to take this matter as seriously as it deserved, and certainly the first Government to have leaseback discussed openly in Parliament.
First of all, there was the Fortress Falklands solution—that is to say, the permanent stationing of a large deterrent force on the islands in perpetuity or, at any rate, until such time as a solution to the problem could be found. Secondly, there was the possibility of negotiation, but negotiation without raising the only matter which was of any interest to the Argentine Government—that is to say, sovereignty. Thirdly,
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there was the option to negotiate on matters of substance, including sovereignty, and the possibility of floating proposals such as leaseback.
The Government discussed these options at considerable length throughout a series of meetings in 1980 and came to the firm conclusion that the first option, that of a Fortress Falklands, was to be avoided if at all possible. The expense, the distortion of our defence effort which would inevitably follow, and the prospect of a confrontation, not just with the Argentines but with the whole of Latin America and most of the rest of the world—because your Lordships must remember that in the United Nations we were in a minority of one on this problem—all this meant that it was against our political and economic interest to accept such a proposal and not something we should accept if it could be avoided.
Of the other two options, we decided that the third was the one most likely to lead to a permanent solution. But we did not feel that we should go ahead on a firm negotiating basis until such time as we had consulted both the islanders and Parliament. So Mr. Ridley consulted the islanders, and, though his reception was nothing like as hostile as that which he got in the House of Commons, it was clear that the proposal did not greatly commend itself to the islanders. As to his reception in another place, it is only necessary to glance at the annex to the Franks Committee Report to appreciate the weight of hostility on all sides of the House.
The Franks Committee says, perfectly accurately, that it was recommended to me that, as a result of that, there should be a national education campaign at home and in the islands to promote the option of leaseback, and that I rejected it. So I did, my Lords, and I would do so again. I took the decision not to promote such a campaign for two reasons. First, if the Franks Committee criticised, as they do, the decision to scrap "Endurance" on the grounds that it sent the wrong signal to the Argentine, how much more powerfully wrong a signal would have been sent if this Government had been seen to be trying to promote the transfer of sovereignty and a negotiation of leaseback in the teeth of opposition from the islanders and from Parliament. How much weaker surely would have been the position of our negotiators at the next round of talks.
Secondly, I believe that such a campaign would have had precisely the opposite effect to that intended. It was clear from the exchanges in the House of Commons that on right and left there was a suspicion of the Government's intentions. Such a campaign would only have served to reinforce those suspicions and would be seen to put pressure upon the islanders to coerce them into a course to which they were not prepared to agree, something which all Governments had resolutely refused to do. If leaseback were ever to be a solution, a Government campaign to promote it would probably have been the worst way of achieving it.
If I may be allowed to say so, it does not lie in the mouth of anybody in the Labour Party, not even the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, or the Liberal Party, or the Social Democratic Party, or the Back Bench of the Conservative Party in another place, to criticise me for

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that decision, for at that time no voice was raised on any side of the House in support of Mr. Ridley. He was left isolated and alone as the opponents made abundantly clear their profound objection to the proposal. Nor, if I may say so, was there a breath of support among political commentators and leader writers for the idea of leaseback—not that you would have thought so reading the press in the last three or four days. The sort of articles that we have seen in the Observer, the Sunday Times and the Guardian would, in my judgment, have been a good deal more useful and more percipient if they had been written at that time rather than with the hindsight of the Franks Committee Report.
We were thus faced with the prospect of seeking to continue negotiations but with no constructive suggestions to put forward, and I have heard no one make a constructive proposal then or since about what we should have done. Leaseback was unacceptable to domestic and island opinion. The Argentine had rejected a freeze. The Franks Committee go on to say that the Government was in a position of weakness, and that to ask Dr. Camilion, who was then the Foreign Minister of the Argentine, to make proposals passed the initiative to the Argentine Government. Here again, I would suggest that not to have done so, not to have asked Dr. Camilion for his proposals, might very well have meant that negotiations would have foundered straight away and we should have been faced with confrontation. It is important to note, my Lords, that the negotiations did not founder.
To negotiate with no proposals of any kind is extremely difficult. And there had been, too, some signs, as a result of a visit by Mr. Ure to the Argentine, that their Government were thinking of that time on the lines of a much wider agreement which would include economic co-operation over a wide field. It seemed to me, therefore, sensible to ask the Argentines, within, of course, the constraints which they knew the British Government have and which I repeated to them—that is to say, the essential need for parliamentary and island approval—to make some proposals.
I do not believe that that gave the initiative to the Argentines in any sense which added to our difficulties, for the initiative always was with the Argentine Government. It is they who wished to change the status quo, not us. It is they who live 400 miles away and who had the capacity at any time militarily to intervene. It is they who had the power and they who had the capacity to make or break any policy which we pursued, save that of Fortress Falklands. To have sought to negotiate on the basis of no concessions of any kind would surely have risked moving to confrontation immediately. In the event we did go on negotiating, and Mr. Luce, to whose skill the Franks Committee paid tribute, negotiated a set of proposals on which it would have been possible for us to continue talking.
That brings me to the events of the beginning of March. It is felt by some, including, I think, some members of the Franks Committee, and certainly by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, that at the beginning of March there was, so to speak, a sea change in the attitude of the Argentine Government. I really do not believe that that was so. It is perfectly true that, when
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Mr. Ros returned from New York to Buenos Aires, a communiqué was issued which was in effect sharply critical of what he had done, but this, in my judgment, was more because of domestic opinion in the Argentine and the need to demonstrate a sense of urgency over the negotiations than for any other reason. For, when we remonstrated with Mr. Costa Mendez, I received an assurance from him that he wished negotiations to continue and that the communiqué from Buenos Aires was not designed to put an end to them. At that time there were no intelligence reports of any kind of Argentine preparations or indications that negotiations had been abandoned. It was explained to the embassy on a number of occasions that the press campaign was for the purpose of creating in the British Government a sense of urgency.
Here, perhaps I might just comment on one thing that the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, said. I think that the noble Lord, in quoting Sir Nicholas Henderson, was in fact quoting Mr. Haig, and not Sir Nicholas Henderson. If he looks again very carefully at what he said, he will see that it is what Mr. Nicholas Henderson said Mr. Haig believed. All I can say is that, having talked to Mr. Haig at that time, and subsequently, he was even more surprised than I was at what the Argentines were doing.
I believe that the Franks Committee itself addresses attention to the differences between the situation in 1977 and early March 1982. In 1977 ambassadors had been withdrawn, Southern Thule had been occupied and shots had been fired at foreign warships. The situation was quite different in 1982. Indeed, the Franks Report also says that not to send warships at that time was a reasonable decision to take. If, of course, we had known what was going to happen in April, that is precisely what we would have done. But the conduct of foreign policy or, at any rate, the criticism of the conduct of foreign policy is always easier with hindsight. I believe that if on 5th March we had sent ships or even submarines to the Falkland Islands it would rapidly have become known, as indeed it did later on when we did send submarines, and the result would have been an end to any possibility of negotiation, and very likely the effect would have been to precipitate the situation which we wished to avoid.
There has been a great deal of talk about the lack of Overseas and Defence Committee meetings. I should like to say this. During the course of 1980 we had, as my noble friend the Leader of the House said, a very large number of meetings about the future of the Falkland Islands. We then made our decision, and that decision was to negotiate, if possible, with leaseback in mind. In the course of 1981 nothing whatever occurred to change that decision about negotiation. When leaseback seemed to be a dead letter, all my colleagues on the Defence Committee were informed, and informed of the proposal to seek to prolong negotiations by the means which I have described earlier in my speech.
During the course of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 I sent a number of minutes to my colleagues on the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee, keeping them abreast of what was happening. If any of them felt more discussion was necessary a telephone call to

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the Cabinet Office could have arranged a Defence Committee meeting. But my colleagues shared my view that nothing had happened during those months to alter our original decisions.
At the beginning of March, when things were beginning to be different, it seemed to be necessary to get the views of the islanders, and the response to the message I intended to send Mr Costa Mendes, before a meeting, otherwise my colleagues would not readily have been able to discuss and assess the Argentine position. Then, of course, the South Georgia incident intervened and we were obviously in a different situation. I believe that Overseas and Defence Policy Committee meetings are essential on occasions, but I think it is a mistake to assume that Government is best carried on in a perpetual committee meeting.
The rest of the story is well known and very fairly dealt with by the Franks Committee. Over a long period of years there are always things that might have been done better or differently. I dare say, for example, that noble Lords opposite, as they reflect upon their handling of the occupation of Southern Thule, might feel that they should have done things differently. If a committee of six distinguished Privy Councillors inquire minutely into the conduct of a Government department on a particular issue over a period of years, it would be very strange if they did not think that some things could be done differently. Indeed, I can think of no problems with which, in Government, I have been connected, whether in Africa, the European Community, the Budget or the Middle East, on which this committee, if it reported, would not have found some ways in which there might have been improvement. But I do not think that the Government or the Foreign Office came out of this with discredit.
I have only three other very short things to say. One or two noble Lords have queried my resignation. Those of your Lordships who have longish memories may perhaps recollect an interview which I gave on the night I resigned. In the course of that interview I said that, given the information that we had at that time, I did not believe that the Government or I had mishandled the sitution, or that we should have done differently. Nine months later, and with the benefit of the Franks Committee, I do not really honestly think that I can say that I would have done anything of substance differently. But there was an indeniable feeling in this country that Britain's honour and dignity had been affronted. The governor of a British territory had been forcibly removed. An alien flag had been raised over an occupied population. The wide sense of outrage and impotence was understandable, and I was at the head of the Foreign Office. It did not seem to me a time for self-justification and certainly not to cling to office. I think that the country is more important than oneself.
The second reason is linked to the first. Argentine actions had made war a strong possibility. One does not enter a war amid a welter of recrimination about who was responsible. As I said at the time, I did not accept the criticism levelled at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and myself, but I did accept the responsibility of my position at the centre of a controversy which could have been damaging to this country at a time of national emergency.
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There had been a highly charged debate in the House of Commons. The press was all but unanimous in calling for my resignation. Perhaps it would not be putting it too strongly to say that it was baying for blood. I make no complaint about that. When something of this nature happens it is human nature to turn round and blame the man in charge, although perhaps I might be allowed to say that the reputations of some of those instant critics would not have been significantly damaged if they had suspended sentence until they had learned the facts.
I believed then, as I believe now, that my resignation would put an end to those recriminations and that we could go forward united in our task. That was not a particularly easy decision for Mr. Atkins, Mr. Luce or myself, but I believe that our resignations did precisely have the effect we hoped for. Unfortunately, it did not stem the tidal wave of unjustified criticism directed at the Foreign Office. My Lords, if you were to ask me what I found most unpleasant about the whole of this affair, I would say it has been the way in which some Members of Parliament and some journalists have never ceased to vilify the Foreign Office. One allegation is that the Foreign Office is always seeking to act contrary to the wishes of the people of this country and to promote some sinister policy of its own. The Franks Committee disposes of that with regard to the Falkland Islands. I should like to put on record that in all the dealings I have had with officials on the two occasions that I have been in the Foreign Office, the issues, the alternatives and the options have always been presented to me with scrupulous fairness and objectivity. When decisions are taken they are the responsibility of Ministers, and it is Ministers who should be blamed, not those who are carrying out their decisions.
If I may say so, it seems to me that there are some in Parliament and in the press who actually seem to believe that there is something disreputable or even treacherous in trying to seek agreement with foreign Governments. It is their view that to negotiate is a sign of weakness—even when the settlement of a problem is in the interests of both sides and designed to prevent a situation arising which is detrimental to the political and economic interests of this country. They carry chauvinism and insularity to such a degree that one almost feels they disapprove of anyone in the Foreign Office talking to a foreigner. Negotiation, it seems, is feebleness and unpatriotic. But the alternative to negotiation is confrontation. In general, confrontation is not in the interests of this country, is extremely expensive and very often in the long run leads to war.
I must say, frankly, that I believe those who have spent the last nine months abusing the Foreign Office do little credit to themselves and much damage to the national interest. For those who travel abroad know that foreign Governments are envious of the professionalism, skill and expertise of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Those of us politicians who have worked with them know that there is no more dedicated or patriotic or skilful body of men in England; and I am overwhelmingly resentful of these unjustified criticisms, which are more revealing about the critic than they are about the criticised.
Lastly, I would like to say just one word about where all this leads us. The Falklands crisis has been both

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good and bad. It is bad because we have got ourselves—through no fault of our own—into the position which successive Governments have sought to avoid. We are committed, and unavoidably and rightly committed, to spending large sums of money and to accepting a distortion of our defence policy. It is inevitable, and we have to accept that for the foreseeable future. Numbers of our fellow countrymen have been killed or severely wounded—and that is a sadness which even victory cannot eliminate.
But, my Lords, there has been good. I wonder whether a year ago our fellow countrymen knew to what standard of excellence the defence services of this country had been trained and had reached. Surely no praise can be too high for the skill and bravery and efficiency of our armed forces. And let it not be forgotten that, without the formidable administrative capacity of the services, no task force would have put to sea at such short notice, and the incredible difficulties of the logistics of fighting a war 8,000 miles away might well have caused disaster. I believe that their success has been because they are professionals and volunteers, and not conscripts.
With the success of the British forces has come a national pride and a belief that, when called upon to do so in what we believe to be not only our interest, but in the interests of the defence of civilised conduct, we can react with courage and resolution and efficiency. There has been a resurgence of belief in ourselves and a respect abroad, even from those who find our conduct puzzling or are opposed to our way of life. There is a lesson to be learned from that. We should not retreat into our island home believing that we can, as a result of the Falklands, ignore the rest of the world. We should not be tempted into believing that we in this country are not part of Europe and the Western world with an obligation and a duty to play our part in settling the many problems on the international scene; of trying to impose rationality on chaos and discord. There is much to do, and our aim should be to continue to resolve differences by genuine negotiation.
My Lords, if all of this has given us confidence in ourselves and our traditions, then let us use it to promote sanity and good sense, and a sense of proportion abroad. If we can do that, then lasting good will have come out of these sad events.
Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
5.5 p.m.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, it is a very great privilege indeed to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in this debate, and I think that most of your Lordships will agree that his speech today has been yet another example of the dignity and the integrity which have characterised his behaviour throughout the whole of this momentous episode.
As the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal has said, I was the first British Minister to visit the Falkland Islands in the 1960s and to see the beginning of the chain of events which led eventually to this tragic war. I am bound to say that I intervene in this debate today, having read the report of the Franks Committee, with a profound sense of sadness, because it seems to me that since the 1960s successive Governments have, for
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one reason or another, failed to implement policies which they clearly perceived to be both wise and desirable. I wonder why it is that they failed to implement those policies? It is true that sometimes they were faced, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has said, with a small but vociferous lobby, but this cannot have been the only reason.
The report of the Franks Committee is, as one would have expected given the committee's composition, an honest, perceptive and valuable report. I find myself at odds with those who say that the analysis of the Franks Report does not lead to its conclusions, or is at variance with its conclusions. It seems to me that there is nothing inconsistent in the analysis of the Franks Report with the main conclusions which it reaches.
However, I want today, for the brief time that I shall address your Lordships' House, to spend as little time as possible in the past. There are others here with a legitimate political interest in examining the events which led up to the war in the Falkland Islands and in learning the lessons which come from that analysis.
The committee of Lord Franks was not required to look into the future: we are required to look into the future. There is an important starting point, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has just underlined. We have had a war. I believe, as he does, that the Government were right to take the action that they took once the Argentine Government had taken the step of invading the Falkland Islands. Indeed, I do not believe that any Government interested in preserving the credibility of this nation could have done other than they did.
But in that war, as the noble Lord has just mentioned, over 250 of our men gave their lives, and they cannot speak today. If they could speak to us I think that perhaps the message that they would send across the world to your Lordships' House might be in the terms of that famous poem of Housman which many of your Lordships, I am sure, know by heart. It appears in Lord Wavell's anthology, Other Men's Flowers. It says:
"Here dead we lie, because we did not choose
To live and shame the land from which we sprung.
Life, to be sure, is nothing much to lose
But young men think it is, and we were young".
That is the message of young people through the ages who have given their lives in great causes. It is a message that was put another way on the memorial for the Battle of Kohima in North Burmah where many people in your Lordships' House today left, as I did, comrades behind. The inscription carved on that monument simply says:
"When you go back, tell them of us and say
'For your tomorrow, we gave our today' ".
It is tomorrow that I believe is the direction in which we should now be looking, not yesterday. So far as possible let us have no sterile apportionment of blame for this or that mistake, for this or that alleged failure of perception. Above all, let us ensure that the men who did not come back from the Falkland Islands did not die for nothing.
But how are we to do that? It is easy to say that their memory must be honoured, but we now have to face the realities of a foreign policy which, in its problems, is very much the same as the dilemma that faced us

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before the war. To that extent nothing much has changed. We have heard again today much about the policy of Fortress Falklands, a policy which successive Governments rightly rejected as the preferred solution to the problem, and yet it is the policy which we are now obliged to pursue. I think it right that we should understand what that policy means.
It means spending hundreds of millions of pounds a year on extra defence commitments. Whether you calculate the cost in its total terms or in its incremental terms, we shall have to spend hundreds of millions of pounds more a year out of our gross domestic product than we have spent before. We must add to that the fact that if the islands are to be defended, they must presumably be economically developed as well. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in his excellent report has told us that in order to do that we shall need to spend something of the order of £35 million to £40 million extra over a period of five years. But over and above all that, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has mentioned—and he mentioned it in the context of rejecting the Fortress Falklands policy—it means a fundamental distortion of our defence effort. It means that forces and equipment and resources that should be deployed elsewhere in order to meet the main threat to our freedom will now have to be devoted almost entirely to the defence of the Falkland Islands. This is what is involved in keeping those islands economically viable and militarily safe.
Now we can do that; we have demonstrated already that we are a nation that can make sacrifices when we are called upon to do so. Indeed, some might think that the Fortress Falklands policy is a small price to pay to repay the sacrifices of those who went to the war. But does it really make sense in the long term? Can we really sustain this policy? The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in his report said—and I paraphrase it—that it is inconceivable that we should contemplate a long term policy in which 3,000 soldiers continuously defended 1,800 islanders. Of course, we then have to ask ourselves—if we believe, as I do, that Fortress Falklands is not an intelligent policy for the long-term—what are the alternatives? As many noble Lords have said in your Lordships' House before and as I am sure many others will say again today, there can, of course, be no question of immediate negotiations on this issue with Argentine. The bitterness of the war is still too vivid in people's minds; the loss and the bereavement of the families of the men who died there is too much alive to allow any Government of any complexion at this stage to revert to the negotiating table with Argentina.
But, again, I refer to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, whose experience of these matters was so valuably represented in both the reports which he made. One of his conclusions was—and it is a thread that runs through both his reports—that in the long-term there can be no successful, prosperous and viable future for the Falklands Islands except in the context of understanding and good relations with Argentina. There must, of course, be preconditions to any further talks with anyone about the future of the Falkland Islands. First, there must be the acceptance of a formal end to hostilities, which the present Government of Argentina seem reluctant to concede.
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It would be a help if in that country there could emerge or re-emerge, as there has been in the past, a democratic Government to replace the somewhat oppressive military régime which exists there at the moment.
However, having said all that, it is essential now, immediately, for the Government to begin to clear their mind and once again to set their long-term aims in the context of this dispute. There are many reasons why we must do this. The first concerns our own foreign policy and the need that we have to maintain good, friendly relations with the countries of Latin America. There is the foreign policy of our allies, not least the foreign policy of the United States of America, which gave us such much-needed and valuable assistance during the war in the South Atlantic. It may not seem easy to us to understand, but to many people in the United States of America, South America is a matter of much greater strategic and political importance than what goes on many thousands of miles away in Western Europe. Nevertheless, there are Americans who are now beginning to believe that, and if we continue to refuse indefinitely—as apparently some people would like to do—to re-enter the field of international diplomacy on this issue, we shall create frictions with our friends in Western Europe and with our allies in North America, which will militate against the one thing of which we must never lose sight, which is the maintenance of our defences against the real threat to our security and our survival.
The threat does not come from Latin America; it does not come from the South Atlantic. It comes from where it has always come: from an expansionist and aggressive Soviet Union. If we allow ourselves to take our eyes off that ball in the interests of maintaining some kind of—and perhaps I may borrow the word from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington— chauvinistic view of the future of this problem, then I think we shall be treading a very dangerous path indeed.
It is not for me here to attempt to specify how the solution will eventually be found. Whether transfer of sovereignty and leaseback is any longer a feasible solution, I do not know. It may be that the events of last year have placed that out of court. It may be that we shall have to look to some form of international solution to this problem. I speak not of a solution under the auspices of the United Nations, but rather of a solution in which those countries most involved in the future of the Falkland Islands should take a part—those who are involved and interested, not only in their economic prosperity and their survivability, but in their strategic importance as well: the United States of America as well as ourselves and Argentina, and perhaps other countries of Latin America also. It may be in that direction that we shall have to look for a solution—for a solution must be found. Those who know Argentina know perfectly well that their defeat in this recent war will not change one whit their belief in the rightness of their claim to the Falkland Islands. We may contest that; we do rightly contest it; but that does not alter the fact that they will continue to press it.
Therefore, whatever solution the Government eventually decide upon I hope, echoing the words of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that in arriving at

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that decision they will place great value indeed upon the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I believe, like the noble Lord who preceded me, that the officials of that organisation have been dealt with in a thoroughly unpleasant and disreputable way when they have, in my own personal experience, never in my view ever had anything in their minds but the good and the future interests of this country. They are, as the noble Lord has said, among the most dedicated, loyal and patriotic people in this country.
Whatever solution the Government decide upon I hope that they will now pursue it openly and courageously. I hope that they will not be forced off course by vociferous minorities either at home or abroad, or on any side of the political spectrum. It was an Israeli Minister who once said, "Politicians may be relied upon to make wise, intelligent and statesmanlike decisions—having first exhausted all other alternatives". All the other alternatives in this case have now been exhausted, including the alternative forced upon us, let us remember, of a wasteful and bitter war.
Therefore, it is for us not to apportion blame. But I should like to say one thing in conclusion and it is this: when I came back from the Falkland Islands and from Buenos Aires in 1968 I reported to my colleagues that in the absence of a negotiated settlement there would, sooner or later, be a war with Argentina. I say that again in your Lordships' House today. That is something else that has not changed.
In conclusion, those who fought in this war—and they, after all, are the most important actors in this drama—and especially those who did not return, will have been cruelly betrayed if any Government of this country of any political complexion in the future, either through lack of resolution, lack of courage, or lack of foresight, allow anythig like this to happen again.
5.23 p.m.
Lord Home of the Hirsel: My Lords, I must ask the forgiveness of the Leader of the House and, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham. Months ago I made an arrangement to be outside this House this evening, and I am afraid I cannot break it, and I must ask for their understanding. I do not think I have ever been guilty before in this connection; I hope I shall not be guilty again.
I think the truest words in the report of Lord Franks were that there is nothing simple about the Falkland Islands affair. Those words would be fervently echoed by any Foreign Secretary, or any Foreign Office official, who carried any responsibility for the matter over all these years. No one—and this has been plain from what every speaker has said—can feel any satisfaction about the whole business as it has run its course, for the reason of course that we were dealing with an apparently irreconcilable difference: the Argentines' determination to acquire sovereignty of the islands, and the islanders' refusal to concede it. In the circumstances of a clash of opposites what should the Foreign Office, the department of state most concerned, be expected to do? To accept the deadlock and, by implication, the inevitability of confrontation—a word which my noble friend Lord
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Carrington has properly used—or to use all the arts of diplomacy and honourable conciliation to prevent a dispute degenerating into war?
I recall a memorandum written for the Cabinet in 1937 by Sir Orms Sergent, a highly placed official of the Foreign Office, when the officials in the Foreign Office were supposed to be hostile to the Government of the day's attempts to conciliate so far as Germany was concerned. He wrote:
"The fundamental idea is that the ex-Allied powers should come to terms with Germany in order to remove grievances by friendly arrangement and the process of give and take, before Germany takes the law into her own hands".
In those few lines is expressed the essence of diplomacy. In any dispute it is obligatory, and particularly in a democracy, to explore every means to find a modus vivendi, steering a course between precipitate action which will prematurely and unreasonably rupture conciliation, and appeasement which could be interpreted by a potential enemy as weakness amounting to an invitation to aggression. When dealing with dictators that is not an easy equation to strike.
What were the interests of the islanders for whom Britain was, and is, a trustee? Quite clearly we had to try to secure for them a relationship with Argentina which respected their freedoms. When I held some responsibility in this matter now 10 years ago it looked as though the Argentine Government might be willing to act within the rules of international behaviour and woo the islanders to their point of view. There were distinct advantages for the islanders to be gained, and the programme began. Investment in better communications; increased trade; the children of the islanders were given facilities for education on the mainland; travel documents were simplified and reduced to a minimum.
I do not believe that the Foreign Office can be blamed for seeking to extend those contacts when the alternative was hostility and boycott which could have made life for those on the islands intolerable, if not untenable. That was the basic dilemma which was faced by Governments of which I was a member, and inherited by one Government after another. The question which every Government had to ask was, where did the real interests of the islanders lie?
Placing the interests of the islanders first, the answer, on balance, always was in a negotiated settlement with the Argentine, provided the islanders' wishes on sovereignty were respected. When the options narrowed for the Government of which the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, was a member, and others on that side of the House, and for the Conservative Government which followed, were the Secretary of State of the day and the Foreign Office justified in continuing negotiation and discussion despite the narrowing of the options? I think so, my Lords. Condominium was a possibility. Leaseback was certainly a possibility. It may be a handicap but in a democracy if a people are to be asked to go to war all the cards of conciliation and compromise must be seen to have been played, and one of these was leaseback. My noble friend explained the reason why he could not pursue that issue. In the circumstances, I think he was right. But for better or for worse, it was Parliament who took the decision in effect that leaseback should be dropped out of the programme of negotiation.

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It is useless now—the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, said this and it has been endorsed by everybody—to try to pursue any specific proposals for settlement and agreement. My noble friend Lord Chalfont said the climate had to change, but he also said there would be a tomorrow. That is true, and in that tomorrow, at some time—although I do not agree that the Government should define the policy now; it is too early for that—a political solution to this problem will have to be found. If it is not, there will, as he said, be another war.
There are, no doubt, some things that could have been done differently. If mistakes were made, I think they were concentrated in the final months in the rather twilight area between the Department of Defence, the Foreign Office and Intelligence, about which I shall say a brief word in a moment. But I cannot share the view of some of the critics that the Franks Committee were mealy-mouthed or weasel-worded about the Government's action and the conduct of diplomacy. I found the report fair and well-balanced.
I echo what my noble friend Lord Carrington said about the Foreign Office and the service it has given to the nation. The diplomatic performances of Sir Nicholas Henderson and Sir Anthony Parsons were beyond praise, and it is perhaps worth noting that those two gentlemen came from the same stable as Mr. Ure and the others who were handling the negotiations before the crisis broke. There has been some criticism, too, of a lack of contingency plans. I should be very surprised if contingency plans were not there, considering the miracle of what was achieved by the Quarter-master's Department of the services when they sent, in 21 days, a force of that magnitude out that distance and were completely successful in that.
Before I resume my seat perhaps the House will allow me one reflection about the security service. When I went to No. 10 Downing Street in 1937 with Mr. Neville Chamberlain, I noticed that there was virtually no coherence in the form in which intelligence was brought to the notice of the Prime Minister. It came in fits and starts and it was almost impossible to construct from the pieces a convincing picture of the relevant scene. Changes were made, and of course by the end of the war the service was a highly efficient machine; anyone who has read Sir John Masterson's book The Double Cross will remember how at the end of the war the German secret service was mostly working for us.
When, therefore, I went to the Foreign Office later on I took a particularly close look at how the organisation of intelligence had developed. I watched the operations of intelligence through a series of crises—Berlin, Suez, Cuba, Rhodesia, Belize and so on—and I concluded that the Government of the day were well served by the Joint Intelligence Committee, though I had one doubt. That was whether intelligence arriving at the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence was sufficiently interpreted and co-ordinated on its way to the Prime Minister. Obviously the Franks Committee share that doubt.
However, I am glad to see—and I think that, on the whole, there will be an improvement—it says it is
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necessary to be cautious in reforms of so sensitive a service. The Americans inflicted a near mortal blow to their Central Intelligence Agency in the name of open government and we do not want to fall into that kind of error. I think that, on the whole, the case is proved for the chairman of the JIC not to be distracted by the business of a large department but to devote his mind entirely to acquainting Ministers, and the Prime Minister in particular, with the particular situation that he has found to exist at a particular time.
We have not reached the end of the Falkland Islands saga and we shall not do so until some sort of democracy returns to the Argentine. However, at this time I join with those who have welcomed the care with which Lord Franks has dealt with the main issues of Government responsibility in relation to the war and the sensitivity with which he and his colleagues have approached the role of departments of state which, make no mistake, are very valuable to the efficient and proper conduct of the affairs of our country.
5.36 p.m.
Lord Shinwell: My Lords, we have enjoyed, if that is the appropriate word, a wonderful spate of oratory, with contributions from some of our most distinguished parliamentarians. The question that occurs to us would seem to be: what is the purpose of this debate? I suppose it is to consider the Franks Report. Inevitably, we expected the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to return to the House. I hope it does not cause him any embarrassment, coming from me, when I say that he is the one person who comes with complete and 100 per cent, credit out of this affair. There were some reservations in regard to his speech; for example, his praise of the Foreign Office. My experience of the Foreign Office, when certain Foreign Secretaries were in charge, was that they were inclined to be dictatorial and argumentative—extremely so—and (to use a term that seems appropriate) excellent goal-keepers; one could never get the ball past them. Although Lord Carrington was not on trial—let that be clearly understood—he leaves the court without a stain on his character. So having asked the question as to the purpose of the debate, clearly it is to inquire into the Franks Report, with all its details.
The noble Baroness the Leader of the House tried to conceal the obvious paradox, and it is one which often occurs. She tried to convey to noble Lords that the Government were in no way to blame for the Argentine invasion and that they never anticipated the affair occurring. In that case, the realistic question which must be asked is this: why come to the House and ask us to note the Franks Report? If the Government really believe that the report is frank and realistic—with some reservations that are obvious in almost every report that is submitted to both Houses of Parliament—they should have asked us to approve it, 100 per cent. of it; but they have failed to do so, and that is the paradox. They want to defend the Government and at the same time are afraid to put the question to the House and to the country, probably because they were aware that had the country asked the question—had we asked the question and expected an answer and the Government expected an answer—we would refer to all the reservations that are

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included in the small print—I repeat, the small print—in the Franks Report.
I do not want to criticise the Franks Report, beyond what I have said about reservations in the small print, because it was impossible for the Franks Committee to do anything other than they did. But that is not the question that we should be considering, which is: did nobody in the Government know anything about the intentions of the Argentine junta? We had an ambassador in Buenos Aires, a military attaché and we had the intelligence staff available, We could have had spies—I suppose there were some in the South Atlantic, as there are in Russia. With all the intelligence at our disposal, all the staffs available, the Foreign Office included, and members of the Government also, we were unable to anticipate the intentions of the Argentine junta. It just happened. I do not accept it at all. I am certain that they were aware that something of the kind was going to happen. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, referred in the course of his activities—not here this afternoon —to when he was Foreign Secretary and referred to HMS "Endurance" and his intentions in that regard and what was likely to happen; that obviously indicated that there was some awareness, some suspicion, that something of the sort would happen.
I repeat: What did the ambassador do? What do we expect from our ambassadors? We pay them well, they are well looked after. I have attended some of their functions in other countries. We have those military attachés. What are they expected to do? Are they not expected to find out what is happening, what is going on? But they did nothing, nothing at all. I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, did not attempt to defend them, just saying that the Foreign Office was 100 per cent, perfect. That I do not accept.
The question is: What are we going to do? Let us forget about the past. So far as our military achievement was concerned it was a wonderful affair. There were bravery, fortitude, courage, heroism, all the qualities we expect from our forces. That can be repeated over and over again. The Labour Party, with few exceptions, praises what our forces have accomplished. So much for that.
What about the future? That is the question. In the debate we had last week on this subject I ventured to suggest that we have come to no conclusion, just a temporary conclusion; in other words, we have a long way to go before we come to the end of the story. We have not reached the end of the story today in discussing the Franks Report. Far from it. It would be for the Government to act, but not to act in the way the Prime Minister has acted by going to kiss the babies in the Falkland Islands. It is all very fine and large but it does not take us very far when it comes to achieving some conclusions. If there is a conclusion in the mind of the Government, what do they intend? Do they intend to spend millions, even billions, in building up a garrison 8,000 miles away? In my opinion that is complete nonsense.
I say that with great regard and respect for the Falkland islanders. We do our best for them. I invite them to come to the Highlands of Scotland. They will get a better living there and be of more value to us and cost us less than it will cost if we try to promote a
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garrison with all the military strength that might be available at a huge cost that we cannot afford. This must be reckoned with. It is not altogether a matter of cost. I have said many times in your Lordships' House: never mind about the expense; if we have to fight we have to fight, but we will have the people to fight for us.
That is the situation. What is to be done about it? I do not trust the United Nations to solve the problem. Not at all. I do not trust the United States of America to solve the problem. They have plenty of problems of their own to solve, but I am quite satisfied that they were ambiguous about their intentions as regards the United Kingdom's attentions to the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands. I would not trust them very far, either.
What are we going to do about it? I would suggest caution, prudence, hesitation. Do not let us rush our fences. Do not let us come to a conclusion too readily, too hastily, about what should happen in the Falkland Islands. We should spend a little money to make it more comfortable for those who are there. Many members of our forces are far from comfortable, and I know that the men of the Merchant Navy who have been assisting them, either on Ascension or the islands themselves, are far from adequately accommodated and looked after. There have been complaints about their situation, but these are the incidental matters. The question before us is, what are we going to do about the situation there?
We have been discussing this problem for a long time, 150 years or more. I have been asked the question recently, outside your Lordships' House, what did the Attlee Labour Government do about the Falkland Islands? The answer is, practically nothing, but for a very good reason —because we had other fish to fry. We had just emerged from a great war fought at great cost and we were bankrupt. We were not bothered very much about the Falkland Islands. We had South Korea to deal with. Incidentally, the situation in Korea is comparable to what is happening about the Falklands. Let me explain in a few words. I will not be long. When the United States was involved in North Korea and the United Nations was hesitant in coming to a decision about whether they would endorse the United States decision to fight—General MacArthur was involved up to the point where President Truman dismissed him—the Attlee Government did not consider them. But we at the Ministry of Defence were forced to do so. What was done? We could not alert the forces, either naval or military, without a decision and endorsement of the United Nations. But what we did—I remember it quite well—was to have a meeting of the chiefs of staff. I met with them and we considered the situation and anticipated that the United Nations would eventually endorse the decision of the United States of America. And so we alerted, with even the consent of the Cabinet, a brigade in the department itself. We did more than that. We decided to send the cruiser "Theseus" offshore the island in order to assist our forces. That was done.
Eventually the United Nations endorsed the United States decision to involve itself in military activities. That is what happened. It is comparable with what has happened recently. We suspected something would happen. So we acted, perhaps prematurely.

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Sometimes one has to act following one's suspicions and not because all the facts are available. That is all I think I need say because we have had a spate of oratory. Whether we shall come to any conclusion at the end of the debate, I do not know. Indeed, we cannot formally reach any conclusion, because we are only "noting" the Franks Report. And after we have noted it, what is going to happen? Is it going to be put into the wastepaper basket? What is going to happen to it? Is there going to be anything further done about the Foreign Office, about the intelligence staff, about espionage? Are all those matters going to be considered in order to secure us against a similar affair occurring in the future? I think that we are entitled to ask that question.
I should like to end on the following note. I have spoken very realistically, and perhaps almost offensively, to some Members of your Lordships' House on this matter. But I think that the time has come when we have to speak out, to say what we think about these matters. If it is to the Foreign Office, if it is to a member of the Government, if it is to Mrs. Thatcher, if it is to members of the Labour Party—whoever it is, it is about time that politicians on both sides of the House were a little realistic and were not afraid to talk. The time has come. Incidentally, if we want to make the House of Lords more popular than it is, it is desirable that we should talk in that strain. Having said that, I leave it to the rest of the orators to try to come to some conclusion about this matter, and if they do, I shall be very glad to hear it.
5.51 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, first, I wish to join with those noble Lords who have already congratulated the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his colleagues on an extremely clear and well-organised report, and to say that I, too, am delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, back among us—at least I was until he started to leave the Chamber—and to say how much I share his pleasure in the fact that the Franks Report has, in its appendix, conclusively nailed some of the more unpleasant rumours that were going around. I am sorry to have to tell the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that I shall have more to say about his speech in a minute—but it will be in Hansard. Ah, I see he is returning.
Now that the initial surprise and euphoria have passed, everybody, and I suppose the Government, too, recognise that the Franks Report conclusions do not exonerate the Government. It concludes that the Government had no reason to believe that the invasion would
"take place at the beginning of April".
Very well; but the Government had plenty of reason to suppose that it would take place some time soon. The air was thick with warnings that we could not go on negotiating about nothing much longer before there was an aggression. But nothing was done, and "Endurance" was ordered to be recalled.
The report asks, how did the situation become critical? That is its question—not in its terms of reference. Then it runs through how it became critical,
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and in that run-through there is much blame. Then it asks—once again its own formulation—how did the Government handle the dispute? Once again it runs through the history that it has already told, and in that run-through, too, there is a good deal of blame. Lastly it asks,
"Could the Government have prevented the invasion?"
It answers that with two striking formulations: first, that in effect there is no reason to think that if the Government had acted as the Franks Committee thinks they ought to have acted, the invasion would have been prevented; and, secondly, that no blame attaches to the Government for
"the Argentine junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands".
Well, I do not think that we need a distinguished committee to tell us that. And as to not knowing whether wiser action would have prevented the aggression, of course not—one never can tell. But we should still have liked the wiser action.
The report gives a full account of the unwise actions. It blames the "Endurance" decision. It blames the way that the Government allowed the initiative in the negotiations to pass to Argentina, the way that the Defence Committee of the Cabinet did not discuss the Falkland Islands for 15 months, the way that the Foreign Office misjudged, and did not effectively brief Ministers—I am wherever possible quoting the words of the report—and the way that both the Foreign Office and the Defence Department did not respond promptly to the Prime Minister's inquiry. It blames the way that the Latin American Current Intelligence Group of officials met 18 times in eight months and never once discussed the Falklands. There is also some blame attached to the way in which during all that time the intelligence assessment itself was not updated. We are also told how military action should have been taken a week earlier; and so on.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, has based a characteristically brilliant and thorough speech on those criticisms, and others like them, though in the end it was perhaps not very constructive. Nobody could call the Franks Report a whitewash, and behind all that the committee itself seems to have harboured some questionable values of its own. In one place it speaks, on the same page, of the
"deep roots to Argentina's attitude towards the Malvinas"
and then, simply, of the "constraints" imposed upon the British Government by "the wishes of the Falkland islanders".
Fascist roots are not deep; they are air-roots. In a lean year they can be nourished only with bombast—and we know it. The wishes of the islanders were, and are, important; but even more important is the fact that what they wished for were the rights of free people.
I should like to turn to the future. The report can help us here because it shows, with such sad clarity, how the Government allowed their options to become narrower and narrower. Once it was clear that the Argentines were seriously pressing their claim to sovereignty, the Government wrongly accepted that there were only three things to do: Fortress Falklands; leaseback; or string along the Argentines by negotiating about nothing. The islanders, and the House of Commons, very properly in my view,

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rejected leaseback, and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, very properly rejected Mr. Ridley's proposal for a great education campaign to get the islanders and the Commons to change their minds.
So since we, as has often been said, "couldn't afford" to keep "Endurance" there, the Government looked the dilemma in the face and decided to do nothing. They fell glumly back on stringing along the Argentines. But unfortunately the Argentines were better stringers-along than we were. We pretended that there was something to talk about. They pretended that they were not going to invade on 2nd April 1982. That is bound to raise the question of why our intelligence was so feeble at that time when, as the Franks Committee appears to show, it was so good a year or two before. So now we are left with Fortress Falklands for a while, willy-nilly.
But there was a fourth possibility all along, and it is still there. That is the possibility of an international solution. This indeed would need a great programme of public education before it could be launched, and that is where I shall start. The islanders and the House of Commons have not needed instruction in the history of the Falklands dispute, nor in their own duty. It is a section of world opinion that needs that, including of course Argentina and, regrettably, some other Latin American countries, too.
The Argentinian claim on the Falklands may indeed be deeply felt by many in that sad, nationalistic country, and some international lawyers may also be unable to put their hands on their hearts and say that there is nothing in it at all. But historically it is sheer antiquarian rubbish. The United Nations Charter has ruled out all such claims.
The Argentinian claim stems from two bulls issued by the Spanish Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, in the 1490s, and from declarations made by the Kings of Spain and Portugal based thereon. Those declarations were duly rejected by the Kings of England, and in the 1670s Spain recognised the British claim to everything that Britain then held in the Americas, though that did not of course at that time include the Falklands, which were uninhabited.
The only time that Argentina, or rather its precursor as an independent country, the United Provinces of the River Plate, has settled the Falklands was from 1826 to 1831, when they used it as a prison camp, reputedly for rebellious Patagonian Indians. In 1833 they were thrown off the islands, not by Britain but by the United States, and, as we all know, since then people of British descent have lived there peaceably and under increasing democracy, until they were attacked by the cruel and tyrannical Government of their great neighbour last year. The claim of Spain to South America was dynastic nonsense dignified by a Spanish ruffian on the throne of St. Peter, and the claim of Argentina to the Falklands is colonialist racist nonsense dignified by nothing whatever. It is colonialist because it would subject a free people living according to their choice to domination by an alien and unwelcome political system, and it is racist because behind it lies the claim that only successor states to the Spanish or Portuguese empires are legitimate while successor states to the British, French and Dutch empires are not.
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We see this false claim being made in the Caribbean, too. We, and the black and brown people there, have been warned: at length. The Argentinian claim is also against the principles of the UN charter and the decolonisation procedures which flow from it. During the Falklands war I argued from this Bench that the whole apparatus of decolonisation, including the famous Resolution 1514, had, with the unnecessary agreement of the British Government, been turned on its head; and that we should have welcomed it with open arms and pointed out that, if anybody suffered from colonialism down there, it was the mainland Amerindians and not the Falklanders.
Now to get a Falklands solution we need international action, and to get international action we need to gain wider understanding among the nations of the world that the Argentinian claim is a false and romantic one, that nationalistic expansionism cannot now survive—either as "Greater Bulgaria", "Greater Guatemala" or "Greater Vietnam". We also need understanding that the resolutions of the United Nations must be observed in their obvious sense and no longer turned upside down. That is the great public education campaign that we need and, surely, we should look to the Government to begin it now in every international organisation, in the world's media, in negotiation with every country on every relevant topic and, above all, in the United Nations itself, before Argentina gets its breath back. I do not know why the Prime Minister rejected the General Assembly Resolution 37/9 at the end of the war with such contumely. The advantage of her rejection, however, is that Argentina is now standing by that resolution which in no way endorses Argentinian claims.
My Lords, I come now to the question of the solution itself that we might seek. What could it be? Many arrangements might be considered and I hope that they are. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, proposed an American—not a Latin American or a South American, but a Pan American—arrangement. This is a possibility; but the one that looks most attractive to me would be to use the Antarctic Treaty in some way. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said that no one till now has made any constructive proposal beyond the ones that the Government have tried and have failed.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, proposed in this House on April 29th last year—indeed, as he said, he has been proposing it for about 30 years—that the Antarctic Treaty should be extended to include South Georgia. I supported that proposal from this Bench. Though mine is a small voice, yet I did at that time make a constructive proposal; since, on May 20th, I went further and proposed that the Antarctic Treaty might be extended to include the Falklands Islands themselves. The idea has recently gained enormously in plausibility from the reported utterances of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that it might be worth examining; and I am glad to see that it is running well in the press in general. I had hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, might endorse it again in this House today; but it is good to know that, even if fleetingly, a person of his unique knowledge, experience and authority should think it might be worth looking at.

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Today, I should like to give the idea a little more flesh on its bones. The great merit of the Antarctic Treaty is that it would completely demilitarise the islands as it demilitarises Antarctica, and would freeze the claims to sovereignty over them, as it freezes all the conflicting claims to sovereignty on the Antarctic continent. The treaty can be modified at any time by unanimous agreement of all the signatories, which include, of course, both Britain and Argentina. There seems a fair chance that in time all the signatories, including the United States and Russia, may come to see it as an acceptable way of ending a dangerous conflict. Again, the treaty may, but need not, be the subject of a review and revision on the demand of any one signatory in 1991. But if the notion comes off, action should come under the unanimity clause far earlier.
There is one respect in which that treaty may not suit and which might point to an early amendment. That is, that where it is in force people are within the jurisdiction of the country of their own nationality. It may be that appeal to higher courts in London would be a difficulty. If so, perhaps the Falklands court itself could be given final jurisdiction despite the Falklands Nationality Bill we are at present taking through this House. Then, again, perhaps this will not be a difficulty at all. The Antarctic Treaty alone would probably not be protection enough for the islanders in their exposed situation. Where should we look for reinforcement but to the Charter of the United Nations itself and, in particular, to its trusteeship system?
Here, my Lords, I come to another positive proposal—which has been advanced before this time, for all Lord Carrington's negative impression. This idea was first proposed by my right honourable friend Dr. Owen in the House of Commons during the Falklands war itself last summer. Any territory can be voluntarily placed in UN trusteeship. That means that the actual proposal could come from Britain alone, although we should want to be confident of a majority in the General Assembly before proceeding. Sovereignty claims would be frozen under Article 80 of the Charter, just as they would be frozen under the Antarctic Treaty. Lawyers think that sovereignty probably gets altogether suspended when this happens, or perhaps it vests in the people themselves for as long as the trusteeship lasts. All the relevant international instruments would be frozen for the duration of the trusteeship. That is a belt-and-braces way of putting the sovereignty dispute into commission, where it can very well spend quite a few years.
Let me now quote from the article of the UN Charter which spells out the purposes for which a trusteeship may be set up. The first is,
"to further international peace and security".
Right on the mark! Second is,
"to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their development towards self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and to the freely-expressed wish of the peoples concerned".
Thirdly,
"to encourage respect for human rights";
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and, last,
"to ensure equal treatment in all social, economic and commercial
matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals".
My Lords, it seems almost tailormade for our case. It even has self-government as well as independence. Could one do better? Moreover, each trusteeship has to have its own one-off agreement which can make any member state or member states of the UN the administrator, or it can be the United Nations Organisation itself. The General Assembly exerts remote but real control of everything.
Difficulties there would be. Some we can think of today and others, no doubt, would appear. It may well be that Argentina would not agree to anything like this, but if they reject it and maintain their objection it is unlikely that they will get much support from other members of the UN; and the less support they get, the safer the islanders will be—even if the arrangement does not come to fruition.
My Lords, the Prime Minister carried through the campaign with great courage and vigour. We on this Bench told the Government at the time that they had our support for the campaign. We also said that that did not mean that we were satisfied about how we got into the campaign. Well, the Franks Report has told us what we all expected—one big sin of commission, the "Endurance", and many smaller ones of omission. The war has not changed the sovereignty dispute. Indeed, the Prime Minister has come up once more with our old friend: "There is no alternative"—this time to Fortress Falklands; the South Atlantic TINA. But there is an alternative; there always was. The Government have glumly and myopically painted themselves into a corner. What the country needs now is some imagination and an eye for new solutions. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, ended his speech by praising negotiation as the only way to proceed in the international community. Perhaps trusteeship within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty could be something to negotiate towards.
6.10 p.m.
Lord Carver: My Lords, may I first make an apology to the Leader of the House and to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, that, owing to a long-standing engagement some way out of London, I shall not be able to be here in the early hours of the morning when the debate comes to an end. I find myself very much in agreement with my noble friend Lord Chalfont on this issue. I had hoped that this debate would not be an occasion on which we would rake over the ashes; that we could avoid recrimination, not make party political points, and, above all, look to the future. It is a tragedy of the Falkland Islands issue that party politics have not done it much good. It has been the case—and I have seen it—in both Labour and Conservative Administrations, which have attempted to follow through all these years exactly the same policy, that when they reached the point at which they thought they had found a possible solution to this very difficult problem which could be acceptable to the islanders themselves, they then had to face the political reality that it would be exploited against them by the Opposition—and this was true in both cases—and they could not be certain of the support of their own party, certainly not a

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majority of it. Annex F to the report makes this point horrifyingly clear.
The campaign—brilliantly conducted, as has been said—very successfully achieved its aim of removing the Argentine armed forces from the Falkland Islands. Our armed forces are justifiably proud of what they did and they are very grateful for the national, and indeed international, recognition that they have received. But we have to face the awkward fact that it has not actually solved the problem. We are still faced with the three options of policy which were pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in September 1979 to his colleagues (which is related in paragraph 73 of the report): first, a Fortress Falklands policy; secondly, a policy of negotiating, but not seriously, on sovereignty; and, thirdly, substantive negotiations on sovereignty. The second policy of negotiating but not on sovereignty was a policy of Mr. Micawber's, and what turned up was rather nasty. So, willy-nilly, we are at the moment pursuing the policy of Fortress Falklands.
Can we contemplate that as a permanent policy? Prudent chiefs of staff, including myself in the past, have always been reluctant to send forces somewhere in response to a Foreign Office request to meet what appeared to be a temporary threat. They were reluctant because they knew very well that if they sent forces it would be very difficult to take them away or reduce them, because any reduction or removal of those forces would be justifiably said to be a signal to the other side that they could now do what those forces were sent there to prevent them doing. That perhaps was what lay behind the reluctance of the Ministry of Defence to face this fact very quickly, as is expressed in a paragraph in the report which says that the Ministry of Defence did not react as quickly on 25th March as the Franks Report would have expected.
I was Chief of the Defence Staff in February 1976 when the first report, which was referred to by the Leader of the House and is referred to in paragraph 47 of the Franks Report, was presented to the Defence Committee on what would be required as a permanent garrison, what would be involved, and the problems of sending forces there and dealing with an invasion. One of the important points which must have been very much in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, at the time was that the moment you decide to send any force, the other side could always get there first and could represent to the world that he was merely reacting to what you were doing. That is very important to bear in mind.
It is perhaps appropriate at this moment to comment on HMS "Endurance". I am afraid that the whole issue of "Endurance" is a casualty of the infighting and tactics of reductions in public expenditure in Whitehall and, specifically, in the Ministry of Defence. "Endurance" was offered up in 1974, I know; "Endurance" was offered up by the Navy, and a few other things too which perhaps it would not be tactful to mention, because it was seen —rightly— as not being a high priority so far as defence was concerned. If it was then met with comments from the Foreign Office that it was thought to have a great political importance—and I expect it came from my noble friend Lord Greenhill, who was sitting in front of me at the time—the Ministry of Defence answer would
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be, "Well, if the Foreign Office think it is so important, they should pay for it". I am afraid that "Endurance" was a casualty of that in-fighting. In retrospect, one should recognise that it probably would have been right at that time for the Foreign Office to have suggested that the Prime Minister insist that whatever the Ministry of Defence might think—and even though "Endurance" appeared to have no real defence capability—it should have been retained. Let us remember that "Endurance" was not withdrawn. "Endurance" was there and had not the slightest effect upon the invasion.
Now we are in the position that prudent chiefs of staff always try to avoid. We are in a Fortress Falklands situation. Surely, we cannot contemplate as permanent such an absurd disproportion between the defence effort and the actual United Kingdom interests involved. To defence effort you have to add economic subsidy that a Fortress Falklands policy involves. No other citizens of this country or of its dependencies have in the past or do now receive that kind of support on anything like that scale.
An important point which has not yet been mentioned is that the longer that goes on and the more we put into it, both for defence and for subsidy, the more the population will become dependent on both, and the more difficult it will then become ever to withdraw any element of support. As the Shackleton Report made abundantly clear, a civil air link is essential for both social and economic reasons. I shall quote what it said:
"Without a regular air service, many of the proposed future changes to and possible development of the economy will be impossible to realise. It is probable that such a situation would also be unacceptable to many of the existing population."
It is surely very unlikely that one would be able to establish a satisfactory civil air service without Argentine co-operation. However distasteful it is to consider it, there is no alternative to consideration of some solution to the sovereignty issue which will satisfy Argentine amour-propre. The report relates very clearly how difficult that has been. It is much more difficult now from the point of view of both sides. It is clearly not possible even to begin to consider it until after the next general election. But my plea to the Government is that they should not do or say anything which will make the issue even more difficult than it already is.
6.20 p.m.
Lord Soames: My Lords, I should like, if I may, first to say what a pleasure it was to me, and I know it would have been to so many of your Lordships, to hear the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, again. It must be a great relief to him that this report is out and he can speak his mind again, which he did this afternoon to such good effect.
The Falklands war was described in another place as an unnecessary war. The Franks Committee was not asked to pass an opinion on that. They were asked to pass an opinion on the limited aspect of whether the Government had fulfilled their responsibilities in the events leading up to the war, but not on whether it was avoidable. Nevertheless, certain themes which recur again and again in the report concerning the years

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1965 to 1982 bear upon this aspect and should, I believe, give cause for thought.
The first theme is that from the early days of the dispute successive British Governments, Labour and Conservative, came to decide that it was in this country's interests to resolve the dispute with the Argentine over the Falklands. Accordingly, each successive Government took the view (a) that it was necessary to negotiate with the Argentine Government on the future of the Falklands; (b) that they would seek a sovereignty freeze for 30 years or more; but (c) should this option prove unattainable (which, incidentally, it did consistently over the years), then other ways should be sought for reaching agreement on the key question of the transfer of sovereignty.
Evidence of this can be found in the deliberations and actions of Governments. First, in 1968 there was a visit to the Falklands by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont; and, again, in 1973 there was the Heath Government's proposal for a condominium, which was espoused afresh by the Wilson Government in 1974. Then there was the recognition by the Callaghan Government in 1977 that the only possible conclusion ultimately would be some form of leaseback arrangement—a conclusion which was equally arrived at by the present Government, and which led to the visit of Mr. Ridley to the Falklands in the hope of convincing the islanders that leaseback was in fact in their long-term interests.
So the report makes it abundantly clear that Governments of both colours under four different Prime Ministers between 1965 and 1982 all independently concluded, after careful examination of all the facts available to them, that it was in the national interest to arrive at an agreement with Argentina on the future of the islands, including the question of sovereignty. One is left with the impression that had any of those Governments felt able to negotiate freely along these lines they might have been successful. One can say no more than that, because they never did. But it is worth while asking oneself why they never did—a question to which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont addressed himself—
Lord Gladwyn: I did.
Lord Soames: My Lords, and Lord Gladwyn, yes. But as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has said "I did", may I say that I was looking up all the relevant Hansards in years gone by, and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, might refresh his memory of what he said from time to time on those occasions. I think it is a good and necessary exercise to consider why successive Governments did not feel able to proceed with substantive negotiations. Indeed, it seems to me to be infinitely more relevant to the debate in front of us rather than to the detailed matters like the timings of ministerial meetings or the dates of despatch of Her Majesty's ships. Indeed, my hunch is that the Franks Committee came to feel like-wise— that this was really the key to the matter. Why, then, did Governments not proceed with their intentions?
The second theme running through the report is the extent to which Governments have been inhibited
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from pressing forward with the purposeful negotiations. It comes out quite clearly in the report, the fact of repeated refusals by the islanders themselves to co-operate and by Parliament to support Governments. For instance, in paragraph 22 of the report we read this:
"and in March 1967"—
it goes back as far as that—
"the British Government for the first time said formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions, …On 27 February 1968 the unofficial members of the Council of the Falkland Islands sent an open letter to all Members of Parliament stating that negotiations were proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments 'which may result at any moment in the handing over of the Falkland Islands to the Argentines'. There were strong protests in Parliament and in the press, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Stewart, and other Foreign Office Ministers made clear on several occasions that there would be no cession of sovereignty against the wishes of the Islanders."
That is how it started—"against the wishes of the Islanders"—and very soon it became the position that the wishes of the islanders must be paramount. Then in November 1968 the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, paid a visit to the islands and on his return Statements were made to Parliament, in the other place and by the noble Lord in this House. These again got such a critical reception that the Cabinet decided at the time that they could not continue with negotiations on the lines that they wished to follow.
Then the Heath Government produced the idea of seeking agreement on a condominium, and after the 1974 election the Wilson Government, on the advice of the ambassador in Buenos Aires, decided to pursue this idea. So once again the islanders were consulted and once again they declined to co-operate. I would now direct your Lordships' attention to paragraph 30, which says:
"The subject of condominium was broached with the Argentine Government; but, in the face of the islanders' continuing refusal to participate, it was decided there would be no purpose in proceeding without them …".
The next chapter of this aspect of the saga was a paper for the Defence Committee in July 1977 by the then Foreign Secretary, Dr. Owen. Paragraph 61 of the report tells us that it argued in advance of what was hopefully going to be a further round of talks on the same subject; and again I quote briefly:
"Broadly speaking, the Government's strategy was to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the Dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina."
It seems that in the event no substantive talks on sovereignty took place with the Argentine before the election in 1979. Why?—one asks oneself. This is not explained in the report. But we read that in September of 1979 my noble friend Lord Carrington, who by then had become Foreign Secretary, wrote a highly prescient minute suggesting the opening of substantive negotiations on sovereignty.
The next statement of importance to Parliament was made on 2nd December 1980. That was when Mr. Ridley, the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, reported on his visit to the islands, and the reception that he got—notably, by the official Opposition who, when they were in power a few years before, had been proceeding with exactly the same policy, but also by a

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number of members of the Conservative Party—was almost universally hostile. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Franks, thought it worthwhile publishing in full the exchange which took place in the House of Commons on that day. One lone voice was raised to question whether, perhaps, Her Majesty's Government were putting too much emphasis on the interests of 1,800 Falkland islanders as perceived by themselves, at the expense of the interests of 55 million people in these islands. Fifteen months later the Falkland Islands were invaded.
As your Lordships know well, the report is about the responsibilities of Government. It concludes that no blame can be attached and in vain, I think, will the Opposition in either House try to dredge up anything worthwhile to run counter to that, try as they will and, evidently, are doing. I would go further than that. I think history will show that no blame attaches to any Government between 1965 and 1982 about what they were trying to do in and about the Falkland Islands. I very much agree with the point which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, made on this matter.
I do not think the responsibility will be judged to have rested with Governments. What about the responsibilities of opposition and what about the public attitudes of those who set themselves up as a parliamentary pressure group, in support of what the Falkland islanders perceived their interests to be? For this sad story shows that four successive Governments in turn, from 1965 to 1982—Labour, Conservative, Labour, Conservative—reached the same conclusion, that it was in both the British and the islanders' interests for the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with Argentina, including the issue of sovereignty. Yet, whenever they reported such intentions to Parliament, they were mauled by the party in opposition and others besides, who reacted with fury and apparent passion, despite the fact that when they had been in power they had espoused that very self-same cause and when they got into power later they returned to it.
I have read the relevant paragraphs of the Hansards which are referred to in the Franks Report and it seems to me that both parties, when in Government, desired the same thing. There is plenty of evidence about how successive Oppositions behaved, for each one complained of the Government of the day when different Governments said, "Let's go and talk to the islanders. Let's try to persuade them and convince them of what we think is in their interests. Let's try". When they did that, they were accused in Parliament of bringing pressure to bear upon the islanders and, as a result, found themselves under pressure to give what was, in effect, a veto to the Falkland islanders over this matter. They then, for 15 years, consistently declined to co-operate with any negotiating position which either Government, either Labour or Conservative, thought up. They would only agree to a freeze on sovereignty, which was never a runner.
Among the lessons that we should draw from this story are the advantages that flowed to the United Kingdom from the long tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy, which, in this matter of the Falklands, went by the board. But no party in this House—and if noble Lords were to read the Hansards referred to they would see that I am not referring to any one party, in
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particular, that was then in existence; obviously, I am not referring to anything that has come up since—will be able to say, "We were not guilty of this".
Before concluding, I must join my noble friends Lord Carrington and Lord Home in praise of the Foreign Office, which has been much castigated in recent times, both in Parliament and in the press, to the point where it seems to have become something of a fashion. I wish to say that, though I have never had the honour to serve in the Foreign Office as a Minister, all the jobs that I have had as a Minister in five departments of Government, and in three other jobs that I have held abroad, have all brought me into close and constant contact with the Foreign Office during the period stretching from 1951 to 1981, and I like to think that I know them well. It is my considered view that these people are of the highest possible standards, and that the Foreign Office are the finest department in the whole of Whitehall. I had experience of the Foreign Office and their activities when serving in the Commission in Brussels, and when I compare them with the Foreign Offices of many other countries they are, to say the least, second to none. This is made abundantly clear in the report that we are discussing today.
I noticed in the Hansard reporting Mr. Ridley's statement to the House, which is set out in the report, that one honourable Member said that for years the Foreign Office have wanted to "get rid of the Falkland Islands". In fact, this report shows that the Foreign Office did their job from beginning to end with great distinction, and that there was not a Government that came into power during that period that was not presented with a report setting out all the options which were open to them. The report equally shows that it was Ministers who took the policy decisions. The Foreign Office must have felt, from time to time, what a pity it was that Ministers, having conceived the policies, could not proceed with them. But they, of course, loyally and naturally, supported the Government all through and tried to find other means of achieving the same objective.
So, in my view, our national interest is in no way served by castigating the Foreign Office, and those who do so tend to do so because the Foreign Office recommend what they themselves do not happen to like or agree with. But that does not mean that the Foreign Office's opinion and advice was not both wise and right.
6.40 p.m.
Lord Greenhill of Harrow: My Lords, I share, with the majority of the House, the great admiration that there is for this lucid and comprehensive report. Having served on Lord Franks' staff in Washington and having known him for over 30 years, it came as no surprise to me. But I hope your Lordships will not consider me flippant when I say that the whole episode of the committee and the report reminds me irresistibly of the late Stanley Holloway's famous monologue, "Albert and the Lion".
Your Lordships will recall that Albert, the son of a certain Mr. and Mrs. Ramsbottom, was eaten by a lion when visiting Blackpool Zoo. Mrs. Ramsbottom was understandably indignant, refused an immediate financial settlement and insisted, in her words, that

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"Someone has got to be summoned". The matter was therefore referred to a magistrate to examine all the relevant facts. Finally, after a full examination, the monologue concludes: "The magistrate gave his opinion that no-one was really to blame". The reaction of the House of Commons in the first week of April was the same as Mrs. Ramsbottom's: Someone had got to be summoned. And the conclusion of the Franks Committee is very much the same as the Blackpool magistrate's: No-one was really to blame. It will, I suppose, be considered a rather typically British outcome, but it is probably as nearly right as it is possible to be when almost 20 years of history and four successive Governments are under scrutiny.
There are one or two aspects of the report upon which I should like to comment, primarily on the basis of my experience in the Foreign Office from 1964 to 1973, under both Labour and Conservative Governments, and also from my service for some years as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. When I spoke in the debate here on 14th April last I said:
"… the present problems have in part been caused by lack of frankness by Governments of both parties in dealing with Parliament and with the islanders".—[Official Report; 14/4/82; col. 303.]
I do not think the report in any way invalidates that view. Indeed, it confirms it.
May I perhaps be a little more explicit. When the cost of World War II came home to roost, and as our imperial status was reduced, a considerable number of small territories, mostly islands, were left still under our protection and responsibility—widely scattered in the Caribbean and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These territories were in reality no longer defensible with the resources available, and could have been taken over had any major or even medium power had the wish or the will to do so. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, will remember, as I do, that one territory, Anguilla, was nearly taken over by an independent adventurer.
The fact that we could no longer realistically contemplate the defence of these territories was not a conclusion it was pleasant to face. It was a matter for continued anxiety, and the realisation of the position may never, in my view, have been fully grasped by the public or by some Members of Parliament. In some cases—in fact, more often than not—the way out of the dilemma was eventually to grant independence to territories whose size and resources hardly justified it, and sometimes this independence by no means coincided with the wishes of a significant proportion of the inhabitants. As a result, these territories moved out of our responsibility and came under the umbrella, for what it was worth, of the United Nations.
But the Falklands were a special case, for several reasons. First, there was a foreign power which had long claimed sovereignty and which had significant military resources. Second, the geographical situation of the islands made them hard and, indeed, prohibitively expensive to defend. The report reveals how often the defence chiefs reiterated this over the years. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the inhabitants were British, albeit the numbers of long-established residents were less than the inhabitants of a Cornish fishing village, or even a large comprehen-sive school. Nevertheless, although a most important
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principle was involved, their small numbers certainly raised the question whether their claim on our defence resources could be justified when we were being compelled to withdraw from the Far East and the Persian Gulf, areas of outstanding importance to us. Did a thousand people living overseas or, indeed, within this country have a right to such a share of our national defence resources? Fourthly, and lastly, the case of the Falklands was in the hands of an active and totally uncompromising lobby.
It is surely true that since 1964 the dilemma inherent in all this was never put effectively or with sufficient urgency by either party to Parliament or to the islanders. A recognition of this is revealed in the report, in which Ministers in the Foreign Office in particular referred to the need for public education when, I suspect, it was far too late. But the situation was not tackled by any Government, Labour or Conservative: and, sadly, in international affairs time is seldom a healer. Problems usually get worse rather than better if they are not squarely faced. The Falklands is a good example of that.
Politicians were, of course, not solely at fault, but I think your Lordships will recognise how inhibiting were the parliamentary constraints and how much they impeded a diplomatic solution. Successive Governments found themselves continually contem-plating or trying to negotiate solutions which had little chance of parliamentary acceptance, and they were reluctant to consider and explain the logical consequence of that fact.
It is perhaps legitimate to speculate whether, had the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs existed in the 1960s and the early 1970s, the Falklands problem could have been better understood by Parliament, the public and the islanders. It is of course debatable whether a better parliamentary understanding would have permitted a diplomatic solution, given the character of the Argentine régimes. However, it cannot be doubted that it would have increased the number of diplomatic options available. For example, it would have enabled a leaseback to have been considered much earlier, when its acceptance might have been satisfactory to all parties.
On the question of what is called "crisis management" in the last months leading up to the invasion, I found it difficult to make up my mind, reading the report, but I was entirely convinced by the defence of his actions which Lord Carrington so eloquently made. No doubt there will be argument and dispute about this matter for years to come, but the case that he made seemed to me to be extremely convincing.
I am bound to say that the picture of ministerial and departmental relationships revealed in the report was not an entirely familiar one to me. I suspect that there was more informal, inter-departmental discussion of the problem than the report suggests; and I believe that there should have been greater reference to the distractions of the other important problems which the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet had to consider.
Now may I turn to the report's observations on the Joint Intelligence Committee and the assessment staffs, which the Foreign Secretary has characterised as "a bit thin". I agree with him, although my first-hand knowledge stopped in November 1973. The JIC, as

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has been pointed out, is a Cabinet committee. It never has been a Foreign Office preserve, and the members of the assessment staff—which was an innovation brought in under the Foreign Secretaryship of the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel—are seconded from different departments.
A suggestion is made about the desirability for a full-time chairman. This has been a topic of discussion for years, and the Government have now accepted it. I personally do not believe that it will affect matters too much one way or the other. The present so-called part-time chairman is engaged full-time in the assessment of intelligence from all sources, covert and overt, in his day-to-day work, and certainly used to be a member of defence department committees. The important point is that whoever is appointed should have more than a passing acquaintance with the whole scope of foreign affairs. He must have access, as he now does, not only to the product of the intelligence agencies but also to the whole flow of reports coming from overseas, both overt and covert. This includes the reports on the foreign press. All this is the daily bread of any senior Foreign Office official, and I was rather mystified by the references in the report to the fact that the committee did not seem to have considered overt reports.
The assessment of intelligence, in its widest sense, cannot be made from an ivory tower. It can come only from experience gained, so to speak, "on the shop floor"; from personal knowledge of foreign personalities and of the history and historical ambitions of foreign powers. It is not a detached academic exercise. The report also implies that the chairman should be independent and free from bias. In theory this seems sensible, but is it possible or necessary? It is as well to remember that it was in search of this theoretical impartiality and independence from established departments that the assessment branch of the CIA was originally set up. In practice it very quickly developed a strong, almost overwhelming departmental view of its own. I believe that it does not matter too much where the chairman of the JIC comes from provided he has practical experience and extensive knowledge, and understands that his parent department does not have a monopoly of wisdom. All in all, logic would point to a Foreign Office official.
Lastly, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and other noble Lords who have made flattering references to the Foreign Office. If the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, admires the Foreign Office, all I can say is that the admiration is strongly mutual. I am extremely glad, however, that the Franks Committee took action to kill the variety of stories and allegations which have been so widely canvassed during the period of waiting before the publication of the report. Obviously, in a matter of this importance the media were impatient for the truth; but in their impatience they played fast and loose with the reputations of persons and institutions. I hope that in time the detractors will try to make amends. There is a widespread tendency among what I call the "heads must roll" school of journalism to initiate clamour for official inquiries and then to reject the findings.
Finally, what will be the effect of the report on Whitehall as a whole? There will no doubt be changes and perhaps procedural improvements in the dealings
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between Ministers and civil servants and among civil servants themselves. There may also be a damaging loss of informality between departments and the growth of a bureaucratic recording of views and conversations. I hope that the people in the departments will have the strength of mind to resist this. In total, perhaps, the report will bring a little more discipline into public life and into the press, and for this it must be welcome.
6.56 p.m.
Lord Buxton of Alsa: My Lords, I wish to apologise to my noble friend the Leader of the House, to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, and to your Lordships that unfortunately I have to leave soon owing to an inescapable longstanding engagement for which I am now already overdue. I will therefore cut what I had to say to absolute ribbons and will make only one or two points.
The Franks Committee did a superb job, and having been "grilled" by them I can only say that I was glad that I was not trying to pass an exam; I was given a keen impression of the way in which they got down to work and that they really understood this whole subject. In saying that, I believe that the committee was absolutely right not to attach any special blame to any quarter, because in my view the only alternative would have been to blame everybody. One must ask oneself: how was it that there was no trouble in the Falkland Islands for 132 years? This point was overlooked and never mentioned. For 132 years, there was no problem whatsoever. The answer is quite simple. In the first place, for 132 years we were resolute and firm and Argentina—which is a very strange place and a very strange country with a developing community—had not yet assumed an aggressive and oppressive spirit under its new-dictatorial leaders.
It was only when we became ambivalent for the first time, following the reference by Argentina to the United Nations in 1964 about bringing an end to the so-called colonialism in the Malvinas, that the rot set in. Had we dismissed that matter then and there, and taking into account that Buenos Aires Governments themselves have been the most callous colonialists in history, I sincerely believe that it could have been the end of the matter. But that was not so and it is no use dropping backwards. In my view, it is impossible to blame anyone since 1965, and no Government since have been able to retrieve the situation, phase or era of difficulties and impossible negotiations in which we find ourselves.
I want to say a word about leaseback. Before the invasion I supported the leaseback proposal, provided it was for 99 years. I had arguments with my friend the Argentinian ambassador in London and with Costa Mendez about the terms, and the bracket was roughly between 15 years and 99 years. I said so to Mr. Ridley before I went on my last two visits to the Falkland Islands and actually lobbied for leaseback on those terms. Although opinion in the Falkland Islands as reported in the Franks Report hardened against trusting the Argentine dictatorship—and who can blame the islanders?—I must make it clear now that there was a strong minority in the islands, including substantial citizens and one leader of opinion, who

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accepted that this had to be an option for consideration. I could not go any further than that, but it is not true to say that everyone was against it, and I spoke to many people.
The problem now is that, like everyone else, I have changed my mind about leaseback after the invasion because the real fears of the inhabitants were proved. One simply cannot have an understanding with a volatile and perfidious régime that stabs one in the back in the midst of honourable negotiations in New York. You could never have a respectable relationship with a régime whose troops lock up 100 British citizens as prisoners in a village hut for more than a month, apart from much other uncivilised conduct. I fear, therefore, that the junta themselves have now "blown it" as far as leaseback is concerned, or concerning any compromise with a military regime. I think now we have to wait, as some noble Lords have said, be patient and look for some other options, perhaps within the context of the Antarctic Treaty.
Finally, my Lords, I would like to say one word in response to my noble friend Lord Carrington and to what is confirmed in the report, and also what was said by the noble Lords, Lord Home and Lord Soames. On this question of castigating the Foreign Office, I confess freely to having been suspicious at different times over the past five years. I would only like to suggest to the Leader of the House, and perhaps to the Opposition, that this may need looking at, because the question was not one of vicious, castigating, malevolent people in either House or in the country; the fact remains that it was deeply ingrained and embedded in the minds of all the Falkland islanders, of the Falklands lobby at home, certainly of people in Buenos Aires and a great many people everywhere. I would only suggest that my noble friend the Leader of the House might like to take this on board, and suggest that we wonder, why? I absolutely accept the assurance, naturally, of my noble friend Lord Carrington, and I accept the verdict as presented in the Franks Report, but it would be unwise, in my view, to just pass it by and not ask ourselves, why?
7.2 p.m.
Lord Sherfield: My Lords, my initial reason for wanting to take part in this debate was perhaps a frivolous one. When I entered the Foreign Office in September 1928 the first serious piece of work which I was instructed to undertake was to write a memorandum on the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands. In the light of recent events, I thought it might be interesting to see what I then wrote and perhaps share some of the conclusions with your Lordships. So I approached the Foreign Office for permission to see the memorandum, if indeed it still survived. To my great astonishment, I was informed that the memorandum was an active ingredient of the current file; that it is still regarded as a key sensitive document; and that it must stay in the public domain. So your Lordships are fortunately spared quotations.
But this small episode leads to a couple of serious reflections; first, that this affair has been around for a very long time; it is not something that started, though it was certainly revivified, in 1965. Secondly, it shows
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how little progress has been made in dealing with this matter during more than half a century. In this sort of historical perspective too much can be made of individual actions and incidents, such, for example, as the decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance" from the islands. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Carver, has pointed out, "Endurance" was in fact on station throughout the period under review.
However, the main reason for my wish to intervene was to call attention to the performance of our foreign service in the run-up to the Argentine invasion. Well, my Lords, this has been done already in full measure by previous speakers, but for a reason to which I will come later perhaps a variation on the theme from a former Foreign Office servant may not be amiss, though I can be very brief. There is a propensity, especially among some sections of the media and the intelligentsia, to belittle, to run down and indeed abuse the work and achievement of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This propensity tends to build up over a period, and boils over about once every seven years. It is a kind of seven-year itch. I need only point to the controversial report of the Central Policy Review Staff in the time of Sir Keith Berrill and, seven years earlier, to the criticism that led to the report on the foreign service by Sir Val Duncan. It is a cyclical affair, and 1982 was about the top of the cycle.
I will not weary your Lordships with my views on the psychology, or perhaps I should say the pathology, of this hostile attitude to the foreign service. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has made some trenchant comments on this. The foreign service officer is depicted as being good for nothing except mixing martinis, as knowing nothing about business, and indeed in a very recent leading article is described as an unnecessary burden on the Exchequer from a department which could easily be abolished. But as so many noble Lords have said, the report of the noble Lord, Lord Franks, shows that the performance of the foreign service was throughout of a very high order.
I was impressed, for example, by the account of the activities of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, whose reports seem to have been clear, accurate, indeed prophetic, and infused with a refreshing sense of humour. This not only applies to the professionals. It is clear from the report that the junior Ministers who were allotted the thankless task of negotiating on a very arid brief also did well: Mr. Rowlands under the previous Government, Mr. Ridley and Mr. Luce, supported by their professional advisers, evidently not only retained the confidence of the Argentine negotiators but kept their end up with considerable success.
On top of this your Lordships hardly need to be reminded of the performance of our diplomatic representation when the crisis broke: Sir Anthony Parsons in securing an unopposed condemnation of Argentine aggression in the Security Council, Sir Nicholas Henderson in negotiating with the United States Government and talking to the American public on television, our ambassadors in Brussels in rallying our European partners in the Community and in NATO. All of them carried out their duties with great efficiency and skill and made their supporting contribution to the success of the campaign.

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The noble Baroness, in introducing the debate, has already explicitly rejected the criticism made of the Foreign Office, and other noble Lords have echoed that. But I do not make any apology to the House for emphasising this point. The critics of the foreign service, who are already showing resentment at the fact that Franks has shot their fox, will not desist in the future from criticising and attacking the foreign service. The foreign service itself has so far survived these criticisms, but it still must have a depressing effect inside the office on morale, and also on those who may be thinking of entering the service.
In conclusion, I have just a word to say on the general aspect of this matter. Although bickering, argument and discussion will no doubt continue for a time, I believe that the Franks Report has effectively dealt with the past. But what of the future? No doubt, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said, for the time being we are boxed in to something like Fortress Falklands. But sooner or later we have to get out of the box.
I can briefly state my own view because I have been thinking very much along the lines of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. I have thought for some time that this problem can only be resolved peacefully by widening the scope of the negotiations to include an international régime for the whole of the South Atlantic, including, of course, the area of the Antarctic Treaty. Whether the latter treaty can be adapted to a wider area, or whether a different international régime would need to be devised, is a matter, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said, for study. However, I believe that the sensitive issue of sovereignty over the Falklands Islands could perhaps be subsumed in a wider international arrangement. Further, if such a régime could be established development funds might be available from international agencies.
I have only one other suggestion to make. To mark the adoption of a new policy, when the time comes, it might be advisable to appoint a high commissioner, or special representative, at a higher level than the Governor of the Falkland Islands, with a mandate to work towards a broad international solution for the South Atlantic and its Antarctic sectors. I do not expect the noble Baroness to make any observations on these matters tonight, but I hope that serious study will be given to them.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him whether he can possibly tell us the broad conclusion of his paper of 1928, which I am sure he will recall?
Lord Sherfield: My Lords, I am not going to trust my memory after 55 years.
7.13 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, as other noble Lords have suggested, the Falklands story is the supreme example of the tail wagging the dog. I do not know of any creature that keeps its brains in its tail. I have never been an uncritical admirer of the Foreign Office. We must take great care this afternoon to see that we do not convert the béte noire into an angel of light. Nevertheless, I believe that in the matter of the Falklands the Foreign Office and the noble Lord, Lord
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Carrington, were right and that the Prime Minister, Mr. Nott and, apparently, the rest of the Government were wrong.
I find myself in a surprising degree of agreement with what other noble Lords have said in this debate, and since I have on another occasion suggested that your Lordships were guilty of a certain amount of unnecessary self-praise, I should like to say that in this debate up to now, at any rate, that self-praise was not entirely unjustified.
What invalidates the Franks Report seems to be its failure to place the Falklands within a wider historical context. If the post-war period had been one of imperial expansion, so far from trying to dispose of the islands we should have been seeing them as a stepping stone towards the invasion and conquest of the South American mainland, as we did in so many parts of the world in our expansionist years, which continued, one must remember, right up to the end of the last century, and indeed even into the early years of the present century. When I was at school, even after the First World War, we still sang:
"Wider still and wider shall thy bounds be set"—
and we meant it. As late as 1924 there was a British Empire exhibition at Wembley. There was no thought that within a generation there would have been such a transformation that the British Empire would remain only a word. After the Second World War even the word had disappeared.
The significance of this is the same significance as that of the film "Gandhi", which celebrates a man who helped to give the avalanche of imperial decline a tremendous shove. The process has continued inexorably ever since and all sensible British Governments have co-operated in it or, as has already been said in the Chamber, have tried to co-operate in it. The great British counterpart of Gandhi, as I see it, was Clement Attlee, who made the dismantlement of the empire something in which to take pride and not to be ashamed of. In that he was wiser than Winston Churchill who was unable to see that the empire was dead and that only rapid transformation could save the Commonwealth. Macmillan saw it with his "wind of change" in Africa. How much wiser he was than his predecessor, Anthony Eden, who I like to think was not at his best when he seemed, towards the end of his period of effective office, to be wishing to show that Britain was still a great power and all of which ended in the débâcle of Suez.
That was the end of the empire, but there was Aden, and so on. The list of withdrawals continues until today, when we find ourselves left with a small number of direct responsibilities. It is no use pretending that on the whole they are not rather unwelcome responsibilities. Of course—and this is most welcome—we have a large number of associated and virtually independent states in the Commonwealth. Among the embarrassing direct responsibilities the least important, perhaps, but certainly not the least embarrassing, was the Falkland Islands. If the Franks Report had begun with a more adequate coverage of that ground, I believe it would have reached a different conclusion. But even starting, as it does, in 1965 the report is rather like a jury which, having received a damning summing up indicating that the Government

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are undoubtedly guilty of a lack of understanding and perhaps even of incompetence, nonetheless comes up with a verdict of not guilty, against all the evidence it has just digested.
Interestingly, the only extract from the parliamentary proceedings quoted in the report is an extract from the debate in the House of Commons of 2nd December 1980, which has already been referred to. I referred to this last week, before the publication of the Franks Report, when speaking on the Government's own Paper The Falklands Campaign. That 1980 debate, when Mr. Ridley returned from the Argentine and proposed a leaseback agreement, is correctly identified in the report as the point at which the lamentable* process, which led to the death and injury of so many men and the waste of so much money, was, as I see it, unnecessarily and wrongly embarked upon. There was a failure on all sides of the House of Commons—as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, suggested—not only on Government Front Benches and Back Benches, but on Opposition Benches as well. As the noble Lord, Lord Soames, has suggested, this has characterised dealings with the Falklands on both sides of the House.
Mr. Peter Shore, now happily translated to more congenial duties, led the way. He immediately declared the proposition of the paramountcy of the wishes of the islanders, quite overlooking the fact that that proposition had not been accepted by the Labour Party when in office. Mr. Ridley, lacking any support from his Front Bench, forthwith retreated and the competition in jingoism masquerading as principle, which led the Opposition mistakenly but inevitably to support the launch of the task force, was started on its way with all that inevitably followed. From that debate only Mr. Frank Hooley emerges with credit—contrary to what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said—because he was the one man who asked the crucial question: were the interests of 1,800 Falklanders to be allowed to command those of the 55 millions of people of this country?—for that is what has happened.
For lack of a little flexibility, for lack of a willingness to compromise, from the desire to appear as intransigent as a belligerent Prime Minister, for lack of a sane voice in the press and on radio and television, more people have been sacrificed on both sides than the entire population of the Falklands; millions of pounds have been poured out and we are now stuck up a blind alley with our backs to the area of our real interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said.
There is no glory in all this save only for the men who had to carry the military can, and their glory is the same as that of those who took part in the Charge of the Light Brigade—
"Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do or die".
But it is ours to reason why. That is our duty to them. And when the reasoning is done we shall find that the answers reflect no credit on the Government, and precious little on the Opposition.
Indeed, Parliament itself emerges from this debacle as a place in which the blind passions of the mob, fanned by a prostitute press, were allowed to hold sway. Of course, the excuse for this is the bestial nature
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of the Argentinian dictatorship. I do not believe that the failure of the Opposition to support the unfortunate Mr. Ridley and his leaseback was solely due to a desire to out-Thatcher Mrs. Thatcher. It was partly due to a proper distaste for the Galtieri régime, and partly to the parliamentary tradition of automatic opposition to a Government statement. But whatever the reason, the whole episode was a mistake which ought not to have happened. It will increasingly be recognised as a mistake, and the sooner that occurs the sooner we shall be able to extricate ourselves from the nonsense of Fortress Falklands.
In 1983 the islands which we ought to be concerning ourselves about are those in which we live—it is to the defence of these islands and to the welfare of our people here that both Government and Opposition should turn their attention. Abroad, our role should not be that of military adventurers, but as leaders in the search for peace and disarmament.
In the annex to their report the Franks Committee quote a number of assertions against the Government's conduct which they find not proved. They do not quote the most important assertion of all. perhaps because there is no answer to it; namely, that there is now no point in hanging on to pieces of territory in Latin America. It is a fruitless exercise, which is bound sooner or later to end in disaster. The Government lacked the moral courage to tell our people this unwelcome truth, and the losses which have been suffered and the further losses to come all stem from allowing the tone of Britain in the "eighties to be set by irresponsible rags like the Sun instead of by a Government prepared to face reality.
There are many reasons why we need a change of Government. Not least of them is that only a Labour Government can get us out of the Fortress Falklands mess. Mr. Healey has aleady begun to show the way, and I believe that between now and the next general election there will be a massive swing of public opinion which will bring Labour back to office. This report could well form an obituary of Thatcherism. It is a tale of mess and muddle, of Ministers like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who knew what had to be done but who lacked the power or the will to carry their views in Cabinet; of other Ministers, like the Prime Minister and Mr. Nott, who were hopelessly wrong, and coupled with their ignorance an obstinacy, a determination, to persist in error at the expense of the nation and of brave sailors like David Tinker, who knew full well that once again men were being placed in jeopardy by the incompetence of politicians. The wrong people resigned—it should have been the Prime Minister and Mr. Nott, for they above all others are responsible for what will be seen, more and more clearly in coming weeks and months, to be a hopeless entanglement from which we have no alternative but to extricate ourselves before it brings us into even more serious trouble.
7.27 p.m.
Baroness Vickers: My Lords, it seems to be my habit now to speak after the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, and as usual I cannot agree with all that he says. In particular, I cannot agree that any man wasted his life if he was serving his country in the Army, Navy

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or Air Force. It is very unfortunate that he made that remark, particularly for those who have been made widows. They do not think that their husbands wasted their lives and I hope that the noble Lord will never say that again.
I have tried to understand the report. I have read it and taken a great interest in it. But I cannot understand the continual criticism of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is not the president of this country; she has other Ministers who take collective responsibility with her. Therefore, I hope that the chivvying against her all the time will soon cease. On 20th June 1982 the Prime Minister stated:
"This is British sovereign territory and they are British people. We need the friendliness of neighbouring states. We do not negotiate sovereignty with them".
We should remember—and this is a matter which has not been mentioned before—that people who are dictators are very unpredictable. Neville Chamberlain found that to be the case in the last war and we, too, can remember the unfortunate mistakes that led to the fall of Singapore. The headline in the Sunday Times last Sunday stated:
"A verdict that is at odds with the evidence".
But that was again, as so many people have stated, a hindsight thought. I met several of the Falkland Island representatives when they came to this country and I had discussions with them in the Commonwealth parliamentary offices. I found that they were not even willing to accept boat-people who were then trying to find a refuge. They wanted to remain entirely British.
I personally was against the scheme for leaseback because it could only lead to difficulties in future. This is particularly so when one thinks of Hong Kong. I would not mind suggesting that we might have a condominium in later years with the Argentine, if that were possible. Fortunately, when Belize became independent—and I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, here because he was so helpful in that debate—we realised that they were in danger of Guatemala, and we ought to have realised that the Falklands were in danger of the Argentine. Although we did not get it included in the Bill we managed to persuade the Government—and for this I was particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham—to ensure that there were some services of the Army and the Air Force in Belize in case Guatemala attacked. We also know that there is danger from Venezuela in regard to Guatemala. Therefore, we must be on our guard as regards these various territories in South America which are still under dictatorships.
When the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, came here to receive the freedom of the City of London, he said:
"Britain's expulsion of the Argentines from the Falklands was a great feat of arms".
The headlines in the press were:
"Lee sees hope in the Falklands spirit".
From listening to the radio and reading the weeklies one cannot but help agree with the headline in The Spectator which refers to "The Blame for Victory". Of course, the blame for victory falls on the Prime Minister.
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I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Franks, has made an excellent factual report and, to quote from The Spectator again, he said that nearly every stone that is thrown at Mrs. Thatcher will come from a glasshouse. Mr. Callaghan is stated to have deterred the Argentinians from a previous attack. However, there seems to be no proof in this at all, neither in the report nor in the press.
In the Observer of 2nd May 1982 they published a copy of a diary kept by Captain George Grey, R.N., who was later made an admiral and who commanded the 26-gun "Cleopatra". In 1836 he made a survey of the islands and reported their position. Even at that time sovereignty was disputed. In January 1837 he was ordered to see about the rest of the country. He reported that although there were no doubt many drawbacks to a settlement, it was a tempestuous region and it possessed advantages, none of which was found in the new settlement in Australia. He went on:
"When I return from a short survey of the country I find all in due order, the Union Jack flying at the top of the tent".
He must have been very glad that he had no interference from Whitehall and there was no radio and no television, so he was able to do his job quietly and peacefully. In 1836, having warned the Americans that the islands belonged to England, he continued his exploring.
For the sake of the future I hope that we can all co-operate in this debate on the Falkland Islands in leaving the past year to history and return to the need to keep peace in the future. We shall not do this if we are continually arguing, and I regret to say that if a Minister in the other place refers to the fact that the Argentines will be threatened with a "bloody nose" that will be no way to keep peace. We have reached an understanding with our old enemies, Japan and Germany, and we must try to obtain co-operation with the Argentine in the future. I do not think that a Labour Government need worry about the influence of the Falklands spirit, or whatever they like to call it, on the next general election because we can remember 1945, when "Churchill" was still a name to be conjured with. I thought that election was certainly very well won, but the Labour Party was returned with a large majority. So I think that they are making a great deal of trouble by repeating this.
Some Members, including perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, may remember that on 5th February 1960 Mrs. Thatcher made her excellent maiden speech on her Private Bill, which was called Public Bodies and concerned the admission of the press to meetings. She has always wanted to have open government, and I think that she will continue to do so.
If we are to co-operate with Argentina, I think we might consider the following. I should like to suggest that, with them, we make use of the Falkland Islands. It is reported that they are of strategic importance in case of the closure of the Panama or Suez Canals. The same is true of Drake Passage. Masses of ships pass through it carrying oil from the Far East to the United States of America and Europe. They also provide for the installation of sea and air bases; a station for tracking satellites and for the arrival and departure of space craft, taking advantage of the thinness in this

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area of the dangerous Van Allen Belt, a radiation-producing zone which can kill astronauts. Very good experiments in tracking could be carried out here.
I hope that in the future we shall try to obtain cooperation, because otherwise I do not think that peace will prevail. I shall be visiting the Falklands shortly and will have an opportunity to talk to the Falkland islanders and to see how we might get better cooperation. Finally, as in the last war and in the first world war, the Falkland Islands were helpful to us. If it had not been for these islands HMS "Exeter" and HMS "Ajax" would never have reached England again.
Reference has already been made to the standard of excellence of Her Majesty's Forces; indeed, one noble Lord has already mentioned that they are so professional. I should also like to mention the civilians who co-operated so magnificently. The wives of servicemen, many of whom I have had an opportunity to meet in recent months, have said that their husbands were disappointed not to go to the Falklands. These were both young and older wives. The wives were of tremendous support in the campaign.
I think that Britain still has a great deal to do in this world protecting human rights, and, therefore, I hope that we shall stick by this idea and that we will do our best to help keep the peace in the world. Whatever the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, decides to do in the future, I wish him every success.
7.37 p.m.
Lord Walston: My Lords, at lunchtime I had the privilege of listening to the most reverend Primate speaking at Chatham House, and in the course of his fine and thought-provoking remarks he said, "War is always a failure". We have just had a war. It was a short one and a successful one, but, nonetheless, it was a war, and it marked a failure. It is the causes of that failure to which we must now direct our minds. That is what the Franks Report sets out to do, and to a very large extent, but not to my mind completely, it does it in the admirable, iucid and objective way which one would expect of the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his colleagues.
What purpose does this report serve? Is it to enable us to punish those who have erred? So far as I am concerned, that is not so at all. Is it to learn from errors and to remove them? According to the report, there have been no errors but the very minor one of the chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Or is it to see that the methods and the individuals who were in positions of responsibility at the time leading up to the Falklands confrontation still remain—or have those people or those methods changed? That is the point to which I should like to direct my remarks this evening.
I am not for a moment suggesting that, had other people of a different Government, a different party, been there at the relevant time in the three years or so leading up to this, there would have been anything different. I do not know. Government have many privileges, but they also have responsibilities and they also have failures. If things go right it is right for the
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Government to receive praise. If things go wrong, if there are failures, it is right for the Government to take responsibility for those failures. That is why I am looking solely at the period during which the present Government were in office.
I hope I shall not weary your Lordships if I repeat some, but by no means all, of the points other speakers have made. I would refer in the first instance to paragraph 73 of the report, 20th September 1979. There, as you will remember, Lord Carrington sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister and to other members of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee setting out three options for the Falklands. One—we have heard this already—Fortress Falklands; two, protracted negotiations but with no concessions. Three, substantive negotiations on sovereignty. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recommended the third. The Prime Minister's response to that was that she did not wish to be rushed.
Paragraph 75 and 76, 12th October 1979, about three weeks after the first memorandum:
"Lord Carrington circulated a memorandum"
again—
"to the Prime Minister and other members of the Defence Committee"
on similar lines underlining the high risk of direct military action by Argentina and pointing out that they had the capability to capture the islands. In spite of this second approach, in spite of the urgent tone, the Prime Minister decided to postpone discussion until after the Rhodesian problem had been settled.
Paragraph 77. November 1979: the Joint Intelligence Committee, about whom we have read so much to its detriment but about which I am glad to say those who know far more about it than I do have spoken with praise, warned about the high risk of more forceful measures by Argentina if negotiations were not serious. One might have thought that in the light of this the Government would have been alerted and would have discussed the matter with seriousness in the DOPC or in Cabinet.
Paragraph 86, March 1981: another note from Lord Carrington to the Prime Minister, who said that if the islanders wanted to retain the status quo it would be necessary to arrange for supplies of essential goods and services, and perhaps to defend them against physical harassment. There appears to have been no response to that.
Paragraph 90, June 1981: Mr. Ure of the Foreign Office suggested a campaign of education of the islanders to gain their support for leaseback, and also suggested resettlement schemes and land distribution schemes. In the next paragraph we are told that Mr. Ure's suggestions were strongly supported by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Buenos Aires. So far as one can tell from this report no action was taken on either of these suggestions.
Paragraph 96, July 1981: Mr. Ridley warned Lord Carrington of some form of military action if by 1982 Her Majesty's Government were not thought to be serious. Paragraphs 98 and 99, September 1981–quite a pause: there was a reply then to Mr. Ridley's warning because Lord Carrington met with Sir Ian Gilmour and Mr. Ridley and officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. There he refused

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a recommendation from them for a policy of education in the islands and in Parliament on the grounds that his colleagues would not agree.
Paragraph 117, January 1982: Lord Carrington urged the retention of "Endurance", but Mr. Nott, as he then was, and the Prime Minister refused on the grounds that it cost too much. I will not labour that point. We have heard enough about it already. Paragraph 121, January 1982: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office warn that the new Government of Galtieri would adopt a more forceful approach. In the subsequent paragraph this warning was reinforced by Her Majesty's Ambassador.
Paragraph 123, also in January: the Governor of the Falkland Islands warned that the islanders were more suspicious both of the Argentine and of Her Majesty's Government as a result both of "Endurance" and of the legislation proposed by Her Majesty's Government on nationality, the citizen legislation. Paragraph 124, and still in January: Mr. Fearn of the Foreign Office warns,
"we are left with no alternative way to prevent the dispute moving sooner or later to more open confrontation".
This was reinforced in paragraphs 129, 130, and 131 in February by the Argentine press warning of military means to solve the dispute.
In paragraph 133 in February 1982: the Prime Minister told Lord Carrington to tell the Argentines that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. Paragraph 142, still in February: for the first time— and this is a curious thing which has not yet been mentioned —an approach was made to the Americans by Mr. Luce to Mr. Enders, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American affairs. This was followed up a month later by Lord Carrington approaching Mr. Haig, the Secretary of State, for the first time.
It seems to me curious that, with all these warnings which the Government have had which the Foreign Office were giving through all these years, no approach was made to our closest ally with such influence in the whole of Latin America and with such an interest in the whole of Latin America, and particularly with close relations with the Government of General Galtieri. No approach was made until virtually the eleventh hour. It would be interesting to hear from the Leader of the House why this in fact was so.
Then we turn to paragraph 312, perhaps a minor point but not altogether minor, where it is recorded that the defence attaché in Buenos Aires said that he had
"neither the remit nor the capacity to obtain detailed information"
of military movements in Argentina. Again one might have thought, in view of all these warnings, that he would have received instructions to step up his activities. But possibly the need for economy, saving money, made it impossible for that to happen. In paragraph 284, as a form of summary, we are told that Ministers without exception rejected the alternative of fortress Falklands. We are also told, in paragraph 291, that the Government policy towards Argentina and the islands was never formally discussed by Cabinet or the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee between January 1981 and 25th March 1982 when the Cabinet discussed it—a matter of 14, nearly 15 months—and
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the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 1st April 1982; no discussion whatsoever in Cabinet itself or in the appropriate committee which is responsible for these matters. It was dealt with entirely by the Prime Minister reacting to various memoranda which she received from Lord Carrington and to a certain extent from the Secretary of State for Defence. No question at all of discussing our strategy with regard to arms exports to the Argentine, in spite of the threats that were coming along. No question of discussing whether any advice should be given to our banks who had such big dealings with the Argentine with regard to loans, loans used, as we well know, for the purchase of weapons which were so destructive to our own forces. A complete absence of any interest, of any policy discussions or any guidance whatsoever during all that crucial period.
What has been the result of it all? It has been that only one of the three options which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, presented to Mrs. Thatcher way back in 1969, and which was universally and continuously rejected, is the one with which we are now left—a complete failure. The result also has been that we have had the resignation of Mr. Atkins, who, so far as I can tell from reading the report, had no responsibility whatever for Latin America, for the Argentine or for the Falkland Islands, but he felt he should resign. Mr. Luce receives special praise in the report for his handling of a very difficult remit, but we have had his resignation. And we have had that of Lord Carrington, who made great efforts—perhaps they were not sufficient, but he made great efforts—to persuade the Prime Minister and his colleague, at the Ministry of Defence to take actions which he thought would be helpful. I believe his resignation was right. I regret it. The whole House and the nation regrets it, because he was one of our outstanding Foreign Secretaries, but he was right to do it.
The Minister really responsible, who failed to appreciate the seriousness and urgency of the matter, who overruled the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, on "Endurance", and who failed to have the matter discussed in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, of which she, the Prime Minister, was chairman, or the Cabinet, is still there. Honour demands that she, like her Secretary of State, should also resign. So long as she remains pursuing the policies she is still pursuing, in the manner in which she has been pursuing them, there is no likelihood of any solution along the lines wisely adumbrated by my noble friend Lord Kennet and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, and others. There will be no possibility of policies along those lines reaching fruition, although they represent the only chance of a solution to this otherwise intractable problem.
7.53 p.m.
Lord Balfour of Inchrye: My Lords, having listened to virtually all the debate, one question has yet to be answered. I listened to the Leader of the House with great admiration for her complete justification of the policies of the Cabinet during the Falklands crisis. I listened to the brave speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and I listened, with less conviction, to the attack on the Government by the Leader of the

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Opposition. But, then, I am somewhat prejudiced in the matter.
The one question which has not been answered is: Where do we go from here? It is the future which is important, far more so than the past and, in political terms, we seem to have arrived at a situation with the Argentine that reminds me of a schoolboy question we all had put to us when we were young: What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable body?
We are pledged to the British Falklanders—that they remain British citizens under British rule—and rightly so; we cannot think of handing them over to an invading power with laws and customs alien to British citizenship and our way of life. On the other side, though, the Argentines have a different viewpoint. They are convinced that the Falklands are theirs by history and that we have occupied the Falklands illegally since 1833. They demand sovereignty based, they claim, on history and they declare that sooner or later they must obtain it.
The armed fortress—I use that term—will be a costly burden to carry for an indefinite number of years ahead. We cannot indefinitely alienate some parts of South America, including the Argentine, who at present are not on speaking terms. With Argentina only hundreds of miles away and ourselves thousands of miles away, how can we face a timeless future for the armed fortress? I say that because it is at the moment a timeless future.
It is impossible to expect the Government to talk at present, so soon after hostilities, about the transfer of, or concessions on, sovereignty. However, there is nothing to prevent the ordinary private Member doing so, and I have a suggestion to make. Supposing that in 50 years' time we were to concede sovereignty to the Argentine. We should meanwhile have fulfilled our pledges to the full to the present British inhabitants of the Falklands. We should not only have fulfilled our pledges to the adults there today but also to the younger generation. During those 50 years, one hopes that the sores will heal and gradually be forgotten, and that we will get closer in social and economic matters. In the fictitious, if you like, 50 years I postulate, we should neglect no opportunity for social and economic relations to be far different at the end of that period than they are today.
We should have to build a social and commercial relationship based not on the past but on the future. Air and sea communications would have to start again. Commercial relations with the Falklands would have to be developed, as also with the South American countries, including the Argentine. There would need to be established some joint machinery—not immediately, but in a few years of the 50 years I postulate—to try to develop the closer contacts which we all hope will come about one day. From gentle beginnings, those 50 years will gradually bring the Argentines to realise that the social standards to which the Falklanders have become accustomed are British and valuable and should not be interfered with. There might even be some form of federal structure coming about during those 50 years.
It is, of course, easy to knock any ideas off the stage, but it is just possible that something broadly on the
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lines of bringing the element of time into our relations with the Argentine might succeed. I do not expect the Government to give any sort of positive reply to what I have said in that connection. I merely bring forward that possibility to your Lordships' House.
8 p.m.
The Earl of Cork and Orrery: My Lords, this debate began with one of the more remarkable speeches that I have heard since I came to this House. To begin with, we had the very fine speech from my noble friend the Leader of the House and, in particular, the eagerly looked-forward to and keenly awaited speech, for the first time after his return, of my noble friend Lord Carrington, who made an enormously distinguished speech in its own right as a speech, and also produced not only a complete vindication of his own actions in resigning—though that was not his intention particularly—but a vindication of the Government.
That feat can in no way be undercut by the rather remarkable and, I might almost say, admirable efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, to find and seize sticks wherewith to beat the Government, to replace those sticks which were used by him and his friends during, after and before the actual war with the Argentine, and which had been wrested from his and their hands by the Franks Report. On the other hand, he may have made some dent on the effect, the generally deserved effect, of a rather admirable speech, certainly from his point of view and to some extent from ours, made by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition. Not that from this side we agree with everything that he said, but it was agreeable to listen to a restrained and statesmanlike speech rather than the kind of ranting which I have no doubt is going on not a hundred miles from here this afternoon, and perhaps even now.
I do not suppose anything has yet emerged with greater clarity from the debate than the absolute unfailing resolution of the Argentines to regain sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. This resolution is matched by an equal resolution on the part of the islanders to have no such thing; and they, in turn, have been supported by successive Governments, who have maintained that their wishes are paramount. This word has been criticised often enough, or perhaps not quite often enough because I shall do it a little more now, or at least mention it.
By this assurance that their wishes are paramount, their wishes have been set above their own interests and above the interests of the British Government and people and of the rest of the Commonwealth. I doubt whether so high a privilege has ever been accorded to a minority of citizens of any nation anywhere in the world, but, for better or worse, it has been done, and here we are now, locked into the Fortress Falkland situation, as certainly as we are locked into the Arab and Northern Ireland one, for as long or possibly longer, though I hope not. Whether the Fortress Falklands turns out to be a permanent reality or not, there can be little doubt that the islanders are on the anvil, and the least that we can do, and are expected to do, is to help them to meet the blow when it descends on their heads, as unquestionably it will.

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There are two reasons, if I may venture to remind your Lordships, why the islanders do not wish to come under the sway of the Argentine. The first is that they are, and wish to remain, British. That can be understood by everybody in the world, including the Argentines, because everyone can understand the ties of ethnic nationality and descent. The other reason is different, and that is that they do not want to come under the sway of the Argentine. This is not simply the opposite of the first reason; it is something quite different and separate. It is not to be confused with it. It is not obvious or understandable by the world at large. For example, I doubt whether it is obvious to, or easily understood by, a Nigerian or an Italian, a Korean or a Greek. It is of such vital importance, though, that it should be explained, and particularly to all the members of the United Nations.
What is it? The Franks Report makes only a glancing reference to the origins of this passionately-held feeling of the islanders, in paragraph 273, which says that the military coup, the take-over of government in 1967:
"introduced a repressive régime, whose appalling human rights record understandably increased the Islanders' reluctance to contemplate any form of closer association with Argentina".
"Reluctance" is good. The same point has been made by my noble friend Lord Buxton of Alsa.
I believe that this truth, the reluctance—to use that absurdly mild word again— should be rammed home and explained to everybody as widely, loudly and clearly as possible. For that purpose I propose a book. I suggest that a book should be published by Her Majesty's Government. It should not be very long or very large, but it should be well and expensively published; it should contain no statements of opinion, except perhaps in a foreword or epilogue, but should concern itself entirely with statements of fact: facts about the Argentine operating under their present Government.
This would fall into two parts. First would be the record of the Government at home in their own country—their record in what even they themselves have referred to as "the dirty war", in the course of which and afterwards a number, variously estimated as between 9,000 and 15,000, of Argentine citizens have just, as the word is, "disappeared". This is the way this régime in the Argentine treats its own people. These are the people who are proposing to take over the Falkland Islands, which are inhabited by people who have nothing whatever to do with their own people. They are totally alien, they are British with no Spanish or Argentine blood in them at all. What can they look forward to under such a régime?
The Argentines were in occupation of those islands for two months. That was an opportunity, of a sort, to make some small effort to win over the hearts and minds of the people whom they proposed to take over. Did they do that? They did not. What they did should be recorded in this book that I propose. I am not thinking of anything that they did under the stress of war, but what they did quite needlessly; for example, on the milder plane, what my noble friend Lord Buxton of Alsa referred to, the locking up of 150 villagers for a month in a school hall. There was no reason for them to do that. They treated the people
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with brutality; they insulted their houses, and desecrated their buildings and everything. They made the whole place into more or less a shambles.
When they went away they left behind an estimated number of 11,000 unexploded objects within 20 miles of Port Stanley. There were unexploded mines all over the place, with the minefields not even marked. It was total incompetence from the military point of view. It was also totally careless and unfeeling for the people on whose country those mines were left. They are there forever; they are a danger to children and people of all ages. In some cases they will be there for very many years to come. This is the sort of legacy they have left behind on the land of the people they wish to govern.
They left behind a very large number of rotting corpses. That again is an example of what they do to their own people. They take young men, they conscript them into the army. If they are wounded, they look after them, presumably so that they can fight again. If they are taken prison they will not even accept them back for a few months, until they are forced to do so; then they take them home by the back door so that their relations and fellow countrymen do not see them. If they die, they just leave them there. They will not even bury them. They are refusing to return to bury them now.
That is the kind of fact that I want put in this book; and I want the book to be published by the Government and all the things that are in it to be written by the Falkland islanders themselves or reporters. They ought to be eye-witness accounts; and they all ought to be, as I see it, vouched for and supported as to their authenticity by affidavits sworn by persons operating under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the International Committee of the Red Cross.
This book is then to be circulated to all embassies in London, to all Foreign Offices abroad and, above all, to all nations and all libraries in the United Nations in New York; so that when the time comes, as it will, when the Falkland islanders are required again to say: "No, we will not have anything to do with these people"; when they are asked "Why not? We are fed up with the arguments of yours", they will say: "It is because of what is written in this book". The book will be there—the black book. It will not be a book about, or directed against, the people of the Argentine. As has been said several times today, we have to live again in terms of friendship with these people, and I have no doubt that we shall. The book has to be confined to the people of the Galtieri junta, and the generals who, like other such Governments, will eventually disappear into the dust while the nation goes on. Therefore it is against them only that the book should be aimed.
An admirable account of the whole campaign was written and published by the Sunday Times by the Insight team. It ends with these words:
"The threat from Argentina, 400 miles away"—
that is from the Falklands—
"will continue to be very real, but sooner or later negotiations will have to start again. Neighbouring states must learn to live together somehow. At least the war has guaranteed one thing for the Falklanders on their remote rocks in the South Atlantic—no one will ever again underestimate the dangers they face."

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My Lords, they will underestimate them, bearing in mind human nature. It is not the whole world that now knows what dangers they face, and what is known will in many cases be forgotten. It is the purpose of the book to see that people do not forget.
8.11 p.m.
Lord Benson: My Lords, in this country we have a genius for setting in hand commissions, reports, investigations and inquiries to find out why things went wrong. The inquiries are usually conducted with great care and integrity, and when the findings are published we flay ourselves all over again, either by trying to find some grounds for criticising the report or by using the report to criticise others, without much elevation of the discussion. I do not want to go down that road at all.
What I found most satisfying about the Franks Report is that to me it seemed to explain beyond peradventure why the Falklands war took place. It was due to two reasons. The first was an irresponsible and unstable Argentine Government. There is nothing new in that. It has been an unstable Government for many years, and will continue to be an unstable Government for many years to come. The second reason was the obduracy of the islanders. If one reads the report, one sees that it is clear beyond doubt that year after year successive British Governments were unable to make any progress in negotiations because the islanders would not give ground on any single substantial point.
For myself. I was totally in support of the Government's action in the spring of last year. I have every sympathy with the islanders. Nobody could wish to live under the heel of Argentine domination when they have the alternative of British rule: and it is obvious that negotiation is impossible at least until the Argentines have declared an end to hostilities and have ceased to rattle the sabre.
But the circumstances have now changed. I suggest that it is impossible to contemplate that, for an indefinite period of time, we should live under a continuous threat of war—a war which at any time could escalate to gigantic proportions. We cannot contemplate pouring in large quantities of equipment, men and resources to sustain 1,800 islanders, of whom perhaps no more than 900 are adult. I suggest that the situation must be brought to an end, and a solution must now be found.
What the solution is to be is a matter for experts. I do not know whether the Falklands are important from a major strategic, military point of view. If that is so, possibly some form of trusteeship in which other nations are involved is the right solution. But if that is not so, a solution on more traditional grounds would be necessary. It may be condominium. It may be leaseback. It may be that we have to give an option to the islanders to withdraw within a reasonable period of years, under proper terms of compensation and a basis of resettlement. If they will not accept the option, they must realise that they will have to live under a form of government different from the one that now prevails.
In finding that solution we must of course take into account the views and wishes of the islanders. But I
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suggest that we can do that only so long as those wishes and views are reasonable and realistic. I suggest that if the islanders continue to be unrealistic and unreasonable, we have no alternative but to make it clear to them that a solution will be imposed upon them.
8.15 p.m.
Lord Granville of Eye: My Lords, I very much hope that the noble Earl finishes his book and gets it published, because I think that even this debate has illustrated how short can be our memory about some of the events that took place before the Falklands invasion. I agree with other noble Lords that we were all very glad to hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, because undoubtedly he holds a very real place in your Lordships' House. But I must confess that, listening to some parts of the debate, I began to wonder, perhaps wrongly, if, after all the lessons of the past months, we are going to get on the old merry-go-round again and again, with no possible solution in the future.
I thought that the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition made a very strong speech; perhaps, if I may say so, the best speech that he has made since he became the Leader of the Opposition. Being a Welshman, he took the advice of Nye Bevan:
"Don't attack the monkey when you can deal with the organ grinder".
I can understand that because we have now had the Franks Report, we have had statements from the Government and we have had various other reports. But I hope that that does not mean that the Falklands and all that it implies will become a party football, because in that there is always a danger of kicking the ball in your own goal.
It has been said in the press, in your Lordships' House and by the Government that it was a short war and that it will be a long-term harassment, which would be a headache for any Foreign Office. But, of course, as the noble Earl said in his speech, we are not dealing with a normal, ordinary, democratic Government. We are still dealing with a military dictatorship, a junta, at the Pink Palace and the Plaza del Mayo. It is a country where the widows still parade around the Plaza del Mayo crying, "Now cry for me, Evita". They are the widows of thousands who have disappeared in their own country, and who have never been traced.
I have listened to the debate with very great interest, and I am convinced that the only real hope that we have is of a truly democratic government in Buenos Aires with whom we can negotiate upon an international basis. But in the course of today's discussion two questions have arisen. Did our intelligence service, our secret service, really know? Did the Government, the Foreign Office, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, really know?
I believe that our secret service is second to none but the Pink Palace, the Galtieri Government, told the military attachés in the embassies at Buenos Aires that all that was happening at Bahia Blanca and at the southern ports of the Argentine was the annual manoeuvres on a full basis. This is what they said. What was landed at the Falklands, where the invasion took place must have taken months of organisation

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and preparation, with a general conscription and a general call-up; and everybody seemed to know about it and what would happen. All leave was cancelled, ships were there waiting, the aerodromes were put on full alert, and I believe that our intelligence—which I still think is the best in the world—must have seen that happening, must have understood it and must have reported it, even to our much-maligned communications centre at Cheltenham.
The CIA, the Reagan interest in South America at the back door—and this is their front door—which is active in all the South American countries, knew what was going to happen; they must have told their counterparts and it must have reached us. There were the reconnaissance flights over British Antarctica, the islands, where Russia, under the treaty arrangement between the 11 nations, was very interested, and still is so. Why?—because the prize there is oil and minerals plus.
There is another thing. Marcel Dassault of Paris, the great arms and aircraft producer, was stocking up the supply of Mirages and Exocets for months before the invasion took place—and the scrap merchants of the island were a feeler. Even the ordinary Argentine newspaper reporters in London and in Paris were openly reporting back to Buenos Aires and making statements here that the Argentine was going to invade the Malvinas.
The Argentine Embassy in London were probably advising the military junta and giving them the same advice as Ribbentrop gave to Hitler, that appeasement and pacifism is strong in the United Kingdom so that the United Kingdom will do nothing; and, of course, since the "Odessa Run", the Nazi influence with the Buenos junta is still very strong. One must realise there are conflicting opinions about this. There was a letter in a prime position in The Times today from which I will quote at this late hour just one sentence. The writer says, quoting Winston Churchill:
"By all means turn the other cheek, but don't turn all four".
In CIA language, where was the buck going to stop? Was it with the United Nations? There was Mrs. Kirkpatrick and all that, and the South American lobby; but I am glad to read that there is to be a committee of inquiry into the media in wartime and the relationship between the press, television and broadcasting with the Cabinet and those responsible for the direction of operations. But there were media interviews during the crisis when we could have lost the Falklands war, when it was as close as that. At least one, if not more, of those interviews sounded as though it was coming from Buenos Aires, from the Pink Palace, and as if the Iron Curtain had infiltrated the media here. As the noble Lord, Lord Benson, said, the media had great problems. It is a long way. It is just as well that Sir Alan Cobham's refuelling project was not cancelled or we should have been in a desperate plight. I repeat that the real hope, and the only hope, I think, is for a democratically-elected government in Argentina with whom we can negotiate. I do not mean another Peron and Evita. The Falklands could become a maritime staging post with full port facilities and air capability between two vast oceans.
Nearly everything has been said in this debate. In conclusion, I believe that we have the best scientists
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and technicians. As the noble Earl suggested, the trouble with us as a nation is that we have looked inwards for too long. We still have enormous responsibilities in the scattered empire. I put to the Government, as a long-term study, that they should consider the French system of electing senators to Paris from far-away dependencies in their colonies. This would be one solution for many countries, and not only the Falklands, which would give this country, the mother country, closer ties than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office can offer at the present time. I suggest to the Government that perhaps one day when the future of your Lordships' House is being considered this might be one of the suggestions.
8.28 p.m.
The Duke of Portland: My Lords, I venture to address your Lordships as I was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee from September 1939 to June 1945. The formation of this committee was first proposed by Sir Maurice Hankey, later Lord Hankey, in 1937, but it was not properly constituted until June 1939. The JIC, as it came to be called, was composed of the directors of intelligence of the three services and a Foreign Office representative who became chairman, the post to which I was appointed at the outbreak of war. The Foreign Office representative was appointed chairman as he was the most acceptable member of the committee in view of the rivalry between the three services. On the outbreak of war the director of the Ministry of Economic Warfare joined the committee and the heads of M15 and M16 attended when required.
During the winter of 1939–40, and also during the operations in Norway, the JIC, was not often called upon to produce appreciations or reports as the three services preferred to rely on their own intelligence divisions. However, after the German attack on France had been launched in early May 1940, adversity drove the three intelligence divisions into closer co-operation and it became easier to reach agreement on the reports to be submitted to the chiefs of staff. At first comparatively junior officers from the three services, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Foreign Office would meet ad hoc to draft appreciations and reports as required for submission to the full JIC. But later it was found desirable that a junior JIC should be formed, which was called the Joint Intelligence Staff or JIS. This committee met almost daily and its members were fully briefed by their respective departments. They had access to all available intelligence (except Enigma or Ultra in the raw), namely, reports from His Majesty's missions in allied and neutral countries, press extracts, SIS reports, the produce of cryptography and "bugged" conversations between senior enemy prisoners of war—which were most amusing. All of this provided the material on which the JIS based their reports. As and when I thought it desirable, I would take the chair at meetings of the JIS.
During the first year of the war, the JIC did not have regular meetings with the chiefs of staff but subsequently we had weekly meetings of about an hour every Tuesday morning. In my capacity as chairman of the JIC, I regarded General Ismay as my

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chief but remained in daily contact with Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Since June 1945,1 have had nothing to do with intelligence matters, and I am well aware that conditions have greatly changed. Nevertheless, I cannot resist the temptation to make the following comments and suggestions after reading paragraphs 299 to 323 of the excellent report of the noble Lord, Lord Franks.
In paragraph 319, Lord Franks recommends that consideration should be given to the position of the chairman of the JIC, to the desirability that he or she should be full time with a more critical and independent role, be appointed by the Prime Minister and be a member of the Cabinet Office. 1 regarded myself as seconded to the War Cabinet Office although, at the same time, I had a room in the Foreign Office. I was occupied full time on JIC work, though from 1942 I was also Foreign Office adviser to the Directors of Plans. I am certain that 20 years in the foreign service, dealing with foreigners and foreign affairs was of great benefit to me as chairman of the JIC. I understand that the Foreign Office chairmanship of the JIC had proved satisfactory until the unfortunate Falklands affair, and I wonder whether the appointment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Franks, will prove equally satisfactory throughout the next 40 years. Like the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, I hope that the person appointed to be chairman will be someone with wide and practical experience in appraising foreign individuals and reports.
In paragraph 319 Lord Franks expressed the view that the assessment machinery should be reviewed. I shall venture to offer some suggestions—which I hope will be practical—based on my wartime experience. First, the JIC should continue to be composed of a Foreign Office representative of the rank of Deputy Under-Secretary of State, the Director of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence, the heads of Cheltenham, of the SIS and of M15, plus—and I know this is a novelty—a senior Treasury official. The JIC should prepare reports and appreciations on the instructions of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary or the Minister of Defence, also the Secretary of the Cabinet, or on their own initiative—and I hope they will often do so. These reports should be prepared and submitted as speedily as possible and should not be delayed awaiting the meeting of some ministerial or other committee.
The JIS, which would correspond to the present assessment groups, should be composed of representatives of the members of the JIC, though the Army, Navy and Air Force should each have separate representatives. The JIS would be responsible for the preparation of all JIC appreciations and reports, which would be based on all available intelligence, also on the views of the respective departments of the members of the JIS. Officers and officials seconded to the JIS should be persons who are regarded as likely to rise to high rank. Before the last war, Intelligence was not a stepping stone to rapid promotion; in my position as Foreign Office adviser to the Directors of Plans and also at the same time chairman of the JIC, I found the Directors of Plans to be of higher calibre than the Directors of Intelligence.
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I would finally urge that any expansion in the machinery of the JIC should be very closely controlled. After 28 years in the Civil Service and 35 years in the private sector, I have reached the conclusion that the efficiency of Government departments or organisations, also that of the head offices of large companies, is generally in inverse ratio to their size.
8.37 p.m.
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, like many other noble Lords, I must congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Franks, on his exceptionally well written and skilful report which was both fair and interesting—a combination which is not always achieved. This must be the only occasion when a report on the responsibility for a crisis has been commissioned in this way when the crisis concerned has turned out to result in a military victory, and so the report without question has a historical curiosity of its own to begin with.
I should like to say what a privilege it was to have been here today to listen to the speech of my noble friend Lord Carrington, whose conduct in April of this year and whose speech today it seems to me is a model as to how to behave in such circumstances. What a tragedy and irony it is that a Foreign Secretary, one of the very few Foreign Secretaries who have both known and liked Latin America—I think the only other Foreign Secretary who has actually been to Latin America is sitting on the Benches opposite at the present time—should have had to interrupt his career in this way.
In 1981 I had the pleasure, along with two other noble Lords who are in the Chamber at the moment, to accompany my noble friend, Lord Carrington, on a visit to Latin America. I know very well therefore from personal experience how well respected and admired he is in that fascinating, great green continent whose countries will, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said in his speech today, continue to exercise us in the future very considerably. Also, all who heard him will wish to ponder Lord Carrington's reflections on the press, on public opinion and on parliamentary opinion in 1981–82. and will wish to do the same in respect of his defence of his then colleague, Mr. Ridley in the House of Commons in 1981.
Although I naturally have some reflections like everybody else on some of the details of this interesting and important report, I want to devote most of what I have to say to a subject which is certainly at the heart of the matter but is not very well covered, if I may so put it, in the report itself. I refer to the psychology and the character of Argentina. Sometimes, reading the report, you get the impression that those who wrote it were thinking of it as a far-away country—almost a far-away planet—of whose quarrels they knew little. I think that perhaps that is the chief weakness that I detected in the report. It is, however, rather like having a discussion about the effectiveness of the policies of Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Baldwin without considering the character of the Nazis.
Argentina, it seems important to represent to your Lordships, is a country of great wealth and great complexity with irrational Governments for many years, as the noble Lord, Lord Granville, has pointed

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out. It is also a country in which the people and society generally have had connections with this country for nearly 200 years. I would submit, indeed, that that is part of the problem. I do not believe it to be irrelevant, for example, that it was Commodore Popham's expedition to Buenos Aires in 1806 which led directly to the independence of Argentina. It was British investment and trade in Argentina between 1850 and 1930 that led Argentina to become the great success story of Latin America, both politically and economically, in the early part of the century. British immigrants to Argentina were far more than to any other Latin American country. Many who were fortunate enough to have inherited wealth in this country must certainly reflect on the connections that they have even today—the connections that their ancestors established—with British involvement with refrigerated meat, gas, insurance, railways and shipping in what was for many years referred to as the "sixth dominion". It is entirely appropriate that the dictator who in 20 years of brutal rule managed to create modern Argentina should be buried in Hampshire—in Swaythling, I think—to which exile he was able to escape by courtesy of a British cruiser.
I suggest that this is one of the problems. Even recently it is the same people in Argentina who in the middle of the afternoon would be demanding the return of the Falklands, the Malvinas, who, in the evening, would be going to the British Council and trying to negotiate some way of sending their sons to an English public school.
The second complexity of Argentina seems to me to relate to the country itself, and not to its relations with us. As I have said, it was very wealthy, comparatively speaking, at the beginning if this century. It looked down on the other Latin American countries and considered itself a rival to the United States for the leadership of Latin America. Its history is in some ways an object lesson of how countries can go down in the league table of development as well as up. That is particularly interesting, because all the inhabitants are of either Spanish or Italian origin; that is to say, they are all of European origin. The problem of modern Argentina, it seems to me, is that the agricultural wealth of the country led to the development of a great deal of industry linked with agriculture, which in itself attracted immigration from Europe on a large scale in the last century and the beginning of this, particularly from Italy.
The large increase in population as a result of that immigration led eventually to economic problems, which were exacerbated by the economic crisis following 1918. The consequence was that in the 1920s and 1930s there began to be in Argentina a large unskilled labour force which was easily stimulated by demagoguery, whose task, in turn, has recently been rendered even easier by modern mass communications. Although Argentina today is still primarily an agricultural country—60 per cent, of GNP and 60 per cent, of exports derive from agriculture—political power in the country depends on the man who can best control the huge urban population, concentrated in Buenos Aires and Cordoba, the big cities. Hence, therefore, Peron and the excessively corrupt monopoly labour force; hence a great deal of government interventionism, very
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expensively managed to create quite bogus industries in the cities; hence, therefore, inflation; and hence, in the end, the military adventures which have resulted in this present debate.
Until recently Argentina has not played a very large part in Latin American international politics. That is perhaps because they are so far away. Some of your Lordships may remember a book by a distinguished Australian historian called The Tyranny of Distance. Maybe that has to some extent applied in the case of Argentina as well. Argentina was known to despise her neighbours who, on the whole, either feared her or made fun of her. But things began to change in the 1970s. The military régime which, as many of your Lordships have pointed out, won a ferocious civil war against terrorism did not become immediately popular, because of the continuation of the lopsided economy to which I have drawn attention.
Oddly enough, Argentine generals, once in power, behave rather like politicians—they wish to have popularity. I think incidentally, it would be wrong, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, did today, and as other speakers have done on other occasions, to refer to the Argentina junta as being "fascist". They themselves are of military origin and were responsible for a successful civil war against elements, some of which were fascist; and it would be false to refer to them by that adjective.
The drive for popularity by the generals in Argentina led them to seek some kind of adventure with which to entertain their population in these huge and uncontrollable cities. The modern urban mass does not want loaves and fishes. It wants vicarious excitement on its television screens, preferably at the expense of other countries—hence the incident of the Beagle Channel, which nearly led to war with Chile; hence the Argentine involvement in Bolivian coups d'etat a few years ago; hence their idea of a flirtation with involvement in Central America earlier this year; and, ultimately, hence the campaign against the Falklands. That was an obvious option for a military Government looking for popularity, since it was one which enabled them to pursue a war against a country which is an old enemy but also, as I said earlier, and old friend. What better plan could there be than that?
The Franks Committee is naturally vague about the actual day or the actual circumstances in which Argentina decided to attack, and some attention was paid to that by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn. But the fact is that we probably never will find out the truth about all that since, with many countries such as Argentina, the papers which relate to these things are likely to be taken away by the Ministers concerned. Therefore, although we ourselves will be able no doubt to look up our papers in the Public Record Office in 30 years' time, people in Buenos Aires will not be able to do so to see the truth about those activities referred to in this report.
Perhaps I could conclude by referring to some points which relate to the future rather than to the present. First, whatever confusion there may be in Argentina at the moment, she will certainly remain a rich country, with unsurpassed agricultural assets and sufficient oil and gas for all her needs. Thus, unfortunately, it could be the case that she will be able to afford bad government for a good deal more time.

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It is not so much evil government as bad government I am complaining about, though certainly they have used evil methods, as many of your Lordships have pointed out. The trouble with the Argentine Government, as it is presently constituted, is that it is not susceptible of being able to take a proper decision. We saw that during the course of the crisis in May, when an extremely conciliatory British compromise plan could not be brought by the Government to stick with the army officers in the barracks upon whom the Government depend.
In conclusion, it is possible, as the noble Lord, Lord Granville, seemed to suggest, that this crisis may result ultimately in the opening of the door towards democracy in Argentina, and I agree with him that the odds are that such a Government resulting from a democracy would be easier for us to deal with. On the whole, democracies are more pacific than military regimes, if only because they find it more difficult to get their electorates to vote for large arms budgets.
Nevertheless, in Argentina anything is possible and there is certainly a chance that a democratic system in Argentina would result in a Government which felt itself bound to retain the same irrational and jingoistic policies of its predecessors. We cannot be certain what will happen in Argentina. It is all very well for rational noble Lords to tell us that we must secure a solution almost at all costs. The fact is that in certain circumstances, when one is dealing with a régime which has this long, complex and difficult history, such solutions may be a long time coming.
8.52 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, the first principle of responsible government is the granting and acceptance of responsibility. The electorate delegates its responsibility to its elected representatives, and they to members of the Government. At the apex of this pyramid of responsibility is the Prime Minister. This responsibility must be recognised and its consequences accepted. We are discussing today a war which cost 250 British lives and several hundred maimed men; some of them, incidentally, killed or maimed by arms provided by this country. The consequence of responsible Government is that every wife, every son and daughter and every mother and father of those who died, or who were maimed, has a right to know who is responsible. That is the awesome task which we in this Parliament have to approach today in both this House and in another place, because it is Parliament which is the final court.
The Franks Report is a valuable document and I am certain that we are all grateful for the way in which the noble Lord and his team have put it together. But we have been enjoined from all sides, and, in particular, by the noble Lord, Lord Franks, himself, to read the report as a whole, and, as a whole, the Franks Report presents evidence of a kind about Government actions, ministerial discussions and papers which is, in my experience, unique in being published so early after the events which they describe.
We are enjoined to read the Franks Report, and I believe most of us have read it, but that does not
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necessarily mean that we must accept all its conclusions. It is the evidence in that report which is most important and, as I have said, it is Parliament which is the highest court. Therefore, it is a report which is presented to Parliament, and it is for us as responsible Members of Parliament to consider the evidence which the report presents. My noble friend Lord Cledwyn made this abundantly clear in his opening speech, and he demolished the selective sentences which were included in the introduction of that report when it was published last week.
In the debate last week on the military side of this issue, I was told from the other side that the deaths that had occurred were the responsibility of the Argentinian junta. No, my Lords, they were not. The Argentinian junta are responsible for the Argentinian deaths and wounds, and I hope that their people will hold them responsible and act accordingly. But we in this Parliament are responsible for any national action which causes death or wounding to British citizens. Therefore, that responsibility cannot be sloughed off to the unforgivable action that was taken by the junta in the invasion of the Falklands. In any case, it is a little hypocritical to talk about the principle of maintaining human rights and freedom, when we would be somewhat uncomfortable if we were asked, as a country, what our Government are doing in their relations with countries like Chile, Turkey or South Africa.
In paragraph 260 of the report, the Franks Committee set itself these two questions:
"First, could the Government have foreseen the invasion on 2 April? Secondly, could the Government have prevented that invasion?"
Those are two very narrow questions. The committee answered them both in the simple negative. But it did not ask the question which is surely more important than that: who was responsible for creating the situation in which that invasion and the consequent war took place? I noticed, in particular, this afternoon the great difference in emphasis between the opening speech by the noble Baroness the Leader of the House and the speech by the ex-Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I am not surprised that there was a difference in emphasis, because Lord Carrington made out an unanswerable case for the actions of the Foreign Office; in particular, in deliberately warning the Government, both the Cabinet and the Defence Committee, time after time, of the danger of invasion. He started in 1979, when he put his three options and when he rejected Fortress Falklands or negotiations without the concession on sovereignty, both of which he believed brought a serious threat of invasion.
The Prime Minister and the Defence Committee received that advice from him. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister put it aside until after the Lancaster House conference. Nothing was done about it for three months. It was not even discussed until January 1980. But the Joint Intelligence Committee that has been so attacked, particularly in the press and by some noble Lords, was warning in 1979 that there was a danger of military activity if certain circumstances came about. Those circumstances did come about, and they were brought about by the present British Government.
Then there was the case of Mr. Nicholas Ridley. I believe that Mr. Ridley has been very badly treated by

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his colleagues. I can understand the difficulty which Lord Carrington had, because he was in the wrong House. He was not sitting beside Mr. Ridley when Mr. Ridley came back with the suggestion of the leaseback solution. When he was being savaged in the other place, who was there to stand up for him? The Prime Minister did not. I cannot believe that if Lord Carrington had been with Mr. Ridley on that occasion he would not have come to his support. That might very well have changed the minds of certain Members of the other place.
In June and July 1981, the Joint Intelligence Committee was reporting once more that there was a definite danger of invasion if negotiations were thought by the Argentinians to be being carried on by the British Government without any serious intention of transferring sovereignty. Your Lordships will see in paragraph 100 that the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in September 1981 sent a memo to this effect to the Prime Minister and to the Defence Committee: that there was a risk of military confrontation. But the Cabinet Ministers never met on the Falklands issue from January 1981 to 25th March 1982, a matter of 15 months. In the meantime, there had been the difference of opinion between Lord Carrington and Mr., now Sir John Nott, the Defence Secretary, on the issue of the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance". What happened? The Prime Minister supported her Defence Secretary against the Foreign Secretary. So I believe that this afternoon Lord Carrington made out a good case.
I have only two criticisms to make of Lord Carrington's handling of this situation as Foreign Secretary. In the first place, I think he was somewhat lacking in political courage (although I can understand why, after the number of rebuffs he had had) when he did not try to convince the Cabinet that there was a need for the Government to promote the leaseback option. He said that his Cabinet colleagues would not "wear it". What does that really mean? It means that they were so in awe of the Prime Minister that they would not consider the case on its merits and decide what was in the best interests of Britain in that situation.
By then, 1981, Lord Carrington had become very unpopular with the Prime Minister. From the attitude which the Prime Minister took before the Lusaka conference, it was quite obvious that she was by no means pleased with the Rhodesian settlement which Lord Carrington managed to engineer. Nor was the Prime Minister pleased with the Foreign Office in their attitude towards the European Community. So I think Lord Carrington might have summoned up a little more courage to go to the Cabinet, face them squarely with the options he had been trying to insist on for two years and insist that they make a Cabinet decision as to whether they should go for the leaseback option. It might be that if at that stage Lord Carrington had been defeated he would have felt that he ought to resign.
The second criticism I have to make of Lord Carrington is that he does not appear to have seen the need to have some defence behind the negotiations, as had been the case in 1977—defence which could be called on if, and only if, the negotiations broke down. Those noble Lords who have said that the Argentinians did not know that there was a submarine
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there in 1977 are missing the point. They were not supposed to know. The submarine was to be deployed only in the circumstances which are laid down by the JIC and by the Foreign Office: that the Argentinians had been convinced that Britain was not serious in its negotiations and had then followed up with an attack on the islands. That submarine could certainly have prevented the invasion of the islands. So both the Cabinet and the Defence Committee, but particularly the Defence Committee, continually ignored the frequent warnings that were given by Lord Carrington and by the JIC over a period of two and a half years.
Where does that leave us? It leaves us in this situation: that there is one common factor running right through this story. That factor is the Prime Minister. It is the Prime Minister who at every stage has been the blocking point to what could have been—I only say "could", because we cannot forecast what might have happened if circumstances had been different—a prevention of the invasion and therefore a prevention of the war. I would say quite frankly that those members of the servicemen's families who are feeling so saddened now, if they want to look for responsibility, must go where that responsibility is, and that is at the top of the pyramid of power.
Is it not obvious, too, that at every stage, in all the signals we have heard about which were sent across the Atlantic, it has been domestic policy which has been extended into foreign policy over the whole of this issue—the "Endurance" to be withdrawn to save £3 million a year; the British Antarctic Survey to have its budget cut so that it would have to abandon South Georgia; the sale of HMS "Invincible"; the British Nationality Act, which deprived a considerable number of islanders of their British citizenship. All these signals come directly from domestic policies—again, under the leadership and direction of the Prime Minister. I believe that when it comes to a question of responsibility, because of the Prime Minister's ignorance of foreign affairs, because of her prejudices and because of her lack of interest, but above all because of her presidential style of government, it is the Prime Minister who must be held responsible for the whole of this story.
After all, how many Prime Ministers would have written a note on 3rd March calling for contingency plans and then have said nothing when there came no reply? How many Prime Ministers would have asked the Defence Secretary on 8th March how long it would take to send naval ships to the Falklands, and then find that nothing happened? If the Prime Minister really believes in Victorian values, as she told the nation on television, I can think of many Victorian Prime Ministers who would have felt that they had the responsibility of resigning rather than allowing their Foreign Secretary and his colleagues, who had been right all the way through so far as their assessment of the situation was concerned, to "carry the can" —people who had been blocked continually by the Prime Minister and her followers, and by her style of government.
I do not need to go into the details of the future, although it would be wrong not to finish this speech by doing so. However, this has been done so well by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that all I can say in looking to the future is that I agree with virtually everything

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that was said by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, about the projection of the future of the islands. What I would say, first, is that we shall secure no hopeful future by just fiddling with institutions and the chairmanship of committees. Secondly, we have other territories similar to, if not identical with, the Falklands. We have to look at the situation in Belize; we have to look at the situation in Guyana. There are many people in both those countries who would ask, "Are you going to treat us like the Falklands, or are you going to treat us in the same way as you treated the citizens of Diego Garcia?—who were not given any paramountcy of either interest or veto, but were thrown off their homeland without any choice and sent into exile despite the fact that they were a British reponsibility.
Across the Floor of the House the future of the Falklands as a Fortress Falklands has been rejected. I will simply endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, had to say about the necessity to begin thinking about, talking about and discussing the question of the extension of the 1961 Antarctic Treaty; and to begin to discuss with representatives of other nations the role that the United Nations should play in this—after all, we set up United Nations in order to prevent this kind of war happening, and to negotiate in disputes—and, in particular, the role of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, which, again, was set up for this purpose.
I am a little encouraged—only a very little—that in May 1982, even after the war had started, there were some proposals along this line. They were quickly withdrawn, but they were there. We are the people responsible for the welfare, safety, lives and prosperity of the people of this country, and we owe it to them to take such action now to hold responsible those people who are responsible; otherwise, the whole structure of responsible government will collapse. Further, we must begin now to discuss and look forward to an internationally negotiated settlement that will prevent this kind of tragedy from ever occurring again.
9.15 p.m.
Lord Wilson of Langside: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, when he says that it is indeed an awesome responsibility that rests upon us in this matter, and I agree with him too about the debt which we owe to the soldiers sailors and airmen, the dead the wounded and the survived for the professional skill with which they got us out of the mess into which we had gotten ourselves. I am not quite sure, beyond that, to what extent I am in agreement with the noble Lord. I agree, too, with what has been said by a number of your Lordships—Lord Kennet, Lord Chalfont and Lord Carver, to mention but three—that what we should be concerned principally to do is look towards tomorrow, and I agree with Lord Chalfont when he said that embarking upon a party political debate, raking over the ashes of this particular matter, would be indeed a sterile exercise.
I think that our Government adopted the least objectionable of the courses which were open to them in April last. It is a circumstance of human affairs almost invariably when presented with any situation,
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but particularly a political situation, that several courses of action are open to us. This is a simple truth which most people acknowledge, but there are still some who are not prepared to acknowledge it, and more of that anon. In any event we adopted this course which was the least objectionable of the lot and we went to war with Argentina. And with the committee's final conclusion, as stated by them, I would have thought that it was pretty well impossible to quarrel: they concluded that they would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government—they did not stop there—for the Argentine junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression. I would have thought it was impossible, practically speaking, to quarrel with that conclusion. Yet there have been some who have. After all, in the last resort when at our prompting President Reagan tried to get in touch with him the ghastly Galtieri refused even to answer the phone, and at that stage it was not too late.
I think the British custom of self-criticism, particularly political self-criticism, is a quite admirable one, and I do not think we want to lose it. But, you know, you can carry it too far, and it often leads to misunderstandings in foreign affairs. At this time of night one does not want to explore the many illustrations in history where those of other lands have been misled by the circumstance that it is possible to be fiercely patriotic and British and yet to enjoy nothing so much as criticising your own country. This was the kind of custom which was adopted, for example, in the Germany of Bismarck or Kaiser Bill, and that led in due course to a lot of misunderstandings. But this is not the time of night to go into these historical parallels.
I was not able to be in the House last Tuesday and I did not get the report until Thursday, so for two days I was dependent on the media. I do not read too many newspapers. One must not do that, because every time one reads about something about which one knows one can see that the newspapers are almost always wrong. Nowadays television reporting is becoming almost as bad. I spent two days dependent on the media and I formed an impression of the report. That impression was that, while it was obviously an admirably informative review of the situation, it appeared from the media to have one or two fatal flaws. It appeared to have let the politicians off the hook too easily—I do not believe that is ever a good thing to do-and to have left the Civil Service carrying the can as it were, albeit a fairly small can. That was the impression that I gathered from the media.
I deprecate the fashion, already referred to in the debate, of seeking to blame the Civil Service for all our misgovernment, and that is not merely in relation to the Foreign Office. That fashion is commonplace among men and women in the street, and I deprecate it greatly. I can enjoy "Yes, Minister" just as much as anyone, and perhaps more than most; but so far as the Civil Service is concerned my inclination is to adopt the aphorism of the first Duke of Wellington in relation to military men and say that there are really no bad civil servants, only bad Ministers. Of course, that is the kind of thing that one says and is then immediately, in no time at all, the victim of the actions of a bad, wretched civil servant and has to be rescued

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by a diligent Minister. However, your Lordships are men and women of the world and will know what I mean.
This first impression of the report was completely dispelled when I read it. I echo the appreciation which has already been expressed by so many of your Lordships. This historic document, apart from anything else, is extremely readable; and that is not only highly commendable but not always achieved in committee reports. Nevertheless, I remained a little unhappy about some aspects of the committee's approach to its main task. I think I have already said that carping criticism on points of detail tends to be sterile, but now I am going to carp a little, and I accept that. I was a little unhappy, for example, about the first sentence of paragraph 13, which states:
"In our review we have taken particular care to avoid the exercise of hindsight in reaching judgments on the development of policy and on the actions of Ministers and officials".
I feel that the word "hindsight" is much over-used. It is much favoured by politicians, and I do not mean that in relation to any of those who were responsible in Government in this matter, but as a general approach to assessing information before the committee. The word "hindsight" is favoured by politicians when matters for which they are responsible go adrift. We cannot expect Ministers to have second sight, but I should have thought that they must be strong on foresight. Moreover, I would have hoped that, equally, the committee would take particular care to avoid using hindsight as an excuse for failing to see the foreseeable. I hope that your Lordships will not regard this as a carping type of criticism on a matter of detail. As a lawyer, I feel that it is fundamental to the approach of judging the matters which were before the committee.
Paragraph 13 goes on:
"We have sought to judge on each important issue whether the views expressed and the action taken by those concerned were reasonable in the light of the information available to them and the circumstances prevailing at the time, and not to substitute our judgment of what we might have done in those circumstances".
I would not have thought that that was quite right. I would not have expected a committee of this type to adopt the approach of a famous Glasgow lay magistrate who was faced with a reprobate in the dock, whom he asked whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty and who said that he was pleading not guilty, but who then in the local patois added, "And what's mair, I've got an alibi". The magistrate in the same patois replied: "I'll have none of your alibis. If you had not been there, you would not be here". I am not suggesting that that is the type of approach which the committee should have had, but I am wondering whether the one they adopted was the right one.
Paragraph 14 says:
"We have also borne in mind that our task required us to focus exclusively on the Government's responsibilities for the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, whereas those concerned, both Ministers and officials, had to deal with many other major and pressing preoccupations."
I should have thought—and this is quite important too as regards the matter of approach, but perhaps your Lordships will not agree—that that was appropriate in relation to small matters of day-to-day routine in any department, and a proper consideration to take into account. However, in relation to matters of this
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magnitude, in my view the answer lay in the famous observation of Harry S. Truman, when he said:
"If you don't like the heat, you should keep out of the kitchen".
As I have said, it is sterile to carp on and I have taken too long already. In conclusion, let me say that it is important to learn the lessons, to explore the options which are now open with the utmost care—which many of your Lordships have already suggested is necessary—and to make from those the right choice for the future. There are many lessons, but I venture to mention only two. The first is probably the oldest in the book, but it is not perhaps sufficiently appreciated by any of us, and it is that politics is not only the art of the possible, but very often involves choices between what is unpalatable and what is utterly disastrous.
The second lesson, which is also one of the oldest in the book, is that there is not a lot of time to spare. It has been said that there is no alternative to Fortress Falklands. In my view that is nonsense, and it is dangerous nonsense. We do not have much time left to find the alternatives. Of course we cannot discuss them openly with the Argentinians, but certainly the Government should be thinking about them. There is not much time left, particularly since we are now, after all—and we should keep reminding ourselves of this—on the last lap to 1984.
9.30 p.m.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Buxton of Alsa asked why for 130 years the Falkland Islands were peaceful and why this trouble had all blown up in the 1960s. To a great extent I think that many British Governments are to blame for this. It may seem fanciful to say so, but if we look back to that famous "wind of change" speech by Mr. Macmillan, we see that from those years onwards we were dismantling and getting rid of all our vast responsibilities throughout the world, and, unfortunately, handing many of them over to corrupt and tyrannical dictatorships. Many countries of the world looked on in wonder at this action, and those countries with aggressive tendencies came to think that, to use a piece of slang, we would be a "soft pushover" and that we were great appeasers.
With the type of Government that we have had in Argentina for the past few years—and it is a very volatile country (Italians and those with Spanish blood being excitable)—those dictators have thought that we had sunk into decadence. I think that that has had a great bearing on why Argentina has for the last 20 years been aggressive.
The trouble is that we as a nation are very bad at dealing with dictators. Certainly we are not a young nation, but when you are young you are very inclined to think that other people should behave as you would behave. We as a nation do not appear to have outgrown that philosophy. When we deal with dictators we seem to think that they will behave as we behave. It is a habit that we must grow out of, but I doubt whether we shall because that is not in our nature.
General Galtieri came to power on 22nd December 1981. According to the constitution of that country, he

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was also Commander in Chief until 1982. He caught this country in the Christmas festivities and Recess, which certainly went on for a long time. I think that we were slightly casual about the whole affair. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires said that in his opinion negotiations would go on for a long time, and that if there was to be any invasion it would probably be in January 1983. This was the 150th anniversary of the British occupation of the Falklands. Of course he was wrong, but had he been dealing with a reasonable, democratic Government in Argentina he would probably have been right; an invasion would have been very unlikely.
We have heard a lot about HMS "Endurance". I think that there were three reasons that gave the junta the green light to go ahead, and without doubt one of the reasons was the decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance". The reason given in Parliament for this decision was to economise. However, as HMS "Endurance" cost only about £2½ million a year, I do not think that the Argentine Government really believed that it was to economise. After all, we spend £12,000 million on defence and probably £40,000 million on the welfare state, so I do not think that the question of spending £2£ million made them think that the idea was to economise. No; what they thought was that we had decided to give up the Falklands.
The other reason was the plan to educate public opinion to cede sovereignty. I am glad to say that my noble friend Lord Carrington did not fall in with either of these plans. The plan to educate public opinion to cede sovereignty was washed aside. With leaseback you are ceding sovereignty, but there is some point in it. If you are ceding sovereignty on a leaseback for 30 years, as was proposed, to a régime like General Galtieri's, and perhaps to further régimes like that, one of those regimes would probably find an excuse to abrogate the agreement. You would probably find that they cut short the period of the leaseback agreement. I feel rather like the noble Lord, Lord Buxton, that if you are going to have a leaseback it must be for a very long period, and that you must negotiate leasebacks with stable Governments. However, to the credit of Her Majesty's Government, they did not embark on the leaseback because the islanders did not wish it. I have heard mention of the figure 1,700, but I thought that there were 2,000 inhabitants.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and one or two other noble Lords, suggested that we should not accede to the Falkland Islanders' wishes, but that we ought to decide what is in their interests. That is a dangerous policy for a democracy such as ours. Much depends on who is going to decide on the interests of the islanders, or in fact any other group of people. One need only take the case of ethnic minorities in this country. Much depends on the Government in power, of course, but it would be possible for a Government to decide some unpleasant things for ethnic minorities. Indeed, if a Government took the view that it was in the interest of the people, they might decide after five years in power to have another ten years in office. Thus, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and others on that line.
Although I agree with the Franks Report that the invasion on 2nd April could not have been foreseen,
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we must remember that that was only one day. It would require a very clever Government, with an extremely good espionage system—indeed, one would need to be in the pocket of the commander in chief—to know the exact date of an invasion. Anyone who was in the services during the last war will be aware that prior to an invasion there must be a great deal of preparation. No commander of an army or fleet can say suddenly, "We shall invade". There must be a big build-up.
I feel especially sympathetic for our Defence Attaché in Buenos Aires, who lacked the means to finance sufficient people to watch the build-up of the invasion force. Had he had enough finance—I suppose the Treasury would not allow that; I rather blame the Treasury over several aspects of the matter—the Government would probably have had very accurate knowledge of the date of the invasion. Indeed, in some circumstances they might even have known the day of the invasion, or at least have known within a few days of it. Lack of adequate finance clearly had a great bearing on the Falklands affair, though not once the war started. Then finance was unstinted. I refer to the lack of finance during the time leading up to hostilities.
My noble friend Lord Carrington comes out of all this extremely well; being an honourable man, he resigned, and while that has been a great loss, I hope that one day he will again hold high office. On 24th March he wanted to plan for civil replacements for sea and air services to the Falklands—because he had a shrewd idea that the invasion was coming—with the cost coming from the Contingency Reserve Fund. Again, however, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury refused, so the Treasury has some share of the blame, though of course only on the financial side.
To sum up, I hope we shall learn the lesson that the real cause of the invasion was, as everyone knows, that we did not have a sufficient deterrent in the Falklands. If we had had that deterrent, in the form of one or two ships and submarines—though a submarine was sent a bit late—there would not have been an invasion. I sincerely hope that we take that lesson to heart, but I doubt whether we shall.
One item I cannot understand; that apparently someone in the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office gave the advice that the few marines we had there—not more than about 70, I understand—were quite sufficient to protect the Falklands. I find it very hard to believe that that was said. But I have seen it reported. The Falklands has a coastline of 4,000 miles and it seems a fantasy that any civil servant with responsibility could have said such a thing. I have spoken enough, but I hope we will learn the lesson.
9.47 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, to some extent this debate has been disappointing. It has been disappointing in the sense that the Franks Report has clearly not achieved what we hoped it would achieve. It was set. Its membership was agreed. Its terms of reference were agreed, and yet we find that noble Lords opposite are disposed to challenge its conclusions. I find this a rather extreme example of party spirit. Indeed, its seemed to me that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of

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Lusby, could scarcely contain his grief, not for the losses in the Falklands but because of the failure of the Franks Report to damage the reputation of the Prime Minister.
It is, I think, clear, and it has been made clear from speeches in this House—notably from the very remarkable speech, which in itself has justified the debate, of my noble friend Lord Carrington—that it could have been, and was indeed, foreseen that an attack on the Falklands was a not unlikely event. There were differences of opinion as to when the date might be, but certainly there is no evidence that the Government excluded that from their considerations. But, as I understood the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, he thinks that the Government, having achieved this insight into the likely course of events, could have acted so as to prevent it. The only way one can prevent an attack is, as the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, said, by a deterrent, by having a force so considerable that only a lunatic—General Galtieri was perhaps a man of strong passions but, so far as we know, perfectly sane—would challenge it.
Is it thinkable that Her Majesty's Government could have sent a major task force to the South Atlantic in time of peace and not be criticised by the Opposition, particularly the Opposition in another place, for unnecessary belligerence? After all, the Leader of the Opposition in another place is committed to the view that we exaggerate our need for a deterrent against a much more dangerous and forceful foe. Is it to be thought that he would have led a party which would have said, "Bravo! Why not a couple more ships while you are about it?" rather than, "Surely at a moment like this, when negotiations are still possible, we must do nothing to ruffle the Diplomatic scene"?
I believe that a Government can take measures of this kind—and this is a very important part of the lessons of the report—only when they have in Parliament a degree of understanding, and a degree of consensus, that will make the actions acceptable. That I believe did not exist, and for the Opposition now to say that the Government should have taken action of that kind—if that is what the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, meant—is I believe in the circumstances difficult to maintain. But perhaps the noble Lord, Lord
Stewart of Fulham, will reply to that point—
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? He is making a pretty good party political speech himself. What I in fact said was that, in my view, the government were responsible for a number of actions which could well have given the regime in Buenos Aires the impression that we were no longer interested in the Falklands; and that emerges clearly from the evidence in the report. Is the noble Lord saying that we have no right in this House to criticise the report?
Lord Beloff: My Lords, I would myself agree that the report brings up these points. The report states (and I am inclined to agree with it) that even if the decisions had been taken differently—and I think that in many cases, with hindsight, one would have
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expected them to have been taken differently—things might not have been different.
I am not an uncritical admirer of the report. I believe that a mistake was made in not enlisting the services of professional historians. I consider that the report concentrates rather too narrowly on a particular set of events and a particular set of considerations, which would have been much enriched if there had been the services of someone such as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, who has contributed some important matter to our deliberations this evening. But I do not think that it amounts to saying that there were actions which the Government could have taken, with popular public approval, which would have been so convincing of our determination that the Argentinians would have held back.
I would go further. I would say also that I would agree with the criticism of the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, that it is a pity that the financial aspects of the constraints were not explored. There is evidence from the inter-war period, where the documents are available, of the way in which those charged with financial responsibilities tended to believe that they could also make policy as to the way in which those responsibilities were discharged. Although not much was made of that point, I think that it is a genuine one.
In my view the report's most important lacuna—because it points towards the future, and we have been repeatedly asked to look at the future—is that it does not ask the question which seems to me to be essential to understanding the position that arose and the war that happened. The question is: why did General Galtieri think that once he got the islands by a coup de main—it was not really an invasion; one can hardly call it an invasion against a dozen or so marines—we would in the end accept it?
There are various reasons why he might have thought that. They have been referred to in passing by a number of noble Lords, though they do not appear in the report. One of them lies in a feeling abroad that Britain was not going to interrupt the procession of imperial abandonment for a relatively small territory and an even smaller number of people; that Britain would go on behaving as it had on the whole behaved, and that the very different circumstances of the islands were not taken into account.
The second, I think, which may account for General Galtieri's confidence, was a belief that he may have acquired that the United States had come to view him and his régime as an important part of the security of the American continent and that they, as Britain's closest ally, would suffice to prevent Britain from taking action which would lead to his troops being turned out of the islands. Indeed, there is public evidence to this effect and I think it is a pity that two distinguished servants of Government who have been mentioned by more than one noble Lord, our Ambassador at the United Nations and our Ambassador at Washington, were not asked to give their views—they were not interviewed by the Franks Committee—about the international political background. It remains to some extent, therefore, a mystery, more of a mystery perhaps to others than to ourselves.

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There is one other issue which is quite essential; and you may say that it is not so much lack of historians or lack of historical imagination but simply a question of time, the pressures of time, which led to the report nowhere indicating to the reader the importance, if any, of the Falkland Islands as such or indeed of their dependencies. Is this an important part of the world or is it not an important part of the world? And noble Lords in the course of our debate have differed as to that. We know that many people in Argentina, in Chile and in other countries think that the Antarctic and the Falkland Island dependencies (which are in a sense a gateway to the Antarctic) are of considerable importance, strategic, economic, political. Therefore, it seems that when one inquires into the origins of a war of this kind some indication might have been given of the committee's view as to whether we were only concerned with the admitted rather disagreeable fate which the Falkland islanders would have under Argentinian rule or—and this explains perhaps the assistance that we eventually got from the United States—whether we were concerned with the role which these islands and the other dependencies might take in the future; because that view would surely tell us to what extent the various peaceful solutions for the future which have been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and others, have a chance of success and
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a chance of commanding attention in the international community.
There are still some very odd things about the story—like the detective story about "the dog that barked in the night; but he didn't"; why for some six years successive Governments (beginning with the Government of which noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite were members) allowed an occupation of a piece of territory in Southern Thule which was within the area over which we claimed sovereign rights. The Franks Committee mention this; but they never explain it; they never go into why and what were the considerations which made us feel that we could, as it were, let this derogation from our sovereignty go by default.
I think that the committee, under the constraints they had, have produced a series of arguments which lead them to the conclusions they have and which I think it is idle to try to upset. But there are still matters to which we shall have to come back when perhaps, with passion subsiding, we can look at these events in the general context which, as we were reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, and again by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, must underlie all our thinking on these as on other events on the international scene.
10 p.m.
Viscount Hanworth: My Lords, at this time of night one ought to consider three alternatives: first, to remove one's name altogether from the list of speakers; secondly, not to use one's speech but to refer to other speeches with which one may agree or disagree; thirdly, to give the speech one originally intended with possibly some alterations. I am going to adopt the third alternative because although much of what I wish to say has already been said, it has not been said in the same way, and that will probably be the quickest way for me to complete my speech.
I suggest that it is really rather pointless talking about the few possible mistakes which the Government may have made just before or during the Falklands campaign. I submit it is scratching around in a rather arid desert. The real failures in my view go far deeper, and both this and previous Governments are to blame for failing to grasp the nettle and for boxing Britain into an impossible situation.
As events have turned out, the money already spent and required for military purposes alone could have made every Falkland islander a multi-millionaire. Yes, I know—and I agree—that we had to be prepared to fight, if only to demonstrate to the world that the use of force to achieve political ends will not be tolerated. But the situation should never have arisen. The war could almost certainly have been avoided, and the ultimate prospects of the islanders greatly improved, if we had been able to agree to give sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback agreement.
If, on the other hand, we were determined to preserve sovereignty, then we should have clearly said that this was not negotiable and taken the necessary steps to safeguard the position from a military point of view. As it was, negotiations were little more than a delaying tactic, with no advantage being taken from the delay. 1 am sorry to say it, but never, never should we have given a pledge that the islanders' views should be paramount. Important, yes; paramount, no. To take this view meant neglecting all other people concerned. For example, our taxpayers will now have to provide billions of pounds, with an enormous continuing annual expenditure. We completely ignored the interests of some 10,000 Britishers in Argentina. As it turns out, we have gravely weakened our contribution to NATO and brought sadness to the relatives of those killed and injured in the war.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said that a leaseback arrangement, which he favoured, would have probably been politically unacceptable by Parliament without education, and I can well appreciate that. But, on the other hand, I do not go along with him in the view that this would have made the negotiations impossible. After all, you could take another point of view, and that is that if the Argentines had realised that we really were prepared to do this and were merely prevented from doing it at the moment, we might in fact have found negotiations easier. As it was, they did not believe that our negotiations had any purpose at all—and they were right.
We have also to consider that we should have tried to get across to the Falkland Islanders the facts of life and their own interests, and their pure emotions were not really very relevant to a very difficult point of view.
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All this should have been done, starting years and years ago. I hope that we will never again give a pledge regarding a community's view as paramount. It is equivalent to giving a dependant a blank cheque on one's account. Moreover, no community, Britain included, can give a sensible answer to an emotional issue without having time to assimilate the facts.
I should like to end by emphasising that I was never against using force, if we had to, but that I still believe the terms we offered to Argentina after the fleet sailed were unacceptable to any Argentine, and once again we hid these behind so-called negotiations. Our Prime Minister has the undeniable merit of forcefulness in carrying through a policy but, alas! I hardly think of statesmanship or possibly flexibility of mind. I do not propose to dwell on the future. I would only say that I think the ideas of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, are worthy of very serious consideration. There is no doubt whatever, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and others have said, that the present situation cannot endure indefinitely. Other solutions must be found to the present "fortress" policy.
10.2 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, may I also be allowed to congratulate the chairman and members of the review committee on what has been described by my noble friend Lord Home as a fair report and in no way flawed, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, was disposed to suggest, or indeed marred by the criticism raised by my noble friend Lord Beloff. May I also heartily endorse the many expressions of gratitude which have been made to my noble friend Lord Carrington from all sides of the House for his wholly efficient and selfless service to the state.
At this late hour, there is not really much to say that has not been said. My main concerns no longer exist. It is, however, idle to pretend that there is no political element in this debate. The conduct of policy by this Administration has been vindicated not only by the report but also by noble Lords who have spoken earlier in the debate. The Foreign Office has been vindicated. It is agreed on all sides, to take only some examples from the speeches of my noble friend Lord Carrington and those of the noble Lords, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, Lord Chalfont, and Lord Buxton of Alsa, that our only policy, now that we are permitted to protect our people from the instant threat of further aggression, is Fortress Falklands. This is a policy which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, was disposed to describe to your Lordships as "crazy", though the reasons given for his view were not readily plain to me, and which the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, finds unacceptable, as I understand it. For, as my noble friend Lord Home observed when giving his authoritative assessment of the real interests of the islanders, in contra-distinction to the perceived interests to which my noble friend Lord Soames referred, we are talking not about what will happen in 20 to 30 years' time or the prospects of some international treaty, but about what is happening now.
If the key to that tomorrow lies in that metaphysical distinction between what are the real and the perceived interests, so be it. But today we are too close to the trauma and horrors of that occupation to be able to indulge in the exercise of drawing that distinction.

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Indeed, as I understand the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, he accepts that the climate is not now right, but in the long run it is, no doubt, the wish of all noble Lords to seek resolution by negotiation rather than war, if possible.
As my noble friend the Leader of the House truly stated, in 1982 there was no new situation. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Carrington might well have sensed that he was back in the reign of George III, who was constrained to seek the advice of Parliament in a similar dilemma about a war with dim prospects, then with Spain, or a shameful peace. As the report finds that no policy could have prevented resort to arms by the Argentines, may I inquire what relevancy it has to suggest—if I do not misunderstand the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn—that Her Majesty's Government's policy could not have been worse? For his own Administration, when in office, pursued the same policy as this Administration, as was pointed out forcefully by my noble friend Lord Soames. May I say a brief—
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord would not want to misquote me. I have no recollection of saying anything in the sense that he has just said. Perhaps we had both better read Hansard in the morning. It may have been my Welsh accent that misled him.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, maybe it is my Scottish sense of understanding. I apologise to the noble Lord if I have misunderstood, and it was certainly not wilful. May I say a brief word or two about the wishes of the islanders, disagreeing, if I may respectfully do so, with the views just expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, as affording any fair criticism of either my right honourable friend the Prime Minister or of her Administration. I should also like to say a word about the transmission of signals, and about some matters of current concern, and I will then conclude.
On the question of the wishes of the islanders, the report endorses the policy which accorded paramount importance to the wishes of the islanders—a fact which Dr. Johnson failed to take into account in 1771, when he wrote that it would be manifestly absurd to go to war about them. It is the factor which constituted the stumbling block, as I understood the speech of my noble friend Lord Soames, over 200 years later in September, 1981, according to the report, when it was suggested in negotiations with Argentina that the present status of the islands could not be maintained. This was not acceptable to the islanders who were not interested in leaseback, any more than they were in condominium.
Hence the report finds that the pursuit of the policy of my noble friend Lord Carrington—protracted negotiations, no concession on sovereignty—was wholly justified, albeit that it carried the risk, though not the certainty, of a serious act of aggression, as distinct from the pinpricks of the past. The wishes of the islanders having precedence precludes resort to the International Court of Justice, as the principle of self-determination has not as yet been accepted as constituting an international custom or a general principle
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of law as part of the jurisdiction of that court. It is of passing interest, perhaps, that we offered to submit this ancient dispute for resolution by the court in 1951, but that that offer was refused by Argentina.
May I say a word about the transmission of signals. This report refutes the charge that we contributed to the invasion by the transmission of false signals as to our intentions—a point relied upon by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, in his measured criticism of the conduct of the Government. The findings show that it was Argentina, bent on resort to force, which transmitted the false signals and went out of its way to mask its intentions to take us by surprise. The following questions arise. First, if false signals were transmitted, having regard to the findings of the report what relevance have they? Secondly, if we had reacted as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, and to some extent as was later suggested by my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard, the situation, according to my noble friend Lord Carrington—and I, for one, trust his judgment—would have been worse, not better.
Thirdly, the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, blames the domestic policy of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, saying that it was due to savings of expenditure on the defence budget, and so forth. The noble Lord appears to wish to align himself—a strange alliance—with Victorian Prime Ministers. Presumably he refers to Lord Palmerston. But I wonder, and I expect your Lordships wonder, what policy the noble Lord's party would have pursued, if we read with care the speeches of his right honourable friend Mr. Foot in another place. The criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, however sincerely motivated his criticism may be—I question not his motives—is without objective foundation and, in my submission, wholly misconceived.
Since 1771, when we resettled the islands after Spain's armed intervention the year before, we have stood on our right of discovery in 1592 and our landing in the 1690s. There is a very wide gulf between what we as a nation can accept when there is no immediate threat of force against our people and what we shall demand when that threat is imminent or has materialised. That threat persists. So long as it persists we can only pursue that policy with dim prospects and learn to live with it: never to opt for that shameful peace.
10.19 p.m.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I want to follow the example of the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, who said that much of what he anticipated he would say had already been said. There have been quite a number of remarkable speeches. I thought that the examination made by noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Cledwyn, was admirable, fair and just. Because it was admirable, fair and just, and truthful, quite naturally it annoyed the Benches opposite. If it had been lacking in spirit or determination the noble Lord would probably have sat down to a few muffled cheers from the Conservative Benches.
Then we had the remarkable proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Beloff—and I am sorry that he is not

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in his place, He finds it utterly distasteful and almost an outrage to the British Constitution that Her Majesty's Opposition in another place and in this Chamber should dare to criticise Her Majesty's Government—particularly if it is a Conservative one. The only person who would have given him one and a half cheers for that would have been General Galtieri.
I want to place on record my honour of the forces in that campaign. Irrespective of what caused it and all the preparations or lack of preparations, what is beyond all peradventure is the magnificent endeavours of the British forces. I wish to pay my respects to those who were maimed or wounded and those who died. I hope that I will never have to say that again in this House. That perhaps is the real lesson of this remarkable Franks Report.
I find the committee's terms of reference also quite remarkable, but at this time of night I will not go into detail on that subject. When one reads the report, marks it, and then rereads what one has marked, it seems that there were a number of errors and a number of miscalculations but that nobody made them. The only person to whom is attached any degree of blame in the Franks Report is the Almighty; it would appear that everything was an act of God. 1 do not believe that this sort of thing helps us in our endeavours, because we are living in a very dangerous world.
I am bound to say that when I listened to the otherwise admirable speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, I gasped for a moment when, if I interpreted his remarks correctly, the noble Lord said that we must keep an eye on the Soviet Union. Perhaps we will be sending a task force there. That would be a very bright thing to do, I am sure! I do not think such a thing can be in the mind of any serious person, and I hope that it was a genuine lapse on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, will permit me to intervene, I believe there must have been some terrible misunderstanding. I did say in the course of my speech that I thought there was a threat to the security of the West from the Soviet Union. If the noble Lord does not believe that, perhaps he will say so.
Lord Molloy: Of course I believe that, my Lords; but I was trying to say that because of that threat, and in view of the threat that was made when the Falklands issue began, perhaps we should take a little longer in arriving at a peaceful situation and follow the sane policy of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—to talk, talk and talk until we arrive at a solution. To the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, I shall just say that it will be much more important to carry out the policies which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, endeavoured to get the British people to understand if there should ever be a dangerous situation involving the Soviet Union—more so than in the case of the Falklands campaign. I hope that this House will thoroughly endorse that statement.
As I was saying before I was interrupted, when we examine in depth Lord Franks' Report we find a hidden rather than a blazoned reason and damaging charge of weakness and equivocation, despite the
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achievement in earlier years of preventing a military confrontation. I do not wish to apportion blame or say who was right and who was wrong at this stage in my remarks. What is beyond peradventure is that during the period of 10 or 12 years, under both Labour and Conservative Governments, because of endeavours to come to some agreement there was no war, no confrontation and no loss of life. If we could have gone on in that way we might perhaps ultimately have arrived at some form of solution, as we shall have to do in the end.
It may well be that we all have to share the blame in various degrees, but I believe the lion's share of the blame in the last instalment is this Government's. More than any previous Administration, Tory or Labour, it seems to me, on reading the inner depths of this report, the Government were massive in muddle, resolute in equivocation, somewhat competent frustraters and they seemed to be bereft of any firm policy. If they were not most of those things, why did Lord Carrington resign? We have to look at such behaviour as this as creating a terribly dangerous situation.
I will give credit for this fact, that it was terribly difficult for any democratic Government, such as we have in this country, whether Tory or Labour, to deal with a totalitarian junta. This, I believe, was not appreciated by our democratic allies. We had massive support in the initial stages from the United States of America, but I do not think they really understood the difficulties, never having had the experience of dealing with a junta as fascist as that which existed in Argentina or even being prepared to talk to them, distasteful though it was. I do not believe this situation was generally understood by those who have enjoyed democracy over the past 30 odd years in Europe, and much longer in the United States.
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, at the risk of boring the noble Lord by interrupting him yet again, would he say that General Haig's efforts were not a question of talking, trying to converse with the Argentines?
Lord Molloy: My Lords, as far as I understand the noble Baroness, she could not have heard the first part of what I said, about the admirable support we had from our allies, particularly the USA. Later there was a dwindling of that support; there was a confusion. Indeed, General Haig resigned. I think that proves what I am trying to say: that they did not really understand the difficulties of being an honest broker between a fascist régime and an ancient democratic regime like ours. Like our Foreign Secretary, their Secretary of State paid a very full price indeed.
Therefore, I would say that although Lord Carrington's efforts, his suggestion to educate public opinion in the United Kingdom and indeed in the Falkland Islands, particularly about leaseback, were abandoned, I believe we have to give earnest consideration to reintroducing them, and that we should listen to those who have had experience in the Falkland Islands. I am bound to admit that I would not be able to say what I am saying were it not for conversations and discussions I have had with people who have had considerable experience in the islands

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themselves, who know some of the misgivings and some of the misunderstandings of the islanders, just as much as they were here at home. I believe that although this policy was abandoned and the war has taken place, we have now to look very seriously at whether we ought to go back to that proposition first enunciated by Lord Carrington.
I happen also to believe that the economy of Great Britain would almost break its back if we indulged foolishly in a policy of Fortress Falkland. We would at some stage have to abandon it; we could not go on with it, having tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of men, ships, signals, all that is involved for year in and year out. The time would come when we would think we were fairly safe and we would withdraw, and some new Galtieri would start performing. So I do not believe that particular policy is viable.
I am one of those in this House who have always admired, and still very much do admire, the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. I cannot understand why he is not still Foreign Secretary. I believe it was Clement Attlee who said that if someone agrees with every single word he says, be suspicious of him. In the main I have agreed with nearly every single word that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said, but not always. I did not agree with him on why he resigned. I believe that he was a very powerful restraining element on the Prime Minister. He has a first-class understanding of foreign affairs, which she has not, and, therefore, his value was not merely to his party but of much greater value to the nation. I hope that he will be restored in some way in the not too distant future.
The noble Lord said that there was much more examination of the Falklands issue under the present Administration than under previous Administrations. He should have been in the other place when I was there a few years ago. I listened to the heated and great debates there—indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, proved it—and the massive debates that went on in the Upper Chamber. He was right when he said that the Labour side was horrified at the idea of doing any deal with a fascist junta. The Conservative side did not feel that anything was to be gained by dealing with such people who were threatening our shipping. So there was not much chance, I readily admit, but the fact is that the issues were discussed and the policies of the then Government, particularly Mr. Callaghan's Government, were enough to show, with the "Endurance" and a few other warships, and with the signals that were coming back, that we could deter the junta, even from 7,000 miles away, from behaving in the way it did.
I would refer to the endeavours and efforts of Mr. Ridley, who must have had a terrible time. We can be very sorry for Mr. Ridley, but we must have the courage to say that he was not given a fair and sensible hearing in the other place by Members on all sides. We can rectify that by examining what Mr. Ridley had to say and seeing whether we can, in this House, give him a better, decent and civilised hearing, not merely in the interests of our own country, but, ultimately, in the interests of mankind as a whole.
There are many things that I should like to say, but
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the noble Baroness has to wind up the debate and my noble friend has yet to speak. Therefore, I shall merely say that, concerning the future of the Falklands, I believe we should go back to the policy adumbrated by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and Mr. Ridley. We need a campaign to teach and understand, both at home and in the Falkland Islands, what the issues really are. When the noble Baroness replies in this context, will she explain exactly what is the Falklands Islands Company? This question is being asked more and more every day. How much land in the Falklands Islands, that people died for, does it own? Why do the Falkland Islanders themselves look on the company as anything but helpful? Let us not forget that many men died. We have a right to an answer. It may be a decent and wholesome answer, but there is a danger that something is lurking behind the fact that no one will tell us openly what the Falklands Islands Company is, what land it owns, and what are its negotiations with the islanders. All this will help in getting back to a policy of campaigning to teach and understand.
It will be necessary for us to talk with the Argentines and, within reason, as soon as possible. I put this question to your Lordships' House: how many of us, when we were swanning over the Rhine, or wherever it was, in 1945, would have said to our tank crews, our companies, or whatever they were, "Look, boys, in two years' time we shall be sitting down talking to the Germans about business and commerce and helping them to rebuild their country"? That observation could apply also to the Italians and the Japanese. At some time we shall have to talk. Perhaps, and who knows, by that sort of gesture we might then at the same time be aiding the real democratic forces in the Argentine. It will be a hard task, but it will be better to waste words initially than blood and lives later.
If there is any country that can pull off something of this magnitude, that has 700 years of experience, that I still believe can lead the world in civilised behaviour, can pull us back from dangerous brinks, can give an example, even after errors have been made, of how to recoup from them, make the best of them, and take danger out of a situation, I believe that it is this country. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that, and that perhaps we can get on to this last strand of endeavouring to remove the danger which still exists in the Falkland Islands, to ensure a fair and just peace, not only in the interests of the people of this country and in the Falkland Islands, but in the interests of all mankind.
10.36 p.m.
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein: My Lords, like all noble Lords who have spoken I, too, should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his team for this fascinating report, and to say that I agree totally with the conclusions. I should also like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, who has just spoken, that I find myself in quite some measure of agreement with much of what he has said, although not with all of it.
As instructed by the noble Leader last week, I have read the whole report, but as nightwatchman from these Back-Benches I propose to confine my remarks to the history of the negotiations between 1965 and 1980, and to make a few comments about the future. Throughout the long history of this report, and long

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before, Argentina has sought to press its claim to sovereignty by negotiation. It was therefore interesting to read and to hear that leaseback, which was—and I believe still is—the most viable formula, emerged so early in the negotiating process. What also emerges from the report is the progressive importance given to the views of the islanders. It started with consultation and respect for their interests; then their wishes were to be followed; and finally their views became paramount, overriding all other British interests in the region. This process of increasing paramountcy, which has been referred to by several noble Lords, reached a climax with the savaging of Nick Ridley in the other place in December, 1980. I believe that this situation came about partly due to the natural intransigence of the islanders, who wanted nothing more than to be left alone; partly due to the Legislative Council in Port Stanley; but mainly due to the small but exceedingly powerful Back-Bench lobby organised by the Falkland Islands Committee.
I should also like to join in the tributes that have been paid to my noble friend Lord Carrington, who shares with the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, who will speak next, the honour of being the only Foreign Minister to visit Latin America when in office. I was privileged to accompany him as a member of his team when the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, visited Latin America, which visit has already been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton.
My noble friend Lord Carrington, in a very fine speech this afternoon, said that he rejected the proposals for a campaign of public education on the Falklands Islands issue. It seems to me that this was a great pity; but, of course, he was quite right at the time, since it was far too late—any campaign should have been started long before. So I conclude that if there is any blame in the history of the negotiations it is due to successive Governments of both parties—and, indeed, as my noble friend Lord Soames pointed out, to successive Oppositions as well—which lacked the political will to overrule the powerful parliamentary Falklands faction.
But all that is now past and we must concern ourselves with the future. The islands are to become a fortress which, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has pointed out so cogently, will distort our defence policy for many years. I should, therefore, like your Lordships to consider three important facts which may or may not find their way into the unusual book which has been proposed by my noble friend Lord Cork and Orrery.
First, the Argentine claim to the islands will not go away and is being maintained as strongly today as ever, despite miltary defeat and economic disaster. The claim derives from the Spanish succession and is based on an interpretation of uti possidetis. This complex legal proposition has important implications for the territorial integrity of all other Latin American states, and is one reason why they so consistently support Argentina.
Secondly, the United Nations has called for the recommencement of negotiations. If we ignore this call, which was passed by a large majority at the General Assembly, there will be further resolutions with greater majorities and also calls to the same tune in other international fora. Whatever noble Lords may
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think about the United Nations—and several opinions have been expressed about its effectiveness—there can be no doubt that we were loud in its praises when it passed Resolution 502. We cannot just turn the United Nations on and off when it suits us. Thirdly, the investment that is required to develop the economic resources in the Falkland Islands, which have been clearly outlined in the Shackleton Report, can never prosper in a climate of such uncertainty. If the islanders' interests, as opposed to their wishes, are to be served, investment must take place in combination with other nations and in a secure atmosphere.
Argentina is a proud nation with which we have had a long history of collaboration and friendship. We even helped to bring it into existence in the first place. Their Government have made a catastrophic blunder and are in total disarray. As victors in the last recent tragic conflict, we must eventually exend an olive branch, as otherwise we shall have the economic burden with us for a very long time, with no conceivable benefit. The early renewal, therefore, of diplomatic relations becomes essential.
There can be no lasting peace in the South Atlantic, and consequently no long-term future for the islands or the islanders, if we view this problem unilaterally and do not involve Argentina. Several noble Lords have suggested that we must wait until that country has a democratic Government, but I can assure this House from my long experience that if we wait that long, it will be much more difficult. No Government could ever be elected in Argentina unless it was committed irrevocably to securing sovereignty, not necessarily administration, of the islands.
I have spoken about our relations with Latin America many times before, but never has this subject seemed so important as it does today in these new circumstances. I therefore hope that when my noble friend replies to this debate she will be able to give some glimmer of hope that our real long-term interests in Latin America will receive proper consideration in due course.
10.45 p.m.
Lord Stewart of Fulham: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, and certain other noble Lords have suggested during the debate that there is something ignoble in raking over the embers and digging up the past, and that we ought rather to talk and think about the future. It is understandable that noble Lords should say that, but if we follow that doctrine we stultify one of the main purposes of Parliament—and let us remember the situation on that Saturday in April when the House met.
We from our side of the House made it clear—and I think the Government will not question that we lived up to this—that we should do nothing to make the Government's task difficult in the military job of resisting and defeating the aggression; that they could count on our full support for that. That we did. But we also made it clear—and it was not only on our side of the House that it was said—that later on, when the conflict was over, there must be an inquiry into how we had ever got into this position. That was a perfectly proper inquiry to make.

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We cannot therefore now say, the report being before us, "Don't let us discuss it; it is too sordid to rake over the past". We need to consider why it was that things fell out as they did, because that will help us to avoid similar errors in the future and be something of a guide to the future handling of this matter. It is of course much more attractive to talk about what we ought to do immediately in the Falklands, and about what should be our future policy towards the Falklands and the Argentine.
That is a more attractive and more interesting subject than, as it is described, raking over the past. For that reason I shall have a few words to say about it at the end of my speech. However, it is not, and is not meant to be, the main subject of this debate. The subject of this debate is an examination of the Government's handling of affairs in the years that led up to the invasion.
I think I might say this. The noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, described how the Franks Report reminded him of the Stanley Holloway poem where the magistrate gave his opinion that no one was really to blame. Similarly, I myself was reminded of a rather macabre episode with which I had been connected earlier. Some years ago, in another place, I was the chairman of the committee to which the Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, reports. At one of our meetings we were considering the case of a man serving a sentence of imprisonment who had fallen ill and needed to have his leg amputated. The operation was carried out with great skill and expertise, but unfortunately on the wrong leg.
Some of the officials concerned endeavoured to argue that, regrettable as this result was, there was in fact no maladministration in the matter, and it therefore did not fall within the Ombudsman's province. The Ombudsman gave the robust common-sense ruling that when you have a result such as this there must have been some maladministration somewhere. Similarly, when I read in the Franks Report the words, "No blame or criticism", I really had to remember that the invasion of the islands had occurred. This was something that might have occurred a number of years previously and which previous Governments, in one way or another—perhaps by skill, perhaps by luck—had managed to avoid. But now this appalling thing had actually happened. The wrong leg had been amputated.
It was difficult to believe that there was no criticism and no blame going around anywhere. Of course, when one came to read the report, as well as the conclusions, one saw that time and again in the report there were sharp criticisms of the way the Government behaved. It can be said that even if the Government had made none of those mistakes the result would have been the same. That may be so; but there is no proving it one way or the other, and it is no excuse for the Government's mistakes. What we are doing, therefore—and here I am, in effect, replying to Lord Beloff—is saying that we are not satisfied with the conclusion of the report because it contradicts the contents of the report as you go through them in detail.
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Now I do not propose to do that at great length, because so much has been said already, but there are a few salient points that I want to bring out.
A forcible attempt by the Argentine to seize the Falkland Islands had been a possibility for a long time. The aim of Governments had been to prevent that from happening, partly by the skilful use of diplomacy—by seeing whether any peaceable solution of the problem could be found in discussions with Argentina—partly by taking reasonable precautions against it, and, above all, by making it quite clear beyond doubt that Britain would resist an attempt to seize the Falkland Islands if it were made. One of the most serious charges against the present Government is that on that point of certainty they fell down. Gradually it became to observers in the Argentine less and less certain that Britain would have both the will and power to resist if the attempt were made.
When the present Government came to power, the situation, which had always had its ups and downs, was at a point where the temperature was rising. There had been, a year or two earlier, the military takeover of the Government of the Argentine, the Argentine had been disappointed and frustrated by the arbitration ruling given on its dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel and might well be considered to be sore, frustrated and angry and looking for somewhere else to turn.
I want to look particularly at the situation which events had reached in the summer of 1981. At that time there was a JIC assessment which, after discussing various possibilities, expressly envisaged the possibility of a full-scale invasion of the islands. That was only one such warning. It is true that some of the warnings that came, either from intelligence sources or embassies, were rather cautiously worded and suggested that there might only be, to begin with, say, the harassment of shipping, the seizure of uninhabited territories and so on. But several of them mentioned, as that assessment of the summer of 1981, that invasion could not be discounted. That phrase was used on more than one occasion. One of the criticisms of the Government is that those warnings were not given the weight they deserved.
It was about that time—when that was the JIC's assessment of the situation—that a meeting was held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the conclusions of which were that they thought we should try for leaseback, that a scheme of public education would be needed for that, and that, at the same time, attention should be given to preparing contingency plans. That sounds reasonable enough; on the one hand, that you seek a diplomatic approach, while on the other, if that does not come about, you make contingency plans against possible action that might be taken by the Argentine if diplomacy does not succeed.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, then Foreign Secretary, turned down the proposals about leaseback, and he gave us today a very powerful account of the reasons for doing so, and I do not criticise him on that point. But that meant, of course, that if you were closing that door—a door towards trying to solve the problem by conciliation—you must give all the more attention to the preparation of contingency plans, civil and military, against action by the Argentine. Plans of a kind were prepared. They even got to the point of

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receiving the approval of the defence chiefs. But they did not reach the Defence Committee because that committee at that time was not discussing the Falklands Islands at all. Several references have been made to this matter, on which the Government's answers have been at their weakest. The undoubted fact is that the Defence Committee did not discuss the Falkland Islands from January 1981 until April 1982, when the invasion was upon it.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said, "After all, one does not want matters conducted by perpetual committee". Perhaps not, but the Defence Committee has the merit that it can make decisions. The contingency plans had been patiently and diligently prepared in the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence and could have been considered, with decisions taken on them, if that committee had met. The trouble at this time was that we were not having perpetual committee, we were having perpetual minutes from the Foreign Secretary and perpetual office meetings; but not a committee meeting on the Falklands issue, which would have turned all those deliberations into actual decisions for action. That seems to me to be a matter for serious criticism, and we are obliged to notice that the chairman of the Defence Committee is the Prime Minister.
May I just draw the attention of the House to paragraph 152 of the report. It describes how the Prime Minister saw a telegram on 3rd March which the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires had sent, describing the alarming worsening of the situation. When the Prime Minister saw this telegram she wrote on it: "We must make contingency plans". Her private secretary wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 8th March, four or five days later, copying his letter to the Minister of Defence in the Cabinet Office, recording the Prime Minister's comments and saying that he understood that it might be the intention of Lord Carrington to bring a further paper on the Falkland Islands to the Defence Committee in the fairly near future, and that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might think that helpfully this could contain an account of contingency planning.
It seems to me that there is a declining emphasis and urgency as that paragraph proceeds. It reminds me rather of the person who said, when trying to explain a particular idiom of a foreign tongue, that it is like the Spanish "mañaña" but it has not the same sense of urgency. From the Prime Minister's Lists we must make contingency plans for the various "mights", "coulds", "could helpfully". It looks as if the machinery of government, as has been suggested by other critics, was suffering from a kind of paralysis in its reactions to the Falklands emergency. The swift commands of the Prime Minister were not being translated into action and she, apparently, was not doing anything to see that they should be. The Defence Committee, of course, did ultimately meet, but by that time the invasion had already occurred.
I would hesitate to pronounce on the proposed changes in the Joint Intelligence Committee, but if the idea is that instead of having a Foreign Office chairman one should have a chairman appointed by the Prime Minister, then if the Prime Minister is somebody whose orders and instructions run into the sand in this fashion, I doubt whether the change would be to the national advantage.
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My noble friend Lord Walston drew our attention, with great wealth of detail, to the many warnings that came from embassies and intelligence sources and how they were repeatedly neglected. He also made a point that has not been made elsewhere but is, I think, important. Not until the last minute does there seem to have been an approach to the United States, and one wonders very much why not.
While all this was going on, several other things were occurring which were not lost on the Argentinians. The British Nationality Bill had made its appearance. It would be difficult to say exactly how much weight observers in the Argentine paid to this Bill, but, prima facie, it looked as if this Government were not greatly interested in the Falkland Islands. That the Government themselves have attempted, by their decision, with the help of the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, to put right; and I trust they will see that that attempt is pushed through in another place as resolutely as I trust it will go through this House. By itself, that factor might not have mattered. But at a time when all the other signs were drawing attention to the increased danger of the situation, to push through Parliament a nationality Bill of that kind cannot have been helpful.
That is still more true of the matter that has been mentioned so often, and which must be mentioned again: the decision about Her Majesty's Ship "Endurance", and the proposed sale of the "Invincible". I need not go over what happened there. The Foreign Office kept asking that the decision about the "Endurance" should be altered. The Ministry of Defence, with the Prime Minister's support, kept refusing. That was the situation until, of course, the invasion altered the whole position.
When one looks at the comparative roles of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence in this matter, one sees that it is not surprising that a good many people came to the conclusion at the beginning of April that the wrong person had resigned. It looked as though the Government had decided to act on a maxim laid down by one of Charles Dickens' characters,
"Better hang the wrong fellow, than no fellow".
The nation wanted a scapegoat; unfortunately, they got the person who was not responsible for the trouble. Today, in a most moving speech, to which we all listened with great respect and interest, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I think was really saying that he and his colleagues were ritual victims, in a sacrifice which would enable the nation to obtain unity for the prosecution of the war. Well, I think that that may well be so, but I am not sure whether the choice of the wrong victim really meant that what happened was in the national interest.
In addition to those points, there was the neglect of the Argentine military preparations. The character who appears fascinatingly and, as it were, through the mists in the report, the British defence attaché in Buenos Aires, clearly thought that there was a good deal going on and wished that he had the resources to enable him to obtain, and send back to his Government, further and more detailed information about Argentine military preparations.
What is clear is that those preparations were certainly going on. They must have been going on for

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the invasion to have been launched when it was launched. There was also the matter of the Argentine press. One of the criticisms of the Joint Intelligence Committee is that it pays too much attention to secret sources of information and does not just go out and read the papers. I think that there may be something in that. Certainly to a lay person a study of the Argentine press at that time would have given considerable cause for alarm. So far as we can see, it does not appear to have had any impact on the Government.
So what that means is that in the summer of 1981 the Government had decided to drop one diplomatic possibility—leaseback—while at the same time they had allowed the efforts for making contingency plans to run into the sand. There had been apparent paralysis of the work of the Defence Committee about the Falklands. There was neglect of alarm signals in the Argentine press about Argentine military preparations, and there were actions taken, such as the nationality Bill, and the decision about "Endurance", that could not but have encouraged the Argentines to think that aggression might succeed.
In relation to any one of those matters, one might say, "Well, we all make mistakes". But really there are here rather a lot of mistakes, all tending in the same direction. I felt obliged to ask myself the question: If it had been a Labour Government that had done, and had not done, all this, what would have been the reaction? Would it have been possible to obtain six persons of the good and great to hold up their hands unanimously and say that there was no criticism or blame? I do not believe it. Nobody else believes it, either. Further, there would not have been all these speeches about, "Don't let's rake over the embers of the past", if the errors had been committed by a Labour Government—
Lord Soames: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for interrupting? It seems to me quite extraordinary that he is saying that were there to have been a Labour Government, the Prime Minister could not have found, say, half a dozen Privy Counsellors who would have had the confidence of both the Government and the Opposition to make such a report and to render it to Parliament.
Lord Stewart of Fulham: My Lords, what I am saying is that if you had found them, they would not have delivered a unanimous verdict of "not guilty" if it had been a Labour Government that was in the dock. And that we all know; we need not be too mealy-mouthed about this. This is how politics works in this country.
We have had this catalogue of error. With that, I conclude what I have to say about the recent matters, the raking over of the past. I would just say a word now about the future. If by Fortress Falklands we mean creating a situation in the Falklands which will make it impossible for the aggression to be renewed, then I am certainly for it, whatever it may entail. That must be what is done at the present time and for the immediate future. And, with that ought to go, so far as possible, the implementation of the measures described in the Shackleton Report.
But, having said that, we have got to accept that that
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can be for only a limited period. After that we must consider the resumption of diplomatic discussions and, in the end, some solution of this problem which involves, as Sir Nicolas Henderson put it, an international dimension. Whether it be through the United Nation, whether it be on the lines of the interim plan proposed by the British Government themselves while the hostilities were on, or whether it is built on the Antarctic Treaty, those are matters that we can consider a little later.
I think that, in view of the feelings in the Falkland Islands, we cannot begin those discussions immediately. Neither can we postpone them indefinitely. I hope the time will come when we are able to take up that task. For, although I believe that this examination of who was to blame was right and necessary, more hopeful, more attractive for the future, is the consideration of whether we can yet find a proper, workable diplomatic solution to this problem.
11.7 p.m.
Baroness Young: My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging and immensely valuable debate on a matter of great importance to the country as a whole. It has been primarily concerned with the past, the causes of and the build-up to the invasion last April of British territory, and with the determined, successful but costly action undertaken for its recovery. It is absolutely right that these events should be the subject of exhaustive examination and of the widest possible debate. Many of your Lordships tonight have looked towards the future and that, too, is right and welcome. This House today paid warm tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and his right honourable colleagues for the admirable thoroughness and clarity of the report which they produced. I should like once more to report the Government's recognition of what, particularly in view of the complexity of the issues and volume of material and the relatively short time available, has been an impressive achievement and a model of its kind.
That said, I must say that I was astonished at the concluding remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, and I should like to say to him that perhaps on reflection he will feel that that was not a suitable criticism to make of the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Franks. We were fortunate that we had six Privy Counsellors who took part in it. It was a committee, the membership of which was agreed, the terms of reference were agreed, and it was in fact good for the country that they reached a unanimous conclusion. Indeed, if I might say this briefly to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, he said that someone must be to blame. The answer perhaps is so clear that he has overlooked it—Argentina.
It is a mark of the quality of the proceedings in this House that we have heard from so many noble Lords who were directly concerned in British foreign policy in the period reviewed by Lord Franks' Committee. They spoke either as former Ministers or as officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We have also heard from two professional historians, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, and from at least two experts on the Falkland Islands, the noble Lord, Lord Buxton, and the noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery. I shall be taking the opportunity to

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respond to the many important comments and views that we have heard, but I should like once again to welcome the presence of my right honourable and noble friend Lord Carrington. His contribution has, if I may say so, dominated our proceedings.
I should like to reflect briefly on one broad conclusion that has emerged clearly from the report of the noble Lord, Lord Franks, and I believe from the debate today, and which is essential to a proper understanding of the Falklands dispute. As the noble Lord, Lord Home, said, it has never been a simple issue capable of easy solution. If it were, it would have been resolved long ago. As so many speakers in the debate have stressed, four British Governments—two Labour and two Conservative—have faced the same dilemma. There has, on the one hand, been a persistent Argentine demand for an early transfer of sovereignty; and, on the other, a deep and enduring reluctance on the part of the Falkland islanders to see any change in their status or way of life. At the time, the islands' geographical position and the growing pressures on Britain's resources imposed inevitable constraints on any Government's ability to defend and support the islands against a strong and often unstable Argentina.
In these circumstances, successive Governments have concluded that it was both in the national interest and in the long-term interest of the islanders to seek a negotiated settlement to the sovereignty dispute, provided—and this has been the essential though necessarily complicated proviso—that any such settlement was in accordance with the islanders' own wishes. The difficulties of resolving such a complex question through negotiation were always clear; and even more clear were the difficult and dangerous consequences both for Britain and for the islanders of the alternative course of confrontation. It is this continuing dilemma, and the consistency of British foreign policy in the face of it, that the report of Lord Franks brings out so well. Throughout the course of the dispute and through previous periods of tension, the central objective was to maintain the negotiating process and to avoid a collision.
Over the years, the options steadily narrowed until only a solution based on leaseback seemed capable of bridging the negotiating gap. I am sure that we were all interested when my noble friend Lord Carrington said that it was the present Government which were the first to talk openly about the leaseback concept. For reasons which we all know, that, too, was blocked; and that was a point that was very well made by my noble friend Lord Soames and referred to as well by my noble friend Lord Montgomery.
By March 1982 tensions had risen, and it was apparent that without some modification in the position of either the Argentines or the islanders negotiations were approaching their end. But they had not yet broken down, and all the evidence which the report sets out in detail was that the period of danger for which the Government should prepare was the second and not the first half of 1982. It was the junta's sudden decision to exploit the South Georgia incident, in a way which Lord Franks concludes could not have been foreseen, which made the crisis come when it did and in the way that it did. But what underlines the report's conclusion is that the cause of the crisis should
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not be sought in a narrow examination of particular decisions or events; it has lain in the logic of this complex and intractable dispute.
I should now like to turn to some of the more specific points raised during the debate. The noble Lords, Lord Cledwyn, Lord Shinwell and Lord Stewart have suggested that after Parliament's rejection of leaseback, the Government's policy was one of drift, and the absence of a meeting of the Defence Committee was evidence of this. This is, of course, as I believe, simply not true. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, the Government's policy towards the Falklands was worked out in a series of ministerial discussions in 1980 and early 1981. The policy was to continue negotiations with Argentina. Discussions in Cabinet and Cabinet committees are primarily for the purpose of reviewing policies and taking fresh decisions.
Up to the New York talks at the end of February 1982, there was no cause for a reconsideration of agreed Government policy. The New York talks were the first round of negotiations for nearly a year. It was after these talks, and not before them, that the prospect for a continuation of negotiations would be clear and discussion in the Defence Committee would have been properly focused. A meeting of the Defence Committee on 16th March was arranged. It was the Argentine reaction to the New York talks, and the consequent need to establish agreed terms of reference for future negotiations endorsed by island councillors and accepted by the Argentines, which delayed this timetable. The details are set out in chapter 2 of the report and I will not rehearse them, but it really is nonsense to suggest that because there was no meeting of the Defence Committee the Government had been operating since early 1981 in some kind of policy vacuum. Ministers were agreed on the policy to be followed and had been kept fully abreast of events by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, whose speech we shall all read very carefully in the Official Report.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, also referred to the Government's policy as having been one of Micawberism, if I may use that phrase. I ask the House to consider what the policy options were in 1981 and early 1982.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. What I did was to quote our Ambassador in Buenos Aires, who described the policy as "Micawberism."
Baroness Young: My Lords, I agree: it was in the letter from the Ambassador in Buenos Aires. If I might return to the policy options in 1981, they were essentially those available to successive Governments during periods of either greater or lesser tension: negotiation or confrontation. The Government could have concluded that negotiations were useless and, by reinforcing the islands, have brought the dialogue to an end. We could deliberately have incurred the costs and penalties of what is described as a Fortress Falklands policy. But would it have been right to do so, or in the interests of Britain or the islanders? We could have chosen to disregard the wishes of the islanders and to impose on them whatever solution was agreed with Argentina. That was not a course which this

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Government could accept. All we could do—as we did—was to avoid any coercion of the islanders but to keep the negotiations going in order to avoid the consequences of their breakdown, and to keep open the prospect of a modification of either islander or Argentine opinion which might allow progress to be made. I have no doubt that that was the right course, and it seems the only sensible and practical policy.
It has also been suggested that in the months before the invasion there were signals of Argentina's aggressive intentions which the Government either ignored or misinterpreted, and that it was clear by early March of last year that negotiations were at an end. My Lords, surely not; the report itself does not bear this out. By early March, tensions had risen and the seriousness of the situation was recognised. The need for a full review of the situation by the Defence Committee was foreseen; but the evidence and the detailed account of the evidence in chapter 2 of the report should be carefully read. This was to the effect that the Argentine Government continued to attach overriding importance to the establishment of its negotiating position and that the talks were not yet dead. All the indications were that there was far from being any consensus within the junta on a possible use of force, that direct Argentine pressures would follow, and not precede, a breakdown of negotiations and that the crucial period would be the second, not the first, half of 1982. That view was fully corroborated by the intelligence which the report sets out and which it accepts as being reliable. It is the evidence at the time which is the main point: it is not hypotheses, aided by hindsight.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, would the noble Baroness give way? Is it not the case that the situation at the time that she is describing was precisely what had been forecast by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, from 1979 onwards?—that there was a grave danger of invasion of the islands if either Fortress Falklands or negotiations without concessions on sovereignty were the options taken by the Government?
Baroness Young: My Lords, the situation is as I have described it and it is, I believe, as set out in the report of the Franks Committee. I do not think there is any discrepancy between those two descriptions and I do not think that it is a valuable contribution, at this late hour, to go back once again on to further hypotheses.
In this situation and on this evidence it would have been wrong for the Government to take action to bring the negotiations to a premature end and to hasten confrontation. The right course was to keep alive the prospect of a peaceful settlement: to go down the road to negotiations while preparing against the contingency of their breakdown. That was what the Government were doing, and it was the junta's opportunist exploitation of the South Georgia incident, which could not have been foreseen, which accelerated events.
Perhaps I may now turn further to the point about contingency planning, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, devoted a great deal of his speech, and which was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, who referred critically to the absence of
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a response to the Prime Minister's question on contingency planning in early March. The Prime Minister's request, as conveyed in her private secretary's letter of 8th March, was that, when Lord Carrington put his proposed paper on Falklands policy to the Overseas and Defence Committee, it should contain an account of contingency planning. That was already precisely the intention.
As the report sets out in paragraphs 108 to 113 and in paragraph 295, civil and military contingency papers had been drawn up in 1981. These were further developed and had been prepared as annexes to the proposed paper for the Defence Committee in March. When it became clear that the Defence Committee meeting, expected in mid-March, would be delayed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office took steps before the South Georgia incident to obtain ministerial authority out of committee for carrying the civil contingency plans forward, as set out in paragraph 155. The military paper was also circulated. So I believe that this criticism is misplaced. The response required was to ensure that contingency planning was undertaken and ready for the expected meeting of the Defence Committee, and this was done; and, indeed, as the Franks Committee recognised, we were able to send the task force.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, referred to HMS "Endurance", and much has been said in the report and elsewhere about the decision to withdraw HMS "Endurance". As, however, to the effect on the I Argentine junta, this must, at the end of the day, be a matter of judgment. It would be wrong and irresponsible to suggest that the Government had any intention of giving a signal that the Falklands were free for the taking, or that they neglected the need to make clear, as we did, that the garrison in the Falklands would remain and that Her Majesty's ships would, from time to time, visit the islands. A number of speakers, including the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, the noble Lord, Lord Walston, and my noble friend the Duke of Portland have referred to Lord Franks' comments on intelligence machinery—
Lord Kennet: My Lords, may I be so bold as to interrupt, before the noble Baroness leaves the question of the "Endurance"? Is the noble Baroness under the impression that any Member of this House this evening, or, indeed, to my knowledge, anywhere else before, has been suggesting that the Government intended to send a signal to the Argentines that they could invade, when they withdrew the "Endurance"?
Baroness Young: My Lords, I have not said that someone in this House had made that particular point. But it has been suggested that there was a signal to the Argentines that we were no longer prepared to defend the islands or to have a presence in the South Atlantic, and I was clearing that point. In fact, as we know, the ship was not withdrawn, but there has been discussion of the effect that this matter had on the Argentine junta. As I have indicated, it was, indeed, a matter of judgment.
If I may, I will now turn to the questions that were raised about intelligence. I hope I made clear in my opening speech that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has accepted the Franks Committee's

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proposal that the chairmanship of the Joint Intelligence Committee should be held full-time by a member of the Cabinet Office. He will have direct access to the Prime Minister, in the same way as the heads of the security and intelligence agencies.
A number of noble Lords paid tribute to the professionalism and valour of the British armed forces. They included the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, my noble friend Lady Vickers and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside. My noble friend Lord Carrington reminded us that our servicemen and women are all volunteers, and I share his belief that there has been a resurgence of national self-respect and confidence as a result of their success in the South Atlantic.
I should like to add my own tribute, not only to the servicemen and women who sailed with the task force, but also to the countless number of service and civilian personnel who made possible the preparation and dispatch of the task force in a remarkably short space of time, and who kept it supplied with ammunition, fuel and stores along a supply line stretching half-way round the world. Let us not forget, despite all that has been said in today's debate, and which I have no doubt will continue to be said and has been said publicly in criticisms of contingency planning, that within a matter of 10 weeks British forces had sailed 8,000 miles, effectively neutralised the Argentine navy, fought off an air force which outnumbered British aircraft by more than six to one and brought to surrender an entrenched and well supplied enemy, who at all times outnumbered our forces. By any standards this was a brilliant campaign.
Many noble Lords also referred to the work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and paid tribute to their ability and dedication to duty in the service of our country, a view which has been supported by the Franks Committee and which I myself am glad to reiterate once again.
The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, referred to the living conditions of our troops stationed in the South Atlantic. I can assure the House that we regard the welfare of our troops as a matter of the greatest importance. I understand that the commander of the British forces in the Falkland Islands has investigated thoroughly the complaints published in the press last week and found them to be almost entirely without foundation. In addition, my honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, who has been visiting the islands, has looked into this matter and will be making a full report to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence.
The noble Lord, Lord Walston, asked me to comment on why the Government had not sought the assistance of the United States with the Argentines in the years before the crisis. This is a question which applies to successive Governments. But it would not have been appropriate to seek to involve the United States Government in the rights and wrongs of a sovereignty dispute which was not their direct concern. It was only when it seemed that the Argentines might be considering forceful rather than peaceful means that we quite properly asked the United States to use its influence.
Most noble Lords have referred to the future of the
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islands, starting with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. The point has been made in the debate that if the need to seek a negotiated settlement was accepted in the past, why is it less necessary or acceptable now? The answer, of course, lies in present realities. The negotiations were broken off through unprovoked Argentine aggression. Thereafter we made strenuous but unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to avoid armed conflict and the resulting loss of life. The scars of war are still fresh in the islands and Argentina remains unrepentant, aggressive and unstable. In the longer term, relations between the islands and Argentina will have to be settled. As almost every noble Lord who has spoken has recognised, the conditions for doing so simply do not exist at present. There will need to be a fundamental change in the Argentine attitude before that can be possible. It is not possible to say when that might be, nor yet to consider the precise basis.
I have listened with interest to the very varied views which noble Lords have put on this question. We attach great value to our relations with Latin America and will continue to do so. Meanwhile, our duty remains to defend and support the islanders: to give them the conditions of peace and security necessary to recover from the effects of the invasion and for them to give thought to their own future. Our current defensive presence in the Falkland Islands in no way reflects a wish to establish a permanent British military base in the South Atlantic, but the fact of the matter is that Argentina has refused to declare a definitive end to hostilities and refuses to renounce the use of force in pursuit of her sovereignty claim. Argentine readiness to resort to force is a matter of record. It is clear that Britain must maintain an adequate defence force on the islands.
Meanwhile, noble Lords will be aware of the Government's commitment to press ahead with the economic development of the Falkland Islands, starting with the implementation of the economic programme announced to this House on 8th December. Indeed, if the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, looks again at the report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, he will see the answer to his particular questions about the Falkland Islands. This will be accompanied and, where necessary, preceded by a continuing reconstruction and rehabilitation programme to ensure the existence of the sound infrastructure which any economic development requires. A good start has already been made on this work, thanks in large part to the job done by the armed services. I am delighted to echo the tributes which have been already paid to them for what they have achieved in this field.
I have sought to respond as fully as possible to the many points raised by noble Lords tonight. We have had a full and valuable exchange of views covering many aspects of the Falkland Islands. But our central concern has been to consider Lord Franks' report on how the responsibilities of government were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2nd April 1982. On a matter of such exceptional importance and of such complexity there has inevitably been controversy. It was for that reason that the Government decided to have a full inquiry and to entrust this to an independent and distinguished committee of Privy

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Counsellors with a chairmanship, composition and terms of reference agreed on an all-party basis.
The review committee have considered all the evidence and have made an impressively thorough and detailed report. This sets out their unanimous conclusions that the Argentine invasion could have been neither foreseen nor prevented, and that there would be no justification for attaching any criticism or blame to the present Government. I hope, indeed, that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister takes great satisfaction from that. These are clear, unequivocal and unanimous conclusions, and should be accepted as such.
My Lords, the past nine months have been a difficult period. Let us now put this matter behind us and look to the future instead of to the past.
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes before midnight.

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