Sitting of 20 May 1982

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS
  PRIVATE BUSINESS
    BRITISH RAILWAYS BILL
    Read the Third time, and passed.
    HERTSMERE BOROUGH COUNCIL (ROWLEY LANE) BILL (By Order)
    Lords amendments agreed to.
    FELTHAM STATION AREA REDEVELOPMENT (LONGFORD RIVER) BILL (By Order)
    Read a Second time and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

    TEES AND HARTLEPOOL PORT AUTHORITY BILL (By Order)
    Order for Second Reading read.
    To be read a Second time upon Tuesday 25 May.

    ALEXANDRA PARK AND PALACE BILL (By Order)
    Orders for Second Reading read.
    To be read a Second time upon Thursday 27 May.

Oral Answers to Questions
  HOME DEPARTMENT

    Data Protection
    Mr. Andrew F. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many favourable and unfavourable views he has received on the White Paper on data protection.
    The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Timothy Raison): The White Paper sought comments by 31 May. The views so far received include criticisms of certain features of the proposals, but there has also been widespread acceptance that the Government's approach is a reasonable and balanced one.
    Mr. Bennett: Does the Minister accept that many people feel that the White Paper is an example of fudge and compromise which satisfies nobody? It will not give genuine protection to the individual and it is in danger of setting up a bureaucracy that will achieve nothing.
    Mr. Raison: The hon. Gentleman's tired platitudes do not help. I believe that this will prove to be the right legislation and that it will be widely accepted.
    Mr. Dickens: If the data protection procedures outlined in the White Paper prove to be ineffective, may we have an assurance that there will be a review within 12 months?
    Mr. Raison: That is an extremely hypothetical suggestion. I say again that I believe that our measures will prove to be effective and acceptable.
    Mr. Christopher Price: The Minister will recall that the Prime Minister said from the Dispatch Box that she hoped that there would be legislation in the Session following the White Paper. May we have a promise to that effect?
    Mr. Raison: The hon. Gentleman knows that I am not in a position to make firm promises about next year's legislative programme. However, we want to make progress on this matter.
    Mr. Cryer: Is the Minister not concerned that the White Paper contains no provision for the protection of the accumulation of data in, for example, the £20 million Special Branch computer? If there is no authorisation from the House, if the House is not accountable, and if there is no protection of the data, what sort of protection has the ordinary citizen got?
    Mr. Raison: As the hon. Gentleman knows, it is clearly understood, and it has been made clear in the European convention on this subject, that matters involving State security are exempt from the legislation.

    Portland Borstal
    Sir William van Straubenzeeasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the average cost per young offender at Portland borstal.
    The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Patrick Mayhew): Figures for individual establishments are not available. The average weekly cost of keeping a person in a borstal or young prisoner centre was £180 in 1980–81.
    Sir William van Straubenzee: Is not one of the weaknesses of the sentences served at Portland, as well as at other borstals, that they have an inderterminate nature? Does my hon. and learned Friend appreciate that he would have great support if he phased out borstal sentences and replaced them with determinate youth custody orders.
    Mr. Mayhew: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. There is a wide body of support for the provision in the Criminal Justice Bill—which received its Third Reading last night—which ensures that the indeterminate sentences for young offenders will be phased out. In future, sentences will be determinate. That is a great advance.
    Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Does the Minister recall that the reconviction rate for young people leaving borstal institutions has increased from 63 to 69 per cent. in the past five years and that the figure for juveniles is 83 per cent.? Therefore, does he accept that, given the ineffectiveness of custody and residential care in preventing the commission of further offences, there

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    should be a massive and fundamental change of resources away from custodial sentences to other options within the community?
    Mr. Mayhew: In those custodial establishments, I do not dispute that the success rate for going straight for more than two years is not encouraging. On the other hand, custodial sentences must be available to the courts for dangerous offenders, including young offenders.
    Mr. Greenway: Does not the cost of keeping people in Portland borstal, or anywhere else, include an element to cover the cost of education? Will my hon. and learned Friend give an assurance that the quality of education in borstals and other custodial institutions—for the young or for anyone else—will be kept under constant review?
    Mr. Mayhew: The cost of keeping people in such institutions certainly includes the cost of educational staff. There are no plans to change the present educational arrangements at such institutions.

    Metropolitan Police
    Mr. Thomas Coxasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, subsequent to Operation Countryman, any further inquiries have been set up into alleged corruption in the Metropolitan Police.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. William Whitelaw): Yes, Sir. Certain other investigations into alleged corruption by police officers have been put in hand by the complaints investigation bureau of the Metropolitan Police and will be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Police Complaints Board as necessary.
    Mr. Cox: I welcome the Home Secretary's reply. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, despite all the talk of cleaning up the Metropolitan Police through Operation Countryman, all we got was a cover up? If we wish to tackle the corruption and perjury that we repeatedly hear about, should not the Home Secretary become personally responsible for these inquiries? Should he not begin by appointing a totally independent person, who will not be subject to any form of police pressure, to conduct the inquiries?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's wild allegations. If he has any individual cases to put before me, I hope that he will do so.
    Mr. Marlow: Would it not be corrupt for the Metropolitan Police, or any other police force that was up to establishment, to select additional recruits on the basis of race?
    Mr. Whitelaw: There is no question of doing so.
    Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Is not the right hon. Gentleman still concerned about the outcome of Operation Countryman, since it clearly did not produce the results intended and did not satisfy the anxieties of people such as Sir Robert Mark? Is it not time that we reconsidered the status of the Metropolitan Police force and perhaps broke it up into four separate forces?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I do not think so. Operation Countryman was very important and it made various investigations. We all dwell far too much, in a generalized
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    way, on cases of corruption. It would be unfair to the Metropolitan Police if we did not recognise its outstanding record as a whole.
    Mr. Stanbrook: Is it not well known to anyone with any knowledge of such matters that the Metropolitan Police is the least corrupt—
    Mr. Flannery: Nonsense. Sir Robert Mark did not say that.
    Mr. Stanbrook:—of any of the police forces in the capital cities of the Western world?
    Mr. Whitelaw: The British police service as a whole—including the Metropolitan Police—has a very high record, which would bear comparison with any police service in the world.

    Residential Care Premises (Fire Precautions)
    Mr. Sainsburyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department when he will publish the guide to fire precautions in residential care premises.
    Mr. Mayhew: We hope to be able to publish the draft guide in the late summer.
    Mr. Sainsbury: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that there are about 450 fires per annum in residential homes for the elderly and that it is nearly two and a half years since I was told in an Adjournment debate that a code of guidance would be prepared? Is he further aware that it is nearly six months since the end of the consultation period on that code of guidance? Is it not time that my hon. and learned Friend got on with publishing the document?
    Mr. Mayhew: I accept that that amount of time has elapsed. On the other hand, three separate rounds of consultations have taken place. The last revision is expected to take another six to eight weeks, but we hope to arrange publication by the late summer.

    Merseyside Community Relations Council
    Mr. Parryasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what has been the funding by his Department to the Merseyside community relations council over the past three years.
    Mr. Raison: The Home Office does not fund community relations councils. I understand that in the last three financial years the Commission for Racial Equality has given Merseyside community 'relations council grants of about £25,000, £37,000 and £39,000.
    Mr. Parry: Does the Minister accept that there is a case for positive discrimination in areas such as Toxteth, Brixton and Moss Side? Is he aware that fundings from the CRE to the Merseyside community relations council do not go towards specialist appointments and the salaries of persons such as the employment officer and the education officer? They are essential posts. Will the Home Office consider rectifying the situation?
    Mr. Raison: The question of which posts within community relations councils are supported is a matter for the CRE and the local authority, not for the Home Office. Positive discrimination is largely a matter of terminology. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Government help to remedy racial disadvantage through a number of schemes.

    Bedford (Police Strength)
    Mr. John Carlisleasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what response he has made to the chief constable of Bedfordshire's request for an additional 30 policemen on approved establishment.
    Mr. Whitelaw: The Bedfordshire police authority has been informed that I am prepared to approve an increase of five police officer posts.
    Mr. Carlisle: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that, before the figures were announced, the Bedfordshire establishment was 43 short of the proposed figure? Is he further aware that during the first three months of this year crime in Bedfordshire rose by 12 per cent. compared with last year and that the detection rate has fallen substantially? Therefore, will he give special consideration to Bedfordshire, because of its special problems, and increase the figure with a view to trying to combat the rising crime rate in the county?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I am sure that my hon. Friend realises that I have to balance the considerations of all police authorities throughout the country. Bedfordshire police strength has increased by 84 since the Conservative Party came to power. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary considers that there is scope in Bedfordshire for greater use of civilians to fill posts at present held by police officers. That will increase the number of officers available for operational duties. I hope that it will be able to do that.

    Immigration Rules
    Mr. Tilleyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will seek to amend the immigration rules to enable all women who are legally settled in the United Kingdom to be joined there by their husbands or fiancé.
    Mr. Raison: No, Sir.
    Mr. Tilley: Does the Minister recall that, during the debates on the British Nationality Bill last year, he gave a clear pledge to review the rules? Does he accept that, if he does not change the rules, young women in Asian families—of which all the members are full British citizens—will often be second-class citizens, because they alone among British citizens will not have the right to live here with their spouses? Does the right hon. Gentleman acknowledge that, when the British Nationality Act comes into operation, that rule will be both racially and sexually discriminatory?
    Mr. Raison: During the passage of the British Nationality Bill I said that when the Act came into operation we would issue new rules and that, when we did that, it would be possible to use citizenship as the basis for a new scheme. The hon. Gentleman's question refers to those who are legally settled in the United Kingdom, which is a somewhat different matter.
    Mr. Budgen: How many new immigrants would be allowed in if the rules were amended, as suggested by the Opposition?
    Mr. Raison: I think that the number would be about 3,000 per year. It is not possible to be more precise than that.
    Mr. Jim Marshall: Does the Minister accept that that part of the immigration rules is blatantly discriminatory
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    against a small section of our community? Does he agree that if the rules were changed, on the figures that he has just given there would be no great increase in immigration, although such a change would do a great deal to improve race relations in the United Kingdom?
    Mr. Raison: We introduced the changes because of our concern about the extent to which marriage was being used as a means of primary male immigration. As to what we might do in future, I cannot add to what I have said.
    Mr. Edward Lyons: As the Government's new rules on this issue are being tested in Europe before the Commission and the Court, will the Government obey the likely decision of the Court that these rules are invalid?
    Mr. Raison: The hon. and learned Gentleman is anticipating the conclusions of the European Commission of Human Rights. We do not have those conclusions. All we know is that three cases have been deemed admissible, but the question of merit has not yet been touched upon.
    Mr. Robert Atkins: Does my right hon. Friend agree that these rules apply equally to all the people of different parts of the world and therefore cannot be construed as being racially discriminatory?
    Mr. Raison: Yes, Sir.
    Miss Joan Lestor: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if people are saying, and the Government have always said, that people in this country, irrespective of nationality, are equal before the law, he should not allow a law to exist that makes certain people unequal in relation to others? The argument that the rule was brought in, to avoid men gaining admission is not in accord with the facts, as a large number of safeguards have always been applied to prevent that happening. There are instances of women, legally married to men for some time, who cannot gain admittance because of the rule.
    Mr. Raison: I can only repeat that there is solid evidence that the marriage route has been a means by which primary male immigration to this country has taken place. That was why we brought forward our proposals in 1980.

    Prison Statistics
    Mr. Edward Lyonsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many persons were held in prisons in England and Wales at the latest available date.
    Mr. Mayhew: The total prison population was about 44,300 on 14 May.
    Mr. Lyons: As the prisons are grossly overcrowded, against a background of a very low detection rate for crime, what plans has the Minister to deal with the total breakdown of the prison system in the event of an increase in the detection rate, particularly as the Criminal Justice Bill will, at best, make only a marginal improvement?
    Mr. Mayhew: The question is hypothetical. We place much reliance on the trend established by the Court of Appeal and the judiciary, after judgment had been given in the Upton and Bibi cases, which led to a shortening of sentences of non-violent offenders. We believe that the Criminal Justice Bill will make substantial improvements in that direction.
    Dr. Summerskill: How does the hon. and learned Gentleman explain the fact that during the few months of

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    the prison officers' dispute the prison population was reduced by more than 4,000? What lessons has the hon. and learned Gentleman learnt from that that might lead to a permanent reduction in our prison population?
    Mr. Mayhew: We do not want another prison officers' dispute. There were many reasons why the numbers went down during that period. High among them was the fact that there was a slowing down in committals and prosecutions in non-urgent cases.
    Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Has the Minister seen the recent statement by the Lord Chief Justice, in which he said that the judiciary would not have opposed the introduction of an early supervised release scheme for short-term prisoners if it had been given discretion to exempt certain prisoners from early release? In the light of that statement, will the hon. and learned Gentleman now bring forward amendments in the other place to implement a scheme of automatic early release, with exemptions, in an attempt substantially to reduce the prison population?
    Mr. Mayhew: No, Sir. These matters were fully discussed in Conunittee and on Report of the Criminal Justice Bill. Having consulted the judiciary, I do not believe that the original proposal put forward for consultation for an early release scheme was satisfactory. The present arrangements in the Criminal Justice Bill are an improvement.

    Police
    Mr. Lathamasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what progress is being made in strengthening the police force, both in terms of numerical strength and material support.
    Mr. Whitelaw: The total strength of the police service in England and Wales has increased by 8,480 since May 1979, and stood at 119,973 at the end of March this year. I expect the total strength to increase to 121,000 by March 1983. I know that police authorities and chief officers of police appreciate the importance of ensuring that appropriate levels of material and other support services are maintained.
    Mr. Latham: I welcome that excellent progress. Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the police force, which has been greatly strengthened under this Administration, will always have his full support in enforcing the law impartially on all citizens, despite political pressure to the contrary?
    Mr. Whitelaw: Most certainly, yes. I went to the Police Federation conference yesterday and gave positive assurances on behalf of the Government and, I hope, of the House as a whole.
    Mr. Crawshaw: Will the Home Secretary comment on reports affecting the Merseyside police which would seem to indicate that, owing to a shortage of funds, it may be necessary to remove many administrative staff, whose places will have to be filled by taking police of the beat? If so, is that not contrary to the right hon. Gentleman's assurance to the House, after the Scarman report, that we would have more police on the beat, particularly in areas such as Toxteth?
    Mr. Whitelaw: There will be more police on the beat. I gave that assurance and I mean it. I hear many rumours from Merseyside, but, fortunately, I find that I am right in not believing all that I hear.
    Mr. Kilroy-Silk: What does that mean? It is a slur on Merseyside.
    Mr. Snape: I admire the way that the Home Secretary can rally support in his party despite the collapse of law and order in the country under this Government. [Interruption.] Look at the figures. Does the Home Secretary appreciate that there is widespread concern about the deployment of the police, particularly in inner city areas, and their material support? Does he agree that such matters are the rightful concern of police committees in places such as Manchester and Liverpool? Will he advise chief constables that they have responsibilities to discuss deployment and material support with elected local representatives?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I am amazed at the hon. Gentleman. He supported a Government who did so much to undermine the strength of, and support for, the police service—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman has had his say. I could shout louder than him, if need be, but I shall not. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman is not doing badly from a seated position.
    The Labour Party now wants a policy to deal with crime, based on more bobbies on the beat. The Labour Government failed to provide the bobbies, but Labour Members now recognise that we have done so. I am glad to have their support for the policy that we have pursued.
    Mrs. Knight: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the importance of keeping up the morale of the police force? Will he also note the constant attacks made by the Opposition on the police force and on my right hon. Friend, who has always strongly backed the police force?
    Mr. Whitelaw: Yes. I went to the Police Federation conference yesterday, where I was assured by those who were there that the morale of the police service is extremely is high. I was glad to find that.
    Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Will the Home Secretary examine the experience of the chief constable of Lancashire? He was able to put more police on the beat in places such as Skelmersdale by running down the over-inflated traffic department, without any visible effect on the number of traffic accidents. Is that not a more legitimate and sensible way of dealing with our force?
    Mr. Whitelaw: All chief constables are carefully considering the effective use of manpower. They recognise that it is extremely important.
    This gives me an opportunity to reply to something said by the hon. Member for West Bromwich, East (Mr. Snape), who stopped me from replying by talking too much. I agree that chief officers of police and police authorities can and should recognise their duties under the Police Act 1964.

    Television Licences
    Mr. EdwinWainwright asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what was the total number of television licences issued as at the latest available date.
    Mr. Raison: On 31 March 1982 there were about 18½ million licences in force.
    Mr. Wainwright: Does the Minister realise that many elderly people on low incomes cannot afford to pay the present rate for a television licence? Will he bear in mind that people living in hostels, special homes and council organised homes get a cheap licence, whereas many elderly persons living nearby have to pay the full licence fee? Should not something be done to enable these people to afford a television licence, especially single people on low incomes living alone?
    Mr. Raison: The matter was debated as recently as December last year, when the House came to a decision. Our view is that the right way to help retirement pensioners is essentially by maintaining in real terms the value of the retirement pension. If we introduce a range of different means of support for people, including the payment of the television licence fee, we shall add to the anomalies that already exist.
    Mr. Marlow: Will my right hon. Friend say whether it is a proper use of licence contributors' money for the BBC to commission special public opinion polls so that it can indulge in a propaganda battle with the elected Government?
    Mr. Raison: That does not fall within the terms of this question.
    Mr. Ashley: Will the Minister consider extending to invalidity pensioners living in special homes the licence concession that is extended to retirement pensioners living in special homes?
    Mr. Raison: I understand the right hon. Gentleman's point, but, as I have already said, the extension of concessions in this area will not help. The right thing is to provide proper benefits and pensions. The right hon. Gentleman of all people will know that local authorities may help disabled persons with the cost of television licences in cases of need under the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970.

    Immigrants (Repatriation)
    Mr. Hawksleyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will replace the Government assistance given under section 29 of the Immigration Act 1971 to the International Social Services for immigrants wishing to return home by a Government-controlled and financed body to help all immigrants wishing to return home.
    Mr. Raison: We have no plans to do so.
    Mr. Hawksley: I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer, which I find somewhat disappointing. In view of the fact that in 1980–81 the International Social Service helped only 139 cases, and in view of the opinion poll of West Indian and African immigrants, which showed that about 59 per cent. wished to go home, it is about time that the Government considered taking over—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must put it in the form of a question, not an opinion.
    Mr. Hawksley: In view of that information and the information that I forwarded to my right hon. Friend in a letter from the International Social Service, showing that it has not helped one of my constituents, will he reconsider his answer?
    Mr. Raison: We cannot attach too much importance to that opinion poll. Pressure has not been put on us that shows that many people wish to be repatriated. The case of my hon. Friend's constituent occurred in 1979. More recently, there has been a further offer of an interview with his constituent.
    Mr. Tilley: Will the Minister repudiate more directly the racism that comes from many of his Back Benchers by agreeing with me that to talk of sending black British people home is an evil nonsense, because they are home already?
    Mr. Raison: The hon. Gentleman does not put his case as temptingly as he might, but I am prepared to say that a campaign for repatriation would do nothing to help lace relations in this country.
    Mr. Dorrell: Does my right hon. Friend accept that his answer to my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) was welcome and that it is hard to imagine a scheme better calculated to damage race relations than one in which the Government appear to encourage immigrants to leave Britain?
    Mr. Raison: The present arrangements are the right way to deal with the problem. I repeat that I do not believe that a massive campaign to stimulate repatriation would' do any good.

    Police
    Mr. Michael McNair-Wilsonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will institute a review of police establishment strengths in England and Wales.
    Mr. Whitelaw: Police force establishments are kept under review by chief officers, police authorities and Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary. Police authorities are responsible for fixing the authorised establishment of forces, subject to my approval. I recently completed consideration to applications for increases from 16 police authorities and I am prepared to approve additional posts for eight forces, including the Thames Valley police.
    Mr. McNair-Wilson: I am grateful for the layer remarks of my right hon. Friend, but does he not agree that there is a considerable disparity in the ratio of police to population in different constabularies? The national average is one policeman to 431 members of the community, whereas in the Thames Valley it is one policeman to 565. Is not the latter figure the lowest in England and Wales and is there not a case for a substantial rise in the number of police constables in the Thames Valley force?
    Mr. Whitelaw: For those reasons, which I accept, among others, I was prepaid to authorise 10 additional posts for Thames Valley. As my hon. Friend appreciate, its strength has increased by 445 in the past three years.
    Mr. Stokes: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that there are enough policemen in the middle ranks of the force of sufficient calibre to take up the most senior appointments?
    Mr. Whitelaw: Yes, I am. I can give my hon Friend that assurance.

    Television Licences
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what further representations he has received about the need for all pensioners to be treated equally in respect of concessionary television licence fees.
    Mr. Raison: In the past six months, 53 representations have been received from hon. Members and just under 100 direct from members of the public.
    Mr. Skinner: Is the Minister aware that what is really needed is a Bill to wipe out all the anomalies for those pensioners who cannot have the 5p licence fee? Is he aware that Mr. Leslie Gale, a bed-ridden multiple sclerosis victim who lives about four miles from me, has had to be fined because he refused to pay his television licence fee? He has to lie in bed all day. Surely it is now necessary for the Government to have a fresh examination of those anomalies with a view to bringing in a Bill so that all pensioners receive concessionary licences, including the disabled?
    Mr. Raison: I do not believe that the best way of dealing with the problem is by a spread of concessions. I have already made the point that local authorities can help the disabled where there is a need for them to do so.
    Mr. Dickens: Does my right hon. Friend accept that hon. Members on both sides of the House are anxious that pensioners should have a fair and equal system of television licence concessions? That is what we are fighting for, and we hope that the Front Bench will take it on board eventually.
    Mr. Raison: I say again to my hon. Friend that the right way to help pensioners is through their pensions and the amount of money that they have at their disposal. They can spend it as they think best.
    Dr. Summerskill: Will the Minister bear in mind that on the Labour Benches we are all agreed that the only satisfactory way of resolving the inequality among pensioners is to phase out television licences for all retirement pensioners?
    Mr. Raison: It is a bit much for the hon. Lady to put that to us. She was in office at the Home Office for the best part of six years and nothing was done to follow that policy.

    Prison Governors (Tenure)
    Mr. Farrasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the usual length of time in any one post of a prison governor.
    Mr. Mayhew: As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in reply to a question by my hon. Friend on 8 April, the overriding factor in determining moves must be the operational needs of the service, and there is no usual length of time in any one post of prison governor.
    Mr. Farr: While thanking my hon. and learned Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he feels that one reason for the troubles in prisons such as Gartree in Leicestershire is the fact that, since it was established 16 years ago, there have been no fewer than eight governors? Is that not a possible inducement to unrest and lack of continuity?
    Mr. Mayhew: I know of the problems at Gartree to which my hon. Friend referred, but we must have regard
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    to the overall needs of the service. Sometimes a governor must be transferred, for example to take command of another prison, as the previous governor of Gartree was transferred to take command at Brixton. It is not always possible to do that at convenient times.

    Chief Constables (Discussions)
    Mr. Lennox-Boydasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he has held any discussions with chief constables on the measures being taken by them to increase public confidence in the police.
    Mr. Whitelaw: I am satisfied that the vast majority of the public have full confidence in the police. The welcome increase in police strength has allowed chief constables to return many more men to the streets, where the public wish to see them. My officials are discussing with chief constables and others the terms of the guidance that I propose to issue shortly about local consultation arrangements between the police and the community.
    Mr. Lennox-BoydDoes my hon. Friend agree that the public are often not aware of the many functions and duties that the police carry out on their behalf? Does he agree that the system of open days at police stations has been an enormous success in fostering further confidence between the public and the police? Will he give encouragement to extend those open days where possible?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I know—because I come from near my hon. Friend's constituency—that they had a successful open day at Morecambe. Open days should be encouraged, and they are very well supported by the public when they are given.
    Mr. Snape: Will the Home Secretary publish comparative figures for crimes committed and detected in 1978 and 1981? Having done so, will he publicise those figures widely? That at least would stop the Home Secretary's efforts to delude his own Back Benchers into thinking that the Government have been even remotely successful in their campaign to reduce crime?
    Mr. Whitelaw: If the hon. Gentleman would like to table a question on those matters I shall, of course, answer it.
    Mr. Edward Gardner: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one way of increasing confidence in the police would be to encourage chief constables to resist the temptation of making public statements when they can be avoided?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I think that chief constables are aware well of the feelings of some hon. Members and of what the House has frequently said on that subject.
    Mr. Christopher Price: Does the Home Secretary agree that one way of creating more confidence in the police would be to remove the need for eminent barristers such as the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) to have to spend days in court making allegations of misconduct against the police? Would not this be much less likely if all interrogations were tape recorded?
    Mr. Whitelaw: I should have thought it was clear to most people that some policemen make mistakes and that some are guilty of misconduct. However, for every policeman in those categories, there are many hundreds giving a great service in protecting the citizens of this country.

    Immigration Policy
    Mr. Marlowasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will review immigration policy in the light of the continuing trend of increase in the proportion of the population from ethnic minority groups of non-United Kingdom origin, in London and other major areas.
    Mr. Raison: There has been a reduction in the number of immigrants accepted for settlement and we remain committed to firm immigration control.
    Mr. Marlow: Is my right hon. Friend aware that of the 32 London boroughs, in one, two-thirds of the births are to mothers of foreign origin, in six, over half the births are to mothers of foreign origin, in 13 over 40 per cent., in 19 over 30 per cent. and in two-thirds over 20 per cent.? Since this has massive implications for the identity of the capital city of this country, and since there is massive public concern about this issue, will my right hon. Friend reassure the House and the country that the Government are aware of these facts and intend to introduce policies that the country wants and needs?
    Mr. Race: Racist.
    Mr. Raison: We carefully follow social trends. I have told my hon. Friend that we have tight immigration control and that the numbers of immigrants are falling. That is important. At the same time, I think that the figures referred to by my hon. Friend show the equal importance of a positive race relations policy.
    Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Does the Minister agree that so long as black women have black babies, and so long as ethnic minorities are disproportionately younger than the existing population, it is clear that there will be a slight increase until the black population stabilises at about 3–3 million at the end of this decade and that, thereafter, it will remain stable unless there is new immigration?
    Mr. Raison: It is obvious that the demographic factors to which the hon. Gentleman referred are important in this area.
    Mr. Tilley: Does the Minister agree that any increase in the black population of our inner cities is not a cause for alarm, or for further racist immigration policies? Does he further agree that it is a cause for urgent Government action to ensure that black youngsters do not suffer the disadvantages, particularly in education and employment, that young people in the inner cities are now suffering?

    1977

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    1981

    Recommended use of Royal Prerogative in order to—

    grant free pardon remit remainder of

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    custodian sentence

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    remit fine or other monetary penalty

    16

    25

    206

    75

    57

    Referred case to Court of Appeal under s. 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968

    2

    6

    3

    3

    1

    Mr. Raison: I have already told the House that it is important when looking at these matters to have a positive approach to race relations. The Government have that positive approach.

    Miscarriages of Justice
    Mr. Christopher Priceasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many allegations of miscarriage of justice were made to his Department in each of the past five years; and in respect of how many he took steps to remedy such alleged miscarriages.
    Mr. Mayhew: In any one year several thousand representations are received from, or on behalf of, convicted persons, which touch on matters relating to conviction. I regret that it is not possible, without disproportionate effort, to identify which of these should be classified as allegations of miscarriage of justice. I shall publish in the Official Report a table indicating, for each of the years 1977 to 1981, the number of cases in which, after considering representations about conviction, my right hon. Friend has taken action to remove or mitigate its effects.
    Mr. Price: I am grateful to the Minister for publishing those figures. However, did he see the three programmes entitled "Rough Justice" on television in which it was fairly clear that two individuals have probably been wrongly convicted of murder? Is there absolutely nothing that the Minister can do to reduce the time-scale by which his Department investigates these matters and make the method of investigation rather more open to scrutiny by Members of the House?
    Mr. Mayhew: I am aware of the programmes to which the hon. Gentleman refers. Additional speed in investigating such cases can be achieved only at the expense of thoroughness. I do not believe that that would be right.
    Mr. Stanbrook: Will my hon. and learned Friend point out to the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Price) that it is not possible to remedy an alleged miscarriage of justice unless it has been proved?
    Mr. Mayhew: I should not have thought it necessary always to point out the obvious, but experience has taught me that sometimes it is.
    Following is the table:—

  PRIME MINISTER

    Engagements
    Mr. Ray Powellasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 20 May.
    The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): This morning I presided at a meeting of the Cabinet and had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I shall be having further meetings later today.
    Mr. Powell: Is the Prime Minister aware that the call for a ceasefire in the Falkland Islands is gathering strength nationally and internationally? Will she therefore tell us how many more lives—[HON. MEMBERS: "Reading"]—will be sacrificed to satisfy the lust for blood by the hawks on the Government Benches behind her? Will she tell us when the nation can expect the faith, hope and harmony that she promised three years ago from the steps of 10 Downing Street?
    The Prime Minister: A ceasefire without withdrawal would leave the invader in possession of the Falkland Islands and our people under his subjection. That is far from our objective.
    Sir Anthony Kershaw: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the object of this exercise is to restore freedom and the rule of law to the Falkland Islands? Will she ensure that her view of that is not obscured by any Argentine fancy footwork?
    The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Our objective is to restore freedom and the rule of law to the Falkland Islands and we will not be put off by Argentine procrastination.
    Mr. David Steel: Will the Prime Minister tell the House, in advance of her speech this afternoon, whether she will be able, in the course of that speech, to inform the House of the terms proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations? If that is not possible, can the right hon. Lady give us an idea of when she thinks those terms might be made known to the House?
    The Prime Minister: Not in detail, but I shall be able to give some indication of aspects that have yet to be resolved.
    Mr. Hordern: As President Mitterrand has invited my right hon. Friend to state what is Britain's role within the European Community, will my right hon. Friend tell President Mitterrand that we will not be told by others what lies within our national interest, and that a heavy responsibility now rests with the Community to put right the wrong that it has done?
    The Prime Minister: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. What has happened over the Luxembourg compromise is very serious and could be even more serious if majority voting is applied to other aspects of Community work. Our role in the Community is to be a full and equal partner and to be fully entitled to equitable and fair treatment.
    Mr. Parryasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 20 May.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Parry: Does the Prime Minister agree that the decision taken in Europe is a kick in the teeth and a sellout of British interests? Does she further agree that the simplest answer to the present crisis in the EEC would be to take Britain out of the common agricultural policy? Is she aware that that decision would be widely welcomed on Merseyside, in the regions and, indeed, throughout the land?
    The Prime Minister: The decision is without precedent and has serious implications. We are full members of the EEC. We intend to remain full members of the EEC and we intend to make our views known and see whether we can reverse that decision about the Luxembourg compromise.
    Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop: Will my right hon. Friend convey to the New Zealand Government this country's widespread appreciation and gratitude for their generous action in support not only of Britain but of the rule of international law, not least by offering to support us with Her Majesty's New Zealand ship "Canterbury"?
    The Prime Minister: Gladly. The New Zealand Government and people have been absolutely magnificent in their support of this country, of the Falkland Islanders and of the rule of liberty and the rule of law. I shall gladly convey that to Mr. Muldoon, who, only yesterday, reminded me "Don't forget. In New Zealand, we are still a member of the same family."
    Mr. Foot: I return to the question of the Luxembourg compromise. We shall be discussing the other matters later today. Will the right hon. Lady say whether her answer a few moments ago means that she advocates that we should remain members of the Common Market and of the common agricultural policy, whatever may happen to the Luxembourg compromise? Would she like to have a vote of the House of Commons, following the debate that we are glad will be taking place on this extremely important subject next Wednesday, to sustain her? Does she agree that that might be helpful? Will she guarantee to carry out what the House of Commons votes for?
    The Prime Minister: We are a member of the European Community. What has happened over the Luxembourg compromise is very serious. I believe that it is in our interests to continue to be a member of the European Community. The right hon. Gentleman will understand that one needs a little time to see precisely how we should tackle this latest serious situation.
    Mr. Ian Lloyd: Since this remarkable document, in the Vote Office, has revealed that Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of peace, have been prepared to carry compromise almost to the point of folly, has not the time come for the House to turn its back on timidity and compromise and to make it clear to the gauleiters of Buenos Aires that when British forces have been committed in a just cause they have always triumphed and the consequences for their opponents have been devastating?
    The Prime Minister: As I shall say in my speech later, I do not believe that we have, in that document, compromised any of the fundamental principles that I set out at the beginning—none of them. We were prepared to make certain practical changes that were reasonable if we were to obtain the prize of no further loss of life. But there has been no compromise on fundamental principles.
    Mr. Donald Stewart: Does the Prime Minister accept that her reiteration that the Government intend to stay in the Common Market is an indicaton to her so-called partners that they will get away with anything that they like to try? Will she take a much firmer stand than was evident in the replies of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food yesterday—for instance, by going immediately to a 200-mile limit for fisheries?
    The Prime Minister: I was merely suggesting that we should have time to think through all the aspects before we propose action. That seems to me a very good principle.
    Mr. Beaumont-Dark: Bearing in mind what happened yesterday in the European Common Market, will my right hon. Friend adopt the same robust attitude over this issue as she has so properly adopted over Argentina? If we are to remain members of the Common Market, will my right hon. Friend be just as forthright on that issue?
    The Prime Minister: We are entitled to reasonable and fair treatment. I believe that what has happened over the Luxembourg compromise, and the idea that we can go ahead with changes in the CAP without changes in the structure of the budget, is a breach of faith. We must now get changes in the structure of the budget to Britain's advantage.
    Mr. McNamara: Will the right hon. Lady explain how the failure of our Community partners to observe the Luxembourg compromise will affect the future of the common fisheries policy? Is it not a fact that, at the end of the year, whatever any of her right hon. and hon. Friends may say, if the right hon. Lady persists in remaining in the community, the Common Market countries can fish up to our beaches, have all our fish, ruin our industry and give us no compensation?
    The Prime Minister: I accept that if major decisions are in future to be taken by majority rule this would have a very serious effect on almost every major decision and would seriously affect the future of the Common Market. I ask the hon. Gentleman and the House for time to consider this latest position and to prepare a proper response.
    Mr. Rippon: I thank my right hon. Friend for what she has said about our relationship with the European Community.
    Has my right hon. Friend in mind the terms of the draft Labour manifesto of 1980, published under the authority of the national executive of the Labour Party, of which the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) is the most prominent member, which said—
    Hon. Members: Reading.
    Mr. Canavan: It is what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said in 1972 when he took us into the EEC.
    Mr. Rippon: The draft said in paragraph 88—
    Hon. Members: Reading.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I expect that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's memory is good enough to sustain him. He has had a look now.
    Mr. Rippon: The draft said that we will in no circumstances hand over the Falkland Islands to a regime like the Argentine regime that has no respect for human and civil rights. Does that not reflect in a fair way what is the view of the British people as a whole?
    The Prime Minister: I believe that it does reflect the view of the British people as a whole that we should not hand over the Falkland Islands to the dictatorship of Argentina. I believe that we have the people united behind us in that resolve.
    Mr. Kilroy-Silkasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Thursday 20 May.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Kilroy-Silk: Does the Prime Minister agree that one feature of the Falkland Island crisis is the clear demonstration of how quickly and effectively the Government can act when they have the political will to do so? Will the Prime Minister now put the same effort, the same commitment and the same resources into ending unemployment?
    The Prime Minister: We are putting every commitment and every effort into ending unemployment, which afflicts the whole of the Western world. This requires not only talking, but the efforts of people themselves to create jobs and work harder.
    Sir Patrick Wall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the veto may prove essential for the future of the British fishing industry? Will she look personally into the question of the common fisheries policy?
    The Prime Minister: I am very much aware of that issue. It is one of the very serious aspects of what happened in the taking of a vote by majority rule on the CAP yesterday. Another issue is the future of New Zealand lamb. We are very much aware of this, but we need time to prepare a proper response.
    Mr. Harry Ewing: Is the Prime Minister aware that if majority voting in the Common Market is to be the new rule, it means, almost invariably, especially in relation to the common agricultural policy and the possibility of agreement on a common fisheries policy, that the majority vote will act against British interests? Is the Prime Minister seriously suggesting that, in these circumstances, she would continue to want Britain to be a member of the EEC?
    The Prime Minister: I am suggesting that we do not dash into any hurried conclusions before we have had time to think these things out. I accept entirely that what happened over the voting on the common agricultural policy was extremely serious and without precedent. It is noteworthy that those of us who entered the Community after the 1966 agreement on the Lyuxembourg compromise refrained from voting because we felt that there had been a breach of faith of the terms on which we entered the Community.
    Mr. Viggers: During her testing day, will my right hon. Friend draw strength from the fact that those most directly concerned in the Falkland Islands crisis—the men of the Armed Forces and their families—fully understand the issues and the risks involved and are resolute in their will to perform the roles expected of them?
    The Prime Minister: We are very fortunate in the men and women who make up the Armed Forces. They are resolute and courageous. We are very proud of them.
    Mr.Dubsasked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for 20 May.
    The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply that I gave some moments ago.
    Mr. Dubs: Is the Prime Minister aware of recent assurances by Treasury Ministers that the large sums of money that are being spent on the task force are in no way having an adverse effect on Government economic policy? When the military action in the South Atlantic is over, therefore, will those same sums of money continue to be spent but on the needs of the homeless, the poor and the unemployed?
    The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman has failed to observe one factor. If money from the Contingency Reserve is spent once, it cannot be spent twice.
    Mr. John Carlisle: Will my right hon. Friend confirm the assurance that was given to the House by the Minister with responsibility for sport that the Government will put no pressure on the British football authorities to withdraw from the World Cup? Does she agree that it would be more worth while if, in the event of our being drawn against Argentina, we were to withdraw on the morning of the game, thus putting pressure on FIFA to expel Argentina?
    The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend the Minister with responsibility for sport replied to a question on that matter yesterday. It is not our present intention to intervene in the matters of the World Cup or the taking part in the World Cup of teams from Britain.

Business of the House
3.30 pm
Mr. Michael Foot: Will the Leader of the House state the business for next week?
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY 24 MAY—Progress on the Report stage of the Transport Bill.

TUESDAY 25 MAY—Completion of remaining stages of the Transport Bill.

WEDNESDAY 26 MAY—A debate on the European Community.

Remaining stages of the Harbours (Scotland) Bill [Lords].

Motion on the undertaking relating to Highlands and Islands shipping services.

THURSDAY 27 MAY—Committee stage of the Northern Ireland Bill.

FRIDAY 28 MAY—It will be proposed that the House should rise for the Spring Adjournment until Tuesday 8 June.

Mr. Foot: First, I thank the Leader of the House for arranging today's debate on the Falklands crisis. We may need another debate on the subject in the next few days or at the beginning of next week. I am sure that he will make that arrangement if it becomes necessary. I thank him also for providing us with the document for which we asked as part of the background to the debate that we shall have today.
Secondly, what does the right hon. Gentleman propose to do to provide a similar facility in preparation for the debate next Wednesday on the crisis in the Common Market which the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister has described as extremely serious and without precedent? Will there be a statement on the Government's reaction to that development before the debate? In view of the seriousness of the position that the right hon. Lady has described, I should have thought that that was the best way for the House to approach the matter.
Thirdly, there is an extremely important and urgent matter which, were it not for the other crises facing us, would dominate our thoughts. It is the major crisis that is developing in British Rail that has been sparked off by the board's decision on railway workshop closures which come on top of the financial restrictions that have been placed on the board by the Government. As the House will adjourn at the end of next week if the proposals of the Leader of the House are accepted, there could be movement towards industrial action before the House returns. Therefore, will the right hon. Gentleman make absolutely sure that a statement of Government policy on the matter is made at the beginning of next week? It appears that that is the only way in which a grievous industrial problem can be avoided.
Mr. Biffen: I have, of course, noted what the Leader of the Opposition said about the Falklands issue. The debate on the European Community on Wednesday will arise on a Government motion. I am sure that the Government's position will be made clear then. I trust that it will be endorsed by the Opposition.
With regard to British Rail, I am sorry that I cannot add to the answer that I gave last week. I realise that the
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requirement to arrange debates in Government time has had an effect on Supply time, and I hope that that pressure will ease off. As I have said before, I thought that a Supply day would be a suitable occasion for such a debate.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I am sure that it would be the will of the House that today we should have less time than usual on business questions. I propose not to allow them to run beyond a quarter to four.
Mr Michael Latham: On next Wednesday's business, and in the light of what the Prime Minister has said, will my right hon. Friend confirm that Ministers will state their considered view on the Common Market diktat—that is what it was. Does he agree that one of the options open to us, if the Common Market will not keep to the rules, is that we should not pay the subscription?
Mr. Biffen: I am sure that Wednesday's debate will secure the appropriate response from my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench. I shall draw to their attention what my hon. Friend has said.
Mr. John Roper: Will the Leader of the House ensure that before the Prime Minister leaves for New York for the second special session on disarmament we shall have an opportunity for a full day's debate on the matters to be covered there?
Mr. Biffen: That is an important topic, but no time can be found for it next week.
Mr. Nigel Spearing: In view of the importance of next Wednesday's debate on the EEC, can the Leader of the House say when he expects to table the Government motion? Does he agree that it could be tabled late on Tuesday? I am sure that he would not regard that as useful.
Mr. Biffen: We shall try to table the motion in such a way and at such a time as to enable the House to take full account of it.
Mr. John Farr: What sort of timetable does my right hon. Friend have in mind for the Northern Ireland Bill, which goes into Committee on Thursday? Are we likely to consider it the following week? When does he expect that the Committee stage will finish?
Mr. Biffen: I cannot go further than to say that it is planned that the first day in Committee should be spent on Thursday of next week.
Mr. Laurie Pavitt: In view of the crisis in National Health Service hospitals arising from the injustice to nurses, whose pay is now 18 per cent in real terms behind what it was in 1974, and ancillary workers. will the Leader of the House find time for a statement next week? Does he agree that there could be a crisis of tremendous proportions before we return from the recess?
Mr. Biffen: I am sure that the most helpful and happy event would be the early resumption of discussions within the Whitley council. Nevertheless, I shall draw to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services what the hon. Gentleman has said.
Mr. Christopher Price: May I have the attention of the Leader of the House? Is he aware that the Secretary of State for Education and Science

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yesterday refused to give certain information to a Select Committee of the House? Is he further aware that his predecessor, the present Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, gave a pledge to the House from the Dispatch Box that if there was substantial anxiety in the House that information had not been given by Ministers, he would arrange a debate on the Floor of the House to discuss it? Does that pledge still stand? If we show substantial anxiety, will the Leader of the House arrange such a debate?
Mr. Biffen: I assure the hon. Gentleman that my regard for him is zealous and almost always undivided. I wish to give further measured consideration to the matter that he has raised. When I have done that, I shall be in touch with him.
Mr. Tony Marlow: In view of the fundamental nature of the crisis in the EEC whereby they vote and we pay, and as many right hon. and hon. Members may wish to speak in Wednesday's debate, will my right hon. Friend consider extending the debate to two days, or, if many hon. Members are disappointed about not being called in the one-day debate, will he consider having a subsequent one?
Mr. Biffen: My hon. Friend is a shade ambitious. I suspect that a one-day debate will prove useful.
Mr. Dennis Skinner: Will the Leader of the House arrange for the Secretary of State for Social Services to make a statement on the Government's position with regard to the pay of nurses and other Health Service workers? Does he agree that it is scandalous that throughout the dispute the Tory Government have not allowed their Minister to speak on the matter from the Dispatch Box, either by way of a statement or in a debate? Does he agree that the Minister has communicated with the media many times and in various ways? Does he agree that the Minister should be responsible to the House and give
476
a categorical assurance that nurses and other Health Service workers should receive a pay increase that is at least in line with the Government's tax and prices index?
Mr. Biffen: I refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer that I gave to the hon. Member for Brent, South (Mr. Pavitt).
Mr. Bob Cryer: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on Wednesday there were a number of meetings and stoppages among Health Service workers, including one in my constituency at the Airedale general hospital, at which they pressed for a response from the Government to their reasonable desire to have a better award than 4 per cent.? Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that they feel outraged that the Government have given 18 per cent. to senior civil servants and judges and yet are crushing—
Mr. Speaker: Order. That does not relate to next week's business.
Mr. Cryer: I was saying, Mr. Speaker, that I want a statement to be made. There should be an urgent statement or a debate.
Mr. Biffen: My answer to the question of the hon. Member for Brent, South covers the question of the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer).
Mr. Robert Parry: In view of the recent 21 per cent. increase that has been awarded to senior civil servants and judges and the miserable award that has been offered to the nurses and other public employees, we should have a debate and not merely a statement. Do the Government realise that, in the absence of a satisfactory response from them, hospital workers will involve themselves in further industrial disputes in an effort to earn a decent wage?
Mr. Biffen: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the most helpful thing would be for negotiations to recommence within the Whitley council. I have nothing to add to the reply that I gave to the hon. Member for Brent, South.

Falkland Islands
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Thompson.]
3.43 pm
The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): Seven weeks ago today the Argentine Foreign Minister summoned the British ambassador in Buenos Aires and informed him that the diplomatic channel was now closed. Later on that same day President Reagan appealed to President Galtieri not to invade the Falkland Islands. That appeal was rejected.
Ever since 2 April Argentina has continued to defy the mandatory resolution of the Security Council. During the past 24 hours the crisis over the Falkland Islands has moved into a new and even more serious phase.
On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believe it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Perez de Cuellar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them.
By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentine reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was in effect a total rejection of the British proposals. Indeed, in many respects the Argentine reply went back to their position when they rejected Mr. Haig's second set of proposals on 29 April. It retracted virtually all the movement that their representative had shown during the Secretary-General's efforts to find a negotiated settlement. I shall have some more to say about his efforts later.
The implications of the Argentine response are of the utmost gravity. This is why the Government decided to publish immediately the proposals that we had put to the Secretary-General and to give the House the earliest opportunity to consider them. These proposals were placed in the Vote Office earlier today. The Government believe that they represented a truly responsible effort to find a peaceful solution which both preserved the fundamental principles of our position and offered the opportunity to stop further loss of life in the South Atlantic.
We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means. Ever since 2 April they have responded to the efforts to find a negotiated solution with obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith.
We have now been negotiating for six weeks. The House will recall the strenuous efforts made over an extended period by Secretary of State Haig. During that period my ministerial colleagues and I considered no fewer than four sets of proposals. Although these presented substantial difficulties, we did our best to help Mr. Haig continue his mission, until Argentine rejection of his last proposals left him no alternative but to abandon his efforts.
The next stage of negotiations was based on proposals originally advanced by President Belaunde of Peru and modified in consultations between him and Mr. Haig. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs informed the House on 7 May, Britain was willing to accept these, the fifth set of
478
proposals, for an interim settlement. They could have led to an almost immediate ceasefire. But again it was Argentina that rejected them.
I shall not take up the time of the House with a detailed description of those earlier proposals, partly because they belong to those who devised them, but, more importantly, because they are no longer on the negotiating table. Britain is not now committed to them.
Since 6 May, when it became clear that the United States-Peruvian proposals were not acceptable to Argentina, the United Nations Secretary-General, Senor Perez de Cuellar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain and Argentina.
Following several rounds of discussions, the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations was summoned to London for consultation last Sunday. On Monday Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and presented to the Secretary-General a draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full. He made it clear that the text represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. He requested that the draft should be transmitted to the Argentine representative and that he should be asked to convey his Government's response within two days.
Yesterday we received the Argentine Government's reply. It amounted to a rejection of our own proposals, and we have so informed the Secretary-General. This morning we have received proposals from the Secretary-General himself.
It will help the House to understand the present position if I now describe briefly these three sets of proposals.
I deal first with our own proposals. These preserve the fundamental principles which are the basis of the Government's position. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. International law must be upheld. Sovereignty cannot be changed by invasion.
The liberty of the Falkland Islanders must be restored. For years they have been free to express their own wishes about how they want to be governed. They have had institutions of their own choosing. They have enjoyed self-determination. Why should they lose that freedom and exchange it for dictatorship?
Our proposals are contained in two documents. First, and mainly, there is a draft interim agreement between ourselves and Argentina. Secondly, there is a letter to the Secretary-General which makes it clear that the British Government do not regard the draft interim agreement as covering the dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.
I deal with the dependencies first. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are geographically distant from the Falkland Islands themselves. They have no settled population. British title to them does not derive from the Falkland Islands but is separate. These territories have been treated as dependencies of the Falkland Islands only for reasons of administrative convenience. That is why they are outside the draft agreement.
The House has before it the draft agreement, and I turn now to its main features. Article 2 provides for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Argentine and British forces from the islands and their surrounding waters within 14 days. At the end of the withdrawal British ships would be at least 150 nautical miles from the islands.

479
Withdrawal much beyond this would not have been reasonable, because the proximity of the Argentine mainland would have given their forces undue advantage.
Withdrawal of the Argentine Forces would be the most immediate and explicit sign that their Government's aggression had failed and that they were being made to give up what they had gained by force. It is the essential beginning of a peaceful settlement and the imperative of resolution 502.
Article 6 sets out the interim arrangements under which the islands would be administered in the period between the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of negotiations on the long-term future of the islands.
In this interim period there would be a United Nations administrator, appointed by the Secretary-General and acceptable to Britain and the Argentine. He would be the officer administering the Government. Under clause 3 of this article he would exercise his powers in conformity with the laws and the practices traditionally obtaining in the islands. He would consult the islands' representative institutions—that is the Legislative and Executive Councils through which the islanders were governed until 2 April. There would be an addition to each of the two Councils of one representative of the 20 or 30 Argentines normally resident in the islands. Their representatives would be nominated by the administrator.
The clause has been carefully drawn so that the interim administration cannot make changes in the law and customs of the islanders that would prejudge the outcome of the negotiations on a long-term settlement.
This provision would not only go a long way to giving back to the Falklanders the way of life that they have always enjoyed but would prevent an influx of Argentine settlers in the interim period whose residence would change the nature of society there and radically affect the future of the islands. That would not have been a true interim administration. It would have been an instrument of change.
Clause 3 of this article thus fully safeguards the future of the islands. Nothing in this interim administration would compromise the eventual status of the Falklands or the freedom which they have enjoyed for so long.
Clause 4 would require the administrator to verify the withdrawal of all forces from the islands and to prevent their reintroduction.
Mr. Jack Ashley: I am grateful to the Prime Minister for giving way. Could she help the House by clarifying one point? She said on the Jimmy Young radio programme the other day that she did not like the word "veto" as it applied to the Falkland Islands. Is the Government's position that the Falkland Islanders will be consulted and that their views are still paramount? Can the right hon. Lady help the House on that point?
The Prime Minister: I am dealing with the arrangements for the interim between the cessation of hostilities and the negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman will notice that we have imported into this agreement article 73 of the United Nations charter, which refers to the paramountcy of the interests of the islanders. During the long-term negotiations we shall closely consult the islanders on their wishes and of course we believe in self-determination. That relates to the long-term negotiations.
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These articles deal with the interim administration, and I have been trying to make it clear that the interim administration must not have provisions within it which, in effect, pre-empt the outcome of the long-term negotiations.
I return to clause 4 of article 6. We think it likely that the administrator will need to call upon the help of three or four countries other than ourselves and the Argentine to provide him with the necessary equipment and a small but effective force. The purpose of that is that if our troops leave the islands we must have some way of guarding against another Argentine invasion. The safest way under these arrangements would be for the United Nations' administrator to have a small United Nations force at his disposal, of the type I have described.
Articles 8 and 9 are also very important. They deal with negotiations between Britain and Argentina on the long-term future of the islands.
The key sentence is the one which reads:
"These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome."
We should thus be free to take fully into account the wishes of the islanders themselves. And Argentina would not be able to claim that the negotiations had to end with a conclusion that suited her.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Surely it is implicit in those words that if the rights and claims of the Argentines are being considered, the outcome of the negotiations may be that we shall cede sovereignty to Argentina.
The Prime Minister: I have said that we do not prejudge the outcome. If the islanders wished to go to Argentina, I believe that this country would uphold the wishes of the islanders. After their experience I doubt very much whether that would be the wish of the islanders. Indeed, I believe that they would recoil from it.
I return to article 9. We have to recognise that the negotiations might be lengthy. That is why article 9 provides that until the final agreement has been reached and implemented the interim agreement will remain in force.
Although this interim agreement does not restore things fully to what they were before the Argentine invasion, it is faithful to the fundamental principles that I outlined earlier. Had the Argentines accepted our proposals, we should have achieved the great prize of preventing further loss of life. It was with that in mind that we were prepared to make practical changes that were reasonable. But we were not prepared to compromise on principle.
I turn now to the Argentine response. This revived once again all the points which had been obstacles in earlier negotiations. The Argentine draft interim agreement applied not only to the Falklands but included South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands as well. The Argentines demanded that all forces should withdraw, including our forces on South Georgia, and return to their normal bases and areas of operation. This was plainly calculated to put us at an enormous disadvantage.
They required that the interim administration should be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations which should take over all executive, legislative, judicial and security functions in the islands. They rejected any role for the islands democratic institutions.

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They envisaged that the interim administration would appoint as advisers equal numbers of British and Argentine residents of the islands, despite their huge disparity.
They required freedom of movement and equality of access with regard to residence, work and property for Argentine nationals on an equal basis with the Falkland Islanders. the Junta's clear aim was to flood the islands with its own nationals during the interim period, and thereby change the nature of Falklands society and so prejudge the future of the Islands.
With regard to negotiations for a long-term settlement, while pretending not to prejudice the outcome the junta stipulated that the object was to comply not only with the Charter of the United Nations but with various resolutions of the General Assembly, from some of which the United Kingdom dissented on the grounds that they favoured Argentine sovereignty.
And if the period provided for the completion of the negotiation expired, the junta demanded that the General Assembly should determine the lines to which final agreement should conform. It was manifestly impossible for Britain to accept such demands. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]
Argentina began the crisis. Argentina has rejected proposal after proposal. One is bound to ask whether the junta has ever intended to seek a peaceful settlement or whether it has sought merely to confuse and prolong the negotiations while remaining in illegal possession of the Islands. I believe that if we had a dozen more negotiations the tactics and results would be the same. From the course of these negotiations and Argentina's persistent refusal to acept resolution 502 we are bound to conclude that its objective is procrastination and continuing occupation, leading eventually to sovereignty.
Sir John Biggs-Davison: I thank the Prime Minister for giving way and I apologise for interrupting her. Are we to understand that the proposed interim agreement, like some earlier proposals, is no longer on the table, having regard to the fact that the proposed provisions for the withdrawal of British forces and a non-British administration have consequences for British sovereignty and for the principles for which the task force was dispatched?
The Prime Minister: The proposals have been rejected. They are no longer on the table.
As I said earlier, the Secretary-General has this morning put to us and to Argentina an aide-memoire describing those issues where, in his opinion, agreement seems to exist and those on which differences remain.
The first group of issues—those where he believes there is a measure of agreement—would require further clarification, for on some points our interpretation would be different. The aide-memoire states, for example, that Argentina would accept long-term negotiations without prejudgment of the outcome. This important phrase was, however, omitted from the Argentine response to our own proposals and is belied by a succession of statements from Buenos Aires.
Those points where, in the Secretary-General's judgment, differences remain include: first, aspects of the interim administration; secondly, the timetable for completion of negotiations and the related duration of the interim administration; thirdly, aspects of the mutual
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withdrawal of forces; and, fourthly, the geographic area to be covered. Senor Perez de Cuellar has proposed formulations to cover some of those points.
The Secretary-General, to whose efforts I pay tribute, has a duty to continue to seek agreement. But, as our representative is telling him in New York, his paper differs in certain important respects from our position as presented to him on 17 May and which we then described as the furthest that we could go. Moreover, it differs fundamentally from the present Argentine position as communicated to us yesterday.
It is not a draft agreement, but, as the Secretary-General himself puts it, a number of formulations and suggestions. Some of his suggestions are the very ones which have already been rejected by the Argentine response to our own proposals. Even if they were acceptable to both parties as a basis for negotiation, that negotiation would take many days, if not weeks, to reach either success or failure.
We have been through this often before and each time we have been met with Argentine obduracy and procrastination. Argentina rejected our proposals. It is inconceivable that it would now genuinely accept those of the Secretary-General's ideas which closely resemble our own.
Mr. Guy Barnett: Is the Prime Minister aware that, according to the Quaker mission at the United Nations in New York, certain members of the Security Council have prepared a document which it is thought may be the basis for negotiation between ourselves and the Argentines?
The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I think that that is covered by what I have already said. This is the seventh set of proposals that we have considered. We have considered them carefully. Each time we have met with tactics the object of which is procrastination leading to continued occupation of the islands. Because of the record on this matter we thought it best to put up our own specific draft interim agreement in writing so that our position was clear for the world to see and so that it was clear that we were not compromising fundamental principles, but that we were prepared to make some reasonable, paractical suggestions if we could secure the prize of no further loss of life. Those proposals were rejected. They are no longer on the table.
Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: Will the Prime Minister give way?
The Prime Minister: No, not at the moment. The hon. Gentleman is interrupting the flow of what I am saying. What is being considered is what is called an aide-memoire, which is not a draft agreement, but a number of formulations and suggestions. The essence of those formulations and suggestions, where they are clear, is that they are those that have already been rejected by the Argentine response to our proposals.
Mr. Robinson: I am grateful to the Prime Minister for giving way. Why have we withdrawn those proposals, even though they have been rejected by Argentina? Why cannot they stay on the table for acceptance by Argentina right up to the last minute?
The Prime Minister: Because they have been rejected and it is the seventh lot of proposals with which we have

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been involved. This cannot go on and on. Someone has to make a decision and an assessment of the objectives of the Argentine junta.
Mr. Leo Abse: Since, at the end of the day, every rational man and woman knows that we cannot sustain indefinitely the sovereignty of those rocks 8,000 miles away, why is the Prime Minister showing such extraordinary impatience?—[Interruption.] Why will she not continue to seek to negotiate when the alternative is carnage and bloodshed, which will have no good effect at all?
The Prime Minister: Because the Argentines do not want a negotiated settlement. They want sovereignty of the islands and they are using protracted negotiations to procure that objective. I do not believe that they are genuine in their negotiations.
Dr. David Owen: Does the Prime Minister accept that many people believe that the proposals by the British Government are fair? Many people now recognise that the British Government may feel it necessary to take further military measures, but they cannot necessarily understand why the Prime Minister believes it necessary to withdraw the proposals or why the proposals cannot be held on the table in the hope that the Argentine Government will eventually come to their senses.
The Prime Minister: It seems perfectly clear to me that if the proposals have been rejected it is reasonable to withdraw them. They have been rejected. They are no longer on the table. What we are now considering is an aide-memoire put up by the Secretary-General. It seems right that if one makes an offer and it is rejected, that is the end of the matter, particularly bearing in mind that we are discussing the seventh set of proposals in which I have been involved.
Even if we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the aide-memoire, we should first wish to see subsantive Argentine comments on it, going beyond mere acceptance of it as a basis for negotiation. These are the points that we are making in our reply to the Secretary-General. At the same time, we are reminding him—as my right hon. Friends and I have repeatedly said to the House—that negotiations do not close any military options.
The gravity of the situation will be apparent to the House and the nation. Difficult days lie ahead, but Britain will face them in the conviction that our cause is just and in the knowledge that we have been doing everything reasonable to secure a negotiated settlement.
The principles that we are defending are fundamental to everything that this Parliament and this country stand for. They are the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in violation of the rights of peoples to determine by whom and in what way they are governed. Its aggression was committed against a people who are used to enjoying full human rights and freedom. It was executed by a Government with a notorious record in suspending and violating those same rights.
Britain has a responsibility towards the islanders to restore their democratic way of life. She has a duty to the whole world to show that aggression will not succeed and to uphold the cause of freedom.
4.10 pm
Mr. Michael Foot: I believe that it has been to the benefit of the House and the country not only to have this debate, but for the House to have before it in preparation for the debate the document that the Government have presented about the last period of negotiations. I underline to the Government my hope that they will provide at an early date a larger document. There are documents concerned with Peruvian proposals and the proposals made by Secretary of State Haig. The House and the country have a right to have those propositions before them. The House can see from what has happened here today how absurd it would have been if we had proceeded without having the latest proposals, which the Government have had published in preparation for the debate, albeit at fairly short notice.
I shall certainly comment upon that document and particularly upon the latest remarks that the right hon. Lady made about the Secretary-General's proposals. In my opinion, that is the most important aspect of the debate, and I shall return to it.
There are one or two preliminary matters that I should like to underline afresh. I do not claim that they are novel in any sense. I believe that it is important that we should clearly understand them. First, I refer to the debate of 3 April. I know that there are some people who say that the House reacted in a spirit of impetuosity. I believe that there were good grounds for what was done and that it was the expression by the House of its feeling of moral outrage at what had occurred. I believe that the House was right to underline its concern for the Falkland Islanders. They were the people who were most afflicted and against whom the least possible accusation could be made. They were living their lives perfectly innocently. They were interfering with nobody, and it was the interference with their lives that gave rise to that feeling in the dabate on 3 April. I do not believe that the House needs to apologise for that in any sense. We are concerned not only about the rights of the Falkland Islanders, but with their lives. We have to take that into account, and what kind of protection we can best afford them.
Let me refer also to another matter which became prominent during that debate—even though we did not know the exact outcome—and that is resolution 502, which has been the sheet anchor of the British case throughout the world during the whole period. The passage of that resolution was a matter of major importance. The allegiance of the House to that resolution has been of major importance, and it has been our guide throughout all the difficulties.
I do not believe that it would have been possible for us to proceed without some such resolution to which every Member of the House has given his support in one form or another. It is important that that should be reiterated because it was primarily on the basis of that resolution that we were able to command support for the British case throughout the world. It was important for us to insist upon it. I do not claim any precedence in the matter, but we on the Opposition Benches attach the greatest importance to upholding the United Nations charter and organisation. The crisis has proved that if we did not have the United Nations Charter we would have to invent one, if we did not have the United Nations Organisation we would have to invent one, if we did not have a Secretary-General who could assist in these matters we would have to—

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[Interruption.] I shall come to the Secretary-General in a moment, and I hope that there will not be derision from any part of the House. Any such derision is repudiated by the Opposition. I am sure that it is repudiated by the Foreign Secretary. I believe that in the crisis our allegiance to the United Nations charter and organisation has been of enormous importance and it should be continued. It is the bedrock of our policy.
I know that there may be some doubts on this point, but the view that I have held throughout is that I support the action under resolution 502. It was necessary for the Government to send the task force. In the debate of 14 April I gave my reasons for that view. I still hold that view about the task force, and it is of absolute importance that it should be under political control. The right hon. Lady has constantly reiterated that that is the case, and, of course, it must always remain the case, especially if there is to be an escalation of the military action over the coming days.
If our troops are sent in to further escalating military action—whatever it may be—I am sure that it is the desire of everyone in the House that the action should be as swift and successful as possible. We said that at the time of the recovery of South Georgia. I repeat it because I believe that it is important that it should be said.
The right hon. Lady sometimes refers to "our boys", as if they are her boys. They are not exactly her boys. [Interruption.] We have to deal with our Ministers and their responsibility. We are perfectly entitled to make whatever demands we wish in that respect. In sustaining the rights of the country the Government have had the fullest support from the Opposition. I do not believe that anybody could complain upon that score.
I come to some of the legitimate doubts and anxieties that people in the country have argued about from the beginning of the crisis in April. As time has elapsed it has become evident that it is incomparably better that the dispute should be settled, if possible, by peaceful means. When I use the expression "incomparably better" I mean exactly that. A long list of factors can be cited to illustrate how much greater would be the advantage if we could have a peaceful settlement.
First, there is the obvious factor, which I am sure is agreed by everybody in the House, of the danger of the loss of life of our young men, the Argentines and the Falkland Islanders themselves. All their lives might be involved. That is the first reason why it is important for us to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute and why we have emphasised that throughout the period. There are other reasons, as the Government know and that we have mentioned in the debates. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) particularly mentioned the possibility that if certain actions were taken, which I do not intend to describe now—all of us can understand them—we could lose some of the backing that we have in some other parts of the world. I am sure that the Government would not ignore such a development. It could happen, although I do not want it to. We must ensure that action is taken so that it does not occur. However, it is one of the factors in the situation.
Other factors are the geography of the matter, its diplomatic history, and many of the other developments that were discussed in the debate last Thursday. They cannot all be pushed aside by impatient Government Back Benchers. In considering the way in which the debate has been conducted throughout the country, special credit
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should go to the newspapers which have sought to withstand the hysteria and stupidity that have been spread in some quarters. All honour should go to those newspapers—The Guardian, the Daily Mirror,the Financial Times, The Observer and The Sunday Times—which have withstood the hysterical nonsense contained in many others. It has been good for the reputation of this country, and advantageous to the attempt to secure peace.
I come now to the document which the right hon. Lady and the Government have presented.
Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. Will he take the opportunity at this stage, at the outset of his comments, to say whether he feels that the British Government should have offered more than was contained in the proposals?
Mr. Foot: I am coming to that matter, as I said at the beginning of my remarks that I would, but it was perfectly right for me to put my remarks in the context that I have. I certainly do not intend to be dissuaded from that purpose by the hon. Gentleman. I shall, of course, answer his question.
The right hon. Lady and the Government have presented the terms of their document to us. Since I received it earlier today, I have read it, and I believe that it presents a clear and formidable case. Anyone who claims differently would not be reading it intelligently. The Government have stated clearly the principles on which they have acted—the principles of democracy and self-determination—and they have indicated some matters on which they have been prepared, I shall not say to compromise, but at any rate to make proposals which they believed would help towards a settlement.
It is important that that should be underlined, too, particularly in view of the accusation made in some quarters that the Government have been solely intransigent on the matter, as is said in Buenos Aires. The reputation of the case in this document is a matter of value for the present and for the future. If the Government could secure a settlement on the basis that they have proposed, we in the Opposition would be gratified as, I am sure, would the country and the world. In my view, they are fair proposals, and it is right that they should have been presented in theme terms.
However, I also say to the Government—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"]. One cannot get peace by just roaring in the House of Commons. There would have been peace long ago if that was the way to get it. As those who have been engaged in those matters will understand, much more important issues are involved. There are other factors in the Government's statement that I believe should be considered.
There are many defects in the Argentine proposals, to some of which the Prime Minister very properly drew attention, because many of them are deeply objectionable to the country. I could cite some, but there is no need to cite them all. The one about South Georgia, for example, is an extremely difficult proposition, and one that this country would find it impossible to accept. There are other proposals of that nature. However, I do not believe the right hon. Lady when she says that the Argentine proposals, as outlined in her document, amount to a complete rejection of all proposals. Indeed, I do net believe that the Foreign Secretary would claim that. In the

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debate last Thursday, the right hon. Gentleman suggested that there had been some movement towards the acceptance of two essential requirements that the British Government had rightly insisted on from the very beginning: first, the requirement about withdrawal and, secondly, the requirement of no preconditions about the eventual discussions that were to take place. I do not say that what Argentina proposes on those two items is adequate in any sense, but to say that it is a total rejection on those grounds does not seem to be an accurate account of the state of affairs.
However, the right hon. Lady—here I come to the most important aspect of her speech—said that we have had dozens of proposals. [HON. MEMBERS: "Seven".] Yes, seven. That is quite enough. Then she said that someone has to make an assessment. That is quite right, but it is a question not only of this Government making an assessment, or of an assessment being made in this country; it is also a question of an assessment being made by others, and among those who are entitled to make an assessment on how we are to get peace or war in this matter is the Secretary-General of the United Nations. No one could be more determined to ensure that than the right hon. Lady. She has been saying that. If any of her hon. Friends do not back her in that, they can say so, but she has been most forthcoming on this subject. At the beginning of the week, in response to questions, she said:
"We've been at this for six weeks and we're having one last go to see if we can get a peaceful settlement."
The questioner on the programme asked:
"How long can that one last go, go on for? Days, hours, weeks?"
To that the right hon. Lady replied:
"Well, it occurs through the Secretary-General of the United Nations who is being very active indeed. A person of total integrity. And it just depends how long he thinks he can go on."
That was one answer from the right hon. Lady.
The right hon. Lady gave another answer yesterday about the Secretary-General. She said:
"United Nations administration I believe would be carried on with great integrity."
She was referring to the possibilities of the interim administration.
"I think that we are all lucky to have Mr. de Cuellar as Secretary-General. He is a person himself of great integrity and we have a special relationship with him … because he was head of the United Nations observers at the elections in Rhodesia."
She went on:
"So he knows we bring colonies to independence. He knows how we arrange things with free elections. He knows that we believe in self determination, and he has seen us at it. So we have special faith in him."
At the beginning of this week I put it to the right hon. Lady that one of the reasons why I requested this debate and why we should have the documents was not merely that the Government and the House of Commons would demand the right to judge the terms, but, as I said in the letter that I sent to her on Monday, the Secretary-General himself might come forward with proposals at the end to be put to both sides. On Monday I said that I thought that it would be intolerable if, when proposals were coming from the Secretary-General, who knows as much about the intricacies of the negotiations as anyone, we were to go ahead with a great escalation of the conflict without having had the chance to judge what the Secretary-General might propose at the end of the discussions.
Mr. Robert Adley: If the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) had been Prime Minister, would he have approved the sending of the task force? Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Prime Minister should hand over to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the timing of future negotiations regardless of their outcome? Many of us would find that extremely hard to accept.
Mr. Foot: I am not saying that we should hand it over regardless of the outcome or of the time. The right hon. Lady has insisted on another occasion that there has been no hold up in the military operations because of the discussions. She is now nodding. The right hon. Lady has said many times that there has been no hold up in the military operations because of the discussions. It is a question not of asking for a great deal of time, but of asking for a proper response to what the Secretary-General has to say.
One of the disputes that I had with the right hon. Lady three weeks ago was when the Secretary-General came forward with some suggestions before the Foreign Secretary had had any meetings with him. We said that it would be improper for us to proceed without having the fullest possible discussions with the Secretary-General. That has been repaired in the sense that the Foreign Secretary has had discussions with the Secretary-General.
We have now reached the point at which a breakdown has occurred in the other negotiations, but the Secretary-General believes that the matter is of such supreme importance that, in the words of the right hon. Lady, someone must make an assessment. The Secretary-General has as much right to make an assessment as the Prime Minister or anybody else. The Secretary-General may be listened to in many parts of the world on this subject, and we shall need the support of many countries. I believe that it was a great mistake for the right hon. Lady to say—although I do not suppose it will govern her conduct in future negotiations—that all the proposals that she and her Government had made in the past were now withdrawn. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] I will tell hon. Members. It is because we want the Secretary-General to succeed. We want him to be supported. We want to ensure that the Government will give every proper response to the Secretary-General.
I shall make a specific proposal to the right hon. Lady on the subject in a few moments. It is no use hon. Members pushing it aside and saying that we will have nothing to do with what the Secretary-General proposes.
The Prime Minister: The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) cannot have heard what I said. The Secretary-General has put forward an aide-memoire. I described what we were saying to him. I said that what we were saying to him could not foreclose military options any more than it has in the past. There is his aide-memoire. I do not understand the right hon. Gentleman's point.
Mr. Foot: If the right hon. Lady is now telling us that her response to the Secretary-General is one which she is prepared to follow further at the United Nations, I am in favour of it. I am not quite sure whether a few of her more raucous Back Benchers would support her, but that is another matter. I hope that the right hon. Lady and her Government at such a delicate moment as this, when the command of support throughout the world is of paramount importance, will build on the answer the right hon. Lady

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has just given, that they will build on the response they have already made about the Secretary-General and that they will carry it much further. I hope that, before they take any further action, they will make a much bigger response. I know that the Government have tried on previous occasions to brush aside the Secretary-General, but they have had to come back to him in the end.
The proper course for both the right hon. Lady and the Foreign Secretary is, either tonight or tomorrow, to go to New York and to discuss the matter. That is the proper way in which such discussions should be carried through. If the right hon. Lady wishes to command support in this situation, she must command support through the United Nations Organisation. That means sustaining the Secretary-General in the proposition that he has put before the British Government today.
4.35 pm
Dr. David Owen: The House has listened to a very grave speech from the Prime Minister. I do not believe that anyone who listened to it can be in any doubt that we have witnessed a serious attempt to seek a negotiated settlement. That should be said and heard in the rest of the world.
I am pleased that the Leader of the official Opposition was prepared to recognise that the negotiating position adopted by the Government and now before the House and the world is a fair and reasonable one. It ought to be said quite clearly that we support that negotiating position. We recognise that many of us as individuals have had to accept a fair degree of compromise in those proposals. They are not the ideal proposals which each and every one of us in this House would wish to accept.
It is also right that this debate should be heard in the rest of the world. If the Government are advised by the Chiefs of Staff that the task force needs to take further measures to protect itself or further to tighten the military pressure around the invaders on the Falkland Islands, it is reasonable for them to be given the political authorisation to do so. No one is under any illusion that that would be a grave and dangerous step, and nobody wishes to see any loss of life. We would be fools, however, if we thought that we could take such a step without the real possibility of loss of life, Therefore, this is a very sombre moment, and it should be faced in a sombre and steady mood.
I do not believe that the military option that faces the Government is a single option, as we are sometimes led to believe. I do not believe that the only option is a D-Day-like frontal invasion. But we are getting close to the necessity to put a substantial proportion of our forces on to the Falkland Islands. Like many hon. Members, I have been deeply worried over the last few weeks about the possibility that what happened to HMS "Sheffield", and the tragedy that befell the Argentine cruiser, could happen to any of our ships.
In the light of these negotiations, if the Chiefs of Staff want a decision from the Government such a decision should be taken. I hope that their military judgment will be wisely exercised and their options wisely chosen, and that it will be possible to repossess parts of the islands—a lot of which will not contain any Argentine troops at all—to provide ourselves with an air base, to protect it with Rapier missiles and to have a base on land instead of the rather hazardous base for our aircraft on ships on the high seas.
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I must say to the Prime Minister that none of that in any way reduces,the responsibility to continue the negotiations. None of that in any way reduces the responsibility on us, as a loyal member of the United Nations, to respond to any reasonable request from the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General will face a difficult task. The history of the negotiations does not give ground for optimism. If the Secretary-General is ready to pursue his aide-memoire and to try to reach a negotiated position, we ought to be ready to listen. There has been a lull, although the Prime Minister has said that there has been no period in which there has been a delay in the decisions. All of us who are realistic know that there has been a lull in the fighting. If that fighting increases, it will be one of the pressures.
I hope that when our friends read the negotiating document and the interim proposals, they will recognise the necessity to continue with economic sanctions. I have no doubt that that will be the response of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. I hope that it will be the response of Norway. Although it is not a member of the EEC, it has taken exactly the same measures as the EEC. I profoundly hope that the other nine member States take that decision. If it is not possible to reach a unanimous decision, and if Ireland feels unable to go along with it, I hope that the remaining eight member States will take that decision.
Furthermore, I hope that the United States is prepared to look at its economic sanctions and to take further economic sanctions. If the rest of the countries of the world are asked by us to take economic sanctions which are painful to them and may have adverse economic consequences, we must be prepared to listen to them. They are our friends. They have taken those measures because there is a fellow feeling in the European Community, the Commonwealth and NATO. The message that is corning from those countries now is "We will take further economic sanctions and we recognise why you are driven to tighten the military pressures, but we believe that you must continue to negotiate."
I hope that the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Secretary when he replies, will reflect upon her answer to my question about the necessity to withdraw and take the proposals from the table. What is the aim and object? Surely the aim and object is not unconditional surrender. History shows that by holding out for unconditional surrender one unnecessarily loses lives. Unconditional surrender is rarely the right position for a strong democratic country to adopt.
Having put down these proposals, which are essentially proposals for a ceasefire, withdrawal and an honourable negotiation, Britain should be strong enough and clear enough in the justice of its cause to keep those propositions on the table. Britain should be prepared to say to the Argentines "If at any time in the next few days or weeks of military and economic pressure you are prepared to have a ceasefire on these terms, we will honour it." I believe that that is an essential negotiating position.
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Evacuation.
Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman says "Evacuation". It is not evacuation. It is a ceasefire and a phased withdrawal. It is a proposal for an interim administration. I know that the right hon. Gentleman has never wanted any of those compromises.
Mr. Powell: It is nonsense.
Dr. Owen: It may be nonsense, but it is a view.
Mr. Powell: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that if we continue with military action, whatever the outcome may be, we should go back to the position of withdrawing our forces, a phased withdrawal of both sides and someone else's administration?
Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman's perception is remarkable: that is exactly what I am saying.
Mr. Powell: Then it is nonsense.
Dr. Owen: The right hon. Gentleman assumes that he has a monopoly of these issues. He has his own view and he is entitled to it, but if we had held to his view there would have been no negotiations and no movement in the Government's position, and we would not have had support from any country. The right hon. Gentleman has always held a view of absolute and total certainty. His position of absoluteness and certainty is very similar to the position of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn). The reality of life is that most of us are prepared to negotiate and to have a measure of compromise. Most of us are prepared to live in the real world and not in the nationalistic island on which the right hon. Gentleman seems to have impaled himself.
I urge the Prime Minister to look carefully at this issue because it is on this issue that she could lose opinion not just in the House and in the country but in the rest of the world. There must be a readiness to continue the negotiating process.
These proposals are different from the Peruvian proposals. Those proposals were from another Government. They contained elements that were unpalatable to the British and the Argentines. In the document the right hon. Lady said that she was prepared to accept the final Peruvian argument, but, the Argentines having rejected it, she withdrew that offer. That is different from withdrawing the proposals that have been put forward by the British Government. The Prime Minister should look at that issue. She cannot quote some parts of the United Nations charter and ignore others.
The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman is ignoring what I said in my speech. We gave a full written interim agreement. It was put to the Argentines with two days to reply. They knew what they were doing when they replied within that time limit: they were rejecting the proposals. If we were to enter into negotiations again, they would probably be totally different because they would be on a different basis.
Dr. Owen: If there is a misunderstanding, let us try to clear it up. I am saying not that we should enter into the negotiations on the basis of the document, but that the document is the offer. If in the next few days and weeks, as a result of economic and military pressures, the Argentines accept the document lock, stock and barrel, the Prime Minister should recognise that that is an honourable offer on which it is honourable to ask our forces and Service men to fight. The right hon. Lady should not hold out for a proposition that is as yet unheard of or for unconditional surrender.
The right hon. Lady quoted article 73 of the United Nations charter, which is also quoted in the document. The House should listen to the words of article 74, which also relates to the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories. It states:
"Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less
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than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters."
We have a wider responsibility. The right hon. Lady knows that if, as I hope, military action is totally successful—let us hope that that is possible, although most of us are more objective than that—what would we face? Are we prepared to face a situation in which we have a military garrison in the Falkland Islands for the next 10 or 20 years, which is within range of Argentine land-based aircraft? Is that what we are being asked to do? We know that at the end of the day there must be negotiations. It must be said now before lives are lost that this country is prepared to negotiate. We are not pursuing a colonial claim. [Interruption.] All I am asking Conservative Members to do is to uphold the proposition tabled at the United Nations by their Government. I ask them to uphold it over the next few weeks and months and to be prepared to recognise that an honourable ceasefire, withdrawal and negotiations can happen on that basis. If the Argentines lose the lives of their soldiers in order to resist this fair document, the rest of the world will judge them hard. If the rest of the world has any doubt as to what we are fighting for, we will jeopardise our position. It is a reasonable request to make to the Prime Minister.
During the past seven weeks, the right hon. Lady has had considerable support from the House and the country. She is entitled to that. But she also has a responsibility as Prime Minister to listen to others and consider the views not just of myself or of my party, but of many other Governments. She knows that what I am saying is a view held by many other people in the world.
We wish the Prime Minister every success. We have given her unstinting support and will continue to do so in the pursuit of honourable objectives. We have not flinched from supporting the negotiating position, the application of economic sanctions, or the use of military force. We shall also not flinch from saying unpopular things if necessary about the need for an honourable negotiating position.
4.50 pm
Mr. Julian Amery: I congratulate the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) on the early part of his speech and on the support that he offered to the Government if, as circumstances unfold, the Chiefs of Staff should decide that action should be taken. However, in the second half of his speech he departed a little from the realism that he has, on the whole, steadily shown in these debates.
The right hon. Gentleman led up to the terms that have been offered by the Government by saying that we must be clear about our objectives. They were well summed up by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at the beginning of the crisis. She said that we were asking for the unconditional withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and for the full restoration of British sovereignty on the islands. She said that the interests of the islanders remain paramount. I stress the word "remain".
The right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Liberal Party was right when he said the other day that the final decision about the islands' future depends on the House, because we are the sovereign power of the Falkland Islands. But it must not be forgotten that ever since 1964

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no Government, Conservative or Labour, have put before the House any proposal for the islands' future which the islanders said was unacceptable.
The paper that we have before us shows that in a determined and laudable effort to avoid bloodshed the Government were prepared to make substantial concessions from those original objectives. They would not necessarily have been inconsistent with the original objectives that we had in mind, but they might have put the fulfilment of those objectives at risk. Many Conservative Members would have found them hard to accept. I do not know how many that applies to, but it would certainly have applied to me.
All that is academic now. General Galtieri has failed to learn the lesson of the Sybiline books—what was on offer can no longer be on offer—
"He that will not when he may, when he would he shall have nay."
We cannot ask our forces to go into battle, as the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting, to hand over the islands when repossessed to a United Nations trusteeship under the kind of interim administration that we were previously discussing.
We are taking back our own property. We shall be liberating our own people. If we accomplish that there will not be much to negotiate about, except the surrender of the adversary forces and their repatriation under honourable terms to Argentina.
I do not think that my right hon. Friends would disagree that the phoney war is over and that we are now proceeding to serious business. These will be grim days for the task force. They will be grim days, too, for the islanders. Can we give them just a little encouragement? Can we send back the governor to join the task force as soon as possible so that as we establish ourselves on the islands the new administration will also be there? Can we offer to the Falkland Islands Council—it is for it to reject or accept—what we rejected earlier—the citizenship terms with Britain which the Gibraltarians now enjoy?
The Government have shown admirable determination in terminating—as far as I understand it they have—the negotiating process at the United Nations. Had they made any further concessions, the authority and the standing of Britain in the world would have been seriously undermined. So would the credibility of the Government at home. All policies, economic and social, however sound they may be, are ineffective if the Government's credibility is undermined.
Mr. David Ennals rose—
Mr. Amery: I will continue if I may, because I know that many right hon. and hon. Members want to catch Mr. Speaker's eye.
Since 3 April there has been a new spirit abroad in Britain. Any surrender, however well presented—I do not doubt the Foreign Office's ability to produce the appropriate draft—would undermine national self-confidence. Without national self-confidence there can be no economic, social or moral revival. The consequences of a failure of nerve—there has not been one, thank God—would have been far-reaching. The consequences of determination and, let us pray, success, may be no less important. Indeed, they may be far more important.
What is at stake in the Falkland Islands crisis transcends the immediate issues of the Falkland Islanders and our own stake in the South Atlantic. The crisis is a catalyst of the
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basic values of our society; what Henry Kissinger has referred to as "honour, justice and patriotism". Those are not just intellectual concepts, nor are they jingoism or war hysteria.
The right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition allowed himself a diatribe against the popular press. As a former editor of a Beaverbrook newspaper he should know that editors do their best to meet the wishes of the public. The editors know that the public are getting what they want. What is happening is not jingoism or war hysteria. It is the expression of the deep feeling of a proud and ancient nation and of the most mature democracy in the world.
Even if it is not always expressed in terms familiar to the defeatist "Establishment" that has governed Britain for far too long, those are the feelings that inspire our people. They could lead to unexpected endeavours and unexpected unity such as no political theory could give. Such feelings have not been alive in the same way since 1940, but they could be the key to our national revival.
It is perfectly natural that before the die is cast, before the Rubicon is crossed, there should be doubts, fears and hesitations. But the time is past for such doubts. We stand on the eve of battle. On 3 April the House gave a lead to the nation and sent the task force on its course. Hopes of a peaceful settlement have since been dashed. Our purpose, however, should be as firm today as it was at the beginning. Irrespective of party allegiances or political opinions, I hope that both sides of the House will act together to ensure that we prevail.
4.59 pm
Mr. Tony Benn: I listened carefully—as the whole House did—to the Prime Minister's speech. It is apparent that with the withdrawal of the negotiated interim agreement, the restatement of the fact that the military option must remain open, and with the Ministry of Defence briefing we must assume that an invasion is imminent, and some hon. Members have already called for it. A tragedy is unfolding, the magnitude of which is not apparent from the speeches. As the Prime Minister told the House, responsibility lies not with Parliament, but with the Government. She constantly reminded the Leader of the Opposition that it was for the Government to act. Hon. Members must do as they think right, and therefore some of my colleagues and I will tonight vote against the Adjournment, for reasons that I shall give the House.
Mr. Hugh D. Brown: As one of those who will be involved, would my right hon. Friend mind telling me who he consulted before he made that ringing declaration?
Mr. Benn: I shall vote, and I know that others will do so. Every Member must be responsible for his speech and his vote. I shall not be drawn into implying that other hon. Members should vote in the same way, unless it be through persuasion on the evidence.
Mr. Hugh D. Brown rose—
Dr. Shirley Summerskill rose—
Mr. Benn: I shall not give way, as I wish to give my reasons to the House and, at the same time, be brief.
Mr. Andrew Faulds: My right hon. Friend has been asked whom, among his colleagues, he

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consulted. May I assure him that some of us met to discuss this issue—although we do not always find ourselves in the same stable—and that we intend to vote on this issue tonight? My right hon. Friend is not alone in his intention.
Mr. Benn: Tomorrow's Division list will record the names of those who have exercised their right to state in the Lobby their view of what is happening.
I shall base my argument on an examination of the Government's document. It gives an account of recent events. It also gives the Government's proposals for a settlement, which have now been withdrawn. Because they have been withdrawn, they must necessarily become the war aims of a Cabinet that is about to launch an invasion. Since the Prime Minister said that no proposals for future negotiations were likely to succeed, we must view the document in that light.
One of the arguments given for the Government's reaction to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands was that it took place during a period of negotiation between the British and Argentine Governments. I put it to the Prime Minister that if the interim agreement contained in the document had been made available to Argentina by this Government, or any Government in the past 20 years, the invasion would not have occurred.
Therefore, the task force has not played any part, because—as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said—the proposals involve the abandonment of the substance of sovereignty, which is the right to have troops on one's territory and to control its administration. By publishing this document—and hon. Members should not think that a withdrawal makes any difference—the Government have published their readiness to abandon, in substance, British sovereignty over the islands.
The document says that the Government rejected a "purely military policy". I ask the House to consider whether that is true. What effort did the Government make to bring pressure to bear on the Argentine Government through the world bankers? Had they refused to reschedule the debts, they could have brought the Argentine Government to their knees. What effort did the Government make? None whatsoever.
I cannot anticipate the reason, but yesterday's edition of The Times, in conjunction with other recent articles, pointed out that if the Argentine Government had not had their debts rescheduled we might have seen something approaching the collapse of the world banking system as a result of the financial losses. To rational people it appears that the Prime Minister was prepared to protect the bankers and to send the soldiers in instead. The Government made no serious effort in that direction.
A massive task force has been sent. The Prime Minister allows and encourages the idea that a "War Cabinet" meets every day. That is from a Government who say in their document that they have rejected a military policy. The briefings come every day not from the Foreign Office but from the Ministry of Defence. In various speeches the Prime Minister has encouraged what can only be described as war hysteria. I suspect that that is not like the spirit of 1940, but is expressed in a feeling among the people that a military solution is intended, should be supported and will be successful. The world certainly sees it that way, and that is why support for the Government abroad is eroding.
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The Government's document states that Argentina has been playing for time. Of course it has. But who put the clock in its armoury? The task force gave it the clock as a weapon. It is impossible to leave the task force hanging about. Therefore, once the task force was dispatched, time was given to Buenos Aires—[Interruption.] Of course that was the reason.
The Prime Minister spoke about the weather conditions. Everyone can imagine the conditions faced by the troops. Events are in control. Whether Admiral Woodward is technically under political control is not the issue. The Prime Minister knows that, even if she thought that negotiations would succeed in two or three weeks' time, the task force could not remain there for that time doing nothing. The very presence of the task force gave Argentina the right to dictate an ultimatum to us. Its ultimatum was fight, or withdraw. The Government have decided to fight. When they fight, world support will disappear.
I turn to the Government's negotiating position, as contained in the terms of the interim agreement. I invite those keenest on war on the Government Benches to listen carefully. The document conveyed by Sir Anthony Parsons on Monday is a remarkable one. The offer made involved major concessions, and the war aims have thus been eroded by them. I want the House to understand the question of mutual withdrawal. The Government offered Argentina the concession that no British troops from the task force would land on the Falkland Islands. That is the meaning of mutual withdrawal. However, the essence of sovereignty and of the right to self-defence—to which much reference has been made—is that we have that right. Therefore, the Government conceded that.
Next, the Government conceded that if there were a ceasefire economic sanctions would be abandoned at once. Thus the junta—which is properly denounced as representing a denial of human rights—would immediately be supported again. As soon as the ceasefire began, the junta would get back its money and trade. That was contained in the document, which I invite the House to consider.
The Government also conceded that a United Nations administrator would go to the Falkland Islands. Indeed, many of us urged that that should happen. However, the United Nations administrator would only consult the islanders and would take account only of their interests, not their views. So much for paramountcy! Argentine observers would be there to ensure that he took account only of their interests, not of their views. The Government said that they wanted that administration to continue indefinitely until they had obtained an agreed solution.
The essence of sovereignty is administration, but that was abandoned. Paramountcy was also abandoned. With the Government insisting on an indefinite agreement, there was no guarantee in the interim agreement offer made by Sir Anthony Parsons that British troops or a British administration would ever return to the Falkland Islands.
Mr. Geoffrey Rippon rose—
Mr. Peter Tapsell rose—
Mr. Benn: The right hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Gentleman will have to wait, as I am anxious to develop the argument and put forward an analysis of the case.

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If such an offer had been made at any time over the past 20 years there would have been no invasion of the Falkland Islands.
Mr. Rippon: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall the terms of the draft Labour manifesto of 1980, which was published under the authority of the national executive—of which I believe the right hon. Member is the chairman, or was at that time? Paragraph 28 reads:
"We reaffirm our commitment that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be handed over to any Argentine regime which violates human and civil rights."
Does that still represent the right hon. Gentleman's policy, or does he say it is different if Argentina takes them?
Mr. Benn: I congratulate the right hon. and learned Gentleman on reading our documents. There is nobody on the Labour Benches who supported the Argentine attack or who favours the handing over of the Falkland Islands. The point that I am making is that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's Government have been prepared to make an offer to keep British troops off the islands, and to have a United Nations administrator with Argentine observers. They made the offer and, although it is officially withdrawn, it is now in the public domain.
Mr. Geoffrey Robinson rose—
Mr. Benn: I am sorry; I must carry on.
The task force was not needed. That offer could have been made at any time. With the whole British case conceded, what is the case for war? Why should people die for a pre-arranged abandonment of the paramountcy of the interests of the islanders to a United Nations administration? This is what the debate is about. If we go on—and I am sure that the House knows that this is what is planned—to attempt to repossess the islands by force, there will be more deaths, there will be more killings, but for what?
We know the Government's furthest negotiation position. There will be escalation, because if we land troops they will be attacked, and Argentina must have some strategy for attacking our ships. When the ships, if any, are sunk—and God knows none of us wants to contemplate such a possibility—Tory Members will be demanding that we bomb the mainland. Some have already said it. Are we to bomb the mainland so that in the end we can give the Falklands to the United Nations and take our troops out? We shall be isolated if we do escalate the situation. Everyone knows that President Reagan will stop the present Prime Minister, as Eisenhower stopped Sir Anthony Eden, because the President cannot see the British bombing the mainland of a continent that he seeks to control. The costs, both direct and indirect, will be enormous.
I do not believe, in all conscience, that the House can support this policy. Those of us who opposed the sending of the task force from the outset, as my hon. Friends and I did, have found all our warnings confirmed. We cannot support this policy. The Leader of the Opposition, who has urged on every occasion that the task force should be there but that there should be no escalation of the violence, cannot support a policy contemplating an invasion and then an abandonment. The Government's Back Benchers, who have urged war so strongly, cannot want war, only to prepare for abandonment.
Tonight I hope that hon. Members from both sides of the House will go into the Lobby to vote against the
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Adjournment. I say against the Adjournment, because there is a special significance about the Adjournment. By voting against the Adjournment the House shows that it wishes to continue the debate so that these issues can be explored.
I finish with the points that have been made in earlier debates. We should go for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. We should hand over to the United Nations the Falkland Islands administration in exactly the same way as the Government have conceded in the document. Far from abandoning sanctions at the moment when we unilaterally hand over responsibility for the administration to the United Nations, which the Government contemplate, we should step up the sanctions on Argentina. Financial and economic sanctions, combined with the transfer of the islands to a United Nations responsibility, will almost certainly bring Galtieri down. Let us not forget that when Nixon wanted to bring down Allende he did not send a task force; he economically strangled President Allende. Reagan has the power to strangle Galtieri, provided that we do not make war upon him. Finally, we should bring the fleet home.
These proposals, which are modest and to some extent build on what the Government are prepared to concede, will win widespread support throughout the country. At least tonight in the Division Lobby there will be those who will record their profound opposition to this war upon which we believe the Prime Minister has been determined from the outset.
5.17 pm
Sir Paul Bryan: Many of my right hon. and hon. Friends will by now have come to the reluctant conclusion that in a matter of days we may be driven to the use of major force in the Falkland Islands. If this it to be, it is important that the nation should see that we are taking this step after much thought and with a heavy heart.
It is fortunate that the Government have had seven weeks to prepare the nation and world opinion for this desperately serious decision. The Government have used those seven weeks remarkably well. Immediately after the Argentine invasion, the Prime Minister announced that our intention was to repossess the islands, preferably by diplomacy, otherwise by force, and to restore liberty to the islanders. This has been repeated again and again in the plainest terms, and by now no one can doubt what we mean to do.
Our plan of action was to be intense diplomacy, backed by increasing economic and military pressure, culminating in the use of force if all else failed. The progress of this plan has been discussed and described continuously. In Parliament we have had no fewer than seven debates—one debate per week—in addition to endless opportunities for hon. Members to question the Prime Minister and the Secretaries of State.
On the media, Ministers and experts of every kind have made themselves constantly available. Never have the public been better informed about anything. The document published this morning adds one more valuable piece of information that the House needs. No one can doubt that the Government have tried very hard to reach a peaceful solution.
After all this discussion and clear explanation, and largely because of it, the Government's policy seems to have a remarkable degree of support in the country and in the world, with a good deal more than a majority in its

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favour in the House of Commons. However, once we resort to force in earnest, the picture changes on all three fronts—diplomatic, economic and military. I am sure that the Government have seriously considered the problem of how, in the face of mounting loss of life, we can continue to hold the confidence of our people and of world opinion.
The troops that we have sent to the Falkland Islands—marines, parachute battalions, SAS and Gurkhas—are probably the finest and best trained in the world. Only with superlative training could they have carried out the superb operation on Pebble Island the other day without loss of life.
So admirable has been the performance of our forces during the past few years, be it in the Iranian embassy, Northern Ireland or South Georgia, that there is a positive danger of the public expecting too much—of expecting an easy ride. But even with the finest troops, losses must mount as the fighting spreads.
What is more, anyone who has seen much fighting would agree with me that luck always plays a horribly big part in the fortunes of war. Luck was on our side in South Georgia when a submarine full of reinforcements literally fell into our hands; but, with luck against us, however good our fighters or air defence, we could lose ships, big ships, with devastating losses. Any serving officer to whom one speaks now is apt to say "I hope the country is ready to accept casualties, possibly heavy casualties".
Once major operations have started, Ministers must constantly warn the public of what may be in store. Despite the loss of two major warships, the fighting so far can be no more than a preliminary skirmish with neither side committing its main forces. The Argentines will certainly have kept their main air effort back until more of our ships are in range.
One sees comforting statements in the press, and even hears them in the House, that the Argentine troops are probably not much good, that many of them are unwilling conscripts and that their morale is probably low after the battering that they have had from the awful weather. That is pure wishful thinking. The oldest mistake, in infantry or any other fighting, is to believe that you are up against a weak opposition until that has been surely proved.
I agree with the Prime Minister that concessions, once offered and refused, cannot continue to lie on the table. Those concessions were made at a particular time in return for a peaceful solution. Once the task force has put us in a stronger bargaining position, it would be folly to lessen our requirements, which must always start with a real Argentine military withdrawal.
My point is well illustrated by the contents of the paper published by the Government today. Some of my hon. Friends may consider that the terms that we offered were too generous. On the whole, they were just about right as the price for a peaceful solution at that time and in those circumstances, but they may well seem to be too generous after we have had to suffer the loss of hundreds of lives and after we are in possession of the islands, or a major part of them. That shows the importance of speed in our military action. The more extensive our occupation of the Falkland Islands by the time the next serious peace offer is made, the stronger will be our negotiating position.
The diplomatic contest will take on quite a different form once the real battle is joined. It will not be long before we must consider some other deal, probably
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through the United Nations or through the United States of America, possibly with pressure applied from America. We must be very wary not to give away the strength of our position. We must always remember that America's interests are not necessarily our interests.
As our Foreign Office has been under heavy criticism, I wish to finish by paying tribute to the superlative service that we have received from our diplomats and from the two Foreign Secretaries since the crisis erupted. It is fitting that the last act of a brilliant Foreign Secretary was probably his greatest single achievement. To secure the mandatory resoluton from the Security Council was the foundation upon which all our diplomacy has been based and without which we should have been in a far weaker moral position.
Our present Foreign Secretary took over the reins for as rough a ride as he is ever likely to have, and a ride that still has a long way to go. He has played his part with great courage and with robust skill. I am sure that he would be the first to pay tribute to Sir Nicholas Henderson, who has recaptured the confidence of the Americans, and to Sir Anthony Parsons, on whose advice the Government are so dependent. World support, especially Commonwealth support, will be all-important when the inevitable final deal is made, and it certainly cannot be taken for granted.
5.24 pm
Mr. Ken Weetch: Since the crisis occurred early in April, this is the sixth set piece debate in the house and, if comment is to be believed, it is the last set piece debate that we shall have before the fighting begins in earnest, if I may put it in that way. It is taking place at a time when the protracted searches for a peaceful solution appear to have reached a dead end.
In my short contribution to the debate I wish, first, to put my views on record, because I do not wish to move my feet after the cat has jumped. Secondly, I shall comment briefly on what I consider to be some of the fundamental issues thrown up by the dispute.
It has been my view from the beginning that the issue was never merely a dispute between Britain and Argentina over a group of islands. It is a dispute about the sanctity of international law and about facing up to unlawful aggression for political ends. Times change, but in essence the aggression that we have seen by the Argentines is the same species of aggression as we saw in Britain in the 1930s. As we are on the edge of war—I put it as bluntly as that—we would do well, even at the eleventh hour, to consider the fundamental simplicity of the essential lines of truth which I believe to be Britain's case.
First, only a few short weeks ago we were holding negotiations in good faith with Argentina about the future of the islands. Let us not forget that. Secondly, the islands are ours in law and come within the British framework of sovereignty. Thirdly, they were invaded and occupied and remain so because of an unprovoked, unprincipled and naked act of aggression. It was described by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition as
"an act of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances."
My right hon. Friend said that what was at stake was
"the claim of our country to be a defender of people's freedom throughout the world, particularly those who look to us for special protection".
Those words are absolutely true, and that was my right hon. Friend's gut reaction in his first speech. He has played a principled and statesmanlike part in our debates

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as matters have unfolded. I put it to the House that there are no better words than those of my right hon. Friend to describe the origin and causes of this crisis.
As events unfolded the detail was complicated but the profile remained simple. The behaviour of Argentina was condemned in United Nations resolution 502, but the United Nations' call for withdrawal proved to no avail. Far from it, the Argentine response was to reinforce both troops and equipment. It was evident all along that Argentina did not have the slightest intention of negotiating in any meaningful way—quite the reverse. The junta used every procrastinating device to play for time until the physical conditions in the South Atlantic altered the odds in Argentina's favour. That was true from start to finish.
Among Britain's critics, much has been made of the imperial dimension of this dispute. Britain, it is said, is clinging to an imperialism which has long gone. That is a complete fiction. My right hon. Friend said:
"There is no question in the Falkland Islands of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on the basis of association with this country."—[Official Report, 3 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 638–39.]
I believe that the sending of the task force was right. I put it more strongly than that. Not to have done so would have been an act of the most craven appeasement. If anyone believes that the Argentine military dictatorship would have negotiated without such a task force being sent, they will believe anything. To all Britain's critics I say this: given the facts, the unvarnished truth of the aggression, how strong a case does Britain need in order to exert itself and do something? That is the question to be answered.
Much of what I have said has already been said, and said much better. However, I want to examine the conduct of Britain's ostensible friends in this dispute. I am disappointed, to say the least, at the American response. At most times, as events unfolded, the support of the American Administration has been grudging and halfhearted. I am sorry to say that American support of Britain's case has always been qualified by a desire to keep the lines open to South American States of an odious character.
The United States described itself as an honest broker. Bismarck once said at the Congress of Berlin that he was an honest broker, but that all honest brokers act for a large commission. In political terms, that is what has happened. Given the facts of the dispute, an evenhanded approach from the United States was never justified. If America had given a firm commitment and come in right from the start on the side of Britain—a democracy and a North Atlantic Treaty ally—the dispute would never have reached this stage.
I was not disappointed with the response from Europe, because I never expected anything better. After the grudging extension of sanctions for seven days, my disillusion with the EEC has been confirmed. There is a great deal of talk about the European Community standing for noble ideals of democracy, and all the rest, but in this dispute our European partners have never lifted their eyes above the cash register. I am sorry to say that, but it is the truth.
In broad principle, I support the Government. I believe that they have negotiated in good faith and that they have
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shown flexibility. From a brief reading of the memorandum it is my view that the Government have shown a great deal too much flexibility.
The Government have made an honest attempt to reach a peaceful solution. After listening carefully to the Prime Minister this afternoon, I am satisfied that an exhaustive search has been made for a negotiated settlement. If the Government have failed, it is because of Argentine intransigence. If Britain now exercises her legitimate right of self-defence of her territory under article 51 of the charter, I hope that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition will attend the special briefings which must come from the Government. Consistent with justice for Britain, and in the face of all the facts, I see no alternative but to exercise the only option—to respond to unlawful aggression with self-defence.
If a man is sitting at a table talking to someone who kicks the table over and draws a knife, and if help is not forthcoming, he must face the situation alone. I put the matter in those simple terms. I hope that if things cut up rough the voice of this House will be for national unity first, middle and last.
5.37 pm
Sir John Eden: It has been most refreshing to listen to the words of the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Weetch). He spoke straight and true and without equivocation. I have no doubt that what he has said will find a ready echo in all parts of the United Kingdom and not least in the hearts and minds of those currently engaged in the task force. We owe him our gratitude for his courage in speaking out as he has done.
Earlier in the debate some hon. Members urged the Government to leave their negotiating proposals on the table. I do not agree. It would be dangerous to attempt to roll up all the separate stages of negotiation as though they had taken place within a single time scale and under precisely similar circumstances.
Since the outset of the difficulties there have been two major events. The first was the invasion of our territory by Argentina. The second was the rejection of terms offered to Argentina to achieve a negotiated settlement. The invasion changed the situation from what it was before those events took place. If someone were to seize my property, I should be prepared to offer more to get it back than I should have been prepared to offer in the first place to deter him from taking it.
The invasion has presented us with a different situation. But just as the Argentine act of invasion has altered the circumstances from those which existed before that event, so would repossession of our own territory by our own forces change the situation dramatically from what it is today. We must be absolutely clear that at each successive stage, as these events unfold, we are dealing with a different situation.
In the light of what we have now had presented to us, it seems that there are three options open to us. First, we can accept the invasion and hand over our territory and our people to Argentina. I do not believe that that is a course that commends itself to any hon. Member in the House.
The second course would be to continue to negotiate while agreeing to withdraw our task force, to encourage the Argentines to leave and to accept a formula for an interim regime that would inevitably lead to the establishment of Argentine sovereignty and the handing over of our people to the Argentine regime. That appears

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to be a course that commends itself to some Opposition Members. It certainly does not commend itself to me. I do not believe that it commends itself to the majority of hon. Members or to most people in this country.
The third choice is to increase our efforts to repossess the islands by further military means. Here I agree with the views of the hon. Member for Ipswich. It has been put to me in recent weeks, notably by Churchmen and others who understandably say that they are practising Christians, that they regard the use of force as an immoral act. I need to remind them, as I think my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has consistently underlined throughout the past seven weeks, that the Argentines have already used force, that they intended to seize our territory by the use of force and that they are seeking to hold on to our territory by the employment of force.
I am, however, reminded by Sir John Balfour, who, as many hon. Members will know, is a former ambassador to Buenos Aires and has been a wise and distinguished diplomat in the service of this country, that religion and virtue cannot be maintained without the punishment of wickedness and vice. That might well be underlined throughout the Christian world. There must be recognition of the fact that on occasion, in order to uphold what is right, what is true and what is lawful, it may be necessary to embark upon a course of action that employs the use of force and that hazards the lives of those actively involved in its execution.
If we were to stand back and do nothing, can anyone doubt the consequences? It seems clear to me that the Argentines have ambitions not just over the Falkland Islands and the dependencies. Were they to achieve their objective in that respect, there seems little doubt that they would seek to advance what they believe to be their national cause by further establishing themselves as a continental power in southern America. The people of Chile or other neighbouring territories must be watching with concern to see that on this occasion the Argentines do not succeed. They believe, perhaps rightly, that if the Argentines were to succeed, they would be next in line.
Inevitably, in the employment of force, there is the risk of casualties. It is right, on what has been described as a solemn occasion, for hon. Members to recognise that this is not a course that is being embarked upon lightly by Her Majesty's Government. Deep and careful thought has been given to it. Every possible step has been, and is being, taken to try to reduce the risk to our Aimed Forces. I am certain, however, that members of the Armed Forces would agree with the objectives that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has outlined—that aggression should not succeed, that international law should be upheld, that sovereignty cannot and must not be changed simply by the fact of invasion and that the freedom of our own people, in this case the Falkland Islanders, should be secured.
As my right hon. Friend said, Britain has the duty to ensure that aggression shall not succeed and that we should uphold the cause of freedom. When my right hon. Friend says "Britain", she means not only the British forces. I am certain that she means the British people as a whole. I agree with her that all of us should now join the British forces in sharing that duty to ensure that aggression shall not succeed.
5.45 pm
Mr. James Callaghan: I should like to refer to the document, to the way that we should proceed—on which I may offer my views—and to the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) who has invited me to follow him into the Lobby tonight. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend has left the Chamber. If anyone wishes to go and fetch him, I shall be very happy. I agree that he, like anyone else, is entitled to a cup of tea, but I do not like attacking him if he is not present.
I do not complain, but I very much regret, that the document was not available to hon. Members earlier. I understand why it was not available, but if every hon. Member had had the opportunity to read its contents thoroughly and to consider them for 24 hours before the debate, I do not see how anyone could have reached a conclusion other than that the Government had negotiated in good faith and made a number of concessions that were not to have been expected when we set out on this enterprise. I do not see how any other conclusion can be drawn.
I am sure that the Prime Minister and others have already set the process in motion, but the document seems to explain our position so clearly and fully that every organ ought now to be put to work to ensure that the BBC World Service and everyone at the United Nations is informed about the offer that the Government made. I suggest that the Prime Minister should do what is rarely, but sometimes, done by Heads of Government—send this document to all Heads of Government or Heads of State with a covering note, if she has not already done so, inviting them to study it and asking them what more could have been done by Britain consonant with honour and consonant with accepting and carrying out resolution 502 of the United Nations. I have no doubt that the Government have done their job properly and that they should be supported in the efforts that they have made to secure a negotiated settlement.
I turn now to how we should proceed. I appreciate the Prime Minister's point that if one puts forward proposals which are then rejected, one then says that they are no longer on the table. Formally, I understand the position. I trust, however, that it will not be the final word. I believe that the right hon. Lady could wrong foot herself. I do not think that we could sustain a position in which it was allowed to be thought that, once proposals had been put forward and then withdrawn, we would say, in the event that the Argentines later indicated that they were ready to consider them or similar proposals put forward by the United Nations Secretary-General, "No. They are wiped off the sheet." I understand the difficulty, because we are now, I suppose, going to accelerate military action. It is ironic, as the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West—
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Down, South.
Mr. Callaghan: Down, South (Mr. Powell). I am going back to the days of my youth.
Mr. Powell: And mine.
Mr. Callaghan: And the right hon. Gentleman's. The right hon. Gentleman, with his impeccable logic, asked how, if we put troops on to the islands and lives are lost, we can possibly evacuate the islands having called for such

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a sacrifice. It is a difficult proposition. I thought that he was saying something with which I agreed. We must consider the long-term implications of what we are doing.
I repeat what I said in my first speech on the subject. It is not possible for the Falkland Islanders to live in permanent hostility to the Argentine mainland. That dictated much of the Foreign Office approach that has been attacked so heavily for so long. Because of that, successive Governments have tried to make arrangements between the Falkland Islanders and the people on the mainland that would ensure that the islanders could continue with their self-government and recognised that their communications and much of their life were dependent upon their closest neighbours who, even so, are some 400 miles away.
Despite the logic of the right hon. Member for Down, South, which I cannot fault, we must in the end make some arrangements—I shall not particularise them—that will ensure the permanent security of the Falkland Islanders. No doubt it could be maintained by a large naval presence and a military garrison on the islands. We could maintain that once we have won the islands back. What we could not do, except at great cost, is to develop the islands in the way that the islanders want and in the way that the resources of the region demand.
Therefore, I repeat what I said when I spoke first. We must in the end secure correct relations, if no better, with the Argentine for the future of the Falklands. It is hard to say that at the beginning of what may be a battle. Nevertheless, as the point has been raised, I hope that the Prime Minister will not, having conducted affairs as she has—correctly and with my support—wrong foot herself now by saying that she cannot consider such proposals should they come up again.
With regard to military action, all that we can do at this stage is to wish our men god-speed. Only the Government have the information and advice to decide whether to continue the blockade, whether there should'be a blockade plus landings or whether there should be some form of multi-pronged invasion such as I have read about in the newspapers. I do not envy their decisions. Only the commander on the spot can decide the time to launch any further acceleration.
I hope that it is not improper to say that the anxieties that we must all share are about air cover, the defence of our ships and the facility for reinforcement. The Government should not be attacked if they decide that they do not want to go ahead with a full-scale attack. I am not advising them either way, but they should not be attacked if they do not proceed. The difficulties that have faced us ever since the task force was sent, with my full support, are great.
I echo what the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said. We owe our thanks to the New Zealand Government for their generous offer of a ship.
I shall conclude with a word about what I am supposed to do in the Lobbies tonight. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) have provided real leadership at a time when hostilities are being contemplated by a Government of one party. The Opposition have a duty to give a lead. They also have a duty to make a critical appraisal of what the Government are doing. Some Conservative Members catcall during speeches by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot), but they do him less than justice. He has
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a responsibility. It would be beneath the integrity of the House if he did not carry it out by putting probing and searching points to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and the Government have never been in any doubt about where the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party have stood on the main issues that have confronted the House and the country. They are entitled to our thanks for what they have done.
I come now to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East. I agree with something that he said. He bears some resemblance to the right hon. Member for Down, South. It is, however, only in that they both attack a proposition with devastating and impeccable logic, but then proceed to utterly false, eccentric and wrong conclusions. For example, in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East—
Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Where is he?
Mr. Callaghan: He is having his cup of tea. Some of us sometimes wish that the hon. Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman) would go and have one, too.
What did my right hon. Friend tell us? He told us that the Government agreed that the British task force should be withdrawn in certain circumstances. He told us that they had agreed, in certain circumstances, to the appointment of a United Nations administrator and a governor who, I assume, would not return. He talked about the addition of Argentine representatives. Everything he said seemed to lead to his concluding that he was right. But he did not. He went on to say that the Government were war-like; that they were seeking a war.
I thought that the conclusion that my right hon. Friend must draw from the points that he said the Government had conceded was that they had come nearer to his point of view and that there could be no question but that he had won the argument. If it had suited him, that is exactly what he would have said. He failed to comment on whether he thought that the continuation of negotiations would lead to the Argentine dropping its claim to the South Georgia and South Sandwich dependencies.
He did not say whether he thought that that was a proper Argentine claim. He did not say whether he thought that it would be proper to concede the Argentine claim, that the islanders should be excluded from the United Nations administration. Apparently the Argentine has demanded that. Nor did he comment on the Argentine demand for free access for Argentine nationals to settle on the islands to influence any ballot that may be conducted. If, when choosing which Lobby to go into tonight, I must choose between that leadership or the leadership of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, I know where I stand.
I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East disclaims all personal ambition. I do not suggest that those who follow him tonight will do so on that ground. But Opposition Members who are disposed to support him should note that this is yet another example of what he has consistently done since the general election. I regret that he is not present to hear what I have to say. He has chosen to challenge the leadership of the party, whoever it may be, to set out his own position. Whether that was calculated for tonight or whether it is consequential, that is the result. My right hon. and hon. Friends must choose who to follow tonight. They must choose whether to follow my right hon. Friend the

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Member for Bristol, South-East, and thereby create yet one more division, or to follow my right hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench. That is the choice. I strongly regret that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East has put the party in that position again. However, if that is the challenge, it must be resisted. We must follow the advice of our Front Bench.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) on his perception of the Falklands crisis. Nevertheless, I honour his integrity in holding that view. Will he please honour the integrity of those who have consistently opposed the war and the sending of the task force, not on any political grounds, but because we believe that, in the moral and the practical issues that have been raised by it, it is wrong to shed blood? If we take that view, does my right hon. Friend say that we should take into consideration the partisan position of my right hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench, or that of the party as a whole, if we divide the House? Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is right that we should exercise the freedom to vote—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The intervention is long enough.
Mr. Callaghan: I do not attack my hon. Friend's integrity. He is one of the characters in the House who will always speak his own mind and go his own way. If ever he were to live in a totalitarian society, he would be the first to have his head chopped off.
Mr. Lyon: My right hon. Friend sent me to Siberia.
Mr. Callaghan: I could not even send my hon. Friend to Siberia. I merely sent him to the Back Benches. I was right to do so. The only thing that I did wrong was not to send him there earlier.
At a moment like this, when our troops may be going into accelerated action, it is wrong to give the impression that the House is divided. My hon. Friend can speak his mind.
Mr. Lyon: That I accept.
Mr. Callaghan: At least we are agreed on that. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East can make the speech that he has made consistently since the affair started, but he does not have to vote tonight. If he does, the wrong impression will be given to the world, to the country and to our Service men, who are our first consideration. For that reason, my right hon. Friend is wrong and I hope that the Labour Party will not support him.
6.2 pm
Sir Frederic Bennett: By a strange coincidence, this is the third time that I have spoken immediately after the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) in debates on various subjects. It must be of almost equal embarrassment to us both that on each occasion I have had no alternative but to compliment him on his remarks. I shall not refer to his party's internal matters, which are not for me to speak about.
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There are few who will not be genuinely touched by the right hon. Gentleman's remarks about our responsibilities to our men overseas. His comments will be a source of inspiration to us all.
I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman referred to his attitude to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. His right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) failed to do so.
In the documentation that has been made available to us, far too little attention has been given to a vital factor in all the calculations that we have to make. If we are to talk about international law and negotiations, it is difficult to find any international legal reason why Argentina has a valid claim to the Falklands. Whenever it has been suggested that Argentina should refer the issue to the only relevant international tribunal if it claims such a strong case, on the understanding that it will accept whatever award is made, it is curious that the suggestion has been consistently rejected.
Yet there cannot be even a remote possibility of a legal claim being sustained by Argentina to South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. That is important in law and equally important for another valid reason. If we had secured an Argentine withdrawal in return for a withdrawal of our task force and there had followed, to use the Prime Minister's words, the installation of a United Nations administration with a small United Nations force for security reasons, I should not have had great faith in the United Nations' capacity to provide adequate security forces against a determined aggressor.
I have great faith in some of the United Nations' capabilities, but not in that respect. Indeed, there is a paragraph in the United Nations charter which, I think, would prevent United Nations' forces from engaging in hostilities were the Argentines, after some weeks or months, and either under the present dictatorship or that of a successor, to be induced to launch a reinvasion to assuage what it would describe as a national betrayal. In such circumstances, I do not think that any hon. Member would claim that we could go through the whole operation again or that a small United Nations force would be able to offer effective resistance against such a renewal of aggression.
There may be some who think that what I have just said is fantasy. I suggest that the record of the Argentine Government on keeping international agreements is particularly unsavoury, even in a world in which all too few Governments observe international agreements and undertakings.
I shall give three examples. First, there are some islands in the channel between Argentina and Chile—the Beagle Islands—that have long been the subject of dispute. On two separate occasions in recent years the Argentine Government have agreed, after much sabre-rattling, that the dispute should be put before international arbitration. In putting it before international arbitration—the most recent arbitrator being the Pope—Argentina has written in advance approving the arbitrator and binding itself to accept the award, pleasant or unpleasant. On both occasions the award turned out to be unpleasant for Argentina and the Argentine Government flatly declined to accept it. They said that for various unstated reasons their previous undertakings were no longer valid.
In the Falklands dispute there has already been an appalling breach of faith by Argentina. When Argentina joined the United Nations it agreed to adhere to the charter

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like all other signatories. The charter incorporates the provision that if the Security Council issues a mandatory resolution it will be mandatory on all member States. On joining the United Nations Argentina made itself subject to the rules that had been accepted by the other signatories. When the Security Council issued the mandatory resolution 502 which Argentina refused to follow, it was already in direct breach of faith of international undertakings for the third time in recent years.
If we are successful in accomplishing our aims, we must ensure that the incident does not repeat itself in weeks, months or possibly years. We must be sure that there is some effective restraint. Mention has been made of a large naval contingency force. I do not believe that it has to be a large force, but in the interim, and for some time to come, we shall need something more substantial than hitherto, and not as far away as forces that are held normally in Portsmouth, or even on the Ascension Islands. There must be a presence sufficient to deter Argentina from repeating what it has undertaken.
I do not apologise for repeating that because the record shows that Argentine dictators come and go. There are some even more unpleasant characters in the wings. If there is an effective British success, for which we pray, in the next days or weeks, do hon. Members really believe that Mr. Galtieri is likely to survive? Can there be any doubt that the man who succeeds him will say that his predecessor betrayed him and the country and that Argentina still intends, at the earliest opportunity, to regain by force what it lost as a result of our action? I cannot contemplate with any equanimity our having this type of debate again if such a repetition takes place in the not-too-distant future.
In the European councils to which I belong—the Council of Europe and Western European Union—I have noticed that the support which was forthcoming at the beginning of the operation has to some extent been eroded. Of course, those who said that we had not had any support from Europe were not altogether fair. European Members of Parliament of 21 countries meeting at Strasbourg voted 150 to 1—the one vote being a Spanish Communist; the other five Spanish Members abstained—in expressing solidarity with the British point of view and condemning the Argentines.
Therefore, why has there been some erosion of the high level of support that we enjoyed in those first days? Paradoxically, the answer is that my right hon. Friends and, in particular the Prime Minister, have been so endlessly patient and persevering in trying to achieve a peaceful solution. Because the dispute has gone on for so long, human nature being what it is—I recall the old phrase about a nine days' wonder—people now talk about our invading the Falklands.
Some hon. Members have said that today. The fact that it was the Argentines who invaded the Falklands on 2 April is beginning to become clouded to some extent by that old maxim on which many criminals rely—possession is nine points of the law. The longer the dispute goes on, the more it will appear when it is resolved that we, as some hon. Members have said today, were doing the invading. We cannot say too often that to defend ourselves, our people and our territory cannot be regarded as an invasion. It is a repossession which, in law and in morality, we are fully entitled to carry out.
I am of a generation which, although too young to be in public life before the war, can well remember those
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years and the principles which at least made me volunteer for the forces at the begining of the war. I make no boast about that; so did many millions of people in Britain. But the principles that guided me then as a young man are exactly those which impel me to say what I have said today.
It is odd that in many cases it is the same right hon. and hon. Members and other older men in Britain who have been most virulent in condemning those who then sought peace by what was called "appeasement", but is now more generally referred to as "detente", who before the last war and afterwards condemned the Government of the day for trying to seek peace by negotiation, believing that unprovoked aggression could safely be alllowed to occur, but leading in the event to the last war and who now attack us for resisting a new act of unprovoked aggression.
Even though I, like anyone else, am appalled at the thought of the casualties that might occur through the pursuance of our policies, I am certain that if we go back to the discredited concept that an act of unprovoked aggression can be allowed to succeed we shall open a Pandora's box of casualties in the future in comparison with which our casualties in the Falkland Islands will appear to be an infinitesimal minority.
6.15 pm
Mr. Andrew Faulds: It is one of those strange and happy facts that the hon. Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) and I have been right on a number of foreign affairs issues a long time before most of our colleagues in the House. I have only to quote the arguments that we have made for the inevitability of making friends with China to offset the power of the Soviet Union and the centrality of the Palestinian issue to a real settlement of the Middle East problem, to make the point.
But I have to say that on a number of other issues I have had profound disagreements with the hon. Gentleman. One issue where I was right again, was the emergence of Robert Mugabe as the leader of the new, independent Zimbabwe. I do not think we saw eye to eye on that, and we do not see eye to eye on this issue.
I intend to make an unpopular speech. I have never exactly courted popularity in the House, nor with the parliamentary press, but I had hoped to speak earlier because of my boast, if I must use that word, of having been right on a whole range of foreign affairs issues. I am sorry to have to say it, but I think that I am right in my interpretation of the lunacies of what the Government are presently embarked on.
For an ex-imperial power to embark on a course of negotiations by pounding shot and shell into countries of the Third world is not an advisable policy. That is, tragically, how we have reacted to the totally illegal Argentinian invasion of the Falklands. We intend apparently with the near unanimous agreement of the House of Commons, to pursue that course by launching an assault on the islands and possibly by attacking the South American mainland. I do urge my colleagues to see the absolute lunacy and short-sightedness of such misjudged actions.
We started this unhappy operation with a large degree of world-wide support following Argentina's illegal occupation. We have already seen that support drain away as a result, in the first place, of our naval operations, and particularly the sinking of the "General Belgrano".The

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Hispanic world has declared its support for Argentina. That is not surprising—it shares the same sort of memories of Spain's colonial exercises in South America.
The United States Administration has shown obvious concern about our intention to settle twentieth century problem of decolonisation by nineteenth century means. And we have gravely jeopardised America's relations with the whole of South America. Whether we believe that those relations were pursuing sensible courses or not, we have gravely jeopardised the possibility of the leading power in the world influencing what happens in South America, for good or for ill.
Our European colleagues have expressed their reservations—to put it mildly—about the Government's military intentions. And I believe the EEC action, in disregarding the Luxembourg compromise, is both a signal of how fed up our European colleagues are with the fabricated toughness of the Prime Minister, and a mark of disapproval for, if I may term it such, the Thatcher tantrum exercise in the South Atlantic, which is apparently, inevitably and inexorably leading us into a quite unnecessary war.
Do we really think it worth while damaging Britain's interests, Britain's standing in the world and Britain's enormous and extensive trading interests throughout the world to maintain an imperial outpost in the stormy wastes of the South Atlantic? That may not be how my colleagues see it, but that is how a large part of the world views this matter—
Mr. George Robertson: And the Commonwealth—
Mr. Faulds:—and a large part of the Commonwealth.
Perhaps we should try to see this issue as those outside forces see it by bluntly facing the facts with less cant about the self-determination of a minute settler community. The rest of the world knows, and we should more frankly admit, that for 20 years we have been trying—
Mr. Russell Johnston: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that most of the Falkland Islanders have been there longer than the Argentine population? I do not think that it is necessary to use offensive expressions such as "minute settler community".
Mr. Faulds: If I may be allowed to finish my speech, I shall explain what I mean by "minute settler community". I shall come to that in the next few moments.
We should frankly admit that for 20 years we have been trying to withdraw from this outpost of empire, if we could decently cede sovereignty. Every British ambassador over that period will confirm that view.
Mr. James Callaghan: I completely deny that myth which now has such currency that I doubt whether it will ever be corrected. Certainly the Administration with which I was connected between 1974 and 1979 never made any such proposal or had any such intention. We tried to establish relations between the Falklanders and the Argentines that would recognise the Argentines' special interests. The intention certainly was never to hand over the islands to the Argentines. Such a proposal was never made, nor was it thought of so far as I am concerned.
Mr. Faulds: Of course I accept my right hon. Friend's words because I have the greatest regard for him. But my
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own experience—in having discussed this issue with a particular ambassador of ours and checked with another—is that the ceding of sovereignty was part of that exercise. If my right hon. Friend's Administration had no such intention, then of course I accept that, but the outside world has understood the intention of successive British Governments as being a wish and an intention to get rid of the problem of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.
Mr. James Callaghan: I am sure that some ambassadors thought that that was the right policy, but I want my hon. Friend to understand that that was not the policy of the Labour Government when I was Prime Minister.
Mr. Faulds: Of course I accept what my right hon. Friend has said, but I repeat that the outside world saw the issue in somewhat different terms. It is important to take those considerations into view.
What has gone wrong with the whole exercise is that we have too tardily pursued the discussions on the Falklands problem. We have given foolish endorsement to the islanders' determination to insist on their British ties. We really cannot, we must not, be held to ransom by the self-determination argument. We shall have to maintain a presence in the South Atlantic from here on in if that is what we intend to do.
What worries me too about the arguments that have been adopted is that the Falklanders hardly enjoy what that admirable gentleman Sir Nicholas Henderson has described as "democratic government" and what the Prime Minister described in her friendly little propaganda chat with Jimmy Young two mornings ago as "democratic institutions". That is simply not true. The Legislative and Executive Councils in the Falklands are part elected—and only recently part elected—and part nominated. Why do we maintain the argument that the Falklanders have had freedom, in the sense that we understand political freedom, when they have been kept under careful control by this neat arrangement which is largely dependent on the nominations of the governor and the Falkland Islands Company?
In any case—and this is where the self-determination argument comes in—the people on the islands are not an indigenous people. They are a settler community which went out from the impoverished parts of this kingdom, from Scotland and from Wales, when there were massive exoduses from this island because the economic circumstances dictated emigration. A whole range of those people settled in America and happily changed their nationality. Why should we be so terribly sensitive about our friends the Falklanders, who have Scottish and Welsh blood, when in every geographic and historic circumstance they should be thought of as having much more dependence on their relations with Argentina than on their very distant relations with the British Isles?
Mr. Patrick Cormack: The hon. Member is making an eccentric speech, as he frequently does. Will he please say who is in charge in Argentina? Are they indigenous people?
Mr. Faulds: No, they are not. The hon. Gentleman does not have to be offensive in his interventions. I am making a rational statement on the contrary arguments and I think when we come to examine the history of the period I may once again be proved right in my interpretation of

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the facts. The hon. Gentleman is making my point for me. The Brits who went out to Argentina have happily accepted Argentinian nationality. The Italians who went out to Argentina have happily accepted Argentinian nationality. I am grateful for endorsement of my argument.
These settlers moved in to the islands after we had chucked out in 1833 an Argentinian administrator put in by the young Argentinian republic in 1828 or 1829. That has long rankled with South Americans generally in the history of the independence of their continent.
We have neglected the Falkland Islands reform. The reaction to the Shackleton report is proof of that. We left it to the Falkland Islands Company to control the economy of the island. Many of the islanders are only tenants of the company. Many retire to the Antipodes or return to the United Kingdom when their working days are over. There is only a proportion of the 1,600 or 1,800 islanders who are Falklands families by continuous settlement. That cannot be disputed. It is a settler community which has been there just 50 years longer than the settlers had been in Southern Rhodesia. And there in Southern Rhodesia, if anywhere, we should have taken military action against an illegal declaration of independence by a minority regime against the interests and against the wishes of a truly indigenous people. I do not remember many calls for action then by our Conservative colleagues, nor by the Prime Minister, nor indeed by some of my hon. Friends who are now vociferous for self-determination.
What appalling double standards this place is capable of. I can understand those of my hon. Friends who are incensed by the actions of a Fascist regime in Argentina with its appalling record of brutal repression of human rights, but where they are less than honest with themselves is in not recognising that the vast majority of people in Argentina and throughout South America back Argentina's claim to the Falklands, on both historic and geographic grounds. We must accept that even Fascist regimes cannot dismiss a country's claim to what are seen as its historic rights—rights which many other countries endorse, regardless of the regime that runs the country.
And now we have come to this near unbelievable and tragic situation in a mad wave of patriotic misjudgment, fostered by the appalling irresponsibility of the popular press—such as the jingoistic gibberish of soppy, hysterical scribblers like Jean Rook and the mystic nonsense of the recent article in The Times by that silly sage from South Down and his mystic nonsense about recovering our greatness if we embark on this exercise and we manage to shed some blood at the end of it.
And so stirred by all that sort of rubbish, Britain goes to war over the Falklands. And for what? For the retention of an outcrop of rocks in the waters of the South Atlantic? For a colonial vestige and perhaps for the reinstitution of the Company's right to run the islands? What worries me is that the prime purpose I believe is to prove what a man the Prime Minister is. That is what the person in the street thinks. [Interruption.] That may lead to a few giggles on the Government Benches, but that is what most of the people in our constituencies who support us and discuss these matters think that the exercise is about—that the Prime Minister has to prove what a man she is.
What psychological maladjustment lies behind her shrill toughness? I ask in all seriousness, how many young men must die in this unnecessary war to prove her mettle
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and to provide justification for the dispatch of the task force? It is a tragic misjudgement which the leaders of my party misguidedly endorsed.
The excuse for the task force was to strengthen our hand in negotiations. It has failed to do that, as some of us warned that it would. But the logic of its dispatch had to end in actions of death and disaster. How can we in the Labour Party explain a policy which appears willing to strike but afraid to wound? How do we explain this to our people? We should have opposed the sending of the force from the beginning. We should have insisted on United Nations involvement from the start and dispensed with our American aid. And we should have given some sort of leadership and guidance to our people. And that has been desperately and sadly lacking in the whole exercise.
As it is, the Labour Party's position merely strengthened the Prime Minister's role, and gave our approval to what I am convinced will come to be seen as a shaming episode in our post-colonial history. We really have got to come to our collective senses. Are we really intent on launching an assault on these islands? It will be a bloody business because by now the Argentinians must have the best part of 10,000 troops on those islands. They have been fortifying them defensively with a whole range of armaments, and they may not prove to be such cowards as our expectations make them out. Hundreds upon hundreds of lads from Birmingham, from Glasgow, from Liverpool, from Portsmouth, from the London suburbs—most of them good, patriotic, working-class lads—will pay the price of this last shrug of empire. And they will pay it in suffering, in maiming and in death. And many many British working-class mothers will have cause to mourn, and so too will many Argentinian working-class mothers.
We really have got to resist the temptation, which seems to be abroad in this country at the moment, to go in regardless in a national spasm of a Tory Government in a temper. It is not in Britain's interests to continue this war and so endanger not only the lives of our troops, not only the islanders—who are involved in the whole exercise and cannot get out of it—but also young Argentinians. And we will damage our commercial and trade contacts throughout South America and with the Third world. They are appalled. It is in our interests to propose now a negotiating position which would gain the support of world opinion and help to restore Britain's somewhat damaged standing in the world.
I beg my colleagues on both sides of the House to foresee the danger and the damage that the present course of policy will do to Britain if we seek a military solution. We have to come eventually to a negotiated resolution of this little problem. As the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath), said during the last debate, we have to give the Argentines room to get out of their original offence. We will not do that if we take our latest negotiating position off the table. We must find a way of avoiding a resolution by military means of this totally unnecessary war. We must find a way of settling it—perhaps not amicably—but at least peacefully, so that the lasting scars of an unnecessary war between these two peoples can be avoided. It can be done if the Government's will is there to do it.
6.32 pm
Mr. Neil Thorne: A Member does not realise how keen his colleagues are to get rid of him until

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we have a crisis such as this on our hands and he is known to be a member of the reserve forces. Hardly a day passes without them asking why he is not yet in uniform and when is he about to leave for the South Atlantic.
Mr. Dennis Canavan: Taking the Prime Minister with him.
Mr. Thorne: I wish to pay a tribute to the patience and care of the Government and their civil servants for the way that they are dealing with the present crisis. I believe that every possible action has been taken to try to reach a peaceful settlement.
Sadly, certain regimes are not prepared in any circumstances to deal with matters in a rational, sensible way. It seems clear that in Argentina there is an organisation that remains in power only because of its invasion of the Falkland Islands. If it were seen to condone a withdrawal it would fall quickly, for the simple reason that for so many years it has been staggering along from one internal crisis to another.
I believe, as do many of my colleagues, that this action was by way of a diversionary tactic in the same way as much of Hitler's campaign in Europe before the Second World War was designed as a diversionary tactic for the benefit of the German people. However hard the Government have tried, I do not believe that they could have achieved a rational and sensible response.
I should like to pay tribute to the support that we have received from our Commonwealth friends. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other Commonwealth members have rallied to our support and given us every possible encouragement in trying to uphold international law and order. I was also pleased to see that our European allies were giving us backing, although I am disappointed that they have decided to extend economic sanctions only for a further seven days. That, I believe, was a grave mistake, because this country is not only shouldering a substantial burden with lives at risk, but is facing a considerable extra financial burden. I should have thought that if the Common Market maintains that it wishes to return some of the money that we are contributing towards the Common Market coffers—largely, it would appear, for the benefit of the farming community in France and elsewhere—it could have helped to carry some of the costs of our international policing efforts.
Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: Does my hon. Friend accept that the people of Europe are much more behind us than their Foreign Ministers appear to be? The European Parliament overwhelmingly passed a resolution endorsing the renewal of sanctions. It was the Foreign Ministers who let the side down.
Mr. Thorne: I acknowledge that to be so, but I wish that the European Parliament and the Foreign Ministers would turn their minds towards giving us some economic support in our role, which is for the benefit of the international community, not purely and simply for the Falkland Islanders. It is right and proper that we should look to them for a contribution towards the cost of the exercise.
One of the greatest problems facing the task force is the adverse weather conditions in the South Atlantic and the possible effect on both morale and equipment. We have
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been extremely fortunate and successful in maintaining the equipment so far. I know that we have lost a number of helicopters, and the longer this period continues the more difficult it will be to sustain our position. I hope that it will soon be possible to land some of our men and equipment on one of the main Falkland Islands. That would relieve a lot of the pressure on the ships maintaining the blockade and would give us additional support for air power. I hope that my right hon. Friends will look carefully at the matter soon, because time is running out on our ability to maintain both morale and equipment for a long period of time.
I did not wish to follow the flambouyant speech of the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds), except in one regard. I agree with him that we have neglected this area for too long. Constituents who have relations living in the Falkland Islands, or who were born there, have drawn to my attention the remarkable opportunities that are available in that part of the world. I do not believe that it will be necessary to maintain a permanent presence there with a garrison. In my view, any garrison of less than 3,000 would be quite unprofitable. If one sought to garrison an area of such a substantial size, one would have to think in terms of numbers of that size. In this case, I do not believe that it will be necessary to do that because, with the expertise that we have acquired during the past seven weeks, we should be in a position to mount a campaign, particularly from the Ascension Islands or elswhere. We should not expect to maintain a permanent substantial garrision in that part of the world, because it would be counterproductive and unnecessary after we had repossessed the islands.
Other facilities are available in that part of the world, quite apart from the Ascension Islands. There are ports in Chile and elsewhere that could be used. We have had agreements in the past—
Mr. Russell Johnston: With respect, it is contradictory, on the one hand, to hear a rousing denunciation of the Fascist dictatorship in Argentina and, on the other hand to be told that we should use ports in Chile.
Mr. Thorne: I am open to alternative suggestions from the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston), if he thinks that there is somewhere nearer where we can effectively maintain supplies. We do not necessarily have to agree with every organisation or dictatorship in the world before we trade with it. I have not heard of any territorial ambitions on the part of Chile towards the Falkland Islands. I do not hold with its type of Government, any more than I hold with that of the Soviet Union, but I am not proposing anything to cut off trade completely with either Government. If it is possible to make alternative arrangements through Chile, I hope that my right hon. Friends will consider that possibility.
Mr. Canavan: Is the hon. Gentleman enunciating a new principle: that it is all right to use Fascist military dictatorships as long as we are using them to our own ends?
Mr. Thorne: I believe that we should trade with countries, whether or not we agree with their type of Government. I do not believe that we should support the East German type of dictatorship, any more than we should support any of the other dictatorships of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, I am not saying that we should not

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trade with them. This is an entirely different matter. If we need facilities such as hospitals, closer to the Falkland Islands than the Ascension Islands, I see nothing wrong in purchasing facilities in Chile. The Government do not have to agree with what the Chilean Government stand for, any more than they should agree with what the Argentine Government stand for. If the Chilean Government were to express territorial ambitions towards the Falkland Islands or in Antarctica, it would be an entirely different matter. I do not believe that that is so. Therefore, the argument does not apply—unless, of course, the Opposition advocate that we trade exclusively with recognised democracies of a Western European type.
Much criticism has been mounted in the recent past against the news coverage. It has been suggested in the Chamber today that some papers are being extremely aggressive and unreliable and are putting forward a case for taking on the Argentines in war. We have the good fortune to have a free press, and the way in which it has presented its case to the public has generally been extremely fair and reasonable. The way in which it has spoken to its readers has not been unusual. It knows its readers a good deal better than some hon. Members seem to know them, and it should be allowed to express itself in its own way. I deplore any denunciation of the popular press in what it is doing in support of the Falkland Islanders at this time.
Mr. Stuart Holland: On those same grounds, can we expect the hon. Gentleman to deplore the Foreign Secretarys's criticism of the BBC for expressing its views on the Falkland crisis?
Mr. Thorne: I was about to come to the BBC. The way that it has conducted its broadcasts recently has been much more balanced than has happened in the past. It is important to know what a paper stands for, and it is equally important to know what a broadcast stands for. If the BBC puts out a broadcast of dissidents in the Conservative Party against Government action, the programme should make it clear that that is what it is doing, and that it is not putting forward a general Conservative Party viewpoint or the viewpoint of Labour dissidents. The programme should make quite clear what it is attempting to put over. Criticism has been justified to some considerable extent, but I think that the matter has been put right and that we now have a good balance. My view is that the press has done and is continuing to do a good job on this issue.
6.47 pm
Mr. Jack Ashley: There is a startling and remarkable resemblance in the attitudes in Britain today to those of early 1914, before the so-called Great War. We have the flag waving, the emotional farewells to the troops, and the growing hatred for the enemy, all of which are redolent of that fateful period in British history. The hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Thorne) may well deplore the denunciation of the popular press, but the fact is that the tabloid press is practically handing out white feathers to all those who dare to express their reservations.
The public are becoming quite hysterical about the present situation, and so are some hon. Members. In this respect, we are no different from the people of Argentina, who are behaving in a similarly primitive fashion. We expect that from a nation that is under the control of a
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junta, because it knows no better, but I am appalled when I see that kind of wild, flamboyant attitude to war in Britain, which is supposed to be the world's most mature political democracy.
We have been brought to this emotive state and the brink of war by repeated statements of over-simplified objectives, and they have been repeated today by the Prime Minister. We are supposed to be defending the islanders' interests and proving to the world that aggression does not pay. These objectives conveniently provoke the primitive reaction that Britain should teach the "Argies" a lesson. That is the language of the popular press—"Let us teach the Argies a lesson and show that Britain cannot be pushed around, and demonstrate to the world that Britain can show how the peace of the world should be preserved." Those are the sentiments of today. But the basic objectives of this or any other Government ought to be what is in the national interest. That is the objective, or ought to be.
The basic question is whether British interests are being served or damaged by invading the Falklands now that negotiations have broken down. Contrary to the views of most Members of Parliament, and contrary to the views of most people outside, I believe that our interests in Britain will be gravely damaged if we go ahead with the invasion of the Falklands.
I share the anger about the unprovoked aggression by Argentina. I, too, want action against them, but I believe that military action, which appears to be the most effective, will in fact be the least effective. Invasion will, by any standards, be a hazardous operation, depending as it does for air cover on the two floating platforms of the "Hermes" and the "Invincible" in Arctic seas, 8,000 miles away and within range of enemy missiles. The fact is that modern technology has rendered the most powerful naval forces vulnerable to the most unsophisticated enemy, and Argentina's forces are by no means unsophisticated.
Naturally, all war incurs risk, but if, God forbid, either the "Hermes" or the "Invincible", or both, were sunk we would literally be defeated as a nation unless we were to resort to our nuclear power, which I hope is unthinkable. We are taking this monumental risk and indulging in this crass folly for the sake of islands which, for very sensible reasons, successive Governments have been trying to give away for years.
I accept what my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the former Prime Minister, said but many Governments have been trying to give away these islands. They have been baulked by the 1,800 Falkland Islanders. If ever there were a classic case of the tail wagging the dog, this is it. Unfortunately, we have had a vociferous group of Members of Parliament who have elevated that tail into a holy shrine and a matter of golden principle. Never did any nation lose its sense of proportion so foolishly and never did it dissipate its armed forces and the goodwill of its friends so wantonly.
Britain at war in defence of its own people against armed aggression from any quarter would win the admiration of the world, but Britain at war for islands that it has neglected and sought to abandon for two decades is an absurdity.
If we win the battle for the repossession of the Falklands it will be the beginning of a long war with Argentina in particular and Latin America in general. The island and the islanders—assuming that any of them are left alive after the battle—would be isolated from all supplies from the

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mainland and vulnerable to continuous harassment and missile attack from Argentina. That is hardly likely to make a massive contribution to world peace.
The final proof of the folly of this invasion, if it takes place, will not be available for some years. It cannot be available tomorrow or the day after, but I have no doubt that it will become available. That will be when a British Government do what British Governments have been trying to do for the last past 17 years—cede the Falkland Islands. Then it will be proved how nonsensical, how farcical and how tragic has been this war in the Falklands. This invasion could turn out to be an international tragedy if the super powers are brought in, but that will not happen.
The Government are right to resist aggression, but let them do it by maintaining the blockade. Let them do it by intensifying economic sanctions and negotiating now what must be negotiated eventually. It will be slower and more painstaking to reach a solution that way, but it will lead to a negotiated settlement that will be enduring. That way we can resolve a deadly crisis without the deaths, without the horror, and without the decades of bitterness that would undoubtedly follow war in the Falklands.
6.57 pm
Mr. David Atkinson: The message coming out of the debate tonight, especially from the Government side of the House, is the recognition that negotiations have failed; that every avenue to a peaceful settlement has been realistically explored and exhausted; and that, if our task force and the losses we have already sustained are to mean anything at all, the time for action is now.
I want to stress right away to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that the decision to liberate the Falkland Islands now will receive the unreserved and wholehearted support of the vast majority of my constituents and of the British people.
It goes without saying that no one wants to see further bloodshed. Already we have seen hundreds of British and Argentine lives lost, both on land and at sea, for which the junta must be held wholly responsible. I have no doubt that the foundations have long been laid by those forces of ours who have already been on the Falkland Islands in the past few weeks for the most efficient occupation with the minimum of casualties on both sides. We must pray for that, especially for the islanders themselves, who are bound to be at risk, being caught in the crossfire and the shellfire, and could well be held as hostages during the conflict that is to come. I urge that when we decide to go in, we do not stop until we have the job done. There must be no repetition of the Suez fiasco. There must be no echo this time of the awful words of the Austrian dramatist, Grillparzer, who said about the Hapsburgs:
"It is the curse of our proud dynasty to move too late, to stop halfway, and to take half measures hesitatingly."
If that were the case, it would have been better that the task force had never been born.
There will be faint hearts and cold feet at home and abroad as we go through with the liberation of the islands. Never let us cease to remind ourselves or the world that our action now is in response to Argentina's absolute and blind refusal to comply with United Nations resolution 502 and that we are acting in self-defence, totally compatible with United Nations article 51. When our action comes
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under the full scrutiny of a United Nations debate—as it will, because the Soviet Union will see to it—let us accept no lectures on imperialism or colonialism, particularly when the people of Poland are burning red flags in rejection of superimposed Communism or when Afghan freedom-fighters continue to refuse to accept an alien occupation.
We shall be told that we are putting Britain's long-term interests in South America and elsewhere in the world at risk. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) referred to that point last week and the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) mentioned it today. British compatriots in Argentina have been telling us that all the time. That must be a consideration, but let us also consider why and how we came to establish our world interests and presence in the first place.
I should like to think that the world trades with us because our products are superior to those of the West Germans, for example. However, that is not necessarily so. I should like to think that the reason is that we offer better value for money than the Japanese. Would that that were the case, but it is not. Many countries choose to associate and to trade with us still because of other qualities for which we are peculiarly known as a nation—qualities which we are displaying and principles which we are now defending.
I applaud my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister for articulating those qualities and principles in such an inspiring way, which we have not seen since Churchill. To suggest that we should fudge, compromise or abandon our position now in favour of self-interest would do more damage to our standing abroad as well as to morale at home than any temporary loss of trade that may result from reasserting our sovereignty.
No events in history are directly comparable, but let us recall the Portuguese experience. Portugal was once a great power with colonies and interests similar to the Falkland Islands throughout the world. The power of Portugal declined and its empire disintegrated, as do all empires that fail to recognise the right of self-determination, as the Soviet Union is doing now slowly, surely but inevitably. Let us recall how easy it was for India to seize control of Goa in 1961. Portugal was shown up to be the weak and powerless nation that it then was. Following Goa came Angola and Mozambique. The consequences for the West remain to this day. Within a decade Portugal was on the brink of a Marxist revolution.
As I have said, nothing in history is directly comparable, but Britain's long-term interests will be far better served by standing up for ourselves and by liberating those islands now than by pussy footing, delaying and relying instead on economic sanctions and eternal negotiations.
I now turn to the question of sovereignty and the position that we should adopt once we have liberated the Falkland Islands. I welcome the confirmation by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister at the beginning of the debate that the concessions that we were prepared to make, which were the cause of a great deal of concern by Back Bench Conservative Members and people throughout the country, will now no longer be on the negotiating table. It is right to say, as has been said many times, that our position in the South Atlantic, in the light of the experience of the last seven weeks, can never be the same again. I fear that when we say that we may still have something to concede.

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As a result of the experience of the past seven weeks we have all learnt a lot more about the Falkland Islands and Argentina than we knew before. The hon. Member for Warley, East said how much we had neglected the islands. We should pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Essex, South-East (Sir B. Braine), who has been tireless in his attempts to warn us of our neglect of the Falklands Islands, as has the Falkland Islands office in London.
But for the sovereignty issue, industry today would have been exploring and developing the substantial hydrocarbon accumulations that are known to exist, despite the depth and hostility of the waters. We should be foolish now to ignore, abandon or concede that long-term source of oil and gas. For that we shall require Argentine co-operation. That will be a factor in any future negotiations.
Moreover, let us be fully aware of the massive food resources from the seas, together with adjacent Antarctica. Modern technology there—there is no reason why it cannot be British technology—can be used to help to feed the world, the population of which will double in the next 25 years. It is all those untapped resources, together with the many inconclusive legal claims rather than the sovereignty issue, which should be the subject of future negotiations not just between this country and Argentina, but all the countries that have claims in Antarctica.
Has Argentina given any indication that, in the event of its claim to sovereignty being conceded, it will not exploit such resources for purely selfish, national use? If so, I am not aware of it. However, there is every sign of intense Soviet interest and involvement, which should never be far from our minds at this time. That should come as no surprise to us. Although Fascism and Communism are at opposite ends of the political spectrum, those two ideologies have a great deal in common. They share important characteristics—a hatred of parliamentary democracy, a belief in force, in revolution and in contempt for the law both national and international.
When we see how much the Kremlin is prepared to do business with Argentina, we can appreciate that, far from Communism and Facism being implacable opponents, they are ideological bedfellows. The Soviet Union today is Argentina's major trading partner. There is good reason to believe that it is helping Argentina to develop the nuclear bomb. It was Argentina that sabotaged President Carter's grain embargo on the Soviet Union following the events in Afghanistan.
We would be foolish to ignore those facts and trends as well as the great strategic potential that the Falkland Islands offer to the Western Alliance. In the circumstances, we should contemplate nothing that does not restore full British sovereignty to that part of the South Atlantic. That is why I hope that there will be no more hesitation. He who hesitates is lost. He who dares, wins.
7.10 pm
Mr. Russell Johnston: We are in a grave and immensely difficult position. The Government, in their response to the invasion of the Falkland Islands, for which they have had wide support in the country and the House, have unquestionably been prepared to make considerable concessions to achieve a peaceful settlement. Today's Government document has made that clear and I unequivocally acknowledge it. That has been against the background of the dispatch of the task force, which has
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been in position for some time and which has been involved in hostilities resulting in serious loss of life, both British and Argentine.
There is no doubt that the sending of the task force was supported by all parties in the House. It was seen as a necessary backing without which, given the nature of the Argentine Government and the fact of their invasion during negotiations, it was unlikely that a peaceful solution would be achieved.
I found the view of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn), that the task force damaged our chance of achieving a peaceful settlement, difficult to understand. The right hon. Gentleman is a hawk with an ingrowing beak. He seems to advocate a peaceful approach that does not always work out. Essentially, he appeared to say that the sensible course was to increase economic sanctions and that that would be even more successful if there were no task force and no military action. I find that difficult to conceive. The idea that a world economic boycott of Argentina, for some 1,800 people in the Falkland Islands, could be sustained for any length of time is not a real proposition.
The support given to the task force rests on certain assumptions. Everyone knows that, irrespective of the right of self-determination of the islanders and the justice of restoring that right, if it had in the end to be achieved by military means, all parties recognised that it would be a solution of the last resort which presented great risks at a distance of 8,000 miles. That risk has been underlined in black by the sinking of HMS "Sheffield" and already we have had hon. Members referring to HMS "Invincible", HMS "Hermes" and, God forbid, the "Canberra" and the "QE2". The risks are enormous and we must be in no doubt of that.
Not only must we assess the correctness of what we do—that is enshrined in resolution 502 of the United Nations—but also what it is possible for us to do. We are not the United States. Perhaps there are hon. Members who still yearn for the time when we had the sort of power that the United States has. However, strong as we are, and effective as our forces clearly are, we no longer have the capacity of the United States. If we land on the Falkland Islands this weekend—if that course is taken, as the right hon. Leader of the Opposition said, we hope that it will be done swiftly and without loss—what afterwards?
It is proper to ask whether the Government have calculated what, first, can be done, and, secondly, sustained. I say that not to undermine the efforts that have been made but because it is essential at this critical time to realise clearly what we are doing. If the Falkland Islands are recaptured by force, we almost certainly commit ourselves to defending them for many years. I do not think that that is necessarily wrong, nor do I say that I do not want us to defend them. However, we must appreciate clearly what our action means and what burden it will lay upon us. We must face up to that burden. Irrespective of the remarks of the right hon. Member for Cardiff. South-East (Mr. Callaghan), the former Prime Minister, past Governments recoiled from that burden. Indeed, the Government drew back prior to the invasion, perhaps helping to precipitate the position in which we are now placed. If we recover the islands, we must face up to that burden.
I reinforce the words of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) about the most recent

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initiatives, the aide-memoire of the Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, to whom all hon. Members owe a great debt for his energy, calmness, diplomacy and objectivity.
If there is a chance of peace, it must be taken unhesitatingly. What do we lose by keeping our proposals on the table? That point has already been made by many hon. Members. What do we lose by saying clearly that if the Argentines, under pressure, come back with an acceptance of the Peruvian proposals we would be prepared to reactivate them? We lose nothing. We could gain lives and a stable outcome even at this late hour.
It must be in all our minds that a forced solution, while it would bring back freedom to the islanders, would leave the position unstable and unpredictable, perhaps making any rational economic development upon which a decent life for the islanders depends impossible for a long time.
One thing that this affair has brought into frightening focus is how near the surface lie the atavistic forces of nationalism. It is unreasoning. It is the most difficult of human drives, perhaps with the exception of religion, to contain, but in the end it must be contained, and contained in the South Atlantic.
Hon. Members have said that the islanders are few, approximately 590 families, mainly sheep farmers. I have met some of them such as the Luxtons, who were expelled, and John Cheek, men who are unused to the niceties of political language and who express themselves bluntly. They are very like a number of people whom I know in my constituency, islanders who are not all that excited about politics and who want to get back to the job and the place that they know and love. It repelled me to hear metropolitan Members suggesting early on that it was simply a question of giving them a grant and sending them to New Zealand, the Western Isles or some such place. They misunderstand deeply the profound, rightful affection that islanders develop for a place in which they have lived for many generations. They want to go home. I also found thoughtless and insensitive the remarks of the hon. Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) about rocks in the South Atlantic and those of the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) about imperial outposts.
While I understand the wishes of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East for peace—I desperately want peace—and those of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), their speeches make no mention of the unquestioned rights of these inoffensive people.
Have the Government any knowledge of the conditions in which the islanders are living? I know that there are difficulties, but have any of the islanders been imprisoned? Do we know what their position is in relation to food, water, hospital care and so on?
I sense a feeling in the House that a landing is inevitable. If that is to be, the calculation and the responsibility lie with the Government. Our thoughts and prayers will be with our forces who, in the bitter cold of the South Atlantic, will have the job of correcting political misjudgments—some with their lives.
7.19 pm
Mr. Ivan Lawrence: The unity of the House—with only one or two exceptions—will do a tremendous amount to boost the morale of our troops in the South Atlantic, as will the massive support of the British people. That massive support is evidenced in recent
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public opinion polls and in our experience of our respective constituencies. In addition, we have the support of our friends in the Commonwealth, our friends in America, the EEC, Japan and other countries around the world.
We have heard tonight that one of those exceptions is the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds). Fortunately, no one takes him very seriously when he dresses up and acts the politician. He may be more successful in some of his parts and I sincerely hope that he is. Another exception is the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) whom some, from time to time, take seriously. We shall see how many hon. Members follow him into the Lobby tonight in his attempt to show that the House is disunited and to lower the morale of our troops. He wants the troops to be turned back. He is a man of peace at all costs. Never has anyone been more hoist by his own petard than the right hon. Gentleman when he was felled by a question from my right hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Hexham (Mr. Rippon).
In 1980, the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East was the chairman of the home policy committee of the Labour Party. He had something to do with the draft Labour manifesto in 1980. Paragraph 88 states:
"We reaffirm our commitment that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland islands be handed over to any Argentinian regime which violates human and civil rights."
We know what the Argentine Government do to human and civil rights now. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean when he was a party to the commitment "under no circumstances"? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hexham asked him whether he meant under no circumstances other than when the Falkland Islands are taken by force. The only possible answer was "Yes", and with that the right hon. Gentleman—the arch appeaser of the moment—left the Chamber and has not been seen since.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) said, there are only three options at this hour. We could turn, run and quit. As we shall see in the Lobby tonight, few hon. Members want that to happen. We could keep on talking, or we could liberate—that is the word—the islands. From the first moment that the Argentine tyrant invaded the Falkland Islands seven weeks ago—knowing full well that what he did was in clear breach of international law and against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who had no wish to be anything but British—we had an inherent right, under article 51 of the United Nations charter, to go in to end the occupation by military means.
How much more did we become justified in so doing in the days that followed, when the United Nations resolution 502 demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands? When the Argentines, far from obeying and withdrawing, proceeded to put more arms and men on the islands and invaded and captured South Georgia, which was not even part of the Falkland Islands, how much more were we justified in doing so? It became increasingly obvious as week followed week that the Argentines wanted the sovereignty of the islands and nothing but that sovereignty. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said this afternoon, they were prepared to use protracted negotiations to achieve that end.
However, we have made no fewer than seven attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement. No responsible country

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in the world could have done more. It is almost astonishing to relate that there are still more demands for ever increasing delays from the Leader of the Opposition and other right hon. and hon. Members. How many more hours, days, weeks and months must we delay, while the seas upon which our troops are sailing become rougher, while the weather deteriorates, while our boys—yes, our boys—become more sick and while accidents may happen? How long must we delay before that spirit of enthusiasm that may make the difference between the morale of a winning side and that of a losing side goes off the boil?
It is all very well for perpetual peacemongers to get redder and redder in the face demanding that there should be no military action. Perhaps they do not care whether we betray the Falkland Islanders, the rule of international law, freedom and democracy or whether we betray the memories of those who have unfortunately already died. How long do they want to keep our troops there, as sitting targets that are more vulnerable to attack as the days go by? If HMS "Invincible" and HMS "Hermes" are sunk the day after tomorrow and hundreds of British lives are lost, will they still say "Let's talk"? If they will not say that after the ships have been sunk, why say it now?
Mr. John Carlisle rose—
Mr. Lawrence: For the sake of those ships and the men that we have sent into battle, if for no other reason, we can no longer expect delay. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chiefs of Staff and our commanders and forces on the spot have, to date, all shown extremely wise judgment and have handled the crisis with great skill and courage. I am certain that the overwhelming majority of those who sent me to the House will be content to leave the judgment of timing to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. If the time has come to invade—as I believe that it has—that action will be taken with the blessing and, I hope, the prayers of us all.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. If hon. Members make speeches lasting only nine minutes, the 10 hon. Members who still wish to catch my eye can be called.
7.26 pm
Mr. Geoffrey Robinson: I am glad to participate in the debate, which will probably be a historic one and the last in the House before there is military action at a level that has so far not been seen during the crisis. I hope that I shall stay comfortably within your guidelines, Mr. Speaker, out of respect for those hon. Members who, like me, have attended throughout this debate and many others.
Some of my right hon. and hon. Friends wish to divide the House. I make it clear from the outset that I shall not join them in the Lobby. No hon. Member can take such a decision lightly. Each must make his own decision. I hope and believe that the vast majority of my hon. Friends will not join them. In saying that, I do not necessarily subscribe to the view that in voting tonight we do the House, the country or our troops great damage. I do not, for one minute, impugn my hon. Friends' motives or their sincerity. However, I disagree with their judgment of the situation.
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Like every hon. Member, I must then ask myself why I support the Government's position. My support rests on the document, published today, as a result of which I am now more convinced than ever that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition was correct to ask for it. It does the country and the Government a great service. I do not for a moment pretend that it is the whole truth. We shall not know that until we have had a full inquiry, which will take a long time. However, the Prime Minister has properly promised that there will be such an inquiry. Nevertheless, I am well enough satisfied that it is the truth. From the paper, it is clear that the Government have shown seriousness of intent and sincerity of purpose in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement—several aspects of which must be deeply distasteful to many Conservative Members, Government Members and, not least, the Prime Minister.
If the Prime Minister were in the Chamber, I am sure that she would accept the criticism that her remarks have sometimes shown too strong a proclivity for a military solution. On balance—not all my hon. Friends, I am aware, would share this judgment—the Prime Minister has let her head rule her heart. She has been guided by others of a more temperate nature than herself in reaching the proposition spelt out in the document.
Where I disagree with the position, and where I think that the Prime Minister and the Government have unnecessarily wrong-footed themselves, is in the way in which they have abruptly withdrawn the proposals. Having tabled them as a basis for a peaceful settlement, they must have believed that it was an acceptable and honourable settlement—otherwise it would not have been tabled—and one to which they would expect the Falkland Islanders to subscribe, as they did themselves. However, they then withdrew the proposals almost before the Argentines had rejected them. I know that there has been a formal rejection by Argentina, but I hope that the withdrawal of the terms by the United Kingdom Government following that rejection by Argentina is more formal than substantive. I say that for three reasons.
First, by withdrawing the proposals so abruptly and unconditionally, as if to say "Those are the terms, you will not get anything like that now. We are going in for a fight and we shall come out with full sovereignty on our own terms" we shall give the wrong impression abroad. It went a long way to contradicting the idea that we wish to project of a country forced to take action, although it does not want to, but willing to compromise in a decent and honourable way with the country with whom we realise we shall sooner or later have to reach agreement over the long-term future of the islands.
I say that having had the opportunity to participate in television debates in Europe, in Italy and in France. There is not a great deal of understanding of why we are prepared to risk so much for, what is seen in Europe and elsewhere, so little, and why we have not been clearer about our aims and the concessions that we are prepared to make in obtaining them. I echo the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) in saying how important this document is in showing how far the Government were prepared to go to reach a decent, sensible negotiated settlement. That is still not understood, although the document will go a long way to help that understanding. However, the withdrawal of the proposals will create the wrong impression, and will set us back further. Therefore, it should still be known that we are prepared at any time to settle on those terms.

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That is the first of the three reasons, which hang together, why I think that it is wrong to have withdrawn the proposals.
The second reason is that that action will tend to foreclose an eventual option if—and every one of us hopes that it will not happen—there is no speedy and successful military solution. It may be that we shall be only too anxious to resort to this set of proposals, the option for which, by their withdrawal, we have, as I said, tended to foreclose.
The third reason is difficult to express, but it is an essential objection to what the Government have done. If we say that these proposals were all right for a peaceful settlement but not for a military one, it makes the proposals an unworthy settlement for which to fight. I hope that there will be a successful outcome to any military action that is undertaken. However, if we send our soldiers, sailors and marines to fight with the idea that the only thing that they are fighting for is an outright, uncompromising and unconditional victory over the Argentine invader it will be seen as, and we shall foster the idea of its being, a sell out when we come back later, as surely we shall, to some sort of political settlement and compromise.
This set of proposals is the only plain, logical and coherent solution for the islands. We must not let the idea of victory or nothing, or that it is a choice between a military victory and a political sell out, get abroad. We must foster the idea that it is not ignoble to fight for a United Nations trusteeship of the Falklands. It is the only sensible and logical conclusion for a long-standing problem in this tiny but troubled part of the world. It is by distance too far, and by numbers too small, to be part of our kingdom. It has its own long-established traditions and belongs to itself. It comes logically under arrangements that could be negotiated with it for a United Nations trusteeship.
I urge the Government to look to this as their long-term solution and to remain as flexible in their conduct of the possibilities for negotiation, even as the military operations start and continue, as they have been in the events that have led to this crisis. Now is not the time for us to say that the Government are wrong, or that it is a Tory Government and therefore wrong. I should rather believe in this Tory Government, the Prime Minister and her Ministers who are part of the War Cabinet than what has come out of Buenos Aires. Anyone who has listened to the news bulletins in the past few weeks can logically and honestly come to only that conclusion.
I shall not be joining those of my colleagues who wish to vote against the Adjournment tonight. It is part of the democratic process and the strength of our democracy that they can and do vote. We should not impugn their motives though we disagree with their arguments. But the fact is that the Government have come forward with a set of proposals that can provide the long-term political solution that we all wish to see. Let us hope that it can still be obtained at this late hour.
7.35 pm
Mr. David Crouch: The hon. Member for Coventry, North-West (Mr. Robinson) referred to the Prime Minister using her head rather than her heart. We are fortunate that the Prime Minister has both a head and
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a heart. We should be grateful for that in the country, in the House, and in the Conservative Party. Listening to the Prime Minister this afternoon and reading the document, we realised for the first time how desperately hard the Government have tried over the past seven weeks to obtain a peaceful solution by diplomatic means.
We know that the Prime Minister will not flinch from the military option. She made that clear, and it is right that she should not. She has also shown that she has great patience and is prepared to go overboard to try for a solution. In the document many additional tactical withdrawals have been inserted in an endeavour to try to obtain a diplomatic solution. Clearly the Prime Minister and the Government have been rebuffed on every occasion. I agree with the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), a former Prime Minister, that the document should be made available and distributed on a wider scale to the Heads of State around the world.
The latest response from the junta has been all too clear and stark. It must know that it and we are on the brink of war, but it seems to be prepared to turn its back on this last chance for peace. What can we do now, in the face of this final procrastination? We have shown how hard we are prepared to fight to find a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, we must now consider a military solution. We are ready, and we have been forced to do no less. It does not delight me, as hon. Members will know, and I hope that we shall continue to keep the diplomatic door open. Much reference has been made to this. It is important that we should do so.
I hope that the military operation, which I am convinced will be successful, will be carried out with the least possible casualties and suffering. Perhaps the Argentine people, underneath the junta, will declare that it is ridiculous for them to fight when they have been offered such generous terms.
I have been criticised for appearing on "Panorama" not once, but twice. On the second occasion, I felt that the BBC was, to use that time honoured phrase, falling over backwards to show that my views were in the minority in the Conservative Party. Perhaps it has succeeded. It did it with fun and good taste and I am prepared to accept it for what it was.
For my first appearance, with that dissident view, I have been criticised by some for being on the programme at all, as though it were wrong to be associated with the BBC. I have been criticised by others for beng a dissident voice. I can understand that. Members of Parliament must be prepared to be criticised when they get up and make speeches in this place or anywhere else. They must be prepared to face their critics and explain their point of view. I am so prepared. I should have been prepared on the first "Panorama" programme to have had one of my critics, one of those with a different view from mine, beside me to counter my arguments.
Few people know exactly what I said. Many who have not seen the programme, but have heard what was in it, have condemned what I said. It is said that I was wrong to criticise Government action because I belong to the Conservative Party. It is said that I was wrong to hold a different view. At once I was being judged to be wrong and it was said to be my fault. It is not wrong to hold a different view, provided that one can explain that view. I chose my words carefully, after considerable thought, and even now, two weeks later—I made the recording two weeks ago today—I stand by everything that I said.

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In the Library there is a full typescript of the programme, but I shall summarise briefly my four main points. First, I said that the sending of the task force was right as the strength behind the diplomatic action. I also supported the resolve to use the task force if a peaceful solution could not be found.
Secondly, I said that all along we had been rebuffed by the Argentines and that at every stage they had turned down the peace proposals that had been submitted. I said:
"This is where the fault lies … In the end … there is going to be blood and tears on both sides."
I wished to fight hard, not with the military option but with the diplomatic option, to avoid reaching the blood and tears stage.
My third point was about the Falkland Islanders. There perhaps I trod on thinner ice and was more contentious. I praised their loyalty. The first speech that I made in this series of debates was about the Falkland Islanders, because many of them in my constituency have visited me. I said of them:
"It just isn't reasonable to say that 1,800 people should determine our foreign policy and defence commitment."
I went on to point out that we have a foreign policy and defence commitment in NATO and elsewhere in the world of great proportion and significance and that we have a potentially great adversary in the Soviet bloc. However, perhaps I was on thin ice.
My fourth point was about our duty to defend our territory and our people and, even wider, to defend freedom. We must stand up to dictators. That is hardly a dissident view, but perhaps what I went on to say was misunderstood. I said that, if the war escalated, I believed
"that we may be judged to be standing on our dignity for a colonialist ideal rather than these wider ideals that we are standing on now."
I did not say that I believed that we were standing on colonialist ideals, but that we might so be judged if the war escalated. That might yet happen, but we must wear those difficulties, as a politician must wear the difficulties of criticism.
I did not say that I would not support a military escalation when asked that question. I made it clear all along that I would be prepared in the end, if peaceful solutions did not appear, to go to that limit. However, I added that I believed that it would be "disastrous". I copied that word from Secretary of State Haig. I believed that it would be disastrous because we would lose much support for our rightful aims. I was thinking of disaster not so much in blood and tears, which is disaster enough. All wars are disasters, not triumphs. They are disasters for many families. They are also disasters for the overall main foreign policy intent of Britain and the Western Alliance.
Perhaps the area of greatest interest in the world for development in the next 30 to 50 years are the South American States. Perhaps the Soviet bloc, with its small outpost in Cuba, is anxious to operate in that potentially exciting area of development of resources and people. There could be a disaster if we allow the Soviets to fish in muddy water.
The Falkland Islands crisis or war is a delicate and dangerous subject. It is dynamite. It is very upsetting to people. Was I wrong to plead for more time for our diplomatic efforts to succeed? When I listened to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this afternoon, I did not believe so. Those extra two weeks have been valuable. They have produced a valuable document on which a
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peaceful solution could yet be established, a settlement created and friendship re-established with Argentina and the other nations of the southern hemisphere.
I am in good company. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is the good company that I keep. Two weeks ago some people said that we had talked enough and that we should send in the marines. That is a correct point of view in the logic of some, but it was not my point of view. The great principle of freedom was and is at stake. The world is watching Britain today to see whether we have the determination to show that aggression will not be tolerated and to see whether we are prepared to defend and fight for democracy. I was biased in favour of diplomatic action if we could achieve those aims by diplomacy.
The two weeks since then have shown that the Government were also in favour of that course. They have not been dragging their feet. It has been said of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that she is using her head. So did the Foreign Secretary in our previous debate on 13 May when he said:
"The Government remain determined to see the implementation of the mandatory resolution of the Security Council. As before, we infinitely prefer to achieve this by negotiation."—[Official Report, 13 May 1982; Vol. 23, c. 958.]
I still believe that, and I am in good company with the Foreign Secretary.
I recognised that if the negotiations failed we would have no option but to switch the emphasis to the military solution. I have always had full confidence in the task force. It has my full and loyal support. I have no doubt about its professionalism, courage, modern training and equipment. We wish it god-speed.
I do not believe that I was wrong to speak out for a peaceful solution and to try to avoid the tragedy of war. Wars have a momentum of their own. Surely in these sophisticated and dangerous days, when wars are lot fought by men with limited fire power, we should think first of the diplomatic solution rather than go immediately for the military solution
I saw it as my duty to speak out to the Government, to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, to the Conservative Party, to my constituents and to the task force. Perhaps it was a dissident voice, but I spoke because I believed that I was right and that I should be heard. That is not disloyalty. It is what we are prepared to fight for today. It is democracy.
7.49 pm
Mr. Stuart Holland: I am not sure whether it will be an advantage to the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Crouch) if I say that his arguments are notable by their exception among Conservative Members. The plea that he has made for time in this issue seriously to consider the basis of negotiations would have been even more welcome had it come from the Government Front Bench.
The hon. Member drew attention to the fact that we are facing warfare of a completely different kind from that of the Second World War. This is no longer the battle of the River Plate. This is no longer a matter of better morale, of which we heard from Government Benches, the faster turning circles of our ships, the more rapid rate of fire from the "Ajax" and "Achilles".
A missile war at sea is over in seconds rather than hours or days. We have seen that already in the case of the Exocet and the "Sheffield". How many hon. Members are actually aware that according to French sources Argentina

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is one of the very few clients for all three varieties of the sea-skimming Exocet missile and that this missile is not simply launched by the Super Etendard fighter? They have two varieties of this missile deployed on both frigates and destroyers. The question is, therefore, posed whether the House should be surprised, if an invasion force approaches the islands, why the Argentines have been holding back from releasing or launching those missiles?
The question has been very well put by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) that we may all find in an invasion that we face the same disaster as occurred to the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" through superior Japanese air power during the Second World War. The whole venture of an invasion in these terms may be the most massive misadventure, not only for our troops but for the country.
I do not criticise the Government's policy for being jingoistic. The jingle relating to that term is:
"We don't want to fight but by jingo if we do we've got the men we've got the ships we've got the money too."
It is questionable whether Government policy has any of those three key categories. We have the men, but they have gone to the Falklands with redundancy notices recently delivered into their hands. We have the ships, but only through a rent-a-fleet because of the rundown of our conventional naval forces. We have the money—or have we? The question is there to be asked inasmuch as it has already been made apparent that the money may have to be found by cuts in public spending on housing, health and education. Moreover, tragically enough, it is not apparent that the Government, or the Prime Minister in particular, "don't want to fight". That is not made evident by the documentation which, with other hon. Members, I am glad to have seen put before the House today. It is not made evident precisely because of the point just made by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North-West (Mr. Robinson). If we are not going to fight and are not going to invade, why are those documents not still on the negotiating table?
There is a further factor. There have been many criticisms made in the debate of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn). Some of them were unworthy of those who made them. We are short of time and I shall not reply to them directly. We have not heard one word from Conservative Members that meets the points that he made on the case for economic sanctions backing up diplomatic action rather than resorting to war. If ever a country was ripe for effective application of sanctions, it is Argentina. It has $32 billion worth of debt. Argentina's total foreign exchange earnings do not cover its debt interest to the international community. We have seen the Bank of England rolling over Argentine debt, and the Government have imposed no sanctions or penalty on British-based merchant banks which have removed to Switzerland to carry on their business during the war. What conclusion can we draw from this? That there is a truce for profits but not for our troops.
The tragedy is that perhaps the Government have seriously considered the arguments for applying economic sanctions. Perhaps the Government are aware of the incredible inflation in Argentina. The fact that the Argentine people had their hands round the throat of that
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Government was, after all, one of the reasons why that Government went to war in the first place, and we are aware of it.
So why have our Government not applied sanctions? One is regrettably forced to the conclusion that they could not face the possible collapse of certain banks in the Northern hemisphere if Argentina, with her scale of loans, defaulted. That reflects the failure of monetarist policies, on the slump syndrome in the North which has aggravated the financial situation of those banks. It also reflects the total failure of the Government, with certain other Governments—notably that of which the Prime Minister herself is so fond in the United States—to undertake measures to ensure that the financial instability that could be caused would be offset by joint action by the central banks. That certainly could be done. The underwriting of the loans, whatever the main names of the banks in question—big banks would be at risk—by joint action by the central banks could ensure that the private banks would not collapse. The pressure on Argentina would be such that most probably it would be forced to come to the negotiating table and sign on terms or face the humiliation of the total collapse of its foreign exchange.
In that sense, sanctions have not been tried. Regrettably there is a link between the monetarist policies of the Government, including their failure to pursue policies to intervene and sustain markets, and the Government's militarist policies—for that is essentially what they are—in terms of their invasion of the Falkland Islands. Some Conservative Members have said that we should not be talking about "invasion". The vocabulary is open to choice, but when we reoccupied the mainland continent of Europe in the Second World War that term was used for the D-Day landings.
The right hon. Lady also talked about her record of diplomacy and the efforts that she has made, as if she were the Canning of this new era, whereas it is precisely the whole tradition of Britain's relations with Latin America, based on Canning a century and a half ago, which she has thrown into question by her militarist posture. That is how the policies she is pursuing are seen abroad. For a Prime Minister who advises us that we need to spend £15,000 million a year on defence because of the Soviet threat in terms of world expansion, she has achieved the almost unparalleled feat of bringing Cuba and Argentina into each other's arms with the sponsorship of the Soviet Union. I share with other hon. Members the concern about how this is viewed in Latin America and elsewhere.
The Government's policies also have thrown into question the neo-imperialist heritage of this country in the eyes of world opinion. One thing should be made clear. British occupation of the Falkland Islands was in no sense imperialist. It was not a matter of one State imposing its will over another foreign State. It is Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands, where it did not have people settled, which is imperialist. But the moral basis for opposing such action is undermined by precisely the manner in which the Government are pursuing their militarist policies.
I end on this point. Some Conservative hon. Members have claimed that we on the Opposition Benches who will vote tonight on this issue are appeasers of the Argentine. Nothing could be further from the case. What has not been tried is a combination of international economic sanctions and United Nations action. The scenario could well have been a period of effective sanctions under the aegis of

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Security Council resolution 502 with a deadline possibly set on the Government's terms, if the Government had been willing, and the United Nations backing a joint policing action in the South Atlantic with overwhelming force. If there was a wish to use force in the South Atlantic, why could it not have been done on those terms as in the case of United Nations involvement in South Korea?
Safeguards for the islanders have been neglected and invasion is a risk. With modern missile technology, an invasion now will not be in the style of the raid on Entebbe not least because we lack the element of surprise. It may be a minor Gallipoli. If so, it will be a disaster not only for those involved but for this country.
8 pm
Sir Bernard Braine: It was a pity that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot), in an otherwise interesting speech—he has a duty as Leader of the Opposition to probe and to criticise—saw fit to say that some hon. Members had disparaged the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General. That is untrue, certainly so far as I am concerned. No one who has experienced war ever contemplates military action with equanimity. What must be now must be, but I have remarked in broadcasts in this country, to the United States and to more distant parts of the world, that there has been a real appreciation of the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig initially and of the Secretary-General more recently to avoid recourse to arms.
I have stated repeatedly that it has been right for the Government to be patient and to give the Argentine Government a way out, if they were willing to take it. It is also right that there has been this series of debates in the House. After all, the essence of parliamentary Government is accountability. A point that I have not yet had an opportunity of making, I make now, namely that looking back, it is not unfair to comment that if more attention had been paid to the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants and if Ministers had been called more frequently to account for their ambivalent attitude over the years we would not be in this dangerous situation now. I am referring to their protestations on the one side that the interests of the Falkland Islanders would be fully safeguarded and were paramount, while on the other their policies were designed to force the islanders into a dependence upon Argentina for their external communications.
I remind the House of what was stated by Lord Caradon at the United Nations in 1968. He was quoted by the then Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, when the Government were challenged on the subject at that time. Lord Caradon said:
"There are two basic principles we cannot betray; the principle that the interests of the people must be paramount and, second, that the people have the right freely to express their own wishes as to their future".
The tragedy is that the policies never matched the words. The result was that the Argentines were given the impression that we did not really care about the islands and that we were not prepared to face any dramatic putsch on their part. If we had paid attention to this matter, as some of us urged repeatedly in the House, we would not now be in this dangerous and worrying situation. It was ever thus. Little dangers by being despised grow great, and warnings ignored become terrifying realities.
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None of those who had issued warnings over the last two decades had any idea that Argentine aggression would take the form that it did on 2 April—a full-scale military occupation. But the risks were clear to all but the blind, the deaf and the perverse. There was Operation Condor in 1966. A party of armed Argentines descended upon Port Stanley. They were rebuffed, but it was clear it would happen again unless we took firm action. It was a warning. The Falkland Islanders at that time begged Parliament to be vigilant. An hon. Member sneered at their legislature. I remind him that the Parliament in the Argentine was not only suspended five years ago but some of its Members have since disappeared, no doubt into the prisons and torture chambers of the junta. Unofficial Members of the Falkland Islands Legislature wrote an open letter to Parliament alleging that secret talks about transfer of sovereignty were taking place between the two Governments and appealing to hon. Members, because they did not wish in any circumstances to live under Argentine rule.
The principle of self-determination is enshrined in the United Nations charter. The situation had been described perfectly by Lord Caradon at the United Nations, on the instructions of the Government of the day. The principle has been recognised for all peoples in our former colonial empire. I expect it to be respected here, whatever lies ahead. However, after listening to some hon. Members and some commentators, it appears that in their view self-determination or paramountcy should not stand in the way of some eventual accommodation with Argentina.
It is ironic in the extreme that the one dependency that according to these folk should be denied self-determination is one where the population is wholly British, where there is no ethnic minority, no split allegiance and no desire for independence.
Moreover, despite pledges made to Parliament, Governments here have sent signal after signal to Argentina—I do not say deliberately—that the principle of self-determination is not one which, in the end, would be allowed to stand in the way of agreement.
No extension to the airport runway was permitted. The Argentines were given a monopoly of fuel supply. They were allowed to stay in South Thule without interference. HMS "Endeavour" and the White Ensign were withdrawn from the South Atlantic. Incredibly, all this was allowed to happen against the background of unstable government in Argentina, brutal suppression of political opposition, including trade unions, denial of human rights and the killing, torture and imprisonment of thousands of innocent people.
I have referred to past events quite deliberately. As we move towards expelling Argentina from the Falkland Islands by force, it is essential that we should have a clear idea of our objectives. Listening to the Prime Minister, I get a clear message. Argentina must withdraw by peaceful means if possible, and by force if necessary. British authority must be restored. The islanders must be given the opportunity to indicate their wishes as to the future. But this nation will never forgive a Government who, having expelled the invader from our territory, then submits to pressures which, in the end, gives Argentina what it wants. If that happens, two questions will arise: first, who was responsible for the betrayal of the islanders in the first place; and, secondly, why did we embark on a military operation that cost British lives only to throw away the fruits of victory?

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I come now to my central argument. We have no quarrel with the Argentine people. There is no sense of false patriotism in the attitude of those of us who want to stand up to a brutal dictatorship. After all, the first victims of the Argentine's military junta were not Falkland Islanders; they were Argentines. Their number could be 15,000 or 30,000. No one really knows. What we do know is that today thousands of Argentine families are grieving for loved ones who have disappeared into the junta's prisons and torture chambers. As has been said, in the long term there is plenty of room for a mutually advantageous and functional partnership but it will have to be with a different kind of Argentine. We should seek that by every possible means.
What can one say, however, in defence of those who have been advocating what is effectively a sell-out, either without military action or after it, when it is obvious that we are dealing with a Government who have almost the worst human rights record in the world?
The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale spoke of the assessment that he thought that the United Nations Secretary-General could still make. It would be unrealistic if the Secretary-General left out of his assessment the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which was made to the United Nations as recently as 1980. Why is the right hon. Gentleman, and other passionate devotees of human rights and freedom so coy to avoid mention of the appalling crimes of the junta, the worst of which were committed when the last Labour Government were in office?
Amnesty International can supply any hon. Member with a long list of named persons who have been tortured and killed or who have disappeared in the past five or six years. The list includes not only men but women and children. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report concluded that not only have thousands of people disappeared since 1975, but that there was a systematic use of torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatments. Those of us who have inquired about specific cases over the years—long before the invasion of 2 April—have met with a blank wall of silence.
The gallant captain Astiz, the senior officer on South Georgia who is wanted by the Governments of Sweden and France for killing and torturing women, is but one of a large army of sadistic brutes who are employed by the junta. Moreover, General Menendez who commanded III Army Corps in whose area was located one of the worst of the torture centres is surely the man who is today the governor of the occupied Falkland Islands. The Secretary-General of the United Nations knows the facts perfectly well. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale also knows them perfectly well. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) must also know them. Such facts cannot be ignored. The nettle must be grasped. One can see at once that it would be impossible for any British Government to agree to any proposals, either in the interim or in the long run, which will put Falkland Islanders under the control of the Argentine dictatorship.
I have one final thought for those who believe that we must not accept the paramountcy of the Falkland Islanders' wishes, and who think that we can conveniently forget what Lord Caradon told the United Nations in 1968. Some of the elected representatives, to whom the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) referred in kindly terms, are in Britain. They have told us here in the Palace of
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Westminster that they believe that their people will refuse to live under Argentine rule. Hon. Members should consider where that leads.
Any settlement that offers the prospect that I have outlined and which opens the door to the islanders being swamped by Argentines some time in the future—not necessarily in the next six months or a year—is likely to lead to their demanding resettlement elsewhere. Who would blame them? It would be a solution of a sort. It has been suggested by various commentators writing in the quality press who recoil at the sight of blood but pay no attention to the suffering of those who are in the junta's prisons and torture chambers. It would be ironic if we were to embark on a course which led the Falkland Islanders to leave, and the islands being handed over at some time or other and under some formula or other to Argentina. That would not merely put the clock back to 2 April; it would put it back to 1833 since when the islands have been occupied by a decent, god-fearing, hard-working and democratic British community. It will then be asked "Why did you bother to send a task force? Why did the men of the 'General Belgrano' and the 'Sheffield' have to die?"
In those circumstances, one would be tempted to recall the grand old Duke of York, who marched his army up the hill and then down again, an exercise in complete futility. But it would be worse than that. We would be guilty of a base betrayal and would be regarded both in Britain and throughout the civilised world with contempt, and deservedly so. I shall not rehearse the arguments as they have been made eloquently by others, but the message that "aggression pays", the burglar should be allowed to enjoy his loot, would go out to the world. That must not be.
8.16 pm
Mr. Alfred Dubs: I was interested to hear some of the denunciations of the Fascist regime in Argentina by the hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Sir B. Braine). I know that he has a good record on denouncing that regime and other manifestations of Fascism. I wish that he were not almost a lone voice on the Conservative Benches making such denunciations.
During the past seven weeks, the world has watched with disbelief two nations heading for war. I am pleased that the world, through the United Nations Security Council, has given us backing through resolution 502. I was dismayed and astonished by a recent statement of President Galtieri. He said that he did not mind if as many as 40,000 Argentine lives were lost holding the Falkland Islands. It makes one wonder about the mentality of a leader who is willing so blindly to disregard the lives of 40,000 of his people. He is apparently willing to sacrifice them in a cause of his own making.
We have every right to recover the islands—by force if necessary—and to throw the Argentines out. The question is whether we ought to exercise that right. Other nations have had that right. Often they have decided that it was not sensible to exercise it.
Are the principles at stake sufficiently important and clear-cut to justify the possible substantial loss of life that would be entailed in the recovery of the islands by force? If our use of force is successful—as I assume it will be—will there be a sufficiently stable and long-term outcome to have made the whole enterprise worth while, bearing in mind the possible loss of life? If the answer to either question is "No"—I suggest that it is—we must ask ourselves whether it is right to recover the islands by force.

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There would be nothing wrong in our deciding that, having examined the issues at stake, the possible loss of life can not be justified.
What makes the issue seem less than clear-cut? First, we must consider the question of sovereignty. As we have for many years been willing to discuss the sovereignty of the islands with the Argentine Government, we should think hard before we say that, as of today, the sovereignty of the islands is so important that we will send many men to recover them to re-establish our sovereignty.
Secondly, is our claim to the islands clear-cut? Having been a British possession for about 150 years, in all probability the International Court of Justice, if asked, would back our claim. Nevertheless, we acquired the islands, uninhabited as they were, because we sent a task force to them. For a period the Argentines, or their predecessors, when they were under the rule of Spain, laid claim to the islands. That leads me to wonder whether our claim is clear-cut. I suppose that the past 150 years give us a claim in international law.
Thirdly, the Falkland Islands are not and never will be a viable State. When we discussed the British Nationality Bill, the Government ensured that the Falkland Islanders would not have full British citizenship. We are 8,000 miles away from the islands and we cannot sustain economic life upon them. Therefore, the only option is for the islands to have closer ties with the South American mainland.
Many of us agree that there is an extremely unpleasant Fascist regime in Argentina. However, it seems an inescapable conclusion that any alternative Government in Argentina—democratic, socialist, or a combination of the two—would make a territorial claim to the Falkland Islands. I trust that such a Government would not use force to fortify that claim.
Against that background I question whether the recovery of the islands by the use of force is worth the loss of life that may be entailed. I do not say that we should do nothing. Other hon. Members have spoken eloquently about the possibility of exercising greater pressure on Argentina by introducing tougher economic sanctions and other economic and political measures. I seek to make a distinction between the rights of the islanders and our attitude towards the islands themselves.
We have a responsibility to the islanders to ensure that they are not forced to live under a Fascist regime. Surely that is different from saying that we have sovereignty over the islands and that it must be re-established by military means. We could, even at this late stage, hand over the islands to the United Nations Trusteeship Council and allow it to exercise administration over the islands, provided that the islanders were involved in their internal self-government under the auspices of the United Nations.
It seems that shortly the troops will be going in. This evening we do not wish to say or do anything that will prejudice the lives and safety of our men in the task force. However, given our democratic traditions, that consideration does not mean that there should not be a free debate, and possibly a Division, in the exercise of our traditional rights. Our concern about the well-being of our men in the task force will not be weakened when we exercise our democratic right this evening. They are brave and skilful men, and they have demonstrated clearly that they are willing to do their duty. The question that is implicit in
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many of the speeches that have been made in the debate is whether that duty is one that we have a right to ask of them, given all the facts that must be taken into account.
Even at this late hour I hope that the Prime Minister will pause before there is a full-blooded invasion of the islands. I hope that she will pause to allow further negotiations. I fear that she will not. If we are to use more force than hitherto, it is important that the world should be clear about our aims in using that force. Not having our previous negotiating base on the table will make it more difficult for us to explain to the rest of the world that we are doing other than recovering the islands by military means. I urge the Government to tell the world—especially our friends and allies—exactly what it is that we are embarking upon.
I am not in sympathy with the thrust of the Government's policies. However, if the Government insist on using the task force to its full and on stepping up military measures in the South Atlantic, I hope that those measures will be effected speedily and that the islands will be recovered easily and with the minimum loss of life on both sides.
8.25 pm
Mr. Ian Lloyd: I am sure that all hon. Members who participate in debates on the Falkland Islands speak with the utmost conviction and sincerity. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House recognise the expression of feeling of all hon. Members. It has been somewhat disturbing that some of us should have been criticised for being raucous militarists. I was the initiator of a motion that was so interpreted. I lost many friends in the Second World War and I was involved in it myself. There can be no one of my generation who embarks on decisions of war or peace without the utmost gravity and responsibility. No such views are expressed lightly and no such decisions are taken lightly.
I was concerned when the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds), who is unfortunately not in his place, introduced some of the most objectionable comments that I have heard in the debate by suggesting that we are about to embark on a class war and that only those of a particular class are likely to suffer.
Some months ago I had the great privilege to make a pilgrimage to Delville Wood, on the Somme, where some thousands of men of the Commonwealth were buried. As it happens, it is the burial ground for about 2,600 men of the South African Brigade. I expect that those who died were not greatly concerned whether they came from a racial society or any other type of society. They made the supreme sacrifice. No one who has stood in such a place and experienced the eerie and uncanny silence can do otherwise than speak as I do this evening.
Some of the remarks of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) turned on the vital issue of strategic bombing. He has said that the President of the United States cannot accept British bombing on the mainland. That is a tenable view or argument and great issues hinge on it. If the right hon. Gentleman is right, we must rule out pre-emptive strikes, however limited, for whatever purpose and however great the danger that is faced by our forces.
That argument cannot be carried forward. If we are right and our consciences are clear, as I believe they are, if the principles of international law have been challenged and gravely breached, as I believe they have, if aggression

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has taken place, as it has, and if the United Nations has been gravely flouted, as it has, we are entitled to call on the support of the forces of the free world, no less, whenever these principles are attacked on whatever occasion and however embarrassing the geographical circumstances may be. Geography does not determine right and wrong, and it should not be allowed to invalidate alliances.
Mr. Clinton Davis: Is it the hon. Gentleman's assessment that if we were to attack the mainland we would carry our allies with us?
Mr. Lloyd: That is a matter of grave doubt, but it should not be the determining consideration.
I should like to remind the House of an historical parallel. I know that the House is reluctant to accept either history or technology—I once made the mistake of introducing both at the same time. Should it be the decision of our task force commander and of the Government—and I believe in political control—that only by this pre-emptive action can we fulfil our purposes and avoid the devastating attack on the fleet, I must remind the House of an occasion which is of the utmost relevance to the question of bombing the mainland.
In 1950, General MacArthur had gone up the Korean peninsula and had achieved a great victory. He stood on the banks of the Yalu river. At that point he discovered that two Chinese armies were massing on the other side of the river. General MacArthur's military judgment—it is described in his autobiography—was that only by attacking the bridges on the Yalu river could he prevent the Chinese armies from moving down into Korea and virtually undoing most of his work. He was overruled by Washington and, having ordered 90 B29s into action, he was countermanded by Marshall in Washington.
Nothing in the immediate future happened, but I shall remind the House of the consequences. I shall also remind the House of what MacArthur said:
"I was even more worried by a series of directives from Washington, which were greatly decreasing the potential of my airforce … Manchuria and Siberia were sanctuaries of inviolate protection."
At the moment, the Argentine mainland is a sanctuary of inviolate protection. Some hon. Members will ask that it continues. Marshall countermanded the order. MacArthur accepted it under the greatest protest and said that it
"might well result in a calamity of the greatest proportions."
I was alive at that time. I remember the strong arguments that took place in the House and elsewhere. MacArthur was right: "a calamity of the greatest proportions" followed. Two hundred thousand Chinese and two army groups crossed the Yalu and drove the United Nations forces back to below Seoul at a cost of 13,000 casualties to the American and United Nations forces.
The net result was that the main purpose of the United Nations forces in Korea was effectively defeated. Korea was not reunified and, although one may question General MacArthur's judgment on whether he could have achieved his objectives, he has said clearly and argued powerfully in his book that the defence of the United Nation's objectives was weakened by a failure of will. A failure of will is the most dangerous thing in war. General MacArthur concluded:
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"The order not to bomb the Yalu bridges was the most indefensible and ill-conceived decision ever forced on a field commander in our nation's history."
We should remind ourselves of that judgment this evening, especially when we consider the proper ambit of the task force commander's authority and the question of political control. These are not simple matters; they are immensely complex. No historical parallel is ever perfect, but we should remind ourselves of this one.
I should also like to discuss the generosity of the Government's terms. In a supplementary question to the Prime Minister, I said that I thought that she had compromised to the point of folly. On reflection, perhaps that was a little harsh. I had read the Government paper only briefly before I put my question. Looking at it again now—I have had several hours in which to do so—there are indications of substantial compromise. The Government had been exceptionally generous. They had put forward a series of proposals which my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary realised might not easily have got through the House. It would be an exaggeration to say that the House would have reacted with other than the greatest of scepticism had these terms been presented at any time in the past three weeks as the basis of an agreed settlement, but we should have had strenuous and wide-ranging debates. General Galtieri would have had an easier time and greater opportunity of presenting such a settlement, not to his people but to the other members of his oligarchy, than any British Prime Minister would have had of presenting it, through the House of Commons, to the Britsh people.
The Government have leant over backwards. Their generosity has been exceptional. If we are not able to achieve a settlement on that basis, everything that follows will follow, without our feeling that there is a retreat or that we have to requalify and take a different view.
We have heard much about the need to obtain and maintain diplomatic support in the United Nations throughout the world. I regard a hierarchy of diplomatic support as important. I regard the opinions of the great Western democracies as being of the utmost importance because they think as we do and have our values and our principles. If we fail to carry them on a matter of great substance, that will be a diplomatic failure. I go down from that hierarchy, in the United Nations no less, to the other 87 States which have authoritarian regimes of one type or another. My concern with their international opinion is of a wholly different order and will remain, ever and anon. When I say that we should carry international opinion with us, I must ask whether it is the opinion of free men whose judgment I value and respect, or the opinion of those for whose judgment I have no respect.
It is sometimes argued in both the domestic and international spheres that we should occupy the middle ground. There is no middle ground in the South Atlantic. There is only a deep, cold and watery grave. Our forces will occupy the high ground. In this Chamber we should be occupying the high ground of opinion, judgment, morale and will, and be seen to be so doing.
8.37 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell: Politicians who press Service men into action when the means of carrying such action to a successful conclusion are doubtful have an awesome responsibility and must risk daunting criticism at the bar of history when the bill has to be paid

541
in other men's lives and the world standing of our country. I am shocked at the view of the world expressed by the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) and at what he said by implication about the importance of Latin American countries.
The Government must distinguish between what they want to do and their capacity to do it. Do they have the means to invade the Falkland Islands? An hon. Member's duty is to warn, to warn of loss of lives and—I take no joy whatsoever in saying this—to warn of a possible defeat of the first magnitude. This is not a matter of hindsight, because on 4 April, as reported in The Scotsman of 5 April, I said to West Lothian CLP that sending the expedition was the most unwise decision since the Duke of Buckingham left for La Rochelle in 1627. I am concerned about improvisation and a scheme which is not thought out, the details of which were announced as titbits for the media without regard to immediate need or long-term relevance. In that I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) when he said that our first consideration must be for the lives of our men. We are talking about an improvisation with ill-defined objectives which may not be fulfillable.
Who said that the military solution would not provide the answer? It was not a member of the Labour Party or one of the dissidents; it was Al Haig's considered judgment. We may be faced with, God help us, something of the order of the 1905 Russo-Japanese war in which we are in the role of the Russians. Because we are in entrenched positions, we could be faced with Dieppe 1942 or, worse, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima or the Solomon Islands.
My right hon Friend the Leader of the Opposition hopes that if there is action it will be swift and successful. The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who spoke for the Liberal Party, hoped that it could all be done without loss of life. So do I. But we have to make a cool assessment of the facts. The Argentine army has 130,000 men, 90,000 of whom are conscripts. When Mr. Bruce Carlisle came to see some of us—he is a pillar of the Anglo-Argentine community—he told us that his 23-year-old son, who had been head boy of Harrow public school, had returned to Argentina and now had volunteered for the forces, but it was the Argentine forces.
The Foreign Secretary knows that many of the conscripts may fight as if they were fighting a holy war. They are stiffened by the Argentine marine corps who are professionally well thought of by marines in this country and the United States of America. They are armed with 10 Tiger Cat surface-to-air missiles. I shall go through some of their hardware: 100 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, the light Austrian Kurassian tanks modified for dirt track conditions, 30, 40 and 90 mm anti-aircraft guns, bantam anti-tank wire-guided missiles, 300 infantry carrier vehicles bouncing around and, John Erickson tells me, built for exactly that terrain, 400 to 500 artillery pieces, 10 towed howitzers with 105 mm guns, six self-propelled United States howitzers, 125 Tam tanks built in Argentina, well engineered and a smaller version of the German Leopard. It is not a rag-bag force to be despised, and yet it is what we are going in against.
Let us take the Argentine Navy, possibly the greatest fear of many of us. There are three Kiel-built diesel electric submarines, capable of 22 knots, so far unlocated in the Atlantic lying doggo. What could they do to the "Canberra" or QE2? The resources of the task force will
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be locked in self-protection. Faced with airborne surface-skimming launched missiles, what ship can be safe? The tragic sinking of the "Sheffield" was a turning point in naval history because, after "Sheffield", can "Canberra" and other ships loiter around the South Atlantic?
Those views are not just mine. The editorial of Flight International, a deeply serious technical magazine, reads:
"And what is it about the materials used in British warships that enables one missile hit to turn the ship into a blazing inferno, which has to be abandoned? Are other ships as fire-vulnerable as the Sheffield? And if so, what would have happened if the Exocet had penetrated the defensive screen and found its way into a carrier's hanger deck, full of Harriers and fuel?"
Those are the questions that Flight International asks. What was in people's minds when they sank the "Belgrano"? Is it true that four torpedoes missed? Was it intended to hit the rudder? What happened to the high quality weaponry of the task force? It is very strange that a cruiser, outside the limit with 6-in guns having a 10-mile maximum range, should be attacked from 35 miles away. We still have not had an answer to the question that was asked repeatedly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) about the sinking of the "Belgrano".
I speak with some feeling on this matter. For two years I was on a troopship, which admittedly had been converted to a ship school. It was the "Dunera", but I have sailed in the "Uganda". I say, from my experience of the seas, that our men must be going through a most uncomfortable period. One must ask bluntly "Are they in a condition to carry on, after the assault, a sustained war?" I can understand what the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) said, spine-chilling though it may be. Come the next British ship that is crippled, how can we refuse to knock out the land bases from which the attackers come? Of course, once we bomb the Latin-American mainland, we shall then have to contend with Cuban MiG 23s, the Mil 24 helicopters, and Ile Venuzuelan Mirages. Roberto Campos, the Brazilian ambassador who is well known to many of our colleagues, has just confirmed Brazilian hostility if there is any attack on the mainland. I understand why the Venezuelan President told our ambassador that immediately that happens diplomatic relations will be cut off.
So we are in a dangerous situation, not least from the point of view of the air force, the nine Canberras. Any nation that can marry an Exocet missile with the wing of an aircraft and have an air-launched, surface-skimming missile is a very technologically advanced nation. It is a great error to think that there will be a walkover. The Sky Hawks, the Mirages with the R530s are precisely the combination that was so devastating in the hands of the Israelis.
Incidentally, on the subject of nuclear weapons, may I ask one question: are we infringing the treaty of Platelco, which establishes Latin America as a nuclear-free zone?
I accept that great skill has been shown in positioning the fleet, but there are critical weaknesses which could be cruelly exposed. If that happened, our stock would plummet. We can talk about the problem of mines, kelp and the weather.
It is not a matter of cowardice. The real cowardice of people like myself would be not to tell the truth as we saw it. It does nothing but honour to our forces to say that they are up against highly professional forces, whatever we may think of the Argentine regime. Should we not therefore say, faced with the stark reality of a war with

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unforeseeable consequences on a continent where we are friendless, that we advocate withdrawal of the task force to home ports?
I want to put a question to the Foreign Secretary. At column 957 of Hansard on 13 May 1982, in answer to a question about the long-term arrangements, he replied, with his usual candour, that we were in "a difficult" area. However, there are only two clear alternatives in the long-term—either dependency on Britain, or dependency on Argentina. Does Britain assume such a responsibility in perpetuity? No Latin American country could replace Argentina as the source of air services, hospital services or postal services.
It is true that some Latin American countries disapproved of Argentina's invasion of the islands as a breach of international law. All of them support its title to the islands, and oppose Britain's use of the task force to recover them.
Another question has not been answered by the Foreign Secretary. A fortnight ago it was asked about Jules Goebel, the author of the major work "The Struggle for the Falklands", who, after 460 pages of turgid history and detailed law, came down on the side of the Argentine claims. There has been no answer to that, but at least it should be answered. The only viable policy for Britain in the South Atlantic is based on co-operation with Argentina.
The right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) recognised that; at the end of his "World at One" contribution my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East recognised that. Would more bloodshed help or hinder such co-operation? We can build up pressure steadily and remorselessly, as the Foreign Secretary would have it—diplomatically, militarily and economically—but diplomacy combined with military pressure will not work. Indeed, the two may be mutually exclusive.
The main obstacle to such co-operation has been our failure to grasp the fact that, whilst we see the Falkland Islands as our rightful property, Argentina sees the Malvinas as an integral part of its country. Indeed, it is a geological extension of the South American continental shelf. No amount of military action will change that fact. Nor would it help matters if today's junta were replaced by a democratically elected Government. We have been told that world opinion is vital. Now apparently the Government discount it; that we go it alone. It is an ill-wind strategy because military options are not options; they are constraints.
On Saturday 3 April, as reported in column 638 of the Official Report of that date, I asked the Prime Minister, "Who are your friends in Latin America?" If we take action by vote, it is because we do not like to see our country being made to look ridiculous. We are taking on the entire Hispanic world. We are taking on Central America. We are taking on, as many of us learnt at the Indian high commission yesterday, many countries in the Third world which did not like aggression in the first place. We have the disapproval of the Russians. We have the disapproval of the Chinese. Our EEC partners are extremely uncomfortable. It is clear that the United States is nearly exasperated with us for bitching its relationship with Latin America.
The Secretary of State for Defence justifies his actions by saying that in 15 or 20 years people will thank Britain
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for this. I do not think that there will be much thanking of Britain for it. The best memorial, suggested by Chris Roper of Latin American newsletter, to the brave men who died in the "Sheffield" and in the "General Belgrano" would be some kind of flourishing community of British-stock people and of Argentine people on the Falklands who, after all, are no different from the isolated communities of Welsh, Irish and Scottish settlements who have retained their cultural identity.
When the Prime Minister talks about "subjection" of the Falklanders, that is a different concept from that of the Welsh and Scottish communities in Argentina. Britain still has many friends in Latin America. Let us listen to them. Let us take their advice not to go over the threshold of war.
8.53 pm
Mr. John Stokes: I do not intend, nor do I have the time, to follow the defeatist remarks of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell). My views about this debate are already known. This is the sixth such debate. On the other hand, I must say that this one has been a great improvement on the others, as we have had a very clear exposition from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister of our negotiating stance. The document that has been published will be of enormous use not only in this country but in the world outside.
I listened today to one of the most enjoyable speeches that I have heard in my 12 years here, that of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). His delightfully relaxed style makes one realise what fun it must have been to be Prime Minister!
In general, I return to the point I have made so often, that I do not believe that these discussions can help our diplomacy very much. I doubt whether they aid morale in our battle fleet. We have pretty conclusive evidence that the public dislike them. The position has certainly been made much worse by the broadcasting of Prime Minister's Question Time, because, magnificent as her answers are, the volume of noise and bedlam which accompanies them distress and shock the ordinary listener.
The House of Commons cannot run a battle, and everyone knows it. The suggestion by the Leader of the Opposition that we in the Commons should be in day-to-day charge of operations is not only quite unconstitutional and without precedent in our long history, but is utterly unpractical, as is pointed out in the amusing cartoon which some colleagues may have seen in yesterday's Daily Express. Public opinion is behind the Government. Our job is to reflect that, back the Government and leave them to get on with the job that they alone have the capacity to do.
In spite of the fear of fighting and bloodshed—I was once, although an Army subaltern, in a naval battle—we all share a marvellous feeling of steadiness. It reminds me of the feeling in the summer of 1940. The people know that we have to see this through, by force if necessary. If this unprovoked aggression were to succeed there would be no peace or security anywhere, from West Berlin to the many small countries and islands scattered throughout the world. People also know that if we neglect the wishes of the islanders to live in peace under their own democratic Government, under the British Crown, few in number and far away as they are, democracy would not be safe anywhere.

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I share the view of the vast majority of my constituents and of the people of this country that the invasion of the Falkland Islands must be soon, swift and sure. We want every Argentine off the islands and British administration restored. I want to see the Union flag flying there again and the governor returning with plumed hat and carrying his sword. After that victory we can be magnanimous. We might associate Australia, New Zealand and the United States in the administration of the islands and even allow Argentina a place in the development of the assets of the whole of the Antarctic.
What worries me deeply is the attitude of our allies in the EEC. After all, those countries owe their freedom to what we did for them in the last war. France would have been ruined without our nurturing General de Gaulle in these shores. Italy also was helpless when the Germans came in and before we landed to help them. The Benelux countries owe everything to us. At least the Dutch still remember that. Germany would have had a much worse time after the war without the decencies of the British occupation. The people of West Berlin, as I know from direct experience, look to us to succour them. Should not the Prime Minister say to our EEC partners the words that William Pitt used to our continental allies against Napoleon? He said:
"England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example."
If those countries do not back us now in our conflict with Argentina, it will not only put the whole concept of the EEC at risk, but it will gravely injure NATO. The British public will grow to hate the other EEC countries. Such will be the force of their opinion that no Government will be able to ignore it. I devoutly hope that the Prime Minister will be as strong and firm with our EEC partners as she has been over the Falkland Islands crisis.
My right hon. Friend opened the debate with great clarity and brilliance in outlining our negotiating position and that of Argentina. Frankly, I am one of those who are glad that our proposals were rejected by Argentina, as I believe that in some respects they went too far.
Our position has been made clear before the world. Argentina was never prepared to compromise, and never prepared to evacuate the islands. The talking has gone on for seven weeks. For all that we have heard about the Secretary-General of the United Nations today, I do not believe that he has the power or the ability to make the Argentines become reasonable in negotiation. The time for words has ended and the time for action has come. The country wants it and expects it, and I believe that its instinct is right.
9 pm
Mr. Denis Healey: The Government's detailed account of their proposals and the Argentine response show beyond any reasonable doubt that the Prime Minister and her colleagues have been prepared to make many concessions, some of them as unwelcome to us as they clearly are to Conservative Members, for the sake of a negotiated settlement. There is no doubt that the Government were right to do so.
Argentina, on its side, has made some concessions. The right hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel), leader of the Liberal Party, was wrong to suggest yesterday that Argentina had made none. However, the concessions made by Argentina have been nothing like sufficient to guarantee that negotiations on a
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long-term settlement will not be prejudiced in advance. Inevitably there must be some tightening of the military screw.
The thoughts of the House must first be with the men of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force—some of whom have been at sea for seven weeks in extreme discomfort—who may soon be risking their lives in dangerous operations in appalling weather. They have the right to our unanimous support in the task that the Government now set them.
Today's debate has rightly focused on past and future negotiations. On past negotiations we have learnt much from the document that the Government have published. However, the Government must now produce, when they are able to do so, a fuller paper describing the earlier phases of the negotiations under Mr. Haig and President Belaunde. The Government should have published the full text of the Argentine reply with this document, because there is clearly disagreement between the Secretary-General and the Government on how some of the Argentine replies should be interpreted. The House urgently needs the publication of the Secretary-General's aide-memoire and the reply which I gather the Government—[Interruption.] I hope that the Prime Minister will ask the Secretary-General for permission to publish it and that the Government will publish their reply. The key to future negotiations must be the formulations, as the Prime Minister described them, which have been presented by the Secretary-General.
The House must agree—I hope that the Government agree—that any further increase in the level of military operations must not and cannot lead to a final end of negotiations. The final settlement of the dispute must be a negotiated settlement. As Secretary Haig said, a purely military settlement cannot endure over time. The Secretary of State for Defence made exactly that point with great force in a radio interview on Sunday. He described a military solution as being only short-term. He added, in words that I strongly endorse:
"Of course we will still be seeking, even when we've repossessed the islands, a long-term solution to this problem with countries in the area. We want to, in fact, even if we are forced to take the military option—and time is now very short for that—when that decision will have to be taken"—
he was talking about the decision to employ further military force—
"we will still need obviously to negotiate and the process of negotiations will not end even when we're in possession of the islands once again and they're once again British sovereign territory."
In other words, the view of Her Majesty's Government, as expressed by the Secretary of State for Defence in the words that I have just quoted, is that the negotiations must continue, even if the Government now rightly decide that they must increase the military pressure.
I very much hope that that is still the Government's view, although the Prime Minister did little to reflect it in her speech this afternoon. However, I understand that she may well have felt that it was necessary to say, for example, that the Government were withdrawing their latest proposals because Argentina had rejected them. The right hon. Lady would have had a lot of trouble from some of her right hon. and hon. Friends below the Gangway if she had not said that. Indeed, the concessions that she described in the document would justify her receiving the Bristol, South-East peace prize. At one moment in the

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speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn), I thought that he was about to offer it.
We need not take over-tragically the Prime Minister's words on withdrawing the proposals that she made as recently as Sunday. I recall that the Foreign Secretary also made it clear a few days ago that the Government were withdrawing their acceptance of the Peruvian proposals after the Argentines had rejected them. He went on candidly to admit in that very same speech that the negotiations then about to begin under the Secretary-General's auspices were bound to follow the broad lines of the Peruvian proposals. Of course, he was right, and we can see that by reading the Government's document.
It is equally clear that any future negotiations are bound, in some way, to build on the proposals put before us in today's document; above all, on the two fundamental conditions described last week by the Foreign Secretary—the withdrawal of Argentine forces and negotiations for a long-term solution without prejudice to their outcome. Only seven days ago, the Foreign Secretary told us that if Argentina accepted those two fundamental conditions—which I firmly endorse on behalf of the Labour Opposition—
"we may be able to make greater progress in other areas, where some flexibility is possible."—[Official Report, 13 May 1982; Vol. 23, c. 956.]
When the Foreign Secretary replies to the debate, will he say a little about the difference of judgment as to whether Argentina, in its reply to the Government's latest proposals, accepted the second condition—that negotiations on a long-term settlement should proceed without prejudice to their outcome?
In the Government's document the Argentine Government appear to accept that, although the Government used as their reasons for believing otherwise, first, that the Argentine Government had not accepted the particular formula put to them by the British Government—which is an insufficient reason—and, secondly, that some Argentine spokesmen in Buenos Aires had made statements that were incompatible with the official reply. I remind the House that that is also true of some British Government spokesmen.
The Secretary of State for Defence, in the interview to which I referred, made some statements about prejudicing the possibility of Argentine sovereignty. In one of her odd diplomatic forays into the world of disc jockeys yesterday, the Prime Minister interpreted that as being possibly attributable to the fact that the right hon. Gentleman had been rather tired at the end of a long interview. I often experience similar fatigue and readily concede that that is a natural error to make.
It seems clear that there are still some fundamental problems about other issues related to the prejudicing of negotiations. We would wholly agree with the Government that among the fundamental issues remaining are the Argentine demands that it should be able to swamp the islanders with immigrants and be able thereby to gain sovereignty over the islands by a vote in the General Assembly. If the Argentine Government were given that permission, they would be able to torpedo any negotiations with impunity and would be given an incentive to do so. We strongly support the Government's position on that
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issue, just as we support them in their refusal to include consideration of the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands as open to negotiations in this context.
However, the House will agree that some flexibility is still possible, for example, on the precise timing and distance of the mutual force withdrawal. We all accept the general point that it would be wrong for the Argentines to withdraw only 200 or 300 miles and for us to send our forces back 8,000 miles. Clearly there is some scope for negotiation between the two. It seems to me, without knowing the formulations in the Secretary-General's aide-memoire, that the Government must apply themselves seriously to consider what he says.
I hope that what the Prime Minister said this afternoon demonstrates her readiness to do so, provided—and this is a sensible condition—that the Argentine Government, in their comments on the Secretary-General's aide-memoire, show their readiness not only to negotiate in general on the proposals in the aide-memoire, but to make concessions on certain specific issues.
This afternoon the right hon. Lady the Prime Minister spoke with a peculiar obliqueness that reminded me in some respects of the late Lord Butler's way of handling the language. She said:
"Even if we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the aide-memoire, we should first wish to see substantive Argentine comments on it, going beyond mere acceptance of it as a basis for negotiation."
That is a reasonable condition. The right hon. Lady went on to say:
"These are the points that we are making in our reply to the Secretary-General. At the same time, we are reminding him—as my right hon. Friends and I have repeatedly said to the House—that the negotiations do not close any military options."
Those words imply that the Government are prepared to negotiate on the Secretary-General's proposals, provided that the Argentine Government show a readiness to move on some of the central issues. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will confirm my interpretation tonight, because he could set at rest many fears on the Labour Benches.
The Prime Minister, in the words quoted earlier today, showed her confidence in the abilities and objectivity of the Secretary-General. On Monday, she went so far as to say that how long the negotiations proceed
"just depends on how long he thinks he can go on."
That was a sensible way of approaching the problem.
Last Thursday, I told the House that Her Majesty's Opposition would support the Government's position, as outlined by the Foreign Secretary, provided that the Government supported the Secretary-General negotiating for as long as he believes there is a reasonable chance of success. The Government are committed by the right hon. Lady's words on the radio on Monday to follow up the proposals that he has made.
I agree with the Prime Minister that this does not, and must not, foreclose any military options. The right hon. Lady has made it clear—and the House and the Foreign Secretary should mark her words—that the long process of negotiation that has now lasted six weeks or so has not in any way inhibited the Government in using the task force as they thought wise. That has been so for the past six or seven weeks and must remain so.
That reinforces the point that I made earlier that, contrary to the impression given by a large part of the British press, negotiations and military operations are not alternatives but are indissolubly linked with one another.

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Although the balance may shift from time to time, as it undoubtedly must after the latest Argentine rejection of the Government's proposals, the Government must continue to pursue both courses at the same time.
Some increase in the military pressure exerted on Argentina is now justified, and we support it. The task force commander must obviously be able to decide on the options that the Government have given him. I do not seek to inquire, any more than I did last week, what those options are. No doubt, to some extent, his choice would be determined by the weather as well as by his tactical judgment, but the Opposition would insist that any new military action must also be designed to create the possibility of more fruitful negotiations than we have had so far. The connection between military action and negotiation is just as important in the new situation as it was in the old one. If right hon. and hon. Members of the SDP believe otherwise, they will soon discover that their expectations are mistaken.
In a very powerful speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Weetch) pointed out that no rational person could believe that the Argentines would already have agreed to withdraw their forces from the islands and to negotiate on the future of the islands without the pressure exerted by the task force. It requires an enviable innocence to believe that of a Fascist military dictator. I suppose that such innocence may be natural in the infantile Leftists who were so amiably castigated by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in his article in this week's Tribune.
However, it is odd to find that those who enjoy this enviable innocence are the same people who asked us to rely not upon military force but upon financial and economic pressure exerted by an American Administration which they lose no opportunity of attacking as hostile to Britain and friendly to Fascism. There seems to be a certain schizophrenia about that approach that many of us noticed earlier in a powerful but somewhat revolving speech by one of my right hon. Friends.
More military pressure is now inevitable, but in this new phase it must be limited and controlled, as it was in earlier phases of the crisis. The Government must observe two basic conditions that I have put before the House. First, the force used must be seen by our friends in the world to be proportionate to the issue at stake. Secondly, the way in which the force is used must not jeopardise the possibility of negotiation.
The question of proportionality of the force used is becoming increasingly important to our friends on both sides of the Atlantic. Those of us who had the privilege of joining the Anglo-French council meeting in Edinburgh last weekend will recall that every French delegate expressed concern lest Her Majesty's Government might take actions whose consequences were disproportionate to the real importance of the issue at stake.
There can be no doubt that the reluctance of our Common Market partners to renew sanctions for more than one week at a time owed much to their concern that we might take actions that they would regard as disproportionate to the issue and damaging to wider Western interests in the area. The risk of driving Latin America into the arms of the Russians is real. Above all, some SDP Members, who have always paraded their fear and hostility towards the Soviet Union, should take that danger
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seriously, as do all our allies and, most of all, our American ally, as Mr. Haig has repeatedly made clear in recent weeks.
Mr. Percy Grieve: I accept the importance of the proportionality of the force that we must use, but does the right hon. Gentleman accept that, in the minds of those who are in command on the spot, the first consideration must be protecting and saving the lives of our men?
Mr. Healey: I made that very clear at the beginning of my speech.
The point that I have tried to make repeatedly—I speak with some experience as a former Secretary of State for Defence for six years—is that the important duty of the Government is not to order their military commanders into operations in which, in order to defend their forces, they are compelled to take actions that are inconsistent with the Government's political objectives. Anyone who has served at the Ministry of Defence during military operations—when I was there we had operations in southern Arabia and in Borneo—will know how important that is, as does the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who was Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government.
The Government's duty is to ensure that the military commander is never faced with the position that the only way of achieving the objective that the Government have set him is to use force which destroys the Government's political objective. That is a difficult and unwelcome task for the Secretary of State for Defence and the Government, but in a democracy it is a task that must always be carried out by anyone who is prepared to use force in the pursuit of legitimate political ends.
It is difficult for an Opposition, without full knowledge of the military factors as well as of the diplomatic factors, to judge which operations are possible within those limitations. However, it is clear that in this new phase, in which greater importance may be given to the military arm of our three-pronged diplomacy—as the Foreign Secretary described it earlier—economic sanctions must be greater rather than less than they have been until now. We are entering a phase in which it is clearly necessary to exert more pressure on the Argentines to produce a successful negotiation.
I hope that the Foreign Secretary can assure us that he is approaching our American ally for help in this area, because it is our American ally on whom the main burden of financial sanctions must inevitably fall, since American banks are much more deeply involved in Argentina than British or European banks. But he will know, as well as I, that if we depend on our friends to increase the economic pressures on Argentina, we must be prepared to take notice of their views on how we should proceed in handling the crisis as a whole. There is no escape from that. We depend for a successful outcome of the crisis on the economic and diplomatic support of our friends. That support will be forthcoming only if our friends understand and support the way in which we conduct our policies.
To sum up what I have said, the intransigence of the Argentines, which has been described in detail in the Government's document, has inevitably shifted the balance between diplomacy and military action in the next phase of handling the dispute, but both are still required.
To return to a point that I made in the previous debate, one of the most damaging habits that one has perceived,

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especially in some newspapers during the past few weeks, is the tendency to believe that there is no alternative to surrender and Armageddon and, equally, that there is no alternative to peace with Argentina and all-out war with Argentina. I hope that the Government agree that all-out war with Argentina is not justified in the present circumstances.
We heard with some relief what the Secretary of State for Defence told us about the Government's unwillingness, certainly in present conditions, to extend the war to the mainland of Argentina. He is right about that. There is an almost infinite spectrum of possibilities and there is no doubt that we are moving further towards the military end of the spectrum as a result of the intransigence shown by Argentina in diplomatic negotiations.
Balance between the negotiation arm and the military arm of our policy is just as necessary now as it was before. We shall keep the support of our friends so long as they regard us as preserving a proper balance in this new phase. If they feel that we are not observing a proper balance, they will certainly withdraw their support. We have seen disturbing signs of this in the past week.
I ask the Government to accept our view. We believe that so far, with one or two minor exceptions, their military and diplomatic behaviour has deserved the full support of both sides of the House. We recognise that a change in the balance between military and diplomatic action is required because of the failure of negotiation in the latest phase, but a balance must still be maintained. The Government must still see negotiation as the final objective of their actions, both diplomatic and military. So long as they do, they will have the support not only of their allies but of the Labour Opposition.
9.25 pm
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Francis Pym): This has been, in my view, an important and useful debate. I have drawn encouragement from it as well as a great deal of advice which, I assure the House, I shall ponder. It also contained a gem—the way in which the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) dealt with the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn). Those of us who were here to witness it appreciated it in all its dimensions.
No two debates on the same subject in the House are the same, but tonight's debate has been different in a marked way from the five others that have preceded it on this subject. For the first time since the crisis began the Government have been able to make public a detailed British proposal for a negotiated settlement. This has been a great help to the House. It has enabled us to take our thinking further and has added a new dimension to our considerations.
The House has seen the nature of the proposal that was rejected by Argentina. It was rejected in a reply delivered yesterday. That reply makes it clear that Argentina is simply not interested in the peaceful and honourable solution which could have been available and which was, indeed, explicitly offered. Evidently, Argentina is interested only in delay—delay which would allow her to consolidate, if she can, what she has seized by force, to
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scour the world in search of new weapons and to confuse the issues which were so clearly addressed by the international community in resolution 502.
As the House knows, we have pursued a consistent strategy to produce, if we can, Argentine withdrawal based upon pressures—diplomatic, economic and military pressures all acting in concert and all being necessary. We have sustained and increased these pressures in every possible way and I believe that we have had a great deal of success in all three fields. In addition, the decision taken by the Community earlier this week, and the support and the solidarity expressed by the Governments of our partners in the Community, were a great deal stronger than reports in the press appeared to indicate.
The debate today has concentrated mainly on the diplomatic efforts that we have made, and I shall do the same. However, I should like, in passing, to thank hon. Members who have expressed their support for our continuing military pressures. I have in mind what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden), the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Weetch)—who made a particularly forthright speech, which the Government appreciate very much—my hon. Friend the Member for Howden (Sir P. Bryan) and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, who continued to give support for the sending of the task force and actually said that if it is to be asked to undertake further action he hoped that that action would be as swift and as successful as possible. That is appreciated and it should be noted.
I agree entirely with what the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said about military and diplomatic pressures going together. Both are required. Neither would be effective without the other. They are part of a comprehensive whole. It has been my responsibility to try to put together, with what patience, persistence and imagination I can command, the elements from which a peaceful solution could be constructed. I have been doing this, or trying to, in accordance with principles that have been endorsed by the Government and by the House. I had to pursue this goal without being able to feel sure at any time that the goal was a feasible one or that the Argentines were negotiating in a way that made it attainable; indeed, with a mounting suspicion that the reverse was the case.
There was no lack of advice both from this House and elsewhere. All kinds of frameworks have been examined. During all this time we investigated many possibilities. We pursued many blind alleys. I do not regret this in any way. In any diplomatic enterprise, as Mr. Haig said to me on one of the early days of the crisis, it is necessary to go to the last mile and beyond in order to demonstrate good faith.
Mr. Frank Allaun: Apart from the loss of life, will not invasion fatally undermine the proposals made today by the Secretary-General of the United Nations?
Mr. Pym: We have made it clear throughout that we would sustain and increase all three pressures on Argentina, because what we want is its withdrawal without a shot being fired. That is up to Argentina.
The reception given by the House today to the document that we have produced and published suggests

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to me that we have done what we had to do. Indeed, a number of hon. Members were surprised that we went as far as we did. I am convinced that we were right to do so. I am grateful for the support that has been expressed, including that of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East. I assure those hon. Members who raised the point that the document has already been given the widest distribution all around the world.
Mr. Robert Atkins: Can my right hon. Friend give the House some details of how widely the document is being spread around? I find, like many hon. Members, that it delineates the case well and cogently. It will help us at the bar of world opinion. Can my right hon. Friend give more information about how widespread is its distribution?
Mr. Pym: It is at all our embassies and all our offices throughout the world on the widest possible scale. We want not only hon. Members but the British people and the whole world to know what we have been arguing about.
I remind the House of the basic requirements that we have set ourselves throughout these long weeks. Our first requirement has been to secure the withdrawal of Argentina forces, which was demanded as a matter of mandatory obligation by Security Council resolution 502. The second has been to establish a ceasefire to avoid further loss of life as soon as withdrawal could be agreed. The third has been to make satisfactory provision for the democratic administration of the islands in any interim arrangements that prove necessary. The fourth has been to ensure that the negotiations with Argentina over the future of the islands should be such as to conform with the principles so strongly supported in this House. We have made it clear in this connection that we remain prepared to negotiate with Argentina about the long-term future of the islands, as we and previous Governments were so prepared before the invasion, that we shall be ready to discuss anything which either side might wish to put forward, and that we insist only that the terms of reference of these negotiations should not be such as to predetermine or prejudge the outcome, whether on sovereignty or on other matters.
The Leader of the Opposition said that he understood that there had been some movement by Argentina towards the position of non-prejudgment. That was right, but the position changed yesterday and on Monday, as it has before, and the Argentines withdrew that position and the reply that we received yesterday did not contain it. I think that the right hon. Gentleman would wish to know that. That point was also raised by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East.
Mr. Healey: The right hon. Gentleman has published a document today in which he made it clear—I presume on the latest information—that the Argentine Government were prepared to initiate negotiations without prejudice to their outcome. The complaint made in the document is that the Argentines are not prepared to accept the Government's formula, which is rather different. As I understand it, the Secretary-General, with knowledge of the Argentine reply as well as of our own document, believes that on this matter at least the Argentines have met us.
Mr. Pym: Last week, the Argentine representative at the United Nations in New York tabled a form of words
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which certainly went towards, or perhaps actually amounted to, non-prejudgment of the outcome. As I indicated in my speech a week ago, however, the Argentine Foreign Secretary and other Ministers there were making speeches in another sense. In the reply received yesterday, the words about which much play was made by the Argentines in New York last week were omitted, and the words used were not so strong or so clear as before. That is my point.
Mr. Healey: This is very important. Otherwise, I should not press the right hon. Gentleman. Paragraph 11e of the Government's document states:
"Argentina proposed a formula…which stated that they should be 'initiated' without prejudice to the rights and claims and positions of the two parties."
I agree that that is different from the formula preferred by the British Government, but it is this formula that the Secretary-General regarded as acceptance that the outcome of the negotiaions should not be prejudiced
Mr. Pym: I stick to my reply, because the words to which I referred last week, which were proposed by the Argentines in New York but rejected or denied in Buenos Aires, were stronger and clearer. Those words were omitted from the reply that we received yesterday. There were some words in that direction, but they were not so convincing. That is the point that I wish to make.
I should tell the hon. Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) that there is certainly no question of our ceding sovereignty in advance, and the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that there was no such intention on the part of the Labour Government in the last Parliament.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his characteristic and customary courtesy in giving way. Paragraph 7c of the document refers to the British Government being
"willing, without prejudice, to include the question of sovereignty in negotiations with Argentina about the future of the Falkland Islands."
Does that include the possibility of a reference to the International Court?
Mr. Pym: That possibility has certainly not been excluded, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister indicated in a speech a week or two ago.
With regard to the British proposals, the draft interim agreement that we put forward on 17 May, and which the House has seen today, meets the basic requirements to which I have referred. It shows how far we were prepared to go to reach a solution that would avoid further loss of life. The House and the country would have expected no less of us.
We have stood firm where we had to and we have shown flexibility where we could. In the event of withdrawal, we put forward proposals to secure the rapid, complete and verifiable withdrawal of Argentine forces. It could, of course, be argued that Argentina should have fulfilled its international obligations in this respect without any corresponding move on the part of the British forces, whose presence in the area was fully justified. To this clay, we are exercising only our rights of self-defence under article 51 of the charter. No doubt that is right in principle, but in practice a degree of flexibility on our part was clearly unavoidable if we were to achieve our basic

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purpose of getting the Argentines out by peaceful means. It seemed to us that our withdrawal was an inevitable part of that.
The provisions of the draft agreement make it clear in article 1 that everything done thereunder is without prejudice to our position on the questions of substance which are relevant to the future of the islands. The statement that the administrator should exercise his powers in accordance with the terms of the agreement and in conformity with the laws and practices traditionally obtaining on the islands speaks for itself. So does the requirement that he shall discharge his functions, or would have done so, in consultation with the representative institutions on the islands. We have never lost sight of the importance of the democratic element in the life of the islanders.
Article 73 of the charter is specifically referred to in the agreement and annexed to it. In our proposals we think that we have carried out faithfully the obligations laid down in that article. Our aim was to ensure that they would be equally respected in future, as the people of the islands have a right to expect. I have every confidence that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would have ensured that that was done if our proposed agreement had been accepted. I have no confidence that these obligations, or anything like them, will be fulfilled by the Argentine invaders. That is why the membership of the United Nations must surely share our concern to get them out.
The interim arrangements have been controversial throughout. I explained previously to the House that it quickly became clear during the course of the negotiations that as a practical matter some interim arrangements would have to be made to supervise the withdrawal, to ensure that Argentine forces would not be reintroduced and to provide a degree of international involvement in the administration of the islands until a longer-term solution was achieved.
I think that we have shown flexibility both in agreeing to the need for such arrangements and in the discussion of the precise details. However, we insisted that the details should not be such as to predetermine or prejudge the longer-term settlement. In my view that is just as important in this context as it is in that of the terms of reference for the negotiations in the longer term. We also insisted that there could be no question of ignoring the democratic institutions which had been established by the islanders as the channel for the exercise of their democratic rights.
Responsibility for the present crisis lies entirely with the Argentines. As I have said, they responded to our proposals yesterday through the Secretary-General. Their reply reached us late last night and it was all too clear that it was the equivalent of a total rejection of all that we had proposed. In response to our proposals, which we regarded—I think that following the debate the House will so regard them—as completely reasonable and responsible, and which the Secretary-General passed on to Argentina in good faith, Argentina came back with proposed terms which would have included the following features: entirely unbalanced provisions for withdrawal; nothing less than destruction of the previous democratic structures and arrangements on the islands; the chance to change the character of the islands irreversibly in their favour; terms of reference for long-term negotiations
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which led in only one direction and the need to withdraw from South Georgia. There were other conditions too but those were the main ones.
I invite the House to consider the likely sequence of events if the Argentine terms had been accepted. Within a month the armed forces of the two sides would be back in what are called their normal areas: 400 miles away in the Argentine case, 8,000 miles away in our case, with nothing whatever to prevent theirs from returning to the Falklands at any time. The islanders, whose fortitude we have so much admired and whose sufferings are, sadly, not yet at an end, would find themselves enjoying the same status as the handful of Argentines who lived there before the crisis, together with such inhabitants of the mainland as might choose to come over, by whatever means and in whatever numbers they wished.
Britain, which has enjoyed peaceful possession and administration of the islands for almost 150 years and Argentina, the aggressor and the international outcast, would be obliged to sit down and negotiate not only about the Falkland Islands but about South Georgia. Such negotiations would have been conducted against a deadline to be succeeded next year by a vacuum. One can well imagine what would be the nature of that vacuum, what the Argentines had in mind for dealing with the vacuum, and who, in their estimation, would be in a position to fill it.
That is the essence of the detailed reply which we received formally from the Argentines yesterday through the good offices of the Secretary-General. A more uncompromising rejection of our proposals could scarcely be imagined. Indeed, the Argentines went back on some of the lines that they had been taking earlier. Any lingering doubts that some may have had about Argentine good faith could hardly survive such a reply.
It is possible that Argentina may now claim to be flexible and to have changed its position. We can hardly be blamed for treating any such claim with the utmost scepticism. Argentina's whole object was to achieve through negotiations what she has tried to achieve by aggression—the imposition of irreversible transfer of sovereignty to her. All her arguments and all her points about the interim arrangements were designed so to change the character and normality of the islands in her favour that the end result of long-term negotiations could only be in her favour.
It is not for us to publish the Argentine proposals, although, no doubt, they will become public in due course. But from what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have been able to say about them, the House can judge for itself which party has been negotiating in good faith and which has made no genuine attempt to address the issues in any reasonable spirit; which party has made every effort to achieve a peaceful settlement and which has at every turn responded grudgingly and negatively; which party wants peace and the avoidance of further loss of life and which talks so blithely of its readiness to throw away any number of lives in the cause of aggression.
Mr. Healey: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman can give a better explanation of why he is not publishing the text of the Argentine reply. He is contemplating an increase in military activities to be directed against the Argentine Government. He has given a summary of the Argentine reply. It seems to me that there can be no

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conceivable reason of protocol or political reason why he should not publish the text so that we may judge its full horror, if horror indeed it is.
Mr. Pym: All the papers and documents in relation to all the negotiations throughout the crisis have been kept secret and in the hands of the negotiator. They were when Mr. Haig was negotiating. They are now with the Secretary-General. We have tabled these British proposals, first, because they are British proposals and the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government and, secondly, because they have already been considered by the Argentines and we have received the reply that I have indicated to the House. The Argentine response is not my document, although it is directly relevant to what I have said. It probably will become public, but it is not for me to publish it. In publishing our own proposals and indicating the response I have been fair to the House. Argentina created the crisis—
Mr. John Gorst: I follow the necessity for what my right hon. Friend has said and the niceties involved, but could he say bluntly whether he intends to issue an ultimatum to the Argentines either to get out or be kicked out? When will he do that?
Mr. Pym: We are maintaining and increasing our pressures. That is our strategy. An ultimatum has never been part of it. We have tried in good faith to achieve a negotiated settlement. I have explained what has happened to the negotiations. Argentina created the crisis. Argentina has refused to take the road of serious and genuine negotiation which could have brought us to a peaceful conclusion. I noted the request by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East for a longer paper. Perhaps in due course a fuller account will be appropriate. I have taken note, but in the context of the privacy of present negotiations I do not think that a fuller account would be right.
Mr. Healey: This is a probing debate and the Opposition have taken care to keep it so. I have made it clear, as I did in the last debate, that the Opposition's attitude to the Government's policy will depend largely on the Government's readiness to allow the Secretary-General to continue negotiations so long as he thinks it wise.
Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm my interpretation of the Prime Minister's remarks this afternoon—that the Government are prepared to pursue the Secretary-General's formulations in further negotiations on a certain condition? It is important that the right hon. Gentleman gives an unequivocal reply to my questions on that, because it could be the decisive factor in maintaining unity on both sides of the House.
Mr. Pym: I am coming to that important matter and I hope that I shall be able to satisfy the right hon. Gentleman. I was about to deal with the Secretary-General's suggestion. A number of right hon. and hon. Members asked about the suggestions conveyed to both parties overnight. I shall make clear again the nature of the suggestions. They include formulations covering some of the most important matters of disagreement. They do not touch on some of the other crucial elements of the negotiations. For instance, they contain no specific proposals on the practical details of mutual force withdrawal. Obviously that is a matter which is very important to us and, indeed, to both sides.
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In some respects the Secretary-General has come to the same conclusions as we have. In other respects his ideas differ from proposals in our draft interim agreement. We made it clear on Monday that these were our final positions. Even if the suggestions by the Secretary-General were acceptable to both parties as a basis for further negotiation, there could be no doubt that negotiations on the outstanding points would take many days—if not weeks, or more than a week—to reach either success or failure.
On many occasions we have been through the process and our concern about the detail that remains to be decided in relation to the Secretary-General's idea. That is what concerns us. We have been through this so many times. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister talked about six or seven sets of proposals. Although only three have been specifically put, we have explored all the areas of possible disagreement.
Because of the prolonged Argentine prevarication, we have made it clear to the Secretary-General throughout, and particularly since the beginning of this week, that we simply could not allow the negotiations held under his auspices to be spun out indefinitely. The Secretary-General acknowledged that. We have accordingly made it clear to the Secretary-General that, our final position having been rejected, the existence of his overnight suggestions cannot be allowed—any more than at any other stage in all the negotiations—to affect the military options at our disposal. That was acknowledged by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East, and I am grateful for that.
On that understanding and basis, we naturally await the Argentine response to the Secretary-General's ideas. We do not yet know what that is. I cannot conceal from the House, however, that, on the basis of the known Argentine position as it was communicated to us as recently as yesterday, I am far from hopeful, to put it no more pessimistically than that, that the Argentine response will be such as to enable an immediate ceasefire to be achieved, followed by the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the island.
Mr. Healey: I have made it clear that for the Opposition this is perhaps the central issue. The right hon. Gentleman must answer the specific question: do we understand that the Government are prepared to pursue suggestions put forward by the Secretary-General so long as he thinks that there is a chance of their leading to a settlement, without prejudice to military action in the meantime?
Mr. Pym: I was coming on to the future of negotiations, which was one of the important points taken up by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East as well. There is no question of the Government having turned their back on the idea of a negotiated settlement. The diplomatic option and effort continues as vigorously as before. It is clear to the House that we have tried hard to achieve a settlement over the past week. We are prepared to try equally hard in the future, but a carefully balanced offer made at a particular stage in complex negotiations cannot just be left on the table.
The Argentines, having rejected our offer, cannot be allowed to think that they can continue their unlawful occupation of the Falkland Islands, continue their attacks on our task force and continue their diplomatic

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prevarication and public misrepresentation of our position, then hope to come back a few days or weeks later and pick up a position which had been put to them previously. The circumstances have changed since the Argentines rejected first—
Mr. Healey: Answer the question.
Mr. Pym: I am coming to it.
The Argentines rejected Mr. Haig's proposals. Circumstances have changed since then and they will change again after the most recent rejection. We cannot ignore the realities and the conditions that existed at each stage in the negotiations. That covers the important point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Essex, South-East (Sir B. Braine), and others.
The House will recognise the position that I have described as the one which common sense requires. It does not in any way mean that we are no longer prepared to talk or that we will not follow up with imagination and energy any ideas which may lead to a fair settlement. We shall remain in the closest touch with the Secretary-General, who is doing all that he can to secure the implementation of resolution 502. He deserves the constructive support of all members of the United Nations. He will continue to get it from us. I hope that that answers the right hon. Gentleman. I hope that it answers also the point raised by the right hon. Member for Devonport.
Dame Judith Hart rose in her place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put; but MR. SPEAKER withheld his consent and declined then to put that Question.
Mr. Pym: We remain ready to negotiate, but we shall not do anything to give credit to the cynical Argentine pretence that they are negotiating in good faith when they are not. We have set out today what we have been prepared to do to achieve a peaceful settlement. Throughout the crisis we have been upholding the essential principles of freedom, democracy and international law and order. That is why we have been able to attract such widespread international support for our strategy since the invasion.
Mr. Dalyell rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question put, That the Question be now put:—
The House divided: Ayes 33, Noes 296.

Division No. 165]

[9.59 pm

AYES

Abse, Leo

Maynard, MissJoan

Allaun, Frank

Meacher, Michael

Atkinson, N.(H'gey,)

Mikardo, Ian

Benn, Rt Hon Tony

Parry, Robert

Bennett, Andrew(St'kp'tN)

Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)

Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)

Race, Reg

Canavan, Dennis

Richardson, Jo

Cryer, Bob

Roberts, Allan(Bootle)

Dalyell, Tam

Roberts, Ernest (HackneyN)

Dubs, Alfred

Skinner, Dennis

Faulds, Andrew

Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)

Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith

Thorne, Stan (PrestonSouth)

Holland, S.(L'b'th,Vauxh'll)

Tilley, John

Huckfield, Les

Wigley, Dafydd

Lambie, David

Lamond, James

Tellers for the Ayes:

McKelvey.William

Mr. Martin Flannery and Mr. Ernie Ross.

McTaggart, Robert

Maxton, John

560

NOES

Adley, Robert

Finsberg, Geoffrey

Aitken, Jonathan

Fisher, Sir Nigel

Alexander, Richard

Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'ghN)

Alison, Rt Hon Michael

Fookes, Miss Janet

Ancram, Michael

Forman, Nigel

Arnold, Tom

Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

Aspinwall, jack

Fox, Marcus

Atkins, Rt Hon H.(S'thorne)

Fraser, Rt Hon Sir Hugh

Atkins, Robert (PrestonN)

Fraser, Peter (South Angus)

Atkinson, David(B'm'th,E)

Freud, Clement

Baker, Kenneth(St.M'bone)

Gardiner, George(Reigate)

Baker, Nicholas (NDorset)

Garel-Jones, Tristan

Banks, Robert

Glyn, Dr Alan

Beaumont-Dark, Anthony

Goodhart, Sir Philip

Bendall, Vivian

Goodhew, Sir Victor

Bennett, Sir Frederic (T'bay)

Goodlad, Alastair

Benyon, Thomas(A'don)

Gorst, John

Benyon, W. (Buckingham)

Gow, Ian

Best, Keith

Greenway, Harry

Biffen, Rt Hon John

Grieve, Percy

Biggs-Davison, Sir John

Griffiths, Peter Portsm'thN)

Blackburn, John

Grist, Ian

Blaker, Peter

Grylls, Michael

Body, Richard

Gummer, JohnSelwyn

Boscawen, HonRobert

Hamilton, Hon A.

Bottomley, Peter (W'wichW)

Hamilton, Michael(Salisbury)

Bowden, Andrew

Hampson, Dr Keith

Boyson, Dr Rhodes

Hannam, John

Braine, Sir Bernard

Hastings, Stephen

Bright, Graham

Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael

Brinton, Tim

Hawksley, Warren

Brittan, Rt. Hon. Leon

Hayhoe, Barney

Brocklebank-Fowler, C.

Heath, Rt Hon Edward

Brooke, Hon Peter

Heddle, John

Brotherton, Michael

Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael

Brown, Michael(Brigg&Sc'n)

Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

Bruce-Gardyne, John

Hill, James

Bryan, Sir Paul

Hogg, HonDouglas(Gr'th'm)

Buck, Antony

Holland, Philip(Carlton)

Budgen, Nick

Hooson, Tom

Burden, Sir Frederick

Hordern, Peter

Butcher, John

Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

Butler, HonAdam

Howell, Rt Hon D.(G'ldf'd)

Cadbury, Jocelyn

Hunt, David (Wirral)

Carlisle, John (LutonWest)

Hunt, John(Ravensbourne)

Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Hillhead)

Carlisle, Rt Hon M.(R'c'n)

Jessel, Toby

Chapman, Sydney

JohnsonSmith, Geoffrey

Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)

Johnston, Russell(Inverness)

Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)

Jopling, Rt Hon Michael

Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith

Clegg, Sir Walter

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Cockeram, Eric

Kellett-Bowman, MrsElaine

Colvin, Michael

Kershaw, Sir Anthony

Cope, John

Kimball, Sir Marcus

Cormack, Patrick

King, Rt Hon Tom

Costain, Sir Albert

Kitson, Sir Timothy

Cranborne, Viscount

Knight, MrsJill

Crawshaw, Richard

Knox, David

Crouch, David

Lamont, Norman

Cunningham, G.(IslingtonS)

Lang, Ian

Dean, Paul (NorthSomerset)

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Dorrell, Stephen

Latham, Michael

Douglas-Hamilton, LordJ.

Lawrence, Ivan

Dover, Denshore

Lawson, Rt Hon Nigel

du Cann, Rt Hon Edward

Lee, John

Dunn, James A.

Lennox-Boyd, HonMark

Dunn, Robert (Dartford)

Lester, Jim (Beeston)

Durant, Tony

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Dykes, Hugh

Lloyd, Ian (Havant & W'loo)

Eden, Rt Hon Sir John

Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)

Loveridge, John

Eggar, Tim

Luce, Richard

Elliott, Sir William

Lyell, Nicholas

Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)

McCrindle, Robert

Emery, Sir Peter

Macfarlane, Neil

Eyre, Reginald

MacGregor, John

Farr, John

MacKay, John (Argyll)

Fell, Sir Anthony

Macmillan, Rt Hon M.

561

McNair-Wilson, M. (N'bury)

Roper, John

McNally, Thomas

Rossi, Hugh

McQuarrie, Albert

Royle, Sir Anthony

Madel, David

Sainsbury, Hon Timothy

Major, John

St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.

Marland, Paul

Sandelson, Neville

Marlow, Antony

Scott, Nicholas

Marshall, Michael (Arundel)

Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)

Marten, Rt Hon Neil

Shaw, Michael(Scarborough)

Mates, Michael

Shelton, William(Streatham)

Mawby, Ray

Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)

Mawhinney, Dr Brian

Shepherd, Richard

Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

Shersby, Michael

Mellor, David

Silvester, Fred

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Sims, Roger

Miller, Hal(B'grove)

Smith, Dudley

Mills, Iain(Meriden)

Speed, Keith

Mills, Peter (West Devon)

Speller, Tony

Miscampbell, Norman

Spence, John

Mitchell, R. C. (Soton Itchen)

Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)

Moate, Roger

Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

Molyneaux, James

Sproat, Iain

Monro, Sir Hector

Squire, Robin

Moore, John

Stainton, Keith

Morris, M. (N'hamptonS)

Stanbrook, Ivor

Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)

Stanley, John

Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)

Steen, Anthony

Murphy, Christopher

Stevens, Martin

Myles, David

Stewart, A. (E Renfrewshire)

Neale, Gerrard

Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)

Needham, Richard

Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)

Nelson, Anthony

Stokes, John

Neubert, Michael

Stradling Thomas, J.

Newton, Tony

Tapsell, Peter

Normanton, Tom

Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

Nott, Rt Hon John

Temple-Morris, Peter

Ogden, Eric

Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.

O'Halloran, Michael

Thomas, Rt Hon Peter

Onslow, Cranley

Thompson, Donald

Osborn, John

Thorne, Neil(Ilford South)

Owen, Rt Hon Dr David

Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)

Page, John (Harrow, West)

Trippier, David

Page, Richard (SW Herts)

Vaughan, Dr Gerard

Parkinson, Rt Hon Cecil

Viggers, Peter

Parris, Matthew

Waddington, David

Patten, Christopher(Bath)

Wakeham, John

Patten, John (Oxford)

Waldegrave, Hon William

Pattie, Geoffrey

Walker, Rt Hon P.(W'cester)

Pawsey, James

Walker, B. (Perth)

Penhaligon, David

Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.

Percival, Sir Ian

Wall, Sir Patrick

Pitt, William Henry

Waller, Gary

Pollock, Alexander

Walters, Dennis

Powell, Rt Hon J.E. (S Down)

Ward, John

Prentice, Rt Hon Reg

Watson, John

Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)

Wellbeloved, James

Prior, Rt Hon James

Wheeler, John

Proctor, K. Harvey

Whitelaw, Rt Hon William

Pym, Rt Hon Francis

Whitney, Raymond

Raison, Rt Hon Timothy

Wickenden, Keith

Rathbone, Tim

Wiggin, Jerry

Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)

Wilkinson, John

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Williams, D.(Montgomery)

Renton, Tim

Wolfson, Mark

Rhodes James, Robert

Wrigglesworth, Ian

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Younger, Rt Hon George

Ridley, Hon Nicholas

Ridsdale, Sir Julian

Tellers for the Noes:

Rifkind, Malcolm

Mr. Anthony Berry and Mr. Carol Mather

Roberts, M. (Cardiff NW)

Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

Question accordingly negatived.
It being after Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Aberdeen (Development Area Status)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Thompson.]
10.12 pm
Mr. Robert Hughes: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for affording me the opportunity to discuss the need for the Aberdeen travel-to-work area to be included in the review of areas eligible for financial assistance under regional industrial policy.
When I saw that I had been successful in obtaining this debate and the business which apparently preceded it, I was not sure whether I was happy or sad because the Adjournment would have been at about 5 o'clock in the morning. Now that the debate is at a reasonable hour, I am still not sure whether I am happy or sad as the events of the day might obliterate my speech from tomorrow's press. However, as I intend to have the debate so that I can influence the Minister, that does not matter.
The requirement for this debate and its urgency arise directly out of an exchange at Scottish Question Time on 28 April this year between me and the Secretary of S Late for Scotland and the Under-Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Edinburgh, North (Mr. Fletcher). During those exchanges, I persisted in seeking a clear answer and eventually succeeded in getting from the Under-Secretary a reply the effect that the Aberdeen travel-to-work area was excluded from the review currently nearing completion. For the accuracy of the record, I shall repeat those exchanges.
I asked the Secretary of State:
"Will the Secretary of State give a categorical assurance that the review of assisted area status will include the city of Aberdeen, as the Under-Secretary of State recently suggested that Aberdeen would be excluded?"
The Secretary of State replied:
"I assure the hon. Gentleman that we are including in the review all the authorities that we said that we would include—that is to say, those areas that have been downgraded by more than one degree. We shall stick to that undertaking and we shall, of course, be glad to receive representations from anyone who is affected."
I later asked:
"Will the Minister give a straight answer to a straight question? Is Aberdeen included in the review that is taking place? If not, why did he agree to meet representatives of the city council on 15 March?"
The Under Secretary replied:
"We meet various bodies and local authorities on this and other matters. The straight answer the hon. Gentleman wants is 'No'. In 1979 we said that in this review we would reconsider local authorities that had been downgraded by more than one step."—[Official Report, 28 April 1982; Vol. 22, c. 832–40
I can say with certainty that there was consternation in Aberdeen and the surrounding area as a result of these questions and answers.
It must be emphasised that the Aberdeen travel-to-work area comprises about half the geographical area of Grampian, but in terms of population much more. The Minister's Department was in some consternation as it was unable to answer the many phone calls that it had and it was unable even to put a gloss on the Minister's answer. One senior local Government official in the area told me that he believed that the local authorities in the area had been misled by Government Ministers. No doubt the Ministers will deny that and say that the position now is exactly the same as it was in 1979 and that nothing has changed. That is exactly what we are complaining about and I believe that we have a legitimate complaint.

563
While the need for this debate arise from the Scottish Question Time, the origins of the debate go back almost three years, to 17 July 1979. On that day there were two events of great significance. In the morning the Scottish Grand Committee met to discuss the Scottish Estimates on employment and industrial prospects. The Secretary of State made an announcement that was warmly welcomed in all political quarters in the House, by industry and commerce, by local government and throughout the whole of North and North-East Scotland.
The Secretary of State said:
"There is one other small matter which is important and to which I should like to refer. That is the concern which hon. Members have often expressed, and which I also feel, that there may be a particularly difficult effect on ordinary local indigenous industry in areas which are very much involved in the development of North Sea oil. It is not always the case that North Sea oil development is advantageous for everyone in the area. Oil-related industry boosts the local economy, but, at the same time, there can be adverse effects for indigenous firms."
He went on to say that we was setting up a special study into the effects of oil-related industry on indigenous industries.
Later, in the same debate, the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Sproat) said:
"I begin by saying to my right hon. Friend how much we welcome the report, of which he has given us news today, that he intends to look into the effect of oil on the indigenous industries, particularly in the north-east of Scotland. I know that this will be welcomed, particularly by my hon. Friends the Members for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. McQuarrie), Banff (Mr. Myles) and Moray and Nairn (Mr. Pollock)."—[Official Report, Scottish Grand Committee, 17 July 1979, c. 20–27].
We were all pleased, although I had a sense of foreboding that, welcome though that statement was, it was a forerunner of bad news. So it proved to be. In the afternoon of the same day, that fateful 17 July 1979, the Secretary of State for Industry made his announcement about the review of industrial policy and assisted area gradings. As a result of that review, the Aberdeen travelto-work area was downgraded from intermediate area status to unassisted area status effective from 1 August 1982. The hopes raised in the morning by the Secretary of State were dashed in the afternoon by the Secretary of State for Industry.
Throughout the whole of the north-east of Scotland, opinion was virtually unanimous that those propositions must be fought and opposed. Although people were pessimistic, everyone took some comfort, mistakenly as it now appears, in the special study to be set up by the Secretary of State to which I shall return later, known as the Begg-McDowall report when it was published.
Everyone believed in the result of that study, which confirmed that indigenous industry was affected by oil-related industry, that assisted area status was important and should be retained. Everyone believed that that report would have an effect on Government thinking and that its evidence would powerfully support the case that we had been advocating. However, such was the anxiety about the effects of the downgrading that immediately a strong coalition was put together, under the unbrella of the Grampian regional council, to put the needs of the area before the Government. It was agreed that representations could not await the results of the special study. I recall that there were three deputations to see Ministers. The first was made to the then Under-Secretary of State for Industry, the hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mr. Mitchell). The most
564
recent of the deputations was made on 15 March, to the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland at New St. Andrew's house, who is to reply to tonight's debate. I cannot recall the Members of Parliament who attended each of the three meetings, but I know that at some time every Member of Parliament from the Grampian region was present. I cite them not as a rebuke, but as a tribute. They were the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Sproat)—Under-Secretary of State for Trade—the hon. Members for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. McQuarrie) and Banff (Mr. Myles)—both of whom I am glad to see in the Chamber—the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Sir R. Fairgrieve) and the hon. Member for Moray and Nairn (Mr. Pollock). I do not blame those who have not attended the debate.
At all the meetings there was unanimity of view. The local authorities, the chamber of commerce, and the trades council all presented a common front: that the changes were bad for our economy and must be subject to review. The propositions put on the first occasion were clear and specific. In November 1979, a document was prepared by all the local authorities in the area, the chamber of commerce and the trades council, that recognised the dangers of the situation. Its first proposition was that the Aberdeen travel-to-work area should be included in any proposed review and in any special study associated with that review. The Government's reply on that occasion—as on every occasion—was courteous. Indeed, the Government have been courteous almost to the point of deception. Every Minister told us that a powerful case had been made and that it would be taken into account. At the later meetings, the importance of the Begg-McDowall report was emphasised.
The only sour part of the first meeting was that no Minister from the Scottish Office was present. In all the deputations and correspondence, the Government have never said "Thank you. Those interested in the Aberdeen travel-to-work area have made a good case, but we are sorry to say that it will not be included." At the early meetings I might have thought that reasonable, because we were arguing for a flexible Government approach. However, it was inexcusable to fail to point that out at the meeting on 15 March 1982. Even at that meeting, we were left with the impression that the case would be carefully considered and that the Government well understood the strength of feeling. It was only on 28 April that we received the specific answer that the area would not be included in the review.
Sadly, the united front has now broken down, because Grampian regional council—under the chairmanship of Councillor Mutch, who is no longer the convenor—voted by a majority against a Labour resolution to make urgent representations to include Aberdeen travel-to-work area in the review. I trust that the new regional council will have second thoughts and will take up the case again.
Some people, and some of the Government's friends in the area, are trying to pretend that the Begg-McDowall report could be considered independently, and in isolation of the review taking place on areas covered by regional industrial policy. That is arrant nonsense and anyone with any intelligence knows that. There can be no illusions about it. There is no possibility of the review being completed throughout the United Kingdom and of the Scottish Office later saying that notwithstanding the review just completed, it would make separate arrangements for the Aberdeen travel-to-work area.

565
Unless the Government make a definite decision to include Aberdeen, all the work done by the various bodies will be a waste of time and money. The Begg-McDowall report will be seen as an expensive waste of time and as a con trick of the highest order from the beginning.
The report has supported all that we said and has upheld the concern expressed by the Secretary of State on 17 July, when he explained why the report should be produced. No one will be surprised that the report's major conclusion was that financial assistance was important. Page 17 states:
"We concluded from our examination of the evidence presented in Chapter 4 that regional financial assistance had a beneficial impact on the economies of all our Study areas during the 1970s. It has not been possible to quantify this conclusion in terms of aggregate jobs protected or created, especially in view of the large shock effects of oil developments on the one hand and a major recession on the other. We are, nevertheless, impressed by the evidence given by companies starting up in the areas over half of which reported that the availability of RDG, was important to their position. Indeed a significant proportion (almost one-quarter) of established firms said that regional aid had been crucial. We are persuaded that regional aid was not a negiligible factor in influencing the economic growth and structure of the areas."
After discussing the different prospects the final sentence of the report, on page 72, says:
"Our evidence strongly suggests that withdrawal of Assisted Area Status, where this is implemented, will make the creation of new jobs considerably more difficult."
It is often said that Aberdeen had done particularly well out of oil, and it has. Had we not had oil-related industries, the problem would be much worse. I should say by way of explanation, not as a point of criticism, that many of the jobs in the area are not held by residents of Aberdeen or Grampian although I am not complaining about that. Even in the Aberdeen travel-to-work areas unemployment is increasing. Although in general economic terms unemployment stands at the comparatively modest total of 6·7 per cent., this is an appalling figure. It is still too high and unacceptable.
Of even more crucial significance is the severe downturn in what we might describe as the traditional or indigenous industries, of which I give three examples. In fishing there has been a continuing decline, not only in the catching side but also the onshore processing side. We have had the closure of a paper mill, and no one can say, with his hand on his heart, that paper making prospects are buoyant. We have had the closure of Consolidated Pneumatic Tool, an engineering factory that had existed in Aberdeen from about 1947. The withdrawal of assisted area status has repercussions beyond simply regional government assistance. We shall also lose assistance under section 7 of the Industry Act 1972 Act, and:
"unless there is a change in policy, the Scottish Tourist Board grants for tourist developments will not be obtainable—and certain forms of EEC assistance, notably European Regional Development Fund aid, will be withdrawn. "
That is a quote from the Begg-McDowall report, from page 5.
The position is serious, I could continue to put the case for the retention of assisted area status, but I believe that what I have said so far leads at least to the compelling conclusion that the case should be examined under the review.
All that I shall say this evening is that in February 1982 a joint submission of all the bodies that I have previously mentioned, and all the local authorities, was the basis of the deputation to the Scottish Office Ministers on 15
566
March. This included a statement that Aberdeen's manufacturing employment, in cases of firms of more than 10 employees, declined at a rate faster than any other Scottish industry.
Among the proposals of that document that we took to the Scottish Office on 15 March was the one that Aberdeen should retain its intermediate or assisted status, albeit that the travel-to-work area should be redrawn to include Aberdeen and roughly 12 miles round it. I do not ask the Minister to pass judgment on these proposals tonight. That is not the purpose of the Adjournment debate. However, we are entitled to have from the Minister a clear explanation as to why he has rejected the case for at least including the area in the review that is taking place, and preferably an undertaking that he has changed his mind and will now include the area in the review. It is not much to ask for and the case is compelling.
There is a definite feeling among all political persuasions in north-east of Scotland that the Ministers have not properly studied the case. This can be dispelled only by a change of course this evening and a clear undertaking that the Aberdeen travel-to-work area will be included in the review of development area status that is taking place.
10.29 pm
The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Alexander Fletcher): The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) has made a case for Aberdeen which I fully appreciate. It is recognised that Aberdeen is one of the most prosperous cities in Britain because of the development of North Sea oil and gas, but the hon. Gentleman is right to point out that within the overall picture there are clear differences and difficulties not least because of the impact of oil and gas operations on the traditional industries.
The hon. Gentleman suggested that there is some consternation in Aberdeen because the Aberdeen travel-to-work area has been excluded from the review that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry announced in 1979. I am not sure how that misunderstanding has arisen, because it was perfectly clear at the time, and it has been said since, that areas that have been downgraded by more than one step will be included in the review.
Mr. Robert Hughes: It was asked that Aberdeen be included in the review.
Mr. Fletcher: We have been asked to include many areas in the review. The cause of the misunderstanding is that, although we are dealing essentially with areas downgraded by more than one step, we have always made it clear that we are happy to consider other areas where a strong argument has been made. We are not being rigid or dogmatic about the matter, but it would be unfair to the hon. Gentleman and to other interested parties in Aberdeen to suggest that because there is some flexibility in the Government's thinking—bearing in mind that three years will have passed since the pronouncement of my right hon. Friend—every argument presented to us for areas that are not being downgraded by more than one step should be included automatically in the review. I assume that the misunderstanding has arisen because of the willingness of myself or my right hon. and hon. Friends to be flexible, but we are not so flexible as to defeat the original purpose, which is to consider those areas being downgraded by more than one step.
Mr. Albert McQuarrie: My hon. Friend will be aware of the letter sent to the chief executive of Grampian regional council on 11 May 1982, which states:
"The study area extended to the whole of the Grampian Region, including Aberdeen, and the report provides valuable background for policy and planning decisions—for example, on matters such as infrastructure needs—which affect the Aberdeen TTWA in common with the rest of the region."
From that, I take it that any revision of the travel-to-work area within the boundaries of Grampian region will be considered along with the points raised since the report was published.
Mr. Fletcher: I am not sure to which letter my hon. Friend refers, but it seems that the reference is to the Begg-McDowall report, which was a separate study undertaken by the Scottish Office and which was referred to by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North. The purpose of that report is to provide some background information about oil-related areas in Scotland, not just the Aberdeen travel-to-work area, but the Orkneys, Shetlands, all of the Grampian region and other areas in the North-East of Scotland that have been affected by North Sea oil and gas operations but which are subject to the conditions of the regional policy review.
While I am on the subject of travel-to-work areas, may I tell the hon. Gentleman that of course they are unsatisfactory because, with the best will in the world, they are rather a crude measure of employment and unemployment statistics. Nevertheless, they have for many years been the basis of Government reviews of unemployment and regional policy and they will continue to be for the reasons that I have given. There can be no question of altering, adjusting or making allowances for travel-to-work areas, even one as elongated as the Aberdeen travel-to-work area, which extends into the Grampians. There are other travel-to-work areas in Scotland—Inverness, for example—which are as large if not larger and which present difficulties.
All the local authority representatives who have seen me have complained about the travel-to-work area concept. I have had to observe that, crude measures as they are, they have been the basis for many years of regional policy and are likely so to continue, at least for the existing review.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North prompts me to consider the basis of regional policy generally in the United Kingdom and not only in Scotland. I remind him that the purpose of regional policy is to help areas that are in greatest need of assistance. With the best will in the world, and bearing in mind the legitimate arguments that he has raised, I do not believe that he would care to say that Aberdeen has the most serious economic problems of any part of Scotland.
The hon. Gentleman has acknowledged that unemployment in the Aberdeen travel-to-work area on 15 April was 6·7 per cent., which was equal to the lowest figure in Scotland and was less than half the Scottish average. Employment prospects for the area, in contrast to many other parts of the country, are by no means unpromising.
The recent Begg-McDowall report on oil-affected areas found that oil-related employment in Aberdeen, both direct and indirect, would continue to grow and that that would ensure the overall prosperity of the city for the foreseeable future.
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If regional policy means anything, it means that we are anxious to give aid and assistance to the areas of the United Kingdom that have the most serious unemployment problems. The hon. Gentleman made his case cogently and dutifully as an Aberdeen Member, but I do not believe that he would wish to argue that Aberdeen is a part of the United Kingdom that is suffering more than the average.
It is important that we should bear in mind the difficulties of areas that have reasonable levels of employment in present circumstances. They are not reasonable by the standards that we used to apply. That is why we commissioned the Begg-McDowall report, which we are finding useful in considering employment in the entire Grampian region and in the Orkneys as well as in the Aberdeen travel-to-work area and other areas that are affected directly by North Sea oil. I imagine that it is the consideration of these matters and those in other parts of the North-East of Scotland that have brought my hon. Friends the Members for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. McQuarrie) and Moray and Nairn (Mr. Pollock) into the Chamber. They, too, are deeply concerned about the development status of their areas. They have made representations to me on numerous occasions. I have said to them, as I say to the hon. Gentleman, that we shall take these considerations into account before any final decisions are made about the new development area status.
If development area status is removed, the hon. Gentleman may bear in mind the major new initiatives that the Government have taken in promoting new businesses and giving incentives to industry, which have not been confined to geographical areas.
For example, the business start-up scheme and the loan guarantee scheme are very important initiatives for small businesses. They are not restricted to areas that enjoy assisted area status. The same applies to the grants related to new products and processes for innovation in industry and also in Scotland to the work of the Scottish Development Agency.
On the specific question of tourism, I can say that, although no final decision has been made, it is hoped that we shall be able shortly to announce that tourism projects in non-development areas will be considered for a certain element of grant.
Mr. Robert Hughes: I wish to make it clear that, if there has been any misunderstanding about the position of the Aberdeen travel-to-work area, it rests with the hon. Gentleman and Ministers who have never replied to or rejected the initial proposition that Aberdeen should be included. That is where people feel that they have been misled.
Mr. Fletcher: I have already stated that I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding in this respect. I know that the initial announcement was clear. I can recollect repeating at this Dispatch Box the announcement that those areas being downgraded by more than one step would be considered in the review. In case there is any danger of misleading the hon. Gentleman further as a result of my remarks this evening, I would say that, with the best will in the world, I see no case whatever for the Aberdeen travel-to-work area being made an exception in the studies that are taking place.
I do not wish any misunderstanding to persist in the hon. Gentleman's mind or in the minds of other people in the Aberdeen travel-to-work area. I leave him with the

569
point that I have already made about the expansion of new schemes that are not restricted by development areas—the ones that I have mentioned and others. Indeed, on Sunday, I opened a business exhibition in Aberdeen where there were throngs of people and many stands showing the vigour of the economy of Aberdeen and the willingness of people to take an interest in new businesses, to start up new businesses—
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at eighteen minutes to Eleven o'clock.

ENERGY
  Coal Reserves
  Coal Reserves
  Coal Liquefaction Project
  Coal Liquefaction Project
  Oil Production
  Oil Production
  Research and Development
  Research and Development
  Opencast Mining (Grendon)
  Opencast Mining (Grendon)
  Gas Explosions
  Gas Explosions
SCOTLAND
  Highlands and Islands Development Board
  Highlands and Islands Development Board
  European Regional Development Fund (Strathclyde)
  European Regional Development Fund (Strathclyde)
  Alcoholism
  Alcoholism
EMPLOYMENT
  Dock Labour Scheme
  Dock Labour Scheme
  Youth Opportunities Programme
  Youth Opportunities Programme
  Occupational Noise Levels
  Occupational Noise Levels
  Self-help Project Groups
  Self-help Project Groups
  North-East Lancashire
  North-East Lancashire
TRADE
  Companies House Records (Departmental Use)
  Companies House Records (Departmental Use)
  Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Water Industry)
  Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Water Industry)
  Labelling of Goods
  Labelling of Goods
  British Airports Authority
  British Airports Authority
  Electricity Industry Consumer Councils (Secretaries)
  Electricity Industry Consumer Councils (Secretaries)
  Consumer Credit Licence Applications
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DEFENCE
  Royal Ordnance Factories
  Royal Ordnance Factories
DEFENCE
  Aircraft Shelters (Cost)
  Aircraft Shelters (Cost)
PRIME MINISTER
  Engagements
  Engagements
  Secretary-General of the United Nations
  Secretary-General of the United Nations
  Falkland Islands
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  Heaton Chapel
  Heaton Chapel
  Gibraltar
  Gibraltar
  Trades Union Congress
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  Civil Servants (Trade Union Membership)
  Civil Servants (Trade Union Membership)
  Arms Sales
  Arms Sales
  European Community (Veto)
  European Community (Veto)
WALES
  Anorexia Nervosa
  Anorexia Nervosa
  Job Creation
  Job Creation
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Education Act 1981
  Education Act 1981
  Liverpool Croxteth Comprehensive School
  Liverpool Croxteth Comprehensive School
  Toxteth
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  Liverpool (Ministerial Visit)
  Liverpool (Ministerial Visit)
  Examinations Policy
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NATIONAL FINANCE
  Public Bodies (Departmental Assistance)
  Public Bodies (Departmental Assistance)
  North Sea Oil (Taxation Regime)
  North Sea Oil (Taxation Regime)
  Aviation Gasoline
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  Common Agricultural Policy
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  Overseas Investment
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  Commemorative 20p Coin
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  Stamp Duty
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HOME DEPARTMENT
  Cable and Satellite Television
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  Police (Pay and Emoluments)
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  Citizens Band Radio
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  Independent Broadcasting Authority
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  Commission for Racial Equality
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  Mr. Douglas Heyes (Prison Sentence)
  Mr. Douglas Heyes (Prison Sentence)
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  Metropolitan Police
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  Serious Crime (Clear-up Rates)
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  Immigrants (Repatriation)
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  Moor Court Open Prison
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  Prisoners (Policy)
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  Police Officers (Costs and Damages)
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  Licensed Taxi Trade
  Licensed Taxi Trade
  Firearms Certificates
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  Police (Judicial Comments)
  Police (Judicial Comments)
  Highpoint Prison
  Highpoint Prison
  Homeless Tramps
  Homeless Tramps
  Animals (Research and Product Testing)
  Animals (Research and Product Testing)
  Gaming Machines
  Gaming Machines
  Citizenship
  Citizenship
  Immigration Statistics
  Immigration Statistics
INDUSTRY
  British Shipbuilders
  British Shipbuilders
  Manufacturing Industry
  Manufacturing Industry
  Aeronautical Co-operation
  Aeronautical Co-operation
  Departmental Reports
  Departmental Reports
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
  Falkland Islands
  Falkland Islands
  Passports
  Passports
  Argentina
  Argentina
ENVIRONMENT
  Planning Charges
  Planning Charges
  Inner City Areas (Capital Programmes)
  Inner City Areas (Capital Programmes)
  Land Purchases
  Land Purchases
  Building Control Regulations
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  Ivory (Imports)
  Ivory (Imports)
TRANSPORT
  Wheel Clamps
  Wheel Clamps
  Weigh Stations
  Weigh Stations
  London (Parked Vehicles)
  London (Parked Vehicles)
  Bus Services
  Bus Services
  East London River Crossing
  East London River Crossing
  Traffic Cones
  Traffic Cones
  Nurses (Parking Arrangements)
  Nurses (Parking Arrangements)
  Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Rebreathing)
  Motor Cycle Crash Helmets (Rebreathing)
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  Land Resources Development Centre
  Land Resources Development Centre
  Zimbabwe (Land Resettlement Programme)
  Zimbabwe (Land Resettlement Programme)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Angling Licences (Cumbria)
  Angling Licences (Cumbria)
  Sugar
  Sugar
  Agricultural Produce (Smallholdings)
  Agricultural Produce (Smallholdings)
  Agricultural Products
  Agricultural Products
  Animal Feedstuffs
  Animal Feedstuffs
  Milk
  Milk
  Employment Statistics
  Employment Statistics
  Horticulture
  Horticulture
  Chemical Fertilisers
  Chemical Fertilisers
  Farm Holdings
  Farm Holdings
  Wool Prices
  Wool Prices
  Food Standards Committee
  Food Standards Committee
  European Community (Agriculture Ministers' Meeting)
  European Community (Agriculture Ministers' Meeting)
  Restitution Payments
  Restitution Payments
  Farm Output
  Farm Output
  Pigmeat
  Pigmeat
  Food Prices
  Food Prices
  Food Production and Consumption
  Food Production and Consumption
  Cereals
  Cereals
NORTHERN IRELAND
  Constitutional and Electoral Expenditure
  Constitutional and Electoral Expenditure
SOCIAL SERVICES
  Nursing Homes
  Nursing Homes
  Family Status
  Family Status
  Special Hospital Patients (Contact with Children)
  Special Hospital Patients (Contact with Children)
  Supplementary Benefit
  Supplementary Benefit
  District Health Authority (Budgets)
  District Health Authority (Budgets)
  Doctors (Pay)
  Doctors (Pay)
  Unemployment and Health (Research)
  Unemployment and Health (Research)
  Family Income
  Family Income
  Petrol (Lead Content)
  Petrol (Lead Content)
  Falkland Islands (Requisitioned Vessels)
  Falkland Islands (Requisitioned Vessels)
Preamble
The House met at three of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Chichester): The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.

Hill Farming: Government Support
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: My Lords, before I ask this Question, I must declare an interest. I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what support they are giving to the hill farming community which forms a vital part of our agricultural industry.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, particular support is given to hill farmers over and above that which is available to other farmers. The rates of hill livestock allowances are the highest which they have ever been, and these—together with payments to hill farmers of the sheep annual premium and the suckler cow premium—were worth £118 million in 1981. Hill farmers also receive enhanced rates of capital grants.
Baroness Elliot of Harwood: My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Earl very much for that extremely good news. I am quite sure it will be appreciated, when one realises that 42 per cent. of Scotland is less favoured area and all that the noble Earl has said will apply to them. I think we must be extremely grateful.
Lord Peart: My Lords, may I inform the noble Earl the Minister that I wish to support the noble Baroness.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, I am grateful for the noble Lord's question. I would only inform him, if I may, that the total aid to hill farmers last year of £118 million compares with £56 million in 1979, which means that it has about doubled.
Lord Ross of Marnock: My Lords, can the noble Earl the Minister tell us what is the effect on the hill sheep industry of the price review which the Government had imposed upon them?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Ross, will have noticed yesterday, many of the parts of the common agricultural price review, which he says was imposed upon us, were in fact agreed beforehand, and many of them will benefit hill farmers.
Lord Mackie of Benchie: My Lords, would the Minister agree that 20 years ago the hill cow subsidy would in fact buy food for the cow for the winter, yet today that subsidy would not do anything like that? Would he not agree that in fact there is further room
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under EEC regulations to support the hill cow to a further degree?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mackie, has his own method of calculation. All I would tell him is that between 1979 and 1982 the hill cow allowance rose from £29·50 to £44·50, which is an increase of about 50 per cent.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, when considering the very admirable support that is given to the agricultural community, will the noble Earl bear in mind that there are other vital sections of the economy that are equally exposed to the chill winds of market forces?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, of course that is perfectly true, but I cannot see what that has to do with the Question on the order paper.
Viscount Brookeborough: My Lords, can my noble friend tell the House why there has been such a delay in the presentation of the case for the extension of the less favoured areas in the whole of the United Kingdom, bearing in mind that the area which has benefited in Scotland is much greater than anywhere else in the United Kingdom?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the survey to which my noble friend refers is now complete and the precise nature of the case which might be made to the European Commission is at present being considered.
Lord Winstanley: My Lords, would the noble Earl agree that it might be helpful to many hill farmers, particularly in the national parks, if the planning authorities adopted a slightly more co-operative attitude towards the development of alternative activities which might supplement hill farming in those areas?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, that also is an ingenious question which goes rather wide of the Question on the Order Paper.

NHS Administrative Staff
3.6 p.m.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to what extent the proportion of administrative and clerical workers among the staff of the National Health Service have been reduced and how these figures compare with the increase in medical staff.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, administrative and clerical staff account for just over 13 per cent. of all staff employed in the National Health Service in England. This percentage has remained fairly constant since 1976. The proportion of medical and dental staff as a percentage of total

799
staff has risen slightly from 4·6 in 1976 to 4·8 in 1981. There has, however, been a marked increase in the proportion of staff involved in direct patient care—that is, doctors, nurses and professional and technical staff—from 57·7 per cent. of all staff in 1976 to over 60 per cent. in 1981.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, will my noble friend understand that many of us are very pleased to see the right tendency in these figures—less administration, less bureaucrats and more medical staff—which is a satisfactory movement in the right direction? Could he assure us that, in connection with the cleaning staff, the ancillary staff and the like, we are not denying them automatic equipment for cleaning, for washing and all the many processes in the health service, so that their productivity continues to increase and does not diminish?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the health service is, I think inevitably, a very labour-intensive operation and there are limits to the improvements in productivity which one can make by employing more technical equipment, for example. But I can say that the number of in-patients treated has increased by 5 per cent. betwen 1979 and 1980, while the number of NHS staff has increased by only 2·4 per cent. which is a measure of the improved efficiency of the organisation.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, would it not be a better way of increasing productivity in the NHS if the Government would take some positive action to bring this industrial dispute to an end? Surely that is the most destructive aspect of the productivity problem.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the noble Baroness asks a rather different question, if I may say so. But if she is meaning that we should make greater resources available to the health service—for example, by acceding to the demands of the unions—I would have to say that that would result in a reduction in the level of services available and not in an increase.
Lord Segal: My Lords, will the Minister confirm that the number of senior medical staff has fallen, but the number of junior medical staff has increased?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I have the figures for the total number of medical staff, which I gave in my original Answer. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will write to him with the precise break-down of the different categories of medical staff involved.
Lord Davies of Penrhys: My Lords, will the noble Lord tell me if I am deaf, but I think he said in his original Answer, "The health service in England". Does he not consider Wales and Scotland part of that service, and do the figures apply to both or just to England?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the figures I gave did indeed apply to the health service in England, which is, of course, far and away the largest of the different regions in the United Kingdom. That is not, of course,
800
to detract from the importance of the other areas, but the figures are, I think, less indicative of the general situation.
Lord Auckland: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the figures he has given are very encouraging so far as they go, but is he further aware that in the long stay mental hospitals, particularly in the grey areas, there is still an acute shortage of trained and student nurses? What plans have the Government to try to put this situation right?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, my noble friend is right to point to the long-stay mental hospitals, where it is true that certian difficulties do exist. We are making a number of efforts to improve the recruitment levels for those particular hospitals, and I hope that our efforts will have some success.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the point made in the supplementary question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, regarding the improvement and increase in technology in the auxiliary staff work of the health service, is a very real and important issue? Would he not also agree that the use of modern technology in the health service might be improved, particularly as regards preventive medicine? What we really want to see is a decrease in the productivity of doctors, nurses and specialists, and not an increase which means that more people are becoming ill. The ideal of any medical profession should be to work itself out of a job.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I certainly look forward to the day when the number of patients treated is reduced because there is a reduction in the demand for the services of the health service. However, that is not the same as reducing the productivity of the health service, which is an undesirable aim.
Baroness Masham of Ilion: My Lords, would the Minister not agree that, now that the area tier has gone from the National Health Service, good monitoring should be undertaken of administration at regional level to see that there is a good balance kept at the district level?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, yes, indeed. I and my right honourable and honourable friends are particularly concerned to see that the monitoring of these matters continues and is, indeed, improved. We have taken certain steps to that end.
Lord Underhill: My Lords, in view of the Minister's comment that the figures which he gave are for England only, would he not agree that that is a rather unusual procedure? Is there any reason why the figures are confined to England? Has the noble Lord the figures for the United Kingdom as a whole?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I do not have figures in front of me for the whole of the United Kingdom, which I understand are collected on a different basis. But I will certainly see what additional information there is that I can pass to the noble Lord.

Agriculture: Promotion of British Produce
3.13 p.m.
Baroness Sharples: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what they are doing to improve marketing and sales techniques in the agricultural industry so as to increase the sales of British produce in this country.
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the Government provide substantial financial aid for promotional campaigns for British farm produce, and they are helping to fund a series of British Food Weeks which are designed to increase sales of British produce in leading stores. My department's advisory service provides advice to producers on all aspects of marketing. My right honourable friend appointed five marketing advisers to suggest ways in which British agriculture can improve its marketing. They have made many valuable recommendations and are continuing their important work. We hope shortly to announce plans for improved co-ordination of marketing at a national level.
Baroness Sharples: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that encouraging reply. I should like to press him a little further because I understand that the Central Co-ordinating Council was proposed about 15 months ago. Can my noble friend say when he thinks that that council will be set up?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, it is perfectly true that discussions on this have been going on for some time. My right honourable friend was concerned to get the answer right rather than have a premature announcement, but I can tell my noble friend that the announcement about this will be made very shortly.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, is the noble Earl satisfied with the working of EEC Regulation 355 of 1977, which provides assistance to marketing and processing? Is the noble Earl aware—I am sure he is aware—that this regulation terminates at the end of this year? If it provides assistance of value, are Her Majesty's Government now pressing for a renewal and, if so, for how long?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, that is being discussed and I cannot tell the noble Lord what the results will be. However, if I am in a position to let him know, I shall write to him.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, will the noble Earl say whether Her Majesty's Government regard this regulation as being of value?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, it certainly has been of great value.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, may I put a slightly simpler question to the Minister which he may understand better? Do we spend as much money on the promotion of agricultural products as the French do?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, if I can give the noble Lord, Lord Mackie of Benshie, an answer which I think he would understand fairly easily, I think that the answer is in the negative.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, are there any plans under consideration, in the context of this Question, to restore the cherry orchards so that we may have our own cherries for our own consumption?
Earl Ferrers: My Lords, the Question was primarily directed to what is being done to help the marketing of produce. That is rather different from a question on the future of cherry orchards. Certainly if cherries are produced it is important that they should be marketed properly and correctly, and I hope that they will be.

The United Nations: Disarmament Proposals
3.16 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Geneva Committee appointed by the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmaments in 1978 to make recommendations to the renewed Sessions in June 1982 has agreed on proposals for comprehensive disarmament and, if so, what the proposals are.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead): My Lords, the Committee on Disarmament has agreed to submit a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the Second Special Session. But the committee was unable to reconcile the differing approaches of the three main groups within the committee, each of whose proposals are incorporated in the draft programme. I am placing a copy of the draft programme in the Library.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Will he confirm that the United Nations Special Assembly in 1978 asked this committee to prepare proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction and for the phased abolition over years of conventional weapons leading to complete and general disarmament? Is it not disappointing that the committee has not come to an agreement to carry out those instructions of the United Nations Assembly? Does the fact of this division mean that all three proposals will come before the renewed assembly in June?
Lord Belstead: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord's assessment of the task of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and I share the noble Lord's disappointment that it has not been possible to put forward an agreed programme.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, will the Minister answer my second question? Will all three proposals now be brought before the renewed assembly in June?
Lord Belstead: Yes, my Lords.

Port of London Bill
3.18 p.m.
Read a third time, and passed, and returned to the Commons with amendments.

The Whitsun Recess
Lord Sandys: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I announce that, subject to the progress of business, this House will adjourn for the Whitsun Recess on Thursday 27th May and return on Monday 7th June. The House will sit on Thursday next at 11 a.m.

The Falkland Islands
3.19 p.m
The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young)The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young) rose to move, That this I-louse takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. I hope the House will agree that it was right that we should hold this debate at short notice today. It is three weeks since the last debate in your Lordships' House on this particularly important matter.
Seven weeks ago today, the Argentine Foreign Minister summoned the British ambassador in Buenos Aires, and informed him that the diplomatic channel was now closed. Later on that same day, President Reagan appealed to President Galtieri not to invade the Falkland Islands. That appeal was rejected.
Ever since 2nd April, Argentina has continued to defy the mandatory resolution of the Security Council. During the past 24 hours, the crisis over the Falkland Islands has moved into a new and even more serious phase.
On Monday of this week our ambassador to the United Nations handed to the Secretary-General our proposals for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. These proposals represented the limit to which the Government believed it was right to go. We made it clear to Senor Perez de Cuellar that we expected the Argentine Government to give us a very rapid response to them. By yesterday morning we had had a first indication of the Argentinian reaction. It was not encouraging. By the evening we received their full response in writing. It was, in effect, a total rejection of the British proposals. Indeed, in many respects the Argentinian reply went back to their position when they rejected Mr. Haig's second set of proposals on 29th April. It retracted virtually all the movement their representative had shown during the Secretary-General's efforts to find a negotiated settlement. I shall have more to say about his efforts later.
The implications of the Argentinian response are of the utmost gravity. This is why the Government decided to publish immediately the proposals we had put to the Secretary-General and to give Parliament the earliest opportunity to consider them. These proposals were placed in the Printed Paper Office
804
earlier today. The Government believe that they represented a truly responsible effort to find a peaceful solution which both preserved the fundamental principles of our position and offered the opportunity to stop further loss of life in the South Atlantic. We have reached this very serious situation because the Argentines clearly decided at the outset of the negotiations that they would cling to the spoils of invasion and occupation by thwarting at every turn all the attempts that have been made to solve the conflict by peaceful means.
We have now been negotiating for six weeks. The House will recall the strenuous efforts made over an extended period by Secretary of State Haig. During that period the Government considered no fewer than four sets of proposals. Although these presented substantial difficulties, we did our best to help Mr. Haig continue his mission until Argentine rejection of his last proposals left him no alternative but to abandon his efforts.
The next stage of negotiations was based on proposals originally advanced by President Belaunde of Peru and modified in consultations between him and Mr. Haig. Britain was willing to accept these, the fifth set of proposals for an interim settlement. They could have led to an almost immediate ceasefire. But again it was Argentina who rejected them.
Since 6th May, when it became clear that the United States/Peruvian proposals were not acceptable to Argentina, the United Nations Secretary-General, Senor Perez de Cuellar, has been conducting negotiations with Britain and Argentina. Following several rounds of discussions the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations was summoned to London for consultation last Sunday. On Monday Sir Anthony Parsons returned to New York and presented to the Secretary-General a draft interim agreement between Britain and Argentina which set out the British position in full. He made clear that the text represented the furthest that Britain could go in the negotiations. He requested that the draft should be transmitted to the Argentine representative and that he should be asked to convey his Government's response within two days.
Yesterday we received the Argentine Government's reply. It amounted to a rejection of our own proposals, and we have so informed the Secretary-General. This morning we have received proposals from the Secretary-General himself.
It will help the House to understand the present position if I now describe briefly these three sets of proposals. I deal first with our own proposals. These preserve the fundamental principles which are the basis of the Government's position: Aggression must not be allowed to succeed; international law must he upheld; sovereignty cannot he changed by invasion. The liberty of the Falkland islanders must be restored. For years they have been free to express their own wishes about how they want to be governed. They have had institutions of their own choosing. They have enjoyed self-determination. Why should they lose that freedom and exchange it for dictatorship?
Our proposals are contained in the paper which has been made available to noble Lords in the Printed Paper Office. It comprises two documents. First and mainly, there is a draft interim agreement between ourselves and Argentina. Second, a letter to the

805
Secretary-General which makes it clear that the British Government do not regard the draft interim agreement as covering the dependencies of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. I deal with the dependencies first.
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are geographically distant from the Falkland Islands themselves. They have no settled population. British title to them does not derive from the Falkland Islands but is separate. These territories have been treated as dependencies of the Falkland Islands only for reasons of administrative convenience. For these reasons they are outside the draft agreement.
I turn now to the draft agreement itself. Article 2 provides for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Argentine and British forces from the islands and their surrounding waters within 14 days. At the end of the withdrawal British ships would be at least 150 nautical miles from the islands. Withdrawal much beyond this would not have been reasonable because the proximity of the Argentinian mainland would have given their forces undue advantage. Withdrawal of the Argentinian forces would be the most immediate and explicit sign that their Government's aggression had failed and that they were being made to give up what they had gained by force. It is the essential beginning of a peaceful settlement and the imperative of Resolution 502.
Article 6 sets out the interim arrangements under which the islands would be administered in the period between the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of negotiations on the long-term future of the islands. In this interim period there would be a United Nations administrator, appointed by the Secretary-General and acceptable to Britain and the Argentine. He would be the officer administering the government.
Under Clause 3 of this article he would exercise his powers in conformity with the laws and the practices traditionally obtaining in the islands. He would consult the islands' representative institutions—that is, the Legislative and Executive Councils through which the islanders were governed until 2nd April. There would be an addition to each of the two councils of one representative of the 20 or 30 Argentines normally resident in the islands. These representatives would be nominated by the administrator. This clause has been carefully drawn so that the interim administration cannot make changes in the law and customs of the islands that would prejudge the outcome of the negotiations on a long-term settlement.
This provision would not only go a long way to giving back to the Falklanders the way of life they have always enjoyed, but would prevent an influx of Argentine settlers in the interim period whose residence would change the nature of society there and radically affect the future of the islands. That would not have been a true interim administration. It would have been an instrument of change.
Clause 3 of this article thus fully safeguards the future of the islands. Nothing in this interim administration would compromise the eventual status of the Falklands or the freedom which they have enjoyed for so long.
Clause 4 of Article 6 would require the administrator to verify the withdrawal of all forces from the islands and to prevent their reintroduction. We think it
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likely that he would need to call upon the help of three or four countries other than ourselves and the Argentine to provide him with the necessary equipment and a small but effective force.
Articles 8 and 9 deal with negotiations between Britain and Argentina on the long-term future of the islands. The key sentence is the one which reads:
"These negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and without prejudgment of the outcome".
We should thus be free to take fully into account the wishes of the islanders themselves. And Argentina would not be able to claim that the negotiations had to end with a conclusion that suited her. But we have to recognise that these negotiations might be lengthy. That is why Article 9 provides that until the final agreement has been reached and implemented, the interim agreement would remain in force.
Although this interim agreement does not restore things fully to what they were before the Argentinian invasion, it is faithful to the fundamental principles outlined earlier. Had the Argentines accepted our proposals, we should have achieved the great prize of preventing further loss of life. It was with this in mind we were prepared to make practical changes that were reasonable. But we were not prepared to compromise on principle.
I turn now to the Argentinian response. This revived once again all the points which had been obstacles in earlier negotiations. Their draft interim agreement applied not only to the Falklands but included South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands as well. They demanded that all forces should be withdrawn, including our forces on South Georgia, and return to their normal bases and areas of operation. This was plainly calculated to put us at an enormous disadvantage.
They required that the interim administration should be the exclusive responsibility of the United Nations which should take over all executive, legislative, judicial and security functions in the islands. They rejected any role for the islands' democratic institutions. They envisaged that the interim administration would appoint as advisers equal numbers of British and Argentine residents of the islands, despite their huge disparity in numbers. They required freedom of movement and equality of access with regard to residence, work and property for the Argentine nationals on an equal basis with the Falkland islanders. The junta's clear aim was to flood the islands with their own nationals during the interim period, and thereby change the nature of Falklands society and so prejudge the future of the islands.
With regard to negotiations for a long-term settlement, the Argentines pretended not to prejudice the outcome. However, they stipulated that the object was to comply not only with the Charter of the United Nations, but with various resolutions of the General Assembly. As is well known, the United Kingdom dissented from some of these on the grounds that they favoured Argentine sovereignty. And if the period provided for the completion of the negotiation expired, they demanded that the General Assembly should determine the lines to which the final agreement should conform.
It was manifestly impossible for Britain to accept such demands.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, would the noble Baroness allow me—
Several noble Lords: No! Order!
Baroness Young: My Lords, I think it might be better for the House if I continued my speech because it has a thread of argument running through it. I hope that the noble Lord will put his question later so that he may receive an answer to it.
Argentina began this crisis. Argentina has rejected proposal after proposal. One is bound to ask whether the junta have ever intended to seek a peaceful settlement or whether they have sought merely to confuse and prolong the negotiations while remaining in illegal possession of the islands. I believe that if we had a dozen more negotiations the tactics and results would be the same. From the course of these negotiations and Argentina's persistent refusal to accept Resolution 502 we are bound to conclude that her objective is procrastination and continuing occupation leading eventually to sovereignty.
As I said earlier, the Secretary-General has this morning put to us and to Argentina an aide-memoire describing those issues where, in his opinion, agreement seems to exist and those on which differences remain. The first group of issues—those where he believes there is a measure of agreement—will require further clarification in New York for on some points our interpretation would be different. The aide-memoire states, for example, that Argentina would accept long-term negotiations without prejudgment of the outcome. This important phrase was, however, omitted from the Argentine response to our own proposals and is belied by a succession of statements from Buenos Aires.
Those points where, in the Secretary-General's judgment, differences remain include: first, aspects of the interim administration; secondly, the timetable for completion of negotiations and the related duration of the interim administration; thirdly, aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces; and, fourthly, the geographic area to be covered. Senor Perez de Cuellar has proposed formulations to cover some of these points.
The Secretary-General, to whose efforts I and, I am sure, the whole House, pay tribute, has a duty to continue to seek agreement. But as our representative is telling him in New York, his paper differs in certain important respects from our position as presented to him on 17th May and which we then described as the furthest we could go. Moreover, it differs fundamentally from the present Argentine position as communicated to us yesterday.
It is not a draft agreement but, as the Secretary-General himself puts it, a number of formulations and suggestions. Some of his suggestions are the very ones which have already been rejected by the Argentine response to our own proposals. Even if it were acceptable to both parties as a basis for negotiation, that negotiation would take many days if not weeks to reach either success or failure. We have been through this often before and each time we have been met with Argentine obduracy and procrastination.
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Argentina rejected our proposals. It is inconceivable that they would now come genuinely to accept those of the Secretary-General's ideas which closely resemble our own. Even if we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of his paper, we should first wish to see substantive Argentine comments on it, going beyond mere acceptance of it as a basis for negotiation. These are the points we are making in our reply to the Secretary-General. At the same time we are reminding him that the negotiations do not close any military options.
The gravity of the situation will be apparent to the House and the nation. Difficult days lie ahead, but Britain will face them in the conviction that our cause is just, and in the knowledge that we have been doing everything reasonable to secure a negotiated settlement. The principles we are defending are fundamental to everything that this Parliament and this country stand for. They are the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in violation of the rights of peoples to determine by whom and in what way they are governed. Its aggression was committed against a people who are used to enjoying full human rights and freedom. It was executed by a Government with a notorious record in suspending and violating those same rights. Britain has the responsibility towards the islanders to restore their democratic way of life. She has a duty to the whole world to show that aggression will not succeed and to uphold the cause of freedom. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands—(Baroness Young.)
3.39 p.m.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships will share the gratitude that I feel personally and indeed on behalf of my party for the very clear exposition from the Lord Privy Seal. I think it would be agreed that it clearly gives the lie to the suggestions that have recently emanated that the Prime Minister, however intemperate some of her earlier words were, has in fact been intransigent. Indeed, it is striking how far the Government have moved from their original position. It is quite clear now that we have the whole story that it is almost impossible at the present moment to arrive at any agreement with the Argentine Government.
Not for the first time in your Lordships' House I shall have to discard the speech I had prepared, because the noble Baroness has answered practically all the questions I had intended to ask. It seems to me that the Government have now moved from a position which they may say they were never entirely stuck on; namely, that the future sovereignty of the Falklands will, in the long run, be negotiable, and it is the Argentinians, either by weasel-words or otherwise, who are refusing to accept that fundamental point. Nor have the Argentines shown any willingness, that I can see from the latest Statement, to recognise the undoubted rights of the Falkland islanders.
I do not propose to get into arguments about paramountcy, but there is no doubt that in international law they have rights, and we are hound to seek to uphold them. Anybody who suggests we should not is proposing something which may be expedient but

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which I doubt is honourable, unless they adopt the clear and understandable position of those like some of my noble friends such as Lord Soper and Lord Brockway, who adopt what is basically a pacificist position. Anything between that seems to me to smack of dissemblance.
I wish at this point to dissociate, I am sure, the majority of my colleagues in the Labour Party from the position taken up by Mr. Benn, Mrs. Hart and others on this subject. It is important at this time, possibly at the eleventh hour, that we should seek, while still retaining the undoubted right to criticise the Government—and I have some quite serious criticisms to make of them—that there should be a degree of national unity, bearing in mind all the time that our people are down there and will wish to have the backing of the British people.
That is not to suggest that we should move into a jingoistic mood. Nor am I suggesting that we should move into the mood of those of us who remember 1940, when we were all really rather glad that we were alone in the world, with the possibility of some help from the United States. I regret that there is a certain uncertainty among some of our European allies in this matter. Of course, the Government are right to go on showing as much patience as I believe they have been showing in the face of a great deal of provocation. I say straight away that I agree with the noble Baroness that it is right entirely to separate South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands from the area for negotiation, for reasons which are clearly explained and which have been explained, at last and belatedly—that brings me to my criticism—in a document produced by the Foreign Office seven weeks after the invasion, The Falkland Islands, the Facts.
I wish to make clear—the noble Baroness knows I hold this view, because I have talked to her; I speak more in sorrow than in anger, but perhaps with a bit of anger too—the failure of the Government to get across the general case on the whole of the Falkland Islands issue. I say that not to score any party point. Somehow—whether it is because we have lost the experience we had in earlier days I know not—there has been a failure to co-ordinate in the area. No Minister, so far as I know, has been appointed to carry out responsibility and bring together the various information sources—even to organise a rather better presentation of the various communiqués which so embarrass us all—and to bring a more positive view to bear; it was six weeks before they got the broadcasting system to the Argentinian forces.
I would remind your Lordships that in earlier times—and even at this late hour I urge the Government to do it—we sought to mobilise national resources in all parties. I remember just after the war, when Britain was in quite severe economic straits, the Government of the day invited a large number of people—Labour and Conservative MPs—to go abroad and talk and lecture so as to put the British case. As someone who has been called on several times to broadcast to Canada and the United States, and indeed within Britain, I am amazed at the ignorance of the British case. I suggested that, if necessary, I would write a pamphlet for the Government. Luckily they have now done it, and they have nearly got it right;
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there are a few mistakes, even so, but nevertheless it is an improvement.
Even in that exceptionally deplorable "Panorama" programme the other day, one of the interrogators referred to the fact that the British had taken the Falklands from the Argentines. That was quite untrue. I am sure there is an Argentine case and I am sure every Argentine believes the Falklands belong to them, but the simple historic facts show that that is not true, and, if any of your Lordships wished me to give another lecture on the subject, I could; I have given one or two already. I hope we shall not hear people anywhere say that we have taken them from the Argentine. I believe that on the whole most of the British people understand that.
I claim that the Government have failed to get across the much wider significance of the matter. I will not again bore the House; I said all this in my very first speech when we started debating the Falklands. If you look at the map of the South Atlantic and at the meridian of the Sandwich Islands, and then you look at the meridian of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, and you draw the sector which the Argentines claim is their land up to the South Pole, you find that it exactly meets those meridians. The Argentines have been pursuing that consistently. We have mentioned the example of children being born in the Antarctic. How many people are aware that, contrary to the treaty—that admirable treaty—they made one of their bases, Marambio, capital of the Argentine, although it was in the Antarctic? They even flew their whole Cabinet down there for a meeting. I am sure the British Cabinet would love to be flown to South Georgia at a suitable moment, and they too might then learn a little geography.
What I am describing is quite fundamental, and indeed Mr. Costa Mendes understands it, because he in fact said that it was not only the islands; it established their power and influence in an area both economically and politically. We should get those facts across to the rest of the world. We are arguing this question now not because we seek war but because we wish to preserve the rule of law and peace in a part of the world where peace could be put at risk if we failed to stand up to the threat.
As for the present situation from a military point of view, none of us has the facts at our disposal, although there are plenty of commentators who claim to be military journalists and who continue to make really nonsensical statements. Indeed, the Government have contributed to that—although they have changed their tune a little—and they have got somebody (I am sorry to say that this applies to all of us) actually to look up the weather. The weather will be no worse in the next three months than it has been in the last three months. Anybody can look at the statistics. The weather is a great deal less unpleasant than it was on the Russian convoys. There are only two, three, or maybe four days in the month—I am not talking about the other side of the Antarctic convergence, which is sub-Antarctic—when there are full gales in the Falklands Islands area. In August it goes up to about five. It is not very cold. People still think that it is much colder. I must repeat again that it is not as cold as it was in Bournemouth. It never has been as cold as it was in Bournemouth last

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winter. I may say that I happen to live about 20 miles away. It is not a very nice place to go camping. Anyone would hesitate to go camping, though some hardy spirits do it in the Outer Hebrides in winter. It is a chilly place, it is neither hot, nor cold, with the smallest annual temperature variation to be found anywhere in the world.
I mention that because I believe that the Government have still not given up the hope of reducing the Argentine occupation by the kind of tactics that they are following. I was very surprised—I think it was very daring—that the raid took place on Pebble Island, which is one of the parts nearer to the Argentine, and was even more amazed that we were able to send a frigate into the Falkland Strait. But it shows that there is a degree of freedom if the tactics that have been used are followed.
It is not just a question of assaulting the islands. There are many places—not only in the west island—which 100,000 men could not properly patrol and defend. Clearly, we have to leave it to the commander-in-chief to decide what tactics he is to use, but at this last moment I still hope that it might be possible to avoid an all-out assault. However, it is not for me and it is not for your Lordships' House to dictate what course the commander should now follow.
I have now successfully thrown away my prepared speech, so I may as well conclude my remarks rather quickly. I should like to leave one thought with your Lordships. I was very interested in what the Lord Privy Seal had to say about the proposal with regard to the United Nations administrator. I am bound to say that the interesting paper which the Lord Privy
Seal said was made available earlier actually got to us at only about one o'clock. I found her shortened version more intelligible than the paper, and I am very grateful for that. A long-term solution will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. I think it unlikely that the Falkland Islands will ever really be able to settle into the kind of life that they have had in the past.
I do not know to what extent the British Government—any British Government—will make up for the neglect in the past, but I should like to put this—perhaps too optimistic—solution. It is a solution that would have commended itself to many people immediately after the war; and certainly it would commend itself to my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker. It is that ultimately it should be possible for the Antarctic Treaty area to be extended further north. That might not be possible at the moment, but in the long run a permanent United Nations administration of a kind which properly provided for the representation, consultation with, and indeed legislative abilities of, the islanders might be a solution. The difficulty always is to get the right kind of United Nations administration—and I have had unfortunate experience of that in the past. There are certain people. If their names were mentioned in such a connection, I would say it would not work; but there are others.
It could be that in the end we shall see a lengthy occupation of the islands. Therefore I hope that the Government, even if they retake the islands, if they are compelled to do so, will not necessarily say that all bets are off and we will return precisely to the status quo. In the long run we must find a solution. In the long run
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the people of the Falklands have to live in friendship with the Argentinians. If only the Argentinians had pursued the policy which spasmodically they have done in the past, and had not endangered for many years their possible relations with the Falkland islanders! There could be a coming together; it will not be quick, but it is amazing how over many years old enmities can be forgotten.
I welcome the noble Baroness's speech. I wish that the Government had done more to get across their case, and even at this time I would ask them to make a very determined effort, use the resources, and, if necessary, hire professionals. I am sure that Members of your Lordships' House would all volunteer to do this, and some of us would even go to the Falkland Islands, as in fact many people have already volunteered to do. We have now really for the first time been given a clear exposition of the Government's case. We shall want to give further thought to it, and when my noble friend winds up perhaps he will find points of criticism, but as of now I welcome what has been said.
3.56 p.m.
Lord Byers: My Lords, too, should like to thank the noble Baroness for the way in which she has opened the debate; the House is very grateful to her. On the 3rd April in this House I stated our position on these Benches as being that of hoping for a peaceful solution to the appalling situation created by the invasion of the Falkland Islands and as supporting the Government in backing their diplomatic stance with a substantial military force. I see no reason to change that view. I believe that the principle that we must constantly reiterate—as the noble Baroness did—if we are to maintain world opinion on our side, is that unprovoked aggression must not be permitted as a means of settling any dispute, and that wherever possible the aggressor must not be allowed to benefit from his aggressive act.
Although we may not know all the details of the long-drawn-out negotiations, two clear impressions remain with me, and these have been confirmed by the Statement which has been placed in the Printed Paper Office and by the noble Baroness's speech. The first is that the intransigence has been entirely on the side of the junta, that they have deliberately drawn out the diplomatic processes in the hope that we will begin to lose world support—and to some extent unfortunately in that they have succeeded. The second impression is that there has been a shift in the original bargaining position of our own Government towards greater flexibility on a number of the issues, but this welcome change has not been reciprocated by General Galtieri and his colleagues. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how much longer the so-called diplomatic process can be continued.
Without knowing all the details, I would hazard a guess that Her Majesty's Government have done everything possible to seek a peaceful conclusion, only to come up against the traditional impossibility of negotiating rationally with irrational dictators. It may be that when history is written we shall have to change our minds, but at present I want to say that we fully support the Government and the task force which may have to carry out the Government's decisions.
In the meantime, I express concern at the plethora

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of speculation in the press and the rest of the media on military tactics and options available and in discussion of the minutest detail of the men and units of the task force, its equipment, and its potential performance. I know that there is held a view that all this information is already in the hands of the Argentines. It may be, but I doubt it; even so, why should we contribute anything to dispelling any part of their ignorance when our own troops are in a potential battle zone?
I have been involved in three invasions. Any combined operation has its attendant risks, but I think that our commentators would be wise to remind themselves of the Second World War slogan, "Careless talk costs lives". As many of your Lordships will know, an integral part of our successful landing in Normandy and our managing the difficult task of establishing the beach-head was our ability to maintain, largely through the Canadian Army in Kent, the deception that in reality the main invasion was to take place in the Pas de Calais. If our newspapers and radio at that time had embarked on the sort of speculation we have read and heard in the last few weeks, we should never have kept Hitler, the German High Command and Rommel guessing for those precious few days when they did not know where to commit their reserves. Of course we must have a free press and a free media, but there is a strong case for our so-called commentators and experts who are airing ideas to count 10 before they do so.
As to the issues themselves, or such of them as remain, I am quite sure the whole House concedes we are the aggrieved party. Unlike the junta, we are prepared to abide by Resolution 502 and we are
protected by Article 51 of the Charter. If sovereignty is really one of the major sticking points, the junta, I think, should remind itself that negotiations on sovereignty were broken by the unprovoked invasion of the islands by the Argentines. But once Resolution 502 is activated those negotiations could be resumed, although I must say that the experience of the islanders under Argentinian administration must I think point to the need for some form of international administration rather than to leave it to the Argentines themselves.
We are defending a principle on behalf of all lawabiding nations—a defence which could be of vital importance to any one of those nations in the future. We are trying to uphold international law and the Charter of the United Nations itself. This must surely be of vital concern to everyone who believes in the rule of law. I must say that now I have had a look at the draft interim agreement submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General by Sir Anthony Parsons on behalf of the British Government on 17th May and compared it with the final position adopted by the junta, I can well understand and support the decision of Her Majesty's Government that this attitude was totally unacceptable.
I have not had time to take in what the United Nations Secretary-General has put in his proposals. We will study them with great care and with interest. But I must say that, on the face of it, they do not appear to give much hope as a means of progress to peace—a peace which we all wish to see.
4.3 p.m.
The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury: My Lords, when I last spoke in this House, five weeks ago, I stressed that there were two important principles at stake in this unhappy dispute: the need to ensure that nations act within international law, which is the bulwark on which the future peace of the world depends; and the need to stand by the interests of the Falkland islanders, to ensure that they and other similarly exposed groups of people do not have to live in continual fear of aggression by more powerful neighbours. I said that our first aim must be to seek a diplomatic solution, but that this must not be a solution which fudges these principles.
Now, five weeks later, despite the unremitting efforts of the American Secretary-of-State, the Peruvian President and, latterly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations—and let us not forget the efforts of our own Foreign Secretary and Sir Anthony Parsons, who have borne such enormous burdens during this time—and despite the blood already shed, we still find ourselves in a situation where the Argentinian troops are still in possession and have not complied with the Security Council's resolution. These are the realities on which moral judgments have to be based. I am glad that the Government have decided to publish a White Paper setting out the differences between ourselves and the Argentine Government as these have emerged during these discussions, so that the people of this country and the world may know the facts and may make an informed judgment about them; and I share the gratitude already expressed for the clear statement put before us this afternoon by the noble Baroness.
My Lords, if a greater degree of force now has to be used—and this seems likely—let us remember that its purpose must always be to achieve a just political settlement and not a military victory. We need to be very clear that our objective is not to punish or to avenge hurt pride. It must be to achieve a settlement which is based on justice and which upholds the two principles which I have mentioned—and, ultimately, that can be achieved only by negotiation.
As events unfold during the next few days there are certain points which I think we must keep in the forefront of our minds. First, if more force has now to be used it should be the minimum which is necessary to obtain our objective. The most that force can ever achieve is to remove evil: it cannot of itself create good. The American Admiral Mahan said at the end of the 1914–18 war:
"The only purpose of force in international affairs is to provide breathing space for moral ideas to take root".
We shall have to live with the consequences of what we do, and it is all the more important that we are clear about our ultimate goals. There are principles, not just one principle; and principles have to be balanced. But, of course, meanwhile hard choices have to be made. I believe the British people have found a unity in wishing to combat injustice, and we have to live with the consequences of that stand. At the end of the day there has to be reconciliation. It has often been said that we have no quarrel with the people of Argentina. It is necessary for us to maintain some expression of that assertion.

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As your Lordships know, the Pope has arranged a Mass for Peace to take place in Rome at which Roman Catholic leaders of both countries will take part. Next week I will send my representative to a meeting in Paraguay of the Anglican bishops in South America, so that he can share in worship and can listen and consult with them. We hope also that the Pope's visit to this country may be yet another of those symbols and pictures which we need to stimulate our hopes and prayers in what we must acknowledge is not only a quarrel within the human family but is, alas!, a quarrel within the Christian family as well.
As we pray for all those caught up in these events and pray for the Falkland islanders, the innocent victims at the centre of it all, we must never allow the military option simply to replace the diplomatic efforts, or despair of the machinery which we have brought into being and to which we appeal in the United Nations. A member of that much maligned species, a BBC correspondent, said the other day that the Christian message behind all this is that politicians, journalists, soldiers and relatives everywhere are level under the fatherhood of God. None should yield to the temptation to regard the other as sub-human or themselves as superhuman. When this rumpus has been tidied up and everyone has had the grace to admit their mistakes, there will be a great deal of forgiving to do, and it will come harder if we lose our tempers now.
In the coming days we shall need to keep our moral nerve as well as our courage. That is why I feel a duty to be here for, alas! only a short time this afternoon, and that is why I venture to speak to your Lordships again from these Benches.
4.10 p.m.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, having listened to the noble Baroness the Leader of the House, the House cannot be unaware of the extreme gravity of the situation in the South West Atlantic, a situation which could easily lead to greater conflagration in that area. I only wish it were possible for every home in the country to have heard the speech of the noble Baroness, or perhaps the speech of her right honourable friend the Prime Minister, who undoubtedly spoke in the same vein; because I sometimes feel that the position is not fully going home into the hearts and minds of our own people. The first thing that we must emphasise, whether individually or collectively, is that the cause of all this trouble at the moment is not a question of to whom the Falkland Islands belong now or will belong at some future date, but the aggression of the Argentine Government in trying to solve the difficult problem in that way.
I believe that the country understands that the Argentinians were the aggressors, but until today they may not have understood fully how hard our Government have been trying in the negotiations which have been going on to reach a settlement. In this respect, I would re-emphasise with other noble Lords our gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to Secretary Haig of the United States, and not forgetting the President of Peru who also tried in this respect. Regretfully at the moment most of these efforts have been unsuccessful. These efforts so far have not brought peace; nevertheless, we thank them.
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It has been quite clear from the beginning, from when the Falkland Islands were first invaded and when the United Nations condemned their attitude, that as a first stage the islands must be vacated by the Argentine troops.
That has been clear; but it was not clear until today how hard the British Government have tried to reach that end. The information we received is so important that, in addition to it going home to those in this country, I wish it were going home on radio and television in Argentina at the same time; because when one listens to what is transmitted from their radio and television, one realises how one-sided and completely unbalanced is the presentation. This does happen perhaps in times of war. It has been said so many times that the first victim of war is truth. But that is not so in the case of the British Government whom we fully support in their action.
In looking at some of the proposals we learned of today for the first time, it is interesting to note that at one point the Argentine Government were prepared to put aside the question of sovereignty but then, almost within hours, statements are broadcast on their radio and television to the effect that the future of the Falkland Islands is not negotiable. We learn with interest of the proposal for the withdrawal of the Argentine troops—again some information that we have had today for the first time—with a proposal that at the same time the task force should withdraw to 150 nautical miles of the Falkland Islands. It is interesting to note the Argentine Government reply to this, a reply which on the face of it seemed fairly reasonable: that all forces should withdraw to their bases. It so happens, however, that our bases are 8,000 miles away and their bases are 250 miles.
This is the sort of argument which has obviously been going on, with the Argentinians hardening their attitude on every point that is put to them. However, it is gratifying to know that, before anything worse happens than has already happened—and everyone regrets the loss of life so far—the Secretary-General of the United Nations is continuing to try. It may be that we shall have to have a United Nations administrator on the islands for some time. This is not a step to which reasonable people would object.
The negotiators were themselves in an impossible position almost from the beginning because a self-appointed junta who themselves were never elected, who themselves were quite unrepresentative of their people, are the people with whom we are trying to negotiate as a democratic Government. It is almost an impossible task for the negotiators. It is not unusual for dictators to start some external adventure to draw the attention of their countrymen away from the issues at large. The invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentinians may be a way of withholding from the people of Argentina the fears and the horrors that they have experienced over the years under various forms of government. Having taken the step of invading the islands, the junta may find it impossible to climb down because it is very likely that their own heads would be at stake if such a thing happened.
Those of us in this country who saw in the early 1940s something of warfare at close quarters—and many of us, if not all of us, in this House did so—would never wish to see another shot fired in anger.

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But however much we wish that it may never happen, there may be no alternative. To my mind it is rather more than a question of driving the Argentine forces off the Falkland Islands; it is to indicate to the world that aggression of this kind cannot pay and must never happen. It is well to remember that there are small countries with similar problems who live in fear of aggression of this sort. Our action in the South Atlantic makes it clear that we, at least, stand up for what is right.
I should like it to be understood, as I have said before, that this small political party supports the Government and we ask for a continuation of what has happened today. Changes in the negotiation situation that can be explained to the country should be explained, with as much information as possible. Never would we ask for military information; neither do we ask for a debate on the Falkland Islands every other day. There is no need for that; but the occasional Statement as things develop would be helpful.
My colleagues on this Bench hope and pray for a speedy and successful conclusion, with as little loss of life and as few casualties on both sides as possible. We know that Her Majesty's Government are doing everything possible to resolve the problem and we are with them; but we must remember in the days to come that, however bad it may become, it was not of our choosing; we were not the aggressors.
4.20 p.m.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, I should like to join other noble Lords in thanking the noble Baroness for her impressive statement of the Government's case this afternoon. It is part of a remarkable manifestation of the working of a parliamentary democracy in which the details of a negotiation and the views of a Government can be made clear in the Houses of Parliament while the crisis is still at its height. It is a most heartening demonstration of what this House and the other place are all about.
From what the Minister has said, it seems that the Government have already made or are prepared to make some very great concessions. Indeed, I think that there are some of us who might believe that those concessions are already in danger of being too great. I make no point about that today because it seems to me that what the Government have done in the field of negotiation reflects a great patience and a great sense of pragmatism. There has clearly been a determination on the part of the Government to leave no stone of negotiation and discussion unturned before resorting to military sanctions.
I should also like to make my own view clear: in the handling of the whole of this crisis, after the first unfortunate—and perhaps one might say "tragic"—mistake which led to the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argentine forces, the Government have conducted this exercise in crisis management with enormous and impressive skill and determination.
The delicate interaction in a crisis like this between diplomatic levers, military levers and economic levers has been handled with a very sure touch. It would be right that at least those in your Lordships' House who agree with me should convey their congratulations to the Ministers and their advisers who have handled this crisis with great and impressive skill so far.
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I must make my own personal point of view clear: it is of course, as I speak from these Benches, only a personal one. I have never believed from the moment that the Argentine forces invaded the islands that a negotiated settlement was possible. It has seemed to me always since that moment that anything that would be acceptable to General Galtieri and his Government, and anything that would have allowed him to survive, was bound almost by definition to be unacceptable to the British Government. I have said that and believed that right from the beginning. Yet I believe that the Government have been right, as I have said, to investigate every single possibility and to act in every single forum of negotiation rather than resort in a precipitate way to the military sanction.
However, I believe that since this crisis has begun the whole situation has gradually, perceptibly and irreversibly changed. This is no longer a matter of the wishes or even the interests of 1,8000 British subjects in a far away island. It is far more than that. It is a real and serious test of the credibility of this country as a democratic nation which will stand up against aggression from whatever quarter it may come. I make no distinction between aggression from a militaristic fascist junta, as it is sometimes called, or a state of any other kind of any other political persuasion. Aggression is aggression from whichever quarter it comes. We are now facing a test of the credibility of the determination of this country to stand up against that aggression—a credibility which is important not only to our potential enemies, who remain the same enemies whatever happens in the Falkland Islands, but to our allies as well.
I think that probably—perhaps unfortunately, but inexorably—the time has come when the process of negotiation is exhausted and that the Government will have to resort to the military means of restoring the situation in the Falkland Islands. There has been already clear evidence of procrastination and devious manoeuvrings on the part of the Argentine Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, with his great and profound knowledge of this area, has pointed out that perhaps some of us have made too much of the way in which the weather is deteriorating around the Falkland Islands. I defer to him in his knowledge of the climatic conditions in that area. I would only say that, as someone who, like the noble Lord, has experienced both the Falkland Islands and Bournemouth, if anyone were at this moment to give me a choice of resort in which to spend my holiday, I should unhesitatingly choose Bournemouth. Nevertheless, whether the weather conditions in the South Atlantic are deteriorating or not, the morale of our troops, cooped up on those ships for weeks on end, must soon become a matter of concern.
Any military commander of any distinction or eminence will assure your Lordships' House that there comes a time when troops who have been at sea, even in the most equable climatic conditions, begin to lose their edge and lose their morale. It has been truly said in this House today that there is far too much speculation about the military options open to the Government. I do not propose to perpetuate that speculation, except perhaps to say that it would be foolish to believe that an all-out frontal assault upon

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the Falkland Islands is the only option open. It most certainly is not.
It seems to me that whatever military option the Government choose, whatever doubts any of us may have expressed from whatever band of the military spectrum, when those operations begin it will be time for this country to close its ranks solidly behind the Government and behind the forces that are carrying out that operation.
It has been said—and I certainly concur with this—that there has been an exhibition of great and admirable professionalism in the putting together of this task force, in the solution of the logistical difficulties that presented themselves when the task force was sent to the Falkland Islands, and in its concentration in its area of operation. At the same time, it has to be said —and I am again repeating only what several other noble Lords have said today—that we may be in danger, while preparing to win the military battle, of losing the propaganda war. I am less than impressed with the way in which our information services have been handled.
In this context, I make no excuse for returning in my last few remarks to the question of the broadcasting media and the BBC in particular. There are those who have said that the recent example of the "Panorama" programme is now forgotten and that the explanations have been good and sufficient. I do not accept that. I listened only this morning to a commentator speaking about the Government's radio station, Radio Atlantic of the South, broadcasting to the Falkland Islands. In it he used the expression "crude propaganda" as a description of the content of those programmes. That is to my mind unforgivable and unacceptable.
The BBC went on at great length to insist that this was a Government operation and that it had no BBC content in it at all. Why do they have to be so much at pains to point out that they are not involved in an operation which is designed to support a military operation on behalf of this country in the South Atlantic? Whatever the public opinion polls may say, it should be made quite clear to the BBC that the people of this country and the Parliament of this country will not lightly forgive them if they try to maintain this attitude of arrogance and magisterial objectivity when this country is faced with a national crisis. I think it was Winston Churchill who once said, "I accept no position of neutrality as between the firemen and the fire." I think the BBC should bear that in mind.
I have already spoken too long and I shall therefore not make any comments about the long term of this, except to say that if we are forced into a war and into an escalation of military activity, then, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, I hope that all bets will be off. We cannot risk the lives of our soldiers, sailors and airmen simply to go back immediately to the status quo. That is something which I think should be made clear to the Government of Argentina perhaps before—although I think it unlikely—it is too late.
Finally, perhaps I may be the first, though I hope not the last, in your Lordships' House today to say that, if we have to go into war of a very real kind in the Falkland Islands, we in this House wish the Government well in the prosecution of that war; and when we
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think of the soldiers, sailors and airmen who are taking part in that operation, those of us who have experience of war will know that when they land on those islands they will probably be cold, they will be frightened and they will be confused. Many of them will wonder why they have been sent 8,000 miles away from home to die for a cause that perhaps some of them do not entirely understand. I hope that if they have to do that they will at least have the wholehearted support of the people and the Parliament of this country.
4.32 p.m.
Lord Buxton of Alsa: My Lords, I am not going to speak for long because I have said so much on this subject before, but I should like to say, endorsing what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has said, that I never believed that there was any chance of a settlement by diplomatic negotiations. I feel that the handling of the diplomacy and the brilliant organisation and the movement of the task force has been absolutely faultless and the Government were right do it and to pursue it with painstaking care and patience. Nevertheless, I never believed there was any hope of a settlement. How could there be? The noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, has already pointed out that any military dictator who surrenders his prime objective is really preparing his own bunker or scaffold.
Apart from that, we have a unique situation where Argentina and the Malvinas is concerned. We must understand this, because it is going to be very important in the anxious days and weeks ahead. The generals are not unrepresentative of the people. This subject is the one subject which unites them all, and they are not going to be divided by being defeated. When they are humiliated and defeated, as one believes will be the case, the situation will remain exactly as it was before and it is no good thinking that we can give the Argentines a lesson about the Falkland Islands. The only lesson they will learn is that it may take 300 years and not 150 years to get back sovereignty. Therefore, in my view, any solution when it comes should first restore the status quo of British administration. I do not believe in third parties in this case.
Secondly, I believe it is possible at some stage in the anxious weeks or months ahead to get Argentina off the hook, spare the Argentine nation humiliation and possibly find a solution that will last for a century or more. But there is one thing we must be quite clear about: we must never ever again contemplate Argentine administration, or even their involvement in administration, of any territory of ours and certainly not of the Falklands.
I am sure your Lordships will remember that for the last two years or more the Argentines have been saying over and over again that the one thing they would guarantee was the maintenance of the British way of life in the Falklands and the way of life the inhabitants were accustomed to; nobody would interfere with that. They would be allowed this and that—their own education and everything they wanted—nothing was too much trouble. It was said by the Minister, Enrique Ros, during the negotiations in New York last February and it was said to me by Costa Mendez in Buenos Aires on 22nd February; it was said in a film which my company made about the Falkland Islands called, "More British than the British"; and an Argen-

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tine Government spelt out in the clearest terms what they would retain. And what happened? Within two days that idiot, General Menendez, makes everybody drive on the right of the road. He then insists on the schools teaching Spanish and he tells people to remain indoors because there is a curfew—and there are absolutely no hostilities going on anywhere at all. He then starts picking people up.
All these are very curious situations which will have to be looked into when the dust has settled and an inquiry takes place about the whole thing. We ought to know why Mr. Luxton, who is here in London—a large shareholder in one of the big estates and its manager—was with his family suddenly picked up by helicopter and removed when he had had no involvement and no contact whatever with Stanley. All that can wait for another day; but if they can be as stupid and as hopeless as that, I hope that we are in no uncertainty that what has to remain is British administration.
Nevertheless, I believe that settlement may be possible at a particular point and I would hope it would be after the military action had virtually succeeded and achieved what we are aiming at; in other words we should have recovered the initiative, and, even if it is controlled stalemate, that may be the moment. I hope that a settlement of some kind can be found, and I have my own views about the best lines, before the Argentine troops are sent home in humiliation. It may be that it is worth it for a century to find a solution at that particular point. The ideas and options on this are best left to the Government at this stage, of course.
The only other point on which I should want to insist is that British administration should be restored, because I have the feeling that when the dust has settled and all this is over the United Nations could do something much more useful than simply getting involved in a specific matter such as the Falkland Islands. Of course they had to, but they could do something much bigger and much broader. There are islands occupied in this way by European nations, by the United States and by others all over the world and especially in the southern hemisphere. The United States are involved, as are France, Norway and Holland—everybody has these little rocks and pimples dotted round the world.
Apart from that, the Antarctic Treaty is due to be renegotiated before 1991. It seems to me it would be a very useful exercise for the United Nations to give long-term consideration as to what the ultimate status should be of these distant rocks, pimples, islands and archipelagos, because this problem will not go away, and indeed the problems will increase as interest in the future development of the Antarctic stirs over the next few years, as it must. I need only say in that connection that I trust that will not be forgotten by this country. We should not primarily be taking action about 1,800 people. Of course they are just as important as 1,800 people here, but what is at stake is the security of the seaways in the South Atlantic and the security of our bases and our interests in the Antarctic. That is the concern of the whole of the free world, while Russia, as we have seen, is only too eager to disrupt the situation and get involved.
4.39 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, I had intended to deliver
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a controversial speech in the usual habit of debate, making points and answering points. I cannot do so. I am so overwhelmed by what may happen as a result of today's debate in another place and here, not only in the Falkland Islands area but in the world. I was present in the House of Commons during the debate on the eve of the First World War; I was there for the similar debate before the Second World War, and what we have heard today is terribly like the speeches which were delivered before those world tragedies.
I would sum up the speech of the Leader of the House, and the speech which the Prime Minister has made in another place, as, in effect, this. We have sought a solution by negotiation. We have done our best. We have failed and now there is no alternative, except military escalation; the conversion of military hostilities into actual war. Though my voice may be lonely tonight, I am still going to urge with all my being that an effort should still be found for a peaceful solution.
That was the view of the Secretary-General of the United Nations only yesterday. He used these words:
"At this decisive moment, a last urgent effort is needed to reach the accommodation necessary for a reasonable settlement. I am persuaded that that can be done without prejudice to the rights, the claims or positions of either party. We must continue to work for peace without jeopardy to principles".
I found it a little difficult to follow what the Leader of the House said in regard to the communication which has been received today from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Apparently, he has still made, both to the British and to the Argentine Governments, proposals which might lead to peace. I hope that I am not misunderstanding what the noble Baroness said, but my impression was that, having considered that document, our Government had, in effect, replied expressing appreciation of the action, but holding out no promise that this new approach could bring results. The effect of that would be that military escalation must now take place in the Falklands, with, perhaps, an attempt to occupy the islands tomorrow.
I just want to submit to the House that, if that is the kind of reply which we have made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, it will have a disastrous effect on world opinion. It will bring prejudice in the Security Council of the United Nations. That council adopted Resolution 502, but only because it contained other clauses than the request to Argentina to withdraw—the first demand, cease fire; the last demand, negotiations.
I think it very doubtful indeed if the British Government have repulsed this approach from the Secretary-General, whether continued support in the Security Council of the United Nations can be maintained. The votes of unaligned nations on the last occasion were doubtful. I do not believe that we could depend upon them now. But it is not merely a question of the Security Council. If we now take military action of an increased kind, and do not still seek for a peaceful solution of this problem, even countries in Latin America which have tended to be sympathetic will turn against us. I just give a warning that, by turning against us and turning against the United States of America for supporting us, they will lean towards the Soviet Union, and it is repercussions of that kind oil existing policy which we must keep in mind.
As regards Europe, there are already division and

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doubts in the European Community, with extension of sanctions for only seven days and two of the Governments declining to apply them. I do not think there is any doubt that, if we now expand military activities without still seeking diplomatic negotiation, we shall lose the support of the majority of countries, even in Europe. The Commonwealth Secretary was able to say three weeks ago that African and Asian nations in the Commonwealth supported us. I say with some knowledge of them that, if we proceed with military action without continuing to seek a diplomatic solution, we shall lose the support of members of the Commonwealth in Africa and Asia. Lastly, the support of the unaligned nations of the world will be lost as well, and we shall find ourselves in a world where the majority opinion of nations and peoples is against us in the action which we are taking.
As your Lordships know, I have been prepared to defend the rights of the Falkland islanders to have the citizenship which they desire. But what will happen to them?—military invasion of the Falklands, the destruction of their farmlands, the loss of their thousands of sheep, their whole situation destroyed and, at the end, their position will be worse than it was before this situation began. Therefore, I conclude by urging that we should still seek the support of the United Nations to bring a fair and just solution to these problems. Today, there is support for the Government for their attitude; but wait a few weeks, my Lords, maybe a few months, and the disastrous outcome in the world of the policy of the Government will mean that the peoples of this country, realising the situation, will regret that the Government have started on this course.
4.50 p.m.
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, it is always a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, whose experience and sincerity are always moving, even though we on this side of the House do not always agree with his prescriptions.
I should like to echo the congratulations of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, and my noble friend Lord Buxton of Alsa to the Government for the patience, forbearance and imagination with which they have undertaken these negotiations indirectly with Argentina, through the United Nations and other intermediaries, since the beginning of April. Anybody who looks at the document which has been given to us today would say that this Government, this country, have made in this interim agreement a number of important concessions. We have accepted the idea that the status quo of 2nd April is something which can be questioned and we have accepted the presence of Argentinian representatives in two ways: both in relation to their presence on the executive and legislative councils of the Falkland Islands and also in respect of their presence on the islands as observers. I submit to your Lordships that any sensible Government would have seen that this would be a very wise way of escaping the conflict—if indeed they wished to escape from it. Now that Argentina have rejected that document—and, by inference, the whole series of negotiations which led up to that document—it certainly seems as if there is no
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honourable course open to Her Majesty's Government other than a military one.
Those who say that—and particularly I, who have never worn a uniform, except an academic one—have some obligation to say why we take that view. I say it, first, because it seems perfectly evident that to accept the prolonged, the interminable Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands would be a prize for aggression in general and a prize to these aggressors in particular. There are a great many other countries in the neighbourhood of Argentina who would prefer not to give such a prize to these particular aggressors. It would also be a prize or a stimulus to other potential aggressors in Latin America over other potential territorial disputes, of which quite a number are available. We have heard some of the noises which have already been made both in Central America and in the northern part of South America which are extremely menacing.
Furthermore, if we were to do nothing we should not be doing any service whatever to the Argentinian people. We should be suggesting to them that we accept that it is possible for a military Government to do something successfully which other Governments in Argentina, including many democratic Governments, have failed to do. We should also be encouraging the idea of military Governments everywhere in Latin America, just at a time when the idea of democracy has been having quite a good wind in that continent, not only in Peru and Ecuador but also—potentially, anyway—in the biggest country of all, Brazil.
I have two further points, both of which relate to the suggestions about information which were made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. The first relates to the past. The second relates to the present. The matter relating to the past concerns the reason why we were in the Falkland Islands in the first place. It is not sufficiently appreciated in our media, in our newspapers—much less in those of continental Europe or the rest of the world—that our claim to the Falkland Islands does not depend only upon continuous occupation since 1833—overriding though, in international law, that claim actually is. It depends, partly at least, on the fact that we intervened in the Falkland Islands in 1833 in order to sustain a claim which we had had since we first appeared in that archipelago in 1765 and which was recognised as a claim—though not as a claim with which they agreed—by the Spanish Government in 1771. This is more than a matter of mere history, since I have seen on English television and heard on English radio the suggestion that the Argentines in 1982 are simply doing what the British did in 1833. This is a point which could be reflected in our information policy throughout the world.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, was it actually the British who did it in 1833? Was it not, rather, the Americans?
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, the course of events between 1828 and 1833 was extremely complicated. But the fact of the matter is that after the United States steamship "Lexington" had taken off the Argentinian colony, there was a short period when nobody was there, and HMS "Clio" arrived just at the time when another Argentinian prison colony was

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about to be estabished. It was certainly HMS "Clio" which established our settlement, subsequently our colony, in the archipelago.
The second point about presentation which I want to make relates to some extent to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. It is true that this is a crisis in Latin America as well as in the Southern cone, but we have many friends in Latin America. We do not have just enemies or critics. Argentina has always had many critics in Latin America and the present Government of Argentina has many enemies. We must prepare ourselves, bearing in mind that subliminal basis of support for the idea of democracy and the principles which we have very eloquently put forward both in these debates and in debates in another place, for quite a long information or propaganda campaign to sustain our position, a campaign which might very well last longer than the military action which we must all expect, with great regret, to occur in the next few days. We have an excellent case and we must ensure that it is put excellently.
The second point relates more to the future. As I understand it, Her Majesty's Government have withdrawn all the proposals which have been put forward in the negotiations, including the proposed interim agreement which we have had today. I think we need to prepare ourselves for the fact that any long-term settlement which is likely to satisfy us—for example, independence under a United Nations Trusteeship Council, independence itself, or even the restoration of the British colony, as suggested by my noble friend Lord Buxton—will in the end have to gain credibility in the international community.
One consequence of these events may be that we shall see in Argentina a development towards democracy. We have seen some signs that the Argentinian Government is opening its mind to the idea of collaborating with the political parties. If that is the case, one consequence may be that subsequently it will be easier to deal with the Argentinian Government and for us to sustain the idea of some of the solutions which have been put forward. Even if that is not the case, we do need to make clear both in language and tone, in our information services as in our political discussions, that we are in this conflict at issue with the Argentinian Government and not with the Argentinian people—and above all, certainly not with the peoples of Latin America.
5 p.m.
Lord Ardwick: My Lords, there was a good deal of wisdom in what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, and also in what was said before by my noble friend Lord Brockway. I could agree with him wholeheartedly with his demand for patience, and so forth, if the task force was still in Britain waiting to set out, and if there were weeks of possible negotiation in front of us—but matters are much more urgent than that. In hours, battle may be joined, and in those hours there must always be apprehension. That apprehension was all the greater this morning because we did not know exactly how wide remained the difference between us and the Argentinians or what future for the Falklands was envisaged by the Government. We are a good deal wiser now, as a result of the Paper that was published this morning.
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It will relieve many anxieties because it shows that the obduracy and the intransigance was largely on the side of the Argentinians and not on our side. But it has to convince not only us but also our friends, and they are in a very strange state.
Many people abroad believe that the conflict about the material objectives is simply not worth it. There are others who do not see that what is involved is a vital principle and not a mere question of imperialist pride having been affronted. And, we have got so used to the idea that imperialism or colonialism is a matter of refusing self-determination that we do not see that some people are prepared to believe that the great possession of far-flung territory, even if it does not involve the subjugation of another nation, is in itself a form of imperialism. This is very difficult, because it makes Robinson Crusoe into an imperialist even before Man Friday arrived. It is very necessary for us that the British case and the Government's case is put much more strongly and persuasively than it has been so far, because while the Government have sometimes seemed in the past week or two to be offering a wise and generous compromise, sometimes they have also seemed to be showing an heroic but unwise intransigence. The diplomacy was wise, but the rhetoric was damaging. I am a great admirer of the courage of the right honourable lady the Prime Minister, yet I sometimes wonder whether it would not be a good idea to get up a subscription to buy a pair of velvet gloves for the "Iron Lady".
The Falkland Islands is a subject upon which not only political parties but even families are divided. My own party has always contained a large pacifist or semi-pacifist element; it is an honourable and respected minority impelled towards pacifism by the very humanity which made its members into socialists. But one has always to be aware throughout the years of people who have tried to make use of that pacifism for their own political ends. That can happen at this moment. I am not a member of that pacifist minority. It is a creed for individuals, but not one for a party which regards itself as the alternative party of government, with the Government's sacred responsibility for the defence of the Realm. If the previous Labour Governments are to be criticised, it is not for neglect of our defences but for not reducing our commitments to match our resources.
The majority view of my party as expressed from the Front Benches of Parliament since the beginning of the tragic story has been a consistent one of support for the task force in its role of compelling the Argentinians to leave the Falkland Islands, to undo their illegal and aggressive act and, having turned to legality, to take part in diplomatic negotiations about the longterm future of the islands. Many people seemed to regard Resolution 502 as a complete British victory at United Nations—but it was not a complete victory. The Argentines were not told to withdraw and to allow the Falkland Islands to return for all time to their status of the past 150 years. On the contrary, Britain and Argentina were to negotiate. But what about? They were not to negotiate about tariffs, transport, air services or anything like that, but about the very heart of the quarrel—the dispute over sovereignty.
At the beginning, when the task force was setting out, we were in a very strange state of affairs. Argentina,

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by putting down such a large force, involved national pride so deeply that there was nothing she could contemplate other than total victory. Judging by the Argentines' rather vague efforts at negotiation, they are still in that state. But we were hardliners too, at that moment. We emphasised the strict legality of British sovereignty, and by saying that the wishes of the islanders would be paramount, we were implying that they would be able to go on exercising a veto on change. It looked as though we had a demand for total victory on the one side and unconditional surrender on the other. And so at the moment when Mr. Haig began his diplomatic efforts, both parties were making maximum demands, and it was not surprising that even the massive influence of the US was not very successful.
In the very first debate we had on the subject I was worried by the views of the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, whose clear and commonsensical views on external affairs have so often enlightened and sometimes convinced me. But then, the noble Lord was suggesting that our aims should be a return to the status quo ante and I was worried until I realised that the status quo ante just before the invasion was that we were continuing our marathon negotiations with Argentina about the Falkland Islands.
Then Peru came into the negotiations and an agreement was worked out in co-operation with both Peru and the US, which Britain would have accepted and which could have led to an early cease-fire. The agreement involved the complete withdrawal of the Argentinian forces; this was said in another place only a week ago, but it is now confirmed by the Paper we had this morning. The Foreign Secretary provided this information and the Prime Minister added a few details—that our task force would not be withdrawn until the Argentinians had been withdrawn. The Argentines would not enter into negotiations on the understanding that they would have sovereignty at the end. The right honourable lady, the Prime Minister, said:
"We must have an undertaking from them that sovereignty is not committed, but is negotiable".
When the Foreign Secretary spoke about negotiations on the long term future of the islands, he said he hoped that third parties could be involved and that the United Nations might have a role to play, and only in the interim structure would the administrative experience of the islanders be used. There was no mention any more of the paramountcy which would grant the islanders a veto, but a statement that they would want to consider how their prosperity could best be furthered and their security best protected. It is all a very reasonable attitude. The attitude of the Opposition was well put by my right honourable friend Mr. Healey, when he said that there would have been no point in sending the task force unless we were prepared to use it. To withdraw it now would nullify all the efforts of the Secretary-General of the UN to secure a cease-fire.
Nothing has encouraged the attitude of the Opposition more than the belated decision to involve the United Nations in the effort to restore peace. Indeed, many of us on these Benches would not only be happy to see a UN administration, not only in the short term but also in the medium term. I have never thought
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that UN trusteeship was inappropriate because it has been used in the past to give undeveloped nations time to prepare for the full exercise of self-determination. There is no reason why it should not be used for the medium-term administration of territory over whose sovereignty there is a political dispute. Some people, of course, have been saying that we are as intransigent as the Argentines are. There have even been suspicions printed that when the Argentines had made a conciliatory gesture we stepped up our terms. There is no evidence for this, apart from the psychology of our Government, which seems to be coloured by that of its leader. Indeed, the Common Market countries will, I am afraid, find it all too easy to believe that we have been intransigent over the Argentine, in view of the fact that they themselves have been accusing us only this week of being intransigent about more local matters.
Today The Times, which is a much more friendly newspaper to the Government than it used to be, spoke of the fatigue of the Foreign Secretary on Monday, and one can well believe it; and yet yesterday at the height of two international crises the Prime Minister found it necessary to give luncheon to one Commonwealth Prime Minister and then dinner to another, at both of which the Foreign Secretary was present. Such hospitable gatherings are essential and have an important diplomatic purpose, but they must consume much energy. I wish that our leaders in times of crisis could be relieved of this kind of strain, and I am quite certain it could be done without any danger of offending such friends as Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
What we must all hope for now is that the latest efforts of the Secretary-General to get a settlement will succeed; that, if they do not, then the military action we will take will be as economical of life as is compatible with victory; and that, if the battle is prolonged, the negotiations for a ceasefire and withdrawal will continue. An eminent Conservative said today that he thought all negotiations ought to cease when battle is actually joined. I should have thought that that was the moment for continuing if not for intensifying the negotiations.
The other thing is that the Government must think more seriously about the information it is distributing I wonder whether any body in the Government is really looking after the foreign correspondents in London. Some of them seem to have some remarkably uninformed views about what is going on. My noble friend raised the question about who is responsible for publicity in the Cabinet. Well, it used to be Mr. Angus Maude, who had been editor of the Sydney Morning Herald; after that it was Mr. Pym and then after Mr. Pym—who? I have been round asking Conservatives who it is, but nobody seems to know. Some people think it is Mr. Parkinson and other people think it is Mr. Biffen. At least we ought to have information about who is responsible for information in the Government.
This is a very important point. It has got to be done at all levels, at the level of the correspondents in London, at the diplomatic level and at the broadcasting level. This is going to be of crucial importance, especially if we are engaged in a terrible conflict during

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the next few weeks and months. I do hope the Government will give very deep consideration to it.
5.13 p.m.
Lord Gridley: My Lords, I must say that I am grateful to the Government for allowing this debate this afternoon and for placing in the possession of all of us a full statement of the Government's negotiations as they have developed between themselves and the Argentine junta. My noble friend the Leader of the House described in her speech in the most moving terms the efforts of the Government in seeking an honourable agreement. When I read the document this afternoon, prior to coming into your Lordships' House, there was a suggestion in one part of it which I felt some of us might have found it difficult to accept.
I refer to a certain situation where it seemed to me that the Argentinians were certainly getting more than they were entitled to, under the circumstances of the case against them of aggression. In that, I refer particularly to the fact that we have to bear in mind that, in that aggression, a Governor, a representative of the Crown, was kicked out of his position by an armed force. In my opinion once order is restored and the islands are cleared, the proper position should be, anyway for a short period of time, that the Governor should go back there and administer the territory, and then negotiations should start up from there for the future of the country.
There were other proposals which, I believe, the Government might have found rather difficult, too, but, as I say, in spite of all that, this is an indication of the great lengths to which the Government would go to secure agreement with the Argentinians. There was a further example that we know of, the fact that certain proposals were put to the Argentinians by Mr. Haig, and then submitted to our own Government, which they would probably have found it exceedingly difficult to accept or might have found it difficult to get accepted in the Houses of Parliament. Nevertheless, the Government went along with that. But here again the junta in Argentina, so I understand, refused to countenance these proposals.
These neogtiations have been going on for over six weeks, and the Government's efforts in those directions in my opinion deserve the highest praise. Noble Lords who have spoken from all quarters of the House have warmly supported the Government in their efforts to secure peace. Their concern has been to save lives, their action to defend the rule of international law; they are concerned to abide by certain principles. So, whatever may face the Government in the days ahead, let them be fortified by what they have achieved so far and go on with courage into the future.
I spoke in the debate on the Falkland Islands on 29th April, and I expressed then my fears that our Government would never be able to enter into any meaningful negotiations on the future of the Falkland Islands and the islanders themselves. And I stress the islanders themselves for whom we have the most sacred responsibilities. For we are involved with men on the Argentine side who do not recognise the right of self-determination of their own people, who do not recognise even the freedom of free speech, who govern by suppression, and who to gain their ends have in the
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recent past liquidated 9,000 of their own countrymen. To hand over the islanders for whom we have responsibility to the operations of those who perpetrate torture by the secret police is not a matter which I consider we can accept for a single moment.
I could speak at length about this for the simple reason that I know something about it. I could describe the process, but I will not do so. Your Lordships can read about it if you want to. It is all in a book in the Commonwealth Library in an account of the war criminal trials in Singapore. If we were ever to hand over the islanders to Argentina in that situation it would be a betrayal; it would be worse than that, it would be an act of dishonour.
Argentina, so it is reported in the press, and in some of the communications that have passed between the British Government and Argentina in recent days, has said, "We cannot accept colonialism". My Lords, what a nerve! In the past 40 years Britain has brought 40 colonial countries to independence or self-government in accordance with the principles of the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. What has been the reaction of those countries to the present Argentinian aggression? The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth has pledged that the Commonwealth countries are fully behind Britain in the activities which she has seen fit to carry on and which occupy her time at present against Argentinian aggression. So when the Argentinian junta say, "We cannot accept colonialism", I say to the junta in Argentina that we have an honourable record in the manner in which we have divested ourselves of our colonies.
Returning to certain reactions in this country to our present stance against Argentina, when ASLEF votes for the recall of our task force, which as reported in The Times today it has done, and when certain demonstrators burn the Union Jack and label our soldiers as murderers, I would say to them that that freedom which they enjoy would land them in prison under torture if ever a system of dictatorship and secret police were to gain an ascendancy in this country or other free countries of the world. As I have said, such a system is in operation in Argentina. People who act in that manner in Britain prostitute the freedom which they enjoy in this country as well as bringing encouragement to those who commit this evil aggression. It is not a pretty picture.
As I said in my speech on 29th April, I think that the courage, expertise, and I would now add tolerance, of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the Government in these days, has been outstanding. I hope and pray that we shall come out of this and succeed with credit. I believe that this House—I cannot speak for the other place—is behind us and behind the Government in everything that has been said up to this moment in endeavouring to achieve what they have set their hand to do. I wish them well and I believe that the country are behind the Government.
5.23 p.m.
Lord Noel-Baker: My Lords, incomparably the most important issue which we are debating is the aggression by the Argentinian invaders of the Falkland Islands. It is essential that that invasion is brought to an end, and I would even say that until the invaders are out

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there can be no rational negotiation for a peaceful settlement. Neither we nor the United Nations can negotiate under duress. Last week, to a Scottish audience, the Prime Minister said that if the present efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to secure a peaceful settlement were to fail, there would be only one course open to us, and she implied that that was war. With respect, I venture to disagree.
War is not a good way of settling any dispute. As my noble friend Lord Brockway has so powerfully argued this afternoon, war in the Falkland Islands by invasion would have very grave disadvantages indeed. It would put the Falkland islanders in extreme peril and no doubt cause them very grievous losses. It would put the numerous people in the Argentine, the British citizens who live there—are there 100,000?— in grave difficulty. If we won the war, what would we do with the Falkland Islands? There must be a better way than war, and I venture to think that there is.
The first thing that the Government did when the invasion took place was, rightly as I think, to lay the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations. They had a singular triumph. Resolution 502 was adopted by 10 votes to one—only little Panama ventured to vote against. The 10 included the five non-aligned members of the council. There were four abstentions: Russia, China, Spain and one other. But the abstentions were a refusal—a considered, deliberate refusal—to condone the aggression. They were, in fact, an endorsement of the condemnation which the resolution conveyed.
After that resolution our position in the council was extremely strong—strong in law, strong in moral standing. Supposing we had sent our Foreign Secretary to the Security Council, and he had taken with him the American Secretary of State, Mr. Alexander Haig and they had said, "You have adopted a resolution condemning what the Argentines have done". But the United Nations was not created just to pass resolutions. Article 1 of the Charter says, and I quote it merely textually:
"The purposes of the United Nations are to maintain the peace of the world and by collective measures to bring to an end threats or breaches of the peace and to suppress acts of aggression".
I repeat that one of its purposes is to suppress acts of aggression. Article 41 of the Charter says:
"The Security Council may call upon members of the United Nations to adopt the following collective measures which do not include the use of armed force—partial or total economic sanctions; the rupture of all communications: rail, sea, air, telegraph, radio and other; and the severence of diplomatic relations".
Suppose our Foreign Secretary, with the help of Mr. Alexander Haig, had said, "We want collective action by the United Nations to end this aggression. Let us begin with the rupture of diplomatic relations. Let us call on all members of the United Nations to withdraw their ambassadors from Buenos Aires". It is possible, of course, that some Latin Americans might have left their ambassadors there, but I believe it to be a matter of absolute certainty that, within days, we would have had the closure of more than 100 embassies in Buenos Aires. That would have brought home, with a vivid shock to the noble and civilised people of the Argentine, the crime that their fascist junta had committed. I
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think it not impossible that it might in itself have brought the junta tumbling from power.
But suppose it was not enough? Supposing we had also had to ask for collective economic sanctions—the breaking of all trade and financial relations of every kind—by the generality of the states belonging to the United Nations. That would have brought enormous pressure to bear on the Argentine junta whose export trade is to them of extreme importance. Let us suppose that that was not enough. Let us suppose that we had had to cut off all communication—rail, sea, air, telegraph, radio and other—can you imagine what that ostracism, that total silence from the outside world, would have meant to the Argentine people? I do not think that we envisage the enormous power which these collective measures, which do not involve the use of force, have to influence the action of a Government which has made a mistake. I believe that if we had done that we should have had the Argentine troops out of the Falkland Islands long ago.
But it is not yet too late. The Government say they are acting under Article 51, but Article 51 says that the Government must report to the Security Council all the military action which they take and that they must do so immediately, without delay. It says that nothing done by any member state taking such military action shall remove from the Security Council the full responsibility for taking all the measures that shall bring the aggression to an end and restore the peace of the world. I believe that our Government would do well now not to take the matter out of the hands of the Security Council as, if they proceed to invade the islands, they will be doing. But I believe that they should go to the Security Council and say: "Under Article 51, the responsibility is yours. We ask you now to take these collective measures not involving the use of armed force. We ask you to take them at once and to proceed from diplomatic sanctions to economic actions, to the rupture of communications that is required". I believe that by that course we might much more swiftly than by invasion secure the result that we want. Then the way will be open to negotiate the United Nations trusteeship, by which I believe in the end this problem will be solved.
5.32 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, I think that all your Lordships will agree that this is a very unjoyous occasion. None of us can face with equanimity the possibility that, within hours or days, we may be engaged in hostilities on a much wider scale than hitherto. All of us, therefore, must have come here this afternoon hoping to find some alternative by which we could achieve what the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, said must be the primary and the immediate objective, the removal of the Argentinian forces of invasion.
Only two noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon have dissented from the Government's handling of the dispute—the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, and before him the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. It is to me a source, not of pleasure, but of disquiet that neither of them has been able to produce an alternative procedure which gives the slightest hope of success. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, suggested that the Government should negotiate further along the lines of the document—the set of points—which has been

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made available by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and which my noble friend the Leader of the House outlined to us at the beginning of this afternoon's proceedings.
However, it seems perfectly clear—at least it seemed so to me as I followed my noble friend the Leader of the House in her exposition—that this is not an alternative interim agreement which might bridge the gap between the two sides, but merely the setting out of the vast points of disagreement which exist and which have existed since the beginning of this unhappy affair. There may be later and better news, but, on the basis of what we were given, it is difficult to see how the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, could do more than prolong, for another few days or another few weeks, the movement which we have had—the constant attempt to find something which goes not all the way to meet Argentina's original claims. Therefore, it seems to me that that point has been ruled out.
The noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, suggested—as I think he suggested in almost the same words in our last debate—that we should have recourse not to military force but to what are generally known as sanctions—diplomatic, economic and sanctions in the field of communication. It seems to have escaped the attention of the noble Lord that we have made very considerable efforts in that direction; that, in fact, many of our friends in different parts of the world have adopted some of these measures. We have —I think for understandable reasons—found it difficult to keep all of them up to scratch even so, and we are talking about countries which have basically expressed an understanding for our position. Is it seriously to be believed that we would get a better response from a large number of other countries, which have not expressed similar understanding for our position, or that the blows to the Argentinian economy, which have already been delivered by the measures taken, look like, within any measurable distance of time, affecting the issue? If it is only sanctions or only the Secretary-General's document that offers an alternative, it is my regretful conclusion that this afternoon we have been offered no alternative.
What we have had this afternoon is a very important statement from my noble friend the Leader of the House which began our proceedings, which I think must make it abundantly clear that, so far from being intransigent, this Government have made every possible effort to reach an honourable agreement, which a Government not desirous—as is the Argentinian Government—of pushing its luck to the uttermost would by now have accepted.
In various quarters in this House we have in the past asked to be entrusted with more information, not on the military side but on the diplomatic side. I think that many of us believed that this was in fact the case, that the concessions that were being made were being made on our side; that the flexibility was on our side and that the attempt to make peace was on our side. I am glad that it has now been done.
The media has been referred to in the House today, and it is somewhat discouraging to find The Guardian—once a great Liberal newspaper—headlining the Government's decision to publish these documents with:
"Britain—the Government attempts to shrug off the blame".
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There is no blame to be shrugged off. Britain has been the object of aggression. It has made proposals which I am sure will commend themselves not merely to this House and to the country, but to our friends in the Commonwealth, in Europe and in the United States. Alas! those proposals have been rejected.
Therefore, it looks as though we are faced with a war which we certainly did not, and do not, seek and which I suspect the Argentinian Government did not seek. I do not believe—and I know of no evidence to convince me otherwise—that the Argentinian Government launched their invasion forces in the expectation of being involved in major military hostilities. It seems to me that General Galtieri sports enough medals without needing some campaign medals to add to them. I think they were misled.
One of the things we shall face when all this is over, and I hope satisfactorily over, will be, as the Government have said, an inquiry. I hope it will not be a judicial inquiry. I hope it will be entrusted to historians, because I think that the mistake was not one made about the attitudes of the British Foreign Office, British diplomats, or British Foreign Secretaries; it was I think a major miscalculation about the kind of country this is, or the kind of country this has become.
It may well be that the Argentinian Government, looking at the appeal which the notion of peace in itself has so widely among our young people, looking at other aspects of our society, and looking at some expressions of the public mind, has said, "These people are very unlikely to react in any strong way. They will make a fuss. They will go to the United Nations. They will get their resolution, and we shall still be there". When this is looked at historically I think it is going to throw a good deal of light on our own society and the way it has come to be looked at. It is going to throw new light on the whole international scene. We have already somewhat altered our perceptions as to who our friends in the world are, and which of them are stauncher than others.
It has certainly—and I say this with all respect to the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, who regards the United Nations as though it were a favourite child—thrown new light upon the limitations of the United Nations as well as its potential, because the fact remains that a resolution, even a mandatory resolution of the United Nations, cannot be followed up in the world that we have today. The United Nations at best—I do not wish to detract from the services of the SecretaryGeneral—is a forum which can help men of goodwill to come together, but, where goodwill is lacking, has to allow the ordinary operations of diplomacy, of economics, and alas, I fear, of war.
5.43 p.m.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I should like to begin the few things I have to say by sincerely thanking the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal for the measured and easy way she made the statement, which allowed us all to understand precisely the current situation. I have had some experience both in this House and in another place and have listened to statements, and it has been difficult to understand precisely what has been said. That certainly was not the case this afternoon and at least, I, for one, am most grateful to the noble Baroness.

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I should like to say immediately to the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, that he has an absolutely cockeyed view of what the United Nations is really about. When you travel about other parts of the world and see the efforts of UNESCO, the World Health Organisations, and all these organisations built by the United Nations to which we contributed, you can see something of its real worth. Where the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, is absolutely right is in this respect. At the top level, at the level of war and peace, of maintaining peace, I deeply regret that it has not been anywhere as near successful as it has been in many of its other massive undertakings throughout the world. It has done many wonderful things which I believe would receive the applause of the wise and indeed the encouragement of the good. That is something that we must always remember about the United Nations.
When the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, made criticisms of the noble Lords, Lord Noel-Baker and Lord Brockway, I can understand the reason. The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was not tempted, and I will not be tempted to go into the inquiry now as to why we are in this situation. This is the wrong time. But it will have to come at some time. I believe that this would be a much saner and better world if we could hear the voices of a Lord Brockway and a Lord Soper in the Argentine and in other places—where, alas, they would not be allowed to utter a word. But I do not believe that that is any reason why they should not keep on indicating and guiding us with their idealism, if not for this generation then perhaps for the next.
It is also right and proper to refer to some of the vicious, mean Argentine propaganda of harking back to the British colonial days. I have done it in my time long before the last world war. But I am so proud of this country, so proud of this nation, which I believe is the only nation that translated an empire into a commonwealth. I am most proud above all that I belonged to the Labour Party which started that massive transformation. It is also right and proper to put on record—and it has been done, and I am going to do so again —appreciation of someone and of a nation I have criticised in the past. My appreciation is for the endeavours of Secretary of State Haig and the American people. I listened the other day—it could not have been vetoed by the BBC—to a wonderful speech made by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he was submitting that the case of the British was absolutely beyond question. We should be grateful to him, too.
We should be grateful for the endeavours of Peru; the endeavours of the Secretary-General; and that the Commonwealth have stood by us so long. It was right and proper—and this is perhaps what other countries cannot understand—for Her Majesty's Opposition to pressurise Her Majesty's Government into taking every possible step to achieve a diplomatic solution before we embarked on military force, because in the end we are bound to stop the fighting. I support absolutely the need for the return of the Falkland Islands to the Falkland islanders, but talks will have to come at some stage, and therefore we have to look at that as well.
If there is anything I am going to criticise the Government about, it is this. They have a first-class case, but
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they have failed to explain it thoroughly. There were the little documents you could get in the Printed Paper Office and the Vote Office. That was not the place for them. They should in addition have been on the bookstalls. They should have been tested for absolute accuracy. As my noble friend Lord Shackleton has said, I think he could have made it an even better one. But it is not so much for our consumption but for the consumption of our people and others who are bound to be interested in this serious situation, because our country has an extraordinarily good case.
There has also been some criticism—and I am going to make some too—of the BBC. I am bound to say right at the beginning that we in this great democracy are having a hard fight and hard tussle with a fascist junta. I sometimes find it nauseating to have to listen to people who did not mind selling arms to those fascists on the understanding that they would not kill British with them. This is what is happening in Africa now. There have been more human beings slain by arms made in this country by British mercenaries than will probably be suffered during even this crisis. For the sake of the honour of our country we have to look at that situation as well. If we do not, we shall rightly be entitled to the label of "hypocrites".
May I also refer to the BBC. They have this absolute right of freedom, but in addition they have the requirement to be accurate and to present the facts and the truth as they understand it, and not in the banal and unjust way in which they made that presentation in that repulsive "Panorama" programme. If any Argentine equivalent of the BBC had dared present a programme against the Argentine in favour of Britain in that way—if they were Russian they would have had a long acquaintance with the salt mines—they would probably have been gagged for the rest of their lives. That is what some of the people in the BBC must understand. At the same time, I deplore some of the jingoistic fury displayed by some of our cheap national newspapers. When I read some of their headlines I am reminded strongly of the saying that war has no fury like a non-combatant.
United States and United Nations forces should, I believe, be garnered because it is imperative that we be associated in our endeavours, although I accept that there could be a trap. I proposed in your Lordships' House that if the Argentinians withdraw from or got out of the islands, which they have militarily invaded, we should not rush in but that a United Nations force should take over with United Nations administrators. However, as I say, there could be a trap even then because I do not trust the junta in any way whatever. If they were then to pile scores of Argentinians into the islands, like the couple of scrap merchants who started it, then one could be outvoted. Therefore, I would want to see a plebiscite taken of those Argentinians who were there before the crisis occurred; it would be their right to indulge in any form of plebiscite.
The proposition which the Government made, as first enunciated by Mr. Pym on 7th May, was basically right. It had the support of the Secretary-General and the Peruvian Government, but it was totally rejected by the Argentinian Government. While I never lose an opportunity to attack this Conservative Administration, I am bound to say there was not much more they could have done because something gravely serious was, and

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is, at stake, not only because the Falkland islanders are our countrymen but because if we say, "You can invade and occupy by force and we will bow down and acknowledge defeat", there is no hope for mankind in the dangerous world in which we live. I am amazed that those who have a genuine concern for peace seem to be more annoyed at the British response than they—these peace-lovers—are annoyed at the Argentinian fascist junta who actually carried out the invasion. I find that most perplexing.
However, I believe we must also look to the future and we should start thinking now. I recall what happened towards the end of the last war, before the actual total surrender. One might call it the quiet confidence of the British, but in 1943, when we had not yet quite won, we were already making plans to rebuild our island, to have a new education system and to create a new economic liaison with other countries. Although we had not quite won, and therefore that might be looked on as arrogance, it was something we felt because we believed our cause was just and we would win in the end. We should start that sort of thinking now. There will he a need for international machinery to render unnecessary the attitude we have been compelled to adopt. I hope this will be the last time any nation will have to adopt such an attitude and indulge in what we are doing now. The only way to achieve that is to examine all the ramifications of this crisis to see if we can get an international force through the United Nations so that this sort of thing can be prevented.
I suggest it would also be wise for us to say that at some stage in the future we shall have to start some form of economic co-operation with the Argentine; yes, let us say it now, with the Argentine. We did not say so openly in 1944–45, but by 1947 we were co-operating with the Italians, Germans and all those who had taken up arms against us, and it was wise and sensible for us to do that. In any event, I do not accept that every Argentinian at all times is 100 per cent. behind their Government. Indeed, it is not unfair to surmise that the invasion of the Falkland Islands was a ploy to get some form of national unity to prevent the massive demonstration which was going to take place in the Argentine four or five days before the junta ordered the invasion. Therefore, let us say to those who may be listening in the Argentine, "We hope that when this is over we can co-operate with you. We hope to help our countrymen in the Falkland Islands to increase their standard of life by sensible trading with you when this is all over".
We might even suggest that we could perhaps help them some day to enjoy the massive privilege we have of living in a democratic society, so that they—yes, the Argentinians—may join with us, the Americans, Indians, South Africans and others in creating a world in which harmony and justice march side by side. Then perhaps we shall find the means whereby, when situations like this are threatened, whoever is starting it will be taking on the whole of mankind. When that is realised, they will not be able to do it. So perhaps out of the present crisis may emerge the massive paradox that those who are against us now and those who are supporting us, like our Commonwealth partners, will build a system which will prevent a situation such as this ever happening again.
5.57 p.m.
Lord Hooson: My Lords, it is with the greatest regret that I must dissociate myself from the support for the Government expressed by my noble Leader and friend Lord Byers. I find it impossible to support him. I am totally against any military escalation in the present situation, and I speak not as a pacifist but as one expressing quite the opposite viewpoint. I have for years been a defence spokesman for my party. I have been a great supporter of NATO and I was for years the vice-chairman of the political committee of NATO parliamentarians, so I have not taken lightly the step I am taking.
I believe we are, as a country, embarking on a route which could take us into the kind of extremism which the United States found in Vietnam. We tend to forget why America fought in Vietnam; it was for the rule of law, international law, the right of self-determination and to ensure that sovereignty was not undermined by insurgency supported from outside. I was one of the very early critics of the United States when Vietnam started. I never doubted their motives. I believe to this day that America went into Vietnam from the highest of motives. I thought she would be militarily and diplomatically humiliated in Vietnam, and I said so in another place when I was a Member. I was rather howled down for saying it. In the event—it is no pleasure for me to say so—I was proved right.
I am against the military escalation of the present situation because, first, I do not think it is in this country's interests; secondly, I do not believe it is in the interests of the Falkland islanders; and thirdly, I do not think it is in the interests of the free world. The Soviet Union cannot in their wildest dreams ever have thought that the West would so involve itself in the South Atlantic in the way that is happening now as to open up to their influence, without any effort on Russia's part, the South American continent. If there is already one victor in this situation that it is obvious for all who have eyes to see, it is the Soviet Union.
I am bound to say that I have been dismayed by the wave of emotionalism that has gone through this House this afternoon. There is nothing that I disagree with in any speech regarding the condemnation of the Argentinian leaders. They have behaved very badly. It was quite understandable that we should all be greatly angered by what they did, and I give way to nobody in my condemnation of them. In another place and here I have always objected to this country selling arms to any dictatorship, and it ill becomes people who have suddenly discovered the evil of such leaders as the Argentinians have to read moral lessons. They should have found that out a long time ago.
I want to return to the present situation and refer to the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont—that this is a time for this country to close ranks; that except for the pacifist viewpoint, those who have dissension or feel dissension otherwise should not express it, and should close ranks. I profoundly disagree with that view. I am expressing a view that is very widely held in this country—and not only by a considerable segment (it might even be the majority) in my own party perhaps outside this Chamber. I have also been reinforced in my view by what has been said to

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me by a number of individuals in all parties, and by many people in very high positions and who are not politicians at all. There have been expressed the greatest misgivings about the attitude that we have taken up in the present situation.
No one pretends that it is an easy situation for any Government to deal with. But I was against sending the task force at all for very much the same kind of reason, though I think I felt not in exactly the same way as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, felt it. I never believed that there could be a diplomatic solution to this problem backed by force. The very essence of a military dictatorship is that they cannot give way in the face of force. Whoever has heard in history of military dictators suddenly giving up in the face of force? Their very being depends upon their being able, as it were, to mobilise opinion to support them when they are threatened or when their national honour is threatened. It is true of jingoism in any country that when national pride and national honour are involved it unites the people, and of course the people of Argentina have been more united in favour of their junta than they have ever been before.
I also disagreed with the uncompromising diplomatic attitude taken by this country early on. We really did not allow ourselves much room to get out of the corner; nor did we allow Argentina, either, much room to get out of the corner. As has been said, this is not the occasion on which to inquire how, or why, we got ourselves into the lamentable—and I repeat, lamentable—situation in which we found ourselves seven or eight weeks ago. It is an extraordinary thing that a country that was not prepared to spend the money on extending the runway of the Falkland Islands, that was not prepared to have a single frigate or a submarine down there, could suddenly find that the thing was so vastly important that we are really embarking on a path which could lead to the third world war.
It is time that this country got this crisis into perspective. The crisis has steadily escalated in both seriousness and danger. Why? Because there has
been miscalculation on all sides. If they are honest with themselves, how many noble Lords believed five or six weeks ago that the diplomatic activity, backed by the great display of sending a task force, would not have resulted—as I think the vast majority of people in this country thought—in the Argentine climbing down? How many noble Lords actually contemplated that there might be a bloody exchange far worse than anything that we have seen so far in the South Atlantic? Very few, I think. Possibly the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was an exception. I disagreed with sending the task force because I was not prepared to follow up the logic of sending it; namely, that if you send it and you do not achieve a diplomatic solution, what do you do? I remember Nye Bevan after the Suez Crisis once saying, "It is very easy, and every politician finds a situation where he wants to put his foot down. It's to get it up again that's the problem"—
Lord Molloy: We were the aggressors then.
Lord Hooson: The noble Lord has much greater historical information than I have. I want to say
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that we have miscalculated and the Argentines have miscalculated. What will it lead to? The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, said that there was no honourable course left for this country but to go to war. I thought that that was a fantastic statement to make. It had shades, as it were, of the negotiations which led to the First World War, and everybody looking back historically at that situation is absolutely astonished that such a relatively small event could have resulted in such a war.
So we must take the situation as it is today. The task force is down there. I have no doubt whatsoever of the high professionalism, the fine morale, and the excellent leadership of our troops in all aspects; but I remember hearing the Chief of Staff on television when the crisis began. He was asked this question: "How do you think we can achieve the objectives we have in mind, and how do you think we shall acquit ourselves there?" He used these words: "I am sure that our forces will be excellent and can do anything that is asked of them within their capability". It is those words—"within their capability"—that have impressed themselves on my mind.
I do not think that we should escalate military the crisis. We are in a difficult solution, with the task force there. I would send it to South Georgia. I would maintain the blockade for the time being. I shall tell the House why I do not think that we should allow the situation to escalate further militarily. After all, the negotiations have been taking place for only six weeks, and that is a very short time in the history of the Falkland islanders. When one considers the implications of this matter for the free world, I think that we should be very careful.
There is an unacceptable degree of risk, first, of a heavy loss of life on both sides. The noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, ended his speech with words to the effect that one hopes that very little blood will be shed in the achievement of the objects in mind. I regret to say that I think that a great deal of blood will be shed, and I think that this House is escaping its responsibilities in not facing up to that. I respect people who do face up to it, who say, "I am prepared to accept this". I am not; yet I can understand people who do say that. But at least this House should not allow itself to be carried away on a wave of emotionalism and talk about losses as though we are thinking only of tens of people, or numbers of that kind. Let us face the reality that there will probably be heavy losses on both sides.
Secondly, the situation could cruelly expose us militarily. Our military limitations will become obvious, as the American military limitations became obvious in Vietnam. Thirdly, I believe that our diplomatic isolation will grow. Already there are obvious signs among some of our best friends that they simply cannot understand our attitude towards this problem. Fourthly, I think, too, that the position and attitude in Argentina will match the attitude that is developing here; it will become harder and harder to achieve any kind of settlement.
Fifthly, even if there were a huge military success, it would not solve the future of the Falkland Islands at all. It might solve the future of the Government of this country. It might solve the future of the Government of Argentina, but not for one moment would it solve

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the future of the Falkland Islands. If in fact we are hugely successful militarily, Argentina will smart under defeat for years to come; and what about the prospects for the Falkland islanders? What about them? What will happen to them in years to come? Or are we as a country prepared to support a big military force down there for a decade or two? Because that is what it might well amount to.
Therefore, I think that, diplomatic effort backed by military means so far not having achieved the breakthrough that we all very much hoped that it would, this country ought to take stock of its situation; because I can well see that if we invade the Falklands, however it is done, and we have losses because of insufficient air cover on our part and very considerable (as it were) air activity by the Argentinians, there will inevitably be a demand for the bombing or otherwise disabling of the Argentine land bases. It will be the first time that a European power will have attacked the South American mainland, and it could bring the whole of the South American continent, in one way or another—the Brazilians, and so on—into the war.
I can quite see how the whole situation could escalate, because the military argument is going to be obvious: "We cannot let our boys suffer this enormous military disadvantage of being bombed from the Argentinian mainland; the only thing to do is to attack their bases there", and in this kind of way the escalation will grow. We have got into this situation now because, I think, of enormous miscalculations, and I regret to say that the miscalculations continue.
I believe there is such a thing as a just war, but I agree with the Dean of King's College, who today wrote a letter to The Times, I believe it was, or to the Guardian, saying that the invasion could
"unleash ills that outweigh any attainable good".
There is a doctrine in the just war: the doctrine, I think, of balance, or proportionality. The whole thing has to be proportionate. The military response and the military risks taken have to be proportionate to what is involved.
The armed conflict will in itself answer no questions; and, in the end, the real problem will need a real solution. This House may as well face the reality that we ought to have faced years ago. In the aftermath of empire we are left with islands 8,000 miles away from us. We have been gearing our defence effort to defend Europe and taking part in NATO, and, therefore, the defence capability which was appropriate to a far-flung empire is no longer appropriate to us.
Are we prepared, in the future, to allow the Falkland Islands to determine our defence posture, so that we should gear our defence effort to a long-term defence of the Falkland Islands, and make the necessary sacrifices in NATO that will be necessary to justify that? Are we prepared to ensure that over not a few weeks, not a few months, but years we shall sustain the economic and financial effort, as well as the defence effort, that will be necessary? I think it is overwhelmingly in the interests of this country, overwhelmingly in the interests of the Falkland Islands and certainly overwhelmingly in the interests of NATO and the free world, that we should not escalate this matter any
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further, and should continue with our efforts to obtain a diplomatic solution.
6.14 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, your Lordships have just listened to what was to me perhaps the most remarkable speech that I have listened to since I had the privilege of joining your Lordships' House just a year ago. I think it only remains for me to underline some of the points which the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, made.
After listening to the opening speeches here this afternoon I spent a little time in another place listening to the Leader of the Opposition. I found it refreshing. Mr. Foot's speech was much more in line with that delivered later here by my noble friend Lord Brockway than it was with that delivered from our Front Bench by my noble friend Lord Shackleton; and, if I may say so, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, did himself and his party more credit than was done from our Front Bench by our opening speaker here this afternoon. I hope that we shall hear something less adulatory of the Government from my noble friend Lord Stewart when he speaks later. Perhaps he will take a line from the noble Lord, Lord Hooson.
While I am on my feet, may I say that the BBC has been attacked for that "Panorama" programme. I may be alone in this, but I took the trouble to listen to and measure the tape afterwards, and it seemed to me to be a programme which was well balanced, slightly in the Government's favour. This is an individual view, and I claim no mathematical certainty for it. I will agree that the tone of this programme was the tone of a programme which was put forward from the point of view of showing that the Government's policy could be dissented from; but, surely, that is what we are about in this country. That is what we are supposed to be condemning in the Argentinian junta. It is precisely because they do not enjoy the freedoms which we enjoy in this country that the notion (and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, on this) that on an occasion like this all of us must shut up and keep quiet if we disagree with the Government, is not one which I believe many of your Lordships, on reflection, would wish to support.
Whatever happens, whether or not hundreds more lives are lost, in a few years' time there will be no difference of any sort. These lives will have been sacrificed in vain, for no useful purpose; and that is the real tragedy of the Government's policy. I am sure I am not alone in having come across, in distant parts, the graves of men who died in the acquisition of the British Empire. It is a melancholy experience, but not so sad as to see the more recent graves of those who died because we hung on too long—the graves near Aden; those who died at Suez; and now those who have died (and, unless we can stop it, will die) in the South Atlantic.
Such a waste of human life is especially appalling when alternative means of settling the dispute are in fact available: not only economic sanctions but diplomatice pressure; diplomatic isolation, perhaps, as my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker has suggested. Financial strangulation has not been attempted, and that could be very effective and very quick if we had the guts to apply that particular remedy. To reject all these

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possible alternatives in favour of killing is really criminal.
The Government's claim to be acting as the enforcement agency of the United Nations is in my view untenable. They are rather like a householder who, having been burgled, not only shoots the burglar but kills his family as well, and then claims to be upholding the law and the right of self-defence. The means deployed in this matter are grossly excessive having regard to the ends to be sought. They are grossly excessive from our own point of view, from the point of view of our own deployment our forces in the world, apart from any other consideration. My Lords, if the Government go ahead and launch an invasion, they will bitterly regret it. I want to add my small minority voice to those who are pleading for second thoughts, even at this late stage, perhaps along the lines proposed by my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker.
It has been suggested that the Government have had no effective criticism, and that they have done all that reasonably could be expected. This view has been expressed not only on the Government side of the House but elsewhere as well. But I should like to point to the fact that there are other voices, and the fact that they are Latin American voices would not, I hope, exclude them from consideration—because, after all, the war is going to be fought, is being fought, in the Latin American area. The President of Peru, for example, has accused Britain, so the Guardian says, of direct responsibility for the collapse of his mediation effort by the sinking of the "General Belgrano". I daresay that some noble Lords will have read the very remarkable article in The Times by Adolfo Esquivel, the Argentinian winner of the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize—not by any stretch of the imagination a supporter of the Argentine military junta.
My Lords, to use military force in the nuclear age really is madness. If we do not learn to check aggression without counter aggession—because this is the secret that we must learn in the nuclear age if we want to survive—then mankind has no future. That is why this tragic and outdated operation should be called off at once. I beg the Government to step back from the brink. They will have to return to the negotiating table after the killing and maiming. Why not go to the negotiating table now, before the escalation with its inevitable human tragic consequences takes place? Let the Government give a positive response to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose démarche and latest attempt in this matter was I thought, rather cavalierly dismissed as no more than an aide memoire. It demanded a more satisfactory response than that. I hope that when the noble Lord comes to wind up, we shall hear of the Government's intention to take this last opportunity to settle the dispute by peaceful means. I urge that the Government will give that positive response and will save the day, even at this eleventh hour.
6.23 p.m.
Lord Monson: My Lords, we do not know how things are evolving at this moment either in New York or in the South Atlantic, and nor is it right that we should. The matter is rightly in the hands of the inner
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Cabinet. I doubt if at this stage the Government will be swayed by anything said in this House, certainly not from these Benches, in any difficult and crucial decision that they will have to make within the next few hours; so this part of my speech is addressed to those who seem inclined towards appeasement. I contend that when one has such a difficult decision to make one should do what one knows in one's heart to be right, and if what is right conflicts with so-called world opinion then that is too bad.
I have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in his contention that if we proceed in the way in which we appear to be proceeding, then all of Asia and Africa will be turned against us. We have had much support from Asian and African countries and I forecast that that support will largely continue. What is misnamed world opinion is actually no more than the opinion of a tiny élite, representing well under 1 per cent. of the world population, and it is unwise to attach too much importance to this opinion, fickle and volatile as it is.
Russia, of course, does not care a fig for world opinion; but nor do many of our friends and allies, notably France, Israel, Turkey and, until the mid-1970s, when they got cold feet, the United States. All or most of these countries take the sensible view, as we used to in our time, that, if one has to make the difficult choice, then it is better to be respected than liked. But we are in a much more favourable position than they are because of the total soundness of our moral case. Even the staunchest friend of Israel must have some doubts about that country's present West Bank policy, and the friends of Turkey—among whom I number myself—must surely have some misgivings about that country's occupation of such a disproportionate share of the territory of Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. In contrast, our present enterprise can evoke no moral qualms at all. Practical qualms, yes; but moral ones, no. There can be no comparison with the Suez operation, where even the most ardent advocates of that adventure cannot seriously have believed that we were entirely and wholly in the right, while many of us think that on balance (it was not a black and white issue) we were definitely not in the right.
Our present intention to restore British sovereignty in accordance with the democratically expressed wishes of the people of a territory illegally seized by a foreign invader means that right is not 51 per cent. or 66⅔ per cent. or 75 per cent., on our side. It is 100 per cent. on our side, by any moral criteria as well as in international law.
When we debated the Falklands crisis about five weeks ago I spoke of certain red herrings which were littering the path of resolution. Since then, a few more have come to light. The first is the "Red scare", the Soviet bogey. After Poland and Afghanistan, the moral bankruptcy of the Soviet system and the imperialistic nature of the Soviet Union must be evident to even the most blinkered intellectual. An Argentinian defeat might conceivably result in that country, and possibly a few others, going Marxist, for a time. But it is highly unlikely to result in their going Russian.
Secondly, the claim that we will soon have to make things up with the Argentinians come what may, since

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the islanders are totally dependent upon Argentina for their trade, for hospital treatment and so on simply is not true, as any Falkland islander will confirm. To the extent that communications with the South American mainland are thought necessary, they can be re-introduced in the first instance with Chile, which is a dictatorship like Argentina, but is not an imperialist or expansionist one. They have never threatened or bullied the Falklanders, nor do they look likely to do so. After the runway is lengthened, as I hope it will be, communications can be established with Uruguay and possibly with Brazil. A famous Trinidadian novelist who knows Argentina well has made the point that, however charming individual Argentinians may be and however talented—and there are a great many talented ones—collectively they are a neurotic and a somewhat flawed people. One cannot forget that 50 years ago Argentina was one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Since then, they have declined almost to the status of a third world country, whose name is a byword for hyper-inflation, corruption, economic decline, torture and murder. It will be a long time before the Falklands will wish to do business with them again.
The third red herring is the oft-repeated statement: "We were planning to give the place away, anyway; so what is the point of making such a fuss?" It is possible—I do not know—that a few politicians and a few officials were planning to "give the place away" but neither the British Parliament nor the British people were planning to do so, and they would never have acquiesced in a sell-out, whatever Machiavellian plots might have been hatched up behind closed doors. If by some extremely remote chance, a last-minute compromise seems possible, on what grounds could it honourably be accepted? I agree wholeheartedly with the Government and with the noble Baroness the Leader of the House that there can be absolutely no question of our fellow British subjects, an educated and civilised people, being treated like primitive stone-age tribesmen of New Guinea. There is no question of their elected assembly being dissolved, rendered impotent or in any way being overridden. The people of the islands must retain their legislative and, for the most part, their executive power. As the Government document states, there can be no question of Argentinian immigration during the period of any interim administrations, whether that immigration be legal or illegal.
This means substantial—and, above all, trustworthy—armed forces garrisoning the island, which may be a little more difficult than is supposed. In islands with the lowest crime rate in the Southern hemisphere, which are used to being policed by two unarmed policemen, there surely can be no question of armed men in uniform—other than of course British servicemen—roaming the streets, particularly so if their cultural background is markedly different to that of the islanders. The gentle and peace-loving way of the islanders must be preserved. This is probably all hypothetical, because, clearly, if the Argentinians do have to be removed by force—as looks increasingly likely—the extremely generous—indeed excessively generous, as my noble friend Lord Chalfont has suggested—compromise that we have offered must obviously be withdrawn.
Lastly, I come to the question of how our impreg-
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noble case is being put forward by the Government, so as to dispel the misconceptions that unfortunately are all too widely held, at home as well as abroad. In contrast to the magnificent efforts of our Ambassador in Washington and our Ambassador in the United Nations in convincing American opinion and such other opinion as is formed in New York, the Government's own efforts here seem feeble. Here I thoroughly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton.
Apart from a few omissions, which I shall come to in a second, this booklet, The Falkland Islands: The Facts, is a first-class document. But why on earth has it taken six weeks for it to come out? The booklet makes the excellent point that the great majority of the population of Argentina descend from immigrants who came to the country after 1870. I wish that it had gone on from there to make the deduction that the average kelper family has probably lived on the Falkland Islands longer than the average Argentinian family has lived in Argentina. If that is indeed correct, that should give world opinion, such as it is, something to think about. I wish, too, that it had knocked the "right of possession by geography" argument on the head, even supposing that that argument had any moral validity, which of course it does not.
Too many educated people who ought to know better have made half-baked comparisons of the Falklands with the Isle of Wight or the outer Hebrides, asking how we would like it if Argentina occupied these islands. The Isle of Wight is two or three miles off the South Coast: the Outer Hebrides are 35 miles, on average, off the Scottish coast. Everyone should surely know by now that the Falkland Islands are 300 miles from Argentina. The Falklands are as far from the Argentinian coast as La Rochelle, Dijon, Bremen and Stavanger are from the British coast; while Buenos Aires is as far from Port Stanley as Helsinki, Minsk, Tunis and Tangier are from London.
The booklet makes no mention of the fact that neither Argentina nor Spain ever occupied the West Falklands at all, to the best of my knowledge. They occupied the East Falklands, intermittently, but never the West Falklands. Again, this greatly strengthens our moral case. Perhaps later editions of this booklet—if they are planned—might stress that point.
I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, to indicate how widely this booklet is being distributed. Is it going to schools, universities, public libraries, board rooms, to bishops' palaces and all the other places where people appear—such a high proportion of them—to be ill-informed? On the propaganda front, I urge all newspaper editors and editors of radio and television news and current affairs programmes—excluding the Editor of the Guardian, who, as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, pointed out, has accused Britain of being at fault and is obviously therefore incorrigible—not to talk about an imminent British "invasion" of the Falklands, nor of "military action against" the Falklands, as the presenter of the "World at One" did today. To talk about "invasion" or "taking action" against the territory suggests to the naive and uninformed—and unfortunately there are all too many naive and uninformed people about—that we are aggressively using force against some innocent foreign country. What we are in fact about to do is to liberate our own territory.

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Let us, instead of speaking of "invasion", speak of "liberation", and pray to God that it goes well.
6.36 p.m.
Lord Soper: My Lords, I rise to appeal to the Government, even at this late hour, to resist what seems to them to be the inevitable consequence of their purposes and to continue to give heed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his plea that there should be a continuation, however unpromising it may appear, of the negotiations short of the mass violence which is war. I do this because I am convinced that on utilitarian grounds it is possible now to raise the argument against the use of war in the terms which the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, has already adumbrated, and in which he has set forth the position so clearly and unmistakably. It is the nature of war which from the utilitarian standpoint is indefensible in terms of what it does, what it can be calculated to do and what its inevitable effects are going to be.
The moment war is invoked, it makes up its own laws, it takes on a totalitarian view and nothing is prohibited if it inflicts upon those who are going to war the prospects of being defeated. This unfortunately is true. It has great relevance to the doctrine of original sin. But it is the experience of a historian and the experience of those who take the trouble to look at the wars in which they have suffered or in which they have been alive in their own lifetimes.
The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, is not a pacifist as I am. However, I much admire the realism with which he speaks of the qualities that belong to an effective process of war-making; and in a previous speech I remember him saying with considerable contempt how impossible it is to talk about limited violence. You cannot he rather violent in modern times any more than you can be rather dead. The process of violence takes on its own nature and proceeds according to its own laws. Those laws are manifest for all who care to look at them. It is the fact that, once you embark upon the process of violence, you become very largely the servant of the demands that violence itself imposes. Let it in at the back door and, sooner or later, it will occupy every room in the house. This is the utilitarian concept.
It is further true that, the moment that the prospects of war appear upon the horizon, ordinary language is prostituted. Instead of the realities that can belong to a linguistic precision, you embark upon all kinds of words which cloak and mask the issue rather than describe it, let alone define it. I notice with regret—and I say this with considerable difficulty—that the most reverend Primate in his speech was talking about force when he really should have been talking about violence. There is a world of difference. I noticed some time ago in an article which he wrote that he said that there are some circumstances in which it is permissible to shed blood. That is another evasive phrase. A surgeon sheds blood but in a very proper operation.
The process of war denigrates the language in which we describe it and therefore we are less and less able to see the realities that belong to it, until we face it as starkly as the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, compelled us to do. Whatever may have been the arguments in
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the days of chivalry—when apparently you "knocked off" on Sundays and did not fight in the winter, and if you happened to be a knight you behaved very courteously to your enemies—war is a dirty, filthy business from beginning to end today, and the very measure of its comprehensive power is a measure of its total inability to be reconciled with what I believe, and what I am sure many of your Lordships—if not all your Lordships—believe, to be a moral universe.
So I come to that which for me is the prime reason for pleading that we should not discontinue the processes of argument but that we should turn our faces absolutely resolutely to the processes of war. It is no accident for me that when the word "ascension" is mentioned today it is usually associated with an island from which warlike propaganda is issued. Today is Ascension Day, and it is for a Christian the proclamation of the victory of the Prince of Peace. I find it utterly irreconcilable with the teaching and spirit of Jesus to embark upon the processes of war. I would not worry your Lordships, and you will understand that I speak, I hope, with due humility, recognising the problems that are envisaged when the moment comes to take an absolute stand against the armed violence of war. Nevertheless, it is my business to testify to it—and how ardently I could wish that His Holiness of Rome, the most right reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and a lot of others would take that step which I believe is the only one which can ultimately be set in line with the spirit and teaching of the founder of the Christian faith. How anybody can read the Sermon on the Mount, and then believe that you can translate that into the terms of modern war, completely escapes me.
I realise how difficult it is to meet the demands of a world so full of problems. Nevertheless, I fear for the future of the Christian faith unless it expresses that to which it is uniquely committed. There is no other world faith which takes the same attitude to the repudiation of violence by the substitution of positive, suffering love. If you argue that the Buddhist is against violence, his faith essentially is a world-renouncing faith. For the Christian, I believe that the pacifist case is a world-embracing faith.
That leads me to the question which was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, to which I will offer, if I can, some kind of practical answer. He wanted to know what the alternative programme is. I would support diplomatic sanctions with all my heart and mind. I believe the psychological isolation of those who do wrong is a most powerful directive towards penitence. I would support economic sanctions in many respects, so long as they attempt to bring the enemy or the miscreant to his senses rather than to his knees.
I am afraid the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, made one slip, if I may respectfully suggest it to him. You have to have nothing to do whatsoever with armed violence. You cannot let it in, as he says, by a continuation of the blockade, for the blockade itself is an act of violence. It is in that regard that I believe the answer to the problem of what you do as an alternative lies in the heart of the Christian faith; and you will allow me to present that as best I can, very briefly.
I believe that God can do much better with our obedience than he can with our expertise, and I

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utterly reject the concept that the Christian faith is only operative in favourable circumstances and that in some cases we have to help God out of an awkward jam when there is no possibility of following the plain commands of his Gospel. This I utterly reject. I do not know what the future holds and I cannot presage the effects of that obedience. All I can ask people to see is, as I see it, that we live in a world in which, over and over again, we have endeavoured to mutilate or at least to modify the Christian faith in the belief that it becomes more practical as it becomes less dogmatically associated with a teaching and a spirit represented by its founder. These are alternatives.
I would end with one commitment which comes again from that Christian faith, and it is this. People who peer into the future and ask what will happen if you do what is right may well be asking a question to which there is no immediate answer. What I happen to believe is that the gateway into more practical dealing with the evils of this complex and difficult world releases into tomorrow issues and possibilities which are never there until there is obedience today. Therefore I cannot, and would not, presume to offer, even if I could, to such a House as this any detailed presentation of what will happen if we do not go to war with Argentina. What I do know is that to clear away this completely false method of trying to deal with evil is the open door to some success, at least for us poor mortals, in the discovery of ways which are non-violent and which, because they are in obedience to the law of God, will prevail.
6.45 p.m.
Lord Morris: My Lords, there is hardly anything further to be said on this subject at this particular time. I have slight doubts as to the wisdom or otherwise of holding such a debate in your Lordships' House at this time. If there were anything further to say, it certainly has been said today by Her Majesty's Government and also, not for the first time, so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, whose recent writings, if I may say so, have been a tremendous help to the understanding by so many of this subject, and not least by that instant pundit, that Olympian neutral, the media. I must say, however, that I cannot entirely agree with the long-term prescription of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. This hurts me, for he has no more loyal or devoted admirer than I, and it is very much the admiration of the pupil for his master. But this is neither the time nor the place to debate this difference of view.
I would put forward for consideration only two points. The most reverend Primate of England referred to (I quote from memory) "the machinery set in motion by us". I can only assume that he was referring to the military machinery. I despair of those who give comfort to those who insist, even today, in believing and in stating that it is Her Majesty's Government, or, worse still, Her Majesty's loyal forces who are in any way responsible for setting in motion, or indeed escalating, military confrontation.
The morality of self-defence, the morality of a mother protecting her young, the morality of the strong protecting the weak and the morality of right and not might prevailing, I would humbly suggest, is more the Christian position than seeking and stating moral
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reasons for avoiding arduous and sometimes cruel responsibilities. I would further suggest that a genius for seeing difficulties is more the prerogative of the lawyer than of the Christian statesman, as in my view my right honourable friend the Prime Minister undoubtedly is.
Finally, to raise a comparatively minor matter, may I ask my noble friend the Minister to confirm that the illegal occupation of Southern Thule Island in the South Sandwich Islands is not forgotten? Other than that, I beseech Her Majesty's Government to remain steadfast; to earn further the respect and admiration not only of our own countrymen but of so many throughout the world; to continue to give hope to the oppressed and to make the oppressor hesitate; and, above all, to silence the appeasers who pay for so many more lives in the long run by mouthing the wrong words at the wrong time.
6.48 p.m.
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, I do not think that we find ourselves in a situation which we can enjoy or in one on which we should be congratulating each other. After all, we are in a jam because Her Majesty's Government put us there. In spite of warnings, they were taken completely by surprise. They were unprepared and they had not even made clear to the Argentinians the kind of strong reaction we should make. We had no preparations and no plan. We only had an instinct and an emotional reaction. Two things would happen—and this was in 24 hours, without a plan and with nothing prepared—the first of which was that the wishes of the inhabitants would be made paramount, and that a fleet would be sent within 48 hours to give that effect. That fleet did not serve the islanders. They were in no immediate danger. We did not serve them by denying ourselves six months, within which sanctions could work, within which financial measures could press upon an economy that was already in difficulty and within which, above all else, we could have prepared a proper air cover for the fleet which we would send when the summer came.
No, my Lords, the people who were in immediate difficulties were not the Falklanders; they were Mrs. Thatcher's Government. They were in difficulties. They were extremely unpopular. They were faced with the resignations of the two Ministers who were concerned and they were in real trouble. It was then that the Prime Minister came to the rescue, and her instinct was absolutely right from a political point of view. She restored the popularity of a most unpopular Government, a Government which had given us 3 million unemployed and many other things. She restored popularity by giving people what they wanted, and that was war. I have no doubt at all about that. If somebody were at this stage able to stop this war, the great majority of the British people would be bitterly disappointed. That is one of the rather alarming things that we are up against.
I was a little shocked to discover how popular war still is; but then I come from the 1914 generation, and that was a war that gave war a very bad name. Nobody really enjoyed the trenches. In the 1920s—I think, perhaps, for the only time in human history—the really ordinary man in the street was genuinely against war. The feeling started wearing off in the

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1930s, but even in 1939 we went to war grimly, not joyously. But as the war worked on, I think we rather enjoyed it. I find so many people who tell me that the wars were the best years of their lives. There was the phoney war and then came the blitz. Again, I remember people telling me that there was a special quality to love-making in the blitz which they never found repeated. That was the kind of attitude we had. It was not, as the liberals told us, that we were all against war. That is how we were really feeling. Then people found that the country had done very well out of the war. Indeed, Mr. Macmillan was wholly right when he told us that we had never had it so good.
But the kind of war enthusiasm which we are seeing around us today is still alarming. Traditionally, I suppose that war has always been man's most honoured occupation; it is now becoming woman's, too. There have been several women Prime Ministers and every one of them has had a war. So far as I know, I was alone in opposing, for other than pacifist reasons, sending in this fleet. During the last war, I served in Combined Operations, and I was far too well aware of the dangers run by a fleet in a combined operation, if there was not near absolute air superiority.
Just look, my Lords, at what we have run into now. First, we have lost the "Sheffield". I am not unduly alarmed by that particular Exocet incident. I think that the Argentines have, at most, only two more and, anyhow, the fact that the attack was successful was, I think, due to a technical slip-up in the defence. Far more serious was the attack on the second ship, which I do not think has been named, when a bomb went straight through. I received an extremely interesting letter from a Mosquito pilot of the last war, who was engaged in precisely this sort of operation, attacking selected ships. He said this:
"The Exocet incident was bad enough, but for the second wave of obsolete fighter bombers to have pressed home a last war attack at low level on modern warships with impunity can leave us in no doubt about the probable fate of our invasion fleet. I also want to know how the four planes penetrated the usual curtain of machine and multiple gunfire from the deck and why their fighter escort was not successfully engaged".
It would be very interesting if we could have some answers on that, because I do not think people realise how dangerous the situation is.
The other point that has worried me enormously—and I do not know whether this has official backing or comes from a handout—is the fact that the existence of thick cloud and some fog in this area is being welcomed as the best conditions for an invasion. I think it is a fairly terrifying situation, if your hold of the air is so poor that you do not wish to see them coming, and you prefer being concealed by fog from aeroplanes which are certainly armed with penetration guidance to ships which they pick up on their instruments. You prefer the tremendous risks run by a fleet, which is being attacked in that sort of way by an invisible enemy, to being able to see the enemy and fight them off. It also seems to indicate a terrible lack of confidence, because at that point your fighters cannot operate in the fog.
I certainly do not feel that we should in any way blame them if the force stands off. Whatever they are saying, the risks from going in may very well be far
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too appalling to be taken by the people down there. But if they do not go in, for how long can they not go in? Here, again, you come to the difficulties of people's wars. People's wars are wars which you cannot stop. Once people have got into a war, they will never let go. The people would not stand for it if this fleet was brought home. That is the kind of position that one is in. The other point—and I am sure that your Lordships will support me in this, as a student of military history—is that people's Governments are vastly more reckless in incurring heavy casualties than ever the kings were in the old days. It is popular Governments that go in for the mass killing of war.
But if we do go in, let us realise the tremendous risk that we are running and do not let us force the fleet to go in with its hands tied. The question of bombing the enemy airfields—and we really require an assurance on this—must be a matter for the commander who is sending in that force, without any attention being paid to outside political effects. You cannot ask a force to go in, in these circumstances, if you deny it the right to take the maximum steps—any steps it can—to protect itself from so dangerous an attack.
Secondly, can we justify the storming of these islands, without accepting the responsibility of defending them? And how do we defend them? If they blockade the islands, which contain an occupation force and inhabitants, we can hardly supply them by air from Ascension Island.
What about nuclear weapons? There is a great deal of published material about this question. May I quote from the New Scientist of 3rd December 1981:
"Argentina will win the race to produce South America's first atomic bomb by the end of 1982, say intelligence experts in the US".
The article continues:
"Argentina's foreign ministry has admitted that the country could build a nuclear device but denies that it is doing so. Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, the head of the National Atomic Energy Commission, has said that Argentina has the know-how to build the bomb".
Admiral Madero recently took journalists to see it being done. If at the end of this year the Argentines have a nuclear bomb, could we possibly send the fleet back? Could we do anything at all then about a re-invasion?
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, I must thank the noble Lord for giving way, but if I am following him accurately, would that not be a good reason, if it be true, for taking military action soon?
Lord Paget of Northampton: My Lords, this is part of what I was going to say: not merely taking military action soon, but taking it extensively enough to make us secure afterwards. If we are going to storm the Falklands, I think we must accept that it will involve the next steps, for it is only the further steps than can possibly justify the first. And the first step is that we must not leave until we have knocked out the Argentine fleet and imposed naval disarmament upon them—until we have removed from them the capacity to make the nuclear bomb by the same methods as those used by Israel in Iraq. We cannot stay in the Falkland Islands unless we are prepared to take out their nuclear bomb. Unless we do these things and are prepared to face up to the fact that these things will have to be done, I do

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not see any surviving object in taking the islands or landing oneself in a position which one can neither defend nor extricate oneself from. I think that this war, which has been slipped into without plan or thought, should be thought out a little before it is pushed too far.
7.3 p.m.
Lord Hankey: My Lords, I do not want to add to the length of this debate, but I do want to start by saying how much I agree with the very interesting speech of my noble friend Lord Chalfont, to which I draw your Lordships' attention.
Personally, I am deeply impressed by the way the Government have handled the Falklands crisis. I am very greatly struck by the remarkable speed and efficiency of the Royal Navy, especially in recapturing South Georgia, and I am greatly impressed by the efficiency of our seaborne aircraft, of all sorts, and their missiles. It is true that there have been losses of ships on both sides, one of them a very painful loss on our side and an even more painful loss for the Argentines. But to me it is very interesting to see how incredibly powerful these new missiles are, and I think the Navy have shown very well how to use them.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have issued an excellent paper on the facts. It is very clear and well produced. It is a pity that we did not have it some weeks ago, but I know how hard it is to produce a really accurate paper of this kind when Ministers are so very busy. The other paper, summarising the negotiations up to this morning and so ably described by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, makes it clear beyond any peradventure that we have gone at least as far as we ought to in order to make some sort of compromise.
It is quite clear that the Argentine Government have no intention of giving way. I do not know myself why anybody ever supposed that they would give way. But before using force to restore the situation I think we have been right to negotiate, to probe the Argentine position and finally to expose its true nature, which is obviously to hold on to the Falkland Islands by hook or by crook and to get South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands also. We shall let this situation continue at our peril.
It seems to me to be obvious now that we have to retake the Falklands by force, as we have already retaken South Georgia. I am very sorry about this because I have had many Argentine friends and the Argentine is, or at least should be, our ally in the South Atlantic. But the junta have behaved disgracefully in committing aggression against a British territory and in flouting the United Nations Security Council Resolution, which was absolutely clear. We most certainly and definitely must now restore the situation. If we do not do so, I can assure noble Lords, as a diplomat of many years' standing, that it will be almost impossible to foresee all the dangerous consequences elsewhere in the world. And, when I say that, I include Europe.
If the Government now send in the troops and the Navy, they will have my wholehearted support. In this connection, I want to make a very important point. Do not, I say, use minimum force for this job. Go for it with the maximum available force so as to settle the matter as soon as possible. The noble
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Lord, Lord Paget of Northampton, made some extremely pointed remarks in this connection, but I was a little frightened by all the consequences which he drew in the nuclear field. I hope that this is still years away.
There is always a danger that warlike measures may escalate unexpectedly. I suspect that our allies are already beginning to doubt our real ability after these weeks of waiting, vitally necessary though the delay has been. You do not mess about with a scorpion when you find it in the bathroom. You take your heaviest shoe and you give it a hard and fast smack on the top. I totally disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, in this connection. The dangers of doing nothing are incomparably greater. Please do not be in any doubt about this.
I have one other very important point. It is really dangerous for Britain to appear to be too weak in the world in which we live. Personally, I think that neither the First World War nor the Second World War would have happened just when they did if Kaiser Wilhelm and later Hitler had fully realised Britain's real potential. They thought we were weak. They thought we were not determined. They thought they could get away with it. How wrong they were. They landed us, each of them, in a world war of incomparable destruction. I think that General Galtieri foolishly fell into a similar trap. After all, we had—scandalously, to my mind—some years before given up the use of the Simonstown base and our ships seldom appeared in the South Atlantic. Recently we announced the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" which serviced our Antarctic bases. For years we have negotiated about the future of the Falklands themselves. It is true that we gave nothing away, but we did try very hard to appear reasonable. The Foreign Office have really been under criticism for this, and I have always told my friends there that it would be impossible to pass in either House of Parliament a measure which involved removing our sovereignty from the Falkland Islands against the wishes of the inhabitants. I do not think there is any doubt that neither House would go along with that. I believe that General Galtieri rather comprehensively construed all these signs as weakness, though.
So now it is high time to set the record straight, and to do so strongly and quickly before this dispute escalates and endangers world peace, as I think it might do if it went on too long. The dangers of delay, in my opinion, are now quite unacceptable and the Government will have my full support in anything they do to settle this business quickly and effectively.
7.10 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, we have heard many eloquent speeches about not going forward but giving up and coming back. Some of them were expressed in terms of noble and lofty ideals, including the central Christian ideal itself, and others consisted more of dark forebodings. But at the end of all that, I for one am left with the question: what in terms of ordinary, everyday politics are we supposed to do except go forward? There is a dark side to the morality of international affairs which, in a certain sense, leaves the aggressor always in command of the situation. We have been placed in a corner by Argentina. Not

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in a political or military corner, but in a moral corner. They have morally left us no alternative but to undertake a hateful and dangerous action. That being so, I feel sure that the Government are right to do what they have said they will do today, or do what they have implied they will do, and that the country is right to support that action, and that most noble Lords will be right to support it too.
Obviously the document published this morning put everything in proportion for the first time for many of us. It would be just too easy, under the Argentinian proposals for a settlement, for them to replace their military invasion with a civilian invasion, thereby giving themselves a majority when the time came once more to exercise "democracy" there. There was a claim that we should withdraw our forces from South Georgia, but not only was this never Argentina's and never belonged to the Republic of the Plate, but also it was never even part of the Spanish Empire. So the demand to withdraw our forces from South Georgia is, of course, absurd. We are boxed in by the will of this aggressor. We are boxed in by the necessity of taking military action to redress the aggression.
Having said that, there are one or two things which I hope that the Government will be able to do, and give an answer as to the possibility of doing. This afternoon, the right honourable lady the Prime Minister said that we had withdrawn the interim agreement which was published this morning for the first time. She said that was something we had offered to Argentina and since Argentina had not agreed to it—since their disagreement was so far from the document that it had to be taken as a rejection—we had therefore withdrawn it. Why do we withdraw it? If that is no longer on the table, what is our demand? Is it unconditional surrender? We have examples enough from history, and from modern history, of the dangers of demanding unconditional surrender. If it is not unconditional surrender we are asking for, what is it? If it is something rather like what we proposed only four or five days ago, why have we withdrawn that proposal? Could it not be left there, and could we not draw attention to it all the time?
Again, with regard to the Secretary-General's initiative today, it was not quite clear from the Prime Minister's speech exactly what had happened. She told the House that the Secretary-General sent a list of formulations and suggestions. Then she read out two lists of formulations; the Secretary-General's formulations of issues on which we were in agreement with Argentina, and his formulations of issues on which we were in disagreement with Argentina. However, she did not read out any suggestions. She then proceeded in effect to dismiss the Secretary-General's initiative with the words, "We have been here before."
I have a question for the Government. Were there any suggestions in the Secretary-General's communication? Or was his use of the word "suggestions", in a text which does not in fact contain any, a misapplication of the word? In any case, the Government are going to have a rough ride with world opinion about that demarche by the Secretary-General. We are going to have a rough ride in any case. When the fighting resumes—not begins, as too many noble Lords have loosely said or implied—and is stepped up, the
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outside world (by which I mean public opinion all round the place) is going to continue being expressed, and it will be as important for us to put the truth of our case across effectively as it will be that the military operation should be effectively conducted.
Not only that, but all other courses of action which can help us to achieve our aim will have to be mobilised. I have in mind particularly the point which has been made, tentatively and without being pressed home, by the Labour Party—to some effect in my view—about the possible financial processes which could be brought to bear. I am not talking about trade sanctions, the freezing of assets or the stopping of new lines of Government credit; I am talking about the role of private banks. Is it the case that United Kingdom banks could, single handed precipitate an early total default of the Argentinian state? It may be hard to know whether that is the case or not. Are the Government closely in touch with the banks about that, and are the Government sufficiently informed? Would action tending in that direction by British private banks—that is to say, the declaration of default on individual loans where interest is quite simply not being paid—stimulate, or would it not, cross-default clauses, the execution of which lies in the power of banks in friendly countries?
We know, I think, that all the banks in the West are pretty well strapped by the Polish affair and that they have had to run down quite a bit for the benefit of other sovereign debtors: Nigeria, Mexico, and so on. Even so, can we he sure that calculations are being made about the effects which can be achieved—at great financial sacrifice, and we are facing that anyway, but without bloodshed—by this particular route? Is it not likely that there is going to be a moratorium of some sort anyhow on financial facilities to Argentina, and some kind of bankruptcy of the state? If that is so, and it is something we think is likely to happen in any case after the fighting is over, should we not be thinking of bringing it on now, or would we judge that the side effects of doing that for other developing third world countries—which is all Argentina is now—would be so grave that it would not be fair to inflict it upon them? Or should we on the other hand judge that it might be a salutary lesson to other less developed countries not to go invading defenceless islands?
I would like to see this area opened up, even during the course of military operations, if it does come to military operations. I believe that the Government should consider having a plan which they could discuss with and eventually lay before the IMF, for the opening of specific financial facilities to rescue the people of Argentina in the event of a total default and consequent civil disorder. These things should be pursued if possible without military action, although I believe we must accept that there will now be military action.
I come now to what one might call the "information war". I am reluctant to call it the propaganda war, because the word "propaganda" suggests that one is not telling the truth, and we are telling the truth. We should be hurling at Argentina throughout the world on every channel we can all the charges against them about the conventions which they have broken. They have quite a good signing record in regard to the Geneva Conventions, and we have an excellent one. I mean the old series of Conventions going back to

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1899 and 1907. Will we ventilate these issues? Will we seek solutions through those courses as well as through the United Nations? Why not? The machinery is rusty, but it has never been dismantled.
Will we—and I beg the Government to pay attention to this—please clothe our case at the bar of world opinion in United Nations language? Let me start with the most glaring example; the word "paramountcy" itself. The Government have taken a lot of stick for declaring that the wishes or the interests of the islanders should be paramount. "Paramount" is not the invention of the present British Government. The word is in the United Nations Charter. This is United Nations language, that the people of a given country have the right to self-determination, to live in freedom, and that those rights are and should be paramount. That is not a British word against Argentina.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, if I may intervene, I think the Charter says the "interests" of the inhabitants should be paramount.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I accept the correction of the noble Lord on the verbal point; but I am seeking to make a political point, that in using the word "paramountcy" correctly the British Government are using a United Nations word. Moreover, everything that we have done, our case throughout, and every action we have taken, has been strictly in accordance with United Nations decolonisation procedures.
The whole thrust of Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly, which is the governing text of the Decolonisation Committee and all its works, is towards the proposition that a people in a given territory have the right to freedom and are not to be occupied, subjugated or subjected to violence of any sort or to pressure of any sort by any other people in any other territory. In invading the Falkland Islands the Argentines have, therefore, gone straight against the decolonisation wording of the United Nations resolution, this very resolution which they sometimes call in aid. This, too, should be known in every country of the world.
We can safely trust to UN decolonisation procedure, if we read the texts carefully and exploit them carefully in the interests of common sense, where we now stand. The United Nations cannot by its nature approve the suppression of freedom, of political freedom, in any country by another, nor can it approve the invasion of any country by another, nor can it assist in the assimilation of any country or people by another. We have nothing to fear from the United Nations. It is, by its foundation document and all subsequent documents, on our side in this struggle. Let us have faith in it and let us try every move in it as we go forward.
My Lords, I would like to think that any time now—I think it was Lord Molloy who raised the point earlier—we shall start thinking about what to do after it is all over. We should bear in mind that there will be two things to do. One will be what I fear will be a great British political upheaval, and that will be the post mortem on how we ever got into this mess, which is agreed by all parties. The other, I hope, will be a new régime for the South Atlantic, in which régime all the existing elements of internationality, the Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed Treaty and all other such will be drawn upon, for a new period of hope and peace down
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there. This can be the answer to many of the forebodings that have been expressed in the House this afternoon.
7.26 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, I suggest that there have been two rather overriding points which have emerged during the welter of discussion on this subject in the last six weeks or so. The junta in Buenos Aires seriously miscalculated the effect of their military occupation of the islands on this country, which was doubtless the result of their need for some popular external adventure to distract attention from their disastrous internal economic situation. They probably now recognise their error, but having aroused public emotion to the extent that they have, there is a point in the process of climbing down beyond which they cannot go without being, I should have thought, in some danger either of assassination or of their being replaced by some perhaps even more regrettable régime of a semi-communist nature, which would probably try to form some connection with the Soviet Union and Cuba. This, no doubt, accounts for the junta's intransigent and prevaricating attitude in general.
We for our part, and in spite of such sinister possibilities, nevertheless have to demonstrate, in the first place, that aggression does not pay, and in the second place, that the interests of the islanders—and I repeat the interests of the islanders—must be protected. I think that most of us, in this House at any rate, agree that this should be our general objective. The essential question, therefore, which I think this nation must now answer is, would it or would it not have been possible, in the negotiations which we have quite rightly been conducting along with simultaneous application of the necessary force, to achieve these general objectives, even on the basis of some compromise, without going to the admittedly dangerous extremity of actually evicting the invaders by all possible military means?
I am indeed glad—I was rather apprehensive that this would not happen, until now—that Parliament is now having the opportunity of expressing its view on this rather crucial point before any landing in the islands takes place. We are now, happily, in possession of our last proposals, our final proposals, and what on the face of it seems to be their virtual rejection, almost total rejection by the Argentine junta. If indeed this really is the junta's last word, then I would agree with what I feel is a majority of noble Lords here, that the greater part of what they propose would be unacceptable to any British Government. It would, I suggest, have been preferable—I think this is perhaps the view of some of us here—if we had been given the opportunity for studying the actual text of the Argentine's reply, instead of a kind of summary with, as it were, marginal comments by Her Majesty's Government. I would suggest to the noble Lord who is to reply that perhaps we could have the full text in our hands before very long; I hope so.
But certainly if the summary is at all accurate—and I imagine it is—then, it would appear to be of small use in continuing the negotiations. On the other hand, I certainly agree with my noble friend Lord Kennet on the SDP Benches that on the face of it there does not seem any reason why we should now publicly withdraw the last proposals which we made to the Argentine Govern-

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ment, which seem to be, though they may have embodied some concessions on our part, inherently reasonable and might even at this last moment have formed the basis for some other proposals which could be generally acceptable to the United Nations.
Again, we have been told—at least I think we have been told—that the Secretary-General now has some proposals of his own. I am not exactly clear what they are, but I rather understand that, in the very near future, proposals are going to be put forward by him to the Security Council as his own ideas for a settlement. If that is so, and if they differ materially from the latest Argentine proposals and seem to be generally acceptable to the Security Council of the United Nations, should we not, in those circumstances, stay our hand until we have at least seriously considered the resulting situation?
If the Security Council definitely comes out by a majority in favour of some plan put up by the Secretary-General, are we—to put it frankly—going to veto that? What happens if the Americans accepted it and we rejected it? A very difficult situation would probably arise. I hope that it will not do so, but it may do so. Of course, if such proposals of the American General, or even of the Security Council, are immediately turned down or rejected by the Argentine Government, then clearly, there is nothing to be done. But supposing the Argentine Government accept? What then?
I realise that these are awkward, hypothetical questions, but I feel that the Government might at least consider them because they are possibilities. I repeat, speaking personally at any rate, that if the Argentine proposals, as recorded in the papers are really the last word, then I can see little hope of a peaceful settlement and would imagine that, if that really is so, then the only thing we can do is let nature take its course. But if there is a last hope of some reasonable compromise advanced by the Secretary-General or by the Security Council, then the Government should hold their hand until Parliament has also had at least the opportunity of expressing some kind of view on these proposals if they emerge. It may be that that would not be possible for military reasons—I do not know, and I am certainy not competent to express a view on that. But otherwise the situation is so grave, and the long-term results of military action are so unpredictable, that possibly a further delay of a day or two before the final decision is taken, might well be thought—and I think by most of us—to be desirable.
After all, although we must all hope with some confidence that military action, if taken, will be completely successful, the resulting situation will hardly be anything but rather grim. For we must assume, I imagine, that the Argentine Government would not sue for peace but would continue with war; that that would, I suppose, necessitate our maintaining, throughout the winter at least, a considerable garrison on the islands, backed up, one must imagine, by some kind of naval and air force contingents; and that the condition of the remaining islanders in the islands would be, to say the least, the reverse of pleasant.
No doubt the Government have contingency plans to cope with all these developments—at least I should sincerely hope so. We can all, except for my noble friend Lord Hooson—who has objected to the dispatch
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of the task force from the very start—and except for noble Lords of his persuasion, unite in saying that, had it not been for the task force, the Argentine Government would now certainly have been happily organising the complete absorption of the islanders, quite irrespective of their wishes, into the Argentine Republic. We can also—with the exception of the noble Lords to whom I have referred—surely congratulate all responsible for organising, at such short notice, the really remarkable display of strength, and appreciate the spirit of all those actually taking part in the expedition who are undoubtedly animated, and rightly animated, by a desire to liberate their countrymen and to show them that at least we have the will in this modern world to prove that it is both dangerous and unprofitable to fall, in violation of all your obligations, on innocent neighbours or at least on those who have friends capable of protecting them against attack.
Whatever battles they may now engage in—and we must still hope that these will be avoided—there is no doubt that they will acquit themselves in accordance with our great national traditions. But it would be far, far better if all this efficiency and enthusiasm were to result in some last-minute acceptable compromise on the interim arrangements following on any withdrawal of forces which would be acceptable, in the last resort, on both sides of the Atlantic. For then the task force would really have shown itself to be a peace force, successful in its primary mission and deserving the congratulations of all those interested in preserving both the authority of the United Nations and the rule of law throughout the world.
7.36 p.m.
Lord Stewart of Fulham: My Lords, what has given this debate its gravity is that we know that we meet at a time when the Government may be about to use military force on a greater scale than they have done so far. I do not attempt to prophesy in what form; those are matters the Government have the responsibility of deciding. But I think I would say that I do not take the view which seemed to come out from some speeches, that the Government are going to make a complete switch and abandon diplomacy altogether and concern themselves solely with invasion. I think that some speeches have been based upon that assumption. I do not think—and I hope that the Government can confirm this—that that is so. All we can say for certain, or nearly for certain, is that at present negotiations have run into a difficult passage, and that it seems to be probable that there will be an increase of military action.
We have, therefore, to consider the fearful responsibility that lies on us. What is this for? Is there a justifiable reason for taking the increased military action that is bound to result in loss of life? It is perhaps as well to remind ourselves how all this began. I stress that because a great many commentators now tend to discuss the matter as if the Falkland Islands had been a type of neutral territory in dispute between the two from the start. This was, and had been for a long time, our territory. What happened was that the Argentine Government committed something that was in law an aggression, in form a military invasion, with the immediate result of the suppression of the liberty of the islanders. I believe that that is a fact which the man

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and the woman in the street in this country have grasped. I think that that is the reason why the Government have a wide measure of support for the actions they are taking.
It is a very straightforward common sense proposition that if aggression occurs against your own territory, it is extremely desirable for you to repel it not only through your duty to your own subjects, but because of the peril to the whole world of allowing successful aggressions to take place. That is a simple and almost platitudinous statement, but it is one which the man in the street has always understood. He understood it when Mussolini was blustering about Abyssinia. In the often maligned League of Nations Union Ballot, which was of quite a different nature from general public beliefs at the present time, of the 10 million people who signed it more than 70 per cent. expressed themselves explicitly in favour of military sanctions against an aggressor, if necessary. This was the generation that had been through the First World War. The one thing that they thought they had learned there was, if you want to have a peaceful world, stop aggressors in their tracks. We have paid a fearful price for the neglect by governments of that advice. The responsibility has lain on governments and not on the man in the street.
What did we do in that situation? The British Government took the quite proper step of taking the matter to the Security Council, and they secured Resolution 502. At the same time they set to work preparing the task force. Several speeches raised the question whether the task force was necessary, prudent or desirable. I would ask the Government to give attention to the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker, who put forward projects of economic, diplomatic and financial sanctions. It would be useful to have the Government's opinion on how far we might be able to get on those lines and whether, indeed, they are even now thinking of trying to get joint action on those lines.
However, I am bound to add that it seems to me, from experience, that to make economic, financial and diplomatic sanctions effective you must have the military power and the other side must know that you are prepared to use it. At one stage, Mussolini announced that he did not care about other sanctions, but if people tried to stop the oil getting to him, he would bash their ships. The British Government then put themselves in the astounding position of saying that they would pursue all sanctions that were not likely to result in military conflict. This, of course, enables the aggressor to say what sanctions you may use against him. On the other hand, it is not a reason for ruling out economic and financial sanctions, so I shall be interested to hear the Government's thinking on this.
However, I am left with the conclusion that if we had not sent a task force, the general belief—not only of the Argentines, but of our friends, our critics and those who are indifferent to us in the world—would have been that we are not serious about rescuing the Falkland Islands. Therefore, I think that it was a necessary step.
At this point, I should like to comment on the speeches that have been made by those noble Lords—particularly my noble friends Lord Soper and Lord Noel-Baker—who have put forward what is generally called the pacifist position; that is to say, the position that it is entirely wrong in principle and in all circum-
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stances to use military force, particularly military force of the kind with which modern technology has supplied us. To my mind, the objection to that position—that it is always wrong to use military force—comes to this. It is a recipe for putting the government of the world into the hands of the most unscrupulous people in it. By all means, when a dispute exists, seek peaceful means of solution as long as there is any chance, but, if you take the position that you are never prepared to resort to force, the most unscrupulous will realise that and will take advantage of it.
I want to add this. We all respect the views held by those who are pacifists, but the showing of respect must be a mutual process. Our pacifist friends must understand that those of us who find it impossible to take that view, those of us who believe that there can be circumstances in which it is right to use force, reach that conclusion as a matter of morality and conscience just as the pacifist reaches his conclusion. This is not an argument between people who pursue strict morality on one side and those who are making concessions to expediency on the other. It is a genuine conflict of belief as to what is right and what is wrong.
We know the terrible results that can come from using military force, but we also saw during the last war half Europe groaning in servitude under Hitler and no prospect whatever of delivering those people from that tyranny except the ultimate armed victory of the Allies. It is that that some of us have in mind when we find that we cannot accept the pacifist view. But very clearly, if you do reject the pacifist view, you are under a heavy obligation to seek peace wherever it can be sought. The person who always assumes that you can get out of any difficulty without the use of armed force is, in my judgment, mistaken. The person who cheerfully barges in and assumes that the use of armed force is the first thing to go for is a dangerous fool in the modern world. If we reject pacifism, we must be prepared to work as hard as we can for conciliation and peaceful settlement.
My noble friend Lord Jenkins urged me not to be adulatory to the Government. I hope that I shall not be that, but the words are simply dragged out of me that when we consider, from the Government's Statement here, the record of what they have done to get a peaceful settlement, I think that we are bound to conclude that this is a good record. It is not a perfect record; no human endeavour is. But when we notice the willingness to accept what is sometimes called the Peruvian plan, and their own plan put forward in the annex at the end of the pamphlet, quite clearly those proposals do not spring from the mind and the heart of warmongers. They are the product of people who genuinely seek a peaceful solution.
This document has also had one interesting result. A little while ago the right honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in another place urged the Government to arm us with information about what proposals the Government had put forward and what they had refused, so that Parliament could judge whether the Government were handling the diplomacy rightly. The first answer of the Prime Minister was that that would not do at all, that it would be quite unconstitutional; it was the Government's job to make the choices and for Parliament to judge them afterwards.

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I have thought a good deal about this and it seems to me that on the constitutional argument the Prime Minister was probably right, but on common sense grounds the Leader of the Opposition had got it right. The interesting thing is that this, in fact, is what the Government have done or gone quite a long way to doing—informing both Houses of Parliament more fully of what was in their minds and how we had arrived at a position where negotiations apparently are, for the present, stopped. It was right, therefore, for the Government to put forward this document and I think it shows their degree of flexibility.
I should like to take up again a point that I made earlier. I take it that the Government will continue to negotiate whatever the military situation may bring. As I understand it, the Government have said that we cannot allow the process of negotiation to hamper our military judgments as to what to do with the force. To put it crudely, we shall not be put into the position where we are strung along by prevarications and delays for so long that the task force no longer becomes an effective instrument. That I perfectly well understand.
The Government believe then that the military and the diplomatic procedures go on side by side; that one does not necessarily take the place of the other. For example, if the Secretary-General or anybody comes forward with a new set of proposals, I presume that the Government will consider them. If a meeting of the Security Council is convened, I presume that the Government will attend. I presume that our ambassadors to the United States and to other relevant capitals will be on the lookout—that they will have quick eyes and ears—for any suggestions for a peaceable settlement; that, whatever the military situation, we shall have a continuation of diplomacy.
I agree that it may be a little while before any profitable or hopeful suggestion is put forward. The situation looks a bit bleak at present, but I do not believe that will be permanent. In my judgment, the more resolute we show ourselves militarily, the more likely we are to find reasonable proposals coming along from one quarter or another.
I am not going to attempt to give the Government military advice. This really is a field where the Prime Minister's doctrine of the responsibility of Government does hold good. Parliament cannot be asked to weigh up and judge in advance what is the right military strategy. The Government face then this rather harsh position. They must make the decision. The Opposition cannot give them any help on that, because it cannot have the information necessary to form a good opinion. And yet it must be known that if the Government get it wrong, the Opposition are fully entitled to attack the Government for so doing, as Mr. Neville Chamberlain's Government was attacked for its mishandling of the Norwegian campaign.
The Opposition cannot have foresight. It cannot be provided in advance with all the military facts for foresight, but it remains perfectly entitled to use hindsight, and if things go wrong to blame the Government for it. Governments therefore that engage in military operations do so—if this is not too unkind a phrase—with a rope around their neck. Perhaps it is just as well that that should be so, so that no Governments put themselves in that position frivolously or
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wantonly. I think we should take into account when we weigh up the Government's handling of the matter that all the evidence shows that the Argentine Government has at no time shown any serious intention at all of making peace. They have been swaying this way and that, but every time you came to examine what they said you were driven to that conclusion.
There have been several mentions of overseas opinion on our actions. I am inclined to think that some of the speeches we have heard have painted too black a picture of what overseas opinion towards us is. I must say that I, for my part, was astounded at the first reaction of the Common Market countries to agree immediately to the month's sanctions. I think we were jolly lucky to get that. Let us ask this question for the moment: suppose the French—and they have quite a lot of islands here and there—had had a couple of their islands pinched from them by an aggressor. How indignant would the ordinary Englishman, or Englishwoman, in the street feel about that? What demands would he make on his Government to go to the assistance of France?
The same is true, I am afraid, of nearly every country. I thought, therefore, that the EEC countries showed a remarkable measure of goodwill, and it was not altogether difficult to understand why some of them could not keep it up as much as we should have liked. It is possible, of course, that if the Government were a little more tactful in their handling of EEC matters generally, we might have got a better result on that issue, but I had better not pursue that line of argument in this particular context.
I do know this: what would be the reaction of overseas opinion if we were simply to give up, bring the task force back, and agree to some form of words that would leave the islands effectively under Argentine control, which is the real test? If we did that, many nations might sympathise with us; none of them would respect us any more or consider that what we had said or done mattered in any serious sense. I do not think I am exaggerating. I believe that that would be the result.
I want to turn finally to what we do in the future. I would say myself, as I did in the first debate we had on this, that this might be a long and expensive business. We still do not know yet how long, and how expensive in blood or treasure. But it will certainly end in victory on the main issue, the liberty of the islanders, for us. What follows from that, that we have to do? It is agreed that we have to have an inquiry as to why the islands were ever overrun in the first place. It is I think increasingly agreed that the country has to take an entirely fresh look at its defence policy, and particularly its naval forces. We have then to consider the future of the Antarctic. I commend to the Government the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Shackleton that we should, in effect, consider together the Antarctic, the Falklands, South Georgia and the other islands, and see what arrangement we could make that would have sufficient international approval to make the islands secure in the future. I am propounding, I know, a number of problems which are much easier to formulate than to answer, but we had better have them in mind as things we must tackle when the immediate emergency is over.

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Another thing we ought to take a look at is the working of the United Nations. There ought to be some way in which it is made easier after you have got an explicit verdict in your favour to get that verdict enforced. Can we look again at the possibility of a permanent, standing United Nations force? I see enormous difficulties about that, but I think that if the world wants to keep the peace it has to get there some day. Another lesson we have learned is to ask what we can do about the selling of arms right across the world, between so many countries. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, who is to reply, was questioned on this the other day. He will forgive me if I say that he seemed to be giving a rather stalling reply. He told us repeatedly that these things were kept under review. I know perfectly well that, in his position as a middle ranking Minister in the Government, he could not, in answering those questions, have said any more. We know that he is always very willing to be as helpful and responsive to the House as he can.
It clearly is an appalling situation that we should be now engaged in this tangle with the Argentine and both sides are using weapons made in the same countries; some of our own, some of our allies'. It is not at all easy to see the answer to that, but it is one of those problems mankind has to find the answer to. My noble friend Lord Noel-Baker won great fame, deservedly, for his book many years ago on the private manufacture of armaments. But today of course the villain of the piece is not so much the greedy and unscrupulous private manufacturer of armaments as the behaviour of governments generally which have never really tackled the question of what principles we ought to observe about those to whom we shall sell armaments and those to whom we shall refuse them.
Those are things that we have to tackle. We have to consider the necessity for resolution, in military matters if necessary, and the task of making peace in the future. It has always seemed to me that what we call civilisation rests on a blend of two kinds of virtue—the tough virtues such as courage, self-discipline and loyalty, and the gentler virtues of a sense of fairness, appreciation of beauty, kindness, and so on. Get a community that has the gentler virtues without the tougher ones, and it will he overrun by some more unscrupulous opponent. Get a community that has the tough virtues without the gentle ones and you will get monstrous horrors like Nazism. You have to preserve the two together.
In my judgment, the greatest practitioners of the art of politics have been men like Abraham Lincoln, who were prepared to use military force when, and for as long as, it was necessary, but never loved it for its own sake and were concerned with the task of reconstruction when the conflict was over. So I may venture to conclude by reminding noble Lords, if they will forgive me, of some of the words of his second inaugural address: "With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in".
8 p.m.
Lord Belstead: My Lords, as with each day this crisis has deepened, the broad measure of support which the Government have received from your
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Lordships' House has been a source of great encouragement and strength, and speeches from most parts of the House today, and the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, most particularly, have shown that together we have stood by the principles which have been strengthened, together we face the grave consequences of our stand for freedom, democracy and the rule of law.
Though the details of the diplomatic initiatives have of necessity to remain unexplained as the weeks have gone by—and of course upon military secrecy the lives of servicemen depends—nonetheless in our debates over the weeks your Lordships have been able to make many suggestions and proposals which the Government have been able to follow up and put to some use in our negotiations.
From the beginning seven weeks ago the Government were faced with a choice of three courses of action. The first was simply to acquiesce in an act of aggression. Undoubtedly the Argentines expected that and calculated that occupation of the islands would gradually have become a fact of history. The second course of action was to take steps to eject them from the islands by force. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter entitles us to take such steps. But we are a member of the United Nations Security Council and we have special responsibilities for promoting the peaceful solution of disputes, and we have kept those responsibilities very much in mind.
The third course was the one which the Government, with the general support of your Lordships' House, have been pursuing. It was to make clear our readiness to repel aggression and our ability to reclaim our own possessions; but at the same time we would take advantage of the time needed to bring military pressure to bear to put in train a whole process of diplomatic endeavours designed to achieve a peaceful solution. The British Government's first action, after securing the United Nations condemnation of Argentine aggression, was to despatch a task force.
Many voices at that time were already urging diplomatic mediation. Attempts at diplomatic mediation followed immediately. Mr. Haig, in a succession of exhausting journeys, spared no effort to find some basis on which the Security Council resolution could be implemented. He produced final proposals which the British Government were ready to consider. But the Argentinians rejected Mr. Haig's proposals. From the start, it had seemed to us that Mr. Haig was the mediator most likely to succeed. But after the rejection by the Argentine of Mr. Haig's proposals, a Latin American leader, President Belaunde of Peru, came forward with his own ideas. A set of proposals was put forward which could have led to a cease-fire. The British Government were willing—and were said by my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the House of Commons to be willing—to accept the final version of those proposals for an interim agreement. But Argentina rejected the proposals of the President of Peru. Despite her protestations to the contrary, Argentina has throughout shown her lack of interest in any peaceful settlement.
On 1st April the President of the United Nations Security Council had formally appealed to Argentina not to invade the Falkland Islands, yet it was on the following day that Argentina invaded. On 3rd April

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the United Nations Security Council passed the mandatory Resolution No. 502 demanding a cessation of hostilities and an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands. It was the same day that Argentina took South Georgia. Mr. Haig's efforts were thwarted by Argentina. It was Argentina who rejected the proposals springing from the initiative of the President of Peru.
Senor Perez de Cuellar then began his own series of consultations. The United Nations Secretary-General has worked valiantly to bring the two sides together. His latest suggestions—and they are suggestions (that is how he describes them) not a draft agreement—show recognition of the reasonableness of our proposals. But, as my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal made clear, the suggestions of the United Nations Secretary-General differ from our proposals in certain important respects. The point to which I would draw particular attention, however, is that they are also at total variance with what Argentina has shown she is prepared to accept. That is the reason why we have instructed our representative at the United Nations to tell the Secretary-General that before we could consider negotiating on the basis of his paper, we would need to see substantive Argentine comments on it.
The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, attributed the pass which we have reached today to the United Nations breaking off negotiations. With respect to the noble Lord, that is not the case. The fact is that the position taken up by Argentina on the four crucial issues—of the role of the islanders during an interim administration, the rules for a withdrawal, the position of the d ependencies and the pre-judgment of negotiations—is wholly at variance with the Secretary-General's latest suggestions.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked, in effect: Why could the United Kingdom proposals nonetheless not simply be left lying on the table?—proposals which, I would say in passing to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, are printed as an annex to the Paper which was placed in the Printed Paper Office earlier today. We are prepared, even having reached the pass we have reached, to try equally hard again in the future. I give that assurance to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart. I would say, however, to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that a carefully balanced offer has been made at a particular stage in a complex negotiation, and it cannot just be left lying on the table.
The Argentines, having rejected our offer, cannot be allowed to think that they can now continue their unlawful occupation of the Falkland Islands—continue, for instance, their attacks on the task force. Our soldiers, sailors and airmen in the South Atlantic have done a wonderful job, and it is our duty at all times to ensure that their safety and operational effectiveness is a first priority. The Argentines cannot simply continue their diplomatic prevarication and their public misrepresentation of our position and then hope, with our proposals still lying on the table, to come back a few days or weeks later and casually pick up a position which we had put to them previously.
The debate has demonstrated that your Lordships' House deeply regrets that we may now stand on the brink of further conflict. But we must stand by our principles. We cannot betray them. Anyone who
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feels that Britain should have gone further to meet Argentinian demands should consider for a moment what acceptance of Argentine demands would mean in practice. Their aggression would be rewarded and, as was made clear by my noble friend Lord Buxton in his speech, the islanders' future would be gravely compromised.
What would have been the consequences of accepting the Argentine proposals? First, I ask your Lordships to consider the military consequences. Argentina wanted the armed forces of both countries withdrawn to their normal area of operations. For Argentina, that would have meant a withdrawal of 300 to 400 miles. For Britain, it would have meant redeployment to the North Atlantic. How could anyone feel confident that Argentina would not exploit that disparity again in due course? How could the Falkland islanders live in confidence with such a threat hanging over them?
Secondly, the Argentinian proposals would have transformed the islanders' way of life. Their executive and legislative councils would have been abolished. Their only influence—the only influence of the islanders—would have lain in the possibility of providing advisers, a possibility which was apparently to be enjoyed in equal numbers with the handful of Argentines who lived on the Falklands before the crisis.
I always listen to the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, with attention, as indeed, the House always does, but I must say that I disagreed deeply with his speech. The noble Lord is a kindly and humane man, and if he will not mind my saying so, I was surprised that never once, I think, did he mention the interests of the islanders—
Lord Hooson: My Lords, will the noble Lord give way? That is not correct. I said that I did not think the action was in the interests of the islanders. It was one of the very first points that I made.
Lord Belstead: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord. I absolutely withdraw my remark as being inaccurate and unfair to the noble Lord. However, perhaps the noble Lord will answer the question how, if nothing is done, free people are to continue to live under the heel of an aggressor?
Thirdly, in terms of the consequences of accepting the Argentine proposals, the negotiations would have taken place in conditions which would have meant that in the event of a solution not having been reached—and this was the Argentine proposal—by an arbitrary deadline, there would have arisen a dangerous situation which Argentina would only too well have been able to exploit.
I think that I have said enough about the Argentine proposals to compare the consequences of them with what the British Government themselves have put forward and have published in the paper that has been before your Lordships' House, to show that the Argentines have taken up a wholly intransigent position.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and indeed many other noble Lords, have spoken this afternoon about the need for us to get our case across to domestic and world opinion. Since the very beginning of the crisis we really have done our best to mount an intense information campaign covering the aspects—historical, legal, and in relation to current events. All the important Government statements have gone immediately

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to our British posts abroad, for them to disseminate them in the countries which they serve. Our ambassadors and their staffs have spoken frequently to the media and to opinion-formers in numerous countries. I am sure that the noble Lord would agree that no one has done that more remarkably than our Ambassador in Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson, and our permanent representative at the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons.
The Central Office of Information has produced a film, and a pamphlet, to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, very fairly referred. The pamphlet, entitled, The Falkland Islands—The Facts, has had a print run of 60,000 in six different languages. The noble Lord wondered whether it is on the bookstalls. I understand that it is. Broadcasts by the BBC External Services in Spanish to Latin America have been increased from four hours per day before the crisis to five and a half hours now, and of course the BBC broadcasts to the Falklands are increased.
In saying that I am not crossing swords with the noble Lord and other noble Lords over this point. I know that there has been concern about it in your Lordships' House. It is a matter which has come very much from your Lordships' House and the Government have listened to it and tried to act upon it. I give an undertaking this evening that, in addition to what I have just said, we shall try to continue to do better.
Finally, I should like to turn to a general question that was asked by both the noble Lords, Lord Stewart of Fulham and Lord Kennet. The noble Lord, Lord Stewart, asked, What about economic sanctions, what about extra pressure from economic sanctions? The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked about the pressure which could be applied by the banks upon the financial life of Argentina. We believe that sanctions are placing considerable strains upon the Argentine economy and undermining her ability to prosecute the military campaign. But there must be doubt as to whether economic sanctions alone would be sufficient to force Argentina to capitulate, at least in the short-term. Let us remember that we are not talking of a democracy; we are talking of a dictatorship. Now—
Lord Kennet: My Lords, I was talking about "as well". not "alone".
Lord Belstead: That is a fair point. As well as military operations, the economic sanctions, as I say, are having an effect, but we do not believe that in the short-term they would necessarily bring about capitulation. The noble Lord asked me direct whether we could not declare Argentina in default on bank loans. As I understood him, that was a question put to me. That would be a matter for the banks involved. But to declare Argentina in default would absolve her only from paying her debts, totalling £35 billion—£5.8 billion to United Kingdom banks. The immediate effect of that would probably be, paradoxically, to help Argentina and to harm the international banking system and British interests.
Lord Morris: My Lords, I should like to raise a point with the noble Lord before he concludes. I am sure that he is, quite rightly, of the opinion that he missed
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very little by not being in the Chamber when I was speaking, but I asked one specific question and it would be very helpful if he would give me an answer to it. It is simply whether Her Majesty's Government will bear in mind the legal occupation of Southern Thule and the South Sandwich Islands?
Lord Belstead: If I may turn to my noble friend Lord Morris, I would say that certainly we shall bear that point very closely in mind. This is one of the sticking points between the Argentine proposals and the other proposals, in that the Argentine proposals would wish to treat the dependencies along with the Falkland Islands.
The pass to which the diplomatic negotiations have now come is cause for the deepest concern, and though the negotiations may not succeed, I again confirm (in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stewart) that it does not necessarily mean that diplomacy is at an end. Any military measures that we are forced to adopt will be undertaken with maximum restraint consonant with achieving our objectives and with a proper regard for the safety of our forces. Argentinian withdrawal can still take place by peaceful means, but the proposals that we have put forward have been rejected, and any fresh negotiations would have to be on a new basis.
The Government's original decision to combine military, economic and diplomatic pressure in the hope of a peaceful settlement has at every turn been met by Argentine intransigence. But that does not mean that we were wrong to pursue that course. The Argentine invasion was a criminal act of folly, which our responsibility to the islanders and our duty to the rule of law requires us to put right. We face a very critical situation, but we face it with determination.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

  THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE
  THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE
  UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNFAIR DISMISSALS
  UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNFAIR DISMISSALS
  NAPHILL BUNKER: COST
  NAPHILL BUNKER: COST
  THE NATIONAL TRUST: LEASES OF LAND TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
  THE NATIONAL TRUST: LEASES OF LAND TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
  SHEEP AND THE CONTROL OF DOGS
  SHEEP AND THE CONTROL OF DOGS
  WINFRITH HEATH: PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER STATION
  WINFRITH HEATH: PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER STATION