Sitting of 14 April 1982

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock, notice having been given by MR. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 122 (Earlier meeting of the House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Resolved,
That this House, at its rising this day, do adjourn till Monday 19 April; and that, at this day's sitting, Mr. Speaker do adjourn the House at half-past Seven o'clock without putting any Question.—[Mr. Jopling.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

  Falkland Islands
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Jopling.]
  2.35 pm
  The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): It is right, at this time of grave concern over the Falkland Islands and their people, that Parliament should be recalled so that the Government may report and the House may discuss the latest developments.
  Our objective, endorsed by all sides of the House in recent debates, is that the people of the Falkland Islands shall be free to determine their own way of life and their own future. The wishes of the islanders must be paramount. But they cannot be freely expressed, let alone implemented, while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues.
  That is why our immediate goal in recent days has been to secure the withdrawal of all Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council and to secure the restoration of British administration. Our strategy has been based on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic pressures and I should like to deal with each of these in turn.
  First of all, we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic effort. This, too, is in accordance with the Security Council resolution. In this approach we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world, and also by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig, who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires.
  On his first visit last Thursday we impressed upon him the great depth of feeling on this issue, not only of Parliament but of the British people as a whole. We may not express our views in the same way as the masses gathered in Buenos Aires, but we feel them every bit as strongly—indeed, even more profoundly, because Britons are involved. We made clear to Mr. Haig that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not affected by the act of invasion; and that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.
  On his second visit on Easter Monday and yesterday, Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion—ideas concerning the withdrawal of troops and its supervision, and an interim period during which negotiations on the future of the islands would be conducted. Our talks were long and detailed, as the House would expect. Some things we could not consider because they flouted our basic principles. Others we had to examine carefully and suggest alternatives. The talks were constructive and some progress was made. At the end of Monday, Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution.
  Late that night, however, Argentina put forward to him other proposals which we could not possibly have accepted, but yesterday the position appeared to have eased. Further ideas are now being considered and Secretary Haig has returned to Washington before proceeding, he hopes shortly, to Buenos Aires. That meeting, in our view, will be crucial.

  1147
  These discussions are complex, changing and difficult, the more so because they are taking place between a military junta and a democratic Government of a free people—one which is not prepared to compromise that democracy and that liberty which the British Falkland Islanders regard as their birthright.
  We seek, and shall continue to seek, a diplomatic solution, and the House will realise that it would jeopardise that aim were I to give further details at this stage. Indeed, Secretary Haig has been scrupulous in his adherence to confidentiality in pursuit of the larger objective. We shall continue genuinely to negotiate through the good offices of Mr. Haig, to whose skill and perseverance I pay warm tribute.
  Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if they are backed by military strength. At 5 am London time on Monday 12 April, the maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falkland Islands came into effect. From that time any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within this zone are treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British forces.
  We see this measure as the first step towards achieving the withdrawal of Argentine forces. It appears to have exerted influence on Argentina, whose navy has been concentrated outside the zone. If the zone is challenged, we shall take that as the clearest evidence that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned. We shall then take the necessary action. Let no one doubt that.
  The naval task force is proceeding with all speed towards the South Atlantic. It is a formidable force, comprising two aircraft carriers, five guided missile destroyers, seven frigates, an assault ship with five landing ships, together with supporting vessels. The composition of the force and the speed with which it was assembled and put to sea clearly demonstrate our determination.
  Morale on board the ships in the task force is very high. The ships and aircraft are carrying out exercises on passage, and by the time the force arrives off the Falklands it will be at a very high state of fighting efficiency.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: Am I right in thinking that if the task force arrives off the Falklands there will be sufficient air cover against a land-based air force from the Argentine?
  The Prime Minister: I shall have something to say about air cover in a moment. I have every confidence in all aspects of this task force.
  A number of civilian ships have now been chartered or requisitioned. These include the "Canberra" for use as a troop ship and the "Uganda", which will be available as a hospital ship. Recourse to the merchant marine is traditional in time of naval emergency and its response has been wholehearted on this occasion as in the past.
  Men and equipment continue to be flown out to Ascension Island to meet up with the task force. These additional elements will enhance the fighting capability of the force and the range of operations which can be undertaken. Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft are now patrolling the South Atlantic in support of our fleet.
  Sustaining a substantial force 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom is a considerable undertaking. As the Ministry of Defence announced this morning, additional measures are now in hand to provide extra capability for the force over an extended period. In particular, the second
  1148
  assault ship, HMS "Intrepid", is being recommissioned for operational service. She will significantly add to the amphibious capability of the task force now entering the South Atlantic, which already contains her sister ship HMS "Fearless".
  Arrangements are in hand to adapt a large cargo ship for the sea lift of additional Harriers. This will nearly double the size of the Harrier force in the South Atlantic. All these aircraft have a formidable air combat and ground attack capability.
  Our diplomacy is backed by strength, and we have the resolve to use that strength if necessary.
  The third aspect of our pressure against Argentina has been economic. We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own, and we have achieved a heartening degree of success. The most significant measure has been the decision of our nine partners in the European Community to join us not just in an arms embargo but also in stopping all imports from Argentina.
  This is a very important step, unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision. Last year about a quarter of all Argentina's exports went to the European Community. The effect on Argentina's economy of this measure will therefore be considerable and cannot be without influence on her leaders in the present crisis. I should like warmly to thank our European partners for rallying to our support. It was an effective demonstration of Community solidarity.
  The decision cannot have been easy for our partners, given the commercial interests at stake, but they were the first to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands, it would be encouraged the world over.
  Other friends too have been quick to help, and I should like to thank Australia, New Zealand and Canada for their sturdy and swift action. They have decided to ban imports from Argentina, to stop export credits and to halt all sales of military equipment. New Zealand has also banned exports to Argentina. We are grateful also to many other countries in the Commonwealth which have supported us by condemning the Argentine invasion.
  What have the Argentines been able to produce to balance this solidarity in support of our cause? Some Latin American countries have, of course, repeated their support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty. We always knew they would. But only one of them has supported the Argentine invasion, and nearly all have made clear their distaste and disapproval that Argentina should have resorted to aggression.
  Almost the only country whose position has been shifting towards Argentina is the Soviet Union. We can only guess at the cynical calculations which lie behind this move. But Soviet support for Argentina is hardly likely to shake the world's confidence in the justice of our cause and it will not alter our determination to achieve our objectives.
  One of our first concerns has been and remains the safety of the British subjects who have been caught up in the consequences of the crisis. They include, apart from the Falkland Islanders themselves, the marines and the British Antarctic survey scientists on South Georgia and the British community in Argentina. In spite of all our efforts, we have not been able to secure reliable information about the 22 marines who were on South

  1149
  Georgia and the 13 British Antarctic survey personnel who are believed to have been evacuated from Grytviken at the same time.
  According to Argentine reports, these people are on a ship heading for the mainland. There are also reports that the six marines and the one member of the crew of "Endurance" who were captured on the Falkland Islands are now in Argentina.
  Finally, there are 13 members of the British Antarctic survey team and two other British subjects who remain on South Georgia. The survey team's most recent contacts, on 12 April, with their headquarters in this country indicate that they are safe and well.
  On 5 April, we asked the Swiss Government, as the protecting power, to pursue all these cases urgently with the Argentine Government. We trust that their efforts will soon produce the information which we and their families so anxiously seek.
  On the same day we also sought the assistance of the International Red Cross with regard to the position of the population in the Falkland Islands. So far the Argentine Government have not responded to its request to visit the islands.
  Last night, a party of 35 people from the islands, including the Chief Secretary, arrived in Montevideo and a report from the Chief Secretary on conditions in the islands is expected at any moment.
  Recently the Government received a message from the British Community Council in Argentina urging a peaceful solution to the present conflict and asking that due consideration be given to the strong British presence in Argentina and the size of the British community there. We have replied, recognising the contribution which the British community has made to the development of Argentina—but making it plain that we have a duty to respond to the unprovoked aggression against the Falkland Islands and insisting that Argentina should comply with the mandatory resolution of the Security Council calling upon it to withdraw its troops.
  Mr. Dalyell: Before the right hon. Lady comes to the end of her speech, I wish to repeat my question about air power. Does the right hon. Lady not remember what happened to "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse"? Does she not know that there are at least 68 Skyhawks as well as the Mirages and R5–30s in the Argentine Air Force? That is a formidable force if the task force is to go near the Falkland Islands. Will the right hon. Lady answer my question?
  The Prime Minister: I have indicated to the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) and to the House that we have taken steps to double the provision of the Harriers. We believe that that will provide the air cover that the hon. Gentleman and the House seek. I trust that he and the House will express confidence in our naval, marine and air forces. That is what they are at least entitled to have from the House.
  We are also being urged in some quarters to avoid armed confrontation at all costs and to seek conciliation. Of course, we too want a peaceful solution, but it was not Britain that broke the peace. If the argument of no force at any price were to be adopted at this stage it would serve only to perpetuate the occupation of those very territories which have themselves been seized by force.
  In any negotiations over the coming days we shall be guided by the following principles. We shall continue to
  1150
  insist on Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and dependencies. We shall remain ready to exercise our right to resort to force in self-defence under article 51 of the United Nations charter until the occupying forces leave the islands. Our naval task force sails on towards its destination. We remain fully confident of its ability to take whatever measures may be necessary. Meanwhile, its very existence and its progress towards the Falkland Islands reinforce the efforts we are making for a diplomatic solution.
  That solution must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the islanders shall remain paramount. There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the administration which they enjoyed before Argentina committed aggression. It may he that their recent experiences will have caused their views on the future to change, but until they have had the chance freely to express their views, the British Government will not assume that the islanders' wishes are different from what they were before.
  We have a long and proud history of recognising the right of others to determine their own destiny. Indeed, in that respect we have an experience unrivalled by any other nation in the world. But that right must be upheld universally, and not least where it is challenged by those who are hardly conspicuous for their own devotion to democracy and liberty.
  The eyes of the world are now focused on the Falkland Islands. Others are watching anxiously to see whether brute force or the rule of law will triumph. Wherever naked aggression occurs it must be overcome. The cost now, however high, must be set against the cost we would one day have to pay if this principle went by default. That is why, through diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, through military means, we shall persevere until freedom and democracy are restored to the people of the Falkland Islands.
  2.54 pm
  Mr. Michael Foot: I thank the Prime Minister for responding to our request that Parliament should be recalled today. It was a wise decision and I thank the right hon. Lady for taking it.
  I wish to make one matter clear at the beginning. I do not say this with any sense of grievance, but there have been no private discussions between the right hon. Lady and me or between my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the Foreign Secretary on these questions. That is a perfectly reasonable way for us to proceed but I mention it now because it underlines the fact that we are free to make our judgments on matters as they arise. That is what we intend to do. We shall continue to do what we have done ever since the difficulties and the crisis in the Falkland Islands arose. We shall continue to act and respond in what we conceive to be the best interests of our country. Included high among those interests in this dispute is that the matter should be settled by peaceable means. The right hon. Lady has also declared her interest in that procedure. I believe that that is the overwhelming desire of the British people. The more that is understood throughout the world, the better for us all.
  Mr. Russell Johnston: This is an important point. If the Prime Minister invited the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) to have the discussions to which he referred, would he agree to do so?
  Mr. Foot: I would wish to see the circumstances. That has been the position in the House for a long time. That has been the position of Opposition parties in previous circumstances. We have to make up our minds but I repeat and underline, and anyone who has seen what we have sought to do over the past weeks will understand, that we shall make our response in the best interests of what we consider to be serving the country and enabling us to achieve the purposes that have been commonly described.
  Before I turn to some of the aspects of the Prime Minister's report to the House, I should like to underline some aspects of the matter, since it is absolutely necessary to do so. The aggression occurred some time ago but that does not make the aggression any better. It does not mean that we should in any sense forget the origin of the crisis. It was an unprovoked aggression. That is why the problem has arisen and until that is dealt with properly it will remain a major factor in the situation. We certainly do not wish anyone to disguise that fact.
  Another pre-eminent aspect is the threat to the United Nations charter and the influence that that charter may have throughout the world. It is that charter that is attacked. It is a resolution of the United Nations that calls upon the Argentine to withdraw its assault. It is that charter, and the United Nations as an institution, which are under threat. That is a matter of major importance in the crisis but it is not only the United Nations charter that is involved.
  There is also an Organisation of American States, which has a definition of what aggression is or can be. I should like to quote it to the House because in a sense it might be said that on the other side of the Atlantic they have what might be regarded as a stricter definition of aggression even than we under the United Nations charter. It might be described as a more fastidious definition. Article 17 stipulates:
  "The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or other means of coercion shall be recognised."
  The signatories to that declaration include both the Government of the Argentine and the Government of the United States of America. Indeed, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States resides in Buenos Aires, whereas the organisation and the secretariat operate from Washington. The definition, which applies exactly to what has happened in the Falkland Islands, is one that should be recognised both in the Argentine and in Washington. In both places it is essential, I believe, that the real meaning of aggression and the real requirements of the charter and of the Organisation of American States itself should be upheld. There is no part of the world where a recrudescence of international anarchy in the sense of aggression being allowed to be undertaken with impunity would cause such dangerous results as in Central and South America.
  The United Nations itself has a strong interest in ensuring that there is no departure from those doctrines. A letter appeared in The Guardian yesterday from some citizens of Guyana. They described what they considered to be a possible threat to their country. They compared it with the situation in the Falklands. They have some right to make the comparison. I remember that, at the time of the Commonwealth Conference, the Prime Minister of
  1152
  Guyana came to see me about the matter. I am sure that he also visited the Foreign Office to describe his anxieties about what might be done by neighbouring Venezuela.
  If the excuses for the Falklands invasion were to be proved valid, Guyana would indeed have every reason to be afraid. There is all the more reason for fear when the people of Guyana read the same day of the special arrangements now being made by the United States Government for the sale of jets to Venezuela. According to an account from Washington in the New York Herald Tribune yesterday, more sophisticated jets are being sold to Venezuela, a country next door to Guyana—which is threatened with possible invasion—than to any other American state. I hope that one of the longer term outcomes of this crisis, once it is satisfactorily settled, is that the British Government, the United States Government and all the Governments concerned will look into the whole question of the supply of arms to these different states to see how the unrestrained, or scarcely restrained, supply of arms to these states has contributed to the crisis.
  I know that the right hon. Lady may say that these matters are subject to close supervision. The supervision over recent arms supplies to the Argentine, and the supervision at this moment, have not been sufficiently close to prevent sophisticated weapons being sold to Venezuela. There is no part of the world where there is a greater danger from unprovoked aggression being allowed to proceed with impunity than in Central and South America. I believe that the Government are right and the British people are right to act on that principle.
  It is partly because I subscribe to that principle that I support the dispatch of the task force. I support it because I believe that it can have strong diplomatic results. The right hon. Lady has also stressed this factor, as she is entitled to do. If there were no task force, I do not believe that there would have been any prospect of negotiations with the junta in the Argentine. If any of my hon. Friends, or anyone else, were to say that this is not the case, I would say that I think they put too great a store on General Galtieri's good nature. I have no great faith in that. I believe that there has to be a combination of pressures. If, at the time of the dispatch of the task force or subsequently there were to be strong opposition in this country represented by the Labour Party to the dispatch of that force, my fear is that one of the consequences would have been to injure at least the world-wide support that we have received. It was of absolutely major importance, in the interests of the peaceable settlement of this dispute, that we should sustain in the highest degree the support that we have received from so many countries.
  I welcome what the right hon. Lady has had to say about the countries of the European Community. Many other countries have come forward to support us from the very first day of the aggression. Many of them have taken economic measures. Some of these measures will take a considerable time to have their effect. If anyone were to say that those measures should be pushed aside or impaired, I would say that this would only increase the dangers of a military clash. All those measures are a part of the means whereby we may secure what we all want—a peaceable settlement of this dispute. All those measures are designed to assist that objective. I hope that the right hon. Lady will consider some others.
  I acknowledge fully the tribute that the Prime Minister has paid to General Haig. All hon. Members must

  1153
  understand the appalling personal pressures under which he must have been placed by the service that he has done. We must, however, say to General Haig and to his Government that we believe that the case about aggression is clear. We believe that the vote of the United States at the United Nations was clear, as indeed was the vote of many other nations. Those votes, we believe, must be carried into effect. I am not seeking to detract from the efforts that General Haig has made and is still making to secure a settlement. I am not seeking to diminish them. That would be foolish. They are, however, not the only propositions for trying to secure a peaceable settlement. There was the proposal from the Peruvian Government for a "holdfire", or whatever term was used. At any rate, there was a proposal that I presume was made in good faith for trying to ensure more time for solving the matter. Even if the latest proposals from the American Administration do not succeed—I am not hoping that this will happen—it will not be the final failure. We must go on again and again seeking the peaceable method of settling this dispute. The other forms that are not exhausted include the United Nations itself. It has means whereby we can look afresh at the matter.
  I was eager at the beginning that this matter should be taken to the United Nations. It was proved to be right that we should have done so. It was right for the way in which the matter was presented. I congratulate the spokesman of this country who put his case there so effectively. It was the case itself, I believe, that enabled him to succeed. But we can go back at some stage—I do not say immediately—to the United Nations. We can prove to the whole world the simple truth that this country is not only determined to protect the rights of its people against aggression but that we seek to deal with these grave matters by the most peaceable means that are available to us. Anyone in the world who puts a different construction on what is happening misconstrues the real nature of what this country wishes to secure from the dispute.
  The Opposition will examine with care the course of discussions. I can understand that today the Prime Minister did not wish to go into full detail. I am not sure when we shall have a chance to see the report of the debate in the Parliament in Buenos Aires on these matters. These might reveal to us the Argentine negotiating position, but that would be a different question. However, it is right that the right hon. Lady and the Government should come back and report to the House frequently. They will not risk weakness from such a course. They will secure strength from it. That is what has happened on previous occasions. I am sure that the right hon. Lady will come and report to us. It would be extremely foolish, or worse, if, in the midst of such a state of affairs as she has described and we can describe any provocative action were taken by us that would disturb it. I do not believe that that is the right hon. Lady's intention the intention of the British Government, because I believe that we wish to secure that peaceable settlement. It may take a little time to achieve. In some respects there are difficulties because from our point of view some aspects might weaken over a period of time. Other factors, such as the economic pressures coming from many different parts of the world, might favour us.
  The right hon. Lady has referred to the crucial meeting that might take place when Mr. Haig goes to Buenos Aires. It may well be crucial, but that does not mean final, and I repeat that there are still other possibilities in the
  1154
  search for peace and in the attempt to re-establish the rights that the right hon. Lady fairly described at the beginning of her speech.
  I hope that out of this tragic and peculiar affair there may come a fresh vindication of the United Nations charter and a fresh vindication of the idea that no nation should resort to force or seek to establish its way through aggression against other nations. We can all live in a safer world if that principle is established. We can all live in a safer world if we uphold the doctrine that it is better for the people of the world to know that Britain keeps its word. The peace of the world has been assisted by that doctrine in the past, and I believe that it can be assisted by it in the present circumstances. I do not think that we need any further history lessons in that regard.
  We can play our best part in the dispute by the firmness with which we oppose the aggression and by the intelligence, the skill and determination with which we pursue peaceful methods of solution. By that combination we can live up to the highest ideals of Britain and make a contribution not merely to the safety, the security and well-being of the Falkland Islanders but to that of many other peoples, and in particular many small nations throughout the world.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I am under considerable pressure from hon. Members who wish to catch my eye. I hope that they will not come to the Chair to advance their cause.
  3.13 pm
  Dr. David Owen: The House has just listened to a speech from the Leader of the official Opposition with which I do not disagree in any particular. I pay tribute to what the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot) has said, because I think that he has spoken for the whole House. He has not sought in his speech in any way to embarrass the Government in their negotiating position.
  We all recognise that it is very difficult for either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary to reveal to the House the full nature of their negotiating position, and I do not wish to press them on that issue. It is also true to say that the House can sustain a democratic Government, and I believe that is what the debate will do.
  I believe that two messages will go out from the House as a result of the debate. There will be a reaffirmation—if it needs to be made—that we are resolute in our resistance to any form of armed aggression and that we are persistent and steady in our pursuit of peace. I believe that it is right that the Government—not yet able to come forward with a proposition for a peaceful and negotiated settlement—should continue with the deployment of the naval and marine forces. No one should weaken oar negotiating position by casting doubt as to the length of time or as to our intention to see the issue through.
  Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that the refusal of the Argentine Government for the past 50 years to take its case to the international court at the Hague only demonstrates its weakness?
  Dr. Owen: I think that there is no issue in the International Court concerning British sovereignty, and the Argentine Government know that. The question that has always been faced by British Governments is that we

  1155
  wish to give security to the Falkland Islanders, and, because of distance and geography, it has been necessary for us to talk to Argentine Governments in order to give security to the Falkland Islanders. That is why successive Governments have felt it necessary to discuss the question—giving, as the Prime Minister said, the utmost importance, the highest priority and the greatest attention to the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. That is the issue lying behind our position.
  We have made it very clear on many occasions that our retention of the administration and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands does not relate to the possibility of there being gas or oil in the region. We are not there for a commercial purpose. We are not balancing whether there is a positive or a negative trade. We are there because the islanders, successively through their Legislative Council, have made it clear that they wish us to be there. That is the issue which I, with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, believe will be upheld within the United Nations.
  One of the sacred principles of the United Nations is the right to self-determination, and it is on the right to self-determination that we have been prepared to trust the United Nations, and should still be prepared to trust the United Nations, to uphold the rights of the Falkland Islanders. It would be a very sad day for the United Nations if it were to desert from the principle of self-determination and to take account of force or of might.
  The United Nations must be the protector of the small countries. There are now—often as a result of British decolonisation—many very small independent states. They are watching with great anxiety what is happening in the Falkland Islands. If the interests of the Falkland Islands were to be ridden over roughshod, it would be extremely damaging to world security.
  Mr. Dalyell: If what the right hon. Gentleman says about the United Nations is true, why is it not a United Nations task force but a British task force that is on its way to the Falklands?
  Dr. Owen: The day may come when the United Nations will seek the power to enforce peace around the world. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the original charter envisaged a much more active role for the United Nations than it has been able to play. At the time of the formation of the military committee in 1945, it was envisaged that the United Nations would not only be able to dispatch peacekeeping forces after the event, but that it would be able to take action prior to an aggression.
  I believe that what has happened in recent years—and in particular what is now happening in the Falklands—may result in authority beginning to come back to the United Nations as more and more in an interrelated world it is realised that national governments are not capable of ensuring international security. But it is at this stage a fact of life that a United Nations peacekeeping force could not be mobilised, and the charter envisages the right of an independent nation to use all peaceful means to defend its interests. It is purely and rightly within the context of the United Nations charter that the British peacekeeping force has been dispatched. We are upholding a democratic right in so doing.
  The response of our allies and friends has given us great comfort. I pay tribute to the work that has been done by Secretary of State Haig. The United States is in a crucial
  1156
  position. We understand that, as it is helping to achieve a peaceful settlement, there are limits to what it can say. Obviously, it does not wish to be provocative to one side, but it has to be said—I believe that it is well understood by Secretary of State Haig and, I hope, by the entire United States Administration—that the United States cannot be neutral on the question of aggression. One cannot be neutral as between a fire and a fire brigade.
  I believe that it is extremely important that the United States—and most of its newspapers well understand this—is categoric with Argentina in private at this stage on the issue of the necessity of the withdrawal of Argentine forces to fulfil the Security Council resolution. There may come a time when the United States will have to wield that influence that it, and probably it alone, has on the Argentine.
  The other factor that has been of great comfort to the House has been the response of the member states of the European Community. We expected a firm response from Canada, Australia and New Zealand and we have not been let down. However, in recent months the ability of the European Community to respond unanimously in terms of sanctions when facing international outrages has not been, to put it at its most mild, the most dramatic demonstration of Community resolution.
  In this case—and perhaps it is appropriate when one of its member states is threatened and asking for support—the support has been unequivocal and very powerful. No one should underestimate the effect of the Community of Ten, with considerable imports from Argentina, imposing these economic sanctions. I gather that the Community is now examining the whole question of export credits. I would only say to the member states of the Community that they have to be ready to continue those sanctions for a long time.
  The overall support that we have had internationally is very important. I do not need to emphasise to the Prime Minister that the spirit behind the debate today is one for peaceful settlement without a shot being fired. Not one right hon. or hon. Member wishes to see any loss of life. However, there is a resolution and a firmness on the country when faced by this form of aggression.
  We have learnt lessons in this House from history. No one can draw too many parallels, but one thing that we do know is that weakness in the face of aggression only increases the appetite. There are serious problems in South America that will haunt the world over the years ahead. There are at least two countries, one of which is likely to be Argentina, that are drawing close to becoming nuclear weapon states. It will be incredibly important that international order is accepted not just in the rest of the world but in South America as well. There are grave troubles ahead for those economies, for those undemocratic military juntas and for the people who live in what are often in the starkest areas of poverty in the world.
  Therefore, we are upholding not some minor issue 7,000 miles away from our shores but a fundamental issue, and we are showing, perhaps above all, the readiness of a major nation to negotiate for peace. I suspect that some compromises will be necessary from every hon. Member before a peaceful solution is achieved. It would be wrong to go to the international community with an image that we are so resolute that we are not prepared to look at any concessions or at any necessary face-saving arrangements. It was to the great credit of President Kennedy in his diplomacy in the Cuban missile crisis that he was prepared

  1157
  to see some face-saving gestures. On the fundamental principles there is no shift in our position. We are with the Government.
  3.25 pm
  Sir Philip Goodhart: I am glad to follow the Leader of the Opposition, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) in the tributes that they have paid to Secretary of State Haig. As he flies from capital to capital at considerable risk to his political and physical health, it is only natural that one should think back to the machinations of John Foster Dulles during the Suez crisis. For reasons that still seem inexplicable to me 25 years after the event, every move that John Foster Dulles made seemed to be designed to weaken this country's bargaining position. However, I believe that Mr. Haig's interventions have been helpful and are meant to be helpful.
  It would be wrong, however, to think that British and American interests in this dispute are identical. The Americans have a general interest in seeing that aggression is stopped. As the Leader of the Opposition reminded us in his forthright speech, no part of the world is more important than Central and South America. We have a specific interest in ensuring that an attack on British territory does not go unpunished. Our legal interest is the greater, but paradoxically the strategic interests of the United States in the area are infinitely greater than our own.
  In normal times, under successive Governments, we have hardly been able to summon up enough energy to maintain a marginal naval presence in the area. Cape Horn can be vital to the Americans, for if anything should go wrong with the Panama canal—and canals have a habit of going wrong at times of crisis—the only way of going by sea from one coast to another of the United States is around Cape Horn. The only way that the Atlantic or Pacific fleets of America can be mutually reinforced is around Cape Horn.
  This is no new problem. For many years, as a member of the North Atlantic Assembly, I have visited NATO commanders in Norfolk, Virginia, and they have bewailed the fact that NATO has no plans and no facilities for protecting shipping in the South Atlantic. The complete lack of secure facilities in the South Atlantic has become obvious to everyone in the last fortnight. When the present crisis has been resolved I do not think that this country should be committed indefinitely to keeping a major naval presence close to the Falkland Islands, but it is now quite plain that the Western Alliance must have some secure naval and air facilities in the South Atlantic. It is plain that NATO as a whole will never agree to an out-of-area presence. Facilities can be provided only by ourselves, with, I would hope, the assistance of the United States and Canada—and, conceivably, eventually, Argentina. After
  There are Churchillian precedents for such a venture. More than 40 years ago this country gave America eight base sites in the British possessions in the Western hemisphere in return for 50 old American destroyers from its reserve fleet. I should welcome the transfer of a site in the Falklands to America. In these austere times it is more likely to construct adequate naval and air facilities than we are. I suspect that such a move would not be unwelcome to the Argentines. Nor would I disapprove of the idea that
  1158
  has been floated in the last couple of days—that America might be associated with the administration of the islands in the post-invasion phase.
  But the invasion of the Falkland Islands has also drawn attention to the wider problems of the Antarctic, and these are likely to become more pressing as the term of the main treaty draws to a close. Again, I doubt whether we need to think in terms of a large British specialist defence force, but we should think in terms of a joint force with our Australian and New Zealand friends. I regret the way in which the ties between our own defence forces and those of Australia and New Zealand have tended to loosen. I believe that the time has come to reverse this regrettable trend.
  I join in the congratulations given to those who have been responsible for organising the task force. As The Times rightly said, it was an astonishing achievement. The more that one knows about the problem of mobilisation, the more astonishing it seems. I also salute the Royal Navy's firm policy of requisitioning. That has been implemented with imagination and determination. It has implications for the other Services that we can discuss in the coming weeks.
  Meanwhile, the speed with which the fleet has set sail has had important diplomatic repercussions. As the Leader of the Opposition said, if the task force had not sailed, it is doubtful whether those in Buenos Aires would be willing to talk. If we had been as dilatory as we were at Suez, other Governments would have been given the opportunity to forget that there is only one reason for this crisis, which is that there has been aggression. All concerned in the Royal Navy deserve our congratulations, and the Government deserve our continued support.
  3.32 pm
  Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Given the initial failure, which we do not yet fully understand, to anticipate and therefore to frustrate the invasion of the Falkland Islands, it is difficult to fault the military and especially the naval measures which the Government have taken. We have invested the islands, which have been the object of an unprovoked aggression; and within a measurable space of days there will be a naval force in the area which, without bravado or braggadocio, we are justified in considering ought to be the equal at least of any challenge that can be offered to it.
  It would be deluding ourselves if we imagined that, the islands being thus invested and a substantial fleet being present in those waters, matters could then continue indefinitely without change. There would come a point at which further action became necessary to repossess the islands. But, at any rate for a matter of days, I do not think that that is the event that we need envisage. There are, however, imminent and present dangers, dangers other than of a military character—dangers of a political character—which are with us now. I refer to two of them.
  We are in some danger of resting our position too exclusively upon the existence, the nature and the wishes of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands. Quite obviously, if the population of the Falkland Islands did not desire to be British, the principle that the Queen wishes no unwilling subjects would long ago have prevailed; but we should create great difficulties for ourselves in other contexts, as well as in this context, if we rested our action purely and exclusively on the notion of restoring tolerable, acceptable conditions and self-determination to our fellow

  1159
  Britons on the Falkland Islands. Logically, this would mean that, had the Falkland Islands perchance been uninhabited, we would not have been justified in resenting and repelling armed agression against our territory. It would mean, presumably, that if another flag were flown from Rockall, that would be a matter of indifference to us. Coming nearer to the Falkland Islands, it would mean that, since South Georgia is not permanently inhabited and since British Antarctica, for which provision was made recently in an Act of this Parliament, is inhabited principally by penguins, we would stand idly by when a similar unprovoked and unjustified act of piracy was committed upon those territories.
  I do not think that we need be too nice about saying that we defend our territory as well as our people. There is nothing irrational, nothing to be ashamed of, in doing that. Indeed, it is impossible in the last resort to distinguish between the defence of territory and the defence of people.
  The second danger which is upon us is an ambiguity in interpreting the second portion of the Security Council resolution. If a peaceful solution means that the invasion of the Falkland Islands is to be reversed without bloodshed and without more casualties, a peaceful solution must be the desire of the House, the country and everyone. But the various synonyms and restatements of "peaceful solution" which we are reading and hearing carry quite a different meaning. The notion seems to be of a negotiated settlement or compromise between two incompatible positions—between the position which exists in international law, that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies are British sovereign territory and some other position altogether. The notion seems to be of a kind of compromise or middle position between those alternatives which not merely might be sought but which we might be thought to seek.
  That cannot be the meaning of the resolution of the Security Council. It cannot be meant that one country has only to seize the territory of another country for the nations of the world to say that some middle position must be found between the two parties, that some compromise must be the object of diplomacy, some formula that takes account of the objects and interests of the aggressor as well as of those of the aggressed.
  If that were the meaning of the resolution of the Security Council, the charter of the United Nations would not be a charter of peace; it would be a pirates' charter. It would mean that any claim anywhere in the world had only to be pursued by force, and points would immediately be gained and a bargaining position established by the aggressor.
  We must, it seems to me, be quite clear what we mean by a peaceful resolution of the problem that was created by the aggression. That problem has nothing to do with the pre-existing circumstances. It has nothing to do with the fact that the Argentine has from time to time urged a claim to our territory. There has been ample opportunity for a lawful and peaceful resolution of that claim, if there were such a resolution to be had. That no such resolution exists the Argentine itself has now proved by resorting to aggression. We are under no obligation to try to find a middle position between what the Falkland Islanders and we have the right to and what might be found tolerable by an aggressor, who has admitted by his aggression that he has no case.
  1160
  When we say therefore—I hope that the Government will be able to confirm this tonight—that we seek a peaceful solution, I hope it will be made clear that what we seek is the reversal by peaceful means, by diplomatic and other pressures, if that can be brought about, of the aggression upon our territory, but that we seek no compromise, no diminution of our undoubted rights. By maintaining that position we shall do no harm to all those interests, which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition so eloquently displayed, not only of this country but of the world at large. We should rather injure them if it were thought that aggression in itself could put some new complexion upon our rights and upon our duties.
  3.42 pm
  Dame Judith Hart: I appreciate a number of the points made by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) and should like to refer to one or two of them a little later in my speech.
  I have listened with the keenest interest to the Prime Minister and to my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, than whom, in the whole of his history and in the history of this House, there has been no greater man of peace. I shall go on to express a point of disagreement, but I should first like to express where I am in no disagreement whatever with anything so far said in the debate by the Prime Minister or by my right hon. Friend.
  First, we are all agreed, I think, that there has been an act of intolerable aggression by Argentina against the Falkland Islands. Secondly, we are all agreed that the Argentine Government are a particularly brutal and nasty Fascist regime—and I am sure that Conservative Members will forgive me if I say that some of us on the Opposition side have been rather more involved in the protection of human rights in Argentina than many of those who have newly discovered the nastiness of the regime. Indeed, there is one factor which illustrates that and to which I shall return.
  Thirdly, we are all agreed, I think—although I think that the right hon. Member for Down, South is not quite so sure about it—that the interests of the Falkland Islanders must be at the very front of our minds. The Prime Minister talked about their need to have freedom to express their views, and she was absolutely right to say so. Fourthly, we are all agreed that we must all observe the United Nations' resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the territory, for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the region of the Falkland Islands—that is a very significant phrase of which we need to take very careful note—and for Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences. We are all agreed, I think, that these must therefore be our objectives. Those are the objectives which appear in the resolution of the Security Council.
  I think that we are also agreed that no one in the House wants a war. If I have now stated the points upon which we are all in agreement, let us look at the problems that stand in the way. The right hon. Lady referred to discussions which were changing and difficult.
  I turn to the background to this issue—and this is where, if I may say so to the right hon. Member for Down, South, it is not only a question of rights but also a question of responsibility. It is not very well known to the House, because it was not fully reported in the press, that on 30 March in Argentina there was the biggest anti-junta

  1161
  demonstration that had been held for many years and that 2,000 people on that day were arrested. They included trade union leaders, the leaders of the human rights movement, the mothers of the "disappeared" people, and the son of the Nobel prize winner Perez Esquivel. That was on 30 March, which is highly relevant in terms of the date when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
  There is, in my view, a crucial difference between ourselves and the modus vivendi, nasty as it is, of the Argentine regime—and that is that it needed that invasion in order to consolidate its position against the explosion of democratic demands in its country. That is not our position. Therefore, when I talk about the difference between rights and responsibilities, I believe that in pursuing one's rights one has a responsibility towards peace that we here in Britain should be able to exercise with the deepest care.
  Then one comes to how to avoid a war. We know that the problem of the Falkland Islands has been with us for 20 years. In my terms of office at the Commonwealth Office and at the Ministry for Overseas Development, I have been on the periphery of the problem for many years, if not as directly involved as some of my colleagues and former colleagues. We recall the United Nations resolution of 1965. We know that there are implications, and they are very serious, for other territories that are part of the British Commonwealth, to whose people and to whose territory we owe very grave responsibilities.
  Gibraltar is one such, and I point out just one small but regrettable side effect of what has happened. I was in telephone conversation yesterday with one of my friends in Gibraltar. One small consequence of this situation to people in Gibraltar is that, because the opening of the frontier with Spain has been postponed, for the first time, as some of them see it, there is now United Kingdom acquiescence in the closing of that frontier.
  We have always said that it was the Spanish closing of the frontier, and now there is a degree of concern in Gibraltar in that we have agreed with Spain to postpone its opening. We are now seen by some of our friends in Gibraltar as having acquiesced for the first time in the closing of the frontier.
  Mr. George Cunningham: It would be very unfortunate if the idea were to get about that the continued closure of that frontier were, as it were, a joint action. The British frontier between Gibraltar and Spain is open, as it has always been. It is the Spanish frontier which is closed.
  Dame Judith Hart: I take the hon. Gentleman's point, but certainly in the eyes of the people in Gibraltar with whom I am in contact—[Interruption.] Hon. Members who have not been in the House so long as I have may not be aware that during my time at the Commonwealth Office I and my colleagues carried out the referendum in Gibraltar. My record on Gibraltar is second to none. The problems of the small territories must cause us deep concern, and they must form the background of all our thinking and our actions at this time.
  The negotiations undertaken by Secretary of State Haig and the proposals made by members of the United Nations, from Peru and other sources have not yielded any diplomatic solution that at this moment could prevent a war. More time is needed for the first stage for, clearly, there are two stages. The first is the establishment of
  1162
  peaceful negotiation to prevent a war. The second is the negotiation of a longer-term solution that will meet the needs of the Falkland Islanders. As the Prime Minister said, the people of the Falkland Islands must have freedom to express their choice. There may be ways of discovering what their varying choices might be.
  The crucial need is therefore for a pause for peace, so that there may be more breathing space for negotiations. That means, in my view, that at this stage we should not retreat but halt the task force and allow time for negotiations. I am well aware that I express a minority view in the House, but that will not prevent me, as it has not prevented a number of hon. Members in years past, from expressing a personal view. I believe that we should now halt the task force and suspend the "shoot first" maxim of the Secretary of State for Defence so that there is time to negotiate a settlement that will prevent war.
  Mr. Tony Marlow: Will the right hon. Lady give way?
  Dame Judith Hart: No, I shall not give way at this point.
  I believe that we should consider that view, in which we are not entirely alone. The Daily Mirror—not a favourite newspaper among Conservative Members—says this morning:
  "Before any shooting starts off the Falklands, we should be clear about why we might be about to embark on a war.
  It is to free the islanders from an invading force. It is not to get our own back or to sink the Argentine navy..
  It is to give the islanders a choice about their future. It is not to strike a blow against the dictators of this world..
  We have supplied too many of them with arms—including Argentina's—for a policy like that to be sincere."
  Before any hon. Member dares to criticise my minority view, let him ask himself what support he has given in past years for the supply of arms to Argentina.
  The consequences of a shooting war would not serve the interests of our people or of the Falkland Islanders, who should be our prime concern. Nor would they serve the long-term interests of the United Nations in ensuring that, wherever possible, peaceful solutions are found to international disputes and international aggression.
  We need a pause for peace—and it should start now.
  3.55 pm
  Mr. Michael Shersby: First, I warmly welcome the statement made today by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. It was a very clear statement of Britain's position in relation to the Falkland Islands. I also welcome the decision of our partners in the European Community to back us by imposing trade sanctions on the Argentines. I pay tribute to the sterling work of Secretary Haig.
  I speak today on behalf of many Falkland Islanders whom I had the privilege to meet last September, when, with the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Ogden), I spent two weeks in the Falkland Islands meeting a large number of the inhabitants. We were there as a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation visiting the Falkland Island branch. Our job was to talk to the islanders and to ascertain their views about the constitutional dispute with the Argentine, and at the same time to reassure them that this Parliament cared about them and that we would support them if difficulties arose in the future.
  I should like to say on behalf of those wonderful people who live in the Falkland Islands that, by one means or

  1163
  another, they will be listening to every word spoken in this debate. They are resolute people who are second to none in their radio communications with this country, and I am confident that whatever sanctions may have been imposed on them by the Argentine aggressors will not prevent their hearing these words from Britain.
  In Port Stanley I met not only residents of the town but all the officials of the islands' public administration. Everyone, whether working for the public administration or simply living in the islands, without exception, told me that they wished the Falkland Islands to remain British, and that they hoped and expected that Britain would do its duty in ensuring that that was possible.
  During our two-week visit to the islands, we met people who lived in the Camp, or the countryside as we would know it. We visited them in Darwin, in Green Patch, Salvador, Hill Cove and Port Howard. I shall try to convey to the House what it is like to live in those isloated settlements where perhaps 25 people live together, farming their pastures and keeping their sheep. We were able to talk to 25 people in one room of one house. There is no better way to get people's views than to sit with them.
  The hon. Member for West Derby and I were left in no doubt as to what the people wanted. They wanted to continue their peaceful life as loyal subjects of the Crown. They were deeply concerned about the future and the discussions about Britain and the Argentine that have been taking place for many years and involve the possibility of ceding sovereignty to Argentina and the possibility of a condominium. From those discussions and from my personal experience in the islands just a few months ago I offer the House one or two ideas about the kind of diplomatic solution that might be possible. It will obviously be much more difficult to achieve now than it might have been a few weeks ago. Nevertheless, we all hope and pray that armed confrontation can be avoided and that diplomatic solutions can be found.
  The solution that has been discussed between Britain and the Falkland Islanders for many months, if not years, has been the possibility of what is called "leaseback"—that is to say, the ceding of titular sovereignty to the Argentine with an immediate lease-back to Britain for up to 100 years, so that the British way of life can continue under a British governor with British laws and customs.
  The vast majority of the Falkland Islanders whom we talked to rejected that solution for one reason above all others. They did not trust the Argentine to keep to any agreement into which it might enter. They feared that an invasion would take place once sovereignty had been ceded. Unfortunately, their fears have proved to be only too correct.
  Had we tried a little harder a little earlier, perhaps with international guarantees from three or four powerful countries, it might have been possible to put at rest the Falkland Islanders' minds and to have achieved a leaseback solution. That would have had the advantage of ensuring that British rule continued along with the British way of life and that our people would have felt safe under the British Crown. For the Argentine, it would have meant that its long-held views, and tremendously strong emotive feeling, that the Falkland Islands are part of its territory, would have been met by the ceding of titular sovereignty. Such an agreement would have offered both the Argentine people and the Falkland Islanders considerable oppor
  1164
  tunities for economic development, oil exploration trade and tourism. However, guarantees would have been needed to the effect that under no possible circumstances could an invasion have taken place. That would have meant that HMS "Endurance", and undoubtedly some other tangible evidence of Britain's intention to protect her people, would have had to remain off the Falkland Islands and in the South Atlantic for the foreseeable future.
  What solution is there to this tragic situation? I believe—I am sure in my heart that the hon. Member for West Derby will agree with me—that Argentina must withdraw in accordance with United Nations resolution 502. I am in no doubt that British administration must be restored, even if it is only for a limited period of time. When I say "limited period of time", I do not mean a few days or a few months; I mean for years. During that time this difficult situation can cool down and friendly relations can, perhaps, once again be restored with the South American continent.
  All hon. Members present today must recognise that the Falkland Islands are 8,500 miles from Britain. The only method of air communication with them is through the South American continent—through Argentina or perhaps Chile. In the long term we must try to restore the relations that have become strained by this tragic situation.
  I back the policy of Her Majesty's Government 100 per cent. as it was expressed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister this afternoon. Argentina must withdraw from the Falkland Islands. The authority of the United Nations must be seen to run in those islands, as anywhere else in the world. If we do not see British administration restored to the Falkland Islands, the future for our people there and for other territories round the world in a similar position is indeed bleak.
  Many of those brave people in the Falkland Islands are sixth generation British subjects. They believe that Britain will do its duty. I know that they will take heart from what they hear from the House this afternoon. It will bring them great comfort in their hour of trial. They will know that we shall never abandon them.
  4.4 pm
  Mr. A. E. P. Duffy: The whole affair over the last fortnight remains a salutary lesson in the nature of power in the modern world. It is easy to shrink—as I perceive that some hon. Members do—from the logic of our possession of that power and to call for a halt to the exercise of such power. It is much more difficult to close one's mind and eyes, after nearly a fortnight, to the obvious lesson of last Friday week's invasion. In the end, one cannot negotiate successfully from a position of weakness, especially when dealing with the present rulers in Buenos Aires, who are, after all, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition reminded us, the scourge of democrats and trade unionists and of the peace of mind of their neighbours.
  Another unpalatable lesson for some hon. Members is that the Argentine Government undoubtedly believed that they had achieved a fait accompli. The logic of that situation is that if the Argentines knew that nothing could happen to them, they were hardly likely to entertain the idea of compromise. We can all see now that on the surface in Buenos Aires words may be as resolute as ever. There has certainly been movement behind the scenes. That undoubtedly justifies the sailing of the task force.

  1165
  Given our responsibilities to the Falkland Islanders, as well as to the United Nations and to the international rule of law—as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition argued so powerfully a few minutes ago—somehow, some time, the Argentine forces must be induced or forced to leave the Falklands. I say that in those terms because I do not believe that it is just our responsibility. As my right hon. Friend reminded us, it is the responsibility of all those who care for the rule of law and who are aware of the risks that we run in its disregard and of the penalties that we have paid in times gone by.
  I believe that the House is united in its belief that diplomacy must be given the first chance. The friends of Britain and the Argentine must exhaust every opportunity of organising negotiations, of giving constructive advice, of cajoling and of warning by turn to propagate the cause of peace.
  We must distinguish—as my right hon. Friend implied—for as long as we can between the bulk of the people of the Argentine and their rulers. There can be few of us who do not know of someone in the Argentine who is of first or second generation British descent. Just as many of us know people from New Zealand and Australia, as well as Rhodesia and like countries under the Commonwealth, who rallied to Britain in 1939 and 1940, some of us also know that young men from the Argentine rallied to Britain. We must distinguish between what I suspect is the overwhelming bulk of the people in Argentina and the rulers with whom they are currently accursed. There may be war-like talk in the Argentine, but so there is in Britain. No one who looks at the whole range of the international press at the moment can believe other than that there is a consensus for a peaceful settlement. That throws a great responsibility on to the Prime Minister and her advisers.
  Happily, ours has been a just cause, so far. We cannot repeat too often that the Falklands issue is not Suez. The fleet now sails in restitution. This time, the cause is just. We have the full authority of a Security Council resolution. We are on the soundest moral ground, but we must stay there. The United Nations is a forum for both sides and obviously it must continue to be used in full.
  We are fortunate in having the EEC's backing, but I suspect that it wants not only to provide us with support but to act as a restraining force on any over-adventurousness on our part. The Prime Minister is a student of Kipling and will be aware of the warning against overweening pride. What is our final objective? That question must be uppermost in the minds of many of us when we see the Prime Minister and recall her remarks. Indeed, we shall want to look carefully at the text of her speech.
  We are entitled to maintain our present military posture. That view is shared by my hon. Friends and by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. However, I go further. I concede the case for a blockade. I cannot understand how we can win time unless we are prepared to take at least that step. Where we can win time, we must do so in order to find a diplomatic solution.
  Mr. Dalyell: For how long can we maintain a blockade 8,000 miles away from base, in the Roaring Forties, at the beginning of an Antarctic winter? How feasible is that?
  Mr. Duffy: Other hon. Members are better placed to answer that question than I. Indeed, there are others,
  1166
  outside the House, who have always been better placed to answer that question. However, I know that the Royal Navy is capable of such a commitment.
  For as long as I can remember, it has been the Royal Navy's practice to deploy one task force globally each year. In one year a task force would sail through the Mediterranean and the Suez canal into the Indian Ocean and as far as Australasia. On route it would carry out exercises with other navies. In the next year the Royal Navy would sail across the Atlantic, through the Panama canal and up the west coast of America. Sometimes, the task force would be away for eight or nine months. In addition, individual units would deploy in northern climes, in an environment similar to that which might now await the fleet.
  The Royal Navy's afloat support is probably equalled by only two other navies in the world. Indeed, it is not surpassed even by those two navies. With its present afloat facilities, the Royal Navy cannot only deploy far away from base but can continue to do so. Of course, the quality of leadership is equally important. However, I am arguing for time so that we can find a diplomatic solution. We are unlikely to gain that time unless we are prepared to face up to the possibility of a blockade.
  At the same time, the Argentines must he given some inducement to withdraw. I have great sympathy with the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby). We must all begin to consider two conditions. Indeed, I imagine that some hon. Members have already entertained them. We cannot look for a peaceful settlement or expect the Argentines to withdraw—even in the face of force—unless we offer them some inducement. Therefore, the first condition is that we all accept, in our hearts, that there is an Argentine dimension to the Falkland Islands. We must, therefore, give an early indication that we are prepared actively to explore its implications. As soon as circumstances permit, we must urgently seek agreement. Options that have already been mentioned will then he open to us. Any such proposals should involve, as a condition, a commitment to sound out the Falkland Islanders about the future that they would wish.
  That does not mean that the task is easy or that there will be no risks. Of course, there will be. However, they must be faced. Things can go wrong and they usually do. If the situation remains unchanged we may have to face up to some hard decisions. From Britain's point of view everything that could be wrong about this confrontation is wrong. I refer not only to the place and the time and to the fact that winter is only six weeks away, but to tie assessment of intelligence—about which much has been said—to the adversary, to muscle power and to diplomacy. However, there are two exceptions. I refer to the Royal Navy and to our cause.
  In this crisis the Royal Navy must know that it has the fullest support of the House and of the British people. On the Saturday before last that support rang out loud and clear. I hope that it will continue to ring out loud and clear.
  Thousands of young men are sailing with the task force. There cannot be an hon. Member who has not, in recent days, seen a photograph in his evening newspaper of one of his constituents. There cannot be an hon. Member who has not heard the parent of one of his constituents being interviewed on the local radio. How young are they? Half of them may be as young as 21. Indeed, they may be younger. One quarter of them may be teenagers. Many of them are only boys. They are entitled to our support. Not

  1167
  only because of their age, but because that task force was assembled and dispatched with extraordinary speed and efficiency.
  Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I take the point that those who go into battle on our behalf are entitled to our support. However, they are also entitled to our judgment. Those in the trenches who went over the top on the Somme and at Passchendaele often went to their deaths because we did not exercise our judgment. Surely we are entitled to question whether these young men should spill their blood.
  Mr. Duffy: I enter only two caveats. First, I was careful not to mention battle. Secondly, if we form a judgment, we should be careful about to whom it is addressed. I suggest that it should be addressed to the Government Benches and not to the Royal Navy. It should certainly not be directed to the Royal Navy's personnel.
  The task force was assembled and dispatched with extraordinary speed and efficiency. We take that for granted. No other country in the world could have done it. With its usual self-effacing modesty and low profile, the Royal Navy say that the credit lies with the workers and trade unionists in industry who provided the Fleet with its hulls, equipment, weapon systems and other provisions and with the workers in the dockyards, many of whom had redundancy notices in their pockets but who helped to prepare the ships for sea. I know sailors, and I say that much of the credit must also go to them and to the Naval airmen, and Royal Marines, who are responsible for operating and maintaining ever more complex equipment and who are ready to deploy in any operational environment. In an increasingly materialistic society, I never cease to marvel at the commitment, the motivation, the education and training and, above all, the self discipline of the men and women who man our Armed Services today. The quality of leadership from admiral to leading seaman has never been higher.
  Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, who operates from Northwood, was right to declare publicly that the fleet will perform competently and efficiently any task that it is asked to perform and that lies within its capabilities. No doubt all hon. Members saw him on television two days ago. I know that the fleet is worthy of our support. I hope that we shall stay worthy of the fleet.
  4.19 pm
  Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: First, may I praise the resolution of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in her speech today? I also wish to express my personal gratitude to her for the selfless way in which she has conducted negotiations with Mr. Haig during the past few days.
  We all recognise that force will be the counsel of last resort in solving this crisis, but because at least I hold that view, following the mandatory resolution of the Security Council, which tries to persuade the Argentines to withdraw from the Falkland Islands, it also follows that that mandatory resolution must be backed up by further action from the Security Council. Although I welcome all statements of unilateral sanctions being imposed against Argentina, I cannot help but feel that that is not as impressive or as likely to be persuasive to the Argentine Government as sanctions imposed by the Security
  1168
  Council. To that extent, the concept of mandatory sanctions passed by that body should be the next step in New York.
  I did not intend to speak in this debate until yesterday evening, when one of my constituents telephoned me and asked to see me urgently. As a result of that visit, I realise now that the largest private owner of land in the Falkland Islands lives in my constituency. His name is Mr. John Matthews and his family has had holdings in the Falkland Islands since 1867. Currently they possess 200,000 acres.
  Mr. Matthews came to see me because he was sufficiently exercised by the problem to feel that he must talk to his Member of Parliament in the hope that I could pass on his views to the Prime Minister or to whomever would listen to me. In effect, he said that everyone is trying to tell the Falkland Islanders what their final choice should be, but the islanders have not been consulted in the way that most of us perhaps imagined. He argued—it is a personal view but his family has been there for a long time—that the elected council, which comprises five elected representatives, does not represent the views of the 1,800 islanders. Yet, too often during the past 15 years Ministers have listened to the council as if it was the parliament of the Falkland Islands, when it is not—at least not in the sense that we understand such concepts.
  My constituent said that perhaps the time had come for every one of the 1,800 islanders to be able to express a view about where his future lies. He concluded from that that if such an opportunity was provided, the answer that might be received from all 1,800 would be rather different from the answer as we now understand it.
  Mr. Matthews made it clear that his statement in no way gave any sort of sanction to what the Argentines have done. It cannot, because the concept of consulting the islanders when they are living under duress, as a population within an occupied territory, is clearly meaningless. However, he argued that the future of the islands depends upon stability. First and foremost they need political stability, but they also need stability that will persuade the farms and businesses that are now on the islands to invest for the future and will encourage the population to stay on the islands and to contribute as much as they can.
  As my constituent argues, it must follow that those who live on the islands should make their views known and that those who have an interest in the islands—whether they be in the United Kingdom, Argentina or, dare I say, the United Nations—should pay due respect to the views expressed.
  Mr. Frank Allaun: A very sensible point of view has been expressed by the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson). However, let us suppose that, of the 1,800 islanders, some wished to retain their British nationality and be resettled elsewhere and some wished to stay. Would it not be right to offer those people the opportunity to take either of those courses rather than to fight a war about it?
  Mr. McNair-Wilson: I was going to say to the hon. Member for Salford, East (Mr. Allaun) that I agreed with his point, until I heard his last words. I do not believe that what I have been suggesting can become a reality that will last and give stability if we ask the islanders to make decisions when they are living under duress and as a population under enemy occupation. It follows that if the

  1169
  Argentines really wish a resolution of the Falkland Islands dispute, it is as much in their interests as in ours that the islanders give an answer that can be respected by either party.
  I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister referred three times in her speech to the right of the islanders to be free to determine their own way of life. What I have said is only an echo of the words that she used.
  If the Argentines believed that their aggression would present Her Majesty's Government with a fait accompli to which they would not react, clearly they sadly misjudged the reaction of a democratic Government who have responsibilities that they intend to carry out for the sovereign parts of their territory. Perhaps all dictatorships are likely to make such a mistake, so none of us should be surprised. However, the Argentine Government must now recognise their miscalculation. Whether they recognise it from the words used in this House or whether they choose to recognise it from the United Nations Security Council or the EEC, it is there, written for them all to see and hear, from three great bodies with international responsibilities.
  As to the need to consult the islanders, let us examine what we would be putting before them. We all know the options. We could hand sovereignty to Argentina with a view to a lease back, presumably for a defined time, after which the islands would revert to Argentina's administration and sovereignty. My constituent favoured that proposal, because he argued—
  Mr. John Stokes: He has not lived there.
  Mr. McNair-Wilson: He has lived there. He argued that in the future the Falkland Islanders would find themselves more in the sphere of trade and influence of Argentina than of Britain.
  The second option is condominium—the concept of shared sovereignty—which no one believes is satisfactory. A third option may be to give the islanders self-government. Let them decide their destiny, for it is their country. In those terms, we would do for them no more and no less than we have done for many other islands scattered about the world.
  Whatever decision we make, it is surely unrealistic to talk about the next steps until the Argentines withdraw and it is unrealistic for the Argentines to believe that might will succeed when nearly all the world is against them.
  I continue to support the Government's original recourse to the Security Council and its endorsement that Argentina must withdraw. I see the task force as a follow-through to resolution 502. We all know that if we do not have mandatory trading sanctions there is a second sanction which the Security Council can introduce which involves measures where force may be used if necessary.
  None of us wants bloodshed over this most intractable problem, but none of us can flinch from that possibility in a crisis of this magnitude. To do so would be to give way to aggression and to renege upon the concept of self-determination which we have all held so important for so long. Lastly, it would be to undermine the United Nations, which in future may be a more important body than it has been in the past.
  4.31 pm
  Miss Betty Boothroyd: I have read all the speeches made in the two earlier debates on
  1170
  this issue. It seems that the mood of the House has moved from its initial emotional response to one that is much more questioning, to one that has a greater degree of realism in seeking a solution to the issue of the Falkland Islands and their people.
  It would be wrong for me to range over some of the arguments that have already been heard other than to say that I believe that the majority of the British people believe and accept that the task force was a correct initial response to the invasion. I believe also that those self-same people do not give that support wholly without conditions and do not wish us to be involved in military conflict. What is now needed is for new initiatives to justify the support of the British people and to justify the support of the actions taken by and the decisions arrived at by the international community. The Prime Minister said, as have many others, that we have obtained the support of substantial sections of the Commonwealth, including some countries, especially in the Third world, which can ill afford to demonstrate their support by the economic measures that they have taken.
  I am not completely in accord with many of my colleagues regarding the European Economic Community. I am, perhaps, in a small minority on the Labour Benches. I have always maintained that the supreme test of the Community lies in its political decision-making, in its ability to speak with one voice and in the way in which it is able to use its economic force in support of a member state that has been aggressed. Those who share my views have not been disappointed.
  The Foreign Secretary said that we shall need the support of the world community. We have that support but it is not sufficient to chalk it up on a scoreboard. It is not sufficient merely to obtain the approval of international bodies. We must justify that approval by seeking to implement the United Nations resolution, by exploring the possibilities of a role that the United Nations may be able to adopt as a mediator and in providing a mechanism whereby Argentina can be assisted to move off the hook of the Government's earlier arguments about sovereignty.
  I have always believed that if statesmanship means anything it places demands on those who regard themselves as statesmen. It demands that those who aggress sometimes need to be provided with a face-saving formula; they sometimes need to be provided with an opportunity to retreat without loss of face. If we believe in the rule of law, we must develop our actions in concert with the United Nations charter, to which we have been committed for many years.
  The Government have demonstrated that they have the military force. They have demonstrated that there is a will to use it. They must now demonstrate their belief in the rule of law and must put that belief into practice. They must be prepared to examine and contemplate a range of solutions and take some initiatives in presenting them. They may have to do so by diplomatic means through the United Nations. We need to look to the United Nations. The offices of the United Nations may have to be involved in seeking a withdrawal of both Argentine and British defence personnel and administrative personnel from the entire area. We may have to examine the possibility of filling the vaccuum with a United Nations peacekeeping force, which would administer the islands until such time as a more permanent solution could be found.
  We may have to refer the issues to the International Court so that it may state its views on the future of the

  1171
  islands. We may have to seek a solution by those means for both the area and the people. At least an opportunity will be provided for an independent judicial body to examine the claims of Argentina and the claims of Britain as well as the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. There are many approaches and initiatives that we may have to take to bring about a solution.
  I have tried hard to follow all the views of knowledgeable commentators outside the House, as well as the views of hon. Members on both sides of the House who are familiar with the islands and with the people who have lived on them for generations. Hon. Members on both sides of the House who know the islands and who have talked with the people have advanced varying points of view about the way in which they see their future developing. Those comments have been made in good faith. They have been accepted in good faith in the knowledge that they have been expressed by those who wish to be helpful to the House. However, the views vary considerably and many of us are left confused by them.
  I was interested in what the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) had to say in expressing the view of a constituent to whom he has been talking recently. That view and others have led to greater confusion. What is not confusing is that we know that we cannot turn back the clock. I believe that the islanders are aware of that. They must be aware that we cannot provide a large and permanent military and naval presence in the area and that things will never be the same again in that part of the world.
  I do not know the islanders and I do not know the part of the world in which they live. I have tried to educate myself in recent weeks about them. However, I believe that the islanders may be more realistic about a negotiated settlement and about how they see their future than perhaps some of us give them credit for. Let us not be more aggressive in seeking their protection than the islanders themselves would be. We must be honest with the islanders about what they can expect. The time has not come for appeasement. The Government have shown their potential military and naval strength. However, the time has come to try to implement the solidarity which has been demonstrated to us by world opinion. We should, perhaps, use the United Nations to explore all the possibilities that may bring a solution to the area—not through continued aggression or military might, but through the rule of law to which this country and this House are firmly committed.
  4.40 pm
  Mr. Russell Johnston: In our first debate on 3 April, the day after the invasion, much was properly made of the fact that during the past few years we have been giving signs to Argentina of a lack of commitment to the Falklands Islands by our unwillingness to act following the Shackleton report, the leaseback proposals, the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance", and so on. The consequent invasion could almost be seen by Argentina as a move which would be greeted with a sigh of relief in this country—admittedly suitably concealed with expressions of indignation, but a sigh of relief nevertheless—rather than the genuine outrage which has been expressed by both sides of the House and by the country as a whole which led to the support for the dispatch of our fleet.
  1172
  The hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) put this aspect aptly in our debate on 7 April. Unfortunately, I was unable to be present, but I read all the speeches in detail. The hon. Gentleman said:
  "The failure is best illustrated by this fact—the battle fleet is on its way down the Atlantic and the Argentines are surprised. That is the very essence of the failure of diplomacy. The object always should be that the person to whom you may do something knows that you may do it. If you are a good diplomat you get him to believe that you will be able to do more than you actually can."
  That summed up the position extremely well.
  For that reason, as I said when intervening in the speech of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot)—who made a fine speech—I have doubts as to the wisdom of proceeding in this manner at this stage when, willy-nilly, we have a series of set-piece debates. It is the essence of this Chamber and of parliamentary style that the Opposition seek to criticise the Government and work out a competing policy, not a joint policy. That is how we operate. A statement is made and an attempt made to distinguish from it. We tend to drift into that situation whether we like it or not.
  Given the degree of common ground—although we may not officially be at war we are certainly on a war footing—I cannot understand why the Prime Minister has not, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Liberal Party said last Wednesday, sought fully to consult the party leaders. It might not be possible to sustain a consensus for any length of time—one does not know—but it should be tried. In exactly the same way as the coded messages—to use the jargon of the past few years—clearly encouraged the Argentines, equally, the more we articulate doubts and uncertainties from a position of some ignorance of the military position on the spot, the more we encourage the Argentines to maintain their position and the more we weaken our own diplomatic clout and capacity to succour the Falkland Islanders without actually using force.
  Will the Foreign Secretary tell me why that has not been done? It is important to know. Although the Leader of the Opposition responded to my intervention, I am still not clear whether he would co-operate. However, from the content of his speech, I see no reason why he should not. His speech was clear and as decisive as his speech on 3 April. The logic of all that is that the whole House should work together. Force has been used against us, but no one wants to see force used in response, as was said by many hon. Members. Equally, if we must use force, it must be the minimum necessary.
  I would briefly put on record—this point has been made by other hon. Members—our gratitude and pleasure at the firm and united response from our European Community partners in immediately instituting economic sanctions at considerable cost to themselves. Critics of the Community should recognise how greatly this strengthens our position. However, I should like the Government to say how rapidly those measures will be implemented. I understand that although declarations have been made and the intention clearly signified, the sanctions have not yet come into effect.
  In conjunction with that, while Mr. Haig's efforts and the way in which he has acted are greatly to be commended, one cannot let pass President Reagan's reference to an even-handed attitude being necessary between two friends of the United States, or the even more unfortunate remarks of Mrs. Fitzgerald, the United State's representative at the United Nations. Many hon. Members

  1173
  have already said that the United States must be informed that one cannot be even-handed between an aggressor and his victim.
  Picking up the point made by the Leader of the Opposition concerning the imminent sale of fighter planes to Venezuela and its relevance to Guyana, there is no doubt about the one clear lesson to be learnt from this crisis. By engaging in the indiscriminate sale of arms, the Western nations are stoking fires that may be hard to control.
  I agree that at a critical moment in negotiations—as the Prime Minister said—it would not be helpful to examine negotiating positions or compromises in any detail. However, there has been talk by hon. Members about various options for continued British sovereignty. In this connection I refer to the speech of the right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) on Wednesday. He said:
  "Sovereignty is not what we want, it is the welfare of the people."
  Sovereignty is what the Falkland Islanders want. They want the continuing sovereignty of the British crown. They regard that as the best safeguard for their welfare. That is the answer to the right hon. Gentleman.
  In talking of options, whether condominiums, leasebacks, or United Nations trusteeship, we are in logic saying that we cannot sustain the position indefinitely if we are to be faced indefinitely with the hostility of the Argentine and the possibility of further aggression at some unpredictable time or times in the future. If options are to be debated—I am not sure that they should be, but that is the nature of these debates—we should not seek to cloak them with verbiage about diplomacy, equable solutions and just compromises, and so on.
  If it were not for the invasion we would not be talking in such terms. We must face that fact. We are in the position that was well put by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) on 7 April. He said:
  "it is a fact of life that one cannot negotiate if one has no reserves and no strength and if one has no basic readiness to assert one's will."—[Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 985–99.]
  That is true.
  Therefore, if long-term problems arise it will be necessary for the international community to come together. That point was well made by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy), who was formerly Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Navy.
  I firmly stress that the principle of self-determination must be upheld, and the trust of the Falkland Islanders must not be betrayed by this country.
  Finally, I wish to ask two simple questions that seek information, because there seems to be a lack of it. The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) referred to South Georgia. What is the position of the Argentine over South Georgia? As I understand it, there was no claim on South Georgia comparable with that on the Falkland Islands, yet the Argentine has occupied that island. Is that island also blockaded by us? Secondly, since the imposition of the blockade, have there been any incidents within that 200-mile zone? Do the Government know whether any Argentine vessels remain within that zone?
  Our prayers must be with the Falkland Islanders in the dreadful circumstances that they now face.
  4.41 pm
  Mr. Hal Miller: I follow the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) and several
  1174
  others by turning my thoughts to the future and to the possible solutions to this dangerous and difficult situation. Before doing so, as one who had the privilege of working in the Colonial Service for 13 years, I must say that I have a deep sense of outrage at the violent aggression on a British colony and a burning sense of shame that we were unable to protect and do our duty by the inhabitants and the British citizens of that territory.
  I am therefore grateful to my former Colonial Service colleague, the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), for his courage in resigning and for the dignified speech that he made to the House on that occasion, on which he deserves sincere congratulations. My hon. Friend and his more senior colleagues will be a great loss to the Administration, but I am sure that his chance will come again to offer distinguished service.
  I hope that when the story of this whole episode comes to be written we shall be reassured that the civil and military power in the Falkland Islands at the time of the invasion behaved with distinction and valour. Now is not the time to go into those events. We must turn our minds beyond the immediate future, however difficult that is for my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is engaged in the heavy burden of day-to-day negotiations. We must think about the best future for the Falkland Islanders themselves. My right hon. Friend has said that the wishes of the islanders will be dominant. Have we the right to be confident of their decision?
  Like the hon. Member for Inverness, I regret that the recommendations of the Shackleton report were not given greater weight and put into action. What have we done to earn the continued confidence of the Falkland Islanders, and what do we now propose? It is not enough just to restore British administration and to regain our effective sovereignty over the islands. As my right hon. Friend has said, we cannot go back to the status quo ante. What is being offered to the Falkland Islanders? In considering that, we must recall the signals that we have given in the past.
  I am ashamed to say that we have a record of neglect of the islands. We have provided them with inadequate communications. Indeed, the airstrip was adequate only for service from the Argentine. Their oil supplies come from the Argentine. It even appears that at the crucial moment in the invasion the transmitters were inadequate to impart the information. If we were embarked on a high risk policy ever since we gave up maintaining a South Atlantic squadron, at least we should have ensured that there was adequate communication so that we could be constantly aware of what was taking place.
  That lack of interest has manifested itself over the succeeding years in the lack of development in the islands. My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) referred to one considerable absentee landlord. There are others. For example, what about the future of young people who find difficulty obtaining farms that they can tenant? The uncertain future for the islands' staple product—wool—makes the situation extremely bleak, unless we can offer alternatives for economic development which must centre on oil, fishing, and even kelp with its valuable chemical properties. We must also consider the unknown and untapped resources of the Antarctic.
  The withdrawal of our Navy into the NATO sphere of operations, the decision to abandon HMS "Endurance", our apparent lack of any negotiations with Chile as a countervailing power to the Argentine, and our negotiation

  1175
  on lease-back or other derogation from sovereignty must all have given signals to the Falkland Islanders, and to the Argentine, that we were not sincerely interested in their future on a long-term basis. We must now give thought to the signals that we shall give. We must now consider our future intentions for the islands. What future shall we now seek for young islanders?
  I have set out the various areas in which we must secure a basis for peaceful and continued development to the end of this century. These must play some role in the negotiations that must certainly take place. We should not blind ourselves to the strategic importance of the islands. It is highly significant that units of the Soviet Navy are already present in the area.
  It is not enough for us to seek to determine the views of the islanders. We must have something to offer them. That is the course that I counsel most earnestly on my right hon. Friend. I urge him constantly to pursue the withdrawal of the Argentines in accordance with United Nations resolution 502. I do not shrink from force, if necessary, but the restoration of Pax Britannica by itself is not enough. May we please have some positive plans for the future?
  4.58 pm
  Mr. Peter Hardy: I shall try to be brief, and in doing so I follow the hon. Member for Bromsgrove and Redditch (Mr. Miller) in expressing the hope that at the end of this unhappy chapter there can be an improving quality of life for the people in the Falkland Islands.
  At the outset, it is clear that one of two Governments are at risk—either the Government here or that in Buenos Aires. My hon. Friends and I have very little cause to admire the present Administration here, but in the national interest and to avoid further international ignominy, one hopes that the Buenos Aires Government collapses rather than ours. It was interesting that recently the Prime Minister recognised the nature of the regime in Buenos Aires. As some of my hon. Friends have pointed out, it is perhaps a pity that she did not do so earlier.
  Whether or not the Buenos Aires Administration collapses, it is clear that while the Government have given a commitment that there will be an inquiry, that inquiry will have to be very searching if it is to satisfy the British people. I am glad to see that the Foreign Secretary is nodding his head in agreement,. I hope that the Foreign Secretary was nodding his head in agreement because the comments made by spokesmen on behalf of the Government in recent weeks seem to confirm that view.
  Although my constituency is a long way from the sea, I have been surprised to learn in the past few days that a considerable number of young sailors in my constituency—some of them not yet 21 years old—are members of the task force. Last night I spoke to the secretary of the Labour Women's Council in my constituency whose son, aged 20, is on board one of the Navy's ships. While she and other people are extremely critical of the Government's record in the matter, they recognise that the task force is serving an essential purpose and must continue to sail southward in the hope that, before it reaches the war zone, the efforts to secure peace and the possibility of a reasonable settlement will succeed and prevent further risk. I do not know as much about the
  1176
  Royal Navy as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) but I do not like the prospect of my young constituents who are in the Navy spending month after month in those inhospitable waters.
  At the weekend I examined the journals of Captain Cook to see what relevant gems of geography or interest could be obtained. In those journals it seems confirmed that the climate and the waters in the South Atlantic are likely to be inhospitable. Therefore, I hope that the task force can secure a swift resolution to the crisis.
  My main reason for contributing to the debate is to find out the position of those uninhabited islands that are involved in the current dispute. The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) referred to territory as well as to people. An examination of the atlas reveals points of considerable interest with regard to the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia.
  South Georgia is as far away from the Argentine as Athens is from the United Kingdom. From the United Kingdom to Warsaw is only two-thirds of the distance from the Argentine coast to South Georgia. Therefore, the Argentine claim to South Georgia is even more questionable than its claims to the Falkland Islands. While the Falkland Islands are much closer to the Argentine than to Britain, they are as far away from the nearest point on the Argentine coast as the Swiss border or, indeed, the Norwegian border is from Westminster. Our friends in Norway have as much entitlement to invade Iceland—indeed, the Irish Republic has more entitlement to invade the Shetlands—as has any Argentine general to invade the Falkland Islands.
  My right hon. Friends are correct to suggest that the Government cannot look idly at this aggressive invasion. We should not enter war lightly. I hope that the orders to fire that will be given by the Prime Minister will not be swiftly given, so that there can be time for negotiation. However, given the importance, investment and interest in the Antarctic throughout the past 100 years—Britain has led the world in Antarctic development—and given the important minerals and oil that may be available in Antarctica, it would be highly undesirable for us to allow 1,800 Falkland Islanders to decide by referendum that territory in South Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands could be lightly given away.
  We must consider the question of territory as well as the question of people. One hopes that the future of the islands will be well served by an Administration who will be concerned more with the people there than with absentee landlords, who appear to have inspired the speeches of several Conservative Members. The Government have brought about a considerable humiliation for Britain. That has had the unfortunate result of arousing a degree of jingoism in Britain that is hardly appropriate to the twentieth century. But the fact remains that, if the task force does not continue to sail, the Government will have surrendered an opportunity to serve principle and international decency. For that reason, my support continues to go with Her Majesty's Navy.
  5.5 pm
  Mr. John Stokes: I sometimes find it difficult to understand the part that the House and Parliament can play in the difficult and complicated matters of foreign affairs. I certainly think that some of our questions on foreign affairs are not always helpful. It is of course right that we have been recalled

  1177
  again today and it is right that we should be kept informed by Her Majesty's Government about what is happening. Parliaments in the past were an awful nuisance to kings when they were conducting difficult diplomatic negotiations. Queen Elizabeth I took a very severe view when Parliament interfered in foreign affairs, let alone in questions of whom she should marry. I am sure that many modem Governments must have felt the same.
  Yet the House and the other place have a part to play. Our vital role is to express the will of the nation as we Understand it and, on this occasion, to give our unstinted backing to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and to the Government. The nation expects us to meet when there is a crisis. People somehow feel better when they know that Parliament is sitting. I was told that the crowds outside the Houses of Parliament on the last special sitting on Saturday were the largest since the abdication crisis of 1936. May we live up to the high regard in which, apparently, the public regard us.
  I consider that our main role today is to represent the wishes and feelings of our constituents—which are that the Government should see this matter through to the end. That is the message that I am receiving loud and clear from my constituents, and I believe many other colleagues have had the same experience. That means that the Argentine must remove its troops from the Falkland Islands before we can enter into negotiations. We can then have perfectly sensible and reasonable negotiations.
  The nation is quite remarkably united at present. All the previous conflicts that seem to have divided us appear to have faded into the distance. I watched with admiration, as I sure millions of my compatriots did, on television the fitting out of the battle fleet, the majestic departure from Portsmouth and the cheering crowds on the shore. I was reminded of the Dutch wars of long ago and of the efforts of Samuel Pepys in the fitting out of the Fleet of those days. We have now national unity and cohesion in Britain, which is something precious and not, I hope, to be lost. That is not to say that the nation yet realises how long and protracted the struggle may be; nor are some people yet ready to accept that if we have to fight it is inevitable that some British blood will be spilt. We may face some very difficult weeks or even months. As we know from our long history, blockade is, in essence, a slow business.
  Anxiety is, I believe, felt by many hon. Members and by people in the country about the part that the United States and Mr. Haig will play. After all that our Prime Minister and the Government have done in supporting the United States—we have been its most fervent ally over Poland, over nuclear arms and even over E1 Salvador—it would be appalling and unthinkable if the American Administration should try to sell us down the river now. I am sure that it will not. The United States Administration must know that if that happended it would strike a death blow to the Atlantic Alliance.
  Mr. Jim Craigen: Does the hon. Gentleman not think that there is a danger that President Reagan could take this country's continued friendship for granted?
  Mr. Stokes: That is difficult to say. Time alone can tell. I believe that in the end President Reagan and his advisers must know that we are their greatest supporters. Without that support, their position and the position of the whole of the West would be put gravely at risk.
  1178
  We have many cards in our hands. Our cause is self-evidently just. We are supported by a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations and we have received remarkably strong support from the EEC. I hope that some of those who are invariably critical—I am sometimes critical—of the EEC will think that this must be its finest hour.
  We must never forget that Soviet Russia—not the Argentine, and certainly not the people of the Argentine, with whom we have the friendliest relations—presents the greatest threat to us. The decision to stand and, if necessary, to fight is not just about the Falkland Islands, about their 1,800 inhabitants, or about the possibility of finding oil and gas in the South Antarctic. It is a question of national will. The answer that we give will be noted not only in Gibraltar and in Hong Kong but in West Berlin and wherever the West may be threatened. Soviet Russia, above all, is watching on the sidelines. The successful resolution of this conflict will not be lost on it.
  There is little point at this time in worrying in too much detail about what form the eventual negotiations will take. The wishes of the Falklanders are of the highest importance, as will be the desires of the British Government and our people. Meanwhile, the Argentine troops must be removed from the islands—by diplomacy we hope, by total blockade, possibly, and, if not, and finally, by all means of force, difficult and bloody though that may be.
  One small but highly disagreeable feature of the handling of the crisis in some of the national, although not, I believe, in the local newspapers, has been the carping against the Prime Minister. After all, these decisions are the decisions of a Government led, it is true, by a remarkably strong-willed and definite Prime Minister. If, however, one goes outside Fleet Street and listens to the views of ordinary people, I believe that the criticism comes only from those whom I shall call silly intellectuals. Anyhow, our duty here is to represent good, ordinary people. I believe that most ordinary people admire the courage and patriotism of the Prime Minister and that they are thoroughly behind her. I find that the nation, as a whole, is remarkably calm and resolute and that it trusts the Government to see this matter through to the end. I am sure that they will.
  5.15 pm
  Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: No one called me an intellectual until I came into this place, when it was used as a term of abuse. I hope that the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes) will not feel that any offering I make in this debate is couched in those terms. I envy his assurance about what is right and what is wrong. I confess that for the last fortnight I have been racked by a real feeling of conscience about what is right and what is wrong in this situation. If I speak in a manner that is out of sympathy with the consensus that has emerged in the House it is not because I have any disrespect for the judgment or experience of many hon. Members who have spoken in a contrary sense.
  If the fleet gets to the Falkland Islands and by that time the Argentines have withdrawn from the islands and there is a settlement that is acceptable to the Falkland Islanders and to the Argentine, no one will breathe a greater sigh of relief than myself. I am bound to say, however, that in

  1179
  questioning the consensus that has emerged here I find it almost impossible to believe that such a situation awaits our fleet when we get to the destination.
  Every indication given by the Argentines is that they regard the occupation of the Falkland Islands as their natural right in asserting their claim over territory as, recalling the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), we should assert in relation to ours, that they have occupied them in sufficient force to make it a very dangerous assignment to try to reoccupy them and that they therefore intend to remain. If that is the case, we have to ask ourselves what the fleet is going to do when it gets there.
  It may well be the intention of Her Majesty's Ministers at the moment simply to surround the islands in such a way that they cannot be easily provisioned from the sea. All the indications are that the islands are capable of withstanding such a blockade for some considerable time. We know that the airfield is sufficiently intact for the islands to be provisioned by air. In those circumstances, the question that arises, if the Government are serious that they will not negotiate about the future status of the Falkland Islands unless the Argentines withdraw, is whether we are committed to anything short of bloodshed and war. I find that a horrifying prospect. I cannot approach it with the equanimity of the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge.
  The idea that we should shed blood over this issue tends to transcend the principles inherent in it. That is largely because I see the principles inherent in this situation differently from many hon. Members. I have thought for years that for us to assert that the issues of a number of islands, the remainder of our colonies around the world, are to be determined simply by the will of the inhabitants of those islands is a wholly unrealistic principle. To allege that the right of a people to decide whether they want to be an independent country is the same as the right of a small island that cannot be an independent country, because it is not viable as a country, to assert that it should remain part of the British Commonwealth as a colony seems wholly unrealistic in relation to some of the areas that we are discussing.
  There are not only the Falkland Islands; there is Gibraltar. If the facts of the situation suggest that the islands are within the economic area of a larger territory which has always regarded them as its own, it is difficult for us, approaching the twenty-first century, to go on asserting that they are British and that they have the right to remain British because their people claim that that should be so.
  Incidentally, in relation to Gibraltar, the United Nations has never asserted that the people of Gibraltar have a right to make such a decision themselves. The United Nations has always recognised that, in relation to areas which have been a source of long-standing controversy, there are real difficulties in asserting that it is simply a question of self-determination.
  The issue of the Falkland Islands has been the subject of controversy between the United kingdom and the Argentine for almost as long as we have occupied the islands. I remind those who say that the occupation by the Argentine is aggression that our right to be present in the Falkland Islands rests on just such an invasion—150 years
  1180
  ago, yes, but nevertheless an invasion. For most of those 150 years the Argentine has been protesting against our right to occupy the islands.
  The protest was made long before the assumption of power by the present dictatorship or by an earlier dictatorship. It goes back to the time when the Argentine was ruled by a democratic regime. It is not enough to say, as some of my colleagues have said, that this is a Fascist dictatorship and that therefore we should not give any consideration to its claim upon the Falkland Islands. If that be the case—I recognise that most hon. Members see it differently—I do not find it easy to say that we should shed the blood of Britons or Argentines in seeking a settlement when the reality, in my judgment, is that the Falkland Islands ought to go back to the Argentine.
  Sir John Eden: Surely it is not just a case of self-determination, or whether the islanders are capable of a separate existence. Surely it is the case that under British sovereignty they live in freedom. If that sovereignty were to be changed by an act of aggression, those people would be denied the opportunity to continue to live in freedom, and there would be no opportunity for any kind for self-determination.
  Mr. Lyon: I feel immense sympathy with the 1,800 inhabitants of the Falkland Islands, who are not Argentines, do not speak Spanish, do not have a Spanish culture and do not wish to be part of the Argentine. I would certainly make provision in any settlement for them to have the right to come and live in Britain if they wanted to do so, but what I would not say is that they have a right to determine whether we shall, in pursuance of their right to self-determination, expend not only money, ships and aeroplanes but people's lives in order to ensure that the 1,800 islanders are entitled to maintain the way of life that they already have.
  Mr. Percy Grieve rose—
  Mr. Lyon: In that question lies a real uncertainty about our present attitude. When hon. Members question the argument, as so many do, I ask what will happen if and when the Chinese occupy Hong Kong. It is, of course, true that the New Territories are on lease and will go back to China at the end of the lease, but the island is British. On the thesis advanced by the right hon. Member for Down, South, we ought to be willing to assert our territorial integrity in relation to Hong Kong Island, and I do not believe that this House would go that far.
  Mr. Grieve rose—
  Mr. Lyon: If the Chinese invaded Hong Kong, I do not believe that we would send the fleet to Hong Kong. I do not think there would be any question of considering how many aeroplanes we could send in the hold of a cargo liner in order to assert our integrity in relation to Hong Kong.
  Mr. J. Enoch Powell: As the hon. Member mentioned me, perhaps I may say that I do not think that we should, because I do not think that it would be practicable for us, by military force, to maintain that territory if it were seriously challenged and attacked by China. But I think that it is self-evidently practicable for us to maintain our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.
  Mr. Lyon: I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman because he has brought me on to the next fundamental point in the British position. It is one thing

  1181
  to make such an assertion—although I do not believe that we can reoccupy the islands and drive the Argentines back to Argentina—but it is a wholly different thing to presume that from now until the Falkland Islanders change their view of the situation we can police the area in a way that will stop the Argentines going back on to the islands. I do not believe that we have the capacity, in the late twentieth century, to mount such an operation permanently in the South Atlantic.
  The fact that we are sending nearly two-thirds of our Navy and the fact that we are commandeering trawlers and fishing boats to send to the South Atlantic at this moment in order to maintain this one response suggest to me that Britain can no longer claim that it can police the world. It is in that final assertion of our role in the world that I find myself so much at loggerheads with most hon. Members on both sides of the House.
  The fact is that the British Empire is over. We are no longer able to say that we are the policeman of the world and can determine what the people of the Pitcairn Islands, the people of Ascension Island or the people of St. Helena want or should have. We ought to have settled the future of those tiny dependencies a long time ago through the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.
  For 16 years in this House I have listened to one Government after another saying, "Oh, no, we cannot do that because the inhabitants do not want us to do it." I have listened to hon. Members who have been to such places maintain on their return, "Whatever we do, we must safeguard the integrity of the Pitcairn Islands"—or of Gibraltar, Hong Kong or some other country. Galtieri has shown us that we cannot honour such a pledge to the islands permanently. We ought to come to terms with reality and recognise that we cannot.
  If we do not come to terms with reality, what we have in prospect is disaster on a massive scale. I do not care whether it brings down a Government. What I care about is whether human beings are to lose their lives, whether they are Argentines or British, just in order that we can preserve a bereft principle so that we can preserve an illusion about the power of the British Empire which in my view is out of tune with what we have and what we are capable of achieving.
  5.30 pm
  Dr. Alan Glyn: We have listened to a speech by the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) in which he admitted that he is in a minority in the House. The feeling in the House has been demonstrated by the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. They have made it clear that they regard this act of aggression as unwarranted and something that should be put right. Sovereignty and the rule of law should be restored. If we fail to do that we fail not only in the Falkland Islands but in the world and we shall pay for it in future.
  The hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) mentioned the task force. All of us have constituents in the force. I make no secret that my own regiment, the Blues and Royals, which is stationed in my constituency, in Windsor, is in the task force and I am sure that all hon. Members have a constituent or constituents in the task force. It is a great tribute to our nation and to the Prime Minister that we have been able to mobilise this force in such a short time. How many other nations could have
  1182
  mounted a force so well and so quickly? With the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union we are the only nation capable of mounting an operation of this nature.
  Why have we had to do this? We have had to do it because the only way of showing the present Administration of the Argentine that we mean business is by sending out a force capable of carrying out a task if necessary. It is noticeable that we have no quarrel with the Argentine people, as the hon. Member for Attercliffe pointed out. However, it is not the Argentines that we are dealing with: it is the junta. Those are the people with whom we have to negotiate in the long run until, let us hope, they are no longer the rulers of the Argentine.
  As we all know, this country has many friends in the Argentine but we are compelled by events and by an act of aggression against our territory to act in the way that we have and to follow the path so well laid by the Prime Minister. She has gone to every possible means and spent hours with our American allies in an effort to avoid any warlike action. At the same time, she has had the backing of the EEC and the Security Council.
  The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) made a very important point. He said that it was not only a question of the islanders but a question of sovereignty of territory. That is a point that has to be brought out. We all think, quite rightly, of the future of the Falkland Islanders, but at the same time we must also think about the wider implications of what would happen if we had given in in this instance.
  The implications are that if we give way to the forces of dictatorship we pay for it in the long run. In this case our objectives are simple. They are, first and foremost, to restore the sovereignty, or the Administration as it should be called of the Falkland Islands. The second is to make sure that the Argentine troops are withdrawn. It would be impossible, as my hon. Friends the Members for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) and Newbury (Mr. NcNair-Wilson) made clear, to find out the wishes of the Falkland Islanders so long as the Argentine soldiers remain on the island.
  Therefore, our first duty is to clear the island of the invading forces. A great deal of nonsense has been talked about flags. There is only one flag that should be flying over the Falkland Islands—the British flag. There is no place or justification for the Argentine flag. As far as we are concerned it is sovereign territory inhabited by British subjects.
  I should like to refer to the position of the islanders. Their views may have changed because of the occupation. Many views may be expressed, but I put it to the House that the only time that we can ever obtain the views of the islanders is when the Argentine troops have gone. We must then have some form of referendum to find out the views of the islanders, because their future is of paramount importance, although it may well have been changed by the recent events. Nevertheless, we have a solemn duty to find out what those views are. Successive Governments have, in their wisdom, decided that their views should and would be considered.
  We are immensely grateful to the EEC for the rapid way in which it has responded to this wanton act of aggression, and we are grateful to the United Nations. But there are two points that must be answered. With 9,000 troops on the island, unless they voluntarily withdraw, how long will

  1183
  it take to get rid of the invaders? It will be an immensely difficult task, even if they are subjected to long periods of economic sanctions, both by the EEC and other countries.
  There are problems. As we all know, there are Russian troops in the area. The 200-mile limit round the Falkland Islands may be breached by the Argentine navy. However, it is a tribute to the House of Commons, to all the parties and to the leaders, that they have unanimously come down on the side of resolution and are firm not only in their determination that we should carry out this operation to its conclusion but that they should back the Government in their dispatch of the force necessary to achieve the objective.
  We all want to see the matter resolved by a diplomatic solution but if that is not possible we know that we have the superiority to be able to achieve that objective by force. Let us hope that after the objective has been achieved, whatever negotiations take place, we do not give away any sovereignty and we recognise the importance not only of the islands but the area in that vicinity.
  I hope and pray that the solidarity of the House of Commons behind the Prime Minister will remain, except for a few hon. Members who have already—
  Mr. Bob Cryer: Some of us are dissidents.
  Dr. Glyn: The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) will have his chance of showing his solidarity with the Government and the nation.
  For my part I believe that the House has shown that it is firmly behind my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, with a few exceptions. I hope and pray that this matter will be brought to a swift conclusion.
  5.37 pm
  Mr. William Hamilton: Having listened to all three debates on this matter in the course of the last two or three weeks the impression that I have is that the House has a feeling of helplessness in circumstances where no solution that will be satisfactory to us either in the short or the long term is possible. The great danger is that there will be a battle not so much of principle but of survival of one Government or another—the survival of our Prime Minister or the Argentine President. All matters of principle may go out of the window.
  Mr. Nicholas Winterton: Cheap and nasty.
  Mr. D. N. Cambell-Savours: Not very original.
  Mr. Hamilton: Let the Prime Minister be under no illusion as to the support that she gets from the Labour Benches. She, in the first debate, sought to make cheap party political capital out of the matter. Now she is rather more smooth about it because she more than anybody understands that her survival depends very much on the outcome of this issue. It is her ineptitude, more than anything else, that has brought us and the country to this impasse.
  I wish to say one or two words about the role of the United Nations. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made a powerful speech, a combination of the idealism for which he is known and realism. My hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) made a similar
  1184
  speech. Unless we understand that there are ideals and measures of realism in this matter, we shall never have a solution to the problem.
  My right hon. Friend referred to the Organisation of American States and its definition of aggression. He said that we should make the United States Government understand clearly that they could stop this matter overnight. If the United States Government took action in conformity with their own Organisation of American States, they could stop the Argentine Government in their tracks within a week. But they will not do it because they have too many vested interests in Argentina and in South and Central America as a whole. So it must be understood clearly that some of us do not trust the United States Government to deliver the goods, even though the Prime Minister has fallen over backwards ever since she took office to defend every action that the Reagan Administration has taken.
  That is the first factor that I want to get on the record. The other one concerns the task force, and here I take issue with my right hon. Friend the Member for Lanark (Dame Judith Hart). Now that it is on the ocean, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by, as she said, halting it in its tracks. Halting it where? In the middle of the ocean? Sending it back and dismantling it?
  Dame Judith Hart: Essentially.
  Mr. Hamilton: My right hon. Friend did not make it clear. She simply said "Halt it." That would be a tremendous fillip to the junta in the Argentine—the very thing to which my right hon. Friend objects. Like me, she objects to the junta. To do what she suggests at this moment would be a great fillip to a regime that we want to bring down at the earliest moment.
  We are faced with this dilemma. That is why so many Opposition Members are uncomfortable and uncertain about the outcome. Meanwhile, we owe loyalty to those men who are on the ocean not because they volunteered but because that woman, the Prime Minister, said "You will go whether you like it or not." They have no choice. Meanwhile, we have to give them what support we can.
  If that force is used, it fails. I ask hon. Members to imagine the scenario. The guns fire from our ships, the bombs are dropped, the torpedoes are let loose, and we raze those islands to the ground, with the result that every one of the 1,800 inhabitants is killed. What happens then? The Prime Minister has not a clue, and nor has anyone else. But anyone who pretends that that is a solution to the problem must be wrong in his mind. That is why my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is right to insist that, come what may, however long it takes, there must be a peaceful solution.
  Mr. Frank Allaun: I agree with my hon. Friend, but if the task force continues into the zone and the Argentine Government do not withdraw their forces from the Falklands, can we rely on this Government not resorting to force and not sinking a ship, leading to blood and tears from both sides?
  Mr. Hamilton: I agree with that absolutely, and that is the scene that I was trying to paint. We have had bellicose noises from successive Ministers, including the Secretary of State for Defence, saying that we would be quite prepared to sink ships and to blow everyone to Hell—as if that would solve anything. My right hon.

  1185
  Friend the Leader of the Opposition is right to say that we must at all costs get a peaceful solution. If it means losing face, it is better to lose face than to lose lives.
  That brings me to the United Nations resolution. It instructed the Argentine Government to withdraw their forces, and they have refused. It also demanded of the two parties that they get together to arrive at a peaceful solution. It did not rule out the use of force. It did not rule out the use of economic sanctions. We should not hesitate to say to the Argentine Government that we are prepared if need be to use economic sanctions and to engage in peaceful negotiations over an extended period.
  The final part of my remarks concerns the 1,800 islanders. My hon. Friend the Member for York approached this matter realistically. A great deal of romantic nonsense has been talked about the rights of 1,800 people to determine how we should use our Armed Forces, no matter what the expenditure, if they say that they want our protection. It will cost us half our Budget, but if they want that protection, we shall give it to them. What nonsense! We should spell out to them that the restoration of the status quo is impossible. They cannot have back what has been taken from them. We must rely on the United Nations to protect them as best they can, but we must make them understand, if they do not understand it already, that our days of empire and our days in the role of international policeman are long since over—and thank goodness for that.
  The Prime Minister must understand that the apparent unanimity of the House now is more apparent than real. She will get her deserts in due course.
  5.46 pm
  Mr. Ian Lloyd: I cannot help a certain sense of dejà vu on this occasion. Some time ago I had the opportunity to read in considerable detail a debate which took place in the House in 1867. Two British subjects, a British consul general and one other, were held by the Emperor Theodore in Abyssinia. We sent two divisions, one from India and one from this country, to Abyssinia to recover those two individuals.
  The interesting feature is that during that debate, although our power comparatively and relatively was totally different from what it may be comparatively and absolutely today, exactly the same arguments were used.
  I give some of the answers made then, because they are extremely relevant to some of the arguments used today, especially by the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon). It was said, for example, that if we sent two divisions into Abyssinia, because it was difficult, we would be inviting a similar nemesis to that which overtook the British Army in Afghanistan some 12 years earlier when, I remind the House, we failed to do anything about the murder of two British colonels in that country.
  The arguments were advanced effectively on that occasion by Sir Henry Rawlinson. On the cost of the operation, he said:
  "I cannot subscribe to the doctrine, now so prevalent, of weighing the honour of England against gold and silver."
  Speaking of the scale of the disaster, he said:
  "the same Nemesis may again overtake us now if we exhibit to the East such a miserable example of moral cowardice and military weakness as to allow our envoys to perish in an Abyssinian dungeon and yet make no sign, show even no desire, to wipe such a stain from the escutcheon of England."
  As for the difficulty, the answer was given on a previous occasion by General Nott—I am not aware that
  1186
  he was any relation of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. What he said was equally relevant. He was taxed with the difficulties of the Kandahar campaign, and he said:
  "It is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties when the national honour and our military reputation are so nearly concerned."
  That gives the answers to some of the arguments that we hear today. Although the dislike of war and of bloodshed is widely shared on both sides of the House because we are fully aware of the consequences of that kind of action, equally we are fully aware of the consequences of inaction.
  The Falkland Islands situation has raised two major issues. The first is the question of intelligence, which I believe to be quite fundamental, both to any past failure there may have been and to any future success which we may have and deserve. The second is the influence on policy and procedure which we should be prepared to concede to circumstances. I am sure that I do not have to remind the House of the advice given a very long time ago by Aristotle, who reminded us that the true legislator ought to be acquainted not only with what is best but with what is best relative to circumstances, advice which applies even more to questions of foreign policy than to domestic policy.
  First, then, intelligence. The history of major wars, their anticipation and their conduct, is of course littered with intelligence failures. We have only to think of the following brief list: the invasion of the Low Countries and France in 1940, the sinking of "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse"—already mentioned in the context of air power—Pearl Harbour, the escape of the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" up the Channel. The whole problem of intelligence, obtaining it, distributing it, and judging it is most memorably documented in R. V. Jones's book "Most Secret War", in which he describes the brilliant performance of a small group whose contribution to victory in 1945 is still largely unrecognised, at least by the Establishment, which did so much to reach different and disastrous conclusions. The basic problem has not changed one iota.
  Mr. Dalyell rose—
  Mr. Lloyd: Certainly I give way.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. This is the fourth time that the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) has interrupted. It only stops someone else from being able to speak.
  Mr. Dalyell: Does the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) recollect that the original "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" were sunk in the battle of the Falkland Islands and that in those seas there were very few survivors? The point one makes is that if there is a naval battle there now it will be very difficult to effect rescue. While we are on Greek history, was any fleet sent out with quite such purposes since Agamemnon set out to rescue Helen of Troy?
  Mr. Lloyd: I do not necessarily dispute the hon Gentleman's qualms—he is entitled to them—but I do not think that they are relevant to the point about intelligence that I am about to make.

  1187
  The electronic devices to which R. V. Jones referred have aggravated the complexity, and it is nowhere better summarised than in Churchill's commentary on Czar Nicholas II:
  "At the summit, where all problems are reduced to yea or nay, where events transcend the faculties of men and where all is inscrutable, he had to give the answers."
  So has my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. Let those who dare to criticise or point the finger of scorn first demonstrate a superior ability in this field. None can do so. R. V. Jones has described the difficulties, which none can escape, not even my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He says:
  "The commander's information system … can easily bring about the hierarchical attenuation of front-line experience … Commanders must delve to lower levels and exercise something akin to artistry in selecting key details."
  So must Ministers.
  The Foreign Office, despite what my noble Friend Lord Home has written, has clearly not reached its usual standards of artistic performance, but it is method and understanding and not supermen that we require. There are no supermen, but what we do need, and need now, are men who are aware of the immense significance in today's context of military affairs, of electronic technology and its effects on the character of intelligence and the course of events. [Laughter.] Those who laugh may have occasion to laugh on the other side. I give examples.
  The United States "big bird" satellites can be directed to take daily scans of any area of interest and televise the images to the ground. The Russians have similar devices. We may be certain that our fleet will be minutely observed by both. Are we certain that this information is secure? In this context it is well known that the launch of a Russian satellite two days before the Yom Kippur war gave the first direct signal of the impending Egyptian attack. We have the capability of detecting such launches. Did we do so on this occasion, what significance did we attach to them, and have others been launched since the invasion? The House would like to know.
  Secondly, what is known as the "Sosus" system can detect submarine movement at 3,000 miles range with the precision which enabled the United States navy to locate in 1968 a Soviet C-class submarine which had sunk in the Pacific. Presumably the Soviets have at least by now that capability. Can we be sure that the intelligence about our submarines is not reaching the Argentine command? Since the provision of such intelligence could make a fundamental difference to the success of the whole operation, what should our attitude be if we discover that it is being disseminated?
  I turn now to what I might describe as the sophistication superiority argument. The influence of morale is doubtless still 10 times that of material in any invasion. Again, we have been warned that the subtle enemy will avoid encounters when his technical inferiority will impose unacceptable risks, as it will to the Argentines. R. V. Jones says:
  "A subtle enemy will try to fight the war in whatever terms of sophistication or non-sophistication will suit him best."
  It has never been better put than by Marius in his reply to Pompidaeus Silo, who tried to bring the former out of the hills to fight in the approaches to Rome. Silo said to Marius:
  "If you are a great General, come down and fight."
  1188
  to which Marius replied:
  "If you are a great General, make me do so against my will."
  That will surely be the Argentine response on this occasion—to keep our fleet at bay and avoid battle. They will rely on four admirals—Admiral Attrition, Admiral Expense, Admiral Indifference and Admiral Boredom. But if they are brought to battle, as they might well be by skilful commanders, this will be the first battle whose outcome will be decided by computer software written probably over two years ago.
  I turn now to the policy options. What should we do, and what can we do? What, indeed, are the circumstances that complicate the otherwise simple issues of sovereignty? As I see it, there are only four possible outcomes. First, the engagement will be limited, successful and brief—that is obviously the hope of the House. Secondly, the engagement will be limited, inconclusive and long-drawn-out. Thirdly, the engagement, whether successful or not, in the first instance will involve other South American powers. Finally, other major powers will be involved.
  Clearly, if diplomatic pressure fails, our primary objective must be to achieve the first of those outcomes. Any of the remainder will not only be costly, dangerous and possibly disastrous; they would also indicate a calamitous failure on the part of the civilised world to recognise that we had not sent an expeditionary force to reimpose British sovereignty, which is a limited if legitimate objective, but to uphold and reassert the rule of law. I believe that to be common ground.
  The Argentine has not just offended British pride and seized what it may regard as disputed territory. It has undermined everything that the allied powers fought to establish and protect in both world wars—the rule of law and international order.
  The Argentines have also undermined and challenged the whole philosophy underlying the attempts to impose that rule of law in the League of Nations and the United Nations. That is why it is so serious; that is why the scope for mediation is so limited; that is why, as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) pointed out in a most effective speech, countries which uphold the rule of law would all be threatened by any failure of our nerve or resolve, or of naval expedition.
  First and foremost, therefore, we must not weaken our resolve. It was once said that the Emperor Andronicus had a heart to resolve, a head to contrive and a hand to execute. We need all three, but it is the resolution of the Prime Minister and of those around her that is critical. The contrivance and execution are well within our grasp and capability, and always have been.
  Secondly, we must not modify our objective to the point at which it becomes unrecognisable.
  Thirdly, as always, we must leave tactics and operational decisions to those on the spot.
  Fourthly, we must do all that we can to bring home to the Argentine people, with the minimum of damage to their economy and livelihood but the maximum damage to their ill-advised Government, that as part of the West they have as much to lose and nothing to gain from salvaging the decrepit pride of decadent oligarchy.
  Fifthly, we must make it clear to all that we are defending a general interest—the rule of law, the charter of the United Nations and civilised procedure in the relationship between States in dispute. If every dispute about a national boundary or sovereignty were to justify

  1189
  unilateral aggression, the millions who died to defend freedom in both world wars, in Korea and in Vietnam, will have died in vain. The Argentine nation did not participate in any of those conflicts, although many of the British residents may have done so. The Argentines should be asked to choose which side they are on—we do not know—and help to distinguish between the nationalist fervour and the long-term interests of their country.
  Therefore, my support for the Prime Minister, which is unequivocal, does not rest on the narrow interest of the nation state, although I believe, as the Security Council has decided, that ours is entirely legitimate in this context. It rests rather on the threat to international order in a world that has paid a staggering price in life and wealth to establish the present precarious and fragile structure of international relations.
  There are two answers to the question whether that order is gravely threatened. The first might be described as the sceptical negative. All major armed conflicts diminish international order, destroy life and wealth, increase anarchy and threaten or cause wider conflagrations. That view begs the question whether any particular conflict is ever justifiable. It is the raison d'être of the United Nations and the principal concern of the Security Council. Yet the founders of that organisation recognised that the greatest threat to international order is the unilateral and unprovoked resort to force to secure the objectives of the nation state. That is why its charter recognises the right of national self-defence and does not unduly fetter that right.
  There is then the positive affirmative, which follows directly from the previous qualification. Nothing imposes a greater threat to international peace and stability than the actions of nation states, alliances or even terrorist groups, based on the assumption that a long-standing national grievance or expectation legitimises aggression.
  Those are the major criteria. From them, all the rest flow, but they are not without significance. Time does not permit me to go into all the detail. I merely say this. It is conceivable that this operation may run into difficulties, but that is no reason why the House should in any sense diminish or restrict its support for the Prime Minister and the Government. It is my earnest wish and hope that the operation will succeed. It deserves to succeed, it has right on its side, and we should support it wholeheartedly.
  Several Hon. Members rose—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand that it is hoped to begin the winding-up speeches at 6.50 pm. I hope that all hon. Members who are called will bear that in mind.
  6.2 pm
  Mr. Dafydd Wigley: I shall not follow the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) back to 1867, except to say that it was my impression that gunboat diplomacy was a matter for that age, not this, and I am appalled by some of the recent jingoism, particularly in the media.
  I approach the debate with an awareness of the seriousness of the position and I shall not go into matters that are not directly relevant. The speeches of a number of Opposition Members will have made it clear that there is not unanimity on this matter and that there is an understandable worry. There is unanimity in condemnation of the Argentine junta and the way in which it has attacked and occupied the Falkland Islands, but the view
  1190
  falls short of unanimity, outside the House in the countries of these islands, on the question of where our present course will take us. If it leads us into an escalation towards a general war, many people ask at what point we should withdraw from that course. The possibility of Russian submarines around the coast now brings home the point clearly.
  I see this matter from a standpoint slightly different from that of many hon. Members in that there have been close links between Wales and the Argentine over the years. There are now 20,000 people of Welsh descent living in the Argentine. I had the opportunity to go there and meet many of them, and I know from discussions 15 or 20 years ago that even among that community, let alone among the community of Spanish descent, there is a strong feeling of the affinity between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine. Whether or not we in this House or in these islands like that, that is the reality. The strength of that feeling can be judged from the number of people who turned out for the demonstrations in Buenos Aires and the way in which a tin-pot dictator, who was a month ago on the way to oblivion, appears to have been rescued by the sad sortie that he has undertaken. That must be borne in mind.
  I have discussed the position with officers of the Welsh Argentine Society, of which I am a member. It is worried about the possibility of a war in which Welsh people in the forces now going to the Falklands could be confronting their cousins who have been conscripted into the Argentine army.
  I have a constituent who was a fourth generation farmer in the Falkland Islands. He tried for 10 years to return to Wales from the Falkland Islands. Up to last year, when I took him to the Foreign Office and met the then Minister of State, he had been unable to sell his farm, not because there were no buyers—there were buyers—but they were from the Argentine. He was not allowed by Government policy to sell his farm to those buyers from the Argentine. The point that was made by the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) is one of which I am aware also from my constituent. There is a significant element among the population of the Falkland Islands that may not be looking to their future in the Falkland Islands.
  We must find a diplomatic answer to the problem for three reasons—
  Mr. Geraint Morgan: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that the unhappy history of the Welsh colony in the Argentine to which he has referred provides the best possible justification for the Government's policy of protecting the Falkland Islands? Does he not recall that the colonists went there intending to set up a Welsh colony under its own government, preserving its own language? It was prevented from doing so by an Argentine dictator named De Rosas, a name, I notice, which figures among the names of the junta today. They were prevented from running their own government and even from speaking their own language as the official language in that colony.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. That is a very long intervention.
  Mr. Wigley: I take the point that the hon. and learned Gentleman is making.
  Of course, there have been difficult times in the Argentine. The Welsh people living there, like other people from the countries of Britain living in the Argentine, have suffered under successive regimes. There

  1191
  have been a number of unhappy dictatorships. I make absolutely clear our condemnation of the type of government now in the Argentine. I wish to see a more democratic government evolved there.
  We must find a diplomatic answer to the problem for three reasons. The first is the well-being of the islanders themselves. They are the people in the front line. Those 1,800 people may well suffer most if it comes to fighting. We must also bear in mind the position of British citizens in the Argentine. A number of the Welsh colony there still have dual citizenship.
  Secondly, we must ensure that there is stability in the long term. If we do not have a diplomatic answer, even if we get our way by force in the short term, there will be instability in the future. That will give us major headaches in the years to come.
  Thirdly, we must set an example to other countries. Problems like this can be resolved without resort to the force of arms. It would be a terrible indictment of the failure of diplomacy if we had to resort to other methods.
  The Falkland Islands are a small community 7,000 to 8,000 miles away. They are to a large extent dependent on South America for food, education and health services. That is a day-to-day reality for those 1,800 people when they look beyond the present occupation. It is a small population which could not possibly be self-sufficient in all aspects of life in the modern world. There are many of that community who would like to leave the islands if it were possible to do so.
  In her opening speech the Prime Minister underlined that it is the wishes of the 1,800 people on the Falkland Islands that are paramount. I think her words were, "This aspect is paramount in all considerations." Therefore, I hope that in any negotiated settlement the Falkland Islanders will be given an opportunity, once the troops have been withdrawn—we appreciate that the troops must be withdrawn before there can be a meaningful settlement—to make their voice heard on their long-term future. The hon. Member for Newbury was right. I have also had feedback from my constituents that there may be people, particularly after the recent experiences, who will be looking for solutions other than the previous relationships.
  At the end of the debate perhaps the Government will give an assurance that, if the majority of those 1,800 people want a solution that involves a different formula for sharing sovereignty, or for lease-back and so on, the Government will accept that their voice is paramount. I hope that the Government will give a commitment that they will not resort to the argument that territory is more important than the islands' inhabitants. The Government have made it clear that they will respect the Falkland Islanders' wishes. Now is the time to find a way of determining their wishes.
  If there is to be a negotiated settlement and the Argentines withdraw their fleet, there may be some dispute about whose flag is to fly on the islands. However, if that is the only question remaining in the short term, the United Nations' flag could fly for a limited period until the other problems have been sorted out. Surely it is not worth risking a war that could escalate by arguing about national flags. Although people want the Argentines out of the
  1192
  Falkland Islands, they do not want bloodshed if it can be avoided. They certainly do not want the situation to escalate into war.
  The Government may be able to take other steps to put pressure on the Argentine regime. One possibility has not been mentioned today, although it may have been mentioned previously. I refer to the fact that World Cup football is held very dear in the Argentine. If the countries taking part in the World Cup applied some pressure against the Argentines taking part in it, the message would go home loud and clear. Mandatory sanctions by the United Nations have already been mentioned. Several other courses could be pursued and there is no earthly justification for allowing the situation to develop into a war that could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. It has been said that we should use all arms possible. However, we must make it clear that we will stop short of such a war, because it would not carry the support of the peoples of these islands.
  While there is still time I urge the Government to start seeking a de-escalation of the situation and to find a peaceful solution.
  6.12 pm
  Sir Hector Monro: I add my warm support to that already given to the Prime Minister and the Government for their conduct of affairs since Argentina's wanton act of aggression against the Falkland Islands. The Government have taken every conceivable step calmly and with great efficiency. That view has been reflected by many of my constituents and by others who have spoken to me.
  I wish to put on record time and again the exceptional performance given by the Royal Navy and the Ministry of Defence in putting the task force to sea in four days. It reflects tremendous credit on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and on everyone who worked so hard that weekend. When the fleet left it had great support from the crowds at Portsmouth and the support of the vast majority of the country. It is right that our Service men should feel that at the same time they have the united support of the House in their efforts on behalf of the nation.
  Of course, there are a few predictable dissenters. We heard them both today and last week. They have every right to protest, but they are probably gaining more publicity than they are worth. I hope that their views will not deflect the United Nations or our mediators who are working on our behalf. Never, at any time since the last war, has there been a more important period during which the nation should stand together. I welcome the views expressed by the leaders of the Opposition parties. The situation may last for quite a long time—months or more—and we must not falter. This is no time for the fainthearted. We have heard some of their voices during our recent debates. Of course, we shall have an inquiry later, but until then let us forget our differences and be united.
  Since our previous debate—of which I heard every word—the "Canberra" and other ships have sailed to the South Atlantic. More of our Service men have sailed on those ships. Perhaps even now they have reached the staging post of Ascension Island on their way to the Falkland Islands. They, too, must have our full support in the task ahead. It is right to say that the House has every

  1193
  confidence that our Service men will play their full part, because they are the finest trained volunteer force in the world.
  We all welcome the maximum diplomatic activity towards finding a peaceful solution and our thanks are due to the United States of America for its efforts during the past week. Of course we wish to save lives through diplomacy and it will be far less expensive and perhaps more enduring if we can win through diplomacy. But Argentina has commited an act of war that has been condemned by the Security Council of the United Nations. Argentina has been required to withdraw, but it has taken no notice of that order from the Security Council. I doubt whether there is any way in which the Argentine Government's face can be saved through a compromise that would be acceptable to Britain.
  The first condition—my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has rightly brought it home to the nation time and time again—is that the Argentine invader must leave the Falkland Islands forthwith, flags and all. There must be no "ifs" and no "buts" and no quibbling. The Argentines must leave the islands before we can begin to negotiate. We must not allow, as Opposition Members have mentioned from time to time, endless procrastination in the form of peace conferences or diplomatic negotiations to deflect us from the first priority of the Falkland Islands being returned to our administration.
  While that is going on, we know that even now fortifications are being strengthened in our islands and against our interests. We must confer only when the duress of occupation is removed. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced a 200-mile maritime enforcement zone around the Falkland Islands. I wonder whether it is feasible to announce an air space zone, because with a highly vulnerable airstrip near to the sea, with aircraft taking off and landing low over the sea, the Argentine air force might as well know that it is as vulnerable as the Argentine ships if it flies troops and supplies to the Falkland Islands.
  The message that we all wish to send is that the Government have the full support of the vast majority of the House in their determination to succeed. The sovereignty of the Falkland Islands is ours. We insist that it returns to our administration as soon as possible. Then we shall consider the future in the light of the wishes of the islanders, many of whom are of good Scottish descent.
  However, Britain must react to the support that we have received from the Commonwealth and the EEC. The economic measures will be valuable but long-term. We must show that the spread of dictatorship or Communism by force must be stopped in the interests of freedom and democracy. The task force will be concentrating the minds of the Argentines. As soon as they realise that we are not bluffing, the better. So good luck to our force. Let us remain a united House until victory is ours.
  6.20 pm
  Mr. Dick Douglas: I shall not take up the remarks of the hon. Member for Dumfries (Sir H. Monro), because I just do not agree with some of them. I do not think that the House is united behind the Government in their desire and outlook. The Government must spell out much more clearly to the nation their essential aims. Initially the Government should take on board the need to produce a White Paper that sets out the background to the issue and shows clearly the nature of our
  1194
  aims. I understand the difficulties in doing that immediately but I hope that the Government will appreciate the need for such a document.
  In representing Dunfermline and Rosyth I represent a constituency that is heavily involved with the Navy. I pay tribute to the speed and effectiveness with which the task force has been prepared. I say, as a former merchant navy officer, that we should remember those in the merchant navy—those in the "Canberra" and others—who responded immediately. We should not seek on the Floor of the House to undermine the resolve of those who are under the Government's direction.
  Let us try to be clear about our aims and how effective we might be in pursuing them. It is said that the United Kingdom must maintain sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the dependencies, no matter what. However, the Argentine troops are there and it is not right for us to be so inflexible that we refuse to negotiate as long as those troops remain on the islands. They are there and, therefore, there must be some flexibility.
  Mr. Nicholas Winterton: Why?
  Mr. Douglas: Because we live in the real world. The task force will be 8,000 miles from its base.
  Mr. Winterton: It will be 7,500 miles away.
  Mr. Douglas: Very well. That is the distance from the United Kingdom to the Falklands alone. Another 500 or 1,000 miles are involved if we include the dependencies. I do not want to quibble about that. Whatever the exact distance, we shall be involved in an enormously costly exercise. The British people might not have known that on 1 or 2 April, but they are beginning to realise that now. More important is the fact that the Argentines know that. In the next few weeks or months we might defeat them, but in the longer run it will be impossible to maintain a force of the magnitude of the task force that will have consequences for the Argentine military regime. That is the reality. I accept that it is not palatable. Being a wee fellow, I never like giving way to a bully, but we have to face facts.
  What is the position of the United States and the Organisation of American States? The United States cannot be even-handed. It is a wrong posture for the American President to be parading in his bathing suit on holiday when we are facing a potential conflict. At a suitable time I hope that the Prime Minister will have in mind the need to ask the President to intervene.
  We are not privy to all the things that are happening behind the scenes involving Mr. Haig. He has been exposed to great personal strain and has made a great sacrifice. I am sure that we are all grateful to him for that. At a suitable time—it cannot be far off because the task force is rightly proceeding in order to strengthen oar diplomatic position—the American President, with the prestige of his office, should intervene, perhaps through the Organisation of American States or through the United Nations.
  I do not want to be disrespectful to the Prime Minister at this juncture, but it would be wrong for the nation to become involved in a war of "Maggie's ego". It will be wrong if we appear to be inflexible towards negotiations. Like my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon), I have great respect for the principle of self-determination. However, the people of the Falklands cannot hold a veto over us in terms of what they want.

  1195
  That is not a long-term viable position in which we should be engaged, or one that should be maintained until Kingdom come. That should be made clear. I support the Navy and I support the task force, but above all I plead that a clear indication of our longer-term aims should be given to the people of this country. In the mid-term there must be extreme flexibility in negotiations and a resolve to try to solve this crisis by peaceful means through the medium of the United Nations.
  6.20 pm
  Sir Anthony Meyer: I have set myself a hard and disagreeable task that has been made harder and more disagreeable by the wise speeches with which the debate was opened, particularly by the very balanced and judicious speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
  I shall say two things that will be distasteful to both sides of the House. The first is that I believe that the clamour that the House set up on 3 April for the resignation of Lord Carrington marked one of the lowest points in its history. Lord Carrington's offence was to believe in the absolute necessity to reach some kind of agreement with the Argentines over the Falklands, since to defend them against a hostile neighbour in perpetuity would be prohibitively costly. Events will prove him right.
  The House did itself no honour by echoing the hysterical demands in the press that national humiliation should be purged by offering a scapegoat. My right hon. Friend the present Foreign Secretary is a man of outstanding ability and utter integrity, but with Lord Carrington we have lost the Minister who could best have turned to our advantage the initial prejudice of world opinion in our favour—a prejudice that his diplomatic skill had done so much to create. Clearly, the strongest card in our hand is the whole-hearted support of the EEC. I hope that hon. Members on both sides will note that.
  The second and still more distasteful thing I must do is question some part of the consensus in the House, excluding only far Left and the hon. Members for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) and for South Ayrshire (Mr. Foulkes), about what to do next.
  The Government have, rightly, the unanimous support of the House for the two propositions that the Argentines must not be allowed to enjoy undisturbed the fruits of their wanton and unprovoked aggression and that the people of the Falkland Islands must recover their right of self-determination. They have the overwhelming support of the House for the proposition that it is both right and expedient to dispatch the task force to demonstrate the firmness of our resolve and to use that task force, if need be, to enforce a blockade. I am part of that consensus, although not without misgivings caused by the gap that is now left in our defences against our real enemy—the Soviet Union.
  There is also overwhelming support on both sides of the House for the proposition that we should seek a peaceful solution to the crisis, but that if diplomacy fails we must be ready to use force to restore British sovereignty or, at any rate, British administration to the islands. I have to tell my right hon. Friends with great sadness, having given many hours of agonising thought to the matter, that I for one on this side—and, perhaps, only for one—am not part of that consensus.
  Mr. Frank Allaun: Well said.
  Sir Anthony Meyer: I do not believe that it would be right, I do not believe that it would in the end help us to achieve our objectives, to use force in such a way as to kill people, Service men or civilians, just to ensure that the Union Jack—the Union Jack alone—flies over what would be left of public buildings in the Falklands.
  If there is fighting, there will be casualties—British casualties and, indeed, Welsh casualties—on both sides. Some casualties may be unavoidable from the very presence of the task force in those waters. Of course, if the Argentines attack, we must defend ourselves, and that risk is a real one—[HON. MEMBERS: "They have attacked".]
  Mr. Eric Ogden: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
  Sir Anthony Meyer: No.
  Mr. Ogden: But they have attacked the islands.
  Sir Anthony Meyer: I would rather not give way. This is in the nature of a personal statement, and I do not want to be drawn into saying anything more than my carefully chosen words. Of course, if the Argentines attack we must defend ourselves. That risk is real if we establish a blockade.
  I accept that risk. What I cannot accept is that the task force should at any time be given instructions to seek out and destroy Argentine vessels or installations or to attempt an opposed landing in circumstances where substantial casualties are to be expected.
  If the Government really intend—as reports in The Times today suggest, and contrary to the impression given by the Prime Minister in her opening speech—to carry matters as far as that, I have no doubt that they will have the overwhelming support of this House, certainly of Conservative Members and of the majority of Opposition Members. I must tell them that at that stage they will no longer have mine.
  6.31 pm
  Mr. Douglas Jay: Despite the Government's blunders that led up to this crisis, today almost for the first time I found myself in almost complete agreement with both Front Bench speeches.
  Now, as we near the end of the debate, let us be clear about the real issues that are at stake. It is not the Union Jack or national prestige that is primarily at stake, but two crucial principles. The first is the principle of self-determination. I agree with the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that that is not the only principle, but it is one. At any rate, the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands have never freely expressed a wish to be governed either wholly or partly by the Argentines, least of all by the present military clique that rules there.
  Of course, if it is argued that what matters is not the wishes of these people now but who seized what territory one or two centuries ago, the Argentine dictators must be reminded that on that argument the Spaniards or, indeed, the Portuguese have very little right to be in South America at all. They seized that country by force from the American Indians. However, that line of argument is absurd.
  The second fundamental principle—this is where I part company with my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon)—is that it is vital to show that unprovoked armed aggression does not pay, if the post-war system of international law and order is to survive.

  1197
  This is not just an issue of 1,800 people or so many thousand square miles of territory. In the 1930s, which we need not rehearse now but should not forget, one successful aggression led to another and in the end to the catastrophe. If we now let this would-be Mussolini prove that aggression does pay, we shall again be on that fatal slide.
  If any positive gain came out of all the appalling sacrifices of the second world war it was the establishment of the United Nations system and a collective promise by all members to resist aggression at once. The nearest postwar parallel to the present attack was the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950. It is worth remembering that on that occasion the United Nations called on all members to resist aggression, and that the British Government sent British forces immediately to the assistance of the American forces there engaged. I see no less an obligation on everyone to resist this aggression as a matter of principle.
  The case for resistance now is made all the more overwhelming by the right of self-defence that is written into the United Nations charter, by the almost unanimous United Nations resolution and by the support given to Britain by both Commonwealth and European countries. Of course, a diplomatic solution must be sought eventually, and, of course, loss of human life must be avoided if that can be done. But that solution must be one which is consistent with the paramount aim of showing that armed aggression does not succeed.
  Therefore, the Government are right in my view to refuse negotiations on the future of the Falkland Islands until the Argentine forces have been withdrawn. There will be plenty of time later to discuss all sorts of possible eventual solutions. We do not do much good, I believe, by discussing them at this moment.
  Ministers are also right to refuse any conditions about Argentine administration, Argentine flags or power-sharing during the interim period. If the economic and naval blockade can succeed without any loss of life, that is plainly by far the best alternative. But if there is loss of life, let there be no doubt that the responsibility lies squarely and wholly on the Argentine regime, which first took armed action. Let us also remember that that regime might not long survive a military reverse and that its paper promises are not worth a very great deal.
  If international law is to be vindicated and a civilised and secure future assured for the Falkland Islanders, we must, together with other UN members, prove indisputably that this armed assault does not pay the aggressors.
  6.38 pm
  Mr. John Browne: Although we have been tricked and humiliated we have not yet been beaten. The two main reasons for our being tricked and humiliated and that stimulated the Argentine attack were, first, that the Argentine military junta was insecure internally and in need of an external successful adventure and secondly, externally, that the junta was encouraged by Britain's weakness—or apparent weakness. By appearing to be disinterested in the Falkland Islands, weak and unprepared to act or to back up diplomacy with force, we in Britain actually encouraged this aggression. The Falkland Islands must have seemed to the Argentine junta to be an
  1198
  extremely tempting target. That is why I strongly support and welcome the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
  I also welcomed the opening speech of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Foot), the Leader of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition. First, he is absolutely right. The United Nations charter itself is now under threat. Secondly, he showed calm, wisdom and firmness. Above all, he stressed unity. This is the vital fact. At long last the world can see that we are actually one nation, that we mean business when attacked and that the Government are strongly supported both in the House and throughout the country. I thank the right hon. Gentleman, but I hope fervently that he will maintain his support if and when any shooting starts.
  My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister showed clearly in her speech that our cause is just and that we are defending our own territory and our own people who have been subject to blatant military aggression. Secondly, my right hon. Friend showed that our case is right under article 51 of the United Nations charter. Thirdly, she showed that our case is strongly supported. Here, I believe, Ministers and officials in the Foreign Office have been extremely successful. We have resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council, the strong support of the EEC, of the Commonwealth countries and of the mass of free world opinion. Most importantly, we have strong support here at home.
  The future freedom of all nations is affected by this aggression. The reception of the Prime Minister's speech today shows that she has undoubted support in the House. Her clear statement of the aims, the fact that our sovereignty is not affected by the invasion and that we have a clear resolution to aim for a diplomatic and peaceful settlement but to use force if necessary is good. It shows that our clear duty as hon. Members is to ensure that the spirit of resolution outlined by the Prime Minister is impressed upon the military dictatorship in Argentina, that it is made entirely clear, and that there is no further room for misunderstanding. I feel that speeches such as that of the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) have the unfortunate effect of suggesting that this country does not mean business.
  I echo the support of the Armed Forces. The assembly of a task force of 36 ships in four days, when one realises that we had 27 ships of the line at the battle of Trafalgar, required an enormous effort of the Services and the Ministry of Defence. It has so far been a great success.
  I wish to refer to the position of the United States and also that of Russia. I agree with the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) when he says that the United States can surely not remain neutral against aggression for much longer. I agree with those who say that we owe President Reagan a great deal of thanks for his efforts to avert the aggression before it even took place and secondly for his great efforts through Secretary of State Haig in mediating following the aggression. But there must be a limit to the thanks that the Argentines are to gain for their support of the United States in El Salvador.
  The Americans appear to be convinced that, if the junta fails, Communism will sweep Argentina. It is the job of our Foreign Office to impress upon the United States that many juntas in South America, including Argentina, have failed, that Communism is not immediately under the floor and that fear of Communism is not sufficient ground for

  1199
  the United States not to throw its weight behind us. President Reagan would do well to remember the strong and unequivocal support that this Government, and especially the Prime Minister, have given him and his country on matters such as Afghanistan, the Iranian hostages and even interest rates.
  I believe that the overall aims of Russia are that it intends to fish in troubled waters and to continue to subvert Central and South America. Furthermore, Russia sees in Argentina a massive alternative source of grain supplies of great value to it, and it also sees a chance of increasing subversion. The Russians want to spy on the Royal Navy—first, to give aid to the Argentines in the location of our ships and submarines; secondly, to observe how a modern navy such as ours controls and operates in today's war conditions and, if any modern weapons are used, how they are used and to what effect.
  I wonder whether Russia has already had a hand in the operations to date. When I look at Argentina and consider the sophistication of the invasion, my suspicions are aroused. First, there was the very successful transfer of an exercise into an operation; secondly, there was an invasion during a period of radio silence when the Falkland Islands Government were out of contact with the United Kingdom; thirdly, there was the willingness of the Argentines, in that very successful invasion, to accept casualties themselves while not inflicting a single casualty on a British civilian or soldier. There was, indeed, great expertise and great sophistication. There was also the immediate repatriation of prisoners out of the war zone and back to the United Kingdom.
  Most important of all, we have a very vivid illustration of the dangerous exposure of the southern flank of NATO. Amazingly, the official southern flank of NATO is drawn on the map along one of the tropics, whereas the actual southern flank of NATO surely lies in the South Atlantic approaches.
  I believe that it is in the interests of NATO security that we cover the sea routes from the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean into the South Atlantic, and that NATO could well re-think its naval strategy. There may be a case for having naval outposts in Ascension Island, Simonstown and the Falkland Islands.
  In regard to the wish for the long-term security of the Falkland Islands and in the interests of NATO, I suggest that we should aim for the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the islands, because I believe that no one will accept any longer the sovereignty of the Argentines. They have thrown away what trust they had.
  I think that it is necessary to maintain, in the long term, United Kingdom sovereignty, but that we should accept joint United Kingdom-Argentine administration. We should also establish a NATO naval outpost in the islands. That would have the effect of assuring the long-term security of the Falkland Islands. It would also influence the southern area of the South Atlantic, while at the same time providing a source of earnings to the Falkland Islanders.
  I repeat that we have been tricked and humiliated, but we have not been beaten. We must win and I believe that we can win if we remain determined and united. It is the clear duty of all of us in the House to see that we win. We must leave no room for doubt in the mind of anybody—least of all the Argentine junta—that we mean business.
  6.48 pm
  Mr. Denis Healey: I think that the House will agree that it has been a necessary and a useful debate. Although we have had little new information—and I do not blame the Prime Minister for being unable to give us more at this delicate moment—it has enabled us to establish a broad consensus rather more firmly and precisely than in the earlier debate on the major issues at stake in the Falklands crisis.
  There have been on each side of the House some notable exceptions to the consensus, and I applaud the courage of those such as the hon. Member for Flint, West (Sir A. Meyer) and my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) who put unpopular views but with great strength and knowledge of some of the issues.
  Overwhelmingly we agree that we are dealing here with an act of aggression. It was recognised as such by the Security Council. It has been seen as an offence against the United Nations charter. After listening to the arguments again today, I find it more difficult than ever to understand the odd line of reasoning used by the American ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, that a Government who use forces to pursue a territorial claim that they believe to be justified on historical grounds are not committing aggression.
  Let us face it, there are very few frontiers that are not disputed by one country or another. Even in our country we have a dispute about where the line should go between the Republic of Eire and Northern Ireland. There are disputes between France and Spain on their common frontier, between France and Germany and in the Middle East, Africa, the Far East and Latin America. There is scarcely a single frontier whose rectitude is not disputed by one party or another. If Mrs. Kirkpatrick's line were to be accepted, we should no doubt soon see her justifying an attack by Mexico on Texas, California or New Mexico.
  However, if we take this view it has some implications, upon which I hope the House will reflect on another occasion, on the attitudes that we should follow where territorial disputes have been successfully pursued by force in recent times, and, notably, in the case of the island of Cyprus. We cannot take one line on one part of the world and another on another simply because it happens to be inconvenient to our personal interests or attitudes.
  We are also agreed on what the rest of the United Nations Security Council resolution said, when it demanded an Argentine withdrawal and a diplomatic solution to the dispute. We are mostly agreed that we shall not get either the withdrawal or the solution unless the British Government are able to provide the strength against which to negotiate. Therefore we have supported the dispatch of the naval task force. I support today the recent decision by the Prime Minister to increase the air power available to the task force, and an early decision to provide it with something that was peculiarly lacking in early descriptions of the force—a capability to sweep mines in deep waters.
  I should also like to congratulate the Government, for once, on declaring the maritime exclusion zone and doing so in time to ensure that we had at least one round up the spout before Secretary Haig arrived to explore the scope for negotiation. It was rather nifty footwork for the Prime Minister to take this decision between the moment when the Foreign Secretary sat down in the debate last Wednesday and the moment when the Defence Secretary

  1201
  stood up. There is no doubt that that decision helped to increase the enthusiasm of all concerned to explore the possibilities of a solution.
  I should like to put one question to the Foreign Secretary. The Government have been wise to plan on doubling the size of the Harrier force that is to accompany the naval task force and to provide it with the deep water minesweepers. I imagine that the conversion of the ship to carry Harriers will take some time and there will be more time for the ship equipped with Harriers to sail to the South Atlantic. The minesweepers—I gather that they are deep sea trawlers that are to be converted—travel at about ten knots, so it will take some time for them to arrive.
  Therefore, the force will not be fully equipped as the Government have decided that it should be until some time after the date when it was originally envisaged that the task force would be on the spot in the South Atlantic—the end of next week. This gives us more time for negotiation before the question of a major military action can arise. We must spend that time in very intensive negotiations.
  Therefore, I should like to explore the state of the negotiations, recognising that it is not possible, I readily allow, for the Government to comment in too much detail on some of the ideas that I put forward. But it is right to put them forward in the House, and it is the duty of an Opposition spokesman to do so.
  It seems to me that if we are to believe what has appeared in the newspapers over the last few days, the shape of a diplomatic settlement falls into two phases. The first phase is that in which we secure the withdrawal of the Argentines from the Falkland Islands lock, stock and barrel, as the Prime Minister said—and not only the military personnel but the civilian personnel and any drapery that they happen to have with them. On the other hand, it seems to appear from recent news reports that we are very unlikely to secure the withdrawal of the Argentines from the Falklands unless we can arrange for them to be replaced by some authority whose presence does not pre-empt the solution of the second stage of the diplomatic negotiation.
  The second stage, which has been discussed a good deal in these debates, is the negotiation of a future status of the Falkland Islands which will offer the islanders greater military security and perhaps more material prosperity than they have enjoyed till now. If I interpret properly the Foreign Secretary's interesting dialogue with Mr. Walden on Sunday morning, he does not rule out some sharing of authority after the Argentine withdrawal while negotiations on the future status of the islands proceed. In that connection I agree with my hon. Friends the Member for West Bromwich, West (Miss Boothroyd) and Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy).
  I hope that the Government will seriously consider replacing the Argentines during this first phase with some form of United Nations presence, whether it is as an administrator or as a truce team. There are some very interesting precedents for this. In 1947, for example, the United Nations established a presence which operated effectively in the crisis over sovereignty in the Dutch East Indies. There was another perhaps more relevant example in the 1960s when the United Nations established a temporary authority in West New Guinea in a dispute over sovereignty between the Netherlands and Indonesia. That held the ring for nine months until May 1963, when a resolution of the dispute was effected.
  1202
  While not necessarily promoting this concept, the Foreign Secretary did not rule it out—he actually used those words in his discussion with Mr. Walden on Sunday—and this may be a very useful weapon of diplomacy if we really want to get a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the conflict.
  The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) was right to say in response to an intervention that it was very difficult—indeed, it has hardly even ever been done—for the United Nations to use force to defeat aggression. But it can administer and it can police. In a situation such as this the United Nations might have many advantages as a temporary presence on the islands, not least to be able to canvass the views of the islanders on possible solutions in the longer term in a position where neither Britain nor the Argentine, the main parties to this dispute, could be accused of exerting undue pressure.
  That is not the only possible solution, of course, There are almost as many different diplomatic scenarios as there are military. But some solution along these lines may produce a framework in which the major negotiations between Britain and Argentina on the future status of the islands can take place.
  The great majority of us agree—there were one or two notable exceptions during the debate—that the views and interests of the islanders must be paramount. After all, the central objective of our operation is to protect the right of self-determination of the islanders. But I was glad that last Sunday the Foreign Secretary echoed my words that we cannot say how the attitude of the islanders may have been affected by recent events. It could have moved in either direction and we certainly need an opportunity to canvass their views in a situation rather more normal than the one which exists now.
  But we would all feel that it was very much in the interests of the islanders themselves to resolve a situation which has condemned them to physical insecurity and less material prosperity than they might have enjoyed for many years. The Prime Minister herself, in the moment of greatest excitement in the House when she spoke on Saturday, 3 April, made the point:
  "The only way of being certain to prevent an invasion would have been to keep a very large fleet close to the Falklands, when we are some 8,000 miles away from base. No Government have ever been able to do that, and the cost would be enormous."—[Official Report, 3 April 1982; Vol. 21 c. 637.]
  This is a fact that the House really must not ignore, because it is the fact that has determined the attitude of successive British Governments to the peculiarly difficult problem of the Falklands. That problem is not unique in the world—there are several island territories. Very few of them are threatened externally in the way in which the Falklands have been, but some of them might be if the Argentines are able to get away with this one.
  The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) expressed very strongly a different view. He suggested that any compromise on this issue would be wholly unacceptable, and he put the case with his usual glittering and icy logic—which is a wonderful machine for dazzling the groundlings. But I cannot help recalling that he used exactly the same glittering and icy logic to justify our doing nothing whatever about Rhodesia. Our responsibilities to the black population of Rhodesia were no less in those days than our responsibilities today to the white population of the Falklands, yet he then argued that, because we had not the physical capacity to do just what

  1203
  we wanted there, we had not the right to seek to influence the situation. Nevertheless, the right hon. Gentleman made a fascinating speech, a pyrotechnic display of the type which always fills us with admiration.
  The negotiations, of course, will be difficult and they must be conducted from a position of strength. But there is still some time left even before our task force is on the spot, fully equipped with the new facilities we have been told about today and yesterday. The only thing I would say is that we do not have infinite time. I do not think that time is necessarily on the side of a diplomatic solution.
  As the economic sanctions bite on Argentina, as the rigours of an Antarctic winter bear ever more heavily on our own naval task force, as other issues begin to distract the world from our problem with the Argentine—there are some very dangerous problems facing the world, including the relations between Russia and the West, the risk of a new war in the Middle East; the list is almost infinite—and as other issues emerge strongly into international consciousness, there is the risk that impatience or despair might produce a spark which sets off a major conflict. In addition, of course, as time passes, the risk of a conflict involving other countries than Britain and Argentina—other countries in Latin America, perhaps other countries like the Soviet Union—will be liable to increase.
  I end these remarks with an appeal to the United States. I believe from what I have read that Mr. Haig has made heroic efforts to get the process of negotiations started, and I can only applaud his courage—his physical courage as well as his intellectual stamina—in being prepared to undertake yet another voyage or perhaps series of voyages of diplomacy in the coming weeks.
  I cannot help feeling, however, that the time has come when we must tell the United States that the attitude of an even-handed honest broker is not quite enough. We must recognise that the United States has legitimate diplomatic and economic interests in Latin America. Indeed, it has a whole foreign policy in Latin America which, for obvious geographical reasons, is of far greater importance to it than our Latin American policy will ever be for us. Nevertheless, I believe that if the United States were prepared to follow the examples set by Britain's European allies and at least to warn the Argentines that it, too, might cut off imports and stop supplying arms, it might sufficiently tip the balance.
  Most of our discussions today have revolved around the principles at stake—the principle of not allowing the aggressor to get away with it and the principle of self-determination. But there is even more than principle at stake. There is the stability of the Western hemisphere, which may depend—in my view, will depend—on early and successful diplomatic action, in which the United States must take a more active and positive role than it has until now.
  7.6 pm
  The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Francis Pym): I agree with the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) that this has indeed been a very useful debate. The House has addressed itself to the gravity of the real issues involved, which the House understands very well but which, beyond doubt, I think that the British people also
  1204
  understand very well. The debate has shown a very broad measure of agreement and a broad measure of support for the actions that the Government have taken and are taking. It is a very good example of the way in which our democratic procedures in Parliament are a source of strength to our nation.
  There have, of course, been a number of dissenting voices on both sides—naturally and rightly so. But it has been as heartening to us as it must have been discouraging to the Argentine aggressors to witness the degree of unity that has been reflected in the debate and that was mentioned most recently by the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay). There has been unity in the resolve that the rule of law must be re-established by the withdrawal of the invaders from the Falklands in accordance with the mandatory resolution of the Security Council, of which the Argentine is in breach. There has been unity in our determination to do all that we can to achieve a solution by peaceful means, provided that such a solution is in accordance with the basic principles that successive British Governments have upheld, principles which we know to be essential if small countries are not to be at the mercy of their larger neighbours. There has been unity, too, in the sober recognition of our right to use force in self-defence—that is unquestionable—and in the recognition that, if needs be, that right will be exercised.
  At the outset, I wish to give the House a first report that I have just received from the Chief Secretary in the Falklands Administration, who arrived last night in Montevideo. He stated that he and other senior officials who left with him had all been deported from the Falklands. Until his departure, the Administration in Port Stanley had succeeded in maintaining essential services for the islands—including medical services, water, electricity, telephones and police—but restrictions had been imposed on the radio-telephone links with outlying farms and the internal air service had been stopped.
  According to the Chief Secretary, the conduct of the Argentine forces so far has been correct. The report contains no indication that there is serious hardship among the people of the Falkland Islands, but the deportation of their senior officials is a cause for concern and underlines the need for the involvement of the International Red Cross, which Her Majesty's Government are trying to secure.
  Last week I spoke to the House of the determination with which we are pursuing our efforts to secure Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands. They have no right whatever to be there and they must go. The whole of this business started with them. The entire blame for the crisis rests on Argentina.
  This act of aggression—unprovoked, illegal and unforgivable—must be reversed. The House, the country and the world would prefer it to be reversed by peaceful means. In the interests of avoiding bloodshed we are working with all our strength for just such a peaceful solution—a solution consistent with our commitment to the Falkland Islanders.
  At the beginning of the debate, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister outlined the steps that have been taken so far, the discussions that we have had with Mr. Secretary Haig and some of the ideas that have been produced. Work proceeds apace. Nobody can say whether a peaceful solution will prove possible. If it does not, Argentina knows what to expect. Let it not doubt it.

  1205
  I should like to join with the right hon. Member for Leeds, East in thanking Mr. Secretary Haig for the onerous work that he has undertaken. He has shown not only intellectual stamina but great physical stamina. He has approached this difficult task with great willingness and thoroughness. The House and the country are in his debt.
  The right hon. Gentleman referred to the process as being contemplated in two phases. He referred, first, to the withdrawal. That is an absolute prerequisite for any progress of any kind whatever. At that stage, he mentioned some ideas in relation to the United Nations and the possibility of a United Nations presence—which other hon. Members have raised—and he made other suggestions upon which I would prefer not to comment. I will, of course, take careful note of all that he has said.
  The right hon. Gentleman went on to refer to the second phase—the negotiations for a longer-term solution. I should like to say something about that later on in my speech. I have noted his ideas and I will carefully consider all the other ideas that right hon. and hon. Members have made in the course of the debate.
  Our clear resolve, and the international support that we have mustered from our friends and partners, are beginning to tell. Argentina has seemed at times to be having second thoughts. Certainly it has been invaded by doubts from time to time. We now need not only to maintain those pressures, but to build them up wherever we can.
  Britain's support for the islanders is no empty commitment. Our national response to this crisis has demonstrated that. It was Argentina's great mistake to imagine that there would be a lack of will on Britain's part to defend the Falkland Islands if the need arose. Britain has had a lot of experience of dealing with unprovoked aggression and invaders. That is unfortunate, but we have had it. We understand the vital need not to permit aggression to succeed. It makes no difference to us whether that takes place on our doorstep or 8,000 miles away. Freedom under the law is at stake.
  Presumably, the Argentines reckoned that if they presented us with a fait accompli we would not take steps to reverse it; that they would be met with a great fuss and ballyhoo, but not with any action. They were wrong. They never imagined that we would back our commitment with diplomatic and economic measures that were needed to uphold it, let alone the military measures, which are surely having their effect. The task force is, as we know, sailing on its course towards the South Atlantic. It will build up as operational requirements dictate. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced one element in that build-up today and there will be others in due course. It is a remarkable tribute to the Royal Navy—although I know that the House would expect no less—that it mounted that task force and that it sailed with such speed and efficiency.
  The Argentine reckoned without the response of the international community. It was not in any way prepared for what was going to happen. No doubt it expected the world to deprecate the use of force, but in its ill-judged enthusiasm and perhaps even in a bit of excitement it failed to foresee the revulsion and anxiety felt by nations all round the world at seeing an act of aggression by a large country against a small, nearby territory. The Argentine was unprepared for the resolution that was passed by the Security Council and was certainly unprepared for the task force's rapid departure from the United Kingdom. It was certainly unprepared for the response that we received
  1206
  from the international community by way of economic measures. It failed to realise that countries all around the world would see its act as completely repugnant and intolerable and that they would condemn it almost unanimously.
  The Argentine also failed to see the strength which that condemnation would give Britain in its efforts to rally support to the cause of repelling aggressors. In other words, the Argentines misjudged the situation from the start. They anticipated what might happen, but they did not get it right. The Argentine must now be dismayed at the solidarity shown to Britain by our major allies. It did not see that the United States of America would be bound to condemn invasion.
  I think that I am right in saying that the United States of America has already banned the export of arms to the Argentine. Of course, the United States of America supported us very strongly in the United Nations resolution and is at the moment playing a crucial role in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The House has certainly shown that it would like to achieve such a settlement.
  The Argentine did not reckon with the close ties that link the nations of the Commonwealth. Those ties are at their strongest when democracy is challenged. Above all, it totally failed to foresee the strong political solidarity that so many years of common endeavour have built up in the European Community. The Community's decision to ban all imports from the Argentine was wholly unexpected in Buenos Aires. Condemnations and diplomatic sanctions it could perhaps have lived with, but to see about one quarter of its export trade wiped out at a stroke was a body blow to its already rather shaky economy. All the evidence suggests that the Argentine was very surprised by that and it is one of the actions that we have taken—supported by our friends—that has undoubtedly affected the Argentine's attitude towards the situation.
  I am glad to tell the House that the texts for the complete embargo on imports were agreed in Brussels today. They will come into force as soon as they can be published, which will probably be on 16 April. I should like to express the gratitude of the Government and the whole House for the powerful and positive action taken by the European Community.
  Mr. Healey: Has the Community accepted the advice of the Commission that the ban on imports should last, in the first instance, for only two weeks?
  Mr. Pym: No. In the first instance the Community has agreed that it should last for one month. During that period the position can be re-examined with a view to extending or modifying it, or whatever. However, the initial period is for one month.
  The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) mentioned export credit guarantees. They are a matter for national rather than Community action. I understand that there is a gathering consensus among the Ten that in present circumstances in the Argentine there will not in practice be any new offers of officially supported export credits. In other words, pressure there is mounting considerably. The very positive response by our friends to our call for pressure upon the Argentine rests fundamentally on the firm legal grounds of the United Nations charter and the Security Council resolution.
  After the events of the Second World War there is no doubt that the desire for a better way of settling

  1207
  international disputes was founded in the United Nations. All nations subscribe to it and that is the basis upon which we obtained our support. But, by contrast, Argentina's friends in Latin America can find no such basis for supporting it. The Leader of the Opposition put that point extremely fairly and cogently in his speech. Following that and the doubts about Argentina's position it is fair to say that the gestures of those countries have been, to say the least, unenthusiastic. Despite the agreement of some of them with Argentina's interpretation of the sovereignty issue, they have nearly all refused to condone the use of force. They have joined their voices to those of our supporters in favour of a peaceful settlement, if such can be achieved.
  Many hon. Members have raised the principle of self-determination and the wishes of the islanders. Certainly no one pays more attention to that or gives more weight to it than the Government. However, although we have not set our faces against any idea of change in the future, we cannot accept that some form of change should be imposed on the islanders. Of course, at the moment their views cannot be known. They are bound to be affected by the trauma that they have gone through. I have always taken the view that, as a result of it, they would be likely to wish to be even more British than they were before, if that is possible. But no one knows.
  We must take much care in ascertaining their views accurately when the present invasion is over. We cannot ascertain them at the moment. As I consider the matter at this range, the islanders will need time after the crisis is over to reflect upon the position and consider the prospects and alternatives. They should not be unduly hurried. We have heard talk of suddenly taking a quick poll, but that will not do at all. They will wish to consider the matter in their own way before they come to any conclusion about it. We should enable them to do that, but we shall continue to be guided by their wishes.
  Mr. Sidney Bidwell: It is a mystery that we have not heard much detail about what was discussed in New York at the end of February. We know what the communiqué said and we heard the resignation speech of the Minister of State, but he conveyed very little. Was one of the items on the agenda—if the right hon. Gentleman cannot tell me now, perhaps he can at another time—the question of some derogation of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands?
  Mr. Pym: I cannot comment on the details because I was not in New York at the time. My point is that we are guided by what the islanders prefer. It has been argued in Argentina and in other places that this is a colonial problem, but it is a quite different issue. All that I am trying to convey to the House is that the wishes of the islanders are all-important to us. That implies quite clearly that, if another form of government is required by the islanders, the Government would not wish to stand in their way and neither would the House.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) and other of my hon. Friends have mentioned that point. We wish to ensure that all the islanders have an opportunity to make their views known, but we must wait some time before we can do that.
  1208
  I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bromsgrove and Redditch (Mr. Miller)—the Leader of the Opposition also touched on the point—about the need to prepare plans for the long-term future. Obviously, we wish to settle that as best we can. I shall not speak on that aspect, because my overriding concern now and in the immediate future is to reach a position where long-term proposals can again become relevant. The priority of the invading Argentines leaving the islands is crucial so that we can get on with the process that will lead to a long-term settlement. In the meantime, there is no reason whatsoever why we should not be thinking about the possibilities and, indeed, that is happening. However, my immediate concern is to ensure that we can put any long-term plans that we decide upon into practice in due course.
  The hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) asked about South Georgia. Argentine claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands dependencies, including South Georgia. As the House knows, Argentine forces invaded South Georgia on 4 April. The maritime exclusion zone covers only the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands themselves.
  The hon. Member for Inverness asked also whether there had been any incidents in the maritime exclusion zone. The answer is that there have not been so far. Whether this remains the case will depend upon the Argentines themselves. We have made our position on the zone quite clear and specific and they know well what will happen if they violate it. The creation of the zone is the beginning of the process which makes withdrawal itself possible. My answer to the hon. Gentleman is "Nothing so far but it is up to the Argentines".
  As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said earlier, the Argentine navy is concentrated outside the zone. We hope very much that that will continue to be so. We believe that the Argentines, like ourselves, desire above all else a peaceful solution if it can be achieved without prejudice to the principles that are involved. It is vital to us that the Argentine navy stays outside the zone so that no incidents are invited.
  The British task force is moving steadily towards its destination. Our diplomatic action has yielded magnificent support from our friends in the form of concrete action parallel to our own. It is deeds that they have done as well as uttering words. The costs of aggression are being made clearer every day. The pressure is mounting on Argentina. The vice is tightening.
  As Mr. Haig's admirable efforts continue, we shall see whether reason and responsibility will prevail in Buenos Aires. Should Mr. Haig's diplomacy fail to produce a settlement, it will not be for lack of efforts or of reasonable flexibility on his part or on ours, but on Argentina's. Britain will remain determined to achieve peace if possible but ready for conflict if necessary, because we shall not be deflected from the objectives reaffirmed today by the Prime Minister.
  The priority is the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands as a first step towards a settlement that accords with the wishes of the islanders. In the name of international law and order, they must go.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-eight minutes past Seven o'clock till Monday 19 April, pursuant to the Resolution of the House this day.

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, in pursuance of Standing Order 14: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lichfield

Local Government Finance (No. 2) Bill
The Bill having been brought from the Commons on Thursday last and printed pursuant to Standing Order 47, was read a first time.

The Falkland Islands
2.37 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young) rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands.
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. The very grave situation over the Falkland Islands continues. As Leader of the House I thought it would be the wish of your Lordships that the House should be recalled today, and so have the opportunity to consider again that situation. I believe that the House will want to hear how the Government see that situation, and at the same time will want an opportunity to state its own views. I can assure the House that my noble friend Lord Belstead, who will be winding up the debate, and I, will listen very carefully to all that is said and will take note of it.
Our objective over the Falkland Islands is that the people of the Falkland Islands shall be free to determine their own way of life and their future. The wishes of the islanders must be paramount. That is why our immediate goal in recent days has been to secure the removal of all Argentine forces in accordance with Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council, and to secure the restoration of British administration. Our strategy has been based on a combination of diplomatic, military and economic pressures, and I should like to deal with each of these in turn.
First, we seek a peaceful solution by diplomatic means. In this we have been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world. We have also been helped by the tireless efforts of Secretary of State Haig, who has now paid two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires. On his first visit, last Thursday, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary impressed upon him the great depth of feeling on this issue, not only of Parliament but of the British people as a whole. They made clear that withdrawal of the invaders' troops must come first; that the sovereignty of the islands is not and cannot be affected by invasion; and
290
that when it comes to future negotiations what matters most is what the Falkland Islanders themselves wish.
On his second visit, on Easter Monday and yesterday, Mr. Haig put forward certain ideas as a basis for discussion—ideas concerning the withdrawal of troops and its supervision in an interim period to the conclusion of negotiations on the future of the islands The talks were long and detailed, as the House would expect. Some things could not be considered because they flouted our basic principles; others had to be examined carefully, and alternatives suggested. These talks were constructive, and some progress was made.
At the end of Monday Mr. Haig was prepared to return to Buenos Aires in pursuit of a peaceful solution. Late that night, however, Argentina put forward other proposals, which gave rise to real difficulty. But yesterday the position appeared to have eased. Further ideas are now being considered, and Secretary Haig has returned to Washington before proceeding, he hopes shortly, to Buenos Aires.
These discussions are complex, changing and difficult, the more so because they are taking place between a military junta and a democratic Government of a free people—one which is not prepared to compromise that democracy and that liberty which the British Falkland islanders regard as their birthright. We seek, and we shall continue to seek, a diplomatic solution, and I know that the House will realise that it would jeopardise that aim were I to give further details at this stage. We shall continue genuinely to negotiate through the good offices of Mr. Haig, to whose skill and perseverance we all pay a warm tribute.
Diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if they are backed by military strength. At 5 a.m. London time on Monday 12th April the maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falkland Islands came into effect. From that time all Argentine warships and Argentine auxiliaries found within this zone will be treated as hostile, and are liable to be attacked by British forces. We see this measure as the first step towards achieving the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the area. It appears to have exerted influence on Argentina, whose navy has been concentrated outside the zone. If our authority in the zone is challenged, we shall take that as a sign that the search for a peaceful solution has been abandoned and we shall then have to take the necessary action. Let no one doubt that.
The naval task force is proceeding with all speed towards the South Atlantic. It is a formidable force, comprising two aircraft carriers, five guided-missile destroyers, seven frigates and an assault ship with five landing ships, together with supporting vessels. The composition of the force and the speed with which it was assembled and put to sea clearly demonstrate our determination—and at this point I should like to pay tribute to all those who made this possible, both those who helped on shore and those who are now at sea. I can tell the House that morale on board the ships in the task force is extremely high. The ships are carrying out exercises en route, and by the time the force arrives off the Falklands it will be at a very high state of fighting efficiency. A number of civilian ships have now been chartered or requisitioned. These include the "Canberra", for use as a troopship,

291
and the "Uganda", which will be available as a hospital ship.
Sustaining a major force at 8,000 miles distance from the United Kingdom is a considerable undertaking, but, as the Ministry of Defence announced this morning, additional measures are now in hand to provide extra capability over an extended period. In particular, the second assault ship, HMS "Intrepid", is being made ready for sailing if necessary. Arrangements are in hand to send additional sea and ground attack Harriers. This will nearly double the size of the Harrier force in the South Atlantic.
Our diplomacy is backed by strength and we have the resolve to use that strength if necessary in order to achieve our objectives. But the other aspect of our policy against Argentina has been economic. We have been urging our friends and allies to take action parallel to our own and we have achieved a heartening degree of success. The most significant measure has been the decision of our nine partners in the European Community to join us not just in an arms embargo but also in stopping all imports from Argentina. This is a very important step, unprecedented in its scope and the rapidity of the decision.
Last year nearly one-quarter of all Argentina's exports went to the European Community. The effect of this measure on Argentina's economy will therefore be considerable and cannot be without influence on her leaders in the present crisis. I should like warmly to thank our European partners for rallying to our support. This support must surely be one of the most striking examples of the political benefits of membership of the Community. I hope that it will be recognised as such by all our people. The decision cannot have been easy for our partners, given the commercial interests at stake, but they were the first to realise that if aggression were allowed to succeed in the Falkland Islands it would be encouraged elsewhere.
The Commonwealth, too, have been quick to help. I should like to thank Australia, New Zealand and Canada for their swift action. They have decided to ban imports from Argentina, to stop export credits and to halt all sales of military equipment. New Zealand has also banned exports to Argentina and has broken off diplomatic relations. Many other countries in the Commonwealth have supported us by condemning the Argentine invasion.
I turn now to the question of British subjects. One of our first concerns has been, and remains, for the safety of the British subjects who, through no fault of their own, have been caught up in the consequences of the crisis. They include, apart from the Falkland islanders themselves, the Marines, the British Antarctic scientists on South Georgia and the British community in Argentina. In spite of all our efforts, we have not been able to secure reliable information about the 22 Marines who were on South Georgia and the 13 British Antarctic Survey personnel who are believed to have been evacuated by the Argentines at the same time. According to Argentine reports, these people are on a ship heading for the mainland.
There are also reports to the effect that six Marines and the one member of the crew of the "Endurance" who was said to have been captured on the Falkland
292
Islands are now in Argentina. Finally, there are other members of the British Antarctic Survey team who remain on South Georgia and two other British subjects. Their most recent contacts on 12th April with their headquarters in this country indicate that they are safe and well. The Government have asked the International Red Cross to pursue all these cases urgently with the Argentine Government. We trust that their efforts will soon produce the information which we and their families urgently seek.
In conclusion, I reiterate that we want a peaceful solution, but it was not Britain who broke the peace. We shall continue to insist on complete Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands and its dependencies. We shall remain ready to exercise our right to resort to force in self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter until the occupying forces leave the islands. Our naval task force sails on towards its destination. We remain fully confident of its ability to take whatever measures may be necessary. Meanwhile its very existence and its progress towards the Falkland Islands reinforce the efforts we are making for a diplomatic solution. In that solution, the wishes of the islanders remain paramount. There is no reason to believe that they would prefer any alternative to the resumption of the administration which they enjoyed before Argentina committed aggression. It may be that their recent experiences will have caused their views on the future to change. But unless and until they have had the chance freely to express their views, the British Government have no intention of assuming that the islanders' wishes are different from what they were before.
My Lords, we have had a long and proud history of recognising the right of others to determine their own destiny. We have an experience unrivalled by any other nation in the world. But that right must be upheld universally, and not least where it is challenged by those who are hardly conspicuous for their devotion to democracy and liberty. That is why we shall continue through diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, military means to secure for the people of the Falkland Islands that same freedom of choice which we have conferred upon others and which we shall continue to uphold for them. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands.—(Baroness Young.)
2.50 p.m.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Baroness for her speech. I cannot say that it was a very informative one, but I do not think that we should blame her for that. Of course, it is difficult for the Government to go into much detail as to the measures they are taking. Nonetheless, this does not absolve your Lordships from making their contribution and giving consideration to the issues involved in a rather calmer atmosphere than existed last week.
Those of us who belong to the older generation are rather horrified that at this moment we are debating an issue which could mean the question of war and peace. There is a horrible feeling that we have been here before on an earlier occasion, among those of us who remember 1939 when we all hoped it would be all right and it was not. But I will not go back into the past. Although I do not believe that this will lead to war, nonetheless we cannot ignore the fact that the situation

293
is extremely serious. We ought not in our consideration to allow our feeling of national pride, however great it is, to take charge of our heads when so much is at stake.
I should like to make clear that certainly it will be my intention, and it will be the intention of the party to which I belong, to support the Government and support them in the steps that they have taken and to give them encouragement, while at the same time we wish to make points which I hope they will take into consideration. The first and most important issue is of course—as the noble Baroness said—the welfare of the islanders themselves.
Those of us who know those windswept but rather lovely islands will be very concerned for the future of the people there and of their continuing desire to remain British. However, at the same time we ought to acknowledge that we have let them down in the past. I do not mean this Government, I mean all Governments. They have not shown a sense of responsibility and our post-colonial record, as I have said on other occasions, has not been as good as it should have been. I even wonder about my own responsibility, whether when I produce my economic survey report I ought to have said: "But you cannot rely on the British Government to implement that". As I say, in this matter I am addressing Governments and not just this Government.
I think that we are in a situation now where in honour we are committed to do our utmost to find a solution and to allow the Falkland islanders to remain British. Therefore, I do not wish to waste time. There are criticisms that one could make of the Government. One could look to the failure of judgment. No one is sadder than I am, or indeed most of your Lordships' House, at the departure of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. We paid a tribute to him before. In not taking the opportunity to blame the Government, and not seeking to make party points, I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, comes to reply he will not follow the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, who on the last occasion blamed us by referring to the fact that conventional arms might be more useful than Trident in this situation. This is a legitimate point of view to state.
Noble Lords: Lord Trenchard!
Lord Shackleton: I beg Lord Cockfield's pardon humbly. Indeed, it was the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I am very sorry indeed, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield—and I have now learned how to pronounce his name.
I do not propose to waste time attacking the Government but I want to make a rather wider case. Once again, I criticise the terms of the Motion. It is to draw attention to the situation in the Falkland Islands. What seems so difficult to get across to the Government and to people generally is that the issues go very much wider than the Falkland Islands. If we are to take the possibility of armed conflict with unforeseeable consequences, then we need to decide what it is that is at stake. We have discussed the situation of the Falkland islanders on many occasions, and our concern is first of all for them.
I want to look at the Argentine record over many years, not just in relation to the Falklands, but in
294
relation to the dependencies and in relation to the Antarctic. The key to this, which has not yet been appreciated, remains South Georgia. From South Georgia and down through those dependencies, the Sandwich Islands, there could be established a territorial basis which, if the 200-mile economic zone was extended, would give a degree of control over the approaches to the Antarctic and indeed over the fishing resources of one of the richest sources of marine life in the world.
Let us look at the record of the Argentine. The Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey had to be started during the war so as to protect our interest there. It was only in 1952 that the Argentine opened fire on British scientists. There is a chain of determined pursuit of national aims that we cannot ignore. They claim to have repossessed South Georgia. They never had South Georgia. They had a meteorological station on it. It has been under British administration ever since the beginning of this century. Then they chose to put a landing on a volcano—because that is all that South Thule is—and there had to be an evacuation at one time when there was an eruption. They did this in order to strengthen their claim. These are the pursuits of territorial aims.
As with the failure over HMS "Endurance", Governments failed to take action to reassert our rights in that area. They have, as your Lordships know, taken action in so-called Antarctic bases where they have mostly military men and very little science is being done. Your Lordships will be aware that they flew a woman down to have her baby at Esperanza near Hope Bay in order to establish an Argentinian Antarctic citizen. They are claiming this part of the world where peaceful conditions exist and where they wish to make good their competing claims with Chile and Britain. There is, therefore, a great deal at stake in the long run.
Your Lordships have heard all too much about oil. I repeat that it will be 20 or 30 years—certainly 10 years—before any oil is found. People go on saying that oil has been found. There has been no drilling other than that close to the mainland of South America. In the long run—and in your Lordships' House we can do this—we need to look not just to next year or the next five years but to the next 50 years. The Antarctic Treaty is up for renewal in 1991, and if we allow this aggression to go unheeded there will be further aggression because this has been the history of dictators and fascists throughout history.
There is, too, the question of conservation. Some of your Lordships will have read the document about krill by Barbara Mitchell and published by Earthscan. There is enormous wealth in krill. If it is to be harvested, it needs to be harvested in controlled conditions and not just be dealt with by the Argentines giving a licence to the Soviet Union to take as much as they like. It is most astonishing that this is happening. We find these strange alliances, which have also happened in the past.
I do not wish to waste too much time, except to illustrate my case, on the personal side. When my mission was sent out to do an economic survey of the Falklands there were proposals that an Argentine team should be attached to it, headed by an admiral. I agreed; they then suggested he should be the deputy leader. I refused because it was an independent

295
survey. It was independent of the British Government, and I felt that we could not have an official representative as deputy leader, but they were most welcome to send a team along with us to observe what we observed and to study the economics. Because we refused to make him deputy leader, not only did they not participate but they then made it as difficult as possible. I had to travel to the Falklands by devious ways and I had to use a false name for the second time in my life. When I was met by the ambassador he said to me: "The last time I saw you you were using a false name, very respectably". But how can one deal with them? Then there was the extraordinary incident when they intercepted a research ship: they were over-flying the islands. This has been the history.
I am sure it is vital to the future of the Falklands and the future of peace that there should be good cooperation with the Argentine. I would' not myself rule out the possibility of a two-flag or three-flag solution—the kinds of thing which I believe the Government are talking about—but we must continue to support the efforts that are being made up to the point where we are faced by the horrifying spectacle which I think must be avoided at all costs; namely, the invasion of the Falkland Islands by force of arms. The object at the end of the day must be to get a good negotiation.
There are people in this country who are saying: "Is it worth it? Would not the Falkland islanders be better off if they were Argentine citizens?" Perhaps materially they would be, but those of us who are aware of what has happened in the Argentine can understand their hesitation, and no sort of guarantee will really protect them in this respect. We are operating in accordance with the United Nations. Of course I would agree with my noble friend Lord Brockway that there are all sorts of options, and though we understand the pacifist argument we should certainly consider a further approach to the Hague Court, though I do not believe it will be successful. We also hope the Americans will give rather more positive support to their most faithful ally. But in the long run we are operating in accordance with the United Nations, fortified by the resolution, in the interests of peace and stability and in the interests of the world generally.
3.3 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, when we last discussed this matter in relation to the Private Notice Question asked by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I made what I think must have been the shortest speech I have ever delivered in this House, saying that I doubted whether it was the right occasion to say anything other than that we all hoped that the measures taken by the Government would be successful! I was rather tempted to stick to that line this afternoon. Indeed I believe myself that it might have been better not to have had this debate at all: that is my personal view. But it is, after all, now a question of a Statement of the Government's position, for which I thank the noble Baroness. So it looks as though all parties should now make their general attitude abundantly clear.
Speaking for the Liberal Party, therefore, I may say
296
at the outset that even though our Leader was not—unfortunately, as I think—consulted by the Prime Minister, we at once approved the proposal to dispatch some kind of force to the South Atlantic with the purpose of reinforcing the demand for the evacuation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine troops, formulated in the perfectly clear and valid Resolution No. 502 of the Security Council of the United Nations. We in no way regret or wish to go back on that approval. On the contrary, the dispatch of a task force seems, if we may believe press reports, to have resulted in at least some change of heart on the part of the Argentine Government, who, we understand, are now at least speaking of the possible withdrawal of their troops from the islands, subject of course—if I may have the attention of the Opposition Front Bench, whose Members are engaged in a conversation which seems to be very important—to conditions which are presently being considered by Her Majesty's Government with the powerful assistance of the American Secretary of State.
The Government, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackle-ton, observed, have not told us very much in their Statement, and I entirely appreciate that they could not or would not think it useful to say anything of the kind. I very much doubt, indeed, whether it would be profitable at this critical moment for us to examine in detail all possible short-term or long-term solutions on the basis of which the Argentine Government might be expected to withdraw its troops and comply with the third demand of the United Nations Resolution No. 502—namely, negotiations.
Perhaps, however, I may just say this: it can hardly be denied that the hurried discussions between Mr. Haig and the two Governments concerned which have recently taken place amount in themselves to some kind of negotiations. Therefore, to say that no negotiations of any kind can start before the Argentine troops have all left and the Union Jack is once more proudly flying from Government House in Port Stanley is surely putting our case too rigidly. Nor is it even perhaps what the Security Council intended. Surely the best thing, even though it may not be immediately achievable, would be for Mr. Haig to announce at some stage that he has got both sides to agree to some formula which, while protecting the position of the islanders of course, would nevertheless give some satisfaction to the long held, if legally quite invalid, claim that has resulted in the present deplorable situation.
I believe that the Liberal Party, along with other parties in opposition no doubt, will base their continuing support for Government policy which now exists on whether they believe that the Government have responded correctly to any proposals that may be put forward for an ultimate solution of the problem on some such lines as these. Of course, aggression must be shown not to pay—I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, about that—but that does not mean that some peaceful solution of the dispute cannot be achieved by negotiation. On the contrary, I think it may.
There is only one aspect to which I should like to refer. During the debate in another place the other day, allusion was made by many speakers to the possibility of replacing the departing Argentine troops

297
by some sort of United Nations force, or even by the installation in the Falkland Islands of some kind of United Nations trusteeship: in other words, the islands would become some sort of ward of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. I imagine that if any "force" of this kind is to be dispatched it would have to be authorised by the Security Council. If so, it would presumably have to be approved by the Soviet Union, which might well be difficult.
In any case I am not sure what the exact role of such a force would be. Would it simply assist the Governor? What would its relationship be with the elected Legislative Council? Would it have arms and, if necessary, use them? In sum, would its presence really be necessary? I should be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, when he comes to reply, would tell the House the Government's preliminary view regarding the possibility of setting up such a force. Of course, I may be wrong and the intention may be to set it up by some decision of the General Assembly, which I understand—I may be wrong—has to take its decisions by a two-thirds majority vote. I cannot recall, however, any precedent for this and, in any case, the Assembly, as we know, tends to be dominated by what might be called "anti-colonial" elements which, in this connection, might not be altogether helpful.
To involve the Trusteeship Council might also, I imagine, lead us into certain difficulties. After all, the assumed role on the part of this body has been to prepare certain under-developed colonial territories for independent existence, with the co-operation of a trustee in the shape of a fully developed ex-imperial power. But I imagine that the Falkland Islands would hardly qualify as an under-developed country. Again, however, I may not altogether have understood the reasons for suggesting such a solution or, indeed, those behind the proposal for the dispatch of a United Nations force. So I should indeed be grateful if the Government could tell us in a general way whether they see any merit in the one proposal or the other.
Of course, I do not dispute that, in certain circumstances, the United Nations might have a role to play. For instance, the Secretary-General might conceivably, with the approval of the Security Council or even of the Assembly, dispatch a neutral observer of any settlement involving the possible flying of a United Nations flag and so on. And there are surely many other ways in which the United Nations might be helpful, all of which ought to be investigated when detailed negotiations get going and when the main lines of some eventual compromise have been finally determined.
In the meantime, we can only hope and pray that the justifiable indignation of almost everybody in this country as the result of an act of aggression against some peaceful British subjects by a Government with a most unpleasant record, whose chief object seems to be to distract attention from an economic disaster by an appeal to patriotic sentiment, will continue to be shared by the great majority of the international community and notably, of course, by the American people, who seem to be tending to become more and more on our side. Perhaps, eventually, even President Reagan himself will appreciate that the United States can hardly be an umpire in the present dispute—what kind of an umpire: an umpire between right and
298
wrong?—useful, even essential, as the United States will no doubt be able to be as some kind of intermediary.
It is perhaps just as much as a result of the common determination of all countries who feel this indignation to apply economic pressure on the Argentine military junta as of our own quite legitimate demonstration of force that this régime will ultimately be brought to see some kind of reason and, if this results in the departure or resignation of General Galtieri, few tears will be shed. I think that we should all be particularly grateful for the effective and highly expensive action—this point has already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young—taken by our partners in the European Community in banning all imports from the Argentine, at great sacrifice to themselves. This gesture is clearly much more significant than the odd £100 million too much that we now, pending friendly negotiations, pay into the Community budget. Is it not even possible that, in view of this splendid gesture of solidarity on the part of our European friends, the Labour Party will reconsider the appalling present policy of taking this country right out of the European Economic Community?
I hope that I have not strayed too far from the question that we have immediately before us, but I think it is not irrelevant. My final word is that we must all expect the Government, by one means or another, to arrive if they can at a peaceful solution of what has so far proved to be one of the most difficult problems arising out of the erstwhile imperial responsibilities of a widely extended empire. Though the Government and the Foreign Office may be blamed—I believe most people will think that they are to be blamed—for not having publicly warned the Argentine Government in time of the likely consequences of any forceful action, they certainly cannot be blamed for having, over many years, done their utmost to find a compromise solution. And I personally believe that—thanks largely to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, whose departure we all so much regret—all this good work will not be found to have been wasted in the event.
My Lords, one of the maxims of an apparently now despised diplomacy is, as the French have it, "étendre le pont doré à l'ennemi abattu", or, as we say in English, make it as easy as possible for a defeated enemy to accept the terms!
3.15 p.m.
The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury: My Lords, I should like to make a short contribution to this debate: first, to associate these Benches with the concern and the prayers of our people for all who are involved in this crisis, and particularly in this place for those Ministers who bear heavy responsibilities in decision-making. I also have a direct responsibility for the appointment and support of the chaplain to the islanders, two-thirds of whom are Anglicans; and their little cathedral church named after Canterbury Cathedral, which figures in many of the pictures of the islands, is one of the focal points of community life there.
There have been in recent days a number of messages exchanged between myself and the chaplain, and only yesterday I received, both from him and from the Easter congregation at their little cathedral, assurances

299
that they were in good heart, steadfast, eager to maintain this link and appreciative of the messages which I had sent them in Easter broadcasts. These are the reasons why I wish to add my thanks for the opportunity of hearing from the noble Baroness, Lady Young, the report on the difficult and crucial conversations of the last 48 hours, and to add my tribute to the efforts for peace being made by the United States Secretary of State.
I do not want to seem to give advice to the Government on the way in which these conversations should be pursued. It is not my purpose to make a speech of that kind. But I think it is proper that I should emphasise the support which I believe the Churches feel for the two most important principles which are at stake in this matter. The first is the overwhelming importance of international law. The second is the right to self-determination of peoples, whether they be large or small in number.
The need to ensure that nations act within international law is the bulwark on which the future peace of the world depends. We would have been gravely in breach of our moral duty if this country had not reacted as it did in this matter. The action of the Argentine Government must be condemned by all who believe in the rule of law, and the will of the United Nations in this matter must be obeyed.
The second principle—that of self-determination—is also one of the foundations on which international relations must be built. The fact that the Falklands Islands community is small and defenceless must not be allowed to remove from it the right to determine its own future. Indeed, there are small islands scattered all over the world whose inhabitants must be looking anxiously at the outcome of this crisis. Our first aim must be to seek a diplomatic solution. That must have our energetic support. But it must not be a solution which fudges these principles. In their resolve to uphold them, I believe that the Government have the support of the majority of this nation.
The fact that the people of the Falkland Islands are British does, of course, affect our feelings. However, I should like to think that we would feel as strongly if they traced their descent from a people other than our own. The two principles which I have mentioned would be in jeopardy, just the same. But we must resist any temptation to stir up feelings of hurt national pride which would cloud our judgment or deflect us from our immediate concern in securing the wellbeing of a peace-loving and, I believe, God-fearing people. We need also to remember that whatever we may think of the Argentine Government, the Argentinians are a Christian people with whom we have many ties. I am especially aware of this, since there are two Anglican dioceses in that country.
We all pray that the use of force will be unnecessary, but let us be clear about what our objective must be. It is that the United Nations resolution must be obeyed so that a way can be found which safeguards the rights of the Falkland islanders to live their lives in conditions of their choosing. Those are just aims, and it is right that we should be united and resolute in pursuing them.
3.21 p.m.
Lord Soames: My Lords, personally speaking, I am grateful to the Government for having given us the opportunity for this debate. So far it has been an exceptionally high-class debate. I should have thought that it would be hard to find anybody, either in this House or in another place, who has a greater knowledge of the South Atlantic and the Antarctic than the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who spoke with such knowledge and with such force about these matters and whose opinions we value.
It must have been difficult for the Government to reach a decision to hold this debate this afternoon, because when they needed to take the decision they could not have known whether or not they would have anything to report to the House. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that, as one might have imagined, there has not been a great deal more which our noble Leader has been able to impart to us about what has been happening during the past few days. This is understandable. I think it would he wrong and, I hope noble Lords will agree with me, now is not the moment to try to bring pressure to bear on the Government to say more than they think it right to say in public at the present time. Time and time again we have all adjured the Government that our top priority in this terrible situation is to arrive at a diplomatic solution, and in order to achieve that aim we must give them every chance to indulge in what one might term secret diplomacy. It is only along those lines that they will stand a chance of arriving at a diplomatic solution.
We are, of course, deeply grateful to the United States Government in general and to President Reagan and Secretary Haig in particular for their personal commitment and effort. They bear a heavy responsibility in world affairs generally. If we were to fail in our diplomatic efforts in the South Atlantic, I have no doubt that their world position and responsibilities and, I expect, the inclination of the United States people, would require them to take a firm stand between right and wrong.
Not being involved in these affairs, nor privy to the day-to-day or even hour-to-hour unfolding of events, I must confess that, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, I feel somewhat inhibited from being very "viewy" on the details and intricacies of the various permutations and combinations which might be thrown up during the course of later discussions or negotiations as a key to resolving the issues.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, if the noble Lord would allow me to interrupt for a moment, my chief point was that I was not going to discuss any of these possibilities. I only made some reflections upon proposals regarding the possible involvement of the United Nations. That was all.
Lord Soames: My Lords, what I thought I heard from the noble Lord was that he was not going to discuss them, and then he went on to discuss them. We have all done this from time to time. Therefore, all I shall try to do will be to say a few words about the backcloth against which I believe that we should be judging these events.

301
First, they have come about through a flagrant assault upon British interests. That we can never forget or forgive. It can be argued that there was an error of judgment in the early days on the part of Her Majesty's Government in misjudging what the Argentine action was going to be and in not having ships on station earlier. However, throughout history the democratic system has shown an inability to take military action at what could be the most opportune moment. And this is not the first time in the history of our country that what would have been right was not done on time.
Equally, had we started to torpedo a lot of Argentine vessels in the 200 mile area before there had been any landing on the Falkland Islands—these things are easier to prevent than they are to rectify once they have been done—matters might have stood very different today in terms of the relationship between the Opposition and the Government and between the Government and the outside world. What was certainly an error was that the Argentinians seriously underrated the reaction of the British Government and the British people to their invasion. It is because the Argentinians seriously underrated that reaction that I believe the pressures upon them to arrive at a negotiated settlement must now be very heavy, for a number of reasons. First, for political reasons.
In the Security Council of the United Nations the Argentine Government stands condemned. Whom do they have as friends? Even the Soviets did no more than to abstain in the Security Council. With an economy already in grave difficulties, through their action the Argentinians have brought about decisions by countries who hate having to take these decisions. They have brought about the decision of the EEC to ban trade with the Argentine, to refuse to buy their exports. Doubtless the Argentine will react and will respond to this. In itself this is going to be very serious, in that there is about £1 billion worth of trade, plus, going from the Argentine to the EEC, and also from the EEC to the Argentine, which will now cease until further notice. This will be a very great blow to the Argentine, for it will be superimposed upon the already very grave economic difficulties which they face.
From the military point of view, they have brought about—I do not know whether "mobilisation" is the correct word from the technical point of view, but they have brought down into the South Atlantic an extremely powerful British fleet. If the Argentinians look at this from a political point of view, where are their friends? If they look at this from an economic point of view, where is their salvation? If they look at this from a military point of view, if they do not come to sensible terms with us, then where will they go?
There is one more fact which I believe is playing in favour of a political, diplomatic solution to this problem. It is that the situation is not so difficult, one would have thought, as that which one sees when looking at the Arab/Israeli problem, in that there should not be any irreconcilables. It is evident that the people of the Falkland Islands, whatever they may say about their sovereignty or wishing to remain (this is something that the Argentinians must be aware of), will want to have good relationships with the Argentin-
302
ians in the long term, and that the Argentinians should not therefore be frightened of us discussing with the people of the Falkland Islands the matter of where they see their future. Incidentally, I was glad to hear my noble friend the Leader of the House say that it will be our intention to take into account as soon as possible the views of the Falkland Islanders themselves and where their future lies.
It all adds up to the fact that the Argentinians could and should be looking at solving this matter in a diplomatic and political manner. My fear is that, as the Argentinians tend to dig in, as it were, in a military way in order to make it more difficult for us to budge them, they are going to succeed in digging themselves in more politically, which is going to make it more difficult for the Argentinians to budge themselves. This is a built-in problem and one that points towards achieving a resolution to this problem with some speed.
There are other aspects to this which lead us to hope that a solution will be found with some speed. For instance, my noble friend Lady Young talked about the dispatch of our naval force as demonstrating our determination to resolve this matter. It certainly did and I do not deny that. But it also illustrated something else. It demonstrated how extremely effective and efficient the Royal Navy still is. For the Royal Navy to be able so quickly to get a force to sea with lines of communication 8,000 miles long and, I have no doubt, with everything necessary to sustain them, was a very considerable feat. But those ships—or most of them—are committed to NATO. As soon as we can get this matter resolved and our ships can get back to their proper stations, the better it will be. It is certainly not where the future of the British Navy lies, to spend the next few months or years with a force of this size and character in the South Atlantic. That is another point that puts an accent on speed.
So far as the EEC is concerned, I was glad that my noble friend Lady Young referred to this. I believe this is a great triumph of political co-operation, given the number of brickbats which have been thrown at the Economic European Community over the many years, with comments such as "What are the advantages? What do we get out of it?" being typical. It is certainly not in the interests of many of our partners among the Nine in the EEC to have done what they have; they have done what they have with a degree of solidarity which could never have existed had we not been a member of the European Economic Community and had we not strived ourselves to develop the system of political co-operation.
May I make just one more point as to why I believe it is necessary to proceed with all haste? It is that the world is not a very agreeable place at the moment. There are other areas of the world where peace hangs by a thin thread—and I think particularly of the Middle East. When the media headlines remain the same day after day and week after week, I always have the fear that the topic concerned is taking up people's minds and that others might be inclined to think that under the cover of these events they can take action which they would not have taken in other circumstances. It is a side event of the main dispute, but it is one that should lead us to resolve this matter as soon as possible. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister talked of not countenancing failure.

303
Of course we do not countenance failure, but the pressures are there to ensure that we should not have to countenance failure in a diplomatic solution to this problem.
3.37 p.m.
Lord Greenhill of Harrow: My Lords, I will be extremely brief, and all the more so because not for the first time in my life I find myself so much in agreement with what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Soames. Before I proceed, may I say how much I welcome (although in sad circumstances) the transfer of the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, to the Foreign Office, where his talents are particularly suited to the work he will be called upon to do.
I welcome, as do all your Lordships, the necessarily partial clarification of events which the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has given to the House. It is virtually impossible for those who are not privy to all the facts, who are not familiar with all the personalities involved, and who are unaware of the atmosphere in which discussions are being carried on, to pass authoritative judgments on the conduct of negotiations. However, I would like to make two points which are not new but which I believe are worth reiterating at this moment.
First, there is the fickleness of international opinion. The rectitude of our case is incontestable and we are making the most of it—and we are quite right to back it up with a good show of force. The Government have used the United Nations Security Council appropriately and have done particularly well with the EEC. There has been quick and welcome Commonwealth support. But it is not unduly cynical to observe that international indignation does not have a record of great stamina. One has only to think of sanctions against Rhodesia; of events in Afghanistan, Poland and Cyprus; and of outrageous behaviour in the Middle East. Sadly, Governments—both individually and collectively—accustom themselves with regrettable ease to live with aggression and injustice. Our own Government must take special account of this possibility, and for this reason, as the noble Lord, Lord Soames, has said, we must act quickly to exploit the favourable attitude which our actions have already won for us. This is not, as has been suggested in another place, the voice of appeasment: it is the difference between living in the real world as opposed to the world as it ought to be. I think that the media in this connection have a very important role to play. I hope that they will not get bored with the Falkland crisis. I hope that they will continue to emphasise the essential issues that are involved in it.
The second point that I want to make is for the future. When the time comes to consult the Falkland islanders about their own future, the information given to them and the questions put to them must be very carefully considered to take account of all the possibilities. Their response is not, in my view, in any way a foregone conclusion. Without wishing to go back into the past, I would observe that the present problems have in part been caused by lack of frankness by Governments of both parties in dealing with Parliament and with the islanders. I have discussed these matters very often with the noble Lord, Lord
304
Shackleton, and I was very interested to hear his observation on that particular point. The logic of history has been ignored in the past and defence developments have been obscured. My Lords, this must not happen again.
3.41 p.m.
Lord Kennet: My Lords, history is often written behind our backs, and that which is written behind our backs is not always bad. Whatever the outcome of the confrontation with Argentina itself, there has already been a bit of good history written in the other compass point which has been referred to already, and I mean the remarkable success scored not only by an appreciation of right and an understanding of history, but also by British diplomacy, in securing the trade embargo in the EEC. In so far as the improvement of the political co-operation machinery in the Community was a particular task set himself by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I think that we should chalk that up to his credit here and now. It yielded fruit, to our regret, only a few days after he was no longer in a position to take the credit in person. That was an outstanding success. So also was the remarkable speed with which the correct, the only possible, but still always of course the doubtful, decision of the Security Council was obtained. It was lightning action. It went in the right direction and was once again a palpable hit not only for the cause of justice, but for those who one might almost say happen to be the champions of that cause at the moment—namely, British diplomats. So also, to a lesser degree, was the partial Commonwealth action which has been taken in support of those two more visible actions.
I wish to echo all that has been said about how much we owe to Secretary of State Haig in the efforts that he is making. I hope that he will continue to be able to exert those efforts for as long as they are likely to yield fruit. In passing, I should like to ask the Government to point out not only to the Russians but also to the BBC, that Ascension Island is a place which we are happy to allow the Americans to use and not, as they state, a place which the Americans are happy to allow us to use. There is a considerable degree of misunderstanding around the world about the constitutional and political position in which our remaining dependencies—14 of them—now stand.
We have heard wise words about speed from both the noble Lord, Lord Soames, and the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow. This is true; but I do not think that we need conclude that at the moment things are necessarily getting worse. It might be possible to sustain that an improvement in the world climate is appearing—a doubtful one, and slowly, but perhaps it is. If we look at the position of the Soviet Union, for instance—and I would like to dwell on this for a moment—it is easy for us to understand their preoccupations which arise from a new economic dependency upon Argentina. The astonishing alliance that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred to, has grown up just recently. They look as though they will have to depend on Argentine wheat and Argentine fish, and to that extent they have Argentina to thank for permitting them to continue with their present policy about guns and butter. They have been pursuing this country since the beginning of the invasion of the

305
Falkland Islands with their usual relentless venom and misrepresentation, in their official propaganda. They have appeared to defend the right of propinquity as a sufficient justification for country "A" to invade country "B". They have themselves exercised rights which seem little better than that in Afghanistan, and they seem to be defending Argentina on the same grounds. They also claim to find some historical justification for the Argentinian action, but for myself I do not think it very clever of them to choose 1830 as the date from which historical claims should be judged. At that date their empire was a good deal smaller than it is now. They did not have Central Asia, nor did they have the northern territories of Japan. Ours, of course, was a great deal larger. If we were all to go back to that date it would not be us who would be the losers. I am merely illustrating an almost childishly obvious point.
The Russians have sent electronic listening ships not only to fool around our fleet, as they always do, but also close in off the Argentine coast, where no doubt they are intended to monitor the conversations between Argentinian dockers and the crews of the ships which are loading Argentine grain. We may hope that they do not send any more, or any more alarming types of ships.
Having said all that, I want to dwell on the other side, on a very recent development. I think that it was four days ago that something new happened not only in the Soviet Union, but also, as a point of minor interest, in Hungary. I am referring to the fact that Soviet journalists in the West were allowed to present to the Soviet people our view of the matter. The Soviet Home Service radio has carried perfectly fair and perfectly full accounts of the fact that the Falkland islanders are British people by origin; that there was no settlement there before them; that they have a system of democracy, and that they have exerted it; that their will is known; and that they wish to stay British and not to become Argentinian. I do not know how often before in world crises—and this is a world crisis—the Russians have so soon allowed access for the truth of the matter, as we see it in the West, to the Soviet people. I think that that may be a good sign and we may hope that it continues; and as long as it does continue, we may hope that the Soviet Union will continue not to veto sensible resolutions in the United Nations and not to take any action which would stand in the way of the settlement that we all desire down there in the South Atlantic.
In another place last week the Prime Minister responded positively to proposals put to her by, among others, the Leader of the Social Democrat Party in Parliament, for an inquiry into what went wrong before the fleet was sent off. I do not think that we can expect an answer from the Government, at any rate in this place, today. But if, in answering, the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, is able to say anything about when or where—we do not press to have the information now, and we are not pressing for this or that form of inquiry—the Government might think it right in due course to hold such an inquiry, to which they have already agreed, we should be very glad to know it.
The Falkland islanders are a democratic people for whom we are responsible. They have an elected
306
council. They have recently—only six or seven months ago—had an election. Every candidate who was elected stood on the plank of continued union with this country. British sovereignty has been uninterrupted for 150 years, and before that there was no continuously settled population. The Falkland Islands have been invaded by a neighbour, by force, and bloodshed was used to secure the occupation of that land. That neighbour is itself a colonialist country in that its history is the history of a people of European origin who have oppressed and reduced an existing native people. At the moment that neighbour also happens to be under a fascist or pseudo-fascist military junta, and this junta is believed to have added (if the figures are right) some 12,000 people to the already long list—already thousands long—of those who have "disappeared" as a result of the attentions of the Government in that country.
Over the decades that neighbour has refused our often repeated invitation to take the sovereignty dispute to the Hague Court, and still refuses it; and now has defied a crystal clear resolution of the Security Council asking it to get out of the Falkland Islands. I agree with those who hold that nothing is to he gained—and we are sure of this—by opposition parties canvassing, in any detail, plans, either military or political, for a settlement in the present rapidly evolving military and political situations. Therefore, as a party, we put none forward.
We continue to believe that the Government—any Government of this country, whichever it might be—ought to continue to seek that combination of political, economic and military dispositions which is likely to restore to the Falkland Islands at the lowest cost in bloodshed—and, if possible, at none—the right of self-determination which they securely enjoyed until two weeks ago. Since that is, as far as we can see, precisely what the Government are doing, we continue to support them, and shall continue to do so as long as that is what we think they are doing.
3.54 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, the position of the Government in international law in this matter has not been questioned, and I am inclined to take the view that this is, in fact, because it cannot be questioned. It seems to me that legally, in these terms, the Government are entirely in the right. But I am rather reminded of the couplet about the over-confident motorist:
"He was right dead right as he drove along,
But he is just as dead as if he'd been wrong."
Therefore, what can come under question legitimately is not the Government's rectitude but their wisdom. We have the right and the privilege in this Chamber to question that wisdom. That is our strength; they cannot do that in the Argentine, but we can do it here. However, as compared with Saturday, when the initial, understandable response to totally unprovoked aggression was counter-aggression—an impulse which I believe all of us felt, whatever view we take and on whatever side of the House we sit—that strong feeling of total indignation may have led us immediately to actions which, on reflection, want looking at again. I have detected, in the note which the noble Baroness the Leader of the House brought to this debate, a

307
far calmer approach to the problem than was to be found in some of the utterances of the Minister of Defence, for example, on television, which seemed to me to be undesirably jingoistic. Perhaps that was understandable at the time, but certain facts are now worth recalling.
I should like to remind the House of one or two of them. The Government have put too many eggs in the nuclear basket, particularly opting for Trident. On the Saturday when we debated this, the noble Lord, Lord Home of the thought that it was wrong to mention this question in the present context. With the very greatest of respect, I venture to disagree with the noble Lord, and I am sorry that he is not here today to hear me do so. The task force contains ships that this Government are planning to get rid of in favour of a weapon designed, so far as it has any purpose at all, to kill Muscovites by the thousand. I was rather interested in a letter which I read in The Times this morning. It was from someone who takes a view diametrically opposite to the one which I myself take on some things. I should like to quote a section from it, because it makes the connection that I was trying to make just now. It is from Sir Peter Smithers. He says:
"If Britain was unable to respond to a permanent threat by stationing a permanent defence force in the area to defend 1,800 people many thousands of miles from bases without sacrificing the nuclear deterrent or damaging the national economy, it would have been better to explain this to the Falkland Islanders long ago. They could then have been given the choice between repatriation and settlement in Britain, or remaining to run the risks which have now, not surprisingly, materialized".
I commend the letter to noble Lords, not that I agree with all its conclusions. However, I think it is true that successive British Governments have lacked the guts to grasp this nettle, and the present Government—perhaps it is not entirely their fault—have been the ones who have caught the consequences of this totally indefensible aggression by the fascist junta of Argentina.
When we consider this question of the Falkland islanders, there is another consideration. Many more people than now live in the Falklands were shifted from their island of Diego Garcia against their will, not by a fascist junta but by ourselves. We removed these people from their island. They are British; they hold British passports. They do not speak English—perhaps that is the difference, I do not know. We moved them out of Diego Garcia and put them in Mauritius, where they are now. One of the creditable actions which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, took—I believe that it was one of the last things he did before leaving office—was to bring a measure of financial compensation to the people of Diego Garcia for the fact that they had been so unceremoniously ejected from their island by us in order to install the United States there. The United States now has a base there which, contrary to the original proposition, it is now developing on a full-scale basis. Where were then the cries for the paramountcy of the wishes of the islanders? I do not think we heard them. It would not be surprising if an element of that famous British hypocrisy were discerned here.
The Government refused to develop fully an airport in the Falklands. Who did complete the airport? The Argentine air force. Who flies into the airport?
308
Argentine aircraft. Where do Falklanders go for higher education? To Argentina. Where do they go for a major operation? To Argentina. Where do they get their oil? Delivered to them from Argentina by Argentine aircraft to an Argentine built airport. Who encouraged all this? Successive British Governments, including especially the present one.
The final insult, when the Government reluctantly conceded British nationality to the Gibraltarians in this House several of us argued that the Falklanders should be given the same full British nationality as was conceded then to the Gibraltarians. The noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, played a lead in this. It was a close run thing. But in the end these same islanders who are now so very British—so British that we are apparently prepared to send our own forces to die in their cause—were then denied the full Britishness which we were ready to concede to the Gibraltarians. The Diego Garcians were British, but so far from going to war for them we threw them off their island into abject poverty in Mauritius.
Why the differences? There are perhaps two reasons. First, Mauritius has no forces—no army and no navy. Secondly, the Diego Garcians are not white and they do not speak English. They may hold British passports, but in sentimental terms they are "lesser breeds without the law". I do not know that we come out so well when we erect principles into a cause of action on some occasions and totally neglect them on others. Inside this House we may understand the differences which caused us to act one way on one occasion and another way on another, but we must recognise if outside this House it is not seen so clearly.
This matter can, and should, be settled by negotiation. I was glad to hear the noble Baroness the Leader of the House say that. I am sure that we must bring all the islanders off the island who want to come. I am equally sure that the Argentines will not prevent that, nor will they seek to prevent it. I believe that in the end we should sell, or lease, the islands to Argentina. I know that this may be an unwelcome conclusion to some Members in the House, but it is one which has been argued and suggested over the years not only by Members of the Government opposite but by Members on this side of the House.
May I draw to your Lordships' attention a statement made by Dr. David Owen in April 1977 when he was Foreign Secretary. He said:
"The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom have agreed to hold negotiations from July 1977 which will concern future political relations including sovereignty"—
I repeat, including sovereignty—
"with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories in particular and the South West Atlantic in general".
As recently as February of this year Mr. Richard Luce, who has joined the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in what I believe to be an honourable if misguided resignation, reporting on his own discussions with the Argentines, said this:
"The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute"—
to the sovereignty dispute—
"and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures

309
to make better progress in this sense. They agreed to inform their governments accordingly".
All this of course has been changed by the unprovoked and totally indefensible aggression of the Argentinians, but the Government's position internationally cannot be altered because of that. If we have once gone on record that we are prepared to discuss sovereignty we cannot now say, "Oh, no, forget all that". We have been on record as willing to discuss sovereignty for a long time—for so long that it has tried the patience of some reasonable Argentinians as well as that of some unreasonable Argentinians, and it is not the case that all the right is on our side. We must not condone the unprovoked aggression, but on the issue itself I think we should concede that this is a clash of rights and not an argument between right and wrong. Of course clashes of rights are the most difficult things to resolve. That is why we are in this difficulty.
No one should be compelled to live against their will under this appalling dictatorship, but let us use our forces for peace, not for war. Threatening to shoot it out is not a very sensible thing to do. The idea of putting a blockade round the islands is one which perhaps has some justification, but it is for the purpose of avoiding open warfare and should not be intended to be in itself a causus belli for the purpose of creating warfare. Therefore, this must be approached with the utmost caution, and the Defence Secretary should modify his words in this respect.
I have one or two other things to say, but time is marching on and perhaps your Lordships would appreciate it more if I did not treat you all to the complete statement which I should have liked to make.
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Jenkins of Putney: I will, if I may, bring my remarks to a close. We live in very dangerous times, and I want to urge upon the Government that, in tune with, I think, the more reasonable approach that they have had, we stop the jingoism. It was rather notable that in a poll which took place over the weekend the majority who voted in favour of a shooting war were even more strongly against British lives being lost. What the British people apparently want is war with a bloodless victory. Perhaps that is what Mrs. Thatcher wants. Those of us who have had anything to do with war know that it is not on. War is a bloody thing, not a bloodless thing.
After the war then comes the question, where do we go from here? What do we do? It is not worth getting into a shooting war, and all our endeavours should be to avoid that. I believe that the task force's movement in a westward direction should be slowed and halted at Ascension Island. At that point the negotiations ought to begin, and let us bring this lamentable and desperate episode to an agreed conclusion.
4.9 p.m.
Lord Duncan-Sandys: My Lord, your Lordships will, I believe not be surprised when I say that I do not wholly agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, has just said. As I emphasised when we last debated this question, I am totally convinced
310
that the Government were absolutely right to resist aggression; there was no other honourable course open to them. If it comes to war, I have no doubt that we shall succeed in expelling the invaders. But we must try, up to the very last moment, to avoid hostilities which would do lasting damage to international relations and would not in the long run resolve the problem. All three parties—Britain, the Argentine and the Falklanders—must in my opinion be prepared to make their contribution to a peaceful solution.
We must all of us face the facts. Britain can never acquiesce in the illegal occupation of her territory. The Argentine is never likely to recognise British sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. Therefore since Britain cannot afford to maintain a permanent military force in the South Atlantic, a repetition of the present crisis at some future date is quite conceivable. It follows that unless a solution is found, the threat of invasion will hang over the Falkland Islands indefinitely.
The only possible solution that I can envisage is that the Falklanders should seek security as an independent nation whose sovereign status is recognised by the United Nations, and that they should be admitted to the Organisation of American States, to which they would be entitled to call for assistance in the event of aggression. That would provide security for the Falklanders, it would remove the need for Britain's protection, and it would enable the Argentine to withdraw its troops without the humiliation of accepting British sovereignty for more than a brief period pending independence.
Whether an agreement on those lines is negotiable, I do not know; but I cannot see any better way of resolving the present crisis. The trouble is that time is running out. Our fleet is moving south at full speed. When it reaches its destination, the shooting will probably start, and then the situation will no doubt get completely out of control, and could have much wider repercussions.
If the tireless efforts of Mr. Haig do not quickly yield results, we should not I think exclude the possibility of a face-to-face discussion between British and Argentinian Ministers, and even Heads of Governments. Obviously such a meeting would have to be convened by a third country. The most appropriate might well be Mexico, whose President so ably hosted the North-South meeting in Cancun. If encouraged to do so, I cannot believe that Mexico would not welcome the opportunity to assist in breaking the present dangerous deadlock and help to preserve the peace of the western hemisphere. Those are just a few thoughts which I submit to the Government for their consideration.
4.14 p.m.
Lord Chalfont: My Lords, this is a critical time in the diplomatic phase of this crisis, and like many others of your Lordships, I was not surprised that there was not much information forthcoming from the Government at the beginning of the debate. There are some things that are better carried out without a great deal of sound and fury, and away from the glare of publicity. Perhaps I may here interject a small personal parenthesis. I think that the Government at some stage might regret the lavish endowment of press representatives and media persons who are

311
accompanying our fleet to the South Atlantic: however, that is a small aside.
As many of your Lordships have already said, this is no time for uncertain sounds to issue from this House, or from Parliament as a whole. I think that one of the most heartening things about this crisis since it has begun—and there is not much in it to cause optimism—has been the attitude of the official opposition parties, most of which, most of the time, have adopted a statesmanlike and responsible approach to the Government's problems. There have of course been predictable noises from a few people—some people who perhaps do not count the safety, the honour and the reputation of this country among their principal concerns.
I should like to mention what I believe to be one of the more outrageous suggestions which have come from certain quarters: it is that the Prime Minister might engage this country in war for party, or even for personal political reasons. Personally I find that a contemptible suggestion, which reflects only upon the motives and the reputations of the people who make it.
What has happened has implications not only for this country and for the Falkland islanders but also for the rule of international law and the preservation of order around the world. In fact it presents a threat to decency in the world community. As I think every noble Lord who has spoken has said, the future of the Falkland Islands must, if possible, be solved by negotiation, and not by force. But negotiations sooner or later there must be. It is no good either side in the dispute saying such things as, "Sovereignty is not negotiable". In a negotiation of this kind, of course it is negotiable.
We must also take care that, in saying that the wishes of the Falkland islanders are paramount, we do not lose sight of the fact that we must consider their wishes in the light of their interests, their long-term interests; and we must consider their wishes and their interests in the light of the long-term interests of many millions of other people who are also British citizens.
I shall not attempt to offer any suggestions about the detailed negotiations. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and others have said, this is not the moment for that, and it is not the place for that. But when, first of all, the crisis and then the negotiations are over, there will be many lessons that we must learn from this crisis. It has been suggested that there should be an inquiry into the circumstances that led to the successful invasion of the Falkland Islands, and, as I understand it, the Government have taken a sympathetic view towards that suggestion. It may emerge as a result of that inquiry that there were failures of intelligence, or failures of communications, or failures of political judgment—failures of all three. That we must wait and see.
However, I believe that there is something that we must learn from this crisis which is much more important than simply to analyse and investigate the mistakes, if there were such mistakes, which led up to the invasion. What is more important in my view is that, as a result of what has happened so far and what might happen in the next few weeks, we shall have to undertake a fundamental reassessment of our external policies. We shall have to examine with great care, and without any preconceptions or prejudices, the
312
assumptions which underlie our foreign policy in the last 20 years of this century; and we must also make a fundamental reassessment of how we allocate our military resources in support of whatever foreign policy we decide that we should have. That will be the most important task facing us when, as I hope and believe, the crisis of the Falkland Islands is peacefully and honourably settled.
In my view, there will now have to be a serious and profound debate in this country—in Parliament, in the Government and in the country as a whole—about the external policies which we should pursue in the light of the lessons which this crisis has taught us. But, as others have said, that is for later. It is not for now. What we need now is a Government, a Parliament and a people who are totally united in their determination to demonstrate that brute force in international politics cannot be allowed to prevail. Only in that way—because if we weaken we are lost—can we achieve an honourable solution to the crisis.
I have there used a word which may have gone out of fashion a little in politics and international affairs—the word "honour". I have received, as I expect many of your Lordships have, a great postbag of mail about the crisis and the dangers with which it presents us. I will mention just one letter which I received this morning. It came from someone who said in the course of his letter that he was a bricklayer and did not know much about politics. It was a simple letter in which he advanced the view that perhaps we in this country had been too complacent in the past about attacks on our honour and freedom, and the last words of his letter were:
"Godspeed to the fleet, good sense to the Government, and, for the people of Britain, an honourable solution".
At this stage that says almost all that needs to be said about this crisis. I hope that we in this House at least can join in expressing our unswerving support of the armed forces of the Crown in whatever task they are asked to undertake. I hope too that we can wish the Government, whatever may be our political views and beliefs, every success in an undertaking which will require great reserves of courage, resolution and wisdom, and all the resources at their disposal. And I hope your Lordships will indulge me if at this stage—because I have not had an opportunity to do it before—I pay a personal tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and say how much his wisdom and courage will be missed in the next few weeks.
But, most important of all, for the people of this country as well as the people of the Falkland Islands, an honourable solution is what we must seek. I hope, and I am confident, that the Government will, over the coming weeks, behave in such a way that people all over the world will say that this is still a country to be reckoned with, not because it has nuclear weapons or is prepared to go to war to defeat the aims of an aggressive dictator, but simply because it has behaved with courage and compassion and, most importantly of all, with honour.
4.24 p.m.
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, I ask for a certain degree of indulgence because what I am about to say is clearly out of step with the prevailing mood of the

313
House. I say it because I think it has to be said by somebody. I shall speak with as much moderation as I can, and I hope your Lordships will understand that I would not do it unless I thought it had to be done.
I do not agree with the prevailing mood that it is somehow wrong for a free Parliament—and we are, after all, part of a free Parliament—to manage to have two meetings and at some stage criticise what the Executive have done. The noble Lord, Lord Soames, said in the course of his speech that up to then we had had a magnificent debate. What he meant was that we had had a wonderful prayer meeting at which we had patted each other on the back and undertaken to say nothing rude about the Minister. There had been no debate. In the last few speeches a little of that has emerged. I found myself listening with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, and with a certain degree of interest to the latter part of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins. But we have not done what a free parliament is for—as I say, this is our second meeting—which is to challenge the Executive to defend what they have done.
I gave a hint of my own feeling at the end of our Saturday debate, in which I did not speak for long because I had not put my name down to speak and I did not want to behave wrongly towards the House. I hinted then that I thought the Executive, the Government, had gone wrong, and since that Saturday debate I have thought more and more about it (it is a problem for which for a short period I once carried responsibility) and my worries, fears, doubts and misapprehensions have grown. I feel that we have succeeded in wrong-footing ourselves all the way through. We wrong-footed ourselves by not having a couple of small ships on station, as we did in the period when I was negotiating, as we did in the period when Dr. David Owen was negotiating, but as apparently we did not do this time. We have wrong-footed ourselves, having let the thing happen—and Heaven knows, every Foreign Office policy paper was always written and submitted on the basis that if we let it happen we were lost—by militarily over-reacting.
There is no question—nobody seems to be denying it today, neither the Government nor anybody else—that the situation must be peacefully settled by negotiation. To over-react in this way and to challenge the others in this way makes that, to put it very mildly, that much more difficult to do and, withal, could make it impossible to do. We have wrong-footed ourselves by having so spoken and so behaved—and let us not think that the media dream these things up; a good deal of massaging goes on to produce the stories that appeared in this morning's newspapers—as to have boxed this country into a corner. We have increased the degree of face that we at some point have to lose, by talking and behaving as the Executive have been doing. And above all else, we have managed completely to misunderstand the basis on which a British foreign policy should be erected and to which ends it should be conducted.
To back up what I have been saying, I would draw the attention of the House to the references to "them or us"; asking—telling—the Americans to choose between them or us, to decide whether the United States is an ally or a neutral, letting it go out (I am quoting here; all these statement are quotes) that we
314
have "no need of umpires". Gracious me! that is exactly what we need. That is what the United Nations and this modern world is about. When nations get into conflict, somebody has to umpire it. If that were not so, why go to the Security Council in the first place?
As Lord Duncan-Sandys said, having gone to the Security Council and having with great diplomatic skill and effort on the part of Sir Anthony Parsons and our team there got their resolution, what we now need is to get the Security Council's resolution made effective. Whose responsibility is that? It is the responsibility of the United Nations. That is why we went there. It is not something that one party to the dispute is entitled unilaterally to impose upon the other. If one party to a dispute is entitled to do that then it does not have to go, it should not go, to the Security Council.
The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, once my tremendously strong right arm, if I may say so—he has become a little more my left arm now than in those days made the point I was going to make myself: that the whole business is made redundant if we insist that we must go to war—and again I am quoting—
"to avoid toppling our Government or our PM personally".
The Argentinians must go to war to avoid toppling General Galtieri or his Government. We have made the whole process that we ourselves engaged upon redundant by the things we are saying, and I think we have wrong-footed ourselves by doing it.
The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, was kind enough to the Prime Minister to say that he did not believe that she or any member of the Government had ever said such a thing. He is a good newshound man himself; he has been around Whitehall both as a Minister and as a newshound; he has been both a recipient of massage and a masseur. He did some good massaging in my day, so I know he knows the trade. Those things are not printed unless somebody from No. 10 wishes that they should appear. I am bound to say to this House that one of the things that bother me about this whole situation more and more, and has led me to make what is going to be, as I say, an out-of-key speech, is that I think war is much too serious a matter—and I am no pacifist—to be embarked upon for or in those sort of terms.
In any case, unilateral blockades by one country of another after you have been to the United Nations and asked them to take responsibility, the declaration of a 200-mile zone in which another party is not allowed to enter, create awful precedents which others may wish themselves to pursue. We almost had a war on our hands with a very close ally in our own seas in respect of a neutral zone, a blockade zone, a no-go zone, of much less than 200 miles. Today everybody has made kindly references to Al Haig—and so, of course, they should; so should we all. Kissinger is alleged to have said, "He is almost breaking my heart". They have both had heart by-passes, and Kissinger said, "I only travelled 3,000 miles, he is travelling 8,000 each time". He is doing sterling work; and, of course, we here should be, as everybody has been, kind and understanding. But the media has not been, and there have been some very wounding references to the messages which A1 Haig is supposed to have had to have delivered to him to get him to see

315
the scene properly; and I regret those very much indeed.
Let me say this, too. We are sure about our interests, or we think we are. I think we have got them muddled up, as I said just now. But America also has interests, and she is entitled to be something more than just our friend, just our supporter. She has interests on her own continent, and she is entitled to consult them. If I were the American Secretary of State I would be considering American interests; and you have to take her interests on her continent into account as well as ours, as we see them in the South Atlantic.
That brings me to this question of British interests, for it is on them alone—and on the balance of them—that a British foreign policy can ever be erected. I used to get into awful trouble with my colleagues in the Labour Party in former days because I said, "You can't have a Socialist foreign policy as distinct from a Conservative foreign policy; you have got to try to make a British foreign policy". Quite a lot of our British interests do not change when Governments change, and some of our interests cancel out some others. At the end of the day it is a matter of balance to decide the policy you run. Saving face, maintaining a physical presence, upholding a disputed sovereignty for 200 years in the case of a group of islands 8,000 miles away may be a part of those interests. You take those into account—yes, you should—but they are only a part of your interests, not all of them.
Incidentally, there has been a great misrepresentation and a great misappropriation of Lord Palmerston throughout this public debate. The one reason why I had his picture put up in my room when I was Foreign Secretary (I regret to say that my successor, or his successor, had it taken down again) is that the great thing that Palmerston always stood for was "the balance of British interests"—"ma'am", he used to say to Queen Victoria. Take them and knock them together and make something out of it for Britain. He was not an imperialist only; he was not a colonialist only; he did not think that trade and commerce were somehow immoral and should not be taken into account when weighing up the balance of British interests, as too many people (if I may say so, some Ministers) have been doing in the last week or so.
Here I back up something that, again, Lord Chalfont said. Islanders—we have a duty to them, of course; we must fulfil it. But whether they be the islanders in the Falklands or whether they be the inhabitants of Gibraltar or anywhere else you like, they cannot be given the right of veto. Again today the noble Baroness was talking about their rights being paramount. They cannot be, because if somebody else's rights are paramount in deciding British foreign policy then we move the whole responsibility from Whitehall and the British Parliament to Government House and whatever passes for a Parliament in the place where you say it is paramount—and that cannot be so. This has to be understood by Ministers; but I do not think it is. They cannot be given the right of veto.
We also have other interests, remember, in Latin America. I was disappointed in the attitude taken by the Archbishop in this respect, but as a good Anglican
316
I will take it up with him in the appropriate place. But he seemed to me, as so many others have done, to slide off this question of our other interests in Latin America. They are enormous compared with our interests in the Falkland Islands, and we are placing them at risk. If one is erecting a British foreign policy, one has to put them in the scales as well. The House will not need me to tell it the size and scope of our interests in Argentina itself. That has to go into the balance.
May I repeat to my ex-colleagues in the Labour Party something I have said so often before. It is something that was said to me by the late Ernest Bevin when I was a very young man. He said, "For heaven's sake, don't try to make your policy on the basis of choosing between the goodies and the baddies. Decide what you want for yourself. Go for that; and deal with the goodies and deal with the baddies".
The Labour Party would not have been taking the position it has been taking for the last week or two except for its distaste, which I share, for the nature of the ruling régime in Argentina. When we succeeded, in my day in the Foreign Office, in negotiating an agreement with the Spanish Foreign Minister over Gibraltar, it was rejected—not because the agreement was thought to be wrong, but because we did not like General Franco and his fascist régime. That is no basis for erecting a British foreign policy. It led us, because of our memories of being so wrong about what to do at the time of Nazism in Germany, to a position where we saw Hitler everywhere; and that led us into the disaster of Suez. This is a different kind of thing, but it could be an equally sensational disaster if we go on seeing Hitler almost everywhere we look.
Also, in erecting a British policy, we have to consider the question of our joint interests with the USA. We must put that in the scales. If the United States, having considered their interests, do not make the kind of choice we are trying to push on to them as between an ally and a neutral, then we have to consider whether we want to be with them when this is all over. We have long complained about the lack of consultation by them with us before they make policy decisions, especially during the Carter régime and, to some extent during the present one. How do we think the present President of the United States feels when he is being told the things we are being told at this moment?
We also have our own domestic economic and financial situation to consider in erecting British foreign policy. With great respect to the Government and to the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, who spoke on this subject the other day, we cannot act so cavalierly about costs and resources in a situation like this when we are saying that they are all-important in every other situation, in creating three million unemployed, including some of the people that we have had to call in to try to get these ships together. We must weigh that in the balance: that any British foreign policy must take the domestic situation into account; and, with respect, this policy is not doing so.
There is so much more that one feels one would wish to say. My guess is that, in the policy papers which have been put up by the much-abused Foreign Office, these matters have all been set out for consideration at No. 10. But I must say, as one who gave the present Prime Minister quite a bit of support before she

317
became Prime Minister and during that election—and I came in for a lot of abuse for doing so from ex-colleagues of mine—that I think we have a problem. If she does not mind (or even if she does), I should like to say publicly that you can get a situation where a Prime Minister feels that she must appear to be twice as virile as anybody else might feel it necessary to appear in that office, either because she is perhaps overly conscious of the fact that she is a woman or because she knows that she is in her present office against or despite the wishes of most of her more immediate cousins. Again, that is no basis for conducting our affairs in the way we are conducting them. It is certainly no reason for going to war.
As everybody has said, there are negotiable solutions here to be had. There is a choice of them to be taken. I liked the idea put up by the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys. I have myself tried to negotiate the two-flag solution, in which one flag stood for the "Rock" and the other flag stood for our responsibility for the citizens who are British. There are a number of solutions. If any of the other solutions involve that other flag flying, let us not duck the issue; any of them will involve that. We should have swallowed that problem a long time ago. We have to swallow it now. We have got international support—and, no doubt, in the course of getting it, we have written a lot of IOUs which will surface in due course.
My Lords, in my view—and this is where your Lordships may finally run out of patience with me—we should now halt the armada at wherever is the right place to halt it. If it is Ascension Island, halt it there, and do not go forward from there. Allow others—it is suggested that Mexico would do it, or surely the OAS or somebody there would do it—to negotiate the least disagreeable solution of all those that are available for us to swallow. Do not start a war.
We gave Russia cover at the time of Hungary, your Lordships will remember. They were grateful for it. It caused our Hungarian colleagues, comrades and friends grave misgivings. We are now providing the same service for the Soviet Union in the case of Poland and in the case of Afghanistan. We are again providing that same service. We have taken the world's attention off Russia's misdeeds and the sufferings of the people that she is oppressing while everybody attends to this issue of whether we or the Argentines are the aggressors here. I wonder, shall we never learn? I come back to what I have said before: I am damned sure that Palmerston would have understood that.
4.47 p.m.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, it is always difficult in your Lordships' House to have prepared a speech and suddenly to decide, having heard the immediately previous speaker, that the best thing to do is to tear up the prepared speech and endeavour to deal with some of the points that had been made—points which I, speaking purely for myself, find more than objectionable. I say that perfectly frankly. My Lords, when we are facing a national and international emergency, with 1,800 British subjects having had their land occupied, whether it be by a dictator of the Right or by a dictator of the Left, after naked aggression in pursuit of territorial claims, I never thought that I would hear a
318
former Foreign Secretary of this country say that that is a dispute which has to be dealt with on the basis of the rights of each side, that that was an occasion when we needed an umpire, when we are carrying out our rights under the Charter backed by a United Nations Security Council decision and sending out a task force of our lads. I never thought that I would hear an ex-Foreign Secretary of this country at such a time say: "Stop where you are! Let somebody else get you out of your mess! Let somebody else negotiate; let somebody else decide!"
What has this country become if somebody can make a speech of that kind? My noble friend Lord Shackleton said—and he did not use the words—déjà vu. He was thinking of 1938 and 1939. He was thinking then of naked aggression in pursuit of territorial claims.
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, could I just interrupt? The noble Lord said: "What has this House become when such a speech can be made?" But what kind of free Parliament would he actually have?
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, the freedom of Parliament is to express views. The freedom of the individual Member of your Lordships' House is to say in regard to any views that have been expressed that he personally is ashamed of them, and I am saying that at this moment. It is all very well to say that one sees a Hitler behind every corner. There are many small countries, including those in South America, which are seeing a Hitler at this moment, and all the threats of a Hitler, if this is allowed to go by without a task force, without the ability of a free country to say: "You do not do this. Out you go with your armed forces".
I cannot but say this: I am proud of my Front Bench, who declared in answer to the speech of the Leader of this House that so far the party of Opposition was behind the Government. That did not mean in any way—and that has been said very clearly—giving a blank cheque to the Government. I am going to say this, if I may move on to another aspect of this matter: it is a fact—and here we can face it very frankly—that public confidence, which needs to be at its height at this moment and not at its lowest depth, has undoubtedly been shaken by the events of the past few weeks.
I am not going into the question of whether a couple of ships in the right place at the right time would have stopped the Argentinians. Many of us will wait to a future date for that inquiry and for the intelligence reports, and we are not going to discuss them now. We are going to face the facts as they are. From the public point of view, there is no doubt at all that confidence has been shaken, and understandably so, when for example—and it is of course an important example—a person of the stature of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has to resign together with his colleagues.
At this moment, I am asking for this amount of confidence to be given to the public. There cannot be at this stage, for obvious practical reasons, the formation of a national Government. What would give the public confidence in my view is this: if there were a definite statement made that at this moment, which is such an important and urgent moment in our history, the combined wisdom of former Prime

319
Ministers of this country who are still with us could be at the service of the Government. Without belittling any of those five, I believe that national confidence would be very much strengthened if, for example, it were known that the noble Lord, Lord Home, and my right honourable friend James Callaghan were available to the Government in order to give their guidance and their counsel. That would give a national aspect indeed, in my view, to future Government policy.
Having said all that, of course nobody wants sabre rattling. Nobody wants a war. Obviously, we must look for every diplomatic means of settling this dispute, provided that it is known throughout the world that the task force that is going out has the support of this country, that the Argentinian forces must move—whether it be with a question of one flag or two flags we will not be dealing with today.
But without any question of doubt, what we have to bear in mind is that dictators have different logic to pursuade them into judgments than a democratic Government have. The dictator of the Argentine knows that he stands or falls—it may be lives or dies—by the result of what he has done in the Falkland Islands. That means not only a dangerous situation, but it means that all the adept skills of diplomacy will be necessary provided that force goes out of the Falkland Islands to afford that dictator just one little bit of saving of face. It may very well be, as I and others have said before, that a question of two flags flying while negotiations take place will be worth the saving of lives.
This is not the speech that I was going to make. It may be a worse speech or a better speech. At least I feel healthier as a Member of your Lordships' House for having said what I have said. I trust that the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, will not mind the way in which I felt I had to deal with his remarks as a Member of these Benches and of your Lordships' House.
4.56 p.m.
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein: My Lords, I hope that the House will show the same indulgence to me as they have to the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, because I feel that what I am going to say may also be somewhat out of tune with the general feelings in the House. It may be for slightly different reasons. As your Lordships know, I have been concerned for some 25 years in promoting British interests in Latin America in general and in Argentina, among other countries, in particular. It therefore might be useful if I made one or two observations from, as it were, the other end of the telescope which has not really been very much considered.
First, I totally concur with everything that has been said about deploring Argentine aggression. That must be right and I have said so to the press. However, it behoves us to consider how this has come about. This has been due partly to their frustration because they have been seeking a settlement for many years. Secondly, I think that it is important to understand that Argentina does not think and never will that it is indulging in territorial expansion. For 150 years they have believed irrefutably that these islands are part of
320
their national territory, and they believe so now in the same way as be believe that the Isle of Wight or the Isles of Scilly are part of Britain. They are brought up to think this and they have been claiming the Falkland Islands in international fora for many years.
It is very important to recognise that, however many people may make derogatory remarks about the present nature of the Argentine Government, whether or not General Galtieri falls is quite irrelevant, because the Argentine people are solidly behind the action—or the intention of the action, if not the action—and the wish of Argentina to obtain sovereignty of the islands.
Let us look a little at what this sovereignty entails. The whole issue of sovereignty, which is after all the core issue, is viewed slightly differently from either end of the Atlantic. Argentina does not really have a great deal of interest in the overall administration of these islands. They are occupied by people who speak a different language, but they feel that these islands are part of their national territory. That is why we should have been working for so many years—as indeed the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, said—to try to solve this issue together, because in fact together we have a lot to gain. We have had several debates on this subject since I have been a Member of your Lordships' House and I have always asked the Government to press on with the subject of these negotiations. I still believe it is not too late.
We have since then matched Argentinian aggression with a degree of retaliation which is not inconsiderable, and it is questionable whether the world support we have got at the moment would last in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. We won an initial point very early on by securing the United Nations Security Council resolution deploring Argentine aggression. That was most fortunate, but if we attack Argentina or get into battle in the South Atlantic, I put it to your Lordships that United Nations support, and indeed Latin American public opinion, would very quickly turn against us because the Latin American nations believe in the other principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter about the importance of de-colonisation of the Americas by the European nations. Indeed, we ourselves participated in helping Argentina to do precisely that in the early days of the last century. I think it is important to realise that opinion would change if hostilities broke out.
I believe, like the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, that it is not too late and that indeed the sooner negotiations start the better, on the basis that ultimately sovereignty may need to be ceded in one way or another. I was particularly interested to hear the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, which is quite new; and he is a man of great experience. The only problems with that suggestion is that the Falkland Islands are very small and it is questionable whether they are a viable proposition. But of course every proposition must be considered if this situation is to be de-fused.
One further point, my Lords. It has been said that the wishes of the islanders are paramount. Like the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, I question that. I believe that British interests are paramount. I do not think it is widely known what the islanders really want, except that they want to be left alone in their beautiful islands, to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, so

321
eloquently referred. It is perhaps not so widely known that there are only some 25 farms on the main islands and half of them belong to one company; so whether we should persist in taking such risks to protect such a small oligarchy is highly questionable.
At the same time we are putting at stake the lives and interests of 100,000 Britons or Anglo-Argentines who have lived in Argentina very happily for many decades. I put it to your Lordships that our objective at the end of the day should be to negotiate a transfer of sovereignty which would provide for joint development of the economic resources of the South-West Atlantic—joint development of economic resources—Britain and Argentina together. That is in the best interests of Britain, of the islanders, and for our relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole.
5.4 p.m.
Lord Wigg: My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, would be complimented if I rallied to his defence, but I should like to give him a word of advice. Perhaps he would like to bring his gods up to date, because Lord Palmerston lived a long time ago and the authority he then exercised was of course derived from the victories in the Napoleonic wars and in a period of great expansion. Lord George-Brown might in fact do himself a bit of good here if he took a jump from Palmerston and studied the life of the late Lord Haldane and the contribution he made to education and technological advance in this country. Unfortunately, his advice was not taken, and many of our troubles are due to that fact.
We live in a worn-out, effete class system which has now been run down, which caused even The Times—that devoted supporter of the Conservative Party—to say that the philosophy of the Conservative Party today was a mixture of Poujadisme and the inhibitions and frustrations of the petit bourgeois. They were unkind things to say and I would bring that up to date by suggesting that Mrs. Thatcher herself is not exclusively a Poujadist or a disciple of the petit bourgeois. I think she is a rather obstinate, very limited exponent of the philosophy of the Housewives' League and those of us who are familiar with the Housewives' League recognise all the signs.
I thought, too, that there were some signs of it in the rebukes of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, particularly regarding a couple of phrases. He said he wanted it to go forth that the Government had the support of the British people. That message to the Argentine Government will not be very effective because they do not care tuppence about the support of the populations over whom they rule, but, as a military junta, they will take notice of the facts; and it is the facts of the situation with which I want to deal.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me to intervene, I not only referred to the support of the people behind the Government but I said—which is much more important from my point of view—that the task force had the support of Parliament.
Lord Wigg: My Lords, I am sorry: I did not want to labour the point—"the task force had the support ".
322
That is the point with which I want to deal. It is not sufficient that the task force has the support. What matters is whether it is equipped to do the job the Government have asked it to do. It is that with which I shall deal but I want to deal with it, if I might be permitted, in my own way.
It is a fact—I say this having listened to the debates which have taken place in this House and having read those which took place in another place—that there is universal condemnation of the action of the Argentine Government; and the attitude of the British people as a whole was expressed eloquently by the Archbishop of Canterbury when he said that as a nation we support the rule of law and condemn aggression wherever it takes place, and if it is within our power we would put that situation right. The question is: have we got that power?
The noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, pointed out that we had gone to the United Nations and had the support of the United Nations. Having got that support, we then proceed to act in our own way and we put together a task force which is universally acclaimed here—universally, as expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, when he said that it had the support of the public.
Let us just stop for a moment and consider what has happened. First of all, I ask noble Lords at some time to have a look at page 74 of the Statement on Defence Estimates. There is Table I showing ships of the Royal Navy and their serials. It is said that all ships with serials 1 to 7, and serial 8, the "Island" Class and three of the coastal minehunters in serial 9 are assigned to NATO. So this particular force which has been taken away from NATO is now down mid-way between this country and Argentina. To that extent our NATO commitments remain unfulfilled so that the action of the Government here was to "let the bulldog out", as a letter in The Times said the other day; but what about the back door?
I do not think this is particularly clever. This force has been put together and we are told from the very word "go" that it can do the job. Although I spent all my working life in the armed forces of the Crown, as did my forbears, I have no strategic knowledge and very little experience of what is called "general staff work". I was just a humble old military clerk, who peddled paybooks, mess books and the like, but who became interested in the subject and studied military history in terms of deficiencies in what, in army terms, were A and Q problems.
I looked at this force which has to go out with 1,800 marines and the 3rd Parachute Regiment on the "Canberra", and several hundred other troops on the "Invincible" and the "Hermes", and I wondered what arrangements would be made for heavy casualties. I looked to see what had happened to the "Britannia", because we have always been told that the "Britannia" could be used as a hospital ship. I made inquiries and I found that the difficulty about using the "Britannia" was getting supplies of diesel oil.
But now, several weeks afterwards, and after the operation has been planned, the "Uganda" comes into Naples today, the children are taken off, it will be going into Gibraltar and will then be sent off—but weeks afterwards. So the question of hospitalisation is clearly an afterthought. Then we were told this

323
morning that a number of trawlers have been requisitioned as minesweepers. If we were going to declare a "no-go" area and the Argentine was likely to mine it, we ought to have thought about the minesweepers so that comes a bit late.
But, as I said earlier, my concern about these matters comes from a lifetime of real interest in the subject, and I then started to ask myself the question: What are the aircraft which the "Invincible" and the "Hermes" will carry? There are eight Sea Harriers on the "Invincible" and 12 Sea Harriers on the "Hermes". When I was a member of the Government there was a great fight about the continuation of the Harrier. I fought the good fight, and I am glad to say that I was on the winning side—I will not say against whom—and the Harrier survived, so I am glad that I fought on that occasion.
But I ask your Lordships to remember that the Harrier is essentially a replacement for the old Hunter. It is a close support aircraft. But the Sea Harrier is a different animal altogether. It is not like the RAF Harrier, which has its problems, and the Government are taking the appalling risk of putting in these Sea Harriers as the only protection which they have. They are virtually coining off the factory floor, because the are completely untried—untried in battle, certainly, but untried in many other ways—and I do not doubt that a number of those 20 Sea Harriers have come from the factory floor. They are going in, are armed with the cannon and the Sidewinder. I do not think that it is the ultra-sophisticated L-type Sidewinder—it is probably the J-type—but it is a very powerful weapon indeed. But the combat radius is not more than 200 miles.
Since the middle of last week everybody, except the British public, seems to know that the old "Hermes" has been in trouble. She has had propeller trouble. At a press conference on Good Friday, they let it out of the bag that two or three of the ships were being slowed down. There is no secret about that, because, as we know, the Russians have been surveilling us and they will report that. But it is without doubt that the "Hermes" has had trouble. How significant it is, I do not know, but on the evidence that has come out she has lost speed and the other ships have slowed down. I noticed that for two or three days The Times has been saying that there are minor troubles. But they are troubles of great significance, because if you are going to fly the Sea Harriers off the "Hermes" using the ski-jump you have to push the speed up, and if you cannot push the speed up and only one prop is working she will have steering trouble as well.
But you are virtually sending in this force without effective air cover, because the Sea Harriers will be up against the Skyhawks. I do not think that they have Sidewinders. I believe that the Argentines ordered a couple of hundred of them, but President Carter embargoed them and I do not think they got them. But they have the Mirages and they are armed with a very formidable weapon, the R.530, and have a combat range which is much further than that of the Sea Harriers. So you are sending a force down there with no effective air cover, and you propose to land between 1,800 and 2,500 marines and boys from the Parachute Brigade in an opposed landing, against 4,000 or 5,000 troops who have been dug in. Whether or not it
324
upsets the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, I am "agin" it. I do not play politics with other men's lives. One of the things that is on the line is the question of the defence policy of this country from the 1957 White Paper onwards. I come down and I make—
Lord Duncan-Sandys: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for not disappointing me and for having once again, as he has done in every speech that he has made in the last 25 years, referred to the 1957 White Paper?
Lord Wigg: That is absolutely right, my Lords. I hold it as the most disastrous document that has ever been introduced by a British Government. It was a dishonest document. It followed on the moral of Suez. It had in its framework Blue Streak, which was cancelled on Maundy Thursday by the noble Viscount, Lord Watkinson. It led to Skybolt which was cancelled. It led to the Polaris, which he himself attacked when he was a Minister. I will send him the articles from The Times, if he likes. But the policy that he advocated privately he was attacking publicly. And now we come to the Trident. They are all of one piece and I say, as I have said on every occasion that I could, that this country cannot sustain a defence policy without some form of selective service. It cannot afford to pay for it.
What I want is this. I do not care tuppence about ex-Prime Ministers. They are instruments of public opinion. They know very little about the subject. What I should like to see now is one more effort to get the defence policy of this country on an all-party basis, established by the facts; a defence policy which, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, said, takes into account the external policies of this count' y up to the end of this century. What is required for that is men of undoubted integrity, of undoubted knowledge and of undoubted courage, who would put the interests of the services behind them and put the interests of their country first.
I make three specific suggestions. The three men whom I would choose to do the job are, first, Marshal of the Royal Air Force—a member of your Lordships' House—Lord Elworthy, who I think is a man of great intellect and was one of the best Chiefs of Staff that we have had; secondly, Field Marshal Lord Carver and, thirdly, Lord Zuckerman. You would have three men there who could not be paralleled in terms of their knowledge and experience. They should report to the Government, on the most confidential and, indeed, absolutely secret terms, on the understanding that the leaders of the Labour Party should be brought into consultation, with the deliberate intention of trying to put an end to the military nonsense which, since the end of the war, has cost us—and I repeat the figure again—no less than £112,000 million. Yet, when the chips are down, all you can do is to take away the whole of the support that you have for NATO, and bog it down in the middle of the Atlantic in terms which, if it takes on the Argentines, may involve us in a military disaster of the first magnitude. This is not solely the fault of this Government, because the Labour Party have something to answer for as well. There were three men—I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, because he helped to bring their careers to an end—all on that side of the House: Viscount Head, Sir Fitzroy Maclean

325
and Mr. Brian Harrison, all Members of Parliament, who all disappeared from public life because they could not stomach the dishonesties of the 1957 White Paper for which the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, was personally responsible.
Lord Duncan-Sandys: My Lords, is the noble Lord accusing me of dishonesty?
Lord Wigg: I am saying that the White Paper was dishonest, Yes. And the noble Lord knows it. The figures were false.
Viscount De L'Isle: With great respect, I have been in the House for 36 years and I have never heard a more abusive and unconstitutional speech in my life in this House. I hope that the noble Lord will cease, otherwise I shall have to move that he be no longer heard.
Lord Wigg: The noble Viscount can so move if he wants to, but that is his responsibility. I am going to say what I want to say. If it is abusive it is the truth, and it is the truth which should be told. I say again that there were two Conservative Ministers and one Parliamentary Private Secretary whose careers were ended because of their opposition to the 1957 White Paper. I have opposed it as well. I am saying that the 1957 White Paper was a dishonest document. I have always said so, and I say it again now. If the noble Lord wants to move that I be not heard, that is up to him. I do not care tuppence. I have said what I have got to say. What I want to do, what I have tried to do for 25 years, is to get the defence policy of this country on to a sound basis, within our capacity to pay. What is at issue now is not only the future of the Falkland Islands. Far more than that, what is at issue is whether this country has got any future at all except as a small island off the North-West coast of Europe. That is why I make the plea that I do: to take the opportunity of examining what is happening and what may happen before it happens. We should take the opportunity of getting it right for the future.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, surely it is most unfortunate that he should use the word "dishonest" and attack somebody's personal integrity without using any evidence to back it up. If the noble Lord feels that what the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, did in 1957 was dishonest and unworthy of his office, then he should produce facts and figures, not just hurl cheap abuse across the Chamber.
Lord Wigg: My Lords, what more evidence could I produce? I have said that the 1957 White Paper was a dishonest document. If the noble Earl will take the trouble to read the White Paper, look up the additions of the total number of strengths which were required and then examine the subsequent White Papers and the subsequent statements of the Minister himself, he will see that the figures there were false, whether he was personally—
Several noble Lords: Order!
Lord Sandys: My Lords, the noble Lord is not speaking strictly relevantly to the debate and I think that it would be the wish of the House to proceed.
Lord Wigg: My Lords, I sat down and then somebody asked me a question. What am I supposed to do?
5.25 p.m.
Lord Buxton of Alsa: My Lords, if I may be allowed to bring your Lordships back to the subject of this debate and the important matter which confronts us, I wish to refer very briefly to a subject which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet: the sudden emergence on the scene of the Russians, a matter which has been referred to in the media today as Russia seeing a bit of mileage out of embarrassing Britain. Having been very recently in the Antarctic, the Falklands and so on, I feel that I should put the matter in its proper context.
Russia has a very considerable presence in the South Atlantic and in the Antarctic. What she is doing is following, as always, her long-term objectives, strictly adhering to a typical strategy. There is no question of simply trying to embarrass Britain. What she is doing is hoping to undermine stability in the South Atlantic and in the Antarctic. She has considerable fishing fleets round South Georgia, very considerable Antarctic bases and considerable shipping. By going in to support and assist a military, fascist dictatorship she is doing nothing untypical, for Russia, and is hoping thereby to prevent us from restoring stability in the South Atlantic.
Noble Lords should know something about the Antarctic bases. Most countries, including Britain, have bases which are most appropriately sited from the environmental and scientific point of view on the Antarctic peninsula. The Russian scientific bases in the Antarctic are very carefully and strategically ringed and dispersed round the Antarctic Continent. Whereas most countries have their bases where they are most convenient or where they want them from a scientific point of view, the Russian bases are carefully sited in a strategic sense. If she were able to undermine the stability of the South Atlantic by preventing our restoring sound and proper government in the Falklands, and also the situation in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, she would certainly turn her attention to Argentina.
I think that the Argentine fascist generals should think twice before looking forward to such a situation because Russia will very quickly turn it into a communist dictatorship. At that point, Russia will have a foothold down at Cape Horn. It is no accident that one of her main bases in Antarctica, which I myself saw the other day, is on the South Shetland Islands, immediately opposite the bottom point of South America. She would thereby straddle what is called the Drake Passage, which is the way through from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Perhaps I may be allowed to be what may sound slightly fanciful. Most of the free world, including ourselves, are trying to topple the South African Government. Let me remind noble Lords that Russia has very carefully placed an Antarctic scientific base immediately opposite the Cape. She would

327
thereby straddle the only other passage round the world between the Atlantic and the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
I want to remind noble Lords today that there is no question of Russia meddling to embarrass us. This is part of a long-term strategy. I hope that Mr. Haig, the President and the United States will bear in mind that if we do not restore stability—quite apart from the arguments about sovereignty or the paramount rights of the Falklanders, which I support—America will be helping to bring about the one thing which she wants to avoid if she does not ensure that we get proper backing from them.
The last point I want to mention is that there has been rather a lot in the newspapers recently about so-called dissident voices in the Falkland Islands and suggestions that perhaps the Falklanders have changed their minds and would really rather be with Argentina, or would rather not have Britain back, or whatever it may be. Let me remind noble Lords that about 18 people have been involved, most of them expatriates and not Falkland islanders. How one Englishman, or Welshman, or whatever he is, managed to get such fantastic coverage when he has got nothing at all to do with the Falkland Islands except for having bought a one-third share in a farm is one of the mysteries of the media. And I say that as chairman of ITN. I can only assume that a lot of reporters and people are hunting around hoping to find a dissident voice and somebody to oppose what is happening, simply for the sake of news.
I would urge the Government and my noble friend Lord Belstead to keep this very much in mind and to ensure that the wrong people are not listened to. There are only two people in this country at the moment who are qualified to speak for the Falkland islanders. One is a member of the Legislative Council. The other is the Governor. There is nobody else here at this stage who is qualified to represent the Falkland islanders. Noble Lords should also remember that anybody coming here from the Falkland Islands can do so only with the sanction of Argentina or with the actual, deliberate encouragement of Argentina. At this moment, nobody can come here on their own without going through the Argentine and without the permission of the Argentine. Therefore, all views expressed must be suspect. When the time comes, we have to find out, through the elected representatives, what is the opinion of the islanders. Finally, may I apologise to the House and to my noble friend Lord Belstead because unfortunately I have to catch a train and cannot wait until the end of this debate to hear my noble friend's reply.
5.30 p.m.
The Earl of Perth: My Lords, that we are in the right is recognised by the United Nations and, in some ways even more importantly, by our friends in the EEC and the Commonwealth, who have not only agreed to a resolution but have taken action which is of great importance to us in our attempts towards an economic blockade. We also have the right as an outcome of this, and indeed we have the duty, if necessary, to face bloodshed to uphold the rule of law. But let us remember two facts. For the past 17 years we have
328
been negotiating with the Argentinians about the Falkland Islands. This must mean, by the very nature of things, that in some degree we recognise that they have an interest. The second point we also ought to remember is that the Falkland Islands are 8,000 miles away. The present negotiations must be about people and sovereignty, and not about the third principle which I believe was given to us by the noble Baroness the Leader of the House—namely, aggression. Aggression is something that is highly undesirable and we should not, as it were, teach somebody a lesson by the use of aggression. What we want to do is to ensure the wellbeing of the people and the question of sovereignty.
In that connection, I recall how after the first Great War there were a number of mandated territories in which the League of Nations held the main control but appointed some power or other to operate the mandate. The ultimate purpose of that was that in due course (which might be several years) there would be a plebiscite and in that plebiscite would be decided by the wishes of the people what should be the future of the territory. I am not advocating this as a solution but it is something worth bearing in mind in the negotiations which are now going on and in which we are having the very welcome help of our friends from America—in particular that of Secretary of State Haig.
In my judgment, subject to military and naval considerations which I cannot assess because I do not have the capability, we should have our naval force, our task force, continuing in a passive rather than attacking role. In other words, we should continue our blockade of the Falkland Islands rather than contemplate a landing. This may mean less speed and I well understand why the noble Lord, Lord Soames, and others advocated speed. We would all like to settle things quickly if we could, but it would be a great mistake if the Government concentrate too much on the immediate rather than long-term situation. This situation may take many weeks, indeed many months, before it is solved.
5.34 p.m.
Lord Walston: My Lords, I believe we are all agreed, or almost all agreed, that the course which the Government are pursuing at the moment is the correct one. I must confess that I have considerable sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, in some of the things he said, although I would have suggested to him had he been in his place that much of this would have been better said (and I hope it will be said) in the weeks and perhaps the months ahead, when in the light of the present situation we can take a very dispassionate and cool look at the whole of our defence posture.
Certainly I would support the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, when he said that much as we respect the views and desires of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands, our foreign policy must be based on the beliefs and the interests of this country as a whole, which are paramount, and not on the interests of one very small section of it. That is in no way pre-judging the issue and it is in no way detracting from my support of the Government's present policy.
My support is strengthened after listening to the short but extremely concise speech made by the noble Baroness the Leader of the House. She brought out

329
two points which were later elaborated upon by the most reverend Primate and upon which I should like to dwell for a very brief period. The first is the fact that we in this country now believe in the rule of law and not in the rule of force, and that we believe in the self-determination of peoples. The days when international disputes were settled by the use of gun-boats or expeditionary forces are, I hope, over for ever, and the fact that we took this dispute in the first instance to the United Nations shows that we believe that in deeds as well as in words. I am very happy that we did that, and I am very happy that the result was what it was. We must pursue this matter still further. We must do our best to persuade the United Nations that they should take further action in this matter and not just sit back and leave it to us and to the Argentines to play a very dangerous game of bluff.
What are the implications of an actual shooting war? It can be nothing but war, once the shooting starts. It is not only the appalling loss of life that will take place. It is not only the military strains which will be put upon us and upon the other side. We cannot expect that, if the matter does develop into a shooting war, it will simply be left between Argentina and ourselves. The whole of the continent of South America would be involved. The whole of the American continent would he involved. We know—and the noble Lord, Lord Buxton of Alsa, has reminded us—that the Soviet Union will be a very active onlooker and can only benefit. The implications of a shooting war are frightening and widespread. Just because they are frightening does not mean that we should be deterred from them. It may come to that, and we have shown that we are prepared if it should come to that. But clearly, we must make every effort to avoid that final resort to force. We must use every effort to continue pushing the United Nations into implementing their resolution.
The second point to which the noble Baroness referred, and which was also referred to by the most reverend Primate and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, was the will of the people of the Falkland Islands themselves. We have said on several occasions that we are prepared to listen and to pay due regard to their wishes. But I do not believe we have made that sufficiently clear to the world at large.
I fear that the rest of the world is looking upon this as a form of modern-day colonial struggle. Even the people of the United States cannot help looking upon it in that way. I should like to read to your Lordships a letter that I have received this morning from a friend of mine in the United States. He is an eminent jurist and he refers to this matter in his letter. He speaks of the lack of knowledge of the people in his own country concerning this matter. He writes that it must be realised:
"First, front and centre, that the issue is one of people, not of rock; secondly, that … these people have always been, still are, and long to remain British; thirdly, that this not only makes absurd the charge of 'colonialism'—which term, in its pejorative sense, always refers to the domination of one unwilling people by another—but actually makes it perfectly plain that the very real 'colonialism' involved is on the part of the Argentinians; fourthly, that it is a feature of all peaceable law that dubious claims resting on asserted ancient right are not to be implemented by violence, and that this is particularly true as to national boundaries …; fifthly, that the one and only contemporary thing that could give any colour to the Argentinian claim—and I think it is in fact what
330
does give it colour to the unreflective—is the mere physical closeness of the Falklands to Argentina, something which would legitimate, inter aria, the Russian action in Afghanistan—or perhaps later in Iran and Turkey… I do think it desperately important that the American people be brought to see, with highest possible clearness, the issues raised by this ugly aggression".
If that letter can be written by a highly intelligent man in a very sophisticated part of the United States, concerning his own fellow countrymen, then I suggest that there is a job that this country can do, that Her Majesty's Government can do, in making it abundantly clear that we are perfectly prepared for this issue to be settled, as we have over very many years, by the international court and that we are prepared to abide by its decision whether it be for us or against us. Secondly, if the decision should go in our favour, we will then be prepared to have a plebiscite, a referendum, among all the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to see what really are their wishes. Those are things which I understand Her Majesty's Government are prepared to do, but I do not think that it is sufficiently well known, even in this country. It is certainly not sufficiently known in the United States and one can be quite certain that if here and in the United States it is not known, then it is not known in the third world, which, for us, is of vital importance. Therefore, I would urge upon Her Majesty's Government to make it abundantly clear what our position is in this respect.
There is only one other point that I should like to make. We know the difficulties that occur when national pride is involved, and, indeed, when personal survival is involved. The personal survival of the present rulers of the Argentine may not be something which we are particularly keen to promote. But as realists we must accept the fact that they will fight for their own personal survival, and that if they are shown to their own people to have lost this great national effort, then they themselves will go. Therefore, they will resist it to the last and the last may be a very painful one.
What we must do, what statesmanship must do and, I hope, what Secretary Haig is now doing on his journeyings, is to give them a way out of the present situation into which they have got themselves without realising its full implications. With a certain degree of diffidence I would make one suggestion. I do not believe that it is realistic to accept the fact that the rulers of the Argentine at present will simply quietly withdraw their forces, haul down their flag and have the Union Jack hauled up in its place. I do not believe that that is "on". But, I think that there is an outside chance—1 put it no higher than that—that they would be prepared to haul down their flag and withdraw their forces provided that the flag that was run up was that of the United Nations.
It would, perhaps, be a little difficult for us to do, but there is no reason why we should not accept—since we first went to the United Nations—that, in return for withdrawing our forces back to Ascension Island, and in return for the Argentines withdrawing their forces back to their own mainland, we would hand over the administration of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies to the United Nations until such time as the international court had adjudicated on the matter.
It may be a small detail, but I think that that is a possible way of enabling the Argentines to withdraw

331
from the Falkland Islands without the loss of face which would make it impossible for them so to do.
5.47 p.m.
The Earl of Cork and Orrery: My Lords, I have to confess that I am probably in a minority in your Lordships' House, not because I am going to say things that people disagree with or dislike particularly, but simply because I have had a feeling for some time that this was not a very good time to have a debate of this sort. Now, when the Falkland Islands squadron is within a week of landfall; when Secretary of State Haig is hovering over the North and South Atlantic like a striped and starry dragonfly, and half the world is standing on tiptoe with either amazement or alarm, it seems to me that this is the moment to be quiet. Therefore, I can comfort your Lordships with the knowledge that I have practically nothing to say—nothing at all about the past and present and almost nothing about the future.
However, before I say the little that I do wish to say, I should like to make one small request. Must we go on talking about the "task force"? This may be trivial, but I am not sure that it is all that trivial. A "task force" was a term invented, I think, by our American allies in World War II for their particular convenience. I am perfectly prepared to accept that when a force of this kind is sent to sea it has actually been given a task to carry out. The English word is simply "force". If that is not thought to be good enough, then there are two very excellent words immediately available. "Fleet" may be a little grandiloquent for the circumstances, in which case there is "squadron". If neither of those will do, then I personally will settle for "the Falklands force".
Whatever the outcome may be, when it is all over it will be plain to us and to the world at large that what we set out to do in relation to the Falkland Islands has been met with either failure or success. Our failure or success will, I believe, dictate the standing which we then have in the future in relation to the rest of the world and possibly to the peace of the world. I do not claim to be able to define the word "success". I do not even postulate any particular type of success or type of outcome that is desirable. All that I do say—and I say it with some certainty—is that "success" implies peace—and here I refer with approval to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont—peace with honour, and an outcome which will meet with the satisfaction at least of all the parties concerned. Our finest hour, in the Churchillian definition, is now 40 years behind us, but I suspect that we are approaching another hour in which, in microcosm, we might be faced with the fate of reaffirming or betraying that earlier hour, for this reason: that, if we fail, we shall have no standing in the world and, if we succeed, a vast amount will depend upon it in the future.
But there is this to be said about the present situation, and, God knows, it is not original at all. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands came about largely out of desperation. There was a regime harassed and almost bankrupt, facing rioting in the streets and demands for its own downfall. Not for the first time in history—in centuries and centuries of history—did that Government, like many other governments and
332
rulers before it, turn to the ever present and popular remedy—the nation-uniting military adventure overseas.
This is the situation that we now have and this is the one with which we have to deal. There looms ahead of us a similar, analogous situation in which another nation finds itself approaching again a state of desperation within its own borders, and this time a nation far more powerful than the Argentine, far more influential, far more dangerous and far more capable of annexing small islands overseas. I refer, of course, to Soviet Russia.
That situation may never arise, but if it does, it may well be that we shall find ourselves in a key position in relation to it. Let us drop our curious national pastime of denigrating ourselves, especially in the hearing of foreigners, and recognise that, in fact, in the free world as a whole, and indeed, in the world as a whole, in association with the United States of America, we occupy a key position in the defence of freedom. If we fail in equity and wisdom to solve the Falkland Islands problem, who will pay any attention to us in this possible future Armagedon? On the other hand, if we succeed, then the issue of peace or turmoil throughout the whole world may ultimately depend upon us.
This is the situation in which we find ourselves and, in my opinion, it is potentially a situation of this enormous magnitude. You may say that this is talk; how do we translate this into practical action? Let us face the fact that we cannot translate it into practical action at all. Let us accept the chastening truth that almost none of us speaking here this afternoon has, can or will say anything that will have the slightest effect on what the outcome is likely to be or on what action the Government will take. That is perfectly proper and correct. The only action that is open to us—and I believe it to be a vital one—is that we should pray; if you do not like that word, use some other word that corresponds to that particular function—whatever you find suitable.
Governments, rulers and even expeditionary forces of fighting men in the past have been moved and even inspired by moods and atmospheres. I believe that we can apply ourselves to the task of creating, deliberately by an act of w ill, a national atmosphere and mood of calm resolution. What are the factors that are required in this situation? Some of them are courage, resolution and the will to fight if necessary. These are requisites. On the other hand, inflamatory speeches, gratuitous irritations and bellicosity of any kind are to eschewed. There is something else to be eschewed. There are people in high places, or places high enough to command the attention of the media, so that their words can be heard all over the country and, for that matter, all over the world, who are prepared to snipe at and to criticise the Minister of Defence, the Ministry, or both, and demand the resignation of the Minister. At a moment like this, that kind of attack is to be condemned, and I ask your Lordships to join with me in condemning it. Later on it will be different, but now what is required is silence.
When any force goes to war one of the greatest assets it has is that quality which we can understand but not readily define, morale. Perhaps I shall be

333
forgiven if I speak in platitudes. The morale of a force comes from the top, working down through the chain of command until it arrives at the ratings and rank and file at the lowest levels. If anything goes wrong at the top, it goes right down to the bottom. If men of any rank lose their confidence in the overall direction of the operation in which they are concerned, their morale is affected and that is greatly to their hurt. If we destroy or if we damage the confidence of the man at arms in the direction of the operation in which he is concerned, the overall command, the high command or the overall direction, in which term I include the political direction, then we do him a disservice. He will still preform the task that we have set upon him, and, if necessary, perform it at the cost of his life, but the quality that we require of him is courage and, if we damage his confidence, then we require a higher price to be paid by him in the coinage of courage. That we have no right to ask of him.
Therefore, let us wait in silence until this operation is over. Then, if ever, will be the time for sniping. Then, if anyone feels so disposed, will be the time to call in question the conduct of this or that Ministry or Secretary of State, Then, if ever, will be the time for post mortems and then, if ever, will be the time for saying that the tactics were ill-conceived or the strategy ill-carried out. The high morale with which men are sent into battle is of vital importance. Therefore, let us now be silent. That is my suggestion and my request. Let us be silent, pray for wisdom and fortitude, and support the brave.
5.59 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, when I ventured briefly to take part in the debate on this subject on Saturday morning, 3rd April, I did so because I thought that there was a danger that we might underrate the ramifications of what, at that time, still appeared to be a rather isolated and peculiar act by an individual military ruler. I suggested first that the ramifications of the problem were larger than at first they were made to appear—and the remarks which the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton, have made about the general position in Antarctica somewhat fortify that conclusion—but also that the situation would bring into play (and this again has come out vividly in today's debate) the interests and national outlooks of a great many countries, including our own, the United States, and the Soviet Union. That indeed has happened.
One must not forget that when one has these international ramifications they affect not merely the conduct of Governments but the attitudes of people, or of sections of people. It is interesting to note, now that the Soviet Union has more and more come out, after its first cautious neutrality, to the support of Argentina, that some of the voices which call for us to recall our fleet, or our task force, are voices which have frequently been heard justifying the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs.
Similarly with the United States, as the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, reminded us in a speech which, however much it may have worried us, was worth making because these are important points, the United States has been revealed to have interests which may, in the last analysis, be the same as ours because we also
334
have an interest in the stability of the whole of the American Continent, but interests which it naturally regards, and has naturally regarded, from a somewhat different point of view from that which comes most obviously to us.
It seems to me that, given the fact that we cannot—and I think it is right that we cannot—be told what are the particular lines of diplomatic activity on which the Government are at present launched, with or without the aid of the American Secretary of State because other interventions are at least conceivable, we are left with two tasks which, as part of a Parliament, we can perform. One is—it is unnecessary but perhaps it is always worth saying—to call the attention of the Government to the primary need of maintaining a national outlook which is as unified as possible (unity is impossible, but as unified as possible) on what are the precise points for which we are aiming, and the precise points in the course of diplomacy for which we are sticking out.
Whether it should be done, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, by calling into counsel elder statesmen, or the device of the confidential discussions with leaders of other parties under the seal of Privy Council secrecy, there are various ways in which this can be done by Ministers. As one goes round the country and listens to, or overhears, conversations on this subject, there is still a great deal of confusion, a great deal of uncertainty—which is not surprising, since the crisis came upon us quite unexpectedly from the point of view of the vast majority of people—I am convinced that there is a task to be done in internal information. The primary purpose of Government in this direction must be always that whatever we do commands the maximum attainable support.
A similar task naturally confronts the Government in their relations with friendly nations and with allies. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Walston, was perfectly entitled—and indeed it was desirable that he should do so—to call our attention to the obvious difficulties confronting us in having perhaps to convince the American people, or sections of the American people, of the basic elements in our case: the basic fact of an unprovoked aggression; the basic fact that whatever may be thought about sovereignty the Argentine has never been willing to submit this to an international tribunal, to the Hague Court.
There are many facts which could be put across. It is difficult for them to be put across by professional diplomats who must spend a great deal of time receiving people or sending people off on these intercontinental excursions. I would have thought that there was a case—and I have argued this before in other connections and I repeat, if I may, my argument—at any rate at a time like this, for Britain to be represented in Washington by someone of Cabinet standing. If the Prime Minister were to send to Washington now, to supplement the great efforts which the American Secretary of State is making, someone who had her confidence and was a public figure in the United States, it would contribute something to what I believe may come to be the crucial factor in the whole situation.
Many noble Lords have said—it has been said in speeches in the other place and the Government have said it—that we are trying to do something which

335
is extremely difficult; that is to say, to obtain an acceptable and peaceful solution not from a Government which shares our own ideals, but from a Government which, in word and action, repudiates them. We are often told—I am not sure that somebody did not say this in the course of today's debate—that the days of gunboat diplomacy are past; that nothing is done by force. But in fact things are done by force. The Argentine now holds the Falkland Islands and South Georgia through the exercise of military force, and in no other way whatsoever. If its armada had not sailed the governor would still be in Government House with the Union Jack flying over him.
One could argue then whether that was a desirable permanent feature of the scene, but that it has been done by military force seems to me to be self-evident. We are trying to do something more difficult, which is to use the threat of military force, together, as the noble Baroness the Leader of the House said, with the economic pressure of ourselves and our friends, to bring about an important change in the situation: perhaps not the return to the status quo, which we may agree, is over-ambitious, but at any rate an important change through the threatening of the use, and the successful use, of force, because it would appear that that is the only argument which in this situation, confronted with this type of Government, we can use.
I find it difficult to agree with the suggestions that have been made that there has been a movement of the Argentine Government, that they now seem willing to accept certain compromises which at first they repudiated, and at the same time the same people disconnect this from the fact that the fleet is moving. If we had not reacted in this way, if the Government had not created the task force, does anyone believe that Argentina would have negotiated about anything at all? They would have consolidated their possession of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, in Thule, and no doubt ultimately over the whole of the area of Antarctica which they claim. We are using force, and to try to avoid this and to say: "Well, it is just a form of diplomacy," is, I think, unfair both to those who, as the noble Earl has just reminded us, are taking the risks of this action, and indeed unfair in the sense that we may be deceiving our own public as to what it is we have embarked upon.
I would add only one point, because often there is, or may seem to be, a relatively small issue which has a great effect upon public opinion. I think many people are saying, "We should not use military force as a last resort to retake the islands because an inevitable result would be the death of a large number of the people whom it is our declared object to liberate". I do not wish to enter into the varied possibilities of military operations and the pressures associated with them, but if things were to reach the point where it looked as though the Falklands themselves might be the scene of hostilities, I think our consciences would be better served, and the support of our people better assured, if we were to ask a neutral country for the time being to evacuate the islanders and not leave them as hostages between rival forces I hope it will not come to that but, as I say, it is often on such specific points rather than on the major issue that one suddenly comes up against resistance in public opinion, and the present
336
operation, with all its delicacy, is one which, above all, can succeed only if public opinion is with the Government.
6.11 p.m.
Lord Davies of Leek: My Lords, nearly every angle and shade of opinion about the Falklands problem has by now been uttered. Nevertheless, the dimensions of the problem with which we must deal outside the Falklands area have not, in my view, been thought through in depth. Whether or not one agrees with the way in which my noble friend Lord Wigg criticised the 1957 White Paper, the serious allegations he made about the quality and extent of military equipment should be looked into or denied right away. My noble friend takes the trouble to examine these problems. While one may disagree with some of the remarks he makes, they are serious and should be looked into. On 5th April, The Times wrote:
"Few countries in the world have been dominated for so long by a single company. One company owns 45 per cent. of the farm land in the Falklands and employs more than half the 1,800 people. There are 6,500 sheep and this company owns 3,000 of them".
Point number one, therefore, is whether we should throw into the area, for that kind of economic activity, two-thirds of our force, thus making us the weakest link in the NATO chain of defence. That is the price in Western Europe we are paying for this exercise. That cannot be denied, and unfortunately it has not been publicly written up or sufficiently thought about in depth.
The seriousness of the crisis grows. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the Government and all of us to thank Mr. Alexander Haig for his diligent and steadfast efforts to find a peace formula. I believe his efforts to have been sincere, whatever background one may consider in relation to the interest of the United States in the area. As I say, I believe Secretary of State Haig has been absolutely sincere in his efforts to find a formula for peace with honour—I use the word especially mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont—in that part of the world.
It seems that at present there are no signs of a formula for a truce by Downing Street, so we seem to be rather adrift on that aspect. Certainly Britain has a duty to protect the Falkland Islanders. We failed in that duty the moment Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Britain failed in that duty for many reasons and while none of us can know all of them, I would say—I shall be criticised for saying this, but it is the truth—we have been overwhelmed for years by the bugbear and fear of a Soviet attack on the West. As a result, we have spent our treasure, including our technology and thought, on a mighty missile mania and nuclear overkill.
I promise not to delay your Lordships for long, 10 minutes at the most and perhaps only eight. I had intended to use the United Kingdom Trident programme as an example of an unnecessary squandering of British treasure to maintain what we consider to be overkill. I still believe that we could found a tripwire force of a fleet and troops enough to keep the ambitious dictator Galtieri from overwhelming the 1,800 islanders. We failed to do that and some day—not now, because maybe the Government will need the unity of all of us behind them—we shall have to find out why this coup, which has been on for a generation, succeeded.

337
The first elementary lesson in logistics is to have the right amount of firepower in the right place at the right time. This country could have afforded, had our information been accurate and our thinking in depth, to have had exactly that at the Falklands and so prevented this dictator succeeding with his coup. I take the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Cork, and I shall not make deep criticism of men who now have responsibility behind closed doors to find a formula for success and peace. The Government knew the potential wealth of the area; my noble friend Lord Shackleton and others have made careful studies and we have heard from both sides of your Lordships' House an analysis of that aspect. Meanwhile, the Defence Committee of another place were busy arguing and making explosive statements about the furtherance of the Trident programme to give us security. We do not have that security now.
There is no point reiterating what has already been said, but I ask noble Lords to consider some of the implications from the point of view East-West strategy if the war were to escalate—never mind how, just if it were. A British fleet of some 36 ships is now moving in that direction with all the possible weapons it may need. My first question must be—these are the sort of questions we must ask ourselves—whether our order of battle for NATO is weakened by folly or neglect or by this move into the South Atlantic. Are we now the weakest link in the chain of NATO defence? Reagan is hoping to see Brezhnev if he is well enough to see the American President. I believe a change is taking place in the United States for a rough modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. In my view, Her Majesty's Government represent a weak link in the strategic and diplomatic chain for the defence of Western Europe. However, if we have to fight, we must, as ever, close ranks behind the Government, whatever party may be in power.
I wish to comment on China, another part of the world in which I have been interested for a generation. That country is very concerned about what is taking place. She could not support us because of the shadow of Hong Kong. It is no good denying that because it is a similar situation. China did not come in; they hoped the third world would find a solution through peaceful negotiations. So did India, and that is why that country did not fully come in. It was Spender who wrote in The Exiles, "History has tongues", and if ever the strategists' tongues were wagging, it must be in relation to our present move into the South Atlantic.
I have been eight minutes, and I shall take only one more minute. The questions now are, first, has this situation made Britain an unreliable ally for Western European defence? Secondly, could Britannia meet her commitments to the West when asked to deliver them? How could she with the fleet now where it is? Taiwan is a problem; it is America's "Falkland Islands". Many people may not realise this, but differences are now taking place in China involving the United States of America over the supply of first-class military equipment to Taiwan, which, to use a figure of speech, is now the "Falkland Islands" for America. Is there today a place in international politics for the real use of violence as an instrument of policy in the nuclear age? That is a philosophical question, and it might be a theological one, too. How does one win
338
in this kind of age?
Let me mention the question of invasions. I remember the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961, when Castro, despite all the intelligence given to us, over-whelmed the invasion. Everything went wrong. I remember Suez. At the moment President Reagan is begging Argentina to send troops into Nicaragua because he wants to undermine what he considers the communist and revolutionary elements there.
What would be the effect in the Falklands on the pact that Churchill denounced? He was upset when he was not asked to join the Anzus Pact. I think that at that time my noble friend Lord Shinwell was Minister of Defence. We were not asked to join the Australia, New Zealand, United States of America Pact; and those countries' attitude to the South Atlantic problem will be different from ours.
This is not a problem to go into smiling. It is not a problem that is easy to solve, but I sincerely believe that these matters should be considered, come what may. If not, the nation will have to stand together to win a place for democracy and commonsense in this part of the world.
6.22 p.m.
Lord Caccia: My Lords, if what the Government had in mind and hoped to get out of the debate was an expression of support from party leaders for the course on which the Government are set, then I hope that they will be content with what has been said in the House today. Even more, I would hope that the Government of the Argentine would also take note of that conclusion, if it is the one which the Government have reached. Otherwise I submit that in a democratic assembly like this many views on possible solutions, on attitudes to be taken, have very rightly been expressed and provided that they do not mislead the Argentine Government, that in a sense, as has been said, is what we are here for.
For myself I certainly do not wish to add to the possibilities which have been suggested to the Government. I hope that they will feel themselves fortified that every corner has been looked at, and if they have not noticed everything everywhere, well there it is now displayed to their view. But that is not now a matter for us but rather for them. Here may I say how glad I was to hear one noble Lord re-echo the words of Sir Harold Nicolson who described the objectives of successful diplomacy as public engagements privately arrived at. This is a moment for privacy. I hope that they will be allowed to have it and come forward only when they think the right moment has been reached.
Much has been said in criticism of successive Governments, and from all sides of the House and irrespective of party allegiance. Maybe it is right occasionally to take such a look, but at the same time in a wider aspect I would submit that what successive Governments have been able to do for this country in devolving from empire into a Commonwealth has been of outstanding success. It has been a remarkable story, and at the end of it what do we find? Despite a recession, despite the high figures of unemployment, the general standard of living in this country is now higher than it ever was in the period of Empire. That is something in which we can all take pride.
There are of course hard cases left and part of the

339
difficulty in this is that what we do in one of the hard cases is apt to reflect on what might happen in the others. Certainly, as an ex-Foreign Secretary sitting in front of me has said, British interests must be of paramount concern, and I think that successive Foreign Secretaries have always felt that is what the general policy of the British Government should be. It should be to pursue British interests. That is what they are there for.
Having said that it comes to a question of interpretation, and I would submit that in this respect the present Government have had great success in getting the United Nations to pass the resolution that it did pass, in gaining the support of the Commonwealth which they have achieved, and in securing the promised support of the EEC. That is no mean achievement at this point.
In this the attitude of the United States becomes crucial. As the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, said they must consult their own interests. The Secretary of State and the President of the United States are there to protect the interests of the United States. That is fair enough. But when they are considering their interests I hope they will concentrate on the fact that they have supported the United Nations resolution which among other things called on the Argentine to withdraw from the Falkland Islands. That must become a prime objective of the United States.
Secondly, I would hope that they would also have in mind, as they must the kind of consideration advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton of Alsa, that this is not merely a question of the islands themselves it is not just a question of 1,800 inhabitants. Wider issues, wider interests are involved and above all there is the question of whether or not a resolution of the United Nations once again shall be flouted. Who is going to try to prevent it being flouted? I believe that the role for this inescapably falls principally on the British Government. It is their territory and they have been set on a course to recover that right. It might be that the United States can act although committed to our side over the resolution; it might be that they can help find some way out by negotiations. That again is the policy of the Government and is what I understood to be the general view of party leaders on all sides should be our prime objective. To help that objective there is now a force ready to use if necessary behind it, but only in the last resort and if necessary.
Having said that, I hope once again that the Government will take comfort generally from the support that they have had in this House and will not in any way be discouraged by the number of ideas which have been put forward to help them to find a negotiated solution without in any way going back on the terms of the resolution and the course upon which they have been set.
6.30 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, we are concerned with the present and the future: an inquest on the past has still to come. However, I want to refer to one fact which is very relevant to the question and of the significance of which we are only now becoming aware.
340
In the last few years this country has armed the navy and the army of our opponents. If British soldiers are killed in any military activity it will almost certainly be done by arms built in our yards and in our workshops. In the last few years Britain has supplied Argentina with destroyers, naval helicopters, missiles, armoured cars, an aircraft carrier, minesweepers and Canberra bombers.
It is very fortunate for Britain at this moment that a contract was not signed three months earlier than its endorsement. That contract was for Lynx helicopters specially adapted for anti-submarine activity. They have already been built. One has recently been tested in Somerset. It is already painted with the Argentine flag. If that contract had been three months earlier and activity in the 200-mile zone was being conducted, helicopters provided from this country would now be destroying our own submarines. I want to urge very strongly that this is evidence that the hideous arms traffic in the world should be ended. Over these years we have been supplying arms to a fascist dictatorship, even during a period of diplomatic conflict between this country and Argentina. I hope that the lesson of this may be learned, and that there may be a revision of our whole arms policy.
My Lords, we have to be very clear about the reasons for our involvement in the Falklands. Even from the Government Benches two different reasons are stated. The first is that the residents in the Falklands seek to be British citizens, as they have done for many years. I believe that reason to be absolutely justified. Self-determination is the very heart of democracy. Those people have shown amazing loyalty to Great Britain. They have paid more in taxes to us than we have given in aid to them. Nevertheless, they have sought to be British citizens.
But there is a second reason which is given even from the Government Benches for our involvement in the Falklands. It is that they are our territory, that we have sovereign rights over them. Yes, my Lords—sovereign rights if the peoples desire it. But there has been a great deal of imperialist nostalgia in the attitude to the Falklands by many who have spoken on this subject. We gave up political imperialism in the 'fifties, and it ought not to be a reason for our intervention in the Falklands that we seek to keep them merely as continual colonies of this country. I want to suggest that it is of urgent importance that we should discover what is the view of the islanders now. There have been conflicting reports. I should like to suggest that we would propose that United Nations observers should be allowed to go to the Falklands and test the opinion of the British residents there.
Our terms of reference for activity in the Falklands were laid down in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 502. That resolution has been applauded because it demanded, quite rightly, the withdrawal of the Argentine troops. But that is not all that the resolution said. Its first and determining demand was for the immediate cessation of hostilities in this area; and the final demand was that the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom should seek a diplomatic solution of their differences. Neither has been done. Argentina has poured more troops into the Falklands and has sent more weapons into

341
the Falklands. Great Britain has started its fleet and has operated a 200-mile zone where Argentine ships would be sunk. Instead of a cessation of hostilities there has been aggravation.
Secondly, so far as diplomacy is concerned, we welcome the fact that the Leader of the House in her speech placed this first; but while she placed it first, it surely must be admitted that it has been secondary to military activities. She spoke of the discussions with Secretary Haig of America. The initiative there was by America, and not by us.
I want to make constructive proposals which may assist the bringing about of a peaceful solution to this problem. First, I hope we will accept, and I hope Argentina will accept, the suggestion made by Peru for a three-day truce while negotiations are continued. I would go very much further. I would urge that a truce should be declared during the continued negotiations. Secretary Haig's efforts have not yet ended. The United Nations Secretary-General has just returned to New York with a view to initiating negotiations. I hope that he will take steps to call a renewed meeting of the Security Council, and that the Security Council will seek ways of carrying out the two demands which it made in Resolution 502 which I have mentioned.
My Lords, I want to make a very serious suggestion for action by the United Nations. I am indebted to Brigadier Harbottle and General Rickhey in their book for this proposal. In 1947, the United Nations appointed a Good Offices Commission to bring peace between the Netherlands and the people of Indonesia. That commission was composed of representatives of some member states. It succeeded in its purpose. Why should it not be repeated now? Why should not the United Nations now appoint a good offices commission to try to bring about a solution of this problem? I go very much further than that. I should like to see the United Nations mobilising a peace-keeping force to go to the Falklands and replace the Argentine Army which is there.
If it is suggested that Argentina would reject such a proposal, may I point out that I understand that it has rejected a proposal by Secretary Haig that there should be a tripartite administration, an administration by the United States, by Britain and by Argentina together. While it has rejected that, Argentina would find it very difficult indeed to reject a suggestion that the United Nations should take over supervision of the islands. That proposal would have worldwide support, and Argentina would lose even what support it has if it objected to it.
Lastly, my Lords, I want to make a suggestion to which I have been inspired by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. I do not commit him to the conclusions which I draw from his contribution. There is a precedent for non-military action in the very area of the Falklands. We often speak of the Falklands as though they were one island occupied by British subjects. In fact, they are a vast archipelago of two large islands and over 200 smaller islands. South Georgia is 700 miles away from the Falkland Islands where the British residents are, and there is an entire difference between them. The Falkland Islands with its British residents and temperate climate; and South Georgia, with ice and snow. South Georgia and the other islands are more identified with the South Antarctic
342
than they are with the Falkland Islands. They represent its approach.
It is hardly known that in the South Antarctic all the nations which have claimed territory there—Britain, America, Russia, France and other nations—have now signed the Atlantic Treaty of 1959 and have agreed to engage in peaceful scientific work only. Since then, they have fully co-operated, informing each other of their scientific discoveries. That is an example of how there can be co-operation for peace instead of antagonism leading to war. There, the cold war has been abolished and national antagonisms have been abolished. It is an example to the world, and I beg Her Majesty's Government, as they are approaching this situation in the Falklands, to take the precedent of nearby South Antarctica as a principle which they should seek to adopt in bringing about a settlement in the Falklands.
6.47 p.m.
Viscount Watkinson: My Lords, the views of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, are well known to your Lordships' House. I know that he holds them with great sincerity, and he and I could debate matters for a long time without merging our respective views. But I should, if I may, as a past Minister of Defence, like to say something about the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. I see that he is not in his place. I do not think that he was expressing the sense of this House in his personal attack on the 1957 White Paper and on my noble friend Lord Duncan-Sandys, who produced it. That is perhaps not very important. What is important is the implication that might be drawn from his remarks that our forces now on their way to the Falklands were not as well equipped as they might be—and all the rest. That is just not so. I want to say as plainly as I can that I believe that those forces are well adapted to the task they are going to undertake. I believe that they will give an exceedingly good account of themselves if they have to do so, and I hope that this House sends to the men and women in the task force their very best wishes and their total support for what they may have to do if so ordered.
The noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said—and how right he was—that he hoped that some of the more divergent views in our House would not encourage the Argentine junta to feel that we were not entirely united. I do not believe that that is so; and I think that perhaps it might be not a bad thing at this late hour to come back to what I believe are the two major issues that Her Majesty's Government cannot concede. In this, I would express my personal support for that Government and particularly for the Prime Minister. From my past ministerial times I know well the sort of pressures that lie upon her.
My Lords, whether we like it or not, the world's eyes are upon us. They are on Britain—and not only those of the countries that have publicly supported us: many more who would like to support us if they dared to do so are watching anxiously to see whether we have the courage to show them by our own actions that aggression does not pay. That, I think, is what it is all about. If we can show in this case that aggression has not in the end served any purpose for the military regime which put it into effect, then we shall have done much to influence the course of many events that still

343
lie ahead. This is a responsibility that I think our country cannot shed, even if it wished to do so; and, as I sense the present view of the country and, I believe, of Parliament, we intend to carry it out as best we can.
But, my Lords, let us be clear. All that we are seeking to do, by whatever means we must in the end use to do it, is to make it plain that unprovoked military aggression on this small, remote group of islands cannot be seen to pay, cannot be seen to bring any advantage to the Government which initiated it or the country which presumably supports that Government. In this we are entirely inside the purport of the United Nations resolution.
The second point which we cannot avoid, a responsibility that we cannot avoid—and most noble Lords have agreed to this whatever their views may be, including the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—is the right of ultimate self-determination of the people of the Falkland Islands. It is really quite irrelevant in many ways that they are British citizens. They have a right of self-determination. This has been temporarily taken away from them. It is our job somehow to see that they get it back, and they will then be able to choose freely what they want to do in circumstances that will, of course, have changed. This is a right that they have and a right that we must see they can exercise again as soon as possible.
It is inevitable that someone at my advanced years must look back to his time in government and wonder what lessons then could be applied now. It seems to me that when you have a difficult task ahead, you had better try to stick to some basic principles and try, as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, said, to make this well known to the country if you are going to get support. It is these two basic principles that we cannot avoid and we have to see through: the principle that aggression does not pay; the principle that people have a right to sell-determination that cannot be taken away from them by military occupation. How do we do it? That for the moment is up to the Government. All we can do is to hope that the Government, fortified by reasonable support—not unquestioning support—from Parliament and the country will do the very best that they can. The debates that have so far been held on this issue have greatly benefited from avoiding either witch-hunting or violent arguments about who was right at any one time. That is really what destroyed us at Suez. It is a lesson that we should learn now.
Having said that, anyone who spoke here who has ever had any interest in these events must know that there are not any easy options. Let us very much hope that Mr. Secretary Haig may yet have some success. Again, I think that this country owes him a considerable debt for the degree of application that he has put into a very difficult task. But he may not have success, and probably there are hard knocks ahead and a long period of strain for our country. Our people should prepare themselves for this.
The Government should perhaps be doing more to make it plain to our people that they may have a long period of strain ahead and that Mr. Haig's efforts will not in the end or not at this moment succeed. Perhaps I should add there that I feel very strongly, with other noble Lords who have spoken, that if Mr. Secretary Haig does not succeed at this time, this does not mean
344
that the USA in some mysterious way has opted out of the situation. The USA, in my view, is totally involved and must do more to defend the implementation of the UN resolution for which it voted. To be a neutral broker is not enough at this time. So far no one can have any complaint about the efforts that that great country has made. All I am saying is that I hope that they will not end; they must be intensified if Mr. Secretary Haig goes again to Buenos Aires—if he does—and finds that he cannot make any more progress.
In my view, there really is not much more to say. The Government are there to do a job. They need the reasonable support of Parliament, which so far they have had. But in all this not only Government but the media, Parliament and the people are the face of Britain which the world is watching with great anxiety, to see whether we have the guts to try to prove that aggression does not pay and that self-determination should be allowed to work.
So far, if I may say so, I think all of us have well expressed the will to try and do this. But I must say again that we are only perhaps at the beginning of a hard, long and difficult period which will test the strength and will of the Government. It will be difficult for us here in Parliament watching events, trying to be helpful in a way yet also feeling a right to be critical. It will be even more difficult for the media. As one noble Lord said, one must hope that they will not get it wrong, get bored with it all and turn it into some kind of triviality which must be rapidly appeased.
It is a great issue. It is an issue on which many future developments in relations between nations now depend. Does the doctrine of deterrence against aggression work, or does it not? Do free peoples have a chance to stay free and determine their future if they wish to, or not? Those are the issues on which I personally wish the Government all success and offer what little support I can to that end. I hope that we in this House will do what we can to try to see that those principles are achieved, however long and however difficult it may turn out to be.
Lord Noel-Baker: My Lords, before the noble Viscount sits down, may I ask him a question? He says that it is vital that the Argentinian aggression should not succeed; in other words, that the Argentinian forces must be withdrawn in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. But would he agree that the Security Council has not fulfilled its duty simply by passing a resolution? That it should be using co-operative action of members of the United Nations to bring pressure to bear upon the Argentinian junta—
Lord Sandys: My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, would restrict his remarks to a question and not make a speech, it would assist the House.
Lord Noel-Baker: My Lords, may I put the question that I want to put? Would the noble Viscount agree that our Foreign Secretary should join Mr. Haig in going to the Security Council and seeking the withdrawal of ambassadors from Buenos Aires, economic sanctions and other measures which may be needed?
Viscount Watkinson: My Lords, I am probably out of order, but I thought that we were to have the pleasure of

345
a speech from the noble Lord earlier on in the debate. But I noticed that we did not. I personally missed it because, although I rarely agree with much that he says, I applaud his sincerity and his long and noble career in public life. He has asked me a question. He should address it more properly to the Government. On the whole, he is right if I sense that what he is saying is that we should now make every diplomatic effort possible to secure the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands before they come to the stiff arbitrament of war itself.
6.59 p.m.
Lord Morris: My Lords, I should be very surprised indeed if any of your Lordships could be anything other than admiring of the reaction of Her Majesty's Government to the assault by Argentinian forces upon British sovereign territory. It was both a forceful and most proper statement of indignation and a memorable statement of determination to restore the status quoante. I beseech Her Majesty's Government in no way to lessen their resolve. Like the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, I, too, have the most terrible feeling of "déjàvu" or, perhaps more properly, of "déjàlu", if there is such an expression, because noble Lords who read the last book (published after his death) of that remarkable strategist and historian, Captain Liddell-Hart, will recall the title, which was, Why do we never learn from history? The answer was interesting: very simply, that we can never learn from history because human nature never changes.
I believe that one of the major political lessons of the period between 1933 and 1939 was that negotiations with fascists can only result in allowing unto them the spoils of war without having to go throagh the necessity of going to war. Noble Lords will recall that it was the international community, aided and abetted by the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom, that successfully negotiated away the Sudetenland, the Ruhr, Austria and Czechoslovakia with hardly a shot being fired. That is why I was totally astonished by the observation of my noble friend Lord Montgomery of Alamein, when he suggested that the Argentines invaded the Falkland Islands because they were irritated by the lack of progress in the negotiations between the Governments of Britain and Argentina. I am sure he will recall that that is precisely what Hitler said: "The reason I invaded Czechoslovakia was that the Czechoslovakians provoked me into so doing."
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein: My Lords, may I just say to the noble Lord that when Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia it has never been suggested that that country had always been part of Germany, whereas the Argentines, who took this aggressive action, have always, rightly or wrongly, suggested that the Falkland Islands were their property.
Lord Morris: My Lords, but the Germans have always suggested that German-speaking Czechoslovakia was part of the Greater Germany—all the normal bellicose arguments of fascist dictators. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, as usual in his most eloquent way, made a crucial point, as did the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, and above all the noble Lord Lord
346
Buxton of Alsa, who, in a memorable speech, said that we were not talking alone of 1,800 people. That bears repeating, I think, although in a sense it hardly matters. We are not talking of two windy rocks some 8,000 miles away from these shores: we are talking about the global strategy of our NATO allies, and I would beg your Lordships to consider that 80 per cent. of our strategic material comes by way of the Cape of Good Hope and that the Indian Ocean today is a Russian lake. We should consider how many friendly ports—that is, friendly to the United Kingdom—there are on the whole of the West Coast of Africa. We should also consider what would happen if, at the same time as serious trouble brewed in South Africa, trouble also exploded in Panama. What then, Cape Horn'? What then, the Straits of Magellan? What then, the Drake Passage? I know that American strategists have no doubt whatsoever of the importance of the South Atlantic as a trade route and a strategic route. At this stage I must support the astonishing "courage" of the noble Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, in his action in not speaking today. How he had the courage to keep silent, I shall never know; but there we are.
I would suggest we should also remember that, only 20 years ago, if someone had suggested, at least to me, that there would be drilling for oil in the middle of the North Sea, I would have put it down, partly out of my ignorance and partly out of the astonishing technical achievement that it undoubtedly is. I would have dismissed people who made such suggestions as cranks. But who knows in 1992 what the important economic, let alone the strategic territories will be fought over by the nations when the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 falls in and has to be renegotiated? Who then will control the Magellan Straits, Cape Horn and the Drake Passage? Will it be Russia, under the skirts of Argentina or Chile, or will it be NATO?
It is for those reasons that I fear what I see as a classic example of what I always think of as "Foreign-Office-speak", because after the determined expression of Her Majesty's Government there now appears this phrase—and I beg of your Lordships to look to this language—which speaks only of "the restoration of British administration". I ask my noble friend if he can possibly say precisely what that term means. When the Argentines categorically and firmly state that sovereignty is not negotiable, I believe it is a very serious weakness of Her Majesty's Government to suggest by words or action that it is negotiable. I must support my noble friend Lord Beloff in raising the question: Are we making the case strongly and consistently enough with our major ally in NATO; namely, the United States of America? I wholly support his suggestion that a plenipotentiary extraordinary be sent to Washington to hammer home our case from all its angles. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, at least, will recall that in 1915 Sir Rufus Isaacs, the first Marquess of Reading, was sent to the United States to negotiate on our behalf the total replanning of the economy of the United States of America so that they could get wheat to the eastern seaboard in order to feed the Allies. It was a highly successful diplomatic endeavour. I would go further than my noble friend and ask Her Majesty's Government seriously to consider sending someone of great experience in these matters—and who better than the

347
noble Lord, Lord Shackleton?
I believe it is apt that the motto of the Falkland Islands should be "desire the right", for when Governments ignore—this is yet another lesson of the period from 1933 to 1939—the evidence of oppression of a minority or the oppression of small nations, and when they bend principle in the direction of expediency, they always lose out heavily in the long run. It is for this reason that I rejoiced to read the suggestion by Mr. Henry Fairlie that the right honourable Lady the Prime Minister might better be called Elizabeth than Margaret, for she indeed
"has the heart and stomach of a king".
7.9 p.m.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, I too would like to congratulate the Government on the actions they have taken, and particularly on the speed with which they assembled the force which is now on its way to the Falkland Islands. Whether it is ever used or not is another matter, but surely that speed must be convincing to the world in believing that we really mean what we say. Let us hope we keep that up.
I must mention one or two things that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, said, and I also want to support what my noble friend Lord Watkinson said. The noble Lord, Lord Wigg, displayed a shattering ignorance of things naval—but one would not doubt that, coming from somebody who said that he was mainly interested in Q and A affairs in the army. But, in particular to suggest by innuendo that the propulsion machinery of the "Hermes", and the fighting capability of the Sea Harrier and its ability to land on ships, were somehow suspect, was surely an aid to nobody at all, except possibly our prospective opponents. It was much more disgraceful and—I seek a word which is not too insulting—nastier than anything of which he accused other noble Lords. I think that it was pretty disgraceful.
To take another point which he made, which was later picked up by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, about the question of ships being assigned to NATO, I should like to remind your Lordships that this has frequently happened in the past. When I was last engaged in action in the Far East, my ship was earmarked for NATO and there were many with us who were assigned to NATO. It is a very common practice for ships of the fleet to be moved around the world and, in the event of something nasty occurring in the NATO area, they are switched back again.
The great thing about maritime operations is that you can, more or less, put ships where you want when you want, if you are wise enough to guess where they should be, and in the past we have generally tended to get that right. So that is the great point about maritime warfare which must not be forgotten. It is also relevant to those who say that we should turn the fleet hack at Ascension Island. You do not have to do that kind of thing. Sail them on to what is an appropriate distance from where they might be used, and do not take them any closer than is sensible. It is perfectly straight forward.
To reiterate what I see as being the purpose of our operation, which is exactly the same as that outlined
348
by my noble friend Lord Watkinson, who put it very well, the first point is surely to prove that aggression must be resisted, particularly aggression by dictators in totalitarian régimes. Secondly, the wishes of the islanders must be paramount, as my noble friend the Leader of the House said in her excellent opening speech. In that connection, taking the point made by my noble friend Lord Buxton, any information coming out of the Falklands now, which purports to come from the islanders and to give an idea of their wishes, must be suspect until all the Argentines have left the islands. It is nonsense to suggest anything else.
Though a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, says must be respected, and in his speech on the Saturday before last, which I followed, he made a lot of points with which most of us in this House would agree, the thought of a UN inquiry while the Argentines are still in the Falklands is absolute nonsense. You would not get the truth. The truth could come only after you got the Argentines out. I personally think—and this point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton—that the Argentines, almost above all peoples, should be got out of the Falklands, because they currently have just about the worst record of disappearances, tortures and murders of any dictatorships today.
There are others, and perhaps some that we do not know enough about, such as Russia. But one has read in recent times what seems to be totally authenticated information about the appalling actions which the Argentine Government have committed, and it would be totally irresponsible of any British Government, in any circumstances, to commit their citizens to the rule of such a nation until they have put their own house in order. Let us hope that they will, but until then we must make every move that we possibly can.
That leads me to say that we must be totally firm in our dealings with these people. As we know to our cost, dictatorships respond only to firmness, and firmness it must be. In the event that they force us to do it, we shall have to defend our 200-mile zone in the way we have said. If that means fighting, then fighting it will have to be, and we must be totally firm about that, too. In that event, I have a feeling that people who are used to land warfare see the fact of one ship being sunk as meaning total war; but it need not be in the circumstances of today. I have been involved in many operations where it has not been like that, such as when I sank an Indonesian ship during the Indonesian confrontation operations, at the same time as our ambassador was sitting in Jakarta. That kind of war is not strange, if it is conducted at sea. It is when people get eyeball to eyeball that matters get a little difficult.
Against that background, may I lead quickly to the points that I really want to make. Particularly in the media, the press, the television and so on—and, I regret to say, in many of the speeches in your Lordships' House—there has been far too much speculation about what might happen to us; such as whether we should do this, whether we should do that, and whether, if we do such-and-such, this will happen to us. It seems to me that that is not the best thing upon which to concentrate. We have given the Government a fair degree

349
of latitude to get on and do the job, because I think we, as a House, believe that they are going in the right direction. But, surely, it would be much more to the point if, particularly in the press, we gave attention to the risks which the enemy will run, because their position is quite desperate.
If they force us to fight—and it will be of their own volition—they will undoubtedly lose ships, possibly most of their ships, and they do not have very many, anyhow. If they lose their ships, what about the sabre-rattling in the Beagle Channel? What about the possibility of Chile being a little nasty on her own account? Would it be wise to lose their ships? What are they going to do to support the islands that they have wrongly taken from the British, such as South Thule? How are they going to support other places? They have a lot to lose and they must do a bit of thinking.
How about their troops? We do not know how many there are, but, obviously, there are more than 3,000 or 4,000, and perhaps there are very many more. They probably include shock troops and they are locked up in the Falklands. There is every prospect that, if they do not take them out by agreement, they will just be sitting there. These are, surely, the very troops—if they are the best ones, and they ought to be—whom they will need to defend the junta against their own fellow countrymen. I should think it most unwise for them to press this any further. They might also lose aeroplanes, of which they do not have very many; and they cannot afford to lose too many, because they do not have many friends around them in South America.
They have locked up some sizeable military units, which they may well require to protect and prop up their own regime. I should have thought that the very dicey military situation, added to the economic and trading restrictions with which our gallant friends in the EEC and in the Commonwealth have helped us, should make the Argentines think very carefully about whether they have bitten off a good deal more than they can chew. I am fairly certain they must have thought that it would take us a month or two to get the troops together. They probably thought that it would take as long as it took for Suez, but that is another story. So they would be well advised to say to themselves, "Let's call it off". If good sense prevails and the Argentinians remove their occupying force and allow us to liberate our fellow countrymen in the Falkland Islands, perhaps we can talk. And then perhaps we shall talk a bit more—but not beforehand.
7.20 p.m.
Viscount Hanworth: My Lords, I think your Lordships will be relieved to know that my speech should take well under five minutes. I think that the situation which has arisen in the Falkland Islands should transcend all party boundaries. Some noble Lords may be aware that a week ago I put down a Starred Question asking the Government to establish machinery for inter-party consultation, and it appears that at that stage, at least, they had not done so. Today, although speaking from the SDP Benches, some of the things I am going to say may not be popular and certainly should not be taken in any way as representing my party's policy or thinking. It does not do so.
350
We have always, rightly, been concerned with the wellbeing of the Falkland islanders, but I venture to suggest that we should never have given quite so much importance to their emotional views on purely British sovereignty. I say this because their material wellbeing and long-term future obviously depend to a very great extent on Argentina. This was so for oil, air transport, communications and hospital facilities. It should have been possible to reach a sensible compromise with Argentina long ago. Today we must, more than ever, be concerned with the islanders' wellbeing, but with lives at stake if war results and with thousands of Britishers living in Argentina, the islanders' wishes should not dictate our every move in negotiation with Argentina. In fact, it is now impossible to get a real consensus of their views.
I am a soldier and I entirely agree with the decision to dispatch a naval and military force. Had we not done so, our military credibility, and that of other countries in the West, would have been enormously reduced in areas where other troubles may occur in the future. What I regard as sheer folly—I repeat, "sheer folly"—is the intransigent attitude taken by the Government in publicly stating demands likely to be wholly unacceptable to anyone in Argentina, let alone their government. The Government are apparently set upon a determined course of self-destruction and, potentially, an enormous loss of life in a war which almost certainly cannot be won before the world turns against us, as it did in the Suez crisis, or before other nations become involved. It is nonsense to talk about principles, as the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and others have done. Most wars have been fought on principles, with God on our side. And what about the IRA?
Let us hope that negotiations can be made a viable alternative. Nevertheless, let me make it quite clear that if it is impossible to obtain what others, particularly the Americans, consider a reasonable solution—I make that statement deliberately because I do not trust our own Government's views on this—then I regretfully support all necessary military initiatives. Finally, let me say that, having talked to other peers, I believe the views I have expressed are shared by a far greater number of peers than the speeches today indicate, which show a sign of jingoism which I find appalling.
7.26 p.m.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords, here is one peer who does not agree with a word which the noble Viscount who has just spoken has said. However, when one peers through the smog surrounding the Foreign Office, as I have been doing, it reminds me of a saying, though I cannot remember who said it:
"A diplomat's life is a terrible life. When he is not straddling an issue he is dodging one".
We have seen a bit of dodging today, and presumably there is quite a lot of dodging going on in another place.
I am a simple man. From my point of view, this is a simple issue. It is a question of what is honourable and what is dishonourable. If we let the Falkland Islanders down now, it will be highly dishonourable and we shall have no credibility in the world.
I was very interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, had to say in his, as always, excellent

351
speech. He said, quite rightly, that sovereignty is negotiable. I hope he did not also mean that self-determination is negotiable. I understood him to say that, though it may be that I am thinking of the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown. I cannot say that I agreed with a great deal of what Lord George-Brown said.
Self-determination is more important than sovereighty. Until the Falkland islanders decide to come under Argentina we must support them. The Argentinians must withdraw from the Falkland Islands. The idea put forward by one or two noble Lords that we must turn back the task force is a monstrous suggestion. The Argentinians must withdraw all their troops from the Falkland Islands. When that happens, we can negotiate.
I should like there to be a referendum in the Falkland Islands after all Argentinian pressure has been removed. There could be United Nations observers at a referendum in which the Falkland islanders would decide for themselves whether they want to remain British subjects or to go in with the Argentine. A referendum could be held every 20 years for every new generation, or it could be held perhaps every 10 years. However, there can be no negotiation over self-determination.
I, too, appreciate the efforts which have been made by Secretary of State Haig. He is rather like a yo-yo, going backwards and forwards. I am surprised that he is not becoming, rather like a boxer who becomes punch drunk, jet lag drunk. We must remember, however, that Mr. Haig, as is his duty, puts America's interests first. One of America's interests is not to be unfriendly to the Argentinian régime, because America regards the Argentinian régime as a bulwark against communism. I do not necessarily agree. If a country has too harsh a régime, it can act as a boomerang. I am not so sure that the Americans are on a good wicket there.
The Argentinians' claims to sovereignty are, as we have heard this evening, a complete negation of international law and are also morally wrong. The Argentinians themselves have had very little to do with the Falkland Islands. I believe it was a Dutch ship's captain who first sighted the islands in the 16th century. In the 17th century, one of our ships also sighted the Falkland Islands. We had a small garrison on the Falkland Islands in the early 18th century but then Spain came along and we moved out. If anyone has the slightest claim to the Falkland Islands apart from us, it is probably Spain. Argentina was in the Falkland Islands and had a governor there early in the 19th century for a short period, but she never settled the islands. We are in the Falkland Islands 100 per cent. by right.
However, we have let them down. We ought to have provided far more financial help for them. We should have always kept one or two ships on station there. We have let them down and I hope that, when all this blows over and the Falkland Islands have decided to remain British (which I am sure they will, because the islanders are by blood 100 per cent. British), we will keep ships there, because, as we all know, there is vast wealth in the South Atlantic. It always amazes me that so many people actually think that the 56 million of us in this country can live by hanging out
352
each others washing. We cannot do so. It is quite impossible for us to do so and we call only live by large overseas investment. I believe that in the future, the South Atlantic will be one place where it will be extremely necessary to invest.
I should just like to end by saying that, if we climb down now, we shall lose credibility throughout the world. The sad fact is that ever since the war we have been quitting the whole time. We have never stood up for our rights. This Government were elected by the people to stop this trend and to stop us being trampled on. We have been quitting all the time, but here we have a 100 per cent. good wicket on which to stand our ground and I hope that we shall do so.
7.34 p.m.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, I think it is right on occasions such as this to give maximum support to the Government for doing the right thing. The Government have acted with courage and very rapidly. My noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard has a very strong point when he said that right-wing and military dictatorships who practised torture and the disappearance of their subjects encourage a very strong and active left-wing reaction. That is three-quarters of the problem of what has been happening in El Salvador and other parts of Latin American. Latin America is an extremely unstable place. Surely it would be impossible for this debate to be happening in Argentina. I cannot imagine the noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, or his Argentinian equivalent, getting up in the Argentinian Parliament and advocating that what they call the Malvinas should be ceded back to the British without him being howled down. We may disagree with him but ours is a civilised race which allows him to express those views. I suspect the same would go for the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. If an Argentinian admiral stood up and said that the force which had been sent was ill-equipped and not in proper working order, instead of going peacefully to his taxi he would have gone straight to prison.
If Her Majesty's Government are not successful, it will allow the borders of Latin America to be changed by force. Somebody commented the other day that there are more border disputes between Cape Horn and the Rio Grande than there are anywhere else in the world. In the case of Chile and the Beagle Channel, the Argentinians have been found against but have paid no attention. There is the argument between Venezuela and Guyana and if my history serves me right, we nearly went to war with the United States in 1898 over exactly this border dispute. There is also the argument between Peru, Ecuador and Chile about their borders, and there is the still festering sore between Guatemala and Belize. Everybody in that neck of the woods seems to think that they can discourage any comment on their internal situations by going back to what some Spanish viceroy said between about 1550 and 1826, when, as we all know, Canning called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old.
Furthermore, the Antarctic Treaty, which I have actually gone to the trouble of looking up, is really rather a good document. It was signed by everybody; first by Argentina and lastly by the United States of America. The first part of Article 1 states:
"The Antarctic shall be used for peaceful purposes only".
It is a treaty of nobility and sense. When the treaty

353
comes up for renewal and discussion in 1991, it is essential that nothing should upset the renewal of that treaty. If Argentina is allowed to get away with this particular form of flagrant aggression—and it has been said by several noble Lords already that there is no question of going to the World Court because Argentina knows that she will lose—then the Antarctic Treaty will also be in peril, and that would be a grave loss to the world.
One or two extremely heartening things have happened in this country and in Europe as a result of these rather unfortunate happenings. The trade unions at Rolls-Royce immediately lifted an overtime ban on working on Harrier engines over the Easter weekend. Somebody ought to say to the engineering union concerned, "Thank you very much indeed for putting your country before your own immediate interests." I believe we should also say very clearly and loudly that what the dock workers did at Portsmouth to get that fleet to sea was nothing short of miraculous. Rumour has it that the engines for HMS "Hermes" were in little bits and pieces all over the floor on the Wednesday afternoon, but she sailed out of Portsmouth Harbour in full battle order on Monday morning. That is a stupendous effort by a lot of people pulling together and showing what we in this country really can do when we try. It is very heartening.
We should also say thank you to our European partners. We are in the process of having a fairly sticky old argument over money between a Conservative Government in England and a Socialist Government in France. What happened? Straight away, the French came to our aid. So did Germany, and Germany has more to lose in her trade with Argentina than we have. All of these things are heartening and they raise the morale of everybody. We ought to be grateful and the message ought to go forth that we thank those people who have come to our help.
The American reaction, I would suggest, has been of a slightly lower standard. Mrs. Kirkpatrick going to dinner with the Argentinian ambassador in the evening of the day on which the Argentinian forces occupied the Falkland Islands was, I would suggest, a shabby piece of behaviour. I would also suggest that if the United States had been as firm with us as the French, Germans, Italians and the EEC would have been, the Argentinians would have been in no possible doubt whatever where the world interest lay. The Americans, in spite of Haig's later efforts, gave the Argentinians the impression that they were neutral, and neutral between right on one side and wrong on the other side. That, I regret to say, is not what a great democracy of the United States should be. Perhaps they have gone a little way towards redressing that balance. I saw a report in the New Standard today that they have been providing satellite intelligence to us and to the Royal Navy—"Thank you" if it is true; it was not denied by Washington.
It is quite essential that, if this dispute is to be solved by diplomacy, the force must be there to back it up. It must be a very strong and very powerful force and there must be absolutely no doubt at all in the gaucho general's mind that it will be used. If that doubt is not there, then there is less likelihood of that force being used. The more certainty there is that if the naval blockade does not work, there will be an air
354
blockade and then possibly even a blockade of the grain ports, then we will not have to go and attack the Falkland Islands. We do not want to get hurt ourselves if we can avoid it. We just want to make sure that they get hurt if we have to do it. With luck diplomacy can work. Diplomacy in this case can only possibly be used if the force is overwhelming and the will to use it is absolutely certain.
To paraphrase Pitt, the Falkland Islands will be safe by our exertions, and possibly the world by our example. Finally, I should like to remind your Lordships' House—and I think that this is apposite—that just before the Battle of Quatre Bras, Wellington said, "By God! Boney's humbugged me". He then went on to win the Battle of Waterloo. Perhaps the Foreign Office was humbugged, but I sincerely hope that it will go on to win the diplomatic battle without the use of the force which we must, however, be prepared to use.
7.42 p.m.
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, while supporting, like most other noble Lords, the agile and highly successful diplomatic policy followed by Her Majesty's Government and also the swift and successful military policy in support of that diplomatic policy, I would like to follow my noble friend Lord Montgomery of Alamein down the corridor of speculation about Argentinian reactions and psychologies, although I think that your Lordships will find that I shall not reach the same point in the corridor as my noble friend reached.
What is the nature of the country which is putting us to this particular trial? Argentina is a very interesting country which has not really been discussed in the course of this debate except, perhaps, in relation to its present rulers, particularly by my noble friend Lord Mottistone. Argentina is a country which has had one of the most successful economic histories in the world and one of the most successful records of stable government, although both of those things came to an end 60 years ago. Since that time, the history of Argentina has been a very interesting reminder that, in the world development tables, countries can go down as well as up. The one thing which has been produced in Argentina in the last 50 years very successfully, has been an increasingly strident and hysterical nationalism, the consequences of which we are now facing.
Along with a great deal of the press my noble friend Lord Montgomery—I hesitate to put the two together so lightly, but I think that my noble friend will forgive me—has suggested that all Argentinians are solidly behind the policy which the Argentinian Government have put forward, although there was a certain ambiguity about the way in which my noble friend put it which raised a question mark in my mind anyway as to whether he was right. He suggested that all Argentinians are behind the policy and then he hesitated, to wonder whether he would have been better to have said, "the way in which the policy had been carried out". I think that there is a fundamental distinction between the two, as I am sure your Lordships will agree.
As a matter of fact, I am sceptical as to whether it can really be said that all Argentinians are, indeed, behind the policy. My noble friend Lord Onslow

355
raised a very interesting question, wondering whether in fact there could be any speculation in Argentina about the nature of the policy without the person concerned suffering very severely. In fact, one person has raised doubts publicly about the policy. His name is well known to your Lordships and it is without any question the name of the most distinguished Argentinian living at the present time—Borges, the writer. I have no doubt whatever that his name will be remembered a great deal longer than any other Argentinian living at the moment. He has publicly stated that the policy pursued by his Government is mad. But if he has said that, it may well be that there are a great many others who privately think the same thing although, as my noble friend pointed out, the chances of those remarks being said with the same freedom with which they are naturally said in this House and in the other place, are of course remote.
Also, there is the question as to whether Argentinians have always felt like this. My impression is that before 1929, during the period of economic stability and economic growth and political stability, feelings about the Falkland Islands were a good deal less strong than they are now. Indeed, I cannot help thinking that it is significant that the President of Argentina who lasted the longest—General Rosas in the 19th century—privately tried to arrange an undertaking with this country whereby the Argentinians would abandon their claim to the Falkland Islands in return for our abandoning the debt which they had incurred with us. The decision to turn down that imaginative proposal was taken by none other than the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, whose record has been challenged in one way or another during the course of this debate by many noble Lords, as a matter of fact I think quite wrongly. Speaking as a good Conservative, I recall very well that Lord Palmerston was very tough with weak countries, but nothing like so tough with those that were strong, like Germany. However, that is by the way.
I simply want to suggest that the Argentinians cannot be expected to be quite so solid as my noble friend suggested or as the press has suggested is the case. Even if it were true that they are solidly behind the Government in feeling very strongly about this matter, there remains the question: what does it matter if they feel very strongly?—because very often people have felt very strongly and have led their countries to disaster. We recall very well that many Germans felt very strongly about the Treaty of Versailles. Other Germans felt very strongly about the Jews. Hitler forced them to live down to those very strong feelings, with the greatest disaster which has befallen the German nation.
There is another matter that I should like to draw to your Lordships' attention and it refers to the many allusions made by noble Lords to the consequences on the rest of Latin America. The noble Lord, Lord Walston, for example, said that if we went to war with Argentina the whole of Latin America would support Argentina. The noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, said that our actions threatened our other friendships in the whole of that continent. There is a different point of view. Inaction could also damage our friendships with those countries. For example, what
356
about the Chileans? What if the very strong feelings, to which I have referred and which have led the Argentinians to the present folly, should be followed after their success, if we were to give way, by very strong feelings about one or two issues in which the Chileans are concerned?
Then there is the question of other democracies in Latin America. At the moment it certainly seems as though some of them have given support to the Argentinians, not perhaps in the way in which the policy has been executed, but on the principle of the claim. Even if, in excitement, some of them have, indeed, surrendered to rhetoric and to the support of the Argentinians over this, I think that it can easily be represented and should be represented by our diplomatic representatives, and probably is being represented by our diplomatic representatives, that those democracies can be brought to recognise the paramountcy of the principles so admirably put by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury in an earlier part of this debate.
If we were to surrender the principles which the most reverend Primate put so well, I wonder too whether we would really be helping the Argentinians. Should we not be giving an impression to them and to the world as a whole that this kind of romantic nationalism can in fact succeed, however ill-executed?—because noble Lords may have read in the press that at the moment when this plan was carried out the Argentinian ambassador was not in this country at all, but was in Rome. I make no suggestion that that is a particularly appropriate place for him to have been at that moment, but there can be no question that the Argentinian Government took no care to find out exactly what our reactions might be. This ill-executed policy would then be rewarded.
If we did support this folly, or accepted this folly in any way, should we not be ensuring a continuation in power of a Government which, without doubt, as my noble friend Lord Mottistone pointed out to us, have in fact—and this is not to state it too strongly—tortured their way to survival over the last 10 years? That said, I think that we should have no doubt that in its present form Argentina is not a country which will have any compunction about the use of force. It is a country which certainly understands that force can be successful, as my noble friend Lord Beloff pointed out, and which therefore behaves in diplomacy in a very different way from ours.
In conclusion, I shall simply say that crises of this nature very often concentrate the mind and, as my noble friend Lord Chalfont suggested, enable us to state first principles without fear of being thought platitudinous. Without any question, the principles put forward by the most reverent Primate—the need to maintain the rule of law and the need to try to secure self-determination—are the governing ones which, however important the question of the islanders or the islands may seem, determine our activities in this severe crisis. It seems to me that that consciousness of the principles involved explains what some see as the essential paradox of Her Majesty's Government's policy, which is that once we have again secured control of the islands, then anything more or less can be negotiated, but until we have secured that control, nothing should be.
7.56 p.m.
Lord Shinwell: My Lords, by any standards associated with your Lordships' House this has been a remarkable debate; remarkable in the sense that in oratory and in eloquence it compares favourably with many other debates. Not that one takes exception to those debates of an inferior character. We must be prepared to listen to all kinds and types of oratory and even eloquence. But it is remarkable in another sense. Many of those who have taken part in the discussion seemed to avoid making reference to the primary issue, perhaps because it presents problems which are difficult to solve, complications, contradictions, having to turn the clock back, revelations about our history, criticisms of Governments and of personalities associated with Governments. All that has emerged, but rarely has attention been focused on the primary issue, to which I venture to refer.
Before I do so, I must make a personal observation. I was unaware that a list of speakers had been prepared, perhaps because I did not receive a Whip or even notice. So, when I arrived at your Lordships' House this morning, I saw the list and, as I wished to offer a few observations, I appended my name—No. 31. I regret having to intervene at such a late hour, more particularly because my bedtime is approaching. At my time of life it is sometimes necessary to have a little relaxation. However, in the circumstances I make no complaint.
But there is one complaint that I am entitled to make, although it has nothing to do with defence, foreign affairs or even with the Falkland Islands, except in a remote fashion. When my post arrived this morning at a quarter to one I received a note from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that the House was meeting this afternoon. I had, of course, observed the newspapers and knew that we were expected to attend, but I had received no notice until a quarter to one when my post arrived. I think that we shall have to go to war with the Post Office if this is the kind of service upon which we have to depend. So much for that.
What is the primary issue? Of course, there have been what are called by those who spoke, constructive proposals, constructive suggestions. If I may say so in passing—it is no more than that; just in passing—I have listened to these constructive suggestions ever since I entered public life, 79 years ago, before the First World War. These constructive suggestions are the temporary aberrations of some people who regard themselves as having a superior understanding of the topics in which we are occasionally engaged in discussions—no more than that; they are ideas, notions, constructive suggestions.
Let us return to the point. What is the primary issue? It is simply that the Argentinian Government committed an act of aggression based on what we understand by international law. They violated that law. That is the important issue. The rest, for what it matters, is discussion, indulgence in eloquence, whatever you like, and also the constructive suggestions. Let us focus attention on that. Let us not escape from that. That is the principal issue. They committed an act of aggression.
What happened as a result? The United Nations, to its credit—by a majority, I understand, but at any
358
rate almost unanimously—came to the conclusion that this was an act of aggression and that Argentina should be condemned. And so they were. I observed that some of those who took part in the debate who were inclined to object to the Government's policy were unaware that the United Nations had come to that decision, although so often they argue in favour of the United Nations when it suits their book. This was an occasion when they ought to have appreciated what the United Nations had done. They were upholding international law as we understand it and as they understood it.
What are the Government expected to do? In the opinion of some of my colleagues in your Lordships' House and those in another place, and many in the country, the last thing that the Government should undertake to do would be to threaten the use of force, forgetting that the act on the part of the Argentinian Government was itself an act of force. Indeed, it was a declaration of war according to their philosophy. That is what it was. They occupied territory over which they had no sovereignty, no right of administration, no rights of any kind. It was an act of aggression. What does one expect the Government to do in those circumstances?
It has been suggested by many of my colleagues, and I can understand their sincerity in the matter, that, far from indulging in force, or even threatening force, we should seek to come to some conclusion based on negotiations. How is it possible to negotiate—as indeed the Prime Minister said in so many words, and how right she was—as long as the Argentine Government has a vast number of its forces in the Falkland Islands? If negotiation is likely, if it is desirable, then surely the first thing that should happen is for the Argentine Government to withdraw its forces from the islands. Then we can proceed to negotiate.
Here I want to make it clear that of course I, along with others in your Lordships' House and many outside, although we support the Government in the sending of a task force to a destination 8,000 miles away, think that we should seek every possible road in the direction of negotiations. But you cannot negotiate as long as an act of aggression has been committed and there is no intention on the part of the aggressor to withdraw. That is the first thing.
A great deal has been said about the lack of support on the part of successive British Governments for the people in the Falkland Islands. It may be true enough. But we have to understand the reason why. Given that the islands are 8,000 miles away, as we know, that they are in an area which it is dangerous and difficult to approach and difficult to live in, and that the number of persons involved is not so large as some people seem to think it is and talk about in that sense, surely the Government, no matter which Government, can be excused for not attending to the wants and welfare of the people in the islands as they themselves thought they deserved. Quite frankly, I see no reason why we should use that as an argument in support of the action of the aggressor in taking possession of the Falkland Islands.
Something has been said also about the future. How are we going to deal with the problem in the future? suggest that we should not worry so much about the future, whatever it may hold for us or for those involved in the Argentine, in the Antarctic, or in any

359
other part of the territory involved. We should not worry too much about that, as we should concern ourselves with the immediate issue: what should the Government be expected to do?
Something has been said about the intervention of the United States' emissary. I should like to refer to something I ventured to say in your Lordships' House last week on that issue. I said, and I repeat, that we do not expect, nor is it desirable, that the United States should act as a mediator. Co-operation, yes, I said, but not mediation. Now they have mediated. They have intervened. They have produced various ideas. With what success? None whatever.
I am not going to complain about the failure of Mr. Haig to have his ideas and notions about negotiation accepted by the Argentinian Government. I am not going to complain about that. But I ask myself the question—and I have not got the answer to it—would it not have been more desirable on the part of Mr. Haig on behalf of the United States Government to have immediately condemned the Argentine Government for its act of aggression, instead of seeking at once to mediate and find a way out of the problem? I should have thought that that was active and useful co-operation and far better than anything in the way of mediation.
I also ask myself this question: why is the American Government so anxious to mediate? They have interests in that area. Of course they have. So have we. But the American Government has also got interests in NATO, in the West of Europe, and, as we have to concern ourselves with them as an ally, they have to concern themselves with the United Kingdom as an ally. It is not desirable at all that they should undertake a task which seems objectionable to people in this country—and it is objectionable to many of us—and that they should intervene. Besides, I am not aware that they were asked to intervene, or asked to mediate. Perhaps we should be told by those who are going to wind up in this debate, or told on some subsequent occasion, whether they were asked by the British Government to act as mediators or to intervene in any sense of the word. I am not sure that they were.
That brings me to the conclusion. The conclusion is this: we must, whether we like it or not, stand by the Government. It does not mean that we have to support the Government in every particular: in economic matters; in social issues; or even in foreign affairs or defence. But, when the British Government, the United Kingdom Government, which is, after all, our Government elected democratically by the people of this country, whether we like it or not—it has to be accepted if it is elected democratically—decide on a course of action, particularly when there is a possibility of war—in peacetime it is quite different, no one would raise the issue at all—it is our duty and responsibility in the highest sense of the term to stand by that Government in every particular.
Lord George-Brown: Oh, No!
Lord Shinwell: That does not suit some of our people, including some with whom I have been associated in the Labour Party, but that does not worry me a bit. Many of them are pacifists; many of them
360
do not believe in defence at all, and many of them would prefer to rely on high moral attitudes which mean nothing except that they are expressions of opinion, but nothing more than that. I should have liked the Labour Party not to have indulged in support of the Government in muted tones but to have come out in a forthright fashion and say, "At a time when there is a possibility of conflict, we are behind Her Majesty's Government". I should like to see that happen.
A final comment on the question of defence, a subject about which much has been spoken today. I listened to my colleague Lord Wigg when he made reference to the activity of the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, way back in 1957 and I wish to correct or at any rate amend, what Lord Wigg said; I have as much knowledge of the subject as anybody else. I do not believe that the act was one of a dishonest character at all. It was a mistake. It was premature. It was based on the belief that the time had arrived to go beyond using conventional weapons or conventional strategy and undertake something much more devastating. That was the purpose of it. It failed, as we discovered not long afterwards, and subsequently we had to rely on our conventional forces, and that brings me to the point I wish to make about defence.
What have we discovered as a result of the decision of the Government to send a task force? A week or two ago some Questions were being asked in the House of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, the Deputy Minister of Defence, in the course of which I wanted to put a question which I was unable to put at the time but which I put now. Even if we support Trident—and there is some dubiety about that—is it not a fact that we must rely on conventional weapons and conventional strategy, whether or not we like it? In particular, do we not have to rely (this was the point I wanted to put then, but I put it now) on the strength of our maritime capability? That is what we have now discovered. We have found that when it comes to the crunch and we are faced with an act of aggression, when we are unable to use our land forces and are unable to use nuclear weapons, we have to use our maritime forces, those available to us.
If it is suggested, and rightly so, that those forces are not as adequate as we should like them to be, that is not the fault of those to have advocated a strong Navy capable of safeguarding our trade routes and able to come to our rescue if we are faced with a problem of the character of the one which now exists. Therefore, I urge the Government—proceeding, of course, as ably as they can with all the power at their command to negotiate, if the opportunity to negotiate is there—to negotiate only on the basis that the Argentinians are prepared to withdraw from the islands. Let there be no mistake about that; that must be the first consideration.
If there are to be changes in the Falkland Islands—if there are to be investigations into the economic, social and other properties available in the area in the course of years, all the better for us and all the better for those in those territories—so be it, but the essential thing is that we should go on demanding, before there is any question of negotiations and coming to some conclusion about the fate of the people in the islands and any other issue involved, that the Argentinians

361
withdraw their forces. If they do not, then it is up to Her Majesty's Government to use all the force at their command to uphold their rights in the area. If anyone objects to that, it can be objected to only on the grounds of bigotry and unfair opposition to a Government who, in existing circumstances, are doing their best.
8.15 p.m.
Lord Monson: My Lords, first I must apologise to the House for the fact that my name is not on the list of speakers. In fact, I telephoned the Government Whips Office as early as 10 o'clock yesterday morning to put my name down and my name was one of the first to go down, but, because of the confusion that I suppose is inseparable from such a difficult occasion as this, my name was mistakenly omitted. I wanted to stress that to show that any prolonging of the debate was not due to a last-minute decision on my part.
When my noble friend Lord Chalfont said that this was no time for uncertain sounds from this House, my spirits rose. When, a few minutes later, he suggested that we should relinquish, or at any rate compromise upon, our sovereignty, my heart sank. When he wound up by stressing the necessity for an honourable settlement, my spirits rose once again. I believe that much of the slight mental confusion that runs through recent public comment arises from the understandable yearning for a peaceful settlement and the commendable desire to avoid casualties. The pressure of those worthy sentiments is such that it is all too easy to lose sight of one central fact. We are in the right, and they are in the wrong; and in that context I was greatly heartened by the robust speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon, from the Labour Benches, and Lord Kennet, from the SDP Benches, and indeed the speech to which we have just listened from the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell.
We—our people, that is; the Falklanders, who are just as British as we are, decent, hardworking people who have never harmed anybody in their lives—are the victims of aggression. They—the Argentinians—are the aggressors. The noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, told the Government, "Do not start a war"; but the Argentinians have already started a war, as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, pointed out. By any objective criterion, there is not an atom of substance in the Argentinian claim, whether by the criterion of self-determination or by historical criteria. Let us remember that in the approximately 400 years since the Falkland Islands were discovered, Argentina occupied the islands, with under 50 men, for a mere 13 years, or less than 3½ per cent. of the total time during which the islands have been known. The Norman French were the first settlers. Even by the criterion of geographical propinquity—if one accepts that as a valid criterion, which I certainly do not—the Argentinian claim falls down. If all countries were to launch claims on territories as far away as 300 miles from their own country (or 1,200 miles in the case of South Georgia) against the wishes of the inhabitants, the world would be a much more dangerous place than it is.
With that knowledge in mind, the Prime Minister seems to be resolved to stand firm, as one had always
362
hoped and suspected she would, and to resist the doctrine that might equals right and that aggression must be rewarded. But in case the few trembling hands plucking at her sleeves in any way weaken that resolve, let us assist the Prime Minister by disposing of the red herrings being strewn in the path of resolution.
The first red herring is the "pile of rocks" argument. I think that was first advanced by Dr. Johnson, who is always trotted out when somebody wishes to attack patriotism; those who employ it conveniently forget that the word" patriotism" had quite a different meaning in the eighteenth century from what it has today. In any case, the islands are not, of course, a pile of rocks. As we in this House must now all know from the descriptions given to us by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, they are productive, and provide a modest but contented living for their inhabitants. Admittedly, the islands are no larger in area than Belgium, but Belgium's size did not prevent us taking up arms on her behalf in 1914.
The second red herring, advanced by the noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, but con-contested by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, is that the Argentinian people are enthusistically in favour of the invasion. Well, my Lords, if that be so, so what? Most of the German people, so long as Hitler was winning, were enthusiastically in favour of his territorial conquests. They, too, had been indoctrinated in their schools with the belief that Germany had a right to the historic lands of the east first colonised by the Teutonic knights and to the former Hapsburg territories. The fact that millions of people believe that wrong equals right does not make it so.
The third red herring is the plight of the Anglo-Argentinians, the many tens of thousands of formerly British people who live in Argentina. These people chose of their own free will to go and live under a foreign flag. What is more they chose to go and live in a country which in recent years has more often than not been under the rule of a dictatorship or a semi-dictatorship. Of course we feel for them and of course we sympathise with them, but their interests cannot rank very high in our order of priorities, for the reasons that I have given.
The fourth red herring goes something like this: "Our actions will affront Latin American opinion". The former British ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, who knows South America extremely well and not just as a result of his kidnapping and imprisonment, thinks otherwise. He has made the point that most South Americans respect the rule of law, especially international law, so gravely flouted by the Argentinians.
Despite what the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, says, I think that most people do detect echoes of the 'thirties and early 1940s in what has happened. The noble Lord, Lord Morris, made this point well. The Argentinian invasion of the Falklands with relatively few casualties resembles the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. The only difference being that the Argentinian invasion is even less justifiable than the German invasion, if that is possible. There were a handful of people in Czechoslovakia with national socialist sympathies, but so far as I know there is

363
nobody in the Falkland Islands who sympathises with the Argentinian junta.
We also have a latter-day Nazi-Soviet pact: Russia supports Argentina, as does their mouthpiece in this country the Morning Star. Then again, does not the newsreel footage that we have seen of stunned and apprehensive islanders transfixed by the massed might of an occupying army mirror the experiences of the Channel Islanders under the German occupation between 1940 and 1945, as depicted so well in a recent television series?
It has been said in this debate that the "interest of the islanders cannot be paramount", and indeed I would agree—but not for the reasons given by many other noble Lords. Because, even if the islanders were by some misfortune bribed and cajoled to accept Argentinian sovereignty as a result of this act of aggression, it would have the most terrible consequences for other parts of the world. Aggression would be seen to pay dividends. Gibraltar, Ulster, Hong Kong (and indeed Macao and Taiwan) and possibly, if this does not sound too fanciful, in 20 years' time even the Channel Islands, if an extreme left-wing or an extreme right-wing government were to come to power in France (stranger things have happened) would all be at risk; as would, rather sooner, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and all the French Pacific possessions: no wonder M. Mitterrand has come out so strongly on our side! The same applies to Belize and to Guyana (which is now the subject of Venezuelan claims). In the future Trinidad and Jamaica could be at risk: after all they were once part of the Spanish Empire. Fidel Castro could claim with as much justification as Argentina to have inherited the mantle of the former Spanish Empire.
Only two honourable solutions are possible. I should have liked to say that there were three, but the interesting suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord DuncanSandys, attractive though it superficially is, would be fraught with danger for the Falklanders when one considers the instability and the border disputes endemic in so much of central and South America: the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, listed a great number of them.
No, the first honourable and realistic solution therefore is to return to the status quo ante. Interestingly enough, it is this solution that is favoured by another British ex-diplomat, Mr. Peter Jay, our former man in Washington, who, let it be noted, is no supporter of this Government specifically, or of traditional Conservative/patriotic principles in general.
The only other honourable solution would be one which makes some extremely modest concessions to Argentinian chauvinism and irredentism. By this I do not mean a condominium or lease-back arrangement, both of which, I believe, are, in the long term, fraught with difficulty and peril, but something more like allowing the Argentinians to erect their flag on some remote part of one of the islands, in return for an arrangement to exploit the mineral and marine wealth of that particular part of the South Atlantic, Britain jointly with Argentina, and for the benefit of the Falkland Islanders, Britain and Argentina in that order. The revenues from such an arrangement should enable
364
us to station a permanent garrison on the islands.
Once again, my Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont has said, whatever long-term solution there is must be an honourable one which avoids any suspicion of capitulation. The British people will never forgive a Government or party who contemplate any other type of solution.
8.27 p.m.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, I believe that I have detected in the debate some feeling that since we last discussed the Falklands, on the whole, on balance, events have developed favourably, rather than unfavourably, for our cause. If so, I think that this is fair. Since we last discussed the subject the blockade has been operated quickly and efficiently, and is respected by the Argentinians. Our support worldwide has been remarkably satisfactory. Not only has there been that of the Commonwealth and the European Community; I think that we can be moderately satisfied with the reactions of the Organisation of American States. Our success at the Security Council and with American public opinion has been very reassuring, and such criticisms have been made recently of the Foreign Office that I should like to pay tribute to the work in the United States of Sir Anthony Parsons and Sir Nicholas Henderson. I think that they have both done the country extremely well.
I see on the tape that the European Community has now agreed to continue the blockade, in the first instance for one month. That, too, is satisfactory, and extremely reassuring. Last night I attended a political meeting in Woolwich, and as I entered a leaflet was pressed into my hand. It was a Labour Party leaflet, and it read: "Quit the Common Market now". Well, there is a contribution to solving the Falkland Islands dispute—" Quit the Common Market now"!
Lord Gladwyn: It is Labour Party policy.
Lord Mayhew: It is extraordinary that the key foreign policy issue for the Labour Party, Her Majesty's Opposition, is to quit the Common Market now. Of course I exempt the occupants of the Opposition Front Bench. In fact I am bound to say that in the short time that I have been a Member of this House I cannot recall any one of them, on any issue, actually defending the policy of the party to which they belong, and for that they are widely respected in this House, I have no doubt. But the attitude of the European Community has been magnificent. For the Opposition to accept the support of our friends and allies, at considerable cost to themselves, at our time of danger, and then simply to kick them in the teeth, is to me incomprehensible.
As I say, since events have developed rather more favourably these last few weeks, one might have expected in this debate some hardening of attitudes, some raising of the demands that we expect to be met by the Argentine Government. But that has not been detectable at all. On the contrary, there have been a number of speeches—the speech of the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, and of the noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery—which were of a studiously moderate and extremely restrained

365
kind. I must say that I thought the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was a bit hard on the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, who put a thoroughly unpopular point of view but in an admirable manner, and a point of view that needed to be stated.
Lord George-Brown's speech contained, as one might expect, a number of colourful and striking phrases. I liked the phrase that the Government had "needlessly increased the amount of face we had to lose". That is certainly a danger to be guarded against. I suppose all of us are keenly looking forward to seeing, perhaps on our television screens, the Argentine troops re-embarking in Port Stanley those amphibious troop carriers, moving rapidly backwards in the opposite direction—preferably on the left of the road—and we are looking forward to seeing the Governor returning, preferably in full uniform, and starting again a long period of British administration.
I think many people will feel when this happens that that in itself is a considerable recovery of face; indeed, I would say that those events will go a very long way to redeeming the honour of this country in this affair. That is why I felt some sympathy with what some of the more moderate speakers were saying, because even if that meant some kind of satisfaction to the preposterous claim which started this whole affair off, it would be a great achievement; it would be a justification of the task force; it would be something, I believe, which the Government could accept without grave criticism or opposition.
There were other phrases of my old parliamentary colleague, my old Government colleague, the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, which struck me very much. He said, "We must have an umpire". Here I disagree. "We must have an umpire", he said. But we have an umpire already. The umpire is the Security Council. We appealed to the Security Council, and Argentina was given out, so to speak (if we are talking about umpires, that seems the most appropriate phrase). I say that we need an intermediary at this stage; not somebody to say what is right and what is wrong, but somebody to help us to reconcile our different views. I see that, today, President Reagan talked about being an honest broker. I do not care for that very much; I do not think that is a very good description—an honest broker. I think that what we need is somebody who starts from the base of the Security Council resolution which condemned Argentina as an aggressor.
But now, of course, I come to the point about the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, which I think shocked the House. He said, "We must stop the fleet now and ask someone else "—perhaps Mexico, he said—" to act as intermediary". The noble Lord said, "We must stop the fleet now". I must say I was surprised at this. He said that he had Lord Palmerston's picture up on the wall when he was Foreign Secretary. Lord Palmerston would not stop the fleet now.
Lord George-Brown: Yes, he would, my Lords.
Lord Mayhew: No, my Lords, he would never have stopped the fleet now. He understood that diplomacy needed to be backed with power, and he would never have stopped the fleet. Surely there is some midway
366
course between (using the noble Lord's words) needlessly increasing the amount of face which we might lose and, on the other hand, humiliating the country, which is what would be done if we stopped the fleet now. That really cannot be accepted. However, I will now leave the noble Lord's speech.
Lord George-Brown: No; forgive me. The noble Lord has had a certain amount of fun. Actually, I stand by the phrase, "needlessly increasing the amount of face you need to lose". When the noble Lord has been able to go home and work it out, he will see that there is some sense in that. But having had his fun he said that there is a half-way house between stopping the fleet, as I suggested, at some convenient point, and not stopping the fleet at any point. Would he like to tell the House what is that half-way house?
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, when he goes home and studies my words in Hansard, will see that I carefully used the phrase "middle course", not" half-way house". I think we understand each other about this.
Lord George-Brown: What is the difference? Really!
Lord Mayhew: May I come now to what the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, called constructive suggestions—and I am sorry to say this to the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell. I do not wish to give offence, but I thought his speech was full of constructive suggestions which he very much suggested we should not make. The noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, made one of the constructive suggestions. He said, to my great surprise, that the Falklands should become independent and should rely on the OAS for protection. I could not have heard him aright. How can 1,800 people become an independent country, and how can the OAS protect anybody when it is so divided and unreliable? I could not understand that at all.
I am very sorry that Lord Wigg questioned the effectiveness of the naval task force. Considering the difficult start it had, with no warning from the Foreign Office, I think the task force was assembled and made ready in an exemplary manner, and also that the stationing of the submarines for the blockade was done in an exemplary manner. I was very sad to hear the criticisms, I think unjustified, which the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, made.
Of course it is true that "Hermes" is a very old ship, and very old ships are not always reliable. That is true; but why is "Hermes" in the fleet today? "Hermes" is in the fleet today only because a Labour Cabinet 16 years ago cancelled the construction of the new carrier and phased out the whole carrier fleet. That is why; and we could have done with some of those carriers today.
My Lords, I have exceeded my time. Lord Gladwyn spoke for my party, and I thought admirably set out the position as we see it. In their search for a negotiated peace backed by naval power we wish the Government and the task force every success.
8.38 p.m.
Lord Stewart of Fulham: My Lords, the Government have enjoyed much support from the House during this debate—but not unanimous support. I think it is fair to say that the section of opinion which did not support them found its fullest expression in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown. As he put it, the Government had wrong-footed the whole thing on occasion after occasion. I am afraid there is a good deal of opinion in support of the view that the Government wrong-footed it first of all in behaving in a way which enabled the Argentine forces to get into the Falklands at all. That was certainly a case of wrong-footing; but that, it is I think agreed now, is to be the subject of inquiry later on, and I hope a very full and expert inquiry. Meanwhile, we have other things to consider.
But I cannot at all accept the view that the Government have wrong-footed things in their handling of the matter (if you can mix up feet and hands like that) since. They went to the United Nations. That was obviously the right thing to do; and owing to the skill of our representatives there and the good sense and judgment of most of the other members of the Security Council, we got a clear verdict requiring the Argentine forces to get out. Of course, if we lived in a much better ordered world than we do, we should have a United Nations that not only could pass a resolution like that but could immediately give instructions to its permanent armed forces to go and see that the resolution is carried out.
That is what we should like to have: a United Nations' peacekeeping force which could enforce the decisions of the Security Council. But, as we know, we have no such thing and therefore it was inevitable that once this verdict was given the world would look to Britain, the injured party, justified by the decision of the Security Council, to go ahead; and if the Argentine forces would not come out themselves in obedience to the Security Council resolution, it was, in the first place, Britain's duty to see that they did. The effect of the resolution is to legalise the use of force by us, to make actions which otherwise are entirely contrary to the Charter legal and proper. That is the effect of the resolution. The Argentines have been ordered out; we shall be justified in seeing that they go. And we shall be justified on another ground, that we are simply defending our own territory.
There is no serious doubt that this territory is ours. The noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, said that one ought to have an umpire. This is what the whole thing is about. But there is an umpire in this question and that is the World Court of International Justice. It is not our action that has prevented the case from going there. For those reasons, for the defence of our own territory, for the execution of a Security Council's decision, the fleet is sailing; and it is sailing with the support of the great majority of the Members of both Houses of Parliament. I stress that in view of some of the remarks that have been made about the attitude of the Labour Party on this question. We have dissidents on the matter; and, listening to the debate, I must say that there are dissidents on that side of the House as well, so that we ought not to press that too much.
It is all the more important that the fleet should sail
368
because of the nature of the country against which it is directed. This is not a country of which we could say that this has been an unfortunate misunderstanding between countries which would like to be friends with one another. This is a brutal, fascist dictatorship which knows quite well that what it is doing is contrary to humanity and contrary to the rule of law.
It is the rule of law that I think—and here I agree with my noble friend Lord Shinwell—is the central issue here. If Argentina can get away with this, anybody who has the power can get away with anything. There is the good old rule, the ancient plan, that those should take who have the power, and those should keep who can. This question and principle has come before the world on many occasions, and over and over again it is made clear that if you let the rule of law be defied the danger rapidly increases; if you stand resolutely and resist, you are successful and you improve the situation for the future.
At this stage one has reached the point of saying that nearly all of us support the sending of the fleet and there is the natural temptation to give the Government military and naval advice as to what the fleet should do when it arrives. This is a temptation that without much difficulty I will resist; and I think it is something that we should all resist, because nobody except the Government can have the knowledge to have an opinion which is worth while. But I am obliged to say that if it should turn out in future that the expedition was ill-prepared or that the Government's handling of the matter was bad, the Government will then meet the very harshest criticism. That is what politics is like. Governments have to do things in which there are risks, in which they can only be condemned on the grounds of hindsight; but, none the less, if they get it wrong, they will be condemned. For whatever Government is in power that would be true.
I would add another point following something I said in the Saturday debate. I said then that in advocating the view I do, I hoped I was not underestimating the great difficulty and possibly the great cost of the task. I share the opinion of those noble Lords who have urged the advantage of getting a quick decision. But it is not absolutely within our power to say how quick the decision will be. By all means, if a quick decision can be got, let it be got. The Government may face a situation where they are up against a tough, difficult and expensive proposition.
It is there that there may be some strain on the national unity, because expense may mean taxation, and taxation will be a question of, "Are you sharing the burden of this fairly among the different sections of the population?" I urge the Government to give very careful thought to that question. If we are going to be a nation in a serious military confrontation, it is greatly important that there should be the same strict observance of social justice as there was in the last war and which made possible the maintenance of national unity during that war. I hope that that warning will not be necessary; that it will not be so long and expensive as I fear. I merely say that that might be so; and it would be foolish to go into the adventure not recognising that this is one of the results which the Government might have to face.
The other thing, apart from giving the Government military advice (which I do not propose to do) is that one is tempted to engage in what my noble friend Lord

369
Shinwell described rather unkindly as constructive ideas. I must admit that one of the most interesting features of this debate has been the number of constructive ideas that have been put forward about the future of the Falklands. I do not doubt that the time will come when they will be useful and important, some of them at any rate—some of them more useful than others. I think it is fair to say that a mere blind repetition of the phrase, "the wishes of the inhabitants are paramount", as if there were nothing else in the world that mattered, will not get us where we want to be. But I would say at once that there is one thing that one must not do with the inhabitants, and that is to put them under a fascist dictatorship against their will.
We do not know what sort of answer will prove to be the best. We shall have to seek it in the knowledge of the fact that we are finding the defence and rescue of the Falklands an extremely difficult operation. This is bound to colour our thinking about the future of the Falklands. There are many other interesting and important points raised; and I say this again: the time to weigh them up is when the Argentine occupation has come to an end. It is quite impossible to talk about seeking the opinions of the inhabitants while the Argentines are there. Moreover, if in future we make any new arrangement about the Falklands, anything that differs from their situation before the invasion, it could be represented in some quarters as having given to Argentina something that she wanted.
It must be made quite clear before anything even resembling that is done, that the Argentine invasion has been defeated. It is that situation that makes it possible to consider what my noble friend Lord Shinwell called constructive ideas. I hope that that is not regarded as too polemic. I do not think it is. It has not been my practice generally, either in this House or in the other place, to advocate polemical solutions to problems; but there are occasions when you have absolutely to he clear. This is one of them. The rule of law must be established beyond doubt. Then we can consider all the other aspects of the matter—and very complicated and difficult they are.
In conclusion, I want to raise this point: What are some of the lessons that we can learn from the events that have already occurred? One is the need for fuller understanding between ourselves and the Government of the United States. I believe that Mr. Haig embarked on this venture with goodwill to this country and with a genuine and proper concern for the interests of his own. We have felt that some of the things that he has done have not been as we should have liked them. More recently, I think that we have tended to take a more favourable view. What we learn from this is that there ought to be better understanding. It was quite clear that the American Government did not at the beginning understand at all how the British Government and people felt about the Falklands or why they felt as they did.
It is equally true that we had not properly considered America's view of her concern for the American continent as a whole. We have heard that there was such a thing as the Monroe Doctrine. We learned that at school. I doubt if we have given proper weight to how America feels today about problems of the American continent as a whole. This is the kind of thing we
370
have to straighten out in the future. The lesson has certainly been rubbed into us that it is extremely important that we should understand each other; that Anglo-American understanding, both as part of NATO and outside that context, is vital for our own welfare and the peace of the world.
Another lesson that we have to learn is what are the possibilities—much greater than we thought—of the European Economic Community? I will here say what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, was perhaps too tactful to say: I think that anybody who advocates at the present time that we should quarrel with the United States, weaken NATO and come out of the European Economic Community—well, I do not know how I should finish that sentence! Anybody who fulfills those conditions is severely lacking in understanding of the interests of this country.
There is another grimmer lesson that we learn: I understand that a Russian spy ship is following the fleet and may be sending more or less useful information to the Argentine. That the Soviet Government should support a fascist dictatorship in contravention of a decision of the Security Council is—as I think Gibbon remarked somewhere—a matter for censure rather than surprise. I am afraid that that preaches us this lesson: those who advocate measures of disarmament for this country on the assumption that we have no ground for any anxiety about the goodwill of the Soviet Union are mistaken.
There was a very interesting piece of information given us by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet—that the Russian Government are now allowing their own citizens to know the nature of the British case about the Falklands. This is interesting and perhaps hopeful. It rubs in what I think has always been the lesson about the Russians: never despair of coming to some sort of reasonable understanding with them, but do be careful when dealing with them.
Altogether, what this adds up to is this: Britain serves her interests best when she is an active member of a group. It is well known that we are not a super power. Our population, our total wealth, do not support it. But we are, as one of the reports on the Foreign Office once said, a major power of the second rank. It was once unkindly said of us by Dean Acheson that we had lost an empire and not found a role. We are finding a role now, not in isolation but as an active member of various groupings: the United Nations, primarily; the Commonwealth; NATO and the European Economic Community. The value of our being a member of those groups has been brought out at each point in the development of this particular crisis.
That therefore suggests what Britain's position in the world is: that we can become a great and respected power if we recognise that we do it as a member of various groupings fulfilling our obligations to those groupings. Perhaps one other thing: one hopeful sign is put to us by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. He mentioned the attitude of the Rolls-Royce workers and the workers of Portsmouth. I do not think that that is entirely unconnected with the fact not only that this is Britain and their country, but that this is Britain standing up against a fascist dictatorship. We have generally been at our best when we have been supporting a libertarian cause. That, if I may say so—since

371
everybody has his own view of Lord Palmerston—is one of the things in which Lord Palmerston was interested: the promotion of liberal constitutional regimes against the old tyrannies of the 19th century. Out of the grave difficulties—and I repeat I do not underestimate the great gravity of the military situation—there may come something in which Britain is revived, renewed and respected.
8.56 p.m.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead): My Lords, the quality of this debate has fully justified the decision to recall Parliament early. In such a crisis, the Government must inform and consult Parliament. The views of your Lordships individually and the collective view of this House must contribute to the Government's conduct of affairs. When aggression has been committed, when the concern of the whole international community has been aroused, and when British subjects and British territory are under threat, then it is vital for the Government to have the fullest parliamentary support.
Following on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Stewart, may I say that the Government are much heartened by the speeches made by noble Lords speaking for their parties today. The Government also appreciate the contributions of your Lordships who have close personal knowledge of the South West Atlantic—not least of course the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who spoke early on in our debate—and noble Lords who have long and close experience of international affairs. Also, the House on this occasion much appreciated the speech of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. Although I am sure your Lordships will not expect me to reply to all your questions during negotiations, the message which the Government take away from your Lordships' speeches is that our policy must be based upon determination, realism and concern. Those are the qualities which I assure your Lordships we are determined will underlie our actions.
From the very moment of the Argentine invasion, the Government have made clear their determination to achieve an Argentine withdrawal and the return of the Islands to British Administration. Yet Her Majesty's Government, both under previous administrations and now, have always been ready to negotiate over this dispute. We have always been aware—both under previous governments and the present one—that we must be realistic in pursuit of a settlement. Traumatic events have occurred in the South Atlantic which are bound to affect the future of that region. We will consider proposals that safe-guard the wishes of islanders and are in accordance with our commitment to them.
However—here the Government differ from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—we believe that those wishes cannot be freely expressed while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, that is not what I said. I said we could not expect them to express their opinion under duress and I proposed that the United Nations should send observers there in order to obtain their opinion.
Lord Belstead: My Lords, while of course the illegal Argentine invasion continues. It is there that the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, part company. Many of your Lordships who spoke in the same sense will have been particularly heartened by the plain and robust statement of the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, that the rectitude of our case is incontestable. Perhaps I may just say to my noble friend Lord Morris that the Government are in no doubt about the United Kingdom's title to the islands, a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred on 3rd April. As early as the mid-18th century there was a British settlement on the Falkland Islands. From 1770 until 1833 there was, it is true, a period of some confusion, with Spain, Britain and the then Buenos Aires Government at various times occupying the island. But in 1833 the British again occupied the islands and from that date we have been in open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration of the islands. Thus—
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, would the noble Lord not accept that there is one thing which cannot be overthrown by force of arms, and that is the force of geography?
Lord Belstead: My Lords, I think it is precisely an opportunist and cynical attempt to take advantage of the force of geography which has led us into one of the most difficult crises the world has known since 1945. What I have just been saying leads us to take account of another factor which the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury recognised as being of fundamental importance and which is indeed enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations—namely the right of self-determination of peoples. In this context it is highly relevant that the inhabitants of the islands, for whom the Falklands are home, have repeatedly made clear their wish in the past that the islands should remain British.
I mentioned also as a basis of our action, concern. Throughout the crisis the Government themselves have been concerned, and have been aware of the concern of others, that bloodshed should as far as possible be avoided. While we have made it quite clear that we are prepared to assert our rights by force if necessary, it is our firm view, to which we are bending every effort, that Argentina should agree to comply with the Security Council resolution which enjoys the overwhelming backing of world opinion.
It is obvious that the Argentines hoped to take us by surprise. The suddenness of their decision to invade and the speed with which the action was carried out were clearly intended to present our country with a fait accompli. They obviously expected that we would wring our hands and that the world would shrug its shoulders. But instead we have shown ourselves united and resolute. I was most grateful to my noble friend Lord Soames for pointing to the miscalculations of Argentina. The Argentines little dreamed that we would assemble such a powerful naval force in so short a time. They have been clearly dismayed by the vigour and the degree of unanimity with which the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion and called on Argentina to withdraw.
But that was not their only miscalculation. They

373
also failed to take account of the strength and variety of the diplomatic links which bind us to other countries in the world. They were undoubtedly distressed at the United States' condemnation within the Security Council of an invasion in which the principle of self-determination has been so clearly broken.
My noble friend Lord Soames rightly drew attention to the action of our partners in Europe. I thought it might interest your Lordships if I were to say that the European Community has decided, as your Lordships know, to impose a complete embargo on all imports from Argentina. The necessary texts were approved in Brussels today, and they will come into force as soon as they are published. No Government can readily contemplate the loss of a quarter of its export trade, and that will be the consequence of the united decision with which the European Community has marked its condemnation of the Argentine aggression. And to ram home the message, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have taken that decision also—and of course New Zealand has broken off diplomatic relations.
My noble friend the Leader of the House described the efforts that the American Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, has been making to promote a settlement. These efforts are beyond praise. They have been firmly based on the need to respect the United Nations Security Council resolution. They accept that Argentine withdrawal must be a precondition for all subsequent negotiations. Mr. Haig is also aware that the wishes of the islanders themselves have always been the touchstone of this country's policy and must continue to be taken fully into account before any final settlement is reached. These negotiations, and the precise details of the proposals being discussed, are necessarily highly sensitive—
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to intervene? That is the second occasion on which he has said that negotiations are now taking place. Could he clarify whether this is the official position of the Government; that negotiations are already taking place?
Lord Belstead: My Lords, the Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, made his services available and we then invited him to London. The fact that he is moving between the United States, London and Buenos Aires means that he is of course the carrier of proposals; but those are proposals which are in his safe hands. We have made it quite clear that of course we will not go into detailed negotiations until there is a withdrawal—that is an absolute sine qua non—of the Argentine troops from the Falklands. I regret that in the particular situation in which we find ourselves it has not been possible to tell this House further details of precisely what is envisaged; and the Government appreciate your Lordships' understanding why this is so. But this I would like to say—we shall continue to seek a diplomatic solution in accordance with the United Nations resolution and with the British Government's own stated objectives; and it goes without saying that we shall keep Parliament up to date as the days go by.
The noble Lord, Lord Caccia, adjured the Government to take note of the many suggestions made by
374
your Lordships during this debate, and I will certainly undertake to draw all of them to the attention of my right honourable friend. But may I draw your Lordships' attention, finally, to the warning of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. The noble Lord warned us about Argentine territorial ambitions in the South Atlantic—not just their claims to the Falkland Islands. We are fully aware of the danger of whetting the Argentine appetite. If their current act of agression is not resisted or nullified, then they might indeed be tempted to disturb the balance represented by the Antarctic Treaty; a balance which is valued by all the claimant countries concerned, and on which the peaceful future of that continent depends.
I believe that the people of this country well understand the implications of this crisis. I think that this was very well brought out by my noble friend Lord Onslow, who referred to the strenuous efforts made to get the ships away, and our thoughts are with the men of the task force as it moves south. We are continuing to seek a diplomatic solution through respect for the rules of international behaviour, through our determination to stand by our commitment to the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants and with the admirable solidarity with which our friends and partners throughout the world have stood beside us at this testing time.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

  ELECTRICITY DISCONNECTIONS
  ELECTRICITY DISCONNECTIONS
  UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNFAIR DISMISSALS
  UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNFAIR DISMISSALS
  ENGINEERING APPRENTICESHIPS
  ENGINEERING APPRENTICESHIPS