Sitting of 3 April 1982

Preamble
The House met at Eleven o'clock, notice having been given by MR. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 122 (Earlier meeting of the House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS

  Falkland Islands (Personal Statement)
  11.5 am
  The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Humphrey Atkins): Following my statement to the House at 11 o'clock yesterday, I said in answer to supplementary questions from the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), the hon. Member for Hartlepool) (Mr. Leadbitter) and my hon. Friend the Member for Welwyn and Hatfield (Mr. Murphy) that we had been in touch with the governor of the Falkland Islands half an hour before I made my statement. That was inaccurate. We had in fact been in touch two hours earlier, at 8.30 am our time. No invasion had then taken place, and when I made my statement I had no knowledge of any change in the situation.
  I very much regret that I inadvertently misled the House, and I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing me this opportunity to set the record straight and to apologise to the House.

  Falkland Islands (Personal Statement)

    Business of the House
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That, at this day's sitting, Mr. Speaker do adjourn the House at Two o'clock without putting any Question.—[Mr. Jopling.]
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. Stoddart) gave me notice of a manuscript amendment, which I do not propose to accept. The manuscript amendment proposes that the sitting should continue until 5 o'clock. If the House wishes to vote on the motion, I think that it had better do so straight away to avoid taking time out of the main debate. If the motion were rejected, we would have an open-ended debate.
    11.7 am
    Mr. David Stoddart: I wish to speak briefly to the motion and to give my reasons for asking that the manuscript amendment be accepted.
    The motion proposes a three-hour debate. Quite naturally, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and other senior Front Bench spokesmen will wish to put the point of view of the Government and of the Opposition. The House is packed with Privy Councillors, ex-Prime Ministers and ex-Foreign Secretaries, who are entitled to give the House the benefit of their long experience. There will therefore be very little time left for Back-Bench Members to give their views and those of their constituents whom they will have consulted yesterday about the grave crisis facing this country and the international terrorism perpetrated on the Falkland Islands by the Argentine Government.
    630
    I hope, therefore, that the House will vote against the motion so that we may have an adequate discussion on this matter.
    Question put:—
    The House divided: Ayes 204, Noes 115.

    Division No. 117]

    [11.07 am

    AYES

    Adley,Robert

    Goodhew,SirVictor

    Alexander,Richard

    Goodlad,Alastair

    Ancram,Michael

    Gorst,John

    Arnold,Tom

    Gow, Ian

    Aspinwall,Jack

    Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)

    Atkins, RtHon H.(S'thorne)

    Greenway, Harry

    Atkins,Robert(PrestonN)

    Grist, Ian

    Atkinson,David(B'm'th,E)

    Grylls,Michael

    Baker,Kenneth(St.M'bone)

    Gummer,JohnSelwyn

    Banks,Robert

    Hamilton,Michael(Salisbury)

    Bendall, Vivian

    Hampson, DrKeith

    Benyon, W(Buckingham)

    Hannam,John

    Bevan,DavidGilroy

    Haselhurst,Alan

    Biffen, RtHon John

    Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael

    Blackburn,John

    Hayhoe, Barney

    Blaker, Peter

    Heddle,John

    Body, Richard

    Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.

    Bonsor.SirNicholas

    Hill,James

    Boscawen.HonRobert

    Hogg.HonDouglas(Gr'th'm,)

    Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)

    Holland, Philip(Carlton)

    Bowden,Andrew

    Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

    Boyson,Dr Rhodes

    Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)

    Braine,SirBernard

    Hunt, David (Wirral)

    Bright.Graham

    Hurd, RtHon Douglas

    Brooke, Hon Peter

    Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick

    Browne,John(Winchester)

    Jessel, Toby

    Bryan, Sir Paul

    JohnsonSmith,Geoffrey

    Buck,Antony

    Jopling,RtHonMichael

    Budgen,Nick

    Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith

    Burden,SirFrederick

    Kellett-Bowman.MrsElaine

    Butcher,John

    Kershaw, SirAnthony

    Carlisle, John (Luton West)

    King, RtHon Tom

    Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)

    Kitson,SirTimothy

    Carlisle, RtHonM. (R'c'n)

    Lang, Ian

    Chalker, Mrs. Lynda

    LeMarchant,Spencer

    Channon, Rt. Hon. Paul

    Lennox-Boyd.HonMark

    Chapman,Sydney

    Lester, Jim (Beeston)

    Churchill,W.S.

    Lewis,Kenneth(Rutland)

    Clark, SirW. (Croydon S)

    Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)

    Clegg.SirWalter

    Loveridge.John

    Colvin,Michael

    Luce,Richard

    Cope,John

    Lyell, Nicholas

    Costain,SirAlbert

    McCrindle, Robert

    Critchley.Julian

    Macfarlane.Neil

    Crouch,David

    Macmillan, RtHonM.

    Douglas-Hamilton, LordJ.

    McNair-Wilson,M.(N'bury,)

    Dover.Denshore

    McQuarrie, Albert

    du Cann, Rt Hon Edward

    Madel, David

    Dunn, Robert (Dartford)

    Major, John

    Durant.Tony

    Marland.Paul

    Eden, RtHon Sir John

    Marlow,Antony

    Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)

    Marshall,Michael(Arundel)

    Eggar.Tim

    Mates,Michael

    Emery, Sir Peter

    Mawhinney,DrBrian

    Eyre,Reginald

    Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin

    Faith, MrsSheila

    Mayhew, Patrick

    Fell, Sir Anthony

    Mellor, David

    Fenner, Mrs Peggy

    Miller,Hal(B'grove)

    Finsberg,Geoffrey

    Mills,Iain(Meriden)

    Fisher, Sir Nigel

    Mills, Peter (West Devon)

    Fletcher, A. (Ed'nb'ghN)

    Mitchell,David(Basingstoke)

    Fletcher-Cooke.SirCharles

    Moate, Roger

    Forman,Nigel

    Moore.John

    Fowler, Rt Hon Norman

    Morris, M. (N'hamptonS)

    Fraser, Peter (South Angus)

    Moyle, RtHon Roland

    Fry, Peter

    Murphy,Christopher

    Gardiner, George(Reigate)

    Nelson,Anthony

    Garel-Jones,Tristan

    Neubert,Michael

    Gilmour, RtHon Sir Ian

    Normanton.Tom

    Glyn, DrAlan

    Nott, RtHon John

    Goodhart.SirPhilip

    Onslow, Cranley

    631

    Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs S.

    Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)

    Osborn,John

    Stokes,John

    Page, John (Harrow, West)

    StradlingThomasJ.

    Page, Richard (SWHerts)

    Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)

    Parkinson, RtHonCecil

    Tebbit, Rt Hon Norman

    Patten.Christopher(Bath)

    Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs M.

    Pattie,Geoffrey

    Thompson,Donald

    Pawsey, James

    Thorne, Neil (IlfordSouth)

    Percival, Sir Ian

    Townsend, Cyril D, (B'heath)

    Peyton, Rt Hon John

    Trippier, David

    Porter, Barry

    van Straubenzee, Sir W.

    Proctor, K. Harvey

    Vaughan, DrGerard

    Pym, Rt Hon Francis

    Viggers, Peter

    Raison, Rt Hon Timothy

    Waddington, David

    Rathbone, Tim

    Waldegrave, HonWilliam

    Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

    Walker, B. (Perth)

    Ridley,Hon Nicholas

    Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir D.

    Rossi, Hugh

    Wall.SirPatrick

    Sainsbury.HonTimothy

    Ward,John

    Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)

    Warren,Kenneth

    Shaw,Michael (Scarborough)

    Watson,John

    Shelton.William(Streatham)

    Wheeler,John

    Shepherd,Colin (Hereford)

    Whitelaw, RtHonWilliam

    Silvester, Fred

    Whitney, Raymond

    Sims, Roger

    Wickenden,Keith

    Skeet, T. H. H.

    Wilkinson,John

    Speed, Keith

    Williams.D.(Montgomery,)

    Speller,Tony

    Young,SirGeorge(Acton)

    Spicer, Jim (WestDorset)

    Younger, Rt Hon George

    Spicer, Michael (S Worcs)

    Squire,Robin

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Stainton, Keith

    Mr. Carol Mather and Mr. Anthony Berry.

    Stanbrook,lvor

    NOES

    Aitken,Jonathan

    Coleman,Donald

    Alton,David

    Cormack, Patrick

    Amery, Rt Hon Julian

    Cox.T. (W'dsw'th, Toot'g)

    Ashley, Rt Hon Jack

    Cranborne, Viscount

    Berth, A. J.

    Crawshaw,Richard

    Benn, Rt Hon Tony

    Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)

    Bennett,Andrew(St'kp'tN)

    Davis, Terry (B'ham, Stechf'd)

    Bidwell,Sydney

    Dobson,Frank

    Biggs-Davison,SirJohn

    Dubs, Alfred

    Bottomley, RtHonA(M'b'ro)

    Dunnett.Jack

    Bray, Dr Jeremy

    Eastham.Ken

    Brocklebank-Fowler.C.

    Edwards, R. (W'hampt'n S E)

    Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)

    English,Michael

    Brown, Ronald W. (H'ckn'yS)

    Ennals, Rt Hon David

    Callaghan, Jim (Midd't'n&P)

    Farr,John

    Campbell,Ian

    Field, Frank

    Campbell-Savours, Dale

    Fitt, Gerard

    Carmichael.Neil

    Foulkes, George

    Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th, S'n)

    Fraser, J. (Lamb'th, N'w'd)

    Cohen,Stanley

    Freeson, RtHon Reginald

    632

    George,Bruce

    Robertson,George

    Gilbert, RtHon Dr John

    Robinson, P. (Belfast E)

    Hamilton, W.W. (C'tral Fife)

    Rodgers, RtHonWilliam

    Haynes, Frank

    Rooker, J. W.

    Holland, (L'b'th,Vauxh'll)

    Roper,John

    Homewood, William

    Rowlands,Ted

    Hordern,Peter

    Sheerman,Barry

    Janner.HonGreville

    Sheldon, Rt Hon R.

    Jay, RtHon Douglas

    Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)

    Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Hillhead)

    Silverman,Julius

    Johnston, Russell(Inverness)

    Soley, Clive

    Kilfedder,JamesA.

    Spearing,Nigel

    Kilroy-Silk.Robert

    Stallard,A.W.

    Lamond, James

    Stewart, Rt Hon D. (W Isles)

    Leighton, Ronald

    Stoddart,David

    Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

    Straw,Jack

    Lloyd, Ian (Havant & W'loo)

    Summerskill,HonDrShirley

    Lofthouse,Geoffrey

    Temple-Morris,Peter

    McGu ire, Michael (Ince)

    Thomas, Mike (Newcastle E)

    MacKenzie, RtHonGregor

    Tilley,John

    McTaggart, Robert

    Torney,Tom

    McWilliam.John

    Urwin, RtHon Tom

    Magee, Bryan

    Wainwright E. (DearneV)

    Marks,Kenneth

    Weetch, Ken

    Mitchell, Austin(Grimsby)

    Welsh,Michael

    Molyneaux,James

    White, Frank R.

    Morgan,Geraint

    White, J. (G'gowPollok)

    Morris, Rt Hon C. (O'shaw)

    Williams, Rt Hon A.(S'sea W)

    Newens, Stanley

    Williams, Rt Hon Mrs (Crosby)

    Ogden,Eric

    Wilson, RtHonSirH.(H'ton)

    Owen, Rt Hon Dr David

    Winnick, David

    Paisley, Rev Ian

    Woodall,Alec

    Park, George

    Woolmer,Kenneth

    Pendry,Tom

    Wright.Sheila

    Pitt, William Henry

    Young, David (Bolton E)

    Powell, Rt Hon J.E. (S Down)

    Powell, Raymond(Ogmore)

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Price, C. (Lewisham W)

    Mr. John Maxton and Mr. John Home Robertson.

    Radice, Giles

    Richardson.Jo

    Question accordingly agreed to.
    Mr. Michael English: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Yesterday, as reported in column 620 of Hansard, your Deputy undertook to enter into certain consultations in answer to a question of mine about whether the Foreign Secretary could be examined at the Bar of the House about the Falkland Islands. Could you please inform us of the results of those consultations?
    Mr. Speaker: Only the House can decide on that question. It is not a matter for a ruling by Mr. Speaker.

    Falkland Islands
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Jopling.]
    11.19 am
    The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher):The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands.
    Yesterday was a day of rumour and counter-rumour. Throughout the day we had no communication from the Government of the Falklands. Indeed, the last message that we received was at 21.55 hours on Thursday night, 1 April. Yesterday morning at 8.33 am we sent a telegram which was acknowledged. At 8.45 am all communications ceased. I shall refer to that again in a moment. By late afternoon yesterday it became clear that an Argentine invasion had taken place and that the lawful British Government of the islands had been usurped.
    I am sure that the whole House will join me in condemning totally this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear".] It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality.
    It was not until 8.30 this morning, our time, when I was able to speak to the governor, who had arrived in Uruguay, that I learnt precisely what had happened. He told me that the Argentines had landed at approximately 6 am Falkland's time, 10 am our time. One party attacked the capital from the landward side and another from the seaward side. The governor then sent a signal to us which we did not receive.
    Communications had ceased at 8.45 am our time. It is common for atmospheric conditions to make communications with Port Stanley difficult. Indeed, we had been out of contact for a period the previous night.
    The governor reported that the Marines, in the defence of Government House, were superb. He said that they acted in the best traditions of the Royal Marines. They inflicted casualties, but those defending Government House suffered none. He had kept the local people informed of what was happening through a small local transmitter which he had in Government House. He is relieved that the islanders heeded his advice to stay indoors. Fortunately, as far as he is aware, there were no civilian casualties. When he left the Falklands, he said that the people were in tears. They do not want to be Argentine. He said that the islanders are still tremendously loyal. I must say that I have every confidence in the governor and the action that he took.
    I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment.
    Argentina has, of course, long disputed British sovereignty over the islands. We have absolutely no doubt about our sovereignty, which has been continuous since 1833. Nor have we any doubt about the unequivocal wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock
    634
    and tradition, and they wish to remain British in allegiance. We cannot allow the democratic rights of the islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina.
    Over the past 15 years, successive British Governments have held a series of meetings with the Argentine Government to discuss the dispute. In many of these meetings elected representatives of the islanders have taken part. We have always made it clear that their wishes were paramount and that there would be no change in sovereignty without their consent and without the approval of the House.
    The most recent meeting took place this year in New York at the end of February between my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham, (Mr. Luce) accompanied by two members of the islands council, and the Deputy Foreign Secretary of Argentina. The atmosphere at the meeting was cordial and positive, and a communiqué was issued about future negotiating procedures. Unfortunately, the joint communiqué which had been agreed was not published in Buenos Aires.
    There was a good deal of bellicose comment in the Argentine press in late February and early March, about which my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expressed his concern in the House on 3 March following the Anglo-Argentine talks in New York. However, this has not been an uncommon situation in Argentina over the years. It would have been absurd to dispatch the fleet every time there was bellicose talk in Buenos Aires. There was no good reason on 3 March to think that an invasion was being planned, especially against the background of the constructive talks on which my hon. Friend had just been engaged. The joint communiqué on behalf of the Argentine deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and my hon. Friend read:
    "The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense."
    There had, of course, been previous incidents affecting sovereignty before the one in South Georgia, to which I shall refer in a moment. In December 1976 the Argentines illegally set up a scientific station on one of the dependencies within the Falklands group—Southern Thule. The Labour Government attempted to solve the matter through diplomatic exchanges, but without success. The Argentines remained there and are still there.
    Two weeks ago—on 19 March—the latest in this series of incidents affecting sovereignty occurred; and the deterioration in relations between the British and Argentine Governments which culminated in yesterday's Argentine invasion began. The incident appeared at the start to be relatively minor. But we now know it was the beginning of much more.
    The commander of the British Antartic Survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia—a dependency of the Falkland Islands over which the United Kingdom has exercised sovereignty since 1775 when the island was discovered by Captain Cook—reported to us that an Argentine navy cargo ship had landed about 60 Argentines at nearby Leith harbour. They had set up camp and hoisted the Argentine flag. They were there to carry out a valid commercial contract to remove scrap metal from a former whaling station.
    The leader of the commercial expedition, Davidoff, had told our embassy in Buenos Aires that he would be going

    635
    to South Georgia in March. He was reminded of the need to obtain permission from the immigration authorities on the island. He did not do so. The base commander told the Argentines that they had no right to land on South Georgia without the permission of the British authorities. They should go either to Grytviken to get the necessary clearances, or leave. The ship and some 50 of them left on 22 March. Although about 10 Argentines remained behind, this appeared to reduce the tension.
    In the meantime, we had been in touch with the Argentine Government about the incident. They claimed to have had no prior knowledge of the landing and assured us that there were no Argentine military personnel in the party. For our part we made it clear that, while we had no wish to interfere in the operation of a normal commercial contract, we could not accept the illegal presence of these people on British territory.
    We asked the Argentine Government either to arrange for the departure of the remaining men or to ensure that they obtained the necessary permission to be there. Because we recognised the potentially serious nature of the situation, HMS "Endurance" was ordered to the area. We told the Argentine Government that, if they failed to regularise the position of the party on South Georgia or to arrange for their departure, HMS "Endurance" would take them off, without using force, and return them to Argentina.
    This was, however, to be a last resort. We were determined that this apparently minor problem of 10 people on South Georgia in pursuit of a commercial contract should not be allowed to escalate and we made it plain to the Argentine Government that we wanted to achieve a peaceful resolution of the problem by diplomatic means. To help in this, HMS "Endurance" was ordered not to approach the Argentine party at Leith but to go to Grytviken.
    But it soon became clear that the Argentine Government had little interest in trying to solve the problem. On 25 March another Argentine navy ship arrived at Leith to deliver supplies to the 10 men ashore. Our ambassador in Buenos Aires sought an early response from the Argentine Government to our previous requests that they should arrange for the men's departure. This request was refused. Last Sunday, on Sunday 28 March, the Argentine Foreign Minister sent a message to my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary refusing outright to regularise the men's position. Instead it restated Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their dependencies.
    My right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary then sent a message to the United States Secretary of State asking him to intervene and to urge restraint.
    By the beginning of this week it was clear that our efforts to solve the South Georgia dispute through the usual diplomatic channels were getting nowhere. Therefore, on Wednesday 31 March my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that we should dispatch a special emissary to Buenos Aires.
    Later that day we received information which led us to believe that a large number of Argentine ships, including an aircraft carrier, destroyers, landing craft, troop carriers and submarines, were heading for Port Stanley. I
    636
    contacted President Reagan that evening and asked him to intervene with the Argentine President directly. We promised, in the meantime, to take no action to escalate the dispute for fear of precipitating—[Interruption]—the very event that our efforts were directed to avoid. May I remind Opposition Members—[Interruption]—what happened when, during the lifetime of their Government——
    Mr. J. W. Rooker: We did not lose the Falklands.
    The Prime Minister—Southern Thule was occupied. It was occupied in 1976. The House was not even informed by the then Government until 1978, when, in response to questioning by my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), now Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) said:
    "We have sought the resolve the issue though diplomatic exchanges between the two Governments. That is infinitely preferable to public denunciations and public statements when we are trying to achieve a practical result to the problem that has arisen."—[Official Report, 24 May 1978; Vol. 950, c. 1550–51.]
    Mr. Edward Rowlands: The right hon. Lady is talking about a piece of rock in the most southerly part of the dependencies, which is completely uninhabited and which smells of large accumulations of penguin and other bird droppings. There is a vast difference—a whole world of difference—between the 1,800 people now imprisoned by Argentine invaders and that argument. The right hon. Lady should have the grace to accept that.
    The Prime Minister: We are talking about the sovereignty of British territory—[Interruption]—which was infringed in 1976. The House was not even informed of it until 1978. We are talking about a further incident in South Georgia which—as I have indicated—seemed to be a minor incident at the time. There is only a British Antarctic scientific survey there and there was a commercial contract to remove a whaling station. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that had I come to the House at that time and said that we had a problem on South Georgia with 10 people who had landed with a contract to remove a whaling station, and had I gone on to say that we should send HMS "Invincible", I should have been accused of war mongering and sabre rattling.
    Information about the Argentine fleet did not arrive until Wednesday. Argentina is, of course, very close to the Falklands—a point that the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil cannot and must not ignore—and its navy can sail there very quickly. On Thursday, the Argentine Foreign Minister rejected the idea of an emissary and told our ambassador that the diplomatic channel, as a means of solving this dispute, was closed. President Reagan had a very long telephone conversation, of some 50 minutes, with the Argentine President, but his strong representations fell on deaf ears. I am grateful to him and to Secretary Haig for their strenuous and persistent efforts on our behalf.
    On Thursday, the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Perez De Cuellar, summoned both British and Argentine permanent representatives to urge both countries to refrain from the use or threat of force in. the South Atlantic. Later that evening we sought an emergency meeting of the Security Council. We accepted the appeal of its President for restraint. The Argentines

    637
    said nothing. On Friday, as the House knows, the Argentines invaded the Falklands and I have given a precise account of everything we knew, or did not know, about that situation. There were also reports that yesterday the Argentines also attacked South Georgia, where HMS "Endurance" had left a detachment of 22 Royal Marines. Our information is that on 2 April an Argentine naval transport vessel informed the base commander at Grytviken that an important message would be passed to him after 11 o'clock today our time. It is assumed that this message will ask the base commander to surrender.
    Before indicating some of the measures that the Government have taken in response to the Argentine invasion, I should like to make three points. First, even if ships had been instructed to sail the day that the Argentines landed on South Georgia to clear the whaling station, the ships could not possibly have got to Port Stanley before the invasion. [Interruption.] Opposition Members may not like it, but that is a fact.
    Secondly, there have been several occasions in the past when an invasion has been threatened. The only way of being certain to prevent an invasion would have been to keep a very large fleet close to the Falklands, when we are some 8,000 miles away from base. No Government have ever been able to do that, and the cost would be enormous.
    Mr. Eric Ogden: Will the right hon. Lady say what has happened to HMS "Endurance"?
    The Prime Minister: HMS "Endurance" is in the area. It is not for me to say precisely where, and the hon. Gentleman would not wish me to do so.
    Thirdly, aircraft unable to land on the Falklands, because of the frequently changing weather, would have had little fuel left and, ironically, their only hope of landing safely would have been to divert to Argentina. Indeed, all of the air and most sea supplies for the Falklands come from Argentina, which is but 400 miles away compared with our 8,000 miles.
    That is the background against which we have to make decisions and to consider what action we can best take. I cannot tell the House precisely what dispositions have been made—some ships are already at sea, others were put on immediate alert on Thursday evening.
    The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. HMS "Invincible" will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday.
    I stress that I cannot foretell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the situation at the time. Meanwhile, we hope that our continuing diplomatic efforts, helped by our many friends, will meet with success.
    The Foreign Ministers of the European Community member States yesterday condemned the intervention and urged withdrawal. The NATO Council called on both sides to refrain from force and continue diplomacy.
    The United Nations Security Council met again yesterday and will continue its discussions today. [Laughter.] Opposition Members laugh. They would have been the first to urge a meeting of the Security Council if we had not called one. They would have been the first to urge restraint and to urge a solution to the problem by diplomatic means. They would have been the first to accuse us of sabre rattling and war mongering.
    Mr. Tam Dalyell: The right hon. Lady referred to our many friends. Have we any friends in South America on this issue?
    The Prime Minister: Doubtless our friends in South America will make their views known during any proceedings at the Security Council. I believe that many countries in South America will be prepared to condemn the invasion of the Falklands Islands by force.
    We are now reviewing all aspects of the relationship between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Argentine chargé d'affaires and his staff were yesterday instructed to leave within four days.
    As an appropriate precautionary and, I hope, temporary measure, the Government have taken action to freeze Argentine financial assets held in this country. An order will be laid before Parliament today under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 blocking the movement of gold, securities or funds held in the United Kingdom by the Argentine Government or Argentine residents.
    As a further precautionary measure, the ECGD has suspended new export credit cover for the Argentine. It is the Government's earnest wish that a return to good sense and the normal rules of international behaviour on the part of the Argentine Government will obviate the need for action across the full range of economic relations.
    We shall be reviewing the situation and be ready to take further steps that we deem appropriate and we shall, of course, report to the House.
    The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.
    11.45 am
    Mr. Michael Foot: It was obviously essential that the House of Commons should be recalled on this occasion. I thank the Prime Minister for the decision to do so. I can well understand the anxiety and impatience of many of my hon. Friends on the Back Benches who voted in the Division a few minutes ago and who desire to have full and proper time to examine all the aspects of this issue. I shall return to that aspect of the matter in a few minutes.
    I first wish to set on record as clearly as I possibly can what we believe to be the international rights and wrongs of this matter, because I believe that one of the purposes of the House being assembled on this occasion is to make that clear not only to the people in our country but to people throughout the world.
    The rights and the circumstances of the people in the Falkland Islands must be uppermost in our minds. There is no question in the Falkland Islands of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on the basis of association with this country. We have a moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that that is sustained.

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    The people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute right to look to us at this moment of their desperate plight, just as they have looked to us over the past 150 years. They are faced with an act of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances. Any guarantee from this invading force is utterly worthless—as worthless as any of the guarantees that are given by this same Argentine junta to its own people.
    We can hardly forget that thousands of innocent people fighting for their political rights in Argentine are in prison and have been tortured and debased. We cannot forget that fact when our friends and fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are suffering as they are at this moment.
    On the merits of the matter, we hope that the question is understood throughout the world. In that respect I believe that the Government were right to take the matter to the United Nations. It would have been delinquency if they had not, because that is the forum in which we have agreed that such matters of international right and international claim should be stated.
    Whatever else the Government have done—I shall come to that in a moment—or not done, I believe that it was essential for them to take our case to the United Nations and to present it with all the force and power of advocacy at the command of this country. The decision and the vote in the United Nations will take place in an hour or two's time. I must say to people there that we in this country, as a whole, irrespective of our party affiliations, will examine the votes most carefully.
    I was interested to hear how strongly the President of France spoke out earlier this morning. I hope that every other country in the world will speak in a similar way.
    If, at the United Nations this afternoon, no such declaration were made—I know that it would be only a declaration at first, but there might be the possibility of action there later—not merely would it be a gross injury to the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands, not merely would it be an injury to the people of this country, who have a right to have their claims upheld in the United Nations, but it would be a serious injury to the United Nations itself. It would enhance the dangers that similar, unprovoked aggressions could occur in other parts of the world.
    That is one of the reasons why we are determined to ensure that we examine this matter in full and uphold the rights of our country throughout the world, and the claim of our country to be a defender of people's freedom throughout the world, particularly those who look to us for special protection, as do the people in the Falkland Islands.
    I deal next with the Government's conduct in the matter. What has happened to British diplomacy? The explanations given by the right hon. Lady, when she managed to rise above some of her own party arguments—they were not quite the exclusive part of her speech—were not very full and not very clear. They will need to be made a good deal more ample in the days to come.
    The right hon. Lady did not quote fully the response of Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at his press conference yesterday. She referred to the Minister of State, who, according to Lord Carrington,
    "had just been in New York discussing with Mr. Ross, his opposite number, the question of resumption of talks with the
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    Argentine Government about the problems of the Falkland Islands. And they had had a talk and come to an agreement. Mr. Ross went back to the Argentine and a number of things came up and they sent a message which"——
    I emphasise the words——
    "I have not yet had time to reply to."
    Lord Carrington added:
    "So there was every reason to suppose that the Argentines were interested in negotiations."
    Those talks took place on 27 February. The right hon. Lady gave an account of these negotiations. But from what has happened it seems that the British Government have been fooled by the way in which the Argentine junta has gone about its business. The Government must answer for that as well as for everything else.
    What about British communications and British intelligence? The Guardian states today in a leading article:
    "This country devotes a greater proportion of its annual output to its armed forces than any other Western country, with the exception of the United States. It has extensive diplomatic and intelligence gathering activities. And all of that gave Mrs. Thatcher, Lord Carrington and Mr. Nott precisely no effective cards when the Argentine navy moved."
    I should be very surprised to hear, because of some of the previous debates and discussions on the crises that have arisen with the Argentine, that the British Government did not have better intelligence than that. So good was our intelligence that, although the Prime Minister now tells us that the invasion took place at 10 am yesterday, the Lord Privy Seal—I know that he has apologised for some of his remarks—told the House of Commons and the British people:
    "We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations charter."—[Official Report, 2 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 571.]
    When he was saying that, it was the Argentine Government who were taking appropriate military, not diplomatic, measures to enforce their will.
    The right hon. Lady, the Secretary of State for Defence and the whole Government will have to give a very full account of what happened, how their diplomacy was conducted and why we did not have the information to which we are entitled when expenditure takes place on such a scale. Above all, more important than the question of what happened to British diplomacy or to British intelligence is what happened to our power to act. The right hon. Lady seemed to dismiss that question. It cannot be dismissed. Of course this country has the power to act—short, often, of taking military measures. Indeed, we have always been told, as I understand it, that the purpose of having some military power is to deter. The right to deter and the capacity to deter were both required in this situation.
    The previous Government had to deal with the same kind of dictatorial regime in the Argentine, the same kind of threat to the people of the Falkland Islands, and the same kinds of problems as those with which the Goverment have had to wrestle over the past weeks and months. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) compressed the whole position into the question that he put to the Government only last Tuesday. I shall read his remarks to the House, and I ask the House to mark every word. This was no factious Opposition. This was an Opposition Member seeking to sustain the Government if the Government were doing their duty.
    My right hon. Friend said:

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    "I support the Government's attempts to solve the problem by diplomatic means, which is clearly the best and most sensible way of approaching the problem, but is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood them about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS "Endurance", and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? While I do not press the Minister on what is happening today, I trust that it is the same sort of action."—[Official Report, 30 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 198.]
    The House and whole country have the right to say the same thing to the Government. The people of the Falkland Islands have an even greater right to say it than ourselves. The right hon. Lady has not answered that question. She has hardly attempted to answer it. It is no answer to refer to the matter so effectively disposed of by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands), who has much knowledge of these matters. It is, of course, a very different question.
    No one can say for certain that the pacific and honourable solution of this problem that was reached in 1977 was due to the combination of diplomatic and military activity. These things cannot be proved. There is, however, every likelihood that that was the case. In any event, the fact that it worked on the previous occasion was surely all the more reason for the Government's seeking to make it work on this occasion, especially when, according to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs—I refer again to the diplomatic exchanges—it had been going on for some time. According to the diplomatic exchanges, the Argentine Government were still awaiting an answer from the Secretary of State on some of the matters involved.
    The right hon. Lady made some play, although not very effectively, with the time it takes to get warships into the area. We are talking about events several weeks ago. All these matters have to be answered. They cannot be answered fully in this debate. There will have to be another debate on the subject next week. Whether that debate takes the form of a motion of censure, or some other form, or perhaps takes the form of the establishment of an inquiry into the whole matter, so that all the evidence and the facts can be laid before the people of this country, I have not the slightest doubt that, at some stage, an inquiry of that nature, without any inhibitions and restraints, that can probe the matter fully will have to be undertaken.
    I return to what I said at the start of my remarks. We are paramountly concerned, like, I am sure, the bulk of the House—I am sure that the country is also concerned—about what we can do to protect those who rightly and naturally look to us for protection. So far, they have been betrayed. The responsibility for the betrayal rests with the Government. The Government must now prove by deeds—they will never be able to do it by words—that they are not responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with that charge. That is the charge, I believe, that lies against them. Even though the position and the circumstances of the people who live in the Falkland Islands are uppermost in our minds—it would be outrageous if that were not the case—there is the longer-term interest to ensure that foul and brutal aggression does not succeed in our world. If it does, there will be a danger not merely to the Falkland Islands, but to people all over this dangerous planet.
    Several Hon. Members rose——
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I remind the House that two hours remain for this debate. I appeal to those Privy Councillors who may be called not to take advantage of the fact that they are being called early because they are Privy Councillors. I ask everyone to bear in mind that almost all hon. Members have indicated that they would like to speak.
    12.1 pm
    Mr. Edward du Cann: There are times, Mr. Speaker, in the affairs of our nation when the House should speak with a single, united voice. This is just such a time. The Leader of the Opposition spoke for us all. He did this nation a service when, in clear and unmistakable terms, he condemned what he called this brutal agression and when he affirmed the rights of the Falkland islanders to decide their own destiny. I warmly applaud that part of his speech. I resent and reject his charge of betrayal.
    I have a single simple point to make and I can make it shortly. It is right that the House should also, at this moment of crisis for our nation and for the Government, pledge full support to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues in their heavy and awesome responsibility. As the Leader of the Opposition said, we must do what is necessary and what is right. However, let us see that what we do is well done.
    Undoubtedly, there will be questions to be asked. There will also be questions to be answered. I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that there will be a need for a full account of this affair. However, some of those questions can and should be listed shortly now.
    It is astounding that, for all our defence expenditure, which in absolute and proportional terms is huge, and for all our capacity for diplomatic activity and intelligence, we appear to have been so woefully ill prepared. It is extraordinary that conventional forces were not deployed on standby against an occupation.
    The rule should surely be that the defence of our realm begins wherever British people are. Defence of the realm begins wherever they travel on their lawful occasions and wherever they may be threatened. The apparent assumption that the problem could be resolved only by diplomatic means was surely fatuous. However, if we have no inquests as yet, it must surely be said now that this incident demands a revision of the United Kingdom's defence strategy, some aspects of which have made many hon. Members and others outside the House decidedly nervous.
    However, let us declare and resolve that our duty now is to repossess our possessions and to rescue our own people. Our right to the Falkland Islands is undoubted. Our sovereignty is unimpeachable. British interest in that part of the world, in my judgment, is substantial. It 'As substantial in the Falkland Islands, however trivial the figures may appear to be. It is substantial in the sea, which has yet to yield up its treasures. It is also substantial in Antarctica. The British interest would be substantial even if we were discussing the affairs of just one fellow citizen.
    We must rally support to our position and cause. I entirely agree with the Leader of the Opposition that this nation has always been prompt to condemn dictatorship, to ally ourselves and fight against it and fight against aggression. Of course, we must explore every diplomatic and legal means to recover what is legitimately ours.

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    Every day now is crucial, for every day that the fait accompli is accepted, the harder it will be to remove it: ask the peoples of Afghanistan, Hungary or Poland about that.
    The world must face the fact that if one tolerates a single act of aggression, one connives at them all. In the United Kingdom, we must accept reality. For all our alliances and for all the social politenesses which the diplomats so often mistake for trust, in the end in life it is self-reliance and only self-reliance that counts. Suez, when I first came into the House 25 and more years ago, surely taught us that not every ally is staunch when the call comes. We have one duty only, which we owe to ourselves—the duty to rescue our people and to uphold our rights. Let that be the unanimous and clear resolve of the House this day.
    Let us hear no more about logistics—how difficult it is to travel long distances. I do not remember the Duke of Wellington whining about Tones Vedras. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear. "] We have nothing to lose now except our honour. I am clear that that is safe in the hands of my right hon. Friend.
    12.7 pm
    Mr. J. Enoch Powell: I want to preface the few things I wish to say to the House with an appeal which I direct particularly and personally to the Prime Minister. It would be grotesque, at a time when, in circumstances of crisis, we are deliberating about the protection of a remote portion of British territory and of the British people, that we should at the same time be engaged in following up proposals which those in a part of the United Kingdom believe—the right hon. Lady is aware of the reasons why they believe—are designed eventually to detach them from being part of the United Kingdom. I assume that she will have already given instructions—if she has not, I appeal to her to do so—that the proposals which were to have been produced on Monday will be deferred until a more timely occasion.
    I agree with the right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) that the House today is not primarily concerned with inquests—there will be a time for inquests and more abundant material for them—but with what is now to be done. Those who take part in this debate ought to declare clearly what they believe ought now to be done.
    Nevertheless, there is a matter of the immediate past where our answer will cast light on what we intend to do and what our spirit is. The Secretary of State for Defence was asked yesterday:
    "if the British Marines had been given orders to surrender if outnumbered".
    He is reported as having said "Of course not"—
    "He insisted that 'no British soldier ever surrenders.'"
    Whatever other inquiries there are, there has to be a court martial and an inquiry to establish the circumstances in which what the Secretary of State for Defence evidently regarded as right and expected did not happen, with consequent infamy to this country.
    The Leader of the Opposition was undoubtedly——
    Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On a matter of this sensitivity, the record should be put straight. Was not the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) relying on a quotation from a newspaper?
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order for me. The right hon. Gentleman must be allowed to continue.
    Mr. Powell: I agree with everything that the Leader of the Opposition said with regard to the Government's application to the United Nations. It was clearly right that we should place this matter, as we are in duty bound to do, before that forum; but when the sovereign territory of a country is invaded without warning, without provocation and without excuse, there is nothing which requires us to wait upon the decisions or upon the conditions or upon the deliberations or upon the resolutions of the United Nations before we take the appropriate steps which ought to follow.
    It is an ironical coincidence that the name of one of the ships which may be involved, the "Invincible", was also the name of the capital ship of which the dispatch from home waters to the Falkland Islands in December 1914 resulted in the destruction of Von Spee's squadron. On that occasion the German admiral, when he came up within sight of Port Stanley, made a mistake which proved fatal to him and to his sailors. Instead of closing with the enemy he stood off.
    There is only one reaction which is fit to meet unprovoked aggression upon one's own sovereign territory; that is direct and unqualified and immediate willingness—not merely willingness, but willingness expressed by action—to use force. The Government have set in train measures which will enable them to do that; but there must be nothing which casts doubt upon their will and their intention to do it.
    A few days ago I put a question to the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with regard to opinion in this country. I asked him whether it was "the Government's view that public opinion in this country would support, if necessary, the use of force to maintain British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the dependencies."
    The hon. Gentleman explained to me afterwards that he had clearly heard the first part of my question, but he did reply to it:
    "I should firmly point out that we claim and have sovereignty over the area and there is no shadow of doubt that, if it comes to the point, it will be our duty to defend and support the islanders to the best of our ability."—[Official Report, 30 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 165.]
    The Government have failed to do that duty. They have manifestly failed. They have failed in the face of the world.
    The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a soubriquet as the "Iron Lady". It arose in the context of remarks which she made about defence against the Soviet Union and its allies; but there was no reason to suppose that the right hon. Lady did not welcome and, indeed, take pride in that description. In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made.
    12.14 pm
    Sir Nigel Fisher: Hitherto, Britain's policy for the Falkland Islands has been genuinely bipartisan. Neither side of the House has ever made any attempt in the long drawn out negotiations with the Argentine to make party political capital. We have all been united in our support of the Falkland Islands, but I must honestly say to my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench that they cannot have expected a bipartisan reaction from the Opposition

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    today. Indeed, Ministers will not escape criticism from Conservative Members as well as from Opposition Members.
    Wherever the blame may lie, no one can deny that the islanders have been let down and that Britain has been humiliated. What can now be done? One's natural instinct is to get the invaders out, but it is much easier said than done. Logistically it would be very difficult and it would take a considerable time—I understand about two weeks—but far more serious would be the consequence for the islanders themselves.
    A full-scale battle for the Falkland Islands would mean that the islanders, including women and children, would be caught in the crossfire and many of them killed. We could avoid that by leaving the Argentine land forces in possession and confining our retaliation to a battle at sea. But then what? We could not keep our warships in the area indefinitely, with no base from which to supply them.
    The truth is that we have been pre-empted, as we were in Norway by the Germans in 1940, and that led to the fall of Mr. Chamberlain's Governmment. Of course, I do not suggest that the same situation should apply today[Interruption.]—but we are entitled to a full explanation of these events and, as soon as security considerations permit, to a clear indication from Ministers as to what action is now proposed.
    As a first step, all available sanctions against the Argentine should, of course, be taken. For example, I understand that the people of the Argentine are great football enthusiasts. The very least we should do is to ensure the exclusion of the Argentine from the World Cup. [Interruption.] I am not, of course, suggesting that that would induce the Argentine to withdraw from the islands, but the Argentine should be made aware of world condemnation of its unprovoked aggression in every way open to us, just as we did after the invasion of Afghanistan with regard to our athletes going to Moscow.
    Whatever action is decided upon, this is a deeply depressing and distressing episode. We have failed—and failed lamentably—to defend the integrity of one of Britain's few remaining colonies. It is difficult to understand why Ministers apparently did not understand the gravity of the threat to the islands. Therefore, I must ask one question. I appreciate that sending a task force of the size required in this instance is a very expensive operation. However, I hope that the fact that no task force was sent in time was not due to economic considerations. I must ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who will reply to the debate, to assure the House that that was not the reason for his lack of action. Will he specifically say that any intelligence indicators and threat assessments about early preparation, either overt or covert, were not disregarded by the Government for political or economic reasons? If our intelligence from the Argentine was as good as it should and used to be, we should have done some contingency planning and had ships and men there in good time to resist the Argentine landing. It is always much easier to stop something happening than to rectify it when it has happened.
    The Government can be excused only if our intelligence was very bad and if we genuinely did not know that an invasion was a possibility. That would be some sort of excuse, but not a very good one. Either way, we have been humiliated. Ministers have much to answer for today to the House, to the country and to the loyal people of the Falkland Islands.
    12.21 pm
    Dr. David Owen: The Government have the right to ask both sides of the House for the fullest support in their resolve to return the Falkland Islands and the freedom of the islanders to British sovereignty. They will get that support and they deserve it in every action that they take in the Security Council and elsewhere. However, the Government must restore the confidence of the country and the House in their ability to carry out that mission.
    I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that this is not the time to have an examination. There will come a time when an inquiry will be necessary and we must examine in great detail all that has happened or not happened during the past six weeks. However, it is necessary to examine a central question: why was no preparatory action taken a month ago? It cannot be said that this is a question of intelligence. Our own newspapers were carrying major stories. On 25 February The Guardian carried a story entitled:
    "Falklands raid hint by Argentine army."
    On 5 March there was the headline in The Times:
    "Argentina steps up Falklands pressure".
    There was ample warning that the position was deteriorating. We knew of the horror of the military junta in the Argentine and we knew of its actions. Only a few days ago, 3,000 political prisoners were taken, only to be released amid the euphoria of the invasion of the Falkland Islands. We knew that the military were jockeying for position in the navy, the army and the air force. We have known that for many years. It was for that reason four years ago, when a similar position developed, that naval forces were sent.
    The Secretary of State for Defence, in his press conference with the Foreign Secretary yesterday, said:
    "If we had made an earlier move to prepare the task force we would have precipitated, quite possibly, a military response—the very kind of thing by the Argentinians that we tried to avoid."
    The question that the Foreign Secretary, more than the Secretary of State for Defence, must answer is why no action was taken. On the precedent of the past, it was possible to deploy a naval force and to bring it back without any publicity. It was possible to use it in negotiations with the Argentines, knowing full well that we had behind us a naval force and the capacity to stop invasion.
    I say to the Prime Minister—the Leader of the Opposition fairly mentioned this fact—that the Prime Minister of the day took complete control of that issue. On my recommendation, the Secretary of State for Defence deployed the forces, but that small Cabinet meeting discussed the rules of engagement and the possibility of having to intervene were a naval force to come on to the Falkland Islands. That is the reality that the Prime Minister must now face.
    Enough of the past. This is not a moment for censure. The reality is that our naval forces will set sail, which I support. I say to the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that I am sure that the Royal Marines conducted themselves in the Falkland Islands in the best spirit of the Royal Marines.
    The question that we must now ask is how we can restore confidence. There have been rumours in the newspapers that the Secretary of State for Defence tendered his resignation, only for it to be refused. I would have expected no less of him, because he is a man of

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    honour. Ministers must now consider their position and the quality and strength of the Government during the next few critical weeks.
    Absent from the debate have been any positive suggestions. The Prime Minister is entitled to know where the House hopes she will now guide the country. There is much to be said for declaring our right to a 200-mile limit round the Falkland Islands. It would be perfectly compatible with international law to declare that no Argentine vessel should appear within that limit and that, if it did, the British Navy would take action.
    The precedent for the use of peaceful military action is the Cuban missile crisis and the use of a naval blockade. We still have a very strong Navy, but only just. We have the capacity to put a naval blockade on that 200-mile limit and to enforce it as long as we have hunter-killer submarines there. I hope that the Secretary of State for Defence can breach one aspect of security and let us know that there is a hunter-killer submarine in the area. If not, the House and the Argentines should assume that it is very nearly there. The hunter-killer submarine could effectively take action, if necessary. The Argentine Government should have fair warning to remove their vessels from the area. It is necessary to back up our diplomacy with the resolution and the capacity to deploy our forces.
    We all know that there will be great difficulties in a resisted offence against the Falkland Islands. There are massive forces on the islands, but nothing said in the House should exclude any possibility of repossessing them. I believe that they will be repossessed by a combination of firm diplomacy backed by the use of the Navy. They are far away and there are logistic difficulties, but we should not make too much of those. Perhaps we can call on some of our Commonwealth friends in New Zealand and Australia to help us—at least with refuelling.
    The Prime Minister misjudged the atmosphere of the House most seriously. It is now necessary for the message to come from the House that we are grossly dissatisfied with the conduct of the Government during the past month. We shall sustain them despite that, because we recognise that our service men's lives might be put at risk.
    Mr. Dalyell: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
    Dr. Owen: No. There is no question of anyone in the House weakening the stance of the Government, but the Prime Minister must now examine ways of restoring the Government's authority and ask herself why Britain has been placed in such a humiliating position during the past few days.
    Mr. Dalyell rose——
    Dr. Owen: The right hon. Lady said that it would have been absurd to send forces, but I do not agree. It would have been the right decision a month ago. The absence of that decision has meant humiliation. The House must now resolve to sustain the Government in restoring the position.
    12.29 pm
    Mr. Julian Amery: The third naval power in the world, and the second in NATO, has suffered a humiliating defeat. It is always painful in a state of war to criticise a Government, particularly a
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    Government of one's own friends, but the purpose of recrimination at a time like this is to prevent the repetition of error.
    On television yesterday my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary said that diplomacy was the only instrument that the Government had to hand. I fear that my noble Friend on this occasion, as on others, confuses diplomacy with foreign policy. Diplomacy is the day-to-day handling of conferences and international relations. Foreign policy involves having a clear aim and making sure that one has the means to carry out that aim.
    We supposed, and we were told, that the aim was to maintain British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, but I am bound to say, having followed the earlier negotiations of my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), and having had some experience of the Foreign Office's views about the Falkland Islands, that that aim was pursued with singularly little conviction. As for the means, they were non-existent. After the withdrawal from Simonstown, we no longer had a fleet almost permanently in the South Atlantic, but no attempt was made to carry out the main recommendation of the Shackleton committee to enlarge the airfield so that, when weather conditions allowed, we could have reinforced the Falkland Islands with a big enough garrison in a time of crisis.
    Beyond that, a number of us have been pleading over the years that our defence forces should not only be tailored to the NATO requirements but should be prepared and strong enough to defend our interests outside the specifically NATO area. That advice was not heeded by the Government. Quite the contrary. They proposed to cut back the Navy and, more particularly, HMS "Endurance" and HMS "Invincible". These, ironically, are now two of the ships that are most mentioned in plans for the forthcoming operations. We were told that the cuts were inevitable because of cost. I can only say to the Government that the consequences of our defeat yesterday will be a good deal more expensive than would have been the cost of maintaining those ships.
    At the same press conference, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said that no amount of intelligence could have guided the Government to a different course. I do not understand that. It was in February, well within sailing time to the islands, that the Argentine Government first began to speak in a tone which all of us who know anything about the Falkland Islands detected as quite unusually aggressive. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that even if we had begun to send ships from the time of the landing in South Georgia, they would not be there yet. That is quite true, but they would be halfway there. That would be something. I find it hard to understand, unless our intelligence services have been wholly undermined, how they could have failed to detect the extensive preparations that must have been necessary in the Argentine.
    My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has done her best to serve as an air-raid shelter for her colleagues directly responsible, and that she has done with her customary loyalty. However, we should recognise that we have suffered the inevitable consequences of the combination of unpreparedness and feeble counsels.
    We have lost a battle, but have not lost the war. It is the old saying that Britain always wins the last battle. It will not be an easy task. It is not just that the sea voyage for our ships is long, but that the international waters will

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    beome rougher as the days go by. Pressures will be exerted. We shall be told "Why not try for a reasonable compromise?" and "On no account use force". We already see that in the Daily Mirror and The Guardian this morning. Or we shall be told to think about our economic interests in the Argentine. All those things will be said.
    I do not want to propose a strategy today. This is not the occasion for an armchair strategy. However, I seek from the Government today—and if not today, certainly in the debate that the Leader of the Opposition says he will demand next week—two simple assurances. The first is that we are determined to make the Argentine dictator disgorge what he has taken—by diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary. The second is an undertaking that between now and the publication of the annual defence review the Government will re-examine carefully and closely the plans that they already have in mind; that they will undertake to maintain not only HMS "Endurance" and HMS "Invincible", but make sure that, in all three Services, we have a capability of looking after our interests outside the NATO area as well as within it. Nothing else will restore the credibility of the Government or wipe the stain from Britain's honour.
    12.36 pm
    Mr. Edward Rowlands: I wish to put some basic and serious questions to the Government, but first I want to say that our thoughts and prayers at this time must be with the islanders. Most of us who have been to the Falkland Islands, and those who have been involved in the issue over many years, have built up a host of friendships, ties and acquaintanceships. I have a goddaughter who lives in Port Stanley with her mother, Valerie Clarke. We know also Adrian Monck and Willy Bowles, whom many hon. Members have met. The idea that they are in the hands of Argentine marines should offend us all.
    There should be no petty party arguments about Southern Thule. This is a far greater and more serious issue. Indeed, the Prime Minister fell far short of the occasion. If the right hon. Lady meets the islanders, which I hope she will do—and I hope that we shall succeed in freeing them—she will find that they are passionate believers in parliamentary democracy. They listen to and watch everything that we say and do in the House. It is one of their most remarkable characteristics. Even the most obscure written parliamentary question is followed and debated in the Falkland Islands.
    How will the islanders hear about this debate today? How will they find out the message that will come from the House? What arrangements will the Government make to ensure that they hear what the House says about their present plight? That is desperately important, because it brings home to us the terrible tragedy that has engulfed them in the last 48 hours.
    Having been involved in a handful of crises and incidents during four and a half years of negotiations with the Falkland Islands and with the Argentine Government, I can say that I try to follow these affairs closely. In view of the bipartisan spirit that generally prevails when we handle these issues, I deeply regret saying that I have failed to understand completely the Government's handling of the crisis over the past six to eight weeks. I profoundly reject the suggestion made by the Prime
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    Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence that we could not have foreseen what was happening.
    Anyone who has dealt with these issues over the years will know that there are a number of tell-tale signs. Apparently, the negotiations in New York with the deputy Foreign Minister were cordial and constructive. However, two days later, in the official Argentine press, the military authorities issued a completely different view and line about the negotiations. Surely that was one of the most important tell-tale signs. That was the time to wake up and worry. That happened in February. There were tell-tale signs in February of a major potential hazard. In my view, it was reprehensible not to cover that position by political and military action.
    Secondly, I have great difficulty in understanding how the intelligence failed. Our intelligence in Argentina was extremely good. That is why we took action in 1977. We found out that certain attitudes and approaches were being formed. I cannot believe that the quality of our intelligence has changed. Last night the Secretary of State for Defence asked "How can we read the mind of the enemy?" I shall make a disclosure. As well as trying to read the mind of the enemy, we have been reading its telegrams for many years. I am sure that many sources are available to the Government, and I do not understand how they failed to anticipate some of the dangers that suddenly loomed on the horizen.
    I shall pose a difficult question for the Secretary of State—[HON. MEMBERS: "Where is he?".]—or the Prime Minister.
    Mr. Barry Sheerman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not a great discourtesy to the House for the Secretary of State for Defence in a debate such as this to absent himself from the House for a very long time?
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order for me.
    Mr. Rowlands: The United States is very close to the Argentine regime. Bearing in mind the reports in diplomatic circles and those that appeared in the newspapers last week, did the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence receive advice or suggestions from the Americans that there would be a growing problem with the Argentinian regime? I should be surprised to learn that there was not some information or evidence picked up by other authorities apart from our own. That is why I cannot understand what has happened in the past few days. I cannot condone or support the Government if they received any notification or warning signals that subsequently they refused to heed.
    I shall refer to the action that was taken in 1977 because in some ways it underlines the indictment that I make of the Government's handling of the crisis, which has led to the imprisonment of 1,850 British citizens on the Falkland Islands. We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and put to him the thought that perhaps has been in the minds of the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary over the past 24 hours. I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would

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    trigger a host of uncontrollable events. This seems to have been the state of mind that has prevailed within the Government over the past week or two.
    My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry". I believe passionately that the Government would have been better safe than sorry.
    High office brings privileges and responsibilities. It brings the responsibility of making crucial judgments and decisions, which has fallen upon the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence over the past week or two. I am not a natural opponent of the Foreign Secretary. I have admired his handiwork in Zimbabwe and in other areas. However, he and the Secretary of State for Defence made a massive misjudgment over the past three or four weeks.
    What should the House say to the Government? First, it should remind the Government that successive Governments and successive Parliaments have upheld the principle that the wishes, interests, rights, security and safety of the Falkland Islanders are paramount. Secondly, we should charge both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary to proceed as speedily as possible to restore to the Falkland Islanders their rights, safety and security as urgently as possible. However, if they cannot, and if it turns out that as a result of their massive misjudgment over the past few days they have failed the islanders and Parliament, they should go. The islanders have already paid a high price for the initial set of blunders. They have lost their freedom for the first time for 150 years. The guilty men should not go scot free if we do not retrieve the islands as quickly as possible.
    12.47 pm
    Mr. Patrick Cormack: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister should go forth from this debate strengthened, reassured and grateful. She has heard from both sides of the House a unanimous sentiment and a united voice.
    I have never been more impressed by the eloquence and oratory of the Leader of the Opposition than I was today. For once he truly spoke for Britain, and so, too, did the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), They were constructive, statesmanlike, sensible speeches. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister realises that she will have the fortification that a previous Conservative Prime Minister at a time of grave international crisis did not have. If she feels that it is necessary, and if it becomes necessary, to use force, it will be used with the united and unanimous backing of the House of Commons, every Member of which looks upon the 1,850 Falkland Islanders as he or she looks upon his or her constituents. In a sense, that is what they are, and we must do something to protect and preserve them.
    But what a blunder, what a monumental folly, that the Falkland Islanders should be incarcerated in an Argentine gaol. That is what it amounts to. It is always better to anticipate than to react. It is always easier to anticipate than to react. The great blunder—we shall all want
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    detailed explanations—was that the Government failed to anticipate, and they will now have the greatest difficulty in knowing how to react.
    The right hon. Member for Devonport made some sensible, constructive and workable suggestions but he knows, and we all know, that it will be much more difficult to implement them. It will require greater courage to bombard or sink Argentine ships than to have landed 2,000 marines two weeks ago, which could have been done. Someone has blundered. I do not know who and I do not know how, but I have my suspicions, and they are directed inevitably—and regretfully—at both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary.
    It was not right that the Foreign Secretary should have been absent from the United Kingdom during this week—a time when it was becoming increasingly and abundantly plain that we were on the brink of a grave international crisis. These things must be said because we are talking about redeeming a situation. We are talking about restoring credibility. That is restoring the credibility not merely of a set of politicians and of a Government, but of our nation. We must all be determined to do that.
    I should like to know why NATO, of which we are a member, issued an appeal, as the Prime Minister told us, to both sides asking them to refrain from hostility at a time when the invasion had apparently already taken place or was under way. I should also like to know why we attach so much importance to a telephone call made by the President of the United States. I should like to be assured that the President of the United States will stand four square with Britain, in a way that his predecessor did not in 1956.—[AN HON. MEMBER: "If my hon. Friend believes that, he will believe anything."]—My hon. Friend intervenes with a jocular aside at a time when we are not predisposed to be jocular. This is one of the most critical moments in the history of our country since the war.
    My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues must look again at the defence strategy and capability of this country. If we are incapable of deterring and preventing a jumped-up junta of barbarous men from inflicting an appalling regime on British subjects, we must surely question the whole strategy that has been explained to the House in recent months.
    I should think that there will be some anxious people in Gibraltar today. [AN HON. MEMBER: "And in Hong Kong."] There will also be anxious people in Hong Kong. There will be many anxious people who have felt for a long time that we were taking too cavalier an attitude towards the role of the Royal Navy and who will demand that we rethink some of the things that we have propounded in recent weeks.
    The whole House owes an indebtedness to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) for his courage and prescience. I hope that what he has said will be heeded more than it has been recently.
    However, it is not too late to restore the credibility of the Government. It is desperate that we should do so. People said to me last night and this morning, "We thought, above all, that we could sleep safely while your Government were in power." [Interruption.] That is no cause for hilarity. The Conservative Party has traditionally and rightly prided itself on its attitude towards defence. The Conservative Party has always rightly and properly placed defence at the head of its priorities when confronting the electorate. The electorate expects more of us than we have delivered up to now.

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    Therefore, our united resolve from today must be to utilise the unanimity that has been expressed in the debate. We should be grateful to the Leader of the Opposition and to the right hon. Member for Devonport for their support. We should resolve to present a united front, to know that we will not shirk, however distasteful the use of force may be, from trying to retrieve the situation, to free those prisoners and to restore to their proper territorial integrity those islands, which are bleak and barren, but which are dear to those who live on them, because they personify and embody the freedom that we also enjoy. That must be our task. If the Government fail in leading us along that line, many of us will have to question our position on the Government Benches.
    12.53 pm
    Mr. Arthur BottomleyIn view of your appeal, Mr. Speaker, I shall confine my remarks about this unhappy affair to a sentence or two.
    A few years ago at a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting the Falkland Islands representatives said that at some time the Argentine might try to take the islands by force and that Britain should be prepared. Regrettably, we were not. May I ask the Prime Minister whether she has already assured our friends, and the Commonwealth in particular, that, so long as the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants wish to remain in the 'Commonwealth, Britain will see that they do so?
    12.54 pm
    Mr. Raymond Whitney: I should like to offer a few words which I know will not be popular in the House, but they are based on three years' work in Argentina, trying to avoid the eventuality that now confronts us. [HON. MEMBERS: "For the Foreign Office."] That is right.
    Mr. Teddy Taylor: The Foreign Office was not working for Britain.
    Mr. Whitney: I utterly refute that. I was working both for Britain and for the interests of the islanders.
    Between 1970 and 1972 we negotiated a communications agreement which seemed to offer the promise of a long-term resolution of the dispute and to be very much in the interests of the Falkland Islanders and absolutely in tune with their wishes. I am referring to the opening up of links with the Argentine in terms of travel, medical cover, educational and postal facilities and holidays. All those things now seem trivial and irrelevant, but in those days they seemed to offer hope of a gradual resolution of the crisis that has gone on for so long. That effort was made against the background of a large British community in Argentina, which was also trying to help the people of the Falkland Islands out of the dreadful situation. However, we now face the situation that all of us were trying hard to avoid.
    Recriminations about what might have happened over the past months are not profitable today in this fevered climate. We must consider carefully what action we should take. I should like to offer a few considerations, which I hope very much the Government will bear in mind as the fleet steams towards the South Atlantic.
    The reputation of this Government is based on courage and realism. [Interruption.] Opposition Members may laugh, but no one in the country doubts that the Government pursue their aims with courage and recognise
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    not the world as we would like it to be but as it is. It would not necessarily be courageous to respond instinctively as Britons, with our natural patriotic instincts. That would not be true courage. It is not courage to respond to all the editorial writers and to all the people in the pubs who understandably and rightly are saying this lunchtime, "What a dreadful and despicable thing has happened." Of course it is dreadful and despicable that the self-determination principle which for 60 years has been the major guiding idea of international relations—
    Sir Frederick Burden: We are not responding to the newspapers. We are responding to an act of naked aggression against the Falkland Islands, which are occupied by British people. We are not prepared to see them annexed in this way.
    Mr. Whitney: I recognise the point that my hon. Friend has made. I am asking the Government to take into account a number of considerations which will take at the forefront of importance the interests and future of the Falkland islanders and also the reputation and tradition of our country. Therefore, we must consider these events carefully.
    The easy way would be to respond thoughtlessly. I should like to outline to the Government the real problems that we shall face when we move in. Are we ready as a nation, and shall we continue to be ready, to accept the military implications of what is involved in a landing on the islands? If we are, well and good, but are we ready to maintain that effort not for a week, not for a month, but for years? Or, if we speak of a blockade, are we ready to accept the implications of that for the Falkland Islanders now under the Argentine military occupation, or, I may say, for the large British community in Argentina? Are we ready to accept those considerations? It may be that we are, but I hope that we shall consider them carefully.
    If we pursue the idea of a blockade, can we maintain, and are we capable of maintaining also, the necessary air cover, because, as the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said, a naval blockade is not adequate in itself. An air blockade will also be necessary. These are the questions that we must ask courageously.
    Mr. Alan Clark: My hon. Friend has omitted to state that Argentina is a bankrupt totalitarian country with an inflation rate of 130 per cent. and in an exceedingly precarious social condition. It has no capacity for replacing equipment that is destroyed. It has no capacity for buying, building or launching ships to replace those that are sunk. It has no capacity for replacing ammunition. Yet my hon. Friend is talking as though this were a head-on confrontation with a world power.
    Mr. Whitney: There are many things that I have omitted to state clearly. In the time available, even if it were within my power and knowledge, I cannot give a complete analysis of the military and geopolitical implications. But I must ask my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), who is himself a military specialist, whether we are ready to maintain at 8,000 miles' distance the scale of military operation involved 200 or 300 miles from the Argentine mainland.
    Sir Bernard Braine rose——
    Mr. Whitney: I am sorry not to give way but I have already given way enough. It may be that we are prepared to maintain that scale of operation, but I hope very much that my hon. Friends will think about it very carefully.
    Mr. Harry Greenway rose——
    Mr. Whitney: I am sorry, but I cannot give way again. I believe that there are alternative ways in which the interests of the Falkland Islanders can be protected and I feel that these can be achieved by negotiation. I recognise that at this time the two efforts must go hand in hand, but let us not get led astray so that we lose the whole opportunity of negotiating a peaceful settlement, a settlement not only in the interests of the Argentines and the Falkland Islanders but in the interest of the honour of this country as well.
    Sir John Biggs-Davison: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. At a time of emergency like this, if defeatism of this kind is to be spoken, should it not be done in secret session? Would it be in order to spy strangers?
    Mr. Speaker: I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not.
    Mr. Whitney: I wholly reject any suggestion of defeatism from my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison). But I earnestly implore the House to think very carefully, so that we make sure that we are ready to take and answer the challenges of the questions that are there. They will not go away if they are not enunciated. If we show that we are ready to overcome these immense problems and at the same time pursue our diplomatic efforts, it is not defeatism but realism and the avoidance of another humiliation for our country.
    Several Hon. Members rose——
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand that it is hoped to begin the Front Bench speeches at twenty-five minutes past 1. I hope that hon. Members who are called will bear that in mind.
    1.4 pm
    Mr. Russell Johnston: The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) must face the fact that this is without doubt a very shameful day for this country. The sort of view he put echoed in a strange way what I found, to my horror, in the editorial in The Guardian today. I shall quote it:
    "Reality number two is that the Falkland Islands do not represent any strategic or commercial British interest worth fighting over (unless one believes reports of crude oil under its off-shore waters)."
    It is shocking that in a great newspaper such as The Guardian the view should be put that the only things worth fighting over are commercial matters and not the rights and freedoms of individual people. Every newspaper that I saw today showed pictures of President Galtieri with his thumbs up. To see that barbarous man rejoicing made me both depressed and angry—depressed that he had been given the opportunity, and angry at our neglect of a small group of people who unquestionably have trusted us and to whose trust we have not responded.
    I shall say nothing at this stage about the Government's lack of preparedness, as that ground has been well covered. I add just one point to the constructive intervention of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands). It is not just a matter of our apparent inability
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    to sustain an effective intelligence-gathering operation. What about the Americans, our allies? Surely the Americans have an effective intelligence-gathering operation in the Argentine. Surely, too, they should be in a position to tell us what is happening. If they do not do so, that is a matter for anxiety within the alliance.
    I am a member of the Falkland Islands Association. I also have several constituents who have lived in the Falkland Islands and have families there. One knows of the islanders' loyalty and also of the sustained low profile adopted by successive British Governments in relation to the Falkland Islands. We have looked weak in the Falkland Islands for a long time. The Foreign Office has not been the friend of the Falkland Islands. As the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said, they have been starved of money, with the result that a situation has now arisen in which vast amounts of money will have to be spent and in which results may be very difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, this is where the buck stops.
    Mr. David Ennals: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that decisions about the Falkland Islands or anything else to do with foreign policy are made by Ministers, not by civil servants? Civil servants may give wrong advice, but Ministers take the decisions. Will he also accept that Foreign Office Ministers in the Labour Government, of whom I was one for two years, with responsibility for the Falkland Islands stood solidly by our commitments and moved not an inch from our standing for what the people of the Falkland Islands themselves believed in?
    Mr. Johnston: I do not agree that this country has given adequate economic sustenance to the Falkland Islands for a considerable period.
    In conclusion, as many other hon. Members wish to speak, I support the Government in sending the task force announced by the Prime Minister. Clearly, it must be of sufficient size to operate a blockade. I also agree with the right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) that, if we are to act at all, we must act swiftly. Clearly, that has consequences. The hon. Member for Wycombe was right to refer to the position of British citizens in the Argentine. Will the Government tell us how many such citizens there are? We must face the fact that this must have consequences for them. Even more serious, however, are the consequences of allowing this type of unprovoked aggression to pass without response. The Government have an enormously difficult task, but some of it is of their own making. They must now face up to it, and in doing so they will have our support.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I understand that the winding-up speeches are to begin at 1.30 pm and not at 1.25 pm.
    1.9 pm
    Sir John Eden: The most important point to emerge from the debate came in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when she affirmed that the Falkland Islands remain British territory and she committed the Government to freeing them from occupation and returning them to British sovereignty.
    Like many hon. Members, I have long suspected that elements within the Foreign Office have been wanting to be rid of what they have regarded as a tiresome problem. The one factor that has so far prevented that has been the

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    resolution of Ministers that it should not be so, but there has been a basic weakness within the Administration and that has undermined our negotiating position and has deprived us of the possibility of having an alternative fallback plan.
    I hope that we shall never again hear about the dangerous doctrine that we cannot deploy force while talks are under way. Whatever the pressures against decisive action, which will undoubtedly be mounted in the international arena over the next few days and weeks, I hope that my right hon. Friend, who has now taken direct charge of these matters, will ensure that the Government's commitment is carried through to the earliest possible fulfilment, for the credibility of the Government and the honour of the country demand nothing less.
    1.11 pm
    Mr. Donald Stewart: Like the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston), I, too, have constituents who have worked in the Falkland Islands. In fact, some of their families are there now. For many years, I, too, have been a member of the Falkland Islands Association.
    Many of us have pressed Governments of both parties to do something for these people, and when this incident is passed we hope that a more realistic view will be taken of what they are entitled to.
    I was interested in the comments of the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Sir J. Eden) about the Foreign Office, because one wonders on which side it has operated. That was illustrated by the Prime Minister's use of the phrase "discussing a dispute". There was no dispute. A wholly unfounded claim was made by the Argentine over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. By regarding the matter as a dispute, we started from a position of weakness.
    It is clear that there has been a lack of intelligence, information and preparedness, but, as other hon. Members have said, this is not the time to go into that. The fact remains that for many years successive Governments have given the people of the Falkland Islands an assurance that their interests would be protected. They are entitled to the right to self-determination, and they have said quite clearly that they have no wish to be taken under the wing of the Argentine.
    Other hon. Members have said that everyone ought to declare where he stands. I hope that this matter can be resolved without force, but if force is necessary, so be it.
    1.13 pm
    Sir Peter Emery: With perhaps one exception the House has been absolutely unanimous in the view that the message for the Government and the rest of the world is that the British House of Commons is determined to ensure that the British Falkland Islands people shall be removed from the yoke of the Argentine Government.
    I think that the Prime Minister's statement has been somewhat lost in the debate. She made it absolutely clear that a Navy task force was being assembled and that orders were being given for that to proceed.
    It is obvious that that force cannot arrive to take action for a number of days—perhaps even 10 days or a fortnight. Two things must be certain—that any military action taken by Britain must be 99.9 per cent. certain of being victorious. We must risk nothing that could bring about
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    defeat. That is why the dangerous thought of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen)—that we should send a submarine to wander around without naval cover—was not very sensible.
    Secondly, may I put it to the Prime Minister that, in the period before the task force arrives, we should announce to the world that we expect, and we shall take positive action to ensure, that every diplomatic, trade and economic pressure is brought to bear upon the Argentines in order that they should withdraw before action becomes necessary.
    The use of the United Nations in this matter is the proper and accepted use of that body. If that action of withdrawal has not been taken within the 10 or 14 days stipulated by the Government, a state of war should exist between Argentina and Britain. Confidence in the Government—which I have in my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—can be adequately restored. The British people expect the Government to be able to defend our people wherever they are in the world. Whatever difficulties there may be, those are facts which we must understand. We must pursue every diplomatic measure that we can first of all, but after that there is only one possible action.
    1.16 pm
    Mr. Douglas Jay: I want briefly to say only three things. First, in spite of all that we have heard today, I find it inexplicable that the Government made no preparations and, apparently, did not know what was going on throughout the whole of last month. Not only were there the usual press reports and all the normal signs, but the Government were repeatedly warned in the House—notably by my right hon. Friend the Member fir Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), who raised the matter as soon as the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" was announced. It is now two and a half weeks since l asked the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, what defence forces we had in the Falkland Islands besides HMS "Endurance". I had hoped that that was a hint that if we had not any, we should have pretty soon.
    The whole story will inevitably lead some people to think that the Foreign Office is a bit too much saturated with the spirit of appeasement. I hope that, apart from anything else, the Foreign Office will now examine its conscience, if it has one.
    Secondly, I trust that this event will put an end to the policy of unilateral disarmament of the Royal Navy, which the Government have been carrying on. Unilateral disarmament always invites aggression, and unilateral disarmament of the Navy has invited aggression in this case. I hope that we will hear no more about cash limits in the next few weeks and that there will be no cash limits on any effective action that we now take.
    Thirdly, I do not believe that diplomacy is enough in this situation. The Secretary of State for Defence made an extraordinary statement on television last night. He said that if we took any military preparatory action it would spoil our efforts at diplomacy. Exactly the opposite is true. Diplomacy can succeed only if it is visibly supported by effective action.
    Effective action is necessary for two reasons. First, the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands are at stake. It does not matter how the British forces originally got

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    there 150 years ago. What matters now is that these people wish to remain British, and that is the right of self-determination.
    Secondly, surely, as the whole history of this century has shown, if one gives way to this sort of desperate, illegal action, things will not get better, but will get worse. Therefore, if the Government act effectively they will have the support of the House and the country. But if they do not, they will be unreservedly condemned.
    1.19 pm
    Sir Bernard Braine: This remarkable debate has been characterised by high-calibre speeches showing acute perception of the problem. Until my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. Witney) spoke, I thought that the House was speaking with one voice in a moment of national crisis, warning the Government and expecting them to act. My hon. Friend is entitled to his view, but he seemed to be asking the Government to bear certain weighty considerations in mind with the object, no doubt, of pulling them back from any punitive action that they may wish to take to restore our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. However, I find it odd that my hon. Friend, who has served in Buenos Aires, should omit to mention the most important consideration of all. We are dealing here not with a democratic country that has some claim to the Falkland Islands—with which the matter could be thrashed out in a civilised way—but with a Fascist, corrupt and cruel regime.
    I have spent the past few years in fruitless negotiations with the Argentine ambassador about women and mothers of young children who have been picked up by the secret police and who have been spirited away. They are now among the disappeared ones. They have not been arrested for any criminal offence. They have never been brought to trial. Indeed, they may no longer be alive. They were seized simply because they were related to people who stood in the way of Argentina's Fascist governors.
    The very thought that our people, 1,800 people of British blood and bone, could be left in the hands of such criminals is enough to make any normal Englishman's blood—and the blood of Scotsmen and Welshmen—boil, too.
    This is not a day for judgments to be made. True, it is a sad day, but not one for judgment yet. The Prime Minister was frank and open with the House. At present, none of us 'expects the Government to reveal the dispositions of our forces and any decisions that they may have taken. We do not expect that, but we do expect results. Unless firm and effective action is taken within a reasonable period of time to remove the invaders and to restore the islands to British sovereignty, the effect on the Government's standing will be dire. They will not be able to rely on my support. However, reading between the lines of the Prime Minister's remarks today, I venture to think that the right decisions have been taken. We must now wait upon events.
    This crisis did not come upon us suddenly in the night. I stood at the Dispatch Box some 14 years ago and extracted a promise from the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart—now Lord Stewart of Fulham—that in no circumstances would there be a transfer of sovereignty unless the Falkland Islanders so wished. Since then, we
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    have had weasel words from successive Foreign Office Ministers. One after the other has said the same thing, but they have acted in a way that has driven the Falkland Islanders into dependence on the Argentine for communication with the outside world. In other words, policy has not matched up to the assurances that have been given to Parliament. That sort of thing has happened before and may happen again. However, we must be on the qui vive. Such things happen too often. Parliament must be taken into the confidence of the Government of the day.
    The time for weasel words has ended. I expect action from the Government; and I hope that we shall get it. However, let there be no misunderstanding. Unless the Falkland Islands are quickly restored to lawful British sovereignty, and unless their people are freed from the dreadful shadow under which they have lived for a decade or more, the effect on the Government will be dire.
    1.25 pm
    Mr. George Foulkes: I find it difficult to understand why the British Government were not aware of something of which the people of the Argentine seemed to be aware. Yesterday there appeared on the streets of towns and cities in the Argentine a newspaper entitled "Seven Days". That newspaper had all the details of the invasion. Therefore, I find it difficult to understand why the British Government did not know what was happening.
    It is a question not only of the intelligence service that we have heard so much about and pay so much for, but of what our embassy was saying to us. I should like to know—I hope that we shall have an answer today from the Secretary of State—what our embassy was telling us about what was happening in Argentina. I should like to know what was the Foreign Office's interpretation of what the embassy was saying.
    Many people have already said this, but it bears repeating by someone who went on a deputation to Cuba—allegedly briefed by the Foreign Office. When we arrived in Cuba, we found that we knew nothing about NATO exercises and the participation of a British nuclear submarine in those NATO exercises because the Foreign Office had failed to tell us about them. That is the Foreign Office that has been advising on this matter.
    I must say that I have some reservations. I know that remark will not fall easily on the ears of hon. Members. Indeed, the words of the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) did not do so. I have some reservations about what seems to have been emerging, almost unanimously, as the view of the House.
    I have some worries about how we can take effective action. It ought and needs to be said that, if we are to take effective action, we must examine the consequences. Inevitably, thousands of Argentines will be killed. We may not wish to weep any tears over them, but thousands of British troops will be killed as well. We must face those consequences. Inevitably, there will be recriminations against British people in the Argentine. If we know anything about the Argentine Government, we must know that.
    What is more, can anyone with military knowledge tell me how we can retake the Falkland Islands without loss of life to the men, women and children whom we are saying that we are interested in protecting?
    Mr. Ogden: I can tell the hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Foulkes: I can think of no way round the problem.
    Mr. Ogden rose——
    Mr. Bowen Wells rose——
    Mr. Foulkes: My gut reaction is to use force. Our country has been humiliated. Every hon. Member must have a gut reaction to use force, but we must also be sure that we shall not kill thousands of people in the use of that force. I am in favour of the firmest possible diplomatic action and sanctions against the Argentine. I am in favour of asking the United States and all our allies to unite against the Argentine. However, I am against the military action for which so many have asked because I dread the consequences that will befall the people of our country and the people of the Falkland Islands.
    1.29 pm
    Mr. John Silkin: My right hon. Friend the leader of the nation——[Interruption.] He soon will be. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition spoke for the nation when he talked about the Falkland Islanders and the fact that the whole House, whatever other views that we may have, is thinking of them at this moment. Yes, as the Prime Minister said, they have the right to be free. We also believe that they have the right to be defended, and there are one or two questions that need to be asked about this.
    The truth of the matter is very simple. Today, I agree, is not a day of judgment—we cannot have recriminations—but it is a day of questions. It is on those questions and on the answers to those questions that this House must make its judgment in the debate that I hope will take place next week. It is essential that those questions should be answered.
    Our thoughts are with our fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands. I share the concern expressed by many right hon. and hon. Members that what has taken place is the aggression of a Fascist dictatorship and a Fascist junta whose latest leader, General Galtieri, is probably the worst of the bunch of its leaders—a man who wears upon his chest the medals that he won in repressing his own people. When he says to us that he will respect the rights and property and, above all, the lives and freedom of our people, we have a right to wonder whether that is true in view of what he does to his own people. These are the important questions that we have to ask.
    In those circumstances, I make one appeal above all others to the Government. Let us ensure that our dear fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are kept in touch with us as much as possible. Let us extend our broadcasts. I do not know the technicalities that are involved. But let them hear our voice. Let them know they are not deserted. Let them know that we are thinking of them. That must be the first consideration. We must give them what advice we can in what are difficult times for them. They may be tempted to do things that it may not be prudent for them to do and that may interfere with our own plans. We must keep in touch with them whatever happens.
    The Opposition agree absolutely with the Government that all the diplomatic measures necessary in the United Nations Security Council must be taken. We must press ahead with those diplomatic considerations as rapidly as possible. I do not know how many friends we may get. Those that we can get we must get. I have been cheered by the reaction of the French and the Irish.
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    When it comes to anything else, I wish to speak frankly to the House. I have said that this must not be a day of judgment or a day of recrimination. It is, however, a day of solid questioning. We are being asked to support the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Defence in what may or may not be a dangerous and difficult operation when all the indications are that heretofore they have blundered and bungled over the defence of the Falkland Islands. Had they acted speedily, with effect and force, and also, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) says, with foresight, this whole danger might never have occurred. It is right, before we give the Government any trust whatever, that we should ask and receive answers to three vital sets of questions.
    Is it not a fact that all—no, not all, but largescale—signals were being received by the Argentine junta that we did not perhaps mind so much, wrongly, I know, what might become of the Falkland Islands? It is within the recollection of the House that, in December 1980, the then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices met a very cold reception in the House over the manner in which he had been speaking to people in the Falkland Islands. He had been saying to them, "We are talking over with the Argentines the question of giving them your land and leasing it back. What do you think of that?" The House gave a very clear view. What, however, was the view taken in Buenos Aires? Was this not perhaps a signal to Buenos Aires that the will of the British Government and the British people was weakening? Was that not the first signal? One can turn to other signals. I have heard twice that the talks that took place at the end of February this year between the present Minister of State and his Argentine opposite number were cordial and positive. Cordial and positive for whom? What sort of effect did that have on the Argentines? Therefore, the first question that the right hon. Gentleman must answer when he replies is this: what was the substance of those talks, which were so cordial and positive that they have ended up with an Argentine invasion of British territory in the Falkland Islands?
    There are also other signals such as the small question of HMS "Endurance". On 9 February this year—the Prime Minister has something to answer for on this matter—my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) asked:
    "is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decisions to withdraw and pay off HMS 'Endurance' when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences?"
    He continued:
    "Is she further aware that this stale old proposition was put to me on more than one occasion when I was Prime Minister and after considering it I turned it down flat? Will she please do the same?"
    The right hon. Lady replied:
    "The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there are many competing claims on the defence budget … My right hon. Friend therefore felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority."—[Official Report, 9 February 1982; Vol. 17, c. 856–57.]
    What about the Secretary of State for Defence? This has been a long week, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson) once said that a week was a very long time in politics. This week started with the Trident debate and is ending with the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.

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    On 29 March, Monday last, at a time when the Prime Minister assured us—I shall come to timing in a moment—that the British Government were becoming well aware of Argentine intentions and beginning to counter them, the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) intervened in the speech of the Secretary of State for Defence and said:
    "Will my right hon. Friend answer this riddle, which is worrying many people: how can we apparently afford £8,000 million to meet a threat in 13 years' time, which may possibly be true, when we cannot afford £3 million to keep HMS 'Endurance' on patrol to meet a threat that is facing us today?"
    The answer to the riddle came from the Secretary of State for Defence. He said:
    "I do not intend to get involved in a debate about the Falkland Islands now."
    This was last Monday. He continued:
    "These issues are too important to be diverted into a discussion on HMS 'Endurance'."—[Official Report, 29 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 27.]
    Whatever the Secretary of State's personal position, these signals were being heard loud and clear in Buenos Aires. The Argentines felt that Her Majesty's Government were no longer in a position or had the will to protect their fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands.
    We were told that the Government were taken by surprise and, the Prime Minister said, rightly by surprise. She asked how we could respond to every possible threat from the Argentine. There have certainly been many threats, increasingly in recent years, but many threats over the past 150 years.
    There is a second question that the right hon. Gentleman must answer. In December last year, when this present bargain basement Mussolini, Galtieri, seized power in the Argentine, he never made any pretence about what he intended to do. Not a day went by when he did not talk about recovering the Falkland Islands. He was the kind of man—we ought to have known it—who meant it.
    Again, as the right hon. Gentleman said on 25 February and at the beginning of March, we were getting clearer and clearer indications that such an invasion was imminent. Where was the Foreign Office and where was the Foreign Secretary when all this was happening? Why did the Foreign Office not alert the Secretary of State for Defence? If it did not alert him, why did he not alert himself? It is extraordinary that we are spending £14·5 billion a year on defence, yet apparently were not ready, when the Argentine fleet set sail, although we had five or six weeks' notice of its intentions, to defend our people in the Falkland Islands.
    Therefore, we have a right to ask a third question of the Secretary of State for Defence. Were we not utterly unprepared by him for what was to come? Should we not have been prepared and should we not, in defence terms, have been ready to meet the attack? Why was it so long before we began to answer the threats that were being made—so long that even now we are apparently still assembling a task force?
    I know that there are one or two of our ships—perhaps even a hunter-killer submarine or two—heading for the Falkland Islands, but we have had the time in which to be there. As has been pointed out twice—by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who was Foreign Secretary at the time, and by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands)—when my
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    right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East was Prime Minister, quietly and efficiently and in good time—that was the point—we assembled a fleet with which to say to the Argentinians "You shall not take the Falkland Islands from the British people who live there." We said it then. Why could we not say it now?
    Why were we not prepared for what has happened? Why did the Secretary of State for Defence, as recently as last Monday, find himself in the position of saying that this was a tiny matter and a matter of no importance compared with the vital matters of Britain's defence, as he saw it, in 13 years' time?
    The Secretary of State uses one adjective over and over again—"credible". "We must", he says, "have a credible defence force. We must have a credible defence policy". His policy is so credible that the dictator of Argentine is able to send his ships, invade our territory and then establish a military aggression in those islands.
    So the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Prime Minister herself have something to answer for. This is a collective decision of the three most guilty people in the Government. I acquit most of the others. They probably did not know what was going on. They probably believed that we were capable of defending the Falkland Islands and that the British people who live in those islands could sleep easily at night because they would be protected, as they had been under the previous Labour Government and, to be fair, under Administrations before that. So it is those three Ministers who are on trial today. It is not the moment for judgment, it is not the moment for recriminations, but it is the moment when those questions must be put and answered.
    I fear something else. Unless those questions are answered—and answered very carefully—something else may happen. The House will know that the official Opposition do not believe that Britain has a credible—if I may borrow the Secretary of State's adjective—defence policy. We do not believe that the conventional forces—and in particular the naval and air strength of our country—are in the strength that they ought to be. This he knows, but I remind him that there are other people who are also listening. The dictator of the Argentine was busy listening for the signals. The Secretary of State must remember that there are other and nearer colonies which may suffer unless we take the necessary steps now.
    The Government, as I have said, are on trial. We are not prepared to give them a blank cheque, and we would be foolish to do so unless they show that they are capable of answering those questions. If they are not capable of answering them, I say to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, "The sooner you get out the better."
    1.45 pm
    The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): I wish to join the right hon. Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) in saying that today all our thoughts are with the British people of the Falkland Islands. I know that the whole House agrees with him on that.
    Two main criticisms of the Government have emerged in the debate, certainly in my area of responsibility. There will be another debate on the subject very soon, so I cannot answer every point made by my hon. Friends. The first main criticism is that in some way the changes that we have made to our Naval programme and our other defence

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    arrangements have diminshed our capability to respond to such a crisis. The second criticism is that the specific events that developed 14 days ago in South Georgia have caught us unprepared militarily.
    The pledge of the right hon. Member for Deptford yesterday that we could count on the support of the official Opposition was welcome. Of course, there is much criticism of the Government on both sides of the House, but I hope that we can unite behind our Armed Forces and that they will have the full backing of the House in the difficult circumstances that we face. It is clear that the whole House accepts that the guarantee of political integrity granted to the Falkland Islands by successive Governments has been breached by an act of flagrant territorial agression in the face of a determined diplomatic effort to solve the problem peacefully—without any sabre-rattling by the British Government. Our attempt to achieve a peaceful resolution of a long-standing dispute stretching back for many years under Governments of both parties might have been expected to appeal to the Leader of the Opposition. He welcomed our peaceful attempts to resolve the dispute. We shall all remember that, speaking for the whole House, he said that we would not wish to see foul brutal agression succeed anywhere in the world. My right hon. Friend the Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) and the whole House applauded him for that remark, which we shall remember.
    I wish to dispose of the question raised by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) about the conduct of the Royal Marines at Port Stanley. He referred to what I said at a press conference yesterday. I was asked:
    "Will the Royal Marines be told to surrender?"
    I took that to mean, naturally, that they would be told to surrender without a fight. I replied:
    "Of course not. No British soldier would be ordered to surrender."
    By that, I meant without a fight. What else would anyone have answered at such a press conference?
    The other major criticism that has been echoed on both sides of the House is that we should have reacted earlier with the despatch, either covertly or overtly, of some surface ships. There are two questions on that issue. First, should we have despatched earlier than we did a Naval task force? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] Secondly, should we have deployed covertly some frigates, as the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) did in 1977? With the wisdom of hindsight, the despatch of a large surface task force sufficient to deter or destroy the Argentine navy might have given pause to the Argentines. [Interruption.] Perhaps the House will allow me to argue the point through. As the incident at South Georgia began just 14 days ago, such a task force would not have reached the Falkland Islands in order to perform its task. It is impossible, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to know what psychological impact such a force might have had on Argentine intentions, but certainly in deterrence terms, had it been successful, that large task force would have had to remain perhaps indefinitely in Falkland waters, in detriment to its other tasks. But, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in opening this debate, we were throughout seeking a peaceful solution through the United Nations and by other means.
    Viscount Cranborne rose——
    Mr. Nott: I have only a few minutes in which to answer this debate. The Prime Minister said in opening this debate that we were throughout seeking a peaceful solution to this
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    dispute, and such an act, at a moment when we might have been going to the United Nations, would have seemed highly provocative and would probably—[Interruption.]
    Mr. Eldon Griffiths rose——
    Mr. Nott: The other option——
    Mr. Griffiths rose——
    Mr. Speaker: Order. It is clear that the Minister will not give way. He is now prepared to give way.
    Mr. Griffiths: I have this precise question to put to my right hon. Friend, and I speak as one of his supporters. Understanding full well, as I do, the psychological difficulties of a large surface fleet, why did he not put the hunter-killer submarines on station two weeks ago?
    Mr. Nott: If my hon. Friend will allow me to continue with what I was saying. The other option would have been the deployment of a small force insufficient to resist the Argentine Navy, as was done in 1977. May I comment first on this particular proposal, because there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that this force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy—[Interruption]—but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean. [Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order.
    Mr. Nott: Presumably to deter, the presence of the force must have been known. If so, to have sent it, then it would have had precisely the same objections to a peaceful solution. [Interruption.] If this were a covert deployment, which I believe that it was, it could not have deterred if its presence was not known; and even if the size of the force had been revealed, it could have provided nothing more than a tripwire of exactly the same kind provided by HMS "Endurance" and provided by the Royal Marine garrison on Port Stanley.
    Mr. Foot: The right hon. Gentleman is trying to say that there was some difference of opinion, but it was clearly stated by my right hon. Friend when the fact became known without fuss and publicity, and it had a success. That is the difference. What happened in 1977 was a success. This is a terrible failure.
    Mr. Nott: I do not think that one is able to draw that conclusion.
    Dr. Owen: If the right hon. Gentleman as Secretary of State for Defence has not understood the value to a Foreign Secretary of being able to negotiate in a position of some military influence and strength, he should not be Secretary of State for Defence.
    Mr. Nott: Of course I understand that. However, as the Leader of the Opposition said, there can be no evidence that the position of the frigates in the South Atlantic at that time brought about the settlement of that dispute.
    Several hon. Members have spoken of the problems that we now face. I do not seek to hide from Parliament the formidable difficulties with a crisis 8,000 miles away. However, the United Kingdom has the ability to mount a major naval task force and to sustain it for a period at that

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    distance. The charge that the Royal Navy cannot do this is flagrantly and patently untrue. We have that capability, as will certainly be evident, and it amounts to a formidable force which no other nation in the world possesses with the exception of the Soviet Union and the United States.
    If we were unprepared, how is it that from next Monday, at only a few days' notice, the Royal Navy will put to sea in wartime order and with wartime stocks and weapons? That force will include the carriers HMS "Invincible" and HMS "Hermes", the assault ship HMS "Fearless" and a number of destroyers and frigates armed with anti-surface and anti-air missiles, together with afloat support. A strong force of Royal Marine commandos and a large number of Sea Harriers and anti-submarine and troop-carrying helicopters will also be embarked.
    I suggest that no other country in the world could react so fast and the preparations have been in progress for several weeks. We were not unprepared. I must make it clear to my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) that the carrier, HMS "Illustrious" is now undergoing sea trials. She will be joining the carrier HMS "Ark Royal" and we shall retain an out-of-area capability during the 1980s and 1990s to deal with this sort of problem—[Interruption.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The Minister should be allowed to be heard.
    Mr. Nott: I conclude by saying—[Horn. MEMBERS: "Resign".]—that the Government do not pretend that the
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    situation is anything but extremely grave. The resolution of this problem will undoubtedly be all the more difficult since the occupation. We intend to solve the problem and we shall try to solve it continuingly by diplomatic means, but if that fails, and it will probably do so, we shall have no choice but to press forward with our plans, retaining secrecy where necessary and flexibility to act as circumstances demand.
    The military problems are formidable, but they are certainly not insoluble because of the professionalism, the preparedness and the quality of our defences, which for our nation's size are unique in the free world. I do not believe the claim that the new Labour Party, with its well-known and well-advertised anti-defence bias and lack of commitment to defence spending, would have done any better. The Government will accept criticism—[HON. MEMBERS: "Resign".] But I believe——
    Hon. Members: Go.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. There is less than a minute left for the Secretary of State.
    Mr. Nott: I believe that the Government will have the support of the opposition parties in what we now intend to do. We can at least—and I should like to say this—give to the Armed Forces the unanimous backing of this House in the difficult task that they are being asked to undertake.
    It being Two o'clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Order this day.
    Adjourned accordingly till Monday next, pursuant to the Resolution of the House of Friday 2 April.

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, in pursuance of Standing Order 14: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of London.

Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill
Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and printed, pursuant to Standing Order No. 47.

The Falkland Islands
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Baroness Young): My Lords, I hope the House will allow me to say a brief word about our rather unusual business today. I understand that in another place it is intended that their debate should be limited to three hours. Without in any way wishing to curtail speeches or to prevent noble Lords from speaking, I think it would be generally desirable if we could keep the debate on the Motion of my noble friend Lord Carrington to within approximately the same limits as another place. I am sure that noble Lords will, in our usual way, exercise restraint along these lines.
Lord Peart: I wish to endorse what the noble Baroness has said, my Lords, We support the noble Baroness the Leader in this connection, and I hope noble Lords will show some respect for brevity.
11.7 a.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Lord Carrington)The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Lord Carrington)rose to move, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships will know from yesterday's news why it has been appropriate and necessary for the House to sit today. Argentine forces have invaded the Falkland Islands and established military control. We meet at a time of grave crisis. We do not have full details of the present circumstances in the islands, but the fact of the Argentine occupation is clear. The House will condemn this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory.
The Argentine action has been in the most cynical disregard of the appeals made by both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by the President of the Security Council on 1st April that both Britain and Argentina should refrain from the use of force and should resolve present tensions by diplomatic means.
The Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island dependencies remain British territory, inhabited by British people. It is our firm objective to ensure that they are freed from alien occupation. Our sovereignty dispute with the Argentine is long-standing; but
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we have no doubt about British sovereignty. We cannot accept that the clear wishes of Falkland Islanders, who are British by blood and wish to remain so by allegiance, should be frustrated by armed force.
It may be helpful to rehearse the history of the past two weeks. On 19th March, the commander of the British Antarctic Survey at Grytviken on South Georgia reported that an Argentine Navy transport vessel was anchored at nearby Leith and that a party of about 60 Argentines had set up camp and had raised the Argentine flag. The base commander told them that they had no right to land on South Georgia without seeking the required permission from the British authorities at Grytviken, which is the only point of entry for immigration purposes. He requested them either to seek the necessary clearance or to leave.
Her Majesty's Government sought immediate clarification from the Argentine Government, making clear that we regarded this illegal presence as potentially serious and asking the Argentines to arrange for the departure of the ship and the party. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied any knowledge of the Argentine presence but said they would look into the matter. Subsequently, the ship and most of the party did leave, on 22nd March, but a number of Argentines remained. HMS "Endurance" was ordered to the area to assist as necessary.
Since that time we have made repeated requests to the Argentine Government for them to regularise the position of the Argentine party, either by arranging their departure or by seeking the correct authority. We made clear that, while we accepted that the salvage contract on which the men were employed was a straightforward commercial undertaking, we could not accept that they should remain illegally in South Georgia. We emphasised throughout to the Argentine Government that we nonetheless wished to do everything possible to avoid this incident developing into a serious confrontation, and we made all possible efforts to resolve the problem through diplomatic channels.
All our initiatives, however, were rejected. It became increasingly clear that the Argentine Government were bent on confrontation. They asserted that South Georgia was Argentine territory and that the Argentine men at Leith would be given "all necessary protection" by the Argentine Government. In a further attempt to defuse what was now clearly developing into a most dangerous situation, I sent a message to the Argentine Foreign Minister proposing the despatch to Buenos Aires of a personal emissary to work out some means of settling the issue peacefully. On 1st April—that is, Thursday—the Foreign Minister flatly rejected that proposal; the diplomatic channel, he said, was now closed, and any further discussion would be simply to arrange the modalities of a transfer to Argentina of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Falkland Island dependencies.
In this critical situation, following a personal appeal by the United Nations Secretary-General to the British and Argentine Governments, we sought an emergency meeting of the Security Council on 1st April, which led to a statement by the President of the Security Council calling on both sides to refrain from using force. Our representative associated himself with that statement, but the Argentine representative did not.
It was now clear that the Argentine Government were set on nothing less than the forcible occupation of the Falkland Islands. To prevent this, we sought the assistance of other Governments, including the United States Government. But all their efforts, including a personal appeal from President Reagan to the Argentine President, were rejected.
The House will be aware that the position remained uncertain for much of yesterday. We had no communication with the Governor from very early in the morning because of communication and atmospheric difficulties, which, as your Lordships know, are frequent in that area. Initial Argentine claims about the invasion were clearly premature, and that was why we wished to be sure of the situation before confirming to Parliament that the invasion had taken place. It would, I think, have been wrong for us to act on unconfirmed Argentinian reports.
The House will wish to know the present situation. It is clear that the Argentine forces are in control of Port Stanley and the main Falkland Islands.
The Uruguayan Government were approached last night by the Argentine authorities with a request that the Governor of the islands and the marines detachment from Port Stanley should be allowed to land in Montevideo from Buenos Aires this morning. After consulting our Ambassador, the Uruguayan Government agreed. An RAF VC 10 has left the United Kingdom to pick up the party from Montevideo, returning to this country on Sunday afternoon.
The Prime Minister has spoken to the Governor by telephone in Montevideo this morning. The Governor told the Prime Minister that he could not praise too highly the conduct of the marines detachment, who had fought bravely against overwhelming odds.
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Carrington: The Governor said that the Argentine forces had attacked Port Stanley from both the landward and the seaward sides at approximately six in the morning yesterday local time. The Governor had attempted to inform the British Government of the position before he was captured and had sent a last message to London. However, communications difficulties had meant that it did not get through. The Governor said that the atmosphere among the islanders was one of immense sadness at the turn of events and the alien presence with which they were now faced. But their loyalty to Britain remained undiminished. There had been no civilian casualties. The Prime Minister thanked the Governor for all his efforts and, through him, the Royal Marines.
The position in the dependencies is less clear. There was of course already an Argentine presence on South Georgia and an Argentine naval vessel lying off the islands. The position in the South Sandwich Islands is also not clear. There is of course no British presence there, but the Argentines have had an illegal presence in the island of South Thule, as the House knows, since 1976.
After the Argentine invasion had begun, we immediately summoned a further emergency meeting of the Security Council, at which our representative made
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clear our total condemnation of Argentine's unprovoked aggression, and asked the Council to pass a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. We received firm support from those who spoke, apart from the Argentine representative himself. The Council will resume today, when we hope that the resolution will be passed.
We have asked our friends and allies for their support and help, at the United Nations, in their contacts with the Governments of the Argentine and elsewhere. The Foreign Ministers of the European Community yesterday issued a firm statement of support for us, condemnation of Argentina, and a call for her withdrawal. The Americans have spoken strongly in our favour, as have many other Governments. The NATO Council has met, and our Allies have deplored the use of force.
The Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary-General have both addressed messages to all Commonwealth Heads of Government asking for their support. The response so far has been heartwarming and encouraging.
As soon as news of the invasion was confirmed, the Argentine Chargé d'Affaires in London was summoned to the Foreign Office to be told that we had no option but to break off diplomatic relations immediately. He was asked to ensure that embassy staff left the country within four working days.
Nevertheless, the situation at the moment is that the Argentines remain illegally in control of territory which they have illegally invaded. It is to be expected in the circumstances that criticisms should have been expressed of the Government's handling of the situation. They are, in my judgment, for the most part based on a very considerable misunderstanding of the situation. I have heard it said that we should have moved forces to the area a month ago. A month ago, the Minister of State, Mr. Luce, had just concluded friendly talks in New York with his Argentine opposite number, and we seemed to have reached agreement on a satisfactory basis for further negotiations with the Argentines. They had then sent me a further message, and I was preparing a reply.
It is true that the Argentine negotiator, Señor Ros, appears to have been regarded by some in Buenos Aires as having been too reasonable; and, on his return home, there was considerable comment in the Argentine press urging the use of "other means" if negotiations could not be taken forward quickly. Had this been the first time over the last 20 years that some allusion to the use of force had been made from the Argentine side, it might have struck us as more significant than it did. But this has been part of the currency for many years; and history, up till now, has shown that wiser counsels have prevailed.
My Lords, it is argued, again, that ship deployments somehow resolved a similar problem in 1977. I am not quite sure that I understand what is being claimed. The truth of the matter is surely fairly simple. If the presence of British ships in or near to the area was unknown to the Argentines, it cannot possibly be said to have acted as a deterrent. Neither, had they known about it, would the Argentines have been deterred from an invasion on which they were determined by a force very much inferior to their own. The

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only effective deterrent would have been a large force in the immediate area; and it is a fact of life that the collecting and despatching of such a force would have become known to the Argentines long before it got near enough to the Falkland Islands to do any good. Once again, such a decision would have risked precipitating just the step we are seeking to avoid. The truth of the matter, I suspect, is that in 1977, as on other occasions over the past 20 years, indications that the Argentines might have resorted to force proved unfounded in the event. Had this not been the case, we should have been no better placed to respond immediately and effectively to a large-scale invasion than we were yesterday.
Another argument is that we should have deployed ships as soon as the Argentine scrap merchants landed in South Georgia. Had we done so at that time, I have no doubt whatsoever that we should have been accused of inflaming the situation and of reacting in a way quite disproportionate to the problem posed by the presence of a small party of Argentine workers in South Georgia. They were, after all, said to be there to conduct work under an established contract; there was no indication at that time that they had anything else in mind; and they were at fault only because they had at first failed and then refused to comply with the normal rules of immigration.
I do not of course seek to condone their behaviour—far from it—but I am sure we were right to see in this a situation which had to be put right by negotiation and not by a show of force. But, in any event—and this brings home the geographical problems and difficulties involved—even had we sent ships to the area as soon as the Argentines landed in Leith on 18th March, they would still not have today arrived in the Falkland Islands or South Georgia.
Finally, there is the criticism that the Falkland Islands should have been better defended on a continuing basis. To this, I can say only that successive British Governments have recognised that we could not sensibly maintain in the South Atlantic naval and air power sufficient to deal with, and thus to deter, an Argentine invasion on the scale which has occurred. A look at the map, and at what it requires to maintain considerable naval and air forces some 8,000 miles from base, is sufficient to explain why.
My Lords, we shall continue to do all we can to ensure that our position is understood by the international community and that the unacceptable nature of the Argentine action is fully appreciated. We continue to wish for a peaceful solution to the situation which has now arisen. We hope that it will rapidly become clear to the Argentine Government that their behaviour is internationally unacceptable, and that a total withdrawal of all Argentine forces and the restoration of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies to British control in accordance with our sovereignty must follow.
Meanwhile, we have to face the reality that diplomacy may continue to prove insufficient to deal with Argentine aggression. The Government have therefore decided that, in addition to the naval deployments already made, a large task force should sail for the area as soon as all the preparations are complete. Their orders will depend on the situation at the time of their arrival. But Her Majesty's Government are deter-
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mined to uphold the right of the Falkland Islanders to maintain their British way of life and to determine their own allegiance. The geographical distance and the small size of their community do not affect the applicability to them of the principle of self-determination. I know the House will join with me in making clear to all concerned our resolve to uphold the wishes of the islanders in the face of Argentina's cynical disregard of them. The Falkland Islands are British. The Falkland Islanders wish to be British. Our duty is clear.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone): My Lords, is the noble Lord moving a Motion?
Lord Wigg: My Lords—
Several noble Lords: Order!
The Lord Chancellor: May I ask the noble Lord whether he is moving a Motion?
Lord Carrington: Yes, my Lords.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands.—(Lord Carrington.)
Lord Wigg: My Lords, can the Foreign Secretary tell us—
Several noble Lords: Order!
The Lord Chancellor: The Question is that the Motion standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, be agreed to.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, it is—
Lord Wigg: My Lords—
Several noble Lords: Order! Order!
11.26 a.m.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, it is with very considerable sorrow that we in your Lordships' House have to debate such a situation—I speak as one of those who have had associations with the Falklands and with the sturdy, loyal and typically British way of life of the islanders—in the knowledge that the islanders are now under the rule of a foreign invader; and it is, of course, a humiliation which we must acknowledge. The last occasion I can recall on which a colony surrendered to force was in Singapore.
I think the House will wish to treat the Foreign Secretary with kindness. I shall certainly not stick knives into him, though there are plenty of others on his own Benches, particularly in another place, who will wish to do so when they see what has happened in these last few days. Furthermore, last night I saw him and the Secretary of State for Defence "on the box". They looked sad. Indeed, the Secretary of State was not his usual firm and ebullient self; and I do not want to add to his troubles, all the more so since it is the history of the British, of previous Governments and of Parliament, that we find ourselves in situations of

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this kind. Nonetheless, there will be some questions that I shall want to ask the noble Lord.
I should like briefly, for the benefit of those of your Lordships who are not familiar with this region, to remind the House that the Falkland Islands were discovered several hundred years ago by the British, and that they were first occupied by de Bougainville in the East Island in 1774 and by the British in 1775. There were a number of incidents. France then ceded their interests to Spain; and, as is known, there was a dispute at that time. There was quite a large Spanish garrison at one time; then the Spaniards withdrew; for a time it was uninhabited; then some settlers from the Republic of the River Plate, which was a very small area indeed, came down; then the Americans came down and burnt their settlement; they came back again; and then the British came in again and reasserted their rights, 150 years ago.
It is not known by many people just how British are the Falkland Islanders. People will say, "They are Scottish", but if one were to go out into the street and meet them one would assume they might be Londoners as much as anyone else. They are totally British. I must say that I think it was unfortunate—and it has contributed to this lack of understanding—that the significance of the Falkland Islands and of their quite good standard of living should recently have been dismissed in such a cavalier way by The Times when they spoke about "these paltry islands". This is the kind of thing that gives grounds for the Argentines and others to think that we do not take them seriously. But, as has been pointed out on a number of occasions, the fact is we have been exploiting them. As my report made clear over a period of years the profits that came back to this country from the companies which are registered here and the taxes that were paid on them were twice as much as the islands have cost us. Yet, time and time again, the newspapers and others say that they are a burden to the British. It is true, as a letter in The Times made clear yesterday, that for those who like wild, windy and empty spaces like the Shetlands, it is a very delightful place where the light is bright and clear. I remember talking to a man who came there from Coventry, who told me how much happier he was there than when he was working on a production line.
I do not want to spend much time talking about my report. I never felt it was my job to try to persuade either a Labour Government or a Conservative Government or to run a campaign for its implementation. The fact is that comparatively little has been done; and, in particular—and this is more serious now—the recommendation that there should be a longer runway, which would have made airborne reinforcements possible, was not adopted. Mine was an economic survey, but I am bound to say that I had military considerations in mind.
I should like to ask the noble Viscount who is to wind up whether he can explain the mysterious series of announcements that we had yesterday. The main announcement at Buenos Aires was made at about 11 o'clock in the morning. The time-lag is about three hours. I do not know whether British Summer Time makes it two hours. The noble Lord opposite tells me it is four hours. It is extraordinary that the Govern-
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ment gave such very noncommittal answers implying that possibly there was not an invasion at all. I do not know what attempts otherwise they made to get in touch, or whether they attempted to establish contact with those radio hams of whom there are many in the Falklands. Even then, we were still somehow hopeful that the precautions which the noble Lord had talked about were being taken and might be effective.
Then we found, late in the afternoon yesterday, the ultimate humiliation. One is bound to say that the Argentine Government have carried out an extremely efficient operation and I would have agreed with the noble Lord that, short of having a naval force—and I was not in the Government at the time of the previous incident, although my noble friend Lord Peart was—they were virtually indefensible on the ground unless there was there a brigade group. It was useless to expect the Marines to be more than a tripwire to deal with a casual incursion of the kind which had occurred in the past.
It is necessary to record that this is not the first incident of its kind. In 1952, Argentines opened fire on a British Antarctic base near Hope Bay near the Grahamland Peninsula. In 1967—and I remember this because I was Air Force Minister at the time—there was an unexpected landing by an aircraft full of Argentines coming, as they thought, to liberate their oppressed brothers. There was the attack on a Royal research ship when shots were fired—not across the bows because the shooting was bad and the shots went over the ship. There has been a series of incidents and then has come this latest incident in South Georgia.
At this point I should like to ask the noble Viscount when he replies to let us know what information he has about the situation in South Georgia. Has anybody in the Foreign Office bothered to ring British Antarctic Surveys in Cambridge? I have been in touch with them and they have told me what is happening. They said they had given information to the Foreign Office, but that at no time has anybody thought about the band of British scientists on South Georgia. If the noble Lord wishes to ring up the director of the Falkland Islands Survey, he will be able to find the messages. They have been in touch with the emergency room; but that no advice has been given—
Lord Carrington: My Lords, we have been in touch this morning; and the noble Lord is wrong.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, the noble Lord must have rung them after I had done so—which is only half an hour ago. I do not know who they were in touch with. They themselves made the approach and volunteered information to the Foreign Office who did not bother—
Lord Carrington: My Lords, we have been in touch with South Georgia this morning.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, that is good; that is better than British Antarctic Surveys managed to do. I am delighted on this belated occasion. Perhaps when the noble Viscount comes to reply he will tell us what they said. Have the Argentinians landed on South

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Georgia? There was a cryptic remark by the noble Lord. We know that there are these scrap metal people there with guns shooting reindeer; but are there military forces on South Georgia?
The fact remains that we are not only debating the Motion to take note of the situation in the Falkland Islands; we are also taking note of the situation in the South West Atlantic, including Antarctica. There is much more at stake than the all-important question of the sovereignty of the people of the Falkland Islands. There are a number of bases in the Antarctic. I should like now to widen the situation a little, especially to those who may be concerned about the possible use of force in the future to restore the situation. It is not only the fate of the Falkland Islands that we are concerned with. That is why a number of us formed a group called the South West Atlantic Group in order to concern ourselves not just with the Falkland Islands or just with the South Sandwich Islands but with the whole of that area.
Noble Lords may not be aware that South Georgia, which is 700 miles from the Falkland Islands, is on the other side of the Antarctic convergence where the cold current comes up and it becomes a sub-Antarctic island. It is there that we have our main British Antarctic base. Will it be possible—and this is a separate issue—to maintain the excellent scientific work which has been done Of course, south of latitude 60, I think, the Antarctic Treaty prevails which is due for renewal in 1991.
What is at stake and what undoubtedly is in the minds of the Argentines is not just the Falkland Islands but their claim to Antarctic territory. They have demonstrated a degree of indifference to international law in the past and now which shows that those who may think that we should not take steps to restore the situation may realise that they may be hazarding long-term peace in a part of the world which is entirely peaceful. Those who say there is no wealth there —and there is enormous fishery wealth— must realise that there is also the need for conservation of these great areas and, above all, to preserve a system which is working at the moment but which has been put at risk by these latest actions. We know that the Argentine dispute with Chile over those islands is partly linked to the Chilean and Antarctic overlapping claims in Antarctica.
A relatively stable part of the world is now in process of becoming unstable. No one can tell what a future Government of the Argentine will be. I do not wish to hurl insults at the Argentine Government and I am sure that nobody is sadder at the moment than the Argentine Ambassador who has now already left this country. This Government in Argentine, which everybody in practically every part of the House would condemn, may not last. In that unstable part of the world, who knows who will in the end rule in that area and in whose hands this strategic part of the South Atlantic will ultimately rest?
In conclusion, we should like, if possible, to know more of the Government's plans. On the other hand, I think that the Foreign Secretary is entitled to keep his own counsel and keep matters secret regarding the military operations. Nor is this simply a matter of national pride, although our national pride is strongly involved, and we all feel that at this moment.
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It concerns the preservation of peace in a part of the world whose significance so few people have appreciated. The Argentine has for years been filled with propaganda claiming that the Malvinas are theirs. I hope that the noble Lord, and the present Government, will not rattle the sword unless they intend to use it. In any case, we have to face a national humiliation.
11.41 a.m.
Lord Byers: My Lords, we on these Benches certainly hope and pray, as the Foreign Secretary said, that there will be a peaceful solution to this appalling situation, and that the Falkland Islanders will be restored to the way of life which they have enjoyed for so long. I do not think there is any point in recriminations at this stage, but when the appropriate time does come, there will I think be the need for some very searching questions, particularly as to why the British reaction was so incredibly slow and there did not appear to have been a contingency plan.
However, I am only going to refer to that aspect which seems to have included an important failure from which we can learn something in the immediate future. For instance, does it not now appear that the action of the Argentine Government was one of deliberate, well planned, naked aggression by several thousand men including a substantial naval task force, a number of transport aircraft and so forth? Does it not look as though the landing of the scrap merchants on the island of South Georgia was a ploy to distract attention, and to lull the British Government into a sense of false security by giving the impression that this was a minor incident of a few people of little significance who failed to comply with the rules covering visits to the island, while these substantial forces were being assembled? I do not think one can assemble a force of that nature overnight.
Is it true that the Argentinian Government started to plan the invasion just after it was announced that HMS "Endurance" was going to be withdrawn? One is entitled to ask: What happened to our intelligence services? How did they miss what was happening? The important point now is that our information collecting services should be improved immediately if our diplomatic or military initiatives are to be effective. That is a "must". Perhaps we can get some help from our allies and our friends in this area.
I come now to the question of what is to be done next. I think that it is inconceivable that we should abandon the Falkland Islanders and allow the Argentinians to assume sovereignty. It is important that the Argentine Government should not be allowed to succeed in taking over British territory against the wishes of the islanders. It is a totally uncivilised act to do so and it must be resisted, not just by us, but by all civilised nations if the rule of law is to be maintained. If it is not upheld, it is going to be so much the worse for quite a number of countries in different parts of the world. In this connection, I think public support for Britain by France is very much to be welcomed and appreciated.
I hope that the United States will see it in that light, as a serious threat to peace, and not regard themselves as bound by any treaty of friendship. This is not a question of friendship, it is a question of flagrant aggression against the Charter of the United Nations,

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and by a country which can put forward no justification for the action which it has undertaken. All of us believe that aggressors have to be stopped if it is possible to do so, in the interests of long-term peace. While I am in full support of diplomatic moves to force the Argentinians to withdraw, we would also support the Government in backing, as they intend to do, their diplomatic stance with a substantial military force. Let us hope it will not have to be used. But I am sure that that is the right attitude to take.
May I ask the Foreign Secretary whether there is not more that can be done, possibly through the United Nations? Has a selective blockade of Argentinian shipping been considered? I do not want answers to these questions, I just put the points forward. Is there any other naval police action which could be taken in those areas helped by some of our allies with the support of the United Nations?—although I know that there are difficulties there. I think that at the present time we would wish to give full support to the Government in helping to uphold the rule of law against naked aggression.
My Lords, I repeat that it is in the interests of no nation that aggression should be seen to be an acceptable method of settling disputes. In conclusion, does this not make us think very carefully indeed about spending money on Trident at the expense of our conventional forces?
11.46 a.m.
Lord Home of the Hirsel: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has said, we in this country have lived for many years with the situation in which we knew that if the Argentine were to mobilise her full strength and to attack the Falkland Islands, no garrison, short of brigade strength or more, could hold the situation. Nor could any naval force, unless a major one, have prevented that invasion.
Now we are faced with the fact that this has happened, and from the Foreign Secretary's statement it is quite clear that we are facing an unprovoked and carefully prepared aggression by the Argentine. This scale of preparation must have begun even before the "Endurance" was said to be going to be withdrawn. The Argentine have clearly flouted every rule of the United Nations Charter to which they solemnly put their signature.
That being so, Her Majesty's Government have not only a right but a duty to try to restore the status quo ante. That would be the only tolerable situation. There are two means. The first is diplomatic and the second is the use of force. The Foreign Secretary will clearly exhaust every possible diplomatic ploy, and a great deal has already been done. I echo the thought of the noble Lord, Lord Byers, that French support is important in this matter, and that the more international support we can mobilise, the better.
We have to contemplate that the first option, the diplomatic option, may fail. If that should be so, military action may be necessary. We are not in a state of war, but Parliament has to face the fact that we may be very near to it. That being so, I do not find myself in the mood for post mortems on the past few weeks, and I hope that Parliament does not either. The
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only thing that we can do as a Parliament now—and it is right that we should do it and both noble Lords have said this—is to help the Government in every possible way to restore to the Falkland Islanders the territory which is at present illegally occupied.
I hope that we shall not introduce the thoughts in the final sentence of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Byers. This is nothing to do with Trident at all. Any conclusions about Trident must he related to deterring the Soviet Union from attacking the European Atlantic area, and this matter is very far from that. This is an illegal occupation. It must be ended, and I trust that Parliament will assist the Government to do just that.
11.50 a.m.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, it is my view that if this incident in the Falkland Islands had happened perhaps 700 miles away and not 7,000 miles away it would never have happened at all. It is a fact of geography that the Argentine Government has been able to behave in this way. Some weeks ago I received a personal letter addressed to me purporting to come from the Argentine Embassy in this country, and many other noble Lords must have received a similar letter. It suggested that the small force of scrap metal merchants on South Geogia were there for a purely commercial purpose and for no other. We now know that to be completely misleading and completely dishonest, because at the same time—whether fully known to us or not—action must have been going on to get together this not inconsiderable naval and military force that the Argentine Government has used against the Falkland Islands. If I have any criticism at all, it is that if the Government did not know, then what was happening to our intelligence service in that area? On the other hand, until we get the full story it may be impossible to decide.
It is my view that the action taken by the Argentine Government is divisive action to solidify their own very shaky political situation. It is not many weeks ago that there was a strong possibility of the present military Government in the Argentine being overthrown and it is, as we know, that sort of action that brings all forces within a country together.
On these Benches we still hope, as I am sure everyone else hopes, that diplomatic exchanges will result in a complete solution to this, from wherever it might come, using NATO and the United Nations. It is certainly not the time, in the view of my colleagues on this Bench, for political recrimination in this country or, as some people have suggested in the press, for head rolling. That time may come, but it is not now. This is a time for us all to get together, I hope with the support of the President of the United States and of all our allies throughout the world, in the diplomatic field only, if necessary—and I hope that is all that will be necessary. Our hearts go out to the people in the Falkland Islands, who must have suffered terribly within the last few days, and also to that small and gallant force of our men—some 80 of them, we are told—who tried to defend them against overwhelming force—
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, we must, and I am sure we do, offer them the highest praise. It is the intention of my colleagues and me on this rather small Bench to add our full support to the Government, to condemn what has happened and to hope for a final diplomatic solution. But, should it go beyond that, then we are behind the Government.
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
11.54 a.m.
Lord Soper: My Lords, it would be presumptuous of me to claim that I could speak for the Christian Churches as a whole, but there are certain elements in the present lamentable situation which I believe can be expressed for all those who belong to the Christian faith. The first is the condemnation of the unprovoked and wicked attack that has been made on the Falkland Islands. Secondly, there is our detestation of the tyrannical Government of the Argentine and, thirdly, there is our understanding of the difficulties that confront the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary and those associated with him.
We are in no mood merely for recriminations, but there is one element in the situation which I believe also commands the overall assent of those in our country who take their place within the Christian faith. It is that there is no cheap, easy and final settlement to a problem which has accumulated all kinds of evils for a very long time, and that some element of compromise and some element of unfulfilled intent is inseparable from a problem that has been so long on the wing and has promoted already so much disagreement and misunderstanding. In that regard we sympathise with those who recognise the difficulty and complexity of the situation.
What I have to say—I believe it has to be injected into a full debate of this kind and I say it with care—is that nothing would contribute more to the diplomatic and non-violent solution to this problem than the commitment on the part of Her Majesty's Government that they will not in fact introduce force into this particular situation. That may appear to many in your Lordships' House as an outrageous and quite impossible attitude to take. I take it, first, because I am a pacifist and, secondly, I take it because it is an increasing representation on the part of many members of the Christian Church and others who are appalled at the prospect of what can happen once the dogs of war are unleashed.
There are so many contingent problems which I will not detain the House by talking about now; but supposing we lose? Supposing that for the next fortnight we are increasingly committed to the use of those weapons of war represented by aircraft carriers and so forth? So long as we leave open the door, and, as many communications in the press have indicated, so long as there is the possibility of armed violence in order to secure justice in this realm, I believe that the general results are likely to be calamitous. Therefore, I make my testimony to the fact that nothing will contribute more considerably to the peaceful solution of this very difficult problem than the resolution of Her Majesty's Government to take a new line with regard to these incidents and to say that we will pursue to the limit those elements of diplomatic and non-violent
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means which are available and which will contribute an added factor in that debate.
The moment we ourselves repudiate the violence which hitherto has been very largely concordant with similar events we have in fact broken a vicious circle and, by God's grace, it may be possible that with such a commitment there may be a new spirit throughout the world in general for the resolution of problems like this without the use of armed violence, which can only escalate into the kind of colossal error and futility as well as colossal disaster with which I believe we are confronted. I will say no more, except to make the point, which I think must be injected into this debate today, that we should pursue every means, diplomatic and non-violent, for a solution of this problem, but that we should indicate that, even if we cannot fully solve it and even if there are residual evils which will follow on the heels of such programmes, we will not resort to that armed violence which would be the final confession of failure on the part of ourselves and others to meet the resurgent problems of the present day by the use of that violence which has corrupted good measure and falsified loyal and decent aspirations and hopes over the centuries.
I make that commitment; I make that witness and I finish by saying that I believe that there is a very considerable and growing temper of spirit within Christians and others to think that the first country which is prepared unilaterally to renounce violence as a means of solving unjustifiable problems is the one which can hopefully look to a future of peace for the rest of the world.
12 noon
Lord Duncan-Sandys: My Lords, if Her Majesty's Government were to follow the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, I think we could say goodbye to any prospect of securing the liberation of our fellow countrymen in the Falkland Islands. The situation is far too serious to waste time discussing whether or not the Government should have acted sooner. I think that my noble friend the Foreign Secretary has explained the difficulties of the situation, and not only the obscurity of the position but, also, the dangers of exacerbating the situation, and possibly of bringing on a crisis which could otherwise have been avoided through the United Nations. We ought to concentrate our minds on what needs to be done now.
The Foreign Secretary said—and I am very glad that he said it, though I hope he may say it even more precisely—that Her Majesty's Government are determined to uphold the right of the Falkland Islanders. In my opinion, the only way of securing a peaceful withdrawal of the invaders is to make it absolutely clear to the Argentine Government that the British Government mean what they say. In particular—and I hope that the Minister who is to respond will make these points clear—I urge Her Majesty's Government to make two things clear beyond any possible doubt. The first is that if peaceful means fail—and we can still hope that they may not fail—Britain is prepared to use as much force as is necessary to liberate the Falkland Islands.
The second is that, if the invaders fail to withdraw, the Argentine Government should not assume that their naval and other bases on the mainland, from

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which the invading forces are supplied and reinforced, will necessarily be immune from military action. The Government must make it clear that they mean business. Otherwise, there is no hope of resolving this crisis without bloodshed.
12.3 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, I will seek to be very careful about what I say. We are in a crisis. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, concluded his speech by saying that he still hoped in this difficult situation that a peaceful solution might be found. I want to make a few suggestions by which that conclusion might be reached.
The issue is quite simple. The people of the Falklands wish to be British. They have been invaded by another power and the peoples, themselves, absolutely reject that authority. I suggest that today the greatest need is to secure maximum democratic support in the world for our point of view. There are three spheres in which we can act for that purpose. The first is the United Nations Security Council. It discussed this matter yesterday. There was some doubt among the third world representatives, because they regarded the Falklands as a continuation of our colonial power. I want to suggest that we should place the whole emphasis on the right of the people of the Falklands to self-determination; that we are not concerned in maintaining the old political imperialist authority of the past; that we should be quite ready to leave the Falklands tomorrow, if that were the desire of the people themselves. I am quite sure that, if that point is emphasised in the Security Council of the United Nations—self-determination, not the retention of colonial power—we can win the support of the third world nations for that point of view.
The second point that I want to make is this. There is an association of American Governments. In that association, the United States of America has great influence. I should like to suggest that Her Majesty's Government might propose to President Reagan that a meeting of that association should be called, and that at that meeting President Reagan should use his influence among American nations to press upon the Argentine to withdraw their troops. I believe that, if that were done, great influence could be exerted upon the other American nations.
Thirdly, I want to suggest this. While President Reagan and the American Government have denounced the action of the Argentine, they are still neutral on the issue of whether we or the Argentine should have authority over the Falklands. We want to make it abundantly clear that we are there because it is the desire of the people of the Falklands, and I suggest to Her Majesty's Government that we would be prepared to take that issue to the Hague tribunal, and at the Hague tribunal to clear it up in the minds of both the American Government and any other governments—
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? We have made several attempts in the past to take this whole dispute to the International Court, and the Argentine has always refused to go, and
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will undoubtedly refuse this time. So I am afraid that that otherwise helpful suggestion will not assist us.
Lord Brockway: I appreciate that, my Lords. I am only suggesting that in this situation our position in the world would be stronger if we renewed our application to the Hague tribunal. I believe that in this issue we are right. What we have to do is to convince the world that we are right, and I believe that the three proposals I have made will assist in that purpose.
12.8 p.m.
Lord Mottistone: My Lords, it has often been my position to succeed the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in a debate, and I have usually found myself arguing strongly against him. But on this occasion I find myself almost entirely in agreement, and I much applaud the suggestions which he has made. On his first suggestion, it is extremely important that it is made quite clear that, when the peoples of the Falkland Islands are invited yet again to say where they are, there is no question of our being deceived, or of other peoples being deceived, by the Argentinians who happen to be in charge there now in a false way.
I shall be very brief. I agree entirely that there should be no post mortems at this stage; there might be occasion for them later. Personally, as your Lordships will know, I believe that this is the result of a long period of lack of concentration by Governments on their commitments in the world outside Europe. This is a natural result of that. But we can be very thankful that my noble friend the Foreign Secretary, when Minister of Defence, allowed us to have again the aircraft carriers of which we were to have been deprived. Had it not been for that, I do not think we should have been able to muster a large task force which could be in any way effective if it is to be used either as a deterrent or in a more powerful way. We must thank my noble friend Lord Carrington very much for his contribution in putting us in that position.
I shall not say more on this point at this stage except that I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, that if it comes to something more we must make it quite clear that bases on the mainland of Argentina are just as much under threat as any forces at sea. This must be the case. In conclusion, I wish very much to join all those who would encourage the Government in their deployment of a task force down to the South Atlantic to be used in the most appropriate fashion that seems right at the time, and I wish that task force every success if it is called upon to go into action.
12.11 p.m.
Lord Noel-Baker: My Lords, I rise to express my warm agreement with the first point made by my noble friend Lord Brockway. I am also in warm agreement with noble Lords who have said that we should use every effort under our command to avoid the use of force. I would add that in negotiations on the main issue which we dispute with the Argentine we should make concessions to the Argentine in any way we properly can if the negotiations show any chance of reaching success.

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The main point I want to make is different. The Argentine would like the world to think, as some third world countries in the Security Council want the world to think, that this is one more step by the Argentine in what President de Gaulle called "the necessary decolonisation of the world". If that were so, if the people of the Falkland Islands were seeking self-government and independence, I should be on their side and I hope and believe that the whole House, and our Government, would likewise be on our side. But that is not the case.
As has been said, this is an act of naked charter-breaking aggression by a Government which has carefully prepared it, which has sought to deceive the world as to its intentions and which is now prepared to act by armed force. This means that there is a much more important issue at stake than the integrity of British territory. It is the integrity of the Charter of the United Nations.
Alas! The charter has been disregarded by many people, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. Britain and France long ago—and shamefully, as I think—made the Suez War against Nasser a disastrous failure. The United States has made war against Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and, may I add, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and now El Salvador. The Soviet Union has made aggressive actions against various states, including, notably, Afghanistan. They are not strong on history or they would know that the Afghans always win, as we learned to our cost so long ago.
But while the charter has been violated by the permanent members of the Security Council, it remains true that, if we are to avoid the nuclear war which will destroy civilisation, disarmament must come about: world disarmament on a multilateral basis. But world disarmament on a multilateral basis makes no sense at all unless the charter is accepted as the rule of law by which the nations live. Here, as I think, is a chance for the integrity of the charter to be re-established.
I want to urge on the Government that the Prime Minister and the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary should themselves go immediately, by Concorde, to the Security Council and that there they should take up the argument with the other nations and with the Argentine. I want to urge that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should invite President Reagan and President Brezhnev to go with them to the Security Council, Mr. Trudeau of Canada, the Prime Ministers of other countries, M. Mitterrand, the President of France. They should try to make the Security Council the body of the greatest authority which has ever met in the history of international affairs and they should there urge that the Argentines should be restrained by joint action—joint action, in the first place, of a peaceful kind.
The word "sanctions" has been given a horrid ring in the ears of many people, but there are various kinds of sanctions and I have always believed that one of the most powerful might be diplomatic sanctions—the withdrawal of ambassadors from the capital of the offending state. There was one occasion in the past when that was proposed by a British delegate. It was when militarist rebels in Japan made an aggression in Manchuria against the will of their own Government—so much against the will of their own Govern- 1594
Ment that they had to kill three Japanese Prime Ministers before they could make their aggression succeed with the creation of the phantom state of Manchukuo. The third of the Prime Ministers to be killed was a remarkable man, by name Inukai. His grand-daughter is my intimate friend. I was with her in Geneva yesterday morning and discussed the events of 1932 when her grandfather was killed by the militarist rebels.
Lord Robert Cecil, the great founder of the League of Nations, proposed on that occasion (by chance he was our delegate in the council of the league) diplomatic sanctions: the withdrawal of the ambassadors of all the members of the league from Tokyo. I was in Geneva at the time. I knew no one there who did not believe that if diplomatic sanctions had been imposed peace would have been restored and the Japanese people would have compelled their militarist rebels to withdraw. That was the view of the great Foreign Secretary of Belgium, M. Hymans, who was the President of the first Assembly of the League of Nations and who, by chance again, was president of the assembly of the league which was dealing with the Manchurian question in 1932. It was the view of the legal adviser, my good friend Henri Bolin, with whom I discussed the point only a few weeks before his death in 1973 (and his views entirely reinforced my own) that diplomatic sanctions would have been decisive. In any case, I believe that that measure would have an enormous effect today. As the noble Lord has said, there are strong forces in the Argentine against their military government; that is why this coup has been made. But if we stand on the charter, it may well be that diplomatic sanctions would bring those forces in the Argentine to our side, and perhaps they might even triumph there and topple the Government which have felt themselves to be so insecure.
I terminate by begging the Prime Minister and the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretry to consider that this is an opportunity which may not reoccur. As Arthur Henderson said when opening the Disarmament Conference in 1932, history is a record of opportunities lost as well as of opportunities seized. I beg the members of the Government to think that this is an opportunity which should be seized and that there should be sanctions starting with diplomatic sanctions and proceeding if necessary to the enormously powerful pressure of a complete economic break; the stopping of postal and telegraphic communications, the ending of financial and economic relations—and then if necessary persuading the United States and Russia that the right thing to do would be to throw a naval cordon of all the navies around the Falkland Islands, making the Argentinian force on the island prisoners of the United Nations, cut off from their supplies. I feel that by those progressive measures this serious problem which affects the future peace of the world in so intimate a way may be peacefully, successfully and even gloriously resolved.
12.24 p.m.
Lord Beloff: My Lords, with your permission may I bring the House from 1932 to 1982? If by an action of the Security Council of the United Nations the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands could be returned to the sovereignty which they enjoyed, no

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one would be more pleased than Members of your Lordships' House, including, I am sure, the Foreign Secretary. But we have to see the world as it is. We have to see the United Nations as it is—a place which, no doubt, embodies high ideals but which is also the place in which nations and groups of nations pursue the objectives that they have in mind. There is no reason to believe that on this occasion things will be any different. How far it will be possible to bring collective action to bear on Argentina will depend on the foreign policies of that country; for instance, the close relationship in economic matters which it has, despite its fascist complexion, with the Soviet Union, and other considerations which cannot be far from the minds of Members of your Lordships' House.
It seems to me that much of the criticism to which the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, referred which has been made (not, I am glad to note, in your Lordships' House, but elsewhere) is beside the point. We live in a dangerous world in which there are points, neuralgic points if you like, which can spring to life at any time. It is therefore not surprising that, amid the alarms in many parts of the world, any Government should be prone to take the view that this particular crisis may after all not occur. If one thinks of intelligence failures in the past—and the noble Lord, Lord Byers, referred to intelligence—and of, for instance, the far greater humiliation which the United States sustained at Pearl Harbour and the antecedents of why that country was unprepared, this would seem to me to be at most a tiny peccadillo.
On the other hand, there is the much more important factor which I am sure the Government have not only borne in mind hitherto but will bear in mind now, as they prepare their naval task force. It is that we can only act, if we have to act, through the use of naval power because we ourselves are in part the beneficiaries of our alliance. After all, although we can no doubt muster important naval strength, we can only do so because we can rely upon other areas in which that strength might be operative—for instance, the North Atlantic—to be in the care of the navies with which we are associated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is very curious to find people who continually attack directly or by implication our alliances (and in particular our alliance with the United States) and yet who demand of the Government active naval operations to meet the Falkland Islands crisis and who do not see that there is this intimate connection between what Britain can do in a crisis of this kind by which she is primarily affected and what she is able to do because of her existing alliances.
Important as the Falkland Islanders are, and no group of Her Majesty's subjects should be regarded as less important than any other, they are numerically very much less important than, let us say, the inhabitants of these islands. Their security has always to be the primary concern of any Government. It is for that reason that I feel the Government deserve support on grounds which it is perhaps easier for a Back-Bench Member of your Lordships' House to state than it would be for a member of Her Majesty's Government—grounds which, however, I am perfectly certain must have been present and will be present in the minds of Her Majesty's Government over the next
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couple of weeks, during which time we may hope, as the Fleet steams south, that diplomacy will, after all, bring its rewards.
12.29 p.m.
Lord Buxton of Alsa: My Lords, I want to speak only very briefly on two points. First, having been in Argentina, South Georgia and the Falkland Islands in the past month, I would like to say that I myself can attach no blame to the Government for not anticipating or expecting this massive invasion on such a huge scale. I have to concede and admit that I did not expect it. I had a long private talk in Buenos Aires with the Foreign Minister, Dr. Costa Mendez, and I did not have a clue about the invasion, although I did pass on that I thought casual landings such as that which occurred in South Georgia were quite possible. Certainly the Falkland Islanders did not expect it. The reason why nobody expected it, I believe, was that we are, after all, in the midst of honourable, diplomatic negotiations with Argentina, and that the last session only took place in February. This has clearly been planned and must have been plotted for a very long time. How could we expect any mature nation that cares about its inter national prestige to perpetrate such an action at this time?
Secondly, my Lords, may I briefly make a quite different point. I do understand and sympathise with the heady reaction and sense of outrage, which indeed I share, but the situation is very much more delicate and more complicated, and not quite so simple as some of your Lordships may see it if you have not been there. We are in a position as if your own village, say 800 people, was totally surrounded and subjected to the authority of a hostile alien invader. You would have to think extremely carefully how you went about getting the situation right if you were concerned about the safety of the people inside. That refers to Port Stanley which is rather like my own nearest village, Blakeney in Norfolk, or, if you like, Ullapool on the North West coast. The position is that they are surrounded and controlled by another power. The people on the islands are very isolated; they are in farms by themselves, some of them on islands, just a farmer and wife and children, and they are totally dependent for their communications on the two seaplanes and one Islander which ply back and forth, which are now under the control of the invader.
I mention these things only because, while I totally support the Government and the Foreign Secretary in everything he said, and I particularly wish to reinforce all that has been said about diplomatic moves at this stage, I do think we should remember how easy it would be, by sabre rattling or doing too much initially in that direction, to have two consequences. First, it is bound to form up everybody on the side of the military junta in the Argentine; that is the way to close the ranks. Secondly, there is always the anxiety and concern for the scattered individuals who are now quite powerless to do anything about their own fate.
I therefore ask your Lordships to back the Government and the Foreign Secretary in everything he said about diplomatic moves. We must try to bring the world to impress upon Argentina and the statesmen in Argentina, many of whom we know and are friends,

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what a dismal and appalling and reckless thing they have done.
12.33 p.m.
Lord Stewart of Fulham: My Lords, I would strongly agree with what has been said about the need, and our duty, to support the Government in any measures, diplomatic or military, that they feel necessary to take in the coming weeks and months. I think, however, I am entitled to add this. We have been told by several noble Lords that there should be no post mortems, at any rate not now. I would accept that, and I am sure they would have given just the same advice if it had been under the guidance of a Labour Government that this country had landed itself in this position. But those of us who are normally the Government's opponents have, I think, the right to say that at an appropriate time there are a number of questions which will still need to be asked, and which, with great respect to the Foreign Secretary, his speech today did not fully answer. I do not propose to pursue that any further. We have now to consider what to do in this situation.
I was glad to hear the Government express the view—I do not think I am quoting verbatim, but I think I have the sense right—that their objective is to restore these islands to British sovereignty: to restore the status quo ante, as the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, put it. I do not think there should be any doubt about that, despite the fact that it could be an extremely difficult and unhappily long operation. As the noble Lord who has just spoken has reminded us, it will require great care and skill not to put the inhabitants of the Falklands in unnecessary peril.
It will need, as everyone has said, both diplomatic action and a readiness, if necessary, to use force. I do not think I could agree with my noble friend Lord Soper in his suggestion that we should from the outset say that we would never use force. It seems to me if we say that, we make it quite clear that diplomatic action will not succeed. We all earnestly hope that success can be brought about by diplomatic action, and a number of suggestions from many quarters have been made which, no doubt, the Foreign Secretary will carefully consider, by, for instance, my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker, my noble friend Lord Brockway and many others. But we shall get nowhere with that if it is clear that, in the end, we are not prepared to use force to put the situation right. The more clear we are about that, the less likely that things will come to that pass. This is a situation which occurs over and over again in international affairs, and it has been demonstrated time and time again that this is the kind of situation where resolution, above all, is what is necessary, and the more resolute you are, and the more resolute you are known to be, the less likely it is that you will have to proceed to extremity.
My noble friend Lord Brockway mentioned the possibility of a compromise settlement with the Argentine, and my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker made a similar approach. On that I will say this. There are a number of us in this House, on both sides, who have tried to struggle with the difficulty of solving the problem with the Falklands, in a way that accepts beyond question the right of the inhabitants to remain British, which is what they want. Can that be recon-
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ciled at all with Argentinian ambitions? When you pose the question, I am bound to say it seems very unlikely. But, as I say, Governments on both sides, of both complexions, have tried to do it in the past. I think they were right to try, and it might one day be possible to find an answer.
But if we are to begin on that tack we must begin from a situation where these islands are restored to their lawful sovereignty first. We cannot engage in that kind of dialogue with the Argentine as things now are. Once this invasion is rubbed out, obliterated from history, and the islands are under their proper sovereignty, we may begin again as peace-loving nations to try to find a peaceful answer. But that cannot blur the fact that the restoration of the islands to British sovereignty is the first essential.
Why do I say that? I do not think any of us are likely at this stage in Britain's history to fall victims to chauvinism and flag-wagging. But I think we know this. It is not only the Falkland Islands that are in question, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton pointed out very forcefully from the Front Bench. There are our claims in Antarctica as well. Moreover, we live in a world where, any day of the week, a new scientific discovery can turn what had been supposed to be a derelict, useless island or barren tract of land, into a positive treasure house. That can happen at any time. Therefore, the temptations to aggressors are considerable.
The rule we have learned so repeatedly is that if you once let the aggressor succeed he is likely to try again and others are likely to try again; this is so obviously platitudinous a proposition that people sometimes forget it. It is always important to remember that the solid fact about platitudes is that they are true. If the world sees someone getting away with flagrant aggression with impunity, it is more likely that either he will repeat the aggression or somebody else will follow his example. This is the more likely to be true when new scientific discoveries can so greatly increase the rewards of aggression at any moment. This is why, therefore, although I hope I am under no illusions as to the seriousness of what may occur if all our efforts at diplomacy fail, I would still say we must proceed with whatever action is necessary to restore the islands to British sovereignty; and, as has been suggested, not because we have a passion for putting the Union Jack all over the map, but because that happens to be what they want.
I assure my noble friend Lord Brockway of this point: we stand up for the Falklands because they want to be British subjects. We are not fighting for empire, but for self-determination and for the principles of the United Nations Charter. I assure my noble friend that successive Governments have made this clear over and over again. I am afraid that there are some Governments in the world who are not prepared to listen. But my noble friend is right in saying that we should go on saying it and go on emphasising it.
We have been reminded in the newspapers that this is the first time that Parliament has met on a Saturday since the Suez crisis more than a quarter of a century ago. But there is one very great difference. At that time a large section of the population deeply and sincerely believed that the course of military action

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upon which their Government were engaged was wicked and stupid, and the whole situation, therefore, was an unhappy one for Britain. Now the Government can be assured that, whatever criticisms they may deserve or may subsequently be made about their handling of the matter in the past, they go ahead in trying to deal with the matter now with the full and solid support of the nation behind them.
But do not let us forget what "solid support" means. It means the men who will be in the ships that will be going out to the South Atlantic. We do well to remember that it is on their valour and training and discipline that the whole thing depends. If that disappears all the counsels of statesmen and the wisdom of diplomats fall down like a house of cards. I conclude what I say, therefore, with my own expression of goodwill towards them.
12.43 p.m.
Lord Thomas of Swynnerton: My Lords, I welcome very much the speech which has just been made, which echoes my own sentiments entirely. I speak as one who, as a historian, has devoted a great deal of time to the study of Latin America, a continent which I like and whose people I admire. That perhaps gives me an extra force in my expression of repugnance for this treacherous attack on a peaceful and innocent community by a Government which—in all due deference to the noble Lord, Lord Buxton of Alsa, and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton—have incurred over the last 10 or 15 years obloquy both for their mismanagement of their economy and for their treatment of their political opponents. It is absolutely intolerable to think, as The Times put it very well this morning, that British subjects, however many British subjects they may be, should be now at the tender mercies of that Government.
I only wish to put one question and to make one reflection. The question is this. It is assumed that we are not at war. The noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, or perhaps it was the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, said that we are not even in a state of war. I wonder at which stage and at which step we are likely to consider ourselves at war. After all, the concept of war, although it has not been much used since 1945, has its uses. It, for example, can probably enable Governments to do many things which they may feel it essential to do, but which they might not otherwise be able to do. It is also something which is likely to be able to concentrate the minds of the public upon the unfortunate and evil facts of life or the modern world.
My reflection is simply this. When our diplomacy, as we all hope, or our naval and other forces, as my noble friend the Foreign Secretary mentioned would be available, have been successful and have returned the Falklands Islanders to the allegiance which they desire and deserve, perhaps there may be some benefit to be drawn from this tragic affair and that, perhaps, could be the following: it could be a reminder to the peoples of this country, and perhaps of Europe as a whole, that nothing has happened since 1945 to prevent states using the idea of force as an instrument of state policy. We have tended sometimes to forget that. Although this reflection may be of little comfort to the Falkland Islands at the moment, it could be of permanent benefit to ourselves.
12.47 p.m.
Viscount Caldecote: My Lords, in this grave situation it is very important that we should keep cool, but we should also, I think, be fiercely determined on two points. First, and most urgent, as many noble Lords have stressed, to give our support with all the sincerity and all the wisdom that we can muster, to the Government in determining what now should be done from this position which we would have preferred not to reach. Secondly, to analyse and to decide in due course, but not now, what lessons there are to be learnt for the future. I should like to echo the point that the noble Lord, Lord Byers, made that our intelligence services do seem to have been inadequate in this case, and perhaps that comes from the cuts in those services that have been made by previous Governments. I hope that this Government will look very carefully at that point.
The unpalatable fact is that this country has been gravely humiliated and we can only feel a deep sense of shame that we have let down some 2,000 British citizens and betrayed their trust in us. That is one of the worst things, in my view, that one can do in life, and it is the only reason that I am speaking today. So I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Soper, who says that on no account should we use force, although I accept the sincerity of what he says.
It is fruitless to speculate now on the reasons for the fiasco. That can come later in a calmer atmosphere when all the facts are known. Suffice it to say that collectively the Cabinet appears to have been somewhat naïve and badly informed. But from pre-war days when my father was Minister of Defence, I know well the tremendous strains, pressures and stresses that are on Ministers in circumstances of this kind. Nevertheless, if ever there was a case of sins pacem para bellum it is this one. Now we are paying the penalty of not being prepared, for whatever reason.
I return to the more urgent question of: What now? In my view the Government were right to refer this matter to the United Nations. Although we cannot have much confidence in the outcome from there, we should continue to press our case. I am glad that we have already mobilised the support of our friends in the EEC, in the Commonwealth and in NATO. That is good. At the same time we must prepare and be prepared to use force, as the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary has said, to right the undoubted wrong and injustice that has been perpetrated on this country and on some 2,000 of its citizens. The only reason for not taking such action by force would be if the service chiefs advised that there was little chance of a successful outcome. If that were the case, the Government must tell Parliament and give their reasons clearly.
Finally, I want to say two simple things. First, I wish to express with all sincerity our sympathy to the Prime Minister and the other Ministers involved at this difficult time, and particularly to my noble friend Lord Carrington, who has given such enormous services to this country. We applaud the firm statement which he made when he spoke at the outset of this debate.
Secondly—and clearly I am not alone in saying this—in this grave situation we must stand firmly behind the Government, come what may, as long as they show that they are taking determined, effective action to

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resolve this sad situation, and we must encourage them to do just that.
12.50 p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, the view has been expressed—and I am sure that it will be expressed in future—that the Government are themselves responsible in some degree for the situation in which we find ourselves today. But he that as it may, as other noble Lords have said, this is not the time to go into that. However, I think that it is the time to ask ourselves precisely what we can do about the situation we are in —whether or not we should be in it is neither here nor there.
First, we must recognise that although the action of the Argentinian dictatorship is almost universally condemned —or at least very widely condemned—there is unfortunately no support for our basic position in the Falklands. Here I am afraid that I venture to disagree with my noble friend Lord Brockway. I think that there is very little chance of gaining widespread support in the third world for the proposition that the Falkland Islands should remain permanently within the control of the United Kingdom.
As the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Ridley, said on television last year—when the subject could be approached with rather less emotion than is possible today—when the matter was put to the test in the United Nations, we had no support at all. We had no American support; we had no Commonwealth support; no EEC support—no support whatever from anyone.
I draw a total distinction between the lack of support for our basic position and the very widespread condemnation of the action of the Argentinian Government. Why is it that our basic position lacks support throughout the world? As we see it from our own eyes it is a strong one. However, let us imagine that the Shetlands were populated by Spaniards and that Spain said that they must rule the islands until such time as the people freely opted to become British. If we hold that rather strange idea in our minds for a moment, we can perhaps begin to see that the situation appears differently to others from how it appears to us. So, to say the least of it, I think that our basic position is less strong than it seems to us. I hope that as we approach the problem here and as our military forces approach the problem, a more realistic assessment will be made of the military situation in the islands than was made at the time of Suez.
On the other hand, the forceful occupation of these islands cannot for one moment be condoned, especially as it is carried out by perhaps the most pernicious dictatorship in Latin America, and that is saying something. We may be forced into the position in which we have to blockade the islands. We shall want to seek support in that. Whether we shall be able to go quite as far as the ideas that were advanced by my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker, I am not sure, but even if we have to carry out a blockade ourselves, I hope that we shall be doing it, as it were, under the aegis and with the support of the United Nations. We may have to get into the position—the Government may be forced to do this—where we may have to be ready to take off the islands all those who want to leave. I believe that we should seek at all costs to avoid warfare. That means
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deaths, it means blinding, maiming, burning; and possibly it may not end in doing much for the couple of thousand people on the islands.
I wonder whether the islands themselves, as distinct from the people who live on them, are worth the sacrifice of one British life. Nevertheless, I understand the point raised by my noble friend Lord Shackleton, that we have interests in the area wider than those of the Falkland Islands themselves, and that our interests in the area must be sustained. I venture to suggest that we have not done it very well. With the utmost respect to the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, I think that there is a relationship with what one does with the limited amount of money—because even defence money is limited—that one has to spend on one's forces. If one commits a very substantial part of that money to nuclear weapons, which under no circumstances one can use, one is limited in the amount of money that one can commit to forces which under some circumstances one might want to use. Therefore, I do not think that one can divorce this. I think that we can draw two lessons from this experience. One is this. Never pretend to a sovereignty that you cannot sustain. The second lesson is, do not spend money on nuclear weapons that you cannot use.
12.56 p.m.
Lord Bethell: My Lords, I am encouraged to believe that some good may come out of even such a deplorable incident as this. I have been very encouraged by the unity shown by speakers in this House and by your Lordships' united determination to support my noble friend the Foreign Secretary's contention that the Falkland Islands must be restored to self-determination and British sovereignty as soon as possible. I am also encouraged by the early successes that the Government have achieved in rallying support for our case in the international fora. I think that my noble friend's new procedures in the Ten member states of the European Community have been shown to be a very great triumph, and the fact that he has got such support from them so quickly is a measure of his success when he was president in office of 10 European Community states.
However, I think that we must ask ourselves certain very pertinent questions as a result of this humiliating experience. British territory has been invaded for the first time for many decades, and the fact that it is inhabited by only 1,700 British people and half way round the other side of the world, makes no difference to the fact that our sovereignty has been violated by a foreign country. Therefore, I wonder how our alliances will work in the light of this violation.
The initial signs are good. The President of the United States was helpful; unfortunately, he was unable to deter the invasion. But will he now, as the senior NATO leader, be able to bring about a just resolution of this dispute? I believe that we, in the United Kingdom—our Government—have the right as the ally of the United States, to seek his help in the light of the violation of British territory by an outside power. I very much hope that this request will be made clearly and firmly to all our allies. It is, I think, significant that our old adversary, France, has been one of the first to rally to our side. Who can doubt how France would react were her territories of

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Martinique or Réunion to be invaded in this way? Who can doubt that should their self-determination be put at risk by a foreign power, Britain would rally to France's aid, as Britain did in 1939 and 1940? This is what is meant by political co-operation in Europe and by the alliances which we try to preserve, even in the face of smaller difficulties about money, and others, which so often reach the headlines of our newspapers.
I believe, therefore, that we must look at this question very seriously indeed, because if we do nothing, we shall be in the position of the child at school who has let it be known that he can be beaten up with impunity, and he will then suffer more and more bullying as a result of his failure to retaliate. We have very many other islands under our jurisdiction, some of them close to our shores, and many of them have ships of hostile nations that pass them by every day, every week. If we do nothing—if we are unable, through the help of our allies and the European Community, and by our own unaided defence efforts—to find a just way out of this terrible event, then I am afraid that more than the Falkland islands will be put at risk; not only the islands, but, I suggest, the oil rigs closer to our shores, the defence of which could perhaps also be described as rather weak. We must therefore mobilise all the force we have, miltary and diplomatic, as other noble Lords have suggested, to demonstrate to the international community, in Britain's name, that aggression never goes unpunished and that crime does not pay.
1.1 p.m.
Lord Wigg: My Lords, I wished at the outset to ask the Foreign Secretary a question, and I ask it now because I should like a definite answer. Were British troops, the marines, on the Falkland Islands, engaged? Did they engage Argentine forces and, if so, were there any casualties? The Foreign Secretary skirted over that point. He gave the impression that there was resistance, but when I sought to ask whether there were any casualities, I got no answer, and my noble friend Lord Shackleton did not do me the courtesy of enabling me to put the question.
May I have an answer to that question now? If not, I would point out that I was present in the House of Commons on the morrow of Suez; I had come back from Egypt and I had fairly shrewd and first-hand knowledge of what had happened. One of the characteristics of the answers we got on that Saturday morning, right up to Christmas, was that, on every occasion when it was awkward for the Government to answer, they lied. It was clear that the then Foreign Secretary lied, that the Minister of Defence lied and, I regret to say that the then Prime Minister also lied.
Noble Lords: Order !
Lord Wigg: Does the noble Baroness, Lady Young, wish to intervene, my Lords? I thought I was about to get an answer to my question.
In view of what I have said, I am not prepared to accept what the Government say today as being the absolute and unvarnished truth, because I am sure that, if it suits their political convenience, they will
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gloss it over, in the way they have now glossed over giving an answer to the question whether British troops were engaged.
We are told that we must put our money on diplomatic effort. I agree. But, if that fails, we are told, we must have force. My noble friend Lord Stewart said there must be will and resolution, but he omitted to say that there must be the means. My noble friend Lord Jenkins talked about a blockade. A blockade with our limited forces at a distance of 7,000 miles? The whole idea is barmy. If we wanted to take the Argentines on, we should need at least a division backed up by an amphibious force, the means to supply it and the means to sustain it—and therefore, of course, we can rule it out.
Since the end of the last war we have spent on defence no less than £111,000 million. That is not my figure; it was given to me by the Government in answer to a Question—a Question, incidentally, of which nobody took any notice. The truth is that, having spent that sum, we could not knock the skin off a rice pudding. We have searchlight tattoos, the Trooping the Colour and the threat to drop missiles on Argentine targets, but, over and beyond that, in terms of having a balanced defence and foreign policy, in which diplomacy backs up defence, it is not a starter; it never has been a starter and it is not now.
For the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, above all men—the author of the 1957 White Paper, the most disastrous state document ever introduced by a British Government—to have come down to the House and said what he said, he can have no shame. Blue Streak first, then Skybolt and then Polaris; it was he, by giving false figures, who wound up the whole conception of conventional forces based on conscription. When that decision was taken, there never was a possibility of a viable defence policy within our capacity to pay.
1.5 p.m.
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, not having put down my name to speak, it would be improper for me to seek to deploy a long argument at this stage. On the other hand, I ask your Lordships' permission to say a few words because things have moved as I rather thought they would not, and I have found myself (possibly surprisingly to some) in a large measure of disagreement with some things that have been said today; and as I may write or say it outside, I thought your Lordships might think it improper or cowardly of me not to make my position clear, and in a couple of minutes—and I mean very briefly—I shall indicate what I mean.
I do not agree—sorry, but I could not agree—with those who say that this is the wrong moment to call into question the conduct of the affairs of our two great major departments of external policy, the Foreign and Defence Offices, or the manner in which our intelligence services have or have not operated. I believe that should be called into question now because it seems that a most serious situation has arisen when we could not observe, had no knowledge of and did not react in time to something that must have been very obvious indeed and could not possibly have been hidden. I will not follow up that argument now, but I want to make it clear that I do not accept the general view—a polite one, very acceptable in this House, where we try to be polite and understanding towards each other, though

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it will be jolly well misunderstood outside this House—that this is an improper moment to call that into question.
Of course, I wholly accept the argument that we must do everything we can to obtain a political situation by diplomatic means, although I do not accept the view that it makes any reasonable sense to believe that any situation is obtainable on those lines which would re-establish, as one noble Lord put it, the status quo ante. I believe that is an unrealistic view to take. It will be a different sort of situation, perhaps a two-flag situation, but it will be something quite different; and to get any situation that way we need friends, and among those friends notably the Americans, whom we disabuse so often for other reasons.
That brings me to the third reason for bothering your Lordships, but, again, I do so to put it on record so that nobody should think I cheated by sitting here all morning saying nothing and then perhaps said it outside. I could not disagree more with the purposes that so many noble Lords have argued for the use of the task forces now being assembled from all over the world.
Lord Davies of Leek: My Lords, would my noble friend allow me to intervene?
Lord George-Brown: I shall very shortly, my Lords. Those forces cannot arrive in time to be effective; they cannot arrive for anything between three and four weeks. The Foreign Secretary kept his options open by saying they would receive orders as to what to do—scramble, return or go forward—after their arrival. Other noble Lords—some with whom I hate to have a disagreement—have gone much further and said that we must make it clear that force will be used against the islands and, in one case, even against the mainland.
A noble Lord: Who cares?
Lord George-Brown: Who cares? The very people we need to have with us in terms of getting a political solution, my Lords. I would think that the Prime Minister, for example, should now be discussing with President Reagan what their attitude will be if we were to start a war, a conflagration, on the American mainland against a power, which, rightly or wrongly, the Americans regard as an ally of theirs in their local problems.
I have recorded my disagreement. In view of the fact that I did not think it right to put down my name on the list of speakers, it would be improper of me at this late stage to continue the argument. But I think the House should know that that is how I feel—and I am not normally regarded as a "softie" on these matters. I offered to give way to the noble Lord.
Lord Davies of Leek: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I wish to raise a straight, simple question, and I shall not take half a minute. We know how well the noble Lord can make speeches and how he can be constructive. Was the noble Lord, in the phrase he used, thinking of the possibility of a condominium? There seemed to be a hint of it.
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, when I speak of a
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two-flag situation—I do not want to use other words—obviously it could envisage what the noble Lord mentions, and when I was in office I always thought that that was an option for both the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar.
1.10 p.m.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I believe that we must realise that at this time both our friends and enemies throughout the world regard it as an absolute fact that the British Government have been outwitted, out-manoeuvred, by the Argentine Government, and to me that is a very sad thought, whether or not it is true. Another factor we must consider is that a few thousand loyal, decent people, who are as British as anyone in this House, and who have every right to be on the islands, are now under the muzzle of a fascist Government—a fascist Government who hitherto have had too much support from some of the so-called capitalist, free enterprise devotees of freedom. That is something we must take note of. In short, whether it be my country, the United States of America, or any European country, after what has happened in the past 24 hours, no longer can we say that it is quite all right to sup with an evil devil so long as the spoon is long enough.
I believe in the tone set by my noble friend Lord Shackleton in asking for, and I believe quite rightly receiving, the support of the House in order not to be hyper-critical. I also happen to believe that if a Labour Government have been in office when there have been mistakes in either judgment or policy, the party opposite have always seized every opportunity to harrow, hassle, and denigrate them and run them down. I am so pleased that my party is not imitating that kind of behaviour today.
When the Foreign Secretary made his Statement a few days ago I said that it was right for this British Parliament to state unequivocally that we supported the British Foreign Secretary, and that other free Governments should make their declaration in support of him. I said that a few days ago, and I believe that it is still the right policy for us to accept.
But whatever we are going to do, we must face the reality that at the moment the forces of fascism are on the islands, and our British countrymen are under their heel. The solution as I see it—I hope that it is achieved through diplomatic means—is that those forces must be removed. In this effort we command, quite rightly I believe, the full support of the United Nations and all lovers of freedom.
I should like to ask one or two questions which I believe are irritating many people outside this House, as well as a number of your Lordships who have enumerated certain points this morning. There seems to be a case for saying that there has not been full-scale liaison and co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. I am not going to pursue that question, but I hope that it will be cleared up as the debate draws to a close.
I shall not now embark on the argument—it is so transparently clear—about the imbecile policy under which, if we had 100 Tridents, how many would we be sending to the Argentine and to the Falkland Islands to drop a few hydrogen bombs? That is the lunacy of the policy that the Government are now following.

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However, I believe that, regrettably, it may well be necessary to have a show of strength, with conventional forces in conjunction with, I hope, navies and armies of all the free world, to demonstrate once and for all that no matter how small the element of freedom-loving people, they can no longer be threatened by forces like those which threatened us in 1939. When this island stood alone we won through in the end. We won through in the end because we convinced the world that authoritarian fascism must not prevail. That is what I believe President Reagan, President Mitterrand, and all the members of the United Nations must under stand.
Let those former colonies understand that many of them did not have to fight for their freedom, they were given it; and many of them when they received it, made the decision that, like the Falkland Islanders, they, too, wanted to remain under the British Crown and continue close co-operation with this island of ours. Let them demonstrate that loyalty now in this particular moment of distress for our fellow Britons overseas.
If we do not act as I suggest, then what has happened in the past 24 hours might well be emulated by other evil people. We must give the Foreign Secretary the full support of the House, and indeed of the nation. Certain explanations will have to be forthcoming, but at the moment it behoves us all to devote every endeavour to ensuring that those who are now illegally in occupation of the islands are removed. It also behoves all lovers of freedom everywhere—everybody from presidents to ordinary men in the street—to come to the aid of these few hundred people, so that they can continue a life of dignity and personal freedom, and can pursue, as they understand it, a civilised way to achieve happiness on the islands.
1.18 p.m.
Lord Mayhew: My Lords, some years ago, on a visit to the Argentine as a Back-Bench MP, I was invited to address the Argentine Assembly, and for several minutes after I reached the rostrum I was unable to make myself heard for shouts of, "Malvinas, Malvinas—give us back the Falkland Islands!", until one deputy stood up, interrupted, and shouted, "In spite of the Falkland Islands, we have the greatest admiration for Britain". That shout I think received the loudest cheer of all the proceedings from all concerned.
I say that because, despite the reports that we read of the enthusiasm of the Argentine people for the action which their Government have taken, I trust that none of us will identify the Argentine people with the miserable gang of military autocrats who now rule over them; and rule over them despite the bitter opposition of millions and millions of the Argentine people.
I was very sorry not to be present during the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, because I understand that he thanked the Foreign Secretary for bringing back the aircraft carriers. There stirred in me an old memory of 1966, when, as Navy Minister, I was faced with two decisions by the Labour Cabinet. The first decision was to maintain our full military commitments east of Suez throughout the 'seventies and into the 'eighties. The second decision was to cancel the construction of our latest aircraft carrier and phase out
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the carrier fleet. Well, I am very glad that I refused to accept that situation and resigned as Navy Minister. I may say that today we could have done with CVA 01, which was cancelled at that time.
I must not trespass upon your Lordships' time, but I must say that I thought—and I think your Lordships will agree—that the vital passage in the statement of the Foreign Secretary today was where he described the mobilisation of a major task force and said that its orders will be determined by the situation on its arrival. This is the crux of the situation that we have to consider.
It is an accepted weakness of maritime power, of course, that naval task forces take a very long time to assemble and deploy. I must say that I was persuaded on this point by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, this morning. It is not easy to assemble and deploy naval forces in time for a swift-moving situation such as that with which we have been confronted; and even if, as the noble Lord has shown, our intelligence had been better—and it is obvious that it was very bad—the assembling of a naval force as quickly as everyone would have wished would not, I think, have been possible.
The strength of maritime power, on the other hand, is, of course, that it is so flexible. It means you have a number of options, and it means that you do not have to decide on those options until a fairly late moment—and this I believe to be one of the strengths of our situation today. There are other options open to the Government besides the bombarding of Argentinian ports. A maritime power can also deny access to ports; a maritime power can deny freedom of the seas to merchant shipping; a maritime power can make its presence felt far from the scene of action.
When the time comes to judge what the Government are doing—and it is not now—I think they will not be forgiven if it can be shown that they have failed to study very carefully the whole range of options open to them. I do not think they will be forgiven, either, if they are found to have used strong language and then not matched their actions to their words. I think they will not be forgiven, above all, if they follow the advice tendered to us all in the leading article of the Guardian this morning—to leave the Falklanders in the lurch. That is what the Government will not be forgiven for at all. Happily, after hearing the Foreign Secretary, I think there is no evidence that they are falling down on any of these three important criteria, and they therefore deserve, and will get, the support of the country.
1.22 p.m.
Lord Peart: My Lords, this has been a long debate and we have had different speeches with different emphases. I assure the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that I will not go into a defence debate, much as I might be tempted because I think the run-down of our defence forces may have had some bearing on what has happened. However, we will come to that on another occasion. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has referred to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Argentina and the withdrawal of the embassy staff. He has not said what is happening to our mission in Buenos Aires. If the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, would get me some information

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on that, I would be quite happy on that point. What is happening there, and who will look after our affairs there? This is important for our nationals in Argentina, so I hope it will be pursued.
I agreed very much with the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, when he quoted from the Guardian. The Guardian has a very fine editorial today. The heading is:
"Far away, forgotten and now filched".
It says:
"Parliament has two jobs to do when it meets this morning—its first meeting on a Saturday since Suez—to assess the consequences of the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands. One is to consider what can now be done to retrieve what begins to look like a deeply irretrievable situation; and that job should he done as soberly and realistically and with as little appeal to jingoism as can be contrived. The other is to examine the record of government action and inaction which led up to yesterday's events and the extraordinary train of confusion if not concealment which was allowed to prevail for so much of the day".
I think that was a strong point to make, but we have not pursued it in this debate.
On the other hand, I should like to put on record what happened when a Labour Government was in a similar situation. I quote now from Mr. James Callaghan in a debate on the Falkland Islands on the 30th March last, at col. 168. He said:
"I support the Government's attempts to solve the problem by diplomatic means, which is clearly the best and most sensible way of approaching the problem, but is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood them about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS 'Endurance', and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? While I do not press the Minister on what is happening today, I trust that it is the same sort of action".
I should like an answer from the Government spokesman who is to wind up. But is it not ironical that this Government, which have been inveighing against the forces of communism and have based their defence strategy accordingly, are now in the probable position of having to fire their first shot against a Right-Wing military junta. I have been in Argentina—I did a long journey there many years ago as a Minister—and it is true that there is no democracy as we know it. I believe it has developed into a very brutal dictatorship. I was pleased to hear that the EEC had decided to support us. I think the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, mentioned this. I think this is important. We had no support in the United Nations last time, so it is important that we should have diplomatic support now.
I want to ask some questions. Is there still resistance? If so, can we help? Is the task force at Ascension Islands, which is nearly 4,000 miles away, to be deployed? I think we are glad to see diplomatic efforts; this is more important than trying to have military blackmail. But there should be a military back-up if Argentina refuses. We did not need to deploy naval forces secretly, as Labour did, as Mr. Callaghan said, when the negotiations began with Argentina four years ago.
Then, in February and March this year Argentina said that they were going to invade. Why did we not take precautions? We announced that "Endurance"
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would be scrapped and the "Invincible" sold to the Australians. I am sure all this was a factor in making the Argentine Government decide to take a risk. Let us hope that we have learned a lesson with this sorry episode. I agree with many of my noble friends: If a Labour Government had done this, believe me, there would have been all hell raised!
1.28 p.m.
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Viscount Trenchard): My Lords, I shall be very brief. My noble friend has listened to the vast majority of the debate and will, I know, read the speeches that he has been unable to hear. Most noble Lords have been brief and extremely constructive in their support of the stand that the Government are taking against this shameful act of aggression. We welcome the understanding of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that my noble friend and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence must be allowed to plan their steps and take their diplomatic steps, backed by the movement of armed forces, in their own way and without disclosure. I have to say to the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, that that has to be my answer to his detailed qusetions about the Ascension Islands or any other detailed disposition we may be making.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, if the noble Viscount is leaving that question of forces, he may or may not be able to say anything but, of course, we are concerned about the position of HMS "Endurance", and it may he that when he talks about South Georgia he may be able to say something; but, again, he may prefer to keep it quiet.
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, I had intended to do that when I came to that question. The remark that I made before the noble Lord intervened prompts me to say that we and indeed the whole country are going to have to use a good deal of patience, bearing in mind the time that is taken, both to carry out diplomatic negotiations and to traverse 8,000 miles of sea. The support of my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel is very welcome and his observation about this not being the appropriate moment for post-mortems is also helpful. Nevertheless, I regret that some noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Byers, after a helpful contribution, could not resist the opportunity to make some political points even about our independent nuclear deterrent which, as my noble friend Lord Home has said, is aimed against a quite different threat.
Lord Byers: My Lords, would the noble Viscount not agree that that shaft has gone home quite deeply?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord raised a totally irrelevant point and I think that my noble friend Lord Home has more than adequately illustrated that. But let me just add that since this Administration came to power, we have done more to increase real defence of a conventional kind than any Administration for a very long time. The share of the defence budget spent on conventional naval forces has increased substantially since we came

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to power, as has the strengthening of our air forces. The power of our Navy has been increased greatly since this Administration came into power. I regret that some noble Lords have used this occasion to ride their particular hobby-horses—an exercise which is not borne out by the facts. I must say to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition that criticism from the party opposite about the rundown of our defence forces—and those were his words—really does not come fairly or ring truly. Their record in this respect and the morale of the forces when we became the Government of the country were very poor indeed. As I have said, in all the areas that have a bearing on the Falkland Island crisis, this Administration has strengthened our conventional forces.
Let me answer the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, not fully helpfully at this stage; but our interests in Buenos Aires are being looked after by a small section in a friendly embassy. That is as far as I can go at the moment. In relation to the so-called confusion yesterday, my noble friend dealt with this very fully and I have to re-affirm that communications with the Falkland Islands are never easy and that we were unable to get confirmation of the fact that an invasion had taken place. The last message that we had from the Governor, shortly before 10 o'clock our time, was that no invasion had taken place. It took us most of the rest of the day before we could get that confirmation.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, I want to help the Government. In so far as they did not know until six o'clock, could they not enlist the aid of the editor of the Standard who had it in headlines at one o'clock?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, the media frequently speculate on what, to those without responsibility, may seem obvious. Sometimes they are right, sometimes they are wrong. The noble Lords, Lord Byers and Lord Mayhew, questioned the standards of our intelligence and, indeed, my noble friend Lord Caldecote questioned whether we should not have known a great deal more a great deal earlier. The Argentines perform regular naval exercises on a very big scale at about this time of the year and all the activities that were observed were consistent with their being for the purpose of exercises. Here I would thank my noble friend Lord Buxton who openly and correctly stated—and no one is in closer contact with the area than he is—that no one knew.
It would be superfluous for me to add anything to what my noble friend has already said in relation to the negotiations which his Ministers had been having with the Argentines; but I have to say that it seems to me that aggression of this kind was no more likely in March 1982, in fact, almost certainly much less likely, than at almost any time over the past 15 years. Be that as it may, even if we had not adopted a policy of calm reaction and had mobilised forces as soon as this seemingly minor incident in South Georgia took place, as my noble friend has made clear, our forces would still be traversing the 8,000 miles before they could be in position. Such action a few days or a day earlier would have been inflammatory in a part of the world where heads are sometimes not very cool.
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I do not intend today to comment on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, in relation to perhaps greater permanent steps that might have been taken under any Government in recent years (but which have not been taken under any Government) such as the extension of the runway—except to say that the maintenance of an advance base, or a greater base of any kind including advanced aeroplanes or naval forces at this distance is difficult to the point of being impractical to visualise. I think that the noble Lord will know better than I the degree to which the maintenance of modern equipment and the supplies of it are needed even to maintain enterprises in the civil world and the degree to which they are supplied from the Argentine itself as the only near-at-hand country from which they can be drawn.
But, in my view, this is not the time to debate the question of whether some ships should have set sail a day or two earlier. My right honourable friend has made it clear that we have some ships at sea in addition to the force we are now assembling and that he is not going to report where those ships are, for very obvious reasons.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, asked for a report on the situation in South Georgia. While, at this stage, with communications as they are, almost every report that we get has a degree of hazard about it, we have communicated with HMS "Endurance" this morning, and, as far as we know, she is in good shape and good order. We believe that the 22 Royal Marines—and we have had a message to that effect—on South Georgia are still there and in reasonable shape. There is an Argentine research vessel off South Georgia. At the moment, I can give the noble Lord no more information than that. I must say at this stage that the Foreign Office have been in regular touch with the head of the British Antarctic Survey, Dr. Laws, in Cambridge, and co-operation between us has been and is excellent.
Lord Shackleton: My Lords, the noble Viscount may wish to check my statement as to who telephoned whom; but we need not waste time. He said that HMS "Endurance" was in good shape. I should have hoped that HMS "Endurance" had sailed to safer waters. The noble Viscount may not feel that he can say anything.
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, for all the reasons that the noble Lord himself implied in his initial speech, I do not feel that I can say anything. Let me answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. The information we have at this stage, information which comes from the Governor, is that the Marines did engage but suffered no casualties. There were some Argentine casualties.
I have been pressed in many areas to go further than my noble friend was prepared to go today in relation to the situation should diplomatic pressures from ourselves, from the United Nations and from other countries in the world, fail to achieve the aim that we all hope they will. Noble Lords will know that I have no intention of so doing, and no words of mine could confirm more clearly our resolve to do everything in our power to return British citizens of the Falkland Islands to British sovereignty as soon as that can be achieved.

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I believe, impertinently, that we are very lucky to have my noble friend at the helm of the Foreign Office at the present time, and I believe that the vast majority of the country share that confidence. I hope that we can count on the media—and I make a special appeal to them—not to give undue publicity to two brigades that have been mobilised in the past few days: the wise-after-the-event brigade, who no more foresaw what was coming than anyone else; and the other brigade, the hobby-horse brigade, who are tying the problems we have 8,000 miles away to their particular hobby-horses in relation to defence.
Lord Peart: My Lords, will the noble Viscount give way? I respect the noble Viscount very much for his contributions, but he is really going a little too far. After all, we have had a pretty good debate without rancour. I hope that the noble Viscount will not pursue that line.
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, my appeal was to the media. Perhaps I should not make that appeal in this House, but I make it quite sincerely for all the reasons that I and other noble Lords have given today. I believe that this is a time for national unity and for concentrating on the present situation. The vast majority want to give all the backing that we can to my noble friend and my right honourable friend, and I end my reply with a repetition of my noble friend's words this morning: it is our firm objective to ensure that the Falklands are freed from alien occupation. My Lords, I commend the Motion.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, there was a Motion before the House. I did not exactly gather what it was but may I take it that it was, That this House takes note of the situation in the Falkland Islands? Does my noble friend wish to move that or withdraw it?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, we wish to move that.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, the Question is, That the Motion be agreed to?
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Lord Sandys: My Lords, before moving the adjournment of the House, I feel sure that your Lordships will permit me on your behalf to express our united thanks to the staff of your Lordships' House: the Clerks, Doorkeepers, Hansard Reporters and all those many others who have made it possible for your Lordships to meet and have this important emergency debate today.
I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.
Moved, That the House do now adjourn.—(Lord Sandys.)
Lord Peart: My Lords, before we do so, if anything happens which may be of a serious nature will the noble Lord recall the House tomorrow?
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I believe that is my function, and the answer is that I already have a document which I have not issued: but of course if in the ordinary way it is thought proper, then I imagine that there would have to be consultation between the authorities for everybody. I have a document ready in case anything should happen.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at a quarter before two o'clock.