Sitting of 31 October 1975

Preamble
The House met at Eleven o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]

PALACE OF WESTMINSTER (SECURITY)
11.4 a.m.
Mr. Speaker: I have a short statement to make to the House.
On 7th August, I announced to the House the arrangements for considering the Starritt Report on the Security of the Palace of Westminster.
I am glad to say that the following Members have agreed to serve on the small Committee, to be set up jointly with the House of Lords, to examine the Report:
The hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Cooke).
The hon. Member for Croydon, North-East (Mr. Weatherill).
The hon. Member for Glasgow. Spring-burn (Mr. Buchanan).
The hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Harrison).
The terms of reference of the Committee, which have been agreed with the House of Lords, will be
"to consider the review of security at the Palace of Westminster carried out by Sir James Starritt CVO, formerly Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, and to make recommendations."

RHODESIA
11.5 a.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. James Callaghan): I beg to move,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1975, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th October, be approved.
The tenth anniversary of the illegal and unilateral declaration of independence by the white régime in Rhodesia is nearly upon us, and this is the eleventh time that the Government of the day have asked this House to approve the Order—
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Shame.
Mr. Callaghan: I see that there is at least one hon. Member who does not learn from history. We ask the House to extend for a further 12 months—
Mr. Biggs-Davison: What about Lord North?
Mr. Callaghan: If the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) wants to associate himself and other members of the Conservative Party with Lord North, that will show that, like the Bourbons, they forget nothing and they learn nothing.
We ask the House to extend for a further 12 months Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. This empowers Her Majesty in Council to take whatever measures may be necessary to deal with the situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence. Among the measures which it will maintain in force are the Orders in Council applying sanctions to Rhodesia. I believe that the Order will achieve the overwhelming support of this House.
The renewal of sanctions is a reaffirmation of our commitment—a commitment accepted by successive administrations—to settle a debt of honour to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and in particular to the African majority whose legitimate aspirations remain thwarted. I shall have something to say later about the impact of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy. But since their imposition they have had a further significance. The fact that they have been imposed is a symbol to the

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world of Britain's intention and determination to do everything that we can to contribute to a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia on the basis of the Six Principles which were formulated a decade ago.
For Rhodesia, the past decade has been a decade of drift, of drift towards potential disaster which, as time passes, becomes more and more difficult to avert. The decade has been marked by the consistent refusal of the régime to come to terms with one basic reality—that if Rhodesia is to have a peaceful and prosperous future the right of the Africans to play the major part in the running of their country must be recognised.
The most important development over the past 12 months has been that all of Rhodesia's neighbours recognise that the Rhodesian problem is, in a very real sense, their problem as well as ours. All Rhodesia's neighbours now realise that, unless that problem can be solved peacefully, there is a real danger that Southern Africa will become engulfed in an armed racial struggle.
Earlier in the decade which is just coming to an end, it was felt by successive British Governments that the right course to follow was to attempt to negotiate a settlement with Mr. Smith directly. The turning point came, I think, with the Pearce Commission of 1972. Thereafter, it became absolutely clear that a settlement in which the Africans were not directly involved had no hope of being accepted by them.
Perhaps as important was a growing realisation by the Africans, both in Rhodesia and in the surrounding States, that Britain really did mean what she said in the Six Principles and was not simply seeking a sell-out or an accommodation with Mr. Smith. It was to reinforce that view and to obtain a convergence of our policies that I visited several African Commonwealth States and South Africa earlier this year.
However, in discharging Britain's responsibility we recognise that the condition for a lasting settlement is that the prime responsibility lies on Rhodesians of all races to determine the country's destiny. In that process both Britain and Rhodesia's neighbours have a crucial and legitimate rôle to play in promoting a settlement. The ultimate
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constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia still lies with Britain. But it would be unrealistic to deny that Rhodesia's neighbours have at least as great an interest as ourselves in finding a solution to the Rhodesia problem, and can bring greater influence to bear in the quest for a settlement. For us it is a debt of honour. For them it is a vital matter of security.
I should like to pay a tribute, which I am sure the House will wish to endorse, to the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia for the rôle they have played in attempting to smooth the path of negotiations between the parties in Rhodesia. I should like, too, to acknowledge the very positive efforts of the Government of South Africa towards the same end. A year ago Mr. Vorster spoke of the need for all parties in the position to do so to bring their influence to bear and he has acted in recent months to carry out his own statement of intent.
Despite the present impasse we shall continue our efforts to get both sides around a negotiating table. It is my earnest hope that the four Presidents and the South African Government will continue their effort to achieve the same end. I believe that they can and should continue their readiness to act together in pursuit of this objective, despite the well-known and deeply held differences of view among them on matters. The great majority in Rhodesia counts on their help in achieving a settlement and would be gravely disappointed if they did not pursue their efforts.
In the future, as in the recent past, it is right that Brtain should co-ordinate her efforts as closely as possible with those countries.
I shall not take up the time of the House by rehearsing in detail today the events of the past 12 months or the successive hopes and disappointments to which they have given rise: the release of Joshua Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, with the prospect of constitutional talks "without preconditions" in Mr. Smith's own words, and the uncertain cease-fire; the Lusaka meeting with the four Presidents, followed by my own sounding in Southern Africa in January; the OAU meeting in April; our consultations with Commonwealth

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leaders at Kingston; the visit by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State to Lorenço Marques, Pretoria and Salisbury in June; the partial achievement of the Victoria Falls Bridge talks which then foundered—and let us be clear that they foundered on Mr. Smith's own shortsightedness; the early unity, but subsequent disarray, of the African nationalist leadership. To what point does all this bring us today?
Today, we are faced, and the people of Rhodesia are faced, with a year of lost opportunities—opportunities painstakingly created by the four Presidents and Mr. Vorster, and largely thrown away through the failure of the illegal régime to make a correspondingly generous and statesmanlike response. That failure was perhaps most notable when Mr. Smith refused to make a concession on immunity for the exiled ANC representatives at the Victoria Falls talks in August. Since then things have become steadily worse. What can be done now to keep the hope of a negotiated settlement alive?
I repeat my conviction that our starting point must be that Rhodesia's neighbours will be willing to continue to play a helpful role. A peaceful solution which meets the aspirations of the majority of Rhodesia's population is clearly in the interests of all with power and influence to bring to bear on the situation. Without rapid progress to majority rule, peace will break down, because no power on earth can make Rhodesian Africans tolerate a political system which they have made clear they reject. But war must be equally abhorrent to Rhodesia's neighbours, because each of them has pressing political, economic and social goals which could be put in jeopardy by a resumption of guerrilla warfare on a wider scale.
The conclusion is inescapable. Yet there is still a depth of illusion among Rhodesian Europeans and their supporters in this country and elsewhere about the realities of the situation. They seem to cling to the belief that there is still a chance for them to be left alone to work out their salvation in the way that they, not their African compatriots, decide, that they can be left to choose and dictate the rate and direction of progress, and that they have a preordained right to undisturbed enjoyment of their privileged position. They have totally failed to
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understand why South Africa, as much as anyone, desires a settlement in Rhodesia which will be acceptable to Rhodesian Africans and to African countries to the north.
The consequence of this failure to understand what is taking place outside could be disastrous, because the outcome could be racial war. I have said before, and I repeat again, that I think that every hon. Member well understands the fears and hopes of the white population for the future. They have jobs, homes, farms, pensions, and the future of their children to think about. They do not want to throw these things away. But no one else wants them to throw them away either. What we do say is that there can be no future for them if they persist in their present course.
In their own interests, the Europeans in Rhodesia must start seriously to look for alternatives which take account of the racial balance in the Rhodesian population and provide at least a chance of peaceful co-existence with their fellow African countrymen who overwhelmingly outnumber them. They are done no useful service by those who tell them that the choice for them is between oligarchy and anarchy. The choice is between ultimate defeat—perhaps long delayed—and a chance of a multi-racial society. A number of white Rhodesians understand this very well, and I pay tribute to them.
However, if statesmanship is necessary, as it certainly is, on the European side while they hold power, it is also necessary on the African side. For them the message of the 1950s and 1960s is equally clear. Progress towards their goals will be very difficult unless they can restore a broad measure of unity in their ranks and in their leadership. I hope that even yet it is not too late for the nationalist leaders to subordinate their differences, to repair them and to advance together.
It is against this background that we ask the House to renew the legislation which keeps sanctions in being. As I said in my opening remarks, they are a touchstone of our determination to maintain pressure on the régime to come to terms with reality, and to come to terms with the aspirations of the majority and thus with world opinion. To dispense with them now would be an act of incredible political folly. It would shock

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world opinion as a violation of our obligations under the UN Charter to obey the mandatory rules of the Security Council. It would be interpreted by Africans in Rhodesia as an abandonment of our responsibility towards them. It would shake the Commonwealth. Indeed, it would be an act of folly, and any hon. Member who goes into the Lobby to vote against them must surely hope that he will be defeated in what he is doing.
It is our task and duty to see that we, and others, enforce sanctions as strictly as possible. Even now they are not universally applied—they will not cripple the Rhodesian economy—but they serve a useful purpose in bringing home to the European man in the street—and perhaps the man on the farm—the true extent of Rhodesia's isolation in the world.
Enhanced by the effects of the world recession, the effects of sanctions are now severe. In the financial year which ended last June the deficit on Rhodesia's balance of payments rose to a record peak of nearly R$80 million. The allocations for foreign exchange, travel abroad by Rhodesians and imports have been drastically cut back. On the regime's own admission, improved sanctions' surveillance has contributed markedly to the worsening of the economic climate in Rhodesia—[Laughter].
Mr. Ronald Bell: What an achievement!
Mr. Callaghan: Is that a matter for laughter? The hon. and learned Gentleman says "What an achievement!" That is true. If I were in Mr. Smith's position I should feel that it was necessary to consider where my policy was leading me.
I might add here that the need to meet the threat of renewed guerrilla activity has also placed strains upon the economy, leading to a rise in defence expenditure of some 23 per cent. in the last Budget. Moreover, the increase in the scope of the call-up for military service is bound to have a considerable effect on productivity in the economy.
In attempting to ensure that sanctions are stringently enforced, we have enjoyed the fullest co-operation of the United Nations Supervisory Committee on Sanctions. There have been setbacks. I do
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not conceal my disappointment at the refusal of the House of Representatives to repeal the Byrd Amendment, under which the United States permits the import from Rhodesia of certain strategic minerals—notably chrome and ferrochrome—but I am encouraged by the evident intention of the American administration not to let the matter rest there.
I am glad that, following discussions which I initiated with our European Community partners last year, machinery has now been set up to exchange information about the prevention of sanctions breaking. Other countries, too, have taken steps to strengthen their sanctions controls. Japan, for example, to whom as Foreign Minister I made representations on more than one occasion and who subsequently sent a delegation to visit South Africa, has, I believe in the light of the knowledge she has gained, introduced new documentary requirements for trade which are making it more difficult for her firms to evade sanctions, and she has also made it an offence for them to trade with Rhodesia via third countries.
I believe—I know that the great majority of hon. Members will agree with me—that this is right. There is a new note of earnestness in the attitude of great trading nations towards the enforcing of sanctions. This is a trend to be encouraged, and we shall continue to play our full part.
Looking to the future in more general terms, one concern is and will remain totally and unconditionally central to the Government's Rhodesian policy—that is, the search for a just solution by peaceful means.
Throughout the last year we have devoted our diplomatic effort to this end, and we shall continue to do so. All those who are concerned with this problem, both in Rhodesia and elsewhere, would do well to bear in mind that to abandon the search for a negotiated settlement and to go over to seeking a solution by military means would be to adopt an irresponsible policy of despair. No one who argues in favour of a war of liberation should forget that the Europeans have the power, even if they cannot win, at least to make the struggle a long and bloody one. We can and must do our utmost to see that these destructive forces are not unleashed.

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The armed struggle is not a soft option with inevitable results. If the attempts to negotiate a settlement fail, the drift to armed racial confrontation will begin in earnest. No one can now know how it will end. We know not only that the struggle in Rhodesia will be bloody, but that it is likely that all her neighbours will be sucked into the conflagration. Who and what would survive, we do not know, but I am certain that every country in Southern Africa would pay a very heavy price indeed. That is why I have committed the British Government once again so firmly to the process of negotiation. As part of that commitment the continuation of sanctions is essential.
We remain ready to discharge our historic responsibility for Rhodesia and to convene a constitutional conference when the time is right. But a constitutional conference does not in itself constitute or guarantee a solution of the underlying political problems. As I see it, a pre-condition for calling it together is that the elements for a settlement should exist. Only in extremis would it be worth calling it together as a last ditch enterprise. At present neither the conditions for a settlement nor an extreme situation in which we might do it as a last hope exist, but events are closing in. Mr. Smith has little time left to choose which path he intends to take.
We shall maintain solidarity with the international community on the issue of sanctions and go on working in the closest consultation with the countries in the region which share our broad objectives. We shall hope and work to achieve a settlement which will recognise and meet the aspirations of the African majority while preserving peace in the country so that people of all colours and races may live and have a future there.
I do not think that it could be fairly said that the Government have neglected any opportunity in the last year to make a constructive contribution to this problem. We shall certainly continue our efforts in the coming year and go on actively seeking out such opportunities as there may be. With my right hon. Friend the Minister of State I am always considering what intervention will help best. I feel confident that we shall have the understanding and support of the
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large majority in this House and in the country at large.
11.25 a.m.
Mr. Reginald Maudling: Shelley wrote,
"grief returns with the revolving year."
I cannot help being reminded of those words in this debate today. It is a grief to everyone, because Rhodesia—a lovely country endowed by nature with enormous resources and in which men and women should be able to live happily together in prosperity and unity—is still suffering from these grave difficulties. It is a grief to us that this should be so. It is also a grief to us, inevitably, that we in this country, and particularly in this House, should have so little power, in practical terms, to do anything whatever about it.
We must recognise, as the Foreign Secretary properly recognised, that Britain's ability is now limited to the exercise of such influence as we still have, particularly with the States around Rhodesia, to try to achieve a settlement. Certainly we welcome what the right hon. Gentleman said about what he and his colleagues are trying to do. We assure him that anything that he does to try to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia on the basis of the principles accepted for many years on both sides of the House will have our support.
We have this debate year after year. It comes with "the revolving year". I suspect that the arguments this year will be much the same as those made last year, which I read closely, and that the vote, when it comes, will be much the same as the vote last year, because Members' convictions on this subject do not change.
I must stress that this is an annual debate. Parliament provided that it should be an annual debate, because it was thought wrong to commit ourselves on any one occasion for more than 12 months ahead. This year, when the situation is particularly fluid, it is important to emphasise that we are being asked to continue this Order for 12 months. At the end of 12 months the situation could be very different. We may—I hope to God that we shall—see a settlement of this whole problem, and then the thing will lapse. On the other hand, we may

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be facing a situation of severe fighting, as the Foreign Secretary rightly suggested. Therefore, it is right that we should reserve our position on what we might do in another year in circumstances which we cannot possibly predict.
On behalf of the Conservative Party I must make it clear that, in accepting the need to continue the Order, we do so for this year only, as we are asked, and reserve our position on what may happen in a year in circumstances which may be totally different.
It is true, as the Foreign Secretary said, that pressures are now developing which may help to bring about an agreement and settlement of the problem. I was glad that, in paying tribute to Southern Rhodesia's neighbours, the right hon. Gentleman included not only the four Presidents, but Mr. Vorster and the Government of South Africa. All of them are properly to be congratulated on the efforts that they have been making. Clearly they all recognise that it is in their mutual interests that there should be a settlement and that it can be in no one's interest in any part of Southern Africa for the situation in Rhodesia to develop into brutal armed conflict between black and white. After all, it is only from there that a solution can come.
We should particularly bear in mind today what effect our actions and speeches may have upon the efforts made by President Kaunda, Mr. Vorster, or any of the others concerned who are trying to bring about a settlement. If there is to be a settlement, basically it will come from their influence and activities. Anything that we did to impede those influences would be a sorry thing indeed.
I shall now proceed to the practical question before the House: do we approve the Order? It would be wrong to oppose the continuation of this Order. At the same time, I think that the Foreign Secretary's defence of the Order and of economic sanctions was a bit flimsy. I have a certain sympathy for those who argue that economic sanctions in this, as in almost every other, case prove to be an exercise in absurdity.
What effect have they had over the past 10 years? The answer is, precious little. It is all very well to say that Rhodesia has a balance of payments deficit.
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Rhodesians are not the only people faced with that difficulty and I am not convinced that their balance of payments deficit arises from the imposition of economic sanctions.
Nor do we feel that the imposition of sanctions has been as impartially applied as it might be, or followed up as consistently as it might be by other countries. I notice that last year the Foreign Secretary referred to this and spoke about what he was doing to make sanctions watertight. He said that he would raise the matter with EEC Foreign Ministers. That was 12 months ago. I gather that all that has happened is that they have reached an agreement to exchange information. That is a splendid idea. They should have done that years ago.
The right hon. Gentleman also spoke about the Byrd Amendment. He hoped that he would be allowed to send an appeal to Congress to repeal it. I do not know whether he sent that appeal, but if he did, Congress did not pay very much attention to it.
Whatever the moral or political purpose of sanctions, it is only right to say that in economic terms they have had precious little effect and support. It is worth while emphasising this, because one often hears it suggested that economic sanctions should be applied to this or that country. There is no example in history to show that the application of economic sanctions has done anything more, in practice, than stiffen the resolve of those to whom they are applied.
In relation to this Order I believe that we, as a country, are committed to mandatory sanctions. I think it was a pity that it ever happened in the first place. I should like to quote what Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as he was, said about this, because what he said in 1973 remains as true today as it was then. He said:
"It is true that mandatory sanctions should never have been put on. We voted against them…. But the British Government of the day put its signature to a resolution of the Security Council of United Nations which is binding on its members. We are a permanent member and we are in the habit of keeping Britain's word. We do not…pick and choose which laws we obey and which we do not, nationally or internationally."
He went on to say that the time may come when we have to ask the United Nations to be relieved of this special

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responsibility. That day, he said, might come, but he went on the say that
"with all the emphasis I can command that now and for the foreseeable future, to drop sanctions without a settlement would be to fall between two stools."
What he said on that occasion remains true today. We must have regard to the rapid rate at which things are changing in Southern Rhodesia. If I may be allowed to say so, we should perhaps say tempora mutantur and be prepared to mutare in illis—be prepared at all times to change our stance in the face of changing circumstances. If the time comes to demand such a change, I hope that we shall respond to it. In the meantime it is right to allow the continuation of the Order on the 12-month basis on which it is proposed. I say again that anything the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues can do to bring about a peaceful settlement will have our wholehearted sympathy.
11.34 a.m.
Mr. Bruce George: This is the eleventh time that this House has been called upon to renew this Order. This is the first time that I have made a contribution to the debate. But I have read the previous debates, and on looking at the Opposition benches I note the faces that have appeared at these debates time and again.
There was the hope, 10 years ago, that this illegal régime would be strangled at birth but, regrettably, that hope proved somewhat premature. But this debate is taking place today against a situation of unprecedented fluidity in Southern Africa. It is not simply a repetition of debates of old, when the prospects of change were slight. It may be premature again to say that there will be no need to have a further debate of this kind, but skilled "Rhodesia watchers" are more than aware of the difficulties of predicting the fall of the Smith régime.
There are those who think that once again we are witnessing the dying gasps of Rhodesia, but there are still many imponderables. There will undoubtedly be progression towards majority rule, but will this progression be via a bloody route, and when will this progression take place? Will it be this year, or next year, or some years ahead? I very much hope that the Rhodesians themselves
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will realise that the time has come to settle honourably, and that the bloodshed that is inevitable by any other course can be avoided.
We are no longer at the centre of the stage. We were unable—indeed, some would say unwilling—in the past to discharge our ultimate colonial responsibility in Africa. Others hold the key, and an alternative strategy has been devised. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said last year:
"The time has passed when the Phodesian problem could be settled through a negotiation between the British Government and the illegal régime alone…—[Official Report. 8th November 1974; Vol. 880, c. 1406.]
We still have a rôle to play in the ultimate settlement, and I should like to compliment the Foreign Secretary on his efforts to create a better understanding between the British Government and the other participants in this continuing saga. In Rhodesia, they are dealing with difficult men. They are men who are ostensibly dignified by the office that they hold. They are men who have built a State which at best could be called a dictatorship and at worst a Fascist regime. What they have done is made more obnoxious by the fact that they are of British descent. Few can take pride not only in the way in which they have conducted negotiations over the past decade but in the way in which Rhodesia was conquered, the way in which the last vestige of resistance was crushed, the way in which violence was used to establish the State, and the way in which violence and the potential threat of violence are used to sustain that State.
This régime has maintained white privilege and white supremacy whilst masquerading behind euphemistic phrases such as "a desire to maintain the Rhodesian way of life", "to preserve Christian standards" and "to keep the Government in civilised hands". We should not forget that we are dealing with a régime which is not only illegal but which, in almost every sense, offends against any standards of morality in the world today.
The situation now is very different from the situation two years ago, or even one year ago. The next 12 months will determine the future of Southern Africa. The events of the next 12 months, unless carefully and correctly handled, will turn the

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Southern Africa situation into one as potentially dangerous to world security as is the situation in the Middle East.
However, there are some hopeful signs. As Professor Spence, my former tutor, wrote:
"The most encouraging feature of the current mood is that for the first lime in nearly a decade the major protagonists have asserted their faith in the operation of conventioned diplomacy."
This has been an encouraging feature of the past 12 months, but for Mr. Smith the options are closing.
The collapse of the Portugese empire two years ago signalled the end of an epoch—the end of 500 years of Portugese colonisation of Africa and, we hope, the end of a decade of the illegal régime in Rhodesia. For Rhodesia, one leg of the tripod crumbled—the Portugese leg—and the second leg, that of South Africa, is rapidly being shortened, so Rhodesia's policy options have slowly been whittled down. On the one hand it has seen its own strength vitiated and on the other it is seeing the power of its adversaries magnified.
Improbable though it might have been two years ago, it is now South Africa that holds the centre of the stage. It is South Africa that calls the tune. Mr. Vorster knows that white majority rule in Rhodesia is doomed, and any demand to sustain that régime economically or militarily is a burden which, I believe. South Africa is not prepared to bear. White minority rule in Rhodesia is expendable so that white minority rule in South Africa can be sustained. My hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Mr. Ennals) said in an excellent speech to the Oxford University Labour Club last week:
"In fact they—
namely, South Africa—
"would clearly prefer a stable black régime than an unstable régime based on minority rule."
For South Africa there has been a stark choice—
Mr. Patrick Wall: What country in Africa has a stable majority régimes today?
Mr. George: I think any glance at, not even a detailed study of, the situation in Africa will reveal a number of stable régimes—
Mr. Wall: Name them.
Mr. George: Tanzania, Kenya—there are numerous régimes and political, systems in Africa which are stable. I can name a number of régimes in Europe which are incredibly unstable. In many ways, the reasons for the instabilities in Africa cannot be placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Africans; they are due largely to the legacy that the colonial Powers left behind.
For South Africa, the choice is stark It can either pursue its policy of détente, or it can try to sustain the illegal regime, which will mean military involvement. As my right hon. Friend said, that will benefit no one. Any nation involving itself in conflict in Africa will lose. That is the choice for South Africa, and I believe that it is taking the correct decision in assisting, indeed precipitating, a peaceful settlement. But one should remember the lesson of Angola. There is a bloody conflict in Angola today, but in many ways it can be put down to the fact that the Portuguese stayed too long and then refusal to get out largely led to the civil war.
We do not want too many simplistic conclusions and assessments—[Interruption.]Perhaps hon. Members are accusing me of a simplistic approach. I look forward to listening—quietly—to their analyses. An exciting time will probably unfold in the next four hours.
I hope that hon. Members will agree that we should congratulate those presidents and leaders who have involved themselves in the negotiations—President Kaunda, President Seretse Khama, President Nyerere and President Machele of Mozambique. These men are struggling to achieve peaceful transition. Although we may support the policy of detente by South Africa, we must remember its objectives. It is an attempt to secure an economic and political bridge with black Africa, now that South Africa's cordon sanitaire has disappeared.
But the price that black Africa and the West are expected to pay is to maintain a benign neglect of what is going on in South Africa. As the Foreign Secretary said, this is no time to abandon our role, to withdraw our sanctions. To do so at this point would be an act of monumental folly. It would result in our relations with developing nations and with black

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Southern African States being set back a decade. Far from abandoning sanctions, we must tighten them. We must root out the sanctions busters and condemn those engaging in sporting activities with Rhodesia. Sanctions themselves will never bring down the Smith régime and there are very few who ever thought that that would be the case—
Mr. Nicholas Winterton: The Prime Minister did.
Mr. George: Sanctions are clearly harmful to Rhodesia. One would be foolish to fall for the propaganda coming out of Rhodesia that sanctions are even beneficial. The pressures on the Rhodesian economy are continuing, including the effect of sanctions, which we should not minimise; the effect of guerrilla activity, or potential guerrilla activity, the problems posed by Mozambique, not only political but economic, particularly the problems of transportation. All these are harming, and will harm further, the Rhodesian economy.
The problems of that economy are exacerbated by the world economic climate, the oil crisis, and the world recession, which is hitting Rhodesia hard. There is also the decline in foreign exchange and foreign investment, and the manpower problems created by the call-up. Immigration to and emigration from Rhodesia provide a good barometer of the morale of the population. Many of them are clearly voting with their feet—
Mr. Ronald Bell: And in Britain, too.
Mr. George: A few more could go, to our delight.
A gentlemen called Mr. Anthony Hawkins, writing in the Bulletin of the Institute of South Africa, Issue No. 1, 1975, said:
"Economic sanctions, in their present form, will not bring down Rhodesia. Only a decision from South Africa to stand aside and see Rhodesia fall to such economic pressures could achieve such an outcome."
So the factors that I have mentioned—the way in which the economic screws are being tightened—mean that if South Africa stands aside the elimination of the illegal régime will be precipitated.
Mr. Hawkins refers to sanctions "in their present form" bringing down Mr.
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Smith. I advise hon. Members to read the Seventh Report of the United Nations Security Council Committee about sanctions. It is a voluminous analysis of who is breaking sanctions. Regrettably, the admonitions are sincere but the organisation has few teeth. It sends polite letters to Governments, which are often ignored. The report said:
"Some Governments have co-operated with us but the Committee feels that in a disturbingly large number of cases Governments have failed to respond to our inquiries."
It goes on:
"Information received from established sources indicates that sanctions evasions have continued on a major scale throughout 1974."
The blame is placed to a certain extent on the shoulders of South Africa and Portugal, but as the Committee says:
"Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of Southern Rhodesian trade with other countries continues to be conducted with countries the Governments of which do not question the validity of mandatory sanctions."
Clearly, many Governments are going through the motions of operating sanctions while closing their eyes to the facts.
One must comment on the failure of the American Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment. I said "American Congress" because the American President is trying to put pressure on Congress to repeal it. I was privileged to attend—as an observer, a meeting of Congress when Congressmen and representatives from outside organisations were co-ordinating their policy to secure its repeal. It is vital that we have much stricter enforcement of sanctions, which will make an important and possibly decisive contribution to our objectives.
A publication called the "Common Market Law Review", published as recently as May, contained an article by a Dutchman named Mr. P. J. Kuyper, analysing the rôle of the EEC in sanctions. I hope that it has been read by the Foreign Office and that I shall hear the comments of the Foreign Secretary on it. I hope that his negotiations with the EEC will yield a much more favourable response by the various Governments.
I believe that there will be a solution. I hope that the disunity currently being witnessed in the nationalist movement will be healed. I hope that this saga is reaching its culmination, but one should

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not be too optimistic. Optimism has been raised many times before, but, as President Kaunda has said, we are dealing with a problem which has gone on for centuries, and we cannot expect miracles overnight.
11.50 a.m.
Mr. Julian Amery: Perhaps at the outset I should by the strictest standards declare an interest. I have no business connections with Rhodesia, but I am connected with a mining group which still has certain properties in that country.
The hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) urged us not to adopt a simplistic attitude. I cannot help feeling that he fell a little into the trap against which he warned us. No one would call Rhodesia a pluralist democracy, but it will not have escaped the hon. Member's attention that in the past few weeks both main branches of the African National Congress have held public conferences and demonstrations. This is not quite what we associate with the words "dictatorship" and "Fascism", which he used. I shall deal with some of the other points raised by the hon. Gentleman a little later.
The preface to the Authorised Version of the Bible begins with the words:
"To the most high and mighty Prince James…King of Great Britain, France and Ireland."
That was King James I. The preface was written more than a generation after Queen Mary Tudor had lost her last foothold in France. It was a great piece of humbug for the King of England to claim that he was King of France. King James was known as "the wisest fool in Christendom." I cannot help thinking that if we continue to introduce these Orders, not just the Foreign Secretary—because we were guilty of it, too—but the House of Commons will deserve that soubriquet.
Cant and humbug are the prevailing diseases which afflict Britain today. Ministers shed tears over homelessness, and then it turns out that five of them have 17 homes between them. They advocate egalitarianism in education, and then it proves that many of them send their children to fee-paying schools. They shed tears over the plight of murderers of Spanish policemen, but not over the Spanish policemen or their families. But
1966
this Order really takes the biscuit for humbug.
The Order asserts that we are still the sovereign Power in Rhodesia, yet for 10 years Rhodesia has fulfilled all the criteria laid down by ordinary Foreign Office standards for an independent State. It has managed its economy and assured its defence independently and in face of great problems. It is total humbug and cant to pretend that it is not independent and that we are still the sovereign Power.
The justification for sanctions is that they are a means to persuade the Rhodesians to accept that they are not independent and that they still need our blessing before independence can be conferred.
The right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) and the hon. Member for Walsall, South attempted to assess how sanctions have worked out. I shall try to follow them. The effect has been partly negative to us. We lost £70 million worth of trade at 1965 values, which would presumably have expanded in the period when commodity prices rose and food prices rose even higher. Sanctions have also done some damage to the Rhodesian economy, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out. They have inhibited capital investment from outside, and meant fewer settlers than Rhodesia otherwise would have had. In order to defeat sanctions it has had to pay rather more for what it imports and receive rather less for what it exports. There has been inconvenience for those who have pensions overseas and for those who want to travel.
But there is another side to the matter. Sanctions have meant that the profits of foreign companies, including multinational companies, could not be repatriated, so those companies have had to re-invest in Rhodesia. This has produced something of a boom, particularly in the construction industry. Behind the protective barrier of sanctions, scores of new industries have sprung up, which manufacture everything from loo paper to machine tools—commodities which Rhodesians never expected to make before, but which they always expected to import.
As a result, whole new strata of African and European business men and African

1967
and European skilled men have sprung up. What is more, many of those whom we used to regard as simple farmers have proved to be very competent operators in marketing and international finance. The Tribune Group should take heart from the remarkable success of the Rhodesian economy, operating behind precisely the kind of barrier of import controls and financial restrictions which it advocates for this country.
Three yardsticks should be borne in mind when trying to measures the balance of profit or loss arising out of sanctions. The great nightmare of the Rhodesian régime was that it would be faced with an insoluble African unemployment problem as a result of sanctions. That has not happened. Labour, indeed, is still being imported from Malawi and Mozambique. Apart from last year, in the past 10 years there has been a small net inflow of Europeans. Bank rate stands at 4½ per cent. The rate of inflation is even lower than that which the Chancellor of the Exchequer pretended was ours in the October General Election; it is about 7 per cent.
We may well ask: what are these sanctions for? I shall let the House into the secret. If the sanctions were taken away and if British business men were allowed to trade freely with Rhodesia, there would inevitably follow a de facto recognition of the Rhodesian republic. We might not recognise it de jure, and we might not send an ambassador, but very soon we should have to send a consul to protect our interests there. This would upset the left wing of the Labour Party, perhaps some of the bishops, particularly those who write in the Morning Star, and some of the more extreme members of the Organisation of African Unity.
How does the House of Commons, after 10 years of folly, get off the hook? Much the most attractive way would be by way of a settlement, which all hon. Members could commend as the grounds on which we could confer legal independence from this House. The Foreign Secretary analysed clearly the circumstances of a settlement. Originally, it was regarded as an agreement between Britain and the white régime in Rhodesia. After the Pearce Commission, that phase ended and the African National Congress became
1968
the chief protagonist in our place. It was then a question whether Mr. Smith and Bishop Muzorewa could reach a settlement. More recently, others have come into the act, notably South Africa and Zambia.
What are the chances of a settlement? Until I visited Salisbury this year I had not been there for five years. Certainly there is a big change in the political climate among both Europeans and Africans. The Europeans talk widely about eliminating all discrimination. They have certainly reduced it. It has not been eliminated completely, by quite a long way, but there is a régime commission which is investigating what more can be done and tackling, in particular, the irksome question of the urban areas in which Africans should be allowed to own property and offices. At present they are restricted.
The question is, can those restrictions be swept away, or, at any rate, diminished? Hon. Members on both sides of the House have condemned this practice for a long time. What is interesting is that the Rhodesian Europeans are now themselves talking about sweeping these things away—but not because of sanctions, let us be clear about that. Many considerations are moving them—the change in the Portuguese colonies; perhaps even the threat of terrorism—but, as one distinguished opponent of Mr. Smith said to me, "Starve us out? We can grow enough food for 20 million". In a hungry world that is a big card to play.
In European circles there is much talk about nominating African Ministers to the Cabinet right away, and many are hopeful that some sort of settlement will be reached with part, at least, of the ANC—perhaps with Mr. Nkomo. The Europeans' position is that they are prepared to share power but are still determined not to transfer it, as happened in Kenya. The Africans are deeply divided. Mr. Sithole believes that only force can settle the issue. I was glad to hear the Foreign Secretary denouncing that view. Mr. Nkomo and his colleagues, for their part, have made a substantial step to meet the Europeans. They have made it plain that in their view majority rule does not mean, or need not mean, "one man, one vote". They are quite prepared

1969
to accept a qualified franchise and to leave the question of the qualification and, hence, of precisely how quickly majority rule would follow.
Is it possible to reconcile those two positions—the readiness of the Europeans to share but not transfer power, and the wish of the ANC to achieve early majority rule? I do not know. I do not know whether any of us do. But clearly outside influences will play an important part, and, in particular, the influence of Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kaunda.
There are very good positive reasons for Mr. Vorster's view that there is a great community of economic interest between all the countries of Southern Africa. That is particularly true of the interdependence of Zambia and Rhodesia, as the creators of the old Central African Federation well understood. Zambia is going through a very difficult period. It is very short of foreign exchange, and it can get only part of its principal export of copper shifted by the Tanzam Railway and Dares-Salaam. The Benquela Railway is cut, because of the Angola civil war and the Beira railway is cut because Mr. Smith has closed it to Zambia. Zambia still gets food and coal through Rhodesia, but it must go by circuitous routes, and it costs more in foreign exchange than the market price.
Zambia, indeed, is suffering more from the sanctions than is Rhodesia, and clearly has an interest, as has Mr. Smith, and, in logic, Mozambique, in seeing a settlement and an accommodation arrived at. But President Kaunda has his own political difficulties at home and with the OAU. He cannot very well accept an accommodation with Mr. Smith unless he can point to an accommodation between Mr. Smith and the Africans in Rhodesia.
The negative reasons for détente are perhaps even more compelling than the positive ones. Mr. Vorster and President Kaunda have both looked over the abyss, and they do not like what they see. They know only too clearly that however reluctant they may be to become involved, if there is an abandonment of the negotiation table in favour of the battlefield in Rhodesia, ineluctably both will get drawn in and on opposite sides. As Mr. Vorster has said, the consequences of this could be "too ghastly to contemplate."
1970
If reason and logic prevail, a settlement should be possible. But, of course, wisdom does not always prevail. Of the other African leaders, President Mobutu, President Banda and Sir Seretse Khama will certainly be working for moderation. I should like to be more sure than I am that Mr. Nyerere and Mr. Machel will use their influence in the same way.
No one can quite foresee what will happen in Angola, but if the present civil war there ended in a Communist victory the whole balance of power in Central Africa would be shifted in a way that would make a settlement more difficult and confrontation more natural.
What can we do? We have to admit that there is precious little. The most frustrating sense that I had in visiting South Africa, Rhodesia and Kenya, is that people listen to old friends and talk in a friendly manner, but one is very conscious that Britain has very little influence nowadays out there. We have no longer a military presence. The Beira patrol has gone—from Zambia's point of view—and the Simonstown base, from South Africa's point of view. Our economic situation is all too plain to everyone.
What can we do? The ideal would be for us to face the facts, recognise that sanctions do not work, and accept the reality of an independent Rhodesia and of our own inability to do anything about it, but I despair of getting the House of Commons to do that. The Opposition, when in Government, did not do it, so how we can expect the present Government to do it baffles me. But there are two things that we can do. One is in relation to the Europeans and the other is in relation to the Africans.
The Europeans have a deep mistrust of London. They fear that even if they make substantial concessions and sufficient concessions to arrive at an agreement with a representative group of Africans, the British Government and Parliament may not endorse that agreement and may simply come back and ask for more, under pressure from the left wing of the Labour Party, the OAU, or others. We must, somehow, convince Europeans that if an agreement is reached with a representative group of Africans we shall endorse it promptly before extremist or other pressures get at the agreement and wreck it.

1971
Where the Africans are concerned there is another point which we must make clear. The Foreign Secretary laid the foundation for what I am about to say, but he did not go as far as I shall go. We must make it perfectly plain to the Africans that if they abandon negotiations in favour of force, we cannot continue to maintain sanctions—which would mean a de facto recognition of Rhodesia. I say that for this reason: we have always set our face against the use of force as a means of solving the Rhodesian problem, and if the Africans who have taken over the main negotiating rôle now abandon negotiations and resort to force, we cannot continue sanctions without being accomplices of terrorism and accessories to it. That is a position into which no British Government should ever get, and I hope that the House of Commons will make it clear that it is unacceptable to all of us.
12.9 p.m.
Mr. Bruce Grocott: I am tempted to reply to a number of points made by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), particularly some very misleading statements he made about humbug on the part of my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench. When it comes to humbug, certain Opposition Members take some beating. They are so fond of such phrases as "law and order" and "the rule of law", but they are prepared to give succour to a régime which, among other things, has hanged people who have received the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. It would be difficult to imagine a situation in which law and order and the rule of law, and things of that type, are more violently infringed then they are by that kind of activity.
I want to concentrate today on one theme and a number of points relating to it. The theme which is crucial to the problem of Rhodesia—I claim no originality for this—has been, since the declaration of independence, and continues to be the relationship between Rhodesia and South Africa. Some profound mistakes have been made in estimating that relationship and in making policy judgments based on estimates of the relationship. Further, during the past year that relationship has changed dramatically, as a num-
1972
ber of people thought that it would eventually.
It has long been my view that, if and when a real test arose, South Africa and the South African Government would not be prepared to back Rhodesia. There are any number of reasons for saying that. There are straight logistical reasons. It is fairly obvious that in the long run South Africa will have profound difficulties in containing itself within its own boundaries, let alone trying to defend boundaries hundreds of miles from its frontiers.
There are, I regret to say, racial reasons as well. The balance between black and white in Rhodesia—anyone who knows anything about South Africa knows that that balance and that ratio is one of the crucial factors in any estimate of policy—is simply not good enough for South Africans: there are too many blacks and not enough whites. That calculation obviously enters into the South African consideration.
There is an even more deep-seated and cultural reason why the South African Government would always view whatever any white Rhodesian Government—English-based Rhodesian Government—might do or say with a fair degree of scepticism. The reason is entrenched in South African society, and particularly in white South African society, as anyone who has seen or observed it knows.
I can remember the shock which I received and from which I have still not recovered on picking up a newspaper in Johannesburg some years ago and seeing a headline something to the effect
"National relations improving dramatically in South Africa."
I thought "My word. After all these years they are getting on at last. They are managing. They are coping well."
What the South Africans are referring to when they talk about national relations are the relations between the English and the Afrikaaners. The profound bitterness which exists between the English and the Afrikaaners still in South Africa must be taken into account before one can begin to understand South African society. To understand that is to begin to understand a great deal of South Africa's attitude to Southern Rhodesia.
It is common place for English speaking people in South Africa to refer to

1973
Afrikaaners as white kaffirs. It is an indication of the sickness of that society that that can be a term of contempt, but that is frequently the phrase used by English-speaking South Africans when they speak of Afrikaaners. We know of the cultural gap which exists between the Afrikaaners and the English. We know that the South African Government resisted to the last moment attempts to take television to South Africa for fear that it would swamp the Afrikaaner group with English-speaking views and influence. That is all part of the same symptom.
Therefore, when South African white society and the South African Government look to Rhodesia they see, not just a white-black problem but the dominance of English-speaking people in Rhodesia, and for the Afrikaaner in South Africa that is a subject of great concern in any consideration of future plans between the nations and between the races.
I have said that there are numbers of reasons why, when it comes to the crunch, a South African Government would have very great reservations about doing anything dramatic to help the Rhodesian Government. The significance of this in this debate is that during the course of the past year we have seen real indications that the collusion of thieves, if one likes so to describe it, between the South African Government and the Rhodesian Government is coming to an end. We have seen it with some of the remarks that Smith himself has made about Mr. Vorster and the part that Mr. Vorster played or did not play in the settlement that might have been achieved.
We have seen a reaction of the whites in South Africa to what was said. We have seen in effect Mr. Smith appealing over Mr. Vorster's head to his right wing and to his party in the country. That appeal was rejected, as we knew that it would be because it was an English-speaking person appealing to backwoods Afrikaaners and Afrikaans-speaking people in South Africa. We have seen the withdrawal of South African troops from Rhodesia. We have seen all sorts of indications that whatever honeymoon existed in the past is coming rapidly to an end. We should thank God for that.
According to a report I have here, the South Africans have been preparing for
1974
an influx of whites from Rhodesia. I quote from a report in the Observer on 20th July of this year:
"the South African Government is discussing a contingency plan to absorb thousands of white Rhodesians and particularly members of the 30,000 Afrikaaner community in Rhodesia."
So even in this situation it is the Afrikaaners the South Africa Government want there, if they are anxious to welcome anyone. It is not the rest. That, as I have suggested all the way along, is what we must appreciate in attempting to understand what is going on in South Africa.
So at a time when even South Africa—people know well enough that we on this side do not expect many good things to come from the South African Government—is saying "We are moving towards a settlement" and wants to see a settlement I cannot believe that Opposition Members would countenance a situation in which the British Government should step back from this and should in effect say "We will make it easier for you Rhodesians in the next year. We will step back from sanctions. We will put a settlement further away." That would be monstrous and ludicrous.
Though I know that the logic of events will take some Conservative Members into the Division Lobby, I cannot believe that right hon. and hon. Members, if they consider this argument, will not see the logic and truth of what I am saying. Events in Mozambique have moved against South Africa. Another significant development of the past year is the way in which the South African Government have begun to react in a way in which I would have expected them to react a long time ago but which in the end was bound to come.
There is barely need for me to give my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary any advice on negotiating. To attempt to give him advice on how to negotiate would be rather like teaching my grandmother to suck eggs. However, rather than appear to be too anxious to seek a settlement at present when events are moving inexorably against Smith and against the South African Government I would tend to let things drift a little. Things are at least going in the direction in which anyone with any sense of history knew that they would go. Let us hope

1975
that there is a settlement as soon as possible. But let it be recognised that events in that part of the world are moving against Smith and in particular as regards the crucial relationship with South Africa. I profoundly hope that the House will support the continuation of sanctions.
12.19 p.m.
Mr. Patrick Wall: The hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Grocott) began his speech with a reference to law and order. He then said that the Rhodesian Government had hanged people who had received the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. The hon. Gentleman will recall that the three men in question were convicted murderers, who had been condemned well before UDI. Since then, terrorists who have been caught in the act have been hanged by the Rhodesian Government. I remind the hon. Gentleman, too, that many people in this country are now saying that the same should happen over here.
I follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) in declaring what limited interest I have in Rhodesia. I have no financial interest. The Foreign Secretary will recall that when we visited Rhodesia some time ago I purchased a small rocky outcrop, on which I hoped one day to build a holiday bungalow. I suppose that if sanctions have had any success at all, one could say that their main success has been to prevent my so doing.
It is 10 years since UDI and the start of the tragic farce of sanctions, the nonsense of which has been so eloquently underlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion. I should like to go back to the start of this conflict. Right hon. and hon. Members on both Front Benches have a responsibility for the unfortunate situation which prevails today. The Conservative Government at the time of the Victoria Falls conference, if they had not been too clever, could well have negotiated the independence of Southern Rhodesia at the same time as Zambia and Malawi, and world opinion would have taken that independence without too much argument. The Labour Government could well have secured a settlement at the time of "Fearless" if they had not insisted on the second safeguard of an appeal to the Privy Council.
1976
I suppose the best hope of a settlement in this dispute came during the Home-Smith agreement, which was negated by the Pearce Commission. That was the responsibility of the then Conservative Government, but it was also a Foreign Office responsibility. It would seem to an observer that the Foreign Office has given the wrong advice to successive Governments—first that UDI would not take place, then letting the Prime Minister, nine years ago, say that the matter would be settled in weeks rather than months, and, finally, by mistiming the Pearce Commission, which is the main reason why it did not achieve success.
That is in the past. I now address myself to the new situation which has been created by the South African Prime Minister's policy of détente. I join the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in paying a tribute to the South African Prime Minister. Not only Rhodesia wants a settlement; so does Zambia—economically even more so. She must find routes to get her copper exports out of the country, due to the prevailing chaos in the ports in Angola. Mozambique needs a settlement, because she depends largely on South Africa's help for her economy and tourism. Therefore, détente is wanted not only by the South African Prime Minister but by the Presidents of Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Tanzania. Each of these gentlemen is applying pressure to the protagonists in Rhodesia.
What is the problem in Rhodesia? I suggest that it is this: with whom do the Rhodesian Government negotiate a settlement? The problem is very similar to that facing Her Majesty's Government in Ulster. If they negotiate with one group in Ulster, they know that automatically the other group will disagree and there will be no settlement. That is the problem facing Mr. Smith today. It is now shown that the enlarged ANC which emerged from the Lusaka agreement was a "phoney" arrangement, which was designed merely to paper over the cracks. The tribal groupings in Rhodesia are the major factor in Rhodesia and, indeed, in the whole of Africa today. We call it tribalism, but it is really nationalism, which we in Europe have faced over the centuries. ZANU, mainly SHONA, has the larger guerrilla army, but that army is now

1977
largely disarmed in Zambia. I have said in the past that I do not believe that there is any chance of a settlement as long as they have to negotiate with Mr. Chitepo or Dr. Sithole. Both these men are vehemently anti-white, and do not want a settlement. Indeed, they were both prepared to shed blood. Now, Mr. Chitepo is dead and Dr. Sithole is isolated in Zambia. That leaves Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU, which is NDEBELE-based.
I believe that there is now a chance of a settlement. It is true that when the ANC faction, led by Dr. Gabella, met in Salisbury recently, they had a far larger meeting than did Joshua Nkomo, who had a meeting two weeks earlier. But so far as ZAPU is concerned, it was a conference attended by delegates from all over Rhodesia, whereas in the case of ANC it was attended by any supporter that Dr. Gabella could gather.
I believe that the deciding factor will be the views of the Presidents of Zambia, Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique. I believe that they will very soon show who they believe to be the real leader of the African Nationalists in Rhodesia. Once this is done, negotiations can start with a reasonable chance of success.
As has been said by the Foreign Secretary and others, the alternative is war. The British Government do not want war; neither do the Opposition, but if some people on the extreme left of the Labour Party, who have made speeches, not in this debate but in previous debates and in the country, really think that South Africa is prepared to throw Rhodesia to the wolves, they the living in cloud-cuckoo-land. South Africa, if forced, would certainly rather fight in Rhodesia than fight three years later in the Northern Transvaal. Therefore, people should not think that South Africa will jettison Rhodesia in the search for a settlement. That will not happen Of that I am absolutely certain.
We all want a settlement. It is the only answer to the problem of Africa, because without a settlement there will be more racialism and the danger of conflict. What, then, is Britain's rôle? It is accepted, as is apparent from speeches from both sides of the House, that Britain's rôle is now minimal. Sanctions are irrelevant. One of the amusing factors about sanctions is that the Beira
1978
blockade was instituted because the Mozambique-Rhodesia border was open. Now, the Beira patrol has been disbanded, and the border is still open, in spite of the fact that many people said that when Mozambique became independent she would impose sanctions against Rhodesia. This has not happened.
If sanctions are so irrelevant, why is there to be a vote in the House today? Many of us on the Opposition side of the House—I suspect this applies to many hon. Members opposite—have always regarded sanctions as wrong in principle. They will not help a settlement, and hurt the Africans most. We do not want sanctions. They encourage anti-Western forces in an area which is of great strategic importance to the West. In addition, a vote today will serve to show that the Government and the Opposition still differ in their policies on Rhodesia.
Is there anything that we can do? I have one suggestion. I know from my visits to South Africa, at my own expense and as the guest of the South African Government, that the British Government's information about what is happening inside Rhodesia is minimal. They do not really know what is going on. Therefore, it would be of advantage to re-establish our representation in Salisbury. Such a representation would carry with it the right of Rhodesia to have a representative in this country. In discussing other international problems, such as Portugal and Cyprus, we are always told that it is important to keep open lines of communication. This is what I advise the right hon. Gentleman to do, and I hope he will refer to this when he concludes the debate. Let us do that in the case of Rhodesia. Let us re-open those lines of communication which were severed by the action of an over-anxious Labour Government.
I shall summarise the position as I see it. Bad mistakes have been made by successive Governments both here and in Rhodesia, but today I think that both sides of the House are agreed that we face a new situation. I hope that we also agree that this situation can be settled only by Rhodesians in Rhodesia, assisted, of course, by their friends in adjacent States. Let us keep aloof from the situation until the Rhodesians have themselves reached agreement, and then—and this is the key—let us be prepared to act with

1979
speed in giving Rhodesia legal independence, which I believe should then be guaranteed by South Africa and Zambia. Then and only then can the Western world claim to have won a major victory over the Communist Powers.
12.31 p.m.
Sir Frederic Bennett: I am sorry that the Secretary of State has left the Chamber, as many of my remarks will contradict what he said. But I begin by paying tribute to the right hon. Gentleman in that, after the failure of the Douglas-Home initiative—surely the last one which can ever be mounted from this country—he had the sense to realise the minimal rôle which this country can play. In that context, the right hon. Gentleman has acted with courage in his party because he has not hesitated to invoke the help of that arch devil, South Africa, in attempting to reach a settlement. That required considerable courage for a Labour Foreign Secretary. It could not have been easy for him to enter into discussions with Mr. Vorster and to enlist Mr. Vorster's help in trying to reach a settlement in what we were always assured was a British responsibility in a rebellious colony.
Apart from the inaccuracies of which the right hon. Gentleman was guilty, he was also a little unfair to me on one matter. I have never been a particular admirer of Mr. Smith. On the occasions when I have met him, we have usually engaged in controversial argument. But it is not fair to suggest that the Livingstone talks failed because of Mr. Smith's obduracy. I was not present at those talks, but I do not think that there was any doubt that they largely failed because there was no independent chairman. It is a matter of regret that at this stage we have so far lost control of and touch with the situation that we could not have supplied the independent chairman.
In the event, there were Mr. Smith and a colleague on one side of the table and eight members of the African National Council on the other. Having said his piece, Mr. Smith asked the Africans for their views, but as soon as one of them said something another said, "I do not agree." That went on right through the eight Africans present. That is the truth about that conference, as I am sure the
1980
Minister of State must know from his own information. One after the other, all eight Africans contradicted what the previous one had said, and it was that which led to the breakdown of the talks.
There are many things about which we can be critical of Mr. Smith in the past, but on this occasion I can truthfully say that I do not know how he could have done much better, in view of the convincing proof that at present there is no single voice representing the Africans with whom negotiations could take place.
I have some personal sympathy with that problem. It may surprise some hon. Members opposite, but I was approached professionally—albeit without fee, so I have no declaration of interest to make—by members of the ANC to help in the drafting of a constitution two years ago, which was to have in it immediate parity leading, at a later stage, through qualified overall franchise, to African majority rule. Those talks ended in the production of a fairly massive confidential volume, which was then taken to Rhodesia.
The first thing that happened was that Mr. Smith managed to get hold of a copy and condemned it out of hand as selling the pass. Within a couple of weeks, the situation was put back to normal in Rhodesia because the ANC headquarters there repudiated all that their colleagues overseas had agreed because of the conflict between the various factions within the ANC.
The greatest problem in the way of reaching a settlement is not Mr. Smith's obduracy, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested. Nor is it anything to do with sanctions. There is no doubt that both President Kaunda and the South African Government are trying to get a settlement. But the great problem is the extraordinary difficulty of making a settlement with such an elusive body as the ANC, which is supposed to represent African opinion in Rhodesia. Sooner or later, the negotiators will have to choose one group as representative of the broad mass of African opinion and come to a definite decision, because if they continue to think that they can negotiate simultaneously with the four or five factions involved, they will be continuing the argument for a very long time.
The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. David Ennals): I do not want to deal now with the divisions in the ANC, but I certainly do not want the hon. Gentleman to think that I accept his judgment that the main reason for the breakdown of the Victoria Falls conference was the divisions within the ANC. The reports I have received show that the main reason was that Mr. Smith was not prepared to make any concession to grant immunity to those leaders outside Rhodesia to enable them to take part in the negotiations.
Sir F. Bennett: The right hon. Gentleman and I must continue to differ. Of course that was one factor, but the right hon. Gentleman must know that there were some terms on which the eight African members would agree and some on which they would not. I have put forward my interpretation of what took place. I believe that the principal feature in the failure of the talks was the inability to make a deal with a piece of quicksilver, as it were, in that there was no single representative voice of the Africans.
Over these last 11 years, I have from the beginning expressed my doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions. After all this time it is easy now to say, "I told you so." But it should have been obvious almost to everyone what would happen. There were two main reasons for the failure of this exercise.
First, we seemed to imagine that the kind of external threat which would solidify opinion in this country even among those who disagreed—external threats always do unite us—would not unite people in Rhodesia, who would react differently. But they are in the main English stock, and there is also a fairly substantial proportion—about 30 per cent.—of Afrikaaners among them, and they can be pretty obstinate when they get going. There were the conditions for a perfect amalgam of the Rhodesians to support the Rhodesian Government even if many of them had been disagreeing with Mr. Smith.
The truth is that we never thought the situation out. If there were an external threat to this country, those who disagreed with Her Majesty's Government politically would nevertheless react in precisely the same way and present a united front to that external threat. Thus, from the start,
1982
sanctions were bound to stiffen resistance in Rhodesia rather than the opposite.
Many of my hon. Friends and I said year after year that sanctions were bound to be ineffective unless South Africa was prepared to go along with them, and we were not strong enough to blockade South Africa. We said that the result was inevitable. Everyone surely should have realised that, so long as South Africa was not prepared to have Rhodesia driven to her knees economically and politically, there could be no other result.
In addition to South Africa's position, there was also the covert support of the neighbouring Portuguese territory of Mozambique and also the reluctance of Malawi, under the leadership of Dr. Banda, to become involved in the whole sanctions battle.
There has been a change in the Portuguese territories in Southern Africa, but trade is still continuing between Mozambique and Rhodesia because the new nationalist rulers in Mozambique are not necessarily as silly as we are. They are not prepared to make economic sacrifices in order to achieve something which they know to be ineffective. The border is open and trade is continuing between the two countries as a matter of reality. When they see the effect of sanctions over a period of 11 years, they are not prepared to cut off their noses to spite their faces.
Over a period of a year I have tabled a number of Questions for Written Answer relating to commodities needed by people in their ordinary lives. In every case I have discovered that the goods that Europeans buy in Rhodesia are cheaper than those purchased by housewives in this country. The taxes in Rhodesia are lower, and petrol there costs less. Certainly in terms of balance of payments, our Chancellor of the Exchequer would be delighted if he were faced with the situation in Rhodesia.
It is a little cheap to try to pretend that the power of British or international sanctions has had a colossal effect on the Rhodesian economy. The currency in Rhodesia is far harder than ours, and right across the board the Rhodesians have done better than we have and their economy has not suffered unduly. Of course in a period of recession things have gone wrong, but that has nothing to do with sanctions.

1983
I wish to quote a letter which I have just received from an African who lives in Rhodesia. He is not a "stooge" chief or a member of the administration of the Smith Government. He is a graduate student largely engaged in trying to help race relations in one of the institutions there between white and black settlers. This is what he says in the letter:
"Many people always speak of the imposition of tighter or removal of sanctions. Sanctions as they are now are helping Rhodesia to be self-sufficient and to depend less on foreign goods. This has the impact of stimulating economic growth and a healthy balance of payments. In fact, sanctions are protecting our home industry against foreign competition. Through the system of exchange control we are able to reallocate our limited foreign currency reserves. I don't approach this problem one-sidedly but in a broad spectrum."
I only wish that some others would follow the advice of that African, a man who lives in Rhodesia,
I wondered whether to attend today's debate, and whether it was necessary for me to say the same things that I have said in the past. We are not the only people who realise that we no longer have a rôle to play. The Rhodesians, black and white, know this, as does Kenneth Kaunda and everybody else. However, every year we go through this ritual sanctions exercise. People in that part of the world know that if there is to be a settlement, it will depend on the forces there. The days have long since passed when a British Prime Minister could strut on the quarterdeck of a warship 7,000 miles away and imagine that he could settle the destiny of Central Africa. I am doubtful whether that opportunity ever existed. Certainly it is now long past.
I have a suspicion that if this debate is reported at all in the Rhodesia Herald it will be read second or third after the fatstock prices or the list of local engagements. The interest that is likely to be aroused in Rhodesia at present over what we are doing and saying here is extremely minimal. We have no rôle today. We have the opportunity to do all we can by giving our support behind the scenes to South Africa, Zambia, Malawi and others. We must try to reach some kind of compromise settlement—a settlement that up to now has eluded us. But we are not even
1984
being asked by anybody to play a rôle in this matter.
This brings me to the sanctions Order itself. I have not made up my mind whether I shall abstain or vote against the sanctions. I find myself in some difficulty in going through an exercise that is designed to prove that something which has been shown to be ineffective through the years has some impact on the situation in Rhodesia. It is not useful for us to go through this exercise any longer.
I was slightly encouraged by the speech of my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary, who appeared to suggest that the time had now come for us to look at the problem again. I do not know whether Labour Members realise that this situation has now been in force for 11 years. Are they seriously suggesting that no British Government and no British Parliament should take a fundamental look at the future of Rhodesia? Should we not conclude that this scheme has failed and that we should try some other way? I firmly believe that it is time to consider some other policy, and I hope that the Conservative Party will take that view even if the Labour Party will not do so. Do we need to go through this ritualistic exercise? Do we need to listen to totally inaccurate remarks about the effect of sanctions? Should we not aim at a more productive policy than the present policy has been shown to be?
12.45 p.m.
Mr. Phillip Whitehead: I shall be very brief. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary set out the reasons why for the tenth time we must continue the sanctions Order. The hon. Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) said that reports of this debate would be read in Rhodesia only after the fatstock prices and local news items. That may be the case, but it will be read after discussion of the resignation yesterday of one of Mr. Smith's Government. It will also be read after the news from the outside world, including South Africa, which now cannot provide much hope or inspiration in Rhodesia.
I wish to intrude my remarks into the opinions of the Rhodesian lobby on the Opposition benches just to show that there is another opinion in this House about

1985
the continuation of sanctions. I do so in no gloating spirit, and I take no pleasure in seeing the last death agonies, as they will shortly be, of Mr. Smith's Government. It is clear that, for a number of reasons, Mr. Smith's régime is on its last legs. Plainly, the effect of sanctions is not the only reason for that situation. The progressive widening of the rift between the Rhodesian Government and Mr. Vorster and the South African Government has been a major factor. We must also remember that what has happened in the Portuguese territories has also had its effects.
The hon. Member for Torbay said that trade was continuing with Mozambique, and no doubt that is true. However, that is widely at variance with the propaganda sent to hon. Members presumably from Rhodesia, containing a hostile attack on Marxist Mozambique and the policies of the Government there. Rhodesian external propaganda is becoming more and more strident, and, indeed desperate. The progressive weakening of the Smith régime must be the main reason for that.
In the last few years—despite what has happened in other countries and what will, I regret to say, happen to the white settler population in Portuguese territories—it is a fact that the net inflow of white immigrants into Rhodesia has fallen away. The imbalance between the races will get worse rather than better from the point of white Rhodesia. If a few years ago the figure was 21-to-l or 22-to-l, it is likely in five or six years' time to be very much more in favour of the African population. It means that the embattled white minority in Rhodesia are less likely in future than in past years to be able to contain terrorism, if it is renewed. Of course nobody in this House would wish to see the problem of Rhodesia resolved by any form of terrorism, for that is no answer. We do not wish to see a repetition of the kind of tragedy where the white settler problem has complicated the transfer of power to majority rule.
Sir F. Bennett: I rather agree with the hon. Member. I think this is the most likely outcome. He referred to the Rhodesia lobby. I have never understood that sort of accusation. Surely, if people on this side believe that the present policy is wrong and counter- 1986
productive, it is their duty to say so. This does not mean that we do not expect terrorism to have the most awful effects. I share the hon. Member's apprehensions but I have a different interpretation of what should be done to try to stop those things from happening.
Mr. Whitehead: I use the term "Rhodesia lobby" as a description and not as an accusation. Like the hon. Member, I have in my few years in the House spoken each year on the renewal of the sanctions Order. Each year the same faces have appeared on the other side, putting a line similar to that of the hon. Member and others who have spoken, and no doubt will speak later, in the debate. I see them all present and on parade today. Broadly, they have always said that sanctions against Rhodesia are futile, that we should come to an accommodation with Mr. Smith, and that we should stop the sanctions. They have not said, as we always have on this side, that that should be on the basis of the Six Principles, or on the basis of African majority rule.
I say to Mr. Smith, and to those who may happen to read this debate, that it is quite clear that the blame for the failure of the Victoria Falls conference rests with Mr. Smith. In the continuing disputes between Mr. Smith and Mr. Vorster, which have not been ended by Mr. Smith's apology in this matter, we see some evidence that others in Southern Africa, and not merely the Presidents of Zambia and Tanzania, and so on, regard the breakdown of the Victoria Falls talks as essentially the responsibility of Mr. Smith.
I can see all kinds of reasons why Mr. Smith, with his internal security problems and the possibility of guerrilla warfare, resulting particularly after some of the South African security forces have been withdrawn from Rhodesia and the border areas, is neurotic about allowing any African nationalist leaders—particularly those who for many years have been outside the country or in detention within it—free movement to further conferences or to discussions of the kind which I feel must take place within the country. Indeed, the danger signs at the moment are that Mr. Smith's régime internally is in many ways becoming more repressive and not less, as its moment of maximum danger approaches.

1987
It has been said just this week, by one of the religious organisations active in Rhodesia, that there are now more political detainees in Rhodesia in the hands of the Government than was the case before the so-called Lusaka détente began eight or nine months ago. None of us knows the truth of the background of the kidnapping of Dr. Edison Sithole a couple of weeks ago, but it is not easy now to see how any African nationalist leader, moderate or extreme, whether he belongs to or sympathises with ZANU or ZAPU or not, can feel sure of moving freely at all into Rhodesia or making any kind of approach within constitutional boundaries to the Smith Government. The lives of African nationalists would appear to be at risk in the present situation.
The only possibility for the Smith Government today is to re-open constitutional talks. My right hon. Friend has said that he is ready to assist in this matter wherever and however he can. It is possible that the British Government might have a rôle to play in that respect, possibly in chairing such a conference.
The hon. Member for Torbay said that that was one of the points on which the Victoria Falls conference broke down. I do not know whether that is true or not. I know that, unless Mr. Smith's régime is prepared, in these last days of its undisputed rule in Rhodesia, to come to the conference table with both ZANU and ZAPU, and all the representatives of the African nationalists in Rhodesia—not simply waiting for ZANU and ZAPU to fall out further, and for more disputes to arise between the nationalist leaders in the country—it is doomed. It is doomed not merely to fall but to bloody civil war and mass exodus of the white population of Rhodesia—the kind of thing we have seen happening and will see happening in coming months in Angola and other territories.
We do not want to see the tragedy of Angola repeated in Rhodesia. We do not want, a year or two years from now, to have our debate on Rhodesia not on the resumption of sanctions—by that time sanctions will long have been forgotten—but on what we should do to resettle the 250,000 white people of Rhodesia as they are driven from that country.
1988
That is the possibility facing them. That is the stark alternative facing them today. The sooner they come to an accommodation which will allow for a multi-racial régime in Rhodesia, the better for them as well as for everyone else in that country.
12.56 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: I should like to refer first to the speech of the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George). He said that no one believed that sanctions would bring Mr. Smith down, but the Prime Minister did. The right hon. Gentleman said that it would take weeks, not months. I do not know whether that has been revised to "decades, not centuries". It has gone on for 10 years and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has used the phrase "a decade…of drift".
The hon. Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) has doomed the Smith regime. It is just possible that it may refuse to go away.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) quoted Shelley. I should like to adapt Tennyson and to say that this annual masochistic ritual exhibits in our rulers lunacy broadening down from precedent to precedent.
I do not know when the hon. Member for Walsall, South was last in Rhodesia, but, in addition to my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), there are other hon. Members on these benches who were in Rhodesia a few weeks ago. I think they would agree with me that the description of Rhodesia given by the hon. Member for Walsall, South was a caricature. It bore no relation to the facts. Sanctions may have made Rhodesia less liberal, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion bore evidence to the contrary. I hope that hon. Members will not have heart attacks when I say that Rhodesia is the most liberal State in Africa.
On Wednesday at Question Time the Minister of State referred quite properly to the deprivation of the liberty of many Rhodesians. I regret this very much. Terrorism usually evokes arbitrary measures. Indeed, one of the motives of

1989
terrorism is to evoke that response from the authorities. But in Rhodesia—and I was talking to Rhodesians not so long ago—one gets the impression—in fact, one is told in no uncertain terms—that they consider the British to have double standards when they condemn detention in Rhodesia and at the same time hold or have held hundreds in internment and detention within this kingdom. They consider it to be hypocrisy in a Parliament which has passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and quite rightly so.
I invite the Minister of State to make a comparison between Rhodesia in this matter and other African States, and, indeed, with Rhodesia in the legal days of Sir Edgar Whitehead. I think he will find that more Rhodesians were deprived of their liberty then.
Undoubtedly sanctions have had some effect. Sanctions have deprived the Queen of a fair realm unequalled in its loyalty. Sanctions have deprived Britain of what 10 years ago was a small but growing and highly preferential export market. There have been some attempts here to launch a "Buy British" campaign. In Rhodesia, to buy British was automatic.
Sanctions have also retarded African education and economic advance. But, as those of us who visited the country recently found, the Rhodesians' inflation is as nothing to ours. Their economy has been well-managed. Would that our economy was as healthy as theirs.
But sanctions have not only deprived us of what was once a trusty partner in trade and a comrade in arms. They have almost erased British influence from Rhodesia. Our worst enemies could not have done it better.
Rhodesia was built by the courage, brains and sweat of Rhodesians of all races. There was no colonial period in her history. Rhodesia was never garrisoned and never administered from Britain. British aid has been minuscule. There is a subsidy at present to the multi-racial University of Rhodesia. A small sum goes to mission schools. The British taxpayer is at the moment financing the training of Rhodesian Africans outside Rhodesia. So, on the one hand. we apply sanctions with the object of impoverishing Rhodesia and denying her the means of improving education, and, on the other hand, we tax ourselves to make good
1990
some of the damage that we do to Rhodesian Africans.
It is ridiculous. Today, 1,100 black Rhodesian students receive grants in this country. Many of them arrive without proper arrangements for their maintenance. Some have not received grants. These are thrown on the labour market at a time of mass unemployment. I do not accuse the administration of inhumanity, but this muddle might well be a case for the Parliamentary Commissioner.
Ministry for Overseas Development awards go to students so that they may take post O-level courses. It would make more sense in my view for Britain to contribute to education in Rhodesia than to train Africans in the United Kingdom, where our own people cannot always find places—training them for hypothetical jobs in a far away country about which Her Majesty's Government know little or nothing whilst claiming sovereignty.
Her Majesty's Government have on their own admission no liaison with the Salisbury authorities about these African students, and they have deprived themselves of channels of contact and information and even of some influence which was formerly available. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall), I think that it was a mistake to close down Rhodesia House completely and to withdraw the last British representative in Salisbury who was doing useful work, making friends in wide circles and keeping the Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed.
If any principle governs these matters it is one of pettiness and pique.
Again at Question Time on Wednesday, my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) complained that it took a representative of the South African Government to visit in hospital in Salisbury a young constituent of his who had been severely injured in a car accident. The Minister of State replied that there must be what he called "a constitutional situation" before there could be diplomatic representation in Salisbury. That Answer was beside the point. His advisers could quote examples, for example, from the period of the Spanish Civil War when Britain had consular or other representation with administrations not recognised de jure.

1991
In all this unhappy affair, we have lost trusted friends and made no new ones in a part of the world which is of vital strategic and economic concern. If there is, as we hope, and as Government supporters have said, a chance of a settlement, it owes little to the British Government. It owes much to the diplomacy of detente in Southern Africa and in particular to President Kaunda and Mr. Vorster, who have established a working and even a cordial relationship.
In no part of Southern Africa outside Rhodesia is the sanctions policy more bitterly assailed than in Zambia. I am glad to see the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) in his place, because we spent 12 days together in Zambia as members of the first parliamentary delegation from the United Kingdom since independence. President Kaunda knows, as do all serious students of history and political psychology, that, far from crushing resistance, economic sanctions by themselves, only harden it and, of course, military sanctions are ruled out, as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary told us again this morning.
President Kaunda knows what sanctions have done to the economy of his country. It is not only that Rhodesia provides coal and power for the Copperbelt. At this very moment, Rhodesia, however unofficially, is providing maize for hungry people in Zambia. We found the traders of Livingstone longing for the reopening of the border.
Zambia could be an exporter of maize. She could, like Botswana under Secretse Khama, become an exporter of beef. But in Zambia most food production comes from a couple of hundred European commercial farms, which illustrates what that much-maligned animal, the settler, has done and can do for Africa. Higher prices for maize crops were announced when we were in Lusaka, but so far efforts to encourage production sufficiently among Africans, whose tradition is mainly pastoralist, have failed. So it is that South African grain and South African expertise are playing the same part in Mr. Vorster's policy of détente as that performed by American grain in President Ford's diplomacy of detente with the USSR.
At the Dar-es-Salaam conference, the Zambian Foreign Minister expounded his
1992
country's policy of trying to achieve change peacefully, and we welcome all that has been done so far by Zambia. The refusal of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana to send delegations to the OAU conference in Kampala shows not only a distaste for some of the activities of the President of Uganda but also a regional approach within Southern Africa that is also being followed by Mozambique, which, however Marxist its ideology, needs South African assistance with the running of its ports as well as jobs on the Rand for its young men. What is more, according to my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett). Mozambique has no intention of applying sanctions to Rhodesia.
The Rhodesian currency and economy are underwritten by South Africa. South African forces would undoubtedly prevent genocide in Rhodesia. Mr. Smith must defer to Mr. Vorster, but a settlement which lasted would require endorsement of the four Presidents of a region where all its peoples could achieve prosperity through partnership.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet said, Britain cannot do very much now, other than watch and wait for a chance to do something helpful. This Order is anything but helpful. It is a pitiful irrelevancy. It says nothing for the collective sanity of the United Nations that it should have sought to universalise this farcical national folly.
1.10 p.m.
Mr. Nigel Spearing: I should like to comment on some of the points made by the hon. Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett), especially in respect of Britain's role. He deplored that Britain appears to have no rôle in the present situation—and that, I think, is a view shared by hon. Members on both sides of the House. He also spoke of the lack of a neutral chairman at the Victoria Falls conference. Although it may not have been possible on that occasion, in the future there might be a rôle for the United Kingdom in that type of situation.
If we are to avoid the ghastly alternative which the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) mentioned and which Mr. Vorster has coined in a very appropriate phrase, there must at some time be a drawing together of

1993
people with the aim of reaching an agreement. We all know—some hon. Members know from their industrial experience—that a genuinely independent chairman has some merit in that respect.
If we cannot fulfil our rôle—I hope that on some occasion we shall—this Parliament at some time will have to play at least a de jure rôle in regularising any new legal régime and constitution which comes to Rhodesia, Zimbabwe or whatever one calls it.
Clearly the ultimate constitutional responsibility in terms of legislation lies in this House. At some time there will have to be a Bill presented to this House, which will have to go through all the normal legislative processes. At that time the differences of emphasis which have been illustrated today will have to be debated. At that time there will be a rôle for this House and the United Kingdom. I am not saying that it would be a crucial rôle, because it might be just dotting the i's and crossing the t's of some previous negotiation. As we all know, the translation into legal language of an agreement between people often causes difficulty. This also applies to matters of interpretation. I hope that this country and House will have a role, although at the moment we do not have as big a rôle as we would wish.
The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion made an interesting speech but he had his historical context out of focus or at least out of perspective. He spoke about the creators of the Federation—Zambia, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. He also mentioned the independence of Southern Rhodesia. Of course, it has had de facto independence concerning its internal matters since 1923. That is one of the historical facts which makes the present position so difficult. However, when we talk of independence we must ask—"independence for whom?" We are dealing with a struggle of national independence by a vast majority of the African population, irrespective of what may be happening in the surrounding countries. When we think of an independent Rhodesia, let us think of the whole country and not just the quasi de facto independence of a small European minority from 1923 until UDI.
Mr. Amery: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not wish to misrepre- 1994
sent me. I spoke at various points about the independence of Rhodesia. However, when I referred to the creators of the old Central African Federation, and the links between Zambia and Rhodesia, I used the word "interdependence", not "independence".
Mr. Spearing: I take the right hon. Gentleman's point. However, I am sure he will take my point about Southern Rhodesia's independence before UDI.
The trouble with Conservative Members is that they have underestimated the second independence surge of African opinion. The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion spoke about "talks" to reduce discrimination. He suggested discussions about greater liberalisation of the well-known and unsatisfactory laws in Southern Rhodesia concerning land and residence. The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) spoke about job opportunities. We all know that Southern Rhodesia does not have a good history in that respect. However, I fear that "talks" at present are not good enough. There must be action and it must be fast.
Lack of action during the past 10 years has made the present position more perilous than it would otherwise be. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary appealed to the present European inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia to widen their horizons and to realise their position. In my view one of the great difficulties is that they have done so on only rare occasions. That problem must be taken into account when we consider how to solve the difficulty.
Mr. Smith has consistently adopted a policy of "divide and rule", concerning the two or more African elements. It is not necessarily true that the two groups would come together if Mr. Smith desisted from this policy. However, there would be a greater chance of their coming together and, perhaps with the backing of President Kaunda—we have not heard his recent views on the split—emerging with an agreed ANC coherent line. Unless that emerges it is more than likely that there will be an Angola-type situation. The more Mr. Smith uses the divide-and-rule technique, the likelihood of an Angolan denouement is greater. That would be to the ultimate disadvantage of everyone in Southern Rhodesia

1995
The likelihood of Mr. Vorster's alternative will become greater.
I enjoyed the visit which the Commonwealth Parliamentary delegation made to Zambia. There is concern in Zambia about the present position, including the closure of the border. I take issue with the hon. Member for Epping Forest about the reliance on power. Partly due to the help from this country the same ODM to whom he objected gave well-merited support to the training of people in Southern Rhodesia with loans from this country. In Southern Rhodesia the Kariba power station provides a good deal of power. I do not believe that Zambia is dependent on Southern Rhodesia in that respect. Its own coal resources have been opened up in Mamba and therefore perhaps the bias is not as great as it was in the past.
Zambia is suffering not from our policy of sanctions in Southern Rhodesia but from its own political will not to have the sort of trade with Southern Rhodesia that it otherwise might have. There is also the problem of transport to which the hon. Member for Epping Forest referred. I hope that in that respect my hon. Friend will take some initiatives. As a result of our visit to Zambia I was concerned about the apparent lack of liaison over the problems of Zambia between these two Commonwealth countries which have so much in common. We know about the transport problems. We know about the difficulties of getting copper out. But there is equal difficulty about getting imports in. I believe that the volume of imports and the needs concerning transport are greater than the demands on the export of copper.
Although in answer to a Question recently the Minister said that no specific requests had been received from the Zambian Government, I should hope that in dealing with this difficult situation the Government might perhaps take some specific initiatives. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister took an important initiative in Kingston on the question of copper prices. Approximately one-third of our copper comes from Zambia. Perhaps a specific initiative in this regard would be helpful.
I back my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in his request that these sanctions should be continued. We have no
1996
alternative. The problem is difficult, but I hope that Conservative Members will begin to see the realities of the situation especially concerning the internal conditions of Southern Rhodesia. That has been the long-term problem and unless there is some sort of rapprochement and the ex-European population realise that they must give up part of their economic and privileged position so that they can retain some position in the future, I fear that a result similar to that in Angola will be inevitable. Those people, and Mr. Smith, have some responsibility and I hope that Conservative Members will help them to understand their position. Unless their kith and kin in Southern Rhodesia understand the position, the situation will result in the ghastly solution which we all wish to avoid.
1.20 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Bell: I agree so much with what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) and my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) that I see no need to cover again the ground that they so competently covered.
I wish to refer to some illusions which appear to persist on the Government side of the House, or perhaps, more justly, I should say, in the minds of Ministers. I then want to make the only suggestion that I can make of a constructive nature in this matter.
The first illusion was that the events in Portuguese Africa have in some way transformed the position. That was an illusion which earlier speakers appeared to cherish. Whatever the political motivation of the Portuguese revolution, and the expression which it took in Mozambique, practicalities will prevail. It would be a great mistake to think that the change of régime in Mozambique will materially alter the situation regarding a Rhodesian settlement or sanctions.
The second matter to which I wish to refer concerns the constant appeals—we heard one from the Foreign Secretary this morning—for democracy and majority rule in Africa. On these annual occasions I have always asked myself why we impose sanctions on Rhodesia, and what was the cause in aid of which the imposition was made. Always the answer has seemed to be that it was in order that we might have "one-man, one-vote", and

1997
majority rule, and that, because no safeguards could be obtained from the Rhodesian Government at the time of the break up of the Central African Federation, they could not be given their independence at the time that we gave independence to Northern Rhodesia—now Zambia—and to Nyasaland—now Malawi.
From Uganda, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Nigeria we asked for no assurances about their future conduct or the shape of their political arrangements, and we got none. Indeed, I was involved in the negotiations for the independence of Zambia at the time of the break-up of the Federation, because I was professionally instructed on behalf of Barotseland. Dr. Kaunda and all those with him made it clear that if we sought to impose conditions which they did not like they would sweep them aside as soon as they obtained their independence. They would not be bound by conditions.
On behalf of what was originally the independent Protectorate of Barotseland, I negotiated and, indeed, virtually drafted the Barotseland agreement which this House put in the schedule to the Zambia Independence Act, which Dr. Kaunda gave his personal assurance would be observed. I forget whether it was 14 or 18 months later that it was simply torn up. I put down Questions asking what we were going to do about it. The answer was "Nothing". Zambia was an independent country and if it chose to tear up bits of its independence arrangements, that was its concern.
Mr. Grocott: Is not the crucial difference that in the other States to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred those doing the negotiating could make a reasonable claim to represent the people of those countries, whereas the Smith régime in Rhodesia, by no remote stretch of the imagination, could claim to represent the people of that country?
Mr. Bell: I was dealing with this matter in compartments. I shall come to that point almost immediately. The point that I was making was that we asked for no assurances from any of those other countries in Africa which are now independent. We did not say: "There are Six Principles with which you must
1998
comply, or we shall not give you independence." We asked for no assurance against retrogressive legislation, whatever that means—it is just one of those grand phrases—and no such assurance was given.
In passing, I observe that if the Six Principles were applied to most countries in the world, including this one, those countries' arrangements would not comply with them. There is no safeguard here against retrogressive legislation. Yet, from Rhodesia—from Rhodesia alone in the whole world, as far as I know—that safeguard was asked for.
I come now to the point made by the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tam-worth (Mr. Grocott), who suggested that this had something to do with ensuring democracy and the prevalence of the majority in both Rhodesia and Africa. Not only did those presently independent nations in Africa give no assurances on the future shape of their institutions, but each of those countries to which I referred slid rapidly into one-party States. The list is not exhaustive.
Mr. Grocott: What about Rhodesia?
Mr. Bell: I shall come to Rhodesia. The fact is that the countries to which I referred are now one-party States. They are all oligarchies—most of them tribal oligarchies. There should be no mistake about that. In the whole of Africa, only in the Republic of South Africa and in Rhodesia is there any form of parliamentary democracy—of course with a restricted franchise. But we had a restricted franchise in this country for 700 years, up to 1915. We did not have universal adult suffrage until then. Of course, until 1919 it was a very partial suffrage. At least, South African and Rhodesia have a parliamentary democracy, and one with a considerable franchise. We should bear in mind that until UDI the Rhodesians had made no distinction in their institutional arrangements between people of different colours or races. The qualifications for the franchise was the same for everyone.
As the influence of Europeans was significant in Southern Rhodesia only 75 years ago, it followed that in education and property they had a great lead, and therefore predominated in the franchise. But there was nothing to stop any African

1999
from acquiring the not very high educational or property qualifications, which were the same for him as for everybody else. That process was continuing, and would have continued without interruption and without any prompting from us if we had not been so stupid, obstinate, bigoted and prejudiced at the time of the break-up of the Central African Federation.
When we hear all these high principles pattered out from the Government Dispatch Box, we should bear in mind that Rhodesia was never governed from London. We have given independence to many British territories in the world. We ruled them well when we were there, but we ruled as an Imperial Power. However, when we left we handed over power to some other race of people. When we ruled, we never established anything which could remotely be called a multiracial community. We had many gifts, but that was not one of them. Only in Rhodesia, of all our possessions, did this happen—and it happened because we were not actually ruling that country.
As the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) said, the Southern Rhodesians began to rule themselves in 1923 and they evolved this multi-racial community, with its single franchise qualification and its mixed universities, schools, and so on. They, it was, who had this constructive and creative tolerance, and it is against them alone that we have launched this barrage of sanctions and sanctimonious condemnation.
Mr. Spearing: I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that while I agree with what he said about 1923, I do not accept his description of the country being multi-racial, in the terms that he has described it. I agree with all the other points that he has made.
Mr. Bell: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman. The differences that may exist between him and me may relate to the social mixing and ebb and flow in that country, which was like the rest of Africa. The whites kept to themselves, and the Africans and Indians largely to themselves, but as far as the law and vote for the legislature were concerned there was one law for all. That was the situation until UDI, and if there are now differences, as there are, we can blame our-
2000
selves for that. We refused independence to Edgar Whitehead. We refused it to Roy Welensky. We have refused it to everybody in that country, and it is not surprising that in that embattled territory matters get more tense.
Then one considers sanctions—the subject that we are debating today. All that we have from sanctions, if we have anything at all, is a slight abatement of the normal carping criticism of the Western nations by the General Assembly of the United Nations. That is all. What value should we attach even to the praise of an assembly which now has a permanent terrorist, anti-democratic majority, just like the Inter-Parliamentary Union? I doubt whether any African country wants sanctions to continue, but most, cerainly Malawi, have to pretend that they do.
It appears from the tone of our annual debates on this Order that we are sunk in the same paralysis of hypocrisy as are those African nations. We would not impose sanctions now—I think that virtually everybody from the Dispatch Box, on either side of the House, has said this—but because they have been in force for 10 years it is too positive and significant an action to abolish them. That is a self-perpetuating argument, to which there will be no end, and I ask myself in conclusion: is there anything that I can suggest to Her Majesty's Government that might facilitate a way out of this ridiculous dilemma?
I should like to endorse particular aspects of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay. Let us be realistic about the true nature of the problem in Rhodesia. It is not that Mr. Smith is intransigent—that is all propaganda. Any sensible person in Rhodesia, of either colour, wants to get out of this wretched and ridiculous position, as do Dr. Kaunda and most other African leaders.
The problem is one really of mechanics. The Foreign Secretary said that the Pearce Commission had shown us that the Africans would not consider themselves bound by any settlement in which they had not participated. That is true, but the trouble is that they will probably not consider themselves bound by any settlement in which they have participated. That is the real problem.

2001
Mr. Nkomo has always been willing to settle on reasonable terms. He told me, so long ago that there is no harm in my repeating it, that he would have been happy to settle for independence on the 1961 Constitution, and I should think that nearly all Rhodesians would have been similarly happy.
One had great hopes of Bishop Muzorewa, but it seems that he is not a force in himself but, rather, the resultant of forces acting upon him. As for Sithole, up to the time of the London negotiations for the 1961 Constitution he was for a settlement, and for moving forward together, but from then on he has become increasingly the tool, and is now the complete tool, of those outside Rhodesia who do not want to see a settlement.
That is the real problem. It does not arise in terms of a settlement between Mr. Smith and Nkomo. The problem has been to get the terms settled and recognised by the British Government, and I think that the Government have to tell themselves that they will recognise ZAPU and Nkomo as people who can negotiate and speak on behalf of the African people of Rhodesia. If they can reach an agreement with Mr. Smith, for heaven's sake let us quickly crystallise it and sanctify it and say, "All right, this is it".
What happened last year with Bishop Muzorewa was that he and Mr. Smith agreed on the terms of a settlement, and then Bishop Muzorewa had to go back to the African National Congress, where there took place one of those long and widespread debates that are guaranteed to wash away any terms of settlement. When I last spoke in this House on the subject of Rhodesia, I described it as an Indaba type of procedure. It is what Africans are accustomed to. They expect someone to come back and say what has tentatively been agreed upon, and then everyone has his say. By the end, about 40 people have had their say. The general sense is collected, and that is it. That is the tribe's work, and it works very well with the tribe, because the chief speaks last, and what he says goes.
However, when one applies the Indaba practice to negotiations between Mr. Smith's Government and some body of
2002
negotiators for the African side, with the sophisticated nations of the West, such as Britain, sitting and watching and thinking that they understand the African mind, one finds that any agreement that is reached in that way is dissipated and lost before it is crystallised.
That, I believe, is the real problem. It is a practical problem, though it is very simple to solve if only people will get down to it, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman to recognise that most moderate and sensible Rhodesians are almost in despair because they cannot see how an agreement can be reached, for the lack of what I call Western negotiating procedures on the other side. That is the positive point that I want to leave in the Minister's mind.
I shall today show, in the Lobby, my disapproval of 10 years of idiocy, and my belief that Rhodesia was most wrongly and unjustly treated in 1961 when independence was given to Nyasaland and to Northern Rhodesia but refused to that territory, which was an advanced, tolerate and stable country and which had enjoyed complete internal Government since 1923. We have been in the wrong and they have been in the right, and I understand all their aberrations since. In the circumstances, they are understandable. For that reason, I shall happily go into the Lobby today to vote against the Order.
1.40 p.m.
Mr. Stephen Hastings: My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) spoke with his usual clarity, experience and knowledge of this vexed question and I listened to him, as always, with deep interest. He may at least be encouraged, along with others of our hon. Friends, at the fact that although our votes may be small in number our arguments continue to be displayed with a great deal more consistency than we have heard from those who support the Order. Indeed, in another 10 years, we may have to conduct this debate all alone—hopefully, on the other side of the House. But there is something lacking in the cut and thrust of argument as those who support the Order so strongly run out of steam.
Such speeches as we have heard from supporters of the Order today are characterised by one theme. I would except the

2003
hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) who spoke moderately and in an interesting way, although I would not accept everything he said. What the supporters are saying to us is something like this: "It is nice to see that things are getting worse. We told you they would. We think that they are getting worse because of South Africa and the Portuguese territories, because of weather in the Vumba, because of the result of the latest South African Derby, and a whole lot of other reasons." But none of these reasons has anything to do with sanctions and that is what we are supposed to be discussing. There is nothing much more to be said about their contributions.
I do not intend to speak for long, for the very good reason that I have not been to Rhodesia since we last debated these matters and my knowledge of the situation is rusty or at best second-hand, but also for the good reason that practically everything that could be said has been said. We have heard some remarkable speeches, beginning with a penetrating analysis from my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery). If these arguments are not to be attended to by the Government, nothing that I can say from now on is likely to make any difference.
I have no illusions that any of our arguments will be listened to with anything but the bare courtesy afforded in this House by the Treasury Bench. After all, it is much easier for the Government to close their minds as well as their ears on this matter, since even if they opened them there is nothing that they can do. The folly, the hypocrisy, the timidity and the dissembling which led a series of British Governments—I do not except that of my own party—first to betray Rhodesia and then to seek to mangle her with these sanctions are now just attitudes frozen in time.
So why stir up the ants' nest of the Third World or the United Nations? Is it not easier to go along with all the double-talk and gobbledegook of the Commonwealth Heads of Government conference last spring, for instance? The policy of course is wholly ineffective. I was amazed to see—I was well aware of it—that any time one has breakfast in Meikle's Hotel in Salisbury there are
2004
always kippers on the menu. If a Scottish kipper can get through the sanctions, it seems that there is not much that can fail to penetrate.
Of course the policy is wholly ineffective. Let reality and truth stay decently buried under all the liberal illusions—is it not easier like that? This is the real argument for continuing sanctions. There is no other. So for me the only point of this debate, I am afraid—I have rather cynically to say this—is that it enables the spectre of reality to stir a little for a few short and rather eerie minutes. When we vote, it will not have much to do with this meaningless Order. It will be a gesture to show that there are still those who realise that truth and reality cannot for ever be buried and that to face them, even from a position of impotence, is safer than not to face them at all.
For me, the high point of all this idiocy was the Pearce Commission, the last practical attempt, one would claim, to sort all this out. We were operating then, as hon. Members proudly claimed today, on five principles—or was it six? I think they have got to six now. All these principles have everything to do with our liberal conscience and nothing very much to do with Central Africa. Shackled to them, we have no hope.
Even after Sir Alec Douglas-Home had managed the unlikely contortion of an apparent agreement with Mr. Ian Smith, we fell over one of those principles. A lot of amiable worthies arrived in Salisbury and stuck up the Union Jack. What could the Africans think but, "The British are back"? They did not know, and no one told them, that this was just a last despairing gesture. They thought that Mr. Smith was about to be toppled and all sorts of exciting things were about to happen. No one explained to them that the alternative was a bleak, uncertain and possibly violent future.
So they said, "No," and the amiable worthies went away. Since then, Her Majesty's Government have lapsed into a sort of Afro-Asian dream. How else does one explain the communique of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Jamaica, to which of course our Prime Minister assented and put his signature? In paragraph 18, they said of majority rule that the aim was to achieve it "by peaceful means, if possible." I hope that

2005
the Minister will allude to that when he winds up.
If it is not possible without violence, a weary British Government, presumably, will go along with the violence. Is that what we are invited to believe? And to what end? As several of my hon. Friends have already said, in order to establish—if to violence on that scale we should descend—another example of what is now referred to, perhaps at the Oxford University Labour Club, which the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) referred to—that deep reserve of knowledge and experience of African matters—as "African Socialism", the one-party State, where standards inevitably slip, where less and less and not more and more is spent on African education—the most important contribution that we still have to make, the vital one if that continent is to be in any way saved—where all opposition is illegal and where Communist influence becomes steadily paramount. That is African Socialism.
In any case, what are we to make of this Commonwealth in the African context? For instance, Mr. Arnold Smith has not said a word that I know of about General Idi Amin and his activities. Why is Uganda not excluded? Why have they not long ago been condemned and slung out? But they are not.
However, none of this matters very much now. The single event which has of course made the most difference since last we debated Rhodesia is the collapse of the Portuguese territories. I regret this, because in my knowledge of both of them I believe that they were the most promising and natural attempt at controlled evolution that we had in Central Africa. The process was slow but the Africans are used to that: they like it. It was non-racial in a genuine sense. There were black men in charge of and with authority over white men and it was unencumbered by Western democracy as we preach it and try to export it. All these were distinct advantages for the African people concerned.
Yet it has gone now and I suppose that since we lost our heads in Central Africa its days were numbered in any case. But the economic realities do and will continue to force Frelimo in Mozambique to exercise retraint. They will continue to do so, because their economy depends,
2006
first of all, on the market for the power of the Cabora Basa Dam and, second, on the revenues from the people working on the Rand and from the ports on the Indian Ocean.
In Angola, the collapse is far more tragic and unpredictable, but in both cases the probability is that the deprivation of the vast masses of tribal Africans in those territories will increase rather than decrease. If agreement is ever reached between Mr. Smith and his Government on the one hand and the Africans in Rhodesia on the other—I cannot confess to any great optimism, although there have been moments in the last year when it seemed as though some advance was possible—I should like to echo what my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion and a number of my hon. Friends have said, namely that the one thing left after this endless series of follies is for the Government to pounce on that circumstance immediately, to declare independence for what that is worth and to restore such legality as means anything to the situation there. Let them act with speed and not dither.
If they get that message from this debate—although they will not, of course, confess that it makes any sense to them—we shall have achieved something. We can do very little in practical terms to help in these circumstances—indeed, practically nothing at all.
But for a few minutes it gives us the chance to remember the vast achievements by a relatively few of our people in this part of Central Africa in only 80 years. The most distressing and distasteful aspect of most of the remarks made by Labour Members, including the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary, was their gratuitous insults, continual carping, criticism—even hatred for the European people—their own people—in Southern Rhodesia. They use the phrase "kith and kin" with contempt. If they had exercised any real judgment and if they knew anything of the history of that country prior to the past 10 years, as reasonable men they would be forced to realise what has been achieved.
This place was a desert when the pioneers came from the south, in which the Matabele people, the descendents of the Zulu impi who escaped there, treated

2007
the Mashone, their neighbours, and the other peoples of these lands as game. Most of the population of what is now Rhodesia lived in terror on the top of the kopjes and did not even dare to build huts during the man-hunting season. That was Rhodesia when first they came.
It is a long road from that condition to the establishment of University College, Salisbury, which is a genuine multi-racial university established on Rhodes' ideals of equality for all civilised men. Why not give credit where credit is due? Even the blindest and most prejudiced opponents of Rhodesia will recognise that we are guilty and responsible for matters deteriorating as they have after so much advance.
In the passage on Southern Africa the Commonwealth communiquéof the Heads of States, which I read carefully before coming to this debate and which was signed by the Prime Minister, lends official approval to the ANC word for Rhodesia, "Zimbabwe." What is "Zimbabwe"? I do not know how many of my right hon. and hon. Friends have seen this grim monument. It was built some time in the fifteenth century by Africans. This symbol of civilisation was a vast circle or corral of unhewn stone. Its massive walls were constructed not to repel enemies but to keep slaves in, until they could be shipped down to the coast and sold. That is all there was before the first Portuguese colonialists arrived and put an end to it. And that is what they want to call Rhodesia.
1.55 p.m.
Mr. Nicholas Winterton: I want to make a brief contribution to this important debate. The House should be grateful for the excellent contributions that have been made by my right hon. and hon. Friends, in particular, the contribution by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) which was a splendid and realistic analysis of the situation and the problems of Southern Africa. The contributions by my hon. Friends the Members for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) and Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) have also presented realism to us today.
One of the frustrations of this House is that realism is often submerged, does not surface and is ignored by those in
2008
positions of power, who take decisions which could ease a particular situation. I have been consistent in my opposition to sanctions. I intend to oppose the Order. A year or two ago when my party decided to abstain I was prepared to do so, but in recent times I have opposed with my feet this ridiculous Order which has absolutely no effect upon the situation in Rhodesia, and which is harmful to finding a satisfactory solution.
It was interesting that the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) blamed the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Mr. Ian Smith, for the differences that existed between the various African factions in Rhodesia. He conveniently forgot that one of the factions under Mr. Sithole is pledged to use force to achieve its objective, and that the other faction under Mr. Nkomo is quite prepared to negotiate to achieve a satisfactory settlement. That is, perhaps, indicative of the closed mind attitude that is adopted by Labour Members.
I find it repugnant that after 10 years successive Governments have not learned the age-old rule that economic sanctions, far from breaking the spirit of a nation, strengthen its resolve and its will for survival. If the argument from Labour Members is still that Rhodesia must be brought to its knees, experience has shown that economic sanctions have been the binding, unifying factor in strengthening the spirit of Rhodesia and giving Mr. Smith the support of many in that country who disagree with him on many matters.
Sanctions have made Rhodesia more self-sufficient, to the detriment of United Kingdom trade and the advantage of our trade competitors. If we look at the spirit we have displayed in history, we find that when the world has stood against us our will and determination in the fight for survival has been magnificent. The spirit that carried and united us in 1940 is in many respects the spirit with which the Rhodesian Government have survived in the face of world sanctions. Therefore, far from weakening a nation, we have observed that Rhodesia has strengthened herself as a result of these nonsensical sanctions.
I am tired of so much time and energy being wasted year by year in this House, in the United Nations and by the rest of the world in perpetually trying to attack a small country in this squalid and futile

2009
manner. I am tired, too, of the double standards applied by those who describe the Government in Rhodesia as the oppressor of the black population and yet who fail to recognise that dictatorships in many parts of Black Africa, and in Eastern Europe as well, leave the citizens of those countries far more oppressed than ever are the Africans in Rhodesia. Perhaps one could mention the Ukraine, Tibet, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam and Cambodia. What have hon. Members on the Government benches said about the oppression and disasters that have taken place in those countries?
When I see the Government laying before this House similar Orders against Portugal, perhaps, Idi Amin, and the Government of Uganda, China and the Soviet bloc, I might conceivably believe that they have the right to pontificate in the internal affairs of other countries, albeit that they be de facto Governments such as the Government in Rhodesia. But in the world of economic and political realities, we all know that however much we may wish to apply sanctions against the pet hate country of our choice, on the one hand world trade will not cease and, on the other hand, those sanctions will probably directly harm the citizens living within those countries, the very people whom we do not wish to see adversely affected.
I have talked about the resolve and the will of a nation to survive against sanctions and trade wars of the kind to which I have referred. Those who support sanctions because they believe that this will help the black Africans are, I sincerely believe, deluding themselves and the people of this country. As I have said, sanctions harm the very people they are supposed to aid.
After 10 years, with the spirit of Rhodesia running high—despite what has been said by some speakers from the Government side of the House—and with many countries circumnavigating the restrictions imposed by sanctions, now surely is the time to accept that sanctions are meaningless and are not contributing at all to a settlement of the Rhodesian problem.
I referred a moment ago to the application of double standards. In the world in which we live, and in which Britain has little influence now, to try to preach virtue in connection with the internal
2010
affairs of other countries by means of sanctions is simply unrealistic.
Briefly, I want to make some comments about Rhodesia itself. In 1940 when the United Kingdom stood virtually alone we did not hesitate to accept the support of the Rhodesians in our hour of need—that is, black and white Rhodesians. Are we not blinkering ourselves to the latent loyalty of Rhodesia in the action that we have taken over the last 10 years? In two world wars the men of Rhodesia have contributed to our victory and to the freedom that we enjoy today. That includes the Prime Minister of Rhodesia himself, who was a brave airman in the service of Rhodesia fighting for this country against the Nazi oppression. These same men are still in Rhodesia, men who have fought for this country, but they feel today badly let down by Britain's mismanagement of the whole problem.
As we have heard so well from those who know Rhodesia far better than I do, it has developed from a primitive society into a modern and prosperous society. For 10 years the British taxpayer has paid millions of pounds to try to bring Rhodesia to her knees. The British Government have promised, as we all know, to pay the Marxist State of Mozambique millions of pounds in assistance if it stops trading with Rhodesia. But I do not believe that it will stop trading with Rhodesia. In any event, how can we possibly afford this ridiculous sort of bribery?
Finally, I turn to the future. We hear about the need for African majority rule, but how many General Amins are waiting in the wings to grab Rhodesia and to take away the prosperity that all Rhodesians have had in recent years? It is no matter to some hon. Members on the Government side of the House that an African tribal dictatorship based on terrorism will then threaten the prosperity of Rhodesia. What action will there be from this House to impose sanctions against such a Government or régime? Do we want the African to be drawn into the state that he endures in Uganda, where, daily, bodies float face down in the rivers of that country? Is that the sort of situation that we want to see develop in Rhodesia? I do not believe it.
Do we want to see further dictatorship in the world? That is what will be the

2011
result if guerrilla warfare and terrorism from Zambia replace the tranquillity of Rhodesia. In a society in which tribal origins play a large part in daily life the Western style of democracy and the ballot box are surely a total delusion. What democracy is the "one man, one vote" in Kenya or Tanzania, where there is, as we all know, one-party rule? What does "one man, one vote" mean in a situation such as that? Rhodesia has had in its time a splendid colonial record, and compared with other parts of Africa its citizens are freer and have comparatively greater economic liberty.
I am convinced that the best service that we can do to the great people of Rhodesia, black, white and Afrikaan, is to accept that sanctions are simply encouraging terrorism and benefiting our trade rivals and are not helping the very people in that country that all of us in the House want to help. Let us end this miserable charade and have the dignity to accept that after 10 years we were wrong to engage in this sorry farce of sanctions. Perhaps then the stage will be set for the citizens, black and white, to consider peacefully their future, uninhibited by the follies of British policies of this House.
I am delighted that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said that although he would accept the Order for the coming 12 months, we must have a new look at this situation and that he would not bind Her Majesty's Opposition to supporting sanctions again. However, I am consistent, like my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) and other of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I have never believed that sanctions would work, and I am prepared to go into the Lobby to show how much I disagree with them.
2.7 p.m.
Mr. John Stokes: I approach this debate in yet another year with a sense of weariness. Although I have been present for the whole debate so far, I have been greatly sustained by the force of the arguments and the many excellent speeches which we have heard from the Opposition side of the House.
It should not go unrecorded that the Government's policy of the continuation
2012
of sanctions has had very few supporters indeed. Although it is now a few minutes past the lunch hour, I notice only two hon. Members on the Government side of the House.
Will the present Government never understand that the situation in Southern Africa has now radically changed and that old unhappy, far off things and battles long ago should now be put behind them?
It seems to me little short of incredible that once again this year sanctions are still to be maintained—sanctions which have failed miserably to do any good to anyone but, rather, have caused unnecessary suffering, particularly to the Africans, and which have only stiffened the resolve of the whites to maintain the position that they hold.
Why should Rhodesia, which supported us in two wars and which has been self-governing and self-financing since 1923, receive nothing but kicks and blows from the United Kingdom, when we are prepared to help near-Communist or Communist Mozambique and adopt an extraordinarily tolerant attitude to the bloodshed and chaos in Angola? Surely now that Rhodesia is under terrorist attack it is more than ever necessary that we should help and not try to harm her. Do the British Government want another Angola-type situation in Rhodesia itself? That is the grim risk if black majority rule were to be imposed by force on that country.
We have heard today that Zambia is desperately anxious to normalise relations, including trade relations, with Rhodesia. Above all, the immense progress of Mr. Vorster's policy of detente in Southern Africa has transformed matters in that part of the world.
Not only the whites but many black moderate leaders know full well that an acceptable compromise can now be reached in Rhodesia. Black majority rule is simply not practical politics in Rhodesia for the foreseeable future, but I am sure that Mr. Smith and many of his supporters realise that he will have to agree to something like a fifty-fifty white and black rule within the next few years.
I have been very impressed by many of the moderate black leaders whom we have seen in Britain in recent weeks, not

2013
least by those from South-West Africa, where I am sure that they will hammer out a fair and reasonable solution for that country. If that can be achieved in South-West Africa, surely it can be achieved in Rhodesia.
As there is one representative of the Government here to speak for the Foreign Office, I should like to attempt to place this debate in a slightly wider context. I suppose all hon. Members will agree reluctantly that Great Britain is at about the nadir of its fortunes as any sort of world Power. Our influence is weaker now than it has been for many centuries. In Europe we have become an embarrassing and tiresome poor relation of the European Economic Community. We are constantly duped by the Communist Powers, as we were at Helsinki. We have to bow very low to the Arabs and to the Persians who are now our paymasters. Our Armed Forces are diminishing dangerously and our Navy is conspicuous by its absence from most of the oceans.
But the British Government have to be tough somewhere, and so they continue to take it out of Rhodesia. I regard continuing to reintroduce sanctions year by year as ridiculous, unreal and completely counter-productive. We are insulted and abused by Amin in Uganda. We turn a blind eye to all the horrors being perpetrated in the old Portuguese colonies. Only Rhodesia seems to deserve censure and punishment in the eyes of the British Government, in spite of all the tyranny and misrule that are rife in so many other African States.
In spite of sanctions Rhodesia can show a far better growth record than Britain. Sanctions have stimulated its industries and steeled the white population to see things through to the end.
I believe that a country's foreign policy and defence should be above party ideology. The threat to Africa, as the threat to the world, comes from Communism. But this Government unfortunately seem to be so blinded by what I can only call pro-black and anti-white prejudice in Rhodesia, as indeed they are by their discriminating policies in favour of immigrants to this country, that they refuse to look at the situation with clarity or common sense or with a realisation of where Britain's true interests lie.
2014
The humbug and double standards of the Government are almost beyond belief. My right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) referred to cant and humbug. I always remember one of Dr. Johnson's pithy sayings—
"clear your mind of cant".
I suggest that the sooner the British Government do that the sooner a settlement can be reached in Rhodesia. Our influence there is steadily waning as it is, alas, all over the world, but once we have the courage to call off sanctions and to give some reasonable recognition to Mr. Smith, I believe that the people of Rhodesia, both black and white, will soon come to a reasonable settlement. The continuation of sanctions only fills the extreme black politicians with immoderate hopes. I appeal to the Government even at this late hour to try to forget about the chip they have had on their shoulder for the past 10 years over Rhodesia and to let bygones be bygones and then perhaps, who knows, we might be able to give some real help to Rhodesia.
The Foreign Secretary referred to support in the House. I have not noticed any hon. Members ready to support him, but perhaps they are lurking in the Lobby. The right hon. Gentleman then—I thought somewhat rashly and most unwisely—referred to support from the general public. I invite Ministers to go outside the building and stop anyone in the street. Most members of the public will not even know whether sanctions are on or off, but, if they know that they are still on, they will be utterly opposed to them. Sanctions have always been disliked by all our constituents.
Finally, I appeal to the Prime Minister, whose great gifts have somehow enabled him to keep the Labour Party united. Surely with all those gifts he could turn his attention for a few moments to foreign affairs and to the situation in Southern Africa and try to use some of his skills of compromise there.
2.17 p.m.
Mr. Michael Brotherton: I am grateful for the opportunity to make a brief intervention. It has always struck me that Ian Smith made three mistakes in life: he was born white; he fought for us in the last world war; and the British Government never had the need to put him in gaol. If Mr. Smith had fulfilled

2015
those three criteria, I imagine that he would today be the Prime Minister of an independent Rhodesia.
When I spoke in this shabby charade of a debate last year, I concentrated on the question of the Beira patrol. I congratulate the Government on at long last having taken my advice and cancelled it. It would be wrong to allow this debate to pass without paying tribute to the officers and men of the Royal Navy who took part, with good humour, in that futile exercise, and who withstood the boredom of the patrol with remarkable fortitude.
The question has been asked time and time again from the Opposition side, with telling force: why should we decide to impose sanctions on Rhodesia and pick a quarrel with it? Tanzania and Uganda have been mentioned—the one-party States. We are told that in so many countries of Black Africa the ideal is "one man, one vote".
In Rhodesia there is a constitutional Opposition and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) pointed out, rival African factions can hold vast public meetings. Vast public meetings of protest are not held in the streets of Kampala. I do not hear of the opposition parties in Kenya holding mass rallies to demonstrate against the president of that country.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire talked of the kippers in Meikle's Hotel. I am able to inform the House that an Aga cooker has broken the sanctions barrier. Some people in Kent posted an Aga cooker, in small pieces, to Rhodesia, so now they not only have the kippers; they have something to cook them on.
Ten years ago the Labour Government of the day went to the United Nations following UDI. I believed then, as I believe now, that the question of Rhodesia is no concern of the United Nations. The problem is one between London and Salisbury alone. I believe that Sir Alec Douglas-Home was right when, in Blackpool in 1973, he said that the time might come when we would have to tell the United Nations "Sanctions have failed. We must think again." The time has come to go to the United Nations now and say that after 10 years
2016
sanctions have been a complete failure. The only nation which has really been hurt by sanctions is our country. Ten years ago we had £70 million worth of trade with Rhodesia, and an expanding market. How much has been lost to us—£250 million or £300 million a year? Think what that would do to help in our balance of payments problems.
When the Minister replies to the debate I hope he will say that although the Order will be passed for another 12 months, he or his right hon. Friend will tell the United Nations "Sanctions have failed. " It is because sanctions have failed that I shall vote against the contination of the Order.
2.21 p.m.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: At this time of the year the grey gloom of the autumn in northern Europe descends on this country, and at such a time as this it seems to pervade this Chamber. It is at this time of the year that we debate the renewal of the Order against Rhodesia, that brilliant country in which, at the beginning of the African spring, the sun is shining, as it always does there, to cheer everybody who has the good fortune to experience it.
It is strange that we seem to approach, this debate—certainly those on the other side of the House, although perhaps less evidently so today—with a certain degree of regrettable relish. I therefore stand here without any sense of shame whatsoever, described no doubt by one or two hon. Members opposite as a member of the Rhodesia lobby, whatever that phrase may mean. Of this I am absolutely certain: when the history of this rather tragic incident in our imperial history comes to be written, the speeches which have been made through the years since 1965 by members of the so-called Rhodesia lobby—I refer to all my hon. Friends who have spoken today, but most particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings)—will go down in the history books as they rightly deserve to do.
I momentarily make the observation that if, because during the past 10 years my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire has spoken as he has done, he has not had the opportunity to represent the Conservative Party in wider and more ambitious spheres, it has certainly been the loss of the Conservative Party.

2017
My interest in this matter arises from possibly three directions. It so happens that a great-uncle of mine, known as Matabele Thompson, was the man who, with Rudd, obtained the concession for Rhodesia from the savage king Lobengula, so I have a certain family interest in this matter. Secondly, I have a very small—perhaps negligible—commercial interest, in that I am connected with a great shipping company which serves southern Africa. That is well known.
Perhaps more important, much of my early life was spent in southern Africa, and it is fair to say that anyone who has had that type of experience has a knowledge of that part of the world which is completely different in kind and degree, and perhaps in respect of any other qualification which one applies to knowledge, from that which one derives from reports, newspaper articles, Fabian pamphlets, or any other type of commentary on southern Africa. Therefore, when year after year, this debate takes place and I watch Government Members, I recall a notice which is occasionally flashed on the television screen. On this occasion one might slightly adapt it to "Do not adjust your minds. The intrusion of reality is only momentary."
What the members of the so-called Rhodesia lobby are doing year after year when they come here is to say "We told you so. We have told you so again and again." The consequences of our so doing have been few and far between because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. Brotherton) said, the posture of the Government, with the single exception of the cancellation of the Beira patrol, has been the same. The verbiage which is used is still very wordy and colourful. One hears words such as "majority rule", "constitutional", "totalitarian", and that most popular example of emotional graffiti, "racist", with very little relevance.
I should like to refer to a speech made last week in London by our former High Commissioner—indeed, I believe he was our Ambassador towards the end of his career—in South Africa, Sir Arthur Snelling. He made an extremely important point. Referring to South Africa he said that this was a British creation—"warts and all." He pointed out how many of the great contributions to life in
2018
southern Africa we had made, whether it be the pass which Lowry built over the Cape or the system of law which was introduced and is still largely maintained in that part of the world. These, he said, were essentially British contributions. If that is true of South Africa, how much more true is it of Rhodesia. Yet when one looks further afield and contrasts what is happening there with what we are trying to achieve by our sanctions policy, with very few exceptions one is driven to the conclusion that the maintenance of this achievement and what I might describe as populist majority rule are incompatible and inconsistent.
We are entitled to ask whether, elsewhere in Africa, majority rule has produced general political, social and economic well-being which is by common consent the objective in all quarters of the House. The answer is very clearly "No, it has not." If one asks over what spectrum has this not happened, one can pick the spectrum of anarchy to stability, the spectrum of terrorism to the rule of law, the spectrum of parliamentary government to a one-party State, the spectrum of economic growth to apparently total stagnation. The spectra are by no means consistently overlapping in all the cases which one may care to consider. Once again, the conclusion that one is compelled to reach is that at the stability end of the spectrum, or the end which, by common consent, hon. Members would regard as the proper objectives of the State, there are very few examples in Africa, outside southern Africa, of which we can say "This has been achieved, and we, as the former colonist Power, can claim considerable credit for it." This lies at the heart of what is described as the sceptism and cynicism with which the so-called Rhodesia lobby reacts to sanctions.
The question of South African military power in the context of the present situation in Rhodesia has often been referred to in this debate. I would be the last to suggest that Mr. Vorster, or anyone else in a position of responsibility in South Africa, has any desire to see that country militarily involved north of the Limpopo. But with that essential qualification, I think it is wise to give certain warnings. Let us not under-rate the military strength of South Africa as it is

2019
today. She is a very different and infinitely more powerful country, compared with the South Africa of 1900–1902, when a small group of men held a great empire at bay for over two years. The economic strength of South Africa—perhaps in this context one should say southern Africa, including Rhodesia—and that of the other countries in that area is now infinitely greater.
Thirdly, South Africa is almost certainly about to become a nuclear Power. Finally, and perhaps most important, she possesses still, in the handling of her own national affairs, a resolve and will which should not be underestimated. To put it bluntly, she has not been corrupted by some of the left-wing thinking about the place of Europeans in southern Africa which has happened here.
The dependence of Africa generally on the economic activity and development of South Africa has also increased considerably. For example, there is the situation of Mozambique and the continual flow of labour from all over central Africa to the south. Therefore, there have to be economic judgments of who is going to do what and who can do what. Let us consider the reality underlying the situation.
I heartily endorse the suggestion by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) that if now or in the future the terrorists—that is how they should be decribed, because they are mostly not indigenous to Rhodesia—decide that they can only gain their political ends by force, we should abandon sanctions at once. South African opinion in this matter is and always has been that if change should take place and is required—and there is evidence that Mr. Vorster has reached the conclusion that change should be more rapid than it has been—South Africa's interest and that of Rhodesia and of this country requires that that change should be controlled.
The arguments between Great Britain and Europeans in South Africa over the last half century or more have been not about the direction of change but, always, about the pace. The central dilemma is that the pace of change is one which has to be implemented by those on the spot. It is easy for us here and for those who roar in front of the lions in Trafalgar
2020
Square to say that this and that must be done in southern Africa. We do not have to do it; we do not have to bear the consequences, economic, social or personal; we can only stand 6,000 miles away and trumpet our ideals to the roof. Perhaps it is correct that we should do so from time to time, but let us be realistic.
The pace of change in southern Africa from 1895 onwards has been a major political argument within the groups that live in that part of the world. We are entitled to our views, but let us not adopt the arrogant and quite unrealistic position that only we, outside southern Africa, can make a sane, sensible and intelligent judgment about how fast things should move and about what the consequences are if that move does not take place. Nothing has changed except the compartive degree of ignorance in this country about the affairs of southern Africa.
Is there a cause and effect in sanctions? Is there any perceptible, demonstrable, acceptable and positive relationship between the imposition of sanctions and the settlement which we all wish to see? Is there any perceptible, demonstrable and acceptable relationship between terrorism and the settlement which we all wish to see? Both exhibit plenty of evidence of negative effects, and nothing whatever of positive effects.
Economic self-sufficiency has only increased the determination of that resolute, isolated, brave and admirable community of British people in Rhodesia. If the rôles were reversed and they were here and we were there, I would like to think that our reactions would have been exactly the same. It is extraordinary how so often in the judgments we make about great world affairs we seem to make the poorest when judging the reaction of people like ourselves living in other continents.
What should we do? We should raise sanctions at once. I would go a step further. I would ofler not only the real resources which would be made available by that decision to guarantee economic and social development over a very broad front; I would also call a constitutional conference, on the basis of the good will which that step would create, to draw up and implement what I can readily describe as a Marshall Plan for central

2021
Africa. But as the great General Marshall is no longer with us, and probably had little relationship with southern Africa, perhaps a better name would be the "Schweitzer Plan" because none can deny the enormous contribution which Albert Schweitzer made to Africa. Let us call it the "Schweitzer Plan". A Rhodesian constitutional settlement would and must be the central part of that plan.
In drawing up such a plan, we could sketch out the nature of the constitutional guarantees, of which the United Kingdom, South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, the European Economic Community and last, but perhaps not least, the United Nations must be an essential part, appending their signatures.
Surely the time has come when an act of imagination is required to get us out of the policy log-jam which has held us tight in this House, including Government after Government, for 10 years. Surely we cannot come back here in a year's time and say, "Is the status quo exactly what it was in November 1975?" Surely an act of imaginative statesmanship and policy is called for from the British Government.
2.38 p.m.
Mr. Peter Blaker: This debate is to hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House a sobering, perplexing, painful and frustrating experience. Having recently made my first trip to Rhodesia, I can understand more vividly why this is so, and how it is that we have heard from so many of my right hon. and hon. Friends such very impressive and powerful speeches, based in most cases on their own personal experiences in that remarkable country.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) described Rhodesia as a beautiful land, and it certainly is. What struck me was the attachment that so many people out there, black or white, still feel for Great Britain. I was also struck by the potential which Rhodesia has for future development if a satisfactory solution to the constitutional problem can be found, and the fact that relations between black and white Rhodesians are so relatively relaxed. We are also all conscious that each of us has in his own constituency people with family links with those living in Rhodesia. It is therefore not surprising that this
2022
subject touches such a strong chord in the minds of so many of my right hon. and hon. Friends.
It is regrettable that so little interest has been shown in this debate by Labour Members. Apart from the Foreign Secretary, there have been only three Labour contributors, as opposed to 10 speakers from the Opposition benches.
I also regret the generally hostile tone from the Labour benches towards the white people in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, I was surprised at the way in which some Labour Members described the situation there. The country that I visited a month ago was not the same country as that about which they appeared to be talking. Labour Members should give more reassurance to the white people of Rhodesia. I discovered that the white people there—people of all types; politicians, civil servants, business men, farmers—were looking anxiously for reassurance about their future. It does not help when the Foreign Secretary makes a speech, as he did today, which is generally unsympathetic to the white people, as a whole, in Rhodesia. They look to him for reassurance. It would help if he were to be more forthcoming in his attitude towards them.
Mr. James Callaghan: I thought I was.
Mr. Blaker: If I may take up that sedentary intervention from the Foreign Secretary, I would make the point that when he speaks only in hostile terms about the regime, it is worth remembering that the régime has been re-elected by the white people of Rhodesia.
Mr. Russell Kerr: With the accent on the "white".
Mr. Blaker: Yes, I am talking of the white people of Rhodesia. I was saying that that régime has been regularly re-elected. When we hear scathing remarks about the white régime, it would help if, at the same time, we were to hear something to reassure the white people about help they will receive from Britain in the event of a settlement.
Mr. James Callaghan: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has drawn back a little from what he said originally. The original implication was that I had said things that were hostile to the white people of Rhodesia. He knows that

2023
that is untrue. There was one paragraph in my speech in which I attempted to make clear my understanding of their position in regard to jobs, homes, farms, families. I hope, however, that he is not saying that I should not be allowed to condemn an illegal régime that is still in revolt against the Crown.
Mr. Blaker: I withdraw nothing I said. We shall all have an opportunity tomorrow of reading the right hon. Gentleman's words in Hansard. Despite what I have just said, I believe that it would be wrong for the Opposition to stand in the way of the passage of this Order today.
Sir Frederic Bennett: I believe that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said in opening that although we shall not stand in the way of this Order today, we shall reserve our position, in view of changed circumstances, in a year from now. I gather that it is no part of the Opposition's intention to continue to share responsibility for a policy we no longer believe to be effective—indeed, a policy described by my right hon. Friend as a patent absurdity.
Mr. Blaker: My hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Sir F. Bennett) has correctly understood the position.
Mr. James Callaghan: When the Opposition say that there is no longer any shared responsibility, I hope that does not mean that they are going back on the six principles. In what sense do they not accept responsibility for that policy?
Sir Frederic Bennett: I was referring to sanctions.
Mr. Blaker: The Foreign Secretary is being uncharacteristically touchy this afternoon. The only point I am making is that the Opposition will not go into the Lobby on this matter this afternoon. We propose that the Government themselves should carry their own vote.
Mr. James Callaghan: Does that mean that the Opposition will abstain?
Mr. Blaker: There are two points I wish to make, if I am given the opportunity to do so by the Foreign Secretary.
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My right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet referred to remarks made by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as he then was, in 1973—namely, that mandatory sanctions should not have been imposed, and that we would not have imposed them if we ourselves had been responsible at the time. But he went on to observe that the tradition of the Conservative Party was one of supporting obligations solemnly entered into on behalf of Great Britain. I remember making speeches throughout the country on that self-same point in regard to the EEC, and many of my Conservative colleagues no doubt remember doing the same. I believe that we are right to observe this obligation.
Mr. Wall: I hope that we also recognise the rights of other hon. Members who wish to oppose this matter on principle, and always have done, in the Lobby.
Mr. Blaker: That is a matter for my hon. Friend. I shall now proceed to agree with the Foreign Secretary if he does not object to my doing so. I agree that in the past year there has been a movement over the Rhodesian problem. The right hon. Gentleman recited various agreements and steps that had taken place—for example, the Lusaka agreement; the acceptance of the ANC as a bargaining group; the Victoria Falls conference; the Pretoria agreement; and the meeting between Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kaunda. But there has also been the split in the ANC.
I should like to mention the powerful and remarkable speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery). His views were also reinforced in an equally powerful speech by my hon. Friend the Member-for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings). Their view was that if agreement was reached between Mr. Smith's régime and a representative group of Africans, the British Parliament should proceed to endorse it rapidly. The trouble with the split in the ANC is that it makes negotiation more difficult. That is why I regret it. It also makes it more difficult to identify the representative African group for which my right hon. Friend is looking. But I hope that Mr. Smith will see that it is in his interests that the split in the ANC should not stop the process of

2025
negotiation, and that he will bend his efforts to find a way round this obstacle.
I endorse the points made about the need for speed by Great Britain in endorsing a settlement, if we are satisfied that it has been made with a representative group of Africans.
The main change that has occurred in the last 12 months, referred to by many speakers, is in the rôle of Mr. Vorster and of Dr. Kaunda and the other three African Presidents who are involved. All of them—especially Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kaunda—are using all their influence towards a peaceful solution.
The reasons are clear to see. They have been referred to by a number of my hon. Friends. Dr. Kaunda has a very serious logistic problem. There are now very few avenues open to him for the import and export of his goods. I believe that he would very much like to open the frontier with Rhodesia, if he had good enough reason to do so. I think he must have good practical and political reasons before he can do it. I believe, also, that he is earnestly hoping for a peaceful and not a warlike settlement, because he, with his colleagues in the Black African countries, is only too aware of the dangers of another Angola occurring on the borders of his country.
Dr. Vorster also has a key rôle to play. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) said that the alternative to a settlement is war. I recall that in 1973 he said that the alternative to a settlement was union with South Africa. I think that, whatever the position may have been in 1973, the change over those two years in the way he has put the case marks a very important change in the reality of the facts on the ground. I agree with him that the present alternative to settlement is war.
This is the obvious result of the Portuguese revolution and the changed geographical and political situation in Southern Africa. The recognition by Dr. Vorster of this fact is the key to South African policy. He is determined, if he possibly can, to avoid a war in Rhodesia because of the danger that his country, as a neighbour, might become involved.
Secondly, and even more important, perhaps, a war in Rhodesia would risk the ruin of Dr. Vorster's whole grand
2026
strategy of dialogue with the African nations to the north. Therefore, if we were to withdraw sanctions now, I think it is right to say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that nobody would be more disconcerted than Dr. Vorster himself, because it would disrupt the delicate balance which he believes exists in southern Africa, and which he believes, also, is a factor working in favour of a peaceful settlement.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: While my hon. Friend is on the question whether or not Mr. Vorster would welcome a withdrawal of sanctions, does he not agree that if we combined the withdrawal of sanctions with a great and positive act of policy, having a much better chance of achieving a settlement, Mr. Vorster could only welcome it?
Mr. Blaker: With respect, I find that rather an obscure statement. I am not sure what the great act of policy would be, and I am not sure, regrettably, that Britain alone at this point has the capacity to produce such a great act of policy.
I come next to the suggestion by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion, that if the Africans were to abandon negotiation and resort to force, Britain should immediately declare that we would drop sanctions. On that suggestion my comments are these: if there were a real war, it appears to me self-evident that that would be a totally new situation, and that we should have to treat it as such. I believe that my right hon. Friend is absolutely right to draw attention to the dangers of war. That is the serious problem that Southern Africa faces.
In considering this suggestion—I know that my right hon. Friend will not expect me to give a definitive reaction today—there are two points worth making. It is right to say that there are some people, especially in southern Africa, who have misunderstood the lessons of Mozambique and Angola and who believe that Frelimo, in Mozambique, and the other rebel movements, in Angola, won their war. I do not believe that they did. That war was not won in Mozambique or in Angola. It was lost in Lisbon. That is a vital distinction which I hope will be taken to heart by people in Africa who are disposed towards the

2027
thought that terrorism might be the course to adopt.
Another point of equal importance is that the soldiers who were fighting on the Portuguese side in Mozambique and Angola were expatriates, sent there from their own country, who looked forward to going back. The white people who live in Rhodesia regard it as their home, in the same way as those who live in Israel regard Israel as their home. That is another lesson which those who contemplate terrorism should take to heart.
Mr. Hastings: Does my hon. Friend agree that Frelimo is overwhelmingly a Makonde movement, and that the enmity between it and the Mashone who live to the south makes the risk of conflict in this regard almost inevitable?
Mr. Blaker: I would not care to speculate about that, and I am not sure that it would be desirable for me to do so from this Box.
Returning to my right hon. Friend's suggestion, I am not sure whether he was suggesting that this House should declare now that Britain alone would drop sanctions if the Africans abandoned negotiation and resorted to war. If that was his suggestion—it will no doubt receive appropriate consideration in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—there is one test which perhaps we should apply. Would it help those who want a peaceful solution, those who want to restrain guerrilla activity—I am thinking of some of the African Presidents who are directly involved, in that because of geography they are next door to the problem in a way that we are not—or, if it were adopted, could it be used by those who want to stir up terrorism, for example, by presenting it as an ultimatum in such a way that it made the position of the moderates more difficult? That is a thought which I throw out for further consideration.
There is in southern Africa now a delicate balance. If it is preserved we could see, through the combined efforts of Mr. Smith, the moderate Africans in Rhodesia, Dr. Vorster and President Kaunda, real progress towards a peaceful settlement. But if it is destroyed I fear that we shall see terrorism, the destruction of life and
2028
property, and what Dr. Vorster has described as
"consequences too terrible to contemplate."
I believe that we should do nothing today to disturb that balance. This is not a bold or an heroic posture, and if any of my hon. Friends, or any Government supporters, wish to make that criticism, they may do so. But I suggest to them that there is no ideal course available, because every other course has even greater dangers. If this course is not bold or heroic, it is at least wise, and the best calculated to restore the relationship between Great Britain and Rhodesia which Rhodesia properly ought to have.
3.0 p.m.
The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. David Ennals): The most obvious feature of today's debate is that all the speeches from the Government benches have been in favour of the Government's position and the continuation of the Order. The distinctive factor is that Opposition Members have taken an entirely different standpoint from that of their own Front Bench spokesmen.
Although I welcomed the fact that the hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker) had been on his visit to South Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia—we exchanged views afterwards and we found that we had many common impressions—I cannot say that I admire the courage or the determination with which the Opposition have handled this issue today.
I want to find out just where the Opposition stand. Do the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) and the hon. Member for Blackpool, South—none of the right hon. and hon. Members sitting behind them can speak, so I have to put my question to those two—believe that the Government are right in putting forward this Order? As I understand it from what both have said, they think that the Government are right in doing so but they have no intention of supporting us in the Division Lobby.
The hon. Member for Blackpool, South said that if the Government's motion were defeated, one of those who would be most sad was Dr. Vorster. I think that the hon. Gentleman is right. However, it would also create very great concern

2029
throughout the rest of Africa. On that, they would be united. What is more, I believe that it would be so throughout the world as well.
If the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet and the hon. Member for Blackpool, South think that voting down the Order would be damaging to the course to which Mr. Vorster as well as the African Presidents and our Government are committed, why do they indicate that they will remain in their places when the Division is taken? I hope that this is not simply a lack of commitment by the Opposition Front Bench. It may be simply that they are trying to promote some greater association and trying to ease some of the problems in their party. I hope that it is purely a little local difficulty.
We on the Government benches look back to very different times, when the former Sir Alec Douglas-Home spoke up with principle for the issue that we face today—
Mr. Spearing: And we supported him.
Mr. Ennals: I heard the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) say—
Mr. Ian Lloyd Mr. Ian Lloyd rose—
Mr. Ennals: No. I am not giving way to the hon. Gentleman. I directed my question to his Front Bench spokesmen.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Minister will not give way. However, this matter is too important for it to be left unanswered. The Secretary of State—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Myer Galpern): Order. The Minister has not given way. The hon. Gentleman must resume his seat.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I see that the Secretary of State is in his place—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. There is no point of order. The Minister has not given way to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Ennals: The reason why I do not give way to the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo is apparent to all of us here today. I directed my question to those who speak officially for the Opposition party and not to those who have dissoci-
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ated themselves from the policy not only of the Government but of her Majesty's loyal Opposition.
My second regret is that the hon. Gentleman used the occasion of this debate to misinterpret what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said. I want to repeat it. I believe that the whole House is concerned for the welfare of all the people in Rhodesia. We are concerned, of course, in any settlement for the welfare of the white minority. But I cannot imagine how the hon. Gentleman can expect the Government to show no antagonism towards the illegal régime which has created the situation which has caused this sanctions Order to come before the House for the past 10 years.
There is much that the hon. Gentleman said with which I agree. I share with him a sense of disappointment that the high hopes created by the Lusaka agreement last December have dwindled. A great many opportunities seem to have been frittered away. I look, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman does, with sadness at the widening gap between the leaders of the African National Council. There is no doubt that their cause is damaged by dissension. We must be careful not to place too much blame for the present stalemate on the rival leaders of the ANC, as Opposition Members have done. We must not forget that two of the leaders, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, were kept in detention for 10 years while the Smith régime held power in Rhodesia and also that hundreds of their supporters are still detained, despite the Lusaka agreement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) raised the question of detainees. He said that he had heard reports that there had been an increase in the numbers. The evidence at my disposal—I cannot say whether it is accurate, but it comes from the organisation responsible for the welfare of the detainees—is that whereas in July there were 350 Africans in detention, the figure is now almost 800. That is a deplorable situation.
We must not forget that the African leaders agreed to come together under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa. They maintained this alliance, under the umbrella of the ANC, up to the time when they met with Mr. Smith in a railway carriage on the Victoria Falls bridge.

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We must not forget that their objectives are the same—to achieve independence for Zimbabwe under majority rule. This is an objective which I believe is shared by most people in this country, although not by some hon. Members who have spoken in the House today.
Mr. Hastings: The Minister has used the expression "Zimbabwe". In my remarks earlier I said that from the Commonwealth Heads of States communiqué at the end of their conference in Jamaica, it appeared that some official recognition was given to that word. I then proceeded to explain the background to "Zimbabwe". Is "Zimbabwe" the expression for Rhodesia which the British Government are using or not?
Mr. Ennals: I was referring to the wishes of the Africans as expressed through the African National Council. The Africans' word is "Zimbabwe" and they want to see independence for Zimbabwe. I was quoting their objective. I believe that we all want to see majority rule. It must be recognised that majority rule is not only something which is accepted here, because it is also accepted by all the leaders of the ANC. It is certainly not for us to choose.
I understood the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) to suggest that we should choose one leader and give him our unqualified support. I do not believe that it is for us to decide. It has been said that we should not interfere. It is not for us to decide who are the representatives of African opinion. However, at present there is no sign that Mr. Nkomo's negotiating terms are any softer than those put forward by Bishop Muzorewa. The differences are on questions of tactics, not objectives.
Therefore, we regret the deep rift. We must recognise that some of Mr. Smith's policies have increased the difficulties of the African leaders in holding together. When they met Mr. Smith in the railway carriage on Victoria Falls bridge they were already smarting because so many of their colleagues were still in detention. They were told in no uncertain terms by Mr. Smith on that occasion that the main stage of the negotiations had to be in Rhodesia, not outside, as
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they had hoped, and that leading members of the negotiating team would not be allowed immunity to return to Rhodesia to take part in them. On that matter Mr. Smith had refused to budge. He was saying to them that he would decide which African people would be at the negotiating table. I hope that the time has not passed for him to think again about the position.
Mr. Amery: The Minister will be better informed about this matter than I or other hon. Members, but I understood that at the preliminary meeting in Pretoria both the South African Prime Minister and the representatives of Dr. Kaunda had agreed to the condition imposed by Mr. Smith that the meeting could take place only if it were understood that certain people would not be allowed to return to Rhodesia. Is that correct?
Mr. Ennals: The leaders of the ANC were not present in Pretoria when that agreement was reached. Therefore, they were in a difficult position in that an agreement had been reached in which they had not fully participated.
We must recognise that Mr. Smith's intransigence has contributed not only to the division within the ANC but to the deepening suspicion of some African leaders, both in Rhodesia and outside, that Mr. Smith had no intention of taking part in genuine negotiations and that the only way to achieve majority rule in Rhodesia is through armed struggle. This is a terrible conclusion. Neither I nor my right hon. and hon. Friends accept it, and the two Front Benches are in agreement on this issue.
There are plenty of good grounds for keeping the negotiating option open. First, the fact is that Southern Africa is against the maintenance of white majority rule in Rhodesia. If Mr. Smith and those who support him, either in Rhodesia or in this House, believe that they can indefinitely hold down a population which is overwhelmingly black, they are living in a fool's paradise. They may be able to delay the process of change, but they cannot stop it. Continual prevarication must ultimately end in a guerrilla war which the whites can make long and bloody, but cannot win.

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The second reason for hope is that Mr. Smith's external support is crumbling. My hon. Friends the Members for Walsall, South (Mr. George) and Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Grocott) said that last year Mr. Smith could look to Mozambique for support when it was under Portuguese control, but he can no longer do that.
Mr. Smith thought that he could rely on South Africa—Mr. Vorster—to pull his chestnuts out of the fire. He now knows, and Mr. Vorster has told him in no uncertain terms, whatever the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) may say, that he cannot count on South Africa's unconditional support.
From within the European Community itself, whose members are anxious to live their lives in peace, not in warfare, there are increasing criticisms of Mr. Smith's leadership. The resignation yesterday of Mr. Wickus de Kock is a good example.
The third and perhaps most important fact—this has been recognised by the Opposition—is that the four African Presidents and the South African Prime Minister are determined that a solution to Rhodesia's problems will be found. I am glad that tributes have been paid to the determination of the four African Presidents and Mr. Vorster. It has been an act of courage that they have been able to co-operate together. I join the tribute to the rôle that they have played. For them it is crucial that the problem be solved. It is a must. They will not allow this running sore to infect the whole of the southern part of the continent of Africa. The fact that Mr. Smith must face now, not in 1976, is that time is running out fast.
Mr. Ian Lloyd: The Minister is on a central and important point. As the Secretary of State is present, I am sure that we can have an answer to the question: has Mr. Vorster clearly indicated that he would welcome the continuation of sanctions?
Mr. Ennals: This issue has not been raised by either my right hon. Friend or me with Mr. Vorster, but he has made no representations to us suggesting that the hon. Member for Blackpool, South was not right in the conclusion which he presented from the Opposition Front Bench.
2034
I want now to deal with the important point made by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion—why sanctions? I do not accept that sanctions have had no economic effect. During 1975 there has been a marked and steady increase in the amount of attention which has been devoted to sanctions enforcement by the international community. The Rhodesians themselves have intimated that increased sanction pressures are worrying them. When the Rhodesian Finance Minister introduced his budget in July, he said:
"It is not possible to give details of the public sector investment programmes because sanctions surveillance has been stepped up."
Perhaps I might, as an aside, answer a point raised by the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet, who referred to the EEC. It is important to recognise that, largely as a result of the decision by my right hon. Friend to raise the matter in the EEC, the performance of the EEC countries in relation to the observance of sanctions has greatly improved. In the past 12 months, only nine reports relating to EEC countries were referred to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, compared with 216 during the period since 1968. The right hon. Gentleman said that the matter ought to have been raised earlier with the EEC. Why was that not done when he and his party were in office? Why did they await the arrival of my right hon. Friend?
Mr. Maudling: I am a little baffled. The right hon. Gentleman says that it is a good thing that this year there have been fewer reports to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, yet last year the Foreign Secretary boasted that there had been more. I do not understand.
Mr. Ennals: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman was following what I said. I said that, in relation to countries of the EEC, because of the establishment of the Sanctions Committee and the representations that we had made to the countries of the Nine their performance had improved and it had therefore been less necessary for evidence to be submitted to the United Nations Sanctions Committee.
I come back to the point raised earlier by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion. He said that an end to sanctions would amount to a de facto recognition of the present illegal régime. That

2035
was perhaps the most important statement from the Conservative benches during the course of the debate, and he is right. The right hon. Gentleman is equally right in saying that if action were taken which provided virtually a de facto recognition of the illegal régime in Salisbury there would be anger on the left wing of the Labour Party. There would be anger throughout the Labour movement and I believe that unless his right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet and his hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South are speaking wrongly, there would be anger within the Conservative Party as well. It is not their policy to grant de facto recognition to the régime in Salisbury.
I ask the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion to consider what the reaction would be elsewhere. Conservative Members have business interests in Africa—not only in South Africa. We believe that there would be no welcome for that decision in South Africa. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that our business prospects in other parts of Africa would be improved if we were to take action that was equivalent to de facto recognition of the illegal régime in Salisbury? It is deplorable that the argument can be put forward in this House. The argument for sanctions is not simply economic. It is political, and profoundly so. There is a symbolic significance about taking action that is in accordance both with an international decision and with decisions taken by successive Governments.
One or two other questions were raised during the debate. The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet said, on whosoever's behalf he was speaking—I suppose it was just the two of them—that the House should approve the Order for one year only. We are putting the Order forward for only one year, and it is right that this should be on an annual basis, because circumstances may change. No one would be happier than my right hon. Friend if, in a year's time, we were able to say that the situation had so dramatically changed that we did not need to impose a sanctions Order. This Order is based on the situation as we see it.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice asked whether there could be a represent- 2036
tative of Her Majesty's Government in Salisbury—"some form of presence" as I think he put it. There is a difficulty here. It would have to be short of formal diplomatic representation, but any form of representation that we appointed at this stage could be interpreted as a step towards de facto recognition of the régime in Salisbury. Although there could conceivably be circumstances in which it may be useful for officials or Ministers to be there for a particular negotiation or development, a permanent presence would, I am certain, be misunderstood.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Does not the fact that the Minister cannot give reliable figures of Rhodesians in detention or otherwise deprived of their liberty show that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is not getting information about Rhodesia that it should have? Should it not have a man in Salisbury to give it the information?
Mr. Ennals: Whatever might be the wish of this side of the House or of the Government to have a representative in Salisbury—I have indicated that it is not our wish—it is certainly not something that Mr. Smith would welcome. Someone collecting information about detainees so that the evidence could be given to the world is not a proposal that he would accept.
The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion also asked how a decision could be reached. I think that he asked for certain assurances that any agreement reached between Mr. Smith and some group of Africans would automatically be accepted by the Government and commended to the House. The final decision is for this House. We hold the constitutional right and we could not in advance sign a blank cheque before we knew who was negotiating, how representative they were and what the outcome was.
We have recognised that this problem basically must be solved in Rhodesia, but if negotiation between Mr. Smith or any successor in command of the illegal régime and representative Africans were to produce a genuine agreement, then of course the Government would warmly welcome the opportunity of seeing that change.
Sir Frederic Bennett: The Minister is perfectly fair in saying that he could not

2037
give a blank cheque, but could he say—this would have an impact in Central Africa—that, if an agreement were reached by Mr. Smith and a representative group of Africans which was also acceptable to the surrounding African leaders of their countries who are proven friends of a settlement, that would have a serious impact?
Mr. Ennals: All those circumstances would have a serious impact. It would be surprising if an agreement which was so generally welcomed was not warmly welcomed by Her Majesty's Government.
Several hon. Members have said that Britain has no voice in this situation. Of course my right hon. Friend recognises that the front runners in trying to bring about an agreement were Rhodesia's neighbours—the four Presidents and the Prime Minister of South Africa. The front runners are in Rhodesia itself. But it would be unwise to assume that we have no influence. We have a continuing influence. We are in constant diplomatic contact with the African Presidents as well as with the South African Government, with whom we have a businesslike working relationship on this issue.
Ultimately, we hold the key. Why has no country—not even South Africa—accorded diplomatic recognition to the illegal régime? Obviously, some Conservative Members would do that, but no country in the world has done it. That is not only because of a United Nations resolution but because it is recognised that the key to approval and to independence on the basis of whatever is negotiated is held in this Parliament. So we have a vital influence. I assure the House that my right hon. Friend the Foreign
Secretary and I will do everything we can to influence it in the right direction.
If the Conservative Front Bench believes that Her Majesty's Government are right in what they are doing—I have not heard any serious criticism of this from that Front Bench today—it would be in the interests of Rhodesia and a peaceful settlement that the agreement that exists between us should be demonstrated in the Division Lobby.
We have been told that the vote will show the difference between the Government and the Opposition. It will do no such thing. It will show the difference between the Conservative Front Bench and the Conservative back benches. If that Front Bench had the courage of its convictions, it would go with us into the Division Lobby. It would be faced with a hopeless task if it tried to persuade the cowboys behind it to take that course.
Although it may be said that not everyone will read the reports of this debate, in the eyes of the international community Britain has an inescapable duty to discharge its responsibility for Rhodesia in an honorable manner and in conformity with African political aspirations. However difficult this task may be, we shall do ourselves no service, nor in the last analysis shall we help any section of the community in Rhodesia, if we turn our backs on that duty now. It is important that by its vote today the House should demonstrate that there is no wavering on this issue and no intention of conveying a misleading signal to a régime which has ostracised itself from the international community.
Question put:—
The House divided: Ayes 83, Noes. 13.

Division No. 380.]

AYES

[3.27 p.m.

Archer, Peter

Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)

Jeger, Mrs Lena

Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)

Deakins, Eric

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Atkinson, Norman

de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey

Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Stechford)

Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)

Dell, Rt Hon Edmund

John, Brynmor

Bates, Alf

Dormand, J. D.

Judd, Frank

Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur

Edge, Geoff

Kaufman, Gerald

Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)

English, Michael

Kelley, Richard

Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE)

Ennals, David

Kerr, Russell

Carmichael, Neil

Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)

Knox, David

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)

Lamborn, Harry

Cartwright, John

George, Bruce

Latham, Arthur (Paddington)

Clemitson, Ivor

Gilbert, Dr John

Lipton, Marcus

Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)

Ginsburg, David

Luard, Evan

Cox, Thomas (Tooting)

Graham, Ted

Lyons, Edward (Bradford W)

Cunningham, G. (Islington S)

Grant, John (Islington C)

MacFarquhar, Roderick

Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)

Grocott, Bruce

McGuire, Michael (Ince)

Davidson, Arthur

Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)

Maclennan, Robert

Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Mallalieu, J. P. W.

Davies, Denzil (Llanelli)

Hayman, Mrs. Helene

Mason, Rt Hon Roy

Maynard, Miss Joan

Sandelson, Neville

Tuck, Raphael

Mellish, Rt Hon Robert

Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Miller, Mrs Millie (llford N)

Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)

Ward, Michael

Moonman, Eric

Skinner, Dennis

Weitzman, David

Noble, Mike

Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)

Williams, Alan (Swansea W)

Ovenden, John

Snape, Peter

Wise, Mrs Audrey

Owen, Dr David

Spearing, Nigel

Palmer, Arthur

Stallard, A. W.

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Park, George

Strang, Gavin

Mr. Donald Coleman and

Roper, John

Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)

Mr. Joseph Harper.

NOES

Bell, Ronald

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Wall, Patrick

Biggs-Davison, John

Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

Brotherton, Michael

Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Gardiner, George (Reigate)

Skeet, T. H. H.

Mr. Stephen Hastings and

Lloyd, Ian

Stokes, John

Mr. Nicholas Winterton.

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Admiral

Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)

Question accordingly agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1975, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th October, be approved

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments).
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
  EXPORT GUARANTEES
  That the Export Guarantees (Limit on Commitments) Order 1975, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th October, be approved.—[Mr. Thomas Cox.]

  ADJOURNMENT
  Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Thomas Cox.]
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-three minutes to Four o'clock.

  MAGISTRATES
  MAGISTRATES
CIVIL SERVICE
  Whips' Offices (House of Commons)
  Whips' Offices (House of Commons)
DEFENCE
  Dishforth Airfield
  Dishforth Airfield
  Armaments Sales
  Armaments Sales
  Scottish Aviation Industry
  Scottish Aviation Industry
  Pensions (Public Criticism)
  Pensions (Public Criticism)
  Railways
  Railways
  Conference on European Co-operation and Security
  Conference on European Co-operation and Security
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Rabies
  Rabies
  Plaice (Radioactive Dose)
  Plaice (Radioactive Dose)
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  School Transport
  School Transport
  School Transport
  School Transport
  Student-Teacher Ratios
  Student-Teacher Ratios
  School and Departmental Employees (Pay)
  School and Departmental Employees (Pay)
  Absence from School
  Absence from School
  Capitation Allowances
  Capitation Allowances
  School Meals
  School Meals
  Employees (Educational Services)
  Employees (Educational Services)
  Disabled Persons (St. Helens)
  Disabled Persons (St. Helens)
EMPLOYMENT
  Arms Manufacture
  Arms Manufacture
  Wallasey
  Wallasey
  Labour Relations
  Labour Relations
ENERGY
  Irradiated Nuclear Fuel
  Irradiated Nuclear Fuel
  Windscale
  Windscale
  Nuclear Construction Industry
  Nuclear Construction Industry
  Prices
  Prices
  Coal
  Coal
ENVIRONMENT
  Railways
  Railways
  British Sources
  British Sources
  Water Purification Plant (Hereford)
  Water Purification Plant (Hereford)
  Bedfordshire (Houses)
  Bedfordshire (Houses)
  Coast Protection (Sussex)
  Coast Protection (Sussex)
  Ports
  Ports
  House Building Costs
  House Building Costs
  Home Loss Payments
  Home Loss Payments
  Housing Subsidies
  Housing Subsidies
  Motoring Insurance
  Motoring Insurance
  Nuclear Waste
  Nuclear Waste
  Local Government (Pay)
  Local Government (Pay)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Matrimonial Jurisdiction
  Matrimonial Jurisdiction
  Obscenity
  Obscenity
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Travel Expenses
  Travel Expenses
  Banks
  Banks
  Personal Incomes
  Personal Incomes
  Construction Industry
  Construction Industry
NORTHERN IRELAND
  Harland and Wolff Ltd.
  Harland and Wolff Ltd.
  Constitutional Convention
  Constitutional Convention
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  European Development Fund
  European Development Fund
SOCIAL SERVICES
  Chiropody
  Chiropody
  Handicapped Children
  Handicapped Children
  Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hospital
  Elizabeth Garrett Anderson Hospital
SCOTLAND
  Sheltered Housing
  Sheltered Housing
  Departmental Staff
  Departmental Staff
  European Union
  European Union
WALES
  Comprehensive Schools
  Comprehensive Schools
TRADE
  Import Restrictions
  Import Restrictions
  Oil Rigs
  Oil Rigs
  Yarn Imports
  Yarn Imports
  Slater Walker Securities Limited
  Slater Walker Securities Limited
  Departmental Inquiries (Transcripts of Evidence)
  Departmental Inquiries (Transcripts of Evidence)
  Scottish Aviation Limited
  Scottish Aviation Limited
  Airport Noise (Insulation Grants)
  Airport Noise (Insulation Grants)
INDUSTRY
  Factories
  Factories
  Co-operative Development Agency
  Co-operative Development Agency
  Telephone Charges
  Telephone Charges
  Aircraft Manufacture
  Aircraft Manufacture
  Ship Repairing
  Ship Repairing
  British Leyland Ltd.
  British Leyland Ltd.
  Aerospace
  Aerospace
  Concorde
  Concorde
  Aviation (Warning System)
  Aviation (Warning System)
  Scottish Aviation Limited
  Scottish Aviation Limited
  St. Helens
  St. Helens
  Scotland
  Scotland
  National Enterprise Board
  National Enterprise Board

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock: The Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Ripon.

USSR: EMIGRATION
Lord JANNER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the USSR is breaking her undertaking given in the Final Act signed at the Helsinki Conference by refusing to grant permission to those who wish to emigrate from the USSR (including the territories occupied and annexed by her during the Second World War); and whether Her Majesty's Government will endeavour to persuade the USSR to abide by her agreement and allow to depart those who have applied and will apply to emigrate, including the scientist Benjamin Levich and his wife who have been informed that the specific promise that they would be allowed to leave has been revoked.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, it is too early to speak of a breach of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. The Government intend to implement the provisions of the Final Act, and expect all other participating States to do likewise. All entered into a firm political commitment to do so. The House will be aware of the Government's view that individual cases of this kind can be pursued more effectively through private discussion than through public declaration. But, as my right honourable friend the Minister of State said in another place on 29th October, we shall continue to draw the attention of the Soviet authorities to this sort of case.
Lord JANNER: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for the reply
740
that he has given, may I ask him whether he is aware of the fact that those who apply for exit permits are still being subjected to very serious harassment; that many are being charged with fictitious crimes, or false alleged crimes; and that the vast majority are being given no opportunity to get out? Is my noble friend further aware that, instead of the situation becoming better, so far as emigration is concerned it has become worse? In view of the fact that this was a definite promise, does not the case of Levich and his wife require immediate attention?—because the authorities in the USSR have withdrawn that promise which they gave even prior to the Helsingfors Treaty and, having withdrawn that promise they are subjecting the Leviches to very grievous hardship.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, the evidence which my noble friend has given is unfortunately true in many respects, and may be true in individual cases. We strongly deplore these practices and policies, and our purpose in co-operating at Helsinki and in affixing our signature with those of 35 other countries, including the Soviet Union, was to make some progress towards resolving these humanitarian problems. The progress of the implementation of the Final Act will of course be reviewed in 1977, but in the meantime we shall be constantly consulting our friends and allies in the Community and in NATO as to cases of this kind and also as to general progress along the lines envisaged by the Final Act.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, while welcoming what the noble Lord has said and agreeing with him that, in general, these things are better handled by private representation, may I ask him whether, when these representations are made, he would consider making it clear that the facts which the noble Lord, Lord Janner, has brought to the attention of the House are not unknown to the great majority of the people of this country and that they must inevitably have an effect on Anglo-Soviet relations?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, if I may take the most important point of the noble Lord's interjection—and it is an important point which the noble Lord has made—we entirely agree that the progress of détente, which the Soviet Union and its allies regard as being

741
of great importance, can only be impaired by a lack of implementation over a long enough period of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. As to the first point which the noble Lord made, indeed it is well that all understand that there is a very strong and active public opinion in this country, and indeed throughout the whole democratic world, which deplores and abhors these practices.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, while agreeing with everything that has been said by both the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and my noble friend Lord Janner, and while supporting private movements in this matter, may I ask whether it would be better if we used the Helsinki Conference as a means of asserting the principle of free movement between countries, which is even more important? If we worked on that principle, that is far more important than even individual efforts made by private people in particular cases.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I think the two are equal in importance. The provision in the Final Act relates to a policy for the freer movement of individuals and groups, including, of course, people who are motivated by national, religious or ideological reasons; but within that larger purpose there is clearly the need—in appropriate ways which the noble Lord has described, possibly by private intercession rather than public declaration—to assist in individual cases. I would not wish to specify which individual cases. From time to time our Prime Minister and other leaders in this country intercede on behalf of individuals in a private way, always with a view to their action being productive rather than counter-productive in that particular case.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: But, my Lords, in contradistinction to what the noble Baroness has suggested, is it not a test of the sincerity of our principles that we apply them in individual cases; and are not principles which are not applied in individual cases wholly worthless?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: Yes, my Lords; I entirely agree, and I have no doubt that the noble Baroness would go along with that, too. There is the general purpose of the Final Act, but, as the noble and learned Lord has reminded
742
us, general purposes are valid only if they are applied to individuals.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, while not endorsing everything that is in this Question, may I ask the Minister whether he will raise privately, as has been suggested, the case of Benjamin Levich, and whether he will consider negotiations to extend the Human Rights Commission in Western Europe to the whole of Europe, permitting Governments to raise questions of this kind?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I take note of both points; the individual point and also the point of policy which my noble friend has raised.

PALACE OF WESTMINSTER: SECURITY
The LORD CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (The Earl of Listowel):My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to make a Statement. On 7th August, I announced to the House the arrangements for considering the Starritt Report on the Security of the Palace of Westminster. I am glad to say that the following Peers have agreed to serve on the small committee, to be set up jointly with the House of Commons, to examine the Report:

The noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn,

The noble Viscount, Lord Hood,

The noble Lord, Lord Amulree,

The noble Lord, Lord Champion.

The terms of reference of the committee, which have been agreed with the House of Commons, will be:
"To consider the review of security at the Palace of Westminster carried out by Sir James Starritt, CVO, lately Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, and to make recommendations."
Mr. Speaker has made a similar Statement in another place this morning.

COMMUNITY LAND BILL
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Baroness Birk): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Amendments for the Report stage of the Community Land Bill be marshalled and considered in the following order, viz.:—

Clauses 1 to 3,

Schedule 1,

Clauses 4 to 7,

Schedule 2,

Clause 8,

Schedule 3,

Clauses 9 to 15,

Schedule 4,

Clause 16,

Schedule 5,

Clause 17,

Schedule 6,

Clauses 18 and 19,

Schedule 7,

Clauses 20 to 23,

Schedule 8,

Clauses 24 to 47,

Schedule 9,

Clauses 48 to 57,

Schedules 10 and 11.—(Baroness Birk.)
Lord SANDFORD: My Lords, I am glad to say that these arrangements are entirely convenient to the Opposition. We look forward to returning to the lists next week. I am glad to see that the noble Baroness is dressed ready for a relaxed weekend.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PETROLEUM AND SUBMARINE PIPE-LINES BILL
11.15 a.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, DEPARTMENT of ENERGY (Lord Balogh): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Balogh.)
On Question, Bill read 3a, with the Amendments.
Schedule 2 [Production licences for seaward areas]:
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 1, which is directly consequential upon an Amendment which your Lordships' House made at the Report stage.
Amendment moved—
Page 102, line 24, at end insert ("and an agreement in so far as it provides that, after any petroleum has been won and saved from the licensed area, it shall be exchanged for other petroleum.")—(Lord Campbell of Croy.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Production licences for landward areas]:
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, it might be convenient if I explained that Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 are also directly consequential upon the Amendment that was made at Report stage. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 127, line 6, at end insert ("and an agreement in so far as it provides that, after any petroleum has been won and saved from the licensed area, it shall be exchanged for other petroleum.")
Page 156, line 19, at end insert ("and an agreement in so far as it provides that, after any petroleum has been won and saved from the licensed area, it shall be exchanged for other petroleum."—(Lord Campbell of Croy.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Lord BALOGH: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Balogh.)
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I thought that the Minister himself might be speaking first to this Motion. Having for the convenience of your Lordships' House tried to deal speedily and concisely with the Amendments at Report stage on Wednesday after your Lordships had had an all-night Sitting, we thought that we ought to save the general discussion until the debate this morning. So there are some comments which I, and some of my noble friends, should like to make on the Bill, which we reserved to today rather than make last Wednesday's proceedings much longer than they need have been.
I would remind your Lordships that this Bill reached our House very late

745
in the Session, and the Second Reading was on the last day, 7th August, before the Summer Recess. We have been busy both last month when we returned during the Recess and had two days of Committee and again this month, in examining the Bill and seeing what revision was necessary. I believe that we have been able to make some worthwhile changes and additions. Much of the Bill is necessarily technical as regards licensing and similar matters. We on this Bench have approached it with the object of providing the best arrangements by which to win offshore oil quickly up to 1981. We have also approached it with a view to what would be required in order to apply sensible depletion policies after 1981.
Offshore oil is a new, valuable and welcome resource for Britain. In later years I believe we may well be shocked that we ever used it as fuel, because there are so many other uses as a source of ingredients for the manufacture of goods which are needed by the world, which I am sure we shall concentrate on in years to come; for example, in the plastics industry. The oil will last for only so long. In 40, 50 or 60 years, perhaps less, most of it is likely to be used up. It is against this background that we look at the contents of this Bill.
We on these Benches believe that the British National Oil Corporation (what is known as BNOC) is an unwieldy collossus which is not necessary. It will be expensive to set up, and it will take time, which the country can ill afford, to get itself established with staff and the necessary expertise; and I remind your Lordships that there is only a limited amount of both of those available in the country, or, indeed, outside in the world. In the matter of licensing, which takes up a large part of the Bill, powers are to be given to the Minister and there is to be the enforcement of changes to licences, which again we believe to be largely unnecessary. The Bill could, therefore, have been much shorter and this would certainly have eased the burden on Parliament at this time.
The effect of the Government's actions concerning offshore oil in the last year and a half has been to slow up offshore operations. For the first year of the Government's time in Office there was uncertainty while they were making up
746
their minds. Later there has been apprehension when the proposals have become known.
We have made improvements to the Bill, with the help, I readily acknowledge, of the Government, and I will explain briefly what they amount to. The Government for their part have added a provision whereby the accounts of the BNOC will give separate information about its various activities. This is important considering that it will be engaged in so much; it will have powers, for example, even to run petrol stations at the roadside. The Government have also added a provision which will enable the amount of petroleum revenue tax which would have been payable, if BNOC had not been given exemption, to be made known each year soon after the accounting year is over. Our view is that BNOC should not be given exemption from this tax. We feel that as it is working in competition with other companies, there is greater danger of advantages being gained by this company which it will not be possible to observe from the outside. However, I acknowledge that this is a considerable improvement, made to the Bill in your Lordships' House by the Government, that they have put something in the Bill to meet this criticism.
The Government have also altered the unjusifiable threat of revocation of the whole of a licence. We do not think their Amendment goes far enough, as we demonstrated on Report with some additional supplementary Amendments which would, we think, have completed what the Government were doing. The trouble is the restricted definition which the Government have taken of what is a commercial field. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that on this point, on which there was so much anxiety in the industry, which has to carry out the difficult task of extracting the oil, the fact that the Government have had a considerable change of mind. This change in the Bill is an advance. The Government have also introduced arrangements for representations to be made by a Licensee to a Minister in certain circumstances on technical and financial factors, and again this was meeting anxiety among the operators. These are all improvements which the Government have made as a result of pressure and argument which we and others have been able to put to them.

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Let me outline the improvements which we have made in your Lordships' House, though without the full agreement of the Government. There will be further opportunity now for the Government to consider these points. We have removed the anomalous requirement whereby there should be two civil servants on BNOC who would still be employees of their Departments and responsible to their Ministers. We have added arrangements to deal with possible unfair discrimination or unfair practices arising from BNOC's proposed activities. The Government have said that the Fair Trading Act 1973 would cover this. It might make some contribution, but I remind your Lordships that that Act was addressed to unfair trading as regards customers and consumers in the country, and did not apply to this kind of situation in industry. On licences, we have added a provision for compensation where there is a revocation of a licence as a result, of an act or omission relating to the new changed part of a licence arising from this Bill and not arising from the original terms entered into by both the parties. This will certainly improve the position of Britain abroad. It means that British companies operating abroad and in offshore waters abroad may not be threatened with the same kind of sanction without compensation. On depletion policy, there is now in the Bill the assurance, given in the words of the then Secretary of State for Energy, Mr. Varley, on 6th December, and this assurance means that the companies know that they will have reasonable protection from a very delayed return for the massive investment which they have put in, along with protection from major alterations of programmes at short notice.
In the pipe-lines section of the Bill there is now a period of grace before a termination of an authorisation, and in that period of grace any alleged contravention can be remedied. This was as a result of an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran. And on pipelines also, there is an addition providing a proper basis for the allocating of costs when third parties are to make use of spare pipe-line capacity. There is also now in the Bill an addition which incorporates the Government's undertaking not to withhold approval
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under powers in the Bill in order to enforce on a company their policy of 51 per cent, participation. The Government have said that that policy and its fulfilment is to be on a voluntary basis and, therefore, presumably they will commend this addition to the Bill. This is important because it is one of the chief I elements, as we understand it, of the Government's policy. But this 51 per cent, participation is still wrapped in mystery. It is apparently being pursued in private discussions with the individual oil companies. We are told that as a result the companies are to be no better or worse off financially.
Last Monday some noble Lords may have seen the "Panorama" programme in which the interviewer said to the noble Lord, Lord Balogh:
"The chairman of Shell says that oil company executives are baffled and bewildered by the Government's intentions".
To which the noble Lord replied:
"I never complain about what the oil industry is saying. If I were an oil man I would say the same things."
That was interesting because the noble Lord is an eminent economist and if he, as an economist, were working for an oil company, it is clear from what he said that he would be baffled and bewildered by the Government's intentions on the 51 per cent, participation. I applaud his frankness and there is certainly every reason for bewilderment.
Lord BALOGH: The noble Lord must understand the irony, my Lords.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY:My Lords, I hope that the several million viewers will have understood the irony, too. However, I must draw attention to the more sinister side. Of course I absolve any noble Lord sitting on the Front Bench opposite from this, but it is something which is naturally causing anxiety, particularly among the many engaged in offshore activities who are not necessarily familiar with British systems. It is that there is a possibility of undue pressure being brought on individual companies, arising from the powers which the Government have, to give or withhold assent to schemes and programmes on our Continental Shelf.
My noble friend Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal when he speaks later, will

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go more fully into the question of 51 per cent, particpation, but it is important that the Government should make it abundantly clear that they are not using the powers which they are being accorded under the Bill, and which they already have, to force companies into this 51 per cent, participation. I have pointed out at an earlier stage of the Bill that there has been a certain amount of coincidence. I asked a question, but I have not yet received an answer, so I hope that there is an opportunity now for the Government to provide that answer. I will put the question again: have there been any cases since the policy of 51 per cent, participation was adopted where companies have sought permission to rearrange interests in a licence, and have received that permission, without their also having to announce acceptance in principle of 51 per cent, participation? It is a coincidence that, so far, all the announcements relating to such cases have included the companies—which were clearly under some pressure to get Government agreement—announcing that they accepted in principle this 51 per cent, participation, whatever that may consist of. I ask the question again: Are there any companies which have not accepted this participation?—because this is the kind of coincidence which naturally provokes the anxiety which I have mentioned.
Let us consider the effects of the Government's policies. There is a danger that they will delay operations on our Continental Shelf, so this means that there is still a danger that the oil which was expected by 1980 will not all be available. I am not suggesting that companies which have already committed themselves to a large investment will not go ahead with their particular programmes; it is the next stage to which I am drawing attention. Companies are looking very critically at their later programmes. The noble Lord, Lord Balogh, has, in his charming way which we know so well, given currency to a little known word—"risklessness". He has used this word in your Lordships' House to describe operations in the North Sea. It has been supported in our recent debates during the last few weeks by statistics showing that the ratio of dry holes in the North Sea to the total number of holes is rather less than in other major oil provinces in the world. That may be so, but that argument
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completely ignores the formidable conditions in the North Sea and the enormous costs involved. In those circumstances and with the licensing and taxation systems which are now being imposed, fields which had previously thought to be commercial may not be so—and this may be the case even with large fields which apparently contain a lot of oil.
The Economist recently drew attention to the Government's policies and their effects. On the 51 per cent, participation negotiations, it said that these were being carried out mostly with the smaller companies which were in financial straits. Ironically, said the Economist, this meant that those companies might be placed in a worse condition compared with the large companies. Then it referred to the difficulties with progress payments on fields which are now being developed. The financial institutions and the banks are reluctant to help with finance. Then, decisions on whether to develop fields are being shelved and the banks will not lend on balance sheets or on the promise of oil to come. The article also referred to the reluctance of companies to take on new fields, and it gave as examples the Hutton, Andrew and Maureen fields. Plans have already been shelved for the last two.
I turn to exploration. The Government have been telling us that during this year the drilling rigs in the North Sea—these are the vessels which carry out exploration drilling—have averaged about 29, but the United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association has pointed out that the research it has carried out shows that the average next year will probably be 20, so that there is likely to be a reduction from 29 to 20 drilling rigs on the exploration side.
Turning to production and the platforms—the massive structures which are permanently established in the oil fields in order to control the flow of oil—we find that the Secretary of State is quite rightly worried about the lack of orders. Your Lordships will recall that a platform can be worth about £100 million if it is built in this country and would be a strain on our foreign exchange if it were built abroad. Unfortunately, some orders for platform building went abroad during the uncertainty of last year. However, until the plans for oil fields are certain,

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companies cannot be expected to order and, as I have indicated, they are not committing themselves to these future plans because of the uncertainty and because of some of the contents of the Bill. That is one of the main reasons for the delay in platform orders.
On Monday—in three days' time—there is to be a day of national celebration when the first oil from the Forties field is piped ashore. I say straight away that this has been the result of a great feat. Four platforms have been placed in the Forties field, over 100 miles of pipe-line have been laid on the sea bed and more than that have been laid on land. The cost of laying pipe-line on the sea bed now is about £1 million a mile. The company concerned—BP—and the other companies who are suppliers or have been working with them were given every encouragement. During the last three years they have been pioneering and coming up against new difficulties in this enterprise. We should ensure that similar enterprise in other fields is not strangled at the early stages.
I am glad to have been given the opportunity to be there in Aberdeen shire on Monday, having made a modest personal contribution to the exercise in the Forties field. In December 1971, the first ever application for a platform building site was made for Nigg Bay; a large part of the shore in an area of natural beauty was to be the site. There were, naturally, objections regarding wild life as well as the environment and there were also worries about the effect of the oil industry's activities on the countryside. However, I took a risk—in part of this "riskless"operation—and as the planning Minister, I decided against a public enquiry, and thereby saved up to a year. I am glad to say that that decision has been vindicated because the massive operations at Nigg Bay have in general been accepted in the area and the necessity for a public inquiry has not since been regarded as something which I overlooked. The first platform for the Forties field was built at Nigg Bay and one of the other four was also built there. The opening would not be taking place next Monday but would be some time ahead—perhaps a year ahead, because of the "weather window" in the summer—if that planning decision, with
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out a public inquiry, had not been taken in a matter of a few days.
The enterprise, ingenuity, skill and incredibly hard work needed for offshore oil operations should be encouraged by the Government. The policy of the Government now will determine what happens in the 1980s, but we need investment from abroad. We cannot do it all ourselves. Of course, we want British industry to become increasingly involved in these activities and to be able to use the techniques elsewhere in the world in years to come. This will be a valuable invisible export for Britain. But to obtain the best results for Britain the Government should encourage the investment and the potential massive effort that are still available, because if they do not these may well be diverted to other shores.
11.40 a.m.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: My Lords, may I, as one who has taken an active part in dealing with Amendments to the Bill, offer from the Liberal Benches our good wishes to the noble Lord, Lord Kearton, as the first chairman of the British National Oil Corporation. However much we from these Liberal Benches still disagree with many aspects of the Bill, and indeed with the procedures of the Corporation, we wish the noble Lord well in the immense task to which he is now committed. The new Corporation clearly has a vast responsibility, affecting vitally the future interests and assets of the United Kingdom, particularly in the North Sea.
As Ministers in this House and in the other place have repeatedly said, the Government are seeking to achieve—and these words are very significant in this industry—
"a partnership with the privately-owned oil companies, a partnership which reflects the importance of our national interests, and the need for proper development of our North Sea resources, with proper control over them and a fair return to the nation from them."— [Official Report, Commons, 29/7/75; col. 1577.]
These are indeed very important aspirations which we hope the noble Lord, Lord Kearton, will be able to carry out.
Of course I realise that the Government have had to close the gaps in the North Sea oil policy which they inherited from the Conservative Government. The all-Party Accounts Committee had, for example, criticised aspects of the Conservative Government's policy in 1971. We

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on the Liberal Benches recognise that there should be proper control and a proper share in the ownership of such an important asset, the new wealth which has been found around our shores. The rapid build-up of this oil industry followed by its rapid decline must, as the Government have pointed out, be prevented; and we realise how the economy of both Scotland and Wales was affected by the rapid rise followed by decline in the mining and shipbuilding industries.
On looking back at the four days in which this Bill has been discussed in your Lordships' House (during the Committee and Report stages), it is important that I say that I feel strongly that this House has acted well in its vital function as a helpful Revising Chamber of great national significance. Sincere efforts have been made from all sides of the House—from the Conservative Benches, the Liberal Benches, the Cross-Benches and the Government Benches—and I pay a particular tribute to the noble Lords, Lord Balogh and Lord Lovell-Davis, upon whom the heavy burden of dealing with this important Bill, with its great significance to the future of this country, has fallen.
During this constructive debate the Government have given a number of important concessions and explanations in the light of the matters put to them in this House and from industry. Some of us may think that they did not go far enough, but the fact is that in the course of the debate concessions and explanations were given, and although many of these concessions and explanations were not put into the Bill, as some noble Lords wished, I consider that the fact that the concessions and explanations have been given openly in this House is a great contribution towards the efforts of the BNOC in the national interest. I hope that the oil industry will recognise also that the Government have taken a number of important steps forward in the light of the discussions in your Lordships' House. The Government, in the words of one of their Ministers, are trying to protect the nation's inheritance for this, and future, generations.
We from these Liberal Benches welcome and applaud the great investment, technical and financial, so far made by many oil companies in the North Sea. We recognise, and I think it is fair to say
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that the Government have recognised, in; the course of this constructive debate, many of the present anxieties of the oil companies and international finance houses. During the Committee stage of the Bill I submitted to your Lordships that the powers of the Corporation and the Secretary of State, particularly under Clause 2, were unnecessarily wide. The Government's answer was that these wide powers were vital, as the Minister put it. I to safeguard the United Kingdom in getting a large take from the North Sea. The Minister also said—and this is significant in relation to the difficulties of negotiations which the BNOC may have to face—that it was important to keep these wide powers to avoid,
"weakening the bargaining position of Britain with these very big and extremely skilful oil companies."—[Official Report, 24/9/75; col. 358.]
In the light of my personal experience of dealing with large companies in the course of my profession for a number of years, I sympathise with the difficulties which this Corporation may have in negotiating with very large companies.
I pay tribute to the fair-minded way in which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, has presented so much of the case during our debates. So far as the revocation of licences is concerned, as the noble Lord has pointed out, important concessions have been made by the Government in the light of Amendments put forward from both the Conservative and Liberal Benches. On the financial side, I attach considerable significance to the fact that the Leader of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, a member of the Cabinet, himself took part in the debate dealing with one of my Amendments to Clause 9, intended to make the British National Oil Corporation subject to the petroleum revenue tax. This is a technical matter, yet one of very considerable importance, and there was a similar Amendment to mine put forward from the Conservative Benches. The noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal listened sympathetically to our views and, although such a busy man, he listened to the anxieties of the industry expressed to him. During that debate he gave, as a member of the Cabinet, certain important undertakings. In the result, an important Amendment was introduced by the Government at Report stage and that, in my

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view, was a very considerable step forward by the Government; and we appreciate that concession.
In conclusion, I wish to say that, despite the remaining defects of the Bill, I have been impressed in the Committee and Report stages by the sincere attempts from all sides to help improve the Bill. We on the Liberal Benches do not have access to the resources, nor have we the contacts that the Government and Conservative representatives have. However, from these Benches we have tried to be helpful. It can be said without ostentation that if one examines who took part in these debates, one sees that many of your Lordships—including myself, if I may say so—who have tried to help in the debate, have in the course of their professions and business activities outside this House had, often before they came to it, to conduct difficult negotiations, often on a national scale, with companies as large and as skilful as the oil companies to which the Minister referred in his words which I mentioned earlier.
As the Government have repeatedly said, everything must be done in the national interest, and I am sure that the British National Oil Corporation, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Kearton, with his vast business experience, will be able to adopt in the national interest a constructive and realistic approach in dealing with both the oil companies and the Secretary of State.
11.50 a.m.
Lord TREVELYAN: My Lords, I think this will be the last time I shall have to declare my special interest as a director of the British Petroleum Company, since it is our custom to bow out gracefully at the age of 70 and I fear that that time is coming very soon indeed. There is no dispute that the basic aim is that North Sea Oil should be fully exploited for the British people. It is indeed an operation full of risk, even if those risks are not precisely the same as those that are found in the Middle East. I think the North Sea weather creates as many difficulties as the most inhospitable desert sands. The arguments during the passage of the Bill have been about the best way of fulfilling our basic
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aim, and the Bill has been improved substantially during the debate in your Lordships' House. If I have voted for Amendments to the Bill, it is because I believe that the system proposed by the Government will be improved by them, and I hope that the Government will now look at them in this light.
I do not think that any of the critics of the Bill consider that the Government have any unworthy motive in embarking on this system. The fear has been rather that they do not fully understand the effect of what they are doing. If the Government find by experience that they were in some respects mistaken, I hope they will admit it and take remedial action. But what will matter most is the spirit in which the Act is carried out. We must rely largely on the assurances which have been given in and outside your Lordships' House. The Government must interpret the national interest in the widest sense and beware of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. We must not allow a spirit of enmity to grow up between the companies and the Government, nor a spirit of distrust. There must be real co-operation and a real effort by each party to understand the other party's views. I do not want to discuss the question of participation, since my company is now in negotiation with the Government, but I can say that I trust that the Government will not forget their explicit assurance that all these negotiations on participation will be genuinely free negotiations and will be conducted on the basis that those companies already possessing licences will not be financially worse off than before. We must all hope, for it is a matter of vital concern to the country, that common sense and moderation will be observed by all concerned.
11.53 a.m.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, this is the eighth and final day on which your Lordships have been concerned with this Bill, and I have had the pleasure of being present on all those occasions. I hope the House will forgive me on this occasion if I keep an appointment shortly after one o'clock, even if the Minister is speaking. I, like other speakers, feel that we have achieved a considerable result from our long deliberations and, if our Ministers opposite have from time to time boiled over and used words which perhaps they

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have afterwards regretted, I am sure this is due to overtiredness, and I think most of us would overlook it and forgive that. I have to confess that I do not like the Bill. I think it will create a totally unnecessary and increasingly large bureaucracy; I think it will cost the taxpayer unnecessary and extra money; I think it will cost the nation priceless time and I think it will discourage the adventurous, the risk-takers and the wealth-creators at a time when we want to give them every incentive. I still believe, as the official Opposition does, that these objects could have been more quickly, and incidentally much more flexibly, achieved through taxation arrangements rather than through this very clumsy form of nationalisation.
I fully accept the mixed economy. I think every genuine democrat accepts this, and I hope the Government will continue to back it. They mentioned it in the last Queen's Speech, and I hope that on 19th November we shall hear the same phraseology again. But I cannot help feeling that, despite their so-called dedication to the mixed economy, they are being pushed from the Left of their Party in the other place, and of course by the Left Wing in those unions which are dominated by the Left Wing. I hope they have the courage to stand up and not be pushed further in this direction.
I do not like further nationalisation for five reasons. I think it has been proved —and perhaps Monty Finniston's experience in the British Steel Corporation is the most outstanding and recent example—that it leads to over manning; he believes that he has 20,000 surplus people there and could achieve the same result with many less people, and certainly compared with other competitive nations that is true. Over manning tends to lead to labour intensive industries, and in recent years they have set the pace for wage claims; this has fed back into the private sector, and, therefore, has disadvantaged the private sector in its desire to export the maximum for our country.
The second point is that successive Governments continue to exert too much interference, and so often for short-term political ends, on the nationalised industries. I particularly worry about BNOC because in many ways it is to be more vulnerable than some other nationalised industries; it is more directly under the
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control of the Minister, and, therefore, I think, more vulnerable to political interference. I cannot think that this is good for efficient operation. The third point I wish to make is that I think in nationalised industries, for reasons we have understood, partly because of size and partly because of public responsibility and Parliamentary procedures, decisions take longer, and I think in the North Sea speed, above all, is essential.
Fourthly, I cannot help feeling that the nationalised industries so seldom make profits, but they make losses, and these losses have to be carried by private industry and by the taxpayers. You have only to look at the losses in the current year of the six biggest nationalised industries, two of which made modest profits. The Post Office lost £307 million, electricity, £257 million, British Rail, £158 million, gas £44 million. So in those four alone you have losses in a single year of £766 million. I may say that many of their prices were kept down under political pressure at that time, so the losses will be very much greater this year. So I see an enlarging unprofitable public sector, and a diminishing and therefore less profitable, private sector.
I have been through and analysed just how much debate on this Bill has taken place in both places. It is interesting to see just how much any Government has to amend a Bill, particularly one as complicated as this. In the Commons there were no fewer than 70 Government Amendments to their own Bill, and five Conservative Amendments, among the many which were tabled and discussed, were accepted. The Commons had 56 Sittings in Committee and in the main House, and your Lordships' House have, as I said, had eight full Parliamentary days on this Bill. Here there have been 34 Government Amendments, and I think even now there may be some more; I will draw your Lordships' attention to something later. We tabled some 44 Amendments, and of these seven were passed on Division, nine were more or less consequential, one was accepted by the Government without dissent, and one was moved and passed by the Liberals. So we have had, during the course of Parliamentary discussion, 104 Government Amendments. Let no one suggest that legislation does not need the most careful examination.

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I am bound to say that I wonder whether even today we have got it completely tidy. I may be wrong about this, but I would direct the Government's attention to it and perhaps they may need to do something about it; at column 541 of Hansard there were some consequential Amendments, and Lord Balogh said:
"My Lords, this was discussed before, so I think we can accept it".
The noble Baroness who was on the Woolsack said:
"My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I will put …"
these consequential Amendments. Then it is said "Amendments, by leave, withdrawn". I think we have not got it completely right yet, despite all the discussions we have been having. No doubt the noble Lord will look at that.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I understand that that was just an error and a correction is being issued.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, I am delighted to hear it. It fits in perfectly with the next section of my speech. Many of our Amendments have sought to write undertakings into the Bill instead of relying on Hansard. This underpins the fact that one cannot rely merely on Hansard. Sometimes it says exactly the opposite to what is intended. I quite concede that that is an eror of the time. Perhaps we were all a little overtired and did not notice it. It also suggests that one wants the most careful attention paid to these matters. I still feel that some of the points that have been made so much of in the various stages of our debates should have been written into the Bill. I prefer to see them there, but I think we must just have to differ. However, we will watch during the next few years to make sure that all those assurances which the noble Lord and his Assistant Minister, the Under-Secretary, have given to this House and another place, are completely adhered to.
Lastly—and I do not want to keep your Lordships because there is much business to be done—I come back to something which I know that the noble Lord, Lord Balogh, does not like. It still think it is my duty to ask for a categorical assurance that pressures will not be exerted on the companies when they want to make a change in the terms or their development plans or in any progress that they
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wish to make. They should not then be told (as my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy said), "You can do this only if you agree to 51 per cent, participation." I do not believe it was a coincidence as he suggested. I think this was part of a policy which, if not approved at Ministerial level, certainly seems to be acting further down the line. I know of two cases. The noble Lord is perfectly justified in saying: "Quote them!" I believe the people who have given me this information to be entirely honourable but, quite understandably, they have to work with and live with this Bill and, for the moment, with this Government, and they do not want to roughen relationships. Therefore they say, "Terribly sorry; but we must work with this Bill and do not wish to have our names given."
But, my Lords, I heard of another case only this morning where one group had wanted to extend their drilling obligation—and noble Lords will know that when you get licences you are asked to do the drilling within a certain time. For various reasons this group was not able to keep to the timetable and asked for an extension of the drilling obligation by one year. They were told that if they did that they must agree forthwith to participation. My Lords, the case is not imaginary; it is a fact. I cannot help feeling that the noble Lord should come clean and say, "Yes we believe in participation and I am afraid that this is going on." This is what we fear is going to happen and it is what the operators think will happen, and I have quoted a specific case which came to my ears only this morning.
My Lords, I do not like this Bill, I think there were simpler ways of doing it. I think we have improved it very considerably in both Houses and I hope that, despite the general un satisfactoriness of the whole concept, the North Sea oil industry will prosper despite the machinations of this Bill and this Government.
Lord TREVELYAN: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask whether he does not agree that Hansard has a really remarkable record for accuracy?
Lord ORR-EWING: Yes, my Lords, I do.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I dare to make a few remarks

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following on the contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing? With him, I believe still in a mixed economy; but when I hear noble Lords opposite, on the Conservative Benches, speaking on this Bill, I find them so old-fashioned. They seem to me still to believe that the "golden goose" is a monopoly of capitalism. That is one thing.
I found the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, on the Liberal Benches, much more sympathetic, and his flattery and sympathy I hope will not be construed as irony and that it will be taken at its proper face value. Not only this country but the world today is in a very turbulent state economically and to say that one simply hates this Bill or that one hates nationalisation seems to me to be always falling back on what has happened in the past and to produce no idea which is fresh and new. That is really all I have to say on this Bill.
12.7 p.m.
Lord IRONSIDE: My Lords, before this Bill passes I should like to say one or two things. Having already taken part in the formation of one new corporate body some years ago, I am conscious of the difficulties with which a Minister is confronted in consulting the board and filling the senior posts. In this case we cannot best judge the issues, as the organising committee (with the exception of the Chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Kearton, and the Secretary) are to us faceless men, and we do not have the benefit of a report as to the national need which would have normally preceded the White Paper and which would give us the options so that the present public debate can take place. We have had to judge the issues very much on a political basis and we are left to wonder how this Corporation will fare.
Many noble Lords have expressed justifiable fears about the Corporation and the way it will exercise its powers and conduct its business. Experience has shown over and over again in the past that a newcomer, a latecomer, to an international capital-intensive and highly-competitive business runs very grave risks. The chances of success are at the best only fair. The difficulties of ICL competing against the dominance of IBM is one example. The investment required in British Leyland to keep up with world
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markets is another. The fight taking place at the moment by British industry for a stake in the world-wide offshore markets against dominant US contractors in a further case—and, as I have already said, the US contractors are getting their rough weather and deep sea experience in our own backyard in the North Sea. Even if BNOC is in a privileged financial position, as it obviously is, it still has to pit its wits against the best international brains and no amount of money will buy it a place alongside the "Seven Sisters".
My Lords, this Bill has been about three things: first, the plumbing of the Continental Shelf, to use a crude phrase; second, participation—and here I think that the noble Lord's Department has a definition of "participation" which is different from the Department of Industry definition when trying to agree participation in the British Leyland case; and, finally, control. There well may be overlapping issues, but I feel that certain matters such as safety and inspection should have been consolidated under a completely separate Bill.
In passing, I should like to thank the noble Lord for his undertakings to approach the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the question of the outrageous 25 per cent. VAT rating on submersibles. Clearly, the industry will be grateful for his intercession at a critical time in the development of our Continental Shelf resources. I should like to thank him also for his reassurances on the question of research. But I think that as a result of our debates it is quite clear that the Government not only wish to take the opportunity of introducing a controlling body, but also to incorporate in it instruments of nationalisation, which will gradually and relentlessly work their way into every aspect of offshore activity. For instance, it will be seen that if an owner has a pipeline to which development potential is attached, then the Secretary of State can step in to see that he does not realise this. We have received assurances that the owner will be no worse off, but development value is a matter of opinion and the clause which covers this point does not give sufficient reassurance to the industry.
One wonders what will happen to these pipelines. Eventually, presumably, they will be surrendered to the State. Perhaps

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they will become long distance sewerage outfalls of the future—who knows? But one thing is certain, the original investor will have no place in the deal. Legislation of this participatory nature is not necessary, as many noble Lords have said. The designated areas are not so tied to the economic life of the country that they must be put in a legal province of their own; for example, like the waterways of Holland.
We talk about devolution, my Lords, and if anybody is in a good position to devolve itself, it is the BNOC—the oil province of the offshore shelf—a developing territory with prospects of a budget surplus. The Secretary of State then may even have his own Assembly, if he wants it. If one looks at the position in which the BNOC is placed, I believe that the least it could do would be to invest in some of those offshore facilities which our country finds difficulty in financing, such as derrick barges, supply vessels, lay barges and other major plant. I have used the word "plant", but perhaps to be all-embracing I should say "things". These are the tools of the contracting organisations, and the tools which earn them the revenue in overseas concessions. As I said before, the BNOC will of course be in a position to attract European Investment Bank loans for offshore projects. It ought to figure in the second round of EEC projects in the hydrocarbon sector. I hope that the Government will encourage the BNOC to look at this position rapidly.
Finally, I would ask the Government to remember that the oil industry has an offshore order book worth £800 million per annum in our waters. The Government are trying to secure full and fair opportunity for British industry in competing for this business. British industry is now securing something like £400 million worth of orders per annum, which is about half the total sum. But they get this business only if the £800 million is there from the oil companies in the first place. Already we have heard that the Secretary of State is worried about the lack of oil company orders. But at the end of the day it is the engineering industry of our country which could be the real victim of oil company participation. I hope that the Government will bear this in mind.
12.14 p.m.
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, throughout this debate a number of us have been struggling to master a new technical field which is unfamiliar to us. The Amendments carried in this House have generally addressed themselves to the major issues in the Bill, and I hope I shall not be accused of being smug if I say that, on the whole, this House has shown its customary good sense in dealing with some difficult issues and very difficult technical issues.
Therefore perhaps I may begin by thanking my noble friends behind me for the contributions they have made, and particularly thanking the Peers on the Cross-Benches and Liberal Benches. We can honestly say that all parts of the House have contributed, and it would be wrong of me not to pay tribute also to the customary courtesy which has been extended to us by noble Lords on behalf of the Government, and, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Balogh, in what he calls his "regenerate days"—if I remember that correctly!
Generally speaking, the Government have said the right things but declined to commit themselves in the legislation. I was reminded in thinking about this of a premature epitaph which was written for Charles II—whom I am told I claim as an ancestor on the "wrong side of the blanket"! The epitaph said:
"Here lies our sovereign Lord the King,
Whose word no man relied on,
Who never said a foolish thing,
Nor ever did a wise one."
When he heard about this, he replied:
"My words are my own,
But my Acts are my Ministers."
That, of course, is a let-out that the noble Lord does not have, so I hope we do not have to write the same epitaph for him! This is a very major policy Bill. The fact it deals in a complicated technical area should not allow us to overlook that fact and getting right the provisions in this Bill will dictate the standard of living of this country for the next 20 years. I have said this before, and I make no apology for saying it again: it is for this reason the House rightly recognises the importance of the issues with which we are dealing.
This is the third leg of the Government's policy for dealing with North Sea

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oil. We have the Oil Taxation Act and the Offshore Petroleum Development (Scotland) Act. I think that throughout all these Bills we can see the major difference of approach between the Government and those of us on this side of the House. We prefer to use the minimum of Government interference to create a legislative environment which seeks to identify the aims of the companies with those of the Government so that the companies steer a course in the direction which we believe to be in the interests of the nation. We seek to provide suitable incentives and underpin these with long stop safety net controls. The difference of approach was well underlined by my noble friend Lord Orr-Ewing.
On the other hand, the Government prefer the route of intervention, direction, and mandatory order. I consider this is flying in the face of the record of the nationalised industries despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, was saying. I would not accept that we have a blinkered approach to these matters; but I dare say I shall not succeed in pursuading the noble Baroness—and I see that she nods her head. It seems to me those who drafted this Bill have been told to legislate for every conceivable possibility; rather than taking the minimum of powers throughout the Bill, we see the Government trying to arm themselves against every possible element of exploitation. I should like to remind the Government of a definition I often quote. I think it was Neville Shute Norway, whom I think of as an engineer although most people think of him as a novelist, and he once said:
"An engineer is a man who can do for 'five bob' what any damned fool can do for £1."
It is very easy to write in every sort and kind of stipulation. It is much more difficult to think carefully about the things that you really mean and limit yourself to them. My noble friend Lord Campbell has mentioned today that one of the results of the interventionist policy, as exemplified in the Offshore Petroleum (Scotland) Bill, has been the platform building sites at Portavadie and Hunterston, and I believe we now have the situation up there where £14 million of public money has been spent on Portavadie and there is no platform order at the present time. I am not absolutely
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sure of the facts but I believe that a comparable situation exists at Hunterston. So I would ask the Government these questions—have we any orders? How much money have we spent?
My feeling is that the Government's approach has led us to an inevitable saga of unilateral abrogation of contracts, of forced development plans, depletion controls and threats of total revocation of licences. The first sad result of this approach has been this dictatorial attitude—and I can use no other word—on the unilateral abrogation of contract. Despite the pleas of my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham of Saint Maryle-bone who pointed out to the Government the damage which they can do internationally, let alone nationally, by this course of action, the Government have persisted in their determination to change the rules in the middle of the game. They have attempted to justify this course on the dubious grounds that misdemeanours of other countries justify misdemeanours by us and they have called in aid the events which have taken place in Alberta, New Zealand and the United States. But even if those precedents would justify their actions, I think we should find that the precedents do not stand up. For example, the Alberta case is misleading because in general the licences were issued within a time limit before which the Government were not going to alter the terms of the licences; in other words, in more ordinary intelligible terms, there was a time limit on the rent lease, and after a period the rent was to be reviewed. What happened was that in all but very few cases the licence terms were changed after that time had expired. The second point, which of course follows from this, was that the companies had had an opportunity to recover a great deal of the investment they had already made before the terms of the licence were altered. I think we shall find that very few of these licences were altered before the original time had expired. I have done some researches— perhaps I should say, rather, that some researches have been done for me—and I can find no record of what the noble Lord called "other Canadian Provinces" behaving in this way.
In the case of New Zealand, again, renegotiation was in any case due to convert the licences into mining leases, and my understanding of the situation there

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is that the ultimate changes from licences into mining leases were considered by the companies to be the equivalent of arms-length commercial deals. That is not the situation we are talking about here. In the United States, as usual, the situation is a little complicated. Here again, my understanding is that the violation of a conservation regulation—I am sorry about these very long words—issued by the Secretary of State of the Interior is not of itself grounds for revocation. In extreme cases of suspension orders on conservation grounds, this is considered to be tantamount to forfeiture and gives rise to the constitutional requirement for compensation. Any of your Lordships who have been here during the Committee and Report stages of this Bill will know we have had endless arguments on the question of compensation, and the real worry is that there has been unilateral alteration of a contract without compensation. I shall mention the word, because it has not come up in this debate so far, I am glad to say; but the argument as to whether there is an element of retrospection in this kind of thing is something that we need not enter into now. Clearly, it is there, but that is not really the point.
With this unilateral alteration of the contract has gone the imposition of what we consider to be a totally unreasonable sanction. I am very sorry indeed—but let us start with the good news first and let us acknowledge that the Government have come some way towards us on this issue of partial revocation, as it is known in the industry. The Government started by saying that if you decline to do something which the Government wish you to do in one part of your licence, you are going to lose the whole thing, including a commercial field. They have seen the force of the argument that this was manifestly unreasonable. I still regret very much that they have not seen fit to accept our argument about what we call voluntary relinquishment of part of a licence. We argued this at length, both on Committee stage and Report stage. I have tried to make the issue as simple as it is, because I have a simple mind and I believe that the issue is a perfectly straightforward one.
The Government have prattled on about the unity of licences, although I have not seen any evidence in support of their
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passionate and, as I think, rather blinkered devotion to this concept of the unity of a licence. They have attempted to meet us by extracting certain fields from the threat of total revocation. This has led them invariably into the difficulty of defining exactly to what fields this kind of provision will apply. How much simpler and how much more common-sensical—if that is good English, which I doubt!—it would be to apply a policy of voluntary relinquishment. An oil company says, "You want us to develop this field. We do not think we are either able or willing to do it. We are therefore handing it back to you and you can find somebody else to develop it if you wish, or you can develop it yourselves, and the best of British luck." It seems so intelligible and so logical that I am astonished that the Government find themselves unable to accept it.
This sums up our objection to this area in the Bill and leads me on—I am sorry to go back to it once again—to the unseemly wrangle on participation. We believe this is illogical, damaging and even dishonest. The noble Lord, Lord Balogh, introduced a splendid word I had never heard before: he talked about sacro-egoismo. It has now become part of our standard exchange in this debate and, as I understood him, he was asserting that by participation the nation would be better off. He then turned to the complaints and said that the whole basis of participation is that you will be no better off and no worse off. If the nation is to be better off, where is that betterment to come from if not from a company with whom he is proposing to participate? If the noble Lord has found the philosopher's stone, I suggest to him that he is wasting his time sitting there as a Minister of State. He should be the dictator of the whole country and I think we would all back him, but I venture to doubt that he has made such a brilliant discovery. I would be very pleased indeed if he had. He has been hiding his light under a bushel for a very long time.
The Government justify their seeking for participation on the grounds of gaining control and knowledge. We believe that both these can be better done in other ways. Indeed, it seems to me implicit in the whole belt-and-braces approach of the Government that they agree with this, I too. Half the things in this Bill are

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devoted to finding other ways of obtaining control and knowledge. If they wanted an example of participation, as the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, very well knows, they already have a controlling interest in BP. Why do they not get their knowledge from the oil company's point of view by virtue of their participation—if I may call it that—in BP?
Lord BALOGH: My Lords, the noble Lord suggested that we should use BP in order to spy on other oil companies. What is the confidentiality about that? Noble Lords on the other side have been complaining that we might use BNOC and civil servants under oath for such purposes. He is now suggesting that we should use BP. Where is the logic of that?
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I do not follow the logic of the noble Lord's question. There have been worries expressed about BNOC being used—to use his words—as a vehicle for spying. I am suggesting that if the Government are anxious to have a vehicle for getting inside the oil company's view of things they have it ready made on their doorstep now. Furthermore, they have an association of oil companies, the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, which is in continuous dialogue with them about the problem of how best to exploit our resources. I simply cannot believe that this great edifice which they are building on participation is necessary.
We have been assured by bankers that one of the worst remaining problems in non-recourse financing—the off-balance-sheet loans required to develop an oilfield—is the lack of information in legally binding form which is available on participation. Far from helping to provide finance for the North Sea I am suggesting that the Government's inept handling of the participation issue has made the question of financing vastly more difficult. I invited the noble Lord before to publish details of what he is proposing and negotiating about with the companies. When we talked about this on the third day of the Committee the noble Lord said:
"It is obviously impossible to have a model participation submitted before Parliament because each case differs so much from every other case. In some large fields the situation near the shore in low water … we have small fields set in areas where torrential rains and snow such as in the North Passage …".—[Official Report, col. 876, 15/10/75.]
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All that is true but I cannot see that that particularly affects the nature of participation and the kind of negotiations which are required.
Furthermore, can the Government imagine that any public company which announced it was making a bid for another company would be allowed a year's silence before they issued the details of the kind of proposals they were making. This is absolutely incredible. The Stock Exchange would never stand for that kind of behaviour and even if it did everybody would be up in arms. Then we come back—and I have to harp on this—to the element of hypocrisy in this question of the voluntary nature of participation and negotiations. The Government say, "Where is the evidence?" Surely enough circumstantial evidence has been produced. At least it would require some kind of denial from the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Lovell-Davis, is a journalist—I am sorry he is not here at the moment—and he knows very well that if an allegation is made and is not denied it would be regarded by the public as implicit that there was some truth in the allegation. So far the Government have never attempted to refute any of these sinister coincidences which have been referred to so often in these debates and were referred to again by the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing. Indeed, when we moved the Amendment which attempted to give legal force to the noble Lord's assertion that he insists that these negotiations are voluntary, it struck me that most of the case he was arguing was devoted to justifying the use of pressure to obtain participation rather than saying that participation was indeed voluntary. The article in today's Economist is headed, "Participation go away", with a very benevolent picture of the noble Lord. I only hope that "participation go away" is what we shall find in the future.
My Lords, we believe that reasoned arguments have been put forward for the Amendments we have carried in this House. Most of these Amendments have commanded Cross-Bench and Liberal support and I hope that the Government will take note of this. I thank particularly the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran. We are not seeking to make Party debating points. We want to

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generate for this country the revenue we need so desperately to start repaying the enormous sums we are borrowing, secured by our oil. I sincerely pray that the Government will not feel that pride demands that they should reject on principle all the Amendments coming from this House. If they do, I am sure we shall all live to regret it. Instead I hope that they will show that they have listened and also understood as the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, said. I hope they will show that they have understood and perhaps even learned, and dare I use the word, I urge them to press upon their colleagues the need to show their own favourite word, flexibility.
12.39 p.m.
Lord BALOGH: My Lords, despite the strictures we have just heard may I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, and also the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, for the helpful way, especially in the latter part of our exercise, in which they expedited our business which obviously is contentious and complicated. The Government's aim in bringing in this legislation and the other two pieces of law—the Scottish legislation and that concerning petroleum tax—was designed to restore the balance between national interest and fair treatment of the oil companies. This balance was rudely disturbed in 1970–71, in the fourth and biggest round, which was undertaken in the knowledge of the wealth of the North Sea which was patent and which tilted the balance altogether against the national interest.
I must confess that I am a little astonished at the self-righteousness which has been expressed on the opposite side on this piece of legislation. It ill-behoves people who have been in Government which did nothing for two years after the PAC Report. The proposed arrangements which were announced would not have prevented any really skilled oilmen—and they are very skilled—from jumping the ring-fence and disappearing abroad with their profits. I may be very prejudiced—indeed I am, just as noble Lords opposite are—but I found nothing in the Amendments moved by the Opposition which did not act against the national interest. It would have weakened con
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troll over the technical exploitation of the fields and in this way, therefore, shortened their life and decreased the quantity of oil eventually to be recovered; and there would have been large losses of revenue by way of compensation and otherwise—unjust compensation, I may add.
I accept, of course, the very helpful suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, about tax exemption and the loophole, which was extremely helpful to us and I am sure was not inspired by some of the people who have benefited. May I also tell the noble Lord that the United Kingdom industry as a whole has not made an estimate for the number of rigs which will operate in the North Sea. It was the estimate of the company of the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan.
We have had a debate with a number of themes or set motifs. It was like a Wagnerian opera. Whenever the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, rose the Siegfried motif was heard and he said his little bit; and the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, was the Brunhilde motif. Immediately we got the appropriate wording. But today, of course, they repeated each other and both motifs were heard in a cacophonous ensemble. Co-operation is necessary because of physical possession and knowledge. Knowledge of certain kinds is not available from BP. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, will confirm that we never used BP as a guinea-pig; and far less would we want to use it as a spy for us, because the international complication which that might cause would be really overwhelming. The noble Lord said the objective could be reached by other ways. How could it be reached in an industry where there have to be self-policing arrangements. I do not know why this is such a terribly difficult concept to digest. I am sure it is my fault that I have not explained it sufficiently, although I spoke about it 50 times—or, at least, it seems to me 50 times. Again the Opposition is wishing to alter the balance which has to be reached between these very powerful companies and the national interest.
Both the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona, and the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, asked me to say whether these participation agreements are not

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helped on by certain conditions. I can only say that our special agreement negotiations are normal commercial negotiations in which all sides, obviously, use their full bargaining power. Nothing on earth would lead me to abjure that power because it has to be used in the national interest.
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: Is that what the noble Lord calls "voluntary", though, my Lords?
Lord BALOGH: Of course, my Lords. Voluntary agreements between big oil companies are also sometimes influenced by bargaining power. They are called voluntary, of course; but, as some people said, some are more voluntary than others. But it is exactly the same in the private sector. To put people in the Bosphorus with their hands tied behind them, as Turkish Sultans used to do, would not be the best way of ensuring the national interest in this matter.
I am glad to say that there is a constant pressure on us to allow outside interests to get into the North Sea at this point, and, so far as one can make out. this pressure is increasing rather than decreasing. The problem is how to safeguard the national interest even in this process. I very much agree with the hope of the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, that the relations with the industry will be smooth, friendly, frank and co-operative. I do hope so. I do not think noble Lords have ever heard me attack an oil company. I have always been high in praise both of their technical skill and, of course, of their intellectual skill in presenting their case, which I am sure has been proven by debates in this House. They are extremely good providers of home notes. But we have to be a little reciprocal.
A noble Lord referred to one of my rare appearances on the "box". The other participants were American, who said that we have been confiscating their property. I must confess that this is a misrepresentation of fact of unparalleled gravity. It cannot be said often enough that we are not nationalising. Even where the State owns almost three-quarters of the shares of a big oil company, in no way have we treated that company differently from the way in which we treat any other oil company. We have not put
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upon it any kind of pressure, although we could easily have done so.
I must apologise for the fact that, in a burst of fury, I said certain things which perhaps I did not mean. I ought to have said that the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, uses horrid innuendo, not filthy language. I withdraw that. His tirade against a nationalised industry was totally irrelevant. If electricity bills are kept low and therefore the electricity industry suffers a loss, what has that to do with OPEC, oil prices and the profits from oil? I am very puzzled about that.
I am equally puzzled by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Ironside. The noble Lord seems to want Britain to become an industrial graveyard, immense in its decay, for employment and output, yet at the same time he wants us to embark on a very costly course of research and development. I cannot stress too emphatically that it is not only a large oil production from the North Sea which is important. It may be important from the point of view of the EEC, but from the point of view of Britain what is most important is that there should be a large production of oil and a large stake in the industry. If we do not have a large stake in it, whatever we shall gain on the visible trade side we shall lose on the invisible trade side. In certain circumstances that might be up to £1,500 million to £2,000 million out of a total gain of about £4,000 million in 1980. With Cromwell, I beseech noble Lords to get away from that kind of attitude.
We are opening a new chapter in the history of the exploitation of the sea and I look forward to intensified close co-operation between the Government and the industry. Some of the Government's critics have said that our proposals have been animated by hostility to the industry. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our objective has been only to protect the national interest. The national interest demands an adequate Government "take" from and control over the industry. We have always stood firm on that principle and we invite the judgment of history on our treatment and the treatment of the previous Government of this problem.
We recognise that the national interest also means that the industry must be given an assurance that it will be treated

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reasonably so that it can continue to invest scarce resources of capital and knowledge. That is the principle of participation, and it is also the principle which we apply to this Bill. It is fair to say that no comparable piece of legislation has ever been so fully discussed with the industry that is affected by it. We are proud of the fact that a number of Government Amendments are to a very large extent the outcome of consultations with the industry in the hope that we shall gain the maximum benefit for the country as a whole.
I shall not weary your Lordships further. I am sure that we shall all meet again at Philippi when the Bill comes back from the House of Commons. Therefore, I shall reserve my more florid passages for that occasion. To sum up, the Bill is immensely important. It fills important gaps in our control over and ability to benefit from the North Sea operation. It opens a new chapter in the history of the North Sea. I invite the industry to work with us in making the new arrangements that are contained in the Bill work to our common advantage, and I invite the House to open a new chapter by passing the Bill.
On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT 1965 (CONTINUATION) ORDER 1975
12.56 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS rose to move, That the draft Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1975, laid before the House on 13th October, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1975, a draft of which was laid before this House on 13th October 1975, be approved. The effect of the Order is to continue in force for a further year Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which gives Her Majesty in Council power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia brought about by the unilateral declaration of independence. The Orders in Council which impose sanctions in Rhodesia are made under Section 2.
This debate traditionally gives us an I opportunity to survey political and economic developments in general in and around Rhodesia. When I introduced this same Motion in the House last year, there was a widely shared feeling among your Lordships—I certainly shared in it—that we had seen momentous and radical changes and that there might well be more to come. Certainly,1975 has been an eventful year for Rhodesia, but it has also been a disappointingly inconclusive one. It may be helpful, therefore, if at this point in my speech I describe briefly some of the more important events of the year and go on to suggest some reasons why more positive progress has still not been achieved in the search for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesia question.
Even before the end of 1974, events were taking a new and dramatic turn. Rhodesians of all creeds, colours and races heard with some surprise, as well as hope, Mr. Ian Smith announce on 11th December that there was to be a ceasefire in the guerrilla war, that the African leaders and their followers were to be released from detention and allowed to take part in political activities, and that constitutional talks would take place—and I quote him— "without pre-conditions".
It was learned at the same time that Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, had already been released from the detention without trial in which they had been held since before UDI—detention without trial for nine or 10 years—that they had been attending talks in Lusaka with the Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia and the future President of Mozambique, and that they had merged their organisations, together with the smaller FROLIZI group, in a new African National Council under the Presidency of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. For the first time in many years, therefore, African Nationalists in Rhodesia had formed a united front; Mr. Smith had acknowledged their position as leaders and spokesmen, a status he had always been reluctant to concede them in the past; and a peaceful settlement appeared to all of us to be a real prospect.
Then there were setbacks. Almost immediately, differences arose over the

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interpretation of the so-called Lusaka agreement, an agreement which had not, unfortunately, been reduced to writing. Guerrilla activity went on, if at a somewhat reduced level, and only 100 or so detainees, out of a total of some 400 were, in fact, released. Difficulties were put in the way of African political meetings. This was the developing background against which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs visited Southern Africa in January of this year.
He returned from his fortnight of talks with African leaders convinced that, although there was a better chance of achieving a peaceful settlement than for many years, there was still a long way to go. But, as he said at the time, his visit at least succeeded in achieving a convergence of policy between Britain and the African Governments most closely concerned—I stress the plural "Governments". They include, with great respect and admiration, the part played over the past few months by the Prime Minister of the South African Republic.
Although inconclusive meetings on procedural matters had taken place, there had been no discussion of matters of substance between the régime and the enlarged ANC when the news broke on 4th March that the Reverend N. Sithole had been redetained. At this point the ANC refused to take part in any further talks and demanded Mr. Sithoie's release. Mr. Sithole was, in fact, released again in April to attend a meeting of OAU ministers in Dar-es-Salaam, but only on the understanding that he would be rearrested if he attempted to return to Rhodesia.
Nevertheless, neither the OAU Ministers nor the Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in Kingston in May despaired of the possibility of reaching a settlement by negotiation, rather than through violent means. And my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs visited first Pretoria and then Salisbury at the end of June to assess the situation. He returned—to quote his own words—"encouraged by the sense of urgency to find a peaceful way forward"—a sense of urgency which he had gathered from his visits to Pretoria and other capitals, although he warned that
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"real difficulties" remained. That visit was followed in early August by an invitation to Bishop Muzorewa to visit London as the guest of Her Majesty's Government in order to discuss ways of getting talks started again.
Again, it seemed possible to hope that progress might be resumed for it was announced, after Bishop Muzorewa had returned to Zambia from London and after talks had taken place between Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Smith in Pretoria, that the parties were to meet at the Victoria Falls Bridge on 25th August. Not the least remarkable feature of that meeting was that, for the first time, Mr. Smith and the united leadership of the ANC—including the exiled Mr. Sithole and Mr. Chikerema—faced each other across the negotiating table. Yet in spite of a large measure of agreement on procedure for the next steps in negotiation, there arose an impasse over Mr. Smith's refusal to grant immunity from arrest for the exiled ANC leaders to return to Rhodesia for talks. And before any effective steps could be undertaken to surmount this difficulty, a rift became apparent in the leadership of the ANC which has unfortunately since deepened.
My Lords, I have spent some time on this recital of events, because I believe it illustrates clearly some important themes which I should now like to suggest for your Lordships' attention. First we can see vividly that there is a strong sense among Rhodesia's neighbours that the people of Rhodesia must be helped and encouraged to find a solution which has evaded them for 10 years since the illegal Declaration of Independence in 1965. Rhodesia stands at the crossroads of Central Africa, without access to the sea. She cannot stand alone; her neighbours equally cannot comfortably co-exist with the glaring political anomaly which Rhodesia now constitutes. Time and again in the last year the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, and the Government of the South African Republic, through their Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, have exercised a helpful influence and have made unstinted use of their good offices in order to promote a just and peaceful outcome in Rhodesia. This is a trend which Her Majesty's Government unreservedly welcome. It is, in a way, a new element in this continuing and

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tragic situation, the emergence of a consensus confined to what we call "Black Africa" about the need for a peaceful solution, and a very large degree of agreement as to how it should be brought about.
Secondly, it is clear that these helpful and constructive moves by neighbouring countries have not met with the response they deserve from Mr. Smith and his supporters. Great opportunities have been missed, not least at the Victoria Falls talks. There may not be many more of these opportunities—opportunities for a negotiated peaceful solution, fair and secure for all the elements of Rhodesia. It is, however, encouraging that as these setbacks occur a persistent hope emerges. It is encouraging that the communiqué issued following Mr. Smith's meeting with Prime Minister Vorster on 20th October should state that:
"Both Prime Ministers have agreed that genuine attempts should be made to pursue policies leading to peace in southern Africa".
Finally, no one who has the future of Rhodesia at heart can fail to have been saddened and disappointed by the disunity which has once again become apparent in the Rhodesian African Nationalist movement. The influence of that movement would have been immeasurably greater today had they maintained and strengthened the unity which they established in Lusaka last December. Let us hope that it is not too late for them to rediscover that unity and to advance together, not in the unity of violence, but in unity towards a settlement by negotiation for a peaceful and secure future for their common country.
Throughout the last year, Her Majesty's Government have actively demonstrated their support for the efforts of the Governments of Southern Africa to promote such a settlement. They have done so by Ministerial visits to Salisbury and, indeed, to every capital in the region; by diplomatic activity; by frequent meetings with leading political figures from the region in London, at the United Nations and at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Kingston. We remain ready to discharge our historic and, indeed, constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia and to convene a constitutional conference when the time is right. I believe my right honourable friend has
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taken the occasion in another place to repeat this fundamental point in our policy and programme. Our aim throughout has been to urge all those concerned in the events of the past years not to despair of peace, whatever the setbacks and the disappointments.
I think we can claim some modest success for our own endeavours, and I should like to pay tribute to Members in all parts of the House who, by speech and action, have themselves contributed to the possibility of this country continuing with its contribution in creating, so far as we can, a climate of negotiation and of settlement by peaceful means. What is undeniable is that the door is not yet closed. It might close, but it is not yet closed. The international community has not yet committed itself to force as the only means of bringing Rhodesia to majority rule.
My Lords, this is a position which the Government will continue to defend with all the means at their disposal. The maintenance of sanctions is a necessary and important element in defending that position. Why should this be so? In the first place, there can be little doubt that the effects of mandatory sanctions, together with those of the international recession, transport difficulties, and the increasing burden of defence expenditure upon the Rhodesian illegal régime, must have contributed significantly to bringing Mr. Smith and his associates as near as they have come to substantive negotiation with the nationalist leaders.
Of course, the international recession has played its part—this is a fact of life. But so, I believe, has the evidence of a new seriousness, a new sense of urgency demonstrated by the international community in the enforcement of United Nations sanctions. Practical co-operation and exchanges of information on sanctions enforcement have developed increasingly between our officials and those of our fellow members of the Community. Japan has introduced new documentary requirements, and has made it an offence for her firms to trade with Rhodesia via third countries. Of course, there have been setbacks, particularly the failure, by a relatively small majority, of the opponents of the Byrd Amendment, to carry a repeal Bill through the House of Representatives,

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but that setback carries with it an assurance by the American Administration that they wish to see such a repeal Bill go through. The general trend is unmistakable, and this is emphatically not the moment for Britain to stand aside, to cut herself off from what is a very real international consensus about sanctions in relation to Rhodesia.
My Lords, a still more important consideration here is that any sign of a slackening of the effort on sanctions enforcement on our part, or on the part of other developed countries, is almost certainly going to be seen by the Third World as a final admission that attempts to find a solution by peaceful means have failed, and that the only way open for them is a war of liberation—as they would call it—in Rhodesia, with all that that entails, not only in human suffering and misery in Rhodesia itself, but also in the horrifying implications of something like a Continental holocaust which it would open up. Is that really what any of us wants? I very confidently reply that no one in this House, no one in this country, wants that.
Yet we may possibly, by procedural action today—which I very much hope will not happen—strengthen the very forces with whom we are trying to negotiate into a moderate position, and weaken the very forces which at the moment are taking a moderate position in Rhodesia. Let us think very carefully indeed before we do or say anything that encourages such a conclusion, especially on the part of Rhodesia's African neighbours.
My Lords, I think the House has heard me a sufficient number of times to know that I, like Her Majesty's Government, deeply believe in a future for Rhodesia which is fair and hopeful, and which is constructive for all its people. It is in no spirit of vindictiveness or animosity against Rhodesia or the white Rhodesians that successive Governments, Conservative and Labour, have maintained sanctions at the behest of the international authority since 1965. It is certainly not in any spirit of animosity or vindictiveness that I commend this Order to your Lordships today. Each year, every one of us must hope that this is the last time we shall have to re-adopt these measures. But by maintaining them
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this year, we shall be helping, not hindering, those concerned in Rhodesia and outside who have not yet abandoned the search for a negotiated settlement, and who realise that to seek a solution by military means would have disastrous consequences. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1975, laid before the House on 13th October, be approved.—(Lord Goronwy-Roberts)
1.17 p.m.
Lord COLERAINE: My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for whom I, like everyone else in the House, have the greatest respect and for whom, if he will allow me to say so, I have a great liking as well, has once again been put up to defend the indefensible. I do not deny that the noble Lord deployed his argument with great moderation and great skill. As he spoke, I could not help wishing that the same moderation and understanding had been shown on both sides of the House 10 years ago. I do not know how many noble Lords who are here this afternoon were here in the small hours of the morning on 16th November 1965, when this Bill was passed. But however many may be here, I think they must agree with me that every prediction upon which that Bill was passed and became an Act has been falsified by the event. If any of us late that night had thought that we would be debating again the stale and unprofitable Order 10 years later, he would not have supported the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965.
My Lords, the whole basis of the policy of Her Majesty's then Government, and the whole basis of the support given to it by the Opposition, was that there would be a short, sharp, decisive frontal attack upon an illegal régime, with the result that within a period of months, the régime would be brought back to legality. As we know, none of that has happened. I listened to the speech of the noble Lord with the closest attention, and I was delighted to find that nearly all the slogans and the shibboleths of 10 years ago had been abandoned. There were no demands for the return to legality. There were no promises that sanctions would immediately be effective. There were no appeals to that meaningless abstraction, the conscience of mankind, even though I think

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the noble Lord came fairly near it when he talked about the international consensus and how important it was that we should not detach ourselves from it. Whether or not we should detach ourselves from the international consensus seems to me to depend on one thing only; that is, whether the international consensus is right or whether it is wrong. I wish that I could be sure, for my own part, that it is right.
The noble Lord said that from 1965, at the instance of the United Nations, we had imposed these sanctions. I think he was wrong in that; it was only after 1965 that we went to the United Nations and asked for mandatory sanctions, but that is a matter of detail. But I do not see how any of us can seriously claim that the United Nations, especially in the context of Southern Rhodesia, has represented the conscience of mankind or any other kind of conscience whatever. It really has represented the determination of those nations, which used to be called underprivileged—and then under-developed and now, I think, developing—which I am beginning to think are over-privileged, to bring down the supremacy of the white peoples in Africa and indeed in other parts of the world.
This is a digression, but I can claim to be—at any rate to have been—a very junior partner in the firm of architects which designed the United Nations, and certainly we did not design it for the kind of purposes for which it has been used in recent years. At that time at the San Francisco Conference there were, I think, 37 Member-States of the United Nations. Today there are 142, and each one of those is supposed to be the equal of any of the others in political experience, political wisdom, disinterestedness and everything else, and that surely is a sham. In particular, when one looks back on this sad story the fact that the United Nations imposed these mandatory sanctions without giving the accused even the opportunity of speaking in their own defence is sufficient denial of any hypothesis that the United Nations as constituted today represents in any sense the conscience of mankind.
I agree with the noble Lord; we are now faced with a new position. There is a possibility of a settlement and that
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is really the objective on which each one of us must set his eyes. It is now not a question of restoring legality. It is now not a question, I believe, despite what the noble Lord said, of expediting majority rule. How can anyone, particularly anyone as intelligent and understanding as the noble Lord, believe, after these new divisions in the ANC, which are obviously tremendously deeply-rooted, that majority rule would mean anything other than intense tribal warfare? The reason we want a settlement now is to preserve in Central and Southern Africa—if it is at all possible—a plateau of sanity in a continent which is visibly disintegrating into anarchy and which will proceed from anarchy to something far worse unless we get an agreement.
I have no doubt that what has happened with the oil States has affected the opinion of many of us on the whole of this African question. Certainly it has affected my opinion. I have come to the conclusion that unless we get a settlement we shall be faced not only with a problem in the Gulf States over oil, but possibly in the whole of Africa over raw materials vital to the economy of the West. We have simply got to get a settlement. Clearly, opinions must now differ on the value of sanctions in this respect. The noble Lord says that they are beginning to have an effect. Every speaker from the Government Bench, whether Labour or Conservative, has said that for the last nine years. Perhaps there is more in it this time; I do not know. The noble Lord said, after outlining the history of the past year and the disappointments which we have experienccd, that one of the obstacles was (I forget his exact words') the withdrawal of the white Rhodesian Government from the negotiations. I wonder—this is a point I have made before and I believe it is still valid—whether the best way to have successful negotiations is to have them when one of the parties is under duress. I am not at all certain and, indeed, if the decision were mine I would lift sanctions now in the belief that that would facilitate a settlement and not make one more difficult.
1.29 p.m.
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY: My Lords, it is not with very much pleasure that one rises again in what may be termed the annual fixture against the

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Eleven of the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, and well represented they are today. We have all said so many of these things before that there does not appear to be much chance that we are likely to persuade each other, and for that reason I shall not detain your Lordships for very long. The position of my Party—noble Lords on these Benches and myself—is indeed well known.
I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for the extremely interesting and succinct account of recent developments in Rhodesia. It is valuable to have it in this form on the Record. To the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, I would say that whatever you think of the United Nations—and its defects at the moment are grievous, have been grievous in the past, and will continue to be so—this subject is an obvious example of how good the United Nations has been in doing something which most of its founders hoped it would do; that is, putting very steady pressure over a long period of time on a régime, which in its disregard of human rights can only be called evil, to mend its ways and to change.
Lord COLERAINE: My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to intervene? I do not want to be unduly tendentious, but why is it a sign of merit in the United Nations to single out Southern Rhodesia for its disregard of human rights, and ignore far greater disregard of human rights all over the African Continent?
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY: My Lords, there is a very great disregard, but Rhodesia is in a peculiar position. Rhodesia is in a situation where Britain, as a member of the United Nations, is the nation responsible for the rights of those people in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian Government rebelled against the Crown, and Britain, as a member of the United Nations, asked for the help of all the nations in the world to assist it in discharging its duties to the enormous majority of citizens of Rhodesia for whom it was responsible. This is not on a par with any other situation, many of which I deplore just as much as the noble Lord, Lord Colerain. This case is a good example, and I think we are seeing progress.
I was not here in your Lordships' House when we first started these debates
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10 years ago; I came about two years later. But until last year I certainly was never at any time optimistic that there would be a speedy solution. I do not say that I do not think there could have been a speedy solution at the start—I think there could have been—but soon after that it became apparent that the situation would last for a long time. It is only recently—in fact, at the time of the debate last year on this same subject when we first saw the situation coming under the pressure of the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial empire—that it became clear that the situation had changed and was moving very much against Mr. Smith and the white régime. This is even more true today.
The pressure from all over the Continent, as from all over the world, is gradually increasing. Economic difficulties, which are difficulties for all of us, are becoming even more pronounced for Rhodesia. Mr. Smith is not now able to get on, or to maintain solidarity, with Mr. Vorster. Even within Mr. Smith's own Party, as we read in our papers this morning, there are considerable rumblings and discontent. I should like to go on record as saying that I do not think that this problem will be solved in a year, or even two years. I can see, with gloom and despondency, that we may still be discussing this Order again in three, four or five years' time. But I do say that the tide has turned, and that this is certainly no moment to ease up on our pressures. What we are trying to do, and what we are doing—no matter where else in Africa or elsewhere in the world human rights are abused—is to make certain that we have no responsibility for their being abused in Rhodesia, and that the enormous majority of citizens of Rhodesia, for whom we in this Legislature are all responsible, get justice and freedom.
1.35 p.m.
Lord GRIDLEY: My Lords, I am sure I shall be echoing the feelings of most of your Lordships in saying that none of us is really enamoured of our position in having to continue sanctions. But it is right for those who were in your Lordships' House 10 years ago, some of whom came from Rhodesia, and who stated that the imposition of sanctions would stiffen the Rhodesian Government

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in their hostility to independence, to call attention to the fact that they have been proved right. Again, those noble Lords who opposed sanctions on the grounds that perhaps the timing of independence was wrong, could argue with some justification that when civil war broke out in Nigeria, and when the difficulties arose in Uganda under General Amin, have demonstrated all too clearly that British policy in regard to the bestowal of independence has not always been right at a certain time, and in some cases has probably been premature. I am prepared to concede all that, and that it is regrettable that in individual cases Africans should suffer, because we have had responsibility for Africans and that responsibility still exists. But our decolonisation has undoubtedly been a success in other parts of the world, and compares favourably with what occurred in the Belgian Congo and in some of the territories of metropolitan France.
I now turn to the problem of Rhodesia. To me it is a white settler problem. In my opinion—and I have said this before in other debates in your Lordships'House—if we can settle this white settler problem the solution to the Rhodesian dispute cannot be very far away. But how can the whites, vastly outnumbered by coloureds, be made to feel secure with a coloured Government in control? Mr. Vorster has been mentioned by other noble Lords who have preceded me. I believe that Mr. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, sees this problem in that light and is endeavouring to seek a solution to the issue.
If Press reports are accurate, then in my opinion Mr. Smith would appear to be unhelpful over this issue. I am now beginning to believe that this can be said to have applied to the unhelpful manner in which he acted towards Mr. Vorster's efforts at the Victoria Falls Conference. If that transpired on that occasion, are we to be completely certain that it did not occur at an earlier stage when attempts were made to reach a Rhodesian settlement? It may be rather unpopular for me to say this from this side of the House, but I would suggest that he was probably difficult to deal with when our present Prime Minister endeavoured to seek a solution many years ago. What are we really seeking for when we give
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independence to all those territories for which we had responsibility? I suggest that what we seek to achieve for all of them is freedom with responsibility.
I must refer to an event which occurred in this country today. In view of the words which I intend to use, I should say that I have endeavoured to make contact with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark but have been unable to do so. I wonder what the people of Rhodesia will say when they read in their newspapers, as they will and as will others overseas, that the Bishop of Southwark published in an article in the Communist Morning Star this morning, that a Communist Government established in Britain would clear up the worst features of our society overnight? I think I know what the reaction in Rhodesia will be. It is that Britain has taken leave of its senses and is no longer fit to propound any of its policies anywhere in the world. I invite the right reverend Prelate to come back with me a few years, to the time when my friends had their heads blown off when we were facing a Communist insurrection in Malaya; and even earlier than that, to the Fascist Japanese war machine that had taken over large tracts of that territory when they established all the apparatus of a Gestapo State. Is that what we really want for this country? I suggest that this sort of behaviour here at home makes a solution of our problems and of the Rhodesia problem more difficult for the Government. So, in a period of unbridled difficulty for us at home, I come down solidly this afternoon on the side of the continuance of sanctions. We expect others for whom we are responsible to exercise freedom with responsibility. Let us do so ourselves.
1.42 p.m.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: My Lords, I must first declare an interest in the subject under discussion. The noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, referred to the origins from which sanctions first came to be imposed, but he did not mention, nor did the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, that it was necessary, in order to get the assistance of the United Nations machine, to create a purely spurious argument to ensure that the United Nations would impose sanctions, and that was that Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace. The only threat to peace that we can see

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after the 10 years since that statement was made is that there are a number of countries which appear to be threatening to attack Rhodesia. If one pursues this argument to its logical conclusion, then if one is weak and threatened by the strong one has no right to defend oneself.
If I understood the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, correctly, he was saying—and I know that all noble Lords agreed with him—that it would be a disaster if, as a result of failing to achieve a settlement in Rhodesia, there was an appalling holocaust on the Continent of Africa. But it seems to me that if we carry our desire to get a settlement too far, we are in danger of falling back in the same error that we were when we originally asked the United Nations to impose sanctions. I can see no reason for supposing that at any time Rhodesia would be a threat in an aggressive sense to any of its neighbours. So far as I can see, no results have been achieved as a result of 10 years of sanctions. As has been pointed out, many people have suffered, not only in Rhodesia but among the peoples of its neighbours. Indeed, the people of this country have suffered, for not only have we suffered a decline in our trade with Rhodesia at a time when we could ill-afford it, but—as I understood from what the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, said in a debate on this matter in June—we as taxpayers will be asked to subsidise Mozambique if it agrees to intensify sanctions against Rhodesia. Thus I ask: who has gained from this unhappy story?
As we know, behind the original reason of trying to ensure that Rhodesia returned to the sovereignty of this country, there was also a desire in all parts to ensure that the Africans in Rhodesia were properly looked after and that their interests were protected, and it was also thought desirable to increase as rapidly as possible their political representation. For these reasons, the Five Principles were evolved on which negotiations have, before now, fallen by the way through failure to measure up to requirements. Up to three years ago they formed as I understand it, the criterion on which a settlement rested. I asked Her Majesty's Government whether this still holds good or whether other considerations have arisen which go further than those Five Principles originally demanded. I ask
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this because there have been rumours—I put it no higher than rumours—that, additionally, Her Majesty's Government seek at this time a more general acceptance of the settlement from a greater number of people in Rhodesia than would have been so, say, at the time of the Pearce Commission's visit. Secondly, I ask whether Her Majesty's Government would now require, for a settlement to be acceptable, that the arrangements should provide for almost immediate majority rule. If this second condition applied, I believe that it would almost certainly mean tribal warfare, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Coleraine, in view of the grass-roots of the two branches of the ANC, and, in the light of what has happened in other countries in Africa, to some form of totalitarian government. It would not be in the democratic sense in which we refer here to majority rule, but in the sense that someone who has been thrown up as a result of that would be given totalitarian powers.
At the same time, we must accept that Her Majesty's Government have very limited influence in Africa at the present time. They may be able to help. I hope they will continue their efforts, as the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, said to secure agreement or at least to get the parties together, but it seems that the matter we are discussing today is almost the only one on which we have any direct part to play, and that is whether or not sanctions continue. If a settlement, as seems likely, is reached in Africa and it meets the requirements which Her Majesty's Government have laid down, would they accept it and would that mean that they would thereupon agree to Rhodesian independence? If so, would Her Majesty's Government be prepared to go to the United Nations to seek the ending of sanctions?
It may, however, be too optimistic to be talking about a possible settlement now. There have been other negotiations before and they have not succeeded. The reasons are many, one being that the ANC negotiators have not been able to speak with the support of the representatives who sent them. As one further example, I quote from a statement made by Mr. Smith in Rhodesia on 19th June 1974, when he spoke of the negotiations

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he had had with Bishop Muzorewa. He said:
"On this basis, and in order to bring the matter to a conclusion, I agreed to the Bishop's request for an advance of six seats. The ANC Leader expressed his appreciation and said it was not often that a negotiator in his position ended up getting exactly what he had asked for."
But of course it came to nothing, because the Bishop's supporters refused to endorse it. This seems to me to be one of the problems we face in dealing with the African negotiators. It is very difficult for them to carry their extremists, who have other objects in view, with them.
I should like to illustrate this by mentioning the publicised aims of ZANU, and I shall quote in this context the judgment of the Rhodesian Court of 3rd March this year, when hearing the appeal of the Reverend Sithole against his continued detention. Referring to two ZANU publications, the judgment said:
"All these documents proclaim that Zanu is a 'Marxist-Leninist organisation'. No attempt is made to conecal this. In Zanu's official political programme, at page 29, it is stated that:
'A truly socialist, self-supporting economy will be established and organised on broad principles enunciated by Marxism-Leninism'
and in its political programme, on page 39, Zanu states:
'Zanu is committed to achieving national independence through the armed struggle. It disapproves of the policy of collaboration with the white racist states in Southern Africa advocated by the Republic of Malawi. While Zanu appreciates the motives and reasons behind the signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto, it completely rejects its approach to the problem and reaffirms its belief in the armed struggle'."
There appears to be no doubt that this was the view of Mr. Sithole, because during the trial his counsel, Mr. Maisels said that the Reverend Sithole did not wish to defend himself against Part B, as it was common cause. Nor did he wish to contest documents that were attributed to him personally. Part B refers to charges of incitement of terrorists to kill. It seems to me that in talking about achieving a settlement, as long as this is the view held by one of the principal parties to the negotiations, it will be extremely difficult to get any reasonable agreement between the parties concerned. If ZANU get their way, it is clear what they would like to see happen in Rhodesia.
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Of course, there are other alternatives and I should like to make one suggestion as to a possible basis for negotiation. It has always seemed to me that the basis on which the 1961 Constitution was founded was very reasonable and sensible and, had the Africans not boycotted it, it might by now have taken them a long way along the road to majority rule. It had the great merit that it was non-racial, though it had a limited franchise as a basis. It was the same for all people—black, white, coloured, Indian and so on—and, to ensure that those who did not qualify were represented, it gave a guaranteed representation in the form of a B roll to the others. It does not seem to me that it would be unreasonable to modify the basis of the electorate, perhaps widening the basis by lowering the standards. The economic side could be treated rather differently and possibly more representation could be given than existed under the old B roll to those voters who were not qualified for the A roll.
All this seems to me to be a step in the right direction towards achieving a settlement which would be fair to everyone and which would also provide for the requirement of unimpeded progress to majority rule. I believe it also has the advantage that it has already been accepted as a principle by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Rhodesia. I do not for a moment suggest that we should go back to the 1961 Constitution; one does not do that. All I would ask is whether there is a basis for trying to find a solution with that kind of background.
I shall conclude by saying that it seems futile to allow the present impasse to continue. No one has gained by it so far, and a large number of people have suffered from it. So while it appears inevitable that sanctions will be renewed for yet another year, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, when he says that he hopes that a genuine attempt will be made in the near future to break the deadlock.
Lord BARNBY: My Lords, this Order—a mournful sequence of a sterile list—will doubtless receive assent. So much has been said over the years on the objections to sanctions that anybody who speaks must find it difficult to avoid repetition. Silence might well be best

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today, but it so happens that I feel very strongly on this subject, as do many others, and, like others, I could not suppress the desire to participate. The Minister has given, in his customary lucid and audible manner, a good and wide-ranging account of recent events. I should like to pay tribute at this point to his approachability and his readiness to listen on many matters, particularly Rhodesia. We thank him for that lucid survey, the Report of which I shall read with great interest and profit.
There are two points on which I cannot help commenting. First, the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, referred to the ANC, which is, of course, pivotal in this situation as being an enlarged body. One might have thought that it would be a very heavily disrupted body in the disarray in which it now finds itself. Indeed, it is hard to see that it can any longer be regarded as a body representative of African opinion, with which to negotiate. The noble Lord said that there had been great changes in Africa. Indeed, there are changes. Surely, in Uganda, Angola and Mozambique, events have happened which all considerably modify the situation which existed in the early days when this Order was first brought in. I also add the diminished status of the OAU, because of its present leadership, the world recession, and the worldwide expansion of Communist influence—all situations which have changed a good deal during the past year.
Regardless of this disorder in Africa the Government persist with this Order. It is disadvantageous to the Africans who are the biggest sufferers. Fancy throwing away £20 million a year, which is available if wanted for increased African expenditure. That seems an unwise rejection. But are the Africans better off in other States in Africa which are no longer constitutional? By that I mean the standard of education. Are they better off in Uganda under a mad dictator? Are they better off in Mozambique under Marxist rule? Are they better off in Angola with a bloody civil war?
The noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, referred to the original Order, and let us remember, that that was brought in because, under Article 6 of the Charter, Rhodesia was said to be a danger to the peace. In the event, over all
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these years there has been complete internal law and order and the only disorder has come from external forces. I cannot help interjecting a few reflections here. I was born in the Victorian era when the strength of Britain contributed a great deal to the maintenance of world: peace. The Union Jack was respected over the five Continents. I deplore the change taking place, with the progressive, lessening of the influence of Britain from continual erosion of an extreme liberal I thinking.
Surely it was by British leadership, I sophistication and finance that, in my lifetime, Rhodesia has been raised from savagery to a significantly industrialised country, very different from the majority of other countries in Africa which have rejected constitutional government and now are under one-man government, or military dictatorship. I opposed sanctions at the beginning, because from experience of economic warfare in two World Wars in Government service I was satisfied that they could not succeed. Like others who held that view, it has been proved in the experience. I have already said that the ANC is no longer representative, whatever it may have been at one I time. It is now admitted everywhere that the high volume of finance needed to conduct the agitations, the terrorism, and so on is coming from external sources, and that must be Communist sources.
At this point, I want to revert to the Minister's original review of recent events, including the position of the ANC, and the so-called Lusaka agreement. I was in Rhodesia in January, shortly after that, and it was available from responsible authority that the Rhodesian representatives were not authorised to sign any agreement; and, indeed, as the noble Lord said, none was signed. But there were expressions of hopes, and among things was a simultaneous release of detainees and a cessation of terrorism. The release of detainees was to be conditional upon an immediate cessation of terrorism. Of course, the detainees were released in part; I suppose that we are doing the same thing where there are people detained without trial in Northern Ireland. The detainees were released in part, but the terrorism was not stopped. I remember going to a place about 80 miles from Salisbury where one of the District Representatives reported how two

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members of the South African police force—not military, of course—had been shot during the previous week. He also explained where bombs had been planted in the roads. In short, the cessation of terrorism had not been respected.
Intimidation is inherent in African thought and action, and confidence is not respected. In the main, the African does not seem to be ready for Western constitutional rule. Certainly, the talent does not exist in Rhodesia, where there are black Members of Parliament and where black Members in junior positions in Government have been tried in the past. It seems that, whether it be the picture of Uganda, or Angola, or of Mozambique, where white rule is suddenly withdrawn disorder follows and in Rhodesia the Matabele would be at the throats of the Mashona. The Minister mentioned the names Nkomo and Sithole. One is a Matabele and the other is a Mashona. Of course there will be disarray in the ANC body.
I now come to the charade of the OAU and its fictional status. One recognises, of course, that trading relations with the rest of Africa are important; yet it is not unreasonable to consider policy. In another place in June 1972, it was represented by an authoritative personality that possibly we should go to the United Nations and say, "We have done our part; others have not done theirs, and we are packing it up. "I doubt not that that would be unpalatable to the present Government, but it should be possible. Surely it is ridiculous to continue to describe the Rhodesian Government as an illegal Government. It was constitutionally elected. Most of the other Governments in Africa which were started off on constitutional lines have rejected constitutionalism. We find that in India Mrs. Ghandi has flouted the law officers and has constituted herself the Government, which must therefore be an illegal Government. At home, we are talking of devolution. That would weaken England.
I suggest a new tack. Leave Rhodesia to manage her own affairs, dismiss the past responsibility and, instead of boycott, make some substitute in the way of mutual presence. I welcome the emphasis put by the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, on the fact that, above all, there should be an avoidance of the use of
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force. I record my opposition to this Order.
2.13 p.m.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FER-RARD: My Lords, I was one of those people in this House 10 years ago—I think the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, mentioned it—when we had a very long debate regarding the question of the I United Nations' sanctions on Rhodesia. I know that one docs not like saying, "I told you so", but always since that time 10 years ago I have absolutely deplored the impositions of sanctions, and I have always spoken out against them. Sanctions have never succeeded anywhere in the world. We applied sanctions against Mussolini over Abyssinia—quite rightly, I think—but they did no good to achieve their purpose. The only thing I was wrong about that day was when I said that it would bring about Mr. Wilson's downfall, because I likened him to Robespierre and said that he would fall by his own act in going to the United Nations and putting into action what I considered—and I have asked many international lawyers—was, from its imposition, legally suspect. No good can come of anything that is legally suspect.
I was rather interested to hear what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts. I forgot his exact words now, but he was rather of the opinion, I think—and I quite agree—that it would be politically embarrassing for Her Majesty's Government if they were to go to the United Nations to suggest that sanctions were taken off and it would make the white Rhodesians more intractable. I do not agree with the Minister in that view. It might make those who are very politically right more intractable, but the Rhodesians who I know feel that if sanctions were taken off it would create a lot of good will. In my opinion, therefore, from what they tell me the majority would be far more tractable to some solution.
My Lords, this is the eleventh year in which we are being asked to continue this Order. Your Lordships cannot say that sanctions have succeeded. I have always been told that the art of politics is the art of the possible and the practicable. I think they have failed economically, too, apart from failing to do

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what they were meant to do; that is, to make the Rhodesian Government do a more hasty switch into African rule than they considered wise. I think they have failed economically, because they have made Rhodesia become a far more self-supporting country. During the last debate I quoted figures on this subject. I do not have the figures for 1974, but according to the figures which I had for 1973 Rhodesia's balance of payments surplus had increased. She had a favourable balance of payments, I was told, of £23 million in 1973. I do not know her balance of payments figure for 1974. But provided that those figures are correct—and I have no reason to doubt them—sanctions can be said to have failed economically, at least up till 1973.
My Lords, in the early 1960s we had Mr. Macmillan with his "wind of change" in Africa. I think that was rather a rash statement, because out of the wind of change what has emerged? We have had the most ghastly holocaust, the most ghastly bloodshed, the most ghastly tortures. I do not agree at all with what the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, said. When one noble Lord—I cannot remember who it was—asked, "Why do we attack Rhodesia, why put sanctions on Rhodesia, because compared to many of the other African countries she is a model of tolerance", the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, replied, "Ah! but it was our responsibility. "Of course it was, but so was Zanzibar.
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY: My Lords, I said that it is our responsibility legally, not "it was".
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: So was Zanzibar, and within 24 hours of our giving independence to Zanzibar what happened? There were tortures. Arabs there had their hands cut off. There were 2,000 people murdered in two or three days. That was our responsibility. What did we do about it? Nothing. Why? I have a very good idea why. We know why. It was because it was done by the extreme Left. It was done by Communism, that is why.
Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY: My Lords, I really must intervene, if the noble Viscount will allow it. It was not our responsibility, because he has just said that that is what happened several
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days after Independence. It then became the responsibility of the Zanzibar Government, to whom we had legally handed over. We have never legally handed over responsibility for Rhodesia. The position is entirely and utterly different.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, it was irresponsible of us to hand it over so quickly; that comes to the same thing in practice. I do not want to go on too long in this vein, but I should like to say that we have had the wind of change now for ten years and that we ought to try for a new approach. Cannot we have—I do not know what to call it—a new involvement, a new method of approach to the whole of Africa, a new accommodation? South Africa wisely appears now to be attempting a new accommodation with the black States to the North. I heartily hope that a great deal of good will come out of that.
Like the noble Lords, I was unhappy to see this friction within the ANC. If we had not had that, then I am quite sure that matters would have progressed far faster towards a settlement in Central Africa. But the trouble is, as the noble Marquess pointed out, that Zanu is really a Communist organisation. If only we did not have Communist interference, then I have no doubt that very soon an agreeable solution for Central Africa would come about.
My Lords, I have always understood from the Rhodesians whom I know that what they want—and it is not a question of colour at all—is to evolve a system where men are elected on the basis of ability and popularity—quite apart from their colour. Rhodesia has not done too badly in the matter of education compared with a great number of her African neighbours. I believe that she has spent on education more per head of her population than many of the black republics. We give a lot of money to various States in Africa. I really do think—and I have mentioned this before—that if only this Government could give a little money to Rhodesia for education, to speed up the process where Africans of proven ability can play their part in the Government of their country, it would be far better than continuing the imposition of these sanctions. Of course, I do not know what has been the economic effect in the last two years; but presumably sanctions

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cannot help the African population and I do not suppose they help the whites. I think a better solution would be to hold out the hand of friendship and try to increase the degree of education in Rhodesia; although the Rhodesian Government themselves have done a lot in this direction.
When the Organisation for African Unity talk about majority rule, they do not mean majority rule at all—they mean black rule. They do not mean democratic rule. They are talking racialism in reverse. Black rule has been far more vicious and blood thirsty than ever has white rule in Africa. Therefore I think we need to approach this subject as we always should have approached it: with great understanding and with more tolerance perhaps to the whites in Rhodesia.
I suppose that this Order will go through; but I should like Her Majesty's Government to try to evolve some new approach to this problem. I agree that Mr. Smith appears to have become perhaps a little more intransigent and intractable in the last month or two; but he has tremendous pressures on him and it is quite understandable. It is amazing to consider that his house needs scarcely to be guarded at all; whereas the houses of many African leaders have to be guarded with machine guns and protected by barbed wire and searchlights.
My Lords, there are many Africans in Rhodesia who are very pro-Government. As my noble friend said, there are African MPs and junior Ministers and there are many Africans who would be terrified of a too hasty plunge into universal franchise for the whole of the African population; because they realise that when some Africans get power they can be most arrogant and can behave very badly towards their own people.
My Lords, it is obviously asking too much of Her Majesty's Government that they go to the United Nations and say: "Sanctions have failed; we should like to try a new approach! "I suppose that is asking too much; but I personally do not think that the international consensus was right over sanctions. I think it was wrong. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, was not prepared to give a "yea" or "nay" on that. Perhaps in my rashness, stepping in where angels fear
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to tread, I can say in all conscience that I think the international concensus was wrong. I therefore hope that some new approach can be made and that the wind of change will now start to blow in a better direction in that it will be a change to tolerance and good government over Africa.
2.29 p.m.
Lord BALFOUR of INCHRYE: My Lords, I must apologise to the House for not having my name on the list of speakers. I had intended to speak, but I was not sure that I could get here. I promise I will not detain your Lordships for more than a few minutes. I am one of the survivors—like the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine—of the "10 years ago" debate. There are not many of us left. I think it is almost worthy of a sort of club with a "sanctionists" tie for those who took part in that historical debate. But it seems to me that this is a sad occasion; because it is quite obvious to me that Her Majesty's Government cannot take off sanctions at the present time. Yet sanctions have failed, both in the short-term and the long-term, in their objective.
Ten years ago there was a rigidity on both sides which does not exist today. On the one side there was just the UDI. The Governor at that time was put in a highly embarrassing position; the Government of the day were saying sanctions would I have almost instant effect. There were declarations made which, looking back, were wrong. Looking back, no doubt the circumstances of the time allowed them to be accepted as declarations on the one side or on the other. Today, I feel there is a change of spirit abroad. I was impressed by what my noble friend Lord Coleraine said at the conclusion of his speech. I hope I paraphrase it correctly. He said a settlement now is really vital for the peace of Africa and for the economic good of the world. Therefore, what one would not have thought possible ten years ago, we can discuss dispassionately today.
But there are grave difficulties in a settlement, difficulties which Her Majesty's Government must play a considerable part in removing. The chief difficulty is the adherence of the two (now fighting) bodies of African national

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opinion to what used to be known as NIBMAR—no independence before majority rule. I have not seen any declaration by the rival leaders that they are not standing by that as an essential condition for the gaining of support of their followers. Yet it is the menace—and I use that word advisedly—ofthat claim that makes much support for the claim for the white settlers' extraordinarily difficult. Why should white settlers in Rhodesia, who see their own Rhodesian national parties splitting, fighting, who see bloodshed and who see events in Mozambique and Angola, be expected to support a policy in their country which they have done so much to build up? Why should they support such a policy? It is beyond human expectation. Therefore, I come to the position where I hope Her Majesty's Government will make clear that NIBMAR is not something which they support as an essential for a settlement.
What is majority rule? Does it mean one vote for one man? There are other forms of majority which one can consider. To me, one man, one vote in a country where many of the inhabitants have to have drawings made in the sand on various political issues in order that leaders can gain their support, is an absurdity in a country which is still developing as is Rhodesia. Let us face it, what the leaders of those rival factions want is one man, one vote in order that they should get the power to do things which we have seen in other parts of Africa with great sorrow and regret.
We must make firm our view that we abandon NIBMAR as an essential for our support in a settlement. There are other forms of majority; George Orwell's "All men are equal, but some are more equal than others". That applies to Rhodesia as everywhere else. The majority that I should like to see would be a majority of citizens who wished to see social progress, better education, health and better commercial ventures and opportunities, whether the citizens be coloured or white. That is a majority I want to see, not the electoral, political majority of the signs in the sands which is nonsense. Surely, we can work towards getting majority rule by those capable of ruling and those who have a sense of responsibility in ruling. That is the majority I wish to see and to which I
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hope Her Majesty's Government will give support.
2.36 p.m.
Earl COWLEY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for going into such detail about the background to this Order when he introduced it at the beginning of this debate. I believe that this has been a most useful exchange of views because those views have been so divergent. I do not think there is anyone in this House who is not concerned about achieving a peaceful settlement and a just settlement in Rhodesia. It is important that the tragic relationship between Britain and Rhodesia should be solved. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, when he said that it was an advantage that this Order has to be introduced every year because it has the benefit of having the problem of Rhodesia, and its position within Southern Africa, discussed on at least one day every year.
In spite of the almost notorious assessment that sanctions would take effect "within weeks rather than months", United Nations mandatory sanctions have now been imposed against Rhodesia for 10 years. This point has been mentioned by my noble friends, the new members of the newly-formed "Sanctions Club": As noble Lords will remember, the Conservative Party opposed the introduction of sanctions in 1965, and disapproved of the decision to hand over the problem to the United Nations Security Council because sanctions were considered to be ineffectual, and the responsibility of Rhodesia remained with Britain. This, as noble Lords will remember, resulted in a measure of disagreement between this House and another place. However, following the introduction of the sanctions, Governments of both political Parties have attempted to follow, so far as possible, a bipartisan policy in respect of Rhodesia.
We on this side of the House, as with Labour Governments, have attempted to find a just settlement that would be acceptable to the Rhodesians as a whole I as well as being in accordance with the Five—or, if you are a member of the Labour Party, Six—principles. I think those Principles still fit in with my noble I friend Lord Gridley's concept of freedom j with responsibility. However, success has I eluded Governments of both political

803
Parties. The situation in Southern Africa has changed dramatically over the past eighteen months. I believe that the future of Rhodesia and the solution to the problem lies within Southern Africa, and it is up to the people of that area of the world to decide whether they wish to have immediate majority rule now or to progress towards it.
I think this covers the points raised by my noble friends Lord Salisbury and Lord Balfour. It is no longer a problem between Britain and her recalcitrant Colony. The Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and that country's subsequent independence last June—mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley—and the undeclared state of civil war in Angola have changed all that. For economic and political reasons, the Governments of South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia have been able to come together in an attempt to persuade the various factions in Rhodesia to reach a peaceful settlement, but the failure of the Victoria Falls meeting has shown to the world how difficult that task is.
In Bridget Bloom's very good article in today's Financial Times, she writes:
"In today's depressing scene in Southern Africa, one thing stands out: despite, concerted efforts, for the first time, by both Black and White leaders in the area, and despite the vastly changed circumstances which have resulted from the Portuguese withdrawal from Southern Africa, a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesian problem seems as far away as ever."
One might think that is a rather pessimistic and depressing outlook, but I agree with her conclusion at the end of the article, when she says this:
"In the short term, gradual implementation of the new policy is bound to be to the advantage of Mr. Smith. White Rhodesia could well celebrate an 11th, 12th or even 13th anniversary of UDI without feeling that it is in danger of imminent defeat. But when the reckoning comes, it is likely to face a much tougher, a much more determined and much more radical opposition than it can presently believe."
There is little doubt that the effectiveness of sanctions against Rhodesia will increase rather than decrease in the future. It is probable that the new Government of Mozambique will impose sanctions especially if it is to receive monetary compensation in the form of development assistance, as agreed at the Common-
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wealth Heads of Government Meeting in Jamaica earlier this year.
Also, as the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, has said, the amount of "sanction busting" being carried out by United Nations Member States has been reduced. Consequently, I believe that sanctions have played some part in bringing the Rhodesian Government to the negotiating table. However, it is regrettable that at this time of South African detente and until recently the ostensible willingness of Mr. Smith's Government to negotiate, the ANC should suffer a serious split, since this can only further complicate the issue. The consequences of various nationalist factions arguing among themselves can be seen only too clearly by looking at what is happening in next-door Angola.
I have listened with a great deal of interest and care to the arguments put forward by my noble friends behind me concerning the effectiveness of and the justification for sanctions. I respect their deeply-held convictions, although I cannot always share their points of view. Whether the effect of sanctions is minimal, as my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard believes, or whether it is decisive in bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia is not as vital when compared with other factors involved. The mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia are contained in a number of Resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council between April 1966 and Spring 1970, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. These Resolutions, unlike others that have been passed by the United Nations, are binding in international law, and consequently binding upon this country. Only last week we on this side of the House, with considerable support from the Liberal Party and the Cross-Benches, bitterly condemned the Labour Party, when in Opposition, for encouraging their supporters in local government to disregard their obligations under the Housing Finance Act—an Act of Parliament democratically passed—and then, when they got back into power, for giving these same Labour councillors total immunity from the process of law. I believe it would be, to say the least, hypocritical of us from this side of the House to condemn the Labour Party for supporting its followers when they chose which national laws they would obey

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and which they would not, if at the same time we were considering following a similar course of action as far as international law was concerned.
Lord COLERAINE: My Lords, would the noble Earl allow me one question? Is he really saying that there are no circumstances whatever in which Her Majesty's Government could raise sanctions?
Earl COWLEY: I was going on to say that if Britain feels that sanctions are not working and that there needs to be a change of policy then Britain should go to the United Nations Security Council honestly and openly, and say so. But these sanctions are United Nations sanctions and it is up to the United Nations to change them. On 11th October 1973, at the Conservative Party conference my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel said:
"It is true that mandatory sanctions should never have been put on. We voted against them but the British Government of the day put its signature to a Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations which is binding on its members. We are a permanent member and we are in the habit of keeping Britain's word. We do not, and individual Conservatives do not, pick and choose which laws we obey and which we do not, nationally or internationally."
Lord COLERAINE: My Lords, I am sorry to press my noble friend on this, but have the Government of this country the right to go to the United Nations and say: "We are lifting sanctions"? Or have we surrendered all right to the Security Council?
Earl COWLEY: My Lords, my impression is that Britain has the right to go to the United Nations to ask for sanctions to be removed. It does not have the right to remove them unilaterally.
Lord COLERAINE: So we have abandoned all our rights.
Earl COWLEY: My Lords, as I said earlier, it does not mean that sanctions must go on for ever but to vote against this Order is not the right course to take. If Britain feels that sanctions are serving no useful purpose, then it must go to the United Nations and say so. It is up to the United Nations Security Council to bring mandatory sanctions to an end. I
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believe that for this country to remove them unilaterally would have consequences far in excess of any economic considerations or benefits that might apply. It is up to Britain to hold the ring between the various parties, and for that role Britain must be seen to be, and be, scrupulously fair. While it can be argued that sanctions have little economic or political effect their unilateral removal by this country would cause bitter reactions from other member-States of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and Africa.
While we are a trading nation, it is vital that our relations with other countries in the world should remain as good as possible. Furthermore, to remove sanctions unlaterally would cut the very ground from beneath those countries which are attempting to find a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian question. Such action would be seen not as a recognition of the ineffectual nature of sanctions, but as support for Mr. Smith and for his Government's policies.
While the main effort to find a settlement must be exercised by the countries of Southern Africa, Britain has an important role to play when enough progress has been made. Thus it is important that we should not lose our credibility as a participant in any future settlement. I was surprised to see reported last Tuesday that Britain had joined a consensus of United Nations members in approving a resolution which quite rightly reaffirmed the right of the Rhodesian black majority to self determination, freedom and independence, but at the same time declared—and this part is important—the legitimacy of their struggle to obtain this, "by all means at their disposal". I should be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, when he comes to reply, could elaborate on these last few words and say to what the Government feel they have morally committed this country.
On 11th June this year, the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, when repeating a Statement made by the Secretary of State in another place, said:
"In conclusion, I should like to take this opportunity to emphasise that the Government remain pledged to do all that lies within their power to promote a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia as the alternative to the violence which … will otherwise be inevitable."— [Official Report, 11/6/75, col. 336.]

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Has there been a change in Government thinking on this matter? In view of what certain of my noble friends have said, and in view of the views expressed by some nationalist movements, this is an important point which deserves full consideration.
Also, perhaps the noble Lord could tell us whether the Government have had further thoughts on the holding of a constitutional conference which was also mentioned in the same Statement. What was said was:
"The House will see that I am not setting a deadline for the commencement of a conference. If as I hope both sides in their direct talks begin now to negotiate issues of substance I would not be dogmatic as to the timing of the Government's proposed conference. But a start must be made before it is too late, and if it is clear in due course that substantial progress is not resulting from the direct talks between Mr. Smith and the ANC it will then become the Government's responsibility to call the parties together." [col. 335]
I wonder whether the noble Lord could give the House his thoughts on that particular point.
My Lords, while one can certainly argue very forcefully that sanctions should never have been introduced and that sanctions are ineffective as a means of persuading the Smith Government to reach a peaceful settlement, I believe that there are other considerations which are of greater weight and importance. Our commitments under international law and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; our credibility as a country which has important links with the whole of Africa, both black and white; the moves within Southern Africa itself towards detente; the possible resultant incentive to use increased violence on the part of the African nationalists; the whole question of the rule of law—I would sincerely ask my noble friends behind me to consider most carefully all these important factors. While it is entirely within their prerogative to divide the House, I believe that it will be a great pity if they do. It would be far better to let the Order go through without a Division or even to show their disapproval for it by abstaining. But I must tell my noble friends, in order to be honest with them, that if they do decide to divide the House I shall be unable to join them in the Division Lobby.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, if it is a question of international law that we cannot go to the United Nations to withdraw this Order, what is the point of having this debate? If we divided the House we should presumably be going against international law but if the Government could not go to the United Nations in order to withdraw sanctions I do not see why we should have this debate.
Earl COWLEY: My Lords, the Government can go to the United Nations, but since the sanctions were imposed by the Security Council they have to be removed by them.
Lord BALFOUR of INCHRYE: My Lords, could we have some clarification so that we all know where we are? Could the Opposition Front Bench reply to one question arising from the interchange between the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and the noble Earl, Lord Cowley? If the United Kingdom goes to the United Nations and asks for their agreement for us to lift sanctions, and if UNO refuses, which seems likely, then are we powerless and have to retain sanctions against our wishes for an indefinite period until UNO alters its mind?
Earl COWLEY: My Lords, I believe that in reality the British Government could go to the United Nations to ask for the withdrawal of sanctions with the approval of all the countries in Southern Africa most immediately affected. I think the point put forward by my noble friend is at least hypothetical. I do not believe that Britain, whether a Conservative or Labour Government were in power, would go to the United Nations for the removal of sanctions in the face of opposition from the parties most immediately involved.
2.57 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I hope not to detain your Lordships too long. I made a fairly full statement when I moved this Motion and we have had a truly excellent debate. I should like to thank every speaker who has taken part for his moderate and constructive contributions, and I of course include those with whom I profoundly disagree. Indeed, I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, set the tone, although his views are very different from

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mine on this issue. I thought his speech was a most eloquent plea for moderation. I think it was intended as such and certainly I heard it as such. He mentioned with his noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye a very important particular which I had not mentioned but which is increasingly apparent to all who think about Rhodesia and beyond Rhodesia, namely, the vital and urgent need for agreement not only in the interests of Rhodesia and of Southern Africa but indeed of this country and of countries like it, particularly in the economic situation in which the Western World finds itself. I am most grateful for a speech which at some points took us to matters of even graver importance than those implied by the Order I moved.
The noble Lord, Lord Gridley, made what I thought was an excellent speech. Once again I did not agree fundamentally with the noble Lord, but, as last year, I thought the way he put his views forward was most impressive. I wish the galleries had been full of Rhodesians of all colours to hear the debate, to hear how we deal with this kind of question, where feelings run very deep, and are always informed, and where there is always a readiness to listen to the other man's point of view and to try to find bridges rather than gulfs between those of opposite points of view. The noble Lord, Lord Gridley. gave his own heading to his speech by saying that he believed in freedom with responsibility. This is a hackneyed phrase but it needs repeating, and as Rhodesia moves into responsible independent Statehood, as we hope it will soon, by agreement through the co-operation of all its citizens, this principle of freedom with responsibility must be its guiding line.
The noble Lord, Lord Gridley, also mentioned the situation of white settlers, as did other noble Lords. As your Lordships know, I have from time to time indicated my own concern that when we talk about the future of Rhodesia we certainly include the future of the white settlers and those who have lived there, many of them over generations, and who have in many ways made distinguished and valuable contributions to the development of the country.
This brings me to the point which a number of noble Lords raised; particularly it was raised in the attractive speech
810
of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. He denied robustly that Rhodesia is any threat to peace. This theme was taken up by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby. Who does he mean by Rhodesia? Does he mean the 300,000 white settlers are not threatening the peace? Perhaps this is so, so long as they get their way.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving away. I mean the existing de facto (as I would refer to them) Government of Rhodesia, who I think, contrary to what I gather the noble Lord thinks, represents the vast majority of people in Rhodesia.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, there might be various psephological views about that, as to which and how many Rhodesians the Smith régime represents. The point I was going to make is one with which I hope the noble Marquess would agree. A country becomes a threat to peace because of the conditions within it quite as often as because of the policy of its Government. We are faced in Rhodesia and in Central Southern Africa with a potential situation of very grave danger, not only to that immediate area but possibly outside it. While there may be argument whether Rhodesia is a threat to the peace within the terms of Article VII, it is a danger to peace. The urgency which, for the reasons advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, should prompt us to seek an agreement as soon as possible applies equally because of this persistent danger.
May I pass on quickly to the points raised by the noble Earl, Lord Cowley, who asked whether our vote for the United Nations' Fourth Committee resolution (I think that is the one he meant) on Rhodesia, including references to NIBMAR and implicitly to the use of force, indicates any change from Her Majesty's Government's position as stated in the Secretary of State's Statement of 11th June. The answer is, No, my Lords. The position in the Fourth Committee was this. For the first time we have been able to join a consensus on a general political resolution on Rhodesia at the General Assembly. This was because this year's resolution, unlike in past years, did not make criticisms of this I country or unreasonable demands upon us. We made it plain, however, that we

811
could not accept an unconditional commitment to NIBMAR, and we could not condone the use of force. So in agreeing without a division to the consensus, we placed very carefully on record our reservation on the first point and our complete rejection of the second.
My right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that, should substantial progress not result from direct talks between Mr. Smith and the ANC, it would then become the Government's responsibility to call the parties together. That is still the position, but I do not think we have yet reached that stage. I however appreciate that the noble Earl should have raised this, because it gives me an opportunity of repeating that there is absolutely no change between the position stated by my right honourable friend on 11th June and where we stand today; nor do I anticipate that there will be any change. We stand ready to perform our constitutional duty in the matter of the constitutional conference, hopefully after, and as a result of negotiation in Rhodesia by Rhodesians, assisted by friendly neighbours, including the South African Republic; but if necessary, in the right or inevitable circumstances, by initiative. I hope it does not come to that. I do not think it will. I am hopeful that our role will be played as a result of sensible and constructive discussions in Rhodesia as a start.
Lord BARNBY: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, on the question of mutual presence is it still the firm opinion of the Government that a boycott at arm's length is preferable to mutual presence—by which I mean mutual representatives, of course?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: On the question of representation, my Lords? —Yes. Successive Governments have decided that if we honestly adhere to the decisions of the international authority we must conform in the matter of representation as well as in other matters. However, it is sensible and practical to have contacts, but not formal representation. I suppose the noble Lord has in mind the future of Rhodesia House and a number of other questions which he has
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mentioned to me from time to time. While it is reasonable and practicable to have contacts in order to promote negotiation, and we hope agreement, formal representation is out. That would not be in conformity with decisions of the United Nations to which we are party.
There are a number of other points, but not one of them I think a point of information that it is immediately necessary to answer. I should like to close by reinforcing the reasonable appeal made by the noble Earl that, having once more made prefectly clear with great force and clarity, all the more forcefully for the moderation shown, what many noble Lords feel about sanctions and the right way of going about this very difficult and long-standing problem, it would be the height of statesmanship to refrain from dividing the House. We are, perhaps, poised on the brink of a possible break-through. It is very difficult to define how hopefully we may interpret the position. Equally, there are forces in Rhodesia, in Africa and outside Africa which are loudly proclaiming that it is absolutely no good negotiating and that the only solution to this kind of problem is the so called "war of liberation". Anything that we say or do to encourage that kind of thinking would place a dreadful responsibility upon us. Rather I think that, as the free assembly of a free, democratic country, this House and the other place will today have expressed a wide range of view on this difficult question, but I hope without engaging in a divisive procedure which could dismay only the moderates and would encourage the extremists.
The Marquess of SALISBURY: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him about one point which I raised in my remarks. Do Her Majesty's Government still hold to the Five Principles as being the test of acceptability or have they moved further than that?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, we hold to the Five Principles, and to the sixth, which enjoins that any settlement should have regard to all sections of the population, majorities and minorities.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CHILDREN BILL [H.L.]
3.11 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
[References are to Bill (140) as first printed for the Commons]

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 1 to 12.]
Clause 1, page 2, line 7, after ("Services") insert ("and with approved adoption societies in their area")
Clause 1, page 2, line 9, leave out from ("maintained") to ("and") in line 11 and insert ("under subsection (1) by local authorities in authorities in England and Wales may be collectively referred to as "the Adoption Service" and those maintained by local authorities in Scotland, as "the Scottish Adoption Service".)
("The social services referred to in section 1(3) are the functions of a local authority which stand referred to the authority's social services committee or, in Scotland, social work committee, including, in particular but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, a local authority's functions relating to—

(a) the promotion of the welfare of children by diminishing the need to receive children into care or keep them in care, including (in exceptional circumstances) the giving of assistance in cash;

(b) the welfare of children in the care of a local authority;

(c)the welfare of children who are foster children within the meaning of the Children Act 1958;

(d) children who are subject to supervision orders made in matrimonial proceedings;

(e) the provision of residential accommodation for expectant mothers and young children and of day-care facilities;

(f) the regulation and inspection of nurseries and child minders;

(g) care and other treatment of children through court proceedings and children's hearings".)

Clause 3, page 2, line 23, after ("such") insert ("in England and Wales or in Scotland".)
Clause 3, page 2, line 32, after ("Service") insert ("or, as the case may be, to the Scottish Adoption Service")
Clause 3, page 2, line 38, at end insert ("including, in particular, its ability to make provision for children who are free for adoption,")
Clause 3, page 2, page 3, line 16, after ("Service") insert ("or, as the case may be, to the Scottish Adoption Service")
Clause 3, page 2, line 22, leave out ("but is subsequently refused")
Clause 3, page 2, line 23, leave out from ("date") to end of line 24, and insert ("that applications as granted, or, as the case may be, refused.")
Clause 4, page 3, line 27, after ("Service") insert ("or, as the case may be, to the Scottish Adoption Service")
Clause 6, page 4, line 31, after ("society") insert, ("or by the society jointly with the authority")
Clause 6, page 4, line 35, at end insert—
("(2) Before giving a direction under subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall, if practicable, consult both the society and the authority".)
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with the leave of the House I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1 to 12 en bloc. It is possible to take Parts I and II, subject to your Lordships' agreement, in blocks of Amendments and I have moved that this House should deal with Amendments Nos. 1 to 12 en bloc.
All that I want to call your Lordships' attention to is Amendment No. 3 which adds a new clause after Clause 1 to the Bill. It does not alter or add to the duties of local authorities, but highlights the social services referred to in Clause 1(3) with which the adoption service is to be co-ordinated. Its purpose is to put adoption firmly in the context of the overall local authority services for children and their families and to meet the criticisms of bodies such as the British Association of Social Workers that the Bill was giving adoption too much prominence as a child care resource. The other place showed the same interest as the Lords—in this connection I should mention the noble Baroness, Lady Young—in protecting the position of adoption societies —hence Amendment No. 1 which makes it clear that local authorities shall plan their adoption services in conjuction with approved adoption societies in their area so as to ensure that voluntary societies of the required standard continue to play their important role. Amendment No. 12 provides that the Secretary of State, before directing a local authority to take over the responsibilities of an inactive or defunct adoption society, shall, if practicable, consult the society and the authority. This would give the society the

815
opportunity of commenting on the action the Secretary of State proposed to take if they were in a position so to do.
Amendments 2, 4, 5, 7 and 10 are technical and allow for separate references to "the Adoption Service" in England and Wales and the "Scottish Adoption Service". I do not think I need say much about No. 6, except that it ensures the ability of an adoption society to care for a child who has been freed for adoption is one of the factors that the Secretary of State should take into account when considering a society's approval. I think I have said all I need say on the first 12 Amendments and I beg to move.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord ELTON: My Lords, at the outset may I say we are glad to see the improvement in Amendment No. 3. This is an example of the admirable way in which the earlier stages of this Bill were conducted. I think your Lordships will agree that the Bill received very extensive, careful and thorough consideration in this House before it went to another place, and I am able to say that because I played a very minor part in it myself. Your Lordships who have studied the record of what went on in another place will find that there has been an extraordinary degree of agreement in consultation between the Parties and that the few divisions that took place in Committee often did not follow Party divisions at all. It is therefore an example of the non-political use of Parliamentary skill and time which we welcome. But it has taken up time. Time has run out and it is incumbent upon me to say at the outset that we have been in a very real difficulty—and so indeed has the noble Lord opposite—as a result of the almost total lack of resources and time that has resulted from this pressure.
I refer particularly to Amendment No. 9, which I gave the noble Lord notice I would refer to, and I hope the noble Lord will be able to explain to me by reading out the clause as amended, what in fact it means. It seems to me that we have here probably a drafting error and as indeed corrections to the only copy—the advance proof copy of the Amendments, which has been available to us for about 36 hours—were not comp-
816
pleted until 11 o'clock this morning, it is possible that this has escaped the net. If that is so I hope some procedural means will be found of putting it right before it hits the Statute Book.
Another feature of the pressure of time and events upon your Lordships' House, which I know has been combated so far as possible, has been that a number of those who would have been speaking with me on this side of the House are not present. The noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, in particular and the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot of Harwood. In fact, my noble friend Lady Elliot was expert on the Scottish clauses and I can say only that we will try to fulfil her role to the best of our ability. But your Lordships must be aware that this sort of thinness of resource which the timetable has imposed upon us must have an adverse effect upon the ultimate effects of legislation on the individual children affected by this Bill, and adults as well.
I wish to make no more of that point because I sympathise with the noble Lord opposite, who is probably in an even more difficult position than I am. He may not be free to place his views on the record. I, at least, have had the satisfaction of doing so—liberavi animam meam. Perhaps the noble Lord would be kind enought to explain to me—if I have given him time enough to discover the correct meaning of Clause 3, as amended—how it should read.
3.18 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I appreciate how the noble Lord feels. I think he will understand that this matter was put very strongly yesterday by his noble Leader, Lord Carrington, and my noble friend the Government Chief Whip replied. From my point of view he will understand that I would prefer to leave it there. Clause 3(7) at present provides that the Secretary of State's approval of an adoption society shall last for a period of three years and then, if the society has a further application pending which is subsequently refused, shall expire when notice of refusal is served on the society. These two Amendments—because I have to refer to Amendment No. 8 as well—will extend Clause 3(7) to provide that if an approved society has an application pending which is subsequently approved, the outstanding three years approval expires when

817
notice of the new approval is given. I hope that makes some sense.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, because I think at this stage I am allowed to speak only once, what I am really asking the noble Lord to do is to read the subsection as it now stands because I cannot make it mean what he intends it to mean. By your Lordships' leave, therefore, starting at line 18, it reads:
"(7) If not withdrawn earlier under section 4, approval given under this section shall last for a period of three years from the date on which it becomes operative, and shall then expire or, in the case of an approved adoption society whose further application for approval is pending at that time".
Then we have a deletion, "shall expire on the date". Then we have another deletion— "that applications as granted or, as the case may be, refused". I cannot work that, with my command of the English language, into actually having any import. I am not criticising the intention of the noble Lord nor, indeed, probably what went on to the original typewriter, but I should like to be assured that that is what is meant to come out at the end, and if so, how it arrives at the meaning the noble Lord gives to it.
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, is it not the case that there is a typing error? Should it not be that "applicants are granted or, as the case may be, refused …"?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I should have thought that the noble Lord was right in this. It had not occurred to me and I had not seen it, but as the noble Lord pointed out, and as I am informed, there is a misprint— "as" should be "is". It should read, "application is granted".
Baroness MACLEOD of BORVE: My Lords, at this juncture, before we really get into the meat of the Bill, I should like to say a word or two in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said. In both Houses of Parliament we have been deeply concerned about this Children Bill. Probably it is the view of everyone—certainly of everyone here this afternoon—that we are not likely to see another Children Bill perhaps in our lifetime, and therefore we are providing at this stage for children for perhaps another couple of decades. So this is vitally important.
818
I would stress as hard as I can that at this stage we must get this Bill right.
My Lords, there are various things, even in the Amendments produced by the House of Commons, that I would not go along with—not many, but some. As my noble friend said quite rightly, this is not a political Bill; it is an all-Party Bill. I would stress that I do not think we are going to be allowed enough time to make absolutely certain that the provisions of the Bill are doing the correct thing for the future of our children.
Lord REDESDALE: My Lords, may I enlarge upon what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod of Borve, and my noble friend Lord Elton. I have the greatest respect possible for the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell. However, the way we are trying to deal with this is totally "Mickey Mouse". We are trying to deal with something from a manuscript Amendment, and that seems very sad when we are dealing with something as important as children. I have already said that my interests, which I should declare, are entirely in terms of fostering. However, I would say that at this moment in time—and I will not labour the point any further at this stage —we seem to be dealing with this with such undue haste that it seems a terrible pity, and I hope it is something that we may not all regret later.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, we must look at this from a different point of view. One must bear in mind that this Bill has been considered by this House and another place over a period of twelve months. We must bear in mind that, before the Bill was drafted, there was a good deal of discussion with all the principal voluntary and statutory bodies about the whole field covered by the Bill. In your Lordships' House, we spent a considerable amount of time on it. People who were in Opposition also consulted a large number of societies. This process has gone on over a long period of time in another place. They have given a lot of time to it.
We really must not think that simply, because the Bill does not do all that we in your Lordships' House want done, that it must be wrong. There has been a good deal of thought, care, consideration and ability brought to this Bill in another place. If noble Lords are con-

819
cerned to get this Bill on the Statute Book as an Act, I ask them to bear in mind the timetable. May I say that I understand how certain noble Lords feel. I do not find it easy working from a duplicated series of Amendments, but this is the situation with which we are faced which we can do nothing about. I say with great respect, therefore, that I think we ought to concern ourselves with the long-term point of view, and the long-term point of view is that we want to see this Bill on the Statute Book.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 13 to 29]
Clause 7, page 5, line 14, leave out subsections (4) and (5).
Clause 7, page 5, line 22, leave out paragraph (6).
Clause 7, page 5, line 25, at end insert—
("(6A) An adoption order may not be made in relation to a child who is or has been married.")
Clause 7, page 5, line 25, at end insert—
(" (6B) An adoption order shall not be made in Scotland in relation to a child who I is a minor unless with the consent of the minor; except that where the court is satisfied that the minor is incapable of giving his consent to the making of the order it may dispense with that consent.")
Clause 7, page 5, line 29, leave out from ("is") to end of line and insert ("an adopted child".)
Clause 7, page 5, line 29, at end insert—
("(9) Schedule 1 contains for England and Wales further provisions about the effect of adoption and related or comparable provisions about legitimation.
(10) Schedule (Status conferred in Scotland by adoption) has effect as respect the status conferred in Scotland by adoption, and related matters".)
Clause 8, page 5, line 41, at end insert—
("(3) An adoption order shall not be made unless the court is satisfied that sufficient opportunities to see the child with the applicant or, in the case of an application by a married couple, both applicants together in the home environment have been afforded—

(a) where the child was placed with the applicant by an adoption agency, to that agency, or

(b) in any other case, to the local authority within whose area the home is".)

Clause 9, page 6, line 1, at beginning insert ("Subject to sections 33(1) and 46(1)".)
Clause 9, page 6, line 12, leave out subsection (3).
Clause 9, page 6, line 20, leave out ("If" and insert ("Where the application is made to a court in England or Wales and".)
Clause 9, page 6, line 24, at beginning insert ("Subject to sections 33(1) and 46(1)".)
Clause 9, page 6, leave out lines 26 to 29 and insert ("he has attained the age of 21 and—

(a) is not married, or

(b) is married".)

Clause 9, page 6, line 33, at end insert ("or (iii) his spouse is by reason of ill health, whether physical or mental, incapable of making an application for an adoption order".)
Page 7, line 1, leave out subsection (3).
page 7, line 18, leave out ("if") and insert ("Where the application is made to a court in England or Wales and".)
page 7, line 18, leave out from ("child") to second ("the") in line 20.
Clause 11, page 7, leave out lines 30 and 31 and insert ("the adoption order (whether or not he knows the identity of the applicants), or".)
3.27 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 13 to 29, which I should like to take en bloc, and while doing so refer to Amendments Nos. 85 to 88 and Amendments Nos. 113 and 114. I think those of your Lordships who have had the opportunity of going through Parts I and II will realise that Amendments Nos. 13 to 29, in addition to the others to which I have referred, are mostly technical, but there are two or three I should like to comment on particularly.
Amendments Nos. 19, 21 and 26 meet a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Elliot, that the Bill appeared to allow a court to make an adoption order even though the child might have had his home with only one of the couples applying to adopt him. I hope your Lordships will agree that these Amendments remove possible misunderstanding on this point by simply transferring the provisions of Clauses 9(3) and 10(3) to Clause 8. This makes it clear that while the child has to have his home for a fixed period with only one applicant, before making an adoption order the court must be satisfied that the local authority or adoption agency reporting on the application has had sufficient opportunities to see the child with both applicants together in the home environment.

821
Amendments Nos. 20 and 23 relate to the same point as Amendments Nos. 85 to 88 and 113 and 114, to which I have already made reference, and draw together certain aspects of Parts I and II of the Bill. If your Lordships agree, I think we can discuss them together. The Houghton Committee recommended that,
"where a relative, including a step-parent applying jointly with his spouse, applies to adopt a child the law should require the court first to consider whether guardianship would be more appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the long-term welfare of the child."
This recommendation cuts across two Parts of the Bill, since the adoption provisions are in Part I and the custodianship provisions are in Part II. These Amendments, however, succeed in bridging the gap by directing the attention of the court which is considering the adoption applicaiton under Part I of the Bill to the relevant custodianship or (for Scotland) custody provisions which are to be found in Part II of the Bill.
Among other things the Amendments to Clauses 33 and 46 place a specific requirement on the court to scrutinise particularly an adoption application made by a child's relative or step-parent, and, where it is satisfied that an adoption order would not promote the child's welfare better than a custodianship order, it shall make a custodianship order. The effect of the Amendments together is therefore to place a positive requirement on the court to consider a custodianship order first where relatives and certain parents and step-parents apply to adopt. I hope your Lordships will agree that these Amendments carry out more closely not only the Houghton Committee's recommendation, but also your Lordships' intentions in approving the earlier provisions.
Amendment No. 18 introduces the new Schedule, Amendment No. 249. This new Schedule deals with the status conferred in Scotland by adoption, and is the Scottish counterpart of Schedule 1 which relates to England and Wales. Amendment No. 16 retains the present provision in Scots law, whereby a minor must consent to his own adoption.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.— (Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 30–39]
Clause 13, page 18, line 17, leave out subsections (1) to (5) and insert—
("(1) Where, on an application by an adoption agency, an uthorized court is satisfied in the case of each parent or guardian of the child that—

(a) he freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed generally and unconditionally to the making of an adoption order, or

(b) his agreement to the making of an adoption order should be dispensed with on a ground specified in section 11(2),

the court shall, subject to subsection (5), make an order declaring the child free for adoption.
(2) No application shall be made under sub section (1) unless—

(a) it is made with the consent of a parent or guardian of the child, or

(b) the adoption agency is applying for dispensation under the subsection (1)(b) of the agreement of each parent or guardian of the child, and the child is in the care of the adoption agency.

(3) No agreement required under subsection (l)(a) shall be dispensed with under subsection (1)(b) unless the child is already placed for adoption or the court is satisfied that it is likely that the child will be placed for adoption.
(4) An agreement by the mother of the child is ineffective for the purposes of this section if given less than six weeks after the child's birth.
(5) An order under this section shall not be made in Scotland in relation to a child who is a minor unless with the consent of the child; except that where the court is satisfied that the minor is incapable of giving his consent to the making of the order, it may dispense with that consent".)
Page 9, line 20, leave out subsection (7).
Page 9, line 33, leave out ("subsection (1), (3) or (5)") and insert ("this section").
Page 9, line 34, leave out from ("itself") to ("has") in line 35 and insert ("that each parent or guardian who can be found").
Clause 14, page 10, line 39, at end insert ("as respects that former parent").
Clause 15, page 11, line 9, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
("(3) Where an order freeing a child for adoption is revoked under this section—

(a) the parental rights and duties relating to the child are vested in the individual or, as the case may be, the individuals in whom they vested immediately before that order was made;

(b) if the parental rights and duties, or any of them, vested in a local authority or voluntary organisation immediately before the order freeing the child for adoption was made, those rights and duties are vested

823
in the individual or, as the case may be, the individuals in whom they vested immediately before they were vested in the authority or organisation and

(c) any duty extinguished by virtue of section 6(3)(b) is forthwith revived, but the revocation does not affect any right or duty so far as it related to any period before the date of the revocation.").

Clause 15, page 11, line 13, at beginning insert ("subject to subsection (5)").
Clause 15, page 11, line 16, after ("parent"), insert ("who made the application").
Clause 15, page 11, line 20, at end insert ("as respects that parent.").
Clause 15, page 11, line 20, at end insert—
("(5) Subsection (4)(a) shall not apply where the court which dismissed the application gives leave to the former parent to make a further application under subsection (1), but such leave shall not be given unless it appears to the court that because of the change in circumstances or for any other reason it is proper to allow the application to be made.")
3.31 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 30 to 39 en bloc. If your Lordships allow me to move those Amendments Nos. 30 to 39 perhaps I can discuss them with the consequential Amendment No. 72 to Clause 27, as they all relate to changes in Clause 13 dealing with the freeing procedure. They are largely technical, but there are some of some substance.
Amendment No. 30 changes the basic structure of Clause 13, removing any overlapping aspects of the original subsections (1) to (3). I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is not here because this was a point, if my memory serves me correctly, about which she was very concerned. In fact, she called attention to this in Committee. I hope your Lordships will agree that the Amendment is a considerable improvement. Amendment No. 31 deletes subsection (7), which was intended to promote the freeing procedure, but was opposed, especially in your Lordships' House, as putting unfair pressure on parents.
Amendment No. 39 was introduced to meet the feeling in another place that the Bill was too rigid in absolutely forbidding a second application for the revocation of a freeing order, when a previous application had been refused on the
824
grounds that revocation would be contrary to the welfare of the child. The Amendment allows for a further application but only with the leave of the court, which must not be given unless there is good reason for a further application. I hope your Lordships will agree that this makes the provision more flexible, but, although making it more flexible, maintains necessary safeguards for the welfare of the child. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 40–54]
Clause 17, page 12, line 21, after ("investigate") insert ("(a).").
Clause 17, page 12, line 23, at end insert
(" and
(b) whether the child was placed with the applicant in contravention of section 29 of the 1958 Act").
Clause 19, line 36, leave out ("or 15") and insert ("15 or (Adoption of children abroad.").
Clause 19, line 36, Page 13, line 1, leave out ("adoption") and insert ("reporting.").
Clause 19, line 36, line 2, leave out ("assisting the court in any way the court may direct") and insert (performing such other duties as the rules may prescribe.")
Clause 19, line 36, leave out lines 4 and 5 and insert—
("(1 A) A person who is employed—

(a) in the case of an application for an adoption order, by the adoption agency by whom the child was placed; or

(b) in the case of an application under section 13, by the adoption agency by whom the application was made; or

(c) in the case of an application under section 15, by the adoption agency with the parental rights and duties relating to the child,

shall not be appointed to act as guardian ad litem or reporting officer for the purposes of the application but, subject to that, the same person may if the court thinks fit be both guardian ad litem and reporting officer.")
Clause 19, line 36, line 6, leave out ("adoption") and insert ("reporting.")
Clause 21, page 13, line 26, leave out ("whose") and insert ("who can be found and whose agreement or.")
Clause 21, page 13, line 27, after (required") insert ("to be given or dispensed with.")
Clause 21, page 13, line 28, leave out ("will") and insert ("may".)
Clause 21, page 13, line 30, at end insert—
("(1A) In the case of an application under section (Adoption of children abroad) rules shall require every person who can be found and whose agreement to the making of the order would be required if the application were for an adoption order (other than a Convention adoption order) to be notified as aforesaid.")
Clause 21, page 13, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
Clause 21, page 13, page 14, line 13, leave out paragraph (a),
After Clause 23 insert the following new Clause—

(1) Where on an application made in relation to a child by a person who is not domiciled in England and Wales or Scotland an authorised court is satisfied that he intends to adopt the child under the law of or within the country in which the applicant is domiciled, the court may, subject to the following provisions of this section, make an order vesting in him the parental rights and duties relating to the child.

(2) The provisions of the Part relating to adoption orders, except sections 7(1), (9) and (10), 9(2), 10(2), 13 to 15, 18, 21(1), 22 and 23 shall apply in relation to orders under this section as they apply in relation to adoption orders subject to the modification that in section 8(1) for "19" and "13" there are substituted "32" and "26" respectively.

(3) Sections 20 to 23 and 24(4) and (5) of the 1958 Act shall apply in relation to an order under this section as they apply in relation to an adoption order except that any entry in the Registers of Births, the Register of Births or the Adopted Children Register which is required to be marked in consequence of the making of an order under this section shall, in lieu of being marked with the word "Adopted" or "Re-adopted" (with or without the addition of the word "(Scotland)" or "(England)", be marked with the words "Proposed Foreign Adoption" or "Proposed Foreign Re-adoption", as the case may require.

(4) References in Parts III and IV of the 1958 Act to an adoption order include references to an order under this section, and references in this Act and in the 1958 Act to the placing of children for adoption or to the making of arrangements for adoption include references to the placing of children for adoption abroad or the making of arrangements for adoption abroad.")

Clause 24, leave out Clause 24.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 40 to 54 en bloc.
Lord REDESDALE: Oh?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: Perhaps I should say, my Lords, that if any noble
826
Lord is in any sense aggrieved, he can stop Amendments being moved en bloc and can raise a point on any Amendment.
Lord REDESDALE: My Lords, if the noble Lord continues to take it at this Charge of the Light Brigade pace after Clause 49, then certainly I for one will come in on every single point that arises. But I will bear with him for the moment.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I hope the noble Lord is aware of the possible consequences of such an action. Your Lordships will have a particular interest in Amendments Nos. 43 to 46. This House amended Clause 19 to prevent the guardian ad litem and adoption officer from being the same person, as your Lordships wanted to ensure that the child's interests were fully safeguarded. Some professional associations pointed out that the term "adoption officer" was confusing, because this was the name used by some local authorities to designate the social worker engaged in adoption work. To make it absolutely clear that reporting officers are to be independent officers appointed by the court, and not local authority employees, Amendments Nos. 43 and 46 have substituted the term "reporting officer" for "adoption officer", a change which, perhaps I should say vehemently, and I do not say that unkindly, the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, pressed for. At the same time, the Government have had to bear in mind the views of bodies such as the Association of Directors of Social Services, which comment:
"To insist that the guardian ad litem and reporting officer be separate people not only generates unnecessary duplication of work"—
This, of course, would be wasteful of scarce social work resources—
"but, more importantly, deprives the court of the possibility of having a report from a person who has investigated all the circumstances of the case personally."
The main concern of the House was that a guardian ad litem or reporting officer must be independent of the adoption agency involved in an application for an adoption order or an order under Clause 13 or 15, thus ensuring unbiased representation for the child. Amendment No. 45 represents the Government's wish to take account of all these views by listing on the face of the Bill the persons who shall not be employed as guardians ad litem or reporting officers. The House

827
may feel still further reassured by Amendment No. 44, which provides that rules shall prescribe the duties of reporting officers as well as guardians ad litem. The other Amendments in this group are mainly technical replacing in terms of the Bill the provisions of the present law; Amendment No. 53 inserts after Clause 23 a new clause relating to the adoption of children abroad and replaces provisions relating to provisional orders in the 1958 Act.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER (Lord Maybray-King): My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, wishes me to put any of these Amendments separately, I shall be happy to do so.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: I beg to move.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in their said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord SANDYS: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning in some detail Amendments Nos. 44 and 45 which, of course, relate to the guardian ad litem, and this in some respects justifies the bicameral system of Parliament. We discussed this problem at considerable length in your Lordships' House to ensure the independent representation of a child, and there is no doubt whatever that in these two Amendments another place has greatly amplified, enlarged and improved the situation. I am much obliged to the noble Lord for saying what he has.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 55–62]
Clause 25, page 16, line 18, leave out from ("(5)") to ("The") in line 22 and insert ("after the word "except" there are inserted the words" in accordance with section 20A of this Act or".
(2) The following section is inserted in the 1958 Act after section 20:—
"Disclosure 20A.—(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (6) of this section,".)

birth records of adopted persons.

Clause 25, Page 16, line 23, leave out ("born in England or Wales") and insert ("a
828
record of whose birth is kept by the Registrar General and").
Clause 25, Page 16, line 27, leave out from ("the") to end of line 28 and insert ("record of his birth").
Clause 25, Page 16, line 30, leave out ("who was born in England or Wales and") and insert ("a record of whose birth is kept by the Registrar General and who").
Clause 25, Page 16, line 35, after ("births") insert ("or other records").
Clause 25, Page 16, line 38, at end insert—
("(3) It shall be the duty of the Registrar General and each local authority and approved adoption society to provide counselling for adopted persons who apply for information under subsection (1) of this section.
(4) Before supplying any information to an applicant under subsection (1) of this section, the Registrar General shall inform the applicant that counselling services are avail able to him:—

(a) at the General Register Office; or

(b) from the local authority for the area where the applicant is at the time the application is made; or

(c) the local authority for the area where the court sat which made the adoption order relating to the applicant; or

(d) if the applicant's adoption was arranged by an adoption society which is approved under section 3 of the Children Act 1975, from that society.

(5) If the applicant chooses to receive counselling from a local authority or an adoption society under subsection (4) the Registrar General shall send to the authority or society of the applicant's choice the information to which the applicant is entitled under subsection (1).
(6) The Registrar General shall not supply a person who was adopted before the date on which the Children Act 1975 was passed with any information under subsection (1) of this section unless that person has attended an interview with a counsellor either at the General Register Office or in pursuance of arrangements made by the local authority or adoption society from whom the applicant is entitled to receive counselling in accordance with subsection (4)."
Clause 25, Page 16, line 40, leave out from ("regulations") to end of line 41 and insert ("made by the Registrar General").
After Clause 25, insert the following new Clause—
("In section 22 of the 1958 Act—

(a) the following words are added at the end of subsection (4)—

"or a local authority or an approved adoption society which is providing counselling, under subsection (4A) of this section, for that adopted person.";

(b) the following subsections are inserted after subsection (4)—

"(4A) Where the Registrar General for Scotland furnishes an adopted person with information under subsection (4) of this

829
section, he shall advise that person that counseling services are available—

(a) from the local authority for the area where the adopted person lives; or

(b) if the adopted persons' adoption was arranged by an adoption society which is approved under section 4 of the Children Act 1975, from that society,

and it shall be the duty of such local authority and approved adoption society to provide counselling for adopted persons who have been furnished with information under subsection (4) and who apply to them for counselling in respect of that information.
(4B) Where an adopted person has arranged to receive counselling under subsection (4A), the Registrar General for Scotland shall, on receipt of a request from the local authority or adoption society which is providing that counselling, and on payment of the appropriate fee, send to the authority or society an extract of the entry relating to the adopted person in the Register of Births.")
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 55 to 62 en bloc. While it is generally acknowledged that adopted persons ought to have access to their birth records, the concern expressed in this House about the provisions of Clause 25 extending to persons adopted before the passing of this Bill was shared by the other place. Both Houses felt that, although natural mothers might have been misguided into believing that their anonymity would be preserved for ever, they ought to be afforded some measure of protection against the possible consequences of a change in the law. Following extensive consultatiton, therefore, the Government have decided that persons adopted before the Bill should be required to see a counsellor before they are given the information they seek. We hope that this will reduce the risk of adopted persons thoughtlessly attempting to seek out their natural parents without taking account of the implications.
The counselling scheme will give applicants for information about their birth the choice of being seen at the General Register Office; in the local authority where they live; in the local authority in whose area the adoption order was made; or by the adoption society which arranged the adoption, if that society has been approved by the Secretary of State. Amendment No. 60 therefore lays a duty on the Registrar General, local authori-
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ties and approved adoption societies to provide counselling for adopted persons applying for information. This will be optional for those adopted after the Bill becomes law, but obligatory for those adopted earlier. Amendments Nos. 56 and 58 take up a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, and apply the provisions of Clause 25 to adopted persons who are British but who were born abroad. I do not think there is any necessity for me to say anything more on this group of Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 55 to 62 en bloc.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
3.40 p.m.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to make two interventions at this stage, and the first is on a procedural matter. A number of my noble friends are under the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, proposes to go right through the Bill today, and I wish to reassure them that it is my understanding that we are taking only Parts I and II. Therefore the pressure is slightly less than my noble friends may imagine. The device of moving Amendments en bloc can be interrupted at any stage. It has the convenience, where there is no controversial material, of allowing a Minister to save time and refer to the principles on which a group of Amendments are advanced. There is nothing in itself objectionable about this, provided that it is not used to obscure points of importance. The noble Lord will understand, from what I have said previously, that it has not been possible for me, at the very short notice on which we received the revised list of Amendment groupings, to circulate to my noble friends the groupings indicating the blocs in which the Amendments were to be moved. Therefore although this was useful to myself and to my colleagues on the Front Bench in preparing our material, it was not available to other noble Lords who may well find themselves in difficulty picking out the particular points which they wish to raise from the blocs of Amendments which are being spoken to. I hope that it would be convenient to the House if the noble Lord would now care to make a brief comment on this point, after which I can continue with a comment or Amendment No. 60.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am sorry if I did not make it clear that the purpose this afternoon is to deal with Parts I and II, if we can. I understand that this has been arranged through the usual channels, and I thought that this was known. If I am at fault, I apologise to your Lordships for not making it known at the beginning. I understand that it is the intention to take Parts III, IV and V on Wednesday of next week. I also understand that the Amendments will be available in printed form on Monday. The pressure is only in relation to Parts I and II this afternoon. Perhaps I ought to have made that clear, and I am sorry if I did not.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for making clear the arrangements we have reached. I now wish to draw your Lordships'attention to Amendment No. 60. I thank the noble Lord for his explanation, but I should be grateful if he could go a little further. Many people regard this as emotive and difficult material to deal with, and are not clear what form the counselling, when given, will take. In the Bill it is proposed that there should be numerous categories of people. There are adopted people in Scotland for whom there is no change in the law. There are quite a large number of adopted people in England who are aware of their original names and to whom this provision bears no relation, since they are able to get their birth certificates by straightforward application. In fact, this number is quite large, because adoptive parents normally have the birth certificate of the adopted child through their hands during court proceedings. In England, also, there are those who are adopted subsequent to the passage of the Bill and who will now have to go through the net, and those adopted prior to the passage of the Bill who will go through the net if they wish to. What form of counselling will they receive? The most provocative would be, "You ought not to ask any further, my friend. I am here to stop you finding out something nasty." I cannot believe that it is the intention that that should be the form of counsel, but it suggests itself in many ways as being the end of the line upon which this clause sets out.
More seriously, because it relates to the whole Bill, I should like the noble Lord
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to turn his attention to the question of costing. In this instance the noble Lord's right honourable friend said in another place at column 1376 of Hansard that this exercise might be expected to cost between £20.000 and £50.000. That was at the top of the column, and at the bottom of the column, as I read it, it said that it might be expected to cost £75,000. I do not doubt that something was lost in the transmission of that information, but when one turns to the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum on the original Bill one finds a steady escalation from approximately £2 million at the outset, hovering on £8 million now and with a general supposition—unvoiced officially as yet, I understand—of £14 million in the ultimate at today's costs. That is of the order of seven times the original cost, and it has considerable bearing on the implementation of the Bill because, as I understand it, not much of the Bill will take effect on the day it passes into law and becomes an enactment. Some of the clauses, mostly regulatory clauses and those embodying restatements of existing law, will come into effect on 1st January next year, and the rest in a manner which I find it extremely difficult to follow—and here the pressure of time was very much against one. It says in the Schedules, and in one of the clauses, that it is to be as and when the money becomes available for implementation. We understand the argument behind this. We are aware that courts are very often faced with the alternatives of placinga child in care in a highly unsuitable corrective institution or leaving it in care with highly unsuitable and risk-implying parents. That was one of the unsatisfactory circumstances which led to the conception of this Bill. But if we do not know what any of these exercises is going to cost we cannot know when they are to be put into effect. The one thing which would be worse than waiting a long time to put them into effect when the resources are available would be to put them into effect when the resources are not, when I am told that harm could be done.
We are, then, up against a question of priorities. I think one of the functions of this House must be to attach a label of priority to the passage of this Bill. Albeit we are not a House empowered to deal with financial matters: we are a

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House empowered to give our views on the importance of financial matters; and at a time of economic stringency, when almost every service is crying out against the savageness of the cuts being imposed upon it by outside forces beyond its control and trying to establish a favourable position for itself in the pecking order, I think we have to remember that there is a wide spread of increased costs implicit in this Bill. Furthermore, they are not only costs which immediately suggest themselves in terms of cash, which the noble Lord will doubtless have at his finger tips in response to the circular which went out via the AMA on 27th June, in which the various classes of legislation within this Bill were grouped into eight groups, each with a price tag attached to it. It is not only that, my Lords; there is also the question of manpower costs and training costs.
The Bill will impose considerable strains on the social services and welfare workers. Not merely are they going to have more to do—and I have picked this clause because it is the first one whére we come up against this under the Commons Amendments—but they will also require skills which a great many of them have not yet acquired. It is going to take both time and money for them to acquire these skills, and also, in my humble submission, a good deal of recruitment as well. We were horrified to learn from the Report on the now celebrated case of Maria Colwell that it is not out of the ordinary for a case worker to have a case list of 40 cases. You cannot blandly say, "Here is another Act of Parliament; you will have to go up to 45 or 50 cases". You really will have to recruit somebody else to do the work, and you will have to train them, which costs money; you will have to pay them, which costs money; you will have to provide them with a pension, which costs money; and, indeed, you will have to provide them with transport.
So there are hidden costs, my Lords, and I hope I have made a sufficient plea here for the noble Lord to be able to say what priority is given to this Bill, and to different parts of it, in Her Majesty's Government's programme for public finance. Can he, please, at the same time tell us, in the light of that, when we can expect the various parts of
834
the Bill to come into operation? Because, in my view, it could well be a very long time, which, of course, throws the present situation into slightly absurd relief.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, on Amendment No. 60, which deals with the appointment of counselling officers who shall give guidance to people who have been adopted, I am in rather a state of uncertainty as to how far the use of these counselling officers will extend. Will they have absolute power to give or to deny an applicant the information? Let us take, as an imaginary case, the case of a village maiden in this country in a district where during the war there was an American camp. Let us assume that this village maiden showed her admiration for our gallant allies in a way which subsequently led to the birth of a child. The child will now be grown-up; that child will probably want to get married; that child will probably want to know who his father is. The counselling officer may be in possession of information which shows that that gallant American soldier was really a Chicago gangster. Will he have the power to deny to the adopted child—now a young man—the right to know who his father was; or will he attempt in a tactful way to say, "I do not think that you ought to press your inquiry any farther"? The seriousness of this imaginary situation is this. Will the counsellor often be compelled to disclose to the adopted child his actual parentage, whether pleasant or unpleasant?
Baroness MACLEOD of BORVE: My Lords, may I ask two questions? First, who are these counsellors to be, who is to train them? It seems from what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said, that there will not be a great number of children who will not be able by normal means to find out who their parents were; but there will always be—and that is the reason for Amendment No. 60—a certain number of children who will want to find out. I think it is terribly important to get the counsellors right. As the noble Lord opposite said, it is going to be a very difficult problem to decide how much information should be given. I should like to know that these people will be very specialised and highly trained.

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As I have experienced in my courts—and I have the pleasure normally of granting adoption orders—in many cases one of the parents, presumably always the father, is completely unknown to anybody, very often including the mother. Therefore, in cases where the child wants to know the father and it is not possible to find out because nobody knows including the mother, will the counsellor be able to say or be empowered to say that the father was unknown, untraceable and that therefore they cannot give the information? I think that this is a very delicate matter which I am sure this Amendment will cover, but I wonder if the noble Lord can help me at all.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I know exactly how noble Lords feel. Perhaps I can satisfy them as to my own feelings when I say that I was one of a small group who introduced counselling into the United Kingdom some 35 years ago. I was responsible for many years for the selection and training of marriage counsellors. Having said that, I know how important it is that one should select the right people. Often, people who feel they have the right sort of qualities turn out on interview to be not necessarily the right people to do the work.
I think that one must realise that this is a limited form of counselling. If I may jump around for a while, I can say that this is going to be set up initially by the General Register Office who will also work through the local authorities. The counsellors will, in fact, be social workers. I do not know why the noble Baroness reacts in that way. Can it really be thought that anybody is going to let loose on the public unsuitable people to do the job? They must be specially selected. Notwithstanding the fact that they are social workers, they will have to be specially selected as being temperamentally suitable to do this kind of work. It is not everybody's cup of tea.
Baroness MACLEOD of BORVE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for giving way. It is the specialised knowledge that is of vital importance. The noble Lord has given me the answer I wanted.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It will be a limited field of counselling to deal with one particular aspect where a person feels the
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overwhelming desire to have information as to his parents. Many of us have problems and when we talk them over with somebody the serious worries and anxieties disappear. It may well be when they have talked over their reasons for wanting information they may not want to press this matter.
In reply to my noble friend who sits behind me, I can say this: counsellors will have no power to deny the applicant the information he seeks. Their role is to find out whether or not there is a genuine reason—the word "genuine" is mine—why the person should need this information. If there is a good, valid, genuine reason, the recommendation will be made accordingly. If, in the view of the counsellor, it is not suitable, that will also be passed on; but there the responsibility of the counsellor finishes and it is for somebody else to deal with the situation. I feel we have in our vast and comprehensive network of professional social workers in this country a nucleus; and that is all we need. I would be surprised if we want more than one counsellor in most areas because this is a very small problem, albeit an important one. I hope I have said enough to reassure my noble friend on the counselling point. I would find it difficult to subscribe to any procedure that would let loose the wrong people on the community.
Regarding Lord Elton's question about implementation and cost, let me be perfectly honest; that is difficult to answer. My honourable friend the Minister of State for Health replied recently to a question put to him by a Member in another place. I do not know whether the noble Lord has seen it. Regarding this question, he said something like this: good progress has been made and a substantial measure of agreement reached in discussions between himself and representatives of associations on a programme for the first phase of implementation covering the financial year 1976–77. This takes full account of their assessment of the financial and human resources that will be required.
The associations have shown a strong commitment to do all they can within the resources available to them to implement the Bill and they share the Government's view of the relative importance of the various provisions. Obviously, the

837
timetable—and this is the point the noble Lord raised—has been dictated by the necessity to contain expenditure, though there are many sections of the Bill which do not carry any financial commitment. Discussions are continuing on the detailed timetable, and future decisions will depend on the resource outlook in the summer of 1976 for the financial year 1977–78. My honourable friend went on to say that it would take local authorities at least a full year to prepare for the statutory requirement to provide a comprehensive adoption service, and probably a further period before the necessary high standards are achieved to justify bringing in some sections of the legislation.
I do not think I can take it beyond that except to say, regarding the access to birth records—and I do not want to go over the counselling point again regarding costs—it is difficult to for cast the likely number of applications to be dealt with. But the estimated cost of providing such a counselling service, including social workers and clerical staff—and the noble Lord has to see in that the question of selection, training and consultation—could be between £35,000 and £70,000 a year. The cost of counselling locally in local social service departments is bound to vary. I can only say that it is difficult to give him an adequate answer.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, by leave, may I ask the noble Lord, before he sits down, whether he can carry out a similar speculative assessment of the cost of the whole Bill, and give a similar approximation when the whole Bill may eventually be working? I do not see where else I can ask this; it is obviously a matter of interest to the House.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: I cannot, my Lords; but I will take advice on both these matters. Whether I can give the noble Lord an answer before we adjourn today, I do not know. But if I cannot, the noble Lord will understand that I shall not be available next week and so I will arrange either for somebody to write to the noble Lord or for the necessary information to reach him in some other way.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask whether I have interpreted correctly my noble friend's reply to the
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specific point I put, which was as follows: if an adopted child goes to a counsellor and asks: "Who is my father?" and if the counsellor is in possession of that information, is he compelled to give it to the adopted child?—tactfully of course.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the answer is, No; because the counsellor will have no authority to pass on information of that kind to a person who has been adopted. As I understand the situation, it could be possible on occasions that a counsellor might not even personally have that information. I see the counsellor's role as trying to find out why the information is needed and then reporting to the person responsible why it is needed. I would not have thought, although I may be wrong about this, that the counsellor would be in a position to give information: that would not be his or her role.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 63 to 71]
Clause 26, page 17, line 2, leave out ("subsections are") and insert ("subsection is")
Clause 26, page 17, line 10, at end insert—
("(aa) the following subsections are inserted after subsection (1)")
Clause 26, page 17, line 12, leave out ("in") and insert ("only as respects")
Clause 26, page 17, line 13, leave out ("outside England and Wales") and insert ("in Scotland")
Clause 26, page 17, line 18, leave out ("in") and insert ("only as respects")
Clause 26, page 17, line 19, leave out ("outside Scotland") and insert ("in England or Wales")
Clause 26, page 17, line 29, at end insert ("and for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400"")
Clause 26, page 17, line 30, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
("(c) the following subsection is substituted for subsection (5)—
"(5) Section 16 of the Children Act 1975 shall apply where a person is convicted of a contravention of subsection (1) of this section as it applies where an application for an adoption order is refused."")
Clause 26, page 17, line 36, leave out from second ("of") to ("the" in line 39 and insert ("the adoption order (whether or not he knows the identity of the applicant,")
4.8 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I beg to move that this House doth agree with

839
the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 63 to 71, which, subject to your Lordships' permission, I should like to take en bloc. In dealing with these matters, I should like first to deal with Amendments Nos. 63 to 71 in Part I and to discuss at the same time․
Lord ELTON: Did I hear the noble Lord mention Amendment 77?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: I do not think that we can go quite as far as that. I think I shall have to put Amendments Nos. 63 to 71 en bloc because when we were considering Amendments Nos. 30 to 39—and I hope the noble Lord will tell me if I am not making sense about this—I referred to Amendment No. 72 and I talked to that Amendment. So I am advised that I shall have to put that seperately. Therefore, I propose to move en bloc Nos. 63 to 71 and in doing so I should like to talk to Amendments Nos. 94 to 96 and to Scottish Amendments Nos. 101 to 103 and 110 to 112A in Part II.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I think it is as well, since the noble Lord will not be here on Wednesday, to put it on record that it may be necessary to go over some of the ground again when it comes to the Scottish Amendments, because I simply have not been able to take a view on the implications for Scotland beyond the point we have now reached. My noble friend Lady Elliot will be here next Wednesday and it may well be she will have questions to raise then. I hope it will not be out of order for her to do so. I do not think there is anything to prevent the noble Lord speaking to these Amendments, provided it is not taken by the Chair to mean that those Amendments cannot be spoken to again when we resume on Wednesday.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with respect, it will be all right if they are not moved, and I do not know whether we are going to get to Nos. 110 and 112. If we do, the obvious thing is that I must not move them and then they will be available for your Lordships to discuss next Wednesday.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, this is becoming rather difficult. I am told that once you reach a point on the list you cannot reverse. We are in a genuine
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difficulty here because I do not know the content of these Amendments though some of my noble friends may be aware of them. I think there are only four Amendments before we are due to stop. If it is the noble Lord's intention to stop at No. 114, perhaps we could stop at No. 110. This is a procedural difficulty about getting to the end of Part II.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I was about to make the same observation. Perhaps it would be better to stop at No.100. I shall not then be taking any of the Scottish Amendments so that when the House considers this matter again they can start at Amendment No. 101.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, Amendments Nos.77 and 96—and I will not refer to No. 112A—give the court power to order the return of children taken away illegally pending the hearing of certain applications for adoption and custodianship orders—which are custody orders in Scotland. If the order is not obeyed, the court may authorise an officer of the court to search premises and return the child or a justice of the peace may authorise a constable to do the same.
Amendments Nos. 69 and 95 are the first of a number of Amendments which raise maximum penalties in the Bill and other children's legislation to £400. In another place this was thought to be a much more realistic figure and I think many of your Lordships will agree. I will not read out all the Amendments in which there are penalties but there are a large number. The point I want to make is that the penalty has been increased to £400. I do not think there is any necessity to say anything more on that.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amedments. —(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord ELTON: My Lords, this seems a sensible way of proceeding and the grouping of 63 to 71 is easier to cope with. My noble friend Lord Sandys would like to make a few comments.
Lord SANDYS: The noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, has spoken to Amendment

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No. 96 and there is one point I would like to raise. When an application is made for a search warrant and evidence is taken on oath and such evidence proves satisfactory the justice of the peace may issue a search warrant to a constable to search premises for a child. In this instance the question I would like to ask the noble Lord is whether a search warrant can apply to more than one house or premises at a time. Naturally, this power will be used with great discretion by the justices concerned, and I wonder whether normally a warrant is issued for one premise or domicile at a time.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, having been in the position in the past of issuing such things, I should have thought it was in relation to one specific address. I think the addresses have to be inserted. My information is that I am right. A search warrant names the premises one at a time.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 72]
Clause 26, page 17, line 43, leave out from ("application") to ("is") in line 45 and insert ("is pending for an order under section 14 of the Children Act 1975 and—

(a) the child is in the care of the adoption agency making the application, and

(b) the application was not made with the consent of each parent or guardian of the child,

no parent or guardian of the child who did not consent to the application").
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 72.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.— (Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 73 to 77]
Clause 26, page 18, line 8, leave out ("£100") and insert ("£400").
Clause 26, page 18, line 31, at end insert—
("2A) In any case where subsection (1) or (2) of this section applies, and—

(a) the child was in the care of the local authority before he began to have his home
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with the applicant or, as the case may be, the prospective adopter, and

(b) the child remains in the care of the authority,

the authority shall not remove the child from the actual custody of the applicant or of the prospective adopter except in accordance with sections 35 and 36 of this Act or with the leave of the court.")
Clause 26, page 19, line 2, leave out ("£100") and insert ("£400").
Clause 26, page 19, line 10, at end insert—
("(7) In relation to Scotland, subsection (2A) of this section does not apply where the removal of the child is authorised, in terms of Part 111 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, by a justice of the peace or a children's hearing").
After Clause 27, insert the following new Clause.

("(1) An authorised court may on the application of a person from whose custody a child has been removed in breach of section 34 or 34A of the 1958 Act order the person who has so removed the child to return the child to the applicant.

(2) An authorised court may on the application of a person who has reasonable grounds for believing that another person is intending to remove a child from the applicant's custody in breach of section 34 or 34A of the 1958 Act by order direct that other person not to remove the child from the applicant's custody in breach of the said section 34 or 34A.

(3) If, in the case of an order made by the High Court under subsection (1), the High Court or, in the case of an order made by a county court under subsection (1), a county court is satisfied that the child has not been returned to the applicant, the court may make an order authorising an officer of the court to search such premises as may be specified in the order for the child and, if the officer finds the child, to return the child to the applicant.

(4) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a child to whom an order under subsection (1) relates is in premises specified in the information, he may issue a search warrant authorising a constable to search the premises for the child; and if a constable acting in pursuance of a warrant under this section finds the child, he shall return the child to the person on whose application the order under subsection (1) was made.

(5) An order under subsection (3) may be enforced in like manner as a warrant for committal.

(6) Subsections (3), (4) and (5) do not apply to Scotland.").

Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 73 to 77.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.— (Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I hope it will be in order for me to say that we are very pleased to see Amendment No. 77.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENT
[No. 78]
Clause 29, page 19, line 34, at end insert—
("(6) The Secretary of State shall, within seven years of the date on which section 29 of the Children Act 1975 comes into force and, thereafter, every five years, publish a report on the operation of the schemes since that date or since the publication of the last report.
(7) Subject to the following subsection, subsection (4) of this section shall expire on the seventh anniversary of the date on which it comes into force.
(8) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument at any time before the said anniversary, repeal subsection (7) of this section.
(9) An order under subsection (8) of this section shall not be made unless

(a) A report has been published under subsection (6) of this section, and

(b) a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House.

(10) Notwithstanding the expiry of subsection (4) of this section or the revocation of a scheme approved under this section, subsection (1) of this section shall not apply in relation to any payment made, whether before or after the expiry of subsection (4) or the revocation of the scheme, in accordance with a scheme which was approved under this section to a person to whom such payments were made, where the scheme was not revoked, before the expiry of subsection (4) or, if the scheme was revoked, before the date of its revocation.")
4.16 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 78. I am proposing to take this Amendment on its own. As your Lordships will know, it relates to schemes of payments to adopters. Well guarded though it is, the relaxation proposed in this clause to the present law restricting payments to adopters has caused a great deal of concern. This Amendment, which adds still more safeguards, has been made to meet this concern; and
844
perhaps I might indicate what are the further safeguards.
The Secretary of State will be required to publish a report on the working of the scheme within seven years and his power to approve further schemes of payment will then expire unless, before that time, he has made an order which will have to be approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament so that it may continue. If such an order is not made, the Secretary of State will be required to publish further reports every five years. I know that this was a matter of some concern to your Lordships when this subject was discussed, but it seems that this Amendment imposes sufficient safeguards and I hope your Lordships will feel able to accept it.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord ELTON: My Lords, this Amendment represents an improvement. The point I wish to make is raised, as it were, by the Amendment but is outside the Bill itself. As I read the Amendment or the amended clause, it has the effect that in the case of a child of special difficulty, whether by reason of a mental or physical or other handicap, the adoptive parents may be given financial resources which are not open to the natural parents. If this is the case—and I am advised that it is—I should have thought that it was necessary for Her Majesty's Government to examine very early the problems that this poses, and particularly to ascertain that there is never a case when a child goes into adoption from natural parents, who do not receive such payment, to adoptive parents, who do receive such payment, which could have remained with its natural parents had they received this payment. That is the point at which I think injustice would be seen to occur, though it might be implicit in other cases where there will be difficulty in making borderline judgments. It would be plainly wrong if it were financially possible for adoptive parents to look after a child as the result of payment of Government subsidy in some form, which it was financially impossible for the natural parents to look after.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the noble Lord is working on the assumption that children with a mental or

845
physical disability, who are available for adoption, have been given in adoption simply and solely for financial reasons. I do not think the evidence bears that out. I will not say that this has not happened, but from the evidence available I should not have thought it was primarily the case. Those of us who have been around homes, institutions and so on—I know that the noble Lord has himself visited them—have seen children who have been left behind for long periods, sometimes for years, because nobody wants them on account of some physical or mental defect. We must bear in mind that it has been shown conclusively that there are people full of compassion in the community who are prepared to take them, not because they want the money but because they have needed to do what they want to do. I should have thought that it was highly desirable to take out of homes and institutions children who have some kind of disability, and put them into a normal family life.
With regard to whether a mother should be helped financially to look after her mentally or physically handicapped child, as the noble Lord knows, if she has the child at home and that makes it impossible for her to work, she can call on the State for help. Many of them do so. We are dealing with another point and I do not think we ought to confuse the two.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, with respect, I do not think it is another point. The noble Lord has stood my feelings on their head. I am in no way suggesting that this money should not be made available if it will have the enormously beneficial result of getting some of these children out of homes where they have a generalised and institutional life, into homes where they have a personal and particular love which is more real and more effective. I have no objection whatsoever to that.
I think the noble Lord will accept that the bringing up of such children also imposes a great emotional, physical and financial strain on natural parents. I am not asking the noble Lord to alter this Bill, but to satisfy himself when the Bill becomes law, if necessary, that when it is deemed that it is necessary to give money so that somebody who is not a natural
846
parent can look after a child, it is in justice right that the same amount of I money should be made available to the natural parent. Financial worries are a very real problem. They keep people awake at night and, as a result, they become more irritable and less compassionate and understanding. They eventually find that this worry, added to the others, diminishes their ability to cope with the very difficult task of bringing up handicapped children.
The noble Lord has assured me that State resources are available. I am asking from my ignorance—again, I have not had time to do my homework properly —for the noble Lord or his Department to step in and, when it becomes apposite, to see whether there is a discrepancy and find out whether the same degree of help can be given to the natural parents, thus perhaps avoiding the necessity of adoption. When we were dealing with Clause 3, we agreed that one of the principal factors in the amended Bill was that it pointed out that adoption is not the cure-all and, indeed, not the best aim where a child can remain in its natural home. I believe that the noble Lord has got my message. I am not trying to keep children out of love. I am trying to put them into it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 79–84.]
Clause 30, page 21, line 9, leave out subsection (9)
Clause 30, page 21, line 13, at end insert—
(11) This section and sections 31 to (Procedure in magistrates' courts) do not apply to Scotland")
Clause 31, page 21, line 14, leave out from beginning to ("by") in line 15 and insert ("An authorised court may, on making a custodianship order or while a custodianship order is in force.")
Clause 31, page 22, line 10, after ("1973") insert ("and sections 3 and 4 of that Act (supplementary provisions)")
Clause 31, page 22, line 12, at end insert ("subject to the following modifications, that is to say—

(a) in section 2(2) (b) and (4)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1973 any reference to a parent of the minor to whom the order relates shall be construed as including a reference to any other individual;

(b) section 3(3) of that Act shall have effect as if the words "or the custodian"

847
were inserted after the words "application of either parent".").

After Clause 32 insert the following new clause—
("—(1) Before revoking a custodianship order the court shall ascertain who would have legal custody of the child, if, on the revocation of the custodianship order, no further order were made under this section.
(2) If the child would not be in the legal custody of any person, the court shall, if it revokes the custodianship order, commit the care of the child to a specified local authority.
(3) If there is a person who would have legal custody of the child on the revocation of the custodianship order, the court shall consider whether it is desirable in the interests of the welfare of the child for the child to be in the legal custody of that person and—

(a) if the court is of the opinion that it would not be so desirable, it shall on revoking the custodianship order commit the care of the child to a specified local authority;

(b) if it is of the opinion that while it is desirable for the child to be in the legal custody of that person, it is also desirable in the interests of the welfare of the child for him to be under the supervision of an independent person, the court shall on revoking the custodianship order, order that the child shall be under the supervision of a specified local authority or of a probation officer.

(4) Before exercising its functions under this section the court shall, unless it has sufficient information before it for the purpose, request—

(a) a local authority to arrange for an officer of the authority, or

(b) a probation officer,

to make to the court a report, orally or in writing, on the desirability of the child returning to the legal custody of any individual, and it shall be the duty of the local authority or probation officer to comply with the request.
(5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (3)(a) the order may require the payment by either parent to the local authority, while it has the care of the child, of such weekly or other periodical sum towards the maintenance of the child as the court thinks reasonable.
(6) Sections 3 and 4 of the Guardianship Act 1973 (which contain supplementary provisions relating to children who are subject to supervision, or in the care of local authority, by virtue of orders made under section 2 of that Act) apply in relation to an order under this section as they apply in relation to an order under section 2 of that Act.
(7) Subsections (2) to (6) of section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973 shall apply in relation to reports which are requested by magistrates' courts under this section as they apply to reports under subsection (1) of that section").
4.25 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, with the leave of the House I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 79 to 84. I think it will be for the convenience of your Lordships' House if I speak on all the Amendments to Part II—I am sorry, I had forgotten that we had reached Part II. What I want to do—and I hope it will not confuse your Lordships—is to move the whole of the Amendments to Part II, from Nos. 79 to 103.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, we agreed that it should be No. 100, did we not?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am informed now that it would be very much better if we were to finish at No. 103.
Lord STRABOLGI: My Lords, perhaps I may intervene briefly because while my noble friend has been working I have checked on this. If we go up to Amendment No. 103 we go up to the end of Clause 40, which is the end of the English clauses. Clause 41 starts the Scottish clauses.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I will speak to them all but I cannot put them en bloc because in fact I have spoken to certain of the Amendments with the preceding ones, so I shall have to move them separately. For the most part these Amendments are minor or technical or drafting in character, but I wish to draw your Lordships' attention to several Amendments which, in the view of the Government, considerably improve this Part of the Bill, either by providing additional protection for children or by clarifying the intention of the legislation. There are, in addition, a few Scottish points which I may refer to.
The first Amendment I think I should mention is No. 84, which inserts a new clause dealing with care, et cetera of children on revocation of a custodianship order. The Government accepted in another place that the Bill did not accord sufficient protection to children who were the subject of applications for the revocation of custodianship orders and that an Amendment was needed to ensure that the court dealing with a revocation application had adequate information and

849
appropriate powers to make whatever orders it saw fit. The general effect of this new clause is to provide that when determining whether to revoke a custodianship order, the court is to consider what result revocation of the order would produce for the child, having regard to the provisions of Clause 39(1) on the revival of rights to legal custody on revocation, and that, if the court has insufficient information for this purpose it is to be required to call for a report. Where the court considers that the operation of Clause 39(1) would produce results that would not accord with the welfare of the child, or that supervision would be desirable, the court is empowered to commit the care of the child to a local authority or to make a supervision order.
Coming now to Amendments Nos. 85 to 88, I have already mentioned the forward references to Part II of the Bill in Clauses 9 and 10. These forward references are linked with the specific requirement which is laid on the court by Amendment No. 85—and that is No. 113 in relation to Scotland—to give particular attention to an adoption application made by a relative or step-parent of the child, including one made jointly by a step-parent and a biological parent.
Amendment No. 85 goes on to provide, by the insertion of the extra words creating a new subsection (l)(a), that where an adoption application is made by a person or married couple who do not have any relationship to the child the court may still make a custodianship order instead of an adoption order, but that in such a case the presumption in favour of the custodianship order is not so strong.
The effect of these Amendments is to alter Clauses 33 and 46 so as to bring them more closely into conformity with recommendation 20 of the Houghton Committee, which was that,
"where a relative, including a step-parent applying jointly with his spouse applies to adopt a child, the law should require the court first to consider whether guardianship would be more appropriate in all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the long-term welfare of the child."
My Lords, if I may come now to Amendments Nos. 89 to 93, these include Amendments Nos. 91 to 92 which are, under my grouping, designed to ensure
850
that the local authority officer reporting to the court on an application for a custodianship order, includes in his report relevant information relating to the members of the applicant's household. Although the duty in considering an application to take account of the applicant's family and household environment was already covered in Clause 36 by reference to the welfare principle, the Government have accepted that among the many matters to be investigated under this provision, the requirement to take account of other members of the household is of sufficient importance to include it in the factor specified in subsection (3).
Therefore, the Government Amendments provide for regulations to be made which will set out in more detail than at present would be possible or appropriate in the Bill, the kind of information that must be included in the report. These arrangements, therefore, will follow the present practice in adoption proceedings where, under the Adoption Agencies Regulations, the agency is required to ascertain so far as is reasonably practicable, for example, particulars of all members of the proposed adopters' household and their relationship, if any, to the proposed adopters.
If I may pass on to Amendments Nos. 94 to 96, they relate to a new clause dealing with the return of children taken away in breach of the restriction in Clause 37, to which I have already referred in dealing with Amendment No. 77. The effect of this provision is to ensure that where children are taken away from persons whose application for adoption or a custodianship order enjoys the protection afforded by the Bill, those persons can recover the child with minimum of delay and maximum of certainty.
My Lords, Amendments Nos. 98 to 103 are technical Amendments, the most important of which is No. 103, which inserts a new clause dealing with the procedure at the magistrates' courts. It is at that point, at Amendment No. 103, that I propose to stop. Therefore, I beg to move that Commons Amendments Nos. 79 to 84 be adopted.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
4.33 p.m.
Lord SANDYS: My Lords, I should like to address myself to Amendment No. 81, which I think is an appropriate point to commend to your Lordships the problems which were encountered in your Lordships' House on custodianship, which is a whole new concept in English law. One problem which was encountered in the other place, and spoken to at considerable length both in Standing Committee A and during the later proceedings, was the distinction between guardianship and custodianship. Unfortunately, we have no definition in the Bill of "custodianship".
The only reference in the Official Report that I can find is a very helpful distinction drawn by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, in the Official Report of this House on 21st January. I hope that it will not be inappropriate to quote it here, because in our thinking, this is a particularly important distinction, and a very important point. The noble Lord said:
"… whereas a guardian replaces a parent and has responsibilities relating to both the person and the property of the child, a custodian takes over only his responsibilities relating to the person of the child, usually in a parent's life-time, and has no responsibilities relating to the child's property."—(Official Report; 21/1/75, c. 92 and 93.)
We have had difficulty with the concept of custodianship. We have also found in regard to the use of custodianship orders and supervision orders the great advantage of the provision in Clause 31(4) that the two may be used in conjunction. I think your Lordships' House has been much obliged for the elucidation which the noble Lord has given of this wholly new concept, and I would commend him for giving it because it has been very helpful to us.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 85 to 88]
Clause 33, page 23, line 1, leave out from beginning to ("are") in line 2 and insert—
("(1) Where on an application for an adoption order by a relative of the child or by the husband or wife of the mother or father of the child, whether alone or jointly with his or her spouse, the requirements of section 12 or, where the application is for a Convention adoption order, section 23(6) are satisfied, but the court is satisfied—
852

(a) that the child's welfare would not be better safeguarded and promoted by the making of adoption order in favour of the applicant, than it would be by the making of a custodianship order in his favour, and

(b) that it would be appropriate to make a custodianship order in the applicant's favour,

the court shall direct the application to be treated as if it had been made by the applicant under section 30, but if the application was made jointly by the father or mother of the child and his or her spouse, the court shall direct the application to be treated as if made by the father's wife or the mother's husband alone.
(1A) Where on an application for an adoption order made—

(a) by a person who is neither a relative of the child nor the husband or wife of the mother or father of the child; or

(b) by a married couple neither of whom falls within paragraph (a), the said requirements").

Clause 33, page 23, line 6, leave out from ("30") to end of line 8.
Clause 33, page 23, line 14, leave out from ("30") to end of line 17 and insert—
("(2A) Where a direction is given under this section the applicant shall be treated (if such is not the case) as if he were qualified to apply for a custodianship order and this Part, except section 36, shall have effect accordingly.").
Clause 33, page 23, line 22, at end insert—
("(4) Subsections (1) and (1A) do not apply to an application for an adoption order made by the child's mother or father alone.").
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 85 to 88.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 89 to 93]
After Clause 33 insert the following new clause: —
".—(1) A court dealing with an application made under this Part, or an application which is treated as if made under section 30, may request—

(a) a local authority to arrange for an officer of the authority, or

(b) a probation officer,

to make to the court a report, orally or in writing, with respect to any specified matter which appears to the court to be relevant to the application, and it shall be the duty of the local authority or probation officer to comply with the request.
(2) Subsections (2) to (6) of section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973 shall apply in relation to reports which are requested by magistrates' Courts under this section as they apply to reports under subsection (1) of that section."
Leave out Clause 35.
Clause 36, page 23, line 43, leave out from ("shall") to end of line 2 on page 24, and insert ("arrange for an officer of the authority to make a report to the court (so far as is practicable) on the matters prescribed under subsection (3) and on any other matter which he considers to be relevant to the application.
(2) The Secretary of State shall by regulations prescribe matters which are to be included in a report under subsection (2) and, in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the prescribed matters shall include—").
Clause 36, page 24, line 9, leave out ("and") and insert—
("(bb) information of a kind specified in the regulations relating to members of the applicant's household;").
Clause 36, page 24, line 11, at end insert—
("( ) Subsections (2), (3) and (3A) of section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973 shall apply to a report under this section which is submitted to a magistrates' court.")
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 89 to 93.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 94 to 96.]
Clause 37, page 24, line 19, at end insert:
("(1A) In any case where subsection (1) applies, and

(a) the child was in the care of a local authority before he began to have his home with the applicant, and

(b) the child remains in the care of a local authority,

the authority in whose care the child is shall not remove the child from the applicant's custody except with the applicant's consent or the leave of a court.")
Clause 37, page 24, line 23, leave out ("£100") and insert ("£400").
After Clause 37 insert the following new clause:

(1) An authorised court may on the application of a person from whose custody a child has been removed in breach of section 37 order the person who has so removed the child to return the child to the applicant.

854

(2) An authorised court may on the application of a person who has reasonable grounds for believing that another person is intending to remove a child from the applicant's custody in breach of section 37 by order direct that other person not to remove the child from the applicant's custody in breach of that section.

(3) If, in the case of an order made by the High Court under subsection (1), the High Court or, in the case of an order made by a county court under subsection (1), a county court is satisfied that the child has not been returned to the applicant, the court may make an order authorising an officer of the court to search such premises as may be specified in the order for the child and, if the officer finds the child, to return the child to the applicant.

(4) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a child to whom an order under subsection (1) relates is in premises specified in the information, he may issue a search warrant authorising a constable to search the premises for the child; and if a constable acting in pursuance of a warrant under this section finds the child, he shall return the child to the person on whose application the order under subsection (1) was made.

(5) An order under subsection (3) may be enforced in like manner as a warrant for committal".

Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 94 to 96.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Wells-Pestell.)
Lord SANDYS: My Lords, may I speak very briefly on Amendment No. 95? I have given the noble Lord notice that I would speak. The question concerns fines and the adjustment of the fine of £100, it being increased to £400. The question which arose in our minds in your Lordships' House and indeed elsewhere is whether in this case and in others the fines would be adjusted either by Order or by further Resolution at a later date. We assume the latter.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: That is so, my Lords.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
The DEPUTY SPEAKER (Lord MAYBRAY-KING): My Lords, I will not put Amendment No. 97, because it now appears as Amendment No. 112A at some later stage in the Bill.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
[Nos. 98 to 103]
Clause 38, page 24, line 30, after ("child") insert ("by virtue of a custodianship order made by a magistrates' court")
Clause 38, page 24, line 39, after ("made") insert ("by a magistrates' court")
Clause 38, page 24, page 25, line 1, after ("money") insert ("made by a magistrates' court")
Clause 40, page 25, line 19, after second ("the") insert ("child or the")
Clause 40, page 25, line 25, after ("(1)") insert—
("(a) if the custodian is married to the child's mother, or (b).")
After Clause 40 insert the following new clause:
"(1) It is hereby declared that any jurisdiction conferred on a magistrates' court by virtue of this Part is exercisable notwithstanding that the proceedings are brought by or against a person residing outside England and Wales.
(2) A magistrates' court may, subject to subsection (3), proceed on an application for an order under this Part notwithstanding that the defendant has not been served with the summons, and rules may prescribe matters as to which the court is to be satisfied before proceeding in such a case.
(3) A magistrates' court shall not—

(a) make an order under this Part requiring a person to make payments towards the maintenance of a child, or

(b) vary an order under this Part so as to increase a person's liability to make payments towards the maintenance of a child,

unless the person has been served with the summons.
(4) Rules may make provision as to the persons who are to be made defendants to a complaint for an order under this Part, and where there are two or more defendants to such a complaint the power of the court under section 55(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 (power to award costs etc.) shall be deemed to include power, whatever adjudication the court makes, to order any of the parties to pay the whole or part of the costs of all or any of the parties.
(5) In this section "rules" means rules made under section 15 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1949'…"
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 98 to 103.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.— (Lord Wells-Pestell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Lord STRABOLGI: My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration of the Commons Amendments be adjourned.
Moved, That further consideration of the Commons Amendments be adjourned. —(Lord Strabolgi.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR informed the House, That he had received from the Chief Bankruptcy Registrar of the High Court of Justice a Certificate that Richard John Earl of Lucan was on the 20th day of August 1975 adjudged to be a Bankrupt.

LOCAL LAND CHARGES BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons agreed to with Amendments; the said Amendments to be printed.
POLICYHOLDERS PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons agreed to with Amendments; the said Amendments to be printed.
  SOVIET UNION AND VISAS FOR JOURNALISTS
  SOVIET UNION AND VISAS FOR JOURNALISTS
  CURRENCY: RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRINTING
  CURRENCY: RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRINTING
  CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: EMPLOYMENT
  CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: EMPLOYMENT