Sitting of 3 June 1974

Preamble
The House—after the Adjournment on 24th May 1974 for the Whitsuntide Recess—met at half-past Two o'clock, notice having been given by Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 122 (Earlier meeting of House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

FLIXBOROUGH (EXPLOSION)
Mr. John Ellis Mr. John Ellis (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will make a statement on the explosion which occurred at Flixborough, near Scunthorpe, on Saturday 1st June, and if he will order a public inquiry to be held.
The Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. Michael Foot): At about five o'clock on Saturday 1st June the factory of Nypro UK Limited, situated in the village of Flixborough in North Lincolnshire, was shattered by a violent explosion followed by a fire which raged all the following day and may not yet have been extinguished.
Twenty-nine people are either dead or are missing and must be presumed dead. There is severe damage to property near the scene, less serious damage over a wide area, and minor damage has even been reported from many miles away.
All Members of the House will join me in sending a message of deep sympathy to the relatives of the dead and missing. I should also like to add my sympathy to the injured and to those who have been made homeless. A tribute must also be paid to the emergency services in the area, including the voluntary services, whose efforts to cope with the fire and destruction and to help the injured and homeless deserve the highest praise.
The plant is owned jointly by the National Coal Board and the Dutch State Mining Company. It uses a number of highly flammable raw materials of which
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a major one is cyclohexane in the manufacture of caprolactam. This is a raw material used in the manufacture of Nylon 6. This is one of a small number of plants of this type throughout the world and the only one in this country. As there is already a shortage of this material, there will be economic problems to be added to the death and destruction which have resulted from the explosion.
Within two hours of the incident, locally-based members of the Factory Inspectorate were on site and they were joined late on Saturday evening by a deputy chief inspector from London. On Sunday the Under-Secretary and the Chief Inspector visited the site. They were later joined by three experts from our London headquarters and an electrical inspector. The Chief Inspector has now formed an investigation team to gather the facts as soon as possible while memories are fresh. The team will be under the control of the superintending inspector for the area and he will be able to call on any help that he may need. By courtesy of the police, with whom they are closely co-operating, they have formed a temporary headquarters in the police building in Scunthorpe. For the moment access to the plant is still limited by the fire, but witnesses are already being interviewed.
This investigation is proceeding with all speed, but I must decide in what framework it should now be set. Her Majesty's Factory Inspectorate has been worried for some time about the escalation of risk associated with certain new technologies. It is no secret that the Chief Inspector is on record in his annual reports as expressing his own concern, and that concern is now bound to be widely shared.
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Bill which is now going through the House will greatly assist in relation to this kind of development, since it will provide for the licensing of some of these plants. Arrangements for close co-operation between planning authorities and the new licensing controls will be within the scope of the Health and Safety Commission when it is set up. To that extent I believe that the new legislation will be a major contribution to control in the future, but it is not the case that all efforts to deal with this problem have been allowed to wait upon legislation.

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In 1969 the Factory Inspectorate and the Department of the Environment set up a joint working group the object of which was to look at the implications for planning authorities of the sitting of factories which may involve a major hazard. As a result of this an interdepartmental procedure enables planning authorities to call upon the advice of Her Majesty's Factory Inspectorate when considering applications for new developments. This procedure is, I believe, developing in a way which may well provide a pattern for the future.
I am sure that the whole House will agree that it is necessary to hold a full public inquiry into these events, but hon. Members will also understand that the problems which are raised by the explosion are not confined solely to the matters for which I hold responsibility. I will urgently consult with my colleagues to decide the form the inquiry should take and the terms of reference it should be given.
Decisions about this must clearly be taken as soon as possible, but I believe that the House and the country will also appreciate that there is a double problem—first, how to ensure that the public inquiry is properly rigorous and far-reaching and, second, to learn immediately, if we can, whether there are first aid measures to be taken to prevent any repetition of this terrible tragedy elsewhere.
Mr. Ellis: May I first pay my condolescences to all those who have been bereaved or injured in this disaster? May I also thank the police, firemen, ambulance and hospital workers, teams from the steelworks, and all voluntary associations typified by the Salvation Army, who worked together so magnificently and well? May I also thank mayors and chairmen, their executives and workers, including the new Humberside authority, for the role that they played and are continuing to play? Last but not least, may I pay tribute to my constitutents who, as I saw throughout a night of horror and terror, refused to panic in the face of other dangers and rumours which fortunately did not materialise?
May I now thank the Minister, and in particular the Under-Secretary, for his and his Department's efforts? Will he add his representations to mine to the Prime Minister on the need to improve
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organisation nationally and to have one senior Minister in charge to co-ordinate at this level? Arrangements were plainly not adequate in this respect.
Will my right hon. Friend immediately make representations to his ministerial colleagues so that the homeless, those needing the help of social security, and so on, can be speedily helped?
Regardless of the inquiry, will my right hon. Friend immediately review safety procedures in similar chemical plants and look at the possibilities of restricting large amounts of chemicals and gases to be processed and stored, with a view to preventing any recurrence of tragedies on such a disastrous scale?
Finally, will my right hon. Friend agree that the cost in terms of grief and misery that my constituents have had to suffer and are still suffering on the altars of wealth and so-called technical achievement is too high for a so-called civilised society to bear, and will he now concentrate his and the Government's attention on ensuring the safety and well-being of the community and ending this rape of the environment?
Mr. Foot: I am sure that the whole House appreciates the strength of the emotion which my hon. Friend shows on behalf of his constituents in the horror which he and they have had to face over the past few days.
I hope that arrangements will be adequate to deal with the immediate situation, but if there are any ways in which we can improve them we will seek to do so. I hope to proceed to my hon. Friend's constituency with him later in the week to see whether we can add anything to what has been already done by those who have done so much to deal with the immediate problem.
I think that most of the other questions my hon. Friend put to me were dealt with in my main answer. Certainly, there is no question in our minds but that there must be a full public inquiry of the most far-reaching character. Nothing can be hidden in a matter of this character. However, hon. Members will appreciate that, to have the knowledge that we need to deal with the immediate situation, we cannot wait for the full inquiry in order to take full action on these matters and we will be seeking to do so in the best way that we

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can. We will also seek to co-ordinate as best we can the social services and the health and education services to assist in dealing with the problems.
sir G. Howe: Will the Secretary of State accept that the whole House will join him in extending very deep sympathy to the relatives of those who have died and to those who have been made homeless and also in extending gratitude and praise to those in the emergency services and voluntary organisations who have brought so much help so quickly?
Will the Secretary of State also accept that I for my part follow the reasoning behind his decision to separate the inquiry into two halves, but there is widespread anxiety to get at the cause of this incident as quickly as possible through the investigation team which is now at work and, in particular, to exclude any suggestion of sabotage if that is the right conclusion?
In the light of that investigation, will the Secretary of State consider also whether the interdepartmental procedure he described which enables consultation to take place ought not as an early step to be tightened to require consultation when developments of this kind are in hand?
Can the Secretary of State give the House some indication of how quickly it will be possible to repair the economic damage from this disaster?
Finally, will the Secretary of State accept that I am sure the whole House will accept the decision to establish a full public inquiry into the matter? Because of the breadth of multiplicity of interests involved, will he give further consideration to the establishment of an inquiry comparable to that established into the Aberfan disaster under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act which combines authority with fairness and enables us to draw the lessons which should be learned for the whole of society from such a disaster?
Mr. Foot: To take the last question first, we will consider every possible form of inquiry and see which we think is best suited to deal with this case. We do not exclude the proposal made by the right hon. and learned Gentleman for an inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry Act.
It is not possible for us to estimate the amount of economic and other damage
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which has been done until at least we are able to get on to the site. That has not been possible yet. Therefore, it is not possible properly to answer some of the questions which right hon. and hon. Members and the country obviously wish to have answered. It would be unwise for me to try to answer some of them before we have further information.
As for making arrangements under the interdepartmental procedure obligatory rather than voluntary—not that they are voluntary in present circumstances, as I understand it—the Health and Safety at Work Bill, which is now in Standing Committee, and even more so the regulations that can be made under that Bill, can ensure that these procedures can be made much tighter and much more effective than anything we have had in the past. This is one of the main purposes of the Bill.
Mr. Cyril Smith: Will the Secretary of State note that the Members on the Liberal Bench wish to be associated with the expressions of sympathy to relatives and with the expressions of thanks for the excellent job done by the emergency services?
Can the Secretary of State give the House any indication of when this factory was last inspected by the inspectorate? Secondly, can he give us an assurance that the inquiry which he will set up will include within its ranks people who are technically qualified in this field? Finally, can he say whether the company involved had given a statement to its employees of the risks under which they were working such as the company would now be required to give once Clause 3(2) of the Health and Safety at Work Bill becomes law?
Mr. Foot: An inspection was carried out in November of last year and it was conducted by those in the chemicals inspectorate who were fully qualified to do so. However, I think it would be wrong of me to comment on what was said at that time and to say what might be the views expressed in any inquiry now on the report which the inspector made then.
Mr. Wrigglesworth: The Minister will be aware that on Teesside we have one of the largest chemical complexes in the whole of Europe and, indeed, the largest

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chemical complex in the United Kingdom. Is he aware that in 1969 two men were killed in a tragic explosion which occurred in the ICI nylon factory there when cyclohexane was ignited? I am sure that the Minister understands the terrible anxiety felt on Teesside as a result of the tragic explosion at Flixborough. Will he insure that chemical companies such as ICI make clear to the residents in areas like Teesside exactly what risk there is in the plant, and make it clear to my constituents and those in the whole of the neighbourhood the dangers which are present, because there is a strong feeling that the company has not made available all the information which it should have done? I shall be grateful if he can given an assurance that companies will make this information available so that the residents are made aware of the dangers which are present.
Mr. Foot: Of course, I understand the anxieties which my hon. Friend and other hon. Members have expressed because of this terrible explosion, and the fears which may exist in other areas. I should emphasise to my hon. Friend that the process on Teesside is different from that which was in operation here and, as I said in my statement—indeed, I said it for this purpose—this is the only plant of this type operating in this country. However, I appreciate that that does not remove people's anxieties. One of our purposes immediately will be to see what immediate steps can be taken in other cases to try to learn more of what happened. But that policy to some extent depends on inquiries which we are able to make.
As for the more general question which my hon. Friend raised about requiring firms to make much more public what they propose to do and the implications of what they are doing, I believe that all those desirable requirements are covered by the Health and Safety at Work Bill, and certainly the passage of that Bill and the regulations which will accompany it will mean that much fuller information will have to be given in the future, whatever may have been the situation in particular cases in the past.
Sir Bernard Braine: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what happened at Flixborough has wide and urgent impli-
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cations in other areas where there is already too great a concentration of high fire risk installations, such as Canvey Island where 30,000 of my constituents are hemmed in by massive oil, gas and chemical storage, including 1,200 tons of cyclohexane, the material used at Flixborough, and all of which is within a few hundred yards of people's homes? Yet, on top of this, my constituents are being required to accept two new oil refineries.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that successive Governments have consistently rejected the opposition of local authorities to this situation, and have ignored the warnings that I have uttered in this House about these unacceptable risks to my constituents? Is he further aware that his colleague the Secretary of State for the Environment in the last fortnight has refused an inquiry into the totality of risk to our Thamesside communities? May I ask him, therefore, whether the inquiry that he will set up will be wide enough to take into account the matters which I have raised? Will he also ask the Prime Minister to take a grip on the situation and order that these two refineries cease building until such time as the findings of the inquiry are known?
Mr. Foot: The hon. Gentleman naturally expresses the anxieties of his constituents on the subject, as did my hon. Friend and as many other hon. Members may wish to do. It is only natural that they should seek this opportunity to do so. I am not in any sense deprecating that fact. I only say to the hon. Gentleman that, as I understand it, it is a different process from that which was carried out in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Scunthorpe (Mr. Ellis). It is a storage provision in the hon. Gentleman's constituency and not the manufacturing process which was involved in this explosion; so there is a distinction. However, when the hon. Gentleman asks whether all the matters which he has mentioned will be covered in the terms of reference of the inquiry which we are proposing, that is precisely one of the reasons why I say to him that we must consider how wide those terms of reference are, but we must also see how we can do this so that we can learn as quickly as possible from this explosion whilst carrying the matter further.

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The hon. Gentleman also touched upon the amenity aspects, which are extremely important. These matters will be greatly affected and, we believe, greatly improved by the proper operation of the Health and Safety Commission which will be set up under the Health and Safety at Work Bill.
Mr. Prescott: Will my right hon. Friend accept that I, too, wish to identify myself with the commiserations which have been extended to the relatives and with the tributes which have been paid to the emergency services on Humberside for their efforts this weekend?
Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that this incident has caused great anxiety in my constituency, and particularly among those on the north bank who were affected by the explosion? They are concerned at the possibility of the new technology creating even greater explosions than were envisaged before. We have other plants engaged in this new level of technology on the north and south banks of the Humber, concentrated into small areas two or three miles from huge housing estates. Would my right hon. Friend consider looking at this matter in the short term and will he issue a reassuring statement because of the great anxiety felt by many in the area? I realise that this is a difficult thing to do, but we shall have to make some statement on those lines to reassure people about the further possibilities of explosions with this new type of technology.
Mr. Foot: I will certainly consider what my hon. Friend has said, but it is a general problem and, as I indicated in my original statement, the Chief Inspector of Factories has himself already issued warnings about some of the developments of these new technologies. What has occurred is bound to mean that the whole country must pay more attention to his warnings.
Mr. Brittan: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that, in spite of the inter-departmental procedures which have been referred to, there is considerable anxiety in areas such as that near ICI Wilton, where processes of this kind are already in operation? Will he accept that the only way of effectively allaying those anxieties is to ensure that the terms of reference of the inquiry are sufficiently wide to investigate the safety
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procedures in operation at plants other than the one in question and to make recommendations relevant to plants everywhere in the country?
Mr. Foot: I understand the representations which the hon. Gentleman is making and which have been made by others. I am certainly not proposing to limit the terms of reference of the inquiry before we have even considered exactly what they should be. Several of the matters which the hon. Gentleman has raised are now being debated in the House of Commons in preparation for the Bill which is being put on the statute book to deal precisely with some of these questions.
Mr. Selby: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that, while conveying our sympathy to all concerned, consideration will be given to people who are still living in the area, whose houses have been damaged and who need compensation for that damage? Is he aware that following the great storm in Glasgow five-and-a-half years ago people are still getting demand notes for their share of the repairs?
Mr. Foot: My hon. Friend raises the question of compensation, and, of course, many people in the stricken area are bound to be asking the same question. I understand that the firm issued a statement yesterday in which it said:
"A committee has been formed to take urgent action regarding compensation to all who have been affected. The Management wish to state today that the company will fully meet its commitments."
I should add that the Government also will have to have consultations with the firm about the composition of that committee and how the work is to be done. Certainly that matter is being dealt with.
Mr. Crouch: I think it is appropriate that I should declare an interest, in that I have a considerable interest in the chemical industry and synthetic fibre industry. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is satisfied that there is a full appreciation in his Department, in the Home Office, in the Department of Industry, in the fire services, the local authorities and all the other authorities which are concerned when factories are built that, while there are dangerous processes in the chemical industry, those

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dangers are known, the safety precautions exist, and that as the economic scale is enlarged in those plants so the scale of danger is enlarged? Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that that knowledge is fully appreciated in all the departments which I have mentioned?
Mr. Foot: I am not sure that I can answer the hon. Gentleman's question in the terms in which he put it. But this terrible tragedy shows that the safety precautions are quite insufficient, and that much more must be done about it. The public inquiry will be one way by which we shall hope to discover methods by which we can assist that process. However, I feel that we are all entitled to emphasise in the House that, even before this terrible tragedy had happened, the fact of the passage of the Health and Safety at Work Bill through Parliament is evidence that we realised that insufficient was being done. I commend to the House once again what the Chief Inspector of Factories has himself said on this subject. He has given warnings to the country, and our job is to make sure that those warnings are translated into practical effect.

ADJOURNMENT (SPRING)
Resolved,
That this House, at its rising tomorrow, do adjourn till Monday next— [Mr. Mellish.]

NORTHERN IRELAND
Motion made, and Question proposed That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Golding.]
Mr. Speaker: Before calling the Secretary of State to open the debate, I must inform the House that I have literally an enormous list of hon. Members wishing to speak. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will have regard to that fact.
3.0 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mr. Merlyn Rees): We meet again following the recall of Parliament because of the problem of Northern Ireland and in the wake of a grave political development. The departure from office of the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive is a blow to all of us who saw it as a means for the two communities in Northern Ireland to live at peace among themselves. I want to look back at the events of the last few years before assessing the future.
The House will recall that following the introduction of direct rule in March 1972 the then Government embarked on intensive consultations with the various interests and parties in Northern Ireland about the political future of the Province. The Government of the Province had for 50 years been in the hands of a single political party, and there had developed in Northern Ireland a fundamental split between two communities—one perpetually in government, and one politically excluded.
The old machinery of government in Northern Ireland was not able to produce a Government supported, let alone accepted, by the whole community. It became increasingly apparent during the consultations mounted by the last Government—the Darlington conference, the Green Paper and so on—that the fundamental need in Northern Ireland was a new form of Government able to secure government by consent; and in the White Paper published in March 1973, and later in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act itself, specific and careful provisions were made for this.
There followed many weeks of patient exploration and negotiation, and, although some Northern Ireland party leaders

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refused to take part, the leaders of the Unionist, Social Democratic and Labour and Alliance Parties were eventually able to reach agreement on the formation of a new Northern Ireland administration. Shortly afterwards, the leaders of these parties joined the Government of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland in subscribing to the Sunningdale Agreement, which was in some respects firm and in others tentative in that it left matters for further negotiation.
I believe that those who were party to that agreement were making an imaginative and important step towards resolving those problems and issues which are the concern of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Moreover they did so without sacrificing in any way the basic principle about the status of Northern Ireland.
On 1st January 1974 wide-ranging powers were devolved to the new Executive in Northern Ireland, and direct rule ceased. Responsibility for law and order was reserved to Parliament and vested in the Secretary of State. The Executive had been in existence for a mere five weeks when the General Election was called. The result in Northern Ireland was a severe blow to its authority.
The Government in March experienced within weeks a vicious campaign of proxy bombing by the Provisionals. The extent to which the Provisional IRA was prepared to go was revealed to this House by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when, on 13th May, he told of the Provisionals, "scorched earth" plan.
It has been the policy of successive Governments to pursue a political solution to the Northern Ireland problem. In my speech to the House on 4th April I emphasised our continued support for power sharing and for the Sunningdale Agreement. Furthermore I sought to encourage genuine political activity, and subsequently de-proscribed Sinn Fein and the Ulster Volunteer Force.
There has been other political action too. In the General Election campaign, which, as I have just said, added significantly to the strains on the month-old Northern Ireland Executive, much play was made in Northern Ireland of the Sunningdale Agreement, with the Agreement in many cases being misrepresented
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and the fears of many Ulster people being cynically and unjustly aroused. More recently there was the damaging political strike in Northern Ireland called ostensibly as a result of a vote in the Northern Ireland Assembly in favour of the Sunningdale Agreement.
I now move to the course of this sectarian and political strike—disowned completely by the Trades Union Congress. On 14th May the Ulster Workers' Council called a strike in the Province. This group is a non-elected body of men that sought to subvert the expressed wish and authority to this Parliament through unconstitutional and undemocratic means involving widespread intimidation.
Mr. Anthony Fell: Like the miners' strike.
Mr. Rees: It is not like the miners' strike. Speaking as the son of a coal miner, I can say that we have never used guns.
I made clear immediately that I would not negotiate on constitutional matters with the Ulster Workers' Council, although I was at all times willing to meet elected representatives, and both I and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State did so on a number of occasions. In the same way as I refused to be bombed to the conference table by the Provisionals, so I have been adamant that a sectarian strike by so-called Loyalists and backed by para-military forces would not force me to such a conference table.
The strike bore the ugly face of intimidation. The extent to which pressure was applied was illustrated by events on the first Friday evening of the strike. Extremists went on the rampage in Ballymena. Three "pubs" and a fish-and-chip shop that remained open against "orders"—I put the word in inverted commas—were wrecked. The Catholic owner, and his brother, of a Catholic "pub" south of Ballymena were murdered at point-blank range. The RUC reacted swiftly, and 35 persons were arrested; 33 have now been charged. It was this Ballymena incident that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister characterised as the work of thugs and bullies. He was absolutely right in this description. The incident demonstrated the violent forces which

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emerge, and are the consequence of, a strike of this nature.
There was a progressive interruption in the essential services. As a result of this, and in particular of the worsening effect of the power situation, extra troops, including specialist technicians, were flown to Northern Ireland. The extra troops were used first to help keep the main access roads to Belfast open and subsequently to deal with road blocks on other roads in the Province. It was always clear that soldiers, sailors and airmen could maintain only to a limited degree the services necessary for the preservation of life, and that the extent to which this was possible was in certain areas dependent upon the co-operation of management. This was not forthcoming.
The position was discussed with Mr. Faulkner, the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), and Mr. Napier on Friday 24th May at Chequers. No commitment was entered into. But the leaders of the Northern Ireland Executive asked for a limited operation. This request was considered by the Cabinet, and authority was given for it. It consisted of a plan to operate 21 petrol stations and two oil storage depots and to supply petrol and oil to essential users and chemicals to the Londonderry gasworks. In taking this decision we were moved by our knowledge of the facts in Northern Ireland and the views of the Northern Ireland Executive which was responsible for the services affected, and not by pressures from any individual politicians in Northern Ireland. This was an operation of a deliberately restricted nature. It was never more nor less than that. Some of the reports on this which seemed to emanate from Belfast appeared to show that the days of the romantic novel are not over.
Then there remained a decision on the timing of the operation. This was determined by the need for proper Army preparation, by the situation on the ground, in the power, petroleum and other industries, which was changing from hour to hour, and also by a further security operation which was carried out on the Saturday night by the Army. The Army moved into the petrol depots at 5 a.m. on Monday 27th May. It achieved total surprise and deserves the highest praise for the efficiency with which it conducted this delicate exercise.
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The electricity situation worsened, and by Tuesday 28th May a serious difference of view had developed within the Northern Ireland Executive as a result of the external and internal political strains to which it had been increasingly subjected throughout the period of the strike. Mr. Faulkner had reached a position in which he could no longer maintain the unity of the Executive. After consulting his supporters in the Assembly and the Unionist members of the administration, Mr. Faulkner felt that the right course was to appoint a mediator to negotiate with the Ulster Workers' Council, or else he should resign. The SDLP members of the Executive were opposed to both these courses. The Alliance Party was in favour of a mediator but not of resignation. I made it clear that the Government could not be a party to negotiation on constitutional matters.
Mr. Faulkner felt that in these circumstances the only honourable course was to resign. I accepted that resignation and the resignation of the Unionist Members of the administration. It was clear that in these circumstances there was no basis for a power-sharing Executive as envisaged in the Constitution Act and that the Executive ceased to exist. It would be right for me to pay tribute at this stage to Mr. Faulkner. No one could have fought harder for what he believed to be right; he earned and deserved total respect for his honesty, integrity and courage.
What caused the strike? I believe that in recent years a new form of Protestant nationalism has been emerging in Northern Ireland which has culminated in the events of the past few weeks. It has brought together many strands of what has hitherto been regarded as Unionist opinion. There is no doubt that the events of March 1972, with the ending of Stormont by a Conservative and Unionist administration, fed this development. I hasten to add that it was an action which the Labour side fully supported.
Many other events have fed that development too. A period of direct rule; the Sunningdale Agreement; the advent of power sharing, not as a principle but on a basis which has proved unacceptable to a large section of the Protestant

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community; the frustration of apparently unending violence in all its forms and, not least, the large bombs earlier this year in Belfast and other large towns, have all contributed. All these events have been deliberately misrepresented and exploited by those who have sought power not on the basis approved by this House but by unconstitutional action designed solely to achieve their own domination. And all too many people have been prepared to be used for these ends. Too few have been prepared to stand up for constitutional processes and have lent themselves to unscrupulous and unconstitutional politics which have had no basis of concern for the people of Northern Ireland.
During the strike I was left in no doubt by industrialists, by churchmen and by establishment organisations of a variety of kinds that I should negotiate with the Ulster Workers' Council. This view was also shared by the small Northern Ireland Labour Party. The Government could not do that, because it would have been an open recognition that constitutional matters had passed to the control of non-elected people. This was not an industrial dispute but a major political confrontation.
There must now be a breathing space by all concerned with Northern Ireland affairs. The Government must use it to find a further way forward, but others must make their reappraisals too. We all need time, and it is for this reason that we have used the provisions of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act to continue the government of Northern Ireland while no elected Executive is in existence. The Constitution Act contains provisions to enable us to carry on the government of Northern Ireland without damaging the fabric of the Act. By virtue of the powers in Section 8 of the Act, Ministers in the Northern Ireland Office will be appointed to the heads of the various Departments in Northern Ireland so that the executive government in the Province can be carried on. The Assembly has been prorogued by means of an Order in Council made under the authority of Section 27(6) of the Act. The arrangements are by their very nature temporary, and a new power-sharing Executive can be formed under the constitution if this should prove possible. In any event.
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short though the time available is, we must all use it to move forward.
What then of the future? The loss of the Northern Ireland Executive is a sad blow. The Executive represented a bold coming together of political parties prepared to set aside some of their differences for the sake of Northern Ireland as a whole. We should not forget the magnitude of the differences which they were able to resolve in their short period of government, including the major achievement of phasing the Council of Ireland agreement. I have already paid tribute to Mr. Faulkner, but the House will also wish to join in paying tribute to the hon. Member for Belfast, West and Mr. Napier. One thing I learned in Northern Ireland was that the courage of the members of the Executive was not just political courage, for the lives of them and their families were constantly at risk.
I have already begun, and shall continue, the task of exploring the views of political leaders in Northern Ireland. On Friday last I discussed with them the principle of power sharing. I was not attempting to set up anew the Executive. Indeed, I had the day before advised the Queen that the Assembly should be prorogued.
The hard fact remains that the Executive built up by the previous administration, by the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw), has ended. In the three months that I have been Secretary of State for Northern Ireland I have made it my aim to sustain it and to work the Constitution Act 1973 on which it was based. The political climate after 28th February changed radically and rapidly, but I am sure the House will agree that it was right to continue this approach as required by the Constitution Act, even though it became increasingly clear that the Executive was unlikely to have the time which was vitally necessary for it to prove itself. I say to the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border and to the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) that I was right to do that, that I would do it again and that I have not the slightest regret that I did that on behalf of the new administration.
We now have to move forward in these circumstances. I do not believe that we have a long period in which to find the policy on which to do this. Firm decisions on future policy cannot be taken

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in the immediate future, but 1 put to the House some of the facts on which it must be based. The first is that at present the Ulster Workers' Council, backed by para-military forces, commands much support in large sections of the majority community, which is based on a new but ill-defined form of Ulster Protestant nationalism. Unionism no longer means what it used to mean.
The second fact is not new but, after three months, I realise its force even more than I did before. Over the last five years over 1,000 people have been killed. This includes 257 soldiers, 52 members of the RUC and 717 civilians. There has been about £120 million-worth of damage to property. The bombings the killings and the violence are sometimes carried out by children on behalf of the IRA. It must never be forgotten that there have been more than 250 sectarian murders, the overwhelming proportion of which were committed by Protestants.
Next, and arising out of this, are the methods of dealing through the law with those who bomb and kill. It is not possible to use the normal processes of the rule of law. There is too much intimidation and too much fear. I am bound to tell the House that I have signed two main groups of interim custody orders since February. They covered both sides of the divide. I must also inform the House that there are many people in the Maze Prison who are there because they have committed acts of murder and terrorism, often on a horrifying scale, on both sides of the border, but witnesses dare not, or will not, give evidence in public in front of a normal court of law.
I tell the House simply that to have left these people free would have been to endanger the lives of innocent people. There would have been more explosions and fires in the large cities. There would have been more sectarian murders of the vilest kind. This does not mean that it is not our intention to phase out detention in accord with the Sunningdale Agreement, but that very clearly was linked to the security situation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General will deal tonight with our proposals for investigation of the Emergency Provisions Act.
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There are in the Province para-military forces in both communities with their splinter groups that cannot be dealt with by the RUC alone. Given the large number of weapons that still come into the Province, allied with the sectarian feelings that prevail, there are the ingredients for large-scale murder. In its worst form it could be civil war. The fact is that without the British Army the forces of law and order could not cope in the immediate future.
Then there are the facts of the financial and economic burden. I offer these not in a threatening fashion, but, if we are to consider the situation from a defence point of view and a law and order point of view, let us look at the economic situation as well.
Northern Ireland is heavily dependent on the rest of the United Kingdom for governmental financial support, and this dependence has been growing rapidly in recent years. There is room for discussion about the exact figure. For instance, does one include loans? But the broad message of the figures is clear. In 1971-72 the transfer of reserves, excluding loans, was about £125 million; in 1972-73 about £180 million; and in 1973-74 about £310 million. The estimated figure for 1974-75 is £350 million. With the loan element added in, the total is £430 million.
This is not understood in Northern Ireland. People there say that they pay the same taxes as in Britain. Of course they do, but the figures I have just quoted are for transfers from United Kingdom funds, in addition to Northern Ireland's fair share of United Kingdom tax revenue. The proportion of United Kingdom tax revenue which is allotted to Northern Ireland is properly calculated in consultation with the Northern Ireland Department of Finance and takes full account of the profits earned by companies in Ulster. Northern Ireland will, it is estimated, receive £420 million from United Kingdom tax revenue for 1974-75. No deduction is made from this sum in respect of the costs of defence, overseas aid, foreign affairs and so on.
All this leaves out of account the extra cost of keeping a large part of the Army in Northern Ireland and of the operations there, which is running at about £33

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million a year. I should add that gross domestic product per head in Northern Ireland is well below the United Kingdom average.
I have received today a report from the Northern Ireland Finance Corporation, which says:
"The specific effects of the strike in monetary terms are therefore estimated as follows: £225 million."
In recent weeks we have all been faced with the Protestant backlash, which appeared in the form of industrial action backed by intimidation. We cannot ignore that some members of the minority community aspire ultimately to a united Ireland, and even more important, that all of them want, and are entitled to, a proper place in the life of Northern Ireland. In the past the conflict was between Republicanism and Unionism. The conflict is now not with Unionism but with Ulster Protestant nationalism. But in the aftermath of the majority Protestant strike we cannot in this House ignore the feelings and needs of the minority, which power sharing was designed to meet.
I want to say, in the presence of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, and in view of my responsibilities in the Province for the units which are in Belfast and the border areas and up to Derry, that we should make clear in the House our responsibility not only to the troops but to their wives and parents and the community in this country.
Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: Will the right hon. Gentleman consult his right hon. Friend and say whether he thinks that an allowance of 50p a day is adequate for the job which the troops are doing so wonderfully, as he has described?
Mr. Rees: I shall consult my right hon. Friend on that.
For the moment, in reporting to the House, I think that it is our role to listen to all opinions, and this we shall do. It will be my job following this debate to meet and discuss with the leaders of all political parties in Northern Ireland and to consider the views of all those who have constructive views to offer.
I must, however, make it clear that we are firmly against the often expressed
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populist view that we should pull out quickly and let the two communities fight it out, and that we should watch the result on television. I therefore ask those who favour withdrawal to make clear their disapproval of this extreme view. I ask this because of my security responsibilities in the Province, and I ask it because of the effect it could have on the para-military forces.
I must make it clear, as we did when we were in opposition, that the Government are firmly against integration of Northern Ireland with the rest of the United Kingdom.
The breakdown of the power-sharing Executive must not lead to a period of inactivity. Time is not on our side. In the past two years there was evolved by the previous Government a line of policy which we supported. We were right to do so.
For three months, we in the Government have made it our aim to support the arrangements devised by the previous administration. We did this in the face of a rapidly changing political situation. This Government must now find the way forward. Today and tomorrow we are here to listen, and we see this debate as the beginning of the reappraisal. We must then make decisions. It will be our hope to carry the whole House with us.
3.26 p.m.
Mr. Francis Pym: This is not the first time Parliament has been recalled on account of events in Ireland, and I do not suppose that it will be the last.
At the outset I should like to express, as the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland did, the most genuine appreciation of hon. Members, certainly on this side of the House, of Mr. Faulkner and his colleagues for the way in which they set about their work in the Executive. This brave new experiment in the sharing of power was never going to be easy. Controversy was always going to surround it. The manner in which Mr. Faulkner and his Executive carried out their business through such difficult days commands the respect of every hon. Member. It is a tragedy that it became impossible for them to continue, but I do not believe that their efforts have been in vain.

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On the contrary, even though the Executive had a short life they have shown that it is possible to have a Government in Northern Ireland that includes men of a far wider range of views and traditions than the Province has known before. They have shown not only that compromise is essential in Northern Ireland but that it is practicable. There are plenty of people ready to write off that spirit of compromise, but I see no hope of peace without it.
It is, of course, absolutely right for Parliament to return to debate the situation in the Province, to re-examine our policies and to re-establish our objectives. The Secretary of State has already had preliminary talks, and he has many long days of further talks ahead of him. Obviously, the situation calls for a thorough reassessment, and a heavy responsibility lies on the Secretary of State. The manner in which he conducts the consultations and discussions is very important, and we certainly wish him well in what is an exacting and personally demanding task.
One of the most important functions of this debate is to clarify the Government's objectives. It is essential for these to be restated, for otherwise they may not be attainable. In my view, there is some doubt about those objectives. The Secretary of State, with the best will in the world, has not altogether satisfied everyone this afternoon, and the Prime Minister must, as I am sure he will, dispel those doubts tomorrow. For example, there have been suggestions in recent days that the Government might have objectives other than those that they have declared. I do not suppose that that is so, but we need to be clear about it.
It is fair to say that the Prime Minister's broadcast has itself been a contributory factor to this uncertainty. To anyone who knows something of Northern Ireland, the effect of his words on the people there was completely predictable. The question is, therefore, whether the Prime Minister was himself aware of what the effect would be. In the light of his long and close interest—10 years or more—in Northern Ireland, I find it difficult to think that he did not know.
The alternative is that the Prime Minister did know and that he said what he did with deliberate intent. I find that
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equally difficult to accept. Whichever it was, one is left with the doubt about his objectives, because his broadcast gave great offence throughout Northern Ireland and consequently worsened what was already demonstrably a highly charged situation.
The other aspect of events during the last fortnight that I cannot forbear to mention is the handling of the Army in relation to the strike. There was, or at any rate there seemed to be, delay in removing barriers and there seemed to be indecisiveness. The Government looked as though they were changing their minds. At any rate, that is what I think it felt like to the country, and that is a fatal impression to give in such circumstances. If ever there was a time for strong leadership and firm action based on clear decisions, that was it.
All that is past history now, but it is relevant to the present situation and to the future because it has contributed significantly to bringing the whole position of our troops in Northern Ireland to the forefront of public debate. The Prime Minister has been forthright and consistent in his assurances that they will stay. He has always taken that view, and it was reasserted today by the Secretary of State. But we know what the Secretary of State for Defence said after Easter. I was in Belfast that morning and experienced the heightening of tension that followed.
I ask the Prime Minister to tell us tomorrow whether that speech was an aberration. I think that he has already indicated that it was, but it is curious that it has been followed by something of an orchestration in the Labour Party —elsewhere as well, I know, but mainly in the Labour Party—of the demand to bring our soldiers home.
The Prime Minister has said in the House several times that the consequences would be civil war and massacre; he has been absolutely consistent in what he has said. Almost all responsible politicians throughout Ireland, including the Unionists and the SDLP, support a peacekeeping role by the British Army in Northern Ireland. We on this side believe that to abandon the people of Northern Ireland, as it is said, to their fate would be to abandon them to strife, to the horrors of political oppression, and to bloodshed.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said this and I have repeated it today. Is it not a danger to raise it again as though it were in doubt? I specifically mentioned the point because of the strong feeling on the part of the Government. Can we make it abundantly clear that there has been no orchestration on this? There are views in the country on it, and it is the view of the Government that the troops should not be withdrawn.
Mr. Pym: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, and, of course, I accept that. But it was because this matter has become more to the forefront of public debate that it seemed to me important that the Prime Minister should do that. [HON. MEMBERS: "Orchestration?".] If hon. Members do not like that word, I will gladly withdraw it, but I would say that many more hon. Members have been talking about it; that cannot be denied. It is precisely because of its importance that I raise it now.
As I was saying, our position is that it would be absolutely wrong for that to happen. I am glad that both sides of the House are in agreement on that. Obviously, such a conflict as would follow any question of withdrawal would not leave the rest of the United Kingdom unaffected, and it would be an abnegation of our pledges and commitments towards Ulster.
I myself cannot express our long-term aim more clearly than by saying that it is to reduce our forces in the Province to normal garrison levels as early as possible. The whole effort of the House has been and continues to be the achievement of a political and security situation in which that is possible. Such does not exist at present. Over a period, we wish to see Ulstermen taking more responsibility for their own defence. It must be the urgent task of the Government to examine ways and means of achieving this, so that troops can be reduced to normal strength and so that policing can once again be the responsibility of policemen.
The constitutional position has been provided for by the border poll. The people of Northern Ireland have voted to remain part of the United Kingdom. This House has accepted that and planned for
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the Province on that basis. We have sought to build a system which provides for broadly based government in Ulster and which aims to build a united Ulster rather than a united Ireland. We need to work for understanding and conciliation, and that requires from us a conciliatory approach. The last thing that we must do is contribute anything to their fears.
When he was in opposition, the Prime Minister put forward a plan on Ireland which I think had 14 or 15 points and which some in Northern Ireland take to be Government policy. This has caused some misunderstanding. I am sure that it would be helpful if tomorrow the Prime Minister could say that this plan is not relevant to the present situation and that any suggestion or impression given to the nation of edging Ulster towards a united Ireland is counter-productive and out of his thinking.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I cannot see what the right hon. Gentleman is trying to prove in this speech. When he refers to my speech, he will remember that his right hon. Friends greatly welcomed it at the time. He will know that one of the 15 points later embodied in the Constitution Act was the absolute right of the people of Northern Ireland to decide their future, whether within the United Kingdom or in any other direction. That has remained the policy of this party throughout.
Mr. Pym: 1 absolutely accept that, and I endorse that that was a part of it. But there were other aspects to it as well. I believe that hon. Members desire a unity of objective with the Government, and that is why we need these objectives to be clearly stated. I think the right hon. Gentleman will think that that is fair.
I come now to the present situation and the reality as it exists today—
Mr. Russell Kerr:Not too soon.
Mr. Pym: The first attempt at power sharing has broken down. It has been a remarkable story. There is much to contemplate in the long sequence of events throughout the present troubles, but recriminations over causes and who is to blame do not seem to be useful at this critical juncture. The important

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thing is that power sharing has been shown to be possible. I say that despite the events of the last few weeks.
The days when the idea was prevalent that those with long-standing differences could not work together are now behind us. Some may feel that because the first power-sharing Executive has broken down—indeed, has been forced down by the Ulster Workers' Council—the idea itself is finished. I do not accept that, and I am glad that the Secretary of State did not accept it either today.
The principle has become widely accepted among the people of Northern Ireland as a reasonable and sensible constitutional way of progressing if a suitable coalition of personalities and parties can be achieved. However unfruitful their first attempts may seem, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State must, as I am sure they will, leave no stone unturned in the attempt to find a way of proceeding on this basis. Both of them have expressed their convictions in the principle involved. So has the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe), who said on television last week:
"There has got to be some power sharing."
No doubt like every other hon. Member in the light of what has happened, I, for one, feel compelled to think yet again about all the various alternatives that have been put forward. None of us can afford to overlook any constructive thought which might contribute to a solution. It would take too long to rehearse the case for and against the various so-called "solutions"— integration, re-partition, a federal United Kingdom or federal Ireland, an independent Ulster or any other variation. In each case it appears to me that the disadvantages outweigh the merits.
The right hon. Gentleman spoke last week of the growth of the feeling of nationalism in Ulster. Integration would fly in the face of that, as well as bringing all the problems of the Province to an already overcrowded Westminster. Many Ulstermen do not want their problems brought here. They wish to deal with them in Ulster.
When the Conservative Government considered the problems of what the new system of government in Northern Ireland should be, one consistent theme
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which emerged from almost all the representations made to my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) by the parties—the SDLP and the Unionists, then including the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West), the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Craig)— was that the benefits of regional government in Northern Ireland were very great, that the people of Northern Ireland had come to believe in its value, and that any successful system would have to be within the context of devolved institutions. I think that the people of Northern Ireland would still take that view.
A federal plan, on the other hand, would mean a break-up of the United Kingdom, and, as the Kilbrandon Report said,
"We believe that only within the general ambit of one supreme elected authority is it likely that there will emerge the degree of unity, co-operation and flexibility, which commonsense suggest is desirable."
An independent Ulster is the opposite of what people voted for last year, and the economic consequences are, to say the least, formidable. The adoption by the United Ulster Unionists' Council of a policy of provincial sovereignty in a federal United Kingdom seems to represent a move towards independence. I find some confusion of thought here, because some of those who protest their loyalty to the United Kingdom loudest also call for no interference from London. They cannot have it both ways.
Captain L. P. S. Orr: The House should not be under a mis-concept on this. The wording in that document was to the effect that, in the event of implementation of the Kilbrandon proposals for the rest of the United Kingdom, we would favour this move. But it was only in that event.
Mr. Pym: I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South (Captain Orr)—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] —yes, and my hon. Friend, which he certainly is.
As a party which has always supported the unity of the United Kingdom, we Conservatives would regret any move to sever the historic links between our peoples. In this debate we need to keep the unity of the United Kingdom at the

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forefront of our thinking. At this moment in history the people of Northern Ireland need the rest of the United Kingdom more than at any previous time.
In recent months there has been much loose talk, it seems to me, of this or that policy being "imposed" on Northern Ireland by Westminster. This is a travesty of the truth—a travesty perpetuated perhaps because it suits the argument of those who make it.
Throughout the negotiations of 1972 and 1973 the Conservative Government did all in their power to help and support the decisions of the people of Northern Ireland and their representatives because they are the people who are going to decide in the end.
The Sunningdale communiqué is the most quoted example. It is sometimes alleged that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, in his desire to reach an agreement, forced the various parties at Sunningdale to sit through long hours until they accepted a deal in which they did not believe. I cannot imagine a bigger misrepresentation. This is one of the many myths; myths are popular in Ireland, and this one is a lie. Of course an agreement was wanted by everyone. We did sit long hours. But the only issue was whether it was possible and practical for the representatives of the people of Ireland themselves, both North and South, to strike an acceptable balance between their mutually conflicting aspirations. No wonder the hours were long, but a genuine desire to reach agreement was there on all sides. If that had not been so, the conference would have broken up. I defy anyone to challenge that assessment.
From the British Government's point of view, provided that British interests were safeguarded my right hon. Friend was content to go along with and accept whatever agreement commended itself to the Irish representatives. If they were happy with it, we were content.
My belief remains that the principle of power sharing is not only sound but acceptable. Some hon. Members and some commentators have written it off already. It is easy to say that, and it suits the argument if they are propounding their own solutions. But it is an over-hasty and superficial judgment, because harsh reality requires the power
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vacuum to be filled and I have not yet heard any other proposal which does not present even greater difficulties.
We give full support to Her Majesty's Government in their endeavours to work out a new arrangement founded on this principle. The important factor now is time. I know that the Secretary of State returns to Northern Ireland on Wednesday and intends to treat his consultations and negotiations with urgency. If too much time passes, there will be a risk that new political wedges can be driven between those who represent different sections of the community and who must work together. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman has considered how far he will extend the talks beyond the party leaders. He has indicated that he is prepared to talk virtually to anyone who has any constructive thought, and in that we give him full support. I think that that is what he said.
The need to talk as widely as possible is crucial, because the ultimate solution is for the people of Northern Ireland to thrash out for themselves. The Assembly does not have to remain prorogued for four months. It is important to give the elected politicians a platform in Northern Ireland on which to debate their views, otherwise the voices of those with the greatest television power may drown all others, which is not a very parliamentary way to do things.
When the Prime Minister informed my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir A. Douglas-Home) and me on Wednesday evening of his decision to prorogue the Assembly, we expressed some misgivings about it. But it seems to have been acceptable in the Province, and naturally I am extremely glad about that. I noted the remarks by the Assemblyman for South Antrim on Friday, when he expressed certain concern about a whole range of matters which might be put to one side for the moment. He said:
"Even when decisions are made there will be no opportunity for the democratic voice of the people to be heard unless the Assembly is recalled."
Mr. Merlyn Rees: At an early date I will have to bring to the House the financial appropriations. That will be the first thing.
Mr. Pym: Obviously, it is important to avoid the political vacuum lasting any

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longer than is absolutely essential. We cannot go on without elections to the Assembly indefinitely. The circumstances are now quite different from those which existed before, and it is unrealistic to talk of elections in the sort of terms used by the Secretary of State the last time he referred to the matter. I am sure that he would agree with that.
There is another reason for urgency. The situation existing now is favourable to the IRA and there is an obvious risk of its regaining support. Uncertainty and indecision are favourable to the IRA, and the task of tackling the IRA is made more difficult when the community under constant attack from the IRA is divided within itself. The concern that we all feel about our troops is heightened by civil or political disarray. The very safety of our soldiers and the continuing threat to the lives of ordinary persons are the sharpest incentive imaginable to stir into action those responsible for finding the next political step forward.
I ask the Prime Minister, and no doubt he will make it clear, what team of Ministers he intends to carry the load which now falls on the Northern Ireland office. We are back to a direct rule situation, although in very different circumstances from last time. The shorter it lasts the better, but as long as it lasts, a very heavy burden, which we understand so well, lies on the right hon. Gentleman's team of Ministers.
I should like to say a word about the Republic of Ireland. The co-operation and good will of the Republic remain essential for the achievement of peace. Recent events clearly show that the people of Northern Ireland feel that the price that has been asked for that co-operation is too high, and they are not convinced at any rate not yet, that effective good will is present.
We on this side of the Irish Sea are anxious that the good Anglo-Irish relations that the last Government built up should be maintained and that they should be fostered by the present Government. Almost all political groups in Northern Ireland during the discussions in 1972 declared themselves in favour of formal co-operation with the Republic of Ireland on matters of mutual interest. If that is to be achieved, it will require a more realistic approach from the Republic
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than has been evidenced so far. 1 It is of little use for the Dublin Government to convince this House of their good intentions if they fail to communicate them to the people of Northern Ireland.
Any realistic approach to the Northern Ireland situation must take account of the basic fact that there is not only a Protestant majority but a Catholic minority. It is not good enough simply to talk of "majority rule", as if Northern Ireland would have the British system of alternating parties in power. The permanent exclusion of a large section of the population from any share in government has not shown itself to be a satisfactory form of democracy. Rather it is a recipe for instability, frustration and recurring strife.
Of course the view of the majority must prevail on the constitutional loyalty of the Province. That was provided for in the border poll, the result of which this House has accepted. But within that framework there must be some form of widely based government to meet the unique problems of Ulster's divided society.
There is no dishonour in compromise particularly if it can save lives. The need for compromise has been underlined by recent events. Now a heavy responsibility rests on all political leaders to sit down together, to talk and to work out the form in which that principle can best be expressed. On their success depends the future stability and prosperity of Northern Ireland as a Province of the United Kingdom.
3.52 p.m.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: I wonder whether I may ask a simple question. Has it occurred to any of us who know the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym), the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Rees) why, after five years, these wholly well-intentioned, honourable, hard-working and industrious Ministers have failed to get any success in dealing with the historic problems of Ireland? If anybody had had the political weight, good will, or authority to be successful, it would surely be some of those Ministers.
Therefore, some of us are driven to the conclusion that what might be the

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root trouble, is that the English and Scots are simply no good at dealing with the historic problems of Ireland and that ideas in relation to Ireland very much depend on the stable from which they come. My whole attitude, I assure my right hon. Friend, is not his "often expressed populist view" that we should wash our hands of Ireland, and run away from the problem, and certainly I and most of us have not taken the attitude "Let the Irish cut their own throats"; far from it. It is simply that we are brought by hard reality after five years to recognise our own limitations in dealing with Ireland. Proposals originating in Ireland have on that account a greater chance of success.
Far from washing our hands of the problem, it is simply a belief that people like me should not presume to tell the Irish how to work out their solution. The truth is that they are a very internal people. If Irish Members will forgive me for saying so, some of us are simply amazed by how they can get together one with another after having made the kind of speech about one another that I would not dream of making about a Tory or Liberal opponent. Yet, suddenly, after such a tirade they get together and seem to be friends. I am not saying that Irish Members are better or worse than the rest of us. All I say it that the Irish have a peculiarly Irish way of doing things.
It has been argued that this is all to do with the camaraderie of the House of Commons, that we all meet in the corridors and are firm friends, but that such an attitude does not extend to their supporters. However, I was deeply impressed—I may be accused of great naivety, but this confirms something that contacts had led me to suspect for a long time—when yesterday I spent four very interesting and remarkable hours with the Ulster Workers' Council. Yes, one member of that council took a rather different view of me, but, as far as I understand it. I was warmly welcomed by Mr. Harry Murray and Mr. Jim Smyth and others.
I got the impression that although they would not specifically say so and that it was not the right time or place to say so, they had their lines of communication with the extremists on the other side. The question I want to ask
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is: how can we encourage that communication between Irishmen and Irishmen? One day they will have so to communicate. I put it very gently: if the British Army remains in Ireland, is there not a deep truth in the view that the Irish will always see it as someone else's problem and that as long as the Army remains, Irishmen will hesitate to take certain responsibilities and trust in the British Army to afford a certain kind of protection?
If the Army were withdrawn—I may be deeply wrong in suggesting that it should be done in a few days, and a time limit might be better; I should have thought that that would be messy, but others with maybe more perception than I believe that a time limit would be wiser —the Irish would not only have to come to grips with reality as some of us see it but might be encouraged to form those links which are now at an infant stage.
I hope that a dialogue may begin with a number of groups that have not hitherto been in the discussion. Again I speak to my own party. I may be mistaken, but this is my judgment, and my hon. Friends will have to make their own decision on my powers of judgment one way or the other. I believe that we are seeing an interesting development in Ireland. It is the emergence for the first time of a genuine, authentic, Protestant, working-class leadership. It has to be accepted that in previous Parliaments the kind of people who are now coming to the fore were not noticeably represented in this House. The young UWC man spoke about a "working class salvation with the Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland."
Therefore, although they may have their reservations, I plead with my right hon. Friends that they will at least talk to and listen to those people. I am not turning round on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and saying that hitherto he has been wrong. I am simply saying that from now on I shall plead with him to listen to men like Jim Smyth and Harry Murray and the others, because that may result in a development of a dialogue that may be useful. Such talk could avert alienation.
You asked, Mr. Speaker, that speeches should be short. May I refer to the British Army? I had hoped that the Secretary of State for Defence would take part in

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the debate. Although in April 1973 some of us drew analogies with Palestine in the 1940s, with Algeria in the 1950s and with Vietnam in the 1960s, until a fortnight ago it was quite clear that, however many reservations one had, the Army had a clear function, which was to preserve law and order while the infant Sunningdale Agreement was allowed to take root. I sit down with this question, which I hope will be answered during the debate: can it be made clear, in view of the events of the last week, precisely what the function of the Army is now supposed to be?
4.0 p.m.
Mr. Reginald Maudling: I am grateful for the opportunity of addressing the House on this subject. I was responsible for Northern Ireland affairs for nearly two years. My recollections of that time are not happy. This is not because of minor matters such as the letter bomb or the assault by the then hon. Lady from Mid-Ulster. My recollections are of the appalling strain of office, greater, I think, than in any other office I have held. There was the feeling that one's decisions could affect the lives of men and women, the feeling that anything done wrong could be catastrophic. There was the reading, day by day, of accounts of further murders and atrocities, each one seeming to bear witness to one's own failure to find a solution.
Therefore, the present Secretary of State and his Ministers have my profound sympathy in the work they are undertaking. It is an exceedingly difficult and awesome task. While we must reserve the right to criticise, I am sure that we would also, as a House, give them full support in carrying out such an enormous task.
When the British Army was sent into Northern Ireland in 1969 by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) it was to protect the Catholic community against a very grave situation indeed. The Army was received as protectors, and for some time the situation improved until the position on the streets between the communities was much better. Then the IRA came in and, by its campaign of terror, restarted the difficulties that were for a time beginning to subside. Almost at the same time the reform programme—for which I have
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always thought Lord Moyola deserves the greatest credit in acting with such integrity and staunchness—was going ahead with the support of successive British Governments and would if fully carried out, I believe, as all Catholics would have recognised, have eliminated the legal discriminations against the Catholic community.
By that time it was too late because by that time the minority community was no longer prepared to accept a minority position as citizens within the country in which they lived. They wanted an appropriate share of political power in guiding the destiny of their country. So we came to the concept of power sharing which was evolved while I was responsible as Home Secretary, I think, now that it is not doing so well, that I can without immodesty claim my responsibility for that concept. The concept was based upon what had been stated by my predecessor the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East; namely, that we will never get a healthy political situation in Northern Ireland so long as politics remain sectarian. He rightly said that we would never reach such a situation until the battle of politics was on the same basis as it is in the rest of the United Kingdom.
We were trying to do two things. We sought first, to defuse the border issue and, second, to give to the politicians from both communities experience of working together. Hence the concept of the referenda, to last for a long period of years, which would take the border issue out of practical politics for a long time. The concept of getting politicians on both sides to work together in the common interest of a common community was not, I think, a bad idea. It was rational, fair and dispassionate. Perhaps that is why it did not work in Northern Ireland.
There are many proximate reasons why, for the time being, power sharing is not succeeding. There was the Sunningdale Agreement and the propaganda about it. It is fair to say that the speech of the Prime Minister on television made its contribution. But these are only proximate causes. The basic cause of power sharing breaking down was that the will to make it work did not exist. We overestimated the desire to agree.

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I am forced to two conclusions. First, and it is not a frivolous one, I am convinced now that no Englishman can really understand the problems of Northern Ireland. I remember back in 1970 seeing a television programme showing a young couple with a small baby. I think that they were Catholic, but it would have been the same if they were Protestant. The interviewer was saying to the father "When your son grows up, if he married a Protestant girl what would you do?" The father said "I'd never speak to him again." That made my blood run cold because I knew what was the reality there. Perhaps one forgets these realities in the course of trying to administer a Department of State.
I remember an intelligent Irish journalist saying to me "The trouble is, Reggie, you are trying to pursue a logical policy and that never works in Ireland." The answer was simple. "Very well, I can discover the logical policy, I can advocate that policy, but how do I choose between the 17 illogical policies which are the alternatives?" These are the genuine difficulties created by anyone who tries to apply English-style politics and an English basis of political thought to the problems of Northern Ireland.
That is my first conclusion. My second is that we must now re-examine all alternatives, even some which, up to now, we have completely rejected. The situation is far more difficult than it has ever been, not merely because the scale of the bombing and the killings has grown but because the world in which we live is conducive to this sort of thing. It is a world in which violence is gaining more power, in which groups of men have more than ever become conscious of their power to destroy.
In such a world things are far more dangerous than ever before. Therefore, as a House we must look at all possibilities, however repugnant some of them may be. There will be no new ones; they have all been thought over, chewed over, over the years. There will be no gimmicks, no brilliant new schemes. What are the alternatives? The main ones to the continuation of power sharing are integration with the United Kingdom, re-partitioning and a phased withdrawal of British troops.
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These are the three big suggestions now being considered. Integration is not acceptable to the majority in Great Britain or to the minority in Northern Ireland. I do not think it is really acceptable to the Loyalists, as they call themselves, in Northern Ireland. In some cases this word "Loyalist" is a bit of a misnomer. Their loyalty is not to the constriction and Parliament of the United Kingdom but to their own dreams and desires. Men are perfectly entitled to be loyal to their dreams and desires and to explain them but they should not at the same time argue that they are being loyal to an institution which they wish to defy.
Re-partitioning has been examined time and again. It is not a practical proposition. This will be seen if we look at what is involved in re-partitioning Belfast and separating the Catholic and Protestant populations. Even if it were a practical proposition I do not think it would end the argument about the border. It would merely transfer the issue from one place to another.
I come then to the withdrawal of British forces. This will be seriously discussed in the course of these two days. It is a repugnant thought to consider the withdrawal of the protection of British forces seeking to maintain law and order within any part of the United Kingdom. But there comes a time when we must consider any possibility, however repugnant. I remember how I and my colleagues fought against the concept of immigration control because it was wrong in our belief and fundamentally repugnant to us to exclude from the mother country any citizens of the British Commonwealth.
But, repugnant as it was at the time, we came to accept it and some might argue that we took too long. Now, when we face the facts in Northern Ireland, they are surely that the Republicans do not wish London to dominate Northern Ireland in any way. The Loyalists say that they want an Ulster solution, without interference by London. No one in London, no one in Great Britain, wants to interfere in this situation. All we want to see is a solution, and, above all, one which brings peace to Ulster and solace and relief to our forces and the people of this country.

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Are we not perhaps drawn to this conclusion that the leaders of the two communities in Northern Ireland must sit down together and work out an Ulster solution between them? This must mean that those who wield the power effectively in Northern Ireland must be involved It is no good men conferring about a solution if they cannot deliver the goods once they have agreed. But once this Ulster solution is reached it will not be underpinned by the rest of the United Kingdom. If it is to be a solution on the responsibility of Northern Ireland it must be maintained on the responsibility of Northern Ireland. Neither can it pray in aid the support and protection of Westminster. If both sides come together and reach a solution, then both sides must co-operate in making certain that it works. I suggest that we must be prepared to contemplate a total change in the constitutional relationship between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. I stress "the rest of the United Kingdom". Devolution of power in these circumstances would have to become real. What the new relationship would be in detail I cannot possibly adumbrate at this moment. But I submit that it is now that we must direct our minds to the possibility of a new framework in which greater devolution of power based on agreement between the communities is fitted into a proper United Kingdom framework.
Of course the difficulties are tremendous. It may be said that what happens in Northern Ireland then weakens the cohesion of the rest of the United Kingdom. I doubt that. I think that the problems in Northern Ireland, are so exceptional and so horrific in human terms that they would not have a large influence on the rest of the United Kingdom. The real danger, as the Secretary of State rightly said, is premature withdrawal of British forces. I am quite certain that no one in the House would, in his heart, recommend withdrawing British forces if the consequences would be bloodshed and civil war. But, on the other hand, I am coming to think that there is quite an argument for saying to the people of Northern Ireland that we want to withdraw British forces, apart from, possibly, the garrison strength, and in our saying to the people of Northern Ireland that we want to see them work
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out their own solution because we believe that they would have a better chance to work out that solution among themselves if they knew that it was the desire of the British Parliament that as soon as possible the maintenance of law and order and security in the Province should rest on their shoulders and not on ours.
All courses are fraught with danger. Successive Governments have tried honestly to reach a rational solution. Bipartisanship in the House has had great value. The alternative, party battle across the Floor of the House during the past few years, would have been a tragedy. However, this bipartisan approach does not in any way reduce the right to criticise—I am sure that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State would agree. But in criticising we must be seeking to reach agreement on national maximum interest. The issues before us are greater than ever before in Northern Ireland and we must have no inhibition about discussing any possibility. The House of Commons has never carried a greater responsibility.
4.10 p.m.
Mr. John Mendelson: The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) has carried on his shoulders serious responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland. He spoke with a certain amount of restraint, which I fully understand, but it is, I believe, essential that some of us at any rate should perhaps be a little less restrained if the facts which are being discussed in the country are to be properly put in this debate.
One ought to begin by trying to supplement what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in explaining how the breakdown of the Executive occurred. I would start here with the IRA, for the reason that immediately after the Sunningdale Agreement the IRA decided on a political strategy to destroy the position of the SDLP among the minority. The evidence seems all too conclusive that the ferocity of the bombing campaign which was then immediately carried out by the IRA was meant to have that effect. I do not accept the IRA's nationalism and I do not accept its statements that it has been acting merely in the interest of the long-term history of the Republic of Ireland. I believe that the IRA is a

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group of political gangsters, the members of which are deliberately concerned to play themselves into the political game from which they would be completely and historically excluded if there were to be an agreement between people who are opposed to changes in the life of the people of Northern Ireland being brought about by violence and terrorism.
I therefore think that the IRA must be the first to bear responsibility for the breakdown of the power-sharing Executive. I do not accept the IRA's present proposals that the British Army should withdraw as part of a long and elaborate timetable. The evidence was there for those of us who went as a small Labour Party commission, comprising Members of this House and of the National Executive of the Labour Party, to visit Northern Ireland and Belfast immediately after the start of the present troubles in 1969. All our conversations were in private, and the Civil Rights Association, which was then carrying out a good democratic struggle for more equality for the minority, and the many other organisations which came to see us told us that they fully accepted the reasons that led the then British Government to send in the Army in the first place.
It is important for the record and for the discussion now taking place in the country—if we are to inform the electorate from this debate—to repeat the reasons that were involved. It was a situation in which people were being murdered and having their homes burnt. We saw the evidence of the situation when we went to Northern Ireland. The civil power called on the then British Government to put in the Army to prevent a wholesale massacre which was then feared. This was a perfectly honourable and responsible political reason for the Army being put into Northern Ireland. Many people may have since played the game of saying that they did not want the Army and of asking to have the Army taken out, but that is all public political play. They do not mean it; it is not their genuine opinion. I do not expect that any hon. Member would regard these declarations as any reason for moving in the direction of calling for the withdrawal of British troops.
It should also be put on record that the Government of the Republic did not do enough and did not take enough
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political risks after Sunningdale to help to get the maximum implementation and acceptance of Sunningdale by the majority population of Northern Ireland. I can understand the hesitation which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State might have regarding being too precise about this. He carries grave responsibility and is responsible for good relations with the Dublin Government. But some of us should put it on record if it is our belief, and it is certainly my belief, that it was wrong to delay for so many months the decision to postpone the implementation of the Council of Ireland until the following general election for the Assembly. We know that it is not true, but it made it appear that this was done as a result of further pressure and not as an agreement between members of the Executive. It would have been much more helpful if that had been quickly realised and thus not delayed for so long.
Those responsible for the breakdown are the Mafia on the extremist Protestant side, which exists in the same way as a Mafia exists on the IRA side. Here I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), who made an interesting speech and has made interesting statements on the radio during the last few days and has had recent contact with the Ulster Workers' Council. He said that the process of intimidation by paramilitary organisations is never attacked by Northern Ireland Members in this House. They always cheer when we attack the IRA but they are backward in exposing the Mafia-like activities of the paramilitary organisations on their side. These people were directly responsible in the early stages of the strike—not later, when there was much more mass support —for preventing ordinary working people from going to their place of work. That was intimidation of a gangster type not seen in this country and seen in the United States only at the worst time of gang warfare, in the 1930s.
If there is a criticism—we must be frank about this—which my right hon. Friend ought to answer, or perhaps my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister might answer it as he is to speak tomorrow, it is that it is being said by responsible people that during the first three days of the strike there was a request from some of the members of the Executive—Mr. Faulkner said on television the other night that he identified himself with

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it—that the barricades should have been immediately removed, and that the civil police and the Army should have been called in immediately so that people might be assured that they could go to work without the barricades being in their way.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: We immediately sent extra troops to Belfast for that purpose. May I explain the nature of the problem? On that day 2,000 troops were engaged in removing barricades on five main approach roads. When I point out that the total strength of the RUC is 4,500 and that the barricades on the minor roads had to be left for other days, it can be seen that the job was not easy, and I think that the Army did excellently in those early hours.
Mr. Mendelson: It is not the efficiency of the Army that is being questioned. What is being questioned is the delay in giving the order and instruction for the early barricades to be immediately removed. I do not believe that my right hon. Friend has answered the question.
Mr. Hugh Delargy: I agree with my hon. Friend. I ask the Secretary of State to say how many barricades were removed by the RUC.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: I have not the figure, but there was no delay in giving the order. The problem of barriers—
Mr. Delargy: How many barricades were removed by the RUC?
Mr. Merlyn Rees: All I can say is
that barricades in the country areas were removed by the RUC. I shall find out the number—if such a record is kept.
Mr. Mendelson: I hope that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will forgive this slight irregularity in the debate, but the matter is so important that I thought it should be cleared now. I am not satisfied with the Secretary of State's reply, and I wish to show why this matter is so important.
A number of reports have reached some of us from personal friends in the Province showing that the writers of them are not completely satisfied that the RUC showed at the beginning of the strike the spirit expected of a force whose purpose was to keep order and to ensure that ordinary working people were not prevented by
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violence from going to their places of work.
I turn to the question of the future in my final two points. First, it is essential that we should not merely repeat the slogan that power sharing must continue. It is uncertain whether it can continue. It is essential to realise that the task remains the same: we must make it possible for the majority in Northern Ireland to be convinced that there is no question of an improvement in the political status of the minority having consequences on a decision about the frontier.
I have always believed that to be the key problem. I remember returning from the mission to Northern Ireland in 1969 and being invited to speak at a public meeting in London. At the meeting there were about 3,000 people. As long as I reported on the injustice which had been done to the minority, as long as I explained that the Army had gone in to save lives, and as long as I demanded complete political and social equality for members of the minority, I had the whole meeting with me. However, as soon as I said that it would be highly dangerous to demand changes in the frontier because all the gains would be progressively lost, I lost the support of half the meeting and people started booing me instead of saying "Hear, hear". The Dublin Government must be forthcoming and must follow the lead of one of the most courageous people in Irish politics, Mr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who has made this point convincingly and has taught me much about the situation.
Secondly, we must gain the confidence of more people amongst the Protestant majority that we are absolutely sincere in our view that we in the House of Commons will not accept any manoeuvre designed to improve the peaceful living together of all Northern Irish people as a prelude to any move towards a unification which the majority of the people in Northern Ireland do not want. We must make that clear beyond peradventure.
Perhaps those are not the most popular views among my political friends, but I believe that that is the sort of line which the Government should take as

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their future guide after the recent political tragedy. There will be time for further examination and detailed criticism perhaps of what happened on one day or another. Our main message to the Government should be this: "Be realistic and courageous because your general objectives are correct, but make it clear, even at the cost perhaps of losing some political friends, that the majority in Northern Ireland will have their views respected and will never be coerced into doing anything that they do not want to do ".
4.26 p.m.
Mr. Harry West: I am bound to admit that I am heartened by the evident change in the House in the approach to the affairs of Northern Ireland. The speeches which have been made indicate a more common sense approach to our problems.
However, I have been both puzzled and saddened by the lack of even the most elementary understanding of the Northern Ireland problem shown in speeches and statements made both inside and outside the House. I know that some Members mean well, but they fail to realise that the stresses and strains in Northern Ireland are different from those experienced in London. They fail to recognise the simple but fundamental fact that the differences of view between the two main groups in Northern Ireland are not about religion. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh"] I have lived in Northern Ireland for more than 50 years, and the situation is contrary to that which hon. Members have just indicated.
I made a speech on the day that the House rose for the Whitsun Recess in which I invited hon. Members on both sides of the House to go to Northern Ireland to see the problems for themselves and the manner in which our affairs are being managed or mismanaged. As I say, the difference of view is not about religion but about whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or be absorbed into a united Ireland.
The majority of Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland would apparently prefer to go into a united Ireland, whereas most Protestants want to remain within the United Kingdom. That is the only reason why Protestants and Catholics tend
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to be on different sides of the argument, and, clearly it is not a sectarian reason in the ordinary sense of the word. If that fact were more often remembered, there would be less self-righteous moralising about the Northern Ireland problem by well-meaning outsiders and a more realistic approach would be adopted to it.
The best course which I can take today is to try to clarify certain attitudes found among the majority of people in Northern Ireland. This will require some plain speaking and some hard words, but I hope that the House will accept what I say in the spirit in which it is said. The attitudes to which I refer have arisen mostly from experience and from events in our Province. They were not invented by me or by my colleagues in the House. They are part of the human landscape and must be taken into account if we are to concern ourselves honestly and sincerely with the human situation in Northern Ireland.
We realise that, because of our differences of attitude, words which carry one meaning in London often convey a quite different meaning in Belfast. A good example of our different ways of thinking was provided a little over a week ago by the Prime Minister in a ministerial broadcast when he quoted the Downing Street Declaration of August 1969 as an undertaking given by the British Government which showed their good faith and good intentions towards the people of Northern Ireland. The awkward and tragic fact is that this document, which is cited over here as an indication of good faith, is constantly cited in Northern Ireland as clear evidence of bad faith. That may seem strange, but I will explain it.
The Downing Street Declaration begins with an assurance by the British Government that as provided in the Ireland Act of 1949, which embodies pledges given by Mr. Attlee, as he then was, and his Government, Northern Ireland will not cease to be a part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland. That was said in a recent ministerial broadcast by the Prime Minister, and we in Northern Ireland, with justification, inquire: where is this Parliament of Northern Ireland of which he speaks?
In the Downing Street Declaration the British Government also affirmed that

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Northern Ireland affairs were entirely a matter for domestic jurisdiction. They undertook to assert this in all international relationships. At that time the majority of the people in Ulster welcomed the undertaking that the British Government would not go behind their backs in discussing their affairs with the Government of the Irish Republic. But that was very soon to happen. That is constantly quoted in Ulster as further evidence of bad faith. It is possible to quote a whole series of undertakings given, statements issued and promises—or apparent promises—made by prominent and representative figures in Britain, all of which proved to be false. I do not want to go into individual cases, but a terrible barrier of mistrust has been created between the Government and the people of Northern Ireland. That barrier can be broken down only by complete candour, a readiness to admit past mistakes and a dedicated effort on all sides to understand everyone else's point of view.
If there is this distrust about what we are told about our future, there is also deep distrust and disbelief of what has been said about our past. Many changes have been made in Northern Ireland over the past few years. It has been represented that those changes were a medicine that we needed because there was something wrong with us. Now, facts are beginning to emerge which show that the diagnosis was largely wrong, and that is why the medicine has done so little good to anyone.
In 1964-65, when the newly elected Labour Government had only a small majority in the House, the then Prime Minister threatened to limit the voting rights of Northern Ireland Members of this House. That is on record in HANSARD. He did that despite the fact that Northern Ireland citizens paid the same taxes as citizens of Great Britain, and that all effective control of the level of expenditure in Northern Ireland rested in London.
It may interest the House to know that over many years public expenditure per head in Scotland and Wales was higher than it was in Northern Ireland. Paragraph 589 of the Kilbrandon Report states that public expenditure per head in 1964-65 in Northern Ireland was a mere 2 per cent. higher than it was in England, whereas it was 17 per cent. higher in
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Wales and 16 per cent. higher in Scotland. I leave the House to draw its own conclusions about the "sponging" which was so vindictively mentioned in a recent broadcast.
Following the Prime Minister's lead, other members of the then Government party joined in the attack on the Northern Ireland Unionist Members of this House and on the Northern Ireland Government, and from 1964 onwards HANSARD and the Press recorded these emotive and unfair attacks. We have them filed in Northern Ireland for evidence.
I remind hon. Members that at that time the Northern Ireland Government, with the aid of both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic communities, had defeated a seven-year period of attacks by the IRA. Like earlier IRA efforts, that struggle was aimed at uniting Ireland by force. The IRA stated that it had to end those attacks because, even after seven years, it had not managed to gain the support of the Roman Catholic community. From that it may be seen that, although a large proportion of Roman Catholics were still not willing to play a full part in Northern Ireland society, they were equally unwilling at that time to support violence as a means of obtaining a united Ireland. But the gap between the two communities at that time was beginning to narrow. The then Northern Ireland Government, of which I was proud to be a member, were making slow but sure movement towards encouraging the minority to play a greater part in society. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I know that hon. Members do not like to hear this, but I was involved as a member of that Government. I well remember the Government's efforts to persuade members of the minority to accept appointment on public bodies. I was responsible for appointing a number of the minority community to public bodies at that time.
Mr. Delargy: How many?
Mr. West: Quite a few.
Mr. Delargy: How many?
Mr. West: May I have notice of that question? As a Minister in the Northern Ireland Government I nominated a member of the minority community for inclusion in the Queen's Birthday Honours List.
Rev. Ian Paisley: Not to the peerage?
Mr. West: This was a highly deserved honour—if the member had accepted it. The gentleman turned it down, and when he told me his reason for doing so I was appalled. Nevertheless, the offer was made.
It is tragic that the efforts we were making at that time were sabotaged—I use that word advisedly—by a combination of the well-meaning moralisers and self-seekers in Great Britain whom I have already mentioned. They saw a bandwagon just beginning to crawl in Northern Ireland from the early 1960s onwards and insisted on climbing on it in a clumsy attempt to urge greater speed. The result was that the leaders of the minority, feeling that they had friends in court, escalated their demand for change, and this led to the provocation of the Protestant community.
Encouraged and aided by a steady stream of abuse of the Northern Ireland Government and the Northern Ireland Members of this House by senior politicians of the Government party in the second half of the 1960s, a section of the Northern Ireland minority mounted a vicious propaganda campaign consisting of half-truths and lies which smeared the majority in Northern Ireland. This propaganda campaign was swallowed hook, line and sinker by many leading politicians in this House at that time. As Governments are always at a disadvantage compared with dissidents because they cannot stoop to the methods adopted by dissidents, it is hardly surprising that the Northern Ireland Government and their Unionist supporters came off second best in that campaign. The rest is now history—civil unrest, followed by a build-up of IRA bombings and shootings, despite the use of the Army in large numbers.
In August 1969 a disaster occurred for our Province because in that month a conference was held in Downing Street. To it were invited four of the leaders of the Northern Ireland Government, who apparently came to Downing Street as four frightened men who had lost control of the situation. The result of that conference ultimately led to the distraction of one of the finest police forces
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in Europe. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Of that there is no doubt. Not only was that force disarmed, but it was demoralised and discredited and has never fully recovered from that action.
Mr. Russell Kerr: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the events he is describing to the House were preceded, especially on 5th October, by a vicious attack by the RUC which greatly enraged the Catholic population and which the right hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Craig) was responsible for authorising?
Mr. West: If the hon. Member has clear evidence of those matters, if he was on the ground at the time to see what happened, I should like to hear from him. But if this information comes second-hand, it does not impress me.
Mr. Kerr: I was present on that occasion. I saw it with my own eyes.
Mr. West: There is no doubt that the police acted under tremendous provocation.
Mr. Carol Mather: Is it not true that Lord Hunt, who undertook an inquiry into this matter, now takes the view that, following subsequent events, he believes that he was mistaken in disbanding the B Specials?
Mr. West: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding me of that matter. Lord Hunt has seen wisdom at last and admitted to the folly of his recommendation in that respect. Not only was the RUC demoralised at that time, but another internal security force was disbanded and discredited. I refer to the Ulster Special Constabulary, to whom the present Prime Minister referred as the "much hated B Specials". That was a most unfortunate remark to make since it cast a slur on a body of men who are among Her Majesty's most loyal citizens [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish!"] They were responsible during the previous 45 years for keeping the IRA terrorists at bay. Even the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland admitted to me that that type of defence force was the most likely to succeed in the guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland. These men were discredited and disbanded, to the great joy of our enemies.

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The whole internal security forces under the control of the Northern Ireland Government were no longer available. The British Government accepted responsibility for security in Northern Ireland from then onwards. As anybody who lives in Northern Ireland will know, that pledge was never discharged. There is no security in Northern Ireland. There was imported into our country a chief constable from this side of the water who for two years adopted a "softly, softly" policy. This allowed the IRA to build up a massive collection of arms and ammunition; it enabled it to consolidate its position and prepare for the attacks which it rained upon us in the following months.
The misguided policy which was hatched at that time has resulted to a large extent in a great deal of the disaster which has happened to our country since. We all know that a thousand people have died in that period, not to mention a far greater number who have been injured, many of whom will never recover, and the destruction of property worth many millions. Admittedly property can be restored at a cost, but I was disappointed to hear the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, say at the Dispatch Box in the recent debate on Northern Ireland that all this money was going in Northern Ireland because, for some strange reason, we were responsible for the destruction of property there. But the destruction of property resulted from the manner in which the Government at that time destroyed our internal security forces and allowed the situation to get out of hand. Today we have widows, orphans and heartbroken mothers who look back at that period of August 1969 with despair, knowing that there was a direct or indirect responsibility at that time for the manner in which many families were bereaved.
The Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office (Mr. Stanley Orme): I was questioned about how much compensation had been paid out and how much was still in abeyance. My noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State is dealing with this matter very expeditiously indeed. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that this matter is not being dealt with by Her Majesty's Government.
Mr. West: I did not say that; that is not the point of my argument. The Minister of State when referring to the destruction of property and the expenditure thereby incurred inferred that the destruction was the responsibility of those in Northern Ireland. It was nothing of the sort. It arose because the British Government destroyed our security forces and the situation got out of hand. The destruction has been massive, and I regret it very much. I regret even more the loss of life and the fact that hundreds of thousands of people have been maimed, some for life. That is the point I am making.
Despite all that happened, the myth that somehow this was the fault of the majority continued in the Westminster mind—a mind which seemed to become impervious to the point of view of the Northern Ireland Government or of the Unionists. The Army was prevented from taking effective action against the IRA in the mistaken belief that it would placate the minority. [Interruption.] I know that this view is not accepted by some in this House, and particularly by many on the Labour benches, but a number of Army officers have already spoken out on this subject. One young Army officer, having served three times in Northern Ireland, resigned his commission in protest. [An HON. MEMBER: "He was sacked."] He was not sacked. He resigned in protest at the political interference in the work of the Army in Northern Ireland. That Army officer has written to the newspapers expressing his views and has made speeches. On many occasions when the Army had effective plans to deal with the IRA they were stopped because the Army was told that such action was politically unacceptable. I know that is not accepted over here, but there are many Army officers who know this to be true. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish!"] It is not rubbish. The Army officers who have spoken on this topic are honourable men and I prefer to take their word for it. It is a tragedy that these things have happened. As a result of the IRA campaign —a campaign which continues—citizens are being mercilessly slaughtered.
It is hardly surprising that the IRA went from strength to strength in these conditions bringing death and destruction on an unprecedented scale and that eventually, though not for several years

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some Protestants in desperation, and some in self defence, took counter-measures. Following the dissolution of the Northern Ireland Government in March 1972, the process of bashing and humiliating the majority community continued, despite a massive increase in IRA violence in Northern Ireland.
Amongst other things, we witnessed the degrading spectacle of a senior member of Her Majesy's Government flying the IRA to London for discussions. That was bad enough. We also know that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State met the IRA in Dublin. This raises the point as to why he did not meet the Ulster Workers' Council in the crisis period in Northern Ireland recently having been prepared to meet the gunmen in Dublin.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: The right hon. Gentleman has put this point forward and is now bringing up the matter of the IRA. Does he know what we told the IRA on that occasion? I suppose he knows what was said to the IRA?
Mr. West: No.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: In that case he should not keep raising the issue. We were firm and to the point. We would not talk with the UWC, with which the hon. Gentleman was hob-nobbing for the whole fortnight, or with the men of violence, because we could not from this House negotiate with people who did not have a political base.
Mr. West: I make no apology for what the right hon. Gentleman calls hobnobbing with the Ulster Workers' Council, which is a body of honourable men.
Mrs. Reéne Short: Ask Len Murray.
Mr. West: We in Northern Ireland had expressed in the most democratic way possible our objection to the Constitution Act. Our objections were shown through the ballot box in February.
Mr. William Molloy: What about our ballot box over here? Does not that count?
Mr. West: We confirmed that objection by a poll that was taken in Northern Ireland and presented quite recently in this House. I stressed to the Secretary of
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State and to other political leaders the dangers entailed in turning a deaf ear to the voice of the majority of the people expressed democratically at that time. When people express a democratic will and have it ignored by the Government there is a real danger of one of two things happening. There could be massive disruption in the country or a blood bath.
I supported the strike in Northern Ireland because it was the lesser of the two evils. It was a peaceful performance. In every shape and form it was a highly disciplined exercise. It was carried out in a most efficient manner. It was the best way of registering protest by the Loyalist community in Northern Ireland against measures which were pushed upon us by people from outside against the wishes of the people in Northern Ireland.
All these matters that I have mentioned and other happenings did not give the people of Northern Ireland much faith in the ability of the United Kingdom Government to solve our problems. Rather, as I have already intimated, they demonstrated that London thought that it knew best, even in Northern Ireland, far removed from here.
This view was confirmed later when the Constitution Act was passed, despite a majority of Northern Ireland Members of Parliament in this House being against it and without any serious attempt being made to take account of the views of those Members. This disregard of Northern Ireland opinion in such an important matter was all the worse because the quota of Northern Ireland Members of Parliament at Westminster was substantially below that of other areas of similar population in the United Kingdom. Can anyone imagine a similar happening in Scotland or Wales? Developments since then have shown the folly of riding roughshod over the wishes of the majority in Northern Ireland. I hope that a lesson has been learned for the future.
That brings me to the Sunningdale Agreement. The White Paper on the Northern Ireland Constitution proposals, in the chapter on relations with the Irish Republic, clearly stated:
"…following elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly the Government will invite the Government of the Republic of Ireland and the leaders of the elected representatives of Northern Ireland to participate with them in a conference".

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That conference took place at Sunning-dale, but the participation from Northern Ireland was limited to the leaders of parties which had agreed to share power in the Executive under the provisions of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act.
Mr. Gerard Fitt: It was not limited. We were all invited.
Mr. West: We were not all invited. The hon. Gentleman is wrong.
Rev. Ian Paisley: Is it not a fact that we received no invitation whatsoever?
Mr. West: That is right. Neither I nor my hon. Friend received an invitation to attend the conference as leaders of parties. The Government misjudged the mood of the majority of Ulster people when they excluded the main stream of Unionist opinion from the conference. I say quite unashamedly that this was a dreadful act for a responsible Minister.
Mr. Edward Heath: I will deal with a large number of the points that the right hon. Gentleman has made when I speak tomorrow if I catch Mr. Speaker's eye. In my view, he is perpetuating a considerable number of myths, with which I will deal tomorrow. However, on the particular point that he has just made, I should like to point out that the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) was invited to Sunningdale to give his views on all those questions, as, I believe, was the right hon. Gentleman himself, but the hon. Member for Antrim, North refused to attend
Rev. Ian Paisley: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it right for the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition to make a statement that is patently untrue? The right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) was never invited. He did not get an invitation—[Interruption.]
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton): Order. That is a different version of the facts. The hon. Gentleman must not raise a point of order of that nature.
Mr. West: With respect to the Leader of the Opposition, I was not invited to Sunningdale. Nor were my two colleagues the hon. Members for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) and Belfast,
922
West (Mr. Fitt). [HON. MEMBERS: "He was".] No.[Interruption.]
Rev. Ian Paisley: We were not invited to take part.
Mr. West: Perhaps I may have the indulgence of the House to clarify the point. It is unfair to try to force the view on the House that I was invited. I was not invited. My two colleagues were invited to give their views and to go away. They were not invited to take part as other political leaders were. I will give way if the Leader of the Opposition wishes to intervene again.
Mr. Heath: The right hon. Gentleman is correct. He was not the leader of a separate party. His two colleagues were invited to Sunningdale to give their views to the whole conference and they both declined.
Mr. West: The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. [Laughter]
The Attorney-General (Mr. S. C. Silkin)The Attorney-General (Mr. S. C. Silkin)
rose—-
Mr. West: May I continue?
The Attorney-General The Attorney-General rose—
Mr. West: The Leader of the Opposition is right in his reference to my position, but I am now the leader of a majority group in Northern Ireland. Mr. Faulkner, who does not lead a party at the moment, was invited by the Secretary of State for discussions at Stormont Castle a few days ago. Mr. Faulkner's supporters came to my party to seek entrance. Mr. Faulkner's party never got off the ground. Therefore, he should not have been invited to the discussions that took place at the beginning of last week.
Mr. Heath: The right hon. Gentleman must keep these two matters clear. He referred to the Sunningdale conference. Those who took part in the Sunningdale conference were the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland and representatives who had shown that they were prepared to form the Executive. The leaders of parties, however small, who were not prepared to form the Executive, but were opposed to it, were invited to Sunningdale to give their views, and they declined. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will confirm that they were

923
given that opportunity, but that they refused to take it.
Mr. West: There were no conditions laid down in the White Paper as to whether parties invited should accept the Constitution Act. There were no preconditions. The White Paper stated quite clearly that leaders of political view would be invited to Sunningdale; and it ended there. There was no other reservation or condition attached. That is why my right hon. and hon. Friends and the population in Northern Ireland feel so enraged that a majority within the majority had their views shut out from the conference. That undoubtedly led to many of the perplexities that have raged in Northern Ireland since then and to a great deal of the mistrust that has been evident also.
The Attorney-General: Of course the right hon. Gentleman is entirely entitled to make his own speech in his own way and give his own interpretation of history. However, if he complains that he was not permitted at Sunningdale to give his views about the future of Northern Ireland, now, here, as leader of his party is it his intention at some time to give his views as to the future of Northern Ireland, because it would be a great help to the House to know?
Mr. West: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be patient—[Laughter.]— I will. What I want to say to this honourable House this afternoon is this. Do not victimise your friends—they are scarce. Go after your enemies, for you have plenty of them. I would say to this honourable House in all seriousness that we in Northern Ireland occupy a strategic position in the North Atlantic. Do not place a Cuba on the vital line between Britain and North America. We want to stay within the United Kingdom. We want to stay there, and we will fight for staying there. But if the price for staying within the United Kingdom means policies that will lead to absorption into a united Ireland we must reject that offer.
5.2 p.m.
Mr. A. J. Beith: I rise to follow the right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West), having wondered whether I would ever be able to, and
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also having felt, as I always do when members of his party speak in the House, that they are unable to get, and will never get, a friendly hearing in the House for a point of view which is undoubtedly real amongst a large section of the Protestant population in Northern Ireland, for two reasons.
The first reason is that the members of the right hon. Gentleman's party show so little appreciation of the full problem of the other community in Northern Ireland and so little humility in addressing themselves to that problem. The second reason is that hon. Members see the members of the right hon. Gentleman's party not only here in the House but also on television, where they do not see them exercising their political position and authority in favour of reconciliation and a resolution of the terrible and tragic conflict in Northern Ireland. It is in that situation that members of the right hon. Gentleman's party fail to get a hearing in this House for views which, however much I disagree with them, are widely held and are entitled to a hearing.
Before the right hon. Gentleman spoke much had been said about the cooperation between the parties in this House—the bipartisan and tripartisan policies and the future of the tripartisan approach. I want to make it quite clear that a tripartisan approach evolved not because of any desire on the part of the parties in this House to follow each other in any instinctive belief that what the other party said was necessarily correct, but because each of the three main parties moved independently to the same conclusions about what was tolerable and acceptable in Northern Ireland. I hope that this will remain so, but there can be no assumption that the tripartisan policy is pursued automatically. It is likely to happen, however, if we all arrive by our own routes at the same conclusion.
This debate is no time for recriminations. We could spend much time arguing about the handling of the situation. For my part, I do not believe that even had the Government been absolutely and totally sure footed in their handling of the last fortnight's affairs the situation would have been substantially different otherwise than as to timing. Whether or not the broadcast and other things which have been criticised had taken place, I

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think that we should have arrived at the same point ultimately. The seeds were clearly there.
There are, however, lessons to be learned. One of them quite clearly is that to have had a Westminster election on a non-proportional system at such a crucial stage in the development of the Executive was a tragedy; and we shall repeat that if we are not careful. We have all the apparatus at our disposal to do it again at the next delicate stage of the Northern Ireland situation. If we are not careful, we shall hold a Westminster election on a non-proportional basis with 11 of the 12 Ulster MPs being returned to this House with a similar proportion of the votes as was gained nationally by hon. Members opposite from one party while another party is unrepresented. That is a lesson to be learned.
Another lesson we must learn is as to the strength of Protestant feeling that built up against the Council of Ireland and against the future of the Council of Ireland, a feeling which some Members of this House and other people fomented. It was a most inaccurate and deliberately misleading view which they presented, but that feeling built up and it was very strong.
On a number of occasions as I sat here supporting the view expressed by the Secretary of State about what he should do, I felt that he was none the less going too far in being ready to say that intimidation was the prime reason for the success of the strike. There is no doubt that a wide body of Protestant feeling built up. Although it was in many ways fomented by misleading statements, it was none the less real. The decision to postpone parts of the Sunningdale Agreement came too late to have any effect on the development of this feeling. Those who built up that feeling against the Council of Ireland had done their work successfully.
Another lesson we must learn but which many people on this side of the water find it difficult to understand is the nature of, and the nature of life in, a divided community. In a community such as Northern Ireland it is very difficult not to be on one side or the other. However little disposed one is to violence, however peaceable one's intentions, one is born and brought up on one side of the community or the other. The
926
middle ground is a very uncomfortable and unpopular place to be. Often there is hardly anybody there.
There are times when there are people in the middle ground, however. The Assembly elections was one such time. A substantial number of people were seen to be moderates and found representation for their views in the Assembly. However, when the pressure is on, people in Northern Ireland find themselves on one side or the other. Hon. Members know why that is the case, but it is a fact which is easily overlooked.
Those who say that we must leave the Irish to sort this out should remember that we are talking not just about extremist groups but about large groups of people who have no predisposition to violence, who want to live a normal, peaceful life, who have strong feelings about which side of the community they are on, and who have strong fears which lead them to be more ready to support violent actions than anybody on this side of the water. That aspect of life in Ireland is often overlooked.
That rigid polarisation is what our policies should be avoiding. We must ask ourselves how a form of government could be evolved to operate peacefully in such a divided community. The possibilities are not enticing. We in this country would not contemplate operating military rule and we could not commend it to the people of Northern Ireland. Sectarian rule of the kind of which we had long experience is not a form of government which my hon. Friends and, I suspect, many hon. Members would wish to see continued.
Some means of sharing power between various sections of the community seems to be the only reasonable option. We had a power-sharing agreement which broke down. It had some weaknesses. Not least of its weaknesses was the fact that those who had power in the community were not all part of the agreement. But by their own choice, whatever view they may take of certain actions and certain specific conferences, the fact remains that at any of a number of stages they could have made themselves part of that agreement but did not do so. That is one reason why that initiative did not succeed.
It is clear to most people in this country, as to hon. Members who have spoken

927
already, that Ulstermen will have to sort this out. The view is now being increasingly expressed, not just on the Ulster side of the water but here, too, that Ulstermen must get together and find solutions. I would see the programme of events as involving discussions between every section of the community leading up, perhaps, to some form of constitutional conference in which all the groups represented within the Northern Ireland community could express their feelings. However, in order that we should have this and have effective discussion between the communities we must have a cooling-off period, a period of reasonable order and peace in which this can be accomplished. I do not think the British public would like that period to be very long, but such a period there must be. During such a period, when Ulstermen must take the initiative to sit down and talk together, a number of things must happen and a number of things must not happen.
Britain must not be panicked into playing into the hands of the IRA by any overnight withdrawal and removal from Northern Ireland of the basic security and protection of life, limb, property and civil rights of the community in Northern Ireland. Nothing would play into the hands of the IRA, which has wanted this for a long time, more than the immediate withdrawal of British troops. We must safeguard human rights, without which conversations between groups in Ulster could not reasonably take place. We all want British troops in the sort of strength in which they are there now out of Northern Ireland. We are all unhappy about the level of economic underpinning which has to be provided for a community in which there is such destruction of property.
These things must be brought to an end, but there must be a procedure for doing this. The Ulster politicians— Catholic and Protestant—must show the British public that they are prepared to share power. This involves a certain amount of retracting of hard things which have been said. Those who have said that they will not sit down with Republicans must recognise the diversity of opinion which exists and must resolve those differences. If Ulster politicians cannot show that to the British public, they must expect a bitter reaction.
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Particular responsibility rests upon the Loyalists or the United Ulster Unionists, whatever they call themselves, who have been involved in bringing about the present tragic situation. Do they want to bring about ultimately a united Ireland by force—one can hardly imagine that— or are they prepared to bring about a situation in which people in Northern Ireland can live in peace? Now is their opportunity to show just that. What has been said so far has not encouraged us to believe that they are ready for that opportunity. One hopes that their actions may prove better than their words.
With regard to Britain, the options are open. We have no vested interest in being heavily committed in troops and economic support in Northern Ireland. The options are open, except for certain things. One thing which is not open to Britain is to drag British citizens into a united Ireland against their will—and the events of the last fortnight have contributed to that possibility just as much as the deeds of the IRA earlier. Similarly, no British Government could contemplate upholding and giving financial support to a sectarian regime in Northern Ireland to which the Catholic community cannot feel loyalty. No British Government action would gain support in this House for a sectarian regime which does not have community support.
The options based on responsibility and power sharing are open. The British Government's patience has been clearly shown. Now it is for the politicians in Ulster to demonstrate that they are prepared to take this opportunity.
5.14 p.m.
Mr. William Molloy: In view of the long speech from the right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) it behoves us more than ever, Mr. Speaker, to acknowledge your advice to keep our speeches as short as possible. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) for bringing us down to the essentials after having listened to a boring speech, and one of the most appalling speeches, made in this House by the right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. I hope the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed will not think me particularly rude

929
if I do not follow him in everything that he said, because I agree with most of his sentiments.
Some hon. Members on the back benches opposite, who I understand represent Ulster constituencies, found the murder of a fish and chip shop man and his pal so hilarious that they could hardly conceal their mirth, and I, as a man with no particular religion, am glad that I am not associated with the sort of religion that they profess.
Mr. John Carson Mr. John Carson (Belfast, North) rose—
Mr. Molloy: If the hon. Gentleman is getting upset now I suggest that he should wait another five minutes when he will have more to get upset about.
The British House of Commons has had to be recalled because a policy which was hammered out and agreed by Conservative Members of Parliament, by Unionists and Liberal Members of Parliament, and passed by this House of Commons was then examined by the so-called Loyalists in Northern Ireland who, while they are prepared to accept the £400 million a year economic aid when it suits their purpose, twist the word "loyal" so that it has such appalling connotations that one is tempted never to utter the word at all. It is because of their actions that we are here today in an effort to resolve a situation which is most certainly terrifying.
I have to acknowledge that there is now on the scene in Northern Ireland a force which has to be reckoned with, the UWC. Let me tell some hon. Members opposite that another force is beginning to mutter and murmer. It is die long-suffering, generous, patient British people, who are slowly but surely being driven to a situation where they are compelled to wonder whether their sons, fathers and brothers must be slain in Northern Ireland—
Mr. Carson Mr. Carson rose—
Mr. Molloy: —and whether the money that they give to Ulster should be given or whether they should wash it out.
How many more times is the British House of Commons going to be recalled to deal with emergencies in Northern Ireland? The right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone said that it was not so much a Roman Catholic policy as a Republican policy which the Roman Catholics have in Northern Ireland. What he did not seem to under-
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stand was that they have been driven for 50 years into that way of thinking, not because that was the only way they could be sure of having political and social justice, but because they could read, in what was happening in Ulster, a story similar to that which occurred in Europe, and every Roman Catholic was saying to himself, "I can now understand why in the early 1930s it was very uncomfortable to be a Jew in Hitler's Reich."
There was no collusion between the Liberal, Conservative and Labour Parties. Honest men and women were desperately concerned to try to find a solution to a problem which was causing grave anxiety to everybody in this country, because of their natural sympathy in the situation which existed in Northern Ireland and which ordinary folk in this country cannot understand. They go to work with Roman Catholics, Welsh Baptists and members of the Church of England. It never enters their minds to make this form of discrimination.
Mr. Carson: What about the closed shops?
Mr. Molloy: I can take the hon. Gentleman to a closed shop where there are Catholics, Baptists and members of the Church of England. Let us not have that sort of talk in a serious debate like this. If we do not try to understand why people behave as they do in Northern Ireland and why Catholics were driven into this sort of thinking we shall never resolve the problem.
I was saying—the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed made the same point—that there was no collusion between the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Labour Party. Sunningdale was a genuine attempt to find a method, perhaps not perfect, which at least would command the support of everyone so that people could live together in Northern Ireland, a method which would be accepted by everyone who believed that an answer could be found —everyone, that is, except the extremists who think that the answer lies in slaughter and bombing.
We have resisted all the vulgarities and appalling behaviour of the IRA, and it was right that we should. It would have been utterly wrong if any British Government had succumbed to the idea that

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the bombers and murderers of the IRA could be allowed to intimidate them. It therefore follows—[Interruption.] I wish that the hon. Gentleman would listen for a moment. He does not have to agree, but he should at least listen. He may have his opportunity later. I was saying that we must maintain our standards and that any form of threat to the House of Commons and the British Parliament must be met in the same way.
The other day, I heard a speech by Mr. Faulkner, and I must agree with my right hon. Friend that he and many others in the Unionist Party have shown great courage and great determination. Indeed, many of them have taken a slow but necessary trip down the road to Damacus. I include Mr. Faulkner in that, as well as some of the others who are now beginning to see the light of sanity. I congratulate them on their courage and on their determination now to accept things which they could not accept years ago but which they now believe will contribute to the restoring of sanity to their troubled Province.
It was said by Mr. Faulkner—I am sure that this is right—that the foremost need is to find a way whereby people can argue and debate without the terror of violence, no matter whence it comes. I believe that there are people in Ulster —Protestants, Catholics and members of non-sectarian groups—who are prepared to accept that. I have said more than once in the House that if there is one principle on which the overwhelming majority of Catholics, Protestants and others in Northern Ireland will agree it is that we cannot resolve anything by blowing one another to bits.
If, therefore, all people can be united on that principle, let us say publicly, Catholic and Protestant alike, that we oppose all those who believe that the letting of blood and the blowing up of human beings is the way to tackle the problems of the Province.
If that be so, and I believe it to be true, why cannot my right hon. Friend give encouragement to people in the Ulster community to establish an organisation —let it be called the Ulster peace convention, the Ulster peace council, or whatever it might be—in which, during the initial period, nothing will be discussed save the public demonstration, loud and
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clear, of opposition to the thugs of the IRA or the murderers of any other organisation. Let us say that they and all that they do have nothing to do with us, that we despise, loathe and condemn them. If that sort of assertion can be made by Catholic and Protestant, we shall, I believe, at least make a move towards examining realistically some of the problems which beset Northern Ireland.
I admit that now, looking back with hindsight over events, I have doubts about what was done. I suppose that in this respect I am like some of the clever people who wrote articles in the Sunday newspapers yesterday and who suddenly tell us that they have all the answers. But, with the benefit of hindsight, I am willing to confess that one of the failings of the pre-Sunningdale run-up was that the base was not broad enough. Sunningdale was an excellent idea. It was carried through with favour by the previous Secretary of State. The Leader of the Opposition, when he was Prime Minister, had support from the Labour and Liberal Opposition. I feel, however, that we must now ask ourselves, if something which gathered remarkable unity in this House of Commons has now failed so ignobly, where was it that something went wrong? The failure of the Sunningdale Agreement is very worrying, and I can only think that the reason was that it was not broadly enough based.
What, then, are we to do if British troops and British money are to remain in Northern Ireland, and if the British people are not to turn away and say, "Let us finish with them, let us bring our boys home, let us respond to the call of the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) who wants nothing to do with English, Welsh or Scots"? If the British people were tempted to respond to the bawlings of the hon. Member for Antrim, North Ulster would be isolated, and that would be bad. At the same time, however, the British people must be heard when they say that we cannot go for ever in that tone.
In these circumstances, therefore, one more endeavour should be undertaken. Let us enshrine in what we do the principle of power sharing. If we do that, and if hon. Members from the Province acknowledge that power sharing on a fair

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and just basis is fundamental, we can at the same time acknowledge that the method by which it was attempted at Sunningdale was wrong—I believe that that can now be said—and new ideas must be forthcoming.
If hon. Members from Northern Ireland will take that line, and if they contribute, as they must, their own ideas for a new method which is acceptable to the overwhelming majority, regardless of whether they be Catholic or Protestant, we shall, I believe, be able to say that the recalling of the House for these two days was a historic event, for in this debate we shall have moved a small way towards finding at long last a means to enable us to grope forward to a solution of Northern Ireland's problems, and in that way we shall do something to remove from the British people the temptation to call home the troops and say "Have done with it".
Let us all acknowledge that we have a responsibility to try to establish in that troubled Province a way of life in which we believe, a way of life evolved by our mother of Parliaments for this island and which, for all its faults—the lack of a written constitution and so on—works for us. We have recommended it to millions of people throughout the world, and we know that, by this way, people can live without fear, without the dread of being arrested without proper charge in the early hours of the morning, and without the terror of bombing and murder because they disagree.
If we believe in that way of life, as we surely ought, since it is part of our history, the challenge for us is how to transfer all that it means to the community in Ulster. It can be done only with the full-hearted consent of Ulster-men, Catholic or Protestant. Let us be frank, therefore, and admit that Sunningdale was not, perhaps, broadly enough based, while again affirming the fundamental principle of power sharing. Let us bend our minds and our wills to finding a way whereby, on a broader basis, we can at long last find an answer to Ulster's problems so that the peace, dignity and civility which we have in this country may prevail there as well.
5.27 p.m.
Sir Nigel Fisher: The hon. Member for Ealing, North (Mr. Molloy)
934
may well be right that Sunningdale was not broadly enough based, but, of course, the hard-liners could have been there had they not rejected the whole idea of power sharing, which, I agree with the hon. Member, is a fundamental essence of the whole handling of the Northern Ireland situation. The need for this debate is deeply depressing, and few hon. Members on either side have been able to offer much of a glimmer of hope for the future peace and prosperity of Ulster.
Until this last fortnight I was always an optimist. In 1969 the overdue reforms of Lord O'Neill of the Maine could, I believe, have saved Northern Ireland from sectarian strife if they had been supported by his own party at Stormont. But half the Unionist Party rejected them, and that gave the IRA an opportunity, which it quickly seized, to promote murderous violence in the Province.
There was still hope after that. The patient work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) and his imaginative concept of power sharing provided a real prospect of reconciliation between the communities. Now that, too, has been sacrificed— deliberately destroyed, I believe, by the Protestant backlash which most of us have feared and dreaded for so long.
In retrospect, I concede that the decision to hold a General Election in Britain in February was disastrous for Northern Ireland. The Executive had had no time to gain popular acceptance, and the election gave the self—and very strangely—styled "Loyalists" the chance to misrepresent the intentions and the policies of the Executive and the British Government. It may also have shown—and this may not be accepted by Labour Members—the Protestant working class in Belfast how decisive the power of organised labour can be. Politically-motivated strike action has in the space of a few months defeated both a Tory Government in Britain and the Executive in Northern Ireland. Real power, as the Daily Mail pointed out a few days ago, no longer resides in Whitehall or at Stormont Castle. It is draining away to the more militant trade union leaders in Britain and to the strikers in the streets of Belfast. What has happened in Ulster in this last fortnight is, I believe, a grave warning for any democratic Government

935
anywhere. Mob rule has defied democratic authority and has won a battle. It must not be allowed to win a war.
There was, as there usually is in such a situation, an element of intimidation in this strike. I have talked with working men who would have marched with Len Murray, who wanted to to do so but did not dare because of threats to their families. It must be acknowledged, however, that the strike had genuine grassroots Protestant support. Many mistakes were made on both sides of the Irish Sea. I am a firm believer in the bipartisan policy in Northern Ireland, and so it is with genuine regret that I say that I do not believe the crisis was very well handled in London.
The Prime Minister's television broadcast was, to put it mildly, somewhat tactless and ill-timed in some of the things he said. The people of Northern Ireland pay their taxes like anyone else and the reference to spongers was not calculated to influence opinion in Ulster in favour of British policies. But the real blame lies at the door of the extreme Protestant leaders in Ulster. The hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley), who has not graced the House with his presence very much this afternoon, and his associates have created a monster they can no longer control. They have played on Protestant fears for their own political ends. I refuse to believe that they can be so blind or so stupid as to believe that any British Government have any intention whatever of a so-called sellout to the South. They must know that the Constitution Act leaves the future of Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland hands and that this has been confirmed by Mr. Cosgrave.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) put it in an admirable article in The Times, it is truth that has been the casualty in this matter and the facts have been deliberately misrepresented, so that the less well-informed, the less politically sophisticated people in Ulster have been led to believe, and have now, alas, come to believe, that the Sunningdale Agreement was the back door to a united Ireland. It was nothing of the sort. But the fears are genuine—promoted and fostered by Protestant politicians who have given a bad to prejudice and hatred as un-
936
christian on the one side as that given by the IRA on the other.
I do not blame the ordinary Protestant workers in Belfast or the Catholics in the Falls, the Ardoyne and Andersons-town for the troubles of Northern Ireland. But I do say that the hon. Member for Antrim, North and his friends bear a very heavy responsibility, exceeded only by that of the IRA, for all that has happened, and especially for the near-collapse of civilised life in the Province in the last fortnight. As a result, the Executive is destroyed and we are to revert, inevitably, to direct rule. There is no other course for the time being, but that form of government cannot be continued indefinitely, nor can we go back to the total Protestant ascendancy of the Brookeborough regime. That would not bring peace in 1974; it could only accentuate sectarian strife, especially under the extreme Protestant leadership it would now have.
There are a number of options. Some people favour a further partition of Ulster, and I suppose it would be possible to hive off Fermanagh and Tyrone. But what about Belfast? The Catholic and Protestant houses and streets and districts are so mixed up and so close to each other that it would require a major removal of people who have lived in their own homes for generations and who would rightly and fiercely resent being forced to go and live in the Republic. Almost 40 per cent. of the population of Northern Ireland are Catholics, and that is much too high a proportion to evacuate and rehouse against their will.
Some people take a different view. They want total integration with Britain. I believe that is the policy of Mr. Enoch Powell. But if there is total integration, there must be acceptance of British policies and British standards. Ulster Members cannot have it both ways—and, of course, I do not here include the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt). If they want integration they must conform to British behaviour and not encourage their street supporters to usurp the authority of this Parliament.
Others want independence for Ulster. I do not know whether that would be supported by the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved), because we have not heard from him yet, but I know some of his views.

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Some people—not necessarily the hon. Member—take the view that Ulster's capacity for self-inflicted misery is so great that Britain can no longer bear the burden of it. They say that we should withdraw and leave the Irish to cut their own throats. The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) specifically did not say that, and I accept that. It is true that our soldiers have been killed and we are no longer, apparently, wanted by either side; so why, the argument goes, should we stay? This feeling in one form or another is growing in England, although I have had very few letters about it from my own constituents. I sympathise with it, but I hope that most hon. Members in this House can agree that it is our duty to stay and to try, despite every discouragement, to maintain law and order in what is still a part of the United Kingdom. If we pulled the troops out we should, in my view, be leaving Ulster to anarchy and civil war in which there would be not hundreds of casualties but hundreds of thousands of casualties, including many innocent women and children. It would be irresponsible to do that, and a dereliction of our duty. At any rate, it would be a tremendous gamble.
Some hon. Members may think that that would not be the outcome, that somehow, miraculously—it has never happened before—the extremists on either side would come together if we were not there. I very much doubt it. Anyway, it must be acknowledged that it would be a tremendous gamble, and we are not entitled to gamble with the lives of the people of Ulster.
Mr. Dalyell: Of course there is a balance of risk, and it would be absurd not to admit it. But I ask the hon. Gentleman, in no pernicious spirit: if he accepts his line of argument, how long does he see the British Army going on and on as at present?
Sir N. Fisher: That is a fair point. 1 was about to deal with that aspect in my next sentence. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that there is a limit. If we are to stay, we must receive some co-operation from those whose lives we are trying to protect and whose employment we are trying to preserve.
Power sharing, which I am sure is the only hope for Ulster, must be resumed.
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but moderate Catholics in the SDLP cannot be expected to share power with extreme Protestants. It would not be a workable coalition. I do not want to put words into the mouth of the hon. Member for Belfast, West, but I cannot see him being able to do it, with the best will in the world.
Therefore, when the time for elections comes moderate Protestants must somehow again be elected. I do not know quite how that is to happen. The only hope of that lies with the Ulster people themselves. If the moderates will vote, and if there are enough moderates left in the Province—which I pray there are —power can again be restored to a viable and moderate Executive, which is what we all want in Northern Ireland.
That is what we have to ask of Ulster in return for the troops and the help we give. If she cannot make that contribution for her own good, we are entitled in the last resort—but it would be very much a last resort—to ask whether the game is worth the candle, and to give Ulster the choice: British troops, British money and British policies, leading, we would hope, to peace and prosperity for the Province; or no troops, no money and sectarian policies, leading, as I fear they would, to poverty and civil war.
In the end, it is the people of Ulster themselves who will have to decide.
5.41 p.m.
Mr. Stanley Cohen: I have read or heard recently that it was Mr. Gladstone who said that if anyone provides the answer to the Irish question the Irish will change the question. I am not as pessimistic or cynical as Mr. Gladstone was, but I must confess, having listened to the right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West), that one is tempted at least to appreciate the reasoning behind Mr. Gladstone's assessment.
I am almost tempted to say that it is unnecessary for many of us, having heard that speech, to speak in the debate. If anything would convince me, and I hope many Members, of the need for the continued British presence in the north of Ireland, that speech would do it. It contributed nothing constructive to the debate but merely served to convince

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many of us of the existence of the many problems in the north of Ireland.
I shall not try to cover the whole spectrum of the problems, because so many hon. and right hon. Members wish to speak. I should like to concentrate on what is probably one of the key problems—the British presence. I appreciate that there are right hon. and hon. Members on both sides who, for honourable and sincere reasons, feel that there should be an immediate withdrawal of British troops or at least a date should be fixed by which British troops should be withdrawn from Northern Ireland. I ask those right hon. and hon. Members to consider very carefully, before coming to a conclusion on that point, the following questions.
Would the withdrawal of British troops ease the situation in any way? Would it establish a greater degree of justice, particularly for the minority in Northern Ireland? Would a more democratic system emerge? Would it reduce the violence, bloodshed and murders? Would it undermine the terrorists and the thugs in Northern Ireland?
For me the answer to those important questions is, regrettably, "No." If that is the case, how would withdrawal, either in the immediate or the near future, be seen by the people of Ireland, Britain and the rest of the world? I suggest that in the not-too-distant future it would be seen in one of two ways, as either a decision of utter selfishness or one based purely on desperation. Whatever the decision, or whatever assessment there might be, the fact remains that even if it were welcome in the immediate, history would condemn us for having made it.
Whether or not we find the fact unpalatable, we have a responsibility. We must recognise that this Parliament must accept its fair share of responsibility for the present situation in Ireland. Our predecessors were involved in creating the boundaries which to a large extent cause the problems confronting the Irish people. Having recognised that, we cannot shirk our responsibility if we are to act as parliamentarians and people with a sense of responsibility to those who elected us.
I hope that we shall consider very carefully what has happened. Having helped to create the problem, we decided to
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ignore its existence. For many years the House, to its credit, has been concerned about social, economic and political injustices in every corner of the world; but it has been prepared to ignore totally the existence of this problem on its own doorstep and within the United Kingdom.
I accept the view expressed in the Chamber and elsewhere by many right hon. and hon. Members that if a referendum were taken the British people would be found to be substantially in favour of the immediate or early withdrawal of British troops. That is all very well. Such a judgment could be applied to so many other issues. Popularity may be a good servant, but it is a very bad taskmaster. It would be so easy for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the House to decide to withdraw troops now or in the very early future. But I am sure that the House and the nation would live to regret such a decision. Tragic though it would be for Ireland if we withdrew troops now, the backlash would not stop at Ireland. Its effect would be felt considerably in this country.
I need only remind the House of what has happened in the west of Scotland, for instance, where in the not-too-distant past 20,000 Orangemen were marching. It is well known among Scottish hon. Members that people are being trained by para-military groups to take action in connection with this problem, if necessary, should it spread. It is not confined to Scotland. I represent a constituency in Leeds in which there is a substantial number of Irish people. I understand from reliable sources that Protestant para-military groups are being organised there, too. I can see the danger that could arise if we decided to leave the Irish people to deal with their own situation.
Mr. Dalyell: I am rather alarmed. I would ask my hon. Friend gently whether he has any evidence of such training in Scotland. I have one of the most sensitive of all constituencies in this respect. The truth is that in 1969 the position was tinder-dry. It was very dangerous and we were careful not to open our mouths. In 1971 it was a little different. In 1974 the attitude is totally different. Having been around many of my constituents, asking questions, I find that this overwhelmingly is not their attitude now.
Mr. Cohen: All I can say is that the view that my hon. Friend expresses is not in conformity with the views expressed by some of his Scottish colleagues. After the debate is over, I might introduce him to some, when he may hear the evidence to which I have referred and which might prove useful for him and the House.
I hope that the House will consider carefully everything that is said in this debate. I hope that the decision which is taken will be based on wisdom and decided by sound common sense, by the head rather than the heart. Emotion is the most dangerous feature of the situation confronting us now.
5.50 p.m.
Mr. Jerry Wiggin: As an Englishman representing an English constituency, I approach my intervention with considerable humility, but not with an apology, since I believe that my constituents, like those of all other hon. Members, are beginning to show increasing disquiet at events in Ulster as they have been played over the last five years. Wherever one goes, one is called upon to bring pressure for some action, whether it be the withdrawal of troops or some positive political initiative—I would not distinguish. But the people of this land want something to be done.
When I first entered the House a Bill was passing through known as the Parliament (No. 2) Bill, which had the agreement of both Front Benches but of no one else. A senior back bencher drew me aside and said "My boy, when both Front Benches are in collusion, that is the time to beware of what this House is doing". While I will not be critical of everything that has happened over the last five years one must accept that there has been substantial agreement between both sides of the House. Whether this can or should now continue is something which will no doubt become clear shortly.
One of the problems of Ulster which seem little realised on this side of the water is the immense depth of bitterness and hatred that more than 300 years of sectarian division have created, a bitterness and hatred which, thank God, we are not familiar with anywhere else in the United Kingdom. The right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) was right to say that this is no
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longer a religious division. We know that it started that way, but it is now a question not of whether someone believes in the Protestant faith or the Catholic faith but of whether he belongs to the Catholic gang or the Protestant gang.
From the English point of view there is no doubt that the problems of Ulster should be seen in that light. We have seen over the past five years every possible sensible attempt at reconciliation
Mr. James Wellbeloved: Hear, hear—and they have all failed.
Mr. Wiggin: I have voted—with a heavy heart, but nevertheless I have voted —for a referendum and for proportional representation, neither of which I believed in, but I was forced to the conclusion that unless we tried these things we should be open to the criticism that we had gone too fast. Now we have tried these things. We have even gone so far as power sharing in a way which would be unacceptable in any city in this land and a type of election which, if used in England, would achieve no support. We have tried all these things in an effort to get peace in Ulster.
Sunningdale was the spark that, unhappily, proved just a little too much. I do not want to get involved in a deep debate about the strike, but I have some sympathy with those who say "We believed that Sunningdale was the end for us." I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Sir N. Fisher) that it was not, but many people in Ulster saw it as the beginning of the end, as the beginning of the sell-out, and they voted against it convincingly and overwhelmingly at the last General Election. We made a great mistake in not seeing that danger signal.
I should much have preferred to see Sunningdale accepted and the Executive still in action; all the things that we know would have led to peace. But we have to face the fact that all these things have now broken down. It is no good pretending that what has gone before has been successful. It clearly has not: it has failed.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Down, South (Captain Orr)—I deliberately call him my hon. Friend. I am sorry that he and at least two or three of his hon.

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Friends who used to take our Whip can no longer be in our ranks. We have healed far worse divisions on this side and I am sad that a rift should be growing, not healing, on this matter.
I would take issue with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) and those who have spoken against re-partition. Whether it is called the Cyprus solution or dividing the communities by force, it is a solution which has not been examined in great depth by the House, or, so far as I know, by the Government. Of course it is a policy of absolute despair. Of course it acknowledges the failure of what has gone before. But it means that for a minimum of expense and a minimum use of our troops some sort of peace can be re-established. Listen as I might to all the excellent speeches that we have heard today, so far there has been so suggestion of a new initiative which will help.
Cyprus is worth close examination in this light. There, the dividing force has been the United Nations. With occasional bouts of revolution here and there and the odd accident, for a good many years the totally opposed communities have been kept at peace. I am not suggesting that we should use the United Nations—I should be loth to come to any such conclusion—but I believe that there is a prospect here of a peaceful solution.
In Londonderry there would be very little problem; the river divides the city. In Belfast, I acknowledge the vast problem of interlocking estates, but I see in some new town which is being built with the object of trying to get the communities to intersperse, within weeks the families are moving back into their own tribal areas. In the present circumstances, the type of living together which we here would understand does not and cannot take place.
On the border, it would mean great sacrifices for both sides. It would mean that Protestants would have to give up their land and that Roman Catholics would have to move. It would be a vast and expensive upheaval, and we should have to be quite clear about all the implications of such a plan. But we have spent so much money and so many lives already that, although this policy of
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despair seems almost eccentric, it is worth examination.
Mr. Kevin McNamara: How does the hon. Gentleman think he would persuade either the Nationalist Republicans or the Loyalist Unionists in the areas to which he is referring to accept his policy?
Mr. Wiggin: I am not saying that it would be easy to impose, but very large numbers of people have been moved in similar circumstances in the past, sometimes successfully and sometimes not so successfully.
Mr. Norman Miscampbell: How would my hon. Friend choose those who would have to move? Would he say "Romans, you must go", although the Roman Catholics concerned might be loyal citizens and might wish to stay? Or would he say to Protestants, who might take very different views, "You must go"? How would my hon. Friend choose?
Mr. Wiggin: I believe that in the circumstances which would prevail, given the line which should be drawn or the area to be delineated, those people whom one would wish to move would do so voluntarily. I do not pretend that this is an easy solution but it should be examined.
I cannot see that the withdrawal of our troops at the present time could lead to anything but a ghastly bloodbath in Ulster. Those who suggest that the extremists would put down their guns and settle their differences are being so optimistic as to be unrealistic. But I confirm that my inquiries of people in our own cities where the Irish population is strongest in this country suggest that even if civil war were to break out in Ulster we should perhaps avoid it here. But I am not so certain. I think we have to be very careful about assuming that a bloodbath in Ulster would not reach our shores. That would be wrong and irresponsible of us, and I hope that those of my hon. Friends who think that the troops should be pulled out will accept how dangerous it would be.
Mr. Dalyell: Where is this bloodbath going to take place? In Somerset?
Mr. Wiggin: That intervention is hardly worthy of the hon. Gentleman.

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He knows that I am referring to Ulster, and if the forces of law and order were to be removed from Ulster there would be real risk of civil war breaking out.
Mr. Dalyell: Not here.
Mr. Wiggin: I am not saying that civil war would necessarily break out. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that even if it broke out it might not spread to these shores. But it is an assumption we are not entitled to make.
The time has come for the Army to have a greater degree of freedom in Northern Ireland. I believe that there should be a curfew, that people should carry identity cards and that the hooligans and ruffians, masquerading as soldiers and treated practically under the Hague Convention rules, should be treated as the criminals they are, regardless of which side they come from.
I cannot think of anything more depressing for the Army than to catch one of these louts, put him in the Maze, and then see him out after two or three weeks, causing problems and having learnt a good deal more about arms and the rest of it while in prison. It is no good pretending any longer that the soft hand is winning the war, because it is not. Although I accept that the generals may not be arguing for this, the soldiers on the ground are, and we should pay careful attention to what they are saying.
Mr. Orme: A statement like that which the hon. Gentleman has just made needs to be backed by facts. The officers and men—I am not referring now to the GOC —have made no demands for such action. In fact, if we wanted to impose the policy which the hon. Gentleman is talking about in the terms in which he chooses to put it to the House, we would need 50,000 to 100,000 troops in Northern Ireland. The whole scheme he suggests is absolutely impractical, and he should take that on board.
Mr. Wiggin: I am not saying that to impose such a scheme would not, while it was being imposed, be immensely demanding. I acknowledge that that is a factor against my case. But thereafter it would require many fewer troops, practically no money, and so on. I think that I have made my case, and I accept that there are arguments against it. But the case should be argued, which is what I am asking the House to do.
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The Minister of State has intervened concerning specifically military points, and I accept that there is a difference of opinion here. But I cannot understand why we should conduct the security operations as we are doing. They have never been conducted anywhere else in the world without the aid of such things as a curfew, identity cards, extra rights of search, and so on. These things were done in Cyprus, Aden and Kenya. They have been regarded as aids to British troops everywhere. Now, for some political reason, they are not acceptable in Ulster. The time has come to stop being wishy-washy about it.
The time has come to be realistic. We have done all we can in a political capacity. We have to face the fact that we can no longer reconcile the irreconcilable.
6.6 p.m.
Mr. R. C. Mitchell: For the past five years we in this House have had a bipartisan—or, if the Liberals prefer it, a tripartisan— policy on Ireland. But, as the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said in a first-class speech, the fact that we have a bipartisan policy is no reason why there should not be criticism when one thinks that the policy is wrong.
I have felt for a considerable time that our bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland was based on a fundamental error. That error was contained in the Constitution Act 1973 in the phrase about which we had long debates:
"in no event will Northern Ireland cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland".
Half our trouble stems from that provision. I know that it was included to persuade the Protestants in Northern Ireland that we had no intention whatever of forcing them into a united Ireland. If it said precisely that, I would agree with it, but it does not say that.
I accept that no one can force the people of Northern Ireland against their will into union with the South. But the only people who can decide what are the present or future boundaries of the United Kingdom are not the people of Northern Ireland but the people of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—in other words, all the people of the United Kingdom.

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I believe that membership of the United Kingdom involves certain standards and a certain acceptance of democracy. I am doubtful whether the people of Northern Ireland—I make no distinction between them—are living up to those standards and are willing to accept the sort of democratic institutions which we in the United Kingdom have a right to ask them to accept.
I want to ask the Government this question. Do they still stand by the declaration in the Constitution Act that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom until such time as the majority of the people in Northern Ireland think otherwise? If the Government still stand by it, they are perpetuating a disaster.
Obviously, if Northern Ireland is to remain part of the United Kingdom we cannot return to the pre-1968 position, in which the majority held down the minority and there were all sorts of discrimination in relation to voting, housing and so on. That sort of thing is not acceptable inside the United Kingdom. We in the United Kingdom have to insist on certain standards of democracy and conduct. There may well come a time when the rest of us, through this Parliament, will say "We do not want you any longer in the United Kingdom." We in this Parliament have a right to decide that in the last resort.
Mr. Nicholas Winterton: The hon. Gentleman has stated that this Parliament should be able to make a decision as to whether Ulster should remain part of the United Kingdom. Does he not therefore concede that perhaps Ulster should be represented equally in this House with all the other parts of the United Kingdom? At the moment Ulster is very much under-represented.
Mr. Mitchell: I do not think that follows. I am completely and utterly opposed to the integration solution. I am saying that this Parliament and no other body has the right to decide what are the boundaries of the United Kingdom. We have the right to say to Ulster "We do not want you; you must find your own solution".
Another basic misconception has existed over the past few years. Both Front Benches have often suggested that the
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problem in Ulster is between a small extremist group on the one side and a small extremist group on the other, with a mass of moderates in the middle, people who want only to watch television, to stay at home and so forth. If nothing else, what the events of the past fortnight have shown is what a fallacy that is.
We begin with the last General Election. It was made quite clear then that the large majority of Protestant opinion in Northern Ireland was totally opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement, and the Protestants sent 11 Members of Parliament here to prove that. That is a fact of life. Another fact of life, as shown by the strike organised by the Ulster Workers' Council, is that the majority of the population, not only the working-class population, of Northern Ireland was solidly behind the Ulster Workers' Council.
Of course the council was not elected and the Government were absolutely right not to negotiate with it during the strike—one cannot negotiate with a self appointed body—but, although self-appointed in that sense, many of the leader of the council were themselves elected in another context. They were shop stewards, for instance; they were men who had been elected at Harland and Wolff and other factories by their colleagues to represent them as shop stewards. They came together in a body, and in that sense the Government were right not to deal with them, but they showed that the majority of the population of Northern Ireland would have nothing to do with the power sharing that had occurred so far. Let us call a spade a spade. The strikers won and the Government were defeated. Any Government would have been defeated by that strike. The important question is what happens now.
The Government Front Bench, supported by the Opposition Front Bench, says that we must look forward to some form of power sharing. I hope that is right, but the question is who is to share the power. Obviously the original basis of the SDLP and the Faulkner loyalists was not sufficient, so what sort of power sharing is it to be? We are entitled to hear more details of the Government's thinking on that subject in the course of the next few days. Whom are they to consult? Who is to share the power?
Mr. David James: There is a crucial question that I should like to put to the hon. Gentleman. Does he agree that the power sharing that existed only two or three weeks ago was totally satisfactory to the overwhelming majority of people in Northern Ireland? What led to the workers' strike was not power sharing but the Council of Ireland.
Mr. Mitchell: I doubt whether that analysis is correct. I suspect that although the Council of Ireland was a factor in the Sunningdale Agreement which might have led to the strike, the power sharing over the past few months was not acceptable to the large majority of the population of Northern Ireland. I see no evidence to support the hon. Gentleman's view.
Over the past few hundred years Britain has tried every conceivable solution. We have tried integration, oppression, Stormont, direct rule and power sharing. All of them have failed. Perhaps we should now look to something else. What is left? What other initiative can we take?
I strongly believe that only the people of Northern Ireland can solve the problems of that Province. I do not believe that we shall ever do it. If we try, we shall be having this debate within a year, two years or three years.
Therefore, the Government must get together a conference of the whole range of opinion in Northern Ireland, representing everyone from the IRA on the one hand to the Protestant extremists on the other. That conference should be allowed to reach a conclusion, and I believe that it could well do so. I am not as pessimistic as some about its chances. It might well produce a solution, give the prerequisite.
If we remain in Northern Ireland there will be no incentive to reach agreement. The prerequisite to reaching agreement is not that we pull our troops out tomorrow but that we set a date by which we shall have withdrawn troops from Northern Ireland. It may be a year or two years—wiser counsels than mine would prevail about that—but we must set a date. That would give the impetus to the various factions in Northern Ireland to formulate some sort of agreement.
The answer to the problem may well be an independent Northern Ireland, and
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We must be prepared to accept that. But until we set a date and make it clear that our troops will not stay there indefinitely, there will be no impetus to a solution. Our troops are not being successful. Obviously they could not deal with the strike and they are not trained for the kind of police job that they are expected to perform. Until such time as the people of Northern Ireland realise that the troops are not staying there indefinitely and that Northern Ireland is not automatically to receive aid indefinitely, they will have no impetus to get together and find a solution.
6.17 p.m.
Mr. John Dunlop: I should like to thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for this opportunity to take part for the first time in the deliberations of this honourable and ancient House. I represent the constituency of Mid-Ulster. I do not hold any claim to either notoriety or distinction, whichever way you prefer, for having succeeded Mrs. Bernadette McAliskey as the Member for that illustrious constituency. I should like to assure you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and hon. Members that I do not propose to use in this Chamber the methods of emphasis that the redoubtable Bernadette used when she was here. I notice that the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) on the Opposition Front Bench and I assure him that both his hair and his throat are in no danger from me in that respect; nor is any other hon. Member.
I represent very ordinary people. Indeed, I am a very ordinary man. I have not been used to the front line of political life at any time. It was a rather awe-inspiring experience to come into the House. The fact that I am sitting on these benches is not so much by choice as that there seemed nowhere else to sit when this Parliament opened. Oft-times I have wondered at those who describe us as Protestant extremists. They have nearly got a crick in the neck from looking round at us. I am sick, sore and tired of the two words "Protestant" and "Catholic" that I have heard so much in the House. I do not propose to use such expressions very much.
I know that it is the custom for a maiden speaker to be brief and not to be controversial, although I do not know

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how anyone could avoid controversy in the peculiar circumstances in which we are met for these two days. I would welcome the advice of mature hon. Members as to how I can say anything worth saying without being somewhat controversial. However I apologise for that in advance and hope that the House will bear with me.
Much has been said about the Constitution Act 1973. An Act of Parliament is not an act of God. It is not the word of God. Acts of Parliament have been found at times to require revision and even repeal. I was interested to hear the massive contribution of the Secretary of State for Employment when defending the Government's action in settling the miners' strike. In so doing, he and the rest of the Government rode a coach and four through the Industrial Relations Act. It is the purpose of the Government at the earliest opportunity to smash that Act and wipe it out altogether. As a trade unionist and the son of an ardent trade unionist, I have my own opinions about that Act.
The Constitution Act can be repealed. I presume that this is the business of this House and Parliament. The fact that it was rejected at the polls has been admitted on both sides and we cannot ignore it. I take up what was said by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) when we debated Northern Ireland in this House on 4th April. He more or less inferred that we, the Members from Northern Ireland, were some sort of political freaks and that we had come here by some way other than the way in which other folk had come here.
We came here by the same route as the Prime Minister, by way of the ballot box, by way of the free vote according to the British electoral system. While people may call us Protestant extremists —I promised not to use that word but I do so advisedly—that is the way we came. We came on the wave of a 52 per cent. vote of the total electorate in Northern Ireland. I would make so bold as to say that no Government that has been in office for 20 years or more has come into office with such a proportion of votes. Possibly the highest percentage might have been 47 per cent. On that score alone it seems that the
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people of Northern Ireland meant what they did.
I take grave exception to those who infer that the people of Northern Ireland are stupid and that one man, my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley), leads us all by the nose. That is not so. The people of Northern Ireland are thinking people. They are an earnest and honest people and I have the honour to represent a good number of them in what is, I believe, the largest geographical constituency in the United Kingdom. As Mr. Deputy Speaker said to me one day, "John, travel within the constituency will be considerable." I do not know whether that sounded like a Welsh accent.
The hon. Member for Attercliffe, in analysing the election figures, said:
"If Mr. Faulkner had seriously contested the recent election he must have increased the pro-Sunningdale vote. I ask the House to…look at the constituencies at the distribution of the candidates and at the constituencies which were contested and to slot in a Mr. Faulkner candidate here and there…There must have been a bigger pro-Sunningdale vote". — [OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th April 1974; Vol. 871, c. 1503.]
I represent the constituency of Mid-Ulster where there was a four-cornered fight. Mr. Faulkner slotted in his man. He lost his deposit. In the constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone, represented by my right hon. Friend, Mr. Faulkner also slotted in his man and he lost his deposit. Mr. Faulkner sent his man into Down, North. He sent his right-hand man on the Executive, the right hon. Member for Belfast, South (Mr. Bradford). He was defeated by 16,000 votes. In the constituency of Down, South, my hon. and gallant Friend was not opposed by Mr. Faulkner's candidate. Mr. Faulkner did not have the guts to put in an opponent there.
Why did he not contest it himself when at that time he was claiming on radio, on television, in the newspapers and on the public platform that he commanded 90 per cent. of the support of the ordinary people of Northern Ireland? Why did he not go to the polls and prove it? Far from facing the people through the polls, Mr. Faulkner, on the public platform, radio and television, enjoined the Unionists of Down, South not to vote.

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He said "Don't vote. I for one am not going to vote." That was from a paragon of democracy! Surely hon. Members will concede that that only method by which any people in any civilised country have a chance to speak for themselves and assert themselves is by using the ballot box. To tell the people not to vote was in my view a most undemocratic stance.
I take issue with the hon. Member for Attercliffe in his analysis of the election figures. The fact remains that 52 per cent. of the total vote of Northern Ireland sent the 11 Members to this House. We have heard much about the Protestant backlash. At one time there was a fear that this would take the form of a violent attack upon the Republican side of the political divide. There were fears that there would be an outbreak of horrible violence, sectarian murders, tit-for-tat killings on either side. This did not happen. The Protestant backlash came in a most unexpected way and, I would insist, in an orderly and decent way.
It was the only way that the people could speak because the constitutional way had been ignored by this House. So the Ulster Workers' Council acted. I assure the House that it did so on its own initiative. There was no political problem. We were all a rather surprised bunch of people in the North of Ireland when we were asked to meet these men. They said" Look. If the vote goes against you in the Northern Ireland Assembly this Tuesday, the strike is on." I hasten to the defence of those men, many of whom I know personally. They are ardent trade unionists. One of the main members of the strike committee, a man who had no sleep for about a fortnight, is the senior shop steward of the power workers.
As I have said, I am a trade unionist and the son of a trade unionist. I was one of the founder members of the NUDAW in Belfast nearly 50 years ago. One of the major reasons why I joined was that I worked for a multiple grocery company which was not too concerned about the conditions of employment and wages. I used to have to run for my life to catch the last tram from Castle Junction in Belfast at twenty past eleven on a Saturday night to get home the same day.
The strike action in Northern Ireland was the action of the people. It was not the action of faceless men who were
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dubbed as thugs, murderers, gangsters and bully boys. The people in the strike were trade unionists, but they were not acting as a trade union in an industrial dispute. They were acting in a political way and had a perfect right to do so in the circumstances. They made their plans well and sought by every means in their power to ensure that 60 per cent. of the normal power output would be available for domestic use and for hospitals and farms. Unfortunately, however, in some cases management and those directing affairs in our land redirected some of the power to heavy industry, with the result that there was inconvenience in some quarters. My telephone was red hot with messages from farmers, who suffered most in the strike. They were men who had lost thousands of broiler chickens which they had to throw into mass graves and burn, men who had to throw hundreds of gallons of milk down the drains because it could not be transported, and men who lost their livestock because there was no feeding stuff.
Those men were on the verge of bankruptcy yet they assured me over the telephone "We are behind this move of the people of Ulster." They said "God help you politicians if you turn back now." That was their message. That was the truth of the matter. The action came from the people. It was not a manoeuvred strike brought about by the fiery eloquence of politicians. We had nothing to do with it. To use a term in Northern Ireland, the politicians were in the ha'penny place. Incidentally, talking about trade unions and bearing in mind some of the remarks which have been made about this crisis, I as an ordinary man and an inexperienced Member of Parliament look forward with interest to the next big strike in the British Isles, wherever it may be, and I shall be delighted to see how the Government employ British tanks in that strike. [Interruption.]
Someone mentioned the word "sponger". During the crisis of the past fortnight nothing has hurt the ordinary people of Northern Ireland, of every section of the community, more than the smear on their character and record that they are spongers. During the last couple of decades, or perhaps even during the past half century, during crises of the two

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world wars, the people of Ulster have shown where they stand and they have come instantly to the side of the mother country in every crisis. The people of Ulster, the Province's manpower, industry and agriculture and the flower of its youth, were placed at the disposal of the British Empire and allies in the last war, while that Republican Government in the South of Ireland—about which so much has been said and in connection with which so many superhuman efforts have been made to involve them in the Government of Northern Ireland—stayed in neutrality and denied ports and bases for the Royal Navy in the savage battle of the Atlantic.
What is even worse is that perhaps the greatest of all parliamentarians, Sir Winston Churchill, asked the Government of the Republic to dim the lights of towns and cities to help in the security of Western Europe but they refused, with the result that towns and cities in Southern Ireland became a flarepath for German bombers which were going to Northern Ireland and to Scotland. The friendliness between Britain and Southern Ireland has been distinctly hypocritical in some respects.
Today the Government in the South of Ireland, with all their desire to be involved in the government and affairs of Northern Ireland, have indicted the British Government and the British people and charged them before the International Court with acts of torture and savagery —allegations which have been laid at the door of the British Army. This is the so-called friendly country across the Irish Sea. Some people say "Why don't you all get together?" But who would want to be associated with those people? We in the Province of Ulster do not want to be associated with them. We have said quite definitely that we do not want to be associated with them.
I realise that maiden speeches are supposed to be short and I shall conclude soon, but I appeal in the name of the people not only of Mid-Ulster but of the whole of Ulster to that characteristic of the British people which made them famous many generations ago, a characteristic which has been evident not only in sport, not only in national and international relationships and in human
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relations, but in all relationships—the innate quality of fair play.
All that we ask the British people to believe from Northern Ireland today—I say this with deep sincerity—is that the ordinary people of Ulster, who are at the crossroads, and the Loyalists—that name has been smeared and has attracted a certain slant—have a love for England and for the British throne and a loyalty to everything British. Above all, they want to remain British. They have said that they will resist to the last any attempt to annex the Six Counties and incorporate them into the Irish Republic.
6.35 p.m.
Mr. Kevin McNamara: This is a unique privilege for me because it is the first occasion I have followed a maiden speaker, in this case a Member for a distinguished constituency and the successor to Mrs. Bernadette McAliskey. The hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop) said that he hoped he would never have to adopt the parliamentary tactics that Mrs. McAliskey adopted. I hope that there never will be an occasion when the British Army takes such action against the Protestants in Northern Ireland that the hon. Gentleman feels he has to adopt similar tactics. I also hope that he will show the same assiduity in his constituents' interests and the same devotion to their cause and beliefs as was shown by his predecessor, and by her predecessor, Mr. Forrest.
That does not mean that we necessarily accepted the actions of the hon. Gentleman's predecessor or her political philosophy but it means that in the short time that she graced the House she was a great parliamentarian and a brilliant debater with an ability to put her arguments most succinctly. The best maiden speech in the memory of many of us was that made by Mrs. McAliskey.
However, the hon. Gentleman represents a different tradition and a different train of thought, one which I hope we in the House are now beginning to understand, if we did not understand it previously. When the hon. Gentleman attacked my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) about what he said concerning the result of the last election in Northern Ireland, he misinterpreted my hon. Friend's speech. By

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his own use of statistics, the hon. Gentleman backed up the point which my hon. Friend had made. My hon. Friend said that 51 per cent. of the population voted for anti-Sunningdale candidates. But 49 per cent. did not vote for them. If one paid attention to the deceit, dishonour and downright lying about the contents of the Sunningdale Agreement, that 49 per cent. would represent a true majority in many ways.
The hon. Member for Mid-Ulster made a provocative speech. I hope that we shall hear him often again, because we shall then be in a position to interrupt him. We listened patiently to what he said. We are grateful to him for one thing, and that is that he did not regale us with the history of Ireland. The right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) started his speech by referring to events in 1964 and 1966.1 had a terrible fear that he would go back to speak about the Battle of Clontarf, by which time some of us might have understood the demand for the withdrawal of the British Army.
This is an important debate for the United Kingdom, for this House and for Northern Ireland. The events of last week were a positive defeat for the policies of the two main parties in this House and, indeed, of the Liberal Party. We saw the defeat, perhaps through deception, of what we had tried to achieve. We said that if we were to carry out our responsibilities to Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, this was the way forward for the people of Ulster.
Some Opposition Members, particularly those who call themselves loyalists, say that they wish to be members of the United Kingdom and to retain their part of the United Kingdom heritage. If that is so, we must agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell) said, namely, that they must accept it on our terms. In listening to the Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party today, we felt that we were to be allowed to retain the Six Counties within the United Kingdom on their terms. But those terms are not acceptable to the rest of the United Kingdom.
We are determined that the clock shall not go back to 1968 and earlier while we are responsible for Northern Ireland. We are determined that there shall be, in
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the words of the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster, fair play—something which has been lacking since the creation of Northern Ireland. That means that while we have responsibility people will have the opportunity to be represented.
This has been a sad defeat for the experiments of both parties. But it has been a defeat of only a five-months' experiment. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary believed, when he was Home Secretary, that power sharing started when the British troops first went in. In fact it started only five months ago with the Sunningdale Agreement and with people properly taking executive control.
When we talk about the failure of the policy, we are talking about a failure of five months. What is five months in the last five years? What is five months in the 50 years since the creation of Northern Ireland? What is five months in the 500 years of United Kingdom involvement in Ireland as a whole? A thousand deaths amount to something, but five months is nothing in the sands of time.
Last week my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) said "Let us pull out the troops, not in months, but in days." My hon. Friend the Member for Itchen says that we must fix a date for the withdrawal of British troops. There is no difference between the two. Whether the troops are withdrawn in two years or tomorrow, it is just an excuse to stack arms. It is not possible to fix a date and avoid responsibility in this way.
The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin) spoke about frontier rectification—a Sudetenland solution. He says "Put them all in cattle trucks and take them from one area to another". What right have we to say to Protestants who have lived in Londonderry or the Catholics of the Glens of Antrim for many years "Get up and go"? Echoing the words of the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling), who bears much responsibility for the present situation—I am sorry that he is not present, because I would have devoted more time to his remarks if he were— what right have we to say to the people of Belfast "Get up and go"?
As the hon. and learned Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) said, who would choose who should go?

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Would it be said "Are you Catholic and therefore republican?" or "Are you Protestant and therefore loyalist?" Must people leave places where their ancestors have lived for generations and centuries because we in this House, who created the Six Counties, say "We are sorry, but this is the only way we can see of solving the problem "?
Mr. Wiggin: I accept the hon. Gentleman's criticism of the points I made, but does he not accept that in the streets of Londonderry, Belfast and elsewhere people are being forced by the existing situation to get up and go?
Mr. McNamara: Yes, I accept that. By giving way, however, we are giving way to the evils of the extremists, gunmen and petrol bombers on both sides. If we accept that situation, the extra powers for the Army about which the hon. Gentleman spoke are not needed because the soldiers will not have a job to do. The Army has all the power it wants. The hon. Gentleman has only to look at the Emergency Provisions Act which the Conservative Government introduced to see that it has every power it could possibly need. If it wanted a curfew, it could have it. If our troops were in Northern Ireland in a German sort of situation, hated by both sides and with a concentration camp atmosphere, I would support my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian in calling for their withdrawal. But I do not think that that is yet the situation.
The third argument which is put forward is that we should cut off financial aid, pull the Protestants into line and show them that we are boss. It is said that we should stop the next grant and successive grants to Harland and Wolff. It is said that we should stop social security benefits for people in Northern Ireland and make them feel dependent on us. This is another policy with which I do not agree.
Like the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster, I am a trade unionist. I fought against the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite when they were saying that we should stop social security benefits for strikers. I fought hon. Gentlemen opposite when they talked about giving only loans to strikers. I am not prepared to do that for our people or for people in Northern Ireland which is part of the United King-
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dom. There could not be a greater recipe for urban insurrection and urban unrest than to cut off financial aid. If the workers in the shipyards, in Short Bros and other factories have aid denied to them so that they have to go on Thursdays to collect their unemployment benefit, they will not sit on street corners and twiddle their thumbs. Let us hear no more of rectification, withdrawal of the Army, either immediately or at a fixed date, or of cutting off financial aid.
I have never denied that what I want to see is a 32-county Republic. That is the way Ireland's future lies. But I do not believe that one can get it by bludgeoning people into it, nor can one stop it by lying to the people about what was done at Sunningdale. While Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, we must treat the people who live there as United Kingdom citizens.
Criticism has been levelled at my hon. Friends for refusing to speak to the strikers. There was a properly elected Executive consisting of political representatives and there was an Assembly. My hon. Friends were right to use the constitutional method. I would have no truck with people who say that my hon. Friends should have been to see the Ulster Workers' Council. They had to deal with the organisations that were in existence, and now that the Executive has gone it is wrong to criticise my hon. Friends for failing to use methods other than the proper constitutional methods which the House endorsed. We are now in a different ball game, a new situation. The Executive has gone and the Assembly is prorogued.
Between 1966 and 1974 I felt most concerned about the way in which the Protestant working class had lost its self-identification. As a result of the strike, the Protestant working class has got back that self-respect. In the years when we were, quite properly, paying attention to the minority the Protestant working class had the B Specials to protect them and belonged to the Orange Order. They felt that they were one with the laird and his mansion and with the master in his boardroom because they belonged to this mystical organisation. When we stripped them of the B Specials and tried to end discrimination, we took away everything they believed in and we stripped them of their identity. Now, they have that identity back. I dislike many

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of its facets, but at least it is there and we can perhaps work on it.
Because there has been success for the majority in Northern Ireland, there must be massive reinsurance of the position of the minority. That is why I regret the statement made by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary about the Price sisters after the request by my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt) and his colleagues that they should go back to Northern Ireland. It is important that the minority leaders should be seen to be paid attention to and to be respected.
What do the Government intend to do about internment, which we voted against upstairs and which we voted against as a party down here once unofficially and once officially? It is not sufficient to say that it is a matter for Lord Gardiner. We must take positive steps about it.
Now that there is no Executive, my right hon. Friend can talk to anyone he wishes to talk to who represents any strand of opinion in Northern Ireland. That gives him an opportunity to talk to the trade unionists, the official parties, the UVF and Sinn Fein, which we have now legalised. It gives us the opportunity again to try to find an agreement on power sharing. It also means that we must recognise, as we recognised at Sunningdale, that this is not just a United Kingdom problem but that it is also a Republic of Ireland problem. Although we may have been disappointed at the attitude of the Republic over extradition, nevertheless the Republic has a live concern about any decisions which we take, because it is on the other side of the frontier. I believe that we entered into a noble experiment and that we have had a setback—a defeat—but that we should not turn our backs completely upon the concept of power sharing and getting people of different communities and different traditions to work together to create a stable institution in Ireland.
I was sorely disappointed over the failure of Sunningdale for two reasons. For the first time there was an opportunity in the Six Counties for aspirations for a United Ireland to be realised and to become part of the accepted political life and pattern in Northern Ireland, without anyone being declared to be disloyal, being cut off from the rest of the body
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politic and being unable to play an active part in his community. Secondly, the Sunningdale Agreement contained so many safeguards that not one inch of land—not even Crossmaglen—could have gone into the Republic without the consent of the Protestants in Northern Ireland.
That has all gone. We have to start afresh. The experiment lasted for only five months, and five months is nothing in the sands of time. It is for the House to say to the people of Northern Ireland that this episode has not succeeded and to ask them amongst themselves to try again to get it to work in their own interests.
6.58 p.m.
Mr. Harold Gurden: Most of us in the House know that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) is always sincere and honest in what he says. He tells us directly exactly how he feels, and he means it. In this context, can we be so surprised at the so-called militant Protestants for the action they have taken when they know, as the hon. Gentleman has just reiterated, that there are several supporters of the IRA in the ranks of the Labour Party?
Mr. McNamara: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Gurden: I will give way in a moment. The hon. Gentleman has told us that he is for a united Ireland. He has told us that he supports the Price sisters—
Mr. McNamara: Slanderous rubbish.
Mr. Gurden: —who are murderers and members of the IRA.
Mr. McNamara: The hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden) has a reputation in the House as a Chairman of Committees, and it is pity that he does not bring that reputation to the Floor of the House when we are discussing these subjects. He well knows that at no time has any Labour Member supported the Irish Republican Army—either wing of it—in any of its methods in seeking to achieve a united Ireland. He well knows that we ask only that we should persuade people democratically to that end. With regard to the Price sisters he knows that we have condemned outright what they

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came here to do but that we have said that in many ways it might be wiser if they went back to Ireland.
Mr. Gurden: It is for those who read the hon. Gentleman's speech today and his previous speeches to interpret what he really was saying. The hon. Gentleman —this applies to some of the militant Protestants and certainly to some of the Protestants who have spoken in this House and, as I claim, some of the supporters of the IRA who have spoken in this House—always says the same thing. This is what has sickened many English Members of Parliament. I have heard the hon. Gentleman say time and again— and this applies even to some of those who now sit on the Government Front Bench—" We are against violence". They follow these remarks with the word "but", and then off they go.
The Attorney-General: When the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden), who is very much respected in this House, makes an allegation of that kind, it is right that he should make it clearly. When he says that there are hon. Members in this House, including some on the Government Front Bench, who support the IRA, is he referring to support in the sense of supporting the violence used by the IRA? If he is not saying that, in what sense is he making that comment?
Mr. Gurden: I am grateful to the Attorney-General for his intervention since it has helped me a good deal. I do not believe that those hon. Gentlemen support violence, but I am saying that they given passive assistance to the IRA in what it seeks to do. They admit that they are for a united Ireland. In this state of affairs can we be particularly surprised at the attitude adopted by militant Protestants?
I have criticised the militant Protestants and the attitude which they have adopted, but the militant Protestants during the last few weeks did not seek to murder people. They sought only to withdraw their labour.
Mr. McNamara: What about Ballymena?
Mr. Gurden: I agree with the hon. Member that there have been occasions
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when 1 have criticised the militant Protestants, but I am now seeking to deal with the recent strike. To get out of the present situation, they decided that they had to resort to a strike. But where did they get that idea from? They got it from Mr. Scanlon and his friends. Let us make no mistake about that.
Mr. Mather: Perhaps my hon. Friend realises that many Labour Members have been fishing in the troubled waters of Northern Ireland for a very long time, even before 1969—in fact from 1964 onwards. They have been over there and taken part in civil rights marches and have stirred matters up. Those civil rights marches gave place to the troubles in 1969, and by their action they made it possible for the movements to be taken over by extremists.
Mr. Gurden: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I do not think this matter really needs explanation. Let those whom the cap fits wear it.
Mr. McNamara: Whom does the cap fit?
Mr. Gurden: My right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) made a very interesting speech which I am sure everybody will read and take to heart. However, he did not answer the 64,000 dollar question which he posed of how we are to get the two sides in Northern Ireland to work out a solution. He said that this was the only possible hope but he did not say how it was to be achieved. From all we have heard today and, indeed, in the last few weeks, I say quite frankly that I do not believe that this is on the cards at the moment. Therefore, I think that my right hon. Friend should continue the story and tell the House exactly what was in his mind when he made that statement.
I agreed with so much of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin) that it almost makes my contribution unnecessary—and perhaps we could have avoided the little contretemps which has just taken place. I agree with my hon. Friend that in the present situation bipartisan policies are suspect. It was surely a tragedy that we asked the Army to go into Northern Ireland with one hand tied behind its back. If the Army is to be allowed to go into Northern Ireland to

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do a job, it should be allowed to do it in a professional way without politicians seeking to interfere at every turn.
It has rightly been said that we are now facing a new situation and something must be done. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has done a very good job of work within his remit. If he was sincere, as I believe he was, in saying that he wished to hear all sides of the argument, I think that he should take particular steps to read the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare. I appreciate that my hon. Friend's speech was criticised by those who said that his proposals were not practicable, and my hon. Friend admitted that there were problems in reaching a solution. However, we must ask ourselves the question "What price must be paid for trying to achieve a solution in any other way?" Will the answer be that thousands of lives will be lost, with many thousands more casualties? Are we to go on in that way, or are we to say that enough is enough and employ a stronger hand? The problem with a bipartisan approach is that there is no strength behind it. It is all a question of trying to get Sunningdale to work or to employ some other ad hoc solution, a solution which we ought by now to realise will fail.
There are people in this country who do not take sides in the dispute. Most of our constituents want to see peace in Ireland. They are neither pro-IRA nor pro-Protestant but simply want to see that nation at peace. It is in that spirit—and, I hope, in attempting to speak for my constituents—that I have intervened for the first time in an Irish debate. I believe that we must listen to the voices of our constituents. It is true that many of those voices are asking "When are we to pull out the Army?" or, alternatively, "Let the Army get on and do their job". I believe that it must be either one or the other.
If that is so and the Government, with the support of the Opposition, wish to try again some kind of power-sharing idea, there ought to be an election. Let us wash away all the arguments and have the election in Northern Ireland. Let us see what ideas are thrown up. Let us see whether my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet could be right in suggesting that a solution could
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be worked out by the people on the ground, and then fix a date for the Army to get out. The alternative is nothing short of what was postulated by my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare. It must be either one or the other.
7.10 p.m.
Mr. James Wellbeloved: It has not been my pleasure to listen to a speech by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden) for some time. The memory of his immoderate views has dimmed in our minds, but today he reminded us of his normal characteristic of immoderation when addressing the House.
The hon. Gentleman accused hon. Members on this side of the House of being supporters of the Irish Republican Army. That really is going almost beyond the terms of parliamentary usage. If true, what would it mean? It would mean that hon. Members who have sworn or affirmed allegiance to the Crown and the constitution of this country were aiding and abetting criminals intent upon the destruction of the legal Government of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Gurden: I have heard two voices nearby, so I will pose the question in order that the hon. Gentleman may hear it: what about the previous Member for Mid-Ulster?
Mr. Wellbeloved: The hon. Gentleman must get up to date. The previous Member for Mid-Ulster was never a Member of the Parliamentary Labour Party. She does not sit in this Parliament. The hon. Gentleman was directing his remarks to the Parliamentary Labour Party and to hon. Members on this side of the House.
The hon. Gentleman went on, again with great immoderation, to talk about unleashing the British Army and giving it the power to do the job. I say to him and to any other hon. Gentleman who may entertain such an idea that it will be unacceptable to this Parliament, to the British people and, indeed, to the British Army as well, because it has never been and would not allow itself to become the instrument of Gestapo-like repression anywhere in the world, let alone in what is at the moment part of the United Kingdom.
I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) is not in

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the Chamber. When I heard his opening speech on behalf of the Opposition I was somewhat surprised. He seemed to be intent upon nit-picking and destroying the last remaining remnants of the bipartisan policy that has been operating in Northern Ireland. His words seemed to be designed more to placate the kind of view expressed by the hon. Member for Selly Oak than to return the courtesy and the courage shown by my right hon. Friends and many of my hon. Friends in their support of that policy when it was being put forward by the Conservative Government.
I have consistently opposed the Northern Ireland Constitution Act as a mistaken policy. I did not support the previous Government and I do not support the present Government in continuing to try to uphold and to impose what is now a discredited as well as a mistaken policy.
It does not lie with the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire to be quite so niggardly in his support of my right hon. Friends when I recall how often they had to jump in to save the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) when he was struggling to uphold and pass that policy through the House of Commons. I noted, when the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire was speaking, that his right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border hung his head in embarrassed shame. It was remarkable that that should be observed.
The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) made a most interesting and illustrative speech, because it showed the tremendous shift of opinion that has taken place in the last few months. But the affairs of the last two weeks have crystallised the growing discontent both inside and outside Parliament at the joint policy that we have been following.
I do not see the situation today as full of despair. I see it as a new situation which, far from being a cloud of frustration and danger hanging over us, offers a new road which can lead to the hope of finding a solution to the Northern Ireland problem.
I am not depressed, I do not feel frustrated or elated, but slightly reassured
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that, now that the Constitution Act is discredited and dead, we can at least start upon a new political initiative which holds out the hope of some success. If this new opportunity is to have a chance of succeeding, it must not be based upon the follies of the past or upon the discredited Constitution Act and its guarantee, but built upon some new basis.
We in Britain and in the Westminster Parliament must face the simple but straightforward proposition, to which the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet referred; namely, that we have tried for hundreds of years to seek a solution to this tragic, tangled history of our two nations, Britain and Ireland, and have failed. My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell) described some of the attempts that have been made over the course of history. Now this latest attempt has failed. Therefore, we must recognise that no solution can be imposed by the Westminster Parliament on Ireland or on Northern Ireland and that the only people who can solve the tragic problems of the Province are the people of Northern Ireland themselves.
The Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 is as dead as the dodo. It is dead, despite the courage and determination of those very brave men—I refer to my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Fitt), Mr. Faulkner and many others in Northern Ireland—who have tried to make the Constitution work. They have put their own and their families' lives at risk in trying to get this Constitution off the ground. But, despite their courage and determination, they have to accept— I think they do—as we must that the Constitution has failed and that there must now be a new initiative.
I have said before, but it is worth re-emphasising, that my right hon. Friends have shown great faith in their proposals and great courage and responsibility in all they have done in recent years. I know that they also accept that those of us who have taken a different view have done so in good faith and with responsibility, having considered very deeply and carefully the issues involved. The difference between us is that they have tried their course and it has failed, whereas the course that I and many others have advocated has not been tried. I suggest that it is time that it was given a chance.

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It is time for the repudiation of that nonsense that is contained in Section 1 of the Constitution Act—the guarantee that Northern Ireland shall remain part of the United Kingdom so long as the majority in Northern Ireland so wish.
I say that that guarantee is nonsense because the only body of people which can determine the boundaries of any nation is the total population of that nation. The only body of people which can determine the boundaries of the United Kingdom is the people of the United Kingdom as a whole. Under this wretched Constitution the only people who were given an opportunity to express an opinion were the people of Northern Ireland—a minority in United Kingdom terms. Neither the previous Government nor this Government dare give the people of the United Kingdom as a whole an opportunity of expressing their opinion on that issue. That is what they must do if they talk about guarantees of boundaries, because the only guarantee worth talking about is one backed by a majority of the population of the United Kingdom as a whole.
It is also nonsense in Irish terms to have a guarantee like that. If one takes the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) and many others who share his view, that they want to move towards a united Ireland, it is nonsense to have a border poll that allows a minority only in Irish terms to decide the boundary within that country. So it is nonsense as regards the fixing of boundaries and as regards the guarantee.
It is also a fraud, because it holds out for the minority the prospect that one day it will get a united Ireland but at the same time while that constitutional guarantee of a border poll is there the minority must know that it is not possible for that hope to be fulfilled.
Mr. James Kilfedder: I follow the hon. Gentleman's argument, but does he deny to the people of Scotland the right to decide whether they should have independence; or is he perhaps influenced by the fact that they have some valuable oil offshore? Will he accept from me that I am perfectly prepared to accept the verdict of the people of the United Kingdom, of which I am proud to be a citizen, and I hope
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that Ulster remains an integral part of the United Kingdom?
Mr. Wellbeloved: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will accept that there are some substantial differences between what has happened in the history of Northern Ireland and its entanglement with Britain and what has happened in the history of other parts of the United Kingdom and their more successful partnership as a united country.
As to the right of any part of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the United Kingdom, I say again that the boundaries of the United Kingdom are matters for the people of the United Kingdom as a whole, whether it be Scotland, Wales, England or Northern Ireland. I stand by that test for any part of the United Kingdom.
The majority, because that guarantee is written into the 1973 Constitution, tends to lean on it as a prop. All the time that it is there the majority looks at the words in the Act and says "We need not worry about power sharing or about making an effort to reach an accommodation with the minority population because if it comes to the worst we can always rely upon the pledge in the Constitution and have a border poll and all will be all right." So there is no incentive, or compulsion, for the: majority population to reach that accommodation which is so essential for the rest of the citizens of Northern Ireland.
If I were an Ulsterman I would be very wary about putting too much faith in that constitutional guarantee, because it is a bit of a fraud. As the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop) said in his maiden speech, each Parliament is sovereign and can amend or repeal. I am certain that the day will come when Section 1 of the Constitution Act will be repealed by the Westminster Parliament, because it does not have the backing of the United Kingdom as a whole.
I believe that the British Army is faced with a most difficult task in Northern Ireland. Every Member of this Parliament is equally responsible unless we stand out against the policy which is being pursued by the Government. The policy which is being pursued by the Government is sending the British Army into a sea of hostility. The British Army finds hostility from the community that it originally went in to protect. It finds

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hostility from that section of the Ulster population who call themselves Loyalists.
In the last two or three weeks the British Army has faced a situation of almost insurrection from the majority population who claim that they want to retain their links with the United Kingdom. 1 have spoken to many soldiers who have returned from spells of duty in Northern Ireland and I am more than satisfied that they are fed up to the teeth with the reception that they are getting from all the population, both minority and majority. The soldiers talk about it as going out on to the streets as "duty targets". They go out with great courage to perform that duty. They are "duty targets" for the gunmen with bullets and the kids with stones. No wonder they are sick and tired of trying to carry out the mistaken policies imposed by the Westminster Government.
It is no part of my case or that of my hon. Friends who share my view to criticise the British Army. It is my view that the British Army in Ulster has shown courage, discipline and a quality of service that no other army in the world has been able to show in any comparable situation. So I want no truck with any section of the community which seeks to join the campaign with which I am associated for the withdrawal of the Army because it is critical of the way the Army operates in Northern Ireland.
I believe that the Army has fulfilled, and will continue to fulfil, its duty in Northern Ireland. Its duty is clearly to remain there as long as that is the policy of the British Government. I seek to change the mistaken policy which sends those young men to die for something which is unattainable, but I have no criticism of the Army itself.
If the Government of the Republic of Ireland want to make a contribution to the continuation of British involvement and to the British Army remaining in Northern Ireland—I believe that this is the opinion that the Dublin Government have expressed publicly—the best contribution that they can make would be to withdraw the charges that they have laid as a Government against the British Army at the European Commission of Human Rights. That would be a contribution towards encouraging my right hon. and hon. Friends to follow what I
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think is a wrong policy. However, it does not lie in the mouths of the Government of the Republic to ask my right hon. Friends to continue this policy whilst they pursue their accusations at the European Commission of Human Rights.
One of the most telling arguments against the proposition for disengagement and withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland is the question of what would come if that were to happen—the bloodbath, the civil war. This is an argument that those who take my stand cannot ignore. We must face up to this view. It is indeed a possibility. It is my view that the bloodbath is already here under the policies that we have pursued for the last five years.
I have done a little research. The evidence is that in the period from the Easter Rising of 1916 right up till August 1969 several hundred people were killed, both civil and military, in the various movements for Irish freedom and in the period of partition. In the last five years, under this policy, more people have died in Northern Ireland than in the whole of those 53 years from 1916 right up to 1969. Therefore, on the argument of the bloodbath, I contend that it is there already. What we seek to do is to end the bloodbath which is taking place now.
Mr. Kilfedder: Does not the hon. Gentleman realise that more Ulstermen died in the Battle of the Somme than in all the years that he has been enumerating?
Mr. Wellbeloved: I shall be coming to the Battle of the Somme; have no fear. It is my view that if a new policy such as that which I am putting to the House were embarked upon, it would end the present bloodbath. It is also my contention that when confronted with realities, the people of Northern Ireland will choose to live together rather than die together.
Mr. Merlyn Rees: In the spirit of the many discussions which my hon. Friend and I have had in past months, may I put one point to him? Even if we were to accept the assumption that peace and tranquility would come nearer if Britain were absent and if there were not the problem of arms shipments coming across the border, or arms coming in other directions, the point I am putting in the short run is that 4,500 policemen could not

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keep law and order in the normal situation which has grown up there is the last few years—the situation of "aggro", or whatever one calls it that goes on in the Province.
Mr. Wellbeloved: I accept that. That is why I completely dissociate myself from the view that the British Army could be withdrawn next week. That is not my belief, and it never has been. Just as those who take my view have to face the possibility of greater bloodshed, so do those who take the view of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State have to face this argument which they cannot lightly cast aside. My right hon. Friend gave the casualty figures of the British Army. He gave a figure of 257 killed in Northern Ireland on peacekeeping duties in the last five years. Add to that 1,400 or more soldiers who have been wounded—some so badly wounded that they are dead to all intents and purposes. The only semblance to life they have is that they still breathe. So the casualty rate is even greater than 257 killed.
What my right hon. Friend and those who support him have to do is to spell out at the Dispatch Box what is the acceptable casualty rate for the British Army in Northern Ireland in upholding what is clearly a discredited policy. It is not good enough to paint a picture of what might happen if another course were taken. They also have to spell out the cost if we continue—not only the cost in lives of soldiers for which each one of us in this House has a personal responsibility. They also have to say whether a continuation of this present policy could mean that the shooting from the IRA will stop. Is that to go on? That again means more blood flowing in the streets of Northern Ireland. Are the majority population for ever going to sit acquiescent or are they going to embark upon indiscriminate slaughter of British soldiers?
These are questions which my right hon. Friend has to face when he uses the bloodbath argument—a very powerful and telling argument against my point of view—but I suggest that when one looks at the cost of continuing the bipartisan policy, that also has to be quantified and taken into account because
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that, too, means a bloodbath and disaster for so many people.
Dr. Alan Glyn: I have listened with interest to what the hon. Gentleman has said. He has put his case for the withdrawal of the Army. I agree that this is not really a soldier's job. What he has not told the House yet is this. If the Army is to be withdrawn, by what will he replace it, and for how long would he envisage a civilian force being formed to replace the Army?
Mr. Wellbeloved: I ask the hon. Gentleman to contain his impatience a little longer. What is so dimly apparent to him is obvious to so many other people. I am coming to exactly that point which he has raised.
We have to face the fact that after five years of the bipartisan policy the only success that has been obtained is the uniting of the minority population and the majority population against the British Army and now against the Constitution Act itself. One of my hon. Friends asked "Where have all the moderates gone in Northern Ireland?" We were told for years that there was only a handful of extremists on both sides who were causing all the trouble and that 96 to 98 per cent. of the people of Northern Ireland wanted to continue in peace and harmony with one another and as part of the United Kingdom. The events of the last few weeks have evaporated that argument. The moderates in Northern Ireland do not exist in the sense that they are prepared to stand up and be counted in the way that we in Britain feel they ought to stand up and be counted.
What is the position of the minority population? They still act as a sea in which the terrorists can swim. They, or a substantial section of the minority population, still give aid and comfort to the terrorists of the IRA who are still in direct confrontation with the British Army. What is the position of the majority population? The people who wave the Union Jack and proclaim their desire to remain part of the United Kingdom are in almost insurrection against the laws passed by this Parliament—mistaken laws, in my view, but none the less laws passed by the Parliament of which they profess to remain part.

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What, then, is the future which we have to face in our relationship with Northern Ireland? What can emerge from the disaster of the past? What can be seen to emerge from the ruins of the 1973 Constitution Act? First, there must be further talks with the elected leaders in Northern Ireland and with the political groups—all political groups—in Northern Ireland. There needs to be a convention, an assembly of some sort, a round-table conference at which Britain is represented, to consider all these varying points of view. The first item on that conference agenda should be to set the date for British disengagement from Northern Ireland and for the withdrawal of troops from the soil of Northern Ireland. The second item on that agenda must be the constitutional arrangements for the new independent State of Northern Ireland.
When that conference comes, as indeed it will, the very worst that we can do is delay it. If we delay too long in arranging a conference for the willing transfer of power, we shall miss the boat completely because the people of Northern Ireland will take their independence if we do not confer it upon them.
If we want to try to use this last opportunity, which so many of my hon. Friends desperately and genuinely seek, an opportunity to find a way to encourage power sharing, then at that conference there will be the opportunity to reach a basis for power sharing which meets the mutual interests of both communities in Northern Ireland. There is no future for power sharing based upon some constitution dreamed up in this Parliament. The only future for power sharing •—if, indeed, it has a future—lies in a basis arrived at through mutual interest and through talks at a conference table among the interests on the ground in Northern Ireland.
The hon. Member for Mid-Ulster spoke of the part which the Republic of Ireland had played in the last war, and a minute or two ago the hon. Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder) referred to the Battle of the Somme. In the last war I served in the Royal Navy. With me in the ship in which I had the honour to serve were men from Northern Ireland and from Southern Ireland. Many came from the South to defend freedom in Europe, just as they came from the North,
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men who came without conscription, as volunteers, to fight with us.
There is no need to remind me of the part which the people of Northern Ireland have played in two world wars. Nor do I need to be reminded of the part which people of India, Cyprus, Malta, Ceylon, Canada, Australia and New Zealand played in instantly coming to Britain's side and in giving their lives in the defence of freedom. Northern Ireland is not unique in that respect. I do not decry their efforts; indeed, I am proud to have served with Ulstermen and with citizens of the Republic of Ireland in the last war. No one has a monopoly of service and dedication or, indeed, of death in either of the two world wars.
Mr. Robert J. Bradford Mr. Robert J. Bradford (Belfast, South) rose—
Mr. Wellbeloved: I shall not give way. I must get on, because so many other hon. Members wish to speak. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] All right. I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman, if he really wants me to.
Mr. Bradford: It is true that Ulster has not a monopoly of service, but it seems that Ulster has been insulted in a way not directed to any other country involved in the defence of democracy. I think that that is a point which the House ought to recognise.
Mr. Wellbeloved: I do not altogether follow that. All I know is that comrades from Australia, New Zealand, India, Ceylon and many other countries who served with great distinction with the British forces did so as citizens of independent countries or countries which have since become independent. I seek merely to give Ulstermen the opportunity to become independent and to join the ranks of those who are still within the British Commonwealth.
In my view, we have before us the chance to find a solution which comes from the people of Northern Ireland themselves and is not imposed by Westminster. I do not accept the view that the people of Northern Ireland are incapable of reaching an accommodation one with another. I believe that, if we adopt the basic principle of British disengagement and withdrawal of the Army at a date decided and fixed at a round-table conference, we shall open up the

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possibility that the people of Northern Ireland, working among themselves, will prepare a future in which they can live in peace and harmony, and not only in peace and harmony within Northern Ireland but in growing understanding between Northern Ireland and the South and with continuing understanding and friendship between Northern Ireland and the remainder of Great Britain.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas): Mr. Biggs-Davison.
Mr. Robert Redmond: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. In view of the great length of speeches from the Government benches and the brevity of speeches from this side, would it be possible for you to call two hon. Members from this side for every one from the Government side?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is hardly a point of order.
7.43 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: The hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved) does not, I am sure, expect me to agree with his main arguments. Nevertheless we have something in common. Neither of us belongs to the consensus on Northern Ireland in this House. From different points of view we have opposed the consensus policy, which is now in collapse, and at times we even found ourselves, I think, in the same Lobby, the occasion being when the disastrous prorogation of Stormont was being put through the House.
There have been tributes from both Front Benches and from hon. Members on both sides to Mr. Brian Faulkner, and, of course, other members of the Executive deserve the tributes which have been paid to their courage. But there were tributes only from the back benches when Mr. Faulkner was so unceremoniously removed, although there was no complaint against his policy and administration and although he was trying to open his Cabinet and the chairmanship of important parliamentary committees to Roman Catholics. Until then there was no Protestant backlash, few sectarian murders, if any at all, and our soldiers had to fight on only one front.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) did well, I thought, especially in
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view of what the hon. Gentleman said, to mention the strategic situation of Ulster in the North Atlantic ocean. One reason why I disagree so strongly with the hon. Member for Erith and Cray-ford is that a sovereign British strategic foothold in Ireland is indispensable to the defence of the British Isles, just as it was—as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop), in an admirable maiden speech, pointed out—when possession of some of the Irish ports, which, as Michael Collins once said, were essential for Britain's life, enabled us to win the Battle of the Atlantic and survive in freedom. For this reason alone, independence is for me an unacceptable solution for Northern Ireland.
The IRA is armed from the Soviet bloc. No one can suppose that Czechoslovakia, for example, trades in arms without the consent and encouragement of the Soviet Union. Northern Ireland, like Spain in the 1930s, has been, in a sense, a testing ground for weapons and guerrilla techniques. The proposition that England need hold no part of Ireland or no port in Ireland would find full agreement in the USSR, just as, I suppose, would the proposition that England need hold no part of England either. For we are not talking about disengagement from a costly colonial campaign. We are not talking about Aden, or even about Cyprus. We are talking about the defence of the realm, and London is defended in Londonderry, and Birmingham in Belfast.
We share the feelings of the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford about our troops, who serve tour after tour in Northern Ireland with courage and with chivalry. I want them out. But I do not mean that I want them out of Northern Ireland. The Army does not withdraw from Lisburn or Omagh any more than it does from Aldershot or Catterick. Of course I want to get our soldiers out of the streets and the housing estates. I want police work to go back to policemen, who before the Hunt reforms were expected to tackle terrorists as well as errant motorists.
Phase the forces out, yes, but dates are dangerous. And phase in local forces rooted in the people, forces with the strength and equipment to do the job. I am not thinking here of any kind of third

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force. I am thinking primarily of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and its Reserves and of the Ulster Defence Regiment.
A precipitate withdrawal of troops from support of the civil power would almost certainly, I believe, precipitate either extreme disruption or civil war. I do not want to enter into argument with Scottish hon. Members on the Government side about whether there are pro-Loyalist para-military forces already training in Scotland. But let no one suppose that the sort of solution propounded by the hon. Gentleman would not have its effect upon the separatist movements in Wales and in Scotland.
Do we stand for the integrity of the United Kingdom or not? The integrity of the United Kingdom is bound up with the integrity of Northern Ireland. Strangely enough, that is where I found myself in agreement with the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara), whom I accompanied on a tour of the border areas at the time of the border poll. I found myself more in agreement with him and with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell) than I did with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden) and my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin). I was moved to a certain amount of indignation by what they said and I would almost reverse the Prime Minister's words in that extraordinary, petulant and inflammatory television broadcast and say "What sort of people do we think they are?"
There is an Ulster identity, although I am not sure what is meant by the new phrase "Protestant Ulster nationalism". There is an Ulster identity which transcends religious and political differences, and this was mentioned not so long ago by Mr. Austin Currie when he was a member of the Northern Ireland House of Commons. He drew attention to the fact that Ulstermen of different religions and different politics have more in common with each other than Roman Catholics and Protestants in the North had with their opposite numbers south of the border. Northern Catholics are at least as attached to home and hearth and ancestral soil in the six counties of Ulster as
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their Protestant neighbours with whom so many live intermingled and, in normal times, in charity and concord.
By what right do some of us here propose the redrawing of the frontiers of this kingdom or even the transfer of the population? This kind of political or social engineering would be a surrender to the bigots and it ignores the substantial pro-Union sentiment amongst many Roman Catholics which was evidenced in the border poll and which has been shown in elections. It also shows a lack of respect for the sovereignty of the Irish Republic with which we are trying to co-operate. I do not believe that Dublin has shown any willingness to re-partition Ireland. If the Republic accepted a new border as definitive, it would have surrendered its cherished claim to the whole of Ireland, a claim which I regret is enshrined in its constitution. It took the wrong bit out of the Irish constitution. It removed the truth that the Roman Catholic religion is the main religion of the Irish Republic and it left in the lie that it is the sovereign Power throughout the whole island of Ireland, its territorial seas and adjoining islands.
Dublin is unlikely to forgo that distant aim or aspiration. If, however, a new border were agreed but not accepted as definitive, where would this surgery end? If the parties agreed on a line which would include in the United Kingdom only those parts of the Six Counties in which there was an overwhelming Protestant majority, Northern Ireland would still contain 200,000 Roman Catholics. I therefore dismiss the idea of re-partitioning Ireland.
Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: Surely the argument consists of excluding from Northern Ireland the Republicans, and not necessarily the Catholics. If we were able to leave in Northern Ireland only those people who wished to remain citizens of the United Kingdom, we might be getting towards a solution. My hon. Friend is dealing with this possible solution on sectarian lines which must be wrong. There must be thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Catholics, who are perfectly loyal citizens of Her Majesty. They should of course remain if they wish to, but the argument my hon. Friend should deal with is that

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the Republicans, whether Catholic or Protestant, should be excluded.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: As a monarchist I should be glad if there were no republicans in any part of the United Kingdom. That is an extraordinary argument that I reject just as I reject the solution of independence.
That leaves me with the choice— although the choice will not be mine but will be one for the people of Northern Ireland—between integration or devolution in some form, and I have favoured the latter and still do. Devolution would have to provide for a non-sectarian regional government.
I have had many letters from Ulster folk about the Prime Minister's broadcast. They came from moderate professional and from working-class people. A number of them had been changed by that broadcast from lukewarmness or even hostility towards the Ulster Workers' Council into support for its action. One lady, describing herself as a working-class Protestant of 62 with one son a regular member of the UDR and another in the Regular Army, said:
"We do not mind power sharing but never will we agree to a united Ireland."
That is no encomium of power sharing. But for such a person to say that she does not mind power sharing is a remarkable change from the position adopted not so long ago by some people that they could never agree to any form of regional government or executive where not all of the members accepted the Union.
I have made some suggestions with regard to power sharing within the Northern Ireland Executive which would make it more acceptable to the majority. I have made those suggestions in the House and in the Press and I shall not detain the House with them now. Of course it will not be for any of us to decide how the people of Northern Ireland will be governed. I agree with those hon. Members who say that that is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland themselves.
I suppose that Sunningdale had only one chance of success, and that was if the Government of the Republic had lived up to their international responsibilities as a good neighbour to the United Kingdom. I agree here with the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford, who spoke with
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anger about proceedings against members of the security forces in the European Commission. I do not believe that there is another country which would have tolerated this. Diplomatic relations would probably have been broken.
The truth is that if peace returns to Northern Ireland, all will be possible. It is a sterile and circular argument whether we should be seeking a military or political solution. Urban guerrilla warfare is both political and military. Counter-insurgency operations cannot be dissociated from political action. The people must be won psychologically as well as by trying to free them forcibly from the terrorists that oppress them. A political solution must go hand in hand with the military defeat of the IRA.
7.58 p.m.
Mr. Michael English: I would plead for a little complexity rather than simplicity in the debate. I have heard some remarkable statements today, both on the Floor of the House and upstairs in a meeting of my party.
There are those—they do not include every hon. Member—who seem to think that the whole of the Irish problem, centuries old as it is, can be reduced to a stark simplicity. For example, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Mr. Gurden) said that we should untie the Army's hands or take its gloves off—he used both clichés—or we should withdraw the Army. On the last point the hon. Gentleman is supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Cray-ford (Mr. Wellbeloved).
What do "taking the gloves off" and "untying the Army's hands" mean? Do they mean that if there is a sniper in a house soldiers should go into that house and kill everybody in it because they have harboured the sniper? They might not have done so voluntarily. They might have done, but one does not know. Are they to be killed, arrested, gaoled, or what?
Do those phrases mean that if a child of eight takes away a gun which is used by a sniper—and young women and children have done this—he is to be shot if he is found? That is something that must be considered if hon. Members are to say that the gloves should be taken off

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the Army and that in some way the Army's hands are tied.
Do those who say such things mean that we should act as people have acted in recent European history, all over Europe, by sheer brute force—if necessary killing men, women and children, torturing suspects to find out information, and so on? If that is not what they mean, to say that the alternative is the complete withdrawal of the Army shows one thing. To Irish eyes, they are playing with lives other than their own. That is what is so appalling. This morning, for example, I heard hon. Members comparing Ireland and the Protestants in Ulster with the pieds noirs in Algeria. But the pieds noirs in Algeria were newborn babes compared with the antiquity of the people, both Protestant and Catholic, in Ulster.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State talked about Ulster nationalism. Ulster was being attacked from the South of Ireland 15 centuries ago, before any of the Irish were even Christians, never mind Protestant or Catholic. It is nothing new in Irish history. The Ulster-men of that time retreated behind the Bann, and some of them founded the Kingdom of Scotland. Alas, there has been tragedy in the history of Ireland ever since. Indeed there was probably bloodshed before that, but there was no one to record it.
I happen to be a Presbyterian. My family has lived in Ireland, so far as I know since the Middle Ages. That means that it cannot have been Presbyterian all the time. My name is an Irish name from the Middle Ages. That is the sort of complexity people fail to understand. People in Ireland are saddened by this.
I mean no offence, but I ask every hon. Member to put himself for a moment in the place of a person in Ireland, whether in the Republic or Northern Ireland, whether he is a Protestant or a Catholic. We talk of the withdrawal of the Army and the possibility of bloodshed on a large scale, of which my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford spoke. There is talk of untying the hands of the Army and the possibility of bloodshed in that event. Some, such as the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maud-
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ling), talk of re-partition as a possibility. Can the House understand that that seems to an Irish eye to be part of the infernal perpetual arrogance of the English and to a lesser extent of the Scots and Welsh, which they have always adopted towards Ireland? That is how it looks from across the other side of the sea.
It is clear that the bipartisan policy of both Front Benches means at this time that they have not got a policy. Strangely enough, I agree with that. For a very short time that is the right policy to have. Instead of saying to the Northern Irish "This is our policy", the two Front Benches are saying "We shall talk." That, for a very short time, is the right policy, though it will not be the right policy for ever or for a long time. Perhaps for the first time in Irish history, the Irish—North and South, Protestant and Catholic—are being asked what they want.
I beg several things of my colleagues on both Front Benches. They must recognise that the Constitution Act cannot be regarded as in any way sacrosanct. We had a referendum, a border poll, in Northern Ireland. That is fine. That is one way in which the people who live there can be consulted. But I pleaded with the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw), "Even if at this time you do not feel that politically you can publish the figures, please keep those figures by individual areas." He said that he doubted whether he could, because if he tried, Ireland being what it was, the information might leak out. I do not know whether he did, but I suggest that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State should find out. If we are ever to talk about re-partition or partition, somebody must ask people. We are not just talking about moving them. They know the implications well.
Somebody must decide it—not here, but there. We must ask people not whether they wish the whole of Northern Ireland to stay with the United Kingdom but whether they wish the part they live in to be in the Republic or in the United Kingdom, or to be independent.
It is no good saying "You cannot mention the border. You cannot mention re-partition", as it seems to me some of my right hon. and hon. Friends

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on the Front Bench have said in the past. Nobody can regard the border in Northern Ireland as sacrosanct. It happens to have been inconvenient to mention it in the past, but it is now time to mention the unmentionable.
One side does not like mentioning the border because to move it might weaken the case for a united Ireland. The other sides does not like mentioning moving it, because to move it might reduce the economic viability of Northern Ireland. That will not do, because the border has no meaning in Irish history in more than a man's lifetime. It was created just over 50 years ago.
Northern Ireland is not Ulster in the historic sense of Ireland with a history of 1,500 years or more. Northern Ireland is six counties. They were not six Protestant counties even when it was born. They were four Protestant counties at that time. A Protestant state created now would perhaps be a state east of the Bann, which is a historic boundary in Irish history, strangely enough. But no one can regard Lloyd George's fiddle as a historic, sacrosanct, immutable boundary. So those who talk of partition should not say that Lloyd George's pawn should be considered as a whole and dealt with in one way. I do not believe it.
My right hon. Friend says that he will consult everybody. Whom will he consult and whom do they represent? He said that the Ulster Workers' Council seemed to represent no one. It turned out to represent a certain force which we in Britain do not readily recognise, since we are used to thinking of religion in ecumenical terms, which mean that no one defends the tenets of a particular religion, and we should all have the same religion or not go to church at all. We sometimes fail to recognise that Ireland is the most religious country in Europe.
Momentarily the UWC was united with a force much greater than itself. It was the force which led the Presbyterian Kirk to destroy kings and dynasties not only in Ireland but in Scotland, England and France. That is not a far-fetched analogy. The Member for Dungannon until the 19th century was in hereditary succession, a direct male descendant of John Knox. These people lived there and their descendants are alive today in that same town.
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One does not tackle that sort of force without due consideration. My right hon. Friend said that the UWC represented nothing; it has proved that it represented something. He had better produce better representatives. He said that the British General Election was a disaster, as it was, for the survival of the Executive, He had better produce another Assembly. But if the former Assembly election has been nullified by the results of our elections, I would ask my right hon. Friend next time to hold an election on a respectable and sensible system of real proportional representation.
The single transferable vote system which was adopted is not proportional representation. I asked the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border when he was Secretary of State why he had chosen it. In the debate on the Northern Ireland Assembly Bill, referring to me, he said:
"He asked me how it came about that STV had been chosen. The answer is that this was the system which many of the parties and organisations in Northern Ireland which spoke to me about this matter and submitted papers on it put forward as being the one they thought best.
We had someone in my office working on the list system"—
the proper proportional representation system.
"A great deal of work was carried out in considering the list system on the one hand and the STV system on the other. I must admit that at one time I was convinced that the list system was the better of the two. After careful consideration of both systems and listening to the argument one way and the other—they are narrowly balanced—I came to the conclusion, with my colleagues, that it was right to go for STV, which was the system favoured by those who had spoken to me."
I interpreted that at the time, and I have had no reason to change my mind, as the statement of a Secretary of State who was recommending a system with which his colleagues rather than he had agreed. Nowhere did he say that a different system would not have been better.
There is a difference. STV encourages individualism and discourages parties. In the context of Irish politics, there are enough characters without our trying to cause disruption in political parties. It encourages the election of moderates. That sounds fine, but if extremists are not elected in proportion to their vote they have no legitimate channel through which to express their views. If we had

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had the list system, even at the time of the last Assembly election, there would have been extremists, but they would have been in the Assembly—not many, perhaps one or two at each end of the spectrum. But there were none at all. If there is another Assembly election, my right hon. Friend should change the system.
The former Secretary of State went on to say:
"…I can give the assurance that the work has been done and that there is no reason for not changing if at a suitable time it is thought right that such a change should be made."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th April 1973; Vol. 855, c. 164.]
This is the time to make it if my right hon. Friend chooses to call a new Assembly election. Above all, he should put all these solutions—and more, if anyone chooses to mention them—ultimately to the people of Northern Ireland, whether it be through a newly elected Assembly or through referenda or both. This is not the sole place in which to decide them. They must be decided in Ireland by the people whose blood will be shed if we get them wrong.
8.16 p.m.
Mr. Wm. Ross: It is right that this House should be recalled to discuss the grave situation in Ulster. No body of men and women has a greater right to concern. Not only is this House the nation's governing body; it is also responsible for the present situation in Ulster. The Executive, like any other institution which did not enjoy the support and confidence of a majority of the population, was resented from its induced birth—I say "induced" because it would never have come into being by natural causes.
When I first spoke in this House I said that some day it would have to face the facts of life in Northern Ireland. There has been today some reluctant acceptance of the true position in Ulster. A former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling), especially showed that he was rapidly reaching years of discretion regarding the capabilities of English, Scottish and Welsh politicians to deal with Ulster's problems.
Beneath the brave words of the Government and the Chief Opposition spokesman about the 1973 Constitution Act
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there was a certain amount of gloom. Right hon. Gentlemen should cheer up and reflect that a people who are determined to maintain democracy, who have endured the foolishness that they have had to endure for five bloody and bitter years in Ulster, when their will, as expressed to this House by petition and ballot box was ignored, should stand up and calmly destroy, by their feet and by the tractor wheels of Ulster on the roads of Ulster the nonsense imposed upon them.
I remind the House that peaceable mass demonstration and action is the ideal which is often aimed at, but that it has been realised on only very few occasions in world history. The fact that violence in Ulster was, during the strike at a minimum is the clearest indication of the strength of the majority's outrage at the actions of the House of Commons throughout the present troubles. I am the first to admit that four people unfortunately died in the early stages. Apparently two died at the hands of Protestants extremists, but the IRA itself has claimed responsibility for the other two deaths, Some people have found it rather strange that, since the IRA declared its responsibility, no one has mentioned those two deaths.
Mr. Martin Flannery: Do you consider it reasonable that these people you are speaking about should wear hoods, masks, dark glasses and para-military uniforms and parade in serried ranks? Is that the peaceable demonstration which you are talking about, led by Members of this House?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Flannery) should refer to the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Ross) rather than to the actions of the Chair. The last thing I want to do is to get involved.
Mr. Ross: The demonstrations I saw did not have masked men. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] I simply said that none of the demonstrations I attended had masked men.
The right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) castigated the Prime Minister's speech. I believe that he did so rightly. But the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire will also be aware

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that his own remarks on television were about as helpful in solving the crisis as the Prime Minister's were. Furthermore, his remarks on the use of troops were in keeping with his own attitude throughout his tenure of office in Ulster, and reminded me of the bull in the china shop but where human lives are at stake rather than cups and saucers. Thank God he was not in charge during the crisis in Ulster in the last fortnight.
The House, it seems, rejects completely integration—apparently, it appears, because it is already overcrowded with the business of the rest of the nation and because the minority in Ulster would raise objections. For the House of government to claim that it cannot find the time to govern its own nation is most astonishing and the weakest excuse I have ever listened to. It is evident from the report published today that, despite the objections from a minority in Scotland, this House will govern there in the fullest measure. But, of course, there is a lack of oil in Ulster and in Ulster's waters.
Today we have sneers and jeers by hon. Members opposite at the mention of the RUC and the Special Constabulary. I am proud to have been a member of the Special Constabulary for 16 years.
Mr. English Mr. English rose—
Mr. Ross: I am sorry, but I will not give way. I remind hon. Members that the vilification which led to the destruction of those forces in Ulster also led to the deaths of 1,000 people. We have heard in the last few days rather foolish remarks about Northern Ireland. Most should be ignored, but reference to tanks cannot be buried completely.
Mr. English: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Ross: I do not see why I should. I will content myself by pointing out that a tank would have the greatest difficulty in trying to operate a sewage works, for example.
The future is the most important thing for Ulster at present. We have four months in which to think about Ulster's political future. I think that a great many hon. Members will agree with me in saying that hope springs eternal in the human breast. That was said by a former Member of this House who was much
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more prominent in its affairs than I am. Despite the record of mismanagement by this House—and I hope it will proceed more wisely in future—it must recognise political realities. The House and the Government must recognise that a united Ireland in the life span of any person now living is out of the question. It means that this nation and the Government must destroy the hope of success which keeps the IRA fighting. A people or movement which does not have the hope of ultimate victory will soon disintegrate and disappear. It means that the possibility of the IRA carrying out its plan for an armed take-over in the centre of Belfast must be stillborn.
The Northern Ireland Members of this House are the last people in Northern Ireland to place themselves before their electorates in the Six Counties. We are available to the Government at any time and no doubt our senior colleagues will be spelling out our attitude to the Government's proposals in detail. Many times since I came to this House have I heard it expressed that the people of Ulster will decide their own future. That is all we want. We ask that the Members from Northern Ireland will be listened to so that the views of the people we represent are listened to. Hon. Members must realise that, while they may not like all aspects of the end result which may come out of the consultations which will now take place, the important thing is not whether that result is 100 per cent. acceptable in this House but whether it is acceptable in Ulster. That is the place where the trouble is.
I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved), but I thought that it was rather like the proverbial curate's egg—good in places.
Mr. English: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I did not want to raise this during the speech of the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Ross), but he referred to hon. Members on this side of the House as having denigrated the RUC. My point of order is that it was impossible to interrupt him, not because he did not wish it but because he was reading his speech. I believe that it is wrong for an hon. Member to read his speech in a debate. I have heard no one in this House denigrating the RUC. I think that it is a great body of men.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: The copious use of notes is an old custom of the House.
8.27 p.m.
Mr. A. E. P. Duffy: The hon. Member for Derry—
Mr. Wm. Ross: Londonderry.
Mr. Duffy: The hon. Member for Derry made very provocative assertions in his speech, some of which may be allowed to pass. But he did not take up the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Flannery). The hon. Gentleman must surely be alone in this House if he did not witness even the photographs in the Press showing the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Rev. Ian Paisley) leading processions in Larne which included men who were wearing dark spectacles. They were forbidding sights. The hon. Member for Antrim, North was doing what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State charged him with doing less than a fortnight ago-behaving like a democrat at Westminster but a demagogue in Northern Ireland.
The hon. Member also claimed that the recent insurrection was peaceful, that violence was kept to a minimum. By that I presume he means that the murder of Brendan and Sean Hughes just outside Ballymena was keeping violence to a minimum.
Mr. Carson: Can the hon. Gentleman assure the House that those murders were connected with the strike by the Ulster Workers' Council?
Mr. Duffy: It is not difficult to surmise from reading Press statements on the arrest the very next night of more than 30 men in north Belfast that the Army picked up not only the men who were responsible for those murders—two are to be charged—but the men who were the brigade structure of the UDA in Belfast. I suspect that the Army also picked up men who will be found to be responsible for even graver acts.
The Attorney-General: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I hope that my hon. Friend will remember the sub judice rule.
Mr. Duffy: Yes, of course
The hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Ross) also said that the people of Ulster would decide its future. That is
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the hope of a growing number of hon. Members in this House. But it was significant that he would not be drawn into saying whom he regarded as the people. Does he regard the Catholics of Northern Ireland as the people?
Mr. Carson: Yes.
Mr. Duffy: Would the hon. Member share power with those Catholics?
Mr. Carson: If democratically elected.
Mr. Duffy: That is what this debate is all about. That goes to the heart of the debate. The issue is power sharing.
Mr. McCusker: I would welcome sharing power with Mr. Oliver Napier of Alliance.
Mr. Duffy: Mr. Napier is also on record as having said that thousands of workers were intimidated and prevented from going to work during this very peaceful strike.
Mr. Gerard Fitt: The hon. Member has put a question to the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Carson) and has received the answer that the hon. Member would be prepared to share power. Would he ask the hon. Member whether he would be prepared to share power with the SDLP, which at the moment is the authentic voice of the minority in Northern Ireland?
Mr. Duffy: I was coming to that. It is important that we get straight answers to straight questions. Would the hon. Member be prepared to share power with the SDLP as well as with the Alliance?
Mr. McCusker: I was returned to this House with a majority of 15,000 and the first point of my platform was that I would not share power with the SDLP.
Mr. Duffy: There we are.
Mr. Ted Leadbitter: No hope.
Mr. Duffy: I am not quite so pessimistic. I regard the greater danger now not in the seeming intransigence of some hon. Members, but in the disappointment and frustration of those hon. Members who are turning to an all too simple solution. Nor am I as depressed as

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are some about the events of the past fortnight, because all this has happened before. This is not the first time that some people in Northern Ireland have defied the will of this House. All this has happened before, and it was predictable.
What was reassuring about the events of the past fortnight was the better temper compared with former occasions. In any case, some of us were prepared for the events of the past fortnight. It was not a sudden eruption. There had been opposition to the Constitution Act for a year, and those of us who had been in Northern Ireland during the Assembly elections last June were prepared for that opposition. We knew that, although they had won only about one-third of the seats, the Loyalist candidates would persist with their opposition. The hon. Member for Antrim, North is on record as having said that he would physically prevent Brian Faulkner from getting to the Dispatch Box in the new Assembly.
The reports of those proceedings are available to this House and they make incredible reading. Some members of the Assembly were forcibly ejected while others quite plainly had no intention of allowing the Assembly to proceed on a proper basis.
We must be neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. I do not minimise what has happened. It represented a challenge to constitutional authority. It was successful not only because of the Ulster Workers' Council but because too many other people in Northern Ireland encouraged the council or condoned it or simply averted their gaze. Where were the leaders of communities, of professional organisations, of industry, of the Protestant Church? Why were all those voices silent?
Mr. Wm. Ross: May I point out to the hon. Gentleman that Bishop Quin, who can well be described as being among the leaders of the Protestant Church, was in London, but no one seems to have talked to him.
Mr. Duffy: I met him in this House. I and some other colleagues received him in a Committee room. He received the utmost courtesy and attention from us. We were delighted to see him. But it is a different matter in Northern Ireland, although I take nothing away from the
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bishop. Where were all the other leaders in Northern Ireland?
The issue is now becoming a little clearer for the people of this country and Northern Ireland. It is just possible that in place of the old, stultifying, sectarian divide there could be another issue. There could be a divide between those who accept the British Government's concept of power sharing as the only valid road and those who reject it or those who, like some hon. Gentlemen opposite, wish to qualify it. Despite the derisory references by the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop), who is no longer present, to my previous speech about the February election, it is noteworthy that 48 per cent. of the electorate voted in February in support of power sharing. This does not square with the 11-1 return of candidates to this House. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are fond of playing this point up.
Further, on the evidence of the recent BBC public opinion poll, there was a popular majority for power sharing. Of course there was a large majority for it in the Catholic community, but there must have been a sizeable amount of support for it in the Protestant community.
Mr. Carson: Can the hon. Gentleman say why it is that those who took part in power sharing in the Assembly were later rejected by their local associations? The 1973 Constitution Act was not made clear to the electors. Those in the Assembly who took part in this were later rejected.
Mr. Duffy: I will not go into that. Anyone who knows anything about the constituency structure of Northern Ireland politics on the Unionist side knows the answer. What is noteworthy is that in four constituencies there was no Ulster Unionist or pro-Assembly candidate. The reason for that is bound up in the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question, for which I do not now have the time.
There are only two options available to the Westminster Government. One is to stick with Sunningdale and the other is to leave Ireland altogether. Certainly we cannot move to any of the desperate solutions put forward here and elsewhere, notably re-partitioning and re-shuffling people. It is not only administratively impractical—anyone who knows Northern Ireland knows that it would also be

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socially impossible. Anyone who knows the mix of people in Northern Ireland and in Belfast knows that this is not on. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) I would not want to see Protestants forced out of Derry. I would not want to see the hon. Member for Londonderry forced out of Derry. I know Derry as well as he does. I served in Derry and flew out of the Royal Navy air station at Maydown before it was an industrial estate, and the only people I knew in those days in Derry were people like the hon. Gentleman. I never met the people on the other side of the divide. I met only the hon. Gentleman and his kind and they are still my friends to this day. I do not want those people forced out. I know that people on the other side, the Catholics in Belfast, will not be forced out. I suspect that not even those in the vulnerable Short Strand and Markets areas will be forced out. Heaven knows why they have not voluntarily evacuated themselves by now. I can only believe that they have no intention of going, and certainly British soldiers will not force them out.
I am prepared for what would be by present standards a fantastic situation whereby if British soldiers tried to force people out of their homes in the Short Strand area there might be a relief column swinging its way up the Newtownards Road. It is not on. It is politically unacceptable not only in other countries which need not be mentioned, but also in this country. Consider the effects which even the raising of this nightmarish solution might have on our colleagues in Northern Ireland, on those who have proved that they are democrats, on the Faulknerites and especially on the SDLP. I wonder if my hon. Friends have considered the place of the SDLP, how long the SDLP could survive as a democratic political force, if we go on parading arguments like this. It is certain that the SDLP will be damaged after one day's exposure of such ideas.
What about the effect on Dublin? I was glad to hear the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) this afternoon express his concern for Anglo-Irish relations. We know how well those relations recovered from the low point of three or four years ago, due largely to the work of the Leader of the Opposition
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and some of his colleagues, including right hon. Gentlemen who are now on the Opposition Front Bench. We have done what we can on this side, but the Opposition were then in government and I know how they tried. To what effect they tried has become so evident during the past year.
It must be borne in mind that at Sunningdale the SDLP and Dublin agreed for the first time to acknowledge Northern Ireland and to co-operate with it, and all they got on Irish unity in return for the abandonment of their historic ideal was the promise of a Council of Ireland. The Sunningdale Agreement was always subject to veto at every stage by representatives of both communities. There was never a chance that the North could be absorbed by the South against the freely expressed wish of the majority, yet the contrary view is widespread in Northern Ireland, and why this is so is now widely accepted by many people in this country to be the work of those concerned to misrepresent the position.
Less than a fortnight ago the SDLP agreed to defer executive power. That meant that the Council of Ireland would become nothing more than a moral force. But even that was not enough; even that proved to be unacceptable. However, not only the council but the whole package went. Of course it was not rational; it was hardly considered because there was not sufficient time. It was not even the five months about which my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central spoke but only five weeks before the Westminster elections. The necessary conditioning—I use that word in the kindliest way—of the people of Northern Ireland was precluded.
I come to my recommendations. The British Government must concentrate on those whose voices have been silent for the last fortnight, who were expected to behave differently and from whom we were entitled to see a different response. People who lacked moral courage a fortnight ago must be reminded of the terms on which the union can continue. The British Government must spell out those terms. They must spell out the precise consequences of Britain's deciding to sever the union.
I take it that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. English) is right in his assertion that all bets on

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Ireland are now off and that policymaking on Ireland has started again. If that is so, the British Government must consider as a matter of urgency reminding the people of Northern Ireland what membership of the United Kingdom requires of them and giving them the alternative as a prelude to an election, referendum, commission or convention.
Above all, the British Government must make it abundantly clear that no Government of this country can again support a political system in Ulster which discriminates against the minority. Some form of power sharing is, therefore, a necessary condition for a continued British commitment to Ulster. It cannot be a qualified power sharing. It cannot be power sharing on the terms of hon. Members opposite. It must be power sharing on the terms of this Parliament. If Ulster wishes to remain part of the union, that is part of the price to be paid for membership.
I know that this is plain speaking, but that is precisely why I welcomed the tone and content of the Prime Minister's speech made more than a week ago. I know the people of Ulster. I have known them not merely in war time but since. I go there often with my colleagues in the Northern Ireland group. I have not been to Ulster in the last two or three years without being the target for plain speaking. We can rarely get a word in. It is no good the people of Northern Ireland being so sensitive about what the Prime Minister said, because we have been hearing the same arguments in reverse for the last three years. I do not believe that they resent it. They are accustomed to it; they can stand it.
Above all, the people of Northern Ireland like to know where they stand. What concerns them is that they do not know where they stand. We know that there are doubts about their cultural identity and their relationship with this country and this House. There are doubts on their part about British statesmen. I can understand that. The doubts of the Irish are not confined to the South. Plain speaking will be in their interests; at least they will know where they stand. But there must be plain speaking about the economic consequences of membership of the union. We must make clear the consequences of withdrawal by Britain. That opportunity will come very
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soon when Britain is asked to pick up the tab for the recent insurrection.
According to the business section of The Sunday Times yesterday, the Northern Ireland Finance Corporation is looking for £100 million. Do hon. Members opposite think that the British people will go on paying sums of that kind without a word? Those days are gone. Power sharing may have failed for the time being, but the idea survives; it will be tried again. Some of us will keep renewing that ideal until it wins through to a general acceptance.
8.50 p.m.
Mr. Norman Miscampbell: I hope that one profit we shall gain from the affairs of the last two or three weeks is that we shall begin to look at Ulster affairs with a new realism and put behind us the illusions to which many of us have subscribed over the past five years. I hope that in this debate we shall look at Northern Ireland with compassion and not in anger.
The hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop) in an important contribution spelt out what all of us who know the Province know to be true. He said that the people on both sides of the divide are decent, ordinary folk who are not much different from those in the rest of the United Kingdom. Their aspirations and hopes are the same, and if they hold their politics more firmly that is perhaps because the stakes are rather higher there than they are in other parts of the United Kingdom. The only thing that 90 per cent. of the people on both sides of the divide want is for the bombing and killing to stop.
If we feel frustrated today at the attitude that has been displayed by the Protestant majority, it is perhaps no bad thing to remind ourselves of three facts. First, three years ago we took over the security role in Northern Ireland. We have failed to give Northern Ireland security, for reasons which I shall not go into tonight. Secondly, over the last three or four months, while the negotiations were going on coming up to the Council of Ireland, the level of violence, already intolerable in Belfast and other places, reached a new crescendo, and during that time Belfast suffered some of its worst bombing attacks. Thirdly, what drove the Protestant masses mad in the end

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was the lack of co-operation from the South, with which they themselves were being asked to co-operate. If the bomb which went off in Dublin had gone off in Belfast and if we had known who was responsible for it and pointed a finger at him in the South, he would not have been extradited. That is the measure of what a section of the community in Northern Ireland has had to bear.
If the violence had subsided—certainly if it had ended—during the last three months, Sunningdale might well have had a chance, but the violence got worse and we saw a steady deterioration of Protestant support for the agreement. The key indicator, as is all too clear to anyone who knows the North of Ireland, is that Belfast, South, that middle-class, moderate and quiet constituency, rejected its Faulkner candidate. So we arrive at the situation today that if any Protestant party—certainly the Faulknerite party—is still supporting the Sunningdale Agreement as it stands, it will probably not win a seat in the North of Ireland.
What are the alternatives? I agree with what has been said by one or two speakers on the Government side. I do not believe, in spite of the indications that we had a moment ago, that power sharing is completely off. I want to pause to think about the alternatives, because that is the only rational way in which we can go forward.
Partition is not on the cards for the simple reason that Dublin will not take the bits. One cannot chop off little bits around the border and say that they must go, because Dublin will not accept that situation. We might end up by cutting off the Bogside and the Creggan, but Dublin might refuse to accept them. Therefore, such a course would bring about a ridiculous state of affairs in Irish politics.
Integration is an attractive concept and at times I have thought that it might prove to be a solution to the problem. That concept cannot be dismissed, but we must recognise that it would not be acceptable to the minority. I suspect that such a course would still leave the North of Ireland in a state of continuing violence and in an unstable situation. Therefore, it does not seem to be a runner.
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On the question of withdrawal, we are always hearing stories about the people in Ireland being reminded of what would happen and of what England would or would not do. That is all very well, but to whom is England going to do things? It is not the men of violence on either side who mind withdrawal. It is the people who have stood by, the ordinary people, who would be hurt by withdrawal. It is the people who voted for Faulkner or for the SDLP who would be hurt. We must remember that the SDLP represents the first democratic party on the Catholic side which has taken part in government. Such a policy would also hurt the broad mass of those who supported hon. Members in the Ulster Unionist Party who are now sitting on the Opposition benches and who are all decent people. Are they to be told that England will not stand by its responsibilities? Therefore, I do not believe that a policy of withdrawal is possible.
If we set a date for withdrawal of troops, we must accept the possibility of violence recurring. What will happen if we know that there is not only the possibility of violence but the certainty of its happening? Do we then say that we shall withdraw our troops in any case? Do we take the attitude "The gamble is lost, but we are going to leave anyway?" That is what we would have to do. I do not believe that it is within the compass of a British Cabinet to come to that decision. I do not believe that any party in government would come to that decision.
The experience of the last two weeks has been horrifyingly clear in the North of Ireland. We have heard talk about a bloodbath, but there does not need to be a bloodbath. Belfast is divided into ghettos; there is hardly a mixed street left. If the taps and switches are turned off in Belfast, the city will become another Warsaw. I do not believe that any British Parliament would accept such a situation.
I come to what I regard as the solution to the situation. I am not suggesting that we must stick rigidly to the prospects of power sharing which we imposed upon Ireland before, but people should now consider how it is possible for the community to live together. If the principle of power sharing—a principle which has the great support of the mass of people in this country-—can be taken

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and looked at so that a way can be found, surely the community in Northern Ireland will find some hope left in this situation.
There will need to be great sacrifices, and we in the United Kingdom will need to make sacrifices because we have to stand up to our responsibilities. The United Kingdom has to bear the cost of 257 lives of young soldiers and 1,400 injured, some of them terribly injured. England has a great responsibility and will have to pay a great price. It will not be easy for us. The level of violence must be contained. If not, there is no solution to Ireland's problems at all.
There must also be acceptance by the SDLP and the South that the Irish dimension, as it was called, is out for the moment. They must accept that the only change or discussion that can come about the border is through the border poll at intervals of 10 years, or perhaps 15 years, and that that should be the only instrument. It means a sacrifice from their point of view. I do not believe that it is possible to sell to the majority a package which contains a Council of Ireland which rightly or wrongly—do not let us worry about that—was believed to be leading towards a united Ireland and was being asked of the Protestant majority at a time when they found there was no co-operation from the South over extradition. I appreciate that it would be a sacrifice for the SDLP to give up that long-cherished hope, but surely the alternative is nothing but one of savage warfare between the two communities.
How is this solution to be achieved? I am certain that it is no use having general chats with people. We must have elected representatives to whom we can talk. It was absolutely right not to give way to the cry that there should be an election while the Executive existed. After all, many Governments get into difficulties. Many Governments are unpopular, they do not want to go, and if they have a constitutional right to continue they should be allowed to do so.
I am not advocating an immediate election. However, I am clear that the next time we put the package together it must be agreed by Ulster, not by those who say they will come or by those who say they did or did not get an invitation. That does not matter. We must, before
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we put the package together, do it through an Assembly that has been endorsed by the people of Northern Ireland.
I do not want an election in the next few months, but I want it within a reasonable time scale—perhaps by the end of the year, when passions have had a chance to die down. We can get an Assembly in the North of Ireland which will speak for Northern Ireland. The fact that we may not like some of the people who get elected to it is no good reason for refusing it. We ought to do it.
I should like to mention one last point which may be less acceptable to many hon. Members. If Northern Ireland is long to be in limbo without an Executive, I would consider allowing it to have its true number of Members here. I do not think that it would make much difference one way or the other, because with smaller constituencies west of the Bann there is little doubt that some SDLP as well as Unionist Members would come in.
At the end of the day one thing must be said from this House. If this Parliament, perhaps the greatest assembly in the world, the oldest and the most august, cannot say and understand it, nobody will say it. We must talk to people who are elected. It is no use talking to workers' councils. We must talk to elected representatives. The only way to do that is through an election reasonably soon.
9.4 p.m.
Mrs. Jill Knight: The reason for this two-day debate is, as I understand it, not that there should be a vote or that the House should reach a decision, but merely that hon. Members should be allowed and empowered to express their views. We have heard many views today with some of which I have been in complete agreement and with others of which I have been very much in disagreement. My hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin) made the outrageous proposal that Londonderry and Belfast should be partitioned. If the partitioning of Ireland itself 50 years ago did not work, why should partitioning suddenly work in those cities?
Other hon. Members have suggested that the troops should be withdrawn. I am strongly against withdrawing the

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troops, for one overriding reason. When British people are in danger on British soil they have the right to expect that British troops will protect them. We must face the fact that it is our duty to protect these people with resolution and firmness, which they feel have been lacking in the past.
I thoroughly agree that decisions affecting the future of Ireland should be taken only with the agreement of the people of Ulster. We have had a very dramatic example of what the will of the people of Ulster has been, not only at the General Election but in the recent strike. This taught us one thing above all else; namely, that we cannot inflict on people who do not wish it an arrangement against their will.
What is it that these pariahs and bully boys, as some people regard them—the United Ulster Unionist Council people— want? Why is it so appalling? I have here the policy document of the council. The House would do well to pay attention to what is stated here—
"The United Ulster Unionist Conference is convinced that the mishandling of the political and security situations has increased the torment and suffering of Ulster. Many have been killed and injured and others have been driven to acts of which they would never have been otherwise guilty because of the failure to deal with terrorism."
That is the key to the difficulty which we are facing now.
I spent some time in Belfast and talked to the women there in the terraced houses in a very poor quarter of the city. I was appalled when they told me "We are the people who are interned here. We are the ones who cannot go out after six o'clock at night. We are the ones who are imprisoned." I have great sympathy too, for the appalling plight of the women of Londonderry who had to do their shopping between 9 a.m. when the shops opened and 10 a.m. when the IRA began to be effective again. What patience these brave people have had for years and years. I believe that the time came when they had no patience left. I hold no brief for violence of any kind from any side, but I think that it is understandable that we faced this situation and the strike.
I want to explain why I think that the suggestion in this policy document is perfectly reasonable. It says:
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"We believe the priorities of the Ulster people to be:
1. The rejection of the annexation of Northern Ireland by the Irish Republic."
That seems to be fair enough.
"2. The maintenance, strengthening and defence of the Union through full Democratic Representation in the Westminster Parliament."
What is wrong with that?
"3. The defeat of the Constitutional arrangements… set up by the British Government …"
Whether we like it or not, the will of the Ulster people has shown clearly that this is what they wish.
"4. The defeat of both wings of the IRA."
Who of us can disagree with that?
I make one final quotation. Surely there can be nothing wrong with this. This is what these so-called pariahs and bully boys have asked for:
"We would welcome the provision of a Bill of Rights to ensure and guarantee justice and fair play to every citizen throughout the United Kingdom."
What is wrong with that? The people of Ulster have a right to be heard. They have overwhelmingly stated what their wishes are.
9.10 p.m.
Mr. W. F. Deedes:This debate may differ from its predecessors on Northern Ireland in one important respect. It is not just that we and our policy now stand at major crossroads— goodness knows, we have done that before—but that to a greater degree than before this debate and its consequences may encompass our future as well as that of Northern Ireland. Whatever decisions we reach or take in this debate, it seems to me that we may be shaping our own destiny as well as that of Northern Ireland.
Predictably, the speeches we have heard today have so far centred around— naturally, without resolving—two or three large questions which I shall try to follow. Was the collapse of this painfully-won power-sharing experiment inevitable? That is the first question. What courses lie open to us now? Assuming that we can find a course, have we the will power to try again and stay to see it through?
On the first question, I stress that the reason for looking critically at what led to the breakdown is not to get at the overburdened Secretary of State, of

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whom I thought my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) spoke very appositely, or the Prime Minister, but to avoid if possible making the same mistakes again. For my part, I see no profit whatever in raking over mistakes, save where they are relevant to the future. If we enter into a quarrel about the past, none of us on either side of the House will agree where the past begins.
The first question I raise here was raised by the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson). If there was delay in acceding to the urgent request of the Executive over the barricades, why did not the police and the Army at once remove the newly-erected Loyalist barricades? Was it felt by the Army that action against unarmed strikers should be taken not by them but by the police? How did the police react to that? This is an important point because it is stressed on behalf of the Executive, on behalf of Brian Faulkner, that this was treated as a crucial issue at a crucial moment. Surely this is a contingency which might have been foreseen and thought about.
Again—a kindred point—what feasibility study was made of the Army's capacity in such circumstances as these particularly in relation to power stations? The Secretary of State, I think, said earlier today that it was always clear that the forces could maintain them only to a limited degree and that in the end management failed to come up to expectations. I thought I got his point correctly.
None the less it is important to know, at least for the future, how far the capacity of the Army to deal with situations like this had been thought out and how much, in a sense, we were able to work to that feasibility study when this situation arose. I ask this because any miscalculation of the Army, any failure to reach a right judgment on its role in Northern Ireland, raises issues of the utmost gravity.
Secondly—this is a feature which is relevant to the future—surely we must conclude that there has in recent weeks been a failure correctly to assess the weight of Protestant opinion, the strength of opposition to Sunningdale and the likely consequences. The strike, I accept,
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possibly had origins of its own, but the opinion which was surging round in Northern Ireland could not be gainsaid.
Up to the time of our own General Election it may have been excusable, but when we saw a swing such as there was in Northern Ireland, of about 22 per cent. to candidates whose platform read "Dublin is just a Sunningdale away", surely there were signs that could hardly be ignored. The Secretary of State said today that the political climate after 28th February changed rapidly and radically. That is now clear. Yet these feelings were, I do not say discounted, but perhaps underrated, and the impression given and felt was that the phasing and terms of Sunningdale remained inviolable.
I agree that Mr. Faulkner, to whom I add my own small personal tribute for all he has done, saw it otherwise. We now know that he sought behind closed doors with his Executive to hammer out something closer to electoral reality. In the event his package, no doubt hard won, came too late, and it appeared, when it did appear, inadvertently as a quick response to the threat of strike. But were we not aware of the dangerous build-up of feeling while those talks were going on? This could be sensed by any of us who were in the Province in recent weeks, and it should not, I suggest, have taken us so totally by surprise.
Thirdly—I must add this and it goes partly, I think, to the heart of the breakdown—there is an unwillingness or an inability in London always to measure the effect in the North of words and actions said and taken here. I confess that I thought that the right hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. West) had a point when he said that words uttered here had one meaning in London and another meaning in the North. I shall not dwell on the speech made by the Secretary of State for Defence. I happened to be in Belfast at the time when it was delivered. The Prime Minister quickly acknowledged the mistake and corrected it. I must, however, go on to mention the Prime Minister's own broadcast a week ago.
I think that that broadcast was an example of the failure to measure words, and I shall make only one comment about it, in strict moderation. The effect must be to weaken confidence in Northern Ire-

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land regarding what the Government here can do. To my mind, without recrimination, that is a serious aspect, perhaps the most serious aspect, of the words that were then used. What has to be weighed so much is not always the effect of the words used but the use or the misuse—the manipulation, if one likes— which they suffer in other hands. This is a fact of life, however unpalatable, which we ought to have learned by now.
The Sunningdale communiqué, we say, was in itself harmless to the North, and misrepresentation did the damage. But we should have grasped by now, and we certainly must for the future, that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) wrote the other day, truth is one of the casualties of Northern Ireland, and therefore what means one thing here will be made to mean something else in the Province. So much for the immediate past.
The Prime Minister: I hope to reply tomorrow to some of the points made by the right hon. Gentleman and by others about the broadcast which I undertook, but he will recognise that one point with which I was concerned was the growing impatience on this side of the water about the very large sums that are being increasingly provided to Northern Ireland by the taxpayer here. I referred specifically to the damage done to the economy in Northern Ireland. Is the right hon. Gentleman now saying that the Opposition feel that the taxpayer on this side of the water should readily accept a bill of £225 million, referred to this afternoon, for those self-inflicted wounds? Will he answer that question?
Mr. Deedes: I am not unaware of that and, if the Prime Minister will allow me, I shall come to it in my own time. I was stressing that words used here, whatever effect they may be expected to have on people in this country, have very different consequences on the people of Northern Ireland.
We can now dispose of the past. We now have, as the Secretary of State made clear, an uneasy breathing space. We all need time, he said, and I wholly agree with that. I hope that there will be there as well as here a process of fermentation. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) said that we. were now in a new ball
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game. I think it is very hard to guess, and it might be foolish to anticipate, what may emerge from this process. I am not sure, and I shall come back to this point later, that first reactions to the breakdown will necessarily be the right ones. Of course, the Government have their responsibilities, to which we attach a degree of urgency. But it is arguable that after a period of direct rule we may have weakened the inclination of those primarily concerned to find solutions on their own. It is certainly arguable that, if we can bring ourselves to stand back a little and breathe a little less down their necks, in the light of this experience something fresh might emerge.
We should give others besides ourselves the chance, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet said, to re-examine all the options. Thus, if and when Ulstermen of any hue enjoin upon each other to sit around a table and do some constructive thinking on their own account I should like to think that our response will be one of encouragement. We should not be too ready to expect that such talk must lead inexorably back to Protestant monopoly, and we cannot put the clock back. However, this short-lived experiment should not be written off as a dead loss. We cannot yet be sure what its effect may be on even the most intractable of minds. Some will share the view of the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Mitchell), who said that only the people of Northern Ireland can solve their own problems. Here, however, I take the view that I have expressed before, that the role of the Republic will become absolutely crucial. Dare we hope that some sort of fermentation will go on there as well?
My right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire said earlier that a more realistic approach would be needed. For obvious reasons I must not go too far beyond his words, but without a shred of animosity I feel compelled to describe the attitude up to now as too often ambivalent. It has been ambivalent towards security, towards the border, towards extradition and towards the wider future. With some instinct for the reality of internal affairs in Dublin I cannot accept at face value the protestations of Ministers there that they have been

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doing all their best. At all events great responsibility lies with them now. The reverberations of this crash must surely have reached at least some corners of Ministries in Dublin.
We should by now have learned the precarious and tender nature of the solution we provided, an artefact—it cannot be described otherwise—however well intentioned and however estimable our aim. I judge from the speeches here today that most right hon. and hon. Members sense that the most hopeful way forward lies in power sharing. My hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton (Sir N. Fisher) said that it was the only hope. Without at this stage going so far, I must agree that the sense of most speeches today has been to that effect. However, there is a reality here which not everyone has seized. Power sharing is not sharing the privilege of sitting round a table in Stormont. It is sharing the power to enact policy, and it is when the act of policy shaping and policy making begins that the stresses arise.
The National Government of 1931 found no difficulty in agreeing to share power. It was when policy making called for certain things, such as protection, that some elements of that Government found it difficult to remain within it.
But of this at least I am sure, that we should avoid under the impact of this shock being swung too violently or too quickly towards other radical solutions. Let us try to give instant politics a rest in this realm. We should encourage, not discourage, a feeling among Ulster men and women that this time what they have to say to us will be weighed.
When it comes to the wider future, I confess that I find myself in some difficulty. Those of us who have chosen to involve ourselves fairly closely in the affairs of Northern Ireland are not necessarily the best witnesses now. One can become too closely involved. One can perhaps see things too much from the other point of view. One or two speeches today have suffered from that advantage.
I must declare my own interest, which is a fashionable thing to do just now. That interest is a strong prejudice in favour of the people of Northern Ireland. They are not symbolised, they are not to be judged, by all of those who claim or assert a right to speak and act for
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them. One of the tragedies of the media is that so many are brought to believe that that is so. We should not aid and abet the readiness and eagerness in some quarters to take that superficial view.
For my part—and I speak here of the moderates—I have come to admire the seriousness with which they take their affairs. Sometimes when I return from Northern Ireland I find myself strangely exhilarated, for all the difficulties, the cruelty, the damage and the violence, by a people who take their future destiny very seriously and who are deeply and passionately concerned with it. I am sure that other right hon. and hon. Members have had the same feeling. Sometimes I wish that such attitudes prevailed elsewhere.
But my constituents, as well as the Prime Minister, sometimes say "You must consider our standpoint, too", and they are absolutely right. The constituents of the hon. Member for Itchen had obviously been talking to him. We had better acknowledge that our public opinion has a right to be considered and consulted.
I want to be careful with the figures for the cost of supporting the people of Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister quoted one set, and I have read another set. According to a summary I saw in, I think. The Guardian a day or two ago, the British Exchequer is paying in all about £470 million, only £33 million of it accountable to the extra cost of keeping the troops there. The Secretary of State rightlv made no bones about this. The hon. Member for Ealing. North (Mr. Molloy) reminded us of the implications.
I do not discount public opinion in this matter. It has perhaps been brushed aside too often. But I must add that I think that in this great matter, costs and all, public opinion would be responsive to leadership, and it is entitled to leadership. It is entitled to hear the view of leaders on where we should go next. I do not find that public opinion is fixed and formed. I find that it is bewildered. It is anxious, but it is willing to take a view.
Perhaps the first thing the leadership should make clear is that in Northern Ireland we are not dealing with a problem remote from the reality of the

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modern world. It is not wholly attributable to the Irishness of the Irish. The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) said that the Irish have a peculiarly Irish way of doing things. Yes indeed, and so do most other people in most other countries have a way of doing things by their own lights, but this is also a reality in the modern world. I can conceive of no way in which we can altogether contrive to escape from it.
It must seem to many in this country— I go back again to what the Prime Minister said—that we have had to deal and we are dealing with an unreasonable people, a people who, in the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Surbiton, proclaim Ulster's capacity for self-inflicted misery. Yes, but this, far outside the ambit of Ulster, has been described appositely as an age of unreason. Still more is it an age in which various minorities have found ways of exploiting and stimulating unreason to their own ends. There is no escape from this.
The onus on those who would cry "Enough!" and pull us out of Northern Ireland is to think through the consequences of such a course and to answer some of the practical questions which immediately arise. Terrorism is not our only problem in Northern Ireland, as I think the Secretary of State will agree. More and more, lawlessness emerges with terrorism and spreads across the face of the Province. I confess to some uneasiness at the extent to which the Army is being progressively drawn into that sphere.
Ulstermen declare that, given a chance, they are ready to cope with that. I have reservations, knowing the strength of the RUC and the UDR—the former standing at about 4,500, and the Secretary of State knows that it should be more—
Mr. Merlyn Rees Mr. Merlyn Rees indicated assent—
Mr. Deedes: —and the preponderance of Protestants over Roman Catholics remains and will remain for a long time.
There is no adequate back-up force if the Army goes. In the last five years we have made very little progress towards it. To be practical again, if the Army goes and if temporarily chaos supervenes, bringing about disruption of Northern Ireland such as hitherto has been largely
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avoided, could we stand idly by and see about £4C0 million or £500 million a year dissipated by disorder? Would the Republic do absolutely nothing if, as it seemed to them, with disorder after our withdrawal, Catholics were put at risk? My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell), in what I thought was an admirable speech, was right to say that the main consequence would be that moderates, not extremists, would suffer from our withdrawal.
Of course we all have as our objective the day when the soldiers go. The argument today has been about which day and how it is fixed. In the terms in which we have come to reckon these things— logistics, costs, social benefits, macroeconomics and so on—it might not be impossible to produce a cool analysis which pointed decisively to our pulling out. I have certain misgivings, however, about the style in which we now analyse such issues as Northern Ireland while observing what I can only describe as impeccable moral neturality. It is a style which the media have made all their own and which we sometimes unconsciously ape.
But there remains in my mind one crucial distinction between all the media and Parliament. We should not and we cannot discard the moral issue. Moral neutrality in a matter of this kind is not a robe that we can wear and remain as we are. Whatever the "Insight" column and "Panorama" and all the rest may make of it, we are from time to time called upon to answer the question that they avoid: is it right or is it wrong? That is our distinction, our reason for being here.
There is, I am persuaded, a moral judgment, when everything is weighed, to be made here. However reluctant we may be to make it, we cannot shirk it. It may point this or that way, but it has to be made. It rests with the conscience of every hon. Member, and I must make it clear where mine directs me.
My mind goes back to the time when some of us were soldiers. We finished our task in Europe, I recall, with a brief thanksgiving. I recall the words from it, of which, for greater accuracy, I have obtained a copy. I make a present of it to hon. Members who may use it to

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strengthen the resolve of their constituents. The words are these:
"When Thou givest to Thy servants to endeavour any great matter, grant us also to know that it is not the beginning, but the continuing of the same, until it be thoroughly finished, which yieldeth the true glory."
I think that those words stood good for Europe then, and I think that they stand good for Northern Ireland today.
9.35 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Mr. S. C. Silkin): It is a privilege to begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Mr. Dunlop), on his maiden speech. I hope he will not mind if I say that, in certain fairly obvious respects, he and his predecessor are rather different from one another. He was perhaps a little slower off the mark than she was, but he evidently shares with her a high degree of self-confidence which will stand him in good stead in this House.
So far, the mood of the debate could be called sombre and sober. Certainly, it was not sure-footed, to use the phrase of the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith). Indeed, when every conceivable solution has been tried and, so far at any rate, has not succeeded, it is hard to be sure-footed. It is harder still when one knows that for every solution one finds another problem. So I do not in any way criticise hon. Members for not producing instant solutions. Indeed, I would criticise those who did.
None the less, it is true that the debate so far has been strong on problems and weak on solutions. Although the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) asked my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to make the principles clear tomorrow, I noticed that he himself was a little weak on principles. We must consider why that is and take account of it. It is vital that in the period ahead— not a long period, but at least a breathing space—all the options should be left open until some final and agreed conclusion has been reached, and all the options must be considered and, if necessary, reconsidered to see to what extent they fit the new situation.
The main points which seem to me to have emerged from the debate so far are, first, that a large majority of Members who have spoken accept that the troops should not and cannot be removed at a stroke. Indeed, the view that they should
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is not put forward by those of my hon. Friends who have been cast by the Press as its main protagonists—my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) and my hon. Friend the Member for Erith and Crayford (Mr. Wellbeloved).
My hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian asked what is the function of the Army today, and on that I think I agree very much with what the right hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Deedes) has said on the subject. I will try to give an answer to the question.
Certainly it is not the Army's function to hold the ring between warring gangs or factions. Certainly it is not the Army's function to stand its ground and be caught, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, in the crossfire. But the Army is still the Army of Northern Ireland, just as it is the Army of England, Wales and Scotland. The people of Northern Ireland are just as entitled to its protection, if that protection is needed, from the bombers and killers as are the people of Britain. If, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State assures me, and as I think the House will accept, the police alone cannot provide that protection which is needed, then the people of Northern Ireland are entitled to have the additional protection from violence which the Army offers.
My hon. Friends, I suggest, have approached this issue from a very natural but false standpoint. If and when the time ever comes when for any reason Northern Ireland ceases to be part of the United Kingdom, whether because it becomes wholly or partly independent, or becomes one with the South, or whatever it may be, it would cease to be entitled to the protection, however imperfect, that the Services are able to give it. Meanwhile, we all recognise that in this country there is a natural and strong emotional feeling for speedy withdrawal. But, on the evidence certainly of today's debate, I do not believe that it is the view of the House, or half of it, or half the Parliamentary Labour Party, or half the people of this country, or certainly half of those in Northern Ireland, that there should be a speedy withdrawal. I have no evidence to suggest that that would be acceptable.
We all have the utmost sympathy for the bereaved parents of young men who go to Northern Ireland and do their duty

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to preserve life there; but what of those parents who would be bereaved if the troops were withdrawn, the parents in Northern Ireland whose families would be far more at risk if their protection were left to the RUC, the UDR, and, still more, to the Protestant para-military groups and the IRA? If we move our troops out and civil war follows, what do we do then? Do we move them back in greater strength with tanks and other weapons? Do we leave it to the South, as the right hon. Member for Ashford seemed to have in mind, to move in to protect the peace of the island of which it is part and the people for whom it feels responsibility? I do not think that, whatever may have been said in the Press, there is any reality in that idea.
Secondly, the debate has brought forth the point that there is, as the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mr. Biggs-Davison) said, a growing Ulster feeling that transcends religion, the Ulster nationalism that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State mentioned in his opening remarks. Thirdly, there is the strong consensus, arising partly from what I have just said, that Northern Ireland should make a major contribution to deciding its own future and that all in Northern Ireland who can make a contribution should feel absolutely free to do so, that it is far better to be able to adopt an Irish solution than an English, Scottish or Welsh solution.
Fourthly, so far as can be seen from the debate, there is very little, if any, support for integration. Fifthly, the concept of power sharing in some form is valuable and essential if the rights of minorities are to have effect given to them.
Before I reply generally to the debate, I must answer some questions put to me by my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, Central (Mr. McNamara) in a very persuasive speech, although I hope that he will forgive me if I say that he did not persuade me in all respects. He asked two specific questions that I ought to answer. First, he regretted the position of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on the Price sisters. Secondly, he asked about the future of internment. I shall deal with those so far as I can.
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As to the Price sisters, hon. Members know that my right hon. Friend has given that question the most earnest and careful thought and has taken full account of all the relevant considerations. I believe, and I hope that in time my hon. Friend will believe it as well, that the decision he came to was a courageous and right decision. My hon. Friend can be assured that, although the sisters remain weak, every effort is continuing to make sure that they have as much care as is possible
Coming now to internment, I think all hon. Members will accept that it is not possible to end internment just like that at this time. It is needed for both extremes of the political spectrum. It is, unhappily, true that, although it is the policy of the Government to do all that they can, as arose from the Sunningdale Agreement, to reduce the numbers of those detained without trial, it is as fanciful to think of ending internment now at a stroke as it is to think of removing the troops at a stroke.
The Conservative Party when in Government enacted the Emergency Provisions Act. In opposition we stressed our grave doubts about certain parts of it and gave it a very thorough examination in Committee. Since the General Election, as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, I have been responsible for the operation of Part I of the Act and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Part II.
I will not say much about Part II but it is quite incorrect, as stated by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin), that detainees are kept for a matter of only three weeks. The truth is that, so congested is the business of the commissioners who decide whether to make the detention orders and who also act as reviewing authorities, that it is often many months before a case can even be heard. That is a problem which must be dealt with because it cannot be justified.
My duty is to decide which of the scheduled offences of the Diplock provisions should not apply. My policy has been, and will continue to be, to allow those provisions to be operated only when I am wholly convinced that in the particular case they are needed. Having had many discussions with the judiciary of Northern Ireland and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland

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and members of the legal profession, 1 am convinced that the Act is at any rate being operated as fairly as such provisions can be operated by the judiciary and the DPP.
The criticism we made in opposition has found a ready response in the minds of the profession in Northern Ireland. None the less, we cannot be wholly satisfied. It is our wish that the greatest degree of human rights and fundamental freedoms should be available in the troubled circumstances of Northern Ireland. In the next few weeks the Act will expire, if it is not renewed. If it is renewed parts of it can be omitted but it cannot be amended. I hope that we may be able to omit some parts. We are considering that urgently.
It is clear that the Act must remain in being for the present. It would be needed for Part II, if not for Part I. In those circumstances we have thought it right that the Act should be most comprehensively reviewed. My right hon. Friend said in the House on 4th April that it was his intention to appoint a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Gardiner to examine the workings of the Act, and to consider what provisions and powers consistent with the preservation of human rights and liberties are required to deal with terrorism and subversion in Northern Ireland.
I am glad to be able to tell the House that, apart from my noble Friend Lord Gardiner, four members have already agreed to serve on the committee. They are: the right hon. Lord MacDermott, the former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland; His Honour Judge Higgins, from Northern Ireland; Mr. Michael Morland, a member of the Bar who is a Queen's Counsel; and the Hon. Alistair Buchan, who needs no introduction. We are still waiting to hear from two other members who have been asked if they are agreeable to being appointed and my right hon. Friend hopes to announce their names as soon as possible. I hope that the House will agree that this is a most distinguished body which will do a good job.
Mr. McNamara Mr. McNamara rose—
The Attorney-General: I am sorry. My time has been cut. I must get on.
It is right to distinguish between two trends in Northern Ireland. Both have been there to some extent for a long
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time, sometimes under the surface and sometimes more visible but now they have appeared more strongly than ever before. The first is the extreme face of Ulster Protestantism, represented by certain Ulster Members opposite. During the Assembly elections I met some of their active supporters and I was not filled with confidence about the future of power sharing when I did so. But on that occasion, not long ago, more moderate voices prevailed. However, at the General Election opinion clearly had moved sharply away from moderation, and the history of the five months since the Assembly met has been a history of deliberate sabotage of power sharing and deliberate sabotage of moderate Unionism, accentuated since the return of hon. Members opposite at the General Election. But even before then we must ask, in view of the speech by the right hon. Member for Ashford, what consideration had been given by the Opposition when in government to opposition to Sunning-dale. When we took over we had the Executive. We turned to the Executive; we supported it. It was right that it should be giving us information and that we should act upon it and co-operate with the Executive. It does not lie in the mouths of right hon. and hon. Members opposite to blame my right hon. Friend and hon. Members on this side for lack of anticipation.
The second trend is that of Ulster nationalism, to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred. It has been only in the events of the last few weeks that this trend has become most strongly visible and has moved from a low to a high profile. At places these two trends merge; at other places they part. It would be wrong to regard them as synonymous. On the philosophy of nationalism the Ulster Unionist Party is far from united, as we have seen from the Press. In examining the development of the crisis of the past few weeks it is right to bear these facts in mind. Nothing is easier than to look back with the benefit of hindsight and say that we should have moved Quicker or slower or with greater strength or in a totally different direction. But with this phenomenon of nationalism on the streets in strength for the first time the Government were right to be as certain as they could be of "the reality of the power of that movement before they took

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measures which might have had consequences of bloodshed and terror which happily were largely absent in the course of the strike period. Those who now shout loudest at what some call the dithering of the Government would then have been shouting at the provocation of the Government.
What was clear to all of us involved in the decisions was that the strike against the lawful Government, what Lord Hailsham referred to as treason, was most carefully planned. It was planned to give all the impression of power and the impression that the United Workers' Council was the real government of Ulster and so to gather in support from the moderates at the centre. This is why direct confrontation with the troops was avoided by them, and this is why the strike leaders were prepared to move from one sphere to another so as to give the impression—like a sort of orange Pimpernel—of being everywhere.
The Government were right to tread with care to see whether the appearance of power was a reality but at the same time to do what they could to uphold the Executive and the constitution. The Army acted with all the speed it could. That is why my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister invited to Chequers the leaders of the three parties on the Executive—not to tell them, but to ask them. Agreement was reached at Chequers, as the agreed communiqué shows. It is perhaps important to note, in view of the Chief Executive's and the Unionists reason for resignation—that is, that there should be negotiations with the UWC— that the agreed communiqué at Chequers said:
"While there is every opportunity for elected representatives of any party, whether in the House of Commons or in the Northern Ireland Assembly, to put their views to the Secretary of State, the meeting confirmed that there can be no question of negotiation on constitutional or political matters with anybody seeking to operate outside the established constitutional framework."
I am not critcising Mr. Faulkner or his colleagues if they changed their minds about it. Events moved for them as they moved for all of us and for the Government, and those who have said—they are on both sides—that recriminations will not help are right. The hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed rightly said that it is more important to look to the future
1020
than to dwell on the past. Indeed, what was so depressing about the speech of the Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party was not that he was not prepared to think broadly about the future but that he sounded as though he was incapable of doing so.
I wish to say a word or two about power sharing because it is really the basis of what we are talking about in this debate. Has it failed? In an institutional sense, clearly it has. It has failed in part at least because the institutions which were created for it were found to be unable to cope with a situation in which those who had come to hold de facto power, whatever our views of their methods may be, did not share power. They did not wish to share power, but they could not do so in any event.
However, I believe that power sharing has succeeded in another and, I think, real sense. It has brought home to the people of Ulster that there are alternatives to centuries of confrontation and bloodshed and thus, however imperfectly and ineffectively it has worked so far, it is a concept which cannot and must not be cast away like a broken toy. I agree strongly with the views of the hon. and learned Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Miscampbell).
What of the new Ulster nationalism referred to by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State? Will it help to solve the problems in future? To answer that question, one must ask oneself the reason for the rise of Republicanism in the last decade out of the roots of the civil rights movement. Was that rise basically and essentially that of a Republican movement? Is it today and will it be in future? Or was it basically, as its origins suggest, the product of the frustrations of a minority which had no share of power? If it was, the removal of those frustrations which power sharing was intended to provide and hoped to achieve must be the continued aim.
Whatever other options are open, Ulster cannot return to the rule of a permanent majority, a rule which could be strengthened and made even more dangerous than ever before if it were based more and more upon an Ulster nationalism and perhaps more and more on a UDI-type philosophy.
There are those today who are speaking of independence. Nothing could be

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more likely to foster that philosophy than to give the impression that this Parliament wishes or intends to move to a position in which it regards Ulster as no longer the concern of the people of the mainland. That is not to say that we have to accept the position that our help is open-ended and that the sacrifices both of our soldiers and of our taxpayers must not only continue indefinitely but continue to grow indefinitely.
What, then, can we achieve in this debate? First, I hope that we can show that we reject extreme solutions, solutions based on despair, on emotion, however justifiable, on weakness and surrender to force from either part of the Northern Ireland community. Secondly, we must begin to establish or to re-establish the basic principles on which the people of Ulster must work out their own solution, the principles which, if established, will enable the people of the United Kingdom as a whole to accept the continuing responsibility which Ulster involves at least until the people of Ulster have decided how to give effect to those principles. If the new nationalism enables the people of Ulster to play a larger part in providing their own solution within those principles, this debate will have achieved what we want it to achieve.
Mr. Tom Pendry (Lord Commissioner of the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion by leave, withdrawn.

ADJOURNMENT
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Pendry.]

ROADS (SOUTH-EAST LAKELAND)
10.0 p.m.
Mr. Michael Jopling: When we adjourned for the Whitsun Recess I little thought that I should be standing here tonight raising in the House the problems of my constituency. I suppose it is appropriate that I should be doing so immediately after the two Whitsun weekends when many of the problems to which I wish to draw attention became so apparent.
1022
I believe that I have the most beautiful constituency in England, and many hon. Members would not dissent from that view. Indeed I understand that the Secretary of State for the Environment spent part of the Whitsun holiday in the Lake District although, I am sorry to say, not in my constituency.
The main cause of the difficulties and problems in the Lake District is traffic. With the greater affluence which is enjoyed, the longer periods of leisure, the better use of leisure and, above all, the better roads, I suppose it is inevitable that the motor car should bring these difficulties to the Lake District.
The better roads and the better approaches to this beautiful part of England have made a huge impact on my constituents. On the one hand, the construction of the M6 motorway to Scotland has relieved the old grey town of Kendal of much of the through traffic which bedevilled it for so many years. It is amazing how quickly the pressure of traffic has built up again, although the heavy through traffic has gone. Goodness knows where the traffic is all coming from, but Kendal is just as busy and congested as it ever was. The fact is that with the provision of new roads many more people wish to go to the Lake District on day trips than when I entered the House 10 years ago. There is a terrible danger that those who can so easily come to enjoy the beauties of the Lakes will destroy a great deal of what they come to admire.
I was most interested and fascinated to read the report of the National Parks Policy Review Committee, published only a few weeks ago. I hope that the House will soon be given the opportunity to debate that report, which clearly reflects the mounting difficulties which car ownership and the increasing use of the car cause for people in the national parks. What the report says about the national parks strikes the right note in terms of the Lake District.
We see in chapter 7.1 the following comment:
"The increase in car ownership during the last 20 years has been such that recreational trips by car are now the rule rather than the exception for the average family."
The report continues, in chapter 7.2:
"For some motorists driving in attractive countryside is pleasure enough and any stops they may make are short. Others like to relax

1023
in one place, but have no desire to go far from their cars."
That is a fact which we in the Lake District well understand.
I wish to draw one or two problems to the Government's attention and I hope that they will do all they can to ease the situation. First, I believe that it is important to try to direct the traffic outside the national park before it ever gets into the area. There is a great need for more information as traffic approaches the park. I understand that the Cumbria Tourist Board now has a service centre between Penrith and Carlisle. I believe that there is great need for similar centres. There is certainly a need for an information centre to serve traffic approaching from the south via the M6, for instance at the Burton service area. There is also need for another information centre to cope with the needs of traffic approaching from the east on the A66 somewhere near Penrith.
The Cumbria Tourist Board believes that there is great need to influence first-time, uncommitted holiday visitors to consider destinations beyond the national park. I hope that the Government will consider this point. I know that the board is anxious to have discussions with the Department as soon as possible to see whether other tourist information centres could be set up.
The majority of the traffic which comes to the Lake District emanates from the south-east. It comes from Yorkshire, Lancashire or the Midlands and from the southern part of England in particular. The Minister who is to reply knows this very well since he has particular knowledge of the Lancashire situation. The vast bulk of traffic comes up the M6 or from Yorkshire through Kirkby Lonsdale. When the new Kendal link road is completed in the next few months, the traffic will approach at that point; it will appear on the old A6 road just north of Levens Bridge.
I do not want to fight old battles with regard to the Kendal link road, because that matter has happily been resolved, but I should like the Minister to say whether he has any recent information as to the opening date of the Kendal link road. I received an answer on 25th March to the effect that it would be opened in September 1974. I have since
1024
had local information that it might be a somewhat optimistic guess or estimate. I hope that it is not. At least, I hope it is realistic. However, I have heard local rumours since that reply was published that it might be over-optimistic. It is important at that point, when the road is open, that there should be clear means of separating the traffic as it approaches the Lake District.
On 28th May I received a letter, for which I am most grateful, from the Minister's colleague, the Under-Secretary of State, in which he said that traffic was likely to be split and that clear direction signs would be provided both at Farleton and at the western end of the Kendal link road. That is good. We do not want all the traffic rushing up the A591, which is the main arterial route, right into the heartland of the Lake District. That road goes from Kendal through Windermere, Ambleside, Grasmere and Keswick. In some places it is a very good road but in other places it is abysmal and wildly congested. I have always hoped that the day would come when it would be possible to get a complete ban on heavy lorries on that road.
It is important, from the amenity aspect in the Lake District, that the huge tankers which rumble through from and to West Cumberland should be banned from that road. It is absolute hell for the people living in the villages along that road to have these tankers rumbling through. It is even greater hell for the tourists staying in hotels and boarding houses who have come to the Lake District for peace and quiet to find themselves seemingly on a main arterial road out of a great city when great tankers come through from and to West Cumberland.
The ban on heavy lorries on the A591 must be seen in conjunction with the proposed improvement to the A66 between Keswick and Penrith. I suppose that this has been one of the most controversial road improvements proposed in recent years. I am sure that hon. Members representing Lake District areas—I am pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Mr. Hall-Davis) present—have had as many letters as I have received from irate constituents about the improvement to the A66. But it seems clear, despite all the controversy, that the improvement will take place and that it will be an amenity

1025
setback to the Lake District. However, if we can get a ban on heavy lorries on the A591 I believe that will make up a good deal, if not almost all, of the debit that we shall have regarding the A66. If we can get heavy lorries banned from this road right through the heartland of the Lake District, we shall make up a great deal of lost ground. I was one of the first who, a few years ago, called for a ban on heavy lorries on that road. I must ask the Minister to give us some hope on this matter tonight.
I call in aid again the report of the National Parks Policy Review Committee, which in chapter 15.5 states:
"We recommend that investment in trunk roads should aim at developing routes for long distance traffic which avoid national parks…. We further recommend that where such routes are available, heavy through traffic should be prohibited from using roads in the national parks."
That is important. I believe that that recommendation is absolutely right.
The Minister may say that nothing should be done until the improvement to the A66 is complete. I do not agree. I think that the ban ought to be brought into effect now. However, if the hon. Gentleman is to have his way, I suggest that he should give consideration to an early announcement—perhaps not tonight —that heavy traffic will be banned on the A591 after the A66 improvement is complete. I urge strongly that that should be done.
What form will the improvements to the A59 take? We are still awaiting inquiries on the Ambleside and Staveley bypasses. Can the Minister of State give us any idea when we shall get the result of the inquiries? Apart from the need to ban heavy traffic, there is still a need to improve that road.
I know how much the Minister of State likes the Lake District. I invite him to come with me to Ambleside any Saturday or Sunday afternoon in the holiday season and I will show him what Ambleside is like on a holiday weekend when there are no tankers in sight and when cars make up the whole of the traffic congestion and life is misery for those of my constituents who live in that place. Clearly something must be done about Ambleside and Staveley.
What is in the Department's mind about the type of road? Is the Minister intent on building dual carriageways all
1026
through here? Is it necessary to build dual carriageways? I cannot help feeling that good 24-ft. roads delicately planned and built would be helpful, provided that there were stretches every now and again of dual carriageway so that traffic could sort itself out, with cars which wanted to get ahead having the opportunity of overtaking slower vehicles.
There are other places within the national park where the congestion at holiday periods is appalling. These are places which are great beauty spots and where the roads are of necessity narrow and winding; and I hope that they will always remain so. I am thinking of places like Tarn Hows in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale, of Little Langdale, of Blea Tarn across Great Langdale in my constituency where the road is very narrow and where there are ghastly traffic jams. There is a photograph of one such jam in Little Langdale in the report to which I have referred.
There have been suggestions in the past that there should be a ban on cars in those areas and that the public should rely on public transport. That is the sort of scheme that there is in the Goyt Valley in the Peak District and in the Yosemite National Park in the United States, which I have seen for myself. Before we go in for a ban on cars it must be remembered that congestion happens on relatively few days in the year in these areas. It would be wildly uneconomic if the ban on cars were to be enforced and public transport put in its place. It would cost a fortune. It would also have a devastating effect on those who make their living in hotels, boarding houses and cafes. I hope that the Minister will insist that there should not be a ban on cars and an introduction of compulsory public transport until there is the very maximum of traffic thrombosis —in other words, only as a last resort.
I hope that the Minister will do his best to answer as many of my questions as he can in the time available to him.
10.19 p.m.
The Minister of State, Department of the Environment (Mr. Charles R. Morris): I was impressed by the reasonableness and lucidity with which the hon. Member for Westmorland (Mr. Jopling) put his case on this important issue. I greatly appreciated his justifiable pride

1027
when he stated his belief that he represents the most beautiful constituency in the whole country. It seemed slightly contradictory of him later to question why so many thousands of motorists from the major industrial conurbations of South-East Lancashire and the industrial areas of Yorkshire find such delight in sharing the attractions of the Lake District.
I cannot stress too highly the fact that I as a Minister share the hon. Gentleman's concern for the conservation of the outstanding beauties and natural qualities of the Lake District. As the hon. Gentleman rightly indicated, it is just because of these features that so many people flock to the area in their motor cars and endanger the very beauties they go to see. This fact, now that improved road communications make the area easily accessible to a much larger proportion of the population, is one of the main considerations which I know have motivated the hon. Gentleman's concern. Problems of traffic in South-East Lakeland cannot be divorced from the overall problems of road traffic in the park as a whole. The special needs of the national park make it essential for there to be a very close relationship between the responsible authorities concerned and the fullest co-operation of all who have the interests of the area at heart.
The major routes leading to the Lake District are trunk roads and motorways for which the Secretary of State for the Environment is responsible, but the A591 between Kendal and Keswick, to which he referred, is a road for which the county council is responsible as highway and traffic authority.
On 1st April this year, as the hon. Gentleman is aware, the new Cumbria County Council became the appropriate authority as successor to the three former county councils—Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire. As he will know, a working group has been set up to carry out a study of traffic generation and distribution in the Lake District. The objective is to formulate traffic management proposals aimed at regulating the flow of different classes of vehicle and the parking of vehicles within and close to the national park. This will not only facilitate the movement of traffic but will protect the more sensitive areas from overexposure to the motor vehicle.
1028
The working group will consist of the Cumbria County Council, the Lake District Planning Board the Cumbria Police, the Department's regional office, the Transport and Road Research Laboratory and the Countryside Commission. The group has already begun work on the collection of traffic data, and this will continue throughout the summer season. It is hoped to complete the first phase of the study by the end of this year in an attempt to bring initial traffic management proposals into effect by the council in time for the 1975 tourist season.
The study is proposed to continue next year, largely to establish traffic capacities of roads to suit their environment so that the management of the traffic and recreational activities can be suitably extended and further refined. The group's efforts will of necessity be directed particularly to conditions on the A591 which the hon. Gentleman has rightly drawn to my attention. The Cumbria County Council is the authority responsible for the road and it will be for that council to take final decisions in the light of recommendations from the study group and, indeed, any other sources.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the restriction of heavy goods vehicles from this road. It is, no doubt, a matter to which close consideration will be given, and obviously the county council will read the report of what the hon. Gentleman has said.
One factor which may weigh more strongly with the county council, however, is that improvements to the alternative routes via the A66 have not yet been completed and are unlikely to be completed for another two years or so. Improvements to the A591 are under consideration, and the question of the standards to which they should be constructed has been raised. This again is, in the first place, a matter for Cumbria; but in connection with the Ambleside relief road, as the hon. Gentleman indicated, a called-in planning proposal made by the former Westmorland County Council has been the subject of a local inquiry. Similarly an appeal against refusal of planning permission by the Lake District Planning Board for a bypass of Staveley has also been subject to inquiry.
The hon. Gentleman suggested that I might give an indication of when decisions will be made on the subject of

1029
these two inquiries. As he will appreciate, these proposals are sub judice and I am not able to comment on their merits. I hope the hon. Gentleman will understand my reasons for feeling obliged to say that. At this stage I cannot even give any indication of the date when the decision will be given, but I can give an assurance that we shall seek to bring these matters to a conclusion as soon as possible. I shall ensure that there will be no undue delay in making announcements regarding those decisions.
In each case, the standard to which improvements will be carried out is dependent on the decisions to be taken, and this, clearly, will have a bearing on the standards to be adopted elsewhere along the route.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the Levens-Kendal link road, and he asked me to say when this might be completed, adding that he had seen one report indicating that it was likely to be completed in September 1974. My latest information is that the Levens-Kendal link road is now expected to be completed in October 1974.
Consideration has been given to road direction signs, about which the hon. Gentleman asked, to be erected at either end of the link; namely, at the Farleton interchange on the M6 and at the junction of the link with the A6 trunk road. As has already been explained, traffic for the south lakes will be signed along the link road, and that for the north lakes along the M6 towards Penrith. At the western end of the link where it will join the A6, traffic for Grange and Newby Bridge will be directed to turn left, and traffic for Kendal and Windermere to continue along the A6. This form of signing has been agreed with the county council, and seems to represent the best solution to the problem. I was glad to note the hon. Gentleman's view that he shared the considered opinion that that is likely to be the best solution.
Apart from the specific matters which the hon. Gentleman has raised, there are interim proposals for the introduction of some experimental traffic orders during July this year which have already been publicised and are largely aimed at con-
1030
trolling the parking of vehicles on critical sections of various roads. If, following the consideration of any objections received, these orders are made, their effect will be watched during the remainder of the summer. The public will also be able to experience their effect in advance of our consideration of any recommendation by the study group for permanent traffic management control. Any views expressed will, of course, be taken into account.
The problems of the Lake District are symptomatic of problems generally in national parks. I noted the point made by the hon. Gentleman in regard to information centres, more of which he wishes to see established, and he rightly commented on the views of the Cumbria Tourist Board in this respect. I give him the assurance that I shall write to him separately in regard to that matter.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the report prepared by the National Park Policies Review Committee in November 1973. In the section dealing with roads and traffic in the parks, recommendations were made for alleviating the problems caused by heavy traffic demands, and these are receiving careful consideration. The general principle behind the recommendations, that the environmental quality of the parks must always be borne in mind when road planning and traffic management are under consideration, is one which we warmly endorse.
The hon. Gentleman very courteously extended an invitation to me to visit Ambleside with him. I shall be delighted to accept his invitation. If mutually convenient arrangements can be made, it will be an opportunity for me once again to enjoy the delights of the Lake District. However, I cannot accept the hon. Gentleman's final point when he suggested that at least for some people life is miserable in the Lake District. I know that there are great problems which those who reside in the Lake District are obliged to suffer as a result of the tremendous increase in traffic, but life in Lakeland miserable—never!
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.

  CONSTITUTION
  CONSTITUTION
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
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HOUSE OF COMMONS
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  Speech Therapists
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  Family Allowances
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  Hospital Visiting
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  Abortion
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  Oxygen Appliances
  Oxygen Appliances
TRADE
  Concorde
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  European Assembly
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Preamble
IN THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FORTY-SIXTH PARLIAMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,
COMMENCING ON THE SIXTH DAY OF MARCH IN THE TWENTY-THIRD YEAR OF TFIE REIGN OF
HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II
THIRD VOLUME OF SESSION 1974
The House met at half past two of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, pursuant to Standing Order No. 16:
The Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Salisbury.
The Lord Dunleath—Took the Oath.
The Lord Shaughnessy—Took the Oath.
The Lord Woolley—Took the Oath.

THE FLIXBOROUGH EXPLOSION
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question of which I have given Private Notice, namely:
"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement on the explosion which occurred at Flixborough near Scunthorpe on Saturday, June 1, and whether they will order a public inquiry to be held."
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD SHEPHERD): My Lords, may I reply to that Private Notice Question by repeating a Statement that is now being made in another place by my right honourable
2
friend the Secretary of State for Employment. The Statement is as follows:
"At about 5 p.m. on Saturday, June 1, the factory of Nypro U.K. Limited situated in the village of Flixborough in North Lincolnshire was shattered by a violent explosion, followed by a fire which raged all the following day and may not yet have been extinguished.
"Twenty-nine people are either dead or are missing and must be presumed dead. There is severe damage to property near the scene, less serious damage over a wide area and minor damage has even been reported from many miles away.
"All Members of the House will join me, I know, in sending a message of deep sympathy to the relatives of the dead and missing. I would also like to add my sympathy to the injured and to those who have been rendered homeless. A tribute must also be paid to the emergency services in the area whose efforts to cope with the fire and destruction and to help the injured and homeless is deserving of the highest praise.
"The plant is owned jointly by the National Coal Board and the Dutch State Mining Company. It uses a number of highly flammable raw materials of which a major one is Cyclo Hexane in the manufacture of Caprolactam. This is a raw material used in the manufacture of Nylon 6. This is one of a small number of plants throughout the world and the

3
only one in this country. As there is already a shortage of this material there will be economic problems to be added to the death and destruction which has resulted from this explosion.
"Within two hours of the incident, locally based members of my Factory Inspectorate were on site and they were joined late on Saturday evening by a Deputy Chief Inspector from London. On Sunday the Parliamentary Under-Secretary and the Chief Inspector visited the site. They were later joined by three experts from our London Headquarters and an electrical inspector. The Chief Inspector has now formed an investigation team to gather the facts as soon as possible while memories are fresh. The team will be under the control of the Superintending Inspector for the area and he will be able to call on any help that he may need. By courtesy of the Police, with whom they are closely co-operating, they have formed a temporary Headquarters in the Police building in Scunthorpe. For the moment access to the plant is still limited by the fire but witnesses are already being interviewed.
"This investigation is proceeding with all speed but I must decide in what framework it should now be set. Her Majesty's Factory Inspectorate have been worried for some time about the escalation of risk associated with certain new technologies. It is no secret that the Chief Inspector is on record in his annual reports of expressing his own concern. I believe that his concern is now widely shared.
"The Health and Safety Bill which is now going through the House will very materially assist in relation to this kind of development since it will provide for the licensing of some of these plants. Arrangements for close co-operation between planning authorities and the new licensing controls will be within the scope of the Health and Safety Commission when it is set up. To that extent I believe that the new legislation will be a major contribution to control in the future, but I would not like the House to think that all efforts to deal with this problem have been allowed to wait upon legislation.
4
"In 1969 the Factory Inspectorate and the Department of the Environment set up a joint working group, the object of which was to look at the implications for planning authorities of the siting of factories which may involve a major hazard. As a result of this an inter-Departmental procedure has been set up which enables planning authorities to call upon the advice of Her Majesty's Factory Inspectorate when considering applications for new developments. This procedure is, I believe, developing smoothly and may well be a pattern for the future.
"Members of the House will appreciate that the problems which are raised by this explosion are not solely confined to matters for which I hold responsibility. I am sure the whole House will agree that it is necessary to hold a full public Inquiry into these events. I will be urgently consulting with my colleagues to decide the form the Inquiry should take and the terms of reference it should be given."
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Leader of the House for his very important Statement. I am sure that all Members of your Lordships' House will wish to associate themselves with the remarks made about the feeling for the relatives of those who have lost their lives, and indeed for a whole community which has been so sadly devastated by this explosion.
I should like to ask my noble friend whether Her Majesty's Government are paying attention not only to those aspects of health and safety which are mentioned in the Bill which is now passing through another place, but also to the great problems of large-scale aggregation. There is little doubt that where one has an aggregation of this type, where a dangerous chemical—not dangerous in the ordinary sense, but dangerous when fire takes place—is present, one may have these devastating explosions. I should like to ask my noble friend whether he can assure us that Her Majesty's Government will pay very careful attention in the future to all types of aggregations of petro-chemicals.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, my noble friend refers to the Bill which the previous Administration introduced in another place, and which is to be dealt

5
with in this Session. No doubt he will feel that the arrangements set out there constitute a very considerable advance in this connection, particularly in those factories which one can say are concerned with matters bordering on scientific knowledge, It may be, as a consequence of the public hearing into this terrible disaster, that we may have something further to learn. I will certainly give my noble friend the assurance for which he has asked.
2.45 p.m.
THE EARL OF GOWRIE: My Lords, in the immediate aftermath of a tragedy of this kind, one's thoughts must be with the families and friends of those who have lost their lives, with the injured and those whose lives and property have been disrupted or damaged. On behalf of the Opposition in your Lordships' House, I want to echo the sentiments of the noble Lord the Leader of the House and the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, and extend our sympathy to the bereaved and our good wishes to the afflicted. A tragedy such as occurred here must not happen again. As the noble Lord said, we shall soon have the opportunity to debate the issues of safety and health at work, and to consider in Committee any implications for legislation on this score which the tragedy may have occasioned. In the meantime, as one who has had the privilege of watching at work Mr. Brian Harvey, the Chief Inspector of Factories, may I urge upon the noble Lord the Leader of the House that his percipient anxieties about the likelihood of huge and hideous disasters of this kind be attended to right away, of course in the form of the Inquiry that the noble Lord mentioned, but also in terms of monitoring any potential danger at other comparable plants.
May I also urge on the noble Lord that there be the quickest and widest possible international consultation about the dangers of the Nylon-6 process, valuable though it has proved to be, so that we and others may swiftly learn our lessons and at least see to it that those who died may not have died in vain. May I, in conclusion, ask the noble Lord whether he will consult with his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Industry as to what steps his Department may be taking to help the artificial
6
fibre industry to recover from this deathly blow, coming, as I am afraid it does, at a bad time for the economy in general?
LORD BYERS: My Lords, from these Benches we do not wish to press any questions on the Government at this time, but wish to be associated with the expression of sympathy which has been made to those who have suffered in this ghastly tragedy, and to join the tributes that have been paid to those who took part in the rescue operations. I would only add to what the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, said that I think everybody will have full confidence in the percipience of Mr. Brian Harvey, who is an excellent factory inspector.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, and the noble Lord, Lord Byers, for what they have said. We are in a realm of industrial development and research on which much of our future will depend. Although this has been a terrible disaster, there can be no possible reason to believe that this was not a plant that had been designed and built with the greatest possible care. International consultation clearly will be necessary since other plants of this design are to be found elsewhere. In regard to the supply of Nylon-6—an important factor in the nylon industry—I understand that the Secretary of State has himself seen to-day the noble Lord, Lord Kearton, to see what steps could be taken to alleviate the difficulties of the nylon industry.
2.49 p.m.
LORD HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord two short questions? I read somewhere that a relief fund is being set up. Can the noble Lord the Leader of the House give us any news about that fund, to whom subscriptions should be sent? I heard the chairman of the company involved, which is largely publicly owned, say that compensation would be paid and that the company would meet its obligations. Would the noble Lord be good enough to make sure that the arrangements for the speedy settlement of claims are adequate? One does not want this situation, involving multiple claimants, to drag on like the thalidomide case.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am quite sure that the noble Lord is right about insurance arrangements. I will see that what he has said is drawn to the attention of my right honourable friend. In regard to the relief fund, I understand that a fund has been opened by the Chairman of the Humberside District Authority. If I can find the address, I will find some way by which a noble Lord might ask me a Question for Written Answer so that it appears in Hansard.
LORD TAYLOR OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, while joining in the expressions of sympathy, may I ask the noble Lord two questions. First, what is the total number of factory inspectors throughout the country? Secondly, is that number up to the strength required?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I saw the figure some time ago but I am afraid that I would not wish to give it to the noble Lord "off the cuff". I do not believe that the Inspectorate is in any significant way under strength, but I will write to the noble Lord about the figures for which he has asked.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, in view of the fact that widespread publicity has been given to the statement of the Chief Inspector of Factories that there have been a number of complaints about this factory in the last three years, can my noble friend tell the House, in order to reassure the relatives of the deceased, that these complaints were sympathetically regarded and that action was taken?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the reference that I made in my Statement to the concern of Her Majesty's Inspectorate was related not to this particular factory but to the whole development in the petro-chemical industry. My understanding is that last November a senior chemical inspector visited this plant and found everything satisfactory.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, in view of what my noble friend the Leader of the House said, may I ask him whether he is aware that there were in the Press a number of statements saying that several small fires had started in this particular organisation?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I saw the statements, but in industry one has difficulties from time to time. I can
8
assure my noble friend that I specifically asked about this matter before coming to your Lordships' House. I was told that the place had been inspected last November by a chemical inspector—also of course there are the regular inspections by the local authorities who have responsibility—and nothing untoward was to be found in the site.

BUSINESS
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, I should like to inform the House that, because of the number of Peers who wish to speak on Northern Ireland, it has been decided that the House shall also sit to-morrow. Today's debate will then be continued.
LORD HIGH COMMISSIONER (CHURCH OF SCOTLAND) BILL
Brought from the Commons, endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act 1911, on the 24th of May last, and printed [pursuant to Standing Order No. 48]; read 1a.

NORTHERN IRELAND
2.54 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD ELWYN-JONES): My Lords, I beg to move, That this House takes note of the situation in Northern Ireland. I have little doubt that many differing expressions of opinion will be ventilated in the course of this debate. That is inevitable in discussing a problem which has vexed the course of history for seven hundred years, and in respect of which there is no prospect of a simple solution and no room for dogmatism. But I apprehend that there will be unanimity in your Lordships' House about the rightness of the Government's decision to recall Parliament to discuss the present crisis. This is very much an occasion when Parliament as the Grand Inquest of the Nation can play a vital role, and the Government will of course give the closest attention to the views that are expressed here and in another place.
The present crisis was brought to a head by the break-up on May 28 of the Northern Ireland Executive, which had held office under the Constitution Act since January 1 of this year. The combined forces of I.R.A. terrorism and the

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organised economic disruption of the Province achieved the Executive's downfall. In the result the Executive machinery, so patiently and carefully evolved by the previous Administration with the support of all Parties in Parliament, has foundered. The Assembly has been prorogued. Before I explain the Government's actions, I should like on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to express our appreciation of the courage shown by those Northern Ireland politicians who formed the Executive. They showed a willingness to abandon traditional fears and suspicions and to come together in the interests of the community as a whole, which deserves the highest possible praise. It is tragic that their efforts did not succeed.
It may be helpful if I recapitulate briefly the events which led up to the present crisis. The House will recall that, following the introduction of Direct Rule in March, 1972, the most extensive consultations were held by the previous Government with the Leaders of the political Parties and representatives of various interests in Northern Ireland, in the hope of remedying the deep divide which for over half-a-century had developed in Northern Ireland between the two communities: the one always in Government; the other never in Government. In September, 1972, a conference was held in Darlington, and a month later the then Government published a Green Paper containing many new proposals as the basis for further discussion.
In due course the Government made their own proposals known in the White Paper published in March, 1973, and those proposals were debated in Parliament and received full support from all sides. The basic principle was that the minority in Northern Ireland should be enabled to take part in Government. The proposals were designed to achieve for Northern Ireland a new form of Government enabled to secure government by consent. On June 28, 1973, the first elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly were held. The Northern Ireland Constitution Bill implementing the proposals in the White Paper was passed by both Houses of Parliament and received the Royal Assent on July 18, 1973.
Talks then took place between the then Secretary of State, Mr. Whitelaw, and representatives of those Parties who
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were prepared in principle to form an Executive in accordance with the principles of the Constitution Act. An agreement was reached. Some aspects of the original White Paper—known collectively as the Irish Dimension—involved the Government in the South, and to reach agreement on those matters the members of the Executive-designate met with the then Prime Minister, Mr. Heath, the Taoiseach and some of the respective Ministers of the Governments at Sunningdale in December last year. The agreement reached there was set out in the communiqué issued after the Conference. It was an agreement which demanded concessions, but it contained ample safeguards. The Council of Ministers was to act by unanimity, so that any one Member from Northern Ireland would have a power of veto.
On January 1, 1974, power was devolved to the new Executive in Northern Ireland and Direct Rule ceased. But the United Kingdom Government retained their responsibility for law and order in the Province.
The way seemed set fair at last for political harmony and stability in Northern Ireland and the question which must be anxiously asked to-day is, what went wrong? Your Lordships will remember that the Executive had agreed on May 22 the basis upon which it was prepared to proceed in relation to the Council of Ireland. Their agreement was welcomed by Her Majesty's Government as a realistic and sensible basis on which the North and South could work together. That agreement carefully protected the interests of both sections of the community in Northern Ireland, and was consistent with the requirement which is enshrined in Section 1 of the Constitution Act that Northern Ireland remained part of Her Majesty's Dominions and of the United Kingdom and that in no event would Northern Ireland or any part of it cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. That position had, of course, been accepted as a fact by the Government in the South, and in all these circumstances the Executive's future might well then have seemed secure.
The calling of the General Election in February, after the Executive had been in existence for a mere five weeks, in

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the result added significantly to the strains on the Executive and was indeed in its outcome a disastrous blow to its authority. Then in March there was a vicious campaign of proxy bombing by the Provisionals. The extent to which those terrorists were prepared to go was revealed by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister when he disclosed the Provisionals' relentless, murderous, "scorched earth" plan. The Provisionals wrecked Sunningdale. But, my Lords, it was the recent widespread disruption of industry, public services and private business in Northern Ireland which was the immediate cause of the collapse of the Executive.
On May 14 a total strike was called in Northern Ireland by a group calling itself the Ulster Workers' Council. This group is a body of men that has not been elected and that has attempted to apply pressure on Her Majesty's Government to make changes in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, a position that has been determined by the wish of this Parliament and, indeed, by the wish of Parliament expressed through the support of all Parties in Parliament. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State made it clear that he could not negotiate on constitutional matters with the Ulster Workers' Council, although he was at all times willing to meet the elected representatives, and both he and the other Northern Ireland Ministers had indeed done so on a number of occasions.
The strike was not a strike as we normally use the term in this country. People were intimidated; roads were barricaded; people were murdered. The extent to which pressure was applied was illustrated by what took place on the first Friday evening of the strike. Protestant extremists from North Belfast went on the rampage in Ballymena. They wrecked three public houses and a fish-and-chip shop that remained open against so-called "orders". On, their return to Belfast they went to a Catholic public house South of Ballymena and murdered at point blank range the Catholic owner and his brother. The R.U.C. reacted swiftly and thirty-five suspects were arrested. My Lords, the strike continued. As essential services began to deteriorate, additional British troops. including technicians, were flown into Northern Ireland
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and a decision had to be taken as to whether these troops were to be used to man essential services.
My right honourable friend the Prime Minister invited Mr. Faulkner, Mr. Fitt and Mr. Napier to Chequers on May 24 to discuss the situation. The leaders of the Northern Ireland Parties asked for a limited operation by the Army, but no commitment was entered into. The request was, however, considered by the Cabinet and authority was given for a limited operation for the Army to operate 21 petrol stations, two oil storage depots, the supply of petrol and oil to essential users and the supply of chemicals to the Londonderry gas works. That decision was taken in the light of the facts in Northern Ireland and after the hearing of the views of the Northern Ireland Executive, but it did not result from any pressure applied by individual politicians in Northern Ireland. The timing of the operation was determined by the need for precise planning by the Army, the changing situation on the ground and the developing situation in the essential service industries. The Army acted at 5 o'clock in the morning of Monday, May 27. The operation was carried out most efficiently, surprise was achieved, and the Army deserve our highest praise for their handling of this delicate matter.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Nevertheless, my Lords, the electricity situation deteriorated and by Tuesday, May 28, there was disagreement within the Executive following the political strains put upon it during the strike. Mr. Faulkner considered that to maintain the unity of the Executive a mediator should be appointed to negotiate with the Ulster Workers' Council, but the S.D.L.P. members disagreed. In these circumstances, Mr. Faulkner and his supporters resigned, and the basis of the Executive ceased therefore to exist.
Your Lordships may ask what were the motives of the strikers and those who supported them. It would seem that they were extremely varied. Some, there is no doubt, were intimidated into not going to work, not opening their shops, not delivering bread and milk. Others feared for the loss of the old system which ensured a monopoly of power for "their" section of the community. But I do not

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believe that those explanations account for the great majority. Most of them, I feel sure, feel that they have had enough—enough of year after year of violence, of bombing, of arson, of mindless assassination, of fear and insecurity in their daily lives. What has also emerged, as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has expressed it, is a new form of nationalism in Northern Ireland, bringing together many strands of Unionist opinion and founded in part on a simple fear that the status of Northern Ireland will not be respected and in part on a feeling that the Ulster man must himself make a significant contribution to his own future.
What, then, are the Government doing? In the first place, it was necessary to ensure the continuing government of Northern Ireland. Using the provisions which exist in the Constitution Act, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been prorogued for four months by Order of the Queen in Council under Section 27(6) of the Constitution Act. Before this provision is exercised, it must appear to Her Majesty that the composition of the Assembly is such that it is not possible for the Secretary of State to make appointments in the Executive from the Assembly which conform to the power-sharing provisions of Section 2(1)(b) and that it is in the public interest that the Assembly should be prorogued. The resignation of Mr. Faulkner and his supporters and the attitude taken by the other Protestant groupings within the Assembly satisfied my right honourable friend that it would not be possible immediately to make new appointments to the Executive conforming with these provisions. There is little doubt that in the circumstances obtaining it was in the public interest that the Assembly should be prorogued.
Section 27(10) of the Constitution Act provides that an Order proroguing the Assembly shall specify the period of prorogation. The Order specified that the Assembly should be prorogued for four months. The Assembly is required to meet at the expiration of this period, but Her Majesty may recall it earlier, may prorogue it for a further period, or dissolve it during the time of prorogation. Although an Executive no longer existed, it was clearly necessary for the machinery of Government in Northern Ireland to continue.
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Section 8(6) of the Constitution Act provides for the Secretary of State to appoint persons to the Executive for not more than six months if he does not find it possible to make appointments complying with power-sharing provisions of the Act. Accordingly, my right honourable friend proposes to appoint Ministers from the Northern Ireland Office to take charge of the various Departments in Northern Ireland so that the Executive Government in the Province can be carried on, and will do so—until more permanent solutions are found. Responsibility for legislation for Northern Ireland will rest during the period of prorogation of the Assembly with this Parliament.
These arrangements provide a short time, a breathing space, in which all those concerned with the government of Northern Ireland may re-appraise the situation. Her Majesty's Government must and will use the time to find a further way forward, but others must make their re-appraisals as well. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has already begun the process of exploring the views of the leaders of the political Parties. He will encourage all those to whom he talks to think hard about the future of Northern Ireland and their part in it. It is no good people believing that, either by killing and bombing, or by paralysing economic and social life, they can secure the political arrangements that they want. There is no future on that road. The various parties in Northern Ireland will have to decide whether they are prepared to work together.
My Lords, no devolved system of Government like that set up by the Constitution Act can work for long without the consent of the great majority of the people governed by it. Equally, in Northern Ireland. such consent cannot be expected unless the two main sections of the community each have a proper share in the exercise of Governmental power. The purpose of Her Majesty's Government will continue to be, as was the purpose of their predecessors, one of trying to find ways in which those basic principles can be reconciled. The bleak fact remains that the Executive built up by the previous Administration had ended despite the efforts of Her Majesty's Government in the past three months to

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sustain it and to work with the Constitution Act of 1973.
We now have to move forward and we must move forward expeditiously. Prorogation is for four months only and the Executive in the form that I have described will only exist for six months. Future policy must recognise certain hard, if unpalatable, facts: first, in the past the conflict was between Republicans and Unionists. We must now recognise that a new dimension has emerged in the shape of Ulster Protestant nationalism. Secondly, the human and economic cost of what has been and is taking place must be weighed and recognised. Over the last five years more than 1,000 people have been killed. This includes 257 of our own soldiers, 50 members of the R.U.C., including reservists, and 696 civilians, most of them wholly innocent. 1,553 soldiers have also been seriously wounded. To our Servicemen too high a tribute cannot be paid.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, as to the economic cost, £63 million has been paid out in compensation for damage to buildings and to property, and compensation for cases still pending is likely to cost a further £51 million. Apart from the bombings and murders, often carried out alas! by children on behalf of the I.R.A., there are sectarian murders, most of them murders by Protestants of Catholics.
Thirdly, the situation has meant that it has not proved possible to use the normal methods of the rule of law and procedures of the courts to deal with those who bomb and kill on the scale I have mentioned, although the Government think it right now for a review of the working of the Emergency Provisions Act to take place, and my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner has been good enough to undertake the chairmanship of a committee to carry out that study. For the protection of the public my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has had to sign two main groups of interim custody orders since February—orders made for the protection of the public. On May 24, 1974, 234 persons were held under interim custody orders and 399 persons under detention orders.
It must be recognised that unhappily para-military forces continue to operate
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in the Province in both communities. They cannot be dealt with by the R.U.C. alone. Despite the constant searches and frequent successes of the Security Forces, large supplies of weapons still come into the Province. Sectarian hatreds are intense, the risk of widespread murders and even civil war remains. The fact must be faced that without the presence of the British Army the forces of law and order just could not cope in the immediate future. The Government are firmly against the view that the Army should pull out quickly and let the communities fight it out while we look on.
Next I turn to the economic and financial burden that Northern Ireland involves. Northern Ireland is heavily dependent on the rest of the United Kingdom for Government financial support, to the extent in 1973/74 of about £310 million. This was in addition to its full share of taxation raised in the United Kingdom and does not include borrowing from the National Loan Fund of about £66 million. The economic difficulties of the Province were severely aggravated by the strikes. The Protestant backlash took the form of crippling industrial action.
The next set of facts that must be faced is the position of the Catholic community. They form an important part of the community in Northern Ireland They cannot be overlooked in the new situation, nor their fears, and the fact must be faced that most of them still aspire to a united Ireland. It is an aspiration which at any rate cannot he ignored. It was the clash between this and Unionism in the past which was the basis of the bitter divide. The clash is now with Ulster Protestant nationalism. In the past two years the previous Government pursued a policy of conciliation and power sharing. All parties rightly supported it. It has collapsed, and a new way has to be found.
My Lords, I have endeavoured to set the situation before the House as objectively as I can. Her Majesty's Government will proceed, during this breathing space, to take soundings with leaders of all political Parties in Northern Ireland. As I have said, they will weigh carefully the opinions that will be expressed in Parliament, particularly, if I may say so, by those who have so

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recently tried to grapple with this problem. The Government must, of course, find their own way forward, but we shall hope that their decisions will meet with the support of the whole House.
In conclusion, I should like to emphasise that the restoration of law and order on behalf of the community is the sole object and purpose of the Security Forces—the Army and the R.U.C.—in Northern Ireland. But ultimately law and order can be maintained only by the community itself. They can be restored only if all—and I repeat all—the people of Northern Ireland wish it and cooperate. There is no other way. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House takes note of the situation in Northern Ireland.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
3.22 p.m.
LORD HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, I know the whole House will be grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the calm and informative way in which he has summarised the melancholy situation which we now have to discuss. Whatever differences of opinion may fall from different quarters of the House during the period of the debate, I feel certain the whole House will also have no fault to find with the decision of the Government and of the noble and learned Lord to recall Parliament for this brief discussion, and that the House would wish to be associated with the renewed but none the less necessary and sincere tribute to Her Majesty's Forces which the noble and learned Lord made during the course of his speech.
My Lords, I suppose it is the duty of all of us to be as constructive and as optimistic as possible. I wish that I could find it possible to see many redeeming features about the present situation. At the end of what I have to say, I will be as constructive and as optimistic as I can, but I am conscious that even then I may be deluding myself and thereby deceiving the House. The fact is that quite dispassionately I see few redeeming features about the present situation, or about the facts which have taken place in the last three weeks. The first fact that I should like to emphasise—and I will come back to it in the course of what I have to say—is that we are not talking only about affairs in
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Northern Ireland; we are talking about the constitutional position of the United Kingdom and the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament.
I said in the first speech that I made from the Woolsack on my recall to this House that the last Parliament—the Parliament of 1970—might turn out to be the last chance this country would have to preserve its traditional Parliamentary Constitution and its way of life. Those words, I fear, were thought somewhat extravagant at the time, and got me into a certain amount of trouble. I have never had cause to qualify or retract them in any way. I wonder whether they sound quite so extravagant to-day. I was referring to the centrifugal forces at work in our society at the present time, the fissiparous tendencies which are almost literally tearing us apart: individual interests, geographical, economic, cultural, even personal; unilateral action by men and women, ruthlessly attacking the interests of the nation of which they are part in order to gain concessions which they could not gain by discussion or under the law. But, my Lords, civilised society can exist only by discussion and by constitutional methods. I make little distinction, except one of degree, between one kind of unilateral action and another, nor always a distinction, except one of degree, between violent and so-called non-violent methods.
My Lords, it has been my experience that illegal non-violence always escalates into violence. At any rate in my view, stranglehold by economic boycott is every bit as violent as the bullet and the bomb. It is simply the difference between the garotter and the knife man, the blackmailer and the thug. What is wrong with society in my view is the failure of the will to put the interest of the whole of society first, and the failure of the nation to impose its will with sufficient strength of mind on those who take illegal action.
What we happen to have seen in the past three weeks is a political strike. It is not the first political strike we have seen in the history of the nation in recent times. It is not even the first to have had a measure of political success. None the less, a political strike, at least in my judgment, is a felon blow against Parliamentary government. If it fails, it inflicts harm without purpose; but it is worse still if it succeeds, for it means the power is

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removed from Parliament and rests in the hands of those who control the strike. The political strike in Ulster was not merely a threat to Ulster; it was, I believe, a threat to the United Kingdom as a whole.
Now, my Lords, I know that the alleged justification of the strikers was that there was in existence a covert attempt on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and possibly also of the leadership of the Party of which I am a member, to thrust Ulster out of the United Kingdom against the will of the majority of its citizens. I think it right to say unequivocally and categorically that I know nothing of such an attempt, except by the I.R.A. to whose activities the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor paid a right degree of attention for their responsibility for the frame of mind in which such a strike became possible. And if I did know of such a covert agreement, I should be against it. Such an attempt to thrust Ulster from the United Kingdom against the will of the majority of its inhabitants, if made, would be against the law. It would be against the Constitution Act and it would be against the terms of the Act of 1949.
I find no evidence whatever that Her Majesty's Government intend to break or to amend the Act and its provisions. Until there is evidence that the Government intended to break the law or the Constitution, I can find no justification whatever for defying the Government or Parliament. My Lords, speaking personally now and not as a representative of a Party, I would go even further than that. I know there are people in this country, I know there are people in this House—because I have heard them—who would wish to see the dismemberment of the United Kingdom and a so-called United Ireland, although they would add, honourably and properly, by the agreement of the majority and not otherwise. I know there are such, but I am not among them. I would vote against them on any occasion when the matter came up for discussion.
I am against the dismemberment of the United Kingdom, whether by force or otherwise. I believe that the dismemberment of the United Kingdom by the severence of the Six Counties would be against the interests of the whole British nation, and indeed of the whole
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group of people of whatever nationality who inhabit what, for geographical reasons, I still persist in calling the British Isles. I believe that with unity in diversity and diversity in unity the interests of these people are, for most practical purposes, one. I believe that we have an obligation to one another to get on with one another. I believe that we have an obligation to one another to support one another in difficulty, and to set up arrangements to settle any differences that there may be without outside interference. And I am against any further partitioning in the British islands, whether by agreement or otherwise.
But even if I were not of this opinion, I must also express the personal view that, if it had not been established before—and I think it has been established again and again; and I have felt it my duty in one part of the House or another to say so earlier—in the predictable future it has been established that the Protestant majority in the Six Counties would never agree to a United Ireland, and that any attempt to persuade them to do so would lead only to the kind of disorder which we have seen in the past few weeks and which, to my certain knowledge, has broken out from time to time ever since 1859. The ultimate tragedy of the past three weeks, at least in my judgment, is that it has made this dismemberment more and not less likely. It has not thrust it further away. The ultimate betrayal by the Ulster Workers' Council is not merely of Parliament but, I believe, of the interests of the Protestant community itself. The effect of the strike on British public opinion has not been to strengthen the Union; the effect on British public opinion has been to weaken the Union.
If the Ulster Workers' Council think, as some of them apparently do, that they can set up a separate State of six, or perhaps four or possibly three, separate counties with the majority community dominating the minority community, without power sharing, I believe that they are suffering from an illusion. Even if such a State could be established and could survive—and I do not believe that it could either be established or, if established, would survive—I believe that it would be a step towards a United Ireland of precisely the kind that the Protestants do not want, imposed by force from

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Dublin, and it would not be a guarantee of Protestant ascendancy even if that were wished. That is the real measure of my disagreement with Mr. Craig and his friends. I speak as one whose family, at any rate, remembers and will never forget its Irish connections.
I want to say a word in support of what the noble and learned Lord said about those who formed the Executive—about Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Fitt, in particular. I know both men. Of course members of the S.D.L.P., like many members of the community of which they are part, believe in what I do not believe in. They call themselves Republicans, and they do not wish to see the Six Counties remaining for long members of the United Kingdom. And for that reason I regard them as my political opponents, exactly as I regard many Members of this House as my political opponents. My aims are not their aims, nor are my hopes their hopes. But one must start by recognition, in this painful scene, that in Northern Ireland there are two communities with divergent aims and incompatible loyalties. There is nothing immoral about having a loyalty which is incompatible with the status quo. What can be immoral are the methods one uses to give effect to those feelings. There are two communities with incompatible loyalties, as there are Turk and Greek in Cyprus, as there are Moslem and Hindu in parts of the Indian sub-Continent, as there are Jew and Arab in parts of the Middle East. But I would say this. Although their ultimate loyalties may be divergent, it is my passionate belief that their present interest is the same.
There are, after all, only three possible courses in this Province. The first two consist in domination of one community by the other, of Protestants by Catholics—if one may label the two tribes in this unhappy situation by religious denominations—or Catholics by Protestants. The third is power sharing in some form. Power sharing is, of course, not a solution, but it is modus vivendi. I put forward to the House the view that much of the trouble in Ireland is caused by those who want solutions, and that there are too few people who realise that what we really need is a modus vivendi. After all a modus vivendi corresponds to the justice of the case, and I believe it remains in the interests of both communities, whatever their ultimate loyalties,
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to embrace it unless they are determined on domination, and I believe that domination of either by the other means continued civil war, possibly on a scale compared with which what has passed will turn out to have been only a terrible prelude.
But to return to the Executive and its members, in support of what the noble and learned Lord has said, I share his view that they have kept their side of the bargain. Whether they were S.D.L.P. and therefore my political opponents, or Mr. Faulkner and therefore my political ally—I think both deserve praise for what they have done. They have done what they did with considerable courage, with complete integrity and with extraordinarily steadfast loyalty to one another, which is something new in the history of Northern Ireland. I think this House must say a word not only of sympathy but of commendation to them. There is one thing that I must say to the Government—and I say it with delicacy, because I do not wish to make a Party point about it. I think that the Prime Minister's first broadcast was a total disaster—this talk about "sponging", this inability to understand or enter into the Protestant mind. I beg the Government to realise that that broadcast by itself would have made Mr. Faulkner's position untenable, and I beg them to determine that in future nothing like that will be allowed to happen again.
That leads me to the talk that there has been on this side of the Channel of demand that our troops should be withdrawn. I was glad to hear the noble and learned Lord reject that by implication. I fully understand the growth of feeling in favour of withdrawal. Nobody who can enter into the feelings of parents, for instance, at the present time, who can hardly hear the telephone ring without thoughts crossing their minds, can fail to appreciate the strength of feeling behind such a demand. Therefore, it is no lack of sympathy which leads me to think that such a demand is wholly misguided.
Think first of the position of the troops and whether the knowledge of immediate withdrawal or of withdrawal at a predetermined date would make their position easier of more difficult, safer or more dangerous. If one runs away from one's responsibilities, they have a tendency to

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run after one and to chase one back on to one's home ground. There are some people, I suppose, to whom it would be no good to point out the possibility of a blood-bath across the Channel. They would say, "Let them fight it out among themselves." Nevertheless, I think it right to tell the House that, according to the best opinion I can form, there would be such a blood-bath. I do not think that there is the smallest value to be attached to the promises we hear to Spare the other side. They are not sparing the other side at the moment, and a single act of provocation could let loose violence compared with which that of 1969, the result of which I was able to see for myself, would be a small thing. Once violence on that scale, in the absence of military forces, had taken place, I tremble to think of the consequences to Ireland, both North and South.
But, my Lords, is it not really short-sighted to think that we are not involved in this ourselves? Let no man think that we can withdraw from this problem. We are not an island unto ourselves. Britain is not an island unto itself. In this matter we are all part of the main. So let them not send to know for whom the bell tolls. Unless we see this thing through, it tolls for us; it tolls for England, it tolls for Scotland, it tolls for Wales, as well as for Ireland. both North and South. Unless we wish to see this beloved island, which has played so great a part in the world's history and for which so many better men and women than we have fought and died, founder at last in a welter of recrimination for want of vision, we must even at this late hour awake to our total involvement in what goes on on the other side of the St. George's Channel.
My Lords, I have only two further short points to make. The noble and learned Lord did not mention the Price sisters. I shall not do so either, but I should just like to say this: when I was last in the House of Commons, it fell to my lot to be opposed to Mr. Roy Jenkins, who was then, as he is now, the Home Secretary. I was then the spokesman with the duty of opposing him on Home Affairs. We had some agreement and perhaps rather more disagreement about home policy, but no-one
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who read his statement yesterday, and no one who has known him as I have known him across the Floor of another place, can fail to realise that here and in matters such as this we have a humane and conscientious man who has tried to do his duty, and the bloodcurdling threats which are being made against him at the moment will arouse just as much resentment among his political opponents as among his political friends.
My Lords, I only wish to add this: the noble and learned Lord spoke, and I think rightly, of a need for a space of time in which to recover our cool before we take up unbreakable attitudes. I should like to echo that. The only advice that I can give to the House and to my compatriots is not to cease to involve themselves in this problem, but to soldier on, conscious that we are doing our duty as God has given us the light to see our duty.
3.45 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, the House will be deeply indebted to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the terms and the tone in which he introduced the debate. Equally, we are indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, for the way in which he followed. I should like to endorse every word he said about Mr. Jenkins and the difficult decision he has had to take.
I confess that I find it difficult to see the light at the end of the Ulster tunnel. When one visits the Province, one finds so much goodwill and understanding and desire to work together on the part of so many Protestants and Catholics. One finds so many people who are heartily sick of the violence and senseless behaviour of the extremists and those who are not so extreme. Viewed from here in Westminster, it is easy to curse the whole population of Northern Ireland as a people who seem to have imposed upon themselves a death wish and a refusal to help themselves. Nevertheless, I do not believe that we can possibly abdicate our responsibility towards the thousands of decent, innocent citizens of both religions whose only desire is to live in peace. If there is any ultimate solution to the problems of two communities living together in harmony, it must surely be by some form of shared power which will create a new

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entity to which Catholics and Protestants can both be loyal. The difficulty at the moment is to achieve an entity to which both sectarian sides can feel genuine loyalty. In my view, we must undertake another attempt to make power sharing work.
I think that the first requisite is to examine what has happened to the system over the last few months and to recognise that power sharing has not been given the chance of succeeding which it deserved to have. I am not concerned to apportion blame because it is very easy to be right a long time after the event. However, I think it is worth while examining a number of decisions and events, if only to see whether there would have been some hope of power sharing succeeding if these events had not, for one reason or another, taken place.
I think that the first decision which affected the power sharing system was probably the withdrawal of Mr. Whitelaw as Secretary of State, at the very moment when he was in the process of establishing great confidence in the minds of moderate Protestants and Catholics. As I say, I am not criticising the decision but I think that, historically, it will be shown to have been important. The reasons for the decision are well-known and I believe that the industrial action of the miners must have tipped the balance in Mr. Heath's mind when he was assessing the political priorities at that moment.
The next event—with hindsight—was probably even more important. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has referred to it: it was the timing of the General Election. Everything seems to happen on the 28th of each month: the Assembly was elected on the 28th; various other things have happened on the 28th, and I think that the Executive resigned on the 28th. February 28 was too soon after the setting-up of the Executive for power sharing to have a chance. It not only unsettled Ulster but, by using the normal British electoral system in the 12 Ulster seats, it produced a travesty of representation when compared with the results of the election only a few months earlier for the Assembly, which was carried out among the same electorate using the method of proportional representation. In the Assembly election on June 28, 1973, the 12 United Kingdom Parliamentary con-
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stituencies each returned from five to eight Members to the Assembly, using the single transferable vote. Seven hundred and twenty-two thousand people voted. Of those, 87·6 per cent. elected the 78 Members and only 12·4 per cent. voted for defeated candidates and were therefore not represented. This gave a majority in favour of power sharing.
In the United Kingdom General Election, under the system we use here, with 717,000 voting, practically the same number of people (51·4 per cent.) elected the 12 Northern Ireland Members of Parliament, 48·6 per cent. were not represented at all in the British Parliament, and Brian Faulkner, with 37 per cent. of the total votes, secured no representation at all. This totally undemocratic result, in my view, dealt a body blow to power sharing, and it shows how vital it is for us to consider the necessity for democracy to be based on a system of representation which is in proportion to the votes cast by the electorate.
This result played straight into the hands of the so-called Loyalists, and renewed their confidence in their ability to win their political ends by use of a political strike to undermine the Constitution. I shall not comment on the way in which Mr. Paisley and others exploited the situation. I can only say that the protocol by which Members of this House do not criticise Members of another place is getting to straining point, if not breaking point.
I now turn to the future. I believe that our clear objective is to make one more attempt to get power sharing adopted as a viable system. But to do this I believe that we must secure a firm military grip before any real political solution becomes possible. I say that because I do not believe that people will come forward to operate any form of power sharing while the I.R.A., the Provisionals, or the Protestant extremists are vying with one another to dominate the scene. I believe that the Security Forces, and particularly the Army, must be given the fullest power, and the fullest support, in establishing a firm grip on law and order—a phrase I hate, but nevertheless I think it is probably accurate to describe it in that way. There must be a clear objective, and an uncompromising method of tackling terrorism and rooting out quite ruthlessly all terrorists and

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their collaborators. No tributes are too high for the way in which the Army and Security Forces have behaved in the last few years. But I get the impression when I go to Northern Ireland that they are really fighting with one hand behind their backs most of the time. When the Security Forces are known to have full political backing to root out terrorism I believe that the public will begin to come to terms with the situation and fall in behind the re-establishment of the rule of law. This calls for determination and resolution such as I regret we have not had in the last few weeks.
The noble Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, referred to the Prime Minister's broadcast. I do not think that it was the "sponging" reference that really worried most people, but rather that nothing came over which indicated that the Government had a real policy to deal with the situation in Ulster. This surely is a time when what matters is resolute leadership to re-establish the rule of law and to say so loud and clear. This is why I personally deprecate any talk of withdrawing our troops or abdicating our responsibilities. I understand the sincere sentiments, held by people in good faith, that it would be better to get out, that it would be better to set a definite date for withdrawal, and so on. These views are sincerely held, and I would say to these people, many of them in my own Party, and in other Parties, that they should think carefully of the effect of such opinions and such advocacy. I shall not reiterate what the noble Lord, Lord Hailsham, said about the troops, but any of us who served in the war knows what this kind of thing means, particularly to those who have to give the orders and to those who have to obey them.
We have to be clear as to the enemy we are fighting. We are not fighting our kith and kin, or our comrades. The enemy consists of those who would wreck the constitutional authority for their own sectarian, political, or simply their own selfish ends. These people are much more akin to the Mafia. They are bent on the destruction of society. If society is to be protected, then these organisations have to be eliminated or neutralised as one has to do in war. There is no half-way house in protecting the foundations of a free society from anarchists whose
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aim is to destroy. I do not believe that we can build a new political framework while the foundations of society are under constant attack. I do not believe that this is a time for kid-glove treatment. It is no time for the slogan that I heard when I was in Ulster a few weeks ago, of "taking a terrorist home to tea", or for going soft on internment or detention.
The firmer our resolution to secure the rule of law, and the firmer our determination to support the Security Forces in establishing it, the shorter will be the period before we can make headway with a political solution. I hope that there will be an end to talk about withdrawal, because that only gives new hope of success to the extremists. Certainly the Provisionals would claim it as a success and would strengthen their grip and their intimidation on their own Catholics, and the extreme Protestants would see it as an opportunity to settle the question of sectarian domination once and for all. It frightens me, because I believe that is getting too close to the blood bath that I believe would take place.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY of STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (LORD DONALDSON OF KiNGSBRIDGE): My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves the point he is on, I should like to deny absolutely categorically the suggestion that the Security Forces are fighting with one hand behind their backs. I have denied this every time I have got up in this House, which is not very often, and I should like to do it again.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, I can only tell the noble Lord that I base my remarks on one evening when I was there, one of the bad evenings in Belfast. You can say that this is hearsay if you like, but a number of people told me that there were five soldiers, fully armed, in sight while a bus was being hi-jacked, but they did not move. I know the British Army. British troops do move in those circumstances unless there is some good reason holding them back. I make this point not as a Party political point, but to make quite sure that the fullest support is always available to the Security Forces. I think that it is worth checking to see that that is in fact the situation.

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I think that the Government are quite right to undertake some form of direct rule, and I think that the proposals that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has made to-day are welcome, but there should also be a series of conferences with all parties (not just political Parties), with individuals outside the Parties, and with anybody who has a contribution to make. This could take some considerable time. I am not going to suggest that we want an Ulster Kissinger, but there must be a great deal of consultation and toing and froing if we are to try to establish, as I should like, some understanding that will lead to a viable system of power sharing. If there were such talks aimed at getting Ulstermen of all opinions to come together to try to find a common solution—and it must be Ulstermen, it cannot be done from here—even if it is a compromise solution, I believe that that process of negotiation, consultation, discussion, might throw up some new leaders, who are wanted very badly in Ulster.
I think that it is important to recognise that there is no quick solution to Northern Ireland. Nor is there a chance of settling the Northern Ireland problem once and for all. You cannot do that. You have to go step by step and we are going to have reversals, but I believe that there is hope in getting people to talk, and to talk about power sharing. People believe that the Ulster Workers' Council strike was against power sharing. My information from Northern Ireland is that it was not anything of the kind. It was a strike against Sunningdale, as it had been presented, by the forces who wanted to upset Sunningdale. We must undertake at least one more operation to make power sharing work. If we can succeed, we shall not be talking of withdrawing troops, we shall be talking of handing over the security of Northern Ireland to the people of Northern Ireland. When we can get to that stage, then I think we are on the way to some success.
3.59 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, we are discussing a tragedy but, having listened to the three speeches so far, I should like to say that I have never been more proud to be a Member of your Lordships' House than I have been in the last hour or so, listening to the courage, modera
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tion, patience, and wisdom with which statesmen have been discussing this tragedy for Ireland and for our country. The tragedy is that what seemed to be the near success of a policy advocated by two successive British Governments has run down in failure. I think that again and again in Irish affairs there is for all of us this problem. We are so used to discussing the affairs of mankind in terms of reason and logic, but, again and again, we have to rediscover the fact that the affairs of this particular human area are not for reason and logic but are for feeling and intuition. We think we have discovered that, and then it is proved to us that we have not discovered it and we start all over again. That has been our experience in the last fortnight. I referred to "feeling" as a guide. I have had many feelings on this subject and one of my feelings, as I am sure noble Lords realise, is my own disappointment that, whereas during my years in office I have been devoting myself in this country and in other parts of the world to the good relations of Protestants and Catholics—and not without a good deal of fruit in many places—there is this one tragic spot where it does not happen, because there are people who do not want it to happen. I feel that acutely.
On my visits to Ireland in the last two or three years, I have always felt admiration for the British soldiers. Again and again I have felt acutely that the Catholic minority in Ulster really has had a grievance for years. But, more recently, the feeling which I have had, more overwhelmingly than anything else, is the feeling with and for the people who just cannot take more in the way of bombardment and murder. That is the acute feeling that one gets, and I believe it is the existence of that feeling in Northern Ireland which caused it to be that the foolish political strike had an emotional and unthinking degree of support from masses of the population which took some of us by surprise. We now have a pause and no one quite knows what will happen next.
I want to say a few words about what seems to me to be requisite if the pause is to be used fruitfully. First, I am sure that there must be an end of talk about withdrawing the British Army. The talk about it still goes on in a good many

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places, and the most foolish form for that kind of talk to take is that which says, "Look here, if you do not behave we will withdraw the troops". That is about as foolish a negation of statesmanship as anything can be. A part of the United Kingdom has no right to say to any other part of the United Kingdom, "If you do not behave better, the protection of law and order will be withdrawn".
A second requisite, I believe, in the pause or cooling-off period—call it what you will—is this. We should avoid, so far as possible, the unwitting use of words which stir emotion. Words, which for a month or two are good words, can quickly become emotive and explosive. One such word is "Sunningdale". It may be that a fair power-sharing plan not unlike Sunningdale. may emerge, but the word "Sunningdale" is surely out, because it has become an emotive word, like "Pope", or "Rome", or "hell" or words of that kind. We must avoid the use of terms which rekindle emotion. It is a pity that we have to do this, but there it is.
There is a third consideration for the period of pause. It seems to me to be desirable beyond words that the production of any new policy concerning Northern Ireland should, so far as possible, be bipartisan. By that I do not mean that the Front Benches here or in another place cease to criticise one another, when, in fact, there is a good deal to criticise. But I believe it may require greater wisdom and unity than one Party of itself can produce to ensure that the problem really gets its best from Parliament and from the United Kingdom generally. Fortunately for the prospects of bipartisanship in the future, each Government has had its successes and its blunders. As has been said already today, it did not help when the former Prime Minister called an Election in February, and it certainly did not help when the present Prime Minister made his "spongers" speech. I firmly agree with the view that that is just not the way to talk about Irish affairs, and talk of that sort really must stop. But just because each Party has had its successes and its blunders, it is surely not impossible for whatever new approach emerges from the pause to be bipartisan.
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My final point is that, in the future, whatever moderate conciliatory opinion there is in Northern Ireland should have its chance of being noted and reported. In the previous phase there was a good deal of talk about the silent majority, about the concept that it was only a minority of extremists who were stirring up trouble and the vast majority of people were out for a peaceful solution, and so on. I believe that the last fortnight has tragically shown that that picture is not true. None the less, there are moderate people in Northern Ireland; there are people longing for conciliatory policies; there are Protestants and Catholics ready to work together and to pray together.
In the former phase, I felt it was unfortunate that, while the media, again and again, reported every calamity, it did not give enough publicity to the very courageous conciliatory efforts that go on. I think, for instance, of the Corrymeela Institute, with which some noble Lords may be familiar. Let moderate opinion in Northern Ireland have its chance for expression, because that moderate opinion, whatever its quantity may be, is certainly there and is ready to be evoked, and the tide of fortune sometimes turns.
But like other noble Lords who have spoken, I can say nothing whatever to mitigate the sense of tragedy. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsharn, that we, as a United Kingdom are all in this and we must all persevere with the task that God has given to us. None of us lives to himself and none of us dies to himself.
4.9 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the most reverend Primate said that he felt proud to be a Member of this House after listening to the first three speakers, and I feel even more proud having listened to them and then to the most reverend Primate. On this occasion a Back-Bencher must not attempt a far-reaching analysis of the situation, and unless he has—as I have not—some esoteric nostrum to propound he does better to support one of the main lines of action which are before us. In fact, I want in the clearest possible way to support the line that the present Government, and their predecessors, have taken. In broad terms that is where I stand this afternoon, and after hearing the speeches

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so far I have every reason to suppose that as they have begun so they will continue In the light of after-knowledge, that does not mean that every word that has fallen from the Government—or for that matter from the Opposition—has been inspired. That would be too much to expect.
There was a certain criticism, in quite an affable way, by the noble Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, and by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, in relation to the broadcast of the Prime Minister, I will say only that the Prime Minister was faced with an extraordinarily tough situation. To quote The Times correspondent in Belfast this morning:
"What happened was not just a General Strike, the inevitable protest of an angry majority; it was, in effect, a coup d'etat."
I heard the noble Lord speaking on the radio the other day to great effect, as he did to-day, saying that it was utterly unconstitutional. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Prime Minister should speak with extreme severity. On balance, I feel that he spoke in the right way. Whether every word was exactly perfect, we can leave to others to decide.
The difficulties facing the Prime Minister and his colleagues—and indeed facing all of us—were mirrored in what the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury said, in that we are all in this together. There is no doubt about that, and the difficulties are enormous. But I hope that the Government, supported by the Opposition, will pursue indomitably their decision to make a success of the Constitution Act which, as we know, contains this essential feature of power sharing; and I am much encouraged by what has been said by the Leaders this afternoon. Having myself—for what that is worth—supported power sharing under various names for the last five years, I am not likely to desert it now, nor, I believe, are the Government, although we must recognise that everything has become harder as a result of recent events.
It is not difficult—although it is so far impossible in this House—to find people who are in favour of pulling out and letting Ulster stew in its own juice, of making arrangements for independence and letting them get on as best they can. We have not heard that line of nonsense peddled this afternoon and
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I hope that we do not have it during this two-day debate. But we should be deceiving ourselves if we did not admit that there are large numbers of people holding such opinions, although I think their numbers may be exaggerated. Such a policy is, in my eyes, not only imprudent—as has already been explained more than once—but morally contemptible. With a great nation like ours there are vital interests, not least our national honour.
Sir Winston Churchill once wrote that integral communities, like human beings, are dominated by the instinct of self-preservation. But that was not by any means the whole of his doctrine. Why he became leader of the whole free world was because during the war he elevated our cause of national self-preservation into one identical with universal freedom. If one goes back to Sir Edward Grey—I suppose that not many people here saw him and I never did—and refers to his speech which persuaded us to enter the war in 1914, one finds that he stressed, on the one hand, our vital interests, and, on the other hand, our honour. I wi11 not say more about the vital interests involved, or the vital damage that would be done in the near future if we tried to come out of Northern Ireland, but if we think of it in terms of honour we will see that it would be a tremendous betrayal.
My Lords, again and again, spokesmen on behalf of various Governments have said that Ulster is part of the United Kingdom and that its citizens are entitled to the full protection of the law. In his slightly controversial broadcast which I mentioned earlier, Mr. Wilson said that the Government are standing by those who support the Constitution and I remain confident that that pledge will be honoured. I hope that no one will think I am referring only to the Catholic minority, though for obvious reasons they come first to mind. Obviously, our obligation extends equally to each individual Ulsterman whatever his religion, or lack of it.
The majority of Ulstermen, at any rate for the time being, seem actually to want Independence, and the Protestant community as a whole might also come to want it. But I do not think we should assume for a moment that that situation has been, or will be, reached. In that case, one could argue that the majority

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could look after themselves. But in such a situation, which is far from arising but is, never the less, something which is under consideration, the position of the Catholic minority would be fraught with grave peril. When we talk about the "blood bath", we do not mean a nice sort of battle for the heavyweight championship of the world fought on equal terms; we mean a minority liquidated by the majority. I do not think that we want any mistake made about that.
In an article to-day in The Times—the same one that I quoted from—by an excellent correspondent in Belfast, there is the heading:
"Is Ulster heading towards a Protestant dictatorship?"
It is the central article in the middle left-hand page of The Times. While we hope that that possibility does not come about, it is something that is bound to come under discussion if one is talking in realities. No one can say for certain whether that position would occur if Britain pulled out, but the likelihood, with or without the "blood bath", is something that is so unspeakable that we must not even consider a course that would have such a dire result. In such a situation—and I am sure that we have to look at it in this way—who would be leading the Protestants? For 50 years the Catholics suffered discrimination, which I will not dwell on now—I have referred to it often enough in this House. But during the last five years strong efforts were made, first by the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill, who I am glad to think will follow me to-day, and later by the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, and later still by Mr. Faulkner, who tried to undo the mischief or the disparities of the previous 50 years.
For the moment in the Ulster scene. Lord O'Neill has been swept away; Lord Moyola has been swept away and Mr. Faulkner has been swept away. Why have they been swept away? It is because they were trying to do justice to the Catholics. Whether or not that remark is tactful, there is no doubt about its accuracy. Therefore we have to assume that those gentlemen who were running the strike with certain politicians, to whom I do not desire to give any special publicity but whose names will readily occur, will be the people who would be
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the leaders if we handed over matters to the Protestant community at this precise moment.
My Lords, I am not saying that events are quite as bad as all that, because I still have great confidence in the political sagacity of Mr. Faulkner and his colleagues. I join in all the tributes which have been paid to him, to Mr. Fitt and to the other brave men there, as well as the brave men who have gone over from this country, including Members of this House sitting in the Chamber this afternoon, who have also joined in the efforts—and I must not neglect the contributions made by the Leaders of Southern Ireland. To take Mr. Faulkner's assessment, it is clear that he misjudged the strike, an action which took even him by surprise, and it is no good offering my thoughts about Protestant opinion.
So I think we must assume that the best hope is that Mr. Faulkner and those who think like him on the Protestant side will once again come to represent the Protestant community. Whether that will turn out to be so we cannot tell, but whatever happens we must not have any kind of election now; that would be suicidal. To have an election at this moment, when opinion is much inflamed and when the worst possible Protestant leaders are likely to emerge, would be throwing away both our interests and our honour. So I entirely support the general approach taken by the Government, which is to remain firm. If I may use the expression to them, I hope they will "faint not, nor fear"; and I have no supposition whatever that they will involve themselves in any act of betrayal.
Now it would be agreeable to me to sit down at that point, not having won any enormous ovation but at any rate without any visible signs of disapproval. But as the question of the Price sisters has come up—it has been touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, though he did not pursue it very far, and it has been touched on indirectly by at least one other speaker—I, too, must say a few words about these young women; I cannot in conscience avoid doing so. I refer to these two particular hunger strikers because they are at the centre of the present anguished controversy. I have not visited them. although I know at least one Member of the House, the noble Lord, Lord

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Brockway, has visited them several times. I have visited two of the other hunger strikers, if only because, as they refused to wear prison clothes, they were not allowed any other visits; but I have not visited the Price sisters.
Now in this House—and there are quite a few Members who have had to listen to me on the subject of Ireland quite often—I have never said a good word about the I.R.A. I have never done that either here or elsewhere, and I doubt if I ever will. Mr. Cosgrave rightly called attention—and this point was well made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—to the grave damage which the I.R.A. have done to the Sunningdale agreement by their recent activities. Over the last 30 years they have done a great deal of harm whenever there has been a promising initiative, but I should think that they have never done more harm in a short space of time than in the last few months. Their crimes and follies are in the minds of many of us who have followed Irish affairs, and are certainly in mine. The Home Secretary, for reasons which he has explained very candidly, was faced with an immensely difficult decision. Personally—and this is not a point that can be made elsewhere, and I say it, I hope, inoffensively—I do not know why this particular decision is still regarded as a kind of personal matter for the Home Secretary. It seems to me a kind of hangover from the days of capital punishment, when it was assumed that the prerogative of mercy lay in the decision of the Home Secretary. But here is a matter which can affect the relations between this country and Ireland for years to come, and I do not see at all why one particular Minister should bear the whole responsibility—and in this particular case I think the point is not unimportant.
The Home Secretary has explained in his statement that he would expect that most of the long sentences of these young women would be served near their homes in Northern Ireland. So the intention is that they will go back there; and from any rumours that have reached me, I think the suggestion has actually been made to them that they will be able to go back by the end of the year. That, I believe, has actually been suggested; but, at any rate, most of their sentence will be served in Northern Ireland. If they are going back there eventually,
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why not now? What is the reason for not sending them back now? Are people going to die because of the difference between June and December? You may say that they are very unreasonable. That is true; they are very unreasonable—very sincere, but very unreasonable. But does that mean that the Home Secretary or the Government have got to be very unreasonable too? The special reason given by the Home Secretary is that he cannot give way to intimidation. I think one has to look very carefully at that argument. What does it mean, that you cannot give way to intimidation? It means that because of the I.R.A., through these deplorable threats, these girls must die. Because somebody else does something, they must die. I think the more you look at it, the more inhumane it appears. However, that is the argument that is made out, at least to me.
Now I know the Home Secretary. I cannot say for certain, but I should think that I know him at least as well as anybody who has spoken so far in this debate, and as well as most people who are to speak on this subject. I have known him since he was a young man, and I have the highest regard for his courage and his integrity; so do not let us have any differences on that matter. But I feel that, faced with this difficult decision, he has up till now provided the wrong answer, and I hope and pray that the Home Secretary will find a way—I implore him to do so—to put matters right before it is too late.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD HARRIS OF GREENWICH): My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, may I ask him a question? There are, as I think he indicated, more than these two women undergoing hunger strike at the moment. Is he aware that one of the people who was on hunger strike has now said that, as a result of the Home Secretary's statement, he will stop his hunger strike? He has now done so, and is taking food in the normal way. May I also ask the noble Earl whether he would join others in appealing to these young women, and in asking their supporters outside to appeal to them, to stop destroying their own lives?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the last point is easily disposed of. I have already recommended that both to the young men I saw in prison and to others; so although the noble Lord won some applause for that remark, may I say that my answer to it is extremely easy.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I, too, ask the noble Earl a question? He has said that if the girls die there are several people whom he would have to blame. What about the girls themselves? Does he not apportion any blame to them? How does he justify their attitude?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am in the hands of the House. I could be cross-examined, I suppose, for many hours over this, but I think that perhaps one more answer is all that the House would wish me to deliver in this situation. The answer is that I do not justify the action of the girls. I say that they are being unreasonable. They are very sincere, but they are doing the wrong thing; and if the noble Baroness knew me at all well she would know that that was my attitude without even bothering to ask me.
4.28 p.m.
LORD O'NEILL OF THE MAINE: My Lords, I hope the noble Earl will forgive me if I do not follow him on the subject which we have just been discussing but rather just say how delighted I was that he should have said that he hoped the troops will stay in Northern Ireland. Up till last week, my Lords, I always regarded August, 1969, as the watershed in Northern Ireland's aiffairs. That was the day when the troops marched in in aid of the civil power, and that was the day when direct rule should have been imposed, not two and a half years later. The story might have been very different had there not been that dual control for some two and a half years. However, I fear that that watershed has now been passed. The recent political strike has produced, as the Americans would say, "a whole new ball game", and we do not quite know at this moment where it is going to lead us.
My Lords, when I was jotting down some words this morning I was tempted
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to read some extracts from the speech I made on March 13 in the debate on the humble Address, but I decided not to weary the House with my suggestions. Had it been possible to defer appointing the Council of Ireland we might have saved the frail vessel of power sharing. We might have; but we could not for various reasons, and so that frail vessel sank. To return for one second to the troops, on May 15 Mr. Dalyell, in his wisdom wrote a letter to The Times asking that the troops in Northern Ireland (if I remember his words) "should be withdrawn in a matter of days". Days, my Lords! This was just before the Protestant strike. Heaven knows what would have happened if his words had been followed! That caused me to write a reply on the following day which the Editor of The Times was kind enough to publish. I pointed out, among other things, the great risk that that small pocket of Catholics in East Belfast, next door to the shipyard, would be in if the Army were withdrawn. Historians, who look at these things from a long-term point of view, may be surprised when the Republic of Ireland has been agitating for a united Ireland for the last 50 years, that when that moment appears almost to be reached, they beg the British to keep the British Army in Northern Ireland. I merely mention that en passant, but it is rather extraordinary.
We all must be willing to believe that we are wrong, and I am willing to believe that I am wrong. It is just possible, when middle-class moderates have failed, that extremists could get together and settle their differences, and it could be that in certain circumstances this situation could pass over without there being a bloody civil war. That is not my view, my Lords. That is not the course I am advocating; but I am willing to believe that I could be wrong, though in my view it would be a terrible risk to take and I fully support everything the Lord Chancellor and my noble friend Lord Hailsham have said on this subject. But, right or wrong, it would be regarded as yet another case of perfidious Albion. We had the Hunt Report—and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is sitting over there—at the time when Mr. Callaghan was dealing with these appallingly difficult problems. That in turn was followed by Mr. Callaghan's White Paper; and his

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appeal in that White Paper, to the people of Northern Ireland in general and to the Protestants in particular, was "We are making these changes. We know that you are angry with us for abolishing the B men, but you can rely on the British Army in future". Well, the Labour Party are back in power again. I do not know whether they are yet willing—obviously they are not—to tear up Mr. Callaghan's White Paper. It would be a gross betrayal of what was said at that time if all that were to be buried and forgotten.
I now move on to another subject. I do so with some delicacy, because I do not want to be accused of getting into the same sort of trouble as the Prime Minister did the other night, so I will put it on a slightly different line. When Mr. Heath visited Northern Ireland he explained that if the Protestants broke away from Britain they would not get a penny. That was direct talk, was it not? No one believed a word of it. In December 1968, when things were apparently very serious—of course they were but a tea-party compared with what has happened since—I went on television and broadcast to the nation, explaining that we were at that time getting subsidies from Britain of approximately £100 million. To-day, that figure seems ludicrously small.
Everybody was furious, and nobody believed a word of it. The Ulster M.P.s down the corridor attacked me in private for giving away how much Ulster was subsidised by Westminster, and, as I say, the main tragedy was that absolutely nobody was willing to believe it.
Shortly afterwards I had a talk with a Methodist clergyman. I have related this story before, but I have actually written it down and if your Lordships could bear with me since, it is quite short, it will demonstrate the Ulster mentality on this subject of help from London. "Clergyman: 'Prime Minister, I have a solution for our problems'. Self: 'Please tell me.' Clergyman: We should become a province of Scotland where our problems would be understood.'" That was before the days of Mr. Tam Dalyell. "Self: 'We are talking in an agricultural constituency. Who, for instance, would pay our agricultural subsidies?' Clergyman: 'Surely the farmers get paid by Stormont?' Self:
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'Yes, but the money comes from London.'Clergyman: (incredulously) 'But I know a farmer who gets his payments from Stormont.' Self: 'Yes, but Stormont can only pay because we are financed by London. This is why the South of Ireland cannot afford our agricultural subsidies.' Clergyman: (astonished) 'Well, so many of our Protestants are Presbyterians; perhaps the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland would support us financially?'".
One of the extraordinary facts, my Lords, is that in the old days so many Protestants said to me, "Of one thing we can be sure. We don't trust the English hut, by God, we can depend on the Scotch!" I mention my next point with some hesitation because he is a great personal friend of mine, but there was Mr. David Steele, a son of the manse, advocating the withdrawal of British troops. That must have been a terrible shock to the Protestants of Ulster. They have seen him compering those hymns on Sunday night from Scotland, Songs of Praise. He is very highly regarded in Northern Ireland and yet he has come out and asked that the troops should be withdrawn—or rather that a date should be set for the troops to be withdrawn. This must, as I say, have been quite a shock to noble Lords.
LORD BYERS: If I may interrupt the noble Lord may I say that it was quite a shock.
LORD O'NEILL OF THE MAINE: I make my next suggestion to my noble friend Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge with the greatest amount of caution, but it is just a vague suggestion. Could there be a referendum later this year containing proposals for consideration? I mention two proposals as a possibility: first, are the people of Northern Ireland in favour of continued union with Britain on certain defined principles? Or, secondly, would they like independence without assistance? I put this forward very tentatively and, of course, for much later this year. I fear that what the month of May has shown is that any proposal made by anybody in London is subject to a Protestant veto and that is something which we cannot ignore in the future. They are prepared to exercise this veto even to the extent of wrecking their own economy.

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It may not be generally known that despite the appalling difficulties through which we lived last year, the Ministry of Commerce had their best year ever in attracting new industry to Northern Ireland because, despite the bombs and the bullets, productivity in Northern Ireland factories was so much higher than it was in Britain that international industrialists were willing to come to Northern Ireland. At the height of the strike, I had lunch with an international industrialist in London. He has a large factory in Northern Ireland. He had—and I must put it in the past tense—plans for a large extension to his factory. I regret that the effect that this strike will have on international industrialists will be severe, but I regret also that there are people in Northern Ireland who were responsible for the strike who just do not care, and that is something that must be borne in mind. None of those people has ever faced the problem of trying to attract new industry to Northern Ireland. They have not had to go to America twice a year for 15 years, as I have done, or have this terrible battle against unemployment. They did not realise what they were doing, but they have done it and they would do it again. This is something which must be borne in mind.
May I add that there is in fact nothing new about Ulster Nationalism—this "new" phrase coined by Mr. Rees. It has always been there in the background, and I had to part company from Mr. Craig many years ago because he became more and more wedded to the idea of U.D.I.—to such an extent that he clambered on to an Ulster platform (and this had nothing at all to do with Northern Ireland) and supported Mr. Ian Smith when he declared U.D.I. So we must not think there is anything new about this idea of Protestant Nationalism. It has always been there underground: it has merely come to the top recently.
Your Lordships may have recently noticed on your television screens the Ulster flag instead of the Union Jack; and again there is nothing actually new about that. As so often happens in Northern Ireland, there is a rather strange story behind this. A rather liberal Minister in the Ulster Cabinet some 12 or 15 years ago, in order to show that Northern
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Ireland was a country, as it were, slightly different from the rest of the United Kingdom, decided to fly the Ulster flag on top of Parliament Buildings at Stormont and outside the Ulster Office in London. That Ulster flag in London is still flying there to-day, but there was such a storm of Protestant protest about the Ulster flag flying over Stormont—because they regarded the Union Jack as the Ulster flag in those days—that it had to be hauled down and replaced by the Union Jack. To-day, 15 years later, those same people are now rejecting the Union Jack and wish instead to adopt the Ulster flag. I tell that story merely to show how impossible it is for any Englishman to understand the Northern Irish mind.
The position to-day, as I see it, is as follows: I failed, my successors failed, the Conservative and Labour Administrations failed. What should happen now? What would the Americans do about it to-day? They would send Dr. Kissinger to Northern Ireland. What should we do? I suggest that we have an "anglicised version" of Dr. Kissinger in the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. Before your Lordships laugh this suggestion out of court, what are the advantages of it? The noble Lord is not a Catholic, a Protestant, a Conservative or a Socialist. He would bring a fresh mind into an appallingly difficult situation. I am glad that every speaker so far this afternoon has agreed with the suggestion that there should now be a period of calm in Northern Ireland before anything new is announced. This period could well be filled by the noble Lord's ample frame. Do I hear it said that there is no comparison here with the Middle East?—and here I am back on the Kissinger tack. But there is. Not only are we dealing with two peoples who dislike each other, unfortunately, just as much as do the Arabs and the Jews, but there are even Catholic and Protestant prisoners in Long Kesh, so that the Protestants want the Protestants out and the Catholics want the Catholics out. Therefore, in a situation of appalling difficulty—one which the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury has described as tragic, when for the first time Protestant and Catholic ministers were sitting together round the same table—nothing should be ruled out of account as a possibility. I would ask the noble Lord,

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Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, to pass on to his right honourable friend Mr. Rees the plea that he would consider the possibility of bringing on to the scene some fresh person such as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and report back to London on the possibility of bringing about some new project which might have greater success than the ones previously tried.
4.46 p.m.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, first of all I should like to apologise to your Lordships' House because I shall not be able to stay to the end of the debate since I have to attend an early sitting tomorrow morning of the Lands Tribunal in North Devon.
Listening to the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, I have been reminded of one of the earliest stories to come out of one of the no-go areas. A man held up at one of the I.R.A. stop-points was asked, "Are you a Catholic or a Protestant?" He replied, "I am neither: I am a Jew." The first fellow said, "No, no messing around—are you a Catholic or Protestant?" Again, the man said that he was a Jew. The first man then said. "Now this is your last chance before I bump you off. Are you a Catholic Jew or a Protestant Jew?"
Every speaker so far has seemed to indicate that a person holding views like mine on this situation is obviously one of the lowest things which has crawled out from under the stones. We have been debating this subject in your Lordships' House for four and half years and I have inflicted on your Lordships about half a dozen speeches and probably twice that number of Questions. In addition, I have asked every year a Question for Written Answer, asking the Government how much has been spent by the Treasury on Northern Ireland during the previous year.
I have been attacked by both tribal factions and my opinions have not changed, though I recognise that those opinions could be wrong. All I know is that a couple of Members in another place have now subscribed to a course which I advocated to your Lordships over four years ago. I said then that I did not think that we in this country understood the Irish and that probably we never would. I repeat now what I said then. Speaking as an English Catholic, I am
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quite certain that if at the Reformation this country had remained Catholic, the Fenians—for such is their antipathy to this country—would have gone Protestant. During the course of its history, this country has absorbed Huguenots, Jutes, Picts, Angles—the lot. But across the water (it must be something in the air) the Orange tribe and the Fenian tribe do not seem to want the other tribe to exist. Surely that is the lesson we have failed to learn over 300 years. You cannot tell extremists of one side that people on the other side are human beings; and the cost of the consequences of this is being borne by the unfortunate taxpayer in this Island.
Apart from that background, I have also become critical of the way in which our well-wishing politicans have treated our soldiers. In the first place they were sent in, on the face of it and as I understand it, to save the Fenians from the Orangemen. I think I am right in saying that the first casualty was inflicted on a soldier defending the Catholic unity flats against the elements in the Lower Shankhill Road.
But, quite apart from that, of course the I.R.A. propaganda has made our soldiers out to be more brutal than the Russians in Hungary. Recently I received from an American Irish priest in Baltimore a cyclostyled diatribe of lies which takes a lot of beating. I admit I opposed the sending in of the Army to begin with. I said then—and I still believe—that it could have been a job for riot police, but once there the soldiers should have been allowed to do the job properly. To those who have seen their sons spat at and vilified by both sides over there, and not being allowed to hit back, it has seemed a little unfair, to put it mildly. That is only one side, the action on the streets. I have reason to believe that more Army discontent has been caused by the so-called legal proceedings against, for example, Second Lieutenant Willoughby and Corporal Foxglove. Those things rankle far more than I think the majority of people in either House realise.
The Marxist I.R.A. and Fascist Orangemen have a lot in common—and here I am following on what the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, said. It was only last week that the Provisional spokesman in Dublin put out "feelers", as the

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B.B.C. quoted it, to reach an agreement with the Ulster Workers' Council. There is the possibility raised by the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, of what you might call a Paisley/Provo Axis. Many people would find that hard to believe, but just remember what happened at the beginning of the last war. Nobody thought that Germany and Communist Russia would reach the agreement that they did. As has already been mentioned, Mr. Cosgrave never spoke a truer word than when he reiterated that it was the I.R.A.'s fault that caused all the trouble that we have had in the past fortnight—that is, the Protestant reaction to the violence of the Provisionals. But the Dublin Government could have done much more to help earlier. Your Lordships will remember that about three years ago Parliament was recalled in September. I had an old schoolfriend of mine over here (he was then a Member of the Dail) and at tea in this House he said, "The Dail are mad, only Connor and I are not for marching on the Border". The Dail could have started to learn a good deal earlier the lessons which we think it has learned now. It has taken too long to come to the position it is in at the moment.
On the other side, we know that for years my co-religionists in the North have been treated like serfs. My noble friend Lord Cromarty told me that when serving there in the Seaforths he reckoned that in 1927 they had one to one and a half per cent. Catholics. Because an officer or N.C.O. had the temerity to criticise the way the majority were treating the minority, the locals referred to the Seaforths as the "Pope's Bodyguard". No one of course can see a certain Northern Ireland politician performing on the "Box" without understanding how repulsive that particular crowd of thugs is to anyone brought up in the liberal English tradition.
When I went to stay with the then G.O.C. Northern Ireland in the early days of the present troubles, I was amazed to find how pro-the-minority the feeling in the Army was. I soon learned the reason. But of course the Provisionals by their murders and brutality, in places like the Creagan, the Bogside and parts of Ulster, swung the feeling the other way, as they intended. They provoke the Army Ito the maximum, get a reaction
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and then come forward and pose as the protectors to the Catholic population.
All this is "old hat"—300 years old. My only point is to say again that I do not think we will ever understand either of the factions. I feel that the longer we stay there the more both sides will make use of us. Why worry about blowing up a building, a pub, a factory or a shop, if you know that the British taxpayer is going to underwrite your loss and provide compensation? When it comes to compensation, another of the main criticisms or worries in the Army to-day, especially among the officers who are fighting the cases of their men who have been wounded—and some to such an extent that they are cabbages—is the inadequacy of the compensation they get when compared to the thousands of pounds (£80,000 was the headline a couple of days ago) awarded to someone injured in a motor accident in this country. I should like to think that, now we are having this difficult time where everything depends so much on what the Army can do in Northern Ireland, that facet of compensation should be looked into again. Let us remember another thing—often the wounded soldier has to go back to a court in Northern Ireland to assess such compensation. What happens then? If is becomes known that he was in a certain action and that certain things took place. he or his family in this country are marked for the Provos to get hold of. The Provos have threatened a lot of people that way.
After one of my speeches several years ago, the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Main, said that I took the line I did only because I wanted to get my son out of serving in Northern Ireland which he was doing then for the second or third time. With great respect. I took that rather as an insult. I would remind your Lordships that some soldiers are now on their sixth tour of duty in Northern Ireland. After a supplementary question, in which I suggested that not all the soldiers were happy in the relationship they had with our politicians, I was given a dressing down outside the Chamber by the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham, for even suggesting that such a thing could exist. As it happened, not long afterwards a Captain Cecil of the Grenadier Guards resigned (according to the Press) mainly to be able to say

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out loud what many of us had been hearing for a long time. Some three and a half years ago I suggested that we should let the Irish fix their own business, and it was heard in silence and a certain amount of enmity. But the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, kindly came up to me afterwards and said that a lot of groundswell where he came from agreed with what I had put forward. Now, some three and a half years later, I see that two Members of his Party in another place have produced a lot of signatures in that direction. I hope that the noble Lord will not mind my being a bit suspicious and cynical, because I feel that some of the Marxist wing of his Party, which reduced our defences so dangerously last time they were in power, might use the withdrawal of our troops from Ulster as an excuse to do even more and irreparable damage.
We know from experience what we started when we gave in to strikes called for political ends. Since that method of blackmail has received the blessing of a certain section of the country, the lesson has not been lost elsewhere. I do not think it matters a damn how the leaders arise or are elected. The lesson they have learned is that a comparatively small section of the public organised as a union can bring down Government. I personally agreed with the Prime Minister in practically everything he said recently about the people in Northern Ireland. One has only to see you-know-who ranting on television to know the truth of the old saying that the Devil can quote scriptures, no matter what the shape of his collar.
If I can read between the lines of the Answers to my annual Questions on the cost of Northern Ireland to the Treasury, this current set of troubles has put us back £1,600 million: enough to have paid for population changes, changes in the boundary, the moving of people from areas where they cannot get on; but that suggestion does not seem ever to have been considered. Hundreds of our boys have been killed, over 1,000 wounded, many of them, as I have said, badly and for life. There are those of us who think they should not have been put there in the first place, but, once in, we should have let them deal with the job properly. Why have not they had tanks? The Russians
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fixed Budapest in double quick time that way. A Member of Parliament last week suggested that we should have sent the tanks in in this last strike. I wish he had said so during the "No-go" period and then I should have felt there was no prejudice. When will we learn? The majority of that island dislike us intensely; so do the extremists on both sides. Yet we subsidise them, more than any other country his subsidised another, so far as I can see, in the history of the world.
We let them come and go in this country without even a passport—a privilege not allowed to me, an Australian born. You let them parade in London in their uniforms. It was because of a report of a Question which I asked a couple of weeks ago on that subject that I received the diatribe I have referred to from an American priest in Baltimore. Of course he brought up the subject, which the noble Earl, Lord Longford, brought up, of the Price sisters. I could not help writing back to this person, in defence of the British soldier, upon whom mainly it was an attack, asking him whether, if a Frenchman had set off bombs, maimed and killed people, in Washington, he would have sent him back to France to serve his prison term.
I do not think we can expect, ever, any gratitude for either sending our troops over there or paying all this money out of our Exchequer. I do not think that they will ever do anything to settle their differences so long as they have us to fall back on. I think that the Government—this Government and the previous Government—have sacrificed too much. They have turned the other cheek too often, in both directions. Enough is enough, and we should not spend another penny. There is a large feeling in the country—I know it has been denigrated here so far this afternoon—that we should let them, "Do their own thing", or whatever the expression is. I do not think there would be a blood bath. It is not in the game. But, then, I may be wrong. We have tried to settle the dispute for 300 years and we have failed.
Many stories come out of Northern Ireland from our soldiers, and most of them of course are not repeatable in your Lordships' House. But if I might finish on a lighter note, I would repeat one that was brought back about the Cockney who was touring in County Cork. He

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went into a garage and said: "Fill her up, will you, mate?" The attendant said: "I will not." The Cockney said: "Well, let's have some oil." The attendant said: "We serve no British here. We are an I.R.A. garage." So the Cockney looked up and said: "It's like that, is it? Well, blow up my tyres then."
5.6 p.m.
BARONESS STOCKS: My Lords, I believe there is a Standing Order which prohibits the reading of speeches in this House. I do not know whether there is a Standing Order which prohibits one from making the same speech twice. If there were not, I should be tempted to make now a speech which I made on March 29, 1972, when the proposed Administration was brought into being. I prophesied that it would fail. I do not think I realised with what disastrous consequences it would fail. But in fact it has failed. I propounded a scheme for the settlement of the question of Northern Ireland, which, broadly, was that Northern Ireland should be given home rule as a self-governing Dominion within the Commonwealth and with allegiance to the Crown. I think the Crown has always mattered in Northern Ireland, although not in Southern Ireland for pretty obvious reasons. In broad outline, that proposal would be relevant to-day. Admittedly, at the time it would have involved problems as between a Dominion of Northern Ireland and England concerning passports, defence, overseas representation and much else. But at the time I thought that those problems were more soluble than the problems presented by the proposed Administration. I still think that that plan is relevant. I still think it might achieve a permanent settlement of the question of Ulster. I still think that the problems it would present are less intractable than the problems it would solve.
At the time I repudiated the thought that Mr. Wilson would refuse to consider my scheme because it might damage the Irish vote in Glasgow and Liverpool. I thought that that thought was unjust. I do not think it unjust to-day. I do not see any prospect that Mr. Wilson and the present Government would consider the possibility of the plan I have outlined. But I continue to think it a good plan. Nobody would take any
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notice of my proposal, or of the letter I subsequently wrote to The Times. The only reference made to it in this House was made by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, who said that my views merited attention on account of my long service or long experience in the Civil Service. My Lords, I have never been in the Civil Service, but it was kindly meant.
I therefore again make that proposal, with the absolute certainty now that the present Government will not carry it out. That leads me to the thought that I may not be permanently, or for a very long time, sitting on these Benches, but in another part of the House. However, that is another question. In conclusion, I would mention one thought that strikes me. If my plan for a Dominion of Ulster—self-governing and responsible for its own security—were adopted, I have a strong feeling that the Price sisters would prefer to remain at Brixton.
5.10 p.m.
LORD GREY OF NAUNTON: My Lords, I speak in this discussion in your Lordships' House this afternoon in order if I may, to make three points. These are based upon nearly five years' observation from the position of Governor of Northern Ireland. That is admittedly a position of privilege and a non-political one, but there are occasions perhaps, even in politics, when the onlooker sees most of the game.
The first point is this. It is commonly agreed—and the story retailed by the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, gives the point to it—that it is difficult for an outsider to understand Ulster and the Ulster folk. It is difficult to do so on the spot, but it is impossible to do it from afar and although the sea that divides us is narrow there is no doubt that we here are "afar". There is a great distance between Westminster-with-Whitehall on the one part and Stormont-with-Belfast on the other part, and there is perhaps an even greater difference between suburban Britain and rural Ulster. Yet in these past troubled years voices have been heard up and down the land, day in and day out, advocating courses, recommending decisions, even though the Ulster folk know very well that the owners of those voices have rarely been seen there. Some, indeed, have been content to take far-reaching

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decisions or to advocate decisions by others without ever having set foot in the place. I think that perhaps it is that, rather than any sudden upsurge of Ulster nationalism, that has made some of the Ulster politicians demand that the decisions about their future should be taken without intervention by the English. But in the nature of things it is obviously certain that many great matters will have to be decided by, among others, some who have no great knowledge of Ulster and its people. In that event, however, may they always caution themselves that things and people there are very seldom just what they seem, and may they also take what action they can to ensure that Ulster people know that in their minds is the knowledge that people and things in Ulster are not just what they seem.
The second point is allied. Too much that is said and done in Northern Ireland by its own people is the result not of reason but of emotion. It is not facts that determine events in Northern Ireland. It is what people think about facts and what people think about the myths that they have themselves invented about the facts. We must be careful that we do not follow the same course, that we do not fall into the error of which we accuse the Northern Irish people. We must base our decisions not just upon emotion. Although we must not, as the most reverend Primate advised us so sincerely not to, abjure emotion, the emotion must be long-suffering, patient sympathy, and a determination on our part to find the facts that lie behind the seemingly irrational decisions that people in Northern Ireland take. I hope that my Irish friends, including those Members of your Lordships' House who have come from Northern Ireland and have listened to me this afternoon, will forgive me if I say that, endearing as most of them are, too often they are infuriating as well. But that does not excuse us from our duty, which is patient, long-suffering, earnest, reasoned consideration of the problems that afflict them and afflict us, too.
Thirdly. I would suggest that we shall not be rid of our Irish problems simply by shrugging them off. We shall not escape them. If I may venture to disagree with the noble Lord, my fellow
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Antipodean, Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, who preceded me, we shall not escape them by saying to Northern Ireland: "We have tried hard enough and long enough; now we shall leave and you can get on with it yourselves." We shall not solve our problems by saying, "We shall pull out the troops and let the local people sort it out." I do not intend to speak, my Lords, about the arguments of duty, the arguments of morality mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, that lead to that conclusion. Others have spoken eloquently of those. I would content myself with saying that there are purely selfish reasons why we must not leave the Northern Ireland problem until it has been honourably and acceptably dealt with.
I agree that there is no immediate solution; that we shall not solve it once and for all. However, we must persist. For our own selfish sakes, if for no better reason, we must carry on until some acceptable and honourable solution is reached. If we merely give up we shall he giving a triumph to the men of violence. Whether rightly or wrongly, it will be said that we left not of our own free will but because we were forced out. Even to talk of it is to encourage the men of violence to intensify their violence at home and to spread it further over here. And that is not all. If we are seen to abandon Northern Ireland, or to set now a date when we shall remove our troops from it, then, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, has said, we shall be giving comfort to the men of violence everywhere. Evil men—we do not lack them in these islands—will say, "What a small body of resolute men can do for some Trish cause or causes"—it matters not what they might be—"a small band of resolute men can do here", and we shall rue the day if we let violence triumph in that way.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD GREY OF NAUNTON: My Lords, it is not sufficient to talk about the rule of law. It is good to talk about it and to remind people of its benefits. But talk is not enough. It must be served and sustained, no matter how painful and how prolonged that service is. We must

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indeed, my Lords, take note of the situation in Northern Ireland and we must resolve steadfastly to pursue resolutely, patiently, sympathetically, but with utter determination attempts to improve that situation.
5.20 p.m.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I take part in this afternoon's debate with more than usual diffidence since what I shall have to say runs contrary to virtually everything that has been said by previous speakers so far this afternoon. Without exception those speakers are men with greater knowledge, greater intellect and greater responsibility than I have myself. I make no bones about it that in listening to the debate so far the views I hold have been shaken. I think they are still intact but I would ask your Lordships—although I fear many of you will disagree with what I have to say, or with parts of it—to be forbearing and accept my undertaking that my views have been reached only after much careful and long thought, and in my mind they represent what is both honourable and right when facing up to the ever intractable problem of Ulster.
The events of the last two to three weeks must have been bitter indeed for all those men and women who have worked so tirelessly for the past five years and more to bring a reasonable settlement to Ulster. To all those who have shown wisdom and patience beyond endurance in bringing about Sunningdale, the strike and the collapse of the Executive must have been bitter indeed, and they would be less than human if they did not say to themselves, "What more do these people want? How can they be helped if they refuse to help themselves?" I do not take a totally despairing view of the events of the last few weeks. They have represented a major setback and they have been cruel in the breaking of the hopes and the structure that has taken so much collective time and wisdom to put together, but I believe that the labours of those who worked to construct the Sunningdale Agreement will be shown by history not to have been in vain.
As all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate so far have said, the next four months will give us a breathing space, and I should like to look
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briefly at the choices that face Britain and Ulster in their search for a final solution. My noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham put forward the view that there were three possible solutions: with great diffidence I venture to suggest that in theory there are five possible solutions. First, there is a return to old Stormont rule. I feel pretty sure that every Member of this House will agree with me when I say that such a retrograde step would be totally unacceptable to any Government in this country, formed by whichever Party. That such a return is the devout wish of a considerable number of those who live in Ulster is not to be doubted. Indeed it is loyalty to old Stormont rule that gives its supporters their singularly inappropriate and inept name of "Loyalists". That is all they are loyal to, but as a solution I think it can be dismissed out of hand.
Next as a solution is that Ulster should become part of a United Ireland. This has been the dream of romantics and revolutionaries for centuries, but it has not been the dream only of romantics and revolutionaries. It has had other more sober and more dependable adherents than that. I cannot count myself a romantic and I am certainly not a revolutionary, but I must confess that I would dearly like to live to see a United Ireland. But I shall not do so. For those who cherish such an aim in their hearts the best advice I can give them—and give to myself—is to put any thought of Ireland being a united country out of our minds for the foreseeable future. Indeed to press its claims in any way whatsoever is only doing the cause further harm. If any further evidence is needed that this is so, the strike of the last two weeks has shown overwhelmingly and with the utmost clarity that any hint of any move in any direction not only to a united Ireland but to the two parts of Ireland drawing closer together, is foredoomed and damned.
Thirdly, I come to the full integration of Ulster with the United Kingdom. To my mind this is a solution which should not be discarded as quickly and as abruptly as the previous two theoretical possibilities. There is much to be said in its favour, the chief of which being that once Ulster became fully integrated

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into the United Kingdom it would be plain for all to see that any form of discrimination against Roman Catholics had ceased to exist. Those living in Ulster would be subject to precisely the same laws and rules of conduct as the rest of us living in the United Kingdom and justice would be seen to be done to the people of all faiths. But on consideration, I think noble Lords will agree that the objections to such a solution are overwhelming. To begin with, it runs directly counter to the present strong current of opinion that power from the centre should be devolved to the constituent parts of the United Kingdom; and in particular such a solution would fly in the face of the storm of resurgent Ulster nationalism of which the past two weeks have given such overwhelming evidence.
Finally—and this may appear contrary to what I have just said—it would for ever slam the door on the Irish dimension of the Ulster problem. As I have said, it is best to banish all thought of a United Ireland for the foreseeable future, but none of us is sufficiently prescient to be able to foretell the unforeseeable future and there might at some distant date be an occasion when a united Ireland could be a possibility but for the fact that in the latter part of the twentieth century Ulster became a fully integrated part of the United Kingdom. It would surely be a mistake to slam the door for ever on what at some very distant point might be a future option. So that, too, I disregard as a possible solution.
There remain two other possible solutions, the first of which is a return to a power-sharing Executive backed by a fully representative Ulster Assembly and maintaining the close ties with the United Kingdom that have existed for so long. The fifth and last possibility is the setting up of an independent Ulster. Before discussing the merits and demerits of those two possibilities, I should like briefly to turn to the problem of Ulster as it affects the rest of the United Kingdom. The problem of Ulster as it affects the rest of us largely, almost entirely, revolves around the stationing of large numbers of British soldiers in the Province in a peacekeeping role.
This is where I part company with so many noble Lords. I am far from convinced that the withdrawal of our soldiers at some date in the future would be
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detrimental to achieving a lasting settlement in Ulster. I see grave dangers in the continuation of such a large force as we have there to-day. There is a danger in the same way as I understand those who have the misfortune to spend long periods in hospital or, indeed, in prison, after a certain time on release are unable to cope with the problems of ordinary day-to-day living; it is beyond them. They have been for so long institutionalised that they cannot cope with the stresses and strains of daily life. I fear this is what may happen to the men and women who live in Ulster. The troops have been there for five years now, and if they are to remain there much longer, is there not a danger that the people of Ulster will come to regard them as part of the daily scene, as something quite normal and to be expected? Is it not possible that the extraordinary fact that part of the United Kingdom is not only to be policed but is to have no less than 16,500 troops stationed there, will be not even remarkable, quite un-noteworthy, and that the people of Ulster will feel that without the troops there they are not secure enough to go about their daily life?
It is the duty of everyone who concerns himself in any way with the problems of Ulster to see to it that the people of Ulster demand and obtain the same conditions of life that prevail in the rest of the United Kingdom. They must not be fobbed off with living a life of semi-imprisonment, but must live full and free lives, as do the rest of us. It is one of our obligations to do all we can to help the people of Ulster to achieve this. While as a temporary measure the troops certainly have played a vital role, there is danger in them staying there too long. In a way, this problem has been caused by the success of the peace-keeping mission of the troops. Murder, mutilation, violence, destruction have continued, alas! for the past five years. but the presence of the troops has succeeded in containing that violence to an extent that has become largely acceptable to the people of Ulster.
My Lords, it is a dreadful comment on the state of affairs reached in Ulster, but the fact remains that until the strike brought the Province to a halt, life of a kind was being lived by the inhabitants of Ulster which, although uncomfortable, dangerous and vile, was tolerable, and it is the very success of the troops, at

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enormous loss of life and limb to themselves, that has caused this particular problem.
I would argue that next in the dangers of maintaining troops there and the possible advantages of their withdrawal, is that it seems to me there is increasing evidence that nothing except a shock of realisation that one day in the future there will be no British Army to protect the people will compel the people of Ulster to resolve their differences. The argument I am putting forward is the same as that put forward by Dr. Johnson, that the prospect of being hanged in a fortnight wonderfully concentrates a man's mind. I am increasingly worried at the thought that until the people of Ulster are faced with the necessity to resolve their differences, no solution imposed from outside will have a hope of success. We outside can do a great deal, but at the end of the day it is the people of Ulster—Protestant and Catholic alike—who can solve their problems; they and only they can find a solution and make it stick. Those of us outside can help, but only the people of Ulster can achieve this result. Events over the past five years have shown that all too clearly. It is quite the reverse of the attitude of, "Well, to the devil with Ulster and all who live there. Let them stew in their own juice." I would assure the most reverend primate that that is not the attitude I am adopting. Withdrawal at a date in the future may well be a constructive, positive step towards achieving the elusive settlement that we are all so desirous of finding.
May I turn now to the two remaining solutions open to us. Of them, of course, a renewed attempt to establish a power-sharing Executive with an Ulster Assembly and close connections with the United Kingdom is by far the most preferable. But as I have said, this will not be achieved without the active will and support of the leaders of the people of Ulster. Her Majesty's Government can, and should, be to Ulster guide, philosopher and friend, but they can he no more. They can do a great deal in preparing the ground. In these four months, Her Majesty's Government must utilise every hour of every day to see that the truth of the choices facing the people of Ulster is brought home to those
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people; that demagogues must not be allowed to confuse the issue and to mislead honourable men and women.
The actual final breakdown of Sunning-dale largely came from the setting up of a Council of Ireland. The creation of that Council of Ireland was never a threat to the integrity of Ulster; it never posed the remotest danger to Ulster becoming part of the united Ireland without the overwhelming support of the people in Ulster. But evil men, demagogues, put forward to those who misguidedly trusted them that this was a real danger. In the months that lie ahead, that must not be allowed to happen. The Government must use all the powers of communication that they command to see that the truth is spelt out, so that in the humblest home of the Province people will know the choice they have at their disposal. Thus, when in due course there are elections, as there must be, the people will be able to vote for men who are putting forward policies in which the voters believe, and of which the people can understand the full implications. To my mind, this is the most important role to be played by Her Majesty's Government—the establishment of the facts, and the decision as to what can and what cannot be done for Ulster. The rest must come from the leaders of Ulster, and from the people of Ulster.
My Lords, one thing the strike has shown beyond any shadow of doubt is that the collective will of the silent majority can achieve virtually anything in Ulster. Rather than have a display of the strength that the strike has shown in a disruptive manner, in tearing down an edifice built on hope and one that promised so much, let us see the people of Ulster, and particularly their leaders, making a comparable show of strength towards the forces of reason, the forces of tolerance and of understanding. Let them show their power not destructively but constructively. Let them unite their people, as the strike did, not to bring things down but to create a stable, peaceful, happy, prosperous Ulster. They have shown they have the will. There can be no excuse now; if they turn their minds to it, they can do it. They have people who are prepared to be led, who believe in them. Let them use their ability, let them use their power to be constructive and to achieve something rather than in petty destruction and the continuation of misery.

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As I have said already, at the end of the day it is their problem and their responsibility. We have heard much over the years, and indeed much in the debate this afternoon of our—meaning the rest of the United Kingdom—responsibility to Ulster, but the Ulster peoples have responsibilities to the rest of the United Kingdom. There are many deaths, many soldiers' deaths, many civilians' deaths which lie at Ulster's door. They owe us a debt. They are heavily in our debt. They owe us a responsibility to behave like civilised human beings and not savages. It is not a one-way traffic. Do not let us sit here, with the best will in the world, and say, "We must do this for Ulster, it is our responsibility". Let them show some leadership and let them show some responsibility. If they do not, if they fail, if the collective will of Ulster fails, if their nerve fails, if there is no determination and no resolve to bring about a peaceful settlement, then we will be left with the last and final solution, an independent Ulster.
In the past I have argued in favour of such a solution. I have been told afterwards, by men of distinction and knowledge, that I was wrongheaded to do so, and I am prepared to say that arguing for independence earlier was probably mistaken. I only put it forward now as the final possible solution. The noble Lord who spoke before me spoke with great eloquence, and he said we must not give up the struggle, we must be patient, results cannot be found quickly or easily. I would agree with him, but we have been trying for five long years, and a solution must be found. The cancer of Ulster must be rooted out before it spreads to the rest of the United Kingdom. So if all else fails there is the solution of an independent Ulster.
All of us are proud—and in particular may I address my remarks to my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham because I, like him, am proud—of the United Kingdom; I wish to see no diminishing of its area and no divisions among its peoples. But Ulster has proved intractable. If they will not play their part in the bargain, if they will not meet their friends across the Irish Sea, the rest of the British people, who have gone more than half way, three-quarters, four-fifths of the way to meet them, then they
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must face up to the fact that they will be alone. It would be constitutionally an enormous step, a veritable crossing of the Rubicon. Centuries of close ties of sentiment and affection would cease to be. And economically their fate would be appalling. The noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack gave the figures of the cost; over £300 million a year is the net benefit that Ulster receives from her fellow citizens in the United Kingdom. So to all the other debts that Ulster owes to the rest of Britain there is this enormous financial debt they owe us, too.
Without those subsidies, without that £300 million, they would be economically a totally unviable State. This must be spelled out to them in the months that lie ahead. If many may wish, in the present wave of Ulster nationalism, to be an independent State, well, it is not for us to stop them if that is their considered collective view. But it is our duty to spell out in detail exactly what it means, and if, having fully understood it the forces of intolerance have triumphed and there is no collective will to find a settlement on the lines that Sunningdale proposed, well then, so be it.
The Leaders of Ulster will bear the responsibility. If the result of an independent Ulster is catastrophic, then the Leaders must bear the blame, and the leaders of the majority Party will have to bear the majority of the blame. It is possible it might come off, but the odds are formidable. But it will be their responsibility; there will be no scapegoats, not in this House, or in another place, or anywhere in the country. They have had the choice. All that we will be left with is the House of Ulster divided against itself and fallen, and the crisis that may follow that fall can be laid and must be laid at the door of the Leaders of the Ulster people for failing to live up to their responsibilities.
5.45 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, I follow the noble Duke, who opened a most remarkable speech, which I followed with very close attention, by saying that he spoke with diffidence. I share the diffidence expressed by the noble Duke, and I share it all the more having listened to the preceding speaker, Lord Grey of Naunton, with his five years of continued

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service in Ulster. Unlike the noble Duke, I propose to be quite brief. As was only to be expected at this stage of the debate, nearly everything has been said, if in different words, probably better by other speakers than myself. I speak with diffidence because, despite a long Irish connection and an intensive but brief intervention in the affairs of Ulster, I am conscious of the number of Members of your Lordships' House present—my noble friend Lord Brookeborough opposite, Lord Enniskillen, Lord Moyola and others—who know so much more about this matter than myself. If I say things that have been said, I say them because I am deeply convinced that certain things need to be said not by one speaker but by as many as possible who really believe in the words that I hope to express to your Lordships.
I am not one, like the noble Lord, Lord of Chudleigh, who says that enough is now enough. I am not one who feels that there is no further hope for peaceful progress in Northern Ireland. I do not believe that it can be right to abandon many people, some of them intimidated, many of them misguided, and most of them sincerely desiring for peace, to have their fate sorted out for them by some evil people in the traditional Irish way. We have no moral right to do this. If we were to do it, I believe that the dire warnings that we have had, for more than a year now, of civil war could become true. This is, after all, as has been said, what the extremists want, and we must not give them what they want on a plate.
The danger of this line of thinking which I would call defeatist and immoral—and it has been expressed in the other place and outside Parliament by people from the other place—is that it may cumulatively defeat the efforts of the Government in this brief spell to try to find a fresh and fair start. It may cancel out prematurely such hopes as now remain. For this reason alone there can be, surely, no question of a decision, indeed an ultimatum, to pull out the troops, even at long advance notice.
So long as these efforts are being made, we cannot add yet one further fear to the fears entertained by both communities in Northern Ireland. I say, "Not so long as further efforts are being made".
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because, like the noble Duke, I recognise that it is possible to envisage a situation in which a substantial majority in Northern Ireland could vote themselves out of the club of the United Kingdom, because they were not prepared to accept the basic will of Westminster and the basic conditions. And, surely, the basic conditions must be that there can be no question, while remaining under the protection of the Crown, of going back to the situation of dominance by one community, and discrimination against and disadvantage to the other community, which persisted up to the end of 1969.
I suppose it is possible to envisage that a substantial majority could take a nationalist view and, not being prepared to accept those conditions, vote itself out of the club, and in those circumstances the withdrawal of troops from that section of the community is a possibility. However, there would still remain a constitutional duty on the part of the British Government to protect those who did not wish to be out of the United Kingdom. It is no good the noble Duke speaking of Ulster becoming independent because that is the will of the majority; we have to consider the considerable majority who want to accept the conditions and to remain in the United Kingdom. Of course, the other condition, to which we are surely all looking forward, is that the situation should have improved enough to let the troops go back to their normal duties, and to allow law and order to become the proper and capable responsibility of the police forces. I am one of those who, having conducted a review of the role, the strength, the armament and the general functions of the police forces in Northern Ireland over four years ago, would be most insistent that among the things to be done in the immediate future is a further review of the role of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Ulster Defence Regiment, in order to speed up, if possible, the time when they can come to the fore and the troops can be pulled back, at any rate to some extent.
The noble Duke spoke with great emphasis—and I entirely agreed with him—of the degree to which people can become institutionalised in a certain situation, and with the shield of the British Army. It is equally true—and I have this as an admission from the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary himself—that the continued primary

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responsibility for law and order in the hands of the Army has placed the police in a situation to which they are becoming all to accustomed. It is most important that this aspect should be looked at again, and that everything possible should be done to strengthen the police forces in to-day's altered situation.
My Lords, having said all this, I should like to think—and I think that this has emerged from the debate—that the attitude of your Lordships' House, and of Parliament generally, towards the problems of Northern Ireland despite the disappointments and the difficulties, will continue to be one of hope and not one of hopelessness. That tone has been magnificently set by Mr. Brian Faulkner in all his utterances since resigning his post as Chief Executive, and, with others, I say that no praise is too high for him and his colleagues for their faith and courage in recent months.
Let us not assume that the support for and acceptance of sharing of power and responsibility between the communities has dwindled to negligible proportions in Northern Ireland. After all, that question has still to be put to the test and decided by a poll, whether it be an electoral poll or a referendum. Above all—and here I heartily agree with the noble Duke—let us make sure that, when the time conies to put the people's will and choice to the test, their judgment is based upon the whole truth and is not vitiated by intimidation, and that the real, genuine fears which we know both communities entertain are not fed on fallacies carefully fostered by a few people who have thereby forfeited their claim to be responsible politicians. Let any further guarantees that can be devised and any further assurances from Westminster and Dublin be given, before the people make their choice.
To ask the Army to continue to do its dangerous, frustrating and distasteful task for some time yet is hard enough. But the Army has never failed to do its duty anywhere in the world, whatever it has been asked to do, and no-one doubts that it will continue to do its duty magnificently in Ulster. To ask everybody else on this side of the Irish Sea for yet more patience is to ask a very great deal, but patience depends on a full understanding and, while I heartily agree
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with the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill, that it may not be possible for anyone who does not happen to live in the Irish situation or who has not been deeply involved in it fully to understand that situation, I do not believe—and again I agree with the noble Duke—that most people over here are sufficiently aware of what is really at stake. I venture to hope that much more effort will be made in this intervening period—and I am supporting the noble Duke here—to enlighten the public of Britain. I hope that as part of this communication Mr. Faulkner and his colleagues can be persuaded and encouraged to do the explaining and the asking in Britain, for I feel confident that they will be listened to over here with respect, sympathy and understanding.
5.58 p.m.
LORD CHALFONT: My Lords, I should like to begin by expressing my great appreciation to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for his lucid and objective exposition of the Northern. Ireland problem as the Government see it, and I hope that I can bring to my brief remarks a small measure of the calm, objective and reasonable attitude that he displayed. I should like to concentrate for a very few moments on one aspect of the problem only; that is, the role of the Armed Forces. The political problems have been rehearsed again and again in your Lordships' House to-day and on previous occasions, and they need no reiteration from me. As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, new solutions are now needed and the old policies have for the moment failed. Whether the solutions can be found in any of the ways which have been referred to in your Lordships' House to-day, I do not know. Nor do I know whether we shall look to the redrawing of frontiers, to an independent nation State of Ulster or to integration with the rest of Ireland. These are matters for long, hard negotiations, and for long and thoughtful deliberations on the part of the Government and the people of Ireland. I believe that more than ever there is now a need for patient and resolute statesmanship—patient, above all.
The important point, it seems to me, is that until these political solutions have been found, and however long that may take, until one or another solution

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emerges, the Province of Ulster is as much a part of the United Kingdom as are Wales, Scotland or the Home Counties. It is all very well for people to talk of shock treatment for the people of Ulster, or of the withdrawal of troops or of economic support as a way of bringing what is sometimes characterised as an irresponsible people to its senses. But the United Kingdom Government is responsible for the rule of law in Ulster, and this is a responsibility which cannot be abdicated in a fit of pique or disenchantment or even in the search for some dramatic solution to the problem. The British troops were originally sent to Northern Ireland—at least, sent there in their present numbers—to sustain the rule of law against a campaign of terrorism by the I.R.A. This, to a quite remarkable extent, they have succeeded in doing. As has been said before to-day in your Lordships' House, had it not been for the presence of the Army in Ulster terrorism could not have been contained to the extent even that it has been contained in these last few years.
We hear—and have heard again to-day—of people talking about the possibility of withdrawing troops for various reasons, and one of the reasons that has been put forward, or at least implied, is that the soldiers themselves do not like serving there. Of course the soldiers do not like serving in Northern Ireland; no soldier likes being shot at at any time, particularly from behind. But even though these soldiers have now been shot at in Northern Ireland over many years, and some of them have carried out more than one tour of duty there, the morale of those troops remains extraordinarily and remarkably high. They have done their job in Northern Ireland and they will continue to do it, provided that they are given the resources to do it, the equipment to do it, and, perhaps most important, the full-hearted support of the civil power in carrying out the tasks that they have been given to do. If they are given that, if they are not required to operate in any way or at any time with one hand tied behind their backs, the Army in Northern Ireland can contain terrorism to what might be seen, in political terms, as at least a tolerable level.
Of course, no violence of this kind is really tolerable and we can always, I am
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afraid, look forward, in the circumstances that obtain in Northern Ireland at the moment, to the terrorism of the isolated gunman or the isolated bomber. No police force, no armed force, can overcome that possibility. There will always be the man who can perform an isolated act of terrorism, and very often get away with it. But the Army can, if it is properly supported and if it can continue to have the confidence of all political Parties and all the people of this country, contain terrorism to a level that is at least politically acceptable.
But I believe—and I am not the first to say this in your Lordships' House to-day—that that ability will be eroded if we continue this talk of withdrawal of the troops from Northern Ireland. To withdraw the troops immediately would, of course, be an act of gross moral irresponsibility. It would leave the people of Ulster in the hands of the men of violence of both sides. But even this suggestion of a fixed date for withdrawal at some time in the future carries with it the most appalling implications. It has been suggested that to do so, to announce some date ahead at which we were going to withdraw our troops from Northern Ireland, would provide some kind of shock treatment for the people of Ulster. This seems to me to go against all the lessons of experience. The lessons of experience are that in a situation of that kind, as soon as a date for withdrawal is announced the level of terrorism increases. The struggle for power inside Ulster would intensify, and the men of evil and the men of violence would see to it that, in the interval between the announcement and the withdrawal of the troops, they made their presence felt by increasing the level of their violence and by making their struggle for power more and more intense. There would be—and I doubt whether many people would deny this—bloodshed on a scale which even Ulster has not seen before.
Just as talk about the withdrawal of the Armed Forces seems to me to be dangerous, so, too, am I disturbed when I hear people talking of some kind of massive military action to solve this problem. One hears people talk of tanks being sent out into the streets of Ulster; one hears people talking of the setting up of a military Government to rule by martial law over the Province of Ulster. The talk

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of tanks being sent on to the streets of Ulster in the present situation seems to me to be an astonishing and remarkable suggestion. Perhaps in certain totalitarian régimes this kind of military action is acceptable, and even routine. Indeed, I believe that one noble Lord this afternoon actually put this idea forward, because, as he pointed out, the Russians had managed to solve some of their problems in that way. I very much hope—indeed, I pray to God—that it will never he the way of this country to carry out its military action in aid of the civil power in that way.
Those who talk of massive military action, and even of military Government in Northern Ireland, seem to miss one fact; even if these things were desirable they would nowadays scarcely be possible. Successive Governments of this country, on pretexts or for reasons which may haw seemed good and proper to them at the time, have progressively reduced the strength and capability of the Armed Forces of this country. We now have, whatever else we may have, no military reserves in this country worthy of the name. The logistics and administrative support of our Armed Forces have been reduced to a minimum level. We now have the spectacle of the Armed Forces of this country—and this is no fault of the Armed Forces, but of a series of political decisions made by Governments of both parties—reduced to a level at which they are unable to make their full, proper, and agreed contribution to the allied defence of Western Europe, and to a level at which it is now seriously suggested that we should abandon the Province of Ulster to chaos, because our Armed Forces, at the level at which they now exist in that territory, are unable to maintain the rule of law.
If we do that, if we succumb to the arguments of those who believe and suggest that we should now withdraw our troops, I believe that we shall be laying up some terrible dangers for ourselves in the future. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, was right to remind us, in the words of John Donne, that if we carry out this kind of abdication of responsibility in Ulster it will be no good sending to know for whom the bell tolls. He may recall—I am sure that he will—that the lines preceding the ones he quoted are:
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"Whosoever diminishes me,
Diminishes the whole of mankind."
If we diminish the dignity, individual status and integrity of the people of Northern Ireland by an act of moral irresponsibility of this kind, I believe that we shall be doing a damage not only to them but perhaps to future generations elsewhere. The Ulster of to-day might be the South Wales or the Scotland of to-morrow.
I believe, therefore, that we should now stop talking of withdrawal, stop saying, "Enough is enough", stop saying, "After five years we cannot bear the burden any longer." What we should instead be doing, in my view, while we seek for political solutions which will be very hard to find, is giving to the courageous men and women who bear the burden of security and of the rule of law in Northern Ireland all our support on all sides of the House and in all parts of the country.
6.10 p.m.
LORD MOYOLA: My Lords, I hope I shall not be regarded as being too repetitive, but I think I am probably the only person who has spoken so far in this debate who lives his entire time in Northern Ireland. Also, being a farmer—a somewhat earthy existence—I take a somewhat different view of this situation from those who are rather further removed, so I hope I shall be forgiven if I touch once again on some of the ground which has already been covered. Both in your Lordships' House to-day and in the Press, the cause of this strike has been blamed on the Sunningdale Agreement. Quite frankly, in my opinion that is a wrong assessment of the situation. The Sunning-dale Agreement was, of course, a factor because it was a nice political stick which could be exploited. But the real causes are two: the first is that we have got our priorities wrong. Our priorities are wrong because we have got to win the security battle before we get the political solution. The political solution is essential but you will find it hard to get until the security battle is won.
The second reason for the strike is that the situation in Northern Ireland now is that no one believes a single word in political terms except the very worst possible interpretation that can be put on any matter. My Lords, the plain fact of the matter has been that in Ulster over

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the last few years—and I am not trying to blame anyone in particular for this—there have been far too many broken promises; far too many cases where politicans have said this they will not do, and then immediately have found a hundred good reasons for doing it. Hundreds of times the people of Northern Ireland have been promised tougher action against terrorism and that tougher action did not come. There have been all the totally different glosses that were put on the Sunningdale Agreement on the Council of Ireland and all that by the S.D.L.P., by the Dublin Government, by the Government here, by the Faulkner Unionists and so on. They were all different, and the result is simply that only the extremists are listened to (and even they now with a certain amount of scepticism) and the truth of the matter is that they think their politicians have failed them. That is why they decided to act on their own and, in effect, take the law into their own hands.
My Lords, if I may get back to my first point, this has really all happened because, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said earlier, people are sick and tired of the bombing, the wrecking and all the rest of it. Security is the nub of the problem, and surely it must now be obvious to everyone that the I.R.A. are not looking for the sort of political solution that has been proposed up to now. They have said quite plainly—or I read it quite plainly—that what they are asking for is unconditional surrender. It does not matter what way you look at it, no new form of Government is going to satisfy them. So, my Lords, my view is that when the terrorist is defeated it is not going to be all that difficult to find a political answer. If power sharing can produce peace, then there would have been none of what we have seen. I believe that if peace had come with power sharing, if Sunningdale had perhaps been taken a little more Slowly, even Sunningdale might have been acceptable. Certainly if there had been peace there would have been nothing for the more extreme people to work upon and we should not be in the tangle we are now in.
I have rushed as quickly as I can over the handling of the strike. I want to be constructive, I want to be helpful, and
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I do not think recrimination of any sort or kind is of value. I must say that the lack of tact which has been displayed by the various people who played a part was absolutely disastrous. Of course, being a political animal, I understand that the Secretary of State could not go and meet the strikers, but I doubt if even now the strikers understand why he could not do so. It was never, to my knowledge, spelt out to them in words of one syllable. They simply thought, "Well, his predecessor could go and meet the I.R.A.; why could he not come and meet us?" Of course, as I said earlier, the strike came about simply because ordinary people did not know which way to turn, and as a result of the abuse and invective which was poured upon them their attitude hardened and, indeed, I think there is no doubt that it pushed very many moderate people who were in no way behind the strike suddenly into the position of being behind the strikers. I do not think anyone can deny that it started as quite a small thing but by the time it ended it had massive support, and I am quite certain it came from some of the things that were said and done.
LORD DONALDSON oF KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for one minute? He speaks of the massive abuse poured on the strikers. He did not mention the vicious intimidation used in the Harland and Wolff Works and in many other places, ending up with murder in a pub. Surely the two should go together.
LORD MOYOLA: My Lords, I in no way condone intimidation; I deplore intimidation very strongly, but equally it must be recognised that not all the strikers were rushing round carrying out threats and intimidation. They, as I said, had been pushed too far by what they regarded as broken promises and being quite unable to get their voice heard. I think, as an Ulsterman, that I can claim a little insight into their character if nothing else. There is absolutely no one who can be more defiant when he gets violent and he will carry that defiance to the extent that he will hurt himself and hurt himself very badly. Unfortunately, all that the handling or the invective did was to produce that spirit of defiance and that spirit of obstinacy which Ulster people have in full measure.

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My Lords, having said that, the question is, what now? I was immensely relieved to hear that nearly all noble Lords who have spoken have said, "Do not remove the troops". I could not endorse that view more strongly. No one can be sure what would happen, but at the very least—and I emphasise at the very least—there would inevitably be some very nasty reprisals. There is no doubt that the I.R.A. and the Mafia gangs—and there are plenty of those—would find cause for greater activity and be able to justify their efforts by saying that they were protecting their own area and their own particular community. It is no good thinking that the R.U.C. could cope with a situation like that and I think if the Army were withdrawn we would see a mass of local Al Capones setting themselves up and virtually all form of normal life would finally come to an end. I hope that after discussion that this argument over whether to withdraw or not to withdraw will be finally stopped. I said earlier that no one in Northern Ireland knows what to believe. The uncertainty this sort of thing engenders is making this very delicate situation a great deal worse. It probably also is having a bad effect on the Army.
Then my Lords, I must also say that the next step is to end what certainly appears to us in Northern Ireland to be until now a policy of containment which the Army has followed. Do not think for one minute that I am trying to condone the events that happened during the strike, but one lesson that seems plain is that during the strike the terrorist activity was pretty slight. If one asked oneself why this was so the reason was because of the illegal barricades which went up all over the place and which put the terrorist in the position that he could not move without knowing when he would run into one. A second reason was that as petrol subsequently became short he stuck out like a sore thumb if he started to appear on the roads. But it does suggest, I think, the need for what many of us have always advocated; namely, that regardless of the inconvenience which it causes there is a constant need for road checks to prevent the bomber running around with bombs in his car. Then, my Lords, I would mention one subject in a sentence: the question of nationalism which was touched on to-day. I said that I was a
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pretty earthy individual at the moment and all I can say about that subject is that all the people I talk to show no desire for any kind of independence, nor are there any kind of national aspirations. They want to keep the union, and although some of the politicians may shout about it, I do not think that the ordinary person in Northern Ireland wants the union broken or weakened in any way.
Now I turn to the political side of the problem. To me, of course, the most attractive answer is the continuance of direct rule. I think that to many people in Northern Ireland it is the answer they would like. I remember the days when direct rule was first imposed and politicians all over the place thundered against it. They are not thundering now. Anyone who thinks about it recognises that their lives continued largely unaltered when direct rule was in existence. I appreciate that there are many major problems at Westminster and it may equally well be felt that the minority population in Northern Ireland would find direct rule unwelcome. if one accepts that point—and I do—power sharing is, to me, the only eventual answer. It broke down because some of the Assembly groupings would not take part. Once the strike was on the Assembly could not avoid dealing in security matters so that the various political loyalties became too strong and, so to speak, the in-fighting began. But it did work and was beginning to be accepted, albeit reluctantly.
The only suggestion I have to make is that the power sharing concept should not be rushed. If one is to improve the Executive perhaps it should be along the lines that all Parties which accept the Constitution and want to take part in the Government should have one seat on the Executive in proportion to about six seats in the Assembly. It should be on a type of proportionate basis so that all the Parties will have a right to take part in the Executive and a right to take part in the running of the country; then they could not make much capital on the grounds that they were being excluded. It will be extremely difficult to get back to that kind of solution, but I am absolutely certain it can be done and must be done.
There is one important point—I underline its importance—and it is that there

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should be no deadlines. At the moment we have four months in which to do it, but I think I am right in saying that that period can be extended. It should be made clear forthwith that it will be extended if necessary because deadlines will only help keep up an air of crisis and when the deadline is reached and the objective that is required has not arrived many hopes will be dashed. I hope it will be made plain that this deadline of four months is not fixed, that it can and will be extended as necessary. Secondly, I do not think we can expect—I will probably fall out with many of my friends—to rebuild the future Executive with the old ingredients. They have been tried and failed and I regret we have now to find some new leaders to make it work. As many people have said, we need a cooling-off period. I am not in collusion with the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, but my thoughts run along much the same lines as his. It does seem to me that if we are to get that cooling-off period we must get Northern Ireland so far as possible out of politics for the time being.
I wonder whether it is not beyond hope that, during this interim period of cooling-off while new answers are found, we might find someone outside politics, a person of ability who could advise and who would be known to be fair and acceptable to all communities, to come in and administer the Province. I know immediately that people will say this is fairyland and that such a person would have to be answerable to Parliament. They will also say that he would have to be such a paragon of skill and virtue that he cannot be found, but I personally think he could be found and, having been in politics for some time, I know that provided parties are agreeable the solutions to all these problems can always be achieved. But I do believe something of this kind for a period of time while new solutions are found is quite possibly the answer to our problems.
My Lords, my last point is what I call the incidentals, the Council of Ireland and all that. All I can say at the moment, and probably it is not necessary to say it, is for goodness' sake! for the time being, let them be. It has to be realised that the Council of Ireland—and here I am eating my words because I
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supported it when the White Paper came out originally—has no selling point to a Protestant in Northern Ireland. It could have done if the Executive and other propositions had brought peace, but unfortunately they did not and it does not look as though they will. There is nothing to recommend these propositions to the Protestant community. All I would say on that is "Don't go on trying to push them down anyone's throat, because you might just as well ask Wales and Scotland to join up with some foreign organisation against their will." As we certainly would not do that, let us not try to do it in Northern Ireland. There are just three things to be done, if I may sum it up: let the Army get on with the job without inhibitions and, of course, above all keep them there; secondly, cut out any deadlines for political solutions and, thirdly, try to cool it and give a little trust to the ordinary people and give them somebody whom they can trust. I am absolutely certain that a solution can be found. I certainly in no way despair about the position because there is still a vast majority who want peace and a just society.
LORD GORE-BOOTH: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, sits down may I ask him one question about the interesting part of his speech earlier on about security? Is he speaking of, as it were, a technical operation? Is he saying that if the Armed Forces and the police could improve their security operations so as to deal effectively with the I.R.A. and extreme Protestant organisations that that would be acceptable all round?
LORD MOYOLA: My Lords, absolutely. The Province is crying out for, and will always accept anything that is fair to both sides.
6.30 p.m.
LORD MONSON: My Lords, I am delighted to be lucky enough to be able to speak after the excellent speech of the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, as I realise that I shall not be quite so isolated as I thought I might be. Nobody who saw on television the dignified, poignant and extremely moving speech of Mr. Brian Faulkner after his resignation from the Executive, and who heard the subsequent speeches of Mr. Fitt and

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Mr. Bradford, can take pleasure in saying, "I told you so". But, in retrospect, is it not blindingly obvious that if you lean over backwards and make every effort to accommodate the wishes and the aspirations of one minority, by which I mean not the Roman Catholic minority, but the smaller, Republican minority, who form between 24 per cent. and 27 per cent. of the population of Northern Ireland, and at the same time ignore and deride the fears and aspirations of a much larger majority, which I estimated when we debated this subject last September at 35 per cent., which turned out to be an under-estimation and which now turns out to be over 50 per cent.—and if you take these people for granted and think that they will swallow anything that is handed out to them, then surely it must be accepted that you are heading for trouble.
A former editor of the New Statesman has said on two separate occasions in the last week that any politician who opposes the Sunningdale Agreement ought to be deported to a remote and insalubrious Pacific island without trial for an indefinite period—how long I do not know; for 10 or 20 years or whatever. If any of his political associates supporting him in this view are in positions of power, I shall be in trouble because I have always had very grave doubts about the Sunnningdale Agreement, and in particular about the Council of Ireland aspects of it. I am not alone in this. Significantly enough, the Northern Ireland correspondent of the New Statesman under its present editorship has conceded that the strikers had very much of a case so far as the Council of Ireland is concerned; and many commentators who are not normally sympathetic in any way to a Unionist or Loyalist point of view have written similarly.
My Lords, I cannot set very much store by the supposed safeguards said to be provided by the unanimity rule. After all, there are such things as 'flu epidemics; there are such things as fog, which ground aeroplanes at airports several hundred miles from one's destination; there is such a thing as legislation which goes through late at night, when the legislators' attention is wandering and people want to get home. The most notorious example
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of this, of course, is the Labouchére Amendment introduced at the end of the last century, which ruined Oscar Wilde. I remember specifically when we were debating the Abortion Bill in Committee in your Lordships' House. An Amendment was introduced at about 11.30 at night, when everybody was yawning and wanting to go home. I do not believe that the mover of the Amendment realised the implications of what he was doing. It vastly liberalised the Bill by allowing almost any doctor to sign the certificates which allow a woman to have an abortion. I had not at that point made my maiden speech, so I could not intervene, and it was too late to do anything about it. I went to see the sponsors of the Bill but it was too late and it went back to the Commons. The sponsors admitted that they had not intended that the legislation should be so liberally drawn.
Apart from that, how permanent is the guarantee that the unanimity rule will persist? Nine days ago Mr. Wilson, in his broadcast, cited the Downing Street Agreement of 1969, when he was in the process of scorning the fears of the Loyalist workers as to their future status as being totally unnecessary. He quite forgot to say that the Downing Street Declaration of 1969 also equally affirmed that
"responsibility for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter for domestic jurisdiction. The United Kingdom Government will assert this principle in all international relationships."
Yet, my Lords, the Council of Ireland proposals, with their very strong implications of dual sovereignty, effectively make nonsense of this guarantee. As the noble Lord, Lord Moyola, has said, there have been, to be fair, not so many broken promises as broken assurances, time and time again. Successive Stormont Governments have been told that provided they introduce yet one more reform everything will be all right; Stormont will be secure and the violence will cease. Time and time again this has happened, and we know how it has ended up. To support me in this claim, I want to cite a source which your Lordships may find rather surprising. On December 11 last year, the Irish Times, which is a paper noted, I think it is fair to say, for its hostility to Unionism, in discussing impending Westminster legislation—
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I did not quite hear the noble Lord. Did he say "hostility"?
LORD MONSON: Hostility to Unionism, yes, in the North, and its preference, simply, for eventual union with the South. In discussing this impending legislation they wrote:
"If the Unionists and Loyalists need any proof of the impermanency"—
note the word "impermanency", my Lords—
"of the vaunted guarantees of their constitutional position, they will get it once again".
My Lords, though, as I have said, I doubt the wisdom and even the morality of the Council of Ireland with anything more than purely advisory powers—at least until the Republic formally amends its Constitution—I think that even then it is just conceivable that the package might have been "sold" to the unionist (with a small "u") majority if it had been done with more tact and sensitivity.
First, there is power sharing. Unfortunately, this was presented to Unionists as a moral issue instead of as a purely pragmatic one. If the Unionist man in the street had been told, "We understand why you object to your elected representatives sharing power with those whose loyalties lie with the Republic of Ireland rather than with the Crown, but look at it in this way. Power sharing will, if all goes well, cut down the violence, the bombing, the arson and the murders, and with any luck (although this is perhaps a little less certain) it may induce a few waivering Republicans to think that the Union is not such a bad thing after all and thereby help to ensure your constitutional position", that would have made good sense. Instead of that, it was presented as a sort of moral issue: "You wicked people. You should have been sharing power with these people"—the Republicans, not the Catholics. I entirely agree that the Unionists should have been sharing power with the Catholics decades ago, but unionist Catholics. But to present the view that they should have shared power with the Republicans as a moral issue, saying that people should support this on moral grounds, is equally to say that the Czech Government in the mid-'thirties should have taken Sudetens aspiring to pan-German solutions into
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their Cabinet and that Mrs. Meir should take anti-Zionist Arabs into the Israeli Cabinet. I cannot see that there is any moral as opposed to pragmatic justification for it: but, of course, the pragmatic case is a strong one.
Then we come to general attitudes which have been publicly expressed and which are well-known on the other side of the water: specifically, certain Left-wing attitudes which create suspicion of this country. First, there are those who have for years aspired to a United Ireland. I personally cannot understand why they find Irish nationalism more noble and inspiring and virtuous than United Kingdom nationalism, but I accept that they are perfectly sincere in this, and I respect their point of view. The only quibble I have is that the pressure for a United Ireland started many decades before the Republic made any tentative moves towards a more liberal and secular society, so to that extent I think it is a little bit tarnished. Then there are those with whom I have a little less sympathy—they are not to be found in your Lordships' House, I think, but there are several Members in the other place; and also particularly in the media.
Then there are people who, on this side of the water, favour anything to do with what might loosely be called the permissive society—easy abortion, free contraception, easy divorce, a total absence of censorship, and so forth. (I am not necessarily objecting to these things but am pointing out the paradox in their arguments.) So many of these same people want to impose a solution on Northern Ireland which would deny the people across the water the right to divorce, contraception and so on and impose censorship upon them. Those double standards are recognised by people who quite rightly object to them.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, it seems very odd that all these people who are so keen on divorce, abortion, and all the rest of it, should he taking the same side as the Roman Catholics. I can think of one or two people.
LORD MONSON: My Lords, I agree with the noble Earl. Lord Longford—it puzzles me, too. But they basically favour a United Ireland and favoured it long before there was any question of

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safeguards or amending the Irish Constitution—which, after all, the people in the Republic may not want to do. Why should they? If they wish to ban contraception, it is their perfect right to do so and one has no right to tell them to, amend their customs. But, none the less, it is a fact that although these people have not specifically pressed for the abolition of divorce in the North, the indirect consequences of the action they propose would be just that.
A lady Member of another place, a member of the Tribune group—and I am glad to see that the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, brought up this subject—the other day made the extraordinary suggestion that tanks should be used against the strikers in Belfast. Shades of Walther Ulbricht and the Red Army tanks in East Berlin 20 years ago! It was an extraordinary suggestion. Then there is Mr. Merlyn Rees—for whom I have always had a great respect, and considered to be a moderate, and impartial in his attitude between the communities. But the scales are dashed from my eyes, because it was revealed the other day that he wrote a letter to a lady in Dundalk saying that the British wanted to get out as soon as possible. Conceivably he may have meant the British Army, which is one thing, but he did not specify that, and it is taken by people in both North and South (as he was Opposition spokesman on Northern Ireland affairs) that Labour wanted to pull out entirely from the North. He may not have meant that but it was a gaffe on his part to put it in a letter.
Then, Mr. Wilson is reported to have said on Wednesay—and this is most significant and interesting—that the strike of the loyalist workers was not over anything important like money, but over an unimportant matter; that of nationality. That was a most extraordinary Freudian slip. Whether or not it was intentional, I do not know. I fear that it shows the attitude of people on the Left and I am surprised. It is worrying if Mr. Wilson has the attitude that money is more important than nationality; although, to be frank, there are people on the Left who can understand Tanzanian nationalism, North Vietnamese or Irish nationalism, whatever you like, but what they cannot
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tolerate is somebody waving the Union Jack.
Having said that, the Left has no monopoly of insensitivity and tactlessness. Mr. Heath, some months ago, might have put his words the other way round, and said, "If the majority in Northern Ireland do not wish to remain a part of the United Kingdom, then their wish will be regretfully accepted." I do not want to be maudlin about this, but after all, these people have contributed so much to British life one way or another. They contributed a great number of distinguished Generals to the British Army. In the first two days of the Battle of the Somme the Ulster Division suffered 5,500 casualties, which is equivalent to something like 270,000 from England, Scotland and Wales.
During the Second World War Ulster's loyal support of the United Kingdom almost certainly saved England from Nazi domination—according to the testimony of Winston Churchill, who was certainly in a position to know. And for Mr. Heath, an ex-soldier, to have said to them in the rather testy tones of a man who is reluctantly sanctioning some bizarre eccentricity, "If the Northern Irish majority wish to remain in the United Kingdom, their wish will be respected"—what a hurtful thing to say! He would never under any circumstances, whatever the provocation, have spoken the same way to the people of Kent, Cornwall, Pembrokeshire or the Orkneys had there been a problem there. That is what, understandably, galls people.
The media must bear a great part of the blame. One expects the well-known American news magazines to make the usual glib, half-baked comparisons, as they always do, between situations almost anywhere in the world, and Mississipi and Alabama: such as the claim that school segregation by religion in Northern Ireland is the fault of the Unionists. In fact the exact opposite is the case. We have a book which is lavishly and fulsomely over-praised, so much so that its entire text was read into the United States Congressional Record. It is a book, published by an English newspaper, which actually implied by an extremely dishonest juxtaposition of sentences, in speaking of the two years following the emergence of the Northern

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Irish State, that the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the "B" Specials had very little compunction about using arms and that nearly 300 people had died in the first two years, thereby implying that the police went about shooting people at random. To any man in the street, it would appear that way if he did not study the subject carefully. They were shocking libels, my Lords.
Last Friday on television we had the extraordinary spectacle of a very civilised and interesting, courteous argument between Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien and representatives of the Ulster Protestant workers. There were also two English commentators present. During the course of the conversation one of the Protestants, a footballer of some renown, revealed that in his boyhood in a street of terraced houses in East Belfast all the houses had pictures of Winston Churchill on one wall and King George VI on the other. The snorts of contempt and derision which emanated from the trendy media men—television commentator and editor—at the idea that it is contemptible to have pictures of Royalty or Winston Churchill on one's walls, were quite nauseating to behold.
But enough of analyses of the past. What of the future? What are the options? Independence?—perhaps if it is achieved on terms of good will all round, with security for minorities and adequate financial support for the new State. It is not an ideal solution but it cannot be ruled out of court. But independence in circumstances of bitterness, distrust and cutting off all aid, even leaving aside the moral aspects, would have only the very worst implications for this country.
"Hell hath no fury like a people scorned", one might say, and it is possible for a people to be driven to all sorts of desperate expedients to overcome what they feel to be great unfairness. The Russians now have a toehold in the South of Ireland, much to the worry of friends of mine there with whom I have discussed the matter. One thinks of the Chinese now working in Malta. Could they, too, be interested in a toehold in the British Isles? It may seem fanciful to make these suggestions, but we have to remember that seven years ago many things which have since happened in Ulster would have seemed equally fanciful. Might not
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these people feel driven to desperate expedients by a feeling, whether it is right or wrong, that they have been sold down the river?
Perhaps I might mention integration. It is often said that integration would arouse the fears and dash the hopes of the Roman Catholic minority. I could not disagree more with that view, because for Catholics, qua Catholics, it must do quite the opposite, as the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, said, though perhaps from a different standpoint. Once both communities were absorbed into a wider community of about 60 million people, they could sink their various differences within a wider United Kingdom context. I agree that from the point of devolution, and so on, it is not the best solution, but in many ways it is a very humane one and for that reason it ought to be kept in mind.
I believe that the people whose hopes and aspirations would be dashed are the hard-line Republicans—those Republicans who put the absorption of Northern Ireland into the South above everything else. Of course they have never been very strong in Northern Ireland—and I am not even referring necessarily to the I.R.A. In the 1959 General Election, they contested every seat and received 11 per cent. of the votes, and in a survey which was carried out seven or eight years later they numbered 11½ per cent. of the entire population. A good many of them, although not all, are concentrated in the border areas, such as the South Armagh salient, including Crossmaglen. Here the majority of the people, if they do not support the I.R.A., certainly tolerate them; and the border posts and the Customs posts have had to be moved several miles back. Local policemen and Customs men will not venture there and far too many members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. British soldiers. U.D.R. men and others have been killed there. I do not think this particular salient is worth the life of one more soldier. It probably is not practicable, but I should like to see an effort made to initiate exploratory talks about the possible ceding of parts of this area to the Republic.
If, for one reason or another, both independence and integration are ruled out and there has to be some form of power sharing, I am not so pessimistic

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as many of your Lordships are on this subject. Certainly, it seems that many members of the Ulster Workers' Council do not entirely mind the idea of power sharing, now that they see that without minority co-operation they might commit acts of sabotage or hinder the smooth running of the country in some way or other. But if eventually we revert to power sharing, two compromises might be made which could bring the majority round to acceptance of it, and possibly even to the acceptance of a Council of Ireland.
The first is that the Labour Government, quite rightly in my view, have promised the British people a referendum on E.E.C. membership, if and when the terms are renegotiated. The British people will be asked whether they wish to surrender some of their soverignty in certain matters—for example, the size of the juggernauts to be driven across their roads, the sort of hops to be put into their beer and the content of their loaf, together with the professional qualifications of their doctors and lawyers—in return for potential economic benefits. The countries concerned are, of course, friendly—or, at least, they have been so since 1945—and have not made any territorial claims on Britain. Therefore, if we are to have a referendum on such matters as these, how much more right it would be for the people of Northern Ireland to be asked to pronounce on their own future status and on what form a Council of Ireland, if desired, should take. Such a referendum might go a long way to defuse the situation.
Finally, there is another safeguard, of which your Lordships may have heard ad nauseam. I venture to mention this matter again because Sir Fred Catherwood raised it only the other day. His views are rather similar to my own. Some years ago he published a study of conflict—that is, that changes in the constitutional status of a country should be made only if there is a two-thirds majority in favour. However, all in all, the best course for the future has as much to do with attitudes as with actions. If the people of the North are not constantly being told that they are disloyal or that they are to be urged into a United Ireland against their will, and if their past efforts are given due weight and attention, then I think there will be a great leap forward; and with luck,
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people on the other side of the water may respond.
6.58 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and the House generally will forgive me if I do not follow the noble Lord in detail. He will find that in my speech I shall be mentioning many of the matters which he has raised, and so I ask him not to think of it as any discourtesy to him that I am not following what he has said.
All of us in this debate must have a sense of reserve and even of humility —because none of us has the answer to the present problem in Northern Ireland; it bewilders and confounds us all. Yet at the same time it is our duty to try to find an easing of the way to a solution. That should not be impossible. Northern Ireland is not the only place where there has been abominable slaughter and hatred between communities: one thinks of Bangladesh and the conflict between the Pakistanis and the Bengalis. Now that has moved far towards a solution. We think more closely of the Middle East, where the Arab/Jewish antagonism was as great as the antagonism which there has been in Northern Ireland; and yet there events are now moving to the promise of settlement.
May I commend the idea which was put to the House by the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, when he suggested that we should find a Dr. Kissinger to seek a way to a settlement in Northern Ireland. I never felt that Dr. Kissinger was worth the Nobel Peace Prize for what he did in Vietnam. I think emphatically that he is worth it for what he has done in the Middle East. If during the next four months' period, when we are seeking to cool animosities, someone could be found to fulfill in Northern Ireland what he did in the Middle East, it would be a great advance. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will consider not only the general proposal which the noble Lord made, but the nomination of someone, a particular person, to fulfill that role.
I was one of those who welcomed power sharing in Northern Ireland. I welcomed the Sunningdale Agreement. I thought the fact that Protestant and Catholic leaders had come together and,

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with tolerance, had co-operated was a great hope for the future, and that the proposal for a Council of Ireland, which should seek to bring co-operation between North and South, would again open the way to reduce animosities. That has been destroyed. Perhaps the word "destroyed" is too strong, because it may be a precedent for the future. It was ended from both sides. The I.R.A. had great responsibility for its escalation of the campaign of bombing and shooting which followed power sharing inauguration. I accept the view which has been expressed by speakers with knowledge of Ulster that the strike of the Ulster Workers' Council was not only in opposition to the Sunningdale Agreement, but was due to frustration. There has been this power-sharing Executive for months and yet no reduction of the bombing and atrocities that were occurring in Belfast.
My Lords, to-night I shall be expressing opinions which will be unpalatable to both Front Benches in this House. That may not be unusual, but what I say will be a little strange even to some of my friends. In my view there should have been negotiations with the Ulster Workers' Council when its power was proved. I deplore its views, but it demonstrated clearly that it had the support of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. When it is said that it was a revolt against democracy, democracy is not only a matter of institutions and constitutions. It is also a matter of the spirit and the will of the people, and though I differ entirely from the attitude of the U.W.C., it would have been better had there been negotiations because it reflected the majority. May I just remind the members of the Opposition that that was the view of their allies in Ulster; it was the view of Mr. Faulkner; it was the view of the majority in the Executive of the Assembly. I must in fairness add—because I want to be completely sincere—that I also think that the Prime Minister's broadcast on that occasion was very unfortunate. I think it is the only occasion when I have appreciated the political broadcast of the Opposition more than the broadcast for the Labour Party.
We must now recognise that there has been a profound change in Northern Ireland—a political and a psychological change. The political change is this:
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Northern Ireland used to be dominated by the great landlord class; they controlled Stormont. But they were swept aside. Northern Ireland was then dominated by the great capitalist business class; they were the authority in Stormont. They were swept aside. Now we have had the change that the working class in Northern Ireland has become the dominant influence. Among the Protestants it is the United Workers' Council; among the Catholics, the Social Democratic and Labour Party. From that political change I take great hope because, even though they have different views about Ulster politically, they have an identical social and economic programme. What we have to do is encourage the opportunity for unity in that sphere.
The second great change in Northern Ireland, and one which we have not yet fully recognised, is psychological. Northern Ireland used to be divided between those who were loyal to Britain and loyal to Ireland. It is now becoming divided between those who are loyal to Ulster and those who are loyal to a united Ireland. The noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, referred to the fact that in the recent great processions in Belfast the Union Jack had disappeared, and instead of it the Red and White Flag of Ulster was to be seen. The story which he related tells against him. He said that years ago the Red and White Flag of Ulster was lifted on Stormont and by the opposition of the Protestants it was pulled down and the Union Jack was used instead. But now among the Protestant majority the mood is one of loyalty to Ulster rather than to Britain; it is to the Red and White Flag of Ulster rather than the Union Jack. Those two changes in Northern Ireland are tremendously significant.
During the strike undoubtedly there was scandalous intimidation of the Catholic workers by the Protestants—undoubtedly. But there were some Catholic workers, particularly in Londonderry, who joined the strike on their own initiative because they felt it would be action against the British presence. The Catholics have accepted the view that there should be no union of the whole of Ireland without the consent of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland. I would plead with them to go

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further than that. If one accepts the view that Ulster should not join Southern Ireland except with the consent of the majority, the implication is that one should meanwhile co-operate with the majority in Ulster. I believe that if a basis can be found on which Catholic workers in Ulster can take common action with Protestant workers, and take that action in a positive way in the interest of Ulster as a whole, leaving for the time the idea of the unity of the whole of Ireland, by that action the Catholic workers would be doing a great service to bring about the ultimate cooperation of North and South. They should do that rather than intensify division on the Republican issue. The opportunity for that co-operation between Catholic and Protestant workers in Northern Ireland is increasing. I have been deeply impressed by what the leaders of the Ulster Workers' Council have said of their desire for good will towards the Catholics, and of their identification with the Catholics in their denunciation of internment and of other wrongs. The whole of our policy in this country should be concentrated upon seeking to secure the co-operation of the Protestant and Catholic workers.
I want to make two constructive suggestions. I recognise that the future pattern of Northern Ireland must be decided by the people of Northern Ireland itself, with our co-operation and agreement. I should like to suggest that during these four months of a cooling period the proposal which Professor Richard Rose, of Strathclyde, has made in his book and in the remarkable article which appeared in the Sunday Times of yesterday, should be considered. Professor Rose suggested that plans should be put through for calling a Northern Ireland constitutional convention, elected by proportional representation, and that we should ask the people of Northern Ireland themselves to decide what the future pattern of their Province should be. Under proportional representation the Catholics would have their true minority representation, and I believe that there would be among the Protestants sufficient co-operation to ensure that in the pattern they recommended a charter of civil rights guaranteeing the liberties of the Catholics would be secured.
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The second constructive proposal I want to make is this. There has been discussion about the withdrawal of British troops. I do not want the British troops withdrawn in a situation which will lead to a bloodbath. I too keenly remember what happened in India and Pakistan: half a million died. But I do not think we can indefinitely keep our British boys in Northern Ireland under the conditions they are in now. It is too much to demand from anyone. I would suggest to the Government that they should set a target date when British troops should be withdrawn. It may be a year. I believe that if they did that it would encourage the people of Ulster, Catholic and Protestant, to seek an agreement knowing that at the end of that period they would have the responsibility for Ulster itself.
I had intended to make one other proposal, which I will now only mention. I discussed it with President de Valera years ago—we were friends because we were in prison together. It was a proposal for a confederation: Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland as a whole. As we think of this problem we might begin to ask ourselves whether an ultimate solution might be found in that way.
My Lords, I want to conclude by saying that there is great danger that we shall not be allowed to enter the period of quiet and consideration which is in the mind of the Government. There is the great danger that a violence greater than we have seen in recent months may break out in Northern Ireland and that in Southern Ireland there will be an alienation from Britain which we have not experienced for many years. It seems strange to say, but emotions are of that character, that this depends upon the lives of two girls, the Price sisters. As the Home Office knows, I have done my utmost to get those two girls to give up their hunger strike. I went to them with the letter which the Home Secretary sent to me offering consideration of their return to Northern Ireland. They said, "Consideration is not enough". Then I asked the Home Secretary if, instead of consideration, he would give an assurance that they might return to Northern Ireland when conditions allowed. The Home Secretary got near to accepting that in his statement on Saturday. He indicated

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the expectation that before the girls finish their sentences they will be transferred to Northern Ireland.
I hope that the Minister will listen carefully to what I am now going to say, because I believe that it gives the promise of some solution to this difficulty. The Home Secretary said, "Consideration". It was rejected. The Home Secretary has now said, "Expectation". I am urging on the girls acceptance, but I am doubtful whether it will be given. What the girls would accept—after consideration and expectation—is assurance. The difference is small. It is foolish on their part to insist. But it will be equally foolish on the part of our Government if, appreciating what may happen in Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, they do not bridge that marginal difference. I hope that the Government's representative on the Front Bench will put that point to the Home Secretary and that before the end of this debate in another place he may be able to extend what he has proposed to cover that very small difference which might make all that we fear unnecessary.
My Lords, I hope you will forgive me if I have spoken at some length. I have tried to speak objectively and I have tried to speak constructively. I hope that during this coming period, despite the fears which I have indicated, we may take a great step forward towards bringing harmony to Northern Ireland.
7.24 p.m.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, I start with an apology because I find myself unable to be present to-morrow for the second half of the debate and to hear the reply of the Government. It is always a delight to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, and I share his humility because, like so many others, I have no solutions to offer.
I should like to look at the question of consent, however, and I would go part of the way with my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire in that I believe that the consent and participation of the people of Ulster is absolutely necessary in the search for a modus vivendi. I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in stressing the importance
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of the article by Professor Rose of the University of Strathclyde. He is no stranger to the Northern Irish scene. In a nutshell, he was suggesting a constitutional convention at which there would be valid representatives of all sections of Ulster opinion, including, perhaps, the demagogues and including all who are prepared to negotiate and discuss in the hope of reaching a modus vivendi. It may be important that there should be some kind of institutional framework within which this search can be conducted. We have heard some serious warnings about the dangers of deadlines and we should heed them; but perhaps we should not disregard the case for having a formal gathering in which possible solutions can be discussed—perhaps even an elected gathering.
I want to touch on only two other matters. The first is courage and the second is patience. I join in the tributes that have been expressed from all sides of the House to the courage, the morale, the patience of the Army and the Security Forces and the families of both. Yet on this question of security I should like to ask the Government why it is that I.R.A. funerals with firing parties and so on are tolerated and why is it, on the other hand, that paramilitary marches to Stormont are permitted. To an outside observer these things seem to be a provocation and an intimidation of all non-violent people. There may, perhaps, be some good reason for allowing these things because they have been allowed by several Administrations, but we have not really heard—at least, I have not heard—the reason why.
On the question of patience, I follow very much in the footsteps of the noble Lord, Lord Grey, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the warning on the question of security given by the noble Lord, Lord Moyola. Patience seems to be particularly necessary at this point when siren voices are suggesting withdrawal or even re-partition. I believe that probably at this moment there are no instant solutions, no ultimate solutions. I trust that a degree of bipartisan approach can be maintained here, at least to the extent that English electoral considerations will not cast unfortunate shadows on the search for a modus vivendi in Ulster.
It has been pointed out time and again that there are in Ulster two tribes, two

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communities, two nationalisms. Well, this is a state of affairs which is not unique to Ulster. One can look at Switzerland, or the Lebanon, or Canada and find situations in varying degrees parallel. In these countries, sometimes after several civil wars, ways and means have been found in which power might be shared between two or more communities. With patience I trust the same will be true in the future of Ulster.
7.30 p.m.
LORD DUNLEATH: My Lords, it is with profound but qualified sadness that I rise to address your Lordships' House this evening, because what looked like the new dawn in Northern Ireland has, on the face of it, turned out to appear like a false dawn. So much that had been carefully constructed, that had been carefully conceived, the tender plant that had begun to take root, all seems to have collapsed round about us and to have been destroyed. I said that I was qualified in my sadness and I will amplify that a little later. In the meantime my sadness itself, quite apart from other points that noble Lords have made, is because to a large extent I was fortunate enough to be able to see the power-sharing Executive operating, being as I am an elected Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly. I was able to witness the fact that the power-sharing Executive which came into office at the beginning of this year was an administrative body of higher calibre than we have ever previously enjoyed in Northern Ireland.
I was delighted to witness those who would not previously have had an opportunity of participating in government in Northern Ireland, so doing, and doing so with great distinction. I refer of course to the members of the Social Democratic and Labour Party who previously would always have been in a minority. They were able to go to the Dispatch Box, they were commanding Departments, and they did it most impressively as indeed did their colleagues. In this connection, I think I should pay a special tribute to Mr. Paddy Devlin, whom your Lordships may have seen on television from time to time, who actually managed to present the Estimates of the Department of Health and Social Services from start to finish without once using his favourite word!
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But for all that there was one thing missing; a yawning gap was left in the Assembly and in the Executive by the absence of those Parties who have now come under the umbrella of the United Ulster Unionist Council—the U.U.U.C.—who by and large have declined to participate in the affairs of the Assembly and have declined to participate either in the Executive or in the Consultative Committees which were set up. I only wish that they had been able to find in themselves the magnanimity and the generosity to be able to adjust their position (as did the S.D.L.P. in fact) so that they could have participated. Let us make no mistake about it, they have within their ranks people of ability and dedication and I believe they could have made a good contribution. I am only very sorry indeed that they could not bring themselves so to do.
Noble Lords this afternoon have commented on why this visionary, adventurous, idealistic and, to my mind, entirely sensible experiment in power sharing should appear to have collapsed. There are many factors in it, but the most inronic one is that the fear in regard to the Council of Ireland was so generated that this rather than power sharing was perhaps the main factor of the sad turn of events that has taken place. The fears were sown by so-called Loyalists, members of the Assembly and their supporters who, while they were not in the Assembly, were busy in their constituencies and making statements to the Press and television media. They sowed the seeds of fear which were then fertilised by falsehood and began to grow. Let us he fair about it: it was not only the Loyalists who did this. There was one unimportant Social Democratic and Labour Party Assembly man who, addressing an audience in Dublin, decided to play for an easy round of applause, and said that the Council of Ireland was the vehicle that would eventually trundle us into a United Ireland. This supported exactly what the Loyalists were saying. People such as myself and my colleagues in the Assembly Party have on the whole regarded the Council of Ireland—I am speaking for myself now; I should not have included the Alliance Party—to be incidental whereas I consider power sharing to be fundamental.

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The fact that the Council of Ireland should have been used for this purpose is to my mind most deplorable. But it was so used and unfortunately the results were all too apparent for everyone to see. Of course also there was the fact that violence continued, and this was deliberate. The I.R.A. were scared that perhaps a viable solution was in sight; that perhaps power sharing was going to work and so therefore they pulled out every available stop to keep the violence going, to keep the disruption and the terrorism going; and I am afraid one must admit that they were successful in their efforts, because if only peace had broken out when the Executive got under way at the beginning of this year it would have been much easier for the general public in Northern Ireland to have accepted and appreciated the very real advances that were being made.
The movement to pull the troops out of Northern Ireland has been one of my greatest worries. But I feel much happier this evening. I feel much happier after having heard one noble Lord after another saying that this is a dangerous statement and that there is no question of pulling out. As the noble Lord, Lord Grey of Naunton, said, even if we discard the moral issue it would be strategically wrong so to do, and from the point of view of self interest in Northern Ireland it would be bad policy to pull out the troops.
I would say that the main danger is that if the I.R.A., or indeed the thugs of Protestant extremists on the other side, think that Britain is in this sort of mood, that will be tantamount to saying to them, "O.K., just one more big heave and you will get what you are looking for". That is why I was so delighted to hear those expressions of view on the part of noble Lords, and in this connection I must say how profoundly grateful thinking people in Northern Ireland are to Britain and to the Armed Forces and the Services in Great Britain who have backed up Northern Ireland over these last few years. We feel it every bit as deeply, perhaps even more deeply when we read or hear in a broadcast that a young British soldier has been killed or seriously wounded. We feel this perhaps even more deeply than when one of our own is killed, because
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why should they be killed? Why should they be involved in this appalling situation? I sympathise with the wives, mothers and families who ask, "Why should our soldiers be involved in this?". I would say, 'Thank you, Britain. Thank you for what you have done for Northern Ireland". I thank the people of Britain for their patience and their endurance over this period. One of these days it will become apparent that the majority of people in Northern Ireland will express this thanks by words and deeds, and will continue to back Britain in the way they did during the last war.
However, the strike took place; the Executive fell. The strike started without very widespread support. Its launching was much dependent upon intimidation. But, unfortunately, as it progressed it gathered support; and public anger, which was there because people were suffering much inconvenience and deprivation, unfortunately began to become more directed at Her Majesty's Government than at the strikers themselves. But having expressed my thanks to the British people, here I am afraid I must express a criticism of what I consider to have been an error on the part of Her Majesty's Government. That was that while they took no action concerning the blocking of roads or intimidation, at the same time they presented a facade of intransigence so far as entering into talks with the strikers was concerned. I heard it put very well by someone speaking to me the other day who said that whereas the Government ought to have presented an attitude of flexible steel, what in fact they presented was an attitude of inflexible jelly. This had a poor effect on public morale.
I do not know how many of your Lordships have been in a country when law and order has completely broken down. But when one sees people blocking the roads, stopping traffic, hi-jacking vehicles, with no sign of the security forces in sight, it undermines public confidence almost completely. This was most regrettable, although it is my own opinion that the Armed Forces could not have broken the strike. But even so, the fact that this blatant flouting of the law was allowed to take place while no negotiations were going on I think was most unfortunate. The result was that the

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Executive was put into an impossible position. The Executive had responsibility for providing electricity, gas, fuel, food and so on, but they were not able to carry out that responsibility by physical means because they could not get the supplies through. Perhaps this ought to make Her Majesty's Government take a new look at the division of responsibility. If the Executive is responsible for administration in the Province, should it not also he responsible for security?—all right, not the British Army, but at least the police and the police reserve. This was one of the matters that most embarrassed the Executive.
My Lords, what is the position now? The Ulster Workers' Council are triumphant. They have pulled it off once. Why should they not be able to pull it off again? The I.R.A. (although I have not spoken to them personally) are delighted, I am sure, because, after all, their biggest stumbling block in the past was the restraint of the Protestant working class. Here they were able to sit back, without danger or effort on their part, and see being done in a fortnight what they had not been able to do in not just five years, but what they had not been able to do in 50 years. This is a dangerous situation indeed. Of course, Britain is sickened, and not surprisingly. That is why I have found it so encouraging to hear the expressions of support and consistency made by so many noble Lords this afternoon. In so far as the Republic of Ireland is concerned, I think they are saddened. I think their aspiration for a united Ireland has receded considerably. Certainly if I lived in the South I should not want the Northern Ireland problem put on my plate at this moment.
The other element in the situation is what has been called the silent majority. I would stress this comes from all sections of the community—Roman Catholics, Protestants, weekly paid workers, professional men, managers and property owners. They are not militant Loyalists or militant Republicans. What they really want to do is to be allowed to get on with the job and live in peace. These are the people who, over the last few years, have set the best record in the United Kingdom for industrial production and for industrial relations. Let us not forget that. That is the way they want to let matters go on; that is what they want
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to see continuing. Is their voice never heard? They are the silent majority. It is often said they are not heard. But then, how much have your Lordships who live in this country heard about all the people behind the scenes in Northern Ireland who have worked hard and put themselves at risk to maintain peace?
What about the clergy and the social workers, and the leaders of opinion in the community, who have been out on the streets trying to conciliate, trying to cool things down? Have you heard about them yet? They are the people who have averted the civil war which so often has been predicted, and despite the flash points that have so often been there to set off a civil war. Have your Lordships heard about them? Indeed, have your Lordships heard anything much about the Alliance Party which I represent, and which has been working very hard for the last four years or so to get reconciliation and understanding in the community? I would guess that probably your Lordships have heard little about this side of the matter, unless you have had occasion to go to Northern Ireland, because it is only if one is in Northern Ireland that it is possible to hear the voice of the silent majority, and to realise that the majority of people are looking for peace and reconciliation. Those people do not want to be bulldozed either into a united Ireland or into an independent Ulster. I would demand that their perfectly legal interests should not be sacrificed on the altar of two extreme minorities who are prepared to use violence, intimidation, and indeed industrial action to impose their will on others.
The noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, stated that the concept of an independent Ulster, summed up in the phrase "Ulster nationalism", was not new. I am sure he is right. But it has been canvassed very much more just recently, by so-called Loyalists. "To whom are the Loyalists loyal?" is a question I have often asked myself. One thing is for sure, and has become apparent recently. They are not loyal to Britain. And if the British way of life means fair shares for all and a fair crack of the whip, they are not loyal to the British way of life. What seems to be the fact is that they are loyal to a reincarnation of Protestant ascendency with

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the Roman Catholics as second-class citizens.
They also seem to be loyal to a recipe for total disaster, an independent Ulster. A Member in another place who is also a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, stated the other day that Northern Ireland could go it alone; no problem—"We do not want help from Britain". Perhaps it is not surprising that that Member is not so well known as an economist as he is as a farmer, because I would be interested to hear from him—but he does not turn up in the Assembly so I have not had an opportunity to ask him—what he thinks, if Ulster goes independent, will happen to the shipyard, or Short Brothers, the aircraft factory, which would be closed down now if it were not for the support the British Government have put in to the tune of tens of millions of pounds. How does he think the confidence of international corporations and companies such as British Enkalon, Viyella and Dupont, would be maintained? My view is that there would be massive unemployment. Some people can take unemployment in their stride for a while, the way things are at the moment, but if the unemployed turned up at the Labour Exchange and found that the money had run out, and therefore there was no unemployment benefit payable, that would be a very different situation indeed. What about the farmers who turned out to demonstrate their support for the strike, with their tractors and trailers blocking the roads? If Ulster were independent and if there were tens of thousands unemployed in Belfast, do they think that they could continue to live a quiet, peaceful life in the country? If they do not agree with me that hoards of starving workers would move out of Belfast and begin to requisition assets in the county, I should like to know what their forecast of the events would be.
One argument that has been put up—and I hardly think it can have been very carefully researched—is that, "Britain is not the only source of finance; there are other countries in the world who would be prepared to help us." I agree that this is right, and the first country I can think of is Russia. They have helped Egypt when Egypt was in trouble. They have helped the underdeveloped countries
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in Africa. And they have very kindly and thoughtfully moved in massive numbers of advisers and technicians at the same time, who have given pretty strong advice, too. Would, I wonder, the people of Northern Ireland welcome this? Would indeed, I wonder, the people of Great Britain welcome having a potential Cuba on her doorstep? I very much doubt it. And simultaneously, while this was going on, the bloody civil war which has been referred to earlier would probably break out and the I.R.A. would be laughing all the way to the cemetery. The idea of an independent Ulster is madness. The Party which the noble Viscount, Lord Brookborough, represents, together with my own Party, the Alliance Party, stand absolutely firm on the maintenance of our link with Great Britain. Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and that is the way it has got to stay. That is our policy.
But how can we find language clear enough and simple enough to convince the "thickies" and the honest hardworking people whom they have misled that the establishment of a power-sharing Government in Northern Ireland has done more to underpin our link with the United Kingdom, with Great Britain, than anything else for the last 54 years, since the Government of Ireland Act? And how can we find language to convince them that the collapse of the Executive which has been brought about has done more to put that link in jeopardy than anything else in the last 54 years? I wish people could understand this. I wish that we in Northern Ireland could stop fooling ourselves and see facts as they are, as the noble Lord, Lord Grey, said, instead of imagining things about facts and then believing those.
My Lords, what to do? What is the next step? I think that a cooling-off period has much to be said for it. One thing that the noble Lord. Lord O'Neill, said annoyed me particularly, and that was when he suggested that there should be a referendum. I was particularly aggrieved by this because I was about to suggest the same thing myself. I think that it is possibly one of the answers—maybe not the answer but one of the answers. I do not like suggesting referenda because government by referendum is a dangerous thing; it should not be necessary in an ordinary democracy. But that

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is not the situation, unfortunately, with which we are faced. So I would suggest, like the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, that there should be a referendum asking whether people in Northern Ireland want to remain in the United Kingdom with the continuance of the present economic arrangements and a power-sharing developed Government. The second question is: "Do you wish Northern Ireland to become independent from the United Kingdom without political ties or economic support?" I think this might do something to clear up what is at the moment a smouldering, clouded and dangerous issue, and at least would get it out of the way, because, as other noble Lords said, the result of the recent general imperial election is such that a lot of people are reaching unjustifiable conclusions out of it.
There is one other question, which I do not think it is necessary to ask at this stage because it was asked last year: "Do you wish to remain part of the United Kingdom or do you wish to go into a united Ireland?" The answer was clearly given just over a year ago, and the Constitution Act pledges that the question will not be reopened for another 10 years, until 1983. Therefore, I think this question can be left; but the other question which has become more prominent recently should be cleared up. I am certain that the answer to that referendum would clearly show—as Mr. Faulkner would say, "make it crystal clear"—that the majority want nothing to do with it. I think that a referendum would be a cleaner and clearer way of dealing with it than would be an election, where many other elements would enter in.
Then I think that Her Majesty's Government must address themselves to this very difficult and thorny question of ending internment. My Party have from the start opposed internment. We realise the security difficulties that there are, but at the same time I still feel that this is something that ought to be done. So far as the others are concerned, it is amazing how the politicians who were more or less wrapped up in flags, who shouted that no one but themselves were loyal, who missed no opportunity to sing "God Save the Queen", however out of tune, have now done a complete about turn. They are suggesting severance of the link with the United Kingdom, and this,
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after all, was the rock on which Unionism was founded; this was the fundamental by which Unionism has existed. Yet, having denied both these cardinal points, they still call themselves Unionists, whether they are Vanguard Unionists, Democratic Unionists or ordinary Unionists. I should be interested to know how they would be able to explain that because, if anyone else had suggested it, we should have been deafened by shouts of "traitor", "Lundy" and all the rest of it. Their credibility has been stretched to the breaking point, I feel.
As for us, we shall stand firm and shall continue to fight for that in which we believe and over which I think it fair to say we have been consistent. In so doing, what better could we do than use those good old slogans which are so well known? Those slogans were shouted by the Loyalist politicians and still are though, in their language to-day, their meaning has become slightly different. Our meaning when we shout, "No surrender", is that we shall not surrender to those who will try to pitch us into a united Ireland or into an independent Ulster. When we cry, "This we will maintain", we mean that we shall maintain the link with Great Britain and shall remain part of the United Kingdom. When we cry, "Not an inch", this means that we shall not give an inch in yielding to the terrorists and bullyboys who, by violence, intimidation or, indeed, industrial action, will try to impose their will on the majority.
Finally, I should like to make a plea rather similar to that made by Abraham when he was negotiating the future of Sodom and Gomorrah but, with respect to the Patriarch, I think I have a much stronger case and one which is perhaps less complicated. The majority of people in Northern Ireland are not terrorist Republicans or thuggish Loyalist militants; they are, as I said before, ordinary people who want to go about their business, who want peace and who, I believe, want to remain part of the United Kingdom. They are constructive people. Can we not take their interests and their view into account? Could not their view be allowed to be expressed through the referendum which I have suggested?
In approaching that matter, I would ask Her Majesty's Government not to

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underestimate the significance of what has been achieved. We have had power sharing in Northern Ireland for the first time and it got off to an extremely good start. For a short period, it worked extremely well. That was not apparent to the man in the street, but to those in the Assembly, to the civil servants and to those involved in Government Departments, it was apparent. Let us not forget that. The structure may seem to have fallen to pieces, but the pieces can still be picked up and put together again, and that, my Lords, is what the Party which I represent intends to do all it can to encourage. To bring about this situation, "Alliance will fight and Alliance will be right".
8.4 p.m.
LORD DE CLIFFORD: My Lords, I am only going to intervene in this debate for a few minutes. I have once again to say that I do not know Northern Ireland particularly well. I have not been there in the last five years, and I have really only come to your Lordships' House to ask the Government to realise that they have a problem with regard to Northern Ireland quite apart from that of solving the difficulties there. They have to convince the millions of people in this country who, like myself, do not know what the situation is and if what is being done is right.
The Government have a number of problems to face. It appears to many people that there is a tendency among certain sections of the community, not only in Ireland but in this country also, to ignore and flout legislation passed by Parliament. It also appears at the moment, following this latest strike, that the Government do not control the running of Northern Ireland. Direct rule, it appears to many people, could be overturned tomorrow if a decision were made by the Government which the militants who called the last strike did not like. They could call another strike and, after the exhibition which was put up during the last strike, is there any guarantee that this would not happen again or that it will not go on every time? Many people will require considerable persuasion by the Government to make them believe that the ploy will not work in future.
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This is an outlook which has caused a number of people to call for the recall of the Army from Ireland. Personally, I am not one who holds with this. I do not feel that one should just drop everything and leave. I think that would be most dangerous, but I feel that it will require considerable persuasion for people in this country if they cannot see some end to the use of British soldiers in Northern Ireland. They have the impression at the moment—and this must be dispelled somehow or another—that, irrespective of the rights or wrongs of a case, whether political, financial or whatever, the big battalions with the strength and with the aid of a little intimidation and threats of brutality and violence, can ultimately be almost guaranteed to bring any Government to their knees and to force them to agree with their demands. Somebody must convince the people of this country that that will be stopped. I think that we probably had the first indication of it in the by-election which has recently been held at which the total turnout for a seat in the Mother of Parliaments could not raise as high a percentage as would have been expected at a rather poor municipal election. It is a disastrous situation when the electorate reach such a state of mind.
My Lords, it is a rather hackneyed and commonplace thing to say, but it is leadership which is wanted—leadership, drive and purpose. People in this country will always do anything if they have leadership and purpose; they will provide the drive. At the moment, we have no real signs of leadership. One of the most deflating events which has occurred in relation to the Northern Ireland situation was, greatly as I regret to say it, the announcement of a Prime Ministerial broadcast. Everybody was teed up for some not necessarily dramatic but positive statement, and at the end everybody was left as flat as a pricked balloon. All interest, and nearly everything else, stopped at that moment.
The people are definitely saying, "You must withdraw our Army unless you can give us some idea that there will be a solution to this in the end." I do not believe that they will mind if the Government, either themselves, or through some other person (as the noble Lord, Lord O'Neill of the Maine, suggested),

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negotiated with anybody and everybody in Northern Ireland, and went to talk to them and produced a thin centrepiece of agreement. I would make an appeal to this Government and to my noble friends; everybody has to convince the people that we are right in staying there and finding a solution, but we must tell our own people in this country that that is what we are going to do.
8.12 p.m.
THE EARL OF ENNISKILLEN: My Lords, how much I endorse the words of the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, who has just sat down. We in this country have an immense responsibility to the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. Too often the people over here who talk about the situation in Northern Ireland are inclined to talk about it as if it were what some newspapers have written of it "an English Vietnam", which of course bears absolutely no comparison to it whatsoever. Our Army is engaged in the defence of the civil power of the realm, and our present Government, and their predecessors, have failed to put this across to the British people and to the majority in Northern Ireland, and from this stems more trouble than one would suppose.
I do not think that to-day's debate has been anything but good. Basically we must examine the past, not from the point of view of recrimination but from the point of view of going forward from where we have got, and we must not repeat the mistakes that so obviously we have already made. In the United Kingdom the word "democracy" means a great deal. It means a great deal to that part of the United Kingdom which is Northern Ireland. But with all the will in the world I cannot see how an appointed Executive, unelected, can really be described as democracy. If it loses the support of the majority of the population in the country, it cannot be removed. This is not democratic.
I could not more strongly stress that during this period—which I feel must be a cooling off period, for we have got to the very edge of the precipice—we must get back to democratic issues. Democracy in fact means the rule of the majority, and within that sphere in the United Kingdom comes all our liberalism towards the minority element. But I do not think that your Lordships, or any
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of us in the United Kingdom, really mean by that that we should sit down in Cabinet with members of a foreign State; yet this is the situation with which we are asked to deal in Northern Ireland.
You may well say, and with some justification, that these people are not the enemies of the State. To my mind it is extraordinarily difficult to represent a Royalist majority with a Republican minority, and this is what we are trying to do. I personally believe that the majority of opinion in Northern Ireland wishes to remain part of that liberal United Kingdom of which we are so proud to be members. I am convinced of this. I am equally convinced that the same applies to those of different religious faiths who live in Northern Ireland, but who have really no chance of expressing this opinion in a democratic fashion if the ballot box is to be ignored. We have already had imposed upon us a form of election with which this country, England, will have nothing to do, yet it is right that we in Northern Ireland should have to do with it. If the coloured minority in England are to appeal for proportional representation, which they may well do, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to say that this is right and this we should do, or are the majority, in endeavouring to extend rights to that minority, merely to say, "Well, we will have proportional representation"?
LORD DUNLEATH: My Lords, would the noble Earl kindly give way? Is the noble Earl suggesting that the coloured minority of Great Britain should not have a voice in Parliament, and that they should be denied representation because proportional representation should also be denied to them?
THE EARL OF ENNISKILLEN: My Lords, that is an extraordinary stretch of imagination concerning what I was saying. I was saying that the minorities within this country do have a voice in government; they have an equal voice with anybody in government, but they do not have an extraordinary voice in government. Every single person entitled to a vote in this country may exercise his vote. What I am saying is simply that if they are the minority they cannot expect suddenly to be involved in Cabinet executive power. Equally, those who have the

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Cabinet executive power cannot, and must not, abuse that power towards the minority. That is what I am saying.
In the case of Northern Ireland there has been constantly quoted the term"misunderstanding". Well, noble Lords know that in marriages, for example, the one word that is common to both sides is "he" or "she did not understand me", and all their friends upon both sides endeavour to get a more mutual understanding. This is what is happening in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland does not understand the attitude sometimes adopted, or apparently adopted, by the British Government. Equally, those at home in England do not understand why the people in Northern Ireland cannot understand their motives. But on the political aspect what fundamentally we must get back to is the fact that if you want stability of minorities, if you want stability in a country, it is not achievable by constantly pacifying a minority at the expense or by the disturbance of a majority. You must, by leadership, by example, by publicity, by expounding your thesis, secure the wholehearted support of the majority upon which to seat your policy.
This has been lamentably lacking in the last five years. The majority in Northern Ireland have felt that they were gradually becoming less and less wanted in this partnership which it has been stated will last for ten years, and the security factor is the one pointer which has undermined their confidence in this respect. No one has greater admiration for the Army than I and, as the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, has already stated, those of us in Northern Ireland feel most concerned for our troops, for our people. They are all part of us. To listen every day to the broadcasts about Northern Ireland, and to hear that one of our soldiers has been shot in the street is almost more painful than to hear that your neighbour, with whom you were doing a cattle deal in the market a day earlier, was shot dead, or that a person who was doing all he could to support Unionism, to support the British way of life, to support liberal thinking, was shot dead teaching the children in the local school.
Yet, my Lords, while the country that harbours these people—and I emphasise "harbours"—is suing us for maltreat-
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ment, for abusive tactics, we are bending over backwards to supply them with every argument that they can have. Is that supporting the British way of life? Is that supporting Northern Ireland which is supposed to be sacrosanct for the next 10 years? Will this not undermine the confidence of every man in the street? It is bound to do so. I beg that we will not make this mistake again. We must talk, talk and talk again. It cannot be easily done; it cannot be done tomorrow. Confidence has to be restored, to be built up. The one thing which I hope will come out of the power-sharing experiment is that we will have taught the Roman Catholic element in our midst that there is a role for them to play in government. We have beseeched them to do this in many instances, but the difficulty has been to persuade them and the extremists on the other side. But if the Roman Catholics will realise that there is an element to play in local government and in central government by means of the ballot box and will get their representatives there, then we shall have progressed some way. But the leaders with whom you are to talk in the future must be elected. It is not possible to state that an Executive is to be appointed and claim that the ballot box has a sway, because it does not have a sway.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? I am at a loss to understand his argument. The working of democracy in Northern Ireland has produced a dominant government of the majority, with no representation of the minority, over a long period. This is why the whole trouble started. In 1969, the Party opposite said, "This cannot go on", and they set up arrangements for a power-sharing Executive. They never pretended that it was democratic; they said that that form of democracy had worked so unfairly that something else had to be brought in, so they brought in an elected Assembly but an appointed Executive. That is what we mean by power-sharing. It is no good the noble Earl saying that he is in favour of power-sharing if he is not in favour of that, because that is what it is.
THE EARL OF ENNISKILLEN: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord has

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misunderstood me slightly. If you reversed political thought and produced a new Assembly by new elections, by new selection and so on, and used the proportional aspect of the returns and regarded the Assembly as an electoral college to produce the leader from the majority Party, you might be able to assimilate within the Executive people thrown up by an elected Assembly. This is really what I am getting at. They would not be simply appointed personnel, who were not subject to the ordinary pressures of the Floor.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, about giving publicity to our intentions is I think very fundamental. What are our intentions? They must be, first and foremost, to restore peace, to deal with the law-breaker wherever he may be. This must be seen to be done. When talking about that we think immediately of the British Army. I think of some other things. I think of the men who join the Ulster Defence Regiment and who are on duty day and night in their houses. They are never off duty. They are shot because they have joined up. I think of the British Army patrolling the streets, and I think of the Royal Ulster Constabulary endeavouring to do their share. We must get it right, because the Army cannot and will not for ever be able to hold first base for them. Our police force, our local militia force and our own people must be pushed forward and the Army brought back. This, I believe, is the right and fundamental policy.
Any question of withdrawing anybody or letting up on the wrong-doers—the terrorist, the bomber, the destroyer—must be fatal. We shall hear no cry of leaving the Union if that security is put into full practice and the majority regain the confidence that Her Majesty's Government mean what they say and that the mistakes and past misunderstandings do not leave us with people in power who in fact have no power to share because their power has fallen away from them and in the ordinary process they could not survive as a Government. This must not happen. We must use the whole period now, while we take over control, to talk, to have discussions and to work out the political steps. Unless the Security Forces can defeat the bomber, can hold the Borders and the
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whole exercise is not undertaken, as is misunderstood by people, in an endeavour to get rid of that part of the United Kingdom which at the moment in many eyes, by bad publicity, is regarded as more trouble than it is worth we shall not succeed. It is worth a very great deal to this Kingdom to see that that does not happen.
8.30 p.m.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, forgive me for intervening at this late hour but I cannot be here to-morrow and I should like to support the proposal for a referendum made by the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath. I suggest that the facts are, first, that after five years the I.R.A. have not acheived their object; secondly, that after the General Strike the Protestant Loyalists have destroyed Sunningdale and must now be listened to by the majority; thirdly, that the British Army has not yet restored the country to law and order. I suggest it is no good the British Government continuing to follow the same policy which they have followed for the last five years, but that a referendum with the two questions, complete integration and independence for Northern Ireland, ought to be held in the fairly near future, In the meantime—
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, I do not think that either of the noble Lords suggested complete integration as the first alternative. The first alternative was always power sharing, which is something quite different.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, suggested that.
LORD DUNLEATH: My Lords, if the noble Lord would wish me to clarify my remarks, the first alternative was that Northern Ireland would continue to be part of the United Kingdom as under existing arrangements, with the political and financial arrangements continuing, which includes power sharing.
LORD DONALDSON OF KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, just for the Record, that is not the same as complete integration.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, I entirely accept the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath. In the meantime, there

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ought to be direct rule by the Government. The Royal Ulster Constabulary ought to be reinforced and the British Army should not be withdrawn. As to the date, I am not a politician and I do not suggest that I am, but I would suggest next spring.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned till to-morrow.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
First Report from the Select Committee, made and to be printed.

CORN EXCHANGE
Petition for Bill; referred to the Examiners.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes before nine o'clock.