Sitting of 14 February 1973

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

CONTINGENCIES FUND 1971–72
Return ordered,
Return of Accounts of the Contingencies Fund 1971–72 showing:

(1) the receipts and payments in connection with the Fund in the year ended 31st day of March 1972

(2) the distribution of the capital of the Fund at the commencement and close of the year; with the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General thereon.—[Mr. Fox.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  ENVIRONMENT

    House Prices
    Mr. Goldingasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what is the average increase in the price of houses since June 1970.
    Mr. Hardyasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what was the average amount and proportion by which the price of a new house rose during 1972; and the average price of such a house at the latest available date.
    The Minister for Housing and Construction (Mr. Paul Channon): The estimated average price of housing mortgaged with building societies in the second quarter of 1970 was £5,082 for new dwellings and £4,778 for second-hand dwellings. Corresponding figures for the fourth quarter of 1972 were £8,571 and £8,639 respectively. The increase in the average price of new dwellings between the fourth quarter of 1971 and the fourth quarter of 1972 was £2,520 or 42 per cent.
    Mr. Golding: Is the Minister aware that the effect of this monstrous increase in housing prices is even further added to by the excessive interest rates charged by the building societies? Is he further aware that in this instance he will not be able to blame foreign factors, because this excessive increase in house prices is due to the Rent Act, to land speculation and to the inefficiency of private building firms?
    Mr. Channon: I do not agree with all that the hon. Gentleman says. However, as my right hon. Friend explained to the House last week, the Government are naturally very concerned about the increase in house prices. I would refer the hon. Gentleman to what is said in the White Paper.
    Sir Harmar Nicholls: The increase in prices is due to many causes, including shortages. Has the Department any record of the part played in these increased costs by the increases in wages paid to building workers, in the price of concrete, in delivery charges, and so forth?
    Mr. Channon: I do not have those detailed figures with me, but there have been very substantial wage increases, as my hon. Friend points out.
    Mr. Hardy: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that those increases would be smaller than the profit made by land speculators in recent years? Does he not also agree that he and his party can no longer claim that ordinary people can still afford to buy a small new house, since the outgoings in respect of such a purchase would amount to at least £15 a week?
    Mr. Channon: That is not so. If the hon. Gentleman will study the figures for mortgages taken out last year he will see, in respect of borrowers with incomes up to the average industrial wage, that the number of mortgages taken out increased from 114,000 to 147,000.
    Mr. Ridsdale: Is my hon. Friend aware that bricklayers' wages have increased, at a conservative estimate, by at least 26 per cent? Are not bricklayers now earning between £50 and £100 a week?
    Mr. Channon: I agree that wages have risen considerably. The average earnings

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    index rose by 36 per cent. between the second quarter of 1970 and November 1972.
    Mr. Frank Allaun: Does not the hon. Gentleman admit that the price for old houses has risen by 40 per cent? Does he further admit that part of the staggering increase in the cost of houses is due to the fact that families are being forced to try to buy houses, because of the catastrophic fall in council house building programmes?
    Mr. Channon: The hon. Gentleman has a further Question on this point later on. The only short answer to the question of house prices is to provide more houses. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am very glad to have the support of the Opposition. I shall no doubt receive congratulations from the Opposition for the fact that private sector starts are so sharply up.

    Housing
    Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he is satisfied with the level of local authority building, particularly in the West Midlands; and what steps he is taking to encourage local authorities to carry out their statutory duties in this regard.
    Mr. Channon: My Department has written to all the conurbation authorities in the West Midlands to ask them for their estimates of the future need for new council housing in their areas. No restriction is placed by the Government on the number of houses which a local authority may build.
    Mrs. Short: Does the hon. Gentleman not appreciate that the restrictions are those of finance for raising money to build and the cost of building land? Does he know how many families are on the housing waiting lists? Does he know the housing programmes of the local authorities? If he does not, will he get this information, because whenever we have asked for it we have been refused it?
    Can he say, in answer to the last part of the Question, what he is going to do to encourage local authorities to build? How will he enable them to build at prices which people can afford?
    Mr. Channon: What I did, first, was to write to local authorities asking for their estimates of the future need for council housing. We have to discover the need for council housing in a particular area. Where there is a need, I hope that local authorities will pursue an energetic programme to fulfil the need. If the hon. Lady has a problem about Wolverhampton, I hope that she will get in touch with me. I know of no substantial difficulties in Wolverhampton.
    Sir J. Langford-Holt: Will my hon. Friend define a conurbation authority? I looked in the Oxford Dictionary for the word "conurbation" and could not find it. Will my hon. Friend explain it?
    Mr. Channon: I apologise for the use of that extremely ugly term. I have written to all the conurbation—I beg pardon—to all county boroughs. "Conurbation" is, I think, a well-known technical term. I have written to all the authorities in those areas and to all county boroughs, except for Greater London, where a special action group is already working.
    Mr. Greville Janner: Does not the Minister know that many councils now controlled by the Labour Party—Leicester is an example—are making valiant efforts to increase the amount of municipal housing but are experiencing the greatest difficulty because of the Government's policy on finance? What will he do to help?
    Mr. Channon: I cannot understand the hon. Gentleman's question. What policy on finance? Unlike the position under our predecessors, there is no restriction on local authorities wishing to build. They now receive substantial help under the rising cost subsidy, and no financial restrictions are put in their way. In fact, the Housing Finance Act helps rather than hinders local authorities with these problems.
    Mr. Crosland: That is an incredible answer. We all know that many local authorities would like to build much more than they are building today. Will the hon. Gentleman answer the simple question: what is stopping them?
    Mr. Channon: As they are virtually all controlled by the right hon. Gentleman's own party, perhaps he can give us the answer.
    Mr. Arthur Jonesasked the Secretary of State for the Environment how many local authorities now have programmes which include the building of houses for sale, giving for London and the rest of the country the number of completions and starts during the past three years, and his estimates for the current year.
    Mr. Channon: Information is not available in the precise form requested. In recent months 18 local authorities have had building-for-sale schemes approved. About 1,300 houses are involved. Last year about 800 houses built specifically for sale were sold by local authorities in England and Wales.
    Mr. Jones: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Is he sympathetic to the scheme of council house building for sale? If that is the case, what encouragement is he prepared to give local authorities?
    Mr. Channon: Where for any reason there is special need for houses for sale—especially for those in the lower income brackets—which is not being met, my right hon. and learned Friend is prepared to consider authorising local authorities to employ contractors to build for sale.
    Mr. Heffer: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us how a labourer in the gas industry receiving £19·10 gross pay per week will ever be in a position to buy any type of house, particularly in view of the staggering increase in house prices since 1970?
    Mr. Channon: The hon. Gentleman must have heard my previous answers on this matter.
    Mr. Heffer: Answer this one; never mind the previous ones.
    Mr. Loughlin: What chance is there of local authorities replacing their housing stocks at a reasonable price for rent if they are encouraged to sell their existing low-priced houses? Will not the hon. Gentleman begin to understand that the local authority housing stock is of primary importance if we are to rehouse people who are not earning fabulous sums of money?
    Mr. Channon: The Question on the Order Paper relates to the building of houses for sale and not to the sale of existing council houses. As I have ex-
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    plained many times on the question of the sale of existing council houses, I believe that there is an overwhelming duty on local authorities to allow those of their tenants who wish to have the right and opportunity to purchase to be able to do so.

    Sheffield (Transport Facilities)
    Mr. J. H. Osbornasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he will agree to support an immediate survey of the passenger car and public transport requirements of the city of Sheffield, and the need to improve accessibility of customers and freight to all shops, department stores, and places of trade.
    The Minister for Transport Industries (Mr. John Peyton): My Department is already supporting the land use transportation study, which includes extensive surveys of the movement of people and freight.
    Mr. Osborn: The Secretary of State for the Environment has had letters on this subject. Is there not a need for cities and towns to publish their proposals, and is there not the additional difficulty that shopkeepers tend to distrust proposals put forward by Socialist councils? Bearing in mind, first, the recommendation of the Select Committee that the central Government should take more interest in these matters, second, the fact that the Minister has intervened in regard to the Moss-borough expressway in Sheffield, and third, the need to put forward more ring road and through-bus route proposals, will not my right hon. Friend do something more active to support all cities—including Sheffield—which have to deal with these problems?
    Mr. Peyton: I do not think that further action is called for from my Department, beyond support for the study. In general, I wish to encourage sensible experiments and consultation. I remind the House that when one takes measures such as I believe have to be taken to curtail the movement of the motor car they will always provoke protests—very often from traders whose anxieties are subsequently seen to be not too well founded.
    Mr. Darling: Will the right hon. Gentleman accept it from me that his answer will give a great deal of satisfaction in

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    Sheffield? Does he agree that these matters must be settled by the local authority, in consultation with all the local interests concerned? Further, does he accept that there is a great deal of public support for what the Sheffield council is doing in this respect?
    Mr. Peyton: Within limits, I would accept almost anything from the right hon. Gentleman.

    Seat Belts
    Mr. Wigginasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if, in view of the significant reduction in injuries in those countries where the wearing of seat belts is compulsory, he will now introduce similar legislation.
    Mr. Peyton: As I stated in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend on 18th October, I prefer to see what can be done by persuasion. Seat belt wearing, therefore, forms a major element of this year's road safety publicity.—[Vol. 843, c. 84.]
    Mr. Wiggin: Does my right hon. Friend realise that persuasion is not enough? In answer to an earlier Question he admitted that his advertising campaign, costing £750,000, is achieving only a 30 per cent. response. Can he continue to justify about 300 fatal and serious accidents a week? Ought he not now to introduce legislation?
    Mr. Peyton: This is an important matter. I have never taken it lightly. I have always wanted to see what could be done by persuasion, though I have said that one must be free to consider compulsion if necessary, since, in the light of the Australian experience, it is almost certain that a considerable number of lives and serious casualties could be saved by a high rate of seat belt wearing.
    Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that all advertising campaigns, including the present Jimmy Savile's "Clunk, click" and scarred faces campaign, are doomed to failure because people will always go back to not wearing their safety belts afterwards? As it is likely that about 15,000 serious injuries and deaths every year could be saved if people wore their safety belts, does the Minister not think that the time has come to force people to wear them?
    Mr. Peyton: I note with interest the hon. Gentleman's concern. One of the factors which would influence my thinking and that of the Government would be opinion in Parliament on this matter, because no one would wish lightly to resort to compulsion.
    Mr. Mulley: I appreciate the Minister's difficulties in relation to a law which might be difficult to enforce, but in his publicity will he take fully into account the recent court decision which meant that a person's damages were reduced because seat belts were not worn? Will the right hon. Gentleman, in conjunction with the insurance companies, see that this is brought fully to the attention of all motorists?
    Mr. Peyton: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for making that point. When the courts press the public in the direction of common sense and prudence —as they have done in that case—I greatly appreciate it.

    Local Government Members (Allowances)
    Mr. James Lamondasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will announce the amount of the allowance which is to be paid to members of the new local government bodies.
    The Minister for Local Government and Development (Mr. Graham Page): I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave on 31st January 1973 to a similar Question from the hon. Member for Newport (Mr. Roy Hughes).—[Vol. 849. c. 394–5.]
    Mr. Lamond: Will the right hon. Gentleman take it that this matter, while not a deciding factor in candidates' minds, is none the less of great importance, and that it would be extremely helpful to them if he could remove the uncertainty about the future, and, in addition, set the level of the allowance sufficiently high to ensure that people do not lose money by becoming members of local authorities?
    Mr. Page: As regards the timing of the announcement, this does not come into operation until 1st April 1974, but the deadline for first nominations for the elections this year is 20th March, I think, and I hope that we shall be able to make the announcement in good time before that, so

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    that people may decide whether to stand. On the amount, I must ask the hon. Gentleman to wait. We have said throughout the Local Government Reorganisation Bill that it would be generous.

    A418 (Linslade)
    Mr. Madelasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what plans he has for an early start on the reconstruction of the A418 ring road railway bridge at Linslade, Bedfordshire; and if he will make a statement.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Keith Speed): Bedfordshire County Council, the local highway authority, has not yet put forward proposals for the reconstruction of this bridge. Until it does, we cannot suggest when the scheme might be carried out.
    Mr. Madel: Until this bridge is reconstructed, heavy goods vehicles have to pass through residential areas on roads not built for that purpose. In view of the progress of the Heavy Commercial Vehicles Bill through the House, may I urge my hon. Friend to push Bedfordshire County Council to make an early start on the project?
    Mr. Speed: The decision is for the county council. I understand that it is trying to agree details with British Rail. It is up to the county council to put the scheme forward to my Department.

    Oil Refineries
    Mr. Douglasasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what discussions he has had with local authorities regarding the siting of oil refineries.
    The Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Geoffrey Rippon): I have not entered into discussions with local authorities on the siting of refineries but I have recently sent them a note guidance on the factors which commonly need to be taken into account. This should help authorities in giving advice to companies inquiring about potential sites for refineries which could be to national and local advantage.
    Mr. Douglas: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that his guidance does not go far enough? There is a serious deficiency, in that it does not
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    require companies to undertake an impact survey of the results of refineries on the environment? Will he have consultations with the Secretary of State for Scotland and, with him, offer such advice to local authorities and companies which might be contemplating the siting of new refineries?
    Mr. Rippon: I keep in touch with all my right hon. Friends in other Departments who are concerned about this matter. In dealing with a particular case the question of the environment is of manifest importance.
    Sir Bernard Braine: In this connection, is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the determined opposition of local authorities in South-East Essex to proposals for additional oil refineries alongside residential populations? Will he note that this is a classical example of the matter raised by the hon. Member for East Stirlingshire (Mr. Douglas), namely, the need to consider the total impact of planning decisions on the environment of people who are already under savage assault?
    Mr. Rippon: I am glad to reassure my hon. Friend about that. There is no talk or possibility of oil refineries in connection with the Maplin airport development. I explained in the debate last week that approval in principle had been given by the Government to the concept of a port and oil terminal, but the Port of London Authority has to make proposals, which have to be considered under the Harbours Act. My predecessor made clear that there would not be primary industry development in connection with Maplin—and that includes oil refineries.

    Bus Fares (Schoolchildren)
    Mr. Dempseyasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will give a general direction to the National Bus Company to extend half-fares for schoolchildren to cover those aged up to 16 years.
    Mr. Peyton: No, Sir.
    Mr. Dempsey: Does not the right hon. Gentleman recall that the principle was introduced to enable young persons to travel at concessionary fares until they reached the compulsory school leaving age of 14? Now that the school leaving

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    age is 16, should not they continue to travel at those concessionary rates? Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the cost of fares to schoolchildren has more than trebled, and that this is especially hard on young people who receive no financial assistance from the local education authority? Why does not the right hon. Gentleman, as Minister responsible for transport undertakings, give a direction to enable such young people to enjoy half fares until they reach the compulsory school leaving age?
    Mr. Peyton: I believe that the original concession was made by the undertakings on commercial grounds. I regard the habit of Ministers giving directions to nationalised industries as very bad, but I do not doubt that the Chairman of the National Bus Company will take careful note of what the hon. Gentleman has said.
    Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: If my hon. Friend will do nothing, will he consult my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science to see whether she will help in the matter? It is one of great concern to those who wish to extend their children's education as far as possible.
    Mr. Peyton: I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science will note what my hon. Friend has said.
    Mr. Robert C. Brown: The Minister should not be so reticent about giving directives. He should take a lesson from his right hon. Friend—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should ask a question.
    Mr. Brown: Will the Minister take a lesson from his right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State, who only this week has given what is more or less a directive to the Tyneside Passenger Transport Authority that it should not introduce free fares for old people in the Tyneside area?
    Mr. Peyton: I hardly think that that arises out of this Question. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman who is so busy shouting from a sitting position is confusing passenger transport authorities with nationalised industries. I am asked to give a general directive to a nationalised industry. I have said that,
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    on the whole, giving such directives is, in my opinion, a bad habit.

    Housing Land
    Mr. Clinton Davisasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will call for an interim report of the London Action Group concerning land in outer London boroughs which could be used for local authority housing developments by inner London boroughs; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Channon: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to a similar Question from him by my hon. Friend on 24th January.—[Vol. 849, c. 151–2.]
    Mr. Davis: Is not it an absolute scandal, which could be reflected in a further interim report, that the Tory local authorities of Barnet and Bromley should have directly sabotaged the efforts of inner London local authorities to acquire land in those areas? When will the Minister take powers to ensure that those recalcitrant, anti-social and snobbish Tory local authorities take action to relieve some of the distress in inner London areas?
    Mr. Channon: I cannot accept that from the hon. Gentleman. A great deal of progress has been made in London housing. I was very pleased that in spite of the immense impact of the building strike last year the London figures stood up as well as they did. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary is taking the chair of the Action Group, and will report in due course.
    Mr. Lipton: Is the Minister aware that the problem of homelessness in London is now so serious that it may be difficult to preserve law and order for much longer? The situation is worse than it has ever been and something effective must be done, because people will just not put up with living for months and years in conditions of misery and squalor.
    Mr. Channon: I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the serious and tragic nature of homelessness in London. Together with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services I have already had meetings with the Greater London Council and representatives of the London boroughs—including representatives from the hon. Gentleman's borough—to see what can

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    be done to ameliorate the situation. I shall remain in touch with them.
    Mr. Freeson: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us the basic suggestions put to him by the London boroughs' representatives at the meeting to which he referred? In view of the great progress he has said is being made in London local authority housing, will he say what acreage has been made available to local authorities as a result of the work of the Action Group? What action has been taken, apart from the provision of information about land availability?
    Mr. Channon: The discussion with the London boroughs and the GLC was of a private nature, and I should not reveal what took place without their permission —though I should have no objection to revealing anything which took place. We shall shortly have a report from the Action Group, and no doubt the hon. Gentleman will continue to ask questions about that.
    Mr. Ralph Howellasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he is satisfied that sufficient building land is available in the county of Norfolk; and what response he has had to his recent circular on this subject.
    Mr. Channon: Discussions so far with the Norfolk County Council and building industry representatives suggest that in general the supply is adequate. Further information from the county is being studied by the industry in preparation for another meeting. No formal return under Circular 102/72 has been asked for from Norfolk.
    Mr. Howell: Is my hon. Friend aware of the resentment that will be felt in Norfolk at the complacency of that answer? There are 259 villages in the county, and 59 of them are in my constituency. It is possible to get planning permission only in exceptional circumstances. There is a feeling that very little is being done by my hon. Friend's Department to alter the situation.
    Mr. Channon: I have read what my hon. Friend had to say in his recent speech on this matter. I refute what he says about complacency. There have been discussions not only with the Norfolk County Council but with the building industry. No one can say that the Depart-
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    ment is complacent. If my hon. Friend likes to pursue this matter further in relation to particular areas of Norfolk I shall be delighted to go into it.

    Council Housing (Cost Yardstick)
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if, as one way of stopping the further decrease in council house building, he will now increase the cost yardstick allowance, not only where local market conditions make this necessary, but generally, in view of the national rise in building costs and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Channon: The yardstick arrangements are now more flexible and are not holding up the approval of reasonable tenders. Our readiness to grant allowances to meet local market conditions is, in my view, the most effective way of dealing with the present tendering situation.
    Mr. Allaun: But is not the Minister aware that councils are anxious for a general increase? They do not aim to profiteer out of house building. Would not it be safe to allow them to have a general increase, as they have no motive for abusing it?
    Mr. Channon: What has been done is more flexible and more satisfactory than just a general increase. I accept the rigid nature of the yardstick controls, which were introduced not by me but by the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friends. I know of hardly any case in the country where schemes are being held up by the yardstick. I know of none in Salford. [Interruption.] Hon. Members make generalised assertions. If they will send me details of schemes being held up in this way I shall gladly look into them.
    Mr. Jay: As the hon. Gentleman has so rightly said that the way to bring down house prices is to provide more houses, will he at least give an assurance that his Department will not agree to the destruction of existing houses to build roads?
    Mr. Channon: That is another question.
    Mr. Crosland: There seems to be the most extraordinary conflict of evidence here. The Minister asked for evidence of councils that were prevented from building all they wanted to build. Is he

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    aware that the case of Leicester has already been referred to this afternoon? Does he recall that in the debate on housing on Tuesday of last week I quoted the words of two housing committee chairmen—one in Norwich and one in Hammersmith? Will he at least give an answer on those three specific cases?
    Mr. Channon: It is much better if I can have a specific question, or a letter about a specific case. I genuinely believe that very few schemes are being held up because of yardstick difficulties. I ask hon. Members on both sides who think that I am wrong to give me evidence, and then I shall see whether they are right or I am right.

    Driving Tests
    Mr. David Watkinsasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what is the average length of time which applicants for driving tests have to wait for their tests.
    Mr. Peyton: Nine weeks at 26th January 1973.
    Mr. Watkins: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of my constituents is having to wait for no less than 20 weeks? I agree that the illness of the examiner added to that delay, but does not the fact that the illness of one examiner can so prolong the waiting time for a driving test suggest the need for a better deployment of resources, in order to avoid long delays of that kind?
    Mr. Peyton: Illness distorts even the best arrangements. If the hon. Gentleman will give me details of the case he mentioned I shall be glad to look into it.

    Operation Eyesore
    Mr. Sutcliffeasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he is satisfied with the progress of special environmental assistance schemes.
    Mr. Conlanasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will extend the period during which grants are payable under the scheme known as Operation Eyesore.
    Mr. Rippon: I am satisfied that this scheme has had a major impact on the quality of the environment in the assisted
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    areas. By the end of January over 11,000 projects valued at about £28 million had been approved for grant in England. I am reviewing the working of this scheme but have not yet decided whether it can be extended beyond 30th June this year.
    Mr. Sutcliffe: The Government are to be congratulated on a measure that can create a better image for the North. But is it not a fact that the schemes took a long time to set up and that there will have been only one year and one tree-planting season to carry them out? If Operation Eyesore is ended in June, will not the impetus to improvement and employment be lost?
    Mr. Rippon: It has certainly been a successful scheme. The whole purpose was to give a short, sharp boost to the assisted areas, and to urge speed. It is encouraging that in Teesside, for example, 271 schemes have been approved at a cost of £670,000, which shows that Operation Eyesore has been very effective.
    Mr. Conlan: Does the Minister appreciate that, although the scheme has been beneficial to the regions, all the work that is vitally necessary cannot possibly be carried out before the end of June? What is more, in the Northern Region the unemployment figure is still running at 6 per cent. On those grounds alone there is a very good case for an extension.
    Mr. Rippon: These are factors that we will bear in mind in considering whether to extend the scheme. I am reviewing its working at present.

    North Lancashire Motorway
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he will speed up his decision on the line of the North Lancashire motorway where it runs through Blackburn.
    Mr. Peyton: I will do my best.
    Mrs. Castle: Will not the Minister tell us when we can expect his decision? Is he aware that the Blackburn borough engineer has forecast that there may be a 12 months' delay before it is known'? Is it not grossly unfair to leave those affected in uncertainty about the future of their businesses and homes, particularly with the rise in property values going on all the time, so that those who lose

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    their own homes and have to get others may find that they have been adversely hit by this intolerable delay?
    Mr. Peyton: Nobody knows better than the right hon. Lady the real difficulties involved. When I said that I would do my best I meant it. I would rather not give the right hon. Lady an answer at the moment. I will write to her as soon as I am in a position to do so.
    Mr. Waddington: Will the Minister personally do everything he can to hurry on the project as a whole, it long having been accepted that it is vital to the industrial survival of North-East Lancashire that the road should be completed right through to Colne before the new town begins to grow.
    Mr. Peyton: I will do exactly what my hon. and learned Friend has said. I am rather relieved to be encouraged to get on with a road rather than to hold one back.

    Kimbolton (Bypass)
    Sir D. Rentonasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he will now announce his intention with regard to building a bypass for the village of Kimbolton.
    Mr. Speed: The A45 through Kimbolton is the responsibility of the county council. However, the future requirements of this section of A45 can be determined only when decisions are taken on the proposed M1-A1 link in this area.
    Sir D. Renton: Is my hon. Friend aware that it looks from other answers and letters that I have received that decisions on these matters will not be taken for a year or two? Meanwhile juggernauts are unable to negotiate the bends at each end of this ancient village, and the walls of scheduled buildings centuries old are being knocked down. Will he do his best to give the highest priority for a bypass for Kimbolton?
    Mr. Speed: I expect the feasibility study to be completed by the end of this year. If in the meantime the county wishes to put forward proposals for a bypass at Kimbolton we will consider them. However, it would be better to wait for the result of the feasibility study to get the right answer.
    Mr. Fry: Does my hon. Friend appreciate that, although many people welcome the fact that a motorway is likely between the Midlands and the East Coast, the A45, which runs through some very small places, needs improvement whether or not the motorway is built?
    Mr. Speed: I appreciate that improvements are needed. We have accelerated the feasibility study and we hope to have the answers by the end of this year. It should solve many of the traffic problems that my hon. Friend and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) have in their constituencies.

    River Pollution
    Mr. Greville Jannerasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what action his Department is taking to reduce pollution levels in British rivers in 1973.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Eldon Griffiths): Reductions of pollution this year will result mainly from substantial increases in expenditure by local authorities and other dischargers on the treatment of dirty water to river authority requirements. Later, the reorganisation proposed in the Water Bill will facilitate the better use of the resources available.
    Mr. Janner: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that when volunteers recently dredged the canal or river which passes through my constituency—it was in a disgraceful condition—they dragged out everything from beds and prams to a sawn-off shotgun? Will he take steps to give immediate and generous help to voluntary effort of that nature?
    Mr. Griffiths: I am glad to know that in the hon. and learned Gentleman's constituency, as in many others, people are voluntarily joining together to improve their environment. That is something to be encouraged. However, the Question deals with the larger issue of pollution from discharges into the rivers.
    Mr. John Hall: Can my hon. Friend estimate the total cost of reducing river pollution to an acceptable level?
    Mr. Griffiths: Without notice I cannot give an exact figure. I can say that capital investment in cleaning rivers has risen by about 37 per cent. over the greatest figure

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    ever achieved under the last Government, and during this Parliament will achieve a 50 per cent. increase.
    Mr. Oakes: Can the hon. Gentleman give an assurance that where such schemes have been submitted by the local authorities they will not be monitored out in the counter-inflation legislation?
    Mr. Griffiths: No, Sir. Schemes for cleaning up the rivers will be put forward in the first instance by the river authorities and local authorities, and later by the new regional water authorities—if the House accepts the Water Bill.
    Sir D. Renton: Was not the scheme for cleaning up rivers, announced by the previous Secretary of State for the Environment, the most important and most determined in our history? Can my hon. Friend give the House an assurance that that scheme is going forward with full effect?
    Mr. Griffiths: Yes, Sir. More than one mile in every 10 of the non-tidal rivers which were grossly polluted in 1970 has now been massively improved. That very welcome improvement is accelerating.
    Mr. Harper: My question relates to the pollution of the rivers by detergents which are allowed to pour back into the rivers by manufacturing processes in the West Riding of Yorkshire. This pollution affects my constituency in particular. How do United Kingdom safety standards compare with those of our partners in the Common Market?
    Mr. Griffiths: In terms of biodegradable detergents our standards have generally been higher. There have been recent negotiations seeking to achieve EEC standards which would have been lower than those in this country. Thanks to my right hon. and learned Friend's endeavours we have been able to persuade the whole of the Community to come up to the very high standards which we impose.

    Improvement Grants
    Mr. Geoffrey Finsbergasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will list the provisions in the statute which give authority for local authorities
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    to impose conditions of their own in allowing discretionary improvement grants.
    Mr. Channon: The only provision is that contained in Section 4(4) of the Housing Act 1969 which empowers a local authority to require, as a condition of paying the grant, that the works are carried out within such time, not being less than 12 months, as the local authority may specify.
    Mr. Finsberg: Is my hon. Friend aware that an Under-Secretary of State in his Department told the Environment and Home Office Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee on 24th and 31st January that in general these conditions are illegal? What does the Minister propose to do to stop the London Borough of Camden from imposing illegal conditions, forcing my constituents to refuse grants or run the risk of testing this in the courts? Why will he not take action?
    Mr. Channon: It is not for me to interpret the law. That is for the courts. I am advised that the discretion given to local authorities under Part I of the 1969 Act gives them no power to impose any further conditions than the ones I outlined to the House a few moments ago. We are engaged in reviewing the whole question of older houses and improvements and I hope to report in due course.
    Mr. Stallard: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that Camden has probably had more than its fair share of abuses with the improvement grant system? Many of us feel that the restrictions recently introduced are long overdue. Is he aware that a property in my constituency, in North St. Pancras, changed hands 15 months ago for £7,000, attracted an improvement grant of £9,640, and is currently on sale today for £112,000?
    Mr. Channon: I cannot comment on a specific case. If the hon. Gentleman will write to me I shall be most interested to have the details. I must point out to the House that it is in the discretion of local authorities whether to give improvement grants. Presumably Camden, rightly or wrongly, thought that that was a good case.
    Sir Harmar Nicholls: Local authorities may have discretion whether to give a grant, but should they not carry out the

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    statute as it has been passed by this House? Whilst my hon. Friend cannot be expected to interpret the law, could he issue a circular giving his interpretation of the statute as it was intended?
    Mr. Channon: A number of circulars about improvements have been issued from time to time. I would prefer to wait until the review is complete before risking another circular. I cannot interpret the law, but my advice is that local authorities do not have power to impose further conditions.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: When will the hon. Gentleman come to a conclusion? Many of us wrote to him about cases six weeks or two months ago and are still awaiting replies. We must ensure that local authorities get on with their job.
    Mr. Channon: I am delighted to inform the hon. Gentleman that I had the great pleasure of signing a letter to him this morning.

    Sewage Disposal
    Miss Fookesasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will list the local authorities which rely upon the use of short sea outfalls for the disposal of sewage; and if he will take steps to encourage them to introduce other forms of disposal on environmental grounds.
    Mr. Eldon Griffiths: My Department has been carrying out a survey of sea outfalls. As soon as this information has been compiled I will make it available to my hon. Friend.
    Miss Fookes: Does not my hon. Friend agree that it is alarming that in 1973 there should be any such outfalls, with the hazard that may arise to children and adults using the beaches, and also the threat to wild life in certain circumstances?
    Mr. Griffiths: I am afraid that I cannot accept that proposition entirely. This country has a very large amount of sea space and a comparatively small amount of land space. Provided sewage is properly treated before its discharge into the sea it makes sense to use the purifying capabilities of the sea rather than large areas of land in very short supply.
    Mr. Dalyell: Taking the outfall from the city of Edinburgh into the Firth of
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    Forth, for example, is there not a case for discussing with the Reclamation Industries Council various ways in which sewage can be treated and put to more constructive uses?
    Mr. Griffiths: I think there is such a case, but the hon. Gentleman will know that studies have been made and that the Government's views have been made known about the whole question of recycling waste for useful purposes.

    Rating Revaluation
    Mr. Roderickasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what advice he has offered officials producing the new rating valuation lists.
    Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The valuation officers of the Inland Revenue are required by statute to prepare the new valuation lists in accordance with the provisions of the General Rate Act 1967. It is not for my right hon. and learned Friend to give them advice.
    Mr. Roderick: Is the hon. Gentleman saying that officials have taken the decision of their own volition, to have what is, in effect, industrial derating, and that domestic ratepayers are to pay more rates than they would previously have done? Will he acknowledge that the council house tenant and domestic ratepayers in general must pay in rates well above the 5 per cent. increase that the Prime Minister would like to see?
    Mr. Griffiths: I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that officers of the Inland Revenue have done anything other than their full duty under the Act, which was brought in by the Labour Government. Material assistance has been given to mitigate the pressure on domestic ratepayers, and the whole series of discussions that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State have been having with local authorities may yet lead to decisions which will be made known to the House at an appropriate time.
    Mr. Leonard: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Ford Motor Company is likely to benefit to the extent of about £250,000 through the derating that is implicit for industry in this rating revaluation? The shortfall will have to be made up by domestic ratepayers in the London

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    boroughs of Havering and Barking. Does not he feel that in the light of this circumstance the Government should consider carefully whether they should proceed with rating revaluation at this time?
    Mr. Griffiths: I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend will be glad to consider the specific case mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. If revaluation had not been postponed for 10 years by the last Government we should not be confronted with the substantial changes of value with which we are now having to cope.

    "Non-Scheme" Ports
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he has yet received the results of the inquiry conducted by the National Ports Council into the operations of the "non-scheme" ports; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Peyton: I would refer my hon Friend to the reply given to a similar Question from the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) on 31st January.—[Vol. 849, c. 392.]
    Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that now that it has become apparent that the Aldington-Jones recommendation on the redundancy scheme has cost the taxpayer £30 million, much of it going to perfectly able-bodied and fit dockers who have had to be replaced from the temporary register, it suggests that Lord Aldington and Mr. Jones were less than perfect in their conclusions? Will my right hon. Friend therefore treat with considerable scepticism any suggestion emanating from that quarter which would have serious financial effects on the smaller ports?
    Mr. Peyton: I do not know of anyone who has been perfect in respect of recommendations having to do with the dock industry for many years. The Aldington-Jones Committee made a constructive attempt to get rid of a real sore—the existence of a temporary unattached register—and in particular to enable those who were sick or 55 and over to get out of the industry without further trouble. I think it has been a useful thing, although costly—I agree. My hon. Friend mentioned the smaller ports. The question of the boundaries of the national dock
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    labour scheme was not within the terms of reference of the National Ports Council's inquiry.
    Mr. Simon Mahon: Contrary to the opinion of the hon. Member for South Angus (Mr. Bruce-Gardyne), there are men who have sacrificed the whole of their working lives in the Liverpool docks and are receiving nothing like the amount of money mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have people in my constituency who have done 45 years' hard work in the Liverpool docks but are being treated in a most parsimonious fashion?
    Mr. Peyton: I do not know that that point arises on this Question.

    Housing Policy
    Mr. Carterasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will make a statement on his long-term housing policy.
    Mr. Channon: I would refer the hon. Member to the full statement on the Government's housing policy made by my right hon. and learned Friend in the housing debate on Tuesday 6th February.
    Mr. Carter: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that statement and the reply which he has just given are appallingly complacent, in view of the abysmal housing record of this Government and the skyrocketing house prices of last year? If the Government are serious in their intention to solve the housing problem, does he not think it time that they set a target figure for house building big enough to provide a sufficient number of houses to solve the problem of homelessness and to reduce rising house prices, which have gone unchecked for the past 18 months or so?
    Mr. Channon: Anyone reading the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend would find it far from complacent. He made clear the Government's view on rising house prices and their housing policy. As for setting targets, I would have thought that the experience of the last Labour Government would lead anyone to the conclusion that it is most unwise to do so.
    Mr. James Lamond: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that an important element in his policy must be the

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    securing of an adequate supply of highly skilled labour for the industry? Is he aware that there is evidence of a scarcity of such labour? Does he realise that the number of apprentices entering the industry has fallen drastically in recent years, despite the protestations of the Government that workers in this industry are highly paid? Will he consider that aspect of the shortage?
    Mr. Channon: Certainly. I am hoping shortly to have a meeting with the employers and trade unions to discuss this problem.
    Mr. Allason: Will my hon. Friend consider this shortage in the light of the fact that a bricklayer is required to spend three years learning his trade when most bricklaying jobs, except for the really complicated ones, could be carried out by a man after six months' training?
    Mr. Heffer: You try it!
    Mr. Channon: I detect a genuine wish on both sides of the House that progress should be made, and I will convey that feeling to the employers and the unions.
    Mr. Crosland: The Minister referred to the speech by the Secretary of State last Tuesday. There must be some error here, because the House certainly missed any constructive parts of that speech. I can recall no positive suggestions. Can the hon. Gentleman remind the House of perhaps three brief points which the Secretary of State made—or two?
    Mr. Channon: My right hon. and learned Friend's speech was so full of constructive ideas that it would be a pity to spoil it for the House by attempting to shorten it.

    Bambergers Ltd. (Ports Council Report)
    Mr. James Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will make a statement regarding the report which he received from the National Ports Council arising from the meeting which the Council had on 29th November 1972 with the management and union representatives of Bambergers Ltd.
    Mr. Peyton: Members of the National Ports Council met representatives of Bambergers Ltd. and others during their survey of non-scheme ports and wharves. I
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    received the council's report on the survey on 31st January and will make a statement as soon as possible.
    Mr. Johnson: Will the right hon. Gentleman be a little more forthcoming and answer a perfectly fair question? I thank him for what he has said. Can he confirm or deny that this firm will be forced to employ registered dock labour? If it is, will General and Municipal workers be able to qualify and continue their jobs?
    Mr. Peyton: All I can say at the moment—and I repeat this for the hon. Gentleman—is that the question of the extension of the national dock labour scheme to cover the small ports and wharves was not within the remit of the National Ports Council inquiry.

    Railway Property (Disposal)
    Mr. Alfred Morrisasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he will give a general direction to British Railways that when they dispose of surplus property they should give the appropriate local authority the opportunity to acquire the property at valuation.
    Mr. Peyton: No, Sir.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that deep concern has been expressed in the Manchester area about the disposal by British Railways of the city's Central Station? By which company was this property acquired, and at what price? If it has already been re-sold, at what price was it re-sold and at what profit? Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that there is a full inquiry into this disquieting affair? Will he agree that we must break down the wall of secrecy surrounding these deals affecting the disposal of public property for private profit?
    Mr. Peyton: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that there is no veil of secrecy. As far as I am concerned the nationalised industries are encouraged to behave in a commercial manner.
    Mr. Charles R. Morris: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of a Press report saying that this public property was resold for a reported profit of £1 million within weeks of its purchase from British Railways? Is he satisfied with the valuation advice received by British Railways about this?
    Mr. Peyton: I was asked the general question—
    Mr. George Thomas: Answer the question.
    Mr. Peyton: The right hon. Gentleman advises me to answer the question. I can recollect occasions when he managed to avoid doing so. The hon. Gentleman has now drawn to my attention a particular case and I will gladly look into it.
    Mr. Bradley: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm or deny that it has ceased to be a matter of general policy that local authorities are given the first option to buy from British Railways when they are disposing of property?
    Mr. Peyton: That has not ceased to be a matter of general practice. It is still the practice for nationalised industries with surplus land to give local authorities the first opportunity of buying it.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply I give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible date.

    Play Groups (Goods and Services)
    Miss Lestorasked the Secretary of State for the Environment if he will introduce legislation to amend the Local Authorities (Goods and Services) Act 1970 in order to enable local authorities to include pre-school play groups in the list of public bodies specified in the Act.
    Mr. Graham Page: Legislation is not necessary. My right hon. and learned Friend has power under the Act to designate by order public bodies to which local authorities may supply goods and services. He hopes to make a further order shortly, to extend the list of designated bodies. Pre-school play groups are certainly under consideration.
    Miss Lestor: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the recent correspondence which the Department has had with Berkshire County Council, informing it that it can no longer supply goods and services to play groups because it is excluded under the Act, is causing a great deal of concern and distress within the play group movement? Will
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    he expedite any decisions to change this, thus making these services available to play groups?
    Mr. Page: It was the Berkshire case which raised the matter with which we are dealing. I hope that the order will be laid before the House shortly after the Easter Recess.

    Tree-Planting Year
    Mr. David Jamesasked the Secretary of State for the Environment whether he will mark tree-planting year by planting Australian gum trees in the central reservation area of motorways.
    Mr. Peyton: There is insufficient space to accommodate large trees in the central reservation of motorways, but my Department will be carrying out extensive roadside planting in 1973.
    Mr. James: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, contrary to what some hon. Gentlemen opposite may have thought, this is not a zany question? Is he aware that these trees grow extremely well in this country, that they are slender, and excellent windbreaks, and that as they do not shed their leaves they are an admirable defence against glare yet do not produce a skidding hazard? Is he further aware that they would bring about a considerable beautification of the country?
    Mr. Peyton: I can assure my hon. Friend that it would never for one moment occur to me to suspect that he was asking a zany question.
    Mr. David Steel: Has the right hon. Gentleman considered the safety effects of growing shrubbery on the central reservations of motorways, as is done on the Continent?
    Mr. Peyton: I have considered it. I have frequently been invited to consider almost every conceivable form of barrier. On the whole, I am of the opinion that the one we are using generally is best.

    Bricks
    Mr. Masonasked the Secretary of State for the Environment what is the current state of supply of bricks.
    Mr. Channon: Overall demand and supply are now approximately in balance.
    Mr. Allason: Can my hon. Friend explain how it is that developers are being quoted nine months to a year for supplies of facing bricks?
    Mr. Channon: I would be grateful if my hon. Friend would give me details. I have been assured by the builders and brickmakers that there is no national problem, although there may be a few local ones. For example, the London Brick Company, which produces about 45 per cent. of the country's bricks, removed all restrictions on the acceptance of orders in December, and bricks are currently being delivered against orders being placed four to eight weeks ahead.
    Mr. Fernyhough: Can the Minister explain why in recent months we have been importing bricks from the Continent?
    Mr. Channon: I am saying that at the moment demand and supply are approximately in balance. Earlier last year there were local shortages, and some delays in obtaining bricks. This is not a national problem now, although there may be isolated examples of shortages in respect of specialist bricks which take time to obtain.

GAS INDUSTRY (DISPUTE)
Mr. Prentice: Before I ask my Private Notice Question, Mr. Speaker, may I raise a point of order? The Question was originally submitted to the Secretary of State for Employment, but I notice that it is to be answered by the Minister for Industry. I realise that you would not normally give a ruling about which Minister should answer a Question, but Members throughout the House are deeply concerned about the effects on their constituents of what is the most serious industrial situation we have had for a long time. In these circumstances, we should have had a reply from the Minister directly responsible for industrial relations.
Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman has put that forward as a point of order, but I think that he knows that it is not a matter for me.
Mr. Prentice: I beg leave to ask the Minister for Industry a Question of which I have given notice to the Secretary of
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State for Employment, namely, if he will make a statement on the dispute in the gas industry.
The Minister for Industry (Mr. Tom Boardman): As a result of industrial action British Gas has already had to stop the supply of town gas to several hundred large industrial users and to put in hand pressure reductions affecting a majority of domestic town gas consumers.
The full extent of industrial action and of its consequences has not yet been firmly established, but it is already clear that it will significantly interrupt production and create unemployment in other industries.
The management of the industry and the unions are working together to try to maintain a safe system. Nevertheless, it cannot be guaranteed that there will be no risk to gas consumers. The potential risks are explosions from the effects of reduced gas pressure, millions of homes suffering discomfort and the threat to the welfare of the old and the ill.
The Government deplore this action and earnestly urge the gas unions to accept the restraints necessary to overcome inflation.
Mr. Prentice: I am afraid that the reply only confirms the impression given by the failure of the Secretary of State to answer at the Dispatch Box, that the Government welcome the chance to have a confrontation and are deliberately abdicating from their normal rôle, which is to try to conciliate in a serious dispute.
May I ask the Minister to confirm these two points for the record? First, that in the last five years workers in the gas industry have co-operated in massive technological changes which have had, among other things, the effect of bringing about a tremendous increase in productivity—I am told that there has been a 200 per cent. productivity increase in two years—redundancies to the extent of 22,500 men, cheaper gas for the consumer and a substantial surplus for the industry. Those facts should be put on the record and confirmed by the Minister. Secondly, that the industry has an exceptional record of co-operation and industrial peace and that there has not been any nationally organised industrial action since the National Joint Industrial Council was formed 54 years ago.

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I am glad that the Minister mentioned that the unions were co-operating on the safety aspect. Will the hon. Gentleman go a bit further? Will he acknowledge that the decisions made about industrial action, which started at midnight, were deliberately made in a moderate form so as to conform to safety requirements? Will he confirm from his knowledge that the leaders of the unions have sent the strictest possible instructions to all their district officials about safety? Will he confirm that the union leaders have had talks with Age Concern and have worked out a six-point plan with that organisation for safeguarding the lives of elderly consumers?
Therefore, will the Minister pay a tribute to what the union leaders are trying to do in that respect instead of engaging in the crude propaganda in which he engaged on the radio yesterday when he had the effrontery to say that some of the most moderate trade union leaders in Britain were threatening the lives of members of the community?
May I make this appeal to the Government—and at least there is a Minister from the Department of Employment on the Front Bench—that they might try again one of the traditional techniques of resolving differences: by making conciliation services available, which have been refused so far, or by thinking again about the proposal for a court of inquiry, or by making a positive response to the unions' appeal yesterday, namely, that there was a possible approach by way of hard guarantees that the new Pay Board would consider the merits of this case at an early stage with a view to implementation early in phase 3?
Can the Minister confirm a report which reached me just before I rose to ask my Question—and therefore I have no knowledge about it—namely, that the TUC representatives may be meeting the Prime Minister today? If that is so, will the Government take the opportunity to discuss with the TUC a peaceful settlement of this dispute? Will they try to achieve peace in the dispute and not insist upon having a confrontation of their own choosing?
Mr. Boardman: I answered the Question because I have ministerial responsibility for safety, which I hope is the matter which concerns Members on both
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sides of the House. It is a matter of immediate and direct concern. It was highly irresponsible of the right hon. Member for East Ham, North (Mr. Prentice) to suggest that we were seeking confrontation. I should have thought that in the present delicate situation, with the question of danger and safety being discussed, to make the suggestion which he made was quite unnecessary, unreasonable and irresponsible.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether I agreed that the workers in the gas industry had co-operated in bringing about massive changes. They have. However, I remind him that the offer which they have just refused represents a larger increase than they were offered last year. It is one of the largest increases made in the history of the gas industry. The suggestion that they have been offered nothing must be refuted, and I refute it now.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the scale of redundancies. During the time that the unions were saying that they were barred from discussions they were, at my request, continuing discussions about redundancy payment terms. I am glad to say that a week ago they concluded discussions with the Gas Corporation on improved redundancy terms, which are outside the restraints imposed in the White Paper.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether I agreed that the workers in the industry had an exceptional record in industrial relations. They have, and it is a great tragedy that that record is being broken now.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me to confirm that the workers were taking all the action necessary to secure safety. I regret to say that they have not been able to guarantee that the risks and hazards will not be increased by the action that is being taken because, as they have pointed out, responsibility is delegated to various areas, and the action being taken in various areas is uneven and erratic. It was made clear that if their objective were to make the strike effective it could not be reconciled with making it safe, because to be effective it must operate on the consumers. To operate on the consumers must mean a reduction in gas pressure, which must mean hazards—and the right hon. Gentleman knows that. Therefore,

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whatever protestations have been made about safety—and I accept that large numbers of gas workers are very concerned with what is happening and about the dangers—I cannot, regrettably, guarantee that safety is assured.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether I would pay tribute to the unions for their work. I would pay tribute to them for their past record, but I must express my deep regret at the course which they have now elected to take.
The right hon. Gentleman asked why there was not a court of inquiry. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, there can be no purpose in a court of inquiry when there is nothing to inquire into.—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The workers have been offered by the Gas Corporation the maximum amount that is permitted under the White Paper. They have been given the choice of dividing that amount as they wish. There is no further room for a court of inquiry. They have been given the assurance, which is implicit in paragraph 33 of the White Paper and in what the Prime Minister said on 24th January, that they will have an opportunity during stage 2 to put their case to the Pay Board when it is established.
Mr. John Hall: In view of the confusion that seems to exist in the public mind about average earnings in the gas industry—a confusion which seems to be shared by hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches—will the Minister tell the House what are the average earnings in the gas industry and how they compare with, say, average earnings in the electricity industry?
Mr. Boardman: As I told my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, South-East (Mr. Rost), the average earnings in the gas industry are £35·50—[HON. MEMBERS: "How many hours?"]—excluding those whose pay is affected by absence. The average earnings in the electricity industry in April 1972 were just under £35. The annual increase to the electricity industry is 8·6 per cent. per annum on average earnings in April 1972 of just under £35. The increase that has been offered to and rejected by the gas industry is about 8 per cent. of average earnings of £35·50.
Mr. Thorpe: In view of the gravity which the Minister rightly attaches to the situation, will he accept that there is no personal criticism of him when I ask whether he is aware that the House expected a statement to be made by a member of the Cabinet?
Secondly, are we to deduce from the Minister's statement that no conciliation is going on, that there are no talks and that there is no intention on the part of the Government that there should be such conciliation? If that is so, why not?
Finally, is the Minister aware that the people of this country are getting tired of industrial relations under both Governments on the basis of confrontation followed by capitulation, which solves nothing and will ultimately destroy the political fabric of the country?
Mr. Boardman: The right hon. Gentleman asks me whether there is any conciliation going on. I have made it clear to the General Secretary of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, and to other unions, that they have the right to put their case to the Pay Board when it is established. If they wish to discuss that aspect with a view to the removal of some uncertainty there appears to be on their part, I or my right hon. Friend will of course welcome those discussions. There is no room for manoeuvre. There is no room to move from the offer that has been made by the Gas Corporation, which is the limit permitted within the White Paper.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me about industrial relations generally. I am sure I shall have his support in saying that it has been the wish of the Government that the TUC should co-operate in these policies. Co-operation would have given the TUC the opportunity to express its point of view and have enabled the Government to have the benefit of its opinion and advice on various features. But the TUC has elected to withdraw, and that is not the Government's responsibility.
Mr. William Clark: Have the unions decided to pay strike pay? If not, is it not unfair that the British taxpayer should subsidise strikers in the form of supplementary benefits?
Mr. Boardman: I understand that it is an official strike. I am only reporting

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what I have read, I think in the Press, but I think that some strike payment is being made under certain conditions.
Mr. Ashley: Is the Minister aware that nothing whatever is to be gained by gagging a great and moderate trade union, of which I was once a member, and that, by refusing to allow the union even to state its case before a court of inquiry, he is creating anger and resentment at the very time when cool heads are needed?
Mr. Boardman: The position of the union is no different from that of every other union and every other industry in the public and private sectors. There is no question of gagging the union, selecting it, or treating it in any way differently from anyone else. I repeat that the union has been assured that it will have the opportunity of stating its case to the Pay Board when it is established.
Mr. John Page: Does my hon. Friend agree that until the passing of the Industrial Relations Act it would have been illegal for gas workers to strike? Secondly, will he inform the House whether the gas unions in calling this dispute are in contravention of Clause 5 of the Counter-Inflation Bill?
Mr. Boardman: The answer to the first question is that I believe that is so. The answer to the second question is, "No".
Mr. Palmer: Will the Minister say whether his Department has made any calculation of the extra load that is likely to be placed on the electricity supply system due to the gradual slowing of gas supplies and whether he is satisfied that the electricity supply system will have the generating capacity to meet it?
Mr. Boardman: Yes, estimates have been made of the additional demand that may be made upon the electricity system. There has been close co-operation and consultation between the two industries and the Government to try to meet such extra demands as they arise.
Mr. Burden: Does not it appear that hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches consider this to be a special case? Have conditions of work and pay of gas workers deteriorated considerably since the Labour Government were in power? If they have not, and if this is a special case now, it must have been a special case then and why did the Labour
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Government do nothing about it when they were in power?
Mr. Boardman: I cannot, off-hand, give the detailed figures, but I believe what my hon. Friend has said is absolutely right. The wages and terms compare relatively with those in operation when the Labour Government were in power.
Dr. John A. Cunningham: Will the Minister say on what legal basis he was able to write to the trade unions and the Gas Corporation before the Government proposals on wages were published, to prevent negotiations taking place?
Mr. Boardman: The letter which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister sent to Lord Cooper was in response to a letter from Lord Cooper to the Prime Minister, and it was the inquiry raised in that letter that my right hon. Friend answered. In the letter which I wrote to the Chairman of the Gas Corporation I pointed out that pending publication of the White Paper it would be inadvisable to raise expectations or to negotiate until that White Paper was published and the parties knew the parameters within which they could negotiate.
Mr. J. H. Osborn: How many firms have been affected and what is the number of workers in other industries who are prevented from undertaking gainful employment?
Mr. Boardman: I have no detailed information at the moment. The latest figure I have is that about 530 firms in the West Midlands region have had their gas supplies interrupted. There have been considerable interruptions in the East Midlands and in the Northern region. There has been a reduction of gas pressure in six of the gas regions which is likely to affect at least 3 million homes.
Mr. Orme: Is the Minister aware that his rigidity in this matter matches the rigidity of the Government's current policy since it removes the possibility of trade unions trying, through collective bargaining, to negotiate a settlement? Is he further aware that, in face of the standstill, the White Paper and the Counter-Inflation Bill, a ceiling has been set under which it is impossible for the unions to operate and that until that

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ceiling is removed and free collective bargaining takes place industrial troubles will only escalate?
Mr. Boardman: I am sorry to hear the hon. Gentleman make that last remark. He has taken part in the debates on the Government's counter-inflation policy and he knows the need to secure a growth in prosperity—an objective we all seek—to protect the old and weaker sections of society who have been so vulnerable to the pressures of the strong.
On the question of the power to negotiate, the hon. Gentleman knows that we have moved from phase 1 to phase 2, and that we shall move into phase 3. The Government have already said that it will be possible during phase 3 to look at any anomalies which have been created. Therefore, we would welcome the cooperation of the Trades Union Congress, but so far, regrettably, this has not been forthcoming. I hope that it will be.
Mr. Waddington: Will my hon. Friend invite the public to be on their guard against a ploy that is often used during strikes—and it was used during the miners' strike—when people appear on television to protest that they have tiny minimum wages when those wages bear no relation whatever to actual earnings? Will he take every opportunity to stress within the terms of the White Paper that this union and other unions can help the low paid if they wish to do so?
Mr. Boardman: Yes, it is important that the figures are put in perspective. I have already given the average earnings——
Mrs. Renée Short: Tell us how many hours.
Mr. Boardman: I am asked about hours, but we are now comparing the present rates with rates which were current when the Labour Government were in office.
Mr. Robert C. Brown: Will the Minister accept it from me, as somebody with 30 years' experience in the gas industry, that there is no set of employees more consumer-conscious than are the gas industry employees, and that they will resent the Minister's inference that it is only the Government who are concerned about the wellbeing of the elderly? Does
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he not agree that his provocative attitude yesterday, and his truculent performance this afternoon at the Government Dispatch Box, is calculated only to inject heat into a situation in which at the moment there is a lot of anger, but it is cool anger. I hope the Minister will reconsider some of the things he has said in the last 24 hours in order that he may prevent heat being injected into the situation? Will he not give further consideration to the just appeal made by my union, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, that this matter should be referred to a court of inquiry? If, however, the Government feel that they cannot agree to that suggestion, will they give some assurance that, at the end of phase 2, there will be a clear recognition of the special case of these workers, bearing in mind that in a five-year period when industry generally increased productivity by 25 per cent., the gas workers increased their productivity by 200 per cent., accompanied by 22,500 redundancies?
Mr. Boardman: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that a very large number, and no doubt the vast majority, of members of the gas union are very concerned about the hazards about which I have been talking. The reports that are coming in today show that in regions there are a very large number of workers who have been brought up in the high traditions of the gas industry, who have a loyalty to it and a regard for safety considerations, and who are extremely concerned about the procedures and methods by which it is suggested they should operate during this difficult period. I hope that the attitude of those workers, to whom I pay tribute, will prevail and not the attitude of those who perhaps look on this matter as a battleground.
Mr. Edward Short: Is the Minister aware that the Opposition regard it as utterly irresponsible by the Government, as well as demonstrating a wanton disregard for this House and the seriousness of the situation, that the Secretary of State has not come to the House to make a statement? Could we have an assurance, from the Leader of the House or from the Minister for Industry, that tomorrow the Secretary of State will be man enough to come here and make a statement on the situation and not send the Minister for Industry, who has done his best in the

1293
last 24 hours to stir up the situation—no doubt on the instructions of the Prime Minister—and to make an already serious situation more serious and more intractable?
Mr. Boardman: I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that until industrial action started, with the consequences to which I have already referred, there was no question of any statement being made that could be in any way so construed. And since industrial action has been taken, it has been the Government's right and duty to warn the public of the hazards to ensure that everything possible is done to preserve public safety and to make the appeal we have made. I again make an appeal for good sense, which has so long been a feature of this union, to be restored—[Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Edward Short) may feel that the stirring up has come from his side of the House. The Government's position has been absolutely clear. The gas industry is having no better and no worse treatment than is any other industry in the public or private sector. The terms which have been offered to the gas industry compare not unfavourably with those offered to other industries, and they know that they will have the opportunity to put the matter to the Pay Board. We feel that this is fair and proper and it is an attitude which the public as a whole support.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose——
Mr. Speaker: Order. I must protect the other business of the House, which includes an Opposition Supply Day.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That, at this day's Sitting, Mr. Speaker shall put any Question necessary to dispose of Proceedings on the Motion relating to Value Added Tax on Children's Clothing not later than Seven o'clock.—[Mr. Prior.]
3.58 p.m.
Mr. Marcus Kimball: I think I am correct in saying that this motion is debatable. In seeking to debate it, I appeal to you, Mr. Speaker, as the protector of minorities in this House and also as the protector of the rights of the Opposition—rights which hon. Members on both sides of the House have a very great interest in preserving.
I submit to you, Sir that this motion on the Order Paper requiring the important debate on the subject of value added tax on childrens' clothing to be finished by seven o'clock is a gross interference with the rights of the Opposition. Time is being taken away because the Government have tabled a Private Member's Bill for discussion after seven o'clock. It may be argued that this is not the case, but the Government are convicted of doing this because, since the Anti-Discrimination (No. 2) Bill has a star against it on the Order Paper, it can be assumed that it is a Government Order of the Day. Therefore the Government have taken away the rights of the Opposition on a very important day.
What is worse, Mr. Speaker—and this is why I appeal to you—is that these circumstances could arise only where Government and Opposition were in agreement. This is an unwholesome situation to any private Member of the House of Commons. Further, as I understand it, the Government are giving to Opposition Members an opportunity which they do not give their own back benchers, because the Government have chosen to make this Private Member's Bill a Government Bill and the Opposition have agreed to this device.
The motion that we are now debating can be debated for as long as you, Mr. Speaker, are prepared to allow. As I see it, it would be possible for us to have three Divisions. We may discuss this very important motion until such time as it is necessary to move the Closure. That will be one Division. Then

1295
there will be another Division on the main Question. That means that 20 minutes will have gone. I see that after this motion there is to be a Bill under the Ten-Minute Rule concerning badgers. Some of us may wish to say a few words about that. Thus, before we even reach the Opposition's Supply time there will have been nearly half an hour's delay.
You, Mr. Speaker, are the protector of the interests of the Opposition and of private Members. I appeal to you to do what you can to see whether this motion can be withdrawn, as it should be.
4.1 p.m.
Mr. Marcus Lipton: Before we are drowned in the crocodile tears of the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Kimball), I beg to move, That the Question be now put.
Mr. Speaker: I do not accept that motion.
4.2 p.m.
Mr. James Ramsden: Before the House agrees to this motion which I take it, is necessary in order that time may be found for a Private Member's Bill later in the day, I think that we are entitled to ask for one or two reassurances from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House.
While I appreciate the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Gains-borough (Mr. Kimball), I have no wish to join him as a champion of the rights of the Opposition and their entitlement to their time on these occasions, though it is a respectable argument. However, some of us have been concerned, and not only in this Parliament, with the treatment of Private Members' Bills. Some of us were worried under the Administration of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and again last October that the Government should have been prepared to give selective treatment to certain Private Members' Bills at the expense of others.
I shall not go back into past history, but when the Private Member's Bill concerned with vasectomy narrowly failed on a Friday, my right hon. Friend's predecessor, in what admittedly was a rather special case, took steps to ensure that it should be given Government time to complete its remaining stages. A number of us were not too happy about that, and
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we raised the matter with the then Leader of the House and obviously he took the point. I received a letter from him last October giving fairly explicit assurances that he regarded the instance in question as a very special case and that it was unlikely to be repeated. It is not very long since last October. Here we have another instance of selective treatment being given to a Private Member's measure.
I do not go into the merits. I simply say that there are strict rules embodied in the Standing Orders of the House about private Members' legislation and the amount of time that it should have. If those rules exist I believe they should be kept and then people will know where they are. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House will give us some reassurance about how he intends to handle these matters in future because there is real disquiet among Government back benchers. I do not make too much of it, but apparently last Friday week's proceedings were attended by a certain amount of disturbance from the Public Gallery, and that does not square with the proper dignity of proceedings of this House.
4.4 p.m.
Mr. Robert Mellish: It is right to put on record that the Opposition are appreciative of the way in which the Government have handled this matter. Those right hon. and hon. Members who were present last Friday week will know what happened when you, Mr. Speaker, because of the rules of the House, were unable to accept a closure motion on a matter concerning hon. Members on both sides of he House.
When our Supply Day came up, in the usual way we selected the matter that we wished to discuss and we asked the Government whether the debate could be arranged to conclude at seven o'clock in order that the Anti-Discrimination (No. 2) Bill might come forward for normal debate and be decided one way or the other at ten o'clock. In suggesting that, I thought I was being helpful to the House.
This is Opposition time. I make it clear that this proposition came from the Opposition, and I am grateful to the Leader of the House for his co-operation
4.5 p.m.
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. James Prior): I appreciate the reasonable manner in which my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Kimball) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate (Mr. Ramsden) have raised this matter. I want also to tell the right hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) how grateful I am for the view that he has taken.
On the Friday before last, we were faced with a very delicate and difficult situation of the kind which confronts Leaders of the House from time to time. I believe that it was in the interests of the House as a whole that in this very exceptional case some arrangement should have been made to meet what were the wishes of a great many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides and to avert what could have been a difficult situation to the House as a whole. It was with that in mind that I said plainly from this Dispatch Box that the Government could not give time of their own, and it was then that the right hon. Member for Bermondsey made his suggestion.
I believe that it is in the interests of Governments of all political parties that we do our best to stick rigidly to the rule which has been made. Once we
1298
start to transgress a rule we get into the difficulties about which a number of my hon. Friends have been telling me in the past few days. I do not believe that we should make new rules which lead us into more trouble than is involved by sticking to existing rules. In this case I believe the House has been better served by the action which has been taken. But I hope that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House will recognise that these are very exceptional circumstances and that they will treat them as such.
Mr. William Clark: Before my right hon. Friend sits down, will he answer one question? It has been the tradition that Private Members' Bills are subject to a free vote. May we be assured that both sides of the House will have a free vote?
Mr. Prior: I do not think that that is a question for me to answer. I should be very surprised if they did not.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That, at this day's Sitting, Mr. Speaker shall put any Question necessary to dispose of Proceedings on the Motion relating to Value Added Tax on Children's Clothing not later than Seven o'clock.

PROTECTION OF BADGERS BILL
4.8 p.m.
Mr. Peter Hardy: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to prohibit the taking or killing and the attempted taking or killing of badgers on land without the prior written consent of the owner of that land.
The House will see that this is a modest proposal since it does not provide comprehensive protection for badgers and a good case could be made for that. However, some action is needed urgently. I propose, therefore, only that which I regard as generally acceptable. I believe that this will receive general approval rather than the obstructive doubts which a wider protection might arouse. That response could extinguish hopes for protection which would mean the likely disappearance of badgers from many areas in which the species has already lived for many thousands of years.
Generally the badger is not scarce to a critical extent. In the 1940s and 1950s the population increased. But there is now a very severe decline. This is particularly marked in East Anglia, parts of the South-East, in the counties of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Cheshire and the West Riding of Yorkshire. There is decline in other areas perhaps, but this is a little less severe today than in those areas mentioned.
My authorities for that assessment are the Mammal Society County Recorders and Dr. Ernest Neal one of our leading naturalists and the acknowledged expert upon this species. He believe that a real measure of protection has now become urgently necessary.
Most people may only see a badger in a zoo or dead upon the road. In its natural surroundings it is an impressive and attractive creature and the spectacle of cubs playing is fascinating. Yet some people view the badger with a strange hatred. It is from those people that the most savage cruelty is inflicted and the survival of the species threatened in many of our regions.
Yet the badger is usually harmless to man's interests. The Forestry Commission welcomes the species and offers protection to it through its byelaws. Unfortunately, the penalty for infringe-
1300
ment is small and there is some evidence now that the offenders are likely to continue their offensive practices.
In areas where the population is in decline the principal reason appears to be deliberate persecution. I had better briefly describe the practice of digging. Small terriers, which are often on sale, are sent into a set. Their job is to prevent the badger from moving away. Frequently the dogs are injured. Usually there is noise and towards this noise the people above ground dig. When the badger is within reach tongs are used and the animal is literally dragged out.
If the business ended there it would not be so disgusting, but frequently the badger is not humanely killed. It commences to suffer a long period of dog baiting and torment. In order to improve the chances of the dogs, the animal is often viciously injured beforehand. One case recently brought to my notice involved a badger having a broken lower jaw before the dog baiting began—in order to improve the dogs' chances.
The badger is a formidable opponent. It is retiring and shy and extremely shortsighted, but it is ferocious when roused and provides a great deal for sport for people who are disposed to this kind of activity.
I am reluctant to describe all that may happen—for I know what does happen—in badger digging. Suffice to say that often if a set is so large that digging is impracticable, the people concerned place snares and perhaps wipe out the whole population of the set. Only last autumn, as a further example of the attitude of badger diggers, after a set had been dug unsuccessfully, a gin trap was placed there at the side of a children's nature trail in the West Riding of Yorkshire.
The Bill does not provide a complete answer for this kind of practice. However, there may be times—I am sure that many people would concede this—when the badger could remotely be a nuisance, and therefore there is scope within the Bill for humane treatment in the control and removal of badgers where necessary.
I express the wish—I think that the Bill would provide for it—that land owners, whether private or public, will view the badger with approval and tolerance and not give permission lightly for the removal which is allowed.

1301
Any doubt about the harmless effects of the badger upon man's interests have been largely dispelled by the work of several naturalists in recent years, not least of whom is my constituent and friend, Dr. Richard Paget. Their researches, in which he has played a large part, offer extensive evidence that the badger's diet makes it a welcome neighbour for man. There may be exceptions, but basically the forester and the farmer ought to welcome this animal.
Given our present knowledge of the species, it is clear that the badger in no way merits the persecution which he is currently receiving. I have watched this animal over at least 10 years and can confirm the evidence which naturalists throughout the country are now providing. I can offer not only my confirmation of the merits of the species but also my suggestion to the House that it would be justified in viewing the Bill and the animal favourably.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Peter Hardy, Mr. Peter Archer, Mr. Joseph Ashton, Mr. Sydney Chapman, Mr. David Clark, Mr. Eric Cockeram, Mr. David James, Mr. Brynmor John, Mr. William Price, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Cecil Parkinson and Mr. Terry Davis.

PROTECTION OF BADGERS
Bill to prohibit the taking, or killing and the attempted taking or killing of badgers on land without the prior written consent of the owner of that land, presented accordingly, and read the First time to be read a Second time upon Friday 23rd February and to be printed. [Bill 70.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY
  SUPPLY
  [8TH ALLOTTED DAY] considered.

  VALUE ADDED TAX (CHILDREN'S CLOTHING)
  4.15 p.m.
  Mr. Joel Barnett: I beg to move,
  That this House considers that value added tax should not apply to children's clothing.
  Since the motion was put down the Government have put down an amendment to it which would seek to leave the whole matter to the Budget, but it should be said that the whole House, the Chancellor and the Financial Secretary, who is to reply, will be aware that the Chancellor deliberately took power in the last Finance Act to zero rate anything that he wishes without waiting for a Budget. Indeed, we all know that this is a simple, tactical manoeuvre to avoid a vote on the issue, but the country will see the vote as being for or against taxing children's clothing. That is the issue to which I shall be addressing myself.
  I find it hard to believe that anyone given a choice as to what should be taxed, would deliberately choose to tax children's clothing. So I hope that I carry with me all hon. Members on both sides of the House on the general principle of not wishing to introduce a tax on children's clothing. Unless the Chancellor of the Exchequer changes his mind, he will have the doubtful honour of being the first Chancellor of the Exchequer to tax children's clothing. He will need better arguments than those yet advanced to justify such action.
  Before dealing with those arguments, I should like to mention briefly children's shoes. The House will know that the Chancellor agreed to an inquiry to avoid a revolt from his own side of the House The medical case was very well made out in the debate by hon. Members on both sides of the House, particularly by the hon. Members for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford), Reading (Dr. Vaughan) and Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman) in

  1303
  excellent speeches. It would be an appalling insult to the House and to those hon Members who spoke in that debate if the Chancellor did not now zero rate children's shoes, particularly after having told us how much he had been influenced by the debate. Certainly tinkering about with some medically approved shoe would not be enough.
  Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Surely the hon. Gentleman is leaping to conclusions. It is difficult for the House to make up its mind before having read the report which is not yet published.
  Mr. Barnett: Even without the report, I thought that the hon. Lady, in view of what she said in the debate, would not go back on the words she used——
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: I am not going back on them.
  Mr. Barnett:—when she made it clear that there was a vital need to have children's shoes zero rated.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman Mrs. Kellett-Bowman rose——
  Mr. Barnett: May I finish? I have re-read the hon. Lady's speech with great care.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman Mrs. Kellett-Bowman rose——
  Mr. Barnett: Please let me finish. The hon. Lady should not get so angry. She may do herself some harm. I have reread her speech with great care. I agree that she accepted her right hon. Friend's decision to set up an inquiry into having children's shoes zero rated. She appeared to be saying that she was prepared to accept that certain types of shoes should be zero rated, but I should think that most hon. Members would prefer all children's shoes to be zero rated.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman Mrs. Kellett-Bowman rose——
  Mr. Barnett: Perhaps I may finish this point. The hon. Lady may disagree with that, but that is my view.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, had that been my view there would have been no point in setting up a committee. I have never asked for—and never would—the zero rating of all children's shoes, because I believe that some are positively physically
  1304
  harmful. What I wanted and achieved was the setting up of a committee to find out which shoes were medically useful for children and for them not to be taxed.
  Mr. Barnett: The last thing in the world that I should ever seek to do is to misrepresent the hon. Lady's views, but what I was saying was, to a considerable extent, based on what she said during that debate about the need to zero rate children's shoes.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: Those that were medically approved.
  Mr. Barnett: The hon. Lady and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are entitled to their quibble, and I use the word deliberately because if the hon. Lady thinks that the Chancellor set up the inquiry to do other than avoid being defeated in the debate I must tell her that she does not understand the workings of the House. However, the hon. Lady will no doubt tell us what kind of carefully medically approved shoes she would like to see children wearing. I shall leave it to her to present her own case. I shall leave her to say what kind of shoes she would like her children to wear, but I know what kind I should like mine to wear. I shall say little more about children's shoes because I feel that the House and the country have made their views known to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
  I now come to the main burden of the Chancellor's case about taxing children's clothing. He refused to zero rate children's clothes largely because, he said, of the unscrupulous traders who take advantage of the size problem under purchase tax. He went on to say that because VAT is a broad based tax he must include children's clothing within it. I have had an opportunity of discussing the size problem with a number of ladies', gentlemen's and children's clothing manufacturers, buyers in large and small retail shops and stores, and mail order houses, but before coming on to deal with their views perhaps I may make one last comment on this broad based comprehensive tax which is free from anomalies. That is how it was described by the Chancellor and his cohorts on the Treasury Bench.
  I have a theory about why they described it in that way. It is that the

  1305
  Chancellor's first intention was to have a genuinely broad based comprehensive tax—and that would have been free from anomalies because it would have taxed everything including food, housing, fuel and transport. I have no doubt that that is what the Chancellor has it in mind to do eventually under the cloak of harmonisation. But the facts of life prevented him from doing that. The trouble is that all the briefs were prepared for the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends as if it were still a broad-based tax. We know that it is nothing of the sort. It is riddled with anomalies, as we showed in our lengthy debates on the Finance Bill, and that cannot be used as an excuse for not zero rating children's clothing.
  I now come to the size argument. I believe that the Chancellor was wrong when he talked about unscrupulous traders using the size problem to escape purchase tax. According to the best information that I have been able to obtain, most respectable retailers, including well-known big name stores and large leading manufacturers, connive together to avoid purchase tax. Indeed, they frequently use what is known in the trade as "tolerance" in sizes to ensure that so-called children's sizes can be sold to adults free of tax. It is impossible to tell whether the volume of tax avoided is 20 per cent., 25 per cent., or more, but I willingly concede that a large amount of tax is evaded in this way. I use the word "evaded"—that is to say, the illegal version of the word—because that is precisely what it is.
  I understand that many large manufacturers are compelled to comply with the demands of retailers—the large ones in particular—to supply adult clothing as children's clothing for fear of losing business. I find it shameful that this deliberate tax evasion is used by the Chancellor as an excuse to tax children's clothing of all sizes instead of doing something about these trading methods.
  I admit at once that it would not be easy to deal with this problem. As I understand it, it cannot be done on a matter of lengths. The advice that I have received—and I presume that it is available to the Chancellor—is that he will need to act on chest measurements or, as they say in the ladies' trade, bust measurements.
  Mr. Michael Fidler: Will the hon. Gentleman accept that the advice available to him may not be as all-embracing and comprehensive as he imagines? Will he also accept that chest—or bust measurements, as the case may be—are—and have been for the last 30 years—used as well as length in a hopeless endeavour to define what is children's clothing?
  Mr. Barnett: I am aware of the problem, but I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not wish to mislead the House, as he nearly did in his last speech on this subject. The hon. Gentleman's greatest experience—indeed, his only experience as I understand it—is in rainwear. I have been talking to dress——
  Mr. Fidler Mr. Fidler rose——
  Mr. Barnett: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to finish my sentence. I have been talking to dress, casual wear and trouser suit manufacturers. I have been talking to all kinds of clothing manufacturers, so I have a reasonable view of the matter.
  Mr. Fidler: The hon. Gentleman may be interested to know that, apart from manufacturing rainwear and coats, I have been involved personally in manufacturing skirts and other articles of men's and ladies' apparel. In addition, I have served as Chairman of the Garment Manufacturing Section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. In that capacity I dealt with all kinds of garments and I therefore speak with some authority.
  Mr. Barnett: I am obliged for the commercial, but as far as I am aware the hon. Gentleman's main interest was in producing rainwear. Is that not true?
  Mr. Fidler: The hon. Gentleman has invited me to take up some more of his time. When I was Chairman of the Garment Manufacturing Section of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce I was interested in the production of all types of clothing, and not merely rainwear. If I get an opportunity to speak later in the debate I shall give the House some examples based on my experience.
  Mr. Barnett: I think that we have had enough from the hon. Gentleman. I had the unfortunate experience of being on a local council with the hon. Gentleman, and I heard him at great length

  1307
  upon many subjects. No doubt he is an expert on children's clothing and on everything else on which he cares to speak. I am prepared to accept that he is an expert on every aspect of clothing—ladies', gentlemen's, children's, old women's, young women's, any kind that he cares to talk on. I do not think that I could be more generous than that. I was talking about the difficulty that the Chancellor would have in dealing with this problem, and I do not think that the hon. Gentleman would disagree with anything that I said before he decided that he had to intervene.
  The position now is that coats up to a chest size of 37⅛in. are classed as children's clothing and are not subject to tax. Dresses up to a 36in. bust measurement are also not taxable. I hasten to add that that is the garment measurement, and not the body measurement, which gives some idea of the complexity of the problem. Garments of that size could be, and are, used by a large number of slim women. If the Chancellor decided to reduce the measurement to 32in. for exemption from tax, I am told that most women—other than Twiggy and a few others—would have to pay tax. The difficulty about that is that it would immediately result in a large number of 11-, 12- and 13-year olds having to pay tax. That is to say, some larger young boys and girls would have to pay tax. That is just one additional disadvantage of being large.
  But I must say to the Chancellor that I would have thought that even that situation would be better than having one-to-10 year-olds paying tax as well, which is precisely what the Chancellor would have us do. If the Chancellor feels that he cannot persuade scrupulous firms to stop conspiring with manufacturers—for it is surely a conspiracy to avoid tax that these firms are engaged in—let him not use that as an excuse for taxing babies and young children. That is precisely what he is doing.
  Mr. Adam Butler: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. To make sure that I understood his argument on this case of alleged conniving and conspiracy, may I ask him whether he said that about 20
  1308
  per cent. or 25 per cent. of purchase tax on clothing was avoided because of this?
  Mr. Barnett: No. I said that I was not sure of the percentage. The hon. Member for Bury and Radcliffe (Mr. Fidler) knows the percentage. He is absolutely certain. He knows about every aspect of the clothing industry. He quoted the figures 25th per cent. to 30 per cent. The Chancellor said he did not know. What I said was that it could be as much as 25 per cent. or 30 per cent., but that I did not know what the precise percentage was.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: If the hon. Gentleman is seeking simply to obviate the hardship to families, would all the complications that he has referred to not be obviated if, instead of bringing forward this motion just before the Budget, when clearly it can hardly be sensibly argued—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because the Minister cannot give away Budget secrets now. If the hon. Gentleman were to join in the effort that I have been making to persuade the Chancellor and his hon. Friends to assist these families, not in this indirect way where there are so many loopholes and which will not help the families whom we most wish to help, but essentially by improving FIS and family allowances—
  Mr. Barnett: The hon. Lady and the Chancellor must not try to get off the hook in that way. There is nothing to prevent the Chancellor telling us today, or last month or the month before, that he has already, with 47 regulations since the last Budget, zero rated and made all sorts of changes. It is absolute hypocritical nonsense to suggest that the Chancellor has got to wait for the Budget. It is absurd to suggest at this stage that the Chancellor should do something about FIS, when the hon. Lady knows very well what happened to her Government's initial proposal, through the late Lain Macleod, that family allowances should be increased. There was no suggestion of any FIS, which in any case is not taken up by anything like the number of families that she suggests. All she is trying to do is to wriggle out of facing up to the problem whether or not children's clothes should be taxed, which is all that we are debating today.
  Mr. Healey: The Tory Twiggy!
  Mr. Barnett: I do not know that I can go along with everything that my right hon. Friend says.
  I now come to the question of the yield from the tax. The Treasury statement on the question of the yield from this tax is that no upper estimates can be given. I have, therefore, tried to make my own estimate of the loss of yield which there might be from zero rating childrens' clothing. The family expenditure survey of 1971 states that children's clothing represents 1·1 per cent. of total household expenditure. From that, one can obtain some kind of idea of the amount of money spent on children's clothing.
  Mr. Fidler Mr. Fidler rose——
  Mr. Barnett: The hon. Gentleman is is such an expert on everything, including family expenditure surveys, but I have heard him at such great length on so many occasions that I hope he will forgive me if I do not give way to him again.
  Mr. Fidler Mr. Fidler rose——
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris): Order. The hon. Gentleman would be best advised not to be too persistent. He might lose out later.
  Mr. Barnett: I am sure that I would not wish the hon. Gentleman to lose out in any way, because he has so much expertise to impart to the House.
  The estimate that I have made on the yield is 10 per cent. of £370 million, or about £37 million. It may be £10 million more or less, or even £20 million, but it would be incredible if any Chancellor could on 5th April reduce taxation for those at the highest end of the income scale by £300 million whilst at the same time refusing to allow this amount to relieve children's clothing from tax. The cost to a family with three children would be rather more than appears to be the case.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), with his customary under-statement, estimated in the last debate that it would be in the region of 19p. This does not take into account the way in which retailers calculate their margins. Now, many of them add their
  1310
  profit margins to the cost, including purchase tax, to get a real return on sales. The margin can vary from 50 per cent. on cost, to give one-third on sales, to 100 per cent. to give 50 per cent. on sales. Under VAT they should only put the margin on cost, excluding VAT, which they recover, unlike purchase tax. That is what they should do.
  If they do as I am told many will be doing, the average family will be paying up to 100 per cent. more than the actual VAT because margins will continue to be put on costs plus VAT, and the rebate will be pocketed. That is what will be happening in the case of many retailers.
  We know that the weights and measures inspectors and some of the 300 staff of the Price Commission, while checking on prices and profit margins of 1 million traders, are supposed to keep a specially watchful eye on retailers' profit margins during the first three months of VAT. I always thought that the weights and measures inspectors had other jobs as well. I do not know how experienced they are likely to be in coping with profit margins and costings of small retailers. I would be interested to know from the Financial Secretary what training these officials will undergo for their arduous tasks and how many hours of the day, and night, they will work to keep up with the average retailer of whom, according to the 1971 survey, there were 485,346. That is excluding the service industries and market stalls. I do not know whefther they will go round the market stalls as well, but if they do, the best of luck to them.
  The information given in answers to Questions and from talking especially to small firms makes it clear that the whole VAT operation is miles behind schedule. The latest official figures to the end of last week, which were given in reply to a Question of mine yesterday, are that 950,000 applications were made for registration out of 1·5 million estimated traders. But this again is a fiddle. It was a fiddled answer. I did not ask for the number of applications. I asked for the numbers registered. In the past the answers that I got gave the number of people registered, but I did not get that answer this time. I was told the number of applications—950.000.

  1311
  Even at that level, 950,000 leaves over 500,000 still to register. Even if they all send in their applications tomorrow morning, I find it very hard to understand how on earth the Customs and Excise will be able to cope with the whole of that before 1st April 1973.
  There is also the question of the regional figures. In the Question that I tabled I asked what was the position in the regions, and I was told that the information is not available—very strange. Where do the Government get the figures from? From where do they get the figure of 950,000 applications? I should have thought that it was the regions which submitted the information to them. I cannot imagine that the Treasury is not getting a copy of every registration form which is sent and then doing the calculations from that. I hope that the Financial Secretary will look again at that answer, which was of doubtful significance and difficult to understand.
  The figures show that the whole of trade and industry will be in chaos on 1st April, and, as I say, I doubt that all could be registered in time even if, by some means or other, all the applications were plonked on the Customs and Excise desk tomorrow morning.
  Mr. J. Bruce-Gardyne: I am trying to relate this part of the hon. Gentleman's argument to the motion. If his rather sweeping claims about the state of registration are anywhere near accurate, does he think that acceptance of the motion would assist the position?
  Mr. Barnett: Yes, I would far rather that the decision were taken and that the Chancellor postponed VAT, which would give more time to consider how he would zero rate children's clothing. I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman is not interested in the facts which show the sort of chaos likely on 1st April, but I thought that the House would be interested to know what the situation was.
  The Chancellor should now take the sensible course and announce a postponement. It would be outrageous to do as he plans, to penalise hundreds of thousands of small retailers just because they do not find this monstrous tax and the registration form as easy to understand as the Chancellor does. What is more, to introduce such a tax on child-
  1312
  ren's clothing at any time would be grossly unfair, but to do so at the very time when he is introducing statutory control of incomes is utter folly such as even this Government have not yet exceeded. It seems certain to lead to the mothers' revolt which has been widely forecast. One does not need a vivid imagination to foresee the effect when husbands faced with compulsory pay restraint are told by their wives of the increased cost of children's clothing.
  Inflation is the major problem of our age. Many will regard a deliberate increase in the price of clothing for the youngest in the land as an odd way to cure it. I ask the Chancellor and his right hon. and hon. Friends to think again and accept the motion.
  4.42 p.m.
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Terence Higgins): I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
  "recognises that Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer will give full consideration to all representations made in respect of any aspect of taxation, direct or indirect, and appreciates that no statement on any such matter should be made in advance of the Budget."
  As hon. Members may know, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has thought it right to attend a council meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers in Brussels for immediate discussions on the implications of the financial changes which have taken place in the last few days. The meeting was due to start a few minutes ago. I am sure that the House appreciates that, as matters of great concern to the United Kingdom are being considered, my right hon. Friend felt it right to be present personally. But he has asked me to say how sorry he is that he is not able to attend this debate.
  I believe it to be true that attempts to alter the traditions of the House often reveal the reasons why those traditions have been long established. This has sometimes become apparent when changes have been made quite deliberately to alter our procedures. It is equally true of those traditions which we scarcely notice, and one of these is that, in the period immediately before Budget day, Treasury Ministers say nothing on any aspect of taxation which might anticipate or seem to anticipate the Chancellor's Budget statement. There are good reasons

  1313
  for this, of which, I am sure, it is not necessary to remind the House. All Chancellors of the Exchequer have recognised the wisdom of maintaining that position.
  Mr. Denis Healey: The Chancellor has already made 34 changes in the provisional arrangements for value added tax, all of which affect the yield, including one announced on the back pages of The Times yesterday. Is the hon. Gentleman maintaining that children's clothing is the only aspect of value added tax which is not open to a decision, like the others, at any time the Chancellor wishes to take it?
  Mr. Higgins: That is not what I am maintaining.
  Mr. Healey: Answer the question.
  Mr. Higgins: I am about to answer it, but I cannot do so unless I am allowed to open my mouth for more than a second. The hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett) said that there had been orders for zero rating, giving exemptions, and so on. That is not so. There have been a number of Treasury orders—for example, those on second-hand goods, terminal markets and disallowance of inputs—which were anticipated in last year's Budget debates. Those orders have been laid, as, I think, the House thought it right that they should be, but broad questions of coverage are rightly regarded as budgetary matters.
  Generally speaking, all Chancellors of the Exchequer have taken the view that that is the right position to adopt. As I understand it, under the old rules, Supply Days related to the voting of Supply and, accordingly, debates had to be related to the question of expenditure, so that any proposal for a debate on taxation would have been out of order. It was only in 1966 that the rules were changed so that any subject could be debated on a Supply Day, and I have not been able to discover any subsequent Supply Day debate on any taxation matter in the pre-Budget period.
  The entry of Treasury Ministers into their traditional purdah in no way inhibits hon. Members or persons outside from making representations to the Chancellor of the day. Indeed, if anything, it signifies an intensification of such repre-
  1314
  sentations. Therefore, on the important question of VAT and children's clothing, as on many other important fiscal matters, responsible people and responsible newspapers are now putting forward their views for the Chancellor's consideration.
  If that were what the Opposition were doing today in a Supply Day debate, it would certainly be unusual but it would be a responsible line to take. The Opposition could have put down a motion calling on the Chancellor to consider this question, or another, so that their views, like those of others, could be taken fully into account before the Budget. But, as the House can judge from the Order Paper and the speech of the hon. Member from Heywood and Royton, that is not what the Opposition have chosen to do on this occasion. Instead, they have deliberately put down a motion, which I understand they are likely to press to a Division, to take what amounts to a specific decision on a particular aspect of taxation in isolation from all other questions of taxation, and they have done this at a time when Budget day itself is less than three weeks off.
  Mr. Brian Walden: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman does not want these constitutional matters to be misrepresented. Let me give him an example to show that the doctrine which he is advancing has no traditional validity whatever. In 1853, Mr. Gladstone, the best Chancellor this country ever had, made a public speech on the malt tax two months before his Budget. He was challenged on it, and, very rarely for him, he made a joke. He said, "Purdah does not imply chastity. If I choose to speak on this country's fiscal affairs and to give some indication of my intentions, I may do so unless it can be proved that commercial advantage accrues". The hon. Gentleman has to prove that in some way a commercial advantage could accrue to somebody before he can shield himself in his yashmak.
  Mr. Higgins: The hon. Gentleman has used exotic terms to make his point. I am sure that he does not wish me to misrepresent the constitutional point—I do not think that I should put it as high as that—and I do not wish him to misrepresent it, either. It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman has to go back to

  1315
  Gladstone in 1853. I think it is the case that successive Chancellors have generally taken the view that it is sensible to deliver a Budget statement which takes account of the various factors which need to be regarded as a whole.
  Instead of making representations in the usual manner, the Opposition have chosen today to do something without precedent. I can find no precedent for a Supply Day debate of this kind. [Interruption.] I am glad that the hon. Member for Birmingham, All Saints agrees with me. I understand that it was out of order until a few years ago, and there appears to have been no such debate since that position changed. The Opposition have chosen to act in a way which, regardless of the merits of the case, we can only describe as wholly irresponsible.
  Even after some years in the House, I am still somewhat surprised that a former First Lord of the Treasury—the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. Harold Wilson)—and the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who evidently aspires to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, could have put their names to such a motion. In those circumstances, I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends, and some Labour Members, will support the amendment.
  Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman has referred to my position. He said that the Chancellor welcomes at this stage in his purdah representations from groups in the country who have a view. All that the Opposition are seeking to do is to invite the House to express a view, not to bind the Government, but to say that the House considers that children's clothes should be free of tax. Everything that the Minister has said so far seems to me to be liberating his right hon. and hon. Friends to vote exactly as they feel, so that he has a clear idea of the real views of the House, without the application of party Whips. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will now confirm my view of the implications of what he has said.
  Mr. Higgins: I shall be very happy to spell out the implications of the right hon. Gentleman's motion. He is clearly now trying to wriggle out of the position into which he has got himself. He could have tabled a motion asking for con-
  1316
  sideration of this or that topic. But he has put down a motion tantamount to asking for a decision on the matter, and I understand that he intends to press it to a Division—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] I am answering the right hon. Gentleman's question. I am saying that he is wriggling, that he is trying to get himself out of the position into which he has got himself. He could have made representations. Throughout, we have given great thought and care to considering all representations made to us on value added tax. But it is a vastly different matter, less than three weeks before a Budget, to table an unprecedented motion of this kind for debate on a Supply Day, and then to force it to a Division.
  That being so, I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will feel it right to support the amendment. I believe that it is a necessary amendment, whatever views may be held on the merits of the matters raised by the hon. Member for Heywood and Royton.
  Naturally, as the amendment makes absolutely clear, my right hon. Friend will, as is his duty, take fully into account all the representations made on children's clothes and VAT, on various other aspects of VAT, and indeed on all aspects of taxation. The House will not expect me to go further than that clear assurance.
  I trust that because I intervene only briefly in the debate, no doubt more briefly than Mr. Gladstone would have done on the occasion to which the hon. Member for Birmingham, All Saints, referred, the House will not consider that I am being in any way discourteous to it. On the contrary, I should be breaking with the traditions of the House without good reason—for none has been advanced—if I said more.
  Mr. Joel Barnett: Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that the Chancellor deliberately inserted in last year's Finance Act a section allowing him to zero rate any item he wished at any time—between Budgets or at any other time? How on earth can the hon. Gentleman now argue that he can do it only in the next Budget?
  Mr. Higgins: I am not arguing that. I am saying that it is right and proper that the matters which normally fall

  1317
  within a Budget, with regard to coverage and so on, should be regarded as a whole. On that basis, it is right that we should adhere to the traditions.
  I repeat that there is no precedent for such a Motion as we have before us. It is a crude, feeble, political gimmick, and I believe that it will be recognised as such outside the House. I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to treat it as such by going into the Lobby in support of the Government Amendment.
  4.57 p.m.
  Mr. Walter Johnson: I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to take part in the debate, because about two months ago I tabled a motion on the subject which has now been signed by 142 hon. Members. I regret that they include only one Conservative Member, a clear indication of Conservative Members' concern about the matter.
  I support the motion and oppose the amendment, because I consider that there is no reason for delaying the decision about value added tax on children's clothing and footwear. Already, because of rising food prices, which the Government say they cannot or will not try to control, and because of rising rents and rates and increased mortgage payments, families are finding the burden of making ends meet almost intolerable. VAT on children's clothing and footwear will be the last straw.
  This is why there is so much pressure on the trade unions by ordinary rank and file members throughout the country for pay increases, even to the extent of taking strike action. When responsible men and women in the Health Service, the gas industry and the Civil Service take the ultimate action, there is cause for alarm. Over the years those workers have set an example to the nation by the way in which they have steadfastly refused to be drawn into unofficial action. The Prime Minister and senior Ministers are claiming daily that the public are behind them in their anti-inflation policy. I do not believe that, because the whole policy is so blatantly unfair.
  Since my motion on VAT was published in the national Press, I have received a heavy volume of correspondence from families throughout the country protesting about this poll tax on children's clothing and footwear. Time does not
  1318
  permit me to go into detail, but I should like to give a few examples of the kind of letters I have received. I assure the House that these are typical examples. One letter says:
  "My husband earns approximately £2,000 and we have two children. Since August, 1972 I have spent the following on various items. For son aged 9: corduroy trousers, £2·85, anorak £3·50, shoes (Co-op sale) £1·50, Clark's shoes, £2·99, corduroy jeans £2·40, which is a total of £13·24. For daughter aged 12: anorak £3·50, corduroy trousers £2·75, shoes £3·69 and £3·75 and black school blazer bought at the Co-op, £4·75, a total of £18·44. Thus making a total of £31·68 for the two children in five months."
  Another letter refers to the line that some people have been taking on this subject. It says:
  "When questioned about value added tax on children's clothing and footwear the Government's answer is always that this move is to stop smaller than average women buying children's clothes which at present are exempt. This is sheer nonsense. What is more, it is downright criminal. I have yet to see such a woman get into any of my children's clothes."
  The letter continues:
  "The question about footwear raises a more serious problem. Firstly, children could be wearing their brother's and sister's shoes. Parents unable to do anything else will be forced to buy cheap and ill-fitting shoes. Is this what our great Government wants? A nation of children with corns and bunions before they reach working age."
  These are typical letters that I have received throughout the country. The next letter comes from an old-age pensioner. He says:
  "…as a boy…money was very tight, and it was a case of wearing shoes, patched up, for a longer period than they should have been worn. This was out of financial necessity. At the age of 21 years it was necessary to have some of my toes amputated. You see, the feet were growing but the shoes were not—result, hammer toes. A mother will find it hard, if this tax is imposed, to buy this item as often as she normally would, with the result that the feet will suffer and the child's comfort affected for the rest of its life. Surely all orthopaedic surgeons will back you up on this one matter."
  That gentleman is worried about children's feet, but that is only part of the problem. The trade will tell us that there have been increases in the price of wool and leather and that there will be increases in the price of clothes and footwear. Conservative hon. Members will know something about this. In the 12 months that has just elapsed the price of wool rose from 90p per lb. to 250p

  1319
  per lb. That increase with increased labour costs will push up the cost of children's clothing and footwear by 15 per cent. If we add VAT at 10 per cent. there will be an increase of 25 per cent. on children's clothes and footwear by the autumn of this year.
  My inquiries show that a family with three children spend approximately £120 a year on children's clothes and shoes. If the full 25 per cent. is applied, an additional £30 a year will have to be found by the parents who clothe their children and provide them with shoes. That is a modest figure. I could quote other examples where the position is much worse.
  Some Ministers do not realise the price of some of these essentials. The very lowest price for a pair of shoes for a young boy is £3·50. We all know that boys will kick out two or three pairs of shoes in the course of a year. Trousers are £3 to £4. A blazer is £8. All these things have to be found, including shorts, socks and underwear. The effect of this on a family with three children will be to put up its cost of living to the extent of £30 in one year for those items alone.
  I congratulate the Daily Mail on the campaign which it is running to have children's clothes and shoes zero-rated when VAT is due in April. It is doing a public service by spending so much of its time and energy in organising a petition which has already been signed by 100,000 people without too much effort.
  I assure the House that there will be a substantial effort in the period to come. The Daily Mail's petition and the protest which Labour hon. Members are making is back by the British Medical Association, which has 52,000 members, and the Society of Chiropodists, which has 4,000 members. The BMA and the Society of Chiropodists are backing the campaign to have VAT on children's shoes and clothing—and shoes in particular—zero-rate. They are concerned that the poorer families will not buy new shotes and will make do with old ones. They are concerned that poorer families will be satisfied with ill-fitting shoes and that shoes will be passed down to younger children. They are concerned that poorer families will buy the cheapest possible
  1320
  type of shoe, probably of some composite material which is very bad for one's feet.
  I do not expect some Conservative hon. Members to understand the problems of trying to bring up a family on a modest income. Most of them have been born with silver spoons in their mouths. If we take the Prime Minister at his word—I bear in mind the promises which he made at the General Election and I realise that it is difficult to trust his word—he said that he wanted to help poorer families. Even the Minister for Industry when dealing with aspects of the gas dispute this afternoon, said that it was the intention of the Government to try to help poorer families. I suggest that here is an opportunity for the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to show sincerity by saying now that VAT will not be put on children's clothes and footwear.
  There is no need to wait until the Budget. As my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett) described to the House, it could be done now. An indication could be given to the country. At least there would be some credibility that the Government are trying to help the poorer families. The Financial Secretary said that he hoped that hon. Members will go into the Lobby in support of the Government amendment. Any Conservative hon. Member who is concerned about the problem should think very seriously and go into the Lobby in support of the motion in the name of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition.
  5.8 p.m.
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: No one on the Government's side of the House could have been more powerful than I have been in my advocacy for not bringing in VAT this year. Nevertheless, I propose to vote with the Government and reserve my position on VAT until the proposals are put forward by the Government in the Budget debate. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench will abandon their strange and oriental attitude about not disclaiming or not saying anything, and adopting a peculiarly constitutional position, and consider the economic problems which face us today, and which changed overnight in the most alarming way.

  1321
  The Treasury is on the horns of a grave dilemma about VAT. There are two main problems which face the Government. The first problem is to produce a Budget which will not shake the world by its fiscal irresponsibility, which means not going to the market to borrow about £3,000 million.
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: It is £4,000 million.
  Mr. Fraser: My hon. Friend says £4,000 million. This is in the days when it is called need-borrowing requirements. When I was a young man it was known as Budget deficit, and I prefer to use the old-fashioned term. The Government are faced with a Budget deficit of between £3,000 million and £4,000 million. Since yesterday their problem in battling against inflation has been made vastly more dangerous by the change in the exchanges.
  As the Government are likely to be aware, the change in the currency arrangements has resulted, roughly speaking, in a further devaluation of 5 per cent. in the £ sterling against European currencies, What has been happening with the prices of raw materials, to which the hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Walter Johnson) referred? Certain raw material prices have gone up far more than 5 per cent. Indeed, some prices, like those for tin, copper and diamonds, have shown an 11 per cent. increase. We are faced with a grave problem with value added tax in these circumstances.
  If it is proposed, as is suggested by The Economist, that the rate should be fixed at 5 per cent., this would be fiscally totally irresponsible and would cost the Revenue about £400 million. If, on the other hand, the rate is fixed at 10 per cent. the effect is bound to be inflationary and to run counter to the main policy of the Government to control inflation. The hon. Gentleman spoke about the prices of children's clothing and was right to say that they will inevitably go up. The increases will be passed by the Prices Board because the prices of raw materials are going up.
  The Government must recalibrate their intellectual machinery and rethink the financial problems facing the country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on 5th December lashed himself to the mast of this absurd, leaking colander of a cockle-
  1322
  shell which is value added tax, and determined to sail through, to hell with inflation and to hell with fiscal probity. "Let us go forward", he said, "and take on Scylla and Charybdis simultaneously." We are lashed to the mast with him. All this new Ulysses needs is a pair of Treasury scissors which will just cut out the whole concept of value added tax from the next Budget—snip, snip, snip. That is all we need so that we shall not be in the absurd dilemma of either being fiscally absurd or of forcing upwards the price and cost of inflation.
  These things, although I have said them in a jesting way, are immensely serious. The Government have shown occasional flexibility—indeed, have almost established a reputation for flexibility. They have none of the Gladstonian attitude—and I am one of Mr. Gladstone's greatest admirers. I regard him as one of the greatest of Englishmen. Surely now is the time to change around and to observe the realities of the situation, and realise that through the normal purchase tax and other taxes it is perfectly possible to collect new money and at the same time avoid forcing the rate of inflation higher than it need be.
  5.14 p.m.
  Mr. Kevin McNamara: Having heard my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett) and the reply of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, talking about yields here, goods there and replies to questions and constitutional propriety and all that sort of thing, I thought it a healthy sign that the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Walter Johnson) brought the debate to the difficulties of ordinary families, which would be further added to by value added tax.
  I must declare an interest. I have five children. The oldest of them is 12. My second son had a new pair of shoes last weekend. They cost £3·89. The same size of shoe for my eldest son 18 months ago cost just over £2. That is the sort of problem which families far worse off than those of hon. Members are having to face all the time. That is the sort of problem we are talking about when it is suggested that we should add to the price of the goods they have to buy an extra 10 per cent. or 7½ per

  1323
  cent. or whatever it will be by value added tax.
  The Government have given us some fancy figures about earnings in the gas industry. But the basic wage of a gas labourer for a 44-hour week is less than £20. The basic wage for a skilled man for a 44-hour week is £23. Three million male workers, the majority of them heads of families, are earning £25 a week or less. It is in this context that one sees the true perspective of value added tax and what it means to the ordinary working-class family.
  Right hon. and hon. Members opposite should go round some of our constituencies in the North, where wages are not high. They will see springing up again the second-hand clothes shops—something which we were told about by our parents who remembered their experiences in the 'thirties. We see the growth in poor areas of second-hand clothes being offered in the front windows of houses. We see often the front window of an old house filled with various sizes of children's shoes, ranging from babies' slippers up to football boots for 16- and 17-year olds. The whole range of second-hand shoes for children is on sale. The same applies to coats and dresses. Then, of course, there is the phenomenon of the "nearly new" shop.
  This is a sign of the times. There are queues outside jumble sales—and this is where we see the poverty affecting so many families. Where do they go when the tables are set out? They first go to the tables with children's shoes and coats. The charitable organisations, such as the Society of St. Vincent de Paul and the Child Poverty Action Group, are asking more than anything in their circulars and advertisements for children's clothing and shoes. These are the things which are of concern to us on this side of the House, and this is why we say that value added tax should not be imposed on children's clothing.
  The right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) rightly pointed to the increase there will be in the prices of raw materials. Increased prices of raw materials will be reflected in the market and in any case they have generally escalated in the last 18 months. As he said, they are bound to be approved by the Prices Board. Yet, in addition
  1324
  to all this, we are to have 10 per cent. value added tax. We tend to talk in this House a great deal about the difficulties of retailers' margins, but these will be peripheral to the great explosion in prices brought about because the Government refuse to tackle the whole problem of raw materials in their prices policy.
  The Government have consistently refused throughout their freeze policy to try to put any restriction on food prices; they have refused to consider any type of food subsidy; they have refused to consider whether they could control the prices of basics like bread and meat.
  Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite ought to know how things are arranged and how the money goes in most households. Money goes first for the rent, then for food. Clothes come a very poor third. Anyone who has been a member of a large working-class family knows how clothes can go from brother to brother, daughter to daughter. They need constant work by devoted mothers, stitching and darning. The problem is that there comes a time when they are too thin to be worn again, when new clothes have to be bought. There will be a limited amount of money available for children's clothes because most of the money will have been used to meet escalating food prices and rents.
  This will mean second-hand shoes, the purchase of substitute plastic—Ho Chi Minh sandals and the like—leading to foot rot, perspiration and generally poor feet. All of my children take a very wide "F" fitting. We have quite a problem tracking down shops which can supply such shoes. They could never be obtained second-hand. Translate this problem into the circumstances of the ordinary family with the constant pressure upon the mother, trying to save out of her housekeeping, and we can see just how difficult the problem is.
  Industrial disputes begin on the kitchen floor not the factory floor. The pressure comes from the mother demanding more money from the wage packet. This is why we are most concerned about the main issues of rents, food prices and the taxation of children's clothes. We should not put the success or failure of the Government's financial policy on kids aged from one day to 10 years. That is what the Government are doing and it is mean and nasty.
  Dr. Tom Stuttaford: Before I discuss the topic of children's clothes and shoes I want to address myself to this motion. The Government have tried to score a rather cheap debating point by putting forward an irrelevant amendment aimed at emasculating a perfectly reasonable motion.
  Mr. Joel Barnett: Shame.
  Dr. Stuttaford: If the Government are prepared to receive representations from everyone they should receive them from this House because we represent people from every walk of life.
  I have no doubt that if members of the Treasury team have, over the last six months or a year, been addressing meetings throughout the country as I have they will have found points of view being put forward similar to those now put forward by members of the Opposition. Further, these points of view are being put forward by Conservatives, Socialists and no doubt Liberals too when we have them.
  There is a slight misapprehension on the part of the Government because when it comes to children's shoes we are still discussing last year's Budget. There was quite a strong body of feeling on this side of the House that children's shoes should at all times and in all circumstances be exempt from tax. It is our job in Parliament to encourage the wearing of well-fitting shoes.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: That is not what my hon. Friend and I were asking for. We were asking for positive discrimination in favour of shoes which were medically sound, not in favour of the wedge heels and the winkle-pickers.
  Dr. Stuttaford: My hon. Friend has a point. What we were anxious to do was to see that children should have the right sort of shoes, fitting correctly in length and breadth. We felt that fiscal policy should encourage this rather than discourage it. We were told that there was any amount of time before this year's Budget, that there was no hurry at all. The months ticked by and not even the Committee had been appointed. We became restive.
  This restlessness was picked up by the Daily Mirror Group. Soon afterwards a
  1326
  chairman was apointed. When we made further protestations we were again told that there was plenty of time and that under the particular clause in the Finance Bill the zero rating could be changed at any time. I hope that we shall hear why the Chancellor has been sitting on this report since 6th December. We want to know whether the report will cause trouble or whether it is in favour of what some of us want and is being saved as something to sugar the pill, come the Budget. There seems to be no reason why a decision announced in December should interfere with a Budget which was not due for some months. We are not terribly convinced by the arguments put forward so far. It is a specious argument.
  The hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Walter Johnson) has been running a first-class campaign with the help of the Daily Mail. He pointed out that by the time working-class children reach adult working life their feet are often ruined for ever. This was clearly apparent to any hon. Member who was in the Forces. After I left the Army I did a lot of medical examinations for it. The feet of potential officers were always in splendid shape but the feet of the other ranks, those obviously doomed to be other ranks for their two years, were frequently crippled because poverty had decided what type of shoe their parents bought for them. In all probability it was the shoe which had been worn by an elder brother or sister, already three-quarters worn, already moulded to the shape of another foot.
  Patients in ordinary National Health Service general practice, where I spent my first 12 years, also suffer in this way. Many of them aged over 65 have received a crippling early in life which is beginning to show itself seriously now. Frequently they are disabled. Now, in my poverty, I attend only to private patients. It is rare to find anyone who has feet which are in a bad condition. There is an income difference. Feet can be entirely ruined because of the wrong shoe. The Government cannot possibly agree to do anything which might persuade parents to put their children in the wrong shoes, even though it may be done for the best motive.

  1327
  One of the most appalling figures to come from the Family Expenditure Survey, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Mr. Trew) will seek to refer, is that which says that the average family of three spends £40 per annum on children's clothes and shoes.
  Mr. Peter Trew: That figure does not include shoes. It is purely in respect of children's clothing.
  Dr. Stuttaford: I was misinformed earlier. Any Member who visits a constituent who has children at a grammar school or a good comprehensive school will find that it costs a family of three £300 plus if they are to be as well-dressed as their contemporaries. I went to see one such family and we worked it out that it was £317. This was nothing extravagant or lavish, it was just to see that their children were indistinguishable in their clothing from other school children. Children have this right. Children can be damaged for ever if they are sent to school hallmarked as coming from an impoverished family. The inabilities of their parents, perhaps through no fault of their own, to cope with the family budget, should not be displayed to the rest of the school. We must do what we can to ensure that these children have a good start in life. Their minds as well as their feet may be crippled and they may find themselves in the delinquency courts.
  Like the hon. Member for Derby, South, I have had a number of letters on this subject, with 95 per cent. of them being in favour of a concession in this respect. It is interesting to study the 5 per cent. of people who are against concessions to children. Apart from those with obvious political motives, some come from cranks—people who, because they, regrettably, have been childless, wonder why they should pay for other people's children. However, they will expect other people's children, when they are wage-earning adults, to look after them when they are old-age pensioners. The other group of people who have complained are, surprisingly enough, the rich. Occasionally a rich person writes saying, "This is only a trifling sum". It is a trifling sum perhaps if we take the family expenditure survey figures, but it is not if we take the amount which should be
  1328
  spent on children in order that they might have good shoes and clothes.
  This is part of the wider debate on value added tax. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser), I cannot help but feel that it is a regressive tax which will increase inflation and, above all, will increase the anxiety of inflation. Just when people are scared of poverty and are frightened daily by the thought that perhaps nationally we are going bankrupt, it cannot be a good idea to terrify people still more with a tax of immense complexity which they do not understand and which will increase the cost of the basic necessities of life.
  I should like the Chancellor of the Exchequer to assure us that we shall not have a tax on food. I have repeatedly asked for such an assurance in the last year, and I shall continue to ask for it. We know that he will not impose it in the Budget this year. Perhaps he will go a bit further and give a promise which covers the next 18 months. If he feels that he cannot do that, perhaps he will answer the question raised on last year's Budget and tell us what will happen about children's shoes.
  5.32 p.m.
  Mr. John Roper: It is a great pleasure for me to speak after the hon. Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford), who has made extremely strongly the case in support of the Motion. He made the case strongly in speeches during the Report stage of last year's Finance Bill. It was a pleasure to hear him making it even more strongly today.
  I hope that the reply of the Minister of State will be more adequate than that of the Financial Secretary, which seemed to me a classic example of how to avoid dealing with a subject which is of serious concern to the House. I hope that the Minister of State will reply to the powerful arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett).
  It is not good enough for the Minister to say that this matter can be considered only in a Budget because the history of value added tax in the past 12 months shows that it is not a normal tax which can be considered only at Budget time.

  1329
  For example, the enormous concession on tax-paid stocks given just before Christmas would, in normal years, have occurred perhaps only in a Budget. Clearly the problems associated with introducing a tax of this sort mean that abnormal steps must be taken. I am, therefore, extremely glad that we have created the precedent of using a Supply Day to discuss an important tax matter. There are strong feelings about this subject on this side of the House and, as the hon. Member for Norwich, South has shown, on the benches opposite.
  The regressive effects of the application of value added tax to children's footwear and clothing were made clear during the debates in Committee and in the House on the Finance Bill last year. Few issues have created as much feeling among my constituents as this matter. I sent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and I had an acknowledgment from the Financial Secretary only yesterday—a petition signed by several hundred people in my constituency about the imposition of value added tax, particularly on infants' clothes. Already leather prices are going up in the same way as meat prices. For some reason the two are linked. I should have thought that if the farmers were getting more for their meat they would be able to sell the leather more cheaply, but it seems that it does not work like that. Leather prices are rising as quickly as meat prices. I heard only yesterday that the price of non-leather footwear materials is also likely to increase.
  This tax will have a particularly serious and iniquitous effect on young parents. It will, in verity, be a tax on parenthood. It will fall, not only on all the clothing requisites for a first-born child, but on the other necessities of the nursery—the pram, cot, playpen and all the other equipment which has been exempt from purchase tax. For the first time we are imposing a substantial tax on parenthood. It will fall at a particularly unfortunate moment for people who have just had their first child. Up to then the household may have had two incomes—those of the husband and the wife—to support two people. When there is only one income to support three people, difficulties arise. There may be arguments for restricting the growth of population,
  1330
  but this iniquitous tax on young families is not the way to do it.
  Reference has been made to the administrative problems. My hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Royton dealt very well with the question of large children and small adults. There are borderline cases, but there will always be borderline cases and anomalies, particularly in the administration of value added tax. If we can have the anomaly that lawn turf is subject to VAT while lawn seed is not, we can afford to have some anomalies concerning the boundary between large children and small adults.
  It has been suggested that to differentiate will create problems for shopkeepers because they will have to deal at retail level with some goods which are zero rated and other goods which bear the tax. But that is no different from the problems facing the owner of a food shop who is selling, say, chocolate biscuits, potato crisps and other items which bear the tax. Therefore, the administrative objections about the boundary between children and adults and about shopkeepers could be dealt with if there were the political will to deal with them. The object of the motion is to show the Treasury that there is a political will to deal with this problem which has such a serious social effect upon families.
  It is perfectly possible to modify the tax in this way. Such a modification will not interfere with the essential character of the tax any more than do other items that are zero rated. Many changes in VAT have been announced since the Finance Act, 1972, and it is perfectly possible for an announcement to be made today. Indeed, there is provision in that Act for such an announcement to be made before a Budget and before a new Finance Bill is published.
  If the Government are not prepared to do this either today or later, 1st April will be a sad day for the children. As the hon. Member for Norwich, South, said, they will bear the scars for many years.
  5.40 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Fidler: I have listened carefully to what has been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House. The debate has ranged far beyond the terms of the

  1331
  motion, which does not refer to clothing and footwear and does not refer to the regressive impact of VAT. The hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Walter Johnson) referred to footwear. If that is the feeling of the Opposition, why is "footwear" omitted from the motion?
  Mr. Gwynoro Jones: The hon. Gentleman said that the motion does not refer to clothing. It says,
  "That this House considers that value added tax should not apply to children's clothing."
  Mr. Fidler: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is able to read as clearly as I can without the aid of glasses. The motion refers to the desirability of not adding VAT to children's clothing. As I hope to prove, it is impossible for the motion to be adopted, because of lack of definition. The motion does not include "shoes". In trying to buttress false arguments the hon. Member for Derby, South, referred to an increase in the price of leather of 15 per cent., to which he said must be added VAT of 10 per cent., which makes 25 per cent. He went on to say that since the average family spends £120 a year on children's clothing, 25 per cent. must be added, but that 25 per cent. is related to footwear and not to clothing.
  I appreciate the generous references made by the hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett) to my expertise on clothing. Knowing him to be a man of sincerity and truth, I am embarrassed, but I appreciate his remarks. Equally, I recognise that in his profession of accountancy he stands in similar eminence. I therefore find it difficult to understand why, with his multitude of clients, he is unable to produce figures of the yield, or lack of yield, from garments sold by his clients who happen to be in the clothing industry. The clothing industry is required on its invoices to enter the percentage of children's garments, which are tax free, and the percentage of adult clothing which is subject to tax. His investigations into the industry have not been as profound as I should have expected.
  The hon. Gentleman told us that coats 37⅛ in. long are children's garments which do not bear tax, and that garments with a bust measurement of 36 in. ——
  Mr. Joel Barnett: The hon. Gentleman was obviously so interested in what he was going to say that he did not take a note of what I said. I particularly said that it was extremely difficult to deal with lengths.
  Mr. Fidler: If, tomorrow, HANSARD proves me wrong I will willingly withdraw what I said. The hon. Member for Heyward and Royton referred to children's coats 37⅛ in. long bearing no tax, and he went on to say—he may regret it—that garments with bust measurements up to 36 in. bore no tax. I tell the hon. Gentleman that garments with a bust measurement of 36 in. are outside the exemption for children's clothing and therefore taxable.
  As I thought that reference might be made to my participation in the debate last year, yesterday I visited one of a large chain of stores which has seen fit to canonise my first name, and apply it to a brand of clothing. I will not mention the name of the store. In the boys' and girls' department I found cardigans of long length with 32 in. and 34 in. chest measurements. If the hon. Member for Heyward and Royton were not quite so well-endowed in circumference he, with his height, would be able to utilise one of those garments tax free. I found long-sleeved jumpers with chest measurements of 32 in. and 34 in. in the children's department, and they were tax free. I found shirts with chest measurements of 32 in. and 34 in. tax free. These are the chest and bust sizes of young adults well above the age which is normally regarded as the age at which children's clothing would be worn.
  As I thought that this might be unusual, I went to the skirt department, where I found skirts for children with waist measurements of 22 in. to 25 in. with a length of 18 in. The ladies' short skirts begin at size 12, with a length of 18 in.
  From my considerable experience, I make it clear that manufacturers are not acting unscrupulously. They are taking advantage of the existing regulations. Quite legitimately they are supplying five garments out of every 24 to ladies as children's clothing and therefore free of tax. Garments above size 12 are subject to purchase tax.
  Mr. Barnett: I did not say that these traders were unscrupulous. I was merely repeating what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said.
  Mr. Fidler: I willingly accept that, and I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman's support. As an accountant, he is not acting unscrupulously if he assists his clients to pay the minimum tax to which they are liable by carefully reading and exercising the tax laws. In the same way, every clothing manufacturer is entitled to read the regulations and to invoice and describe his garments in such a way as to attract the lowest level of tax.
  In the debate on the Finance Bill last year I said that between 20 and 25 per cent. of the garments sold to ladies were sold tax free because the sizes 10 and 12 are in the category of children's clothing. Whereas it is difficult to define the article, it is impossible to identify the final wearer, however the article is defined——
  Dr. Stuttaford: Is my hon. Friend suggesting that all children should suffer because one in every five women is sufficiently small to be able to wear children's clothes?
  Mr. Fidler: I allowed my hon. Friend to make his speech without interruption. I shall come to that point. Last year I said that between 20 and 25 per cent. of garments sold to ladies were sold tax free although they were designed and produced for adult persons. At that time the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the missing word "young" before "children's" in the Opposition motion. Had the Opposition thought it possible to define the group consisting of babies in nappies up to children of 8 or 9, no doubt they would have introduced different wording. They would not have asked that VAT should not apply to children's clothing. They would have defined a group. They obviously found it impossible to define that group, and that is why the loose wording recurs today.
  However much I regret it, a large quantity of clothing falling within the terms of the motion is purchased by ladies who fall into the category of adults and cannot honestly be regarded as falling into the category for which the exemption is intended.
  I urge my hon. Friend to consider the position of those who fall well below this
  1334
  margin, with its impossibility of definition. I realise the difficulties and I would have preferred a definition to make it impossible for an adult to purchase for his or her own use an article sold tax-free as a child's garment. I urge my hon. Friend to consider whether it is possible still to do this if the trade itself, which has been complaining about this matter, puts forward a watertight definition which will allow of no loop holes.
  I seek to draw a distinction between clothing and footwear. I pointed out in last year's debate that young children's footwear was given such a bashing that it was worn out, if not in weeks, certainly in months. At that time I asked my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to exempt children's footwear altogether, and I was delighted that my right hon. Friend appointed the Munro Committee to look into the matter. I do not confine my remarks only to shoes produced for medical purposes but am seeking to emphasise that the situation with regard to clothing is different from that which applies to footwear.
  Children grow out of their garments much more quickly than the garments deteriorate. Adult garments are worn until they drop to pieces, but children's clothes are often discarded while still virtually new. It is not unusual for clothes to be handed on from the first to the second child, and then even to the third child. No opprobrium attaches to a younger brother or sister having garments handed down. Therefore, the case for exempting children's clothes from the tax is not as strong as that for exempting their shoes.
  The hon. Member for Heywood and Royton was kind enough to refer to my knowledge of the industry. If the hon. Gentleman would give the House a definition to cover the situation of children's items purchased for adult use, I would be prepared to support the Opposition's motion. However, it is obvious that the hon. Member can offer no such definition. The trade has asked for the present exemption to continue because it will be helpful to sales. No definition has been advanced to close a loophole which has existed for many years.
  I appreciate the problem faced by parents of young children, but if we are to exempt any large category of

  1335
  clothing in the manner suggested by the Opposition, to achieve the required yield the tax may have to be increased on the adult range of clothing. This would mean a heavier burden on families with grownup children, and indeed on families without children.
  We are debating whether a certain section of the community should be exempted from tax. It would be easy to obtain 100,000, or even 10 million signatures, for a petition in favour of abolishing income tax, because everybody is in favour of paying less, but when we examine the Opposition's motion we see how impossible it is to define one particular group. I ask my hon. Friends to support the Government's amendment, which clearly indicates that consideration will be given to logical, reasoned arguments without any attempt, as the Opposition are attempting, to play to the gallery.
  5.55 p.m.
  Mr. Ray Carter: I intervene briefly to draw attention to the way in which the public are gradually being led into the way in which VAT will be introduced—significantly, perhaps, on All Fools Day, 1st April. I hope that information will be made available to the public, not only about VAT as it will apply to children's clothing but as it will apply to very many other items.
  However, it is obvious from the Government's amendment that they are not prepared to make any information available. I hope to tell the House why I believe it is vital in the public interest that a great deal more information about VAT should be made available straight away.
  A visit to any high street in the country will demonstrate that there is a massive advertising campaign by garages and electrical appliance shops, setting out in bold clear terms the slogan "Buy now and avoid VAT". We have been told time and again since last year's Budget that the Chancellor of the Exchequer intends to levy VAT at a rate of 10 per cent. or less on many items and that the prices of some items in the shops would fall. But there has been a clear attempt by a large number of manufacturers in a whole variety of commodities to confuse the public. Against all the assurances which we have been given over the past
  1336
  year that VAT would be administered in a fair and just way, we now see that there will be a large number of unjustified price increases. Although we are told by garages and electrical appliance shops that we must buy now to avoid VAT, what will happen is that after 1st April prices will in many instances fall.
  Certain commercial outlets are now trying to prepare the public for the fact that prices will not be reduced with the introduction of VAT on 1st April. I can see no other reason for their campaigns. The oft-proclaimed belief of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that prices would in certain cases be reduced will not come about, and it appears that manufacturers and distributors are preparing the ground deliberately to confuse the public.
  I undertook to be brief, and I conclude by drawing attention to Written Question No. 87 which appears in my name on today's Order Paper. It is an attempt to elicit information for the public, and I hope that in the Government's reply to this debate we shall be given some clear information about the consumer articles which I itemise in that Question. I instance among other things cars, washing machines, television sets, cameras, binoculars and lawn mowers and I go on to include central heating appliances and a whole range of consumer items. I should like to see comparable figures relating to purchase tax on these articles to the effect of VAT rates of 7½ per cent., 10 per cent. and 12½ per cent. In that way the public would have a very clear guide before VAT was introduced about whether it would be better to buy now or to wait until the introduction of the tax.
  I appreciate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you may think I am extending my argument rather widely. I have been prompted to do so by the Government amendment, and I checked carefully with your predecessor that I should be in order. He assured me that I would. I hope that the Treasury will give the House and the public some clear indications on this whole range of consumer goods and the rates of VAT to be applied to them.
  At this time of the year many people are getting married. Young couples may be contemplating going out and spending as much as £1,000. If the often-proclaimed reductions in prices come about, a couple proposing to spend £1,000 may save between £100 and £150.

  1337
  Leaving aside the arguments about children's clothing, in terms of public enlightenment the whole subject of VAT and its introduction is of vital interest to the public, and the Treasury should do all that it can to enlighten us.
  6.0 p.m.
  Mr. David Steel: The speech that we heard earlier from the Financial Secretary was little more than a lot of pedantic and semantic flannel which was not addressed to the subject matter of the debate. If the Government had been honest when framing their amendment they might have said:
  "… recognises that Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer will give full consideration to all representations … except those of this House …"
  It is an extraordinary constitutional doctrine that while newspapers, campaigners, petitioners and everyone else outside this House can state a view before the Budget about what should be done, this House is not expected to do so.
  The Opposition motion says quite clearly:
  "That this House considers that value added tax should not apply to children's clothing".
  That is not asking this House to take a decision. However it is for this House collectively to express a view, and I believe that the Government have raised a deeper issue than the motion suggests. One of our primary functions is to vote money to the Government and to express a view on taxation matters which are vital to the country. The introduction of VAT is an entirely appropriate and proper matter on which the House should convey a view to the Government, and I took strong exception to the tenor of the speech of the Financial Secretary.
  Mr. Higgins: The hon. Gentleman has misrepresented totally what I said. It is clear to all concerned in this House and outside it that the Government have done everything possible to ensure the fullest possible consultation on this tax, and we said that we would take account of all the views expressed. That was not the point which I made. My point was that the Opposition on a Supply Day a short time before the Budget in an unprecedented way have tabled a motion which clearly is phrased in such a way
  1338
  that a specific decision is sought. It was to that that I objected.
  Mr. Steel: The hon. Gentleman is merely summarising what he said earlier. However I take the contrary view. This House must be entitled to convey a view to the Government.
  Mr. Brian Walden: Should not the hon. Gentleman put the matter more strongly? This is not simply a matter of the way that the Opposition motion is phrased. It is the duty of the Financial Secretary to come to this House and to answer the Opposition motion in terms. The method he has taken to evade answering it has no constitutional validity. It is a trumped-up device to avoid getting involved in the argument. Is not that the case?
  Mr. Steel: The hon. Member for Birmingham, All Saints (Mr. Brian Walden) always expresses these points much more forcibly than I do in my modest way. However, I agree with him. Value added tax and its different ramifications have been anticipated by everyone for more than a year, and it is not good enough for this constitutional fable to be used as an excuse for not having a thorough debate in this House and reaching a decision on it.
  I speak from a slightly different position from that of the Opposition. It is well known that the Liberal Party in principle has supported a value added tax, and I am glad that the Opposition have not wandered into a general discussion of the merits of the tax. However, while I accept that the Government will go ahead with its introduction, I believe that there is a clear case for not applying the tax inflexibly right across the board. The Government should be prepared to consider exceptions.
  One of the Government's answers is that the success of the tax depends on the theory that it must be broadly based. They say that if it is not broadly based it will not work. I accept that in principle. However it has been calculated that if the Government sought to replace the revenue from purchase tax and selective employment tax with a straight VAT right across the board the rate imposed would be about 7·8 per cent. Since the expected rate is about 10 per cent. it is clear that there is room for manœuvre

  1339
  within the overall anticipated flat rate for a slightly narrower base on the tax and for exemptions to be made on items like children's clothes and in the case of charities.
  However commendable VAT is in principle, in replacing our purchase tax system it could have the effect of making some luxuries cheaper and many necessities dearer. The people who have received benefits from the Government in terms of surtax concessions will not worry about a little extra on children's clothes. But it has a regressive impact unless the Government are prepared to to introduce an exception here.
  I am probably one of the few fathers who do not leave the buying of children's clothes to their wives. I notice very little dissent from that proposition. I suspected that to be the case. There are one or two fathers who take some delight and interest in buying their children's clothes. On the rare occasions that my children come to London, I take them to one of the multiple stores in Oxford Street where there is a large selection of children's clothing. The expense involved is considerable. It is all very well on the salary of a Member of Parliament to withstand the expense of buying clothes for two children aged 5 and 6. It is a very different matter when one considers the impact of a 15 per cent. tax on children's clothes on those trying to cope on a fairly small weekly wage packet.
  I happen to represent an area which has the lowest average wage level of any region in the country. For that reason I am especially sensitive when the Government expect people to accept in the national interest a restrictive incomes policy when at the same time they introduce a direct increase in the cost of living on necessities which matter to the ordinary family.
  That is one reason why the Government should listen to this plea. It is no argument to say that because there are some anomalies on the boundary between children's clothes and adults' clothes under the purchase tax system, we must have taxation on all clothing. After all, the anomalies are limited only to clothes of a certain size and not to the generality of children's clothes. They are also limited to a relatively small number of people.
  1340
  The hon. Member for Bury and Radcliffe (Mr. Fidler) described his visits to a certain store. However, he did not say that precisely the same clothes were on sale in the children's department and the adults' department. I suspect not. Today the style of teenagers' clothing is very different from that which an adult will wear, though I accept that there is a limited range of clothing which can be worn by a child or by an adult.
  As a student one of my regular vacation jobs was as a salesman in a well-known department store in Edinburgh——
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: The situation has changed since then.
  Mr. Steel: It was not all that long ago. I found myself working in the boys' department during the January sale. Occasionally someone came in who was small enough to find a sports jacket which fitted him. However, for every sports jacket sold to an adult there were nine or 10 sold to children.
  We should not make too much of a mountain of the anomalies which now exist. The lifting of VAT or the zero-rating of children's clothes would not increase the anomalies which represent a relatively small problem.
  My colleagues and I will have no hesitation in supporting the motion. I hope that some hon. Members on the Government side will also support it. The House must not be inhibited from expressing a view on this matter by all the constitutional flannel we have heard from the Government.
  6.11 p.m.
  Sir John Foster: There are often very strong arguments on both sides of the House for the Chancellor to consider representations about children's clothing and footwear.
  I submit that it would be entirely wrong to accept the Opposition motion. Let us assume that the terms of the Opposition motion were that the House considers that the personal allowance of a single person should be raised to a certain level. It is easy to see that the objection to that would be that the House must not pick out one item of the Budget and attempt to get the Government to agree to reduce or remove the tax on it.

  1341
  The Opposition are asking the Chancellor to take a decision now about the tax on children's clothing. My hon. Friend must weigh the whole impact of VAT to see that it is spread fairly. I have made representations about purchase taxed goods. The Chancellor weighed all the representations on both sides and came to the conclusion that there would be unfairness to traders with purchase taxed goods who either let them out or sold them afterwards. The House is being asked to take a decision about the matter.
  Mr. Brian Walden: The hon. and learned Gentleman is a most distinguished lawyer and, as he knows, no one respects him more than I do. May I, with temerity, suggest that he is entirely wrong and has misunderstood what is involved? The Chancellor has no power to vary personal allowances between Budgets. But the Government specifically took powers to zero-rate anything they chose at any time between Budgets. Therefore, the very analogy that the hon. and learned Gentleman is giving shows that his argument is wholly fallacious and has no constitutional point whatever.
  Sir J. Foster: The arguments remain that the Chancellor must weigh one thing against another. There is obviously a very strong argument for exempting charities from VAT. I have written to my right hon. Friend about this matter, but I do not expect him to agree with my argument without taking into account that he must weigh charities against children's clothing and many other matters—theatres, sports and so on. An argument could be put forward that charities come into the homes of the poorest more often than children's clothing and shoes. It would be entirely wrong for the Government to be asked to make a decision in this debate. They must weigh the representations from all sides. The fact that the House makes a representation should not be a reason for the Chancellor agreeing to it. The House is not in a position to weigh the argument for charities against other matters. Nor has it the opportunity in debate to weigh sports against charities, and so on. On the merits we can appreciate that it would be with great reluctance that the Chancellor would maintain his decision to apply VAT to children s clothing and shoes.
  1342
  The Labour Government were in the same dilemma when they increased purchase tax—incidentally, they increased it six times—on household textiles, sheets, and knitting wool. There were very strong arguments in each case why the Labour Government should not do that, because it would affect people who could ill afford it.
  If the motion simply stated that the House asked the Chancellor to note that there were strong arguments for not imposing VAT on children's clothing, I am sure that most of us would agree. However, the House should not agree to a motion which imposes on the Chancellor a decision to that effect. That is the difference between the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) and me on the constitutional point.
  Mr. Walden: The hon. and learned Gentleman is most courteous in giving way to me twice in a short speech and I will not interrupt him again. His argument fascinates me and I am sure he will want to reply to what I say. I could not agree with him less. I am amazed that he should say such things. There is no body in this country better able to judge what the Chancellor should or should not allocate than the House of Commons. We do it in public expenditure debates when we discuss what future budgetary policy is likely to be. It is an incredible argument that certain interests should be able to make representations and in some cases be given guarded assurances but that the House of Commons must at all costs forgo the opportunity. I simply cannot believe that the hon. and learned Gentleman is telling the House that.
  Sir J. Foster: The House of Commons is entitled to put forward strong arguments for not applying VAT to children's clothing. However, it would be unconstitutional and wrong to make the Chancellor agree. I have not had the opportunity—indeed, I should be out of order—to press the claim of charities against that of children's clothing. I cannot do it in this debate. I cannot put the case about sport, with which I do not agree anyway, and others cannot put the case about theatres. How can the House come to a decision that, in the forthcoming Budget, children's clothing should not have VAT applied to it?
  Mr. Walden: It has the power.
  Sir J. Foster: But it would be wrong, without the arguments being put forward about all the other things, for the House to require the Government to do it today.
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: I think that the Treasury Bench was objecting to the whole idea of the debate. This is extraordinary. The whole concept was to try to have more open discussion of Budget problems by the House of Commons. The late Iain Macleod was very much in favour of this idea. The whole tradition of the House should move towards it. We should not have this great mumbo-jumbo rot of a whole lot of secret Treasury people coming here. They get it wrong. We are better informed than the Treasury. We want more open Budget discussion, not closed Budget discussion.
  Sir J. Foster: I advise the Minister, when he replies, to say that he will consider the representations that have been made in the debate because of the strong arguments from both sides. However, he cannot say that the Chancellor will agree to the motion. That is the whole difference between the two sides of the House.
  The Government amendment states in terms that the Chancellor
  "will give full consideration to all representations".
  What stronger representations are there than those made in the House? I do not agree with the conclusion that because the representations are made in the House, therefore the Chancellor must agree not to impose VAT on children's clothing and should disregard all the other considerations of making it a fair burden. He may in the end remove VAT from children's clothing. However, it would be entirely wrong for him to agree to do so in this debate.
  6.20 p.m.
  Mr. George Wallace: I wonder what on earth all the fuss is about. I cannot understand the Government's attitude. There is to an extent a precedent for the motion. Although it was a private Member's motion—incidentally. I introduced it—the House carried it, much to my astonishment. I think that the Government Chief Whip was caught with his pants down. Any-
  1344
  way, the House accepted the motion calling for a measure of consumer protection. We chased the Government from time to time and eventually economic circumstances and the facts of life forced them to adopt the general principles of that motion.
  That is precisely what we are trying to do tonight. We are trying to inform the Government, and the Treasury in particular, of our views on VAT and its anti-social effects as it relates to children's clothing. That is the issue and Treasury Ministers, as befits them, are making extremely heavy weather of a simple matter.
  I enjoyed the speech of the hon. Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford). I agree with him. His speech gave me great personal satisfaction as it was another indication that the deep-seated Socialist traditions of Norwich occasionally rub off on to the Tory benches. I was going to add mischievously that if the hon. Gentleman is not careful he will find himself on the transfer list at an early date.
  I want to refer briefly to the effect of imposing VAT on children's clothing, the cost of which is already high. The standard of children's clothing has risen steadily compared with what it was when I was a child, and I am sure that no one would like to see a return to the cast-off clothing era which my generation knew.
  It is all very well to make do and mend. It helps sometimes, but the psychological effect on a child today of a return to the use of cast-off clothing could be extremely serious. It could have serious repercussions in later life, and therefore to impose a tax of this sort—and VAT is a tax from the cradle to the grave—is anti-social.
  It is possible to argue that the use of cast-off or cheaper clothing may not have a direct effect on health, but there is no doubt that cheap or worn shoes can have a direct effect. Because of the increase in the cost of children's shoes there is already a tendency for people to buy the cheap and shoddy imported footwear that is coming in in increasing quantities, to the detriment of our own shoe trade.
  I have listened to the arguments of the experts about the medico-social aspects,

  1345
  but they overlook one thing. It is not only a question of having the correct width and length of shoes. What must be remembered is that leaking shoes can be a menace to health as they can lay the seeds of rheumatism in later life.
  It is a simple matter to separate teenage clothing from that worn by children. I know, for a personal reason which I do not wish to discuss, that teenage clothing can be worn by older people. Adult men and women with small physical measurements are able to wear teenage clothing, but it is not a complicated matter to separate children's from teenage clothing. It is a question of simple wording and not a matter involving all the legal gobbledegook to which we are treated from time to time.
  We are not tonight asking the Government to give a definite decision and betray Treasury secrets. That is getting a bit old hat in view of the income tax announcement some time ago. All that we are asking the Government to do is to accept our point of view, as expressed in the House tonight, and inform the Chancellor of the Exchequer what action we think he should take. We know that the Chancellor is heavily engaged, and he has our deepest sympathy in what he is trying to do. All we are asking him to do is to accept what the House of Commons thinks. We are asking him to listen to the voice of the ordinary back-bencher. Some of us are very much married and have a good deal of experience of the past. We are asking the Chancellor to accept what we think and what our constituents think and to do something in the Budget to meet the expressed wish of the House.
  6.26 p.m.
  Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: I believe that the question of the tax on children's shoes is vital because of the effect, which we have gone into in great detail on many occasions, which ill-fitting shoes can have and which lasts for a lifetime.
  I do not want, and have never wanted, the zero rating of all children's shoes. What I asked my right hon. Friend the Chancellor to do on 16th May—and in this I was joined by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford) and others—was to set up a specialist committee on this subject to
  1346
  work out medically approved sizes and fittings, and that he agreed to do. The committee's report has not been published and it seems to me—[Interruption.]—this is a serious matter. If the House sets up a committee of eminent persons and then takes decisions on the matters they are discussing just before their report is published, we shall rapidly find that we cannot get eminent persons to serve on such committees.
  It would be the height of absurdity for any action to be taken in the matter of children's shoes before the committee's report is published. I have every confidence in my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench to see that this matter is dealt with, perhaps not before the Budget as my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South asked but before VAT comes into operation on 1st April, which is what really matters. I believe that that will be done and that we are crying wolf unnecessarily on this subject.
  On the matter of children's clothes, the hon. Member for Heywood and Roy-ton (Mr. Joel Barnett) referred to the tremendous complications of sizes, tax evasion and so on. I have always believed that it would be far more sensible to increase the income of a family who would be adversely affected by VAT rather than go through the tremendous convolution of trying to draw up watertight provisions to stop this type of evasion. I say that particularly because, with the raising of the school leaving age, people are having to support their children for very much longer than used to be the case.
  It would be infinitely better to help these families—and I believe that they do need help—by an improvement in FIS and FAM in advance of our scheme for tax credits which will come in eventually but which is at the moment much too far ahead for the purpose we have in mind today. We must do something as soon as we can by way of FIS and FAM to obviate the hardship that will otherwise befall large families, and families with large children.
  6.28 p.m.
  Mr. Gwynoro Jones: I find the debate and the attempts of Ministers and hon. Members on the

  1347
  Government side to defend the Government's position quite astonishing. The Minister says that due to the imminence of the Budget he cannot comment on the validity of the arguments put forward by the Opposition Front Bench and on our motion that children's clothing should be exempted from VAT. The hon. Gentleman did not remind the House that in October 1970, six months before the Budget, the Chancellor was prepared to announce that income tax would be decreased by 6p. There was no question of Budget secrecy about that. The Minister cannot get away with that excuse just because this is an uncomfortable topic for the Government and because it raises delicate issues for them. The Minister cannot hide behind the Budget secrecy lark.
  Equally astonishing is the argument that the House of Commons must not express a view on the matter. The Government amendment says that the Chancellor
  "will give full consideration to all representations".
  The motion presents the House of Commons with an opportunity to make its representations. This is our debate. This is our way of making our representations to the Government that VAT should not be imposed on children's clothing.
  The arguments about the dangers of ill-fitting shoes to children's health, the impact of the tax on less-well-off families because of the increase in the cost of clothing and shoes, and how the tax will affect less-well-off families with more than one or two children are clear. I do not wish to reiterate valid and serious points.
  There are, however, a few points which I should like to draw to the Minister's attention and on which I shall seek detailed answers. One relates to the loss of revenue if children's clothing is exempted from VAT. My hon. Friend spoke in terms of the loss to the Inland Revenue being £37 million. But let us assume that it is anything up to £50 million. Are we to be asked to believe that our entire economic well-being and the Government's whole fiscal policy depend on children's clothing being taxed, thereby bringing in £50 million—the same Government which in 1971 reduced public expenditure by £900 million and in 1972 increased it by
  1348
  £1,200 million, doing somersaults every other month? Is the £50 million crucial to the Government's financial policy?
  Mr. Trew Mr. Trew rose—
  Mr. Jones: I cannot give way because of the time factor. Will the Minister also deal with the impact of value added tax on children's shoes and clothing and other items and the impact of the tax on the cost of living? I am particularly interested in the impact on the less-welloff families.
  In Committee upstairs discussion is proceeding on the Counter-Inflation Bill, which seeks to ask the less-well-off workers to accept the standstill on incomes or to have smaller pay increases, and yet the Government at the same time are putting forward measures that will increase and further aggravate the inflationary process.
  The Minister must tell us how ordinary people are supposed to accept the fact that the cost of the basic necessities of life will increase including rents, rates, clothing and possibly children's clothes and shoes after the Budget. Will the Minister tell us in down-to-earth terms how the less-well-off family is to cope.
  An hon. Member spoke earlier about people writing to him who were earning £2,000 a year. I can assure the House that well over half of my constituents have never seen, nor are they likely ever to see under the Conservative Government, an income of £2,000 a year. Finally, it is indeed astounding that in the last two or three years the Government have concentrated specifically on measures to hit at children. They have introduced measures such as increasing the price of school meals and curtailing free school milk. Now possibly children's clothing and children's shoes are to cost more. The saving accruing from such measures is unlikely to total £100 million a year. These actions are measly measures to bring in revenue. We have the right to express a view on this matter and to tell the Chancellor that what he is proposing in his Budget in the next few weeks will be such as the country has not witnessed for many years—that is, a Government considering taxing children's shoes and clothing.
  Some hon. Members opposite have argued that one of the reasons why VAT

  1349
  should be imposed on children's clothing is that 20 per cent. of children's clothes were purchased for wear by adults. In order to close the loophole, they are proposing that the other 80 per cent. of those clothes should be taxed, whereas they are not taxed at present. That is hitting children under 10 years of age.
  Dr. Stuttaford: It is less than 20 per cent. becauses only women's clothes are affected and women make up only about half the population. The figure is therefore less than 10 per cent., and therefore that 10 per cent. is to determine the future position for children's clothing and shoes.
  6.36 p.m.
  Mr. James Kilfedder: I wish to refer to the Government's amendment and not restrict myself to the Opposition motion. The amendment calls on the House to recognise that
  "Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer will give full consideration to all representations made in respect of any aspect of taxation".
  I trust that my right hon. Friend will give full consideration to the representations about the anomalies of value added tax. I should like to hear tonight what action will be taken to reduce the hardship created by the tax.
  I have four points to raise, the last three exclusively concerning Ulster, and I hope that hon. Members will bear with me while I make them. First, however, I must say that it would be a tragedy to increase the price of children's shoes. It would be wrong to encourage parents to pass on shoes to younger children because, as one hon. Member has said—I believe that it was my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford)—the shoes have already been moulded to the original wearer's foot and nothing but harm can be done to children who will have to wear them subsequently.
  I do not wish to see an era of cast-off clothing. I live in a fairly affluent constituency and we live in an affluent society—[Interruption.]—but it would be a tragedy if a tax was imposed on children's clothes so that it caused families to hand down worn-out clothes to younger sons and daughters.
  Mr. McNamara Mr. McNamara rose——
  Mr. Kilfedder: I cannot give way because of the time. I wish now to deal with another anomaly under the tax, concerning hearing aids.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The Opposition motion, of course, is restricted and the amendment brings in only the general principle that the Chancellor should listen to all representations. The hon. Member must not go into detail on any other matter.
  Mr. Kilfedder: May I express the hope, Mr. Speaker, that I may also mention fertilisers? [Laughter.] Labour Members may laugh but farmers throughout the United Kingdom might not appreciate their laughter.
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member has gone as far as he may on fertilisers.
  Mr. Kilfedder: In view of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I must restrict myself to the Opposition motion, and I hope that I may therefore briefly return——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I can help the hon. Member. He may mention the three topics to which he referred but he must not go into detail. He has mentioned fertilisers and he may now mention the other two, but no more.
  Mr. Kilfedder: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for your guidance. The point about hearing aids is this——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member has mentioned hearing aids and fertilisers.
  Mr. Kilfedder: I find myself in an extraordinary position. Although I can mention subjects, I cannot give my reasons for mentioning them. I have written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about hearing aids, and perhaps the Minister of State will either refer to them later this evening or write to me.
  The other point is the application of VAT to horticulture outputs. This also concerns me, but bearing in mind your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I will not go into detail, except to say—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman has now mentioned horticulture.
  Mr. Kilfedder: I should rather like to explain the qualification I was about to

  1351
  add. However, having mentioned those three matters, let me return briefly to the Opposition motion. I share the concern expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South and ask the Treasury Minister to give us some hope of determination by the Government that a tax will not be placed upon children's shoes. To do so would be a terrible tragedy and a great mistake on the Government's part.
  That is all I have to say, Mr. Speaker, although there are many other matters I should have liked to put to the House.
  6.41 p.m.
  Mr. Sydney Bidwell: When the hon. Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder) reads his speech tomorrow I am sure that he will be as astonished about it as we are.
  I suggest that the terms of the Government's amendment can be met by voting for our motion. The Financial Secretary made heavy weather of what he described as an unprecedented situation, but we are living in rather unprecedented times and I hope he understands that the idea of imposing VAT on children's clothing has evoked anxiety that reaches far wider than our party's ranks. If one's correspondence is anything to go by, there is considerable public support for the view that children's clothing should be zero rated because of the special position it held in relation to purchase tax.
  I hope, too, that the hon. Gentleman thoroughly understands the inflationary effect that such an addition would necessarily have on a family budget, quite apart from the national inflationary situation. Such an imposition cannot be divorced from grim items like the current dispute with the gas industry workers, because it is exactly workers of that kind who are beset with the problems that a man meets when he has a very low income and several children and faces ever-rising clothing expenditure. VAT in this respect must be viewed together with the measures proposed in the Counter-Inflation Bill. The tax will press most heavily on low-paid workers, who are not necessarily only those who qualify for FIS but others who are above that level of income.
  I cannot understand why the Government should be so adamant or should
  1352
  seek to hide behind precedents which, as the Financial Secretary has said, have been put aside since 1966. That being so I suggest that three weeks before the announced Budget day it is quite valid for the House to assert its opinion in debate and, if necessary, impose its will on the Government. It is best to do that now, because now is the time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer is more likely to listen to advice. Where is he to get that advice? He should get it in the main from debate in the House. But to moan about the Opposition tabling the motion tonight is crazy.
  I therefore hope not only that my hon. Friends will support the motion but that Government supporters who have expressed their anxiety—and particularly the hon. Member for Down, North—will vote with us. I am sure that the hon. Member for Down, North will be one of those who will put his constituents' interests above those of his party at this time. We cannot instruct the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but we can seek to persuade him.
  6.46 p.m.
  Mr. Adam Butler: This is clearly a most serious matter, and I have the greatest sympathy with those mothers and fathers who are worried about the possibility of the imposition of this tax on children's clothing. But it is also an emotional issue which has become even more highly charged, largely due to some alarmist contributions from the Opposition benches.
  The hon. Member for Heywood and Royton (Mr. Joel Barnett) was more or less encouraging retailers to raise their margins unnecessarily. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) was, to use his words, trying to get the working class to adopt "the right attitude" to VAT. I remind him that the replacement of purchase tax and the selective employment tax by VAT will reduce the tax incidence on food, which is the first essential item, by £60 million or £70 million per annum, so in that case the tax is not regressive at all.
  I must take issue with my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford) who used emotive words like "this terrifying tax", which it is not.

  1353
  In last summer's debates on the Finance Bill I indicated my own views on the subject of children's shoes. I hope that the committee considering the matter will soon come to some conclusions on that important question, and report.
  In regard to other children's wear, the case put by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman) for selective assistance possibly represents the right approach to the subject. There is no question of a means test. It is a highly excellent principle that the money available should be used selectively by those who really need it and not by the rich patients of my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, South. Money recovered in tax, plus that extra amount which is at the moment avoided by those adults who can wear children's clothing, could be used selectively by those who need it.
  6.49 p.m.
  Mr. Brian Walden: I propose to keep my contribution short as I want to leave a generous amount of time for the Minister of State to tell us that he does not intend to tell us anything. I say to my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary—and I do not use the word "friend" in any meaningless sense, since we have been friends for at least 15 years—that his speech was an insult to the House. I am well aware that there has never been a Government that had a greater contempt for the House of Commons than the present Government—which is well exemplified by the First Lord of the Treasury—but I cannot think of anything feebler than to come to the House of Commons with this constitutional piffle that they cannot, without a betrayal of Budget secrets, answer a perfectly straightforward motion that asks the House to consider that VAT should not apply to children's clothing, when they themselves in their own measure took power to zero-rate anything at any time they chose.
  Since I am sure that the Minister of State intends to put exactly the same feeble argument and does not intend to discuss the merits of the issue, I repeat what I said. The attitude of the Government in this debate on a Supply Day has been an insult to the Opposition and to the House. The Government have no argument on this case.
  1354
  Several hon. Members on the Government side have said "Wait until we get the Munro Report on children's shoes" They have had it. I am not sure, because we are not privy to the Government's secrets—and, given the nature of some of them, we would not want to be—how long they have had it, but it cannot be less than two months. There is nothing complicated at all in it. Of course the job has been done properly and the matter has been set out well, but the idea that the collective wisdom of the Chancellor, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury and the Minister of State, Treasury, plus the Permanent Secretary, could not have arrived at a decision by this time is nonsense. What they have done is to sit on it.
  As for those Tories who served on last year's Committee on the Finance Bill, I told them that if they accepted any pledges on this issue by the Government they would be cheated out of them, and they now realise the validity of what I said. The Government have got the report on children's shoes and they could have acted on it at any time. They simply have not chosen to do so.
  Some hon. Members opposite, including the right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser), the hon. Member for Norwich, South (Dr. Stuttaford) and to some extent the hon. Member for Down, North (Mr. Kilfedder), made it clear that they did not agree with the Government's point of view. But many hon. Members opposite are encouraging themselves with the thought that, come the Budget, the Government will make the concession. I hope that that is so. I hope that when they make the concession, if they do, in the Budget, they will then explain to the House why the arguments that swayed them on 6th March could not have swayed them at any other point since last year. In fact, what has occurred is simply a quite unnecessary delay. Somebody said that an unnecessary fuss was being made. The Opposition are making a fuss because of an unnecessary delay.
  May I take one or two points which have arisen in the debate. I should like to have made some remarks about the Financial Secretary's contribution to the discussion on children's clothing, but since there was none I have to rely on

  1355
  the remarks of his hon. Friends who made some sort of a defence. I enjoyed the contribution of the hon. Member for Bury and Radcliffe (Mr. Fidler) which I sum up as "Vote Tory and hand on your clothes from kid to kid to kid. Vote Tory for reach-me-downs." The hon. Member has a rather strange idea of what happens amongst young people these days if, as he says, clothes are handed from elder children to younger children without the slightest resentment. That was never so even in my day, and I have the strongest feeling that if the hon. Gentleman applies that rule to his own children and grandchildren he has a few surprises coming to him.
  I want to deal with the extraordinary argument which was particularly favoured by the hon. Lady the Member for Lancaster (Mrs. Kellett-Bowman) that we ought to be careful not to do anything which is not medically approved. I must say that if we followed that general rule in life it would be an exceedingly boring existence. The hon. Lady was worried that the hon. Member for Norwich, South, who speaks with great humanity and sense on this issue and happens to be a medical practitioner, may allow somebody to wear a shoe free of tax which has not been medically approved. The sum involved is so trivial that the hon. Lady can free herself of worry. Of course one prefers children to wear medically-approved shoes, but one certainly prefers them to wear shoes which fit and do not carry VAT. Let us not pick at nits too much.
  Then I want to take up the whole issue raised by several hon. Members opposite about family income supplement. Since I do not wish to cut the Minister of State short of the time that he needs to explain these matters to the House, I will make this my last point. I have been fair in singling out the three exceptions on the benches opposite, and I am certain that there are other hon. Members opposite who share their view, although that fact may not be reflected in their votes. I wish it would be. However, I hope they will reflect it in their representations. All that the present Government want these days is secret representations—no more listening to the House of Commons. My advice to those hon. Members opposite is "Sneak round to the Whips Office and
  1356
  put it in a plain envelope; slip it through, and maybe the Treasury will listen to you."
  Every problem that arises on taxation or income is going to be solved by assistance to the poorer families, according to the Government. It is not. I have seen hon. Members opposite spend the family income supplement about 10 times over for every single item that comes up. Whenever an increase in taxation is brought up, whenever some increase in wages is denied, hon. Members opposite say that there is always the family income supplement that can be used. I do not think so. The take-up rate is appallingly low, and the Government know it. The general measures to relieve poverty, although welcome, by no means cover the whole issue. They certainly do not cover the people who also deserve consideration—people on average earnings with a family of significant size. These people are dealt with in the motion.
  That the merits of the Opposition's case are unanswerable is proved by the fact that the Government have as yet essayed no answer. I give the Minister of State three minutes to tell us something other than the fact that he is draped in a yashmak, held in purdah and unable to say anything until his colleague the Chancellor rises to his feet on 6th March. If he gives some indication that the view then will be favourable, the House may forgive him. If he does not, I suggest to my hon. Friends that we should divide in support of the Opposition's motion.
  6.58 p.m.
  The Minister of State, Treasury (Mr. John Nott): The Government amendment recognises—and I quote—that the
  "Chancellor of the Exchequer will give full consideration to all representations made in respect of any aspect of taxation.".
  That is precisely what we are engaged in doing. We are open to any representations from hon. Members and from others throughout the country. At the same time, it must be perfectly obvious to all my hon. Friends that a specific matter of the kind referred to in the Opposition motion cannot be decided in isolation three weeks before a Budget. The Opposition motion is not a Budget representation. It invites the House to come to a decision on one single issue

  1357
  less than three weeks before my right hon. Friend's Budget statement and, as such, it will be seen for what it is—an obvious political gimmick and one to which no Opposition has descended since the war.
  There is, therefore, nothing more that I can say other than to invite my right hon. and hon. Friends to support the Government amendment and in this way
  to treat the Opposition's motion with the contempt which it deserves.
  Mr. Edward Short: Mr. Speaker, may I congratulate the Leader of the Opposition on his 10 years as leader?
  Question put, That the amendment be made:—
  The House divided: Ayes 290, Noes 264.

  Division No. 55.]

  AYES

  [7.0 p.m.

  Adley, Robert

  Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne,N.)

  Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

  Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

  Emery, Peter

  Jessel, Toby

  Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

  Eyre, Reginald

  Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

  Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

  Farr, John

  Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

  Astor, John

  Fell, Anthony

  Jopling, Michael

  Atkins, Humphrey

  Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

  Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

  Awdry, Daniel

  Fidler, Michael

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

  Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

  Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

  Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

  Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

  Kershaw, Anthony

  Balniel, Rt. Hn. Lord

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Kilfedder, James

  Batsford, Brian

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Kimball, Marcus

  Bell, Ronald

  Fortescue, Tim

  King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

  Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torduay)

  Foster, Sir John

  King, Tom (Bridgwater)

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

  Fox, Marcus

  Kinsey, J. R.

  Benyon, W.

  Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

  Kitson, Timothy

  Berry, Hn. Anthony

  Fry, Peter

  Knight, Mrs. Jill

  Biffen, John

  Gardner, Edward

  Knox, David

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Gibson-Watt, David

  Lambton, Lord

  Blaker, Peter

  Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

  Lamont, Norman

  Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

  Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

  Lane, David

  Body, Richard

  Glyn, Dr. Alan

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Boscawen, Hn. Robert

  Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

  Le Marchant, Spencer

  Bossom, Sir Clive

  Goodhart, Philip

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Bowden, Andrew

  Goodhew, Victor

  Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'field)

  Braine, Sir Bernard

  Gorst, John

  Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

  Bray, Ronald

  Gower, Raymond

  Longden, Sir Gilbert

  Brinton, Sir Tatton

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

  Loveridge, John

  Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

  Gray, Hamish

  Luce, R. N.

  Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

  Green, Alan

  McAdden, Sir Stephen

  Bruce Gardyne, J.

  Grieve, Percy

  Bryan, Sir Paul

  Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

  MacArthur, Ian

  Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)

  Grylls, Michael

  McCrindle, R. A.

  Buck, Antony

  Gurden, Harold

  McMaster, Stanley

  Burden, F. A.

  Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

  Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Maurice (Farnham)

  Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  McNair-Wilson, Michael

  Carlisle, Mark

  Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

  McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

  Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Maddan, Martin

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Hannam, John (Exeter)

  Madel, David

  Channon, Paul

  Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

  Maginnis, John E.

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

  Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

  Churchill, W. S.

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Marten, Nell

  Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

  Hastings, Stephen

  Mather, Carol

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Havers, Sir Michael

  Maude, Angus

  Cockeram, Eric

  Hawkins, Paul

  Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

  Cooke, Robert

  Hay, John

  Mawby, Ray

  Coombs, Derk

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Cooper, A. E.

  Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Cordle, John

  Heseltine, Michael

  Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

  Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Hicks, Robert

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Cormack, Patrick

  Higgins, Terence L.

  Mitchell, Lt. Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

  Costain, A. P.

  Hiley, Joseph

  Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

  Crouch David

  Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

  Crowder, F. P.

  Holland, Philip

  Moate, Roger

  Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knurstord)

  Holt, Miss Mary

  Molyneaux, James

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Hordern, Peter

  Money, Ernle

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

  Hornby, Richard

  Monks, Mrs. Connie

  Dean, Paul

  Hornsby-Smith, Rt.Hn. Dame Patricia

  Monro, Hector

  Dixon, Piers

  Howe, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Dodds-Parker, Douglas

  Howell, David (Guildford)

  More, Jasper

  Drayson, G. B.

  Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

  Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

  du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

  Hunt, John

  Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

  Dykes, Hugh

  Hutchison, Michael Clark

  Morrison, Charles

  Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir John

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Mudd, David

  Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

  Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

  Murton, Oscar

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  James, David

  Nabarro, Sir Gerald

  Neave, Airey

  Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

  Temple, John M.

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

  Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

  Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth

  Nott, John

  Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

  Onslow, Cranley

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.

  Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

  Rost, Peter

  Tilney, John

  Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

  Royle, Anthony

  Trafford, Dr. Anthony

  Osborn, John

  Russell, Sir Ronald

  Trew, Peter

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

  St. John-Stevas, Norman

  Tugendhat, Christopher

  Page, Rt. Hn. Graham (Crosby)

  Scott, Nicholas

  Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

  Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

  Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

  Page, John (Harrow, W.)

  Shelton, William (Clapham)

  Vickers, Dame Joan

  Parkinson, Cecil

  Shersby, Michael

  Waddington, David

  Peel, Sir John

  Simeons, Charles

  Walder, David (Clitheroe)

  Percival, Ian

  Sinclair, Sir George

  Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

  Peyton, Rt. Hn. John

  Skeet, T. H. H.

  Wall, Patrick

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

  Walters, Dennis

  Pink, R. Bonner

  Soref, Harold

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Pounder, Rafton

  Speed, Keith

  Warren, Kenneth

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Spence, John

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

  Sproat, Iain

  White, Roger (Gravesend)

  Proudfoot, William

  Stainton, Keith

  Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

  Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Quennell, Miss J. M.

  Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

  Winterton, Nicholas

  Raison, Timothy

  Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

  Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

  Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

  Stokes, John

  Woodnutt, Mark

  Redmond, Robert

  Sutcliffe, John

  Worsley, Marcus

  Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

  Tapsell, Peter

  Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

  Rees, Peter (Dover)

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Younger, Hn. George

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Taylor, Edward M.(G'gow, Cathcart)

  Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

  Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

  Mr. Walter Clegg and

  Ridsdale, Julian

  Tebbit, Norman

  Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Dalyell, Tam

  Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

  Albu, Austen

  Darling, Rt. Hn. George

  Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

  Allan, Scholefield

  Davidson, Arthur

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

  Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

  Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

  Armstrong, Ernest

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Hamling, William

  Ashley, Jack

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

  Atkinson, Norman

  Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

  Hardy, Peter

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

  Harper, Joseph

  Barnes, Michael

  Deakins, Eric

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

  de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

  Hattersley, Roy

  Barnett, Joel (Heywood and Royton)

  Delargy, Hugh

  Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

  Baxter, William

  Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Beaney, Alan

  Dempsey, James

  Hilton, W. S.

  Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

  Dormand, J. D.

  Hooson, Emlyn

  Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

  Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

  Horam, John

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Douglas-Mann, Bruce

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Bishop, E. S.

  Driberg, Tom

  Huckfield, Leslie

  Blenkinsop, Arthur

  Duffy, A. E. P.

  Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  Boardman, H. (Leigh)

  Dunn, James A.

  Hughes, Mark (Durham)

  Booth, Albert

  Dunnett, Jack

  Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

  Bradley, Tom

  Eadle, Alex

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Broughton, Sir Alfred

  Edelman, Maurice

  Hunter, Adam

  Brown, Boh (tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

  Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

  Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

  Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

  Edwards, William (Merioneth)

  Janner, Greville

  Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

  Ellis, Tom

  Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Buchan, Norman

  English, Michael

  Jeger, Mrs. Lena

  Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

  Evans, Fred

  Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

  Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

  Ewing, Harry

  Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

  Cant, R. B.

  Faulds, Andrew

  John, Brynmor

  Carmichael, Neil

  Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

  Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

  Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B' ham, Ladywood)

  Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

  Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

  Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

  Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

  Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

  Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

  Jones, Dan (Burnley)

  Clark, David (Colne Valley)

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

  Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

  Foley, Maurice

  Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

  Cohen, Stanley

  Foot, Michael

  Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

  Coleman Donald

  Ford, Ben

  Kaufman, Gerald

  Concannon, J. D.

  Forrester, John

  Kelley, Richard

  Conlan, Bernard

  Fraser, John (Norwood)

  Kerr, Russell

  Corbet, Mrs. Freda

  Freeson, Reginald

  Kinnock, Neil

  Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

  Galpern, Sir Myer

  Lamborn, Harry

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Garrett, W. E.

  Lamond, James

  Cronin, John

  Gilbert, Dr. John

  Latham, Arthur

  Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

  Ginsburg, David (Dewsbury)

  Lawson, George

  Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

  Gourlay, Harry

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

  Grant, George (Morpeth)

  Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven)

  Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

  Leonard, Dick

  1360

  1361

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Ogden, Eric

  Silverman, Julius

  Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

  O'Halloran, Michael

  Skinner, Dennis

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  O'Malley, Brian

  Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)

  Lipton, Marcus

  Oram, Bert

  Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Orbach, Maurice

  Spearing, Nigel

  Loughlin, Charles

  Orme, Stanley

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

  Oswald, Thomas

  Stallard, A. W.

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

  Steel, David

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Padley, Walter

  Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

  McBride, Neil

  Paget, R. T.

  Stoddart, David (Swindon)

  McCartney, Hugh

  Palmer, Arthur

  Strang, Gavin

  McElhone, Frank

  Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

  Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

  McGuire, Michael

  Pardoe, John

  Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

  Mackenzie, Gregor

  Parker, John (Dagenham)

  Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

  Mackie, John

  Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

  Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

  Mackintosh, John P.

  Pavitt, Laurie

  Thorpe, Rt. Hn Jeremy

  Maclennan, Robert

  Perry, Ernest G.

  Tinn, James

  McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

  Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

  Tomney, Frank

  McNamara, J. Kevin

  Prescott, John

  Tope, Graham

  Mabon, Simon (Bootle)

  Price, William (Rugby)

  Tuck, Raphael

  Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

  Probert, Arthur

  Varley, Eric G.

  Marks, Kenneth

  Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

  Wainwright, Edwin

  Marquand, David

  Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

  Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

  Marsden, F.

  Rhodes, Geoffrey

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Marshall, Dr. Edmund

  Richard, Ivor

  Wallace, George

  Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Watkins, David

  Mayhew, Christopher

  Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Weitzman, David

  Meacher, Michael

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Wellbeloved, James

  Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n&R'dnor)

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  Mendelson, John

  Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

  White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

  Millan, Bruce

  Roper, John

  Whitehead, Phillip

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Rose, Paul B.

  Whitlock, William

  Milne, Edward

  Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

  Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Rowlands, Ted

  Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

  Mitchell, R.C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

  Sandelson, Neville

  Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

  Molloy, William

  Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Morgan. Elystan (Cardiganshire)

  Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

  Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

  Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

  Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

  Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

  Woof, Robert

  Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

  Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

  Murray, Ronald King

  Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Oakes, Gordon

  Sillars, James

  Mr. John Golding and

  Mr. Tom Pendry.

  Question accordingly agreed to.
  Main Question, as amended, put:—
  It being after Seven o'clock, Mr. SPEAKER proceeded, pursuant to the
  Order this day, to put the Question necessary to dispose of the Proceedings on the Motion.
  The House divided: Ayes 290, Noes 263.

  Division No. 56.]

  AYES

  [7.13 p.m.

  Adley, Robert

  Buck, Antony

  Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

  Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

  Burden, F. A.

  Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

  Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

  Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

  Emery, Peter

  Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

  Carlisle, Mark

  Eyre, Reginald

  Astor, John

  Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Fair, John

  Atkins, Humphrey

  Cary, Sir Robert

  Fell, Anthony

  Awdry, Daniel

  Channon, Paul

  Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

  Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Fidler, Michael

  Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

  Churchill, W. S.

  Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

  Balniel, Rt. Hn. Lord

  Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

  Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

  Batstord, Brian

  Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

  Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

  Bell, Ronald

  Cockeram, Eric

  Fookes, Miss Janet

  Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

  Cooke, Robert

  Fortescue, Tim

  Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

  Coombs, Derek

  Foster, Sir John

  Benyon, W.

  Cooper, A. E.

  Fox, Marcus

  Berry, Hn. Anthony

  Cordle, John

  Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

  Biffen, John

  Corfield, Rt. Hn. Sir Frederick

  Fry, Peter

  Biggs-Davison, John

  Cormack, Patrick

  Gardner, Edward

  Blaker, Peter

  Costain, A. P.

  Gibson-Watt, David

  Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

  Crouch, David

  Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

  Body, Richard

  Crowder, F. P.

  Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

  Boscawen, Hn. Robert

  Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

  Glyn, Dr. Alan

  Bossom, Sir Clive

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

  Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

  Bowden, Andrew

  d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. Jack

  Goodhart, Philip

  Braine, Sir Bernard

  Dean, Paul

  Goodhew, Victor

  Bray, Ronald

  Dixon, Piers

  Gorst, John

  Brinton, Sir Tatton

  Dodds-Parker, Douglas

  Gower, Raymond

  Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

  Drayson, G. B.

  Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

  Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

  du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

  Gray, Hamish

  Bruce-Gardyne, J.

  Dykes, Hugh

  Green, Alan

  Bryan, Sir Paul

  Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir John

  Grieve, Percy

  Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N&M)

  Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

  Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

  Grylls, Michael

  Macmillan, Rt.Hn. Maurice (Farnham)

  Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

  Gurden, Harold

  McNair-Wilson, Michael

  Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

  Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

  McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

  Rost, Peter

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Maddan, Martin

  Royle, Anthony

  Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

  Madel, David

  Russell, Sir Ronald

  Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

  Maginnis, John E.

  St. John-Stevas, Norman

  Hannam, John (Exeter)

  Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

  Scott, Nicholas

  Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

  Marten, Neil

  Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

  Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

  Mather, Carol

  Shelton, William (Clapham)

  Haselhurst, Alan

  Maude, Angus

  Shersby, Michael

  Hastings, Stephen

  Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

  Simeons, Charles

  Havers, Michael

  Mawby, Ray

  Sinclair, Sir George

  Hawkins, Paul

  Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

  Skeet, T. H. H.

  Hay, John

  Meyer, Sir Anthony

  Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

  Hayhoe, Barney

  Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

  Soref, Harold

  Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

  Miscampbell, Norman

  Speed, Keith

  Heseltine, Michael

  Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W)

  Spence, John

  Hicks, Robert

  Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

  Sproat, Iain

  Higgins, Terence L.

  Moate, Roger

  Stainton, Keith

  Hiley, Joseph

  Molyneaux, James

  Stanbrook, Ivor

  Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

  Money, Ernie

  Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

  Holland, Philip

  Monks, Mrs. Connie

  Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

  Holt, Miss Mary

  Monro, Hector

  Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

  Hordern, Peter

  Montgomery, Fergus

  Stokes, John

  Hornby, Richard

  More, Jasper

  Sutcliffe, John

  Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

  Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

  Tapsell, Peter

  Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

  Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

  Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

  Howell, David (Guildford)

  Morrison, Charles

  Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

  Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

  Mudd, David

  Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

  Hunt, John

  Murton, Oscar

  Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

  Nabarro, Sir Gerald

  Tebbit, Norman

  Hutchison, Michael Clark

  Neave, Airey

  Temple, John M.

  Iremonger, T. L.

  Nicholls, Sir Harmar

  Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

  Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

  Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

  Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

  James, David

  Nott, John

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

  Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

  Onslow, Cranley

  Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

  Jessel, Toby

  Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

  Tilney, John

  Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

  Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

  Trafford, Dr. Anthony

  Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

  Osborn, John

  Trew, Peter

  Jopling, Michael

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

  Tugendhat, Christopher

  Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

  Page, Rt. Hn. Graham (Crosby)

  Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

  Kaberry, Sir Donald

  Page, John (Harrow, W.)

  Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

  Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

  Parkinson, Cecil

  Vickers, Dame Joan

  Kershaw, Anthony

  Peel, Sir John

  Waddington, David

  Kilfedder, James

  Percival, Ian

  Walder, David (Clitheroe)

  Kimball, Marcus

  Peyton, Rt. Hn. John

  Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

  King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

  Pike, Miss Mervyn

  Wall, Patrick

  King, Tom (Bridgwater)

  Pink, R. Bonner

  Walters, Dennis

  Kinsey, J. R.

  Pounder, Rafton

  Ward, Dame Irene

  Kitson, Timothy

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Warren, Kenneth

  Knight, Mrs. Jill

  Prior, Rt. Hon. J. M. L.

  Knox, David

  Proudfoot, Wilfred

  Wells, John (Maidstone)

  Lambton, Lord

  Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

  White, Roger (Gravesend)

  Lamont, Norman

  Quennell, Miss J. M.

  Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

  Lane, David

  Raison, Timothy

  Wiggin, Jerry

  Langford-Holt, Sir John

  Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

  Winterton, Nicholas

  Le Marchant, Spencer

  Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

  Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

  Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

  Redmond, Robert

  Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

  Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)

  Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

  Woodnutt, Mark

  Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

  Rees, Peter (Dover)

  Worsley, Marcus

  Longden, Sir Gilbert

  Rees-Davies, W. R.

  Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

  Loveridge, John

  Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

  Younger, Hn. George

  Luce, R. N.

  Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

  McAdden, Sir Stephen

  Ridsdale, Julian

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  MacArthur, Ian

  Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

  Mr. Walter Clegg and

  McCrindle, R. A.

  Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

  Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

  McMaster, Stanley

  Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

  NOES

  Abse, Leo

  Bishop, E. S.

  Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

  Albu, Austen

  Blenkinsop, Arthur

  Clark, David (Colne Valley)

  Allen, Scholefield

  Boardman, H. (Leigh)

  Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

  Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

  Booth, Albert

  Cohen, Stanley

  Armstrong, Ernest

  Bradley, Tom

  Coleman, Donald

  Ashley, Jack

  Broughton, Sir Alfred

  Concannon, J. D.

  Atkinson, Norman

  Brown, Robert C. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne,W.)

  Conlan, Bernard

  Bagier, Gordon A. T.

  Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

  Corbet, Mrs. Freda

  Barnes, Michael

  Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

  Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

  Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

  Buchan, Norman

  Crawshaw, Richard

  Barnett, Joel (Heywood and Royton)

  Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

  Cronin, John

  Baxter, William

  Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

  Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

  Beaney, Alan

  Cant, R. B.

  Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

  Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

  Carmichael, Neil

  Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W)

  Bennett, James (G'gow, Bridgeton)

  Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

  Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven)

  Bidwell, Sydney

  Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

  Dalyell, Tam

  1364

  1365

  Darling, Rt. Hn. George

  John, Brynmor

  Parker, John (Dagenham)

  Davidson, Arthur

  Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

  Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

  Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

  Johnson, James (K'ston-on Hull, W.)

  Pavitt, Laurie

  Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

  Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

  Pendry, Tom

  Davies, Ifor (Gower)

  Jones, Dan (Burnley)

  Perry, Ernest G.

  Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

  Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

  Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

  Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

  Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

  Prescott, John

  Deakins, Eric

  Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

  Price, William (Rugby)

  de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

  Kaufman, Gerald

  Probert, Arthur

  Delargy, Hugh

  Kelley, Richard

  Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

  Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

  Kerr, Russell

  Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

  Dempsey, James

  Kinnock, Neil

  Rhodes, Geoffrey

  Dormand, J. D.

  Lamborn, Harry

  Richard, Ivor

  Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

  Lamond, James

  Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

  Douglas-Mann, Bruce

  Latham, Arthur

  Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Driberg, Tom

  Lawson, George

  Robertson, John (Paisley)

  Duffy, A. E. P.

  Leadbitter, Ted

  Roberick, Caerwyn E. (Brc'n&R'dnor)

  Dunn, James A.

  Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

  Dunnett, Jack

  Leonard, Dick

  Roper, John

  Eadie, Alex

  Lestor, Miss Joan

  Rose, Paul B.

  Edelman, Maurice

  Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

  Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

  Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

  Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

  Rowlands, Ted

  Edwards, William (Merioneth)

  Lipton, Marcus

  Sandelson, Neville

  Ellis, Tom

  Lomas, Kenneth

  Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

  English, Michael

  Loughlin, Charles

  Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

  Evans, Fred

  Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

  Short, Rt. Hn. Edward (N'c'tle-u-Tyne)

  Ewing, Harry

  Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

  Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N.E.)

  Faulds, Andrew

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

  Fernyhough, Rt. Hn. E.

  McBride, Neil

  Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

  Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

  McCartney, Hugh

  Sillars, James

  Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

  McElhone, Frank

  Silverman, Julius

  Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

  McGuire, Michael

  Skinner, Dennis

  Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

  Mackenzie, Gregor

  Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)

  Foley, Maurice

  Mackie, John

  Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

  Foot, Michael

  Mackintosh, John P.

  Spearing, Nigel

  Ford, Ben

  Maclennan, Robert

  Spriggs, Leslie

  Forrester, John

  McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

  Stallard, A. W.

  Fraser, John (Norwood)

  McNamara, J. Kevin

  Steel, David

  Freeson, Reginald

  Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

  Stewart, Rt. Hn. Michael (Fulham)

  Galpern, Sir Myer

  Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

  Stoddart, David (Swindon)

  Garrett, W. E.

  Marks, Kenneth

  Strang, Gavin

  Gilbert, Dr. John

  Marquand, David

  Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

  Ginsburg, David (Dewsbury)

  Marsden, F.

  Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

  Gourlay, Harry

  Marshall, Dr. Edmund

  Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

  Grant, George (Morpeth)

  Mason, Rt. Hn. Roy

  Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

  Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

  Mayhew, Christopher

  Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

  Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

  Meacher, Michael

  Tinn, James

  Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

  Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

  Tomney, Frank

  Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

  Mendelson, John

  Tope, Graham

  Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

  Millan, Bruce

  Tuck, Raphael

  Hamling, William

  Miller, Dr. M. S.

  Varley, Eric G.

  Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

  Milne, Edward

  Wainwright, Edwin

  Hardy, Peter

  Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

  Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

  Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

  Molloy, William

  Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

  Hattersley, Roy

  Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

  Wallace, George

  Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

  Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

  Watkins, David

  Heffer, Eric S.

  Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

  Weitzman, David

  Hilton, W. S.

  Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

  Wellbeloved, James

  Hooson, Emlyn

  Murray, Ronald King

  Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

  Horam, John

  Oakes, Gordon

  White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

  Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Ogden, Eric

  Whitehead, Phillip

  Huckfield, Leslie

  O'Halloran, Michael

  Whitlock, William

  Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  O'Malley, Brian

  Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

  Hughes, Mark (Durham)

  Oram, Bert

  Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

  Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

  Orbach, Maurice

  Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

  Hughes, Roy (Newport)

  Orme, Stanley

  Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

  Hunter, Adam

  Oswald, Thomas

  Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

  Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth. Sutton)

  Wilson. Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

  Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

  Padley, Walter

  Woof, Robert

  Janner, Greville

  Paget, R. T.

  Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

  Palmer, Arthur

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Jeger, Mrs. Lena

  Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

  Mr. John Golding and

  Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

  Pardoe, John

  Mr. Joseph Harper.

  Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

  Question accordingly agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That this House recognises that Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer will give full con-
  1366
  sideration to all representations made in respect of any aspect of taxation, direct or indirect, and appreciates that no statement on any such matter should be made in advance of the Budget.

  ANTI-DISCRIMINATION (No. 2) BILL
  Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question [2nd February], That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  Question again proposed.
  7.24 p.m.
  Mr. Martin Maddan: I make no apology for having risen on Friday, 10 days ago, to ensure that further consideration be given to the Bill. I believed that to be entirely necessary if only to show that a vociferious lobby cannot stampede the House.
  I find it astonishing that the advocates of rushing through the Bill made no more than glancing reference in all they said to the different problems arising from the different positions of women in employment. First, there are single women and those yet without children. Their position is different from that of women with dependent children. The position of both those groups is different from those of women who have grown up.
  The hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) took non-discrimination too far by lumping all these groups together in his cascade of largely irrelevant statistics.
  Dame Joan Vickers: Are women who have married and who have children not grown up?
  Mr. Maddan: I meant that the children are grown up. We all grow up at differing speeds. I assure my lion. Friend that in everything I say I am against unfair discrimination against women. However, I have the gravest reservations about the Bill and I hope to show why. It is no wonder that there are doubts about it.
  The hon. Member for Hitchin (Mrs. Shirley Williams), who is not here now but who spoke from the Opposition Front Bench on Friday 2nd February, noted that legislation already passed in this House was inadequate and ineffective. We want to take care not to fall into the same trap twice. The Bill is too blunt an instrument in principle, never mind its details, to deal with deep and difficult situations. It is also largely irrelevant. It is like trying to use a tin-opener to extract oil from the North Sea. It is not relevant to the main problems.
  1368
  I shall describe to those hon. Members who support the Bill some of the situations which arise. We may not all agree upon the solutions to those situations but they will illustrate the need for deep thought. First, there are single women and those married women yet without children. They are not the main problem. They are not the root of it, though they may be those who are most vociferous in support of the Bill. The proportion of these women in employment is at nearly the same rate as for men. That was shown by Viola Klein in one of her books.
  The total number of single women and those married yet without children in relation to the total working population is small. Their problem comes because most women have children, which interrupts the careers of those who have embarked on one. That interruption has its effect on the cost-benefit to the nation of training them. The hon. Member for Fife, West gave some examples, and the cost of training in those cases is high. One cannot ignore the subsequent comparative rate of fall-out between the sexes. If we invest highly in the training of all women, will there then be pressure on those women to continue their careers rather than to have children? Nobody addresses themselves to that.
  Mr. William Hamilton indicated dissent.
  Mr. Maddan: The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I wonder why he is so sure. That aspect is worth considering. The Bill goes nowhere even to acknowledge the extent of that problem.
  I now turn to the mothers whose children have grown up. Such a mother will have gaps in her experience as a result of having brought up her children—[Laughter.] Everybody laughs. Such a mother will have a gap in her career experience as a result of having brought up her children.
  Mr. Hamilton: Tell us about your gaps?
  Mr. Maddan: I prefer to stick to the Bill. I think that the hon. Gentleman might prefer me to do so as well. In Clause 2(a) the Bill talks about what a person is "qualified" for. The board proposed in the Bill has to enforce the Bill's provisions, but its provisions evade

  1369
  all the important questions including what "qualified" means in the context of somebody who has had a substantial gap in her career.
  I turn next to the women with dependent children. Of this aspect virtually nothing was said. The dual rôle of the worker and mother also gives rise to genuine difficulties which cannot be removed by a quick stroke of the parliamentary pen. The first fact of the situation is that two-thirds of women with dependent children do not work.
  Mr. William Molloy: Surely the hon. Gentleman does not really mean that they do not work.
  Mr. Maddan: When I say that they do not work——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. I have a very long list of speakers on both sides of the House. Interventions prolong speeches.
  Mr. Maddan: I am talking, of course, about working in a career. What I have said underlines the fact that the more women who will have children go out to work at professional careers, the bigger is the problem which this practice poses for those professions. We should note what Political and Economic Planning said, in a study called "Sex, Career and Family", about those women who work at home. It was concerned mostly with graduates and drew attention to
  "the high degree of satisfaction shown by those married women who have committed themselves definitely and in principle to the role of a full-time housewife".
  In that context I welcome Lord Denning's judgment last week that the wife who looks after the home contributes as much to the family assets as the wife who goes out to work.
  I want now to look at the implications of the Bill for the one-third of women with dependent children who work, and I do so from three aspects—that of the woman herself, that of her employer and the trade unions, and that of her children. There are many subjective views on these matters, so I intend to base myself on academic sources and research findings. I will quote what those sources are and I hope in this way to start off on an objective path.
  I begin with the point of view of the working mother herself. What is the nature of her economic contribution? This
  1370
  has been well defined by the National Manpower Council of Columbia University, and what it says applies here just as much as in the United States. It says that women
  "…constitute a distinctive manpower resource"—
  [Laughter.] We all know, as Sir Winston Churchill said, that "man" comprehends "woman" in parliamentary terms. The National Manpower Council says that women
  "constitute a distinctive manpower resource because the structure and the substance of the lives of most women are fundamentally determined by their functions as wives, mothers and home makers."
  Why do one-third of women with dependent children go out to work? Viola Klein in her book, "Britain's Married Women Workers", written when she was a lecturer in sociology at Reading University, reported thus on a survey by Mass Observation:
  "The growth in the number of married women going out to work is the result of the smaller size of their families and the general reduction in housework…combined with a striving to improve their standards of living. It is not due to an urge for 'emancipation'. There is no trace of feminist egalitarianism.…Isolated references to the 'equality of the sexes' were made by men, not women."
  Mr. E. Leach, when he addressed the British Humanist Association a couple of years ago, seems to have hit the nail on the head perhaps more truly than I really like a humanist to do when he referred to the curious assumption that men and women are socially interchangeable. He said:
  "Instead of training our women to be imitation second-class males, we should recognise the basic facts of existence and make a clear distinction between male and female roles, concentrating our attention on raising the social status of the female rôle."
  So much for working mothers' motives and how they see themselves. We in Parliament too ought to give more attention than we do to the importance and, indeed, the honour of motherhood. The significance of Lord Denning's judgment is very relevant here.
  I now want to look at the matter from the starting point of employers and trade unions. Concessions to women which are not granted to men have to be made to women employees to enable them to fulfil their dual rôle at work and at home because, of course, of

  1371
  absence due to family responsibilities. A point here which goes to the hollow centre of the Bill, which ignores the whole topic, is one that I can best make by using the measured words of Viola Klein from the same book I have already quoted from. She says:
  "The onus of carrying out the adjustments necessary to absorb into the labour market employees whose major responsibilities lie outside their field of employment cannot be put on the employers alone."
  I will say more about that in a moment, when I come to taxation.
  Mr. William Hamilton: Hurry up.
  Mr. Maddan: We all thought that there was need for serious debate of the Bill, and now we are having it.
  I turn now to the children themselves.
  "Modern psychology has given support and justification to a belief which at one time may have been thought old-fashioned': the view that the future happy development of infants is dependent on the loving care of their mother."
  That is a quotation from a book by Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein called "Women's Two Roles".
  Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman: Will my hon. Friend give way?
  Mr. Maddan: No, I will not give way because, as Mr. Speaker has pointed out——
  Hon. Members: Give way.
  Mrs. Kellett-Bowman: I merely wished to ask my hon. Friend whether he thinks that the working mothers are less loving than those who do not go out to work.
  Mr. Maddan: I am coming to that. My hon. Friend's intervention fortifies me in my resolve to take Mr. Speaker's hint in future, and I hope that I shall not detain the House. The very point I was going to make is this: how is the working mother to be able to exercise her loving care for her children? What provision does the Bill make for that? It makes none.
  I will not myself describe this problem but will quote three sentences taken from the conclusions of a pioneering book by Simon Yudkin and Anthea Holme called "Mothers and Their Children", based on
  1372
  research by London University. The first sentence is:
  "A large percentage of school children had to eat their breakfast after their mother had' gone to work, especially full-time work."
  The second sentence is:
  "One-third of the children whose mothers worked full-time, and nearly one-fifth of those mothers worked part-time, came home to an empty house for an hour or two."
  My third quotation refers to arrangements made during school holidays for children of mothers at work. It is:
  "A large number still had to manage for themselves. This included nearly 20 per cent. of children between five and 11 years old, though two-thirds of those children had older brothers and sisters. Of the older children between 12 and 15, more than 40 per cent. looked after themselves during the holidays."
  I observe that Women's Lib and its champions here who ignore these problems, as the Bill does, prove themselves to be completely out of touch with the realities faced by so many women and children—[Interruption.]—in our society today.
  Mr. Patrick Cormack Mr. Patrick Cormack (Cannock) rose——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. Clapping or hissing or anything of that sort is disorderly and anyone who engages in it will be requested to leave the Floor of the House, or elsewhere. If the Public Galleries have to be cleared, that will involve a suspension of the Sitting and may endanger the future of the measure.
  Mr. Maddan: There is evidence that working mothers, especially those working full-time, may become less sensitive to the emotional and psychological, as well as the physical, needs of their children. This situation may well get worse as was foreshadowed by Audrey Hunt in her Government Social Survey report. She explained that today granny is the main substitute for mum while mum is working. Today's grandmothers are used to looking after children all day. What will be the position with tomorrow's grannies who have not devoted themselves to looking after children?
  Mr. Molloy: You tell us.
  Mr. Maddan: I will leave that. What plans have we which recognise the severe drop in family income which can take place when a wife who has been working stops doing so as her children begin to

  1373
  arrive? It may be said that Government policies in other areas should look after all these things. I want to take one such area—taxation—and see what is happening. This is my last point—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Hon. Gentlemen may not like this but they had better listen.
  One might suppose, as more single women without dependants take up careers and thus compete for jobs with fathers who have dependants, that the bias and trend of the tax system would move in favour of those with dependants, particularly when we consider that the time when parents are starting a family is a very expensive one for them. It is just at that moment that the wife, if she has been working, is likely to give up work. Yet the bias and trend is in exactly the opposite direction.
  I will take as an example a single woman and compare her with a married man with two dependent children and imagine that they both have an income of £3,000 a year. Let us assume—it is a modest assumption—that the man spends on his wife and children the exact amount that is allowed for tax purposes. In 1938–39 these allowances totalled £200: today they are £550. That is not much to spend on a wife and two children.
  The amount of net income available to the single woman in 1938–39 was 6½ per cent. greater than that remaining in the hands of the father after that assumed level of expenditure on his wife and children. Today the differential in favour of the single woman is not 6½ per cent.; it is 18 per cent. The bias has been moving the wrong way for more than a generation and it is getting worse. I have ignored family allowances because in most professional families these are wholly or mostly clawed back by the taxation system.
  Discrimination is most important in the instance of the single woman and the married woman without dependent children. It arises basically from the consequences of the fact that most women become married and have children. This is the heart of the matter. Discrimination as described in the Bill is far from being the basic issue and the Bill diverts attention from the heart of the matter. That is why I am sure that this whole issue requires much wider and deeper
  1374
  consideration before we rush further legislation on to the statute book.
  7.44 p.m.
  Mrs. Renée Short: I never cease to be amazed at the rubbish that men talk about women——
  Mr. David Stoddart: Some men.
  Mrs. Short: All right, some men—on the other side of the House. If the Hove Daily Courier or whatever it is called prints the speech of the hon. Member for Hove (Mr. Maddan) there will be some angry women meeting him at his next surgery or however it is he meets his constituents.
  The fact that we hear that kind of speech indicates how necessary the Bill is. I am honoured to be the sponsor of it and I hope it will receive a speedy passage. At the moment I am engaged on an investigation, in the Expenditure Committee, of the whole question of women's employment, training opportunities and related subjects, including something which the hon. Member mentioned, the kind of support we give to working mothers, married and unmarried. The report will be published in a few weeks and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will make a special effort to read it and instruct himself about some of the inequalities that exist and the discrimination that goes on as between married and single women and as between men and women.
  The hon. Member began by talking about the House being stampeded into passing this Bill. If we remember that it is about 100 years since people began trying in various ways, through the TUC, women's organisations, and through this House on many occasions, to get something like this Bill, I do not think that anyone can call that stampeding—even at the rate at which this House works.
  If we look first at the industrial sector I am sure that everyone will agree that women come out very badly. Today about 50 per cent. of women earn less than £15 a week, whereas the equivalent figure for men is 1 per cent. Although we have the Equal Pay Act on the statute book, I am disturbed at the effort which is being made to dodge the provisions of that Act. The TUC is concerned about

  1375
  the kind of advice being given to employers about how to dodge the implications of implementing the Act. Advice has been given about job evaluation exercises aimed at creating jobs for women which are apparently not equal to jobs carried out by men. This has been put forward as a means of enabling women to be paid less than men for work of equal value.
  Obviously we have a long way to go and many or us were concerned that the Secretary of State for Employment was not prepared to take the opportunity provided by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle). She introduced her Bill which would have given the right hon. Gentleman the opportunity to lay an order requiring a certain level of equal pay to be reached by 1974.
  Let us look at the opportunities for boys and girls when they leave school and enter industry. There is enormous discrimination. Only a tiny percentage of girls, 7 per cent., enter any kind of apprenticeship for skilled work. Most of those are apprenticeships in the hairdressing trade. About three-quarters of them go to hairdressing. About 42 per cent. of boys leaving school go into skilled apprenticeships. Of the rest, most of the girls go into clerical or secretarial jobs. Girl school leavers and indeed graduates tend to have to follow a clerical or secretarial line if they want promotion. This is particularly true of the BBC. It is particularly true of the top jobs in management. The girls have to start off as secretaries.
  We do not ask the young men to begin as secretaries. They get on to the managerial ladder at the beginning if they are qualified to do so, if they are graduates and have done the kind of training which equips them for a managerial post. Girls who want to follow that kind of profession have to take secretarial work and hope that by some stroke of luck they will be noticed and be given the opportunity to get on the management ladder. Therefore, at every level there is discrimination in promotion against girls.
  The career patterns for girls are largely dependent on their educational background and families, but I am concerned
  1376
  that, although progress has been made in industrial training, little progress has been made by the industrial training boards. In 1968 the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions found that the boards had not increased the range of jobs done by women. In our inquiry we found that precisely the same position exists today, five years later. The boards are not concerned with opportunities for women. They are not concerned with giving women what we might regard as unusual jobs. Women are supposed to go into the ordinary routine jobs which women have done for centuries. Any suggestion that women should be trained to do jobs which they would be anxious to do if they had the opportunity does not enter into the consideration.
  Let us look beyond the school leaving age and the apprenticeship stage and consider the discrimination in day release between boys and girls. Only about 10 per cent. of girls get day release, often for clerical work, whereas 40 per cent. of boys get it. There are very poor figures for day release in industries in which many women are employed and in which the unions are concerned about the position of women. In the distributive trade only 2·3 per cent. of girls and women get day release. The percentage is the same in banking and insurance. In the textile industry it is 3·4 per cent. These are very low percentages for training after school life.
  We need only to consider the situation in the House to realise that there is discrimination against women. There is a large number of women in the Chamber tonight, but in total they are a very small minority in a man's world. I do not complain that we are in a man's world. I complain that there are so few women Members. There should be more of us. There is tremendous discrimination against women in both political parties. It is difficult for women to be selected and adopted for safe Labour or Conservative seats. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about the Liberals?"] We do not consider them. Women have great difficulty in being selected for seats which they are likely to win, but it is all right for them to fight the difficult seats with large Conservative or Labour majorities against them. They can fight the marginal seats if they are lucky.

  1377
  There is equal difficulty in the professions. We see how discrimination works in the appointment of boards and corn-missions. We have the "statutory woman", and that is about it. She is supposed to hold the fort and to put forward the case with very little support.
  The main problem is the support which we give to women who want jobs. The hon. Member for Hove said that the Bill does not deal with support for women. But it is not intended to do so. Some women Members, and I am glad to say some men Members, have been working together to do precisely that. We have won over the right hon. Lady the Secretary of State for Education and Science to our views about nursery education. We hope that we shall win her over to our plea for much more provision to help working women with young children who need to be cared for so that they do not have to come home to empty houses. New thinking in the provision of nursery centres, in the hours which they are open and flexible hours for women workers will help to overcome these problems.
  The difficulty lies with the kind of brainwashing exercise which takes place when little girls are little girls. Girls of two or three years of age are depicted in the picture books as being that part of the community which plays with dolls and prams. The boys in the picture books play with machinery and trains and do the exciting things. They are the doers while the girls are brainwashed into becoming supine and passive.
  That situation permeates through the education system. A tremendous change in attitude is needed in the way in which we educate girls. When girls and boys are doing crafts at school we segregate them. We teach the girls domestic science, and the boys do woodwork and metalwork. Why should we not teach both sexes the same things? Why should they be taught in separate schools? Why should they be segregated in different groups of different subjects? It is nonsense to discriminate in this way. All the time we inculcate the view that girls are not able to do the same things and cannot tackle the same activities as boys. I hope that the Secretary of State for Education and Science will take up some of these ideas. It would be sensible for her to do so.
  1378
  In addition to being concerned about the discrimination which exists in education, I am concerned about the question of different rates of pay for mature women undergoing training in order to return to industry. There are different rates of training pay for them.
  There are many anomalies which I hope the Bill will help to remove. I support the Bill. I do not believe that if we give it a Second Reading and it reaches the statute book it will eliminate all discrimination against women. That will not happen overnight. It will be a fairly long process, and it must happen in many different directions. But the Bill will create the right climate. Just as the Race Relations Board has helped to improve the climate, so the provisions of this Bill will help to improve the climate. It will make discrimination against women unpopular and anti-social. It will make it something which reasonable and decent people do not do. It will make a valuable contribution to bringing about the equality of women which I hope will be pursued throughout our national life.
  7.58 p.m.
  Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Many hon. Members wish to speak. Therefore, the hon. Lady the Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Renee Short) will forgive me if I do not take up her remarks but go straight to the point of what I want to say.
  I shall support the Second Reading of the Bill. I believe that there are areas of discrimination which should be carefully considered and eliminated for the sake of the betterment of our way of life. However, the Bill, in its terms, is very unsatisfactory in many respects—and that has been agreed. I invite the House to do two things—to pass the Bill without opposition on Second Reading and to send it to a Select Committee so that it can be carefully considered. There is a large queue of Bills awaiting to go to Standing Committee. It would therefore be a long time before a Standing Committee could consider it. It might jeopardise the entire Bill unless the alternative procedure is adopted.
  I recognise that there are many male and some female colleagues in the House who are opposed to this Anti-Discrimination Bill. The title is a strange misnomer. If I say to a person, "Sir, you are a most discriminating person", that person will

  1379
  say, "Thank you very much; you have done me a great honour." At the same time, "anti-discrimination" takes on an unpleasant taste.
  Those who drew the Bill—a desperately difficult one to draw—were faced at the outset with an impossible task. Let us consider the difficulty of that task. The advertising clause is a nonsense. We do not want to be in a position in which we cannot advertise for an au pair girl or a daily woman without being guilty of discrimination. We do not want to be in a position in which we cannot discriminate with regard to housekeepers, cooks, daily women and the like. Yet, as the Bill is drawn, all these matters could be regarded as discriminatory because one has to maintain equality of opportunity for males and females.
  In the police service, in hostels and in the fire services we surely do not want women to have to face the difficult task of handling violent criminals. Obviously, there must be a balance. Equally, certain aspects of the fire services are highly dangerous. I can well understand firemen properly putting forward a case that a large part of their work is properly a man's task.
  The Factories Act is designed to protect women. In the police force there are arrangements whereby the hours of duty are less for certain women than they are for men and, properly so, because often they are married women who have domestic duties to perform. It is not in those fields that alterations have to be made.
  Although there is no one more discriminating than dear old medieval, Luddite Mr. Briginshaw, if one asks the members of his National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants whether they are willing to let in any women, they will say, "No women at any price". That is a matter of discrimination that should be looked at.
  The Women's Advisory Committee of the Trades Union Congress has given evidence before the Select Committee in the House of Lords. In that evidence it was said:
  "The TUC Women's Advisory Committee consider that in a number of respects the Anti-Discrimination (No. 2) Bill would not be
  1380
  satisfactory as the basis for legislation to outlaw discrimination against women."
  The advisory committee goes on to point out what is obvious, that Clause 1 cannot stand. Clause 1 is not a definition of discrimination. Whoever comes to consider it will have to decide whether "discrimination" is the right word and, if it be the right word, what is the proper definition of it. The evidence of the advisory committee goes on to say that Clause 2(a) is not effectively worded, nor is Clause 2(b).
  On the setting up of a board, the advisory committee pointed out that the powers of enforcement are quite ineffective, and that is right. Therefore, the Bill, not merely in terms of drafting but in the way in which it sets about the task, does not cover the whole field under the one word "discrimination". Instead, it should seek to pick out certain areas of known discriminatory misconduct which should be rendered unlawful. That is a task which will require the combined brains of men and also of ladies.
  Furthermore, there is a constitutional difficulty. From 13th June 1972 until the present time, a Select Committee of the House of Lords has been sitting. It has already sat 14 times and has taken a lot of evidence. It is an able committee, but it has turned into a doughty battle between three eminent ladies, Lady Summerskill, Lady Seear and Lady Macleod, who have dominated the proceedings in another place. The Select Committee has listened to evidence from societies. So far, the male side of the trade union movement has not given evidence, with the exception of the engineers.
  If this House is to consider this matter, it is essential that we should play the game by the rules. If the unions—and they may have a proper case—say that they will not have women at any price, they must justify it. It may be justifiable. I do not argue that the firemen may not have a case for saying that all the dangerous work they do should be for men only. It may be; it may not be. It is a matter for evidence.
  The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East spoke of girls not participating in certain work. For the last three

  1381
  years almost every polytechnic has tried to get girls to join the engineering and science courses. They have not got one. Girls do not go in for engineering. There is no discriminatory action; it is just that girls do not want to go in for those courses.
  Mrs. Renée Short: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that, although this may not be discrimination, it is part of the conditioning that girls undergo at school? Should not he look at the advice given to girls by careers teachers?
  Mr. Rees-Davies: Yes, but all the guidance in the world does not make girls go in for engineering and scientific subjects, and it will be a long time before they will. I am merely quoting the evidence which was given in another place. I can quote chapter and verse of that evidence and the answers given by the Department of Education and Science and Lady Macleod relating to the polytechnics and engineering and science courses.
  It is plain that Clause 1 has to be amended. With Clause 4 as it stands the Department of Education and Science would be in an impossible situation. Under the Education Act, the Department is entitled to be consulted on radical changes. The Bill provides for the end of all single-sex schools—Roedean out of the window for girls only, Eton out of the window, for boys only. To be precise, the construction is that nothing in the Education Acts requires that any school or institution should be exclusively for one sex. Clause 4 would not require single-sex schools to become co-ed, but they would be in breach of the Bill if they refused admission to a pupil of the opposite sex or refused to appoint a teacher of the opposite sex.
  The result will be a conflict between the Education Acts and the Bill, in particular Section 13 of the 1944 Act which provides that there can be a change only after public notice has been given so that objections may be submitted. All institutions set up by charities or by trust deed which provide for only one sex would be abolished, and the whole system of Roman Catholicism and its education would be rocked to the roots. Those are some of the things that have to be looked at.
  1382
  It is no good saying that I am opposed to the Bill. I am not. I am pointing out that the whole Roman Catholic community will be at our heads if we pass the Bill. All the independent schools will be at our heads, and many trusts and others. We shall find that we shall have to alter the Factories Acts and the Education Acts, and that will be an immense task.
  I invite the House to treat this matter with good will in a fair and honest way and to give the Bill a Second Reading. We must bear in mind that the House of Lords is also considering legislation on this subject. We shall have the opportunity to catch up on the other place when we consider the recommendations of our own Select Committee, with a result which in the long run may turn out to be of very great benefit to women.
  8.10 p.m.
  Miss John Lestor: When people question the equality of opportunity between the sexes, they often advance arguments about the difficulties that would face women if they were expected to deal with violent criminals, or to fight fires in the Fire Service, and all the rest of it. However, we only have to look at the history of working-class women over the last century or so to realise that for many years they carried out work in the mines, in factories, and on munitions.
  I accept that protective legislation must always be carefully examined—and I speak as a woman who does a good deal of night work in this House and who afterwards goes home without protection. And so far I have not suffered unduly from this sort of life.
  It is not strictly true that the Bill is concerned solely with abolishing discrimination against women. The Bill is concerned with abolishing discrimination "on grounds of sex" and therefore includes men as well as women. I cannot over-emphasise this point for many professions and occupations would gain a great deal of benefit if men were involved in them. I have in mind work in nursery schools, day nurseries and similar occupations in which children work and play in an entirely feminine society.
  Mr. Rees-Davies: Does the hon. Lady agree that male nurses should be included

  1383
  within the provisions of the Midwives Act?
  Miss Lestor: Certainly. The whole point of legislation to outlaw discrimination is that it should equalise opportunities for men and for women—in other words, the Bill would emancipate men as well as women. Since women have been discriminated against in so many ways for such a long period of time, and still are discriminated against, there will need at the beginning to be a greater amount of equalisation in relation to them because they are the people who are in greater need.
  The subject of employment for women in the engineering profession has been mentioned, and this whole topic is bound up with much of the fantasy and conditioning which takes place in our society about the woman's role. This conditioning process begins at birth, and it is as applicable to men as it is to women. One of the best toys which has ever been invented is a doll called Action Man. This gives boys the opportunity to have a doll of their own and to dress and undress it and when so doing they are not called cissies. We must guard against the sort of attitude that comes from pushing a child in one direction and expecting that child to conform to a certain mode of behaviour, without any regard to differences in emotional behaviour in both boys and girls.
  I do not deny that the Bill has defects, but I believe that as a measure it is as perfect as much of the legislation which has passed through this House since June 1970. Certain areas covered by the Bill must be carefully examined—such as insurance, hire purchase, mortgage and credit facilities in which women are actively discriminated against. It is clear that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act will not contribute very much to equal opportunities among men and women unless these other important areas are dealt with. It is practically useless to have the Equal Pay Act on the Statute Book unless at the same time we also seek to equalise opportunities for women in the professions and in industry.
  On Tuesday the Under-Secretary of State replied to a Question about opportunities for women wishing to enter medical schools. The hon. Gentleman
  1384
  said that he was not particularly well informed on the question of discrimination in entrance to medical schools, but he said that he found the subject interesting. We have only to look at some of the evidence submitted to the Select Committee in another place to see that large numbers of medical schools operate a quota system for women. The figure in St. Bartholomew's Hospital is 20 per cent., at Charing Cross Hospital it is 25 per cent. and at the Midlesex Hospital the figure, again, is 20 per cent. King's College Hospital takes in 120 women medical students per year. What is important is that certain medical schools require higher qualifications from women than they do from male candidates. There is no justification for that sort of requirement. This is the sort of discrimination with which equal pay provisions will not be able to deal. It is a discrimination in terms of attitude.
  It has also been said that there are too few women Members of this House, and again that is true—though I am not sure that this is a question of discrimination. Again we must examine the sort of conditioning process which operates to give women the impression that they should not try to stand for election to local or national government. The number of women who come forward to play an active part in public life is nothing like as great as it should be, because from the moment they enter school they are discouraged from assuming that sort of role. We must look more closely at legislation to try to bring about equal opportunities and to combat the early conditioning of women.
  Anybody who has been in the minority situation and who has been active in a world which hitherto has been dominated by men, and certainly somebody who has been moderately successful in that world, always has to face the comment "Yes, but she has the mind of a man". This appears to provide great comfort to large numbers of men and women who do not believe in equal opportunity or equal ability. But those of us who for most of our lives have to grapple with the minds of men are quite happy to retain our own minds intact and to argue from our own standpoint.
  I promised to be brief and I conclude by welcoming the Bill and by hoping

  1385
  that, with all its defects, it will be given a Second Reading. I believe that many people who seek to question the provisions in the Bill, and who perhaps see its deficiencies, may themselves have been the victims of the most abject conditioning in their own lives, just as many women have been conditioned about their own role in society.
  I believe that many men—and women too—have to try to understand that they have been part of the conditioning process and that in history the roles of men and women in our society have been one enormous "kid" or confidence trick from beginning to end. In terms of ability, confidence and intelligence there are great differences between men and women but they are differences between men and men, between women and women and between men and women. They are not differences dependent on the sexes of the people involved.
  Society has assumed a sexual inferiority in women and has then set out to prove that inferiority by denying women equal opportunities. That is what this Bill is about. In extending opportunities to women so that they may compete and play a fuller rôle in society, men will be freed from many of the strictures and confines which they face in having to fulfil a role which someone thought up for them and which does not relate in any way to the facts.
  8.20 p.m.
  The Solicitor-General (Sir Michael Havers): I hope that this is a convenient moment for me to intervene in the debate.
  I congratulate the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) on his good fortune in the Ballot for the second year running and on his tenacity of purpose. I commiserate with him that the opportunism shown by the noble Lady in another place has meant that his Bill has had to be called the No. 2 Bill. In spite of that it deserves the closest attention and respect.
  In my remarks I shall have to criticise certain aspects of the drafting. I do that as part of my duty as a Law Officer. But I am very conscious of the difficulties involved in the drafting of a Private Member's Bill as I am of the principle which it is sought by the promoters to establish. What I have to say is no criticism of that principle. It is one
  1386
  which is accepted by the Government as it has been by the Conservative Party since the publication of the Cripps Committee's Report.
  It is not only in the interests of women but of the community as a whole that women should play a full part in the economic life of the country. This Bill, quite rightly, has provoked a great deal of emotion since discrimination against women is a subject on which we all have strong views. However, the time has come to take a cool look at the Bill and to be constructive.
  A great deal of shot and shell has been expended in the general direction of the quarry. If we do not pause for a moment to see what is happening there is a very serious danger that the quarry will slip away in the confusion and, when the smoke clears, we shall be left merely with one or two unexpected and certainly unintended casualties for all our efforts.
  It is important to examine dispassionately what the Bill does and what it does not do. It is perhaps best to see what it does not do first so that we may see what we are talking about. Here the fundamental point to appreciate is that the Bill does not outlaw discrimination against women generally although its Long Title says it is a Bill
  "To make illegal, and provide for the prevention of, discrimination on grounds of sex.…"
  In fact it does not do that. Its provisions relate to discrimination in employment and in newspaper advertisements relating to employment, to discrimination in training and in education, and to discrimination by professional bodies, trade unions and the like.
  Before expanding on what the Bill does and does not do, it is worth noting that there is something in the Bill for men. It is not a discrimination against women Bill. Its prohibitions apply equally to discrimination against men. As has been pointed out already, if it became law institutions such as the Royal College of Midwives, rightly or wrongly, would be compelled to accept men. The Bill is not a charter of woman's rights in the context of the family—her rights in relation to her children or her husband. It does not affect her position as a citizen and taxpayer or in the context of social

  1387
  security. These important matters are not dealt with.
  The Bill is not defective because of that—far from it. It is an advantage because this is not an area in which one can make sweeping changes without very careful consideration of their implications and consequences. This must take time. In Canada the Ontario Women's Equal Employment Opportunity Act 1970 and other legislation was preceded by a Royal Commission on the status of women which was set up in February 1967 and which reported in September 1970. I am not advocating a Royal Commission in this case. I am merely emphasising the need for careful consideration if we are to achieve our purpose.
  The Bill is already dangerously overloaded, and we shall be hard put, however it may be amended, to ensure that it receives proper consideration. It is important to appreciate at this stage that it is concerned only with education and training, business, employment and the professions and unions. I have to point out that there are unions which are practising this discrimination at the moment. I had thought that there were certain institutions in the City, and to a lesser degree in my own profession, wholly or mainly dominated by men. But I was surprised when I read the proceedings before the Select Committee in another place to learn that there are one or two unions which impose restrictions upon the employment of women. In one case they are the first to go on redundancy even though they may have had longer periods of employment. Another union will not have women employed at any price.
  That leads one to an important aspect which has been pointed out already by a number of hon. Members. Whatever the ultimate fate of this Bill it is clear that a great deal of education will be needed in many walks of life so that the various points which have been made can be dealt with and so that there is not a feeling of being channelled along one line from the early years of life. That is why I am so impressed by the American system where great emphasis is placed upon the conciliation procedure. It is only where that breaks down that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission suggests or allows litigation to
  1388
  follow and then the Commission intervenes in the litigation as an amicus curiae in order that the relevant facts on both sides which it has learned in its attempts at conciliation may become known to the court.
  It is said that the Bill applies especially to the woman who goes out to work and is discriminated against. One gets the impression that it will now be unlawful for an employer or anyone else concerned with the employment of others to discriminate on grounds of sex in certain specific situations. The wording is reminiscent of Sections 1 and 3 of the Race Relations Act 1968——
  Mr. William Hamilton Mr. William Hamilton indicated assent.
  The Solicitor-General: One has that precedent, and I suspect that the draftsman carried a great deal of the wording of that Act into the Bill. But the precedent that one gets from that falls down when one comes to a definition of the word "discriminate". In the Race Relations Act one discriminates against somebody if in certain situations one treats him less favourably than others. Although the sphere is the same, the definition of discrimination is different in the Bill. One has to say what is meant by discrimination. This in a sense will open the way to legal argument. If one is not careful, again the quarry will escape.
  I am sure that the draftsman of the Bill was troubled by this, because in Clause 5 we find that the meaning "to exclude" is not the same as "to discriminate". The definition of discriminate certainly at some stage or other will require some attention.
  Having settled the difficult question of what discrimination may mean, it will be necessary to apply that definition across the board in the sphere of employment. Will it be right across the board? We must provide for the possibility that the sex of an applicant may be a perfectly proper qualification or, indeed, in certain cases, disqualification for a post. Leaving aside such unlikely contingencies as women professional footballers—we have an all-England women's cricket team which seems to do very well—we must make special provision for the armed forces, the police and the prison service. The list of candidates for exclusion that

  1389
  we shall have in across the board antidiscrimination will require careful scrutiny.
  I think it is essential that interested bodies must be given the opportunity to make representations if we are not to have legislation that, after it is passed, can be made to look ridiculous because some enterprising litigant of either sex, on the one hand or on the other, tries to create or close a loophole through which discriminators may slip.
  A special study has been set up to discover the areas in which discrimination occurs and the reasons for it. That study has as its principal objective to determine the kind of measures which are most likely to have a real impact on discriminatory activity and will lead—this is more important—to a real improvement in employment opportunities.
  When considering discrimination relating to employment we must remember that we are not merely dealing with a refusal to employ persons, but with their employment and dismissal. Unfortunately we do not have a clean start when we come to consider the proposals in the Bill because, as has already been pointed out, there is a body of law in existence which regulates the employment of women. I am sure that no one would wish to sweep that aside without working out the consequences.
  There are a number of enactments which deal with safety, health and welfare at work. The Factories Acts, the Hours of Employment (Conventions) Act and the Public Health Act provide special rights—I will not call them privileges—for women in employment. The Bill is silent whether all or some of that existing legislation is to be repealed.
  Mr. Eric S. Heffer: I have been following the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument very closely. Does he agree that most of the Acts to which he referred arose because women were being used as cheap labour? It was precisely because it was necessary to protect women in that sense that such legislation was brought in. With equal pay there is obviously an argument for looking at the whole of this type of legislation which is there historically because women were used as cheap labour.
  The Solicitor-General: I do not accept that statement in its entirety. There will be other reasons—for example, the very fact that they were women. That intervention underlines what I was saying about the need for careful consideration in future about how much of that legislation is to remain. The Bill is silent about that matter.
  These and other enactments must be looked at to see how far they must be preserved. There may be those who would scorn any protection, but few would dismiss the need to consider, for example, maternity leave, or possibly leave to look after sick children, without going into it with some care. All these may he very controversial matters, but the Bill does not attempt to grapple with them.
  I must emphasise that, however skilful and knowledgeable the Members of the Committee might be, that skill and knowledge probably would not be enough for them to resolve those difficulties, and again consultation seems to be absolutely essential.
  Mrs. Barbara Castle: The hon. and learned Gentleman is making extremely heavy weather over what are quite small Committee points. For example, maternity leave, which he says has to be given such serious consideration, was dealt with very simply by a clause in the Equal Pay Act, where it was also appropriate, and a similar clause could be inserted in the Bill in Committee without any difficulty.
  The Solicitor-General: I have tried hard to avoid any purely Committee points. What I have tried to do is to look at this on the wider scale.
  When one leaves aside the question of advertisement and turns to education, one finds similar problems. They stem from the failure to deal adequately with the definition of discriminate. If we are to have an across-the-board prohibition of discrimination, all educational institutions, whether maintained or independent —and I am not thinking solely of Roedean or Eton, but across the board—will no longer be able to cater exclusively for either boys or girls.
  There are, apart from higher education —[Interruption.]—I find these interruptions from the benches opposite extremely

  1391
  tedious. I am trying to deal seriously with this point. Apart from higher education, there are nearly 4,000 schools in this category—that figure is well worth remembering—and fewer than half are private. Parents are at present free to choose such schools, and I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to justify the House in coming to a decision without the maximum of consultation in advance. We have, in the absence of any clear guidance on what discrimination means, the difficulty of getting a balance in coeducational schools.
  It is the Bill's concentration on discrimination against the individual rather than against the group that causes the trouble, and that highlights the possible weakness that I see in the Bill as a whole. It is based upon the individual approach. That may not be the best way of doing it. In evidence to a Select Committee in another place an American official put the point in this way:
  "…that the processing of individual complaints … does not significantly alter discrimination patterns and practices… Discrimination is by and large systemic, institutionalised, woven into the entire fabric of a company's personnel practices. Unless the underlying systems are attacked and radically altered—systems such as those involved in advertising recruitment, job classification, wage and salary structure, seniority, etc.—significant change does not occur."
  The Board should therefore, she said, have resources to use a broad-scale approach to combating discrimination, for example,
  "research studies, hearings to focus attention on discriminatory patterns and practices in certain occupations, industries and geographical areas…".
  She spoke of grants to bodies giving technical assistance to companies and so on, to develop affirmative action programmes, and follow up thereafter.
  There are arguments both ways, and it may be attractive to take the individual approach or look at the areas, either in companies or in industry, where the discrimination is widespread and seek to attack it in that way rather than go for the individual case. In any case, one can see many occasions on which the individual is going to be embarrassed by going either to the board or to the court, particularly if it is not a matter of being employed but of opportunities being denied to her when she is already
  1392
  employed. One of the difficulties is that the law has been settled for more than a century, and the courts will not grant an injunction directly compelling a person to employ or to be employed by another, for reasons which one does not have to investigate very much.
  Finally, there is the enforcement procedure, and a lot has been said about that. Is it right, for example, to give concurrent remedies to individuals and to the board? There will be difficulties with regard to what steps a court can take, but those are matters which again no doubt can be properly resolved after the best possible consultation.
  The Bill needs a great deal of thought and consideration if it is to achieve what it is designed to do, and it means that something more than the ordinary Standing Committee is called for. I therefore suggest that the House gives serious consideration to committing the Bill to a Select Committee. This would enable the subject, about which I have suggested evidence, consultation and more knowledge is required, to be properly investigated. It would also give the opportunity of getting the principle which I know the House wants established in an effective way, free from doubt and anomalies, so as to give those women who are at present denied them the rewards and satisfaction from work that potentially are theirs, and at the same time give the country the benefit of their services.
  Accordingly I advise the House to support the suggestion of a Select Committee after the Bill has been given a Second Reading without prejudice to its progress. In that way the House could give the most careful consideration to the objectives of the promoters of the Bill.
  Mr. William Hamilton: May I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman if he will give an assurance that we shall have legislation this Session because women outside are demanding action and they are not prepared to wait for all the procedures outlined by the Solicitor-General? Will he give three undertakings—first, that the Select Committee shall have a duty strictly imposed upon it when it shall report to the House, because most of the evidence has already been given to the House of Lords Select Committee, so that the Committee shall report by not later than 31st March? The second

  1393
  undertaking is that the arrangement suggested will not prejudice the progress of the Bill in Standing Committee and on further stages. Thirdly, may we have an assurance that the Select Committee will determine its own terms of reference? Unless the Solicitor-General gives these undertakings we shall have serious reservations about what appears to be a delaying tactic by the Government.
  The Solicitor-General: I am sure that the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) is well aware that it is not in my power to say when the House will get through any particular part of a Bill. As for how long it should remain in Select Committee, if it goes to a Select Committee, that will depend on how much evidence is taken. That will be a matter to be determined by the members of the Select Committee.
  My advice to the House is not intended to hamper the ordinary process of legislation in any way, but to make it possible to deal in the best possible way with the problems I have outlined. On the two other points raised by the hon. Member, the date of the report would be a matter to be included in the motion which would be laid at some later stage, possibly within a few days, when technicalities, such as the members of the Committee, could be approved by the House. That would be an appropriate occasion on which to seek aproval for the terms of reference.
  Mr. Charles Pannell: I do not think that the Solicitor-General has fully grasped the points raised by my hon. Friend. Do I understand that the Solicitor-General will not oppose the Second Reading and, presumably, that the Select Committee will follow that? We are asking that there shall be reasonable facilities for the Bill this Session. Having taken the Second Reading this Session we want to be assured that matters will not be so protracted as to require another Second Reading in another Session.
  The Solicitor-General: It is for the House not for me to give a Bill a Second Reading. It is for me to advise as I have, and for the House to decide on that advice in its own sovereign right. How long the proceedings in Select Committee will last and how long thereafter the Bill takes in Standing Committee will depend on certain factors. If the Select Com-
  1394
  mittee has dealt with the Bill and has made its own amendments and has produced a thoroughly good Bill, the Standing Committee could dispose of it in no time at all. But that is a matter for the House and it is not for me to say how long that would take.
  8.43 p.m.
  Dr. Shirley Summerskill: The Race Relations Act 1968 was introduced after being given a special place in the Queen's Speech. In introducing it to the House the then Home Secretary said that it was of great social significance and he went on to say that
  "society is most healthy and most free from tension when it is based on the simple principle that every citizen within its boundaries shares equally in the same freedoms, the same responsibilities, the same opportunities and the same benefits."—(OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd April 1968; Vol. 763, c. 53.]
  That Bill dealt with discrimination against only a small proportion of the community. We are discussing tonight a Bill which concerns and affects over half the population of this country. Social policies should be linked with legislation; each needs the other. We are discussing a Bill affecting not only more than half the population but 38 per cent. of our present workforce.
  We know that there is prejudice on ground of sex as well as on grounds of colour. Prejudice usually springs from fear. Legislation cannot abolish prejudice but it can make it harder for prejudice to breed and flourish. It creates a climate of opinion in which these things are made reprehensible.
  There is nothing new or revolutionary in the Bill. Equality of opportunity is not a new concept, neither is legislation to ensure it. The United States has its Fair Employment Practices Commission. The United Nations International Labour Office has its Convention III concerning discrimination in respect of employment which most other countries have already ratified. For two years I served in New York on the United Nations Status of Women Commission where women from all over the world discussed this very issue.
  Let us amend the Bill in Committee if necessary. Let us take into consideration the findings and recommendations of the House of Lords Select Committee and, if the House wishes, of a House of Commons Select Committee. The House, with

  1395
  very few exceptions, seems agreed that discrimination against women exists and that discrimination against women should end. We have before us tonight the means to end this discrimination.
  There is a time factor which the Government should consider very carefully, and that is the connection of the Bill with the Equal Pay Act, which has to be implemented by the end of 1975. The Government in their White Paper on the freeze say that they wish orderly progress towards equal pay to continue. Fine words—but it is three years since the Equal Pay Act was passed yet equal pay, particularly among non-manual women workers, is set back today from what it was three years ago.
  The Engineering Employers Federation is sending messages of guidance to its members suggesting that they introduce new job gradings, that they segregate women employees into women's work with lower wages and that they keep unskilled wage rates as low as possible in order to minimise the impact of equal pay. In the year following the passage of the Equal Pay Act, 156,000 women were made redundant. The present Bill is complementary to the Equal Pay Act: if one is to operate fairly and meaningfully, the other must be introduced. They go hand in hand, equality of opportunity in employment with equality of pay.
  As far as possible, the Bill should integrate the labour force because it is not good for the country and it is not good for men and women to have an artificial delineation of men's work and women's work.
  There is no time to be lost if the Equal Pay Act is to be fully implemented by the end of 1975. I have been a faithful and regular attender at anti-discrimination Bill debates for some time and I have marvelled at the kaleidoscopic variety of excuses and rationalisation presented to us by Government spokesmen. In 1971 we heard from the Treasury Bench the present Governor of Bermuda casually dismiss the Bill—there were not as many present then as there are today. Although that former Minister was against discrimination against women, he did not believe that legislation was the right way to do it.
  1396
  A few weeks ago it was the turn of another Minister of State, Home Office. He chose to hide behind the future recommendations of the House of Lords Select Committee. There was no leadership, no commitment from the Government Front Bench: the Committee would say whether the Bill was right or whether it should be amended: the Committee would say whether a different approach should be made: "We must wait for the Lords Select Committee."
  What has happened in the last 12 days? Here we have yet another Government spokesman, this time the Solicitor-General, with a third variation on the same theme. He says that the Bill is overloaded, that the definition of discrimination needs looking at and that there is need for careful consideration and consultation. I listened very carefully to what he said, and I could find no good reasons for the House tonight to oppose the Bill. We shall not have to listen to any more Government excuses if we do not want to listen to them. We now have the opportunity, as elected representatives, to stand up and be counted on this issue, and let our constituents and the country really see where Members of Parliament stand.
  If the Bill is accepted tonight by the predominantly male House of Commons, the credit for this achievement must go to the women of the country. If any bouquets are to be handed out at the end of the evening, it is they who should receive them because it is their pressure, their determination, their indignation, their perseverance and their dignified campaigning which have brought about this change of heart and mind among the men of the House of Commons.
  Housewives, students, trade unionists, women's organisations have all been campaigning us during the last year; and this, I hope, will be an example of how a battle for justice can be won both outside and inside the House of Commons. But I am not euphoric. In fact, I am cynical and dubious about the future of the Bill. Having seen the battle for the Equal Pay Act since 1964, having seen it put on the Statute Book with great difficulty, and as it is not even implemented yet and we are still having to press for equal pay, I am dubious about the Bill.

  1397
  The Government have granted special time tonight for a decision on the Second Reading. [Interruption.] The Government and the Opposition combined, we can say. The Leader of the House mouthed acceptance of the Opposition suggestion that we should have special time for the Second Reading. This is by no means the end of the affair. Any Private Member's Bill is subjected to threats and hazards throughout its passage in this House, especially if it is controversial and if it relies on the whims of an inconsistent Government to give it support.
  Even if the Bill is accepted by the House tonight, will the Government, having provided facilities so far, give an assurance that when the Bill has completed its Select Committee stage and its Standing Committee stage, it will not fall eventually for lack of time? Will the Bill—the Solicitor-General could answer this on behalf of the Government—be given preferential treatment over other Private Members' Bills so that it can complete its whole legislative course? If the Solicitor-General cannot give that assurance, this extra time tonight is totally pointless and meaningless—a toothless gesture of no significance.
  I conclude by reminding the House of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
  "It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law."
  There can be no doubt that the Bill will contribute not only to women's progress but to total human progress.
  8.55 p.m.
  Mrs. Sally Oppenheim: As a supporter of the Bill, I am forced to express one personal regret. It is inevitable, I suppose, that the Bill should have become associated in many people's minds with the more extreme elements of the women's liberation movement. [Interruption.] We hear an example of it now. As a supporter and sponsor of the Bill, and as a woman, I wish to dissociate myself from the protagonists of that movement.
  In the first place, they distort the aims of the Bill. Second, it appears to me that all too often they do not want to elevate womanhood so much as to deny
  1398
  it. Their extreme views and arguments, the strident way in which they express them, their tendency to emphasise the trivial and to trivialise that which is serious and, more important, the fact that their arguments contain so little knowledge and reveal so little research on the subject combine to create hostility rather than support for the Bill, and support for an important reform which women's organisations throughout the country, as well as hon. Members of the House now and Members before them, have striven for years to achieve and of which there is legislative evidence.
  I believe that women are more effective as persuaders than as revolutionaries, and by that I do not mean persuasion by the blandishments of whatever charms they may have, on the one hand, or meaningless gestures such as burning their bras, on the other. I mean persuasion by the reasonableness and objectivity of their arguments.
  The Bill is not about liberating women. It is about giving women a fair chance. I want that point to be clearly understood. I particularly deplore the way in which, by their arguments, the extreme exponents of the women's liberation movement denigrate those women who are fulfilled and happy in the role of housewife and mother, for I believe that to be a good housewife and mother is, possibly, the highest aspiration of womanhood and the hardest to achieve. But that those women who want to use their talents and abilities in any other way should be given a completely equal opportunity to do so is, I believe, their unquestionable right.
  One of the results of the Bill which I fear is, possibly, that it could lead to the creation of a whole generation of statutory women. There is no more pathetic figure than the statutory woman, the woman who is appointed not because of skill or merit but because she is a woman, to public boards, commissions or public bodies of one kind and another, because this is likely to undermine confidence in the ability of women at a time when we should be exploding myths. I have in mind, for example, the myth that education and training for women is a waste of time. We all know that each year more educated and trained women are returning to the professions or to work after they have had their families.

  1399
  My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) has opposed the Bill on a number of occasions because, he says, it is wrong to prescribe attitudes by law. I agree with him, so long as those attitudes are not doing positive harm to a group of people, and in this case those attitudes are. The Bill represents an attempt to re-educate attitudes, because the nature of discrimination against women is not so intransigent as to be totally unresponsive to education and to reason.
  It has already been accepted by the House that discrimination exists. There can be no doubt that it exists to the disadvantage of a great many women. There is no doubt also that it is manifested mostly through inequality of opportunity in education, in training, in higher education, in job opportunities, in job selection, in promotion and in apprenticeship opportunities.
  Of the fact that a woman usually has to be three times better than her male counterpart to achieve equal pay and status in a profession or a job, and probably five times better to be promoted above him, there is no doubt. Equally, of the fact that the Equal Pay Act could be totally undermined by discrimination, there is also no doubt. I hope that not one hon. Member would challenge the fact that discrimination exists to this extent.
  I do not believe that the Bill will overcome discrimination, prejudice or injustice. I do not believe that it would be acceptable to any Government without extensive redrafting. I do not accept for one moment that it could be implemented without a number of anomalous situations arising.
  But I do believe that even if the Bill succeeded in overcoming discrimination and injustice to only a small degree; even if it succeeded in achieving only modest progress towards raising the status of women; even if it succeeded only in beginning to eliminate those laws and regulations that are anachronistic and to the disadvantage of women; even if it succeeded only in making people think twice before they took discriminatory action; even if it succeeded in only
  1400
  one case in a thousand in preventing a discriminatory action from taking place, then it should not be rejected by the House tonight.
  There is, however, a much more urgent reason to support the Bill—the need to overcome discrimination against those women who, more than any others, need to be given equality of opportunity and equality under the law. I refer to the mother in the one-parent family who has no choice but to go out to work, the single daughter with elderly dependants to maintain and those women who, on top of the emotional shock of divorce, of desertion, of being widowed or even of having an inadequate husband, must face a barrier of discrimination that will bring them face to face with frustration and financial hardship simply because they are women.
  On behalf of those women the Bill should not be rejected, because their struggle is a very unequal one. With a family to support, they cannot earn as much as a man. They are not given the same opportunities to work overtime as a man. The law and the tax system discriminate against them, as do landlords and even some council housing departments. In some cases they will need a male sponsor if they want to take on a mortgage.
  Even more reprehensible, some employers will discriminate against women simply because they are divorced or deserted. Unlike men, women have to reveal their marital status on many more occasions. Even in this enlightened day there are still people who regard divorced women as having somehow failed, as being inadequate, unreliable or neurotic, whereas they regard the divorced man with indulgence, as having escaped from a harridan, or with even more indulgence as being a "bit of a lad".
  I cannot describe as eloquently as the Finer Committee did the plight of those women alone. If the Bill were to move only an inch in the direction of alleviating that plight, it should be accepted, because with all its faults it represents a gesture that I believe should be made. Notwithstanding that it may be no more than a gesture, it is one that could very well provide, if not the whole edifice, at least the foundation stone on which to build a fairer society for women.
  9.4 p.m.
  Mrs. Doris Fisher: Various hon. Members tonight have tried more delaying tactics against a further step in progress towards the rights of women. To hear some hon. Members, we might think that sufficient evidence had not already been produced by various commissions and set out in international declarations, treaties, charters, agreements and conventions. At the United Nations, the ILO and all the various international conferences, sentiments are expressed showing clearly that women are classified as second-class citizens.
  Many conferences are attended by parliamentarians who intend to report the feelings there expressed to their national Governments and seek to embody them in their statutes. They want to try to create a fabric of society which will give women a much more equal opportunity. At international conferences and conventions everybody seems seized of the idea that those objects are right. But when those feelings are expressed to the national Governments, whether the United Kingdom Government or any of the Governments of the European countries, all kinds of problems seem to arise which mean that the ideas cannot be put into operation. Often problems arise because of the attitudes of members of the various Governments. In the present Government and in the House people either echo other people's thinking outside and make those thoughts their point of view in this Chamber or try to form opinions and get the public to go along with those opinions.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) is trying by means of legislation to bring about legal recognition of women's rights. I support him in that aim. To achieve it there must be a change in people's attitudes. They can be conditioned by the utterings of hon. Members but we must go a long way before they can be changed.
  Generally speaking the rights of man have always been interpreted as the rights of men. Women have never even had God on their side.
  There has been a great deal of discussion here about the Treaty of Rome and our accession to the EEC. Article 119 of the treaty provides for equal pay
  1402
  between men and women. That is one of the most important social clauses of the treaty, but I cannot say that I have heard any discussion upon that article. We have been inundated with regulations about the size of eggs and how many eyes a potato must have before it can be brought into this country. All these peripheral matters have been discussed, but not the fundamental social aspects of what is called joining the EEC.
  Before this debate there was a long debate upon the implications of VAT, which is connected with our joining the EEC. I only hope that the Government dealt with discrimination against women with the same speed as they dealt with VAT.
  Many hon. Members have spoken about discrimination and the difficulty of exposing it. It is difficult to expose because, instead of being open and unashamed, it very often takes on the guise of special protection.
  Male hon. Members who are opposed to the Bill have been perhaps echoing the view that women need special protection. I do not accept this concept. There are many jobs in society done by men which all men would not be capable of doing. It can easily be pointed out that there are male hon. Members who would not make very good firemen and many would not make very good miners. I must say that many hon. Members on this side of the House have made excellent miners and firemen, but that does not apply to the majority of male Members of the House.
  Women's work is undervalued only because we persist in giving them the same working conditions as men. We do this because we are hypocritical. Misleadingly it is done in the name of equality, as it is called. I say that we should let discrimination give way to differentiation. Many hon. Members have spoken about woman's place in the home and the role she has to play in the home. Some of my hon. Friends have spoken about the educational approach that trains boys for an active role in society and in the community generally and girls for a much more passive role. One hon. Member spoke about child-bearing as though it were a penalty that women have to undergo, instead of women being praised for bearing children.

  1403
  In our debate on 2nd February the hon. Member for Merton and Morden (Miss Fookes) spoke about discrimination in politics. Many women would love to attend political meetings. But we all know of the women who turn up at political meetings eager to remake the world but find themselves allowed only to make the tea.
  In their contribution to society, the growth in the number of women at work accounts for almost all the growth in the working population in Great Britain in the last 20 years, but we still have to face the fact that there are approximately 2 million more women than men in Great Britain. Yet we still have to fight for equality. The Bill takes a step towards it. For example, there are twice as many men justices of peace as women, and only 12 per cent. of local councillors are women. One of my hon. Friends has drawn attention to the few women Members of Parliament. Perhaps one could argue that this is discrimination against men in that there is only one of us for every 24 men.
  The image of women as decorative dolls with unfurnished minds has really and truly been exploited in our social life. We should look a little further than London and the home counties when taking about the contribution of women. Many hon. Members on both sides must know of the contribution which women are making, not only in London and the surrounding areas but throughout the country. So often women are neglected because they happen to live north of Watford. They are not recognised by Governments or anyone else if they live any further north than Watford.
  This has some bearing on the attitude of women. Women have the same abilities as men. They have ambitions and ideas and can contribute to society as much as men. It is time that men and the community generally learned to think of people in terms of their personalities and not in terms of their sexual rôles.
  I do not believe that men and women are equal; I believe they are complementary. I would not favour a petticoat régime. I support a society which gives equal opportunities, which gives people the opportunities of a free, responsible and independent rôle in society. The Bill is not perfect. There are many imperfections in it and many alterations will
  1404
  have to be made in Committee. Its aim of giving women their due place in society cannot be questioned and I support it.
  9.16 p.m.
  Mr. Ronald Bell: Like the hon. Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill) I can say that, in her phrase, I have been a regular and faithful attender at these debates on antidiscrimination Bills.
  Mr. Thomas Cox: That is the trouble.
  Mr. Bell: I do not think that the hon. Lady will complain of any undue variation in my attitude. I have this to say about the procedure which we find ourselves following. Some odd things come forward on Fridays—I have even been responsible for promoting some of them. There is a merciful procedure which deals with most of them in a relatively painless and not very explosive way.
  If we have time for these Bills, what follows is that hon. Members must take responsibility for approaching them in a critical, serious and, may I say it, discriminating manner. This Bill, which has been given this rather special facility, is really a manifesto. It is not a draft law at all. It is not acceptable to anyone in the House as a draft law. We all know that. A special procedure has been proposed, that of sending it to a Select Committee, in the hope that starting with the underlying purpose, to use the phrase which has occurred so often, the Committee will be able to draft a sensible Bill, applicable in practice and without absurdities. I find this a strange operation but I will not oppose that suggestion if it is the wish of the House.
  There are certain areas in which something could be done, perhaps through the medium of the law where, for example, there is a barrier or impediment to women through a para-legal operation, such as an exclusive rule of a trade union. It can be argued—I do not know what view other hon. Members would take—that where this happens the only hope of dealing with it is through the law. The Bill is a manifesto. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Thanet (Mr. Rees-Davies) went through it. There are five operative clauses. Clause 1 is preposterous because there could not be that definition of discrimination.
  Miss Mary Holt: If my hon. and learned Friend looks at the Bill he will see that the words used are "In this Act". I am sure he will agree that any definition which is incorporated into an Act with those words can be accepted.
  Mr. Bell: If we were to say that, it would produce an odd situation.
  The definition of discrimination in the Bill could not be accepted in practice. That has been fairly generally conceded. I do not agree with the Race Relations Act, but at least people can argue that we should not discriminate on the ground of race in employment, and so on. But no one can seriously argue that we should not discriminate on the ground of sex. We rightly discriminate on the ground of sex in the whole of our social life. So we must have a different approach.
  In the debate which we had the Friday before last, some hon. Members on the Opposition side said that the Bill was not intended to apply to activities in which it would be natural and perhaps desirable to prefer women. But that is not what the Bill is about. When we define the categories in which it is natural and desirable to prefer women, or men, we approach the nub of the problem in preparing a draft law.
  One of the things which worries me is that by allowing the Bill to go through for further study we shall seem almost to have accepted the principle and desirability of it at the outset. Now that there is no time bar, is it right to be using to this extent, as we seem to be proposing, the power of the law over people to regulate judgments or opinions in the ordinary activities of life?
  As has been said, discrimination is a good thing. I would say that it was always right. The hon. Lady the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Mrs. Doris Fisher) said that we must get rid of discrimination and have differentiation. There is no difference. Discrimination is differentiation. What the hon. Lady means is that, having discriminated or differentiated, one should not attach unreasonable consequences to the differences one has observed. That is different. Once we define it properly, we realise that what is an unreasonable consequence will always be a matter of
  1406
  personal opinion and personal judgment. Different people will take different views.
  Mr. George Cunningham: It is the same with every Statute.
  Mr. Bell: Yes, but the difficulty with this Bill is that it is a bludgeoning Bill which says that the whole lot is out.
  Not only Clause 1 but Clause 2 is impossible. Clause 2 puts a blanket prohibition on differentiating in employment. In no job, not even in the case of personal attendants, would it be permissible to differentiate on the ground of sex, not even in lavatories. In no section would discrimination on the ground of sex be lawful under the Bill. It is easy to say that we could put in an amendment about that, but drawing the line would be the 64-dollar question.
  Clause 3 about advertisements is impossible. It could never be operated. Clause 4 applies to the total generality of education. Some people prefer single-sex schools for their sons or daughters. Other people disagree with that. But should no one be able to exercise the preference under the law? Is there to be a bed of Procrustes into which everybody must fit? Some people take a very strong view that there should be no differentiation on the ground of sex. That is what Clause 4 does. How does one try to amend it? Does one do it by saying that some people would have that right and others would not, or that they have that right up to the age of 11 and not beyond? Why should this be done at all?
  A Bill like this does not come just because there are militant organisations milling around looking for something to do. There is a specific reason. It is to be found in the Act which the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) put on the statute book, the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act does not proceed upon the principle of equal pay for equal work. If it did, there would not be the problems that have been referred to.
  In moving the Second Reading of the Equal Pay Bill, the right hon. Member for Blackburn said that the phrase "equal pay for work of equal value" was too abstract to put in an Act, and so that Act does not proceed upon that principle. It proceeds upon the principle of job

  1407
  description. If an employer were to employ a man and a woman to do the same job which, to make it easier, depended entirely upon physical strength, so that one could demonstrate with total certainty that the man's work in that job was worth twice the woman's, the employer nevertheless would have to pay the same amount to the woman. Differentiation according to the value of the work done is ruled out by that Act.
  So far as I know, that Act is unique throughout the world in being based on that foolish concept, totally contrary to the universal declaration to which reference has been made. I do not know why it was done. I opposed it at the time, but it was done and its effect was forecast by many hon. Members.
  Employers are driven to try to re-categorise so as to employ men in those jobs in which their performance is best and women in those which they can best perform. The employer is forbidden by this absurd, unprecedented, unparalleled law not to employ indifferently men or women and pay them according to the measured value of the work done. Because that absurd, doctrinaire thing is done the next doctrinaire thing has to be done, and we are now proposing to say to the employer "What is more, when a man and a woman come for a job you shall not distinguish between them on grounds of sex. You must employ the woman if the job is there, and you must pay her as though she were a man". [HON. Members: "No."] It is no good saying "No". It is the case. The Bill seeks to prevent employers from avoiding the absurdity which is inherent in the Equal Pay Act. It is right that the House should bear that in mind and that a Select Committee should have it in mind.
  Some of those who support the Bill are animated by an absurd and extreme doctrine of interchangeability of sex—the unisex concept. That that is so is evidenced by the fact that almost all hon. Members from the Opposition benches who have supported the Bill have played the numbers game. They have said that women are in a certain proportion, yet the number in a certain grade or position is so-and-so.
  The Bill lays down the condition that one-half of the board must be women.
  1408
  When injustice is sought to be proved, it is always said that the number of women in a particular occupation does not correspond with their proportion in the community. This is not asking for an open choice upon merit and suitability; it is asking for equal representation at all levels. It is like the Equal Pay Act since it puts behind it the true principle and acts on the wrong, the unjust and the oppressive principle.
  The Bill is wrongly conceived and I do not believe that it can be cured by any process which does not involve striking out all its clauses and putting something totally different in their place. In my view, the logical thing to do is to vote against it on Second Reading——
  Dame Joan Vickers: I should like to remind my hon. and learned Friend that he said the same thing about attachment of earnings, and that that has now led to legislation. He also said the same thing about guardianship, and that matter is being dealt with in the House of Lords.
  Mr. Bell: Yes, and I was right on both occasions. My opposition to attachment of earnings was entirely supported by trade union Members opposite who rightly, as it turned out, were looking after the legitimate interests of their members. However, my hon. Friend must not tempt me into other matters.
  I have to ask myself what I shall do at the end of this debate. I have never hesitated to state the true grounds on which I support or oppose any measure. I believe not in evasive tactics but in looking at practical difficulties. When I believe that a Bill is wrong in principle, I prefer to take my stand on a position from which I shall not later have to retreat. I have always opposed this kind of Bill. It has been made clear, however, that there seems to be a corpus of agreement on both sides of the House that the Bill could become an Act of Parliament without ridicule and that the Select Committee procedure might produce something which the House could later support. I doubt it, but I shall not stand in the way of that attempt so far as it lies in my power to do so. Therefore, if it is the intention of the sponsors to agree to this somewhat eccentric procedure, on that basis I shall not seek to divide the House.
  9.33 p.m.
  Mr. Douglas Houghton: I am sure that the Government have responded to the desire of the whole House in affording us the opportunity to have this resumed debate on this Bill today. The House congratulates my hon. Friend the Member for Wood Green (Mrs. Joyce Butler) whose persistence over six years has been rewarded by having a full-dress debate on this Bill at last. We are grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) for affording us the opportunity arising from his good fortune in the ballot, of being able to discuss the Bill on two occasions.
  I hope that my own credentials to speak on the Bill are acceptable to the House. I joined with my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) on the famous occasion in May 1952 when the House approved the principle of the Equal Pay Act. Later I negotiated the first agreement for equal pay in the public service. That was in 1955, 17 years ago, and equal pay is still a matter of current interest and controversy in many branches of industry and administration.
  Some Government supporters made to wound this Bill but appeared afraid politically to strike. That criticism cannot be made against the hon. Member for Hove (Mr. Maddan) or against the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell). The hon. Member for Hove revealed to us how rapidly the world is passing him by, and it may be that Hove is no sort of place to be "with it". But his was the authentic voice of the Edwardian period. He argued against women, especially married women, taking up careers at all. That was the gist of his argument——
  Mr. Maddan: My argument was against women pursuing careers while they had the responsibility of children under 15 at home.
  Mr. Houghton: In other words, the hon. Gentleman was imposing his judgment upon the women concerned. Women who take up careers have made their own choice. They have decided to order their own lives and to satisfy what they feel to be their rôles in life. If they elect to
  1410
  follow careers they are asking for equality of opportunity with men in their jobs.
  The Solicitor-General pointed out that the Bill deals with only three areas of discrimination. That is true. The three areas in the Bill are perhaps the most sensitive in terms of human relationships because they cover employment, education and training. But as the hon. and learned Gentleman said, there are other areas of discrimination against women.
  There is a report of a study group of the Labour Party which I recommend right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to read—and this is only a very brief commercial. It represented three years' work on the part of the study group of which I was a member throughout and it went over the ground very carefully. The report reveals the many other respects in which there is discrimination against women. There is, for example, social security. I blew my top about that in a debate not long ago. There is discrimination against women in taxation matters, in rights in marriage, and in political and public life. They are not dealt with in the Bill because most of them are more suitably dealt with in their respective fields of legislation than in a general Bill against discrimination. Some of them are receiving attention in legislation which is currently before Standing Committees of this House.
  The areas covered by the Bill are employment, education and training, and professional bodies and trade unions. There is no doubt that in all there are strongly entrenched forces of bias against women.
  The need for legislation on the lines of this Bill was surely suggested by the present Home Secretary when the House debated the Equal Pay Bill. On Second Reading the right hon. Gentleman said,
  "First, there is the silence of the Bill on the vital question of equality of opportunity for employment. The Bill is intended to prevent discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment between men and women, but it leaves untouched some most important aspects of discrimination."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th February 1970; Vol. 795, c. 936.]
  We are all agreed that the Equal Pay Act did not deal with discrimination. In Committee, the Home Secretary said,
  "equal pay and equal opportunity must go hand in hand if we are to achieve the advancement of women".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 3rd March 1970, Standing Committee H; c. 137.]

  1411
  That is what the Bill is trying to do. It is complementary to the Equal Pay Act.
  If the Bill is given a Second Reading—that is the question before the House—it will, by being accepted by the House, mark another significant stage in the slow, long march towards equality. If it becomes law in due course, as many of us hope—we shall ask the Government for some assurances about facilities for that—it will rank along with votes for women, the Sex Disqualification Removal Act and the Equal Pay Act in our social history.
  We all know that there are difficulties in changing attitudes by legislation. This is the problem in discrimination against women with which we had to deal in discrimination on grounds of race. But without legislation there is no impetus to change.
  The Solicitor-General said that more education was necessary. My hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Dr. Summerskill), in an admirable speech, pointed out that with the encouragement of legislation the achievement of the purpose of the Bill, equality, is more likely. If something is unlawful then it will influence attitudes, practices and prejudices. It will be talked about, it will be referred to, it will be quoted, and it will largely be observed, even if enforcement proves difficult.
  This is where the functions of the Anti-Discrimination Board proposed in the Bill would come in. Under one clause in the Bill a complainant would still have access to the courts without prior reference to the Anti-Discrimination Board, but that clause can be considered when the Bill is examined, as I understand is likely, in a Select Committee. The Anti-Discrimination Board would probably be the most convenient clearing house for all matters arising under the Bill.
  I agree with the Solicitor-General that it would be of advantage if the Anti-Discrimination Board gave more attention to the broad areas of discrimination rather than got bogged down with innumerable individual complaints of discrimination. We may need to examine whether the same machinery to look broadly at discrimination should be used to deal with individual complaints and appeals.
  Mr. Rees-Davies: Following through the right hon. Gentleman's line of thought, which I think is right, does he agree that if there were some board or committee which would, for example, enable a request to go to the TUC for it to consider as a whole the areas in which it is felt there might be discriminatory action, so that the TUC could call before it the various unions concerned, not only women's, but men's unions, we might be able to get the whole trade union movement together in this sphere to set an example which would knock out discrimination in other spheres faster than almost any other action?
  Mr. Houghton: That is an interesting and important suggestion. It may come within the functions of an Anti-Discrimination Board. My idea is that the Anti-Discrimination Board would have responsibility for eliminating discrimination in all the spheres covered by the Bill and its terms of reference. It could set about the elimination of discrimination and make overtures in particular areas where it exists to get it removed so that complaints need not come to the Board. These questions could go to the Select Committee. The hon. and learned Gentleman in his speech mentioned many aspects of the Bill which obviously require further examination. Indeed, he mentioned the very point with which we have just dealt.
  The Solicitor-General used many arguments against the drafting of the Bill which we heard so frequently against the drafting of the Race Relations Bill some years ago. Admittedly it is a difficult field. Admittedly it is imperfect legislation even when one has made the best of it. Nevertheless, that Bill was dealing with a social issue of grave importance. It was trying to arrest a tendency in the community which, if it were allowed to continue, might create deep divisions and lead to racial antagonisms of the gravest kind.
  Similar considerations do not exist in connection with discrimination against women. Nevertheless, this is a field in which discrimination has to be brought within the framework of legislation and made workable if it is to achieve the purpose that we want it to have. At the same time, Sir Roy Wilson's evidence to the Select Committee in another place about

  1413
  the dangers of too close a comparison between discrimination against women and discrimination on racial grounds should be heeded when the Select Committee looks at the problem.
  As to the future of all this, a great deal of evidence has already been given to the Select Committee in another place. A great deal of publicity is being given to the evidence given to that Committee and to discussions of the issue generally. We hope that if a Select Committee is appointed by the House of Commons it will not need to go over all the same ground again and that it will be able to avail itself of the work done by the Select Committee in another place, though of course that would not restrict the Select Committee of the House of Commons from calling additional evidence if it wished to do so. As I see it, it should not be necessary for the Select Committee of the House of Commons to spend months and months looking at this matter when it can be assisted in such a valuable way by the work done in another place.
  The Question before the House is that the Bill be given a Second Reading. I sincerely hope that the Bill will be given a Second Reading without a Division, because that would have a significant impact upon public opinion. I understand that if the Bill gets a Second Reading there is likely to follow a motion from the Government that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee of the House of Commons.
  If that is done, I shall advise all supporters of the Bill to accept it. At the same time, we should make it clear that we accept reference to a Select Committee on the clear understanding that this is not a delaying device, that it is not intended to impede the progress of the Bill and that it is only a matter of good parliamentary procedure in the special circumstances of this case. The special circumstances are that this is a private Member's Bill lacking all the facilities which the Government have in drafting their legislation and that we acknowledge that the Bill is in need of close examination over a brief period with all the available evidence from another place and from outside so that the Select Committee can report to the House within a reasonable period. That may be more
  1414
  expeditious than if the Bill were to wait for a place in a Standing Committee. The work could be going on in the meantime, but this should not leave the Bill stranded or delayed eventually when the Select Committee makes its report to the House.
  I hope that those understandings can be honoured by the Government. I do not know whether it is the intention to put an instruction in the terms of reference of the Select Committee to report by a certain date. But if the motion comes before the House for its appointment with terms of reference and with its composition we may well wish to see included in that motion an instruction to the Select Committee that it should report back to the House by a specified date.
  We believe that to be essential if we are to avoid a long period of examination by the Select Committee which may mean the House being robbed entirely of the opportunity of passing a reconditioned Bill into law this Session, if ever. We are asking the Government for reasonable safeguards against the possible misuse of the Select Committee procedure so that having been given a Second Reading it shall be subject to the normal process of awaiting its place for Standing Committee.
  I hope the House will define its position and show that it is not lagging behind the Lords spiritual and temporal. There was a time when the House of Lords was a reactionary chamber but now in some respects it is a progressive chamber and in certain matters it has been a pathfinder in social reform. This is one case where the House of Commons might well copy what the House of Lords has already done.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Mrs. Doris Fisher) made a speech which I thought covered the ground admirably from the point of view of what women want out of the Bill. What they want is the opportunity of establishing their own identity. They want to be regarded as persons whose abilities, aspirations and ambitions can be satisfied in the employment sphere alongside men. It is no good saying that this is not another stage in the emancipation of women. It undoubtedly is. I hope therefore that the House will give the Bill a Second Reading and that

  1415
  the motion to refer it to a Select Committee will be accepted. We shall, however, scrutinise very carefully the conditions under which the Select Committee is eventually appointed.
  The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Mark Carlisle): I have spoken already and therefore, with leave, and before the right hon. Gentleman sits down, may I say that of course the motion to set up the Select Committee is a matter for the House and that it will have to come before the House when the terms of reference can include instructions as to the timing of that Select Committee.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second time.
  Bill committed to a Select Committee.—[Mr. Pym.]

  PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
  Ordered,
  That Mr. Rafton Pounder be discharged from the Public Accounts Committee and that Sir Richard Thompson be added to the Cornmittee.—[Mr. Humphrey Atkins.]

  ADJOURNMENT
  Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. John Stradling Thomas.]
  Adjourned accordingly at six minutes to Ten o'clock.

ENVIRONMENT
  Homeless Families (London)
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EMPLOYMENT
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  Engineering Industry (Croydon)
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Value Added Tax
  Value Added Tax
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence
  MEMBERS' CORRESPONDENCE
  MEMBERS' CORRESPONDENCE
TRADE AND INDUSTRY
  France (British Firms' Investment)
  France (British Firms' Investment)
  Motor Vehicles (Pollution)
  Motor Vehicles (Pollution)
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence
  Tracked Hovercraft Ltd.
  Tracked Hovercraft Ltd.
  Government Offices (Dispersal)
  Government Offices (Dispersal)
  North Sea Oil and Gas
  North Sea Oil and Gas
WALES
  Members' Correspondence
  Members' Correspondence

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells.
The Lord Stanley of Alderley—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his kinsman.

NATIONAL COAL BOARD ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. I should like to offer my apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, and to your Lordships' House for not having been present when the Question was originally on the Order Paper for answer.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state the industries hived off from the National Coal Board; whether they are now considered to be viable; what losses, if any, have resulted from the Board's administration and who will be responsible for the difference in the cost of acquisition and any loss sustained.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, the National Coal Board are forming two holding companies to hold the shares in subsidiary operating companies to which the main ancillary activities will be transferred. The Board are also transferring to these holding companies their investments in joint enterprises. The principal activities affected are solid fuel distribution, brickworks, lands and estates, and computer services under one operating company; and the activities of Coal Products Division, which include coke ovens, secondary by-products, processed fuel and offshore gas and oil, under the other. The Board report that the ancillary activities are currently profitable and expected to remain so. The joint enterprises are also generally profitable.
1536
As the wholly-owned activities and the investments in joint enterprises are being transferred at existing book values, no profit or loss on transfer will arise. After transfer the Board will carry out a full revaluation of the assets of each holding company.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether it is true that part of the deficit incurred by the National Coal Board and met by the Government in the form of an additional subvention was attributable to the losses incurred by some of the ancillary undertakings? May I also ask the noble Lord whether he is aware of the rumours—though I cannot myself vouch for their accuracy or for the statements made in connection with them—that some of the officials of the National Coal Board were shareholders and some were directors of these ancillary undertakings? Is it possible for the noble Lord to tell us whether there is any truth in these statements?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, dealing with the first question, some losses were made, but as I said, on the average and taking one year with another, the profits in the ancillaries exceeded the losses. Last year, it is true, there was an overall loss on them because of a heavy loss on coke ovens, processed fuel and secondary by-products due to the coalminers' strike.
As to the second question, this is a matter for the Coal Board themselves. I have seen something in the Press about this, but I think it is a matter for the Coal Board to deal with.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is it not the case that the National Coal Board have instituted an inquiry of their own into these allegations? Does the noble Lord not agree that it would be desirable, in the interests both of the country as a whole and of the Coal Board, that there should be an independent inquiry into these matters?
LORD DRUMALBYN: No, my Lords, this is certainly a matter for the Coal Board themselves in the first place. The noble Lord will be aware that there is a Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in another place which could also investigate the matter, if necessary.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, may I ask the Minister why, if these industries have not in fact made a loss but a profit, they were hived off?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, so that the National Coal Board could concentrate on those activities which are their main business. It is not very easy to hive off enterprises which are not viable—who would buy them?
LORD SLATER: My Lords, is the Minister aware that when the nationalisation of this basic industry took place the Government, on taking over those assets, paid a tremendous amount in compensation to the previous owners? Ever since that taking over, these ancillary industries have been showing profits which came into the public account of the National Coal Board. Is the Minister aware that what has occurred here, whereby outside industries can enter into this field of operation, can only be looked upon as scandalous, because it ought to be kept under the control of the National Coal Board, just as is the production of coal itself?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, there are really two cases here: the kind of enterprise which was taken over along with the coal, and those enterprises which have been subsequently acquired. The main object must be to ensure the successful operation of the Coal Board in dealing with their main activities. All that is being proposed now is that those activities shall be grouped into two holding companies, and they will then look to the private sector for capital in order to expand.
LORD ORR-EWING: My Lords, is it not true that for the year 1971–72 the Coal Board made a loss of £157 million, and this loss will have been increased as a result of the very large wage award made just a year ago to-day? Is it not therefore of paramount importance that the Coal Board should concentrate on making its primary task the raising and marketing of coal and should not concern itself with these very small, ancillary occupations, which can have no great effect on that gargantuan loss?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, that is the view of the Government, broadly speaking. The ancillary industries
1538
will be transferred to the holding companies of the National Coal Board.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, would the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, agree that the loss referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, is, in the view of some industrialists, a good reason for diversification? May I ask the noble Lord another question? He has said that these changes are for management and organisation reasons. Will he give us an assurance that the ownership of this new holding company will remain vested in the National Coal Board?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, as I have already said, they will remain within the ownership of the National Coal Board. After revaluation of the assets it will be possible for the National Coal Board to bring in private enterprise to the extent that they think fit, and with the consent of the Secretary of State.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that in the days of private enterprise the ancillary industries were regarded with pride? What is wrong with the National Coal Board? Why should they not have the same as private enterprise had in the old days?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not quite understand that question. The whole purpose of the Coal Nationalisation Act was to take over the interests in coal. The fact that there were other interests involved which were difficult to extricate from the coal interests made it necessary to take them over as well.
LORD BALOGH: My Lords, does the Minister imply that the Coal Board's North Sea oil interest will also be hived off, at a ludicrous price, to private enterprise?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, it will go into one of the two holding companies, as I said in my substantive Answer, and will remain in the ownership of the National Coal Board.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, regarding the ancillary undertakings that are being hived off from various nationalised industries, is the Minister able to say what kind of accountancy arrangements will take place, so that Parliament will know exacly how each of these undertakings stand? Is it not correct to say that some change took place regarding

1539
the accountancy arrangements of many of these public undertakings some two years ago? Instead of each undertaking being shown separately, the position now is that one is given only a global sum from the nationalised industries as a whole.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, so far as accountancy is concerned, these undertakings will be registered as companies and they will be subject to the Companies Act in the normal way. So far as the amount disclosed to Parliament is concerned, the noble Lord will recall that it is a matter within the power of the Secretary of State to specify in what way the accounts should be rendered to Parliament.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords,—
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, would the noble Lord say—
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, saw that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, who has a priority as the noble Lord who put down the original Question, had risen behind him. If I may suggest it to the House, perhaps after the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, has asked his question we might move on to the next Question.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I apologise. I have one simple question which I think is important. May we have an assurance from the Government that the holding companies which have been hived off, if they find themselves in financial difficulties, will not receive a subvention from the Government?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, as I have stated, at the present time these holding companies, taken overall, would be making a profit if they were in existence. I cannot guarantee what will happen in the future, or what action any future Government will take.

E.E.C. AND TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE
2.48 p.m.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether in their current discussions with the German Democratic Republic they have taken steps to safeguard the position of the United Kingdom in the light of the Protocol to the Treaty of Rome, relating to German internal trade and connected problems, which allows goods to flow into Europe from Eastern Europe free of duty.
THE MINISTER of STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, our discussions with the German Democratic Republic which ended on February 8 concerned the establishment of diplomatic relations, and commercial relations were not discussed in any detail. Apart from the trade arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, the Common External Tariff applies to Eastern European goods.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, the reply given by the honourable Lady completely misses the point—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I beg your Lordships' pardon, I am not accustomed to your ways. Is the honourable Lady aware—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD WIGG: My Lords, is the Minister aware that her Answer completely misses the point? Is she aware that in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was negotiated, President Adenauer was concerned with only one question: the reunification of Germany? The result was that trade with East or West Germany was treated as a whole. Is the Minister aware that East Germany is now the seventh largest trading country in the world; that billions of dollars are pouring into Europe, and probably into this country, not only from East Germany, but also from the Communist bloc and

1541
from countries like Sweden? What are the Government going to do about it? No Minister has made reference to the position, and the Opposition have completely ignored it. Is the noble Minister aware that, strangely enough, even papers like the Daily Express, who take a realistic attitude about the Common Market, have completely failed to notice the matter? That is not so in the American Press, or the German Press or the French Press.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I think I should answer the main question put by the noble Lord. It is certainly true that in 1957 the E.E.C. agreed provisions on inter-zonal trade in the Protocol to the Treaty of Rome, which relates to German internal trade and connected problems; and this can be amended only by agreement with all the members of the Community.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, in the meantime what steps are Her Majesty's Government taking to safeguard the position of this country? Or do they not care a damn so long as Mr. Heath gets his Common Market?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, no doubt the noble Lord will be aware that a great deal is being done by Her Majesty's Government to safeguard the interests of this country in another context: that of currency. But commercial relations between the Community and Eastern European countries will be considered in the E.E.C., and there is no doubt that inter-zonal trade will be taken into account.
LORD RHODES: My Lords, is not the noble Baroness aware that the Government will have to be a good deal more explicit on this point than hitherto? Would she not agree that, while the countries under the Protocol of Rome are called a Common Market, they have no common rules for imports? Does the noble Baroness know of the intention of Japan to ring the Common Market with plants—the first is on its way up in Roumania—for the making of consumer durables? As it exists at present, the loophole which has been brought to the attention of the Government—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Question!
LORD RHODES: I beg your Lordships' pardon. You will listen about this before you have done, my Lords.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I fear I must ask the noble Lord, Lord Rhodes, for whom we all have immense respect, to put his supplementary question to my noble friend in reasonably succinct form.
LORD RHODES: I will, my Lords, Will the noble Baroness tell us whether there are common rules for imports from the countries on the periphery of the Common Market?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I said in my original reply that the Common External Tariff of the Common Market applies to Eastern European goods.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness a question which is brief? Could she make absolutely clear that there is no channel from Eastern Europe through East Germany into the E.E.C. via West Germany which, is it were, dodges the Common External Tariff?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, there is no formal machinery to control the re-export of goods entering the Federal Republic of Germany from East Germany, but there are very heavy tax disincentive measures. I understand that this is not a problem at present and has very rarely given rise to difficulties up to the present time.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, is the noble Baroness saying that when we passed the E.E.C. Bill recently in effect we were having a free trade area with Eastern Germany? Was that point made clear at the time the Bill passed through this House?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, that is not so, because, if the noble Lord will recall the original reply, he will know that I said that the Common External Tariff applies to Eastern European goods. The problem raised by my noble friend was about the export of goods from East Germany into

1543
West Germany and then possibly into the Community. I gave the reply to that.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that her reply is quite in keeping with the habits of her Department?—see nowt, know nowt. Is she aware that there are acres upon acres of warehouses in Hamburg stuffed with goods from all over the Communist bloc and from countries such as Sweden, all waiting to pour into Europe? Is she also not aware that it would be in keeping with the dignity of the British Government if they were as keen about the interests of the British Commonwealth as the Germans are about the interests of Germany? Furthermore, is she not aware that if it is possible for Germany to be treated as one, so it should be possible to treat the British Commonwealth as one?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, no doubt the noble Lord will be aware of the great efforts, and successful efforts, made by Her Majesty's Government for the Commonwealth in connection with the European Communities. But so far as this particular Question is concerned, there is no right of tariff-free trade with other E.E.C. States including the United Kingdom. This is recognised by paragraph 3 of the Protocol to the Treaty of Rome on German Internal Trade and Connected Problems, which prescribes that each Member State is entitled to take "appropriate measures to prevent difficulties arising from it."

RHODESIAN BONDHOLDERS AND PETITION OF RIGHT
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is true that, although a Petition of Right is pending, they are now considering steps which may prevent or delay an individual United Kingdom Rhodesian bondholder from obtaining redress in the United Kingdom in regard to the payment of dividends and redemptions defaulted upon since U.D.I.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE): Yes, my Lords.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, can my noble and learned friend tell the House when the Petition of Right is likely to be heard in the High Court, who will represent the Crown, and, if judgment should be given against the Crown, will the Crown honour its obligations?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the answer to the first part of the question is, No, I cannot; and to the second is, That will remain to be seen.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, I am greatly obliged to my noble and learned friend.

LEGAL AID AND ADVICE
2.57 p.m.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they accept all, or some and, if so, which of the recommendations contained in the Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Legal Aid and Advice.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, all the recommendations in the Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on Legal Aid and Advice, which was published on February 6, are still under consideration.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, while thanking the noble and learned Lord for that Answer, may I ask him whether he is aware that in paragraph 3 of the Report the Committee say:
"We think it urgently necessary to inform your Lordship of our conclusions on income limits … if your Lordship accepts our recommendations, we regard it as essential that the revised income limits should come into operation at the same time as the introduction of Part I of the Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1972."
May I ask the noble and learned Lord whether that date is not April 2, and therefore if the recommendation of the Committee is to be accepted, would it not be necessary to bring a Statutory Instrument into force next month?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think the answer to the whole of that question is, Yes, my Lords.

FUTURE BUSINESS
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I beg leave to ask Her Majesty's Government a Question of which I have given Private Notice:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement on the dispute in the gas industry.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn will answer this Question at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m.
My Lords, because of the expeditious way in which the House completed the Report stage of the National Health Service Reorganisation Bill yesterday, it has been agreed through the usual channels that it will not be necessary to sit this coming Monday. With the agreement of the usual channels and also of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, it is proposed to move the Guardianship Bill, the Solicitors Bill, and a number of special Orders on to Tuesday. The Unstarred Question of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, will move to Thursday, February 22. In addition to this business on Tuesday, it is also proposed that we should debate the Report of the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation. Your Lordships will remember that we were due to debate this a few weeks ago, but that owing to the indisposition of my noble friend the Leader of the House the debate had to be postponed. I hope that these arrangements will be convenient to your Lordships.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether it is also proposed to have before the House the proposed Standing Orders or Regulations for the new Joint Scrutiny Committee? It would be very useful, because they relate to the Brooke Report, if we could take it all in one. If that is too fast a one for the noble Lord, Lord Denham, perhaps he would consider it between now and then.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I am told that the answer to that question is, Yes.

MERCANTILE CREDIT BILL [H.L.]
Read 2ª, and referred to the Examiners.
RHONDDA CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Read 2ª, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE
3.0 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE rose to call attention to the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on Evidence (General) (Cmnd. 4991); and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I rise to move this Motion with some degree of trepidation, for two reasons. The first is an unusual one: that I see from the list of speakers that I am to be followed by my two successors in the office of Lord Chancellor who will have a great opportunity, if they wish to take it, of perhaps tearing apart many of my observations.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee was asked by my noble friend Lord Brooke of Cumnor in 1964,
"To review the law of evidence in criminal cases and to consider whether any changes are desirable in the interests of fair and efficient administration of justice: and in particular what provision should be made for modifying rules which have ceased to be appropriate in modern conditions."
I think everyone will agree that the Committee was composed of very distinguished lawyers, many of them of great experience in the criminal law. They have produced a massive Report—not the easiest of documents to read and digest—and they propose changes in the criminal law which I think those who have read the Report would agree are of a radical and far-reaching character.
The other reason why I move this Motion with some trepidation is that once before I ventured to criticise the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee and I then drew

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upon myself a stern rebuke from the then Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. He rebuked me for putting down 25 Amendments to the Theft Bill—a Bill, he said, drafted by 17 of the best known judges and academic lawyers. He said it was a brave thing to say of 25 Amendments: "I know better than that". Of course I did not say that, and many of the Amendments were accepted by the noble and learned Lord. He would not have accepted them if he had not believed that they improved the Bill—and perhaps if he had accepted more some of the difficulties in relation to that Act would not have arisen.
The noble and learned Lord went on to say—and I quote his words—
"Whereas in the ordinary way there ought to be a presumption that whatever is in a Government Bill is wrong, when we are dealing with a matter that has been considered by so distinguished a Committee as this there ought to be a presumption that what is in the Bill is right".
Despite that, I fear that I am again going to be critical of some of the present recommendations of the Committee. I do so reluctantly, but there are some which I cannot think are right. I shall be interested to hear whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, is also critical. Perhaps we may, for once, agree in our criticisms; and if we do, I hope that we shall not be rebuked for our temerity by the present Lord Chancellor.
I tabled this Motion because I thought the House should have an opportunity of stating its views on these important changes that are proposed. I think that might be of value to those who are considering legislation, and indeed, may forewarn them that if the Bill implements certain of the proposals it is likely to have a very stormy passage in this House. Their proposal "to restrict greatly the so-called right of silence"—and those are their words—"of persons interrogated by the police" has attracted most attention, but that is by no means the only very important and, I think, controversial recommendation they have made. I intend to draw attention to those which I regard as being most important, and to comment on them. This, I fear, must take me some time but I will try to avoid inflicting on your Lordships a speech of unendurable length.
I should like to begin by referring to their recommendations as to the giving of evidence by the accused. They propose that the right of an accused person to make an unsworn statement should be abolished. I think that is right. An unsworn statement is not evidence in the strict sense and it must be difficult for a jury to decide what weight, if any, to give to it. I think if an accused person is to give evidence at his trial he should do so like any other witness, from the witness box and on oath. I shall be interested to hear whether there is any disagreement with that.
What I think will be more controversial is their proposal that unless the accused's physical or mental condition is such that it is undesirable for him to be called upon to give evidence, he will be called upon to testify; that if he does not, the jury may draw such inferences from his refusal as appear proper, and further, that such a refusal may amount to corroboration.
It has long been recognised that a judge is entitled to comment on the failure of an accused to give evidence if there is a prima facie case against him. The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, prohibits comment on his failure by the prosecution: the Committee recommend that that prohibition should be abolished. I agree with that, for it must appear to a jury very odd that there should be no comment by the prosecution; and also if the judge comments, as he should in some cases, it may tend to make it appear that he is putting on the mantle of a prosecutor. Such a comment, of course, can only be made where a prima facie case has been established; that is to say, a case which points to the conclusion that the accused is guilty if that case is not answered. When such a case is established, if the accused does not give evidence what weight is to be given, and should be given, to the fact that he has not done so? On this there has been a difference of legal opinion.
In a case in which I prosecuted many years ago the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, having ruled that there was a prima facie case, then, when the accused chose not to give evidence, directed the jury that it was "utterly wrong" (those were his words) if they were to regard the accused's silence as contributing in any way towards proof of guilt.

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He said—and I again quote his words—"It does not, and it cannot". With respect, I venture to disagree. The silence of an accused is not evidence, but it is a fact that the jury are surely fully entitled to take into account when they retire to consider their verdict and when they have to decide whether they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In 1953 the late Lord Goddard said in a case
"Everybody knows that absence from the witness box requires a very considerable amount of explanation."
That observation has been cited with approval in a recent decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Regina v. Sparrow.
If a case is established against the accused what is the point of a judge being entitled to comment (as he clearly is) on the accused's failure to give evidence, if that is not a factor which the jury is entitled to take into account? If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, is right, what is the point of the judge, and the judge alone, being entitled to comment on something which has no bearing on the guilt of the accused?
The Criminal Law Revision Committee clearly rejected his view. They expressed the opinion that the present law and practice are much too favourable to the defence. I agree. They say they—and I quote their words—
"are convinced that when a prima facie case has been made against the accused it should be regarded as incumbent on him to give evidence." I am not quite sure whether "incumbent" is a very happy word. An accused is, and must always be, entitled to remain silent. He has always the privilege of silence and he must continue to have it; but he must know, and common sense should tell him and also the jury, that if he exercises that privilege when there is a case for him to answer established against him, significance will be attached to his doing so. The Criminal Law Revision Committee go further and propose that the court should tell the accused that he will be called upon to give evidence and tell him what the effect will be if he does not. I do not think that that is necessary where the accused is represented, but where he is not that is clearly desirable.
My Lords, I have dealt with this recommendation first for it bears on the Committee's recommendations that it should be permissible for a court or jury to draw whatever inferences are reasonable from the failure of the accused, when interrogated by the police, to mention a defence which he puts forward at his trial. That is translated in the draft Bill to failure to mention, when interrogated, a fact relied on in his defence. It is provided in the Bill that such inferences may be drawn from such a failure as appear proper. With the greatest respect to the Committee, that is going far too far. It seems to me that it is one thing to say that silence when an innocent person would have been expected to speak can have significance attached to it, and quite a different thing to say that if an accused fails to mention in the course of his interrogation by the police any fact upon which he subsequently relies, an adverse inference can be drawn. That is wholly unacceptable. I do not think it right that any inference should be drawn from an accused's silence on committal proceedings before the magistrates. He may submit to them that there is no case for him to answer. That submission may fail. He may wish to renew it at his trial. I believe that it would be wrong to prejudice his chances of doing so successfully by allowing an inference to be drawn at his trial from the fact that he kept silent before the magistrates. An accused person should be entitled to reserve his defence, if he so wishes, to his trial.
What about when he is interrogated by the police? Should any inference be drawn from his failure to speak, when an innocent person would be expected to speak? I would say, "Yes, undoubtedly" but for one thing: there is not now available a complete record of the interrogation. Unless and until such a record is available, it seems to me that the risk is very considerable that in a number of cases, from the account given of the investigation, an adverse inference would be drawn when, if the complete record could be seen, it would be clear that no such inference should be drawn.
Further, in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962, it is said in paragraph 369:
"There was a body of evidence, too substantial to disregard, which in effect accused the police of stooping to the use of undesirable means of obtaining statements and of

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occasionally giving perjured evidence in a court of law."
—a practice commonly known as "putting in the verbals". I do not think that it is a very frequent practice, but those who "put in the verbals" to strengthen the prosecution's case may be tempted so to present their evidence as to make it clear that the accused's silence or his failure to mention a fact had significance.
So while I believe that inferences can properly be drawn from the accused's silence at his trial, from his failure to answer the case against him, I am strongly opposed to a court or jury being entitled to draw inferences from his silence or failure to mention a relevant fact in the course of his interrogation by the police, unless and until a satisfactory method of recording what happens during the investigation is brought into use. Indeed, I feel that no matter whether the recommendation of the Committee be accepted or not, some such safeguard for the accused by the provision of a record of his interrogation is very desirable. Two methods have been proposed: one by Justice—that interrogation should take place before magistrates and that a complete verbatim record should be made of the interrogation. I believe that that might cause delay and might impede the proper activities of the police. The other method is that tape recorders should be used to record investigations which take place at police stations. A minority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee favoured that method. How large a minority we are not told. We do not know how many constituted the majority, but the minority suggested that a speaking clock should be superimposed on the recording to make it more difficult to tamper with. If that was done and the tape recorder kept in a locked box to which only a very senior police officer had the key, with the interrogating officer only able to switch on or switch off the recorder that, I believe, would provide an adequate safeguard. Only if some such safeguard can be brought into operation should, I think, any part of the Committee's recommendations in relation to interrogations by the police be implemented.
The Committee further recommend that the accused's silence when an innocent person would be expected to speak can be treated as corroboration of
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the evidence against him. If my view is accepted that will only be in regard to his silence, until a satisfactory safeguard is devised, after a prima facie case has been made against him at his trial. There are some offences where Parliament requires that there should be evidence of corroboration. I would expect that if that evidence of corroboration is not produced by the prosecution before their case is ended, the judge would accept a submission that there was no case to answer. But there are other cases where it is open to a jury to convict on the evidence of a witness alone but when it is safer if there is evidence of corroboration. In those cases I see no reason why the silence of the accused when a case has been made out for him to answer, should not be regarded as corroboration. That is common sense and that is a desirable change.
What about the Judges' Rules? They are a historical anachronism. They were first drafted in rather unusual circumstances because of two contradictory rulings being given by judges at Birmingham Assizes. I must say that I believe it is a historical anachronism that those rules should be prepared and put forward by judges. Rules for the behaviour of the police should be a function of the Home Office, not the judges. It should be for the judges to say what evidence is allowed to be given in courts, but that is quite a different matter. I take the view that in these modern days there is really no need for any such rules and no need for there to be any "caution". Surely, there are few people now who are so stupid as not to realise that if interrogated in relation to the commission of a crime, what they say may be given in evidence.
The test in the courts must be, must it not, whether there are Judges' Rules or Home Office rules or no rules, that to be admissible in evidence the prosecution must show that the accused's statement was made voluntarily and not obtained by fear or prejudice or hope of advantage or by oppression, of such a nature as to render the statement or confession unreliable? It is for a judge to rule whether a statement is admissible. He must, I think, have regard not only to what was said but also to the person to whom it was said, for a threat to a

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young girl may have very much greater significance than one to a man of mature years. In my view, the Committee were right to preserve the existing law in general, but to require that to render a statement or confession inadmissible by reason of a threat or inducement the threat or inducement must be of such a character as was likely in the circumstances to render the statement or confession unreliable.
My Lords, I now turn to another very controversial recommendation of the Committee, that the common law rule that evidence showing a disposition to commit the offence charged is in general inadmissible be retained but, they say, relaxed. Under the present law, in certain circumstances evidence of previous misconduct is admissible. The Committee want to preserve that, but also they want to enlarge the occasions on which such evidence can be given. It would, I think, lengthen my speech inordinately if I were to state in detail the reasons why I am against that enlargement. Evidence of previous misconduct is extremely prejudicial to the accused. Its admission is justified in the cases in which it is now allowed. It is so prejudicial that we should be extremely hesitant about extending its admissibility. I find the reasons clearly stated in the Memorandum of the Criminal Bar Association for rejecting this recommendation extremely cogent and convincing. I do not think it is necessary for me to repeat them.
I do, however, agree with the Committee that where evidence of previous misconduct is now admissible the fact that the accused was convicted of that misconduct should be admissible in conjunction with the facts of that misconduct. For it must appear odd to a jury if they are told of previous misconduct similar to that alleged at the trial but are not told what was the result of that misconduct. If the figures given in their Memorandum by the Society of Labour Lawyers are anywhere near correct—I think this is the first time I have ever quoted from a memorandum of theirs—and I see no reason to doubt them, it would mean, if this recommendation were adopted, that in future evidence of previous misconduct and of previous convictions, no matter how long ago, will become admissible in a very large number of cases.
I now turn to the Committee's recommendation about the burden of proof which is sometimes placed on the accused, and I regret that I must again record my dissent from what they recommend. In a number of Statutes Parliament has enacted that a man shall be convicted if the prosecution prove certain matters, and that, of course, means prove them beyond reasonable doubt, but that if the accused proves certain other matters then he shall not be; and proof by the accused, of course, does not mean proof beyond reasonable doubt, but proof on a balance of probabilities, a far lesser burden of proof.
One instance of Parliament enacting such a provision is in Section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1953. That provides that a man commits an offence if he has an offensive weapon in a public place
"without lawful authority or reasonable excuse the proof whereof shall lie on him".
I would have thought that to a layman nothing could be clearer than that. The police arrest a man in Trafalgar Square. They find he has on him an offensive weapon. They cannot prove he had it without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, but if he can prove that on the balance of probabilities he had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for having it in his possession, he is entitled to be acquitted. Other similar statutory enactments could be cited. For instance, the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 provides that where the defendant to an information relies for his defence on any exception, proviso, excuse or disqualification, the burden of proving the exception, proviso, excuse or qualification lies on him.
The Committee now propose that all that should be changed. In place of this comparatively simple concept, they propose that these Acts of Parliament, in which a burden of proof of some matter has been placed on the accused, should not be interpreted as placing a burden of proof on him, but only the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the matter which Parliament has said he must prove. If a man gives sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to whether, for instance, he had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for being in

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possession of a weapon in a public place, then, the Committee say, the burden of proving that he had it without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the burden of proving, the negative beyond reasonable doubt, should lie on the prosecution.
Evidence sufficient to raise an issue is quite different from evidence which shows on a balance of probabilities that there was lawful authority or reasonable excuse for having the weapon. The judge will have to rule whether there is sufficient evidence to raise the issue. It is for the jury to decide what weight to place on the evidence. As I see it, he would have to tell them, if possession of an offensive weapon was triable on indictment, that if they accept certain evidence that suffices to raise the issue, but if they do not accept it then they should convict; but if they do accept it, then the prosecution must satisfy them beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused had no lawful authority or reasonable excuse. What a jury would make of that kind of direction I do not know, but what I think it clear is that what is now proposed is not what Parliament intended when enacting those provisions.
I think that that recommendation is likely to be productive of a large number of appeals. If a judge rules that there is not sufficient evidence to raise an issue, this is likely to be challenged on appeal. I think that this recommendation will add greatly to the difficulties of summing up, and an error in summing up can lead also to an appeal. The recommendation appears to be based on the decision in the case of Woolmington, a decision of this House, but I think it would extend that decision very considerably, and I think it would be wrong to do so. Where Parliament has said in the clearest terms, that the accused has the burden of proving certain matters, I think it is wrong that it should now be interpreted as meaning that he should not prove it and that all he has to do is to produce sufficient evidence to raise an issue. There are a number of these recommendations by the Committee which tilt the scales against the accused, but this recommendation I think is unnecessarily favourable to him and in my view one without merit.
There is one other point. The Committee recommend that a husband or wife
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should be compellable witnesses as to events during their married life if their marriage has ended. If their marriage had continued they could not be compellable witnesses to matters which had taken place during the course of their marriage. I myself think it would be wrong to make them compellable in consequence of the termination of the marriage. I do not agree also with the Committee's suggestion that a witness cross-examined as to credit may be asked whether he has been acquitted. The fact that he has been acquitted of an offence should not reflect on his credit.
On another point, the present position is that if a witness gives evidence inconsistent with a statement he has previously given, that statement can be put to him, and the fact that he has made contradictory statements is likely to destroy the credibility of his evidence in the eyes of the jury. Such a statement is not now evidence against the accused of the facts stated in it, but now the Committee recommend that it should be. So you may get a statement, not on oath, by a witness, accepted by a jury as the truth despite his evidence on oath. My Lords, I agree with the Criminal Bar Association in not liking this at all, because it appears to contemplate that at a trial the evidence against the accused may be partly sworn evidence and partly unsworn from the same witness. At present only young children can give evidence unsworn. This proposal permits of the use of other unsworn evidence if that evidence has been contradicted by the witness's evidence on oath. I really do not think that this will do.
I do not like the recommendation that a judge should be relieved of the obligation to warn a jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. The Committee recommend that in every case it should be left to the discretion of the judge whether or not to give a warning. I fear that if the present rule is abolished, it may happen that a judge may fail to give a warning when the Court of Appeal think one should have been given, with the result that the conviction will be quashed. And, if a warning had been given, the jury might have formed the view that the accomplice had no motive for lying and have convicted and the conviction would then stand.
I now come to what I regard as the most revolutionary of the Committee's proposals; that is, those relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. The present position is that, with a few exceptions, hearsay evidence is not admissible, and the reasons for that are, I think, three: first, that hearsay evidence is inherently unreliable; secondly, that it can easily be manufactured; and thirdly, it cannot usually be tested satisfactorily by cross-examination. I know that the law with regard to the admission of hearsay evidence has been relaxed in civil proceedings as a result of the 13th Report of the Law Reform Committee; and there will I expect, be some who say that what is right in civil proceedings cannot be wrong in criminal practice. I do not agree. In criminal proceedings a man's liberty, it may be for a long period, is at stake. Indeed, in some cases still, his life may be at stake. The Committee say that they propose "large inroads" into the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. They certainly do.
I agree with Clause 34 of their draft Bill, which makes certain records admissible as evidence of the facts stated in them. That will get rid of the difficulties encountered in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions. I agree also with Clause 35, which provides for the admission of statements produced by computers, and with Clause 38, which provides for the admission of hearsay evidence by agreement between the parties. But I have the strongest objection to Clause 31. That provides that in certain circumstances any statement, whether made orally or in a document made before the accused was charged with an offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted or served with a summons, shall be admissible as evidence of a fact which, if it were stated on oath, would be admissible. One of the circumstances in which such evidence will be admitted is if the statement is by someone who has been, or is called, as a witness. So, if this is allowed, you will have witnesses going into the witness box and just asked if that is their statement, and the jury will be deprived of hearing their evidence and of assessing what kind of person the witness is.
The Committee also propose that a statement made by someone who refuses to be sworn should be made admissible evidence, and also that a statement by a person who is a competent but not compellable witness should be admitted in evidence if he refuses to give evidence. Where there is such a refusal to be sworn or to give evidence, this means that there will be no opportunity for cross-examination at all and that wholly untested statements will be accepted as evidence of the facts stated therein. It is also proposed that a statement shall be admitted if it be shown that the person who made it is dead or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental health to attend as a witness. If he is unfit by reason of mental health one may ask: should there not be evidence as to his mental health at the time the statement is made, before it is admitted?
Then there comes the, to me, absolutely astonishing proposal that a statement by a person who cannot be identified is to be admissible in evidence if all reasonable steps have been taken to identify him and he cannot be identified. What does that mean? Let us suppose that a document is found lying in the street, unsigned, but containing a lot of facts which would be very useful as evidence to the prosecution. As I understand it—and I hope that I shall be corrected if I am wrong—that means that the prosecution could produce that statement and say, "Here is this statement; it is evidence of these facts. We do not know who made it. We have done our best to find out, without success. Here it is, and it is evidence under this Act". Conversely, how convenient it could be to the defence to produce documents by someone unknown and just say, "We have done our best to identify the author. We have failed. We have taken all reasonable steps, and now this has got to be admitted as evidence." I really do not think that that will do. I do not think that that change is really consistent with British justice. The idea that a man may be convicted on the statement of someone who is not, and cannot be, identified, and on a statement which cannot be tested at all, is absolutely abhorrent to me.
My Lords, I have nearly done. I am sorry to have taken so long and to have been so critical. I had hoped to be able

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to support the Committee's recommendations to a very substantial degree when I started to read their Report. I shall listen with the greatest interest to what others have to say, and I am very glad to see that so many have put down their names to speak in this debate and let the Government have the advantage of hearing their views on these difficult questions. I do not expect agreement with all the views that I have expressed—that would be too much—but I hope I shall have some support. I hope that I may even have some support from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. I hope, too, that the Government will give serious consideration to the views of everyone who speaks in this debate. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

GAS WORKERS' PAY DISPUTE
3.38 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I now reply to the Private Notice Question put by the noble Lord, Lord Champion. I shall reply in the words used by my honourable friend Mr. Boardman, the Minister for Industry, in another place. The Answer is as follows:
"As a result of industrial action British Gas have already had to stop the supply of town gas to several hundred large industrial users and to put in hand pressure reductions affecting a majority of domestic town gas consumers.
"The full extent of industrial action and of its consequences has not yet been firmly established, but it is already clear that it will significantly interrupt production and create unemployment in other industries.
"The management of the industry and the unions are working together to try to maintain a safe system. Nevertheless, it cannot be guaranteed that there will be no risk to gas consumers. The potential risks are explosions from the effects of reduced gas pressure. Millions of homes suffering discomfort and the threat to the welfare of the old and the ill.
"The Government deplores this action and earnestly urges the gas unions to accept the restraints necessary to overcome inflation."
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating the words used in another place in reply to a similar Private Notice Question. I am sure the whole House will welcome the steps that are being taken to safeguard the public by the management and the unions. We should pay tribute to the unions for the clear instructions they have given to try to keep every action, or failure to supply, within safety limits.
As the concluding part of the Statement dealt with the dispute itself, I will with the permission of the House quote from to-day's Daily Telegraph, which put the position in words very much better than I could find. It said:
"Ironically, it has fallen to the gas workers, hitherto rated among the least militant of trade unionists, to present the Government with its first major test over Phase Two of its counter-inflation package. They have, admittedly, a case: the gas workers are among the few groups which were conspicuously caught out by the freeze. Thus the electricity workers, whose pay negotiations they normally follow, got a significantly larger increase than the Gas Corporation's offer allowable under Phase Two rules. We expressed the view originally that the Government should try to deal with anomalies of this kind during Phase Two."
May I ask whether the Government will reconsider their decision, in the light of the clearly recognised injustice to an important and usually very reasonable body of workers, and at least agree to the setting up of an Inquiry which might hold out some hope of an adjustment to bring these workers into line with the electricity workers? I am, in other words, asking the Government to take up the traditional role of Government in this country in such matters, which is to try to bring an end to disputes of this sort in order to lessen the suffering and hardship to the public as a whole.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, while admitting that the gas workers have in the past been a very responsible union, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, to bear in mind also that any weakening at the present time would have the most serious effects on the anti-inflation measures which are in the interests of the country as a whole? In view of the dangers outlined in the Statement and the very grave public concern about safety, has not the time come for Parliament to look into the different forms of industrial action and to take some decision on the

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policies which should be adopted in the event of loss of life resulting from this form of industrial action? I do not believe that we have yet appreciated the grave dangers which are before us, particularly for old people living alone, in the next day or so.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I cannot dissent from what the noble Lord, Lord Byers, has said. We are faced with a very serious problem here, a problem which Parliament will have to look at. But we are, of course, concerned at the moment with the immediate issue on which I understand he is in no disagreement with the Government. I do not think anyone would disagree that the gas manual workers have a case, but there are circumstances where the public interest as a whole must prevail over a particular case. I think that this is one such case, for the reason stated by the noble Lord, Lord Byers;—namely, that if one were to weaken on one case there would be a flood of other cases. The mere fact that the gas workers are comparing their case with the electricity workers will not prevent others from comparing their case with some other industry which also has just managed to get in before the chopper came down, if I may put it in that way. I hope that the House as a whole will support the Government in doing two things; first, in maintaining a firm stance, and, secondly, in doing their utmost to limit any damage that may come from this action.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, does not the Minister feel that this confrontation with the Government could result in losses in the productive effort of industry of a far greater sum in terms of the inflationary situation than would result from meeting the claim of the gas workers, and would not the previous Ministerial code governing industrial relations of this kind have avoided this particularly difficult situation?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, it is possible for siren voices of that sort to be raised. It is the Government's duty to resist siren voices in the interest of the country as a whole. As I said, if we yield on one we shall have to yield on many.
LORD O'NEILL OF THE MAINE: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the pleasure with which we heard the Home Secretary on the wireless this morning say that the Government would stand firm? Is he aware that this is essential both in the national interest and for the continuing credibility of the Government themselves?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am greatly obliged to my noble friend.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, in his reply the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, did not comment on the point I made about the Government's traditional role of conciliator in matters of this sort. Is not this a case where such a role should be taken up again by the Government: that they should stand in this sort of relationship with the people of this country?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think the House will appreciate that in its offer the Gas Corporation has gone to the limit of what it can offer within the terms of phase 2. That being so, there is really nothing into which to inquire. It has gone to the absolute limit. In addition to that, of course, negotiations on redundancy have taken place, I understand successfully.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, as a matter of public relation and in the national interest, to convey to the Government that it is not helpful for noble Lords and others who are quite well off to talk about standing firm when they themselves financially will be much better off this year as a result of tax reductions than the maximum awards possible to the trade unionists concerned?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord is being as helpful in these matters as he might be. We have to take a stand and accept the standstill measures and those which the Government are proposing at the present time for phase 2.
LORD HALE: My Lords, are not the Government taking their stand on legislation which has not yet been approved and which is not law? Are they not therefore dropping their traditional role of conciliator before the time comes when they should drop it? If they wish to take decisive action against the first

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breach, I would ask: was there not a previous breach, the one to which the former Leader of the Liberal Party referred in his letter to The Times yesterday? If The Times was correct yesterday in saying that the Government have already decided to take their decisive battlefield against the gas workers, may I ask how far that will help conciliation and what plans the Government have if this attitude forces the gas workers to come out entirely?
BARONESS SEEAR: My Lords, it is plain that if the Government give way on this occasion the whole attempt to control inflation through phase 2 will be in ribbons before hardly getting off the ground. This surely underlines the need to get back as soon as we can to a tripartite voluntary way of settling these affairs so that the unions are backing the kind of policies which we must have if we are to control inflation. Does the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, agree that it is quite useless to talk about the Government reverting to their previous role of conciliator while they are themselves the sole party producing the policies on which wage claims must at present be settled? In other words, the Government cannot be, on the one hand, the head of the conciliation machinery and, on the other, the sole party who lay down what the wage policy is to be. There is an inevitable conflict of roles here and the only answer is to return to the tripartite position, without which their role as conciliator cannot work.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House—
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I reply to the two questions that I have been asked? The fact is, of course, that phase 2 will give the opportunity to seek out the kind of solution to which the noble Baroness referred. But we are not concerned with that at the immediate moment. As the noble Lord, Lord Hale, said, the terms of the £1 plus 4 per cent. are not yet law, but they go as far as it is possible to go with any hope of containing inflation. I think it is right to remember that these terms are designed to give an overall average increase of something like 7 or 8 per cent. I understand, in this particular
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case, that on basic rates this is the highest increase that has ever been offered.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether he heard the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and whether we are to accept the permission granted her to make that speech as a precedent to be followed by others, or whether others are to be told that they must limit their observations to questions?
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, the Standing Order, if I recall it correctly, states that short statements are permissible after speakers on the Front Benches have made their contributions, and I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, was just within the definition of "short". But I suggest to your Lordships that we are perhaps in danger, on this very important Statement, of straying into a debate and I hope that we shall shortly be able to return to the very important debate on the Criminal Law Revision Committee.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, as the Deputy Leader of the House has made a statement which will be taken as law to be obeyed by Members of this House, may I ask whether it is not a fact that the Standing Orders provide for statements to be made by Front Bench spokesmen immediately following a Government Statement or Answer to a Private Notice Question? Is it not a free-for-all for the whole House?
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, if the noble Lord will kindly look at the Standing Orders, he will find that short statements are permissible from Back Benches, as well as from Front Benches.

CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE
3.53 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I listened with great interest, and I think considerable advantage, to the speech which was made by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and I agreed with a great deal of what he said. I should like, first, to congratulate this

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Committee, which is one of which I have always had the highest opinion, on completing their really Herculean task lasting eight years. I was a member of the Committee on the Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, which had to consider every aspect of civil procedure, how to simplify it and how to reduce the cost of litigation. We took five years and I personally attended 330 meetings. But we had one advantage over the Criminal Law Revision Committee; that is, that at the end of the five years we made innumerable recommendations nearly all of which were unanimous. The Criminal Law Revision Committee's task has not been simplified by the degree of conflict on so many important questions among the members of the Committee.
The Report has met with a good deal of criticism; in particular, in relation to four matters: first, Clauses 1 to 5 and 9—abolition of the right to silence, being replaced by nothing except some Home Office circular; secondly, Clauses 17 to 21—corroboration; thirdly, Clauses 3, 6 and 7—the admission in many cases, where not now admissible, of the previous convictions of the accused, however old, to show a disposition in the accused to commit that kind of crime; and fourthly, Clauses 30 to 41—hearsay evidence. I spent nearly all of Christmas studying the Report. I cannot say that I found it an easy document to read. It is in a book of 258 pages, the Report itself occupying 284 paragraphs. There is a draft Bill of 47 clauses and two Schedules, with 179 subsections and 46 pages of notes on the subsections. There is no index and there is no summary of recommendations.
Having read this Bill, I do not understand how magistrates will ever understand so complex a piece of legislation. I think there was only one member of the Committee with experience of the magistrates' courts. Of course, the Committee said that they recognised that what they were recommending would have to apply in magistrates' courts as well as in Crown Courts. I am not surprised that the Law Society has not yet been able to complete its memorandum on the Report; I am still less surprised that the Magistrates' Association has not yet been able to complete its memorandum on the Report. It is of course true that magistrates will be advised by their clerks, but
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a clerk does not, unless invited to do so, retire with them when they consider their decision. I would venture to express the hope that Her Majesty's Government will not themselves come to any conclusion until they have at least received the reports of the Law Society and the Magistrates' Association.
The Report deals with what the Committee call matters of principle and matters of detail, and on majorities what they say in paragraph 23 is:
"Where there have been disagreements on important questions of principle, this is shown in the report. Some of the recommendations on matters of detail have been made by majority decisions, but in general these cases are not specially mentioned."
So we do not know on any question of detail whether or not it is a majority decision. On matters of principle, we do not know, in most cases whether the majority was of 13 to 1 or of 8 to 6, and it would have interested those of us who know all the members of the Committee to know which members of the Committee thought what. We are told the figures in six cases—paragraph 37, "with one dissentient"; paragraph 52, "A minority of three members"; paragraph 63, "Three members are in favour of … this course"; paragraph 245 refers to "a substantial minority"; paragraph 276 refers to "a large majority"; paragraph 279 refers to "The great majority"; but there are 15 other cases of matters of principle where they say that there were majority decisions, although there is no indication of the size of the majority.
Comment has been made, perhaps quite naturally, on the experience of those who submitted memoranda on the Report. So for the Record it is perhaps worth mentioning that the Committee consisted of eight Judges, three Professors of Law, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Chief Legal Adviser to the Home Office, no barristers and one solicitor. When we come to the actual Committee which prepared the somewhat devastating Report of the Bar Council, that consisted of seven Queen's Counsel, including one former Treasury Counsel and one former prosecuting counsel to the Inland Revenue, both at the Central Criminal Court, three senior Treasury Counsel at the Central Criminal Court, one Treasury Counsel at the Inner London Crown Court, five other junior counsel, four of whom have considerable seniority in

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court and extensive experience of appearing for both prosecution and defence. The Justice memorandum does not state who formed the Committee which prepared their report, but the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor wrote to ask them so they told him. I need not bother about the names, but they include six banisters, three of whom are recorders, five solicitors, including the chief prosecuting solicitor of the Port of London Authority, the chief prosecuting solicitor for Hampshire, a serving stipendiary magistrate, a clerk of the justices, a justice of the peace and one academic lawyer.
I should like to deal first with matters with which the noble and learned Viscount has not dealt, and with which nobody else may deal, because they are matters which are not in the Report at all, though I might have expected them to be. I believe that it should have started with a short summary of what is the right of silence, how it arose and whether it ought really to have any application to-day.
May I read a very short summary of its history, which I take from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in a case called Miranda v. Arizona. I read from Volume 384 of the United States Reports at page 458:
"We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. Perhaps the critical historical event shedding light on its origins and evolution was the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have bound him to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject … He resisted the oath and declaimed the proceedings stating:
'Another fundamental right I then contended for, was, that no man's conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or pretended to be so'…
"On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber and went further in giving him generous reparation. The lofty principles to which Lilburn had appealed during his trial gained popular acceptance in England. These sentiments worked their way over to the Colonies and were implanted after great struggle into the Bill of Rights. Those who framed our
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Constitution and the Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on individual liberty. They knew that 'illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing… by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure' … The privilege was elevated to constitutional status and has always been as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard' … We cannot depart from this noble heritage.
"Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a noble principle often transcends its origins', the privilege has come rightfully to be recognised in part as an individual's substantive right, a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy' … We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our adversary system—is founded on a complex of values … All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance', to require the government 'to shoulder the entire load', … to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth… In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will'."
My Lords, that case was decided in 1965. Four cases were taken together. They were all cases of alleged confessions obtained in police stations. In three cases, the man had been arrested and was technically in custody; in the fourth, he was not. As your Lordships know, though it might be the next thing coming, we do not have the right to detain people for questioning. This, of course, is why the Press refer to people going to police stations as "helping the police in their inquiries". In Northern Ireland, of course, we have this right under the Special Powers Act; otherwise in this country we do not have detention for questioning.
Another thing which is not in the Report at all, to my surprise, is any express recognition of that fact, because I should have thought that if the right to silence is abolished then everybody will be strongly advised, certainly by the civil rights bodies, in no circumstances to go to a police station to be interrogated. No inference could be

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drawn from that under the draft clauses of the Bill, as I understand it.
What the court actually decided in the Miranda case was this:
"1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"—
that covers the person who voluntarily goes to the police station—
"unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination …

'(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice …

'(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will", during a period of custodial interrogation as well as in the courts or during the course of other official investigations.…

'(c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois … stressed the need for protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege….

'(d) In the absence of other effective measures the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court he must he clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him …

'(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present …

'(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel …

'(g) Where the individual answers some questions during in-custody interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter …

'(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant …

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"2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards afforded in other jurisdictions".
They in fact had a lot of evidence from the F.B.I. that the F.B.I., in contradistinction to the State Police, always followed these practices, but it did not lead to their not being able to prosecute people or to their not being able to obtain convictions.
My Lords, I suppose the first test that anybody considering the criminal law of another country would probably apply is what happens when the citizen goes to a police station; because, of course, if the police are once in a position to know that they do not have to produce any evidence that the person committed any offence as long as they can get a signed confession out of him, the pressures on the police are very great.
The next background factor which I think we ought to take into account is that, while I still believe that the British police are the best in the world, they are also, of course, the most powerful and least controlled. Where a criminal offence is committed here, the police of course interrogate suspects; they decide whether or not there is to be a prosecution; they decide, if there is to be a prosecution, who is to be prosecuted and, most important, what the charges are to be and what witnesses are to be called; and they prosecute, sometimes themselves and in other cases by engaging solicitors and, of course, in the largest cases, counsel.
I made a very stupid slip when I referred to the British police because I do not mean the British police at all: I mean the police of England and Wales. If a crime is committed in Scotland, the police of course investigate the crime; they interview suspects; they do not decide whether there is going to be a prosecution or not; they do not decide who is to be prosecuted, and they do not decide what the charges are to be. They do not decide who should be called as witnesses; they do not prosecute. All these are functions of the procurator fiscal. For three or four years, Justice has been pressing the powers that be to get us to go over to the procurator fiscal system. The Committee of which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was chairman recommended that Northern Ireland should go over to the

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procurator fiscal system; and this has been done—except that he is not called the procurator fiscal and the police can still themselves prosecute in very minor cases.
When I said that the police were the least controlled—I am comparing them with police in European democracies—I meant that they are the only police force in a European democracy which is not a nationalised police force under the orders of a Minister, usually the Minister of the Interior. As the House knows, if you think of a way to improve police procedure and you "sell" it to the Home Secretary and he says, "That is a good idea; we should change that", he must add, "I cannot do anything. All I can do is to put it before the Chief Constables' Conference"—because the policeman is not an employee. Whenever we have a Bill on employment, we must have a special clause for the police. They are nobody's employees. The office of constable is a public office and the only person to whose orders they are subject is their own chief constable.
I spent all Saturday in the court of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice at a conference called by Justice on the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. We had the pleasure of having there about 120, not only members of Justice but representatives of the Law Commission, the police, the Home Office, the magistracy and so on. We had the great advantage of being addressed by two members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, Lord Justice Lawton and Professor Glanville Williams and also by Monsieur Simon, who, as is apparent from the Report, was seen by the Committee. The House may remember that when the Report was published he wrote a letter expressing regret at a number of the proposals. He explained to us that in France, for example, the ordinary police do not interrogate at all. All the interrogation is done by a highly trained body of interrogators working under the procurator. The moment the prosecution starts, the police then come under the orders of the juge d'instruction. If there is to be further interrogation, he decides the nature of it and his orders are all under appeal. Monsieur Simon's strong view was that no one can be safetly trusted with the
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enormous powers which the police would have in this country if the right of silence were abolished in the way proposed and the Judges Rules were not made statutory but depended upon some Home Office circular.
The dangers are set out in the views of the Minority on this first main point. In paragraph 52 they say:
"(i) That the police should be able to question suspects in custody is now generally thought to be necessary for the due administration of the law; but the practice is fraught with dangers. In the first place there is the danger of the use of bullying and even brutal methods by the police in order to obtain confessions. Examples are the Sheffield case in 1963 and the Challenor case in 1964. These incidents are attributable to a small number of 'black sheep' in the police force. However rare their occurrence may be, every effort should be made to erect safeguards against them. Our arrangements should not depend upon the good faith of everyone concerned in the administration of the law. Perhaps a provision for the electronic recording of interrogations would not always eliminate the use of 'third degree' methods by officers who are tempted to use them; but the knowledge that a recorder is running during an interview would surely exercise a deterrent effect. It is of great importance for the police themselves that any public suspicion of their practices should be allayed. In America misconduct by the police has been partly responsible for the alienation of sympathy of the public from the police, which leads the public to refuse to help the police with information, and so greatly increases the difficulty of enforcing the law. Also, every proven instance of third degree by the police, or credible allegation of it increases the suspicion with which juries regard the ordinary confession, which in fact is very likely to be true and properly obtained.
"(ii) The minority argue that the use of tape recorders may help to reduce the occasions on which the police are tempted to fabricate confessions. As with the use of violence, it is impossible to assess the extent to which the police at present commit perjury, but there is a widespread impression, not only among criminals, that in tough areas a police officer who is certain that he has got the right man will invent some oral admission (colloquially known as a 'verbal') to clinch the case."
They then cited the passage from the Royal Commission on the Police, quoted by the noble and learned Viscount. The Report continues:
"If the accused alleges that the evidence against him is perjured, he is not likely to be believed, and the mere making of the allegation by the accused in giving evidence enables the prosecution (under the present law) to elicit damaging facts relating to his previous record.
"(iii) Short of using violence and perjury, the police may get confessions by the use of various kinds of persuasion, which is all the more effective when the suspect is isolated

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from his friends. The present position is that the courts do not exclude evidence of confessions merely because they were obtained by questioning at night or in the small hours. In a murder case in 1963 the police started to question a suspect at about 2 a.m. and obtained a confession at 5.15 a.m.; the confession was admitted in evidence. In 1962, a man was questioned in a Birmingham police station for 10½ hours and was in that time given only one cup of tea; a conviction obtained by means of the resulting confession was sustained on appeal, though on this occasion the appellate court spoke severely about the conduct of the police. It is demonstrated from time to time that even ordinary questioning can produce false confessions, but the risk is greatly increased if oppressive methods are used. Often there is a conflict of evidence between the accused and the police as to the time and duration of questioning. Electronic recording might reduce the conflict …
"(iv) A more subtle danger lies in the way in which confessions are generally taken. Most written statements produced in evidence are not in the suspect's handwriting and absolutely in his own words. As a result of questioning, the police officer may write a narrative which is in part a blend of question and answer. The statement reads as though it was volunteered by the suspect; but in fact it may have consisted of a monosyllabic answer to a leading question asked by the officer with one or more subordinate clauses. Since the statement does not distinguish between question and answer, one cannot tell from the statement what facts were suggested to the suspect by the way in which the question was worded. And the written word does not reproduce the inflection of the voice upon which meaning may depend. One may not even be sure that the officer understood what the suspect said, or that the suspect understood the written statement when he read it through or had it read to him. His signature is not a guarantee that the written statement exactly reproduces what he said.
"(v) The possibilities of error are multiplied if, as often happens, the statement is not reduced to writing at the time and signed by the suspect. The investigating officer may simply embody what he regards as the kernal of the suspect's statement in his notebook. This notebook will be entered up after the interview, and the note may represent only a very small part of a long interrogation. It may be months before the case is heard, and by that time the officer may have no memory of the interview beyond his written note. If there are two or more investigating officers, they are allowed to agree their evidence together before writing up their notes; this practice was approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1953. The officers may even prepare a joint note. If they are inclined to stretch the case a bit against the accused, perhaps because he has a record' and appears to them to be guilty, they know that they will be able to back each other up at the trial and will be virtually impregnable from attack.
That being the situation to-day with the Judges Rules, I should have thought that it is not the right time to abolish the right to silence; certainly not unless and
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until an independent record (not, I think, kept by even a senior police officer) can be taken of what really goes on in the course of an interrogation.
The next point on which I find surprising silence—I do not think there is any reference at all to it in the Report—is the right to see a solicitor. The Judges Rules had preambles. Principle C is this: that every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and consult privately with a solicitor. This is so even if he is in custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is caused to the process of investigation or the administration of justice by his doing so. As your Lordships now know, this is an absolute right in the United States of America.
In June last, the Criminal Law Review published a survey based on interviews with a random sample of 134 defendants in cases tried at assizes or quarter sessions, all of whom had launched an appeal to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. Each was asked whether he contacted a solicitor when first taken to the police station. Of the 134, 15 said they had; 108 said, "No"; the remaining 11 said that they had not been taken to a police station. The 108 who said, "No" were then asked, "Did you ask the police to allow you to speak with a solicitor? If so, what did they say?" Of these, 42 said that they had asked but had been refused. These 42 were 74 per cent., therefore, of the total number of 57 who asked to be allowed to speak to a solicitor. One defendant said: "I asked but they did not let me"; one was asked whether he had a solicitor and on replying, "No," the police said, "Well then you cannot contact him, can you?" Another was told that he could use the 'phone to call the solicitor but there was no 'phone. One was told, "You have been looking at too many films"; another, "If you try to be funny, we can be funny too, and throw the book at you." That does not sound as if that existing right was working very well. I think the reason is simply because—this point is made in the Justice report—the police do not in so many cases in fact comply with the Judges Rules and the judges do very little to make them.

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There is one point, my Lords, which all the bodies who have commented so far are agreed about; that is, that they strongly disagreed with the opinion expressed by the Committee because it is an opinion. The Committee did not, as I understand it, have any research work done and they do not state the grounds on which they are of that opinion; they express the opinion that too many hardened professional criminals were being acquitted when they ought to be convicted. I will not take up time reading the passages, but the Bar Council in their summary, paragraph 7 and later in paragraphs 60–68; Justice in paragraph 5; the Society of Labour Lawyers in pages 9 and 10 and the London Criminal Court Solicitors' Association page 2, all say that it is quite contrary to their experience.
Since the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report a research has been published by the Oxford Research Group who inquired into 475 cases over about a year at assizes and quarter sessions round Oxford. There were, I think, acquittals in 173 cases. They discussed these cases with the prosecuting lawyers; they discussed the cases with the defence lawyers; they discussed the cases with the police and, in some cases, with the judges. The first surprise was to find that in 30 per cent. of the cases there could be no question of an unduly sympathetic jury, because in no less than 30 per cent. of the cases the jury were directed by the judge that they must acquit because there was not the evidence to prove the case. It is part of the fun of this life that one goes on learning even in old age, but what surprised me—this is something completely new to me; I wonder whether it is completely new to most lawyers—was that in 25 per cent. of cases where there were acquittals the police said that they had not expected to get a conviction, they were prosecuting for policy reasons. My Lords, that is something quite new to me, and I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor or the noble Viscount, what does this really mean? Are they cases where, because the police do not like a man, they prosecute him to teach him a lesson, or is it because they want to get him in the dock to ask him questions? Or does it mean that there is some crime which is
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becoming rather prevalent and they thought it about time they prosecuted somebody, even if they did not succeed in getting a conviction? It is a very astonishing to me that as high a proportion as 25 per cent. of the cases should be cases in which the police never expected to get a conviction and were simply prosecuting for policy reasons.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, it is, of course, not surprising to me, nor to the Oxford researchers who explained in the pamphlet exactly what they meant. One of the things they meant was that in a number of cases the police received complaints from people and felt that the complaints were of a sufficiently serious character that a court ought to decide them. They might form their own view about which way the court would decide. That is one of the things the researchers meant when they talked about "policy reasons". I cannot answer about the police, because this is a research document made by an independent body of researchers.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord. Then we learn that in 11 per cent. of the cases either the witnesses went back on their proofs or the evidence simply was not good enough.
We also had some rather sensational figures from Sir Robert Mark, for whom, if I may say so, I have the highest regard. I should like (perhaps I ought to address this observation primarily to the Home Office, or to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross) to quote a comment on Sir Robert Mark's figures, about the number of people he thought were wrongly acquitted, made by an American lawyer, but he does not give his source. If I may just read it and then ask whether at some time the noble Viscount can tell us whether it is right, he says, dealing with 6,000 acquittals:
"Quite apart from the fact that this figure must include all those who were wrongly charged, those where there were inadequate evidence and those where for some reason of law the judge directed an acquittal, the figures are distorted because all that was recorded was the man's plea and, where appropriate, acquittal, on the principal offence with which Fe was charged. Yet it is quite commonplace for a suspect to appear on several charges in decreasing order of seriousness. It is equally commonplace for a man to plead not guilty to all charges, to be acquitted of the most serious one but to be convicted on some lesser

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offence. In an over-simplified example, a man might be acquitted of manslaughter vet gaoled for dangerous driving. In Mr. Mark's system he would appear as an acquittal. The figures quoted by Mr. Mark were in fact assembled rather hastily by the Home Office to deal with a Parliamentary Question. By this measure a high acquittal rate may really be nothing more than the result of British charging practice, a practice which involves putting the accused down for several charges including the most serious conceivable one and then leaving the jury to resolve the question of what charge he is really guilty on. Whereas, as is often the case, the most serious charge is often not justified by the evidence and the judge must instruct the jury to acquit on that charge—"
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS): My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, tell us what he is quoting from?
LORD GARDINER: I am quoting from a lecture (I will let the noble Viscount have the paper) delivered in America and kindly sent to me by my noble friend Lord Ritchie-Calder. The lecturer began by asserting that President Nixon was certainly elected on a strong law and order ticket (the lecturer understood that Mr. Heath was elected on other considerations), and referred to the Miranda case. He pointed the contrast between the judges in America in this field of civil liberties and the extent to which the lecturer thought our civil liberties might be put in danger by the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee.
My Lords, I want to deal with only one more point; it is one that naturally concerns me in a sense, most. I refer to the proposal that evidence about previous convictions may be given, to show a disposition. The Society of Labour Lawyers—and I am glad that the learned Viscount was interested in their report—say in their report:
"The Committee"—
that is the Criminal Law Revision Committee—
"after a lot of hesitation decided to preserve the substance of the common law rule that evidence showing a disposition to commit the kind of offence charged is in general inadmissible but to relax it in one important aspect. In effect the Committee recommend that where the act is admitted evidence of previous bad character can be admitted to prove the intent of the accused. Thus in the case of a man charged with a trivial touching of a woman with an alleged indecent observation amounting to an indecent assault in law, the prosecution could prove a conviction years ago for rape. The danger here is that the conviction may
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have been for an offence out of all proportion in its gravity to the offence being actually tried.
"The recommendation that previous convictions be admissible in this situation assumes outstanding importance when it is realised that this might happen in a high proportion of cases. The study conducted by the Oxford Penal Research Group showed that in no less than seven out of ten cases where the accused pleaded not guilty the defence was a lack of criminal intent or knowledge rather than of involvement in the affair.… It appears from that study … that of the 80 defendants who admitted to being at the scene of the crime but denied that they had the necessary criminal intent, 38 or about half had previous convictions. If these figures are typical of the position in the country generally (and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that they are), previous convictions would be admissible in about one-third of all trials. This is a very substantial proportion and means that this proposal would have an extremely far-reaching effect on the course of trials.
"In this context it is noteworthy that the Committee said it was divided on this proposal and that it constituted a compromise. The evidence of the Oxford study was not before the Committee and it is an open question what view it would have taken if it had appreciated the significance of the question in terms of the numbers of cases that would be affected by its recommendation.
"In our view this proposal is highly dangerous. There is a widespread feeling in this country that previous convictions should not be generally admissible to prove guilt—because of the probability of undue prejudice in the mind of the jury. When prior to the publication of the Committee's Report there were suggestions that it might recommend the general admissibility of previous convictions, the Home Secretary went out of his way to the suggestion in the House of Commons apparently in order to allay public disquiet. Yet if the Oxford study is representative this is precisely the effect of the Committee's proposal. In our view the dangers of such a change in the rules of evidence would outweigh the possible advantages."
The other bodies concerned, the Criminal Courts Solicitors' Association (pages 5 and 6) and the Bar Council in their Report (paragraphs 10 and 12 of the summary, and more extensively in paragraphs 87 to 125), feel equally strongly about this matter.
My Lords, there are three other points that I should make about this. The first is that the Criminal Law Revision Committee did not know of the research work which, through the courtesy of the Home Office, my committee has done in this field and which, the House may remember, showed that if the man had been convicted, say, of dishonesty, and had gone straight for 10 years, he was slightly less

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likely to get into serious trouble than a man of hitherto unblemished character. Whether that evidence would be admissible before a jury, or whether they would assume, "Give a dog a bad name, and hang him", I do not know.
Secondly, again I am concerned about this aspect in relation to magistrates' courts—and I think the Criminal Courts Solicitors' Association say the same. There was only one member of the Committee, I think, familiar with the work of the magistrates' courts. The others were very experienced in the work of the Crown Court. In the Crown Court it is common practice if there is a dispute as to whether an old conviction is admissible under these new proposals—whether the other conviction is for the same kind of offence, and so on—for the argument to take place in the absence of the jury. But what happens in magistrates' courts? Do you have this argument that the magistrates have to decide first, no doubt on the advice of their clerk, whether these old convictions are admissible or not? If they decide that they are not admissible, how are they to forget them? This point does not seem to have occurred to the Committee.
Finally, what shocks me most on this matter is what the Committee say in paragraph 99. They refer to,
"Where proof of a conviction …".
Now, of course, the Bar Council strongly take the point that it ought not to be the conviction which counts; it ought to be the misconduct in question, what the man actually did. That may appear from the conviction, but it is important to see what he actually did previously. But this paragraph says:
"Where proof of a conviction is admissible this will be conclusive evidence that the accused committed the offence to which the conviction relates."
Later, the Committee say:
"We gave a great deal of thought to whether the accused should be able to dispute the correctness of the conviction admissible under our proposals but we decided that this would be impracticable."
My Lords, there is no system of justice which can possibly guarantee that no innocent person will ever be convicted. It is bound to happen. Your Lordships may have read in the papers only the other day of the case of a man serving three to five years when substantially the
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only evidence against him was the evidence of two senior police officers that he had confessed. Questions are now being raised, because both of these officers have since been convicted of conspiracy, and one of corruption. You may have a thin case as to identity or something else, and there is only one witness for the prosecution. If you go to the Court of Appeal, naturally they say: "It is a thin case. It would not have been surprising if the jury had acquitted. But they saw the witnesses, and we did not, and we cannot substitute our view for that of the jury."
Here you have a man who has been wrongly convicted. There he is, and he has now got a photograph with the police. If this man is, by chance, wrongly charged with an offence of that character again, he is not to be allowed to tell the jury: "I have now got further evidence, and I can prove to the hilt that I was wrongly convicted." I thought that this Committee was all for breaking down rules for things inadmissible and letting in the truth. Yet here is this man, the truth being that he was wrongly convicted the first time, who is not allowed to say so. And by the time he has twice been wrongly convicted I should think his cause would be hopeless, because both previous convictions will be available on the third occasion.
Therefore, my Lords, I am not happy about the four spheres to which I have referred. I am most unhappy about the abolition of the right to silence. I agree with M. Simon that nobody, whatever splendid body of men they may be, can really be trusted with sweeping powers in a sphere the kernel of which really is the temptation not to bother to call the evidence that the man committed the crime, but more and more to rely on confessions in police stations. We all know what happens in police stations in some other countries. My second principal objection is to this provision about old convictions. It is, I think, highly prejudicial in the ordinary juries appointed, although if they knew the contents of the research done by the Home Office, they might think otherwise. However, they do not. I am sure that the Government will give the most careful consideration to the points which I have ventured to mention, among all those others which they will hear.
4.39 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, although crime and criminal law and procedure is a matter for the Home Office, I think it would be wrong to let a debate of this kind pass without some word from the Lord Chancellor, who has a somewhat different brief to follow. The first thing I want to say is that it is, after all, a little important that we should try to get a sight of the wood and not lose ourselves in a thicket of trees of one sort or another and of greater or lesser dimension. We all know the story of the three men who were asked to write a book about an elephant. The Englishman wrote The Elephant and How to Hunt Him. The Frenchman wrote l'Eléphant et ses Amours—a very nice little pamphlet—but the German wrote Prolegomena to the study of the Elephant in 1,415 words. I am afraid there is a danger that we are now developing the German technique in relation to this Report.
I want to talk rather generally about this subject and I should like to make this a balanced and unemotional debate. If I appear to lean a little to one side or the other, it is simply because I am trying to say that the other side has not yet been sufficiently stressed in the course of public discussion. I think we can start by agreeing on a number of points. The first is that on the whole—and I am going to be fairly critical in my remarks—we have a system of criminal trial in this country of which we are justly proud. No one, I think, will want to say anything, however critical, which would try to overthrow that fundamental truth: we are proud of our system of criminal justice in this country.
In relation to the Committee's Report which is now under discussion, we must remember that the Government have promised not to enact any of the recommendations, and still less the whole of them, until they have heard the views of Parliament. That of course means that until legislation comes—and one of the purposes of my speech is to indicate that it must come at some stage—it will not reflect the views of the Committee but the views of the Government, after taking into account the kind of speeches to which we have listened and to which I trust we are going to listen in the course of this debate.
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The next thing I want to say is that the advantages of our system are very great, and they are advantages to which we all want to hold. It is as well to remember what they are. The first is that we have an uncorrupt and independent Judiciary, and the fact that we have it is due in very large measure to the tight discipline and the high traditions of the profession from which the judges are drawn. Secondly, we have a system of trial which disposes of cases even now, when it is slightly under strain, more rapidly than any other in the civilised world—and that is a very great advantage, because justice delayed is justice denied. May I say, in parenthesis, that one of the disadvantages of the juge d'instruction system is that it takes a great deal longer than the system which we have developed. I say that in parenthesis, because some zany in one of the weekly papers accused me of wanting to introduce the system—indeed that I have long advocated it—of juge d'instruction into this country. It is a pure figment of the imagination.
Thirdly, we have the presumption of innocence, rigidly enforced at first instance and jealously guarded by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). If anyone were to suggest that there is any single person in this country in a responsible position, on the Committee or off it, who would desire to tamper with that, I should believe him to be talking nonsense. Then we have trial by jury—admittedly the standard method of trial in serious cases. I think it is worth reminding the House, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, did last week, that 98 per cent. of the crime in this country is dealt with by lay magisstrates and a handful of stipendiaries in magistrates' courts. May I say, again in parenthesis, that when we are talking about criminal law and procedure the rather grandiose speeches which are probably going to be delivered are really directed towards a handful of rather serious cases. In nine cases out of ten when you are talking about the criminal law, you are really talking about yourself when you park on the wrong side of a double yellow line, or something of that kind. Some of the things which are said about the right to silence as regards previous convictions, and so on, look a bit funny when they are related to what is actually going on in magistrates' courts

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in 98 per cent. of the cases. This leads me to say that I somewhat regret, not the two speeches which have been delivered to your Lordships' House, which have been unexceptionable in that regard, but some of the rather rhetorical and emotional approaches to this subject which have been made in the course of public discussion.
What I want to say this afternoon is that in spite of these advantages—and they are many, they are great and we must stick to them—there is really no justification for complacency. There is no field of law, in my belief, more urgently in need of rationalisation, reform and ultimately codification than criminal law and procedure. I believe its rules to be artificial, complex and, in some fields, almost if not entirely unintelligible. Quite apart from the verdicts of juries which are sometimes open to criticism, when a conviction is quashed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) and an accused person gets off, he gets off in many cases not because he is innocent (which may or may not be the case) but because the judge has failed to state the law accurately to the jury. This happens not infrequently, and I believe we should sometimes ask ourselves whether this is not partly due to unnecessary complexity in the law which the judge is compelled to state. The status quo which we are discussing is almost all judge-made. It has been made by judges at different times during our history on the basis of precedent and to meet legal and social conditions wholly different from those which now obtain; and when Parliament has intervened, as it has from time to time, it has almost always intervened on an ad hoc basis—sometimes (as in 1898) by imposing rules a shade more artificial and illogical than those which have been thought out by the judges from time to time.
In the meantime we must remember that we are living in an age of increasing crime. I believe he would be a bold and possibly optimistic man who could see an end to it. We cannot therefore, in these circumstances, leave things exactly as they are, indefinitely trusting to good fortune and a serene belief that there are an infinite number of persons in the pipeline who are capable of acting as judges. So it behoves us to discuss
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calmly and without complacency what we can do to maintain our fundamental values and at the same time to introduce a more or less contemporary system of evidence and procedure. This leads me to say what I had meant to say at the outset: how grateful I am to my noble and learned friend from the Cross-Benches (if he will allow me to call him such after long acquaintance) for having introduced this subject for a debate. I have been hoping for such a debate for a very long time, because I thought the Report badly needed Parliamentary discussion. Even if I do not give a detailed commentary on the Report, I do welcome the opportunity it gives me to talk about some of the things which are very close to my heart and very close to the obligations of the Office which I hold.
First of all, may I say what I conceive to be the position of the Lord Chancellor in a matter of this kind? I am not—I repeat, "not"—responsible for law and order. I am not responsible for prosecution or penal treatment. In neither of those senses—am I a Minister of Justice. What I am responsible for, as I see it, is the administration of justice in this country. As Lord Chancellor, I do not think I am concerned with the results of cases: the results of cases are for the judge and the jury. My duty is to see that an accused person gets a fair trial without undue delay before a competent judge and a jury which is not packed. It is immaterial to me as Lord Chancellor whether a defendant gets off or whether he gets convicted. I am not there to do justice myself, but to see that justice is done according to law. But I have another and, for this purpose, a more important responsibility. Whatever departmental responsibilities for law and order may be, I like to think that it is part of the Lord Chancellor's function to take a view of the system of law as a whole. I have seen it described as a "worm's eye view", and I have also seen it described as an "eagle's eye view". I try to ask myself what we are trying to achieve by it, and whether the means we adopt make sense, not from the point of view of individual rules or practices, but in a more general sense.
I was reading only the other day (thinking of this debate as I did so) an article in

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the current number of the Modern Law Review by Professor Hart on the relevance of Bentham to present day law. He represented Bentham as a prophet of rationalising law, or, as he put it, the de-mystification of law. I like to think of the Lord Chancellor's functions like that—an enemy of jargon and jargonisation, a foe of impostor terms which cloud and fog the windscreen of clear thinking and prevent us from seeing the road ahead. I could not help noticing, incidentally, that at the end of his article Professor Hart came to the conclusion that the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee are indeed Benthamite, both in spirit and in substance, and that the recommendations which have caused so much controversy, and were recently condemned by the Bar Council, were largely recommended by him in 1828. In this connection, he specifically mentioned some of the controversial recommendations in relation to hearsay, self-incrimination and the so-called right of silence that have been mentioned this afternoon.
My Lords, let me come back to my own problems. When I became Lord Chancellor nearly three years ago, I soon realised that I was faced with what amounted to a crisis. Serious crime has been increasing steadily since 1950, I think since the war. When I first went to the Bar over 40 years ago there were four courts at the Old Bailey, some of which sat only intermittently. There are now 30 courts they are spilling over into the Royal Courts of Justice, many of them sitting in vacation. It was clear to me in 1970 that unless I could find temporary court rooms I would be faced with a breakdown in the system of criminal trials. I found a number of new court rooms: first 10, then 20, and now approximately 30, in a number of unlikely and relatively inconvenient places: the officers' mess in Wellington Barracks, Lady Astor's drawing-room in St. James's Square, the old county courts in Willesden and Croydon, makeshift courts in the Royal Courts of Justice, which had formerly been "consecrated"—if that is the right word—to divorce, and others.
In September we shall be opening the old Hans Crescent Hotel as a new "Palais de Justice" in ten courts. In the more distant future we shall erect
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something grander still in Tooley Street: 14 purpose-built courts—an increasingly rare luxury in this city. The arrears in the Provinces are largely a thing of the past, thanks in part to the machinery of the Courts Act. The average time in the Provinces between committal and arraignment is now only about eight weeks in bail cases, and about six and a half weeks in custody cases. Personally, I regard this as tolerable, although I shall try to do better. The average time in London to get a case on trial after committal is still 22 weeks—nearly half a year. That is not tolerable. In custody cases, which get priority, the average is nearly 15 weeks which, though lower, is far worse because it means that a number of people stay in prison, some of whom will be acquitted, without getting their cases on for trial. It is noteworthy that the critics of the Criminal Law Revision Committee do not mention these facts in the same breath as their criticisms. This is a pity. The London courts are still receiving more committals than they are disposing of. I suggest that a serious discussion of our problems ought to begin at this point. I have been drawing attention to the problem long before I became Lord Chancellor, since I was Opposition spokesman on home affairs. But people think that I am talking about law and order in the conventional sense, and I do not seem to get anywhere.
Last year the statistics for committals were up once more by 20 per cent., or one-fifth—again, an all-time high, on top of an all-time high, on top of an all-time high. I cannot break down this figure until the Home Office statistics come out in the summer, but I ventured to say at Teesside a fortnight ago that if this continues indefinitely the judicial system will ultimately break down—and so it will. The yearly increases in the number of cases coming before the Crown courts would have already brought about a breakdown but for three factors. The first is the additional court rooms that I have referred to; the second is the Courts Act 1971, and the third is an unprecedented increase in the number of judicial appointments. Since the summer of 1970 I have been responsible for 162 full-time appointments and 381 part-time appointments at Crown Court level. Obviously a part of that is wastage—104 permanent appointments and 200 part-time appointments were additional to

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what can be accounted for by wastage. They cannot go on for ever, yet still the increase in cases for trial continues.
I think I can claim that I have got by without in any way dropping the standards set me by my predecessors, although the pressure on the Bar has been such that I have been in danger—and I have been conscious of it—of denuding the Bar of experienced advocates. I have taken every means known to me of eking out judicial manpower. When I was a younger man the average number of days sitting in the county courts by county court judges was about 170. Many of them are now sitting upwards of 210, without complaint. I have been prolonging the service of some beyond the retiring age. I have appointed a number of stipendiaries to the Crown Court, and a number of solicitors and justices' clerks to be stipendiaries: nearly 30 solicitors are now sitting as recorders. Apart from wastage, I shall have to find for London alone another 14 or 15 Circuit Judges to man the courts by the autumn. People must realise that they are facing a serious problem, and talk about it in a rational way.
Now I want to look at some remedies, some suggested in the Report, and some suggested from other sources. Two facts are quite clear. First, the length of jury trials has increased over my lifetime. Even seven years ago an Old Bailey trial averaged 17 hours of court time; and a court day is about five hours. The average now is between 22 and 23 hours. I have gone into this, and this statistic cannot be explained by the existence of a few very long cases. Moreover, it is the case, as we all know, that a jury trial takes anything up to twice as long as a trial before a judge alone. This has been demonstrated beyond peradventure in the civil courts.
My Lords, I am very anxious not to be misunderstood: I have never advocated, and I am not advocating now, the abolition or truncation of trial by jury in the general run of criminal cases. Its virtues can be exaggerated, but its vices can be exaggerated, too. But at least in my experience it is a safeguard to which we should hold. But what I ask is whether all the cases which in fact go to juries ought to do so. I am also going to ask whether some of the rules of
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evidence and procedure which we have evolved over the years are still rational, or whether they are nothing more than the survivors of a state of affairs that has now disappeared. I can only repeat that I am not concerned at the moment with results; I should still be asking these questions if the results were exactly the same, but I hope I could show that, by more rational procedures, we could achieve a higher disposal rate. I must say in passing that the research document to which the noble and learned Lord referred—the Oxford research—does suggest, alas! that a plausible liar with previous convictions stands a better chance of getting off in front of a jury than perhaps he should; and that is the second of their conclusions translated into plain English. I am not prepared to accept that the rights of the innocent necessarily involve the adoption of artificial or irrational arbitrary rules or time-wasting procedures.
Let me give some examples. Less than a week ago, I think, an experienced circuit Judge wrote to me that
"upwards of 50 per cent. of the time taken up by trials in the Crown Court is in respect of cases which should be tried in magistrates' courts ".
That is a quotation. It is not the only letter I have had from circuit Judges to this effect; a great number have written to me to this effect because last autumn I had to write to them asking them to put in more time. The judge I have quoted from mentioned the breathalyser cases, and I take this as typical of some kinds of motoring offences like dangerous driving—in my opinion well within the capacity of magistrates, who already try the great majority of them anyway. Basically, the only question to be tried in a breathalyser case is a question of scientific measurement: how much alcohol a man has in his blood. Owing to the quite extraordinary way in which the Act has been drafted there are a number of peripheral questions of fact which can give rise to complicated questions of law. If the case goes to a jury this means of course that the accused has the bonus chance of a possible misdirection by the Judge. In none of the cases is prison seriously in question, although the licence is, and in the small minority which are exceptions there is the option of trial on indictment or committal for sentence. But what is there left for a jury to try?

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Let me give an example of a case which some of my noble and learned friends on the Cross-Benches and I heard by way of appeal not long ago. The undisputed facts as they reached us were that the defendant had been driving through the streets of a built-up area on the wrong side of the road at 60 miles an hour, with twice the permitted amount of alcohol in his blood. I may say that the quantity of alcohol in the blood, and the fact that he had been driving in that area with it in his blood, were not disputed by him at any stage of the proceedings. It was the only thing he did not tell an untruth about. So he insisted on his right to trial by jury—small wonder, because he did not have to pay; he got legal aid. He told a lying story which was not relevant to the essential facts and was disbelieved by the jury, who convicted him. He then raised a point on the summing-up which raised a difficult point of law and took him up successively, at the public expense, to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The only questions of fact which needed to be tried could have been disposed of by magistrates in under an hour. I do not quarrel with the result—he was in fact convicted all the way up—but I am entitled to ask: Is this really a serious way of dealing with a case such as that in conditions like those which I have been trying to describe?
Or take the much more difficult and controversial question of trivial thefts, shoplifting and the like. I am told that at the Old Bailey last year a day and a half was taken trying the case of a man attempting to steal one milk bottle. I cannot quarrel with the result because I do not know what the result was, but it is the kind of case which is tried literally by the thousand in the magistrates' courts with both sides' consent. If a defendant thinks that he has been wrongly convicted by magistrates, lie is then entitled to a complete rehearing by way of appeal in front of the Crown Court Judge and probably two magistrates. But why, I ask, is it obviously necessary to take 12 men from their business and have the whole paraphernalia of a jury trial, costing £750 a day, when people are having to wait in prison for 15 weeks to have more serious cases disposed of? And ask any honest or competent man, if he were really innocent, whether he would not be content to
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be tried by an experienced bench, with an unlimited right of appeal to the Crown Court, rather than by a jury from whose verdict there is virtually no appeal, as the noble and learned Lord reminded us, and with possibly a maximum fine of £5 in question.
As I say, I am not suggesting that the right of trial by jury should be taken away. It exists, and it exists in the cases I have been mentioning not because of Magna Carta but because Parliament in its wisdom has allowed magistrates to impose a prison sentence of over three months, which they practically never do. It is right for consideration as to whether the range of magistrates' jurisdiction should not be further extended as it has been in the past.
Or let me take a much more difficult case—and it raises a rather different point, but on the same subject—the increasing number of long fraud cases which come before the Crown Courts, particularly the Central Criminal Court. Some of them last six months or more. Most involve the meticulous examination of documents—not infrequently 2,000 or 3,000 different documents; in a recent case over 6,000 different documents. Most involve the careful inspection of accounts—double entry accounts. Sometimes there are two or more sets of these, one honest, which gives the true account of the business and was not intended to be seen, the other inaccurate and allegedly dishonest, said to have been concocted for the purpose of deceiving creditors of the Revenue or Customs and Excise or Exchange Control.
My Lords, I know I am going to be told that in the end the question is a simple one—who is to be believed, who is honest and who dishonest?—and I shall be told that that is precisely the kind of question juries are best able to answer. That may be so, but I simply ask the House to consider two points. First of all, put yourself in the position of the jury, soon to be drawn straight off the voting list. It is one thing for a working man, I suppose, to give up a week of his time, or for a housewife to give up a week of hers, but it is another thing to ask them to give up six months to try a case they find difficulty in following. And ask yourselves the question, how can a jury be expected to arrive at a correct conclusion about who is to be believed, when they cannot really familiarise themselves

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with the accounting concepts about which the rival statements have been made, and whether, if they can, they are more likely to be right than another tribunal—let us say, a judge and two laymen, who have to give reasons for their decision, which a jury do not have to give, and from whom there would be an unlimited right of appeal, as in a civil case. Ask oneself which one would one prefer to be tried by. I do not think the answer is obvious, and I do not think it ought to be scouted as an attempt to erode the fundamental liberties of the subject because I have raised it.
Let us now look at some of the rules of evidence and procedure, with Bentham's eyes if we can recover them, remembering the kind of danger which the rules were intended to avert. The rules were devised by judges at a time when a prisoner could not give evidence on his own behalf —he could not do so until 1898, if my memory is right; he could not call his wife, his partner or his brother as a witness in his defence. In felony, although he was entitled to counsel, the counsel could only argue points of law. He could not appeal at all from the verdict of the jury, however inadequate the summing-up might be—and in some cases and until the middle of the nineteenth century and later they were sometimes virtually non-existent. He was at the mercy of a Titus Oates or a common informer paid by the results of his evidence. There was no disciplined police. I ask the House, is it likely that all the rules designed to mitigate the severity of that kind of artificial situation are really of contemporary value to protect the rights of the innocent at the present day, when we have moved into an era of rational evidence and discussion?
English law has progressed from mystification to rationality, although I must say at a depressingly funereal pace. It has moved from a discussion of competence of witnesses, admissibility of evidence, to the question of reliability, relevance, probative value and the weight to be attached to different bits of evidence—but, oh, so slowly! The first thing I think your Lordships have to make your minds up about is whether you trust a jury as a tribunal of fact. The Bar Council says it does. So did Bentham, I think, and so do I. But if
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you trust the jury as a tribunal of fact, why cannot it be allowed to decide for itself questions of weight and relevance, or probative value in accordance with the ordinary canons of logic and common sense and not by a series of artificial lawyer constructed rules?
What about the so-called right of silence? Of course Bentham was in favour of the right of silence, and so am I, if by that we mean that nothing can be done or might be done to a man who refuses to speak. But, surely, all the behaviour of an accused person who is confronted with a charge is something which the tribunal of fact is entitled to consider in the context of the other evidence. Take a man—and for this purpose I am not inventing, I am reminiscing—who is accused of incest with his daughter. His wife comes to him with the weeping child and tells him what she has learned. To use the language of the Bar Council he is entitled to say to her:
"In this country, a person is innocent until proved guilty. If you think I have committed an offence, prove it. I do not wish to be interrogated. I wish to seek advice. I do not intend to answer any questions until you tell me what your case against me is."
I submit that a man so accused would have every right to say this or, more literally, he would have every right to remain entirely silent. But how artificial can you get in maintaining that if counsel, or the judge, or, worse still, the jury, discuss with candour the possible reasons for his silence they are depriving him of one of his fundamental liberties?
Obviously there are many explanations for silence. Some of them may be innocent, some of them may be guilty, but which is to apply in a given case is surely a matter for discussion by the tribunal of fact. But, apparently, according to the critics, discussion in front of the tribunal of fact is to be either taboo or artificially restricted. If the accused blushes, if he appears confused, if he hangs his head, if he makes inconsistent statements, that is all right: it is evidence against the accused or, arguably, evidence in his favour. But if he says nothing, apparently the jury are to adopt an attitude towards his silence which they would never adopt in the conduct of their family or business affairs.

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I had always thought that one of the advantages of having juries was that you could apply common sense to important and disputed questions of fact. The main object of some lawyers seems to me to provide artificial criteria which would not be applied anywhere except in the strained atmosphere of a court. I agree with the Bar Council—and here again I quote—that
"the great majority of people who fall foul of the criminal law or who are suspected of doing so are inarticulate or weak or fearful, or inadequate or deprived".
But these are just the people who talk naturally when confronted with an accusation. They do not remain silent. They do not say: "In this country a person is innocent until he is proved guilty". They are precisely the people who do not get the benefit of the rule. What I am pleading for is not an adverse decision against accused persons but a breath of fresh air, a little more common sense and a freeing from artificiality.
I must say with the Court of Criminal Appeal—because they said so in 1967—that the present law is devoid of common sense. Perhaps I should quote their own words.
"It seems pretty plain"—
said the court—
"that all the members of that jury, if they had any common sense at all, must have been saying to themselves precisely what the learned judge said to them".
They then said that what the learned judge said to them was a misdirection, and went on to say:
"The line dividing what may be said and what may not be said is a very fine one, and it is perhaps doubtful whether in a case like the present it would be even perceptible to the members of any ordinary jury".
What we are saying is that judges have got to go on telling the jury things which would not be perceptible to any ordinary member of it. If the accused fails to give an account of his conduct, or fails to give it until the last possible moment, the judges can tell the jury that they can take into account his silence when considering the weight to be attached to his evidence in court, but they may not tell the jury that the jury might think it odd in the context, or even incredible if he were innocent, if he did not venture an explanation at all. This is what we are asked to defend.
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That brings me to the question of previous convictions and bad character —perhaps the most contentious question of all. I think it is worth while emphasising that the status quo is not that evidence of bad character is inadmissible, nor yet that it is. Whether, in a given case, it is admissible or not under the status quo is an extremely complex question. The statutory provisions are not few; decided cases are extremely numerous and not always easy to reconcile. The effect, of course, is that there are numerous misdirections. I should have thought there was a clear case for rationalisation.
Let us remember for a brief moment the recent case of Graham Young. It will be familiar to the House. Again one does not quarrel with the verdict which was given, but the jury who convicted were kept in ignorance of a record of six or seven previous convictions. This enabled the defendant to put forward a plausible defence—and it was plausible. It might have succeeded, but unfortunately for him he had kept a diary. That diary was found and was used in evidence against him. But supposing he had not kept a diary or had destroyed it, or the police had not found it—are we really happy that the protection of the innocent demands that such a jury should be kept in ignorance of certain facts?
I did a criminal appeal about four years ago about a man who was convicted of attempting to rape his daughter, aged 14 or 15. What the jury did not know was that 12 months before he had been found guilty of a sexual assault upon the same girl. So the girl had to go into the witness box. She had to relive and repeat what had happened. She was cross-examined severely by counsel as to whether she had been guilty of the most appalling misbehaviour, with perjury to boot, and the police who gave evidence were subject to similar cross-examination. Of course after the cross-examination it was arguable that the judge might have let the conviction in—the rules of our game are as complicated as that—but only then as to credit, and in fact he did not do so. It is a very difficult point. The jury convicted, but is the House really satisfied that human and civil rights were really protected in this remarkable way?

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Take hearsay. Here may I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, that hearsay is something which excludes evidence for the defence as well as for the prosecution, although I must admit quite candidly that I conducted a murder defence not all that long ago in which I spent about 30 minutes of my time introducing hearsay evidence without any objection from either the prosecuting counsel or the judge! It may, of course, be highly undesirable to introduce evidence of hearsay when the witness is available and ought to be cross-examined. Sometimes what is technically hearsay is far more convincing than oral testimony: business records, for example; or the maker's number on the chassis of a car. Parliament acted on that in 1965. There were further statutory provisions in 1967 and some of the Committee's suggestions were referred to with approval by my noble and learned friend.
Take also confessions. Consider this, which is a reported case of murder. It originated in a court-martial, but that fact is immaterial because the law applicable is the same. A soldier was murdered by one of his comrades. The troops were paraded, and the sergeant major, perhaps rather naïvely, said he would not let them go off parade until the guilty man confessed. Whereupon, he did! He stepped forward—he was a man named Smith—and before the whole parade he voluntarily confessed that he had stabbed his comrade. The court convicted, but the Appeal Court quashed the conviction, not on the basis that the man was innocent, not indeed on the basis that the confession was not reliable, but on the basis that it had been obtained by a threat. Such is the law which the critics of the Committee wish to maintain in its unblemished purity. I submit that in the absence of real oppression the value to be attached to a confession should have been left to the tribunal of fact.
That really concludes what I have to say in rather a long speech, but I want to end with two general observations. A great deal of criticism, not always very good-humoured criticism, has been levelled at the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report. The Committee was composed of, I think, fourteen extremely eminent gentlemen. Most of them are
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known to me as enlightened, experienced, intelligent gentlemen; at least as enlightened, at least as intelligent and at least as experienced as most of their critics. In my view, they have not been given justice and have not been thanked enough for the work they have put in. They have drawn attention to an extremely complicated, obsolete and unintelligible field of the law which is urgently in need of rationalisation and reform, and the present state of which has a distinct bearing on the current prevalence of crime. They have established, I believe beyond peradventure, that things cannot be left as they are, and in my view there is no field more urgently in need of reform.
We hear a great deal about the rights of the accused, but what are they? The right of an innocent man is to be acquitted. That is an unqualified right. It is an absolute right. It is sometimes said that every acquittal involves a miscarriage of justice, and, rhetoric apart there is a sense in which that is true because if the accused man is innocent he has been put in peril; if he is guilty, justice has been baulked of its objective. We are told, and of each accused we rightly insist, that a man is innocent until proved guilty. But in dealing with the rights of a whole series of accused one cannot always make the same assumptions. All are subjected to some restriction. Some who are ultimately acquitted are deprived of their liberty altogether while awaiting trial and must be assumed to be innocent in such a condition. What is wanted is a system that will guarantee acquittal for the innocent and protect the guilty from oppression—two quite different objectives. I do not think that anyone, if he thinks about it, will doubt this.
But what is really under discussion is whether the methods by which traditionally we seek to obtain the objective are rational or efficient. I am of the opinion that at present they are neither, and therefore I am not content with things as they are. Without committing myself to a single one of the Committee's proposals as they stand, I consider that the subject has not so far had a fair ventilation, and that is what I wish to obtain in the relatively short time available to us before we shall have to act.
5.22 p.m.
LORD FOOT: My Lords, I am sure that I enjoy the sympathy of the House in taking part in the debate at this stage. To begin with, I speak immediately after the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, who always sets a high standard to follow. He was preceded by two former Lord Chancellors. What makes it almost calamitous from my point of view is that to speak immediately following me is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, who will be making his maiden speech, and I know that the whole House is waiting to hear him. The reason why I am taking part from these Benches is that we do not happen to have a spare ex-Lord Chancellor in our diminished Party. Indeed, we do not have very many senior members of the Bar.
My Lords, I intend to be brief, and if I am not entirely a layman I am very near to being one. On the other hand, I feel that laymen should take part in this debate because, as we are some way into what is bound to be a long discussion, I suggest that the proposals which have been made in the Committee's Report and which are contained in the Committee's draft Bill will be a matter of high contention and argument—and rightly so—for months, and perhaps even years, to come. It is vital that we should get this matter right, and I suggest that we may refer to this debate as being the opening shot, the preliminary skirmish, in what is likely to be a long and momentous debate.
There is one point on which I think we can all agree and which should be made clear at the outset. It is that the major proposals in this context which are contained in the Report are not, in my view, concerned with legal technicalities —with what can properly and helpfully be said in a criminal court. I hope that the debate of these great questions will not develop into a lawyers' wrangle. We must remember that there are two fundamental issues involved in the proposals in this Report which are of consequence to every member of the community. The first, I suggest, is the quality of justice dispensed in the courts of this land, and the second is the fact that some of the proposals of the Committee raise issues of great constitutional importance as to the relationship between the State and the individual and between the human being
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and the law enforcement agencies. These are matters of concern to every man, woman and child in the community.
I digress briefly from that aspect to comment on the quality of justice, following on what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said about his anxieties over the overloading of the courts and the possibility of transferring more cases into the magistrates' courts, so relieving the burden on the Crown Courts. I am afraid that one of the objections to transferring more criminal matters into the hands of the magistrates is that the quality of justice dispensed in the magistrates' court is not so good as that which one gets in the Crown Court. To put it another way, anyone who is charged with an offence, whether he be guilty or innocent, has a better chance of establishing his innoncence if he goes to the higher court. I say that not in any way to criticise the quality of the magistrates, be they lay or stipendiary; nor do I criticise the magistrates' clerks or magistrates' courts as such.
If one decides to elect to be tried by a jury one has great advantages. First of all, one knows exactly the case one has to meet, because the depositions have been put in at the committal. This is an enormous advantage. I have always thought that the task falling on a solicitor in defending a client in a magistrates' court on a charge of any seriousness or complexity is far more onerous than the task which falls to learned counsel when the case goes to the Crown Court. In the lower court, the defending solicitor does not know what case he has to meet. As a result, he cannot cross examine a witness in the knowledge of what the next witness will say. He has no time to prepare the submissions which he may make to the Bench at the end of the day. All these things are a great disadvantage. I therefore urge on the noble and learned Lord that we should hesitate before transferring to the magistrates' courts cases which seriously affect the reputation and livelihood of people, however small the amount of money that may be involved, lest the quality of justice which they get from the magistrates' court is, in the nature of things, less than that which they will get from the superior court. I have been diverted into making this point because I think the noble and learned Lord would misunderstand the opposition which his suggestion has aroused if he

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thought that the matter about which I have spoken is not a very serious element in the argument.
My main purpose in intervening in the debate is to draw attention to only one aspect of the Committee's Report and draft Bill. For about 150 years in every criminal trial before a judge and jury there has been one requirement laid on the judge when he comes to sum up the case to the jury. It is that he shall always tell them that it is the business of the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt and that it is not the task of the accused to prove his innocence. In appropriate cases there is another injunction which the judge is required to give to the jury as to how they should sift the evidence and reach their conclusion; that is, that they are not to make any adverse inference because it has been given in evidence that at some earlier stage the accused—whether when he was being interrogated by the police, when he was being charged, or when he was being committed for trial by the magistrates' court—remained silent. If either of those injunctions and instructions is omitted in any criminal case, it is almost inevitable, such has been the state of the law for one hundred or two hundred years (I should perhaps qualify that by saying that such has been the state of the law since we had a Court of Criminal Appeal): that the conviction will be quashed and upset because of the failure to give the direction.
It seems to me that the seriousness of the proposals which are made in Clause 1 of the draft Bill, and in the sections of the Report related to Clause 1, constitute a serious breach in those two propositions or principles which have so long been a hallowed part of our legal system. Those two principles are intertwined; the principle that the prosecution must prove its case and it is not for the accused to prove his own innocence, and the principle that a man cannot be convicted as a result of the fact that he remained silent at some stage before he reached his trial. It is precisely because the two principles are intertwined, and precisely because the burden of proof remains always with the prosecution, that the prosecution cannot rely upon the silence of the accused in support of their case. If the prosecution relied in support
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of their own case upon the fact that the accused had remained silent at some earlier stage, it would be tantamount to saying: "If you are innocent, why have you not sought to prove it?"; or, "If you are innocent and were innocent when you were earlier charged, why did you not protest your innocence at that stage?". Is it not perfectly clear that the "right to silence", so-called, is an integral part of the general rule that it is the business of the prosecution to prove their case?
What does Clause 1 propose in this regard? I suggest that it proposes that these ancient safeguards—which we have heard recited at every criminal case we have attended before a judge and jury; these hallowed principles that judges have been compelled to tell to juries, on peril of having the verdict upset—should be breached and that these elementary propositions, as they have for so long been regarded, should be revised and in some senses reversed. The reason I say that they are being breached is because what Clause 1 provides is that the failure of the accused person at any stage prior to his trial to disclose a fact upon which he later relies, that being a fact which he might reasonably have been expected to disclose, can be counted to his disadvantage and an adverse inference drawn. Is that not in fact the abrogation of the right of silence?
One of the remarkable things about the Committee's Report is that the Committee want to deny that they are saying any such thing. The reference is at paragraph 28, and the footnote to it, where the Committee say:
"The suspect will still have the 'right of silence' in the sense that it is no offence to refuse to answer questions or tell his story when interrogated; but if he chooses to exercise this right, he will risk having an adverse inference drawn against him at his trial1."
Then the footnote says:
"In relation to the trial the 'right of silence' enjoyed by the accused means that the prosecution have the burden of proving his guilt, that he may refrain from giving evidence and that the prosecution may not comment on his omission to give it. Under our proposals discussed in paragraphs … comment on the omission will be allowed and it will be permissible to draw adverse inferences from it. We do not propose to weaken in any way the principle that the prosecution have the burden of proving the guilt of the accused: in fact our proposals discussed in paragraphs … are intended to strengthen this principle in one respect."

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I am mystified by that statement, my Lords, because I do not understand how it is sensible to say that a man has a right if he can exercise it only at his peril. It does not seem to make any sort of sense to say to somebody, "You are not obliged to say anything; you are perfectly entitled to remain silent. But woe betide you! if you do." That is even more so when a man comes up at the court tried and is told: "You are perfectly entitled to refrain from giving evidence; that is your legal, constitutional right. But if you do, it may be the worse for you." I do not understand in what sense it can be reasonably said that a right is being retained if that right can be exercised only—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I put a question to the noble Lord at this point? He has practised at the law probably as long as I have. He knows as well as I do that in practice if an accused does not give evidence, the jury does take it against him. In these circumstances, the judge is very severely limited as to what he may or may not say, and prosecuting counsel is altogether debarred from commenting. But does the noble Lord not think that when the fact, as every lawyer knows, is that his chances of acquittal are dropping like a stone if he exercises that right, somebody—perhaps his own lawyer in private but if he has none then somebody else—might warn him of the fact?
LORD FOOT: My Lords, I am not quite sure that I take the noble and learned Lord's point. Of course it is true—and I accept it—that if to-day somebody decides not to go into the witness box, even if he is not brought up under this new procedure and asked: "Are you going to give evidence or are you not?", the jury may well draw an adverse inference. I do not dispute that. What I do object to is what may happen if a person is told, "You are not under any obligation to give evidence." He is told: "You can do one of three things: you can remain silent; you can make a statement, or you can go into the witness box and make a statement on oath. Of course, the jury perhaps will not attach so much importance to an unsworn statement as to a sworn one." In those circumstances, if he decides that he will not be put on
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oath a jury may very naturally draw an adverse inference. But is it right that when he has been told that he is not obliged to give evidence the judge, or anybody else, should seek to emphasise the adverse inference which the jury may draw of their own accord? You cannot in one breath say to a man, "Here is a right", and in the next moment say, "You would be foolish to exercise it."
Another foundation stone, as I have always understood it, of legal procedures in criminal cases, which, as I think, is being overturned by the proposals of the Committee, is the old rule that no evidence can be received of a statement made by a suspected or charged person which is the result of a threat or an inducement. The cases, of course, are full of examples of the sort of inducement that the law has in mind. If a person in authority says to a man when he is interrogating him, "Look here, it would be better for you if you told me the truth, if you talked", that may be held to be an improper inducement and result in the evidence being excluded. It is in this context that it seems to me that the new form of caution which is proposed by the Committee is important and relevant. It is set out in paragraph 44 of the Committee's Report, and perhaps I may quote it because it has not been quoted yet.
What the Committee propose is that when a man is being interrogated by the police, or indeed, as I understand it, by any other person with authority to ask questions, he shall be addressed in this fashion:
"You have been charged with …"
or he may be told that he may be prosecuted for a particular offence—and then the caution goes on:
"If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your defence in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you hold it back till you go to court, your evidence may be less likely to be believed and this may have a bad effect on your case in general. If you wish to mention any fact now, and you would like it written down, this will be done."
It seems to me that if that recommendation were adopted we should be taking something which has always in the past been regarded as thoroughly repugnant, something which is likely to lead to miscarriages of justice, and we should be elevating it and giving it the blessing and approval of society; in other words, we should be giving our blessing to the use

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of inducements to enable accused persons to make statements and make confessions. That seems to me to be an extraordinary reversal of what historically has been the situation in this country.
My Lords, I conclude by saying this. My primary concern here has been to try to make clear what is proposed, or what I think is the significance of these proposals, in this one field of the right to silence. I feel that the Committee have been really very modest in the way in which they have presented this Bill for our consideration. They have presented it in very modest terms, as if indeed it was little more than a sort of tidying up process. What could be more harmless, for example, than what I think is called the Long Title or the Preamble to the draft Bill, which reads in this way:
"Draft of a Bill to amend and, in part, restate the law of evidence in relation to criminal proceedings; to amend section 129C of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 …"
—about which I am glad to say we have heard nothing this afternoon—
"… and for connected purposes".
Who would believe that a draft Bill passing under such a soothing introduction is in fact a Bill which overturns some of the most honoured and hallowed institutions and procedures in this country! If one looks at the front of the Report and reads the names of the Lords Justices, the High Court judges, the academics, the Director of Public Prosecutions, it is like an Establishment list. I suggest that these noble and learned gentlemen are far too modest, and in point of fact they are a bunch of revolutionaries.
5.45 p.m.
LORD SALMON: My Lords, I rise with acute trepidation to face the ordeal of addressing your Lordships' House for the first time. My only consolation is that I know of the friendly indulgence with which your Lordships always treat anyone who finds himself in the daunting position in which I now stand.
I should like to begin by expressing my thanks and paying a tribute to the exceptionally able and distinguished members of the Law Revision Committee for the enormous care and industry with which for the last seven and a half years they have prepared their Report and
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the draft Bill annexed to it. I am happy to welcome and express my respectful agreement with many of the very useful, though comparatively minor, recommendations contained in the Report. I am sad that many of its major recommendations are such that I find it impossible to accept them, nor indeed to do other than totally oppose them. This saddens me because of my deep regard for the members of the Committee, many of whom are my friends, some close personal friends. My only consolation is that none of these major recommendations which I would oppose is unanimous, and therefore presumably there are at any rate some members of the Committee who may agree with some of the criticisms which I shall offer for your Lordships' consideration.
My Lords, the law of evidence is necessarily technical, perhaps dull—at any rate, hardly pulsating with human interest. But the issues raised by this Report go far beyond the realm of arid technicalities; they go to the very roots of British justice, which as it now exists commands the respect and admiration of the whole civilised world. It has a reputation, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, of which we in this country have always been justly proud, and which I am sure we are determined to preserve: and may I make it plain that it is obvious that the members of the Law Revision Committee are just as anxious to preserve it as anyone else. The principles upon which our system of justice rests are well known, generally accepted and have hitherto never been threatened. My Lords, they are threatened now, not, of course, intentionally, but nevertheless in my view really threatened by some of the recommendations contained in this Report.
I do not apologise for very briefly restating what these principles are. Every man is presumed to be innocent until, after a fair trial, he is proved by reliable evidence to be guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. The purpose of the law is to ensure, so far as is humanly possible to do so, that no innocent man shall be convicted. We accept, therefore, that it is better that 10 guilty men should go free than that one innocent man should be found guilty. I hope that I shall not be thought rhetorical or emotional if I say that in my view these are the pillars

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of freedom without which individual liberty would wither and die.
The fact that I recognise that, under our law, the accused have these inalienable basic rights, does not mean that I do not equally recognise the rights of those who are victims of crime. Indeed, a long time ago—I think it was as long ago as 1958—it fell to my lot to say at the Old Bailey that every man has the right to walk our streets in peace with head erect and free from fear, and that that was a right which our courts would unfailingly uphold. A modern footnote may read that "streets include the undergrounds, and that a man has an equal right to feel safe in his house, his shop, his office, his warehouse or bank, or wherever else he earns his daily bread or takes his ease. I certainly fully share the general deep concern on account of the enormous rise in the incidence of serious crime. It increases at an even faster pace than inflation, and the problems of how to contain either seem to be equally intractable. But I am convinced that the answer is not devaluation; certainly not the devaluation of British justice which, however unintentionally, would in my view inexorably follow if some of the major recommendations in this Report were to be adopted.
I have perhaps the temerity to challenge the whole philosophy lying behind these recommendations; namely, that the rising wave of serious crime can somehow be stemmed by a relaxation of the safeguards which we have built up over the generations to ensure that the innocent shall go free. There is not a vestige of evidence to support this philosophy, and I would invite your Lordships to reject it. I am convinced that the comparatively minute proportion of guilty men who are acquitted has absolutely nothing to do with the alarming rise in the rate of serious crime. I say this from my own experience and from the published figures, if I may bore you for a moment with my own experience during nearly seven years when I had the honour of being a High Court judge. During that time I went on every circuit in the country as judge of assize, as well as to the Old Bailey on a number of occasions. I must have presided over hundreds of criminal trials. There were not more in all that number than about half a dozen cases in which the jury acquitted when I considered
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that they ought to have convicted—and, on reflection, when I looked back on them, I came to the conclusion that at any rate as far as some of them were concerned there was a good deal to be said for the jury's point of view. A 1 or 2 per cent. wrongful acquittal of guilty men is surely a small price to ensure that the innocent should go free. In any event, those acquittals never bothered me, but I should not have slept in my bed if any innocent man had been convicted by the jury. Fortunately, that never happened.
May I say a word about the figures to which Sir Robert Mark, for whom I have great regard, has referred. He has pointed out that the published figures show that one out of two men tried by judge and jury is acquitted. I confess that I am rather sceptical about statistics. Assuming however, as I do, that these figures are correct, they are still misleading unless looked at in their context. The context which the published figures reveal, if you examine them closely, show that out of every 100 men brought to trial before judge and jury 71 plead guilty. Of the remaining 29 per cent., half are acquitted. This means that 85½ per cent. of the men brought before a judge and jury for trial are dealt with as guilty, and only 14½ per cent. escape. As any of your Lordships who may be familiar with racing will immediately recognise, that means that the odds are at least 7 to 1 against any man who is brought to trial being acquitted. These are not very tempting odds for a prospective criminal. Compare those odds with the far higher odds of a criminal, guilty of serious crime, escaping detection and arrest. It is the detection rate, in my submission, not the conviction rate which may well be one of the causes of the increase in serious crime, although no one can blame the police, who do magnificently with the exiguous numbers and material now at their disposal. The odds against a guilty prisoner escaping are far greater than 7 to 1, unless one assumes that all the 14½ per cent. who are acquitted must, in reality, be guilty because they have been charged. That would be a shocking assumption. In some countries, of course, the courts are the creatures of the Executive, and if there is a prosecution a conviction almost inevitably follows

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after what is usually a mock trial, but in a free society that, happily, is impossible.
In my view there is no doubt that the vast majority of those acquitted in this country are, in truth, not guilty. The jury acquit because there is no evidence which would justify a conviction, or because the judge directs them to acquit. Very rarely does a jury allow a guilty man to escape in respect of serious crime such as murder, robbery with violence, protection rackets, housebreaking, mugging—or "thugging" as, in my view, it could more appropriately be called. It is the increase in serious crime which is concerning the public. The public is not unduly perturbed about the number of empty milk bottles that may be stolen, or about cars that may be parked on yellow lines. It is the increase in serious crime with which we are concerned, and I do not believe there is any evidence that any relaxation in our rules would, in any way, help in that direction.
The suspect acquittals occur mainly in the realms, for example, of motoring offences where the members of the jury sometimes say, "There but for the grace of God go I", or in fraud cases where the prosecution has been so overloaded or unnecessarily complicated that, in the end, the jury is left in a fog. The laws of evidence, the criminal procedure, are not responsible for acquittals such as those, still less for any rise in crime. The certainty of detection is generally recognised to be the best deterrent, and the odds against a criminal being arrested for a serious crime—I am not counting the milk bottles or the yellow lines, where the odds are about "evens"—are about 10 to 1 against, and in many cases much higher. It seems hardly sensible to ignore that factor, and to attribute the rise in serious crime to the fact that if a criminal is detected he has a chance—though a very slight one—of being wrongfully acquitted.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said that it is impossible to look at each of the trees. I have been looking at the wood and I do not intend to examine the trees. I cannot deal with all the recommendations which are not unanimous and with which I do not agree, but I should just like to mention two as an example. I am no more wedded to all the technical rules, excluding
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hearsay, than some of the noble and learned Lords sitting near me, and I welcome the relaxation of some of these rules proposed in the Report. But some of the recommendations in respect of these rules appal me. If A and B are charged together with committing a crime, and A makes a statement to the police which is written down and which he signs, in which he seeks to exonerate himself and throw the whole blame onto B and he sets out a lot of facts which will be evidence against B, then under the draft Bill accompanying the recommendations that statement can be put in evidence against B, without A even having been called. I say it appals me that material of that trashy kind could be received as evidence in an English court of justice. It goes further than that, because, under Clause 5 of the draft Bill, at the end of the case for the prosecution the judge then has to call upon the accused to give evidence, and has to warn the accused that if he does not give evidence the jury will be entitled to look upon his failure to give evidence as corroborating the facts set out in that piece of paper and which were written out behind his back, the signatory to which has never been called to give evidence. I think that would be terrible.
One is tempted to say that you might as well go back to the days of the French Revolution, the terror at the end of the 18th century, when someone had only to drop an anonymous note into what was then the equivalent of the police box for it to be sufficient material on which to arrest and try you, and sometimes to convict you. Believe it or not, this is the very thing that the draft Bill would allow. Any statement on any piece of paper, unsigned, where it is impossible to discover the identity of the writer, is evidence of a fact that it contains. Surely a recommendation of that sort, however well-intentioned, cannot be accepted. It is sought to be justified on the grounds of logic: it is a bad thing to exclude hearsay evidence; therefore, there is no reason why, logically, we should not admit documents such as these. But, my Lords, our law has never been built on logic alone, still less on abstract academic theory. It has been built on common sense and experience, and on that sense or instinct for what is just, which is innate in our people. Whatever the logical argument may be, I suggest that all the

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other factors to which I have referred, which your Lordships may think are even more important than abstract logic, show strongly that material such as I have been speaking about ought never to be admitted as evidence in our courts.
The only other matter to which I want to refer is in respect of the relaxation in the rule that normally keeps a man's past record from the jury, because, again, experience has shown that it usually has a prejudicial effect. According to the Report, this clause caused more dissention within the Committee than almost any other. In the end, they came to a compromise, but it was a compromise which some of the members—we do not know how many—would have nothing to do with. It purports to codify the common law as it is, and also to relax it. Subsection (2) of Clause 3 is said to be codification, but it is in truth, in my judgment at any rate, a considerable expansion of the law if it means what it says. It says that evidence can be brought against a man accused of a crime if it shows,
"(a) a disposition to commit that kind of offence in a particular manner or according to a particular mode of operation resembling the manner or mode of operation alleged as regards the offence charged".
My Lords, there are, unfortunately, many housebreakers about and they operate in different ways. Some get into a house by breaking or forcing a downstairs window; some favour skeleton keys, others the cat-burgling methods. Each method (and there are many others) has its own devotees—hundreds of them. If that clause were put into operation, consider not only the injustice that might be done but the terrible temptation that would be put in the way of the police, the vast majority of whom would resist it but some of whom might not. Suppose someone has broken in and stolen in, say, Laburnum Road by forcing a downstairs window. Charlie has a good many convictions for housebreaking, and his general mode of operation is to force a downstairs window. The police are convinced—in fact, they know—that Charlie did it. That means that they strongly suspect that Charlie did it: and they may be right. But, on the other hand, Charlie may not have done it. Charlie is arrested, and when he is told what he is being charged with he strongly protests
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his innocence. The policeman says to him, "Now, Charlie, what is the good of going on like that? What chance have you got, with your record? You had better own up. It will be easier all round, and will mean a lighter sentence for you". It may be that some of the Charlies of this world, although not guilty of the particular offence charged, would plead guilty. Most would not. Then in some cases evidence would be given of highly incriminating remarks made by Charlie when he was arrested, which he would indignantly deny, and his record would go in. My Lords, what chance do you think Charlie would have? Absolutely none. The Charlies of this world know it; the police know it. I only wish that the majority of the members of the Committee which produced this Report knew it.
I want to conclude by referring to a short quotation from Doctor Manfred Simon, a distinguished French judge who gave evidence before the Committee. After saying that the proposals contained in the Report sought to introduce the features of many foreign systems into English law without incorporating the safeguards which existed in their home countries, he said this:
"The proposals seem to me to be the first timid step to dismantle the venerable fortress built by many generations of British lawyers to protect the innocent and to challenge the arbitrary action of government. It is a sad illustration of the insidious process whereby standards of even the most civilised countries can under modern pressures subtly but irresistibly be eroded".
My Lords, the only word of that I quarrel with is "irresistibly". I am convinced that there is a host of people in this country who will resist to the last, and resist successfully, any attempt to erode the basis upon which British justice stands.
6.15 p.m.
LORD REID: My Lords, I am sure that every noble Lord present will wish to join with me in congratulating my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon on his maiden speech. It is rare, I think, that we get such a forthright speech, and it is a pity it is rare. I am afraid my experience has not been so much lately as in earlier times, but it has seemed to me rare that speakers take the trouble to prune their speeches of irrelevancies; and

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that my noble and learned friend has assuredly done on this occasion. I am sure we all should wish to say to him that we hope it will not be long before we hear his voice in this House again.
My Lords, we have to approach this problem against a very sombre background. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has once again pointed out the critical situation which exists to-day, and I wholly agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon that the really critical way, the really important way, to try to combat that situation is not by amending the law but by increasing our detective force. It is remarkable that when you have a really serious crime—something that catches the public's attention—it is very rare for the criminal to escape; but when you have a run-of-the-mill crime, of violence or the like, the detection rate is low, and the inevitable inference is that if only we would spend a reasonable amount of money on increasing the police force we should achieve remarkable results. But, of course, we all know that in this country economy is always exercised in the wrong direction, and this is a typical example. We could not spend our money better than to increase the size and efficiency of the police force: instead of that we spend it on a number of things which are very much in your Lordships' minds just now, but which I will not mention.
There is no doubt that trials are getting longer; there is no doubt that a number of guilty men plead not guilty on the off-chance, because they get off far more than they used to; and nobody will say that our present system of the administration of the law is even reasonably satisfactory. Therefore one must approach the consideration of this Report with the utmost sympathy, to see whether it is going to help in any way at all. I agree that there are quite a number of relatively minor proposals which are good in themselves; but, adding them all up together, I do not think they would amount to much in the way of diminishing the time which our courts have to spend on criminal trials.
But when we come to the major recommendations, it is a very different story. I should not like to go quite so far as my noble and learned friend. I
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should not like to go quite so far as the Report of the Bar Council. Strangely enough, I find myself in unusual company, because the Report with which I agree most is that of Justice, which seems to me to be well-balanced and, on the whole, to be well worthy of consideration. But that Report makes it perfectly plain that the major proposals of the Committee are intrinsically unacceptable. Putting it in popular language, I think that this House is telling the Government this afternoon that the major proposals of the Committee simply will not do and will have to be rejected. My purpose in addressing your Lordships this afternoon is not to knock down the Committee's proposals any further, but rather to suggest that the alternative is not between accepting the Committee proposals and doing nothing. If it were, we might be in a difficult position; but it is not.
There are two ways of reforming any part of our system which is creaking. The traditional way in this country is to go bit by bit, to put a bit right here and a bit right there—something that normally is the best way, I think; although it may be called tinkering. Normally, it is the best way of approaching a problem. When you find, as I think is found here, that tinkering is not good enough—and I do not think it is disrespectful to speak of the Committee's proposals as "tinkering"—then you have to start thinking out the whole problem. It seems to me that if you look at the matter on broad lines you must start from two major considerations. The first, rightly. is that you must do nothing which will prejudice the innocent accused. You must bear in mind that an innocent accused person is often stupid, he is often slow, he is often overawed and generally nervous. The result is that he must have a fair deal. If we start thinking again from the beginning we must take as our basic test: Is this giving that kind of man a fair deal?
The second thing that we must think about is the public disquiet, which has been increasing, with regard to the operation of a few members of the police force —and the trouble is that although there are very few, one never knows who they are or what is happening in a particular case. I think that one can say that juries are becoming a little suspicious of "verbals" and things like that. So far

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as my own experience goes, many years ago now, I used to be responsible, as a Law Officer, for the conduct of criminal prosecutions in Scotland. I formed two very clear impressions, although they were not based on anything that one could call evidence. One was that the police never harassed a man who had no record—virtually never—but if a man had a record and if they were convinced that he was guilty of the offence in question, then sometimes—not very often, but sometimes—they used very undesirable methods. I have no doubt that the position is not very different to-day. Therefore, if we are to start altering the present position we must alter it in a direction which will lessen any temptation of the police to overstep the mark.
Central to the whole problem is the so-called right to silence. If we can solve that problem, the others will not be very difficult. If we apply the tests which I have suggested I do not think that the solution is so very difficult. If you are to get rid of the right to silence you must have a system. I do not believe there is such a thing as a right to silence; it is not a human right. A great deal of trouble has been caused in our controversies by theoretical approaches. You say "Oh, well, the Crown must prove its case." You make all kinds of generalities instead of looking at the vital question: Are you being lair to the accused? Instead of that, you ask whether this complies with some generality which does not matter a bit in comparison with the practical realities.
My Lords, if we take as the test fairness to an accused person, perhaps a sub-standard person of the kind I have been discussing, then why not a fair interrogation? What innocent person would ever object to a fair interrogation? The reason why the right to silence has grown up is that in past times it was impossible to be in the least sure that interrogation would be fairly done. Unless we can be sure to-day that interrogation can be fairly done we should not have it. But I suggest that we can be sure. Of course, it is unpleasant for the accused; but so is being accused, and so is appearing at a trial, and so is the whole process. But why should it be unfair? The purpose of the safeguards is not to give the guilty man a sporting chance; it is to see that the innocent man is as fully safeguarded as human ingenuity can achieve.
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If we can achieve a fair interrogation, then on what possible ground can any innocent person object? I can see none. As I say, it may be embarrassing, it may be unpleasant; but I cannot see how an accused person can possibly object if he can be assured that his interrogation is going to be entirely fair.
How are we going to do it? It seems to me that there are two vital safeguards. What I have in mind is that a week after the arrest—or it may be later, depending on the complexity of the case—there should be a formal interrogation. The man should be brought in. He can see his solicitor beforehand; or, if you like, his solicitor can be there. He should be told: "You are going to be asked questions. We cannot compel you to answer; but remember that the record of what you say will be read out to the jury and they will be allowed to draw their own conclusions". It can be commented upon if necessary, but there must be an accurate record. Therefore it will be necessary to have either a reliable tape-recorder or a shorthand writer. There must be somebody in charge of the proceedings, not necessarily a magistrate; it might easily be a panel of part-time people. Of course they would have to be paid, and perhaps it would be far better not to have one man all the time. It could be someone who need not know much about the case but would be there simply to see fair play. The police could employ counsel or a solicitor to examine the man and the tape-recorder would show whether that had been fairly done. The man or his solicitor would object if it was not. The person in charge would be there to make a report if necessary.
It is said, my Lords, that that kind of procedure might cause delay. I do not think that it would. It would save a great deal of time. It is said that it would cause expense. Of course it would. It would be elaborate, it would cost a good deal, but it would save ten times as much in the time of the court later on, because a great many people would be so shown up that they would not dare to plead not guilty. Far from being a disadvantage for the innocent man, it would be a great advantage, because his solicitor would advise him to be candid, and he would be candid. I was rather shocked to hear that in a

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certain sphere of police prosecutions 25 per cent. of them were brought although the police thought that the people were not guilty. I cannot believe that that is rife. If it is, it is extremely stupid, because the police will lose their reputation if they prosecute people they know to be innocent. I should have thought that any sensible police force would investigate what a man told them and see whether they had a case that would stand up or whether the man's story was likely to be believed, or at least sufficiently believed to raise a doubt. In many cases, if there were a proper interrogation the result would be that an innocent accused, who otherwise would have been sent for trial, would never be tried at all.
Apart from theoretical objections about a man's right to silence and the Crown having to prove its case, and so on, I have yet to hear any coherent reason why this system should not be introduced. Of course it depends on the human factor. If we cannot be sure that tape-recorders or shorthand writers are not tampered with or that the man in charge is competent, then it will not work. But I do not believe that in these modern times we cannot be sure that a system of that kind will work. It is turned down by the Committee—I think on page 28 of the Report—in the thinnest and most unconvincing argument that I have read for a very long time. It is obvious that the Committee had no sympathy whatever for that kind of thing and that they were much keener on tinkering on without a radical reform. I must say, I thought that was about the weakest passage in the whole Report. They brushed the matter aside. I agree that if the purpose of these so-called principles is to give a guilty man a chance, of course this system will not do; but if the purpose is to help the innocent man I suggest that it would be favourable to him and not the other way. Therefore I put that forward as something which ought to be very seriously considered.
My Lords, I want to make clear that in no circumstances would I support the giving of any additional questioning power to the police without those safeguards, and it seems to me that the Committee are giving additional powers to the police. I would not allow to the
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police one jot or little of additional power to question anybody beyond the power they have at present. I would not interfere, as a first step at least, with the present system down to, as I say, a period of a week after arrest, when we would have this interrogation. Let the police carry on the way they are doing at present. But, of course, if they got some statement during that preliminary period it would have to be put to the man at his investigation. It would then be so fresh in the minds of everybody that it would be much more difficult for the police to get away with a false statement and much easier for the accused man if he denied it straight away. I should think that the temptation to the police to misbehave at an earlier stage would be greatly lessened if there was a formal interrogation of this kind at a pretty early stage after a man is arrested. But the one thing I want to make perfectly clear is that in my view any increase in powers to the police beyond what they have at present would be absolutely dependent on a proper system of safeguards being introduced, and not one tittle would they get without it. I think that is the general view of all the critics.
My Lords, I do not think I need to elaborate the matter any more; I do not want to speak for too long. But I think that your Lordships would find there would be a very considerable saving in judicial time; I think you would find that the crisis could be very greatly abated if we did something of that kind. But, of course, not immediately because a system of that kind could not be introduced overnight. You would need to have something like a pilot scheme. You would have to select certain areas—or certain offences might be better—in order to get the thing working. You cannot work a somewhat revolutionary system straight away without a trial period. But I do not think that is any objection. You could call it revolutionary, but I do not regard that as an objection when you are faced with such a serious crisis. I am satisfied in my own mind that nothing far short of the revolutionary kind of change that I have suggested will serve to solve the present crisis which is so much on the mind of my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack.
My Lords, there is just one other matter that I should like to mention.

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What is to happen next? I trust that the Government will put the Report aside and say, "We have got to start again". I trust that they will send the whole subject immediately to the Law Commission. It is perfectly true that up to date the Home Office has been traditionally interested in criminal law simply because there was nobody else to do it. The Lord Chancellor had no Department worth talking about and the Law Commission did not exist. But if, as my noble and learned friend said this afternoon, the Lord Chancellor has responsibility for the administration of the criminal law, how can this be outside his bailliwick? It cannot be.
Therefore I suggest that the time has come to take this away from the Home Office altogether and give it to the Lord Chancellor and the Law Commission. It really is not right that in a matter of this kind, which affects the lives and liberties of the lieges, an executive Department should be responsible for the administration and reform of the law. It ought to be done by a legal Department. It is quite true that when you have a technical subject, involving companies or bankruptcies, you cannot help leaving that with an executive Department. But when you have a subject of general interest like this I think it a very suitable opportunity to take the matter out of the hands of the Home Office and send it to the Law Commission; and when we get it there one hopes that we can begin to make progress.
6.40 p.m.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, when two noble and learned Lords, Lord Dilhorne and Lord Salmon, confess to trepidation, I wonder to what I should confess as the first genuine layman to follow this pride of legal lions. I should like to congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, on his excellent maiden speech, particularly as I agree with it; and I hope that I shall agree with him on many future occasions.
I need not remind your Lordships that the discussions here to-day will have a resonance far beyond this Chamber and far beyond this country. This concept of justice has been the bedrock upon which judicial integrity has rested elsewhere. This was borne upon me 7,000 miles away in California, at the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, where
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I am now a Senior Fellow. One of our continuing concerns is criminal law reform in terms of law enforcement, court practices, the penal system and the erosion and abuse of justice when the apparatus of law and order becomes paramount in a frightened society. Rights become subordinate to law enforcement, and law enforcement becomes more difficult as its instruments become distrusted and feared because the individual thinks that once entangled he will have no rights. This is the alienation of the public from the police, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, referred, and which is so plainly manifest in the United States, and now, I am afraid, is also revealing itself here.
My Lords, the discussions at the Centre have been largely preoccupied with the deterioration in the United States, where the rights supposedly embodied in the United States' Constitution are being systematically betrayed. But those discussions tacitly assumed terms of reference based on British justice, and these assumptions were very badly shaken by the Report we are considering and by the draft Bill. A young British lawyer, Piers von Simpson, who had been a research assistant at the Centre and had returned to work in Britain came to the Centre to present a Paper, a critique of the Report—and one that I cannot fault after a close study of the Report—the Justice memorandum and the memorandum of the General Council of the Bar. The effect on my international colleagues, who included visiting Fellows from Eastern Europe and distinguished members of the American legal profession, including Robert Hutchins, was traumatic. To see the underpinning of the traditional standards of British justice being deliberately removed shook them; indeed, they were so shaken that nothing would have prevented me from coming back and taking part in this debate.
What are these "reforms", my Lords? First, the abolition of the caution and the reminder to the suspect of his legal rights—and the latter, at least, has been reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in the Miranda ruling. Secondly, the abolition of the right of silence, in which we now have a situation where we have the absurdity that anything you do not say may be taken down and used in evidence against you. Thirdly,

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the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Fourthly, the exposure of previous convictions to the jury. In our discussions at the Centre, when looking at the American scene, we watched the progress, and indeed the fights, on practically every one of these points; and always the assumptions were based on the solidity of British practice.
What is happening to the sacred principle that a person is considered innocent until he is proved guilty? I am not a jurist, but I have in my time been an official court reporter and a crime reporter in Scotland and in England, and I have had an on-the-job training in the rules of evidence and police practice. I say at once that I have a great deal of sympathy with the police in their difficulties in fighting crime, especially organised crime, which can afford expensive "mouthpieces"; and I know the exasperation of trying to establish evidence which will not stand up in court when the police themselves are satisfied of the accused's guilt.
But I would remind your Lordships that every innocent person who is brought to trial represents a failure of the police to do their preliminary work properly; and, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has pointed out, every acquittal is itself a miscarriage of justice—the innocent have been pilloried and the guilty have escaped trial. And the worst crime of all is the wrongful condemnation of an innocent person. We know the cases of innocent people going to the gallows, and no posthumous reversal can redeem that official crime. It is too glib and cynical to say that the Court of Appeal or a reprieve can salvage some innocent who will be condemned by the relaxed rules. And they will be condemned, my Lords, because the whole emphasis is on confirming police suspicions, clearing the police books and expediting and clearing the court calendar. Everyone admits that there is an enormous problem. It cannot be ignored and must be taken in hand. But let us be careful what we are doing in the process of trying to solve it. We may finish up, as they have in the United States, with a most deplorable practice, as I judge from the evidence I hear, of deals being done systematically between the judges, prosecution lawyers and
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defence lawyers in order to secure "guilty" pleas. This is going on, and systematically so, and so far pleas of guilty amount to about 75 per cent. of these agreed reductions in charges in order to secure a quick passage through the court.
From my experience in the courts and as a field operator in crime, I agree with those who say that the weakness of law enforcement is not in acquittals of the guilty in court but in the failure of crime prevention and crime detection before someone can be interrogated or brought to the stages covered by this Report. That failure, my Lords, will not be redeemed by the proposals being discussed. Hardened criminals or organised crime will not be deterred by these measures; the people at risk are those who are ignorant and without legal recourse. Or the implication—"disposition"—now sanctioned in the Report, which the police tend to make, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, said, that "This job has Charlie's monicker on it; he's done it before". If he is no longer to be presumed innocent, his previous record will confirm the flimsiest evidence.
Then there is this business of silence being a presumption of culpability. This in my estimation, and that of so many other speakers here to-day, is intolerable. Silence can be the helpless confusion of someone caught in an apparatus. It is like relying on the lie detector. There is a proof of guilt. Why should a "blip" on a lie detector mean guilt, when it can be just anybody's reaction to, "Why is he asking that question?"? In the same way, why should anybody be at risk because, without full knowledge of what he is suspected of, he fears that anything he says may have implications beyond his knowledge? Similarly, I can foresee the worst abuses of hearsay evidence. I also think that it can defeat its purpose. When I was a crime reporter I used to co-operate with the police, not as a quid pro quo for priviledged information, but because I and most of my crime colleagues knew the difficulties of their job. The detective in charge of an investigation would say: "We think it's him, but he's got a story we can't break because he's sly". In such cases we would separately go and interview the suspect.

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It is curious that criminals will talk to the Press rather than to the police. They think they can get money (which in my own case, beyond a glass of beer, they would not), or even just that they can "get into the papers". We would talk around his story and find the flaws and, without publishing, tell the police; but they could not use us as hearsay evidence; they had to find the evidence through the chinks we had provided. Then there is the "hearsay" referred to, where there could be systematic blackmail on the basis of hearsay evidence and you could get people being charged anonymously. I would remind your Lordships of the classic case of Leonardo da Vinci, who was charged with homosexuality in Florence simply by somebody dropping an accusation into the anonymous box outside the Palazzo Vecchio. As in all these cases, nobody ever reminds us that he was acquitted.
Without suggesting the prevalence of third degree—though I suppose most of us recognise that it exists, and I have known it to be used in spite of the Judges' Rules —I have always felt that it is invidious for interrogation to be left to the police. It is unfair to them and it encourages a distrust of the police and their methods by the public. It needs only a few "rotten apples" and some "rough-ups" and the public at large, not just those affected, begin to distrust the police.
I do not want to make invidious comparisons with Scotland, particularly in the presence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, but I have always preferred the proceedings of the procurator fiscal to those under the English system. The procurator fiscal is, after all, answerable ultimately to the Lord Advocate. He is an officer of justice and not just a law enforcement officer in the service of the police. He can get from the police the facts and the witnesses; and in taking the precognitions he examines the witnesses, but not in the presence of other witnesses. He can invoke the judicial authority of a magistrate, with consequences of contempt of court if a witness refuses to give information in his possession, provided that that information would in fact make him a competent witness at the trial. The procurator fiscal's job is to satisfy himself that this is a case to go to trial. He co-operates with the defence in the interests of justice and not
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of securing a conviction. It is not an infallible system but it has merits which I find lamentably missing from this Report, and I would add my support to anyone who suggests that while we are talking about a judiciary system we ought to be paying some attention to the procurator fiscal.
One more point: I add my voice to those who distrust tape-recordings. In terms of tape-recordings I am a paraprofessional, for broadcasting purposes, and I know how easily tapes can be doctored most convincingly. I could produce to you a suspect's incriminating silence on a tape, produced by means of a magnet, even if, as the Report suggested, you had a speaking clock. If it were in a sealed casette, I could still produce an incriminating silence. In fact, tapes can be tampered with to a great extent. I would not trust a "walking bug"—I would not trust a policeman going round with a tape-recorder concealed on him. I have no doubt at all that it would not strain human ingenuity to produce some foolproof methods, but I should be very chary of any methods which are put forward now. I certainly would not entrust any of this material even to a senior police officer: it must be in the possession of someone who could not conceivably have any motive in tampering with it. I hope very earnestly—and I bring to you the earnest concern of my colleagues elsewhere—that this debate will in fact have fumigated and decontaminated this Report.
6.56 p.m.
LORD WIDGERY: My Lords, as I listened to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, opening this debate, and as he took us through this Report, item by item, expressing approval or disapproval on each item as he came to it, I was delighted to find that I agreed with virtually every assessment he made. That means that I need not weary your Lordships tonight by making any attempt to go through the wood marking the trees in detail. In substance, I certainly agree with what the noble and learned Viscount said, and I should like to express my views in that compact fashion.
There are two or three "trees", as it were, upon which I should like to make particular comment. I very much support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, said about the suggestions

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in this Report relative to hearsay evidence. It may well be right—indeed, I think it is—that we should make some attempt to rationalise the law of hearsay; but some of the provisions in this Bill seem terrifyingly wide, as he indicated in the course of his speech. And I do not feel able to give any support to the Report in so far as it deals with this subject. Furthermore, I do not feel able to support the Report where it deals with the use of previous convictions on record. The Committee seem to have come to the conclusion that they ought to let well alone, but they failed to resist the temptation to put in some little change—and that little change seems to me to be undesirable and unnecesssary. I should be much happier on that aspect of the matter if we stuck to the common law and did not regard the situation as requiring any change at all.
I differ slightly from the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in one respect: I think the Report is going on the right lines so far as it deals with accomplices and corroboration. It certainly is going along the lines which the Judiciary has been following, and I think wisely following. A few years ago the necessity for evidence to be corroborated meant that you had half a dozen highly technical points which got in the way of getting down to the real purpose of the proceedings, which was to decide whether the accused was guilty or innocent. You had a highly technical definition of "accomplice" and all sort of troubles were possible at the trial in deciding whether or not a particular witness ought to be regarded as coming within the range of "accomplice".
There was also a highly technical definition of what was meant by "corroboration" and many pitfalls for judge and jury were presented by arguments on that. But the modern tendency is to move to the situation in which it is the duty of the trial judge to give the jury, in straightforward and preferably simple terms, a warning about any evidence for the prosecution where he thinks that the witness may have some purpose of his own to serve and where, in the trial judge's opinion, a witness should be treated with particular caution. It may be urged that that is giving too much discretion to the judge. I think not. I believe that this is a field in which we
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must be more ready to give discretion to the judge. I think it is much better in the end to have the matter decided in that way rather than for it to be confined by these rigid and highly technical rules about what is and what is not an accomplice—with all the difficulties, and sometimes the quashed convictions, which follow from some error in that sphere.
I am somewhat concerned that so many noble Lords who have spoken in this debate seem to think that this Report and the attendant Bill are really beyond repair. My noble and learned friend Lord Reid made that point very clearly, and it has also been hinted at by a number of other speakers. I think it would be a disaster if we had to regard this Report as totally ineffective and had to start again by going back to the Law Commission. I find a lot in the Bill which is unacceptable, but at the same time it seems to me there is sufficient thought there to make us see whether we cannot somehow try to build on this foundation rather than after eight years to say that it is of no value and abandon it. I am troubled lest the general public may feel that the Report is hopelessly discredited, and themselves feel that there is no point in trying to preserve it on the basis of some of the general and rather emotive criticisms which one has read in the lay Press. A phrase used more than once was that this Report "stood the common law on its head". Another phrase used more than once was that it "reversed the onus of proof in criminal proceedings". I have read the Report with such care as I can and I cannot find any justification for sweeping comments of that kind.
I should like to take a moment or two with your Lordships to look at the right to silence, to see what exactly it is and where it comes from, because those who feel (and obviously feel sincerely) that the proposed removal of the right to silence is a great death blow to our traditional pillars of common law are, in my understanding of the law, incorrect. It certainly has never been the law of England, as I understand it, that a man could not be convicted on the evidence of his silence. There is an illustration, which is known to every criminal lawyer, known as the "doctrine of recent possession", which says in the clearest terms that if a man is found in possession of recently stolen goods, and he declines to

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give an explanation as to where they came from, his guilt as a thief may be inferred from that silence. I doubt if a day passes without some judge somewhere up and down the country in a Crown Court instructing a jury on those lines.
But it does not stop there. If an outraged father, whose daughter has been assaulted, publicly accuses a man in the street of the assault, and if that man remains silent when an innocent man would speak, a jury can properly be directed that they may, if they think it right, draw an inference of guilt from his guilty silence. The common law in the main accepted the fact that silence, where there appeared to be every reason for an innocent man to speak, was capable of use as proof of guilt.
Although the books contain a few rather desultory references to the fact that a man is not bound to inoriminate himself, I was intrigued to find that my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner had to take us to the United States, and to the Miranda case for the authority he quoted this afternoon. The acceptance of any right to silence, or right against self-incrimination, in the English common law is something which I have never been able to find in any authoritative sense. The two instances where in practice the right of silence arises are too relatively modern exceptions to the common law, both brought in in the course of the past 70 or 80 years. The first one is the well known rule under Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, that if a man fails to give evidence at his trial, the judge can comment on his failure but the prosecution cannot. That is not one of the great pillars of English freedom; that is a rather odd rule which Parliament saw fit to incorporate in the Act of 1898, when it first gave the accused the right to give evidence. For reasons which we shall probably now never discover it was thought proper to say that although the judge could comment on his failure, the prosecution could not. That has remained so to this day, and that is the first place at which a man can reasonably be regarded as having a right to silence to-day, a right created by that Statute.
The other instance, which is regarded so widely to-day, has an even more unusual parentage. It is the right to remain silent under police interrogation,
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which has been referred to, with the corollary that if you remain silent you cannot have an adverse inference drawn against you. Where does that come from? It comes from the Judges' Rules, First Edition, of about 1906 or 1908. At that time the judges (with what we would now regard as considerable presumption) laid down these rules, and they provided for the giving of a caution. The caution was, to tell the man that he need not say anything unless he wished to do so. The only reason why a failure to speak does not give rise to an adverse inference is that it would obviously have been grossly unfair if the accused or suspect, having been told in terms that he need say nothing, was then caught in the trap of having an adverse inference drawn from his resulting silence. The so-called right of silence in that regard is the creation of the judges, a necessary consequence upon their having laid down that there should be a caution.
Although it has that rather peculiar and relatively modern beginning, it has been one of the major safeguards of suspects in police stations for the past 60 or 70 years. I fully recognise that and, in sympathy with a number of noble Lords who have spoken—among them my noble and learned friend Lord Reid—I would be entirely in favour of the proposition that we should not alter the Judges' Rules, take away the caution, or do anything about this aspect of the right to silence until we have provided something better to take its place.
I agree with what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Reid, that if only we could achieve a situation in which one had a guaranteed tape recording of all police interrogation, so that after the event you could hear what was said, in what tone of voice, with what inflection, and one could see precisely what the suspect did admit to, and what he did not admit to—if we ever achieved that situation all our other troubles about police interrogation would go out of the window. I am in the same mind as one of the unidentified minorities in the Report who was minded to abolish the Judges' Rules and get rid of the caution, but who said that this was not to be done until proper arrangements for tape recording had been substituted. That is the attitude I would take up, and I would do it glad to see the departure

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of the Judges' Rules, for which I have no affection at all. I will not take up your Lordships' time in explaining why I do not like them, or what their disadvantages are; they are certainly not the ideal method of protecting the suspect to-day. I would be happy to wave them goodbye if we could substitute at the same time a proper system of tape recording which would show us precisely what had happened in the course of the interrogation.
My Lords, I hope that the Report will not be wholly rejected, but will be a foundation upon which we can build. Although we all recognise that it has many defects, it would be a pity if we could not use it as a springboard to other things.
7.8 p.m.
LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST: My Lords, this important debate, for the initiation of which we owe gratitude to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has shown how difficult, or, indeed, intractable were many of the problems tackled by the Committee. The fact that there is disquiet concerning many of their proposals will not diminish our admiration of the immense services rendered by the distinguished lawyers who comprised the Committee. For my part, the more I study the Report the more impressed I am by the meticulous care which the Committee devoted to an examination of so many problems. The fact that I have many reservations, or very serious apprehensions, about some of the recommendations, does not alter my view that the Committee were throughout inspired by a desire to be fair.
We pride ourselves that it is our aim to ensure that there will be complete fairness at all stages of criminal investigations and trials. But there must not only be fairness towards any accused or suspect person, there must also be fairness towards the community, which means that in a criminal trial the right result ought to be reached. This was the approach of the Committee as set out on page 15 of their Report. They said they had
"no wish to lessen the fairness of criminal trials. But it must be clear what fairness means in this connection. It means, or ought
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to mean, that the law should be such as will secure as far as possible that the result of the trial is the right one. That is to say, the accused should be convicted if the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty, but otherwise not. We stress this, although it may seem obvious, because fairness seems often to be thought of as something which is due to the defence only."
When Her Majesty's judges assemble in Westminster Abbey at the commencement of the legal year to have a blessing upon their solemn duties, one of the prayers in reference to those duties refers to the fact that their function is to clear the innocent and to convict and punish the guilty. My Lords, note the priority, and no one connected with the Judiciary would doubt the validity of that priority. It is the aim and purpose of every judge to clear the innocent. But in the earnest effort to clear the innocent we cannot lose sight of the fact that it is in the public interest that those who are shown beyond all reasonable doubt to be guilty should be found guilty.
Recognising the serious state of affairs in regard to crime at the present time, I would not for my part relax any one of the principles which are really basic to our system. But I cannot feel that the interrogation or questioning of those who are suspect is of necessity anything unfair. Surely, the community has a right to make inquiries if a crime has been committed and when the author of a crime is being sought. No man can be compelled to speak and no man will be compelled to speak. But are there not times when no innocent man would remain silent? We all have duties to the State. We are required to disclose our personal financial affairs to the Revenue; we are required to give information at the time of a Census, and one of the paragraphs of the Judges' Rules records that citizens have a duty to help a police officer to discover and apprehend offenders.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor made reference to Jeremy Bentham, and I think in this connection it is apposite to refer to a comment cited by the Committee in their Report that Jeremy Bentham made in regard to a then rule that suspects could not be judicially interrogated. He said:
"If all criminals of every class had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes is not this the very first that they would have established for their security?"

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And Bentham went on:
"Innocence never takes advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence."
I see no reason, always provided that there are complete safeguards, why there should not be the inferences indicated in Clause 1 of this Bill. But the assurances would have to be complete, and they would cover the fact that in any questioning there should be no threat; there should be no promise; no oppression of any kind.
In order to ensure that, it would be very satisfactory if one could have various safeguards. I am contemplating questioning or interrogation not after some days in custody but at a very early date. It would be very satisfactory if you could have the presence of some entirely neutral person who could insist that all was fair. But I very much doubt whether that would practicable. Whether the neutral person was a magistrate or whether he was any well-disposed citizen, it would not be possible, I think, to have somebody available at all times of the day or night in a great many police stations.
The second safeguard I would think appropriate would be the safeguard of having recording, and though I listened with attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, said I cannot help thinking the difficulties he mentioned could be overcome. The third possible safeguard would be that a person being questioned should be able, if he wished, to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor; and now that there are the extended legal aid facilities he should whenever possible be given help to have a solicitor if he so wishes, because the cause of getting at the right result will never be impaired if there is fairness at all stages.
This leads me to the conclusion that I share the minority view expressed by the Committee on pages 30 and 31 of their Report. They said on page 30 that they considered that arrangements should be made for the compulsory use of tape recorders at police stations in the larger centres of population and that the operation of Clause 1 should be suspended until this has been done. They set out on page 33 their recommendation—it was
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the minority recommendation—in more detail, and they say that:
"the principal safeguard required is—the recording of the voices of all those concerned in an interrogation"
and—
"in the view of the minority, the operation of clause 1 of the draft Bill should be suspended until such time as provision has been made for the electronic recording of interrogations in police stations in the major centres of population. These police stations would in due course be specified in statutory instruments and statements made by suspected persons when under interrogation in a listed police station would not be admissible in evidence unless they had been recorded."
I would take the view in regard to this question of interrogation of suspects, which I do not think would of necessity involve anything unfair, that the provisions of Clause 1 of the draft Bill should not be contemplated until after some system of recordings has been deployed and until it can be seen whether a system is satisfactory.
My Lords, I propose, as the debate has been so thorough and full, to deal with only one or two other matters. May I say in passing and without elaboration that I share the alarm that has been expressed in regard to some of the proposals concerning hearsay. Then there are clauses in the draft Bill and paragraphs in the Report dealing with the subject of corroboration. I think it is a useful recommendation that in the case of a child—that is to say, somebody under the age of 14—the evidence should not be on oath. That would involve that the evidence of such a child would have to be corroborated. As to the remaining suggestions in regard to corroboration, I rather wonder whether they are now necessary. There have been recent decisions which I think have to a considerable extent clarified the law in regard to corroboration, and I wonder whether there is any real need to seek to legislate at the present time.
There is one clause in the draft Bill which suggests that where a judge is advising the jury about corroboration he should do it in the words that, "There is a special need for caution". I doubt whether it is necessary to legislate in those terms. The reasoning of the Committee was that judges had been in the habit of saying to a jury that, though they may convict where there is no corroboration, there is a danger in so doing; and

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the reason was, "Well, is it not a little strange to tell a jury that there is a danger in doing this yet tell them in the next sentence that they may do it?" But that is all a matter of the way in which the learned judge would direct a jury. The danger is the danger that is always present, of an innocent man being convicted, and it is quite easy for a learned judge, when dealing with the subject of corroboration, to stress, when he is telling the jury that they may convict if there is no corroboration, that they may do so only if they are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt.
I will just refer to one other recommendation of the Committee, of which I approve, and that is the recommendation in regard to a summing up in cases where there is disputed identification. There must be many cases where there has been disquiet because the conviction has depended upon evidence of identification. But there are different kinds of cases. There is the kind of case where a man says, "I know 'X' quite well and I saw him there on that occasion." That is merely a question of the witness's credibility and his opportunities for observation. But there may be another case where somebody says, "Well, I saw somebody leave the crowd, and do this and that"—somebody quite unknown to the defendant and maybe not seen again until the trial.
There is much to be said for attention being given to identification parades; possibly to having a photograph in court of an identification parade. But the recommendation in this clause is that where the case depends upon identification evidence the judge should warn the jury of the need to have special caution. For my part, I always take the view that it is unfortunate to impose too many compulsory obligations on a judge, that he must do this or must do that, and I can hardly imagine that in a case where so much depended upon disputed evidence of identification a judge would not direct the jury with the utmost care and point out all the differences. But, at the same time, as this is so important a matter in many trials, I think it may be useful to have the proposal that is set out in Clause 21 of the draft Bill.
I will deal with only one other topic, and that is the topic covered by Clause
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3 of the draft Bill: disposition to commit other offences. Here, as in some other matters, I share to the full the anxieties that have been expressed. I think the Committee were wise to come to the conclusion that, in general, evidence as to disposition to commit an offence should be rejected; but in subsection (2) of that clause what they have done is to seek to set out the existing law. Again I wonder whether it is necessary, and I wonder whether there are not perils in doing so. It so happens that the very same illustration occurred to me as occurred to my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon, which he mentioned in his speech. A man is charged with burglary; the allegation is that he has entered the house by going through a window on the ground floor. He has two or three convictions for burglary and has always entered the house through a window on the ground floor. I shudder at the thought that that evidence could ordinarily be given, yet on the wording of subsection (2), which is not intended to extend the law, it looks as though it could.
Subsection (4) is said to be what is called a "relaxation of the rule". I would not favour any relaxation of this rule. There are some cases—and I should have thought the law on this was reasonably clear—where, in order to prove intent or to negative a defence of accident, or in order to show that something was not entirely innocent conduct, it is possible—and rightly so—for evidence of other occasions to be given. But I would not wish to extend that law. Everything that is expressed in the phrase, "Give a dog a bad name and hang him", appeals to me very much. I believe that a man ought to be convicted only if the evidence against him shows that he has done a particular thing and not because part of the evidence is that he is a man who, because of what he has done in the past, may be likely to do the same thing again.
7.28 p.m.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, may I preface my remarks by adding my thanks to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, for giving us an opportunity to debate this matter this afternoon. On the very first occasion that I addressed your Lordships' House, which was on the Second Reading

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of what is now the Criminal Justice Act of last year, I welcomed the various proposals of that Act but said that the real deterrent to crime would be certainty of detection and conviction. I see no reason to depart from what I said then.
There is no doubt that public confidence in our criminal law, and indeed our criminal procedures, is at an all-time low. That is exemplified by the number of noble Lords who, throughout this debate, have sought ways to stop the police from behaving in a thoroughly disgraceful, and certainly illegal, fashion rather than trying to discover ways of stopping criminals. There is no doubt in my mind that a great many of our procedures are outmoded, and I can scarcely do better than quote from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who said this in a recent speech:
"A criminal trial to-day is more a test of tactics, eloquence, expertise and self control than of guilt or innocence".
If I may respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, in many of our criminal procedures and practices there is an air of artificiality. A criminal trial on some occasions, especially in the lower regions so far as the courts are concerned, before a jury, resembles more a cricket match. The prosecution goes in to bat and the defence tries to knock spots off him as he plays his evidence. Then the defendant, if he chooses to, goes into the witness box and is followed by his witnesses, and the Crown tries to do the same. The judge sits at the top, more or less seeing that fair play is observed by both parties, and at the end the result is declared. Those who have spoken to some of the people who have taken part in these trials, either defendants or more especially witnesses, are astonished by their view of much of what has taken place.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor asked why jury trials were taking so much longer these days. I suggest that one reason why they are taking longer than they took, say, seven years ago is the invention of the photostat machine. When I was first called to the Bar criminal trials were a battle of words, whereas now they are virtually a battle of paper, with endless maps, schematic drawings, schedules, lists and so on. They are immediately reduced to paper, copied
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for every member of the court, the jury, the witnesses, the defendants and all those engaged in the trial, are commented on endlessly and finally pronounced on, one assumes, by the jury in their verdict. If any adminstrative action could be taken by my noble friend or the Lord Chancellor to shorten modern jury trials it would be to abolish, or at any rate curtail, the use of the photocopier.
Though I am being somewhat facetious in this matter, I should like to approach the subject as a practitioner, or as a recent practitioner, from the point of view of the acquittal rate, something which causes so much trouble, especially among members of the public. It is not easy to obtain figures and I shall no doubt be corrected if I am wrong. The usual consensus is that in contested cases before juries the acquittal rate is in the region of 40 per cent., which I suggest is much too high. In other words, out of 100 people who plead not guilty, no fewer than 40 get off scot free. I will look briefly at the reasons for this, and I suppose that they are threefold. The first can be regarded as the changes in education and in social patterns. The age-old idea of a criminal as being a man with a flat skull and a very blue chin, unable to talk or even think, has gone forever. Modern criminals—I deprecate throughout the Report the use of the words "hardened", "professional" or "sophisticated" when referring to criminals—are just people who are very much better educated than they used to be and are far better capable of preparing their defences.
I recall some years ago defending a young gentleman who was a member of what used to be called the old "Hoxton mob", and, as such, an aristocrat of crime. He was accused of breaking into premises, this being before the days of the alibi having to be produced for anyone's inspection before the trial. My instructing solicitor came to see me in my chambers in order to get advice on evidence, and he produced a list of potential witnesses which mostly consisted, to my untutored eye, of stars of stage, screen and radio. I did not know whether to be more appalled because the young gentleman in question actually mixed with those people in his off-duty moments or because they were prepared to perjure themselves at his trial. Be that as it may,

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luckily I managed to secure his acquittal on a submission of "no case to answer" and therefore did not have to call them. That is one example of how times have changed.
The second reason I wish to advance is the growth of legal aid and the now excellent defences which are raised by defendants. When I started at the Bar one's instructing solicitor was a managing clerk—your Lordships who have read books by Henry Cecil will agree that he adequately describes these people—whereas nowadays one's instructing solicitor is a highly qualified, neat gentleman who has thought up most of the defences before one has oneself, and usually before the client. The result is that defences are now more than adequately presented for the edification of the jury.
The third reason is, I suggest, the changes in attitude on the part of the community. There is no doubt that the phrase "permissive society" is out moded; it has been used much too much and in far too many connections. There is, however, certainly a reaction among members of the public who serve on juries against, as it were, interfering in other people's affairs and lives. If one is appearing on behalf of the Crown it is extremely difficult to obtain a conviction for certain sex crimes, notably incest, and I think the acquittal rate in sex crimes is as high as 57 per cent. in contested cases. I make no complaint about that, though it is an indication of how public attitudes have changed over the years. The attitude now seems to be that what people want to do in the privacy of their own homes or wherever it may be is not something for the public to investigate.
The fact is also worth mentioning that there are now many bodies and people most anxious to help the potential criminal. I prosecuted a young gentleman not long ago who was charged with rape. There was no doubt that he had raped the girl; the noise that came from the flat after a party and the injuries she received stopped any defence of consent. He went to ground for three or four days after the incident and duly appeared at West-End Central Police Station with a solicitor, a written out statement which had obviously been
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drafted by the solicitor, and a small card which had been issued by the National Council for Civil Liberties—a sort of "do it yourself when arrested kit". It was only with the greatest reluctance, when his possessions were taken from him in the police station, that he would give up his card. Among his possessions was the card and he knew exactly what to do and say.
My Lords, I hope that I have not been too facetious about this subject. I appreciate that there are a great many matters contained in the Report which are impracticable and might well be unjust if put into execution. Nevertheless, I urge the Government not, as it were, to let the matter stand still, and above all not to go back and start this process again. I submit that there is at least one area where reforms could be initiated now, and I refer of course to cautions and confessions. Of all the artificialities about our English legal system—and I speak as a Scot—I think that cautions are the most artificial. For one thing, they are hardly ever used in the sense that we think of them. They are certainly never used as the court is told they are used.
I remember once, when a very young member of the Bar, going to Bromley Magistrates' Court to defend a gentleman who was found in an arcade with a brick in his hand. The supposition was that he was going to throw it through a shop window and take some jewellery. He was apprehended by an equally young detective constable—at any rate, lie was young to me—and arrested. He complained to me—he of course pleaded not guilty—that he had never been cautioned, and he told me that the detective sergeant had simply said to him, "All right, Ginger, what are you up to this time? In any event, you're nicked." To my great surprise, when I put this point to the young detective in court, he admitted that that was precisely the conversation, and he agreed that there had been no caution and no words about the arrest other than the use of the word "nicked". I invited the Bromley magistrates to infer from that admission that the detective could not be regarded as a witness who could be relied upon and urged that my client be acquitted. Curiously enough, they failed to agree with me. Some time later I met the same officer, by then a dignified detective

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chief inspector, and he told me with a grin that he had never made that mistake again. Both of us had learned something from that occasion.
The point is that many of your Lordships, who perhaps have been concerned with rather higher planes of the criminal law than I have, do not quite realise what happens when a suspect is apprehended. Let us take the case, for instance, of a lorry hijacking or a robbery. One man is apprehended near the scene of the crime, is put into a police car and the police are very anxious to find out, first, what has happened; secondly, who has done it, and, thirdly, where the property is. If they have to wait until they can get that man before a referee, a tape recorder or a magistrate, the whisky, or whatever it is, that has been hijacked will have gone, the other members of the gang will have gone and they will be left with only the person they have in their hands. In other words, interrogations start very frequently in circumstances and at a time when it is impossible to have these safeguards which have been put forward by certain of your Lordships. It may be that if in the future we go over to an inquisitorial system, as opposed to our accusatorial system, the slowness will not matter because—if I may use the expression—it will all eventually come out in the wash. I wonder whether it will, and I shall be interested to hear from any noble Lord how this problem is to be overcome.
In my submission, the police, of whom I have met very many, and talked to very many in off-duty moments, are a much maligned body of men. There are in the Metropolitan Police area 20,000, 22,000—or whatever the number is. Some apples in the barrel are bound to be rotten. But basically the police do their job well and conscientiously, and if they are given the freedom to do it as they think best I am quite certain that there will be very little dishonesty on their part. Where one begins to get dishonesty is where a police officer conscientiously and honestly prepares a case and, in spite of that, a jury returns a verdict of not guilty. It is that depressing effect, especially on a young police officer, which puts him in the attitude of starting to take short cuts, and the easiest shortcut to take is to manufacture what has
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been called "a verbal". I should not think it beyond the wit of my noble friend and his Department to sweep aside the Judges' Rules and make a new system, or code if you like, which would depend entirely on whether a judge who is trying a case is satisfied that there has been no inducement, no undue harrassment, and above all no threat of physical violence. In that situation, I would submit that anything that an accused person said should be put before a jury.
The other matter I was going to talk about was the right of silence. Other noble Lords have already covered that matter more than adequately. As I say, the time may come, if we have an inquisitorial procedure, when the right of silence may go. As things are at the moment, I feel that it would have to stay, if only because a person may be interrogated in the wrong way for the type of activity he has been up to. By that I mean that he may be asked a "When did you last beat your wife?" type of question, and if he says nothing it would be manifestly unfair if that were to be taken against him. Equally he may, as we say in the law, want to "confess and avoid", get it wrong and have that taken against him. In the circumstances, therefore, I feel that the matter is best left as it is.
7.44 p.m.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, at this hour I shall be as brief as I can, but there are a few points with which I should like to deal. First, may I join in the thanks and congratulations to the noble and learned Viscount who has enabled us to have this debate this evening. It is an exceptionally valuable debate. For me it has been a very gratifying debate because it has disclosed something of which one sometimes has some doubt, and that is the unanimity of the legal profession when things which really matter are under challenge. Every branch of the profession has had some comments to make about this Report which are all directed to the same thing: whether or not we shall preserve an adequate system of justice. I should like to say this: I am wondering whether in this long and extraordinarily interesting debate, with a standard of speaking which to me, as a lawyer, has been exceptionally high and valuable (and I hope that the few laymen who have survived

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the debate have found it equally interesting) we have perhaps missed one factor, which is the context in which we are discussing the whole matter, the context of how to preserve law and order, and whether there is an alarming increase in crime which in some way will be rectified by an alteration of the technical rules of evidence in criminal trials.
I would venture to address your Lordships' attention to the great city of New York which I recently visited and which I visit quite frequently. There there is an atmosphere of an almost total civic paralysis as to whether it is possible to restore law and order to an extent that people can live there in safety and tranquility and as civilised human beings. I venture to suggest to your Lordships that no alteration in the rules of the Criminal Evidence Code of the State of New York will make the slightest difference to the situation. The situation is caused by an inadequacy of the police force. It is caused by the fact that the citizens have ceased to have confidence in the police force. The greatest metropolis in the world, as it must now claim to be, lacks an adequacy of policemen, as a result of which the most appalling things happen there day after day. I am sure your Lordships will recollect the case of someone who may have been known to some of the lawyers here, as he was known to me. He was a very distinguished professor of law, who left this country, went to Australia and then to the United States, and who was stabbed in open daylight in order to preserve his briefcase which unknown, ironically, to the criminals, contained nothing but his lecture notes, for which he paid the price of the loss of his life.
I venture to say that we may be losing sight of the realities of the situation if we think that we are going to repair the situation to any relevant extent by the sort of discussion that we have had this afternoon. Of course it is necessary to have appropriate rules of evidence, but one thing we must bear in mind is that the preservation of a system of social order depends upon having an adequate police force, a properly paid and honourable police force, and a police force that has confidence in the Judiciary. If the police force presents cases to the judges in the belief that there will be either convictions or acquittals that are not related
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to the highest principles of abstract justice then that police force, whatever its size and however well paid, will be an inadequate force.
I have sensed in the debate some feeling that it is rather bad form not to say a word of praise to the Committee who have prepared the Report. May I therefore hasten to say that I am very willing to say a number of words of praise to the Committee who prepared the Report. Particularly I would point out that even our critical discussions this afternoon have failed to touch on at least 19 of the very substantial sections contained in the Report. We have touched on only five of them. That should be said, in case one gets a rather distorted view of our criticism. My principal criticism of this Report, meticulously prepared by men of immense probity and learning, is that they seem to have started with a postulate and with an assumption that has not been established. This Report might have been entirely justifiable if it were indeed the case that a great number of guilty men are being acquitted by our courts. But there does not appear to me to be any evidence of this, except for some very suspect statistics of the type presented to us in the extremely attractive and interesting speech of the last speaker. Everyone of us said that 40 per cent. of the people charged on indictment are acquitted; then, in what was a memorable maiden speech, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, pointed out that this was far from being the case because it did not take account of the large number of people charged on indictment who pleaded guilty before the question of any issue before a jury arose and that the actual percentage was 14 per cent. But be it 40 per cent. or 14 per cent., what does it prove? Unless we know the circumstances of those trials, unless we know from some valid investigation that in some relevant quantity of those trials guilty men are being acquitted, it seems to me that not only are those statistics irrelevant but they are misleading and positively dangerous and no account should be taken of them at all.
If there is a widespread belief that a large number of guilty men are being acquitted, it is probably necessary that as a preliminary to a further inquiry about this matter there should be a commission of some kind to inquire into that

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very fact. It is a fact that is refuted, and vigorously refuted, by the people who should know best. It was vigorously refuted by Lord Salmon. It has been vigorously refuted in the very careful memorandum prepared by the Criminal Bar, who said that in their experience a large number of guilty men are not being acquitted. Who can know better than they? But it is not incumbent upon us to accept anyone's word. Let us inquire for ourselves before we set about root-and-branch changes which undoubtedly will have adverse effects in connection with the system of justice we have operated for generations; lot us see whether there is a valid case for making these changes. I think that is the first preliminary into which we need to inquire.
The second point I venture to make is that we have, on the whole, a system of justice which is based on the belief, enunciated with great spirit by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, that it it better to acquit ten guilty men than to convict one innocent man. I think the arithmetic of that is perhaps a little too generous; it may perhaps be better to acquit three guilty men than to convict one innocent man. But what is absolutely certain is that no one can produce an exact equilibrium in this matter. If our system is, as it is suggested it is, biased in favour of establishing innocence rather than conclusively establishing guilt, it may be that some redress is necessary, but certain it is that we cannot arrive at an exact equilibrium. It would be flattering even the wisdom of this Chamber to believe that we could devise a system which would unerringly convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. That we cannot achieve. But we have to make a considered decision as to which it is that we prefer. I regard myself as a very fallible human being and I have never excluded the possibility that I might find myself in some trouble before one of these distinguished gentlemen. I therefore have a very strong preference in favour of a system that will ensure that the innocent are invariably acquitted and the guilty perhaps occasionally acquitted as well.
The suggestion was made that this Report should not be wholly discarded. I think it would be unfortunate if it were
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wholly discarded. It clearly contains a monumental amount of considered work which it would be a great social folly and terribly uneconomic and extravagant to throw away. But we must slightly suspect this Report as the basis for legislation, simply because we have the belief that the people who prepared the Report, the Committee, set off to correct a situation which may not perhaps exist at all. Hence I think everything in this Report must be viewed with considerable reserve. That certainly does not mean that this mammoth task, the work of years, should be thrown away and not made the basis of some legislation in respect of those sections of it about which there would probably be general agreement.
I should like to touch on the suggestion which was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, that it would be desirable to exclude the Home Office from this situation and transfer the responsibility to the Department of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. No one has a greater respect for Lord Chancellors than I have, and I would regard the exuberant speech made by the Lord Chancellor this afternoon as perhaps not entirely representative of his normal mood when he comes to legislation in this matter; otherwise, I should be a little frightened of the consequences. In any event, it is unkind to criticise that speech because it gave us very great pleasure. I might perhaps be entitled to say that it did not appear to me to deal entirely with the matter under discussion. He told us in the most fascinating fashion how he had used his ingenuity to find unexpected locations for law courts, a matter, so far as I know, not mentioned in the Committee's Report at all, and he recommended with great fervour the abolition of juries for a great many causes, just when the Court of Appeal has firmly re-established the right to have a jury.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, with respect, the noble Lord must not allow his own exuberance to get the better of him. What I talked about was breathalyser cases, trivial thefts and very long fraud cases.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, as I say, I enjoyed the speech very much and it would be ungracious and uncharitable to criticise it in the slightest degree. I

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do not think it arises in connection with what I want to say. But what I feel rather strongly is that whomsoever we refer this matter to must have a realistic view of the whole situation. It is not enough to refer it to the lawyers who are concerned only with criminal trials; we must refer it to people who can take a broader view and see the whole matter in the context of crime at large and how to deal with crime. That seems to me a very crucial consideration.
May I touch on one or two points in the Report? There are one or two matters that seem to me rather fundamental. On the question of the right of silence, I would certainly not engage in controversy with the Lord Chief Justice of England as to whether or not that right is enshrined in our law, but it seemed to the Committee that it was, because in a particular paragraph they say so. The right of silence was understood by them to be a right not to make any statement when you are apprehended—that is what it really boils down to. Historically, the reason for the rules and the safeguards that have existed is not because people are concerned so much about what the man may say, but they are deeply concerned about what may be reported, which is quite a different matter. The number of times in criminal trials where immense controversy and detailed argument goes on about whether or not a statement has been made, with or without the safeguard of a warning, would be increased a hundredfold if we introduced a system where it was indispensable that a man should make a statement because he would know that if he did not it could be used to his detriment.
And what safeguards can you introduce? You cannot introduce tape-recorders for the excellent reasons Lord Ritchie-Calder gave; voices are not clearly distinguishable, they can be tampered with. Tape-recorders would not at this stage be safe. You certainly cannot introduce the safeguard that the man can summon his solicitor to the interrogation. How many solicitors would you require? Men are being arrested all over the country every hour of the day. Solicitors, if I may venture to say so, are people of the highest standard of public service, but the notion that they would gallop off like bumble bees every time
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they were summoned in the middle of the night is, I think, stretching the belief in the degree of public service they are prepared to extend.
There are, in my view, no effective safeguards that can be achieved to ensure the exact accuracy of what is said, and the whole of this dispute turns on the question of the exact accuracy, on the doubt or disbelief that what is recorded by a policeman is exactly accurate. I would echo every word of what is said about our police force, with whom I have considerably dealings; I do not believe there is a better police force in the world. I certainly have not met a better police force, wherever I have been. But the fact remains that a police officer is a man who starts off with predisposition towards a belief in the guilt of the accused man. Hence it is not a remote possibility that what emerges of what the accused man said is the police officer's notion of what he said in that context. It would be grossly unfair to the police to impose on them the obligation of taking a statement every time they saw fit to make an arrest or interrogate someone. I believe that that is a dangerous situation.
In relation to the necessity to give evidence, or if you do not give evidence to have it used as a factor against you in connection with your guilt, I would venture to point out that it would create a situation (although this was challenged by the Lord Chief Justice) where the onus of proof changed entirely, because however tenuous the case the police might have against a man, on which they would be very wary of launching a prosecution at the moment, if this new rule were introduced they would have a situation in which they could add to that tenuous evidence the certainty that the man has to go into the witness box or has to explain why he does not. If he does not go into the witness box, and if they should happen to know that there is some embarrassing or even criminal circumstance that he does not want to explain, then his conviction, I should have said, was inevitable. The police, therefore, would be given the opportunity of launching prosecutions on the basis of much less secure and established evidence than is at present the case.
Then there is the other rule: that if you are apprehended and interrogated

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you are at a disadvantage if you fail to state any circumstance which you later wish to adduce in evidence and which you would have known at that time, This appears to me an appallingly dangerous principle, and also a principle that can be reduced to considerable absurdity. A rather inelegant example came into my mind in the rare instance of a man who happens to have been castrated. If this man is charged with rape, it may well be that he will omit to state this rather vital fact—as indeed occurred in another case to which I will refer in a moment. Thereupon, if he wishes later in his trial to introduce the fact that he is castrated, it can be used only as corroboration of his guilt. This is a reductio ad absurdum that is entirely admissible from the provisions of this particular section.
I would remind your Lordships of a case in which the late Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was involved. It was one of his great feats of private detection, as opposed to the stories he wrote of detection. It was a case of a young solicitor in the Midlands, or the North, who was charged with a weird offence of attacking and mutilating animals. The young solicitor was a man against whom there was a good deal of local prejudice on personal grounds. He was, I think, a Parsee, though I am not sure. In any event, he was charged and convicted, and after his conviction there was an agitation because his family continued to believe in his innocence. Conan Doyle saw him in a cell. I should perhaps add that I am reciting the facts from a biography of Conan Doyle, so I must not be taken to task for their exact accuracy; but I believe that they are correct. He saw the man in the cell, and observed that he had the most defective sight, and that he was quite unable to see without the use of the thickest glasses. As these crimes had been committed at night, and required the most delicate incisions to have been made, it was absolutely impossible for this man to have committed the crimes. If this man had been interrogated by the police, and if, as was indeed the fact, throughout his defence he did not raise the point because it did not occur to him or his advisers, his failure to make that point at that stage could be used only as corroboration of his guilt. One can multiply this sort of situation a considerable number of times.
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On the question of previous convictions, I should like to read a passage from page 36 of the Criminal Bar's excellent memorandum. They recite from a judgment of Lord Goddard. This was in the case of R. v. Harrison-Owen. He said, at page 110:
"The Appellant is a man of very bad character, with a list of convictions against him for larceny and housebreaking and the like, and it is quite obvious that once those convictions were before the jury be would have no chance of acquittal."
I would venture to remind the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor of what he himself was saying in this context: because what he is saying, and what this Report is saying, is that there are cases where we are prepared to accept a conviction based only on the previous convictions and on no other adequate evidence.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord, in his exuberance, is really going far beyond what he is entitled to. I never said anything of the sort. I made no comment on what the Report may be saying. I do not think the Committee did, either, but I am only concerned to defend myself. I never said anything that could remotely be construed in that sense.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, I would recommend to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that he should study Hansard carefully to-morrow, and it may be that a short note of apology will be reaching me; but I shall love him none the less if it does not. He said something that closely resembled that, and in my view exactly resembled it.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, let me make this abundantly clear: the noble Lord has accused me of saying that I would support a conviction based solely on the previous convictions of the accused. I neither said anything like it; nor did I say it; nor could anyone reasonably have thought that I said it; nor do I think it.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, I have listened to some emphatic denials in my time, but I think that that one takes the prize. I would only say to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that the last thing I wish to do is to suggest that he said something that he did not say. It is not necessary for me

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to pursue this, because quite clearly that is the result achieved. If the evidence is so slender that it needs to be reinforced by previous convictions, the practical effect of this is that the conviction is achieved by the previous convictions and not by the evidence of guilt in the particular case concerned.
I have kept your Lordships too long. I would only add that I hope we shall reform the law in the fashion that it needs to be reformed. I hope we shall take very much into consideration the first and paramount need that has been expressed by several speakers, and that is to ensure the apprehension and conviction of delinquents. If the delinquent is apprehended, if we have an adequate and sufficiently paid police force, and a real change in the statistics showing whether the man is going to be caught and convicted, then our problem in this matter will certainly be greatly reduced and will probably disappear. But if we do not have an adequate police force, if we are mean in paying them, and do not enlist sufficient numbers, then these problems will continue, whatever changes we may make to the law of evidence.
8.6 p.m.
LORD DIPLOCK: My Lords, at this late hour in the debate it might be more seemly if I exercised my "right to silence", but we are discussing the Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, and I should not like this debate to end without a word or two being said in gratitude and support of the work which that Committee have undertaken. I would wish to approach this not from an emotional point of view beyond saying that, no more than my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon, whose eloquent maiden speech I listened to with admiration, would I wish to erode in one particle the protection of the innocent accused. But, having said that, may I get away from emotion and say why it is that I think that the Report has much to be commended in it.
The law of evidence in civil and criminal cases is illogical and in a mess, and needs to be cleared up. I do not care whether it adds to more convictions of the guilty or not, it needs to be cleared up. May I, before I go through the ways in which the Committee recommend that
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it be cleared up, say in passing, and getting rid of the criticism before I come to the praise, that I agree with what has been said on all sides in this House as regards Clause 1: any inference from silence should not be drawn until some provision has been made, by guaranteed tape recording or otherwise, to make sure that the material from which the inference can be drawn is put accurately before the jury. Secondly, I would express some reservations about Clause 3 on previous convictions.
Having said that about my reservations, may I depart a little from what my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne said, and say a few words about the origin of this Committee. At the same time as the Criminal Law Revision Committee was given the reference on the law of evidence in criminal cases, another Committee, which operated through a sub-committee of which I was Chairman, the Law Reform Committee, was given similar terms of reference about evidence in civil cases. Fortunately, in civil cases one does not grow emotional. Our object in civil cases was to see whether we could bring into this mumbo-jumbo of rules of evidence, which are without logical basis and much of them historical, the rationality that Jeremy Bentham had recommended nearly 150 y ears earlier. And let me say this, that the problem is the same in civil cases as in criminal proceedings; that one is looking to see what material should be put before the court which will enable it to ascertain the true facts. The only difference is that the degree of confidence in the facts in criminal proceedings must be greater than in civil proceedings.
It is not necessary for me to tell this House, or to commend to this House, what we recommended about civil evidence, because that is now part of the law of the land. It has had the approval of both Houses of Parliament and is embodied in the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and in the Civil Evidence Act 1972. The recommendations in the Bill about hearsay in criminal cases are, in substance, identical with those which this House and the other place have approved as suitable in civil cases. They recognise that the object of the law of evidence is to deal with the material which can be put before the court, in order to enable those who

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have to decide to find the facts about where the truth lies; and those they have to decide and find just as much in criminal cases as in civil cases.
So much then for Parts II and III of the draft Bill which deal with the rules about hearsay. What about the other parts? Anyone who has been concerned with the administration of the criminal law must know that in the areas which deal with corroboration, with comment that can be made on this and that, there is more irrational mumbo-jumbo than even there was in the law on hearsay in civil cases, before we tried to bring a bit of rationality into it. What has been the complaint of those who have been criticising the proposals in the Bill about the right to silence? What do the two clauses say? They say that all proper inferences can be drawn from the accused's failure to give evidence. I do not think anyone who has any experience of criminal trials, or anyone who can possibly believe that a jury is a suitable tribunal for deciding innocence or guilt, would doubt for one moment that if an accused fails to go into the witness box when there is a prima facie case against him a jury draws the proper inference, which is all that this Bill says it may draw—that if there was not something that he was afraid to be cross-examined about he would have gone into the box. Certainly, my experience in trying cases was that the jury drew that inference in proper cases; also, that they drew the proper inference—though one was not allowed to comment on that—when the accused brought forward at the last moment a defence which, if he had been innocent, it would have been natural to expect him to give to the police. And, my Lords, add this further absurdity about the comment upon failure to go into the witness box. As the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice pointed out, the prosecution may not comment upon it, but the judge may, provided that he does it in moderate and sensible terms; that is to say, he indicates to the jury what would be a proper inference to draw.
I commend the greater part of this Bill, with a number of reservations, on the grounds that it brings some rationality, some common sense, into a part of the law in which, however proud we may
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be of it, we must recognise that a great deal is to-day quite irrational nonsense.
The jury knows it and, thank God!, a jury generally has enough common sense to ignore the mumbo-jumbo which I, as a judge, had to say to them at the early stages of a case so that they forgot about it when they went into the jury room. I have spoken longer than I intended but I would not desire this debate to end without someone saying in praise of the Criminal Law Revision Committee that, whether or not it increases convictions of guilty men, at least it brings a bit of rationality into a bit of law that bitterly needs it.
8.17 p.m.
LORD HACKING: My Lords, when I first put my name down to speak in this debate, I thought I might be able to contribute to it as a practising member of the Bar. But as this debate has gone on till this late hour in the evening, and as point after point has been made, I increasingly wondered whether there would be anything left for me to say—a wonder that was somewhat increased when I heard the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, reminisce about life at the Bar with Ginger and all that. But before I thought to tear up my notes and leave the Chamber, I decided that there was a little left and that I could, and should, give your Lordships the heads of concern which I believe members of my profession share with me about this Report and the draft Bill that goes with it, and then examine one of those concerns in detail, but as briefly as possible. But before I do that, perhaps I could make a few opening remarks.
I believe that nobody in my profession does not recognise, first, that the quantity and scale of sophisticated crime has much increased, although this problem is not peculiar to our own country and is almost a world-wide problem, whatever criminal procedures a country operates. This is making the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, in a different way. Secondly, the brunt of the increase in crime falls upon an overworked police force. Members of the Bar who always appear for the police in all criminal trials upon indictment are as aware as any of the work that the police undertake, and particularly the work that the detective branch of the police undertake. They

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are aware, too, of the abominable hours that an officer of the detective branch often has to work, going 24 hours and sometimes even 48 hours without sleep.
Thirdly, it is essential for the good order of any society that there is the maximum co-operation between the police and is an area of increasing concern—is the members of my profession—and it is an area of concern that was first covered, I think, by the Royal Commission in 1962, and is an area of increasing concern—is that the area of conflict, if there be an area of conflict (and I think we have to recognise that there is) between police and public will be increased if this draft Bill is made law.
Fourthly, there are defects in the present procedures—and perhaps I may mention the defects in the interrogatories, when the police first interview and question a suspect. First, as members of the Bar recognise, and have recognised for some time, the contents of a police officer's note is at best a précis, pulling out the highlights in the conversation as best the police officer can remember, Then—and, indeed, this is mentioned in the Report, and was mentioned to your Lordships this afternoon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, when he read extensive passages from paragraph 52 at pages 31 and 33—the other point that I am making in this context concerns the written statement and how in reality that statement is composed on a question and answer basis, although it appears and is read as a single statement of the accused, uninterrupted by the police officer who is taking it down. It is because of that fourth recognition by members of the Bar that both the Criminal Bar Association and Justice, while opposing the Committee's proposals concerning interrogatories, the caution and so forth, recommended new procedures concerning interrogatories.
My Lords, my concern over the Report can, I think, be brought under four heads. The first is that the basic premise of the report is wrong. There are not the large-scale acquittals obtained by sophisticated criminals turning criminal procedures to their advantage. If anything can be read from the quantity and type of acquittals (and I for one doubt it) it is that the unsophisticated, inadequate
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criminal often obtains an acquittal for various reasons, not the least of which is the sympathy of the jury—and none of us would wish that to end. On the other hand, it is my experience that the big-time criminals, when they are brought to court, to quote a Queen's Counsel at the Justice meeting on Saturday to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, referred, "go down like stones". It is interesting to note (although I choose this only as an example, and nothing more) that in a trial concerning the train robbers, I think about eight or nine years ago, over which Lord Justice Edmund Davies so ably presided, precisely that happened. It is interesting also to note that recently in the two trials concerning the Kray brothers, over one of which Lord Justice Lawton ably presided, once again, those accused went down like stones. Secondly, and ancillary to the basic premise that the Report is wrong, in any event that basic premise, as several of your Lordships have noted, is incapable of substantiation.
My second concern is that, even if the premise is right, the proposals as set out by the Report and in the draft Bill do not provide the remedy. Indeed, concerning the hearsay rules they positively invite manipulation by sophisticated criminals. Thirdly, whatever the cause and whatever the remedy for the increase in crime, there is no justification for abolishing such a fundamental right—and I use that term even late in this debate—as the right of silence, which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, so ably illustrated, goes far beyond the procedural change and runs contrary to the basic concept of a criminal trial; namely, that the prosecution should prove its case. My fourth concern, which again is one that I believe members of my profession share, is that the proposals in the Report as brought out in the draft Bill are bound to increase both the complexity and the length of criminal trials, resulting in real issues—for example, the prosecution's proving its case—being obscured before the jury consider them, and resulting, too, in injustice to both defence and prosecution.
It is upon this last point that I wish to dwell shortly. I do so particularly because the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor reminded us in his

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speech at an early stage of this debate that many appeals against conviction are filed—and some of them succeed—simply out of the complexity of the law. In moving, I hope briefly, to this point, I would remind your Lordships that indeed the members of the Committee, in their Report, started off on that premise. I read from paragraph 25 at page 13:
"Simplicity is specially important for the law of evidence. It is important for the court, because a point of evidence frequently arises suddenly and without warning during a hearing and has to be disposed of without there being a proper opportunity to consult authorities."
Alas!, my Lords, in proceeding forward with their draft Bill, and in proceeding forward with more detailed consideration in the Report, the members of the Committee did not follow through with a draft Bill which was simple in content and in operation.
I would criticise the draft Bill upon two points. The drafting of the Bill itself—and this is not a criticism of the Parliamentary draftsman—makes the reading of it amazingly complex: so complex that often without use of the Appendix (which, after all, will not go with the Queen's Printers' copy) some of the clauses are quite incomprehensible. Secondly, and more important in my submission to your Lordships, the operation of the draft Bill will produce not fewer complexities in a criminal trial but new complexities. I choose only three examples, and I do so because I wish to be brief at this stage. These three examples are really more simple examples of complexity than other examples I could choose. I choose, first (because it is right to start at the beginning of a draft Bill), Clause 1 of the draft Bill—the clause which starts all the argument about the right to silence. It is my submission that Clause 1 is admitting a new area of evidence and argument; and, in simple terms, the argument is what the suspect said or did not say in reference to any fact relied upon later in his defence.
I shall not weary your Lordships at this stage by reading Clause 1, which is all too familiar to your Lordships, but I can do no better than quote, if I may, and adopt, the types of problems and questions that will arise in argument upon that section, taken from the excellent memorandum prepared by the
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Criminal Bar Association. These, I suggest, my Lords, are the types of questions that will arise:
"What is the status of the questioner? does he fulfil the terms of Clause 1(2)? what facts were mentioned to the police or other official? … which of these facts are of sufficient importance for them to be held to be 'relied upon?' was it reasonable for the accused not to mention those facts found not to have been mentioned? did the facts relate to the offence (with which the accused is) actually charged? was the police officer trying to discover by whom the offence had been committed or was he making general inquiries from which he later decided that the offence had been committed? what inference could be drawn properly from any omission to mention facts? If the fact omitted is found by the jury to be true, or possibly so, but they are not sure, then what inferences are they entitled to draw? should the judge allow police prosecution witness to be called for questioning after the accused has given evidence setting up facts which the witness did not say had been mentioned?"
In thinking about the answers to these questions postulated by the Criminal Bar Association, I think one begins to get a picture of a new area, in my submission, of evidence and a new area of argument.
I turn now as a second example to the disposition clause, Clause 3. There are amazing complexities that can arise out of that, partly because as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, said, the area is an extension of the old common law rule of the similar fact. Also because by invoking Clause 25, a welter of documents must travel on the way from other criminal proceedings towards the trial if similar disposition evidence is being introduced. I make those general observations and move to Clause 3(4) of the draft Bill. This is the clause dealing with the situation where a man admits the conduct alleged against him as part of the prosecution case but denies that his conduct is capable of criminal guilt because he did not have the second constituent of mens rea.
When the Committee were drawing up their examples they chose the three that were concerned with a single accused. The first example is at page 48. It is of delightful simplicity. A man in a crowd leaving a football match has his pocket picked and identifies A, a total stranger, who was beside him as the thief. A has 90 convictions for pickpocketing. One can see the simplicity of applying that if one

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has a simple case; but members of the Bar and of the profession will know that single cases are becoming a diminishing event. Trials are now often multiple trials concerning 10, 12, 18 or 20 accused.
I am not even moving my example to a multiple trial. I move now to a trial concerning only two accused. I move to a case—it could be affray or it could be actual bodily harm—where two men stand before the court on a case of violence. Let us say that this took place in a public-house. One man says, "I was there. I had to use some violence, but I was defending myself and at no time did I attack anybody". The other accused says, "The identification is all wrong. I was not there. It is all a mistake". Looking at it in terms of culpability, if the prosecution case is right, your Lordships may take the view that the man who says he was not there (who was there, in fact, and was participating) is presenting a more outrageous defence than the man who said he was there but did not have the mens rea. Alas! on the application of Clause 3(4) the man who had the honesty (if that is the right word) to admit his presence there would be liable, if he had previous convictions, to have this Clause 3(4) pressed over his head and his criminal disposition put before the jury. The other man who had the more outrageous defence (in the terms I used just now) would not be vulnerable. The trial would go forward, if that clause were invoked against the man who was there, with the jury knowing that the man who was prepared to admit his presence had previous convictions, a disposition, while they would not know that about the man who said he was not there.
I will choose the simplest of examples to make my third point. In Clause 31(3), the hearsay section of the draft Bill, which is tied in with Clause 31(1), there is power vested in the court, when a witness has not been called but his statement has been put before the court under Clause 31(1), to disregard altogether that earlier statement that had been produced in evidence. In other words, a piece of evidence, possibly in the bundle of documents placed before the jury introduced to them by counsel for the prosecution as evidence, has to be withdrawn at a later stage in the trial if that witness does not give evidence and the jury have to be
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told that they must disregard the statement which at one time was introduced as evidence. If one transposes that situation to the justices' court, one appreciates the difficulties and complexities of the allegedly more simple rules of hearsay as set out in the draft Bill.
I have taken far longer than I should. I apologise to your Lordships. I simply make this point on complexity. This Bill is complex. It increases the complexity, and I am bound to say that if the proposals are implemented it will make a lawyers' field day. It may seem strange in some quarters for lawyers on both sides of the profession to ask your Lordships not to allow them to have this field day; but this I do.
8.38 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and I are faced with a task of some difficulty in seeking to resume and possibly to highlight the various arguments adduced in this extremely valuable and interesting debate by noble and learned Lords who have brought to bear upon the considerations at issue the vast wealth of experience at their disposal. I approach the task with a great deal of trepidation, with my eyes firmly fixed on the time indicator opposite me. At the outset may I try to be accommodating and say what matters I agree with? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, is not in his place; but I agree with him at once that we in this House, members of both legal professions, and the public at large owe an enormous debt of gratitude to those very distinguished people who over a period of eight years gave so much time and thought to the preparation of the Report we are discussing. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, did us all a great service in giving us the opportunity to consider the detailed content of that Report.
I hope I shall not be thought emotional or vituperative in any sense in what I say about the main proposals in this Report, if I say that as far as the major subjects which it encompasses are concerned they go flatly in conflict with my basic feelings about the administration of the criminal law according to our democratic system in this country, and I view them with—I hope I am not using an emotive term—distaste. The noble and

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learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, said, "After all, you have to be fair to both sides, both to the person accused and also to society against whom it is said that he has offended." I entirely agree. But, my Lords, I should have thought that most of us—I think I can say all who have spoken in the debate—are rather more sensitive with regard to the position of the accused and the absolute need to see that he does not suffer the risk of being unjustly convicted than we are with regard to those who may become the victims of misbehaviour, who may be the tragic victims of the most wicked misbehaviour.
We have, I suppose—I hope I may say this without arrogance—one of the greatest democracies in the world, and our system of law is fundamental to it. Though some people sometimes seem to take it on themselves to challenge the law these days, the rule of law is still supreme in this country, and it will be a sad day if it is ever really brought into disrepute. And central and focal to our system of law is our system of criminal law. I entirely agreed with what was said by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, that it is a system of which we can justly be proud. I believe that it works well. It would be presumptuous to say that any system is not susceptible of improvement and change; obviously our system of criminal law is. But it works well, and I should have thought it carried an enormous amount of confidence among the public. I should have thought also that if we are considering the question of how we should see to it not only that the innocent are acquitted but also that not too great a proportion of the guilty are acquitted, it is fundamental that juries should have confidence in the judiciary and in the police; that when members of a jury sit in a jury box and hear the arguments of counsel and the evidence of the police, and hear the judge's summing-up and his direction to them, they should feel perfectly safe in saying to themselves, "We can trust this system."
My Lords, it would be very sad indeed if we ever got to a situation in which, when one goes into a jury box and sees a police officer in the witness box opposite, one thinks, "I must be careful about him; he is probably going to' have me on'." If we do get to that situation we
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shall get far more acquittals than we get now. I believe that many countries throughout the world have such inadequate criminal systems for the very reason that by the way in which they conduct their affairs they have not managed to inspire that mutual confidence in the administration of the police, in the independence of the judiciary and in the fairness of the judicial system where accused persons are concerned.
Why do I say that, my Lords? I do so because I want to follow an argument put by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid. They pointed to the fact that it is essential that this confidence should be maintained. The noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, felt that there was some reason to think that that confidence was being impaired. I hope that it is not. The relevance of that point to the argument that I am venturing to submit to your Lordships is this. It goes to the question of the right of silence. I do not wish to use terminological epithets; I think we all know, broadly speaking, what we mean by "the right of silence".
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice said, "After all, what is it?" It was the Act of 1898; it was the inhibition placed on prosecuting counsel under the terms of that Act and the limitations on the comments that a learned judge may make; and also it was the question of the treatment of the accused person when in the hands of the police. Speaking for myself, I think it is the latter which is infinitely more important than the former. I think it fundamental to our system that people in this country should have confidence in the way in which an accused person will fare and be treated when he is in the hands of the police. For that reason I think it very important that before we make any change in the existing system we should make certain that the change we make will not give rise to suspicions which do not now exist.
My Lords, I trust the police. I believe that this country trusts the police. I believe that we have a very great police force which is the envy of the world. What is proposed? If we look at the first clause of the draft Bill we find that it is proposed that there should be comment, legitimate in the case of a person exercising what we at present call his right of silence. It is proposed that in

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place of the existing Judges' Rules the accused person should be given, when the time comes for charging him, a new form of warning. That warning appears on page 26 of the Committee's Report, and is in these terms—and I think that I shall not be taking time unnecessarily if I read it:
"You have been charged with [informed that you may be prosecuted for]—If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your defence in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you hold it back till you go to tout, your evidence may be less likely to be believed and this may have a bad effect on your case in general. If you wish to mention any fact now, and you would like it written down, this will be done."
That form of warning which is to take the place of the existing two warnings that are given under the Judges' Rules has to be read together with Clause 1 of the Bill, which permits silence to be commented upon as pointing to a reason for inferring guilt.
My Lords, I have been in a police station and watched people being charged I have noticed their demeanour. One knows, pace, if I may say so, what the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, said with regard to the rising standard of education of the ordinary criminal, that they are still not, by a long shot, Fellows of All Souls. They are people who perhaps are a little more articulate than they used to be in the old days. I agree that they probably shave—or perhaps some deliberately do not shave. Their foreheads are not all flat—I think that was the expression used by the noble Earl. They are men of moderate intelligence, mostly, who have gone wrong, made a mess of their life and are very often inarticulate.
I have met dozens of such men in prisons, talked to them and tried to get to know them. They are people who find themselves in the hands of the police with nobody to help them. Possibly they are over-awed; possibly truculent; certainly in nine cases out of ten they are not very good at expressing themselves. I would defy any Member of your Lordships' House, who was suddenly confronted with the task of stating clearly, succinctly and accurately an incident or a series of incidents in which he had recently been involved, to do so.
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These people, violent and so on, or truculent as I have said, have been called upon to make a statement of that sort which is going to be taken down, and later it may be referred to. How are they going to fare? I feel, my Lords, that the result would be quite catastrophic. Not only would they not be advantaged, but also what I suspect would happen, if a change of this very fundamental character were made, would be that over and over again there would be complaints about the police. There are already enough complaints about the police. Whenever an unfortunate police officer is complained about it is a source of anxiety to him and to his family. It lowers his morale. It must be extremely discouraging to him in the discharge of his duty. If one is going to make a change in the existing procedure which will mean that time after time when a police officer makes an arrest, puts questions and takes an individual to the station where he is charged, there is going thereafter at the court hearing to be a complaint that the police officer put pressure on the man and tried to put words into his mouth, and all the rest of it—and complaints are easy enough to manufacture—it will have a very bad effect, as I think, on the morale of the police, on the confidence of juries and on the confidence of the public in the police.
You will not get more convictions, but fewer, because juries will let people off if they think they have been subjected to some sort of pressure. I suspect that that is what would happen, and I think it would be a bad and dangerous change for that reason. With the existing cautions each side knows where it is. It may be exasperating for the police officer concerned, but at least he knows where he is, and the man on the other side of the table knows where he is. Complaints there are now, my Lords, but far fewer in my belief than there would be if one had this really drastic change proposed in the treatment of people who are suspect in the hands of the police. I have worked closely with police officers. They are subject to the greatest temptations and provocation. I think that we all owe them a great debt of gratitude in regard to the restraint which they exercise and the high standard of behaviour which they always maintain.

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I would not wish to put them under any extra and, I believe, unnecessary strain.
Then it is said that the existing system constitutes an obstacle in the way of obtaining a conviction against—I forget the phrase the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, did not like—hardened, sophisticated (or whatever it was) criminals. I do not know who they are. They are sometimes described as faceless commuters who run up and down in an underground railway, live in a nice house in the suburbs, and really mastermind a protection racket or some sort of gang. The idea that you are going to get a conviction against a man of that sort if you abolish the Judges' Rules and give this warning to him, whereas you cannot get a conviction under the Judges' Rules, is, I think, completely unrealistic. I do not think you will get any more convictions against the hard type of criminal. All you will do is to give rise to complaint on the part of the weak criminal who says he has been misused. That is my comment on the first but, as I think, basic feature of these Reports.
My Lords, I go to Clause 3. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, has already referred to the case which the Committee cites on page 48: a man in a crowd leaving a football match has his pocket picked; he identifies A, who was beside him at the time and is a total stranger to him, as the thief. A has 90 convictions for pick-pocketing. I have supposed that under the existing law you certainly could not give those 90 convictions or even the conduct leading up to them in evidence unless you could show that the conduct on which the convictions were based always had something exactly similar in type and pattern: if he always went to a football match and always sat down next to somebody on his right-hand side and always tried picking his right-hand pocket, well, you might give that in evidence. I thought that what the Committee were trying to do in Clause 3(2) was to preserve that rule. Very few counsel, I believe, would ever use it. I once had the responsibility of inviting counsel to conduct prosecutions on my behalf. If I had ever thought that any counsel whom I invited had used his discretion unwisely or oppressively in that field he would never again have been invited to act for me.
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My Lords, I think it right to read a passage from page 43 of the Bar Council Report with regard to Section 27(3) of the Theft Act 1968 which we passed, and which replaced Section 43 of the Larceny Act 1916. That was a section which specifically enabled evidence of previous criminal behaviour to be given in the case of receiving stolen property. This is what the Bar Council say:
"Two of the authors of this part of the memorandum, each with 20 years' continuous practice at the Criminal Bar, cannot recall one single case of a prosecution attempting to invoke the section. In our experience it is regarded with distaste by Bar and Bench alike and certainly is no longer used in the metropolitan area."
I do not know what is the experience of other noble and learned Lords, but I should have thought it was the case—and I have some reason for saying this because I have made inquiries—that if and in so far as there is at the moment a right in a case of that sort to give evidence of previous criminal conduct, judges dislike it, the Bar dislikes it, and that right is practically never used.
But those who prepared this Report want to go further, and in Clause 3(4) want to say: suppose a case of that sort, the pickpocket sitting on a seat; the man next to him gets up and leaves his wallet on the seat; the pickpocket picks it up and says that he was going to hand it to the nearest police officer, but he was arrested before he met a police officer. The effect, as I read it, of Clause 3(4) is that it shall be legitimate then for the prosecution to give evidence of other conduct of the accused tending to show in him a disposition to commit the kind of offence with which he is charged. I feel that that is really the most dangerous proposal, and one which I very much regret. What does it mean? What comes within the scope of the words "the kind of offence with which he is charged"? He will be charged, I suppose, with what we used to call larceny by finding. Is there any other kind of theft similar to that? I should have thought so. Could you give evidence that he tried to break into a house in order to possess himself of other people's property? I should have thought that that might well come within the scope of those words. If he robbed a bank in order to steal money

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you might argue that that was an offence with similar characteristics. I really do not know what the ambit of that subsection is, and I view it with the utmost distaste and fear. I know I am with every other noble Lord who has spoken in this debate in disliking, and in the case of many noble Lords cordially disliking, that particular proposal.
In that connection, my Lords, perhaps it is appropriate for me—and I do it with great pleasure—to refer to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon. He said that he was "appalled" by that proposal. I should like to borrow that word and to add to it in my allusion to his speech, which I think all noble Lords will agree was one of the most impressive speeches that has been delivered in this House for many years. That is my second point on Clause 3.
I come to the third point on Clause 31, which also has been commented on by most noble Lords who have spoken. It is the clause that deals with hearsay evidence. Here I should like to say to my noble and learned friend Lord Diplock that I cordially disagree with him when he says that the circumstances which led to the Evidence Act 1968 in civil cases apply equally in criminal cases. I do not think they do. There is a good deal of difference in the matter of proof. A civil case is proved on the balance of probability; a criminal charge cannot be brought home unless it is proved beyond the existence of any reasonable doubt. That is a major difference, and I should have thought that it was absolutely fundamental (I apologise for using adjectives, but I think this is an appropriate one) to our criminal law. If a witness says something about an accused person the jury expect to be able to see that witness in front of them, to be able to assess what sort of person he is and to hear him cross-examined, in order to form a judgment. Without that there really is no criminal trial in the sense in which we have for centuries understood it in this country.
The Bar Association, when dealing with that, give what I should have thought was a very good example on page 60. They say:
"A prosecution witness in an assault case states that immediately after the assault took place a man whose name he knows but who
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has since disappeared told him that it was the defendant who committed the assault."
That would be evidence if the proposal is accepted and Clause 31 is passed into law. I should have thought that that was fundamentally distasteful, and that this sort of evidence in a criminal trial (a civil trial is a different matter) should certainly not be admissible. Take the example of an ordinary lodging-house where people "gang up" and say that one of the lodgers they do not like has been stealing things from them. The police take a great many statements from the people in the lodging-house, who are a migrant population and disappear—one cannot find who they are—but they all say that the unpopular person has stolen from them. Technically, under Clause 31 the statements taken by that police officer would be evidence upon which a prosecution, if I understand it correctly, could be brought against that unpopular person. To me, if I may borrow the phrase used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon, that is quite abhorrent.
Those three aspects of the matter go to the root of the proposals which are contained in the Report. I do not wish in any sense to denigrate the massive achievements of the Committee in composing its thoughts on these various aspects on the law of criminal evidence. I have not had time to examine a large number of the other proposals—all of them valuable in themselves, but I think in many cases susceptible of criticism—and I would hesitate to take up your Lordships' time by going further. Before sitting down, I should like to sum up my objections by saying that in the course of the debate it seems to me that noble Lords have fastened almost entirely on the same points. They have been, if not entirely unanimous, very nearly unanimous in their suspicion and dislike of the Committee's proposals on these three points. I think this has been an extremely valuable debate and the noble and learned Lord Chancellor has indicated how glad he is to have the views of this House. Those views have certainly been fully expressed and expressed without qualification. I should like to add my modest voice in agreement with what most of your Lordships have said on what seem to me to be the three major points in the debate.
9.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. To get up a debate on this subject, as I know to my cost, requires a great deal of homework; and that the noble and learned Viscount should have done it in addition to his other duties is something for which we all owe him our tribute and our thanks.
In view of some of the things said by the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, it is worth while mentioning that we have the Report and the draft Bill before us. But of course we do not have a real Bill, and when one is looking at the drafting, although comments are very useful, one must not treat this draft Bill as positive legislation which is being put forward. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, that it is very difficult to make a speech on this occasion. It is more or less impossible for me, because if I say anything that looks as though it indicates what the Government's views are I shall be failing to fulfil the pledge that we will listen carefully to the views of both Houses before making up our minds—and I shall do something even worse than that if I say something which may be considered before the Law Society and the Magistrates' Association report, in which case the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, would never speak to me again. If I try to say nothing, your Lordships will be, quite rightly, bored; and in any event I cannot possibly hope to cover all the topics that have been dealt with in the course of the debate. However, I think there are a few things that I can legitimately say.
It must be high time that the Criminal Law Revision Committee were thanked for their work on this Report, and it is very gratifying that so many noble Lords have done so to-day. I just wonder where several speakers got the context of this Report from. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, put the context as one of attempting to increase control over crime, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Salmon (whose maiden speech I admired as much as anybody else, I hope), also seemed to suggest that this was the Committee's underlying motive or philosophy—to have some impact on crime. I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken that the
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best way to have an impact on crime is to have a good police force and good detection, but I cannot find one single word in the Report that indicates that this was the motive behind the work they were carrying out. If one reads paragraphs 24 and 25, one of which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking—and indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, pointed it out as well—one gets the real point of the operation, which was to simplify and clear away some of the dreadful complexities in this area of the law. I therefore hope we shall not be involved too much with matters which I think are totally extraneous; in other words, the view that this is an attempt to get more convictions and to increase control over serious crime in this country.
The Committee are not without their proven merits already. One of the Interim Reports that they put up on this very subject concerned the law in three sections of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. Since that date, so far as I know, it has not been working at all badly. I must also rebut any suggestion that because they were mostly rather senior members of the legal profession they were not qualified to express weighty and important words on this subject. After all, they did include a practising barrister and several judges who had been practising barristers, and—I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, who raised this point—if one can only comment on this subject while one is a practising barrister we should have to rely totally on my noble friend Lord Mansfield and the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and discard the views of all other noble and learned Lords who have spoken in the debate to-day. I do not think that that is very desirable, because I am quite sure that although it may have been a little while ago since noble and learned Lords were practising at the Bar they have not discarded all recollection of what went on when they did. I also recall the comments—passages of arms, they were—about the merits of this very Committee, which the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and I exchanged with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, in the debate on the Theft Bill; so I think we must pay some serious attention to the members of the Committee and treat them with the merit they deserve.

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On Clause 1—this deals with the celebrated right of silence, and the critics really have buzzed like hornets (or possibly I should adopt Lord Goodman's "galloping bumblebees", which was a fascinating concept) on it—there have been two different approaches. The noble Lord, Lord Foot, said that he did not want any lawyers' wrangle here, and he considered it to be (as many other people who have spoken and written about this considered it to be) a very large question about the relationship between the person and the State, and a tremendous matter of principle. I respect their views on this.
But then I listened to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Widgery, who told us about the origin of the matter and mentioned specific examples. Let us also see—because nobody has really mentioned this, though my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack touched on it—what a dreadful thing it is that turns out to be suggested on this particular point by the Committee. This is the present law on the right to silence, as stated by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division):
"It is wrong for a judge to say to the jury, 'Because the accused exercised what is undoubtedly his right, the privilege of remaining silent, you may draw an inference of guilt'."
The Court of Appeal statement went on:
"It is quite a different matter to say, 'The accused, as he was entitled to, has not advanced at an earlier stage the explanation that he has offered to you to-day. You, the jury, may take that into account when assessing the weight you think it right to attribute to that explanation'."
That is the difference between the case of Ryan and the case of Sullivan, one where the conviction was upheld, and the other where it was quashed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in the case of Sullivan the conviction was not quashed.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, my noble and learned friend is quite right; but it would have been had it not been for the application of the proviso.
I want the House to consider—and I think we have almost a jury here—whether this is the "ancient safeguard" mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Foot. The distinction is keenly supported as being one of the fundamental underpinning pillars of the freedom of the individual.
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Let us take the case where the defence has turned entirely on a new explanation of facts which had never previously been revealed. I tell the House, as the jury, that you are allowed to say to yourselves "It is really very odd that he never produced this explanation before. We do not think we can rely on this new explanation." That is a matter of weight; that is legitimate. I suppose that a jury might say that if they did not rely on that explanation, and there was no other defence, they had little option other than to convict. But they are allowed to put it that way. What they cannot say is: "It is really very odd that he never produced this explanation before; we infer from the earlier silence that this explanation is not true and that he is guilty". They cannot say that because that is an inference of guilt. But they can say what I said just now, and this is the difference between the two propositions: the existing law and the one in the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report. It may be vital—I do not wish to say whether it is or not—but let us get clear exactly what we are talking about.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, that we want to leave the generalities aside and look at some of the particularities of the case. One has to remember also that despite the one prohibition that a jury must not infer guilt from silence, they can, as I understand it, infer guilt from the hang-dog look and from the other things that my noble and learned friend mentioned. They can also infer guilt from the fact that the man ran away; and from the fact that he told a pack of palpable lies when he was questioned by the police. They may not infer guilt from silence; but even then they can take that failure to explain into account on the matter of the weight of the evidence.
There is one other point on which the House ought to be a little careful—because I am not certain that either the noble Lord, Lord Foot. or the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, when they were considering the practical side of this, had taken it into account; that is, that the Committee's proposal is not unqualified. The inference from silence is to be drawn only if the man could reasonably have been expected to mention it when questioned before. The court and the jury may draw only such inferences, from

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silence as may appear proper. If you take seriously those two words that I have emphasised, it cuts out a great deal of the absurdities to which it is suggested all this is going to lead. I am sure that those qualifications apply also to the use of silence as corroboration. If your Lordships look at paragraphs 40 to 42, on page 211 of the Report, I think that will be clear. I am not saying whether this is right or wrong, but I suggest that the authors of this proposition are not the Red revolutionaries the noble Lord, Lord Foot, suggested they were.
It brings me on to the question of the Judges' Rules and tape recorders. This is a particularly intricate point, but I am absolutely at one with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, and others, who said that what we must get is a fair interrogation. Naturally, if Clause 1 were to be passed into law the Judges' Rules would have to be altered, though whether the caution would take the form necessarily suggested and read out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, I do not know. There is also the question of the status of the Judges' Rules which the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chief Justice, and I think also the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, raised—the question whether they should be statutory, whether they should be made by the judges, whether they should be made by the Home Office. And if they are to be a Statutory Instrument, according to the Labour lawyers there is a good deal of difference between whether you have an Affirmative or a Negative Resolution on this matter.
We must take account, plainly—and the courts do now—of any serious breaches or bending of the edges of these Rules. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, mentioned the access to solicitors point as being something that particularly needs looking at. Within the control of the law, within the context of whatever the law is at the time, I can tell the House that no Government would propose to reduce the safeguards or seek to reduce their effectiveness in looking after a person under interrogation. But how do we do it? The noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, said that the tape recording idea was so easy to falsify that it was not worth considering; but, on the other hand, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Gardiner, Lord Diplock, Lord
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Dilhorne and Lord Widgery, all agreed that something like this would be a prerequisite before we had anything in the way of Clause 1 at all. This, of course, is a matter where we must take into account—and this was very clear in several speeches—the further dimension, which really is a further dimension, of the legitimate and essential activities of the police in detecting and investigating crime. This goes far beyond the rules of evidence and impinges on the whole of their efficiency. They must be fair, but I cannot believe that the House would ever wish them to be less than fully effective in bringing the criminals to court.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, emphasised this point, and my noble friend Lord Mansfield told us of some of the practical side of it. I will study, and so shall we all, the suggestions made by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Reid and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, about this matter. But what I think it leads to is what we should do. The points we have been talking about in this context carry, at any rate in many people's minds, the status of a major constitutional issue. We also have the practical problems of the skill of the police and the way in which they carry out their work. The idea therefore that one should send this issue, as Lord Reid suggested, to the Law Commission seems to me to be, with respect to him, perhaps a little wide of the mark. I do not think that this was agreed to on other sides of the debate. What I think we should do is to look at this matter in Government and see whether we cannot come up with a practical answer to the fear expressed about the profound dangers to liberty, and so on, together with its technical side and the police involvement. I believe that this might be better, although of course it would be for my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor to say whether it went to the Law Commission. It might be better for the Government themselves to try to find a solution, now that we have the legal advice not only from the Committee but from many other people as well.
The subject of confessions has been mentioned. I am sure we must always take great care that there is no improper pressure put on an accused to obtain a confession from him. What puzzles me a little is that set out in the Committee's

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Report, in paragraphs 57 and 58, are cases such as Northam and Zaveckas and Cleary. Then the case of Smith was mentioned earlier in regard to the court-martial. Here there are really grave anomalies, and one finds that the Bar Council, in their Yellow Book, say that these cases involve threats or inducements which may be harmless in themselves and may lead to confessions which are true and which cannot be said to be obtained by oppression. Then all they do is to throw up their hands in despair and say that there is no reform of the law that they can see which will bring about a cure for what is apparently an accepted ill.
To turn to the question of the previous misconduct of the accused, I think the best thing I can do is to say that we shall study with care what the noble and learned Lords, Lord Salmon and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, thought about this issue; in other words, that we should stay where we are with the rule in, I think, Makins case, under the common law, and not try to restate it as a matter of Statute. But there is of course—and here the debate has been somewhat one-sided—another aspect to misconduct. There is the proposal, I think in Clause 6(4), that the defence should no longer be put in peril of having all the accused's previous convictions raised against him if he makes some comparatively minor suggestion which is said under the present law to go to the credit of the prosecution witness. Here in the Committee's Report is a proposition which I should have thought would be welcomed by everybody because it takes away from the defence a grave dilemma, and yet on the subject of previous misconduct nobody has said a word about this matter at all.
Hearsay is a subject upon which, if one knew it well enough, one could speak possibly for ever; but I do not propose to do so. Again, I think we should consider the speeches that have been made and particularly the individual points raised. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said that the proposals in the Committee's Report were very like those in the Civil Evidence Acts, about which he knows so much. As I read the Bar Council's yellow book they do not agree about that at all. I feel sure therefore that there is room for a dialogue here, to see
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whether we can come to some conclusion. But I should have thought, too, that there must be good in this part of the Bill as well as bad, and it has been only the bad that has been picked on this evening.
The corroboration aspect was the area of mumbo-jumbo mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock. Again, that derives from a mixture of common law and Statute, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, dealt with. He is quite right in saying, of course, that this matter has been overtaken to some extent by the decision in R. v. Kilbourne in this House, whereby two children were allowed to corroborate each other. But I noted that he, and I think other noble Lords—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I think that was the case of R. v Hester; it was the case with the two children.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, there were several groups of children in the case of R. v Kilbourne.
I noted that there was welcome for Clause 21 of the draft Bill, which suggests that where the main evidence for the prosecution is that of identification there should be corroboration. The other matter that I noted in the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, was the question whether we really need to legislate for the judge to draw the attention of the jury to the need for special caution in these cases. There is a good deal of comment in the Bar Council's book on this and on the discretion of the judge in this particular activity, which I think runs a little contrary to what the noble and learned Lord was saying, because the Bar Council seemed to be not too happy about the discretion being left to the judge.
I have not time to say much about statistics, but I think I can answer a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. The trouble about his friend in America is that I am afraid he has got the thing exactly back to front. The way in which the criminal statistics are dealt with here is, for better or worse, by the method of recording only that offence which got to the furthest stage in the criminal proceedings. Thus if there are several charges and the accused person is acquitted on all of them except one, he is only recorded under the conviction, because in the case

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of the acquittals the matter stopped there. However, the case of a conviction, and then a sentence, constituted a further stage. This may be a method of tabulation which does not commend itself, but at least it means that a person is recorded as having only one single appearance at court, even though a number of charges are levelled against him at the same time.
LORD RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount to explain that? Does it not finish up as one conviction for acquittal?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: No, my Lords; it finishes up as one conviction because only the offence which gets the furthest is recorded at all; so there is only one entry in that respect and it is the conviction.
I was interested in the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Mansfield why acquittals are getting more frequent. I have been glad to find (this point has not been raised to-day, although it has been discussed outside and in the House generally) that there has not been any attempt to balance the changes which might be said to benefit the prosecution against the changes which might be said to benefit the defence. I do not think it is right to look at this matter in terms of a bargain or balance; each and every one of the changes should be made on its merits.
I have not time to go through all the sections of the draft Bill and Report that have not been discussed in this debate, but I have noted the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that at least 19 clauses have not been discussed. I feel that if there had been something to criticise, one or other noble Lord would have mentioned it. I am therefore encouraged to think that we may have material here which is not subject to criticism and which, if noble Lords had had more time, they would have welcomed. We therefore have something to build on out of the Report.
My Lords, the intricacies of this subject are really beyond a winding-up speech because of the pure enormity of the material, but I can tell the House that all contributions made in the debate have been gratefully received and will be studied most carefully. I know that this
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is what the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, wanted to know. They will be studied in detail and I have myself begun a table containing the points that noble Lords have made. I will yield neither to the Bar Council nor to anyone else the monopoly of considering not merely the rules of evidence, as they put it, but the whole ethic of the system of criminal law. Her Majesty's Government are just as interested in this and, I believe, just as well equipped to deal with it as those who have commented on this matter from outside.
My noble and learned friend who sits on the Woolsack examined the progress and history of the rules of evidence and procedure and how they came about. We welcome the Report we are discussing not as definitive, any more than we would say that the objections to it are conclusive; we welcome it, as my right honourable friend the Member for Barnet said when he was Home Secretary, as a framework for early and necessary reform. We are not committed to acceptance of each and every item in the Report: some may be rejected. Nor do we disregard points which have been raised, either in this debate or outside, merely because they are not in the Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report; I know that the Labour lawyers, for example, have some which they have drawn to their attention and we are grateful for their doing so. We cannot, however, deny that the aim should be to get as near to the truth as possible in the criminal courts and to present to juries all such matters as will enable them to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent—all such matters as can properly and reasonably be put before them.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said that this area of the law was in need of cleaning up. I am sure the House will agree that that is right. I certainly do. What seems to me to be quite unacceptable is that important matters of this kind should be dealt with purely by chance, the opportunity occurring when the matter comes before the courts, as, for example, in Hester and in Kilbourne. This depends on the conduct and decisions of counsel in some individual case—the chance of a mistake in the summing-up, the pursuit of the appeal in that event and the arrival of that appeal in a court senior enough to make

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a clean sweep of the law if that is necessary. And there are probably further steps than that.
Those are four chancy methods of picking away into the defects of the law on criminal evidence. Unless we do something else, that is all we are going to get. It may be very fine, if done piecemeal and bit by bit, and there may be improvements; but I believe that we have to be bolder than that. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Widgery, that we should use this Report as a springboard. I believe that he and the noble and learned Viscount who moved this Motion have shown us that it is not all controversial. We must make an effort, after we have heard the further promised reports and after the debate has taken place in another place, and must come forward with some further positive proposals. I am sure they will not be uncontroversial, but we must take this on and produce something which we, at any rate, think makes sense; and in the process of trying to do that I can assure the House that this debate has been an enormous help to us in seeking to achieve our aim.
9.32 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, and my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross began their speeches by expressing a debt of gratitude to me for tabling this Motion which we have been discussing for so many hours. I do not think that there is any debt of gratitude owed to me. For my part I should like to express a debt of gratitude to all those noble Lords—and in my time in this House I do not think I can ever remember so many legal Lords taking part in any debate—for the contributions they have made. Not only have they been most interesting but I believe that they will be most valuable to Her Majesty's Government.
For myself it has been a most enjoyable occasion. I rather feared what might happen to me at the hands of my two successors in office, but I was delighted to find that on this occasion the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, and I were in substantial agreement upon so many things. My problem in moving this Motion was to try to cover
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the whole of the ground of what was contained in the Report in as short a speech as possible, and I carefully refrained from stepping a yard outside it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, spent some time—and I admired his ability to get it into a speech—discussing not only what was in the Report but also other things which he thought ought to have been in the Report. I make no criticism of that. I could not find a way to do it myself.
At this hour of the night I am not going to comment on the various speeches that have been made, except to say that we heard a very memorable maiden speech from my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon: he spoke with a directness and clarity which commanded attention throughout the whole of the House. Nor am I going to deal with and comment on the various points that have been made, except to say that I was surprised by the general unanimity of opinion and the agreement in criticism on the various matters. As to the conclusion to be drawn from the speeches with regard to the silence of an accused during interrogation by the police, the impression I got from those speeches was that those who spoke would be prepared to have inferences drawn from silence of the accused during an interrogation if, and only if, there was an accurate record of that interrogation in such a form that there would be no risk of an inference being wrongly drawn. So, my Lords, progress can be made on that perhaps if the Home Office and others can devise a system for accurate recording of the process of interrogation. I do not mean by that that all the interrogation has to be recorded. The noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, talked about the interrogation beginning straight away. I see nothing to stop that. But if you are going to ask anyone to draw an inference from silence, in my belief that inference should not be open to be drawn unless it can be seen from a recording that it is clearly properly drawn. That is all I wish to say about that subject.
I think that the speeches have been very interesting indeed. With regard to hearsay, I warmly agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, that you cannot say that the same considerations apply in criminal trials as apply in civil trials. It is all very well for my

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noble and learned friend Lord Diplock to say that we must avoid emotive words and then to talk more than once of "mumbo-jumbo". So far as I am concerned, I draw a very big distinction between evidence in civil cases and evidence in criminal cases, where there is a different burden of proof. I know that my noble and learned friend has a great responsibility, a paternal responsibility, for the Civil Evidence Act, and I dare say that that may influence him into thinking that it should be extended to the criminal law. But I do not think it should.
I have one fear, and that is that those members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee who worked for so long on producing this Report may be disappointed by its reception in your Lordships' House. I hope they will not be. It is only natural that most of the noble Lords who have spoken should draw attention to the things they do not like, and that they should not spend time commenting upon those parts of the Report of the Committee which they find acceptable. The Committee has drawn
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attention to many problems. I agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that the time has come when we should all look, as the members of the Committee have looked, at the situation with regard to the administration of criminal justice. I think we should be grateful to them for that. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Widgery, said, what they have said does provide a foundation on which we can build.
My Lords, may I conclude by once again expressing my thanks to your Lordships for the way in which you have contributed to this debate, and my regret that I do not know, even now, from what the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has said whether or not my Motion is acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. But on the assumption that it is not, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at twenty-three minutes before ten o'clock.