Sitting of 9 November 1972

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  HOME DEPARTMENT

    Alimony
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many letters he received in October, 1972, from women, complaining that alimony granted to them by court order was not being paid by their husbands.
    The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Mark Carlisle): Three, Sir.
    Mr. Dalyell: Even though the Finer Committee has not yet reported, are the Government satisfied with the legislative position regarding women who cannot get money which is granted to them by court order?
    Mr. Carlisle: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we are awaiting the report of the Finer Committee. During 1971 we took various measures of a legislative nature, which we believe assist the situation. However, we await with interest the report of the Finer Committee.

    Prisons and Borstals
    Mr. Meacherasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what information he has about the intelligence quotient breakdown of prison officers, and of persons sent to prison or borstal, respectively.
    Mr. Carlisle: There is no systematic collection of this information.
    Mr. Meacher: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that a recent Ministry of Home Affairs study in Northern Ireland found that a third of young prisoners were above average or average in educa-
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    tional attainment, and that a quarter of that third were bright or very bright? Does not that indicate the need for much greater ingenuity and enterprise in devising employment and general activities for prisoners, especially for young prisoners?
    Mr. Carlisle: I was not aware of the report to which the hon. Gentleman refers. Intelligence tests are carried out as part of the allocation process of those who are being sent to borstals. The only evidence that we have available, from the only studies that we have made, is that the prison population generally appears to mirror the intelligence of the public generally.

    Mugging
    Mr. Croninasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he is taking to reduce the frequency of mugging.
    Mr. Liptonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps he is taking to stamp out mugging in the Metropolitan Police area.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Robert Carr): I am taking all possible steps to strengthen the police—who form the first line of defence against violent crime of all kinds—and to improve their equipment and efficiency. I understand that chief officers of police, who are responsible for police action to deal with such offences, are taking special measures in a number of areas, and I have asked them for an assessment of the current position and for details of the measures which they are taking.
    Mr. Cronin: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in spite of election promises about maintaining law and order, since the present Government took office there has been an increase of violent crime which is much worse than the increase in the cost of living? In view of the widespread fear of being robbed with violence, will the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking to make periodic statements indicating the success which the Government are having in combating the situation?
    Mr. Carr: I am aware that since the Government came to office a new and rather successful recruitment drive has

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    taken place to strengthen the police. The strength of the police has risen by over 5,000 in the last two years. I am glad to say that recruitment is still proceeding. I am sure that the main course is to pursue detection and increase police strength.
    Mr. Lipton: What is the use of the right hon. Gentleman's fine protestations if, as in a case a week or two ago at the Old Bailey—a nasty case of mugging on Streatham Common—the judge awards a suspended sentence? What sort of deterrent will there be if judges disregard the kind of action which the right hon. Gentleman and the police are trying to take?
    Mr. Carr: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I cannot possibly comment on individual sentences. Under our system, that is a matter for the courts. However, I have recently noticed some other sentences of a much more severe kind. When I was addressing the Magistrates Association a few week ago I went out of my way to say that I thought the public would expect severe treatment for crimes of violence.
    Mr. Marten: Is "mugging" capable of legal definition?
    Mr. Carr: I fear that it is not. It is an Americanism, and I cannot define it accurately. I think that what is meant by the term is robbery by gangs of two or more people—usually young people—of citizens walking about in the open.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: The right hon. Gentleman has referred to the encouraging rise in recruitment for the police. Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the position is nothing like as encouraging in the Metropolitan area, where there have been many cases of mugging and where wastage among the police is serious?
    Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman consider the possibility of increasing foot patrols in areas where mugging is most common?
    Lastly, will the right hon. Gentleman discuss with his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Employment the serious effects on young school leavers of prolonged periods of unemployment, a situation which has cropped up in many court cases, in the description of the occupation of young criminals?
    Mr. Carr: The hon. lady's first point arises on a later Question, and I shall have something to say about it then. I understand that some police forces are now instituting foot patrols for this purpose. This is one of my reasons for wanting information from all chief constables. I want to find out what they are doing. I completely agree with the hon. Lady that unemployment among the young is a serious factor. That was why my old Department started, on a pilot scale—which I hope will soon be able to be extended—special community service work opportunities for young people.

    Metropolitan Police (Recruitment)
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he proposes to improve recruiting for the Metropolitan Police.
    Mr. R. Carr: The Metropolitan Police will share in the recent pay increase, and will benefit from the national recruitment campaign. In addition, the Commissioner of Police, with my approval, has doubled the amount to be spent this year on handbooks, films, posters, exhibition displays and other forms of publicity and has launched a new campaign which includes special television and press advertising.
    Mr. Wall: I welcome my right hon. Friend's reply, and, in particular, his reference to increases in police pay, but will he agree that the police are still overworked and undermanned, and look into such matters as hours of work, amenities and pensions?
    Mr. Carr: Yes, Sir; I shall look at all these things. Only last night, when I was addressing the annual general meeting of the Metropolitan branch boards of the Police Federation, I assured the meeting that I had listened carefully to the points that had been raised and would consider them all.
    Mr. Elystan Morgan: What is the establishment strength of the Metropolitan Police at the moment, and how many thousands of officers would be needed to bring the force up to that strength?
    Mr. Carr: I ought to be able to tell the hon. Gentleman off the cuff, but I have to confess that my cuff seems to be missing at the moment. I shall reply to the hon. Gentleman in detail by letter.

    Industrial Subversion
    Mr. Adleyasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will consider seeking to set up a working party comprising officials of his Department, representatives of the Trades Union Congress and of the police to consider and report on industrial subversion.
    Mr. R. Carr: I doubt that it would be helpful to set up a working party of the kind proposed; but I am aware of the concern particularly about suggestions of intimidation in some recent industrial disputes, and am in discussion with chief officers of police.
    Mr. Adley: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that reply, although it is not as encouraging as I had hoped. Is he aware—I am sure that he is—that most responsible trade union leaders are as much concerned as everyone else is about some of the incidents which took place recently, particularly during the building strike? Has my right hon. Friend seen the series of articles in the News of the World which, I understand, have drawn an unprecedented response to that newspaper? Further, will he agree that it is coming to something when one has to use the word "courageous" to describe people who are prepared to speak out against this sort of activity?
    Mr. Carr: This is a serious problem. We have had it for years, but I think that there is concern lest it should be increasing. We need specific information rather than general accusations, and I hope that anyone who suffers intimidation will come forward, because that is the only way which gives the police opportunity to deal with it. It is a matter which everyone should take seriously, and I was glad to see, for example, that Mr. Jack Jones and the Transport and General Workers Union are taking it seriously, following certain events in the recent dock strike.
    Mr. Bidwell: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Question as framed is far from specific—which he invites us to be? It is couched in broad terms and, in the light of the general view within his party, it represents a libel on the trade union movement as a whole. Does the right hon. Gentleman realise
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    that what is referred to amounts to very much a fringe-type activity, and to represent it in the way the Question does is to put it grotesquely out of proportion to the realities of the British industrial scene?
    Mr. Carr: It may be a fringe-type activity, but that does not make it unimportant. I agree that the vast majority of trade union members deplore any activity of this kind, but there are minorities who appear to take a different view. For instance, during the miners' dispute at the beginning of this year the executive of a union affiliated to the TUC came to see me personally to express its great concern at the way in which its members were being intimidated.

    Public Functions (Sunday Restrictions)
    Mr. Sydney Chapmanasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will seek to amend those parts of the Sunday Entertainment Act and the Sunday Observance Act as necessary for Sunday, 31st December, 1972, so that public dances, concerts and cabarets and other public functions may be unaffected.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Lane): My right hon. Friend has no proposals for legislation on this matter, about which a number of differing views may be held.
    Mr. Chapman: I appreciate that point of view, and I wish in no way to be responsible for the further commercialising of Sunday, but does not my hon. Friend agree that many people find it niggling, petty and irritating in the extreme that they cannot hold New Year's Eve celebrations as they would normally do this year, simply because next New Year's Eve falls on a Sunday? Bearing in mind, in particular, that people will wish to celebrate our going into Europe, does not my hon. Friend agree that it is important that public functions should not be discriminated against and that, for example, one should be allowed to wear fancy dress at a public function on that day?
    Mr. Lane: I know that there is a good deal of public dissatisfaction about this matter, but I am aware also that it is an exceedingly controversial one. I am sure that my hon. Friend realises that it would

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    be quite impracticable, anyway, to legislate at this range for next New Year's Eve. It may be that the whole question of the law relating to Sunday will interest one of the hon. Members whose names have come high in the Ballot for Private Members' Bills.

    Prison Officers
    Mr. Thomas Coxasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the number of vacancies that exist for prison officers.
    Mr. R. Carr: For the current financial year, we have planned for a net increase of 800 prison officers, and I am hopeful of achieving this target.
    Mr. Cox: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that reply. In view of the recent prison disturbances, I am sure that he appreciates the importance of adequate staffing in prisons. Will he give a firm assurance that before any attempt is made to implement the report from the manpower control survey teams from his Department which are now touring prisons, the report will be presented to the House and an opportunity will be given for a debate?
    Mr. Carr: I understand the concern that is felt, which often arises when inquiries of this kind are going on. There is a big difference between deciding whether one's staffing ratios are right for the basic requirements of prison officer work and deciding whether one is using one's prison officer manpower as effectively as possible. I understand the fears in people's minds, and I realise how those two aspects get mixed up. I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that our intention is to have an expanding prison officer service.
    Mr. Fowler: I know that my right hon. Friend appreciates the importance of maintaining the morale of prison officers. Will he take it that one of the biggest boosts to prison officer morale was his refusal to negotiate with the self-styled prisoners' union during the summer, and will he confirm that that remains his policy?
    Mr. Carr: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. John Fraser: The Home Secretary has confirmed that he will discuss his
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    manpower requirements with the prison officers. Will he at the same time discuss with them the problems which they often face over overtime and housing accommodation, particularly when house prices are rising so alarmingly?
    Mr. Carr: Yes, Sir. When I met the prison governors and representatives of the Prison Officers Association after the disturbances in the summer, I told both that the whole question of staffing ratios and the conditions of the service was a matter I wished to look into.

    Prisoners (Legal Assistance)
    Mr. John Fraserasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will take steps to ensure compliance with the Judges' Rules on the subject of legal assistance for prisoners at police stations in the Metropolitan Police area.
    Mr. Carlisle: The preamble to the Judges' Rules refers to the accepted principle that every person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor; and that this is so even if the person is in custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is thereby caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice.
    The Commissioner has assured me that the principle is well known to Metropolitan Police officers.
    Mr. Fraser: Are we not now agreed that the principle was not observed in 74 per cent. of the cases investigated by Mr. Michael Zander, and may we have an assurance that where civil liberties are to he exercised or affected in this way it will be allowed to the prisoner, since it is enormously important for maintaining confidence in the police forces that people should be able to exercise their basic civil liberties?
    Mr. Carlisle: It is important that the requirements should be fully carried out by police forces and that people's civil liberties should be properly regarded. If the hon. Gentleman has in mind a particular case I shall look into it, but I should point out that the article referred to was in more general terms and did not raise any specific case which could be investigated.

    Drugs
    Dr. Stuttafordasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many convictions there were for possessing heroin in 1970 and 1971.
    Mr. R. Carr: In England and Wales, 153 in 1970; 433 in 1971.
    Dr. Stuttaford: These figures are extremely worrying. Do they not show that there is a great deal of Chinese heroin still coming into this country—heroin which is imported from South-East Asia, processed in Hong Kong, and then brought to Britain by members of the Chinese population in Soho? Will not our police forces have an impossible task unless supported by diplomatic action?
    Mr. Carr: This is a serious problem. Police forces throughout the country are stepping up their activities in prevention and sorting out drug misuse. It is also important that approval has recently been given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a substantial increase in the staff of the Customs central drugs investigation branch. The increase in the number of convictions may mean—and, I hope, to some extent at least, does mean—that the police effort is being more effective, and not entirely that the abuse of drugs is increasing.
    Mr. Elystan Morgan: Will the right hon. Gentleman say what are the figures for convictions for possessing or pushing cannabis during the same years, and will he say whether those figures cast any light on the continuing argument of the possibility—to put it no higher—of a causal connection between the taking of cannabis and heroin addiction?
    Mr. Carr: The hon. Gentleman seems to be discovering all the cuffs that I have not got on today! In fact, that is another question. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to put down a Question on that point I will answer it.
    Mr. Fell: Has my right hon. Friend any idea of the percentage of pushers, as against users, amongst those convicted? Surely the important thing is that the pushers of the drugs should be caught and convicted, rather than the users.
    Mr. Carr: I am afraid that I have no specific figures on that point. In any case
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    pushers, as my hon. Friend calls them, are often also users; the two overlap. I was present with my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State at the European Community conference in Rome a few weeks ago, and we are trying—particularly on an international scale, above all else—to deal with the traffic in drugs.
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he proposes to take in the light of the figures released at the General Assembly of Interpol that the British police seized 2½ tons of cannabis worth £1½ million on the black market in the last 12 months, and that there is increased traffic in morphine and heroin, and of the seizure of 5,600 doses of microdot tablets of LSD.
    Mr. Lane: The figures reflect the increasing success of Customs and police action against illicit traffic in drugs. I shall do all that I can to ensure that it is maintained.
    Mr. Dalyell: Does the success extend to morphine and heroin?
    Mr. Lane: Yes, the success extends right across the field. In addition to what my right hon. Friend said, I can assure the hon. Member that we have strengthened our defences more recently by setting up the Central Drugs Intelligence Unit in London. This will also be of great help.

    Scientologists
    Mr. Rostasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many alien scientologists have been refused entry to the United Kingdom as visitors during the past three years; and on what grounds permits are refused.
    Mr. Lane: The answer to the first part of the Question is "None, Sir." But 36 foreign nationals have been refused leave to land during the past three years because they were coming to study or work at scientology establishments.
    Mr. Rost: While not wishing to comment on the merits or otherwise of scientology, may I ask my hon. Friend to confirm that the practice of scientology in this country is not illegal? Will he, therefore, give an assurance that arbitrary sanctions will not be applied to foreign

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    visitors to this country simply because they happen to be scientologists?
    Mr. Lane: There is no question of arbitrary sanctions being applied. I do not want to go further into the merits of this question because, as my hon. Friend will know, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services is at present engaged in consultations about our whole future policy towards scientology, and I would rather leave it there for today.
    Mr. J. T. Price: In case the Home Office is in any danger of being conned by this kind of question, may I remind the hon. Gentleman that long before he occupied his present office his Department had plenty of evidence of the practices of this cult, and that all kinds of sinister activities are on record, because I have given some of the information to a previous Home Secretary? Will the hon. Gentleman resist all temptation to reverse this policy—one of the few policies of the present Government which have my full support—of keeping these people out of the country?
    Mr. Lane: In the Home Office we try never to be conned. On that point, I am well aware of what has been said in this House and elsewhere about the scientology cult, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we shall consider this matter very carefully indeed before departing in any way from our present policy.

    Professional Bodies (Police Reports)
    Mr. Leslie Huckfieldasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what reconsideration he has given to the circulars from his Department advising chief constables to make reports to professional bodies on their members; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Carlisle: A review of the arrangements is in progress. My right hon. Friend will make a statement when it is complete.
    Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not recall the case reported in the Sunday Times earlier this year of a chief constable who reported a midwife to her professional body because it was thought that she had an
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    inferiority complex? Does he not recall the rather strong pledge given by a predecessor of his right hon. Friend, and will he now undertake to make a statement on this matter to the House as soon as possible?
    Mr. Carlisle: I recollect the pledge made by my right hon. Friend. That is why a review of the arrangement is taking place. I should point out to the hon. Gentleman, first, that no representations have ever been received by the Home Office from those in whose case a report has been made, and, secondly, that the basic purpose of these reports is the protection of the public.

    Motorways (Police Vehicles)
    Mr. David Stoddartasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will take steps to ensure that the police are provided with vehicles capable of dealing with those drivers who travel on motorways, particularly the M4, at speeds in excess of 140 miles per hour.
    Mr. Carlisle: The provision of vehicles for police purposes is a matter for police authorities. But I understand that it is not normal police practice to pursue vehicles which are travelling too fast on motorways. The law is enforced in other ways.
    Mr. Stoddart: Will the Minister accept that I understand the reasons for what is really a negative answer, and I sympathise with them? But would he not agree that these excessive speeds on motorways are extremely dangerous, and cause much concern to the police? Would he care to comment on reports that there is in London a club of well-heeled louts who travel on the M4 at speeds exceeding 140 m.p.h.? Will he have further discussions with the police as to what other measures can be taken to deal with these dangerous speed lunatics?
    Mr. Carlisle: Of course, I wholly agree with the hon. Member that those who travel on motorways at speeds in excess of 140 m.p.h. are being thoroughly dangerous and, indeed, are a severe danger to the public as a whole. In fact, when the hon. Gentleman asks me about the article to which he has referred and says that people are aiming to drive at these speeds on motorways, I would point

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    out to him that are they in danger not only of committing the offence of exceeding the speed limit but, possibly, of committing offences of dangerous driving, driving at a speed dangerous to the public and also, in the terms of the article, taking part in a race or trial of speed between motor vehicles, which are serious offences.
    Mr. R. C. Mitchell: The Minister is constantly asking the public to exercise restraint. Is this not an example where Ministers should themselves set an example?
    Mr. Carlisle: The Question referred to those who are alleged to drive on motorways at speeds in excess of 140 m.p.h., which is faster than police vehicles are said to be able to go. The hon. Gentleman will realise that we all have a responsibility to obey the law, and I would remind him that that applies to all forms of law and to all parts of the High Court.

    High Security Prison
    Mr. Farrasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has for the construction of the new high security prison for the segregation of trouble makers.
    Mr. R. Carr: None, Sir. But I am considering, in the light of recent experience, how far improvements can be made in our techniques and facilities for containing prisoners who are violent, dangerous or trouble makers.
    Mr. Farr: With regard to the troubles in the autumn, would my right hon. Friend not agree that if trouble makers had been segregated in one highly unpleasant and secure place a lot of the troubles fermented by the trouble makers in the prisons might well not have occurred? Will my right hon. Friend look at that matter again?
    Mr. Carr: Certainly I am looking very carefully at what is called the dispersal policy, but I remind my hon. Friend that the answer would not necessarily be, as some people imagine, a top security prison, because while the so-called category A top security people may include trouble makers, they do not include all the trouble makers. Therefore, this would not be the answer to the problem.

    Broadmoor (Discharged Patients)
    Mr. Wintertonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many patients discharged from Broad-moor or similar establishments have committed further acts of violence.
    Mr. Carlisle: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply given to his similar Question on 26th October. I cannot add to the information that he has been sent.—[Vol. 843, c. 362.]
    Mr. Winterton: I thank my hon. and learned Friend for the figures and statistics given in his reply to my original Question. Is he not prepared to have these figures put in the OFFICIAL REPORT, so that the public at large can appreciate the situation? Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that with very little effort I have discovered five such cases, in which at least two people have died? Does my hon. and learned Friend feel that the interests of the general public are safeguarded by the somewhat liberal approach that is adopted to these unfortunate people?
    Mr. Carlisle: Of course I am prepared to give any information I can to the House, but that information could not be complete, as my hon. Friend knows. What I was able to tell him was that 642 restricted persons were discharged in 1966 and 1967, of whom six had since been convicted of offences involving violence.
    On the wider point, I assure my hon. Friend that the greatest care is taken before anyone is conditionally discharged from a special security hospital, but in the end one has to act on the advice of the doctors and the best advice that one can obtain. We cannot realistically be asked to hold people in special hospitals against medical advice merely because an unfortunate occurrence occasionally takes place. I ask my hon. Friend to accept that all these things are considered extremely carefully.
    Mr. Arthur Davidson: Is not the most important consideration of all to ensure that the after-care facilities for those who are released are much improved and that no one—as in a recent well-known case—is sent to some seedy room without help or supervision from anyone so that

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    it is inevitable that at some time or other he will get into trouble? Will the hon. and learned Gentleman increase the after-care facilities?
    Mr. Carlisle: I agree that these facilities are very important. After the case to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) called for an inquiry, as a result of which certain alterations were made in the process of discharging, including the requirement of a second doctor's opinion. The whole of the safeguards we then imposed are at the moment being reviewed by an independent committee under Sir Carl Aarvold, whose report we are shortly awaiting.

    Legal Aid
    Dame Joan Vickersasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many women who have been sent to prison for prostitution received legal aid.
    Mr. Carlisle: I regret that this information is not immediately available and could be obtained only at disproportionate cost. When Section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1972, comes into force, a court will not be able to pass a first custodial sentence on an unrepresented defendant unless he or she appears to have adequate means or has refused or failed to apply for legal aid after being informed of its availability.
    Dame Joan Vickers: When the Street Offences Act was introduced by a Conservative Government it was suggested that the welfare services would be very much better concentrated. In view of a recent reply about the large number of people being put in prison for prostitution, how are the welfare services working to stop them being put into prison unless absolutely necessary?
    Mr. Carlisle: I should make it clear that, in the last two years, of the 2,347 and 2,871 people, respectively, who have been found guilty of these offences, only 264 and 286 were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. There is a system of cautioning which has to be gone through before a person appears charged with this offence. I am prepared to consider how the system is working in practice.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: May I raise the question of legal aid more generally? At the end of the proceedings on the
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    Criminal Justice Act, 1972, the hon. and learned Gentleman said that he would make arrangements for all courts to be circulated with the Widgery Rules. As far as we know, that has not been done. When is it going to be done? This is extremely important.
    Mr. Carlisle: If it has not been done, I apologise. It is going to be done very shortly. We have gone further. By Section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act no one can be sent to prison for the first time unless specifically given the opportunity of being represented before the court. I stand by what I said about recommending the Widgery criteria to the courts.
    Mr. Peter Archerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many letters he has received on the prospect of extending the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme to applicants for awards from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.
    Mr. Carlisle: None that I can trace.
    Mr. Archer: Is that not a pity? The hon. and learned Gentleman said on 14th July last:
    "… it should be open to an applicant to bring a friend or legal adviser to assist him in putting his case …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th July, 1972; Vol. 841, c. 462.]
    Does not that entail recognition that some people may have difficulty in putting their case without assistance? Is that assistance to be denied to all except the rich?
    Mr. Carlisle: Whether the answer is a pity depends on whether the Home Office has failed to trace cases which exist, or whether, as I suspect, there have been no complaints on the matter. On the wider question, I would point out that this is still an experimental scheme. We hope shortly to institute a review, and this is one of the matters which we shall keep in mind. But I do not hold out high hope that this would be an appropriate use of legal aid.

    Obscenity
    Sir D. Walker-Smithasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, having regard to the passage of time and change of circumstances since the review of the law of obscenity prior

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    to the passage of the Obscene Publications Act, 1959, he will now recommend the appointment of a Royal Commission to review the said law and make proposals for its appropriate amendment.
    Mr. Michael McNair-Wilsonasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in the light of the report by Lord Longford and his committee, a copy of which is in his possession, he will re-define the meaning of obscenity in relation to literature, as expressed in the Obscene Publications Act, 1959, so as to require sellers and publishers, in cases where their output is alleged to be obscene, to prove that it is not.
    Mr. R. Carr: The question of reforming the law on obscenity has been pretty fully traversed in recent years and I understand that the main purpose of the Longford Report is to provoke discussion on this and related matters. I doubt whether there is much further light which a Royal Commission could throw on the relevant considerations. My present view is to doubt whether there is anything to be gained by amending the definition of obscenity.
    Sir D. Walker-Smith: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the complexities and social importance of this question require something more than an unofficial body, however well intentioned? Will he give further consideration to seeking a full objective and authoritative review by an officially appointed body?
    Mr. Carr: Yes, of course I will consider it further. But I feel that there have been a good many official and unofficial inquiries into the subject by well-qualified people, including lawyers from all parties. But I will consider it further, because it is important.
    Mr. McNair-Wilson: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the Obscene Publications Act appears to put the onus on the ordinary person to prove that he has been depraved, whereas what the general public is most concerned about is not the question of depravity and corruption but simply the affront to generally accepted standards of public decency?
    Mr. Carr: I am sure that my hon. Friend is reporting correctly, and, if anything, understating the amount of public
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    concern on this matter, but I am doubtful about shifting the onus of proof. I believe that the whole question of display should be looked at. I believe that that is the most hopeful front to attack, and that is what I am considering very carefully.
    Mr. Robert C. Brown: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the recently published "rag" magazine of Newcastle University students has received considerable publicity, in which it has been described as "filthy", "depraved" "obscene", "disgusting", and so on? Is he further aware that the evidence is that the sales of the magazine will this year be very much higher than last year? Will he therefore resist the temptation to titillate tonsils in this respect?
    Mr. Carr: I am afraid that I have not been sent this journal, so I have not been able to look at it or consider it. No doubt the hon. Gentleman may be able to put that right. But, seriously, I believe that the sort of display which is to be seen is causing considerable offence, and that that is what we should look into very carefully.
    Sir D. Renton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is not really a question of shifting he onus of proof but of redefining the offence in a way which deals with the mischief which causes public anxiety? Will he apply his mind to that proposition?
    Mr. Carr: I assure my right hon. and learned Friend that I will do so. But I must repeat that my predecessors and many others have applied their minds to this problem and have found it an extremely difficult subject. Any new definitions or changes seem to create as many new difficulties as they solve old ones.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: I think most of us on this side of the House would agree that the right hon. Gentleman is right not to try to alter the Obscene Publications Act. I wonder whether the best way to tackle this, as he suggests, might not be in terms of laws protecting privacy. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned display, but another feature that is highly offensive to many people is the receipt of unsolicited material through the post, with the possibility that their children or their elderly parents may pick

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    it up. It seems more fruitful to us to tackle this by protecting privacy or by controlling display rather than by reintroducing censorship.
    Mr. Carr: I shall take into account what the hon. Lady has said. An Act was passed in the last year or two which deals at least partially—I am not sure whether it deals fully—with the receipt of unsolicited material through the post. But this is a serious matter and it needs looking into further.

    London Embassies (Aid to Terrorists)
    Mr. Goodhartasked the secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will investigate the use of embassies in London for the distribution of weapons to terrorists.
    Mr. R. Carr: A serious view would be taken of any indication that embassies are being used for this purpose, but I have no evidence to show that they are.
    Mr. Goodhart: As the Jordanian Minister was shot with a gun which had been exported from this country and then reimported in a diplomatic bag, will my right hon. Friend pay particular attention to watching those very few embassies which abuse their diplomatic privileges?
    Mr. Carr: Yes, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will take very seriously any such abuse of diplomatic immunities or privileges. It is a most serious offence. We need evidence, however, to show that the offence is taking place.
    Mr. Kaufman: Will the Home Secretary examine the status and privileges available in London to the Arab League Office as it provides accommodation for the London representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and as the official radio voice of the Palestine Liberation Organisation praised the Munich massacre?
    Mr. Carr: The hon. Gentleman will probably realise that he is getting more on to the responsibility of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, but I shall certainly draw my right hon. Friend's attention to what the hon. Member has said.

    Armed Robbery
    Mr. Fowlerasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what was
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    the total number of robberies where firearms were used in England and Wales, including the Metropolitan Police area, in each of the three last years; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Carlisle: The number of offences of robbery, or assault with intent to rob, involving the use of firearms known to the police in England and Wales was 463 in 1969, 475 in 1970 and 572 in 1971.
    Mr. Fowler: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that these are disturbing figures? Is it not a fact that there is an increase in armed crime not only in Britain but throughout Europe? Is not one of the facts of this situation that arms are very easy to obtain at present? Will the Government open talks with other European countries aimed at cutting down the supply of arms coming into Britain?
    Mr. Carlisle: Of course I agree that any increase in the use of firearms is disturbing, and a matter for concern. As for the control of firearms, my hon. Friend will remember that a review was carried out under the Chief Inspector of Constabulary. The report has recently arrived in the Home Office and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be considering it shortly.
    Mr. John Fraser: Do not the figures show that despite the protestations about law and order by the Conservatives before the last election the Government have had no success in dealing with gun law—a failure with which the public are disgusted? Will the Minister agree that there is an excessive number of licences and guns in existence—almost 1 million—and will he consider verification of the arms at present held under licences for both shotguns and firearms, perhaps calling them in for inspection? Will he consider tighter control on transfer?
    Mr. Carlisle: The hon. Member is talking absolute nonsense. The figures prove nothing of the kind. I remind him of the steps that the Government have taken. We have set up an inquiry into the control of firearms; under the Criminal Justice Act we have increased the penalties for firearm offences, and we have substantially increased the number of people in the police force. None of those steps was taken by the previous Government.

    Maxwell Stamp Report
    Mr. Geoffrey Finsbergasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has yet concluded his consultations on the Maxwell Stamp Report.
    Mr. Lane: No, Sir.
    Mr. Finsberg: Does my hon. Friend realise that he has given a very unsatisfactory answer? The talks have been proceeding for about 18 months and the majority of the cab trade is becoming absolutely frustrated. Will he try to ensure that the consultations are concluded by the end of the year?
    Mr. Lane: I am not satisfied with the time that this is taking, either, but important questions are raised by the report and although we have made good head-way and a great deal of agreement has been reached already in our consultations with the trade and the Greater London Council, there are still outstanding points which need to be considered. I assure my hon. Friend that we shall press ahead with it as quickly as possible, and I hope that we shall be in a position to say something within a few months.

    CBI AND TUC (TALKS)
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his latest talks with the Trades Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry.
    The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath): I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the statement which I made to the House on 6th November.—[Vol. 845, c. 622–37.]
    Mr. Hamilton: Is it not now undeniable that the Government were determined, in the event of the failure of the talks, to pin the blame for that failure on the trade unions? Does the Prime Minister agree with the interpretation of events by Mr. Jack Jones at the Lobby luncheon yesterday? If he does not accept that interpretation, in which respect does he disagree? Why do land prices not feature in the proposed legislation to curb inflation and why do the Government not
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    accept the proposition advanced by the unions that part of the package should be a minimum increase in the basic retirement pension?
    The Prime Minister: That is a long series of questions. I made my statement to the House, which set out the full position. The Government did their utmost to reach agreement, and most of the country recognises that. My good faith has never been challenged either by the trade unions or by the employers. The issue of land prices was not dealt with at the stage the discussions reached and it did not appear in any previous legislation introduced by the Labour Government because of the difficulties of legislating for land prices, which are well known. My statement set out fully all the points that we discussed. The only new point—which I do not accept—in Mr. Jones' statement is that it was because of the large amount of wealth in so few hands in this country that the talks broke down. The matter was not discussed.
    Mr. Harold Wilson: It is nice of the Prime Minister to look in on our proceedings—[Interruption.]—but will he answer a question put to the Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs last night which I think he felt was of very great importance? The Prime Minister may be able to give us an answer. Will he tell us whether, when on television and, I think, in the House, he referred to legislation at the end of the freeze period, he meant that whatever follows the freeze must be legislative, or that if he can get a satisfactory voluntary agreement he will be prepared to recommend that to the House in lieu of legislation? Has he formed a view of that, in view of his television statement?
    The Prime Minister: I said in my statement that we had come to the conclusion that we would have to deal with the matter by statutory means and that in the meantime there would be a standstill. If by the time the second stage is reached it is possible to have a satisfactory voluntary agreement, no one would welcome that more than the Government.
    Mr. Norman Lamont: In view of the decision this morning by the Bank of England to call for special deposits from the clearing banks, and the anxiety that

    1187
    that will cause to business men, will the Prime Minister re-emphasise, on the basis of the Downing Street talks, that the Government remain committed to 5 per cent. growth?
    The Prime Minister: Of course I repeat that commitment—and we said that we would continue it for a further year. The Bank is pursuing the policy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which is to get the money supply into line with this expansion.

    DEFENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (POLICY CO-ORDINATION)
    Mr. Duffyasked the Prime Minister if he is satisfied with the co-ordination of policy in the fields of defence and foreign affairs; and if he will make a statement.
    The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Duffy: Is the Prime Minister aware that in many directions there are welcome signs of détente, not least in the agreement reached on Monday night between the Governments of East and West Germany? Presumably the Secretary of State for Defence was aware of them. Will the Prime Minister therefore tell the House why his right hon. and noble Friend, in a speech at Blackpool on 13th October, called for the creation of a European nuclear defence force? Do the Government intend to invite their prospective European partners to join such a force? Is this a nuclear U-turn, leading back to proliferation, or was the noble Lord merely playing Tory politics with nuclear policy?
    The Prime Minister: The House has already been told that there was no new statement of policy in my right hon. and noble Friend's speech to our party conference. I have repeatedly made such a statement myself, going back to the Godkin Lectures in the mid-1960s. As to détente, I welcome the agreement, which has been initialled, providing for a better relationship between the two parts of Germany. But nobody has suggested that Western Europe can therefore abandon all defence, and certainly not nuclear defence.

    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
    Mr. Adleyasked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied with the coordination between the Attorney-General and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry regarding the creation of a common legal framework for European industrial co-operation; and if he will make a statement.
    The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. The Summit meeting in Paris agreed that a programme of action should be decided by 1st January, 1974, with the aim of establishing a single industrial base for the Community. This would include the adoption of a European company statute.
    Mr. Adley: I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. Is he aware that a Dutch aerospace company and a German aerospace company recently had to form five separate companies to try to overcome the difficulties of a truly European company framework within the present diverse set-up in Europe? Does he therefore agree that the first priority should be to attempt to harmonise tax and trading laws within Europe so that we may see the emergence of truly European companies?
    The Prime Minister: There is widespread recognition that these changes are necessary if Europe is to develop its full economic potential and improve the standard of living of its peoples to the utmost extent. One of the first priorities in that respect is to have a company law which will enable such companies to be formed without the sort of difficulties that my hon. Friend has mentioned. This will undoubtedly be for the benefit of those who work in them, as well as improving the economic resources of Europe.
    Mr. Thorpe: While awaiting the outcome of the creation of the legal framework referred to in the Question, and within the context of the 90-day period of standstill which the Prime Minister has sought, will he consider the experience of Holland in having guaranteed minimum earnings for workers, and of West Germany in having mandatory works councils and real participation of workers in the running of their businesses?
    The Prime Minister: We examined the new agreement made in the Netherlands with the full co-operation of the trade unions. There is an element of legal enforcement in that agreement, as we understand it. It is very interesting, in that it gives a threshold arrangement of a slightly different kind from that which we proposed, together with an improvement in the real standard of living of the workers—between one half of 1 per cent. and 1 per cent. This was much less than was offered in the Downing Street talks.
    Mr. Skinnerasked the Prime Minister what plans he has to participate officially in the European Economic Community celebration, Fanfare for Europe, early in 1973.
    The Prime Minister: I look forward to attending a number of the events.
    Mr. Skinner: The Prime Minister should be ashamed of himself. Can he tell us how the British people can celebrate a national disaster in the middle of a wages freeze?
    The Prime Minister: They will certainly be prepared to celebrate the opportunities of improving their real living standards, which is what the country wants.
    Mr. Marten: May I ask my right hon. Friend to look at one aspect of the Fanfare for Europe? Without wishing to be divisive on the issue, but realising that, whether my right hon. Friend likes it or not, the country is divided on it, will my right hon. Friend ask Lord Mancroft and Lord Goodman to consider the question of using the churches to celebrate something which some people, rightly or wrongly, regard as somewhat of a slight propaganda exercise?
    The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is wrong to regard it as a propaganda exercise. It is a genuine collaboration of the cultural resources of the countries of the Community. As I have said before, those who are concerned with the arts in all their forms are rejoicing that we should be able to entertain in London and in the towns of the country so many of the most distinguished European creative artists during this period. Surely, where a great cathedral or church
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    chooses to place itself at the disposal of such a festival, it is not the Government's responsibility to try to prevent it. If my hon. Friend is thinking of the particular case of Coventry Cathedral, I would tell him that Coventry Cathedral has been well known for many years for having had a continued series of European events. This must be a matter for the church and the cathedral concerned, and I hope that no one will crab them.

    PERSONAL INFORMATION (CONFIDENTIALITY)
    Mr. Leslie Huckfieldasked the Prime Minister whether he is satisfied with co-ordination of Government Departments in preserving confidentiality in the handling of personal information; and whether he will make a statement.
    The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I told the House on 17th June, 1971, of the rules that were being applied in Government Departments to safeguard personal information held there.
    Mr. Leslie Huckfield: Is not the Prime Minister aware that his own Government have asked for a great deal more personal information from individuals as a result of their policy on rent rebates and tax credits, and that pretty well every week in the Press there is yet another story of a leak of confidential information from Government Departments? When will personal information be safe and confidential under the right hon. Gentleman's Government?
    The Prime Minister: The argument is not against asking for personal information where to do so is justifiable in the interests of policy. The argument must be about keeping it confidential. My Government have done more than any other to make sure that the necessary measures are taken. I hope the hon. Gentleman will not exaggerate the so-called leaks of personal information of this kind. I have always offered to the House an investigation of any example that is brought to our notice. Those which have occurred we have investigated fully, either by the Government's security services or by a tribunal, and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, there are cases before the courts.
    Mrs. Shirley Williams: Does the Prime Minister recognise that this is not merely a question of leaks? As the volume of data on individuals grows—and both the tax credit scheme and the coming into operation of the police national computer will lead to far more information being held on individuals—it is essential for any Government to ensure the confidentiality of that information as between Government Departments as well as between Government and the outside world. Will the Prime Minister look at this matter very seriously?
    The Prime Minister: We fully recognise, all the time, what the hon. Lady says. What I am suggesting is that the difficulties or dangers should not be exaggerated. But if there are examples of a system not working, or one that has broken down, we are prepared to investigate them. We are giving every consideration to ensuring the security of the police national computer, and the same will apply to the tax credit system. I believe that this country has by far the highest reputation of any country in the Western world for maintaining the confidentiality of tax returns.
    Mr. Harold Wilson—
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Lamont—Question No. Q6.
    Mr. Wellbeloved: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Can you do something about the lighting on this side of the Chamber? On a number of occasions, both at Question Time today and at the close of the debate the day before yesterday, you were obviously having great difficulty in seeing hon. Members on this side. Today, again due to the lighting, you failed to see my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition rise to challenge the Prime Minister. It is becoming quite intolerable that, due to the lighting, this should happen.
    Mr. Speaker: Of course, I willingly call the Leader of the Opposition. I had called his hon. Friend on the Front Bench—the hon. Member for Hitchin (Mrs. Shirley Williams)—and I was not aware that another member of the Opposition Front Bench wanted to ask a supplementary question. If the Leader of the Opposition wants to put a question, he may.
    Mr. Harold Wilson: I should like to make it clear that I do not want to challenge the Prime Minister on the question of privacy. My question arises out of a matter about which both the right hon. Gentleman and I are concerned. Can he confirm that he has received the reports from the Computer Society and the members of the Council of the Royal Statistical Society on the privacy of the Census, the initiation of which reports he announced in the House, and can he say whether those reports will be published?
    The Prime Minister: They have not yet been published. There have been certain so-called reports put around as to what they contain. I think that they will both be published, and then it will be possible for everybody to see the recommendations.

    PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN (MEETING)
    Mr. Norman Lamontasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his recent official meeting with Mr. Tanaka, the Prime Minister of Japan.
    The Prime Minister: As I told the House during the last Session, I visited Japan from 16th to 19th September at the invitation of the Japanese Government. I had frank and cordial talks with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs on a wide range of subjects of common interest. I have placed in the Library of the House a copy of the communiqué issued after my visit. I am convinced that the relationship between Japan and other industrialised nations is of fundamental importance for world prosperity and stability. Mr. Tanaka has accepted my invitation to visit the United Kingdom next year.
    Mr. Lamont: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the question of the under-valuation of the Japanese currency was discussed? Is he aware that this threatens a major international monetary crisis in the next six months? Will the Government, in conjunction with their European partners, put the strongest pressure upon the Japanese Government both to liberalise their trade and either to revalue or to float the yen?
    The Prime Minister: A great deal of our discussions were taken up with relationships in international trade and the currency arrangements of Japan, the United States and the European Community. I am not sure that it always achieves the best results to say that one is putting the utmost pressure upon a country to follow a particular course. This is a matter for the Government of the country to decide. Certainly I found that the Japanese Prime Minister recognised the importance of liberalising both existing Japanese trade arrangements and arrangements for the importation of capital into that country. It is only by freeing capital arrangements that many people will be able to trade to a greater degree inside Japan.
    Mr. Tapsell: Is it not a fact that, although it would be helpful if the Japanese yen were revalued, the yen will always be a strong currency against sterling until we put our affairs in order here?
    The Prime Minister: The real point about the international currency situation is that the yen is a strong currency against all other currencies.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Harold Wilson: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business for next week?
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. James Prior): The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 13TH NOVEMBER—Debate on a Motion to take note of the paper for discussion: "The Future of Northern Ireland".
Motions on the Northern Ireland Loans (Increase of Limits) Order and on the Anti-Dumping Duties (No. 2) Order.
TUESDAY, 14TH NOVEMBER, WEDNESDAY, 15TH NOVEMBER, and THURSDAY, 16TH NOVEMBER—Allocation of Time Motion on the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill, and consideration in Committee.
FRIDAY, 17TH NOVEMBER—Second Reading of the Northern Ireland (Financial Provisions) Bill.
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Motions on the Import Duties (Developing Countries) Order and on the Housing (Payments for Well Maintained Houses) Order.
MONDAY, 20TH NOVEMBER—Remaining stages of the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill.
Mr. Wilson: Leaving aside for one moment the question of the guillotine, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman about three early debates which arise out of the debate on the Address? First, on foreign affairs, does he recall that the Opposition agreed with the Government's proposals that we should not debate foreign affairs in the debate on the Address because of the well-understood absence of the Foreign Secretary but that we should have a debate as early as possible afterwards? Can he confirm that we shall get that at an early date? Secondly, he will recall that we pressed him for a debate on the new rules about immigration as well as certain immigration orders coming before the House dealing with Europe. May we have a debate on these, both in Government time? May we also have the regular Welsh affairs debate as early as possible?
Turning to the guillotine, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that the Government now seem to fall back on the guillotine with an unjustified regularity and that they do it on major constitutional matters, including matters for which they have no electoral mandate and, in this case, for which they have the reverse of an electoral mandate? Is he aware—I am sure that he is—that we have, even in this Session, been remarkably co-operative with the Government in getting important Government legislation through? In this connection I instance Northern Ireland. We have put forward proposals which would have saved Government time with legislation which was regarded as important. In view of this latest action with the guillotine and also—I have to put this to the right hon. Gentleman—the contempt with which the Prime Minister now seems to treat this House, is he aware that we can no longer offer to continue this kind of co-operation in our dealings with the Government?
Mr. Prior: I entirely accept what the right hon. Gentleman said about foreign

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affairs. In view of the business for next week, and probably the week after, it will be difficult to arrange a foreign affairs debate within the next fortnight. I entirely accept that we should have a foreign affairs debate at the earliest possible moment.
Turning to Welsh affairs, one or two of the dates proposed last Session did not prove convenient, and I cannot now promise an early debate on the Floor. I understand that arrangements are in hand for a debate in the Welsh Grand Committee.
Dealing with the question of immigration and the European affairs connected with this matter, I should like to look further at the suggestions the right hon. Gentleman made. As for the European side, I recognise the particular interest that the first batch of orders is likely to attract and I hope to make special arrangements for dealing with them and not to take them at the end of the day or anything of that nature.
As for the timetable Motion, although naturally I am sorry that it was not possible to agree on a voluntary timetable, we have tried to meet the wishes of the House—many hon. Members have made this point—by having the Committee stage on the Floor of the House. That meets some of the constitutional objections raised by the right hon. Gentleman. I must tell him that there are a number of precedents. This particular exercise will make the score between the parties two-all.
Mr. Wilson: May I correct something, said in relation to foreign affairs? I saw the Patronage Secretary looking pained, and that is something I never like to see. I think it would be fairer to say not that we adopted his suggestion but that he gave us the choice. He said that we could ask for a foreign affairs debate on the Gracious Speech but that the Foreign Secretary could not be present, and that if we preferred to wait until he came back, the debate would be held then. We are all in agreement. I did not want to upset the Patronage Secretary by what I said the first time.
Dealing with the immigration question, is it not a fact that when we raised this issue at the beginning of the Debate on the Gracious Speech a commitment
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was given that we should have a debate on the wider subjects covered by the immigration rules? I suggest that if we have that debate, we take the orders consequentially with it rather than just proceeding order by order.
Mr. Prior: These are the immigration rules relating to the European Community?
Mr. Wilson: Yes.
Mr. Prior: I think that we could meet the right hon. Gentleman on that point.
Dame Joan Vickers: For the benefit of some of my hon. Friends who have been successful in the ballot for Private Members' Bills, may I ask my right hon. Friend when the Government will bring in the Guardianship of Infants Bill and the Domicile of Women Bill? If they do not intend doing so, it may be that some private Member will wish to take up these two Bills.
Mr. Prior: I could not say offhand whether the Government are to do that. All I can tell my hon. Friend is that legislative time is very much at a premium this Session and I want to see hon. Members having a proper time for recesses this year. Therefore, if my hon. Friend would like to contact me to see whether the Government will make time for these Bills, I will let her know.
Mr. Jay: Can the right hon. Gentleman make a good start by assuring the House that there will be a Report stage of the Counter-Inflation Bill?
Mr. Prior: That depends entirely on how the House gets on in Committee.
Sir Bernard Braine: May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to Early Day Motion No. 1?
[That this House urges Her Majesty's Government to reconsider its view as set out in its Green Paper on Select Committees of the House of Commons published in October, 1970, and to recommend to the House that a Select Committee on Overseas Development be established, whose functions would include the review and appraisal of British performance in relation to the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.]

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It calls for the setting up of a Select Committee on overseas aid to ensure more effective scrutiny of British performance. Is he aware that this Motion has already attracted 188 signatures from both sides of the House, that it will attract more, and that it has a lot of support outside the House? Does he recall that his predecessor gave a sympathetic assurance that the matter would be investigated and that he would consult his colleagues? Will he now give an assurance that he will consider this matter and report to the House soon?
Mr. Prior: I recognise that there is very strong support from both sides of the House for a Select Committee of this nature. Of course I will give it serious consideration. However, I must point out that more than 300 Members of this House were involved in Select Committees last Session, and we have already an obligation to set up at least three other Committees for this Session. I am worried that we may get to the stage where everyone is serving on Select Committees and no one is in the Chamber.
Mr. James Johnson: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman can answer my question since it affects us both. While we are all relieved that the Icelandic dispute has not developed into a cod war, when are the Government likely to make a statement about the situation, and more particularly when will there be talks at ministerial level? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I tabled a Question on the subject last Tuesday and that I have not yet had an answer? What is the right hon. Gentleman doing about it?
Mr. Prior: I note what the hon. Gentleman says. I am grateful to him and to right hon. and hon. Members on all sides of the House for the support they have given the Government over the Icelandic fisheries dispute. We shall be holding a further series of talks. They have not yet been arranged, but they will be held soon. My right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will have heard the views of the hon. Member.
Mr. Spence: When does my right hon. Friend think that time will be made available for this House to debate the
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proposed new parliamentary building project in Bridge Street?
Mr. Prior: I recognise that this is a very important matter for hon. Members to discuss. I cannot hold out any immediate hope of a debate, but we must try to fit in one as time goes on.
Mr. Healey: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that experience in the last three days has shown that the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill is not only unclear, unjust and unprecedented in the totalitarian powers that it gives the Government to define offences but also constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the resumption of talks on inflation with the TUC and the CBI in its present form? Since that is the purpose for which the Government have told us they have introduced the Bill, will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider his decision to impose a timetable even before the Committee stage has been started and enable us to try to correct some of the gross errors in the drafting of the Bill?
Mr. Prior: The right hon. Gentleman is inaccurate in what he said. There will be plenty of opportunity next week for these matters to be debated.
Mr. Wiggin: On the subject of Private Members' Bills, will my right hon. Friend say what will be the Government's policy in the forthcoming Session about finding Government time for these measures after they come back from the other place?
Mr. Prior: I should like to consider that with a view to giving my hon. Friend a reply next week.
Mr. Grimond: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when we may expect the Local Government (Scotland) Bill, and will he undertake that when it goes to Committee it will be sent to the Scottish Grand Committee, since it is a Bill which affects every hon. Member representing a Scottish constituency?
Mr. Prior: I should like to consider that. I have had representations made to me about the number of Members who should serve on the Committee. I believe that the right number on that Committee is 30.
Dame Irene Ward: Perhaps I can help my right hon. Friend with regard

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to two important Bills to which the Government are committed and which were referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dame Joan Vickers). I have drawn place No. 12 in the ballot. That is a rather late position in the ballot if one is to get a Bill through all its stages. If I introduce one of the two Bills to which the Government are committed, will my right hon. Friend find Government time for it, because that will help everyone?
Mr. Prior: I congratulate my hon. Friend on drawing a place in the ballot. I am grateful to her for trying to help me in this manner. I could not give any commitment that the Government would give preference to a specific Private Member's Bill.
Miss Lestor: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider finding some time as soon as possible to debate the recent report dealing with adoption and fostering, since it is of considerable interest to social workers and to right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House who are concerned about these matters?
Mr. Prior: I am afraid not next week, anyhow.
Mr. Pounder: Will my right hon. Friend be prepared to reconsider the business that he has announced for either Monday or Friday of next week? While I realise that the Counter-Inflation (Temporary Provisions) Bill is of great importance to the Government and the country, nevertheless to the people of Northern Ireland the Northern Ireland Border Poll Bill is also of importance. The Second Reading of that Bill has already been postponed twice. Is not my right hon. Friend prepared to give it precedence over the proposed debate on the Green Paper, because the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland want that plebiscite, and quickly?
Mr. Prior: The strong feeling in all parts of the House is that we should have the debate on the paper for consultation on Monday of next week. We shall have a further day on Irish affairs on Friday. I hope that there will be time the following week for the Bill that my hon. Friend mentions.
Sir G. de Freitas: Will the right hon. Gentleman adopt the undertaking given
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by his predecessor on 20th July that in this Session he would consider more general debates on Royal Commission reports and so on by "butchering"—that was his word—suggested legislation?
Mr. Prior: Certainly I will not "butcher" suggested legislation. But I want to see as much of the time of the House as possible available for rather more general subjects.
Mr. Evelyn King: Has my right hon. Friend seen the Motion in my name seeking to annul what I understand to be the Government's proposal that increases in retirement pensions shall not be payable to pensioners who live abroad? This appears to many to be unjust. Might it be discussed?
[That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the National Insurance (Increase of Benefit and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1972 (S.I., 1972, No. 1302), dated 16th August, 1972, a copy of which was laid before this House on 11th September, in the last Session of Parliament, be annulled.]
Mr. Prior: There will have to be a measure to deal with the proposed lump sum pension increases. I think that that will be the appropriate time for this matter to be raised.
Mr. Russell Kerr: When will the Leader of the House find time to debate the history-making report of the Select Committee which inquired into the Independent Broadcasting Authority?
Mr. Prior: Not next week, anyhow.
Mr. Marten: Will my right hon. Friend allocate perhaps half a day in the very near future to a discussion on the axle weights and sizes of heavy lorries—a matter which worries people in this country—and allow time for Parliament to express its sovereign view so that our people at the Community are limited by the decision of this House in what they may do?
Mr. Prior: I am afraid that I cannot promise time for a debate on that matter at an early date. However, my hon. Friend will have seen reports of the visit to Brussels of my right hon. Friend the Minister for Transport Industries, and I have no doubt that he will be pleased with the outcome.
Mr. Prentice: Has the Leader of the House seen the Motion tabled last night dealing with the wages of agricultural workers? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it has been signed by approximately 100 hon. Members on this side of the House and that it demands that the Government allow the award to be implemented despite the standstill period? Will the right hon. Gentleman have urgent discussions on the policy involved and, if the Government cannot meet our point of view, may we have an urgent debate on the matter?
[That this House deplores the decision of the Government deliberately to prevent the implementation of the Wages Board award to the agricultural workers, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's refusal to countenance its back dating after the expiry of the freeze period.]
Mr. Prior: My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a statement about this matter yesterday afternoon, and again it is one which, subject to Mr. Speaker's ruling, can probably be discussed in the course of the Committee stage next week.
Mr. Redmond: Can my right hon. Friend hold out any hope of an early debate on the Report of the Select Committee on Parliamentary Questions as it might help to prevent abuses of the Order Paper of the kind that we have seen in the last day or two, with one hon. Member hogging the Order Paper?
Mr. Prior: I hope soon to be able to tell the House the Government's attitude to the recommendations in that report, but I am afraid not next week.
Mr. Alan Williams: Does the Leader of the House realise that his statement about the Welsh debate is unacceptable not only to Welsh Members but also to Welsh people? Last Session we were denied an opportunity to debate Welsh affairs on the Floor of the House and we were also given utterly inadequate time—contemptuous time—in which to discuss gerrymandering proposals for Welsh local government reform. Will the right hon. Gentleman, further, pass on to the Prime Minister the fact that it has not gone unnoticed in Wales that in his last Cabinet reshuffle the Prime Minister confirmed his previous opinion that not one Welsh Tory Member is fit to speak for the Government?
Mr. Prior: Obviously I should like to find time during this Session for a proper debate on Welsh affairs, and that we will try to do. There is no question of being in any way disrespectful to the Welsh nation, for whom we have the greatest regard.
Mr. Wilkinson: May we have a debate very soon on the latest report by the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration on the police and immigrant relations?
Regarding the timetable, within six hours and ten minutes will not the Leader of the Opposition have broken his commitment to withdraw the Opposition's support for the Government?
Mr. Prior: I do not think I ought to comment on the second part of my hon. Friend's remarks.
On the first part, he will already have seen the enormous demands for parliamentary debates of one kind or another. I cannot promise an early debate, but I will consider the matter he mentioned.
Mr. Edelman: Will the Leader of the House find time for a debate on the film industry, especially in view of the carve up of Shepperton Studios by British Lion and Barclay Securities?
Mr. Prior: I cannot find time at the moment, but this is a matter to be considered.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Will my right hon. Friend be making some new proposals for the more satisfactory and democratic conduct of Irish business?
Mr. Prior: We shall be discussing this matter a good deal next week and the week after. I will then see what further measures need to be taken. However, we certainly have before us the possibility of a Committee for Northern Ireland.
Mr. Ross: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that we on this side of the House would take a very dim view if by any chance the Local Government (Scotland) Bill went to the Scottish Grand Committee for Second Reading? This is a matter for the Floor of the House.
Will the right hon. Gentleman ensure that the Standing Committee that deals with the Bill is very much larger than one containing only 14 Labour Members and

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16 Conservative Members as that size of Committee would not admit any Member of the Liberal Party or the representative of the Western Isles?
Mr. Prior: I will consider these matters further when the Bill comes before the House.
Mr. Body: In considering any guillotine for next week, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend can assure us that a fair amount of time will be given to any amendment concerning farm workers?
Mr. Prior: This is a matter for the Committee to decide. I hope to put down the Motion tonight. That will give adequate time for amendments to be put down. We must then discuss how we are to handle it.
Mr. Heffer: Will the right hon. Gentleman look again into the whole question of the guillotine? He mentioned precedents. The precedents in the last two and a half years have been the Industrial Relations Bill, the Housing Finance Bill and the European Communities Bill. Is it not clear that the Government are undermining the whole basis of parliamentary democracy and at the same time urging people to keep the law of the land when laws are in fact being rushed through without proper parliamentary debate and scrutiny? Is it not clear that if the right hon. Gentleman goes on in this way as Leader of the House he will be as popular in this House as he was when Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food?
Mr. Prior: I think that on reflection the hon. Gentleman will recognise that he has not been fair either to the Government or to the House. In fact, I do not think he is being altogether wise in his remarks about the flouting of parliamentary democracy.
Mr. Lipton: Will the Leader of the House consider a debate in the very near future on the Motion which I have put
1204
down about the export of live animals instead of carcase meat?
[That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to replace the export trade in live cattle by a carcase trade, as recommended by the Balfour Committee 15 years ago.]
Mr. Prior: This subject stirs strong emotions. I cannot promise an early debate, but the hon. Gentleman knows that the Government's view is that we should concentrate more on the export of carcase meat and less on live meat.
Mr. Hugh Jenkins: On a point or order, Mr. Speaker. The Leader of the House has not realised that the Prime Minister gave an undertaking regarding Shepperton Film Studios, and that if those film studios are sold for a purpose other than film use before a debate has taken place in this House the Prime Minister's undertaking will be breached? Will he therefore reconsider the undertaking he has given?
Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that point has much to do with order.

BILL PRESENTED
  LAND COMPENSATION
  Mr. Secretary Rippon, supported by Mr. Secretary Campbell, Mr. Secretary Peter Thomas, Mr. R. Graham Page, Mr. Patrick Jenkin and Mr. Keith Speed presented a Bill to confer a new right to compensation for depreciation of the value of interests in land caused by the use of highways, aerodromes and other public works; to confer powers for mitigating the injurious effect of such works on their surroundings; to make new provision for the benefit of persons displaced from land by public authorities; to amend the law relating to compulsory purchase and planning blight; and for purposes connected with those matters: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 11.]

SOUTHERN RHODESIA
3.55 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): I beg to move,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th October, in the last session of Parliament, be approved.
My explanation of the content of the order can be brief. Its purpose is to continue in force Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which gives Her Majesty in Council power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia brought about by the declaration of independence.
After this order has been considered by the House we intend to move a further order, to be made under the Southern Rhodesia Act, to enable a particular aspect of sanctions relating to travel restrictions to continue after the entry into force of the new Immigration Act on 1st January, 1973. The general effect of both orders is to continue our powers as they are for another year. But in the main I think that the House will wish to use this occasion to review the situation relating to the search for a settlement which would enable Rhodesia to return to a legal relationship with Britain and thereby to gain independence.
It is central to our deliberation in this House to establish our goal at the start, and I hope that it is shared by the great majority of right hon. and hon. Members. It is not by sanctions to bring Rhodesia's people to their knees—that would be an inhuman and ignoble aim; it is by an act of legislation in this House to bring Rhodesia legally into the comity of nations. It is the only way by which it can legally be done. It is this which the great majority of people in this country wish. We hate to see people, European and African, with whom we have had such a close relationship, continue under the stigma of illegality and ostracism. It is to the solution of this problem that all our efforts in this House have been and should continue to be directed. There is no other way, except by an Act of Parliament in this country, to restore legality to Rhodesia in international affairs.
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In my view the previous Government—I never disguised this from them—ought never to have internationalised the problem by taking it to the United Nations and asking for mandatory sanctions. But mandatory sanctions are a fact of life which we have to face.
How then, with this complication added, can we in this Parliament arrive at a legal settlement on which can be based Rhodesian independence? We cannot accept the 1969 constitution. That is why we agreed the very basic modifications to it which were in the November, 1971, proposals which I put forward in agreement with Mr. Smith.
When I moved the continuation order last year, I explained that I was about to go to Salisbury in an attempt to reach an agreement with Mr. Smith for a settlement of the Rhodesia dispute which would give all the peoples of Rhodesia, both European and African, the chance to break out of the existing deadlock at which they had arrived.
Shortly, because it is highly relevant for the future, I will remind the House of some of the salient provisions of that proposal. First, however, it is right to recall why we go to all this trouble at all. It is because we should like, according to our historic tradition, before we leave behind us all responsibility in relation to Rhodesia, to try to lay the sure foundations for a multiracial society in that part of the African Continent. The consequences of that would be felt far and wide. To the south there is apartheid. To the north there are signs of growing racialism and intolerance. Therefore, the prize is great and we want to win it by the road of political evolution in which the majority would gradually qualify by increasing parliamentary representation and experience to manage their country's affairs while minority rights would be ensured.
That may seem to be an ideal almost beyond human attainment in Africa. I do not accept that yet in relation to Rhodesia. Rhodesia's history and present practice differentiate it very sharply from South Africa. There is much more contact in Rhodesia between the races on which the tolerant can build. That is the goal which, I suggest, is worth a lot of patience, so great for all Rhodesians would be the gain if a multiracial society could be established there.

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After prolonged negotiations it was possible to reach an agreement with Mr. Smith. However, as the House knows, the Pearce Commission reported that the settlement was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Nevertheless, as a result of the proposals of November, 1971, and of the findings of the Pearce Commission, I believe that there is a growing awareness in Rhodesia of the need for compromise. The Europeans endorsed it emphatically by accepting the November proposals. The African National Council has since declared in favour of compromise and of a negotiated settlement.
It was in the hope of this that we decided not to withdraw the proposal but to allow time for reflection within Rhodesia so that Africans and Europeans alike could face in a calm atmosphere the dilemma which they have to decide. Is it at the end of the day to be confrontation between the races, or do the Rhodesians settle for a compromise programme which takes them step by step by a multiracial and parliamentary road? That is the dilemma which all of them there, both European and African, must face. In order that there should be a minimum disruption during this period of reflection we continued with the existing sanctions.
In reporting to the House on 23rd May, I said:
"… plenty of time should be given in which the position can be clarified and … meanwhile no door should be closed. We feel that the best atmosphere for constructive discussion and advance will be provided if we maintain the situation as it is today, including sanctions, until we can judge whether or not an opportunity for a satisfactory settlement will occur. If there are to be processes of consultation inside Rhodesia they are likely to take some time, and meanwhile the status quo will remain."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd May, 1972; Vol. 837, c. 1226.]
In the debate which followed on 15th June, I explained that
"… the time required for Rhodesians to judge and to adjust their minds again to a prospect of settlement will take us beyond November this year."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th June, 1972; Vol. 838, c. 1763.]
That was my opinion then and I am sure that it was right.
It may be asked whether any progress in Rhodesia has occurred. There are certain signs, since Lord Pearce's Report, of a change of mood. The African
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National Council Executive, in its latest statement, concludes:
"We are ready to find a solution."
Its leaders—particularly Bishop Muzorewa, who unhappily has been ill for some months—have been able to hold a number of public meetings and to explain their point of view to European audiences. Such meetings have been orderly and attentive. Three African National Council leaders were able to meet a Rhodesian Minister for a preliminary discussion, even though subsequent meetings—because of premature publicity—had to be called off.
Since the publication of the Pearce Report, both Europeans and Africans have acted with restraint. What is more, at his party conference Mr. Smith was able decisively to establish the position which he has taken in favour of a compromise settlement. There are various new groupings, too, of Africans and Europeans who are striving to build a bridge between the races in order to design and to reach a compromise solution.
Recollecting the far-reaching implications first of the November proposals and then of the Pearce Report, one could hardly have expected much more in the six months since the report was made. I believe that there must be adequate time—and I hope that the House will grant it—when the races inside Rhodesia have to do little less than reconsider their whole relationship to each other. After the history of the past six years, that cannot be done in a day. They have a lot to discuss and a lot to decide between them.
I would remind the House that there were many and important improvements for the Africans in the proposals agreed last November, including unimpeded progress to eventual majority rule, safeguards against retrogression, immediate improvement in the political status of the Africans, and progress towards ending racial discrimination. I am sure that these proposals can be used and, indeed, must form the basis for discussion and decision between Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia. There is in reality no other way forward to a harmonious society.
Of course there are strong reasons against sanctions—I can rehearse them as well as anybody in the House—and

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I am well aware of the double standards on African affairs to be found, for example, in the United Nations. I was not the last to raise that question in this country—I did so a good many years ago. No doubt others in the debate will contrast the United Nations attitude to General Amin with the United Nations attitude to Mr. Smith, and it is to some extent valid to note that I cannot, as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, allow my indignation to be diverted and must consider the matter which I feel to be at the centre of British and Rhodesian true interests. That, I repeat, is to go to the limit and almost beyond patience to try by reconciliation to bring Rhodesia back into legal relations with the British Crown and on the international stage. That must be the goal which we must always keep in the forefront of our minds.
I may be compelled by events to come to the House and to go to the United Nations and to state the case plainly for a change of policy. In that event, I should have to mobilise a good case to the House and to the United Nations. In the event of failure, however, as I have said before, that would be the straightforward thing to do—to say straight that the policy had failed. But I think the House will see that if I were to do so now, any tender shoot of racial co-operation that may be just showing above the ground in Rhodesia would wither and die, and with it would go the last slender chance for the Rhodesian people to live in peace with each other, developing their resources free from artificial international restraints and moving towards a society in which colour played no rôle in determining status and/or opportunity.
It is true, as will be said in the debate, that other people break sanctions, that there is no evidence leading to the conclusion that sanctions will bring Mr. Smith's régime to an end and that the chief casualty of sanctions is African employment. All that is true; it must be conceded. But to drop the sanctions now when there is still just a hope that settlement will be achieved inside Rhodesia would be to throw away any chance there may be for Rhodesia to get legal independence—in other words, to throw away the prize before the race is finished. I believe that in these cir-
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cumstances the common sense of the House will dictate that, before conceding failure, we must probe the last crannies of compromise. Existing sanctions therefore should go on and be properly applied for another year. Sanctions were never meant to create real hardship for individuals in a way which could have no bearing on the position of the illegal régime.
During the last two years hon. Members from both sides of the House have raised with me a number of cases and I have had also much correspondence from various persons who consider themselves hurt by sanctions. I have examined all these cases. There are three areas in which I now propose to take action—financial and non-financial measures, and measures concerning certain marriages, divorces and adoptions where inhumanity certainly results.
First, financial measures. Some of our exchange controls in respect of Southern Rhodesia operate harshly in certain cases, as hon. Members have told me. They affect education, the elderly, those with serious personal hardship problems and organisations such as charities, many of which, incidentally, are working for the advancement of Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Many tragic cases of hardship are being referred to us and we believe that there is need for sympathetic treatment. All the changes which I propose, except one to which I shall come later, are in accordance with the exceptions provided for in the Security Council resolution.
Briefly, the changes involve a small increase in the value of cash gifts that may be sent to relatives; transfers for the elderly and those with hardship problems; travel allowances for elderly United Kingdom residents wishing to visit relatives in Southern Rhodesia—there are quite a number of cases in which relatives wish to go and see relations who may not live for many more years; increases in the amounts which residents of Southern Rhodesia visiting the United Kingdom may draw from restricted funds; transfers by United Kingdom residents for their wives and children resident in Southern Rhodesia; the amount that United Kingdom charities and similar bodies may send to Southern Rhodesia; and the transfer from the United Kingdom to Southern Rhodesia of the proceeds

1211
of life assurance policies. I will, with permission, circulate fuller details of these changes in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Secondly, non-financial measures. On 17th June, 1968, the then Attorney-General announced that Her Majesty's Government would retain the power to issue, in place of invalidated Southern Rhodesian passports, United Kingdom passports where there were special reasons for so doing. We propose to extend the issue of these passports to any persons resident in Rhodesia who are genuinely seeking specialised medical treatment outside Rhodesia, and even if such treatment is available in South Africa. On humanitarian grounds it is wrong to limit the freedom of choice open to the sick.
We propose also to extend the validity of the concessionary United Kingdom passports which we issue to Rhodesians ordinarily resident outside Rhodesia from 6 months to 12 months. This proposal will reduce inconvenience and save work in our passport sections. All these things, asked for at one time or another by hon. Members, can be done by administrative means and are totally consistent with the United Nations resolution.
Lastly, marriages, divorces and adoptions, which will need an Order in Council. Following the illegal declaration of independence and later of a republic, certain Rhodesian marriages, divorces and adoptions were and are regarded by the British courts as invalid. There have been instances of persons of impeccable character who have believed themselves to be properly married and who have discovered, in some cases several years after their marriage, that the marriage itself was invalid and that any children of their marriage were illegitimate. This is totally wrong and must be put right.
In many cases the situation could be rectified by going through another ceremony of marriage in this country, but if one of the parties were to have died it would be difficult to make the children legitimate. Some people divorced in Rhodesia found that they could not marry again in the United Kingdom because their divorce was regarded here as invalid. We believe that that is wrong and that individuals innocent of political offence should not suffer in this way.
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We have therefore decided to put a stop to this unjust situation. An order in 1970 gave British courts jurisdiction to grant divorces to certain people whose Rhodesian divorces were invalid. That was only a partial relief, because it did not relate to marriages or adoptions. It still meant that people had to go through further expensive proceedings to get recognised divorces. We will, therefore, be submitting to the Privy Council an Order in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Order which would exercise our constitutional powers to make divorces, marriages and adoptions in Rhodesia valid in Rhodesian law. That will automatically make them valid in United Kingdom law. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will feel that these humanitarian actions are right.
I will summarise my views. We believe that our primary responsibility is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence and to do so through the only way which is open to us—the granting of an agreed constitution.
Mr. Andrew Faulds: Will the right hon. Gentleman make it clear whether, when he is talking of Rhodesian law, he is talking about Rhodesian law pre- or post-"Beadle"?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am talking of the law as we exercise the law in respect of Her Majesty's Government, and in certain cases, if we wish to do so, in relation to Rhodesian affairs.
We believe that to ensure a harmonious future the proposals for a settlement must now come—
Mr. Scholefield Allen: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman has answered the question. The question was: is the right hon. Gentleman validating the post-UDI law created by the illegal régime?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We are using our legal powers to legislate in this case for a limited purpose so as to affect the law in Rhodesia. My right hon. Friend can explain that in greater detail when he winds up the debate.
We believe that to ensure a harmonious future the proposals for a settlement must now come from the Rhodesians. The proposals of last November were

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certainly on the right lines of evolutionary constitutional change. If they can be improved by agreement between Rhodesians, well and good.
I have always tried in the conduct of foreign policy to keep my eye on the main goal and not allow myself to be diverted from it by the gusty winds which are always ready to blow one off course. I trust that I shall never mind admitting failure. That is one of the hazards of politics, especially in a situation where very little influence and no power can be brought to bear.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: I accept that the right hon. Gentleman is addressing his arguments as much to those behind him as to those opposite—in fact, probably more so. The right hon. Gentleman has constantly talked about the possibilities of failure and the reasons why he feels that sanctions perhaps may have to continue and so forth in almost apologetic terms.
Although sanctions have not restored Rhodesia to legality, which we all wish for, have not sanctions had the effect, in the shortage of foreign currency, of bringing to the conference table on three different occasions a man who declared a rebellion against the Crown on the basis that there was nothing further to discuss and that he had no intention of discussing further? To that extent, will not the right hon. Gentleman concede that sanctions have had an effect in bringing the races closer together?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The original purpose was to bring Mr. Smith to the negotiating table. I do not honestly think that sanctions are the main influence which brings Mr. Smith to the negotiating table. I think that the main influence is the one which I have been describing, and not, I hope, in apologetic terms. The main reason Mr. Smith comes to the negotiating table is that he wants to see Rhodesia legally restored to a relationship with Britain and to the other countries overseas. That is what I would put as the main reason, although sanctions may have had some effect.
I was saying that I had tried always to face, as one does in politics, the possibility of failure, especially in a position in which there is no power. Although Rhodesia is only a very small marginal
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consideration in some ways in the wide sweep of British foreign policy—the political and security and economic problems of the Northern hemisphere, the European partnership, the Persian Gulf, the Indian sub-continent, relations with China, and so on—nevertheless there is a great prize to be won in Africa and for Africans. That prize is a genuinely multiracial system.
Therefore I am asking, not for us—because as I said, it is more of a marginal affair in the whole sweep of British foreign policy—but for the Rhodesians, all the Rhodesians, for another chance to try to achieve a compromise settlement and peace.
Mr. Speaker: This is the wide order. The second order is really within the context of the first, and I think that it would be agreeable to the House that both should be discussed together. Is that so? The second order is:
That the Southern Rhodesia (Immigration Act 1971) Order 1972 (S.I., 1972, No. 1583), a copy of which was laid before this House on 31st October, be approved.
4.20 p.m.
Mr. James Callaghan: The Opposition certainly take that view.
The Foreign Secretary is right to introduce this order again today. We shall support it, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said last week, and if it is challenged in the Lobby, then, however repugnant it may be to us, we shall march side by side with those who are willing to come in with the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: They are Labour Party sanctions.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) interrupts early in my speech to say that they are the Labour Party's sanctions. They are not; they are Britain's sanctions. They are sanctions imposed with the consent of both parties, because imposing them was a national duty. It is a pity that some hon. Members have never recognised that duty, as at least the Foreign Secretary has done.
To fail to continue sanctions at the present time would be a betrayal of British responsibility in the matter. Failure would have another impact, not mentioned by the Foreign Secretary, yet it must be very much in his mind. I am

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surprised that it is not more in the minds of those hon. Gentlemen opposite who oppose sanctions. I wish to approach the subject on their level. To fail to renew sanctions at the present time would undoubtedly have unwelcome consequences in our political and trading relationships with many other African countries.
If the moral argument does not appeal to hon. Gentlemen who oppose sanctions, surely the materialist argument should do so. There can be no doubt that whenever the Foreign Secretary thought he had a good enough case to ask to be released from the impact of sanctions, he would always have to weigh in his mind the consequences of such a request in respect of many other countries in the Continent of Africa and elsewhere. That should be mentioned at the outset, quite apart from the betrayal of our responsibilities.
Those who wish to give the Smith régime a free hand and to betray our responsibilities hide behind the argument that sanctions have failed. They do not openly argue that they want to give the Smith régime a free hand, but they say, "We can do no more; sanctions have failed, so why continue?" Superficially, there appears to be something in the argument. Looked at more deeply, it is certainly untrue.
I am sorry that in outlining the case that he said he could make against sanctions the right hon. Gentleman did not also, as he is introducing the order, outline the consequences that have arisen as a result of imposing sanctions. There is a balance to be struck, and the right hon. Gentleman should have mentioned it.
What those who say that sanctions have failed mean is that the hindrances on trade have not brought down the régime. They have not ended it within a period of "weeks, if not months", which was the phrase. That remark was clearly wrong, and because sanctions have not brought the régime to an end, the opposers of sanctions say, "Sanctions have failed and should be given up." That is not so. I consider that we should go the other way. We should now make proposals for tightening sanctions because of the impact which they have had.
Looking below the surface, it is clear that sanctions are having an impact on the development of the country. I say that
1216
in no malicious or gloating mood, because I agree with the Foreign Secretary about hardship to individuals, and some cases to which the right hon. Gentleman referred are not those to which one would wish to deny a measure of comfort. I shall come to some other examples that he forgot.
Sanctions have had what The Guardian leader referred to as a debilitating effect on the economy, and that is probably the mot juste. They have not interfered much with the supply of consumer goods. It is clear that import substitution has led to the setting up of a number of secondary industries and firms which would not have been necessary had sanctions not existed. To that extent, therefore, the white population has been able to secure a continuation of the consumer goods to which they have become accustomed, although even in that field, where sanctions have had an impact on the development of the Rhodesian economy, some trouble will arise, for obvious reasons.
Looking behind the consumer goods industry and the forcing of the secondary goods industries, there is little doubt that the debilitating effect to which The Guardian referred lies in the capital goods industries and the infrastructure. It is here that the impact is most clearly seen. Examples are frequently quoted about the effect on the rolling stock of the Rhodesian railways, on a number of internal transport matters, and in other areas where for years it is possible to run on the existing stock of capital equipment but where a time must come when that capital stock should be replaced. The impact is felt, not so much immediately and directly by the consumer, but to a much deeper and more profound degree which will have a debilitating effect upon Rhodesia's economy.
That position is not easy. Any country of that sort, with an African population increasing by a substantial number each year, must have a rapidly developing economy, not just in consumer goods, but in the capital industries necessary to acquire the material goods that the country needs to sustain itself.
Rhodesia, as all who have seen it recognise, is a country where there is a prize to be had, not only on multiracial development but also in relation to its

1217
economic development. The skill and ingenuity of the European, the nature of the African population, the immense supplies of raw materials, the mineral wealth, and the climate make Rhodesia one of the most desirable countries in the world, potentially, to live in.
Rhodesians are not progressing as they should; they will not secure this prize until they make a political settlement that will give the African a share in the government of his country that will appear to him to be significant at the moment, and that will give him an opportunity to take control of the country within a measurable distance of time. That is the dilemma Rhodesians must face. Let no one say that sanctions have not had an impact. They have. It is a submerged impact; it is not readily seen; but it is there, and it is recognised by all who study the situation.
Why does the Foreign Secretary think that Mr. Wrathall, the Finance Minister, is anxious to get access to the London capital market and other world money markets? It is because any developing country of that sort, with a year-by-year growth in population, must have an influx of development capital if it is to sustain itself and, in the long run, maintain its standard of life.
That is the issue that those who claim that sanctions have failed rarely, if ever, press. Sanctions have not failed. They are making an impact, an impact that none of us welcomes in one sense, as we should prefer that there were a settlement rather than the impact of the sanctions.
Nevertheless, that factor—and the Foreign Secretary would be wrong to deny it—forms part of the motivation of the Smith régime, and those who have to face the daily problems in the Rhodesian Cabinet. They know the situation. This pressure—the Foreign Secretary should study this factor more carefully—is as likely as anything to lead the régime back to the conference table and to allow the tender shoots to develop.
Rhodesia should realise that the continuation of sanctions by this country is not motivated by pique or pigheadedness on the part of the British Government, or on the part of the Opposition, or the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, sanctions—I am not sure whether the Foreign
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Secretary is wholly convinced of this—form the most effective means of exercising influence between now and a settlement, whenever that may be. The régime's unsatisfactory stewardship will not be overcome if we desert sanctions. Indeed, there is a need to tighten them.
If what I say is correct—and I believe that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides will agree with me about the underlying impact of sanctions—this is no time even to talk of abolishing sanctions. Rather, they should be made more effective, so that, if a pinch is to be felt, it will be felt in this sector. In my view, such a procedure holds out a greater prospect of bringing Rhodesia to the conference table.
The estimates of blockade breaking are substantial. I cite the well-known example of the United States Senate with regard to chrome. Our new partners in the EEC, particularly countries such as France and Belgium, are, I believe, guilty of breaking the United Nations resolution. Japan is another example. We all know of such examples. There is too much evidence that other countries are not taking the same view of this matter as ours; nor do they apply the same standards.
Mr. Ronald Bell: They have more sense.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell), with his legal background, should have more regard for the law. Whether or not we wish to sustain the rule of law about trade unions or about external relations with Rhodesia, both arguments spring from the same root. The hon. and learned Member should not need reminding of that fact, and should not, with a superior smile, say that those countries have more sense. That tenet, if it applies to the Rhodesian Government, or to foreign Governments, could equally be applied to trade unionists in this country. I would tell the hon. and learned Gentleman that I deny the validity in either case.
Mr Bell: So high is my regard for legality, and for the provisions of the United Nations Charter, that I am saddened when that organisation passes totally invalid and improper resolutions

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giving the colour of false legality to actions that have no warrant whatever.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. and learned Gentleman did not say that. His comment was, "They have more sense." He is now trying to rationalise that comment, as are a number of his hon. Friends.
In addition, a handful of British companies have sailed close to the wind in this respect, too close in the opinion of some of us. I would refer any hon. Member opposite who may seek evidence of this action to a document produced by Mr. Guy Arnold and Mr. Alan Baldwin of the Africa Bureau on token sanctions, or token economic warfare. I do not know whether those who snigger have even opened its covers. It is one of the most dispassionate and objective. well-backed and substantiated views that I have seen. If right hon. and hon. Members opposite would forget their prejudices and examine the factors of the situation, they might not come to the House with such closed minds.
There is little doubt that the great majority of British companies have behaved in an exemplary manner. Nevertheless, a handful have not. One obvious gap in the sanctions situation is the position of Lourenço Marques. I understand that the Beira patrol is still operating, and is partially effective. If my original hypothesis is right and sanctions are having an impact and should continue to have an impact, far from pouring cold or tepid water on the sanctions the Foreign Secretary should be considering whether he could get assistance from some other countries to establish a patrol at Lourenço Marques.
Mr. R. T. Paget Mr. R. T. Paget (Northampton)rose—
Mr. Patrick Wall Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)rose—
Mr. Callaghan: May I be allowed to develop the argument for a moment? Two hon. Gentlemen wish to interrupt: I do not call either of them hon. Friends this afternoon, although one of them may well be tomorrow. I feel that I should not get much out of either of them.
I understand that some of the African States are willing to help in a naval
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patrol of this sort. I entirely disagree with the Foreign Secretary's view that initially it was wrong to take this matter to the United Nations. I do not now wish us to shrug our responsibilities on to the United Nations for we must be in the lead in this matter, but I see every reason why we should try to involve more of the members of the United Nations in sharing the burden with us, including some of those who are now breaking the sanctions. They might be more involved if the poachers become gamekeepers. If my hon. and learned Friend wishes to interrupt with a helpful comment, I will gladly give way.
Mr. Paget: I do not know whether my right hon. Friend would regard it as helpful, but I find it odd that in the name of legality he should ask us to try to promote a totally illegal blockade of a neutral and allied port. I cannot imagine a procedure more flagrantly in defiance of all known international law.
Mr. Wall Mr. Wall rose—
Mr. Callaghan: Perhaps I may knock down one skittle at a time. My hon. and learned Friend is a notable and skilled lawyer. I have always said that if I were guilty of a crime, I should not hesitate to have him defending me: if I were innocent, I would not touch him with a barge-pole. I do not accept what he has said on this subject, and we have discussed the matter before.
Mr. Wall: I am following the right hon. Gentleman's moderate speech with great attention. Would he bear in mind that one cannot blockade Lourenço Marques, because of the configuration of the coast, without infringing the three-mile limit; but Beira is open to the high seas? If one blockaded Lourenço Marques, it would be an act of war.
Mr. Callaghan: Is the hon. Gentleman taking the view that if it were possible to do so, he would support it?
Mr. Wall: It is not possible, as it would be an act of war.
Mr. Callaghan: I had a feeling that the hon. Gentleman was once again rationalising his dislike of the situation, instead of making what I thought was an attempt to be helpful. The hon. Gentleman may be right—it is a long time since we were

1221
there—but I should like the matter investigated, because I should like to see a position in which the sanction-breakers are brought to book, in which those countries breaking sanctions are invited to help us to maintain sanctions, and in which we strengthen sanctions. That is my whole case. It may be that some of my proposals are not practicable but we have heard nothing from the Foreign Secretary to indicate that he has even studied them, certainly not whether he thinks that they are practicable.
Another proposition, which I would support, is that, in addition to having a United Nations committee on sanctions—and, whether the Foreign Secretary likes it or not, the United Nations intends to keep a close eye on the situation—there should be a United Nations commissioner who would be responsible. I cannot understand why any hon. Gentleman opposite should oppose this proposal. As long as we have sanctions, there may be a difference of view whether they are right, at any rate among a minority of the Conservative Party, but as long as we have sanctions, surely hon. Members want them to be effective. Surely as long as we have them they do not want other nations to be taking advantage of us, do they? Or has patriotism sunk so low that if they "have more sense" then they should get away with it—which is the view being put by the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South. I suggest that there is every case for the Foreign Secretary, while sanctions persist, putting to the United Nations that we need the sanctions to be made as effective as possible. But from his attitude this afternoon I did not get the feeling that he would want to touch this in any sense.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have said constantly in the House that while sanctions continue they should be enforced. I do not think that the Commissioner would help because we send all the complaints we have to the United Nations as it has all the machinery to deal with them. It is that end that has slightly failed.
Mr. Callaghan: I agree with the Foreign Secretary that he and his predecessors have sent a number of complaints to the United Nations, but there is a lot to be said for having a person
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on whom this work can be focused, instead of relying on a committee which may or may not meet. To have one person upon whom it can be focused and who would take action could lead to better results than we have had so far from the complaints which the Foreign Secretary has made.
I want to take up the right hon. Gentleman and the Conservative minority on another point—perhaps principally them rather than him. I thought it was extremely ill-advised and foolish to have a private meeting attended by over 100 back benchers at which they reached the ludicrous conclusion that if they go along with the Foreign Secretary now they can have another go at it next July. That surely is an absurdity, for this reason. They are giving a message to Mr. Ian Smith that if only he can hang on till next July perhaps they will be able to bully, cajole or persuade the Foreign Secretary into getting rid of sanctions.
If ever there were a case for settled policy in view of the impact of sanctions, the slow debilitating effect of sanctions, this was surely it. We should not be indicating every few months that in another few months we shall look at this and see what we can do. To get people to the conference table, hon. Members opposite should be saying to their Government, "We will support you as long as you think it necessary", not, "We will pull your coat tails every six months to see whether we can bully you into changing your mind." Assuming that the reports are correct, I think that a most ill-advised conclusion was reached by that meeting.
After all, hon. Members opposite are ready to soldier on in Ireland. There is, I should have thought, probably no more sign of a solution in Northern Ireland than there is in Rhodesia. If hon. Gentlemen's resolution has not failed them in Northern Ireland, why should they be ready to throw away the prospect of getting a settlement in Rhodesia? I simply do not understand the difference between the two. If this is the idea of the so-called rebels—if that is what the chocolate soldiers sitting behind the Foreign Secretary are—of how to help the Foreign Secretary, all I can say in his defence is, "Heaven help him from his friends." At any rate he will not have to look to them tonight for support, and

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I hope very much that there will be no suggestion of sanctions being enforced for a few more months and then they will be over.
I ask the Foreign Secretary to take a more positive attitude—
Mr. Evelyn King: The right hon. Gentleman's description of what took place at the Conservative Party meeting—and I was present and he was not—is wholly fanciful.
Mr. Callaghan: I am very glad to hear it. Perhaps I can ask the hon. Gentleman a question. I do not want him to betray the secrets of a party meeting because we all know that they are never published anywhere, but can he help me by saying that it is not the intention of Conservative back benchers, in so far as he can speak for them—he can certainly speak for himself—to press the Foreign Secretary to abandon sanctions within the next few months?
Mr. King: The right hon. Gentleman has asked a question which, in all humility, I cannot conceivably answer. What authority have I to speak, not having consulted anybody, for all the Government back-bench Members? I do not have such authority.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Gentleman is being extremely humble. I am afraid that his humility derives from the fact that he knows that he could not give me a truthful answer. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] He could not give me a truthful answer, because the hon. Gentleman will go on pressing for the abandonment of sanctions, will he not?
Mr. King: I do not believe in sanctions.
Mr. Callaghan: Exactly. What I could not get out of the hon. Gentleman when he rose to his feet I got out of him from a sedentary position.
Mr. King: The right hon. Gentleman must not ride off on that. I freely concede to him that in my poor judgment I have always disagreed with sanctions. I have never concealed that fact. However, he has tried to justify an account of a meeting which is false. The two things do not flow from each other.
Mr. Callaghan: The House will be able to judge from the exchanges what is likely to be the attitude of the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends over the next few months to whether they will give the Foreign Secretary the settled support that he needs in order to be able to carry through this policy successfully.
I ask the Foreign Secretary to take a more positive attitude to one or two matters which are of concern to the Opposition and to a far wider audience. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the financial easements that he intends to make. I take it that easements of exchange controls are all minor matters concerning small sums of money that will relieve hardship. Apparently, this is true also in respect of marriages, divorces and adoptions. I do not think that I speak for myself alone when I say that I do not think that the Opposition would want to see undue hardship visited on any individual as a result of the policy that we are trying to follow and that we believe to be right.
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman's feelings in this matter are genuine, but I should like to ask him about Mr. Guy Clutton Brock. I have not looked this up, because I did not know that the right hon. Gentleman intended to raise the matter. However, my recollection from Miss Judith Todd's book is that when Cold Comfort Farm was sold, which had been in the possession of Mr. Guy Clutton Brock for many years and which the right hon. Gentleman and I went to see nearly 20 years ago, according to her £50,000 was the sale price and Guy Clutton Brock has never been allowed to have a halfpenny of that money.
Compassion is not limited to those who may have one political view. Would the Foreign Secretary give me an assurance that he will look into the case of Guy Cutton Brock? If I am wrong about it, I will, of course, readily withdraw, but I do not think that I am. The facts are fairly well known. These funds have never been remitted. Let us hear that the right hon. Gentleman will be willing to raise this case, too, because it would be an affront if he were to leave a matter of that sort untouched.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Of course there are many instances of compensation

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of various kinds due to various individuals such as Mr. Guy Clutton Brock, but that is rather different from the matter with which I was dealing. I will certainly look into that case and put in a claim, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting, but these are rather different matters. We control the money that we can give to people who are sick, elderly and so on, to make their lives a little easier.
Mr. Callaghan: I did understand the Foreign Secretary on that point. What I am saying is that one hardship is at least as strong as another, that one case for compassion is at least as strong as another. I come now to a rather broader political question—
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Before my right hon. Friend leaves that matter, and while he is dealing with individual cases—
Mr. Callaghan: I still am. I am coming to the cases of Mr. and Mrs. Chinamano and Mr. Garfield Todd. I refer to what the Pearce Commission said about these people. They were detained soon after the Pearce Commission arrived in February, 1972. In its report, the Pearce Commission stated:
"The Rhodesian authorities informed us that these were cases of preventive detention arising from the internal security situation which had developed in the Midlands area."
That is in paragraph 147. It continues:
"Mr. and Mrs. Chinamano were detained under ministerial orders"
—that is, similar to the orders concerning the Todds—
"… Sir Glyn Jones and the Secretary-General went to see Mr. Todd and Mr. Chinamanos were of importance, we believe, to the to justify detention on security grounds. Sir Glyn Jones and Lord Harlech also went to see Miss Todd who gave them a similar denial."
Miss Todd has now been released. She is now in this country, as is well known. The commission commented:
"So far as Mr. Todd is concerned we know of no reasons for his detention on law and order grounds save that he was a forceful person who, it might be thought, would disturb the political waters. … The Chinamanos were of importance, we believe, to the African National Council, but there were those who were ready and willing to take their place. We have no evidence that they were planning disorders."
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In paragraph 147, the commission said that the Rhodesian Government said:
"they could not give us the detailed information which led to their detention but said that it was possible that criminal charges might be laid after investigations had been completed."
That was last February.
Has not the time come for the Foreign Secretary to ask what is happening about that detention order? Mr. Todd is, of course, at home, but he is not allowed either to leave the grounds, which are extensive, or to communicate with anyone outside. Why? If no charge is to be brought against him, if the criminal investigations have fallen down to that extent, it is high time that the Rhodesian Government accounted for themselves in these matters.
If we are still to believe that we have a responsibility—and it is because we believe that we have a responsibility that we shall tonight agree on the extension of the sanctions order—I would have hoped that the Foreign Secretary would refer to this matter this afternoon. The conclusion of the Pearce Commission—and the members were all eminent people, whatever may be thought about them by hon. Members opposite—is that on those counts the case must go by default against the Rhodesian Government. We are compelled to infer that those detentions were an interference with normal political activities.
I ask the Minister of State for an assurance that the British Government are willing to put those matters to Mr. Smith and to ask for a firm assurance either that charges will be brought or that the detention orders against those people will be ended and that they will be released to go about their normal political activities. The names that I have quoted happen to have hit the headlines and are those about which people know most. Therefore, I also ask how many people are now in detention in Rhodesia. Are we to shrug off our responsibility for them? We cannot.
I do not know how many there are. I know that there are approximately 50 detainees in the camp which includes Joshua Nkomo. I know that there are at least 34 detainees in Salisbury remand prison. I am assured of that on reasonably reputable authority.

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How many more are there? It is the Government's responsibility, if we hold ourselves responsible for the African people in those territories, to ask the Rhodesian Government how many people are being detained without trial, why, and the intentions about them. That is the least that we can do to show that we take seriously our responsibilities in such matters.
I conclude by saying that I agree with the Foreign Secretary that sanctions are not an end in themselves: they are a means. I do not know how the tender young shoots are progressing. They seem to have withered on the vine, because according to the Daily Telegraph—and who could ever doubt the Daily Telegraph on any issue concerning Northern Ireland or Rhodesia—all the dialogue about the tender shoots
"… drew an impatient snort but no direct comment from Mr. Ian Smith".
I do not know who was the spokesman, but the Daily Telegraph goes on
"'The Rhodesian people are becoming a little cynical of statements attributed to Sir Alec,' an official commented.
One is obliged to conclude that he is attempting to mollify his back benchers."
Not if I can help it. We ought to have the truth about this. Or, if I may use a phrase sanctified by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on Tuesday, "Who is telling the pack of lies?" What is the situation? Are there some tender shoots that are now growing to maturity? I hope that the Foreign Secretary is right.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman sounds like it, I must say!
Mr. Callaghan: I prefer the right hon. Gentleman to be right and the pack of lies to be told by Mr. Ian Smith to having it the other way round—where otherwise would the right hon. Gentleman's reputation for integrity be? I certainly prefer him to be right, not only for that reason but because I believe that this is the right way for Smith, if he is ever willing to do so, to get together with the Africans to see an end to this road. It is the only way it can be done.
The Opposition do not doubt that this issue can be settled only when the
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Africans themselves are allowed to play a full part in the discussions and to reach conclusions necessary to give them an assured future in their own country. The Foreign Secretary made a substantial mistake when he thought that he could sign an agreement—and did sign an agreement—with Mr. Smith over the head of the Africans. Those days have gone, and the Africans have shown him that they have gone.
If the Foreign Secretary is willing to press that they be brought in as full partners to conclude an agreement, an agreement may be obtained, and I fervently hope that it will be. The right hon. Gentleman referred to Bishop Muzorewa. Why does the Foreign Secretary not ask the Rhodesian régime why it takes away his passport? What is so wrong with a man who, according to the Foreign Secretary, is holding reasonable, well-attended meetings in Rhodesia that he is not allowed to leave Rhodesia in order to communicate his views outside, unless the régime is very frightened?
There is, of course, the subject of funds, and membership. The leaders of the African people are not making extravagant requests; they seem to me most moderate in their hopes for the future and in their hopes to secure a good share in the government of their country. Is it so wrong that 5 million Africans in their own country should ask for the major share in government against 227,000 Europeans, many of whom are recent immigrants? Cannot hon. Gentlemen understand why this should be so?
Unless they do show more understanding, if they do twitch the rug from under the Foreign Secretary, they will be responsible for the worsening of the ensuing relations. I trust to God that that will not be so.
4.57 p.m.
Sir Gilbert Longden: If the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) can mistrust the Daily Telegraph for its views on Northern Ireland and Southern Rhodesia, I mistrust his views. If he can seriously equate the situation in Northern Ireland with that in Southern Rhodesia, his argument is too ridiculous for words.
I have always deprecated sanctions, and for three reasons. First, I have always

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believed that it is our business and not the business of the United Nations, and it might as well have been left to us, as we are the only country implementing the sanctions. Secondly, there are so many other places in the world where human rights are being infringed far more than they are in Southern Rhodesia, and the United Nations do not lift a finger or a voice to complain. Thirdly, they have failed in their original objective, which was not, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party said, to bring Mr. Smith to the conference table, but to topple his illegal régime within a matter of weeks rather than months: that was the original object of sanctions.
I have listened this afternoon to my right hon. Friend's exceedingly reasonable and persuasive speech and I will support him in the Lobby tonight, if necessary. He reminded us that the objective was a stable multiracial society in Africa and that it was an ideal almost beyond human attainment in Africa. I am afraid that is impossible to attain but it is well worth pursuing for a little longer, because if it can be attained, a great prize will have come to us all, as my right hon. Friend said, particularly to the Africans.
If my right hon. Friend wants another year in which to strive for that ideal, I am prepared to let him have it. I appeal to my hon. Friends not to divide the House. If they do so they will give Mr. Smith the wholly false idea that, if he hangs on for long enough, he will find a Government in this country who will allow him to get away with independence without the five principles. That he will never do, and he may as well know it, however many people go into the Lobby tonight against sanctions.
These are the facts as I see them, and I do not think that they can be controverted. UDI was an illegal act because in law only an Act of this Parliament can confer independence on a colonial territory. Successive Parliaments over the last 150 years have declared our intention to do that when a majority of a colony's inhabitants were capable of self-government.
My right hon. Friend and his colleagues in the then Conservative Government warned the Rhodesians of the steps that the British Government would have to take in the event of illegal secession,
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and when such secession took place, when the Labour Government were in power, the Conservative Opposition rightly supported the Labour Government in the steps which they originally took. They were the steps which we had said would have to be taken.
The honourable objective of those steps was to fulfil our unquestioned responsibility to our African fellow subjects in Rhodesia. Short of force, which no one—or hardly anyone—advocated, they were the only steps open to us.
It is interesting to remark that at this very moment the General Assembly of United Nations is debating a Soviet motion advocating the non-use of force in international relations. One wonders whether there will be any more Hungarys or Czechoslovakias, or whether the Brezhnev doctrine has now gone by the board—or whether, as I fear is more likely, there is one law for the Soviet Union and another for everyone else.
The Labour Government then took the matter to the United Nations and invoked mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. As I said at the time, such measures could hope to be effective only if all members of the United Nations were prepared genuinely to support them, and to support a prolonged blockade of the whole of Southern Africa, which they would necessitate if they were to be effective. But who could believe that such a condition would be fulfilled? Of course it has not been, as all the world knows.
I read in The Times of 4th November a letter from a Dr. Musa Mazzawi, in which he writes:
"Britain's failure to carry out its obligations regarding the sanctions against Rhodesia renders it liable to be sued in the International Court of Justice at The Hague."
I wonder in what sort of world Dr. Mazzawi is living? Does he not know that Britain is the only member of the United Nations which is honouring its commitment? Only a week ago, Mr. Ian Colvin, from Rhodesia, was able to write:
"Foreign exchange is acutely short, but Rhodesia is actively trading with every customer nation except Britain. Britain is 'going it alone'. A Junior Minister from a European country has just been here offering to buy the entire beef exports of Rhodesia on a Government bilateral deal. Some 15 foreign models are coming off car assembly lines that once produced British cars."

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It was 4½ years ago that in the Daily Telegraph, of 25th March, 1968, I asked:
"Has not the time come for us to confess failure and let Rhodesia pursue her own path outside the Commonwealth? … we have done our best within the limits of the politically practicable and we have failed … were the Government now to shed further responsibility for Rhodesia, I feel they would be exercising only one of the most valuable foundations of policy—commonsense."
Nevertheless, we plodded on. The weeks in which, according to the Leader of the Opposition, the sanctions were to have "toppled" the Smith régime became months, and the months years. Eventually, an agreement was reached which was described by my right hon. Friend as fair and honourable, and by Lord Goodman as one which it would be consummate folly to reject. However, it was in the end rejected by the African majority and could not, therefore, be proceeded with because it would have broken one of the five principles if it had been pursued.
I have always doubted whether the Rhodesia Front would honour any settlement which incorporated the five principles; and, even more, what, if it did dishonour it, we could do about it. When it was rejected by the Africans, I again urged, in The Times of 25th January, that we should shed any further pretension that we can affect what happens in Rhodesia for good or ill, for the history since UDI has amply furnished further proof of the fact that to assume responsibilities without the power to fulfil them is foolish.
That advice was again rejected. I contemplate compiling in retirement a list of those many occasions when successive Governments have failed to follow my advice—speculating in each case upon the subsequent catastrophic results if they had.
I appreciate that we cannot disengage overnight. Now that the United Nations is seized of the matter, which I think is unfortunate, we must explain to the world why, if no satisfactory solution can be found during the coming year—to the Africans as a whole—we must withdraw the whole question from the United Nations and divest ourselves of any further responsibility for the future of Rhodesia. Even if Mr. Smith thinks that might happen, he will not welcome it.
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He does not want us to divest ourselves of responsibility. He wants us to be in a position to award independence legally to that country. One such solution might be found in the suggestion of Sir John Fletcher-Cooke in a letter to The Times of 25th January. I shall read two or three paragraphs of Sir John's letter because they sum up exactly what I feel. Sir John says:
"The first fact, which flows from the perversity of human nature as it is and not as we like it to be, is that individuals who share the same culture and the same way of looking at the world, wish to govern themselves and are never willingly prepared to operate within a single political system in which they share power with those of a different culture. Surely this lesson should have been learnt …".
Sir John then says that surely this lesson should have been learned from the innumerable examples we have seen, not just black versus white but brown versus yellow, black versus brown and so on.
Sir John then says:
"It is really to be expected that … the Rhodesian European minority, now a political majority, would willingly see power pass into the hands of Africans when the latter become the political majority; and even if this mythical situation were to come to pass, is there any reason to suppose that the African majority would then fully respect the rights of the European minority?"
That is fully to respect the rights of the European minority.
Sir John concludes:
"The Africans of Rhodesia have as much right to govern themselves now as have the Africans of the independent States in Africa; and the Europeans of Rhodesia have as much right to govern themselves now as have the Europeans in this country and those of European stock in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. But neither group has the right now, or in the future, to dominate the other. Since recent history contains no examples of successful multi-cultural Governments, surely this unpleasant fact should be faced and accepted.
The inevitable conclusion is partition."
I intend to support the Government in the Lobby tonight, if it be necessary to divide the House. I do this partly because my right hon. Friend asks me to—and what is the good of having leaders if, every now and then, one does not follow them?—and partly because I do not want my country to add to the many instances of sickening hypocrisy and double standards displayed almost daily by the dis-United Nations in New York. In The Times on 4th November I drew attention to the deafening silence with which the United Nations greeted

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the actions of General Amin. It is simply not true, as was claimed in another letter to The Times that day, that
"there has been widespread condemnation of General Amin's racialism in Uganda throughout Africa ".
There has been no such thing.
When Sir Dingle Foot asks me, "Why should racial persecution in Kampala be held to excuse racial persecution in Salisbury?", my answer is that I have never suggested that it did excuse it. Of course not. Racial persecution anywhere is equally culpable—except in the view of the United Nations.
Nevertheless, I still regard the United Nations as one of the hopes for the peaceful future of mankind, and I want to give my right hon. Friend another chance of either achieving his policy, which would be the best of all worlds, or of extricating ourselves with honour from an undignified position.
5.11 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Bottomley: The hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Sir Gilbert Longden) is a highly respected member of his own party and of the House. I hope that his words pleading with some of his hon. Friends not to force a Division tonight will be heeded. If the message goes out with unanimity from the House tonight that the sanctions policy is to continue, it will, I believe, give heart to those Africans who are languishing in detention and suffering indignities of all kinds.
I ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to remember those Africans when he makes suggestions about easing sanctions. I acknowledge the humane considerations which encourage him in so doing, but, equally, I hope that he will meet the wish expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) and see to it that some of those Africans, and Mr. Garfield Todd and others who are suffering, are given some encouragement by the strongest possible representations from the right hon. Gentleman that, unless something is done to ease their plight, little hope can ever be given of acting on such humane considerations and lifting even some of the sanctions.
The policy of applying economic sanctions was introduced by the Labour
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Government, and I had the privilege of putting it forward at that time. I talked to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia and to leading business men then, and they said, "We must have economic sanctions; it is the most effective way of bringing Smith and his crew to some kind of understanding of the problem caused by UDI."
Of course, their intention, and mine, was that sanctions should be applied effectively, efficiently and at once. As we know, however, the Opposition of the day would not support the Government on an all-embracing economic sanctions policy, and the Government were forced to introduce economic sanctions piecemeal. As a result of introducing them piecemeal, we never had the kind of effective results which we had good reason otherwise to expect.
The Africans at that time were unenthusiastic about applying economic sanctions. They wanted the use of force. I am sorry that they did not give enthusiastic support to the application of economic sanctions. As others have said, it is easy to suggest the use of force. I have little doubt that, if force had been used, Smith and his wild men would have blown up the Kariba Dam. After all, they had little to lose. They had the Wankie coal mines to give them power. But if the copper mines had no power in Zambia, the Africans, not just at once and for a short period but for a long time to come, would have been deprived of their economic standards, and, what is more, who knows what would have been the other repercussions if force had been used, repercussions such as those we have seen in other parts of the world? Once there is a trouble spot, the big Powers become involved, and I should never want to be party to a Vietnam situation in Africa.
I have constantly pleaded, therefore, with many of my African colleagues to do all they can to support the policy of economic sanctions and to put pressure on those countries which have breached the United Nations decision to apply them.
I believe that economic sanctions are working and are becoming increasingly effective. Rhodesia is predominantly a farming country. The farmers, particularly the tobacco farmers, are losing money. Not only are they losing income

1235
now but the situation will probably become far worse for them. At this time, with their tobacco crop not being sold, the markets of the world which need tobacco are looking elsewhere for purchases, and where better to look than Malawi? Some criticise Dr. Banda at times, but he knows how to look after his own country's interests, and he is seeking and getting the tobacco markets which the Rhodesians once had. If the Rhodesians are not sensible, they may well lose their tobacco markets for good. Meat, also, is an important product of Rhodesia. Botswana is taking the meat market, and will continue to do so.
Rhodesia, therefore, with economic sanctions applied, will find that its farming interests, which, as I say, are its predominant interests, will suffer, and it will be very difficult for that country to return to the standards which it knew before UDI
The Southern Rhodesian farmers are short of farming equipment. There is a shortage of tractors. They are not receiving the supplies necessary to keep their machinery intact and able to do the kind of job which can make farming much more efficient. The communications system is becoming far worse than ever it was—and it has been bad enough over the past 12 months. The Rhodesians cannot get the railway equipment, the railway wagons and the engines which they need, and this is all having a bad effect on their economy. Replacements for goods and equipment of this kind are becoming more difficult, and so on.
The health services are being depleted because they cannot obtain the goods necessary to keep standards up. As has often been said, the Africans are the ones who suffer most in that situation, but many Africans have said—they said to the Pearce Commission—"We are prepared to suffer these things in order that we may get justice and have an opportunity of playing a part in running our country."
Attempts have been made, as my right hon. Friend said, to build up secondary industries so as to avoid the importation of consumer goods. But these factories are not now obtaining the raw materials required. The goods being produced are shoddy. In due course, the Rhodesian
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Europeans will start complaining about their own standards. They want good quality goods, not inferior, and they want them so as to be up to the standard which people elsewhere in the world are able to enjoy.
It is said by some that if we do not come to some sort of settlement with Rhodesia, we shall drive the Rhodesians into the South African camp, that they will become apartheid-minded, and then we shall all regret what has been done. I believe that the South Africans are realistic people. I recall Mr. Smith telling me on one occasion that the South African Prime Minister had said to him, "If you can keep going for two years, you will have no further worries. Your UDI will be forgotten." It has not happened. No country has recognised Rhodesia, and UDI is far from forgotten. We are to renew the application of economic sanctions tonight to make sure that it is never forgotten.
But South Africa is realistic enough to know that if she ever thought of taking Rhodesia into her orbit she would be adding over 5 million more Africans to her own majority African population. The Africans in Rhodesia are increasing at an annual rate nearly equivalent to the Rhodesian-European population. Certainly South Africa does not want to add those numbers to her already large population of Africans to cause even greater problems.
In addition, South African business men are beginning to complain. They realise that propping up Southern Rhodesia is harming their interests. I think we shall find that South Africa in due course, recognising that she wants to come to terms with Black Africa, will find a way of getting out of trying to support Rhodesia. We shall not make that easier if tonight we do not endorse very firmly the proposition to continue the economic sanctions policy.
Responsible Africans, Asians and Indian leaders acknowledge the debt that they owe to Britain, and specially the Civil Service, in laying the foundations of economic progress. I had an interesting experience not long ago. I was travelling in an aircraft with a Saudi-Arabian. He said to me, "The sad thing is that we were never a British Colony." I had never had that said to me before. I said "Why do you say that?" He

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said "If we had been a British Colony we would have had railways, roads, water and communications like Egypt."
There are many countries which were under our trust which have been wise enough to respond to the suggestions that we have made to them, that they can achieve their nationalistic aspirations by peaceful development, by our help and encouragement. It is because of this that we have brought to independence previous colonies in an atmosphere of mutual respect and friendship and without violence or bloodshed. We must not tarnish our record, or affront the rightful aspirations of newly-emergent States in Africa, by condoning or approving the acts of a white minority which threaten for ever to dominate a majority of their fellow citizens. I congratulate the Secretary of State on putting forward economic sanctions once more, and I hope that the House as a whole will unanimously support him.
5.22 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Bell: The right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley) has been making that sort of speech for seven years, and I have no doubt that he will be able to say that I have been making my sort of speech for seven years also. I am, however, a little worried by the persistent optimism of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. He said that sanctions are working and that they are becoming more effective, not less. It reminded me of the attempt of a former Labour Government to grow groundnuts in East Africa and to run a giant chicken farm in the Gambia, when the Government used to come back each year after a disastrous experience and say that these projects, far from failing, were becoming more successful and the prognostication was that they would be even more profitable than in the past.
I am afraid that the Labour Party opposite know very little about Africa. They are constantly in touch with only the disaffected elements, and it is on the judgments of those elements that they form their own judgments. I feel that a good deal of this support of sanctions is due to not much better than pique because Mr. Smith has appeared to succeed, in spite of the actions that the party opposite took against him.
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The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) described the case of those who oppose sanctions as being the fact that sanctions do not work. I have never founded my opposition to sanctions on that ground. They do not work. But the fact is that sanctions are wrong because the case that they are intended to support is itself wrong. It is founded on five principles, so we are told, and one of those was consultation. I always thought that the consultation principle was nonsense. The operation, carried out very efficiently, I do not doubt, by Lord Pearce and his colleagues earlier this year, was an entirely fatuous exercise, the outcome of which could have been predicted the moment the Commissioners did not go out at once but only after a delay, during which time all kinds of things which one would expect had happened.
Apart from that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Sir Gilbert Longden) said, on both sides it was said that the agreement was honourable and acceptable. Lord Goodman certainly was of that opinion. If it were an honourable and acceptable agreement, and if it were absurd to take this kind of sounding in a country where even the Leader of the Opposition never suggested there should be at once universal adult suffrage—he was never in favour of that—surely it was absurd, upon the verdict of people whom the Labour Party have always said were not ready for instant majority rule, to reject an agreement which was thought on both sides to be honourable and acceptable.
The other four principles are also nonsense, like the consultation principle. By their test there would be few independent countries in the world and Britain would not be among them. We have no safeguards against retrogressive legislation in this country. What other nation in the world has? More relevantly, what country to which we have given a constitution has such a safeguard against what is called retrogressive legislation? Does not this word "retrogressive" carry with it the implication that we know best what is progress in the conduct of affairs of an African country?
If the meaning of "progress" as we have envisaged it, and as seems to emerge in today's debate, is that there should

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be a parliamentary system on the Westminster model with universal suffrage, I must say that on that basis the whole coast of Africa should be ringed with warships applying sanctions against the countries inside Africa. If the idea is that the rôle of Parliament—here, for example—is to intervene to stop retrogressive proposals from the Executive or the Shadow Executive, which means that the Government or the Shadow Cabinet change their conception of progress by 180 degrees, that message ought to be flashed at once to Lincoln, and the Bill that we are to consider next week should be going through on a free vote, neither of which I suspect will happen.
Mr. George Cunningham: Raise the quality a bit, for goodness sake.
Mr. Bell: It is not just that sanctions are ineffective, and expensive and damaging to Britain. It is what we are trying to force on Rhodesia that is in itself wrong. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who has tried very hard, said that our responsibility was limited to, or consisted in, trying to lay sure foundations for a multiracial society by political evolution. I have used my right hon. Friend's own words. They seemed to obtain approval from the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East and others. I have two brief comments on them.
First, the implication, which has been borne out in practice, is that it does not matter what they do afterwards—let them sign on the dotted line at Marlborough House a constitution which has everything we think it should contain, then go home and tear it up within a matter of months or within a few years, as each of these African countries in effect or in form has done, and nothing will happen. The answer in such circumstances is, of course, that Her Majesty's Government have no responsibility for what these countries do once they have been given independence. Indeed, it has been said explicitly that we discharge our responsibility by seeing that they start life with that sort of constitution. What it really means is that anyone willing to come here tongue in cheek and sign on the dotted line gets our blessing and independence, but that those who are entirely honest, who have in-
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herited our concept of integrity and are not willing to sign a document with which they differ in some degree, have sanctions applied to them.
Mr. David Steel Mr. David Steel (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles) rose—
Mr. Bell: I want to get on.
Mr. Steel Mr. Steel rose—
Mr. Bell: Very well.
Mr. Steel: I am sorry to prolong the agony but I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman whether Mr. Smith was acting in integrity when he tore up the 1966 Constitution.
Mr. Bell: As the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) has abused my giving way to him, I shall not make the mistake of giving way to him again. He might bear in mind that the 1966 constitution was not torn up. The last constitution which emanated from this country was the 1960 constitution. The unilateral declaration of independence was in 1965. The hon. Gentleman is slightly mixed up.
Mr. George Cunningham: Answer the question.
Mr. Bell: Obviously, a country which has produced its own constitution can change it. That is the short answer.
My right hon. Friend said that the Rhodesian practice sharply differs from that of South Africa, and that is true. But I disagreed with him when he went on to say that therefore we must keep on sanctions in order to give ourselves the best opportunity of ensuring that developments continued in that line. What is the truth of the matter? The truth is that Rhodesia did this itself without any coercion or prompting from us at a time when it had self-rule and had had it for 40 years or more. Never has Rhodesia been ruled by Britain in practice since the 1920s.
We ruled many countries of Africa, including the Union of South Africa, and countries in other parts of the world, but never in any one of them did we develop a multiracial society; never in any one of them did we leave behind a multiracial society. We ruled these countries well and efficiently and gave them roads, canals and a civil service, and so on, but it was not part of our

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genius ever to produce a multiracial society. The only British territory where a multiracial society ever emerged was one which we did not rule—Southern Rhodesia, which spontaneously and out of its own breast evolved that system.
If it is thought that we, by putting sanctions on Rhodesia, have in some way accelerated that progress and will continue to do so by maintaining them, how does one compare the 1969 constitution of Rhodesia with the 1960 constitution before sanctions? In the 1960 constitution, there was no consideration or mention of colour, race, or anything like that. There were qualifications for the vote on a common roll similar to those which we had had in this country during our long advance. Certainly we never had an education qualification, which was additional in Rhodesia, but economic qualifications were part of our long history leading up to the total suffrage of 1950.
Mr. George Cunningham: Tell us when we had two registers.
Mr. Bell: There was a common roll in 1960. The hon. Gentleman does not know what he is talking about. On that constitution, we refused Rhodesia independence. We not only refused it to Mr. Smith, who had not then been heard of. We refused it to Mr. Garfield Todd, Sir Edgar Whitehead, Mr. Winston Field and Sir Roy Welensky. We refused it to each and all of them one after the other. So, when I am asked tonight to support sanctions because they will encourage these little shoots of development, I say in all sincerity to my right hon. Friend, "Here in this continent of intolerance, of dictatorship, of abandonment of democracy, you have one light, one country, which, uncoerced and out of its own breast, evolved this system which commends itself to so many people."
Mr. Cunningham: I thought I understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to say that until UDI Rhodesia had a common roll. Is he unaware that before UDI there were two rolls—the A and B rolls?
Mr. Bell: What the hon. Gentleman does not realise is that the A and B rolls had nothing to do with whether one was white or black.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Is it not also the case that between responsible self-government and federation there was one roll?
Mr. Bell: That is so. I am obliged to my hon. Friend. To me, the Central African Federation was the most hopeful development which ever happened in Africa. It is tragic that it broke down. If it had succeeded, there would have been no need to lecture South Africa. All we would have needed to say was, "Look at the Federation." But once we started to clobber Southern Rhodesia, what position were we in to lecture South Africa? What do we point out to South Africa as the alternative?
I think we have been guilty of almost unimaginable folly in our handling of the Rhodesia question. It would have been so easy at the breakup of the Federation, sad as it was, to have given independence to all three territories—Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. There would have been no trouble. Southern Rhodesia still had the 1960 constitution and we should have been in a very happy state today with Southern Rhodesia developing on its own as it has developed and showing the way to everybody else in Africa. Now where are we?
Supposing sanctions continue to fail. Is it going to be easier next year? Supposing sanctions were to succeed and Rhodesia were forced to agree to universal adult suffrage? We all know what would happen. There would be one man, one vote, one election—and then would come the familiar dismal slide into despotism either of an individual or of a group. There would be unrest maturing into civil war and disruption. With just a little bit of outside help it would end up as a Congo or as a Zanzibar or, at the very best, as a Uganda or Tanzania.
That is the dilemma we are facing ourselves with. I therefore make an appeal to my hon. Friends or anyone on either side of the House who thinks that responsibility lies upon the individual in Parliament and is not to be evaded by some argument about general support for particular administrations. By our votes tonight we cannot remove at once this stain of error from the House and our country, but at least we can bring nearer

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the day of honour, patriotism and quiet common sense in our handling of this African situation.
5.40 p.m.
Mr. David Steel: We have listened to a most depressing speech from the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) and its low point was when he suggested in all seriousness that the Heads of other African States were people of no integrity while his friend Mr. Smith was the man of integrity whom we should all trust. We should remember Mr. Smith's record and how he "conned" the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) when he was the Commonwealth Secretary. We should remember also that it was he who declared UDI in 1965 and we should remember how when he introduced his constitution in 1969 it was, to use his own words, to sound the death knell of African political advancement.
There was no question of his trying to introduce a new constitution within his illegal framework in order to advance the African people—he was doing precisely the reverse. When the hon. and learned Member talks about hon. Members on the Opposition side listening to the disaffected elements, I suppose that he means we listen to the majority of the population. If he were one of the 4 million black population in Rhodesia today he, too, might be one of the disaffected elements.
The Minister of State will wind up the debate tonight and it will be appropriate to congratulate him on his new appointment to the Foreign Office. When he speaks I hope that he will say a little about how the Government see the operation of sanctions in the months to come. The document written by the Africa Bureau to which the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) referred is no doubt also in the hands of the Government, and it includes a number of concrete suggestions for making sanctions more effective. Whatever the case for or against sanctions, there is no case for ineffective sanctions. If we are to renew the order the Government might give us some idea of measures they might support at the United Nations for making sanctions more effective.
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We must recognise that sanctions might not have worked in the way which was intended but it might be more accurate to say not that they failed but that they have not yet succeeded. I believe that they are working not in months but in years and that the original estimate was wildly wrong. I give three examples to those hon. Members who are giggling. There is, first, the effect on agriculture, particularly on the tobacco farmers. We have recently seen political development inside Rhodesia in the formation of the Rhodesia Party which has the backing of many of these farmers and which is the consequence of sanctions. I am not suggesting that it is a liberal party in the sense in which we know the word, but it is opposed to the intransigence of Mr. Smith and the Rhodesia Front, and that is a new development which we should welcome.
The need for capital investment in the railways and the airways particularly is very obvious. I had one direct experience of this. When I was escorted, uninvited by me, to my aeroplane on leaving Salisbury, we boarded the aircraft, the engines started and then stopped again. I was walked back into the building which I had been prohibited to enter and the aircraft was towed away by a tractor because it was unfit to travel. That is an isolated example, but this year the airways are making a loss for the first time.
No doubt that experience could happen to the Minister of State or to anyone in this country but Rhodesia is operating a fleet of old aircraft. Rhodesia is also operating rolling stock on the railways which badly need new investment. Most serious is the problem created by the lack of access to international funds and the shortage of foreign exchange. Sanctions, therefore, have had that effect and the population of Rhodesia is well aware of the effect they have.
I believe that sanctions are partly, at any rate, responsible for the new feeling of political opposition to the Rhodesia Front among the European population in Rhodesia which we have seen since the Pearce Commission was in that country.
Mr. Paget Mr. Paget rose—
Mr. Steel: I wish to be brief and, as the hon. and learned Member is seeking

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to speak later, he can reply then. The other development since the Pearce Commission is that African opinion has in a sense changed and is in a sense more solid now than it was before the settlement proposals were put. Since UDI we have always been told by the Smith régime that the Chiefs, who were spokesmen of the people, were greatly in favour of the kind of developments that the Smith Government was pursuing. Since the Pearce Commission made it quite clear that the African majority rejected the kind of terms that were being proposed to them, largely on the ground that they distrusted the Smith Government, the result has been that the Chiefs now support the people and say that, regardless of the financial encouragement that the Smith Government give them as Chiefs, they stick by the view of the majority. There is therefore a new situation in which the Chiefs are speaking with one voice on the need for what they call a just and honourable settlement.
I was in Salisbury in the same week and I regarded the moves by one of the Ministers in Mr. Smith's Government, Mr. Lance Smith, to have talks with the African National Council leaders as a hopeful sign. I spoke to those leaders in the few days following those conversations and I believe that they are taking a reasonable attitude when they say that although they reject the proposals they are perfectly willing for the Pearce Commission report to be used as a working document in any discussions that might take place inside Rhodesia. The British Government's attitude should be to tell the Smith régime that it should stop the harassment of the African National Council and should allow a distribution of membership cards and that they should stop preventing the flow of funds to the ANC and allow this very moderate and very sensible development of African political opinion to continue in its work.
The ANC itself put the issues very clearly. It says that there are two settlements here, not one. First, there is the settlement of the outstanding legal matters of dispute between Britain and the Rhodesia Front. The Rhodesia Front declared UDI, and the African population was not party to that dispute. The ANC is not particularly concerned about that settlement, which is a matter
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for us and the international community. It is interested in the second settlement, which is one between those who have traditionally ruled Rhodesia and the majority of the population. I believe that that settlement must come first before we go on to the settlement of the outstanding legal issues between ourselves and Rhodesia.
The one point on which I would diverge from the Foreign Secretary's speech this afternoon was when he tried to set the Rhodesia conflict in a world context. I do not know whether I quote him accurately, but he seemed to think that it was a relatively minor consideration in world affairs. I do not accept that view. As I visited various other countries in Africa, most of which I had visited before this year, I was particularly struck by the impression of good will towards this country which had been renewed partly as a result of the conduct of the Pearce Commission in Rhodesia and the clear stand that we have taken that the test of acceptability was the sticking principle for Britain. The other factor was the swift action taken in the Uganda crisis. These two things have helped restore a lot of our reputation in the rest of the continent. That is something we should not lightly throw away. We should not regard Britain's standing in the rest of the continent as a matter of minor importance, because it is of major importance.
When Conservative Members of Parliament write letters in The Times and say that sanctions should be dropped and negotiations should be pursued with Mr. Smith by other means, I do not know what they mean. We have not heard the "other means" put forward. There has been no suggestion that if we dropped sanctions we would achieve a better settlement or more favourable response from the Rhodesia Front. The Rhodesia Front in Rhodesia and those who support the South African Government in South Africa say that because of what has happened in Uganda they should not be prepared to advance African people in Rhodesia towards majority rule. I reject that argument. It is like saying that because of what happened in Germany under Hitler, we in Britain, because we are a similar people and live on the same continent, are not fit to rule ourselves.

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Although what has happened in Uganda is a tragedy, we should look to those countries in Africa which accepted the constitutions we gave them, which accepted the Westminster system and are still basically operating it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where are they?"] They are in Tanzania and Zambia.
Some of those hon. Members shouting from below the gangway have not been there, and have not seen the different system of democracy that those countries use. The constituency of Macclesfield did not have a choice between two Conservative candidates, which the constituents might well have wished. People in Tanzania have that sort of choice. We should not try to impose a rigid Westminster pattern.—[Interruption]—Zambia is moving towards the same modification. The basic principle of universal franchise, open elections and majority rule is still maintained in those countries.
Rhodesia has about 2,000 African graduates, which is far more than any of those other territories had when they were granted independence. I believe that Zambia had about a hundred. Therefore, the possibility of moving towards a system of majority rule is very strong.
Bishop Muzorewa, the Chairman of the African National Council, is circulating to all those on the electoral roll, the European voters, a pamphlet containing two of his speeches. I placed a copy in the Library yesterday. I believe that when they are read by the European electorate those speeches may have at least a marginal impact. I do not wish to exaggerate their impact, but they are extremely well-reasoned speeches. Bishop Muzorewa makes the basic point that for Rhodesia to continue on its present course is like trying to build a house when the building inspector has already condemned the foundations.
What we in the House must face tonight is that by renewing sanctions, by maintaining the international ostracism of Rhodesia, we are reminding the Rhodesian people themselves, those who hold power now, that when we talk about a just and honourable settlement we are not talking about something which is just and honourable in the view of our Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, or of this House, but a settlement which
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is just and honourable in the view of the majority of the African people.
5.52 p.m.
Sir Frederic Bennett: When the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) opened the debate for the Opposition, I found myself facing the familiar accusation that anyone who disagrees with the right hon. Gentleman about what is happening in Rhodesia must automatically be a pro-Rhodesian Front, pro-Smith stooge. It is time the right hon. Gentleman dropped this childish tactic. It is possible for one to differ about what is likely to achieve the best result without being called "stooge". I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman has left the Chamber, because I should like to know how he would feel if, every time he supported the point of view of a trade union that happened to have a certain number of Communists among its leadership, we on these Benches called him a Communist stooge. Over and over again the right hon. Gentleman has spoken of unpatriotic people on the Government side of the House and has made the usual charges. I hope that we shall conduct the debate in the same spirit as that in which I regard those who differ from me, which is that they honestly and sincerely believe that their way of trying to solve an intractable problem is the best for all concerned. It will be with that approach that I shall make my contribution to the debate.
I have no time for racialists of any colour or type. Ever since UDI I have had no contact with any member of the Rhodesian Front—with one exception only. Shortly after UDI I went to Rhodesia, when we were still diplomatically represented there, and saw Mr. Ian Smith. I tried my humble best to persuade him of the folly of the course he was pursuing. When I returned I went first to see the then Commonwealth Secretary, the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley), who complimented me not only in his room but in the House on the valuable albeit insignificant attempt I had made to straighten things out. Perhaps we can now approach the debate on the basis that we are all trying to do our best to solve a difficult problem.
I was very glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Sir Gilbert Longden) spoke earlier

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on the question of what sanctions are all about. It is in that narrow context that I want to make my contribution, not going too far back into history or looking too far into the future. I do not make any jeers about weeks or months in relation to the policy of sanctions, but it is pertinent to remember that the speeches of the present leaders of the Opposition made it clear that what they were trying to do when in Government was not to bring Mr. Smith and the Rhodesian Front to the negotiating table but to bring them down. I do not blame the Opposition leaders, but let us get away from the fallacy which they now propagate that sanctions are working because they have brought Mr. Smith to the negotiating table. In reply to a question from me about what I thought was the counterproductive effect of sanctions, the Leader of the Opposition, then Prime Minister, told me that a short, sharp, retribution was preferable to a long-drawn-out agony. Does that mean bringing someone to the negotiating table? Of course not. It meant bringing Mr. Smith down and replacing him with a more liberal-minded man. That has not happened. Perhaps we can now return to the facts, and not try to pretend that we were trying to accomplish something that we were not.
I believe that there are two reasons why Mr. Smith has come to the negotiating table, most recently on the draft agreement with my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I am not saying that sanctions played no part in his thinking, but there were two other factors. The one that I am talking about overwhelmingly is that even the most bigoted Rhodesian Front member cannot today ignore the fact that the African population continues to rise by a number equivalent to the whole white population every year. However foolish a person may be, however convinced of racial superiority, in the end numbers count. I believe that these men have been thinking much more about that than about sanctions, when they see the impossibility of maintaining a near-South African pattern without the force that South Africa has at its disposal.
The second reason why Mr. Smith has come to the negotiating table is an indirect effect of sanctions, but not of economic sanctions as such. It is an increasing feeling of discomforture, par-
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ticularly among the younger elements of the European population of Rhodesia, a feeling of unhappiness about being ostracised in the world outside, in sport, travel and all the other matters that count. On my last visit to South Africa I saw that that is what is happening there. The Afrikaner in his laager is ignoring the fact that his laager is being eroded at the roots by young people who are no longer content to be regarded as being within a fortress wall. We are not blockading South Africa, but that is happening there, too. The young white South African is beginning to prompt a sense of movement in that country which I have not seen even starting in the past 20 years.
The actual impact of sanctions is what counts with the ordinary electorate in Rhodesia. I am not talking about the Cabinet meetings or those who look at the figures, those who work out capital investment figures or who think about rolling stock. The white Rhodesian is living an extremely happy and pleasant life internally, as regards his personal prosperity, if he is prepared to put his head in the sand and not consider what is happening in the world outside. He can buy all the petrol he wants at 2p a gallon cheaper than the blockading British can. He can buy in the shops all that he wants of the rather inferior material made in his new secondary industries or—if he is sufficiently well-off, as many Rhodesians still are—all the consumer goods, drinks and luxury foods exported to Rhodesia by Germany, Japan, France and the rest of those countries which are breaking the sanctions rules by one method or another.
When my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth went to Rhodesia for his talks with Mr. Smith on the draft agreement, what car met him at the airport? It was not a dilapidated Rolls-Royce but a brand new Mercedes-Benz. Some of our newspapers said what a shameful thing it was that our Foreign Secretary should have had to drive in a Mercedes-Benz. Did none of them think of the implications of this and the actual effect of sanctions on the ordinary people living there? They are living too well, not suffering now, and not thinking of the day after tomorrow. They are thinking of today and how their life is going now.

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Much has been said about the loss of the tobacco crop. It has caused an appalling loss in foreign exchange earnings although there are methods, we have been told, by which a certain amount of tobacco is reaching the outside world and does not come out labelled as Rhodesian tobacco. They have gone over to planting grain with two results. First, they are able to feed their growing population; secondly, one of the off-shoots of sanctions has been that we have helped to cripple Zambia economically so that last year she had to buy almost the whole of the Rhodesian grain crop because it was slightly cheaper than that which she could get from South Africa. Can we never wake up to the facts of the situation? We are making gestures which do not help what is happening out there.
The right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East, rightly said that it was extremely unlikely that Rhodesia would go into the South African orbit. She is already in that orbit economically but not politically, for the very good reason, from her point of view, that the South Africans, pursuing their apartheid policy, with which none of us would agree, do not want 250,000 Europeans in exchange for 4½ millions Africans to add to the 16 million which they are already trying to fit into bantustans and elsewhere.
I have never believed that this idea of Rhodesia going physically to South Africa is a real possibility, nor do I think that South Africa, with all the problems she has, would dream of taking such a step as territorial aggrandisement by using force against a neighbouring State. This is totally unreal. The white Rhodesians have a way out if in the last resort sanctions do work. They can go to South Africa, where there are many vacancies for European workers as the South African Government try to find an alternative to having to defeat their own apartheid policies by bringing in African workers from neighbouring African States. Every white Rhodesian knows that in the last resort he can go to the south and find a living there.
Sanctions have so far had little or no effect on the man in the street in Rhodesia. They have not led to a lowering in the standard of living but only to a restriction of what might have been reached. It is difficult to appreciate the
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loss of something which one did not know one would get anyway.
I want to say a word about the Beira blockade and one of the more fanciful remarks I heard today about extending it to Lourenço Marques. When the Labour Government first introduced the Beira blockade they sent out one of our last, if not our last, aircraft carriers, and a couple of accompanying frigates. We also managed to arrange in Malagasy for a small air base with which we could survey the Indian Ocean approaches to Beira. Today Malagasy has politely told us to take our aeroplanes away. Our last aircraft carrier had to be brought back to England or it would have sunk from the sheer weight of barnacles which were accruing while it pursued its fruitless task.
We could no longer spare two frigates, so we now have one. As I said in another debate, we now have one frigate for the whole of the affected coastline, without any aerial survey, trying to carry out a blockade. I also mentioned on the last occasion I spoke the pathetic folly of all this. When one of our sailors developed acute appendicitis we had to cable the Portuguese authorities, whom we were blockading, to ask if we could fly him ashore for an emergency operation, which they kindly did for us. He was then flown back to resume the blockade. Can folly go much further than this farce?
If we cannot do it in Beira how the hell can we do it in Lourenço Marques where we cannot even get to the port which we are trying to blockade because we would be invading territorial waters? Let us assume that by marshalling every vessel that we could possibly creak out to that part of the world we could manage to do the blockade. What is there to stop vessels going to Durban or East London? Can anyone tell me how such vessels would operate; and if they do, where will we get the extra ships from? The party opposite has frequently criticised us for spending too much on defence. I find it difficult to maintain a serious face and continue discussing the real problems while we are trying to pretend that we are doing something which we are not doing and trying to salvage our consciences by doing so.
I want to explain my own attitude. I do not want to end on a hopeless

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note, because there are real prospects, even though they are slight, of a settlement in the only way that I, having lived in that country, thought would ever come about. That is not through something being dictated from this country; not, with great respect to the Foreign Secretary, by a meeting in secret in Salisbury or on a series of warships around the world, like the former Prime Minister, but by Rhodesians of both colours when they find out that there is no alternative to reaching a reasonable way of life, getting together and talking.
There are signs of that happening now. There were meetings between the more moderate members of the Rhodesian Front Cabinet and the leaders of the ANC. It is a great pity that some interfering ninny who went out there at the time happened to broadcast about these meetings, to try to get some credit for himself, and spoilt it just when some of us were trying to get things going. However, there is a fair chance of these talks coming to some kind of fruition.
If we can get away from the sterile approach of looking at this, from the idea of a draft constitution, if we could manage to get two sufficiently responsible Africans and two sufficiently responsible Europeans to form some kind of a constitutional council and work out what proposals they thought they could put on the one hand to the ANC and on the other to the Rhodesian Front, then we might have a chance of making it stick.
At the moment there is every prospect of this sort of initiative beginning to bear some fruit. On the one hand the ANC realises that for a long time ahead the power will remain in the hands of the European minority and on the other hand the European minority realises that the power is slipping from its hands over a period of time.
Under these circumstances what should we do? I have asked those who are my friends over there, who are in neither the Rhodesian Front nor the ANC—devoted people in the middle of the road trying to bring the sides together—what are the effects of sanctions now. It would be utterly wrong to mention names. I will just say that the conclusion I have reached, after discussing this with men
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actually facing up to this task, is that they believe sanctions to be irrelevant. They do not believe that they are forcing either side to do anything at all. Their point of view is that at this time it could be counter-productive, in that sanctions are still forcing a number of sensible Europeans, on the basis of "my country, right or wrong," to go along with the Rhodesian Front.
We all know that if our country was under threat people would, logically or illogically, behave in the same way. I may be wrong about the possibilities that lie ahead. It may be that the Foreign Secretary is right when he says that sanctions will help at this stage. Because I respect his view, I cannot bring myself to vote against a man who is much wiser and more experienced than I, but I can no longer go into the Lobby supporting a policy that I regard as fundamentally ineffective, if not actually counterproductive in the present state of affairs.
6.9 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: The hon. Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett) has the advantage of knowing Rhodesia extremely well. He has made a sincere and responsible speech. Some other hon. Members, whose emotions are carried high on this issue, would do well if they read and re-read what the hon. Gentleman has said, because it came from experience.
I, too, know something of Rhodesia, and I have from the start been opposed to sanctions. During the first debate, I was a lonely voice. I said that sanctions would be easy to put on and difficult to take off, that they would hang round our neck like a dead chicken that we could not get rid of. The Beira patrol is just one unhappy and absurd example.
I believe that the Empress Catherine once put a sentry on the first snow drop that she saw: he was there 200 years later. I do not know whether we shall have some obsolete vessel wondering what it is doing in that sea 200 years hence because nobody has remembered to remove it.
There is one point on which I challenge a little what the Foreign Secretary said. It is not a question of making Rhodesia into a nation; she has done that herself. She is a nation. She fulfils in international law what are the conditions of

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nationhood; that is, effective authority within a defined frontier. She has, I think, the legal right to recognition.
The legality of a new nation does not depend on recognition by the ex-colonial Power. I do not know whether we have ever recognised the American colonies. I suppose that at some point we did so but not until years after they had become a nation. I do not think Spain has ever recognised the South American nations, but they are, none the less, nations.
It seems odd to pick on Rhodesia to try to injure it when we compare it with what is happening in, say, Uganda or Libya, where the Foreign Office had to advise our women to submit to rape rather than to risk their lives at the hands of the supporters of Colonel Gaddafi. In Burundi genocide is in active operation. Nearer home, should we mention Czechoslovakia?
Why, because we dislike an internal aspect of policy in a nation which has effectively established its nationhood, should we as busybodies seek to injure it? That is really all that there is left for sanctions to do. It was not their purpose. We said expressly when they were put on, "We did not want to injure. We want something short and sharp to topple Smith." But now the only justification is injury.
Of course there is injury. Nobody, least of all those who have opposed sanctions, as I have from the start, has ever denied that sanctions have an effect. Of course they have an effect. Unhappily, it is the wrong effect. They had a wrong effect before, and they still have. The first effect of sanctions was to consolidate the support of the Rhodesian Front. The Rhodesians made it probably the most stable régime in the world today. The régime's chances of survival are vastly superior to those of the Tory Government here. The Smith Government is firmly established. All the Rhodesian Europeans were brought into support of that régime, with minor and ineffective exceptions. African progress was stopped, and that progress, as has been pointed out, was at that time considerable.
When I was there, everyone was talking in terms of how long one should wait for an African majority government. It was considered that one was very much on the reactionary side if one thought that
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the period of waiting would be as long as 15 years. The general attitude now is that it must never happen. Again, sanctions have produced African unemployment, and probably a drop in African standards of living. Sanctions have not produced European unemployment. There is no drop in the European standard of living.
In a way, sanctions have stopped change. That developing country, that developing society, has been stopped in its tracks. I should have thought that was the object of every reactionary. In the process, a number of vested interests have been created—all the diversifications, all the new industries for import substitutes, which could not live if sanctions were removed.
Therefore, a considerable vested interest in favour of retaining the sanctions has been created. After all, there is no more effective protection for a nascent industry than sanctions, which completely forbid the arrival of competitive goods. Thus for large elements, particularly elements involved in the Rhodesian Front, there has been created this strong vested interest in favour of sanctions themselves. That situation makes it much more difficult to remove them.
We are told that we should retain sanctions so as to produce the hope of a multiracial society. I believe that to be a profound misunderstanding of the situation in Rhodesia. Rhodesia does not want to negotiate, primarily because of sanctions. The existence of sanctions is a minor factor in wanting to negotiate.
The Rhodesians are not the only people who want to negotiate. People all over the world who do not have sanctions want to negotiate on all the interests available to them. Whether or not there are sanctions, Rhodesia will want very much to negotiate; she will want to negotiate the more because at that point suddenly she will be open to the winds of world competition. Suddenly the market will be open, large-scale capital will be coming in and she will be faced with an investment boom, a kind of explosion, something for which she will desperately need co-operation.
Let us open those doors and reveal that Rhodesia has a need of the world from which we have excluded her.

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Immediate and tremendous plans will become apparent to her. I believe, and I have always believed, that in the expansion which is available to Rhodesia lies the hope of a multiracial society, because a quarter of a million Europeans cannot possibly stop that industrial revolution. The need for the educated African—the uneducated African is of no use in a booming society—
Mr. George Cunningham: What about South Africa?
Mr. Paget: The South African situation differs enormously in that South Africa has a white working class and has to a tremendous extent avoided letting any of her key industries become dependent on an indigenous black population. For example, the mine workers and others are contract workers, coming in and going out. South Africa has seen the precise difficulty and has sought, inevitably unsuccessfully, to protect herself from it. This liberation is precisely the development from which South Africa has tried to protect herself and from which we, by our sanctions, are protecting Rhodesia.
Certainly in its early stages the industrial explosion which would occur in the event of the curtain being removed would be staffed for the most part by the East African Asians. Uganda is not the end of the story of the East African Asians. It is they who will be pushed out of the black societies. All the symptoms are there.
One must face the reason why this will occur, which was explained to me by the ex-head of an African university. He told me "You have to realise that no African State can afford multiracialism. Multiracialism means competition between the races; competition for jobs and for leadership. Within that competition the African will always lose, and he will go on losing. He will find a situation in which it is the Africans who are the hewers of wood and the drawers of water and that, whatever the conditions they seek to make, the Asians will rise above them. In those conditions an African society will be compelled to push out the other races which it cannot afford to live with."
That is the fundamental issue. It must then be asked where those East African Asians are to go. If they are to survive,
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they must go to a multiracial society somewhere, one which, at that level in its expansion, desperately needs their services.
In seeking to try to hold closed the place, the home, the obvious destiny of this group facing oppression, not pushing it here where racial prejudice will be aroused, but where it may be of tremendous use, Rhodesia can serve human destiny, provided that we have the courage to allow her to do so. Thus, rather than holding back temporarily, believing that there may be face-saving negotiations in which pressure will prove of assistance—I do not think that will be the case—the way to get those negotiations is to remove the pressures and the conflict, and the rest will follow.
We have been asked about voting. I will follow the advice of other hon. Members who have spoken and who believe that it is unwise to vote tonight. The two parties are in agreement. Unhappily, when the two great parties in the House are in agreement, it is nearly always a bad symptom. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] They nearly always can agree only in folly. It means that one of them has made a mess of it and the other side finds itself involved in that mess; the first one still feels that it is its own mess, and so it goes on.
That is the situation. It is sad; sad in Rhodesia; sad in Ulster. None the less I know that the Foreign Secretary wishes to clear up this mess before the East African Asian situation blows up any further. It is terribly important that he should.
6.25 p.m.
Mr. Douglas Dodds-Parker: I am sorry that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said that when the House is in agreement it is a bad thing. During the years I have been here one of the strengths of our democracy has been how much we are agreed on and how much we do by voluntary agreement. Therefore, if we can reach agreement on these great issues we are more likely, particularly on overseas affairs, to reach a satisfactory conclusion for those for whom we still have some residual responsibility.
I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman about sanctions. As he said,

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they had some effect but one contrary to that which was intended against investment. The substructure of a modern economic State has been affected, but not the consumer's consumption. If I may make a brief party point in riposte to what the hon. and learned Gentleman said, the effect has been rather like that achieved by the last Socialist Government. The underlying investment was curtailed, but not necessarily the consumer's consumption.
A month ago I broke my return journey from the Far East in East Africa, where I first went as a politician some 25 years ago. On that occasion I was lucky enough to make a fairly extensive visit. Many in those days believed in the creation of multiracial societies. Arthur Creech-Jones, who became Colonial Secretary, and Lord Boyd of Merton are the two outstanding names who stand out in my memory as Ministers in those days. If those two had remained in office for two or three years, perhaps we would not be facing the situation we are facing today. Relatively few people who were about in those days still remain, although I was glad to meet one or two of them and particularly Sir Michael Blundell, whom hon. Members on both sides know and respect.
This may have been a naïve and idealistic view, perhaps premature, but I believe that it was worth a try at that time. I believe that one day people will have to learn to live together, regardless of race, creed or ideology, although it may take longer to achieve than we thought all those years ago. I found it encouraging how much sentiment there is out there towards this end, although not so often among those in positions of power.
Central Africa is more troubled today than it was in 1947. I shall never regret the efforts to establish the Central African Federation. Again, had Arthur Creech-Jones not been defeated in 1950 the attempt might well have been more successful. We will never know. In the face of the imperative need for better economic and political co-operation in that part of the world, I deeply regret the need to renew the sanctions order for another year. I believe the aim of the House has always been the same—the legal conferment of independence by
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Parliament. It still remains the aim of the overwhelming majority.
I believe that the Pearce Report represented a compromise which could have allowed progress for all races, but the Africans thought otherwise. I pray that the best may not have defeated the good.
I support the order on two counts—first on the origins of the dispute; that is, between the Government here and the Government of Rhodesia, following the rejection of the Pearce Report by the Africans, which was only some six months ago. I understand that talks of a tentative nature are going on between African representatives and the Rhodesian Government authorities. I believe that the status quo should be maintained until the outcome of these talks is known.
Secondly, I always oppose reference by the Government to the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions. If the modern Commonwealth, for which many of us have worked hard, means anything, this dispute should have been treated as one for intra-mural settlement with the help of other members of the Commonwealth. Many of us said so at the time, and there was substantial support on the Labour benches. By this reference to the United Nations we are in a difficulty—unparalleled in my experience—at the United Nations.
There is, however, a growing understanding of the difficulties of this country, especially among African States and particularly after our acceptance of the Pearce Report. People realise, although it has taken some time for them to do so, our lack of effective power in Central Africa. They have become apprehensive again of the possibility of conflict between the Communist Powers—the Soviet Union and China—in and around the Indian Ocean. These are factors which are making them think again, as they did not years ago.
The other African Powers wish to see the continuation of sanctions for the present until the outcome of the talks which have been referred to is known. After that, with careful explanation and diplomacy, the Africans and others may realise that this country has done all it can and they may agree to try other methods of disentangling the difficulties in which we are enmeshed at present, to

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the satisfaction only at present of their and our enemies.
For this second reason—the United Nations—as well as the merits of the dispute itself, I believe that time is needed. On both these counts I will—regretfully, but firmly—support the order.
6.32 p.m.
Mr. Eric Ogden: I take part in this debate for three reasons. The first is to mention a few brief facts. They are unpleasant to me, but too often enthusiasts on one side of the House or the other seem to ignore them, and I think they should be stated in the debate. The second reason is to pass on to the House some comments and impressions I gained in Salisbury, Rhodesia, on a very brief visit there in August. The third reason is to make my own brief comment.
The first unpleasant fact is about the basic Rhodesian situation, which we ignore from time to time—and we ignore it at our peril if we pretend to be stronger than we are. We all know that Governments are sovereign in theory, in principle and in law but are bound by the practical circumstances in which they have to operate. The Labour Government found that while they wanted to choose No. 1 the only alternatives they had were Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Had we explained that perhaps more often the Labour Government would have got into less trouble, and the Conservative Government might get into less trouble.
The basic fact about the Rhodesian situation is that, whilst Britain has legal, political and moral responsibility for all the people of Rhodesia, the effective power which she has is very limited. It does no good to the people of Rhodesia or this country to pretend that our power is greater than it is. It raises hopes which we cannot fulfil. I shall get the negative parts of my speech out of the way now and then I hope to have something more positive to say. We have in fact little effective power. Rhodesia was to all intents and purposes a self-governing part of Africa for a long time before UDI.
Apart from a few dedicated people and organisations outside, there is little support for the continuation of sanctions against Rhodesia. There has been much
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talk about a referendum in the Labour Party. If we had had a referendum in this country about a deal with the Smith Government brought back by the Foreign Secretary of a Conservative Government, it is more likely than not that it would have supported that settlement. The majority of British people would not have been the least bit interested in the settlement. Had I gone canvassing in West Derby on such a settlement, I know what the result would have been. This might be unfortunate, but it is a fact which we must recognise. At this date—1972 or indeed 1973—it will be impossible to get a long-term settlement—and I emphasise "long-term settlement"—which is agreeable to this side of the House, whether it be the Liberal Party or the Labour Party, to the Government side of the House, whether it be their left, their right or their centre, to the Smith Government, to the white Rhodesian Government or to the black Rhodesians, let alone the United Nations Governments.
I think that if sanctions are continued—let us forget putting a time limit on it if we can at this stage, though they have to be renewed each year—then in 1973 we could seek a settlement which would be the basis for evolutionary progress towards a multiracial society. It would still be a meritocracy, not a democracy as we understand it.
We also have to recognise that there is no guarantee that any agreement made between the British Government and the Government of Rhodesia will be honoured either in months or in weeks, just as I think President Nixon recognises that there is no guarantee that any settlement he makes about the future of South Vietnam or North Vietnam will be honoured in future. There is no guarantee unless there is a physical way of ensuring it. But the hope of a settlement being carried through at any time would be in the support that came from the British Government in the way of education, and the positive side of investment that would make it very unlikely that any Government in Rhodesia would want deliberately to break the settlement because they would then lose the advantages that would come from the settlement.
My hope was for that kind of support, and it was the hope of quite a number of people I met in Salisbury,

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Rhodesia, during my weekend stay. Some of my hon. Friends are very interested in how Labour Members of Parliament get to various parts of the world. Nobody ever asks how one gets to Moscow, but they are always interested to know how one gets to other parts of the world. In this case I paid my own fare, at least from Johannesburg to Salisbury. On another occasion perhaps I will explain how I got to Johannesburg—
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Do it now.
Mr. Ogden: No, there is a right time and a right place.
Mr. Lyon: This is the right time.
Mr. Ogden: No, it is not. It might be the right place, but it is not the right time.
Mr. Lyon: Tell us about the South African Foundation.
Mr. Ogden: Any time my hon. Friend likes but not in this debate. I am not sure whether I followed or was just before the arrival of the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) in Rhodesia, but I must say that the immigration people I met were much more helpful than the immigration people at Heathrow. I sent enough smoke signals up from South Africa to let it be known very clearly who was going. My passport is marked "Ogden, MP" so there is no use trying to deny it.
I went perhaps under the umbrella of—
Mr. Strang: The Rhodesia Front.
Mr. Ogden: That is not the kind of thing one hon. Friend says to another. Let us have a bit of Socialist brotherhood on this side. I went under the umbrella of a company which happens to be called Ogden's Tobacco Company, with which, as Mr. Speaker knows, I have, unfortunately, no financial relationship; I have no directorship with that company. I am trying to establish a link between my family in 1720 and the Ogden family in 1740. If we are relatives, I might yet be a director of the company. But I am not.
However, through that company and through Imperial Tobacco, I had letters of introduction. It might be that that
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was known and people were a little more helpful. I did not go there for any political purpose. During my four-day weekend stay I was unable to speak to any African politicians, nor did I speak to any white Rhodesian politicians. All I did was to walk round the streets taking photographs of exhibitions in windows showing British, Swiss, and Japanese goods of all kinds. I looked at Woolworths, Greatenoughs and Stuttafords.
Certainly on the consumer side, apart from the fact that the people I stayed with could not get Kleenex, the difficulties caused by the sanctions on the ordinary person were not that they could not get a Jaguar—XJ12s are easier to get there than here—or petrol, but awkward, small difficulties. Such difficulties, I am told, are mounting up. A certain amount of anti-British feeling is appearing.
Sanctions are having an impact on companies and organisations. Rhodesian Airways, whose aircraft have a tatty look, is unable to purchase the new aircraft it requires. For the railways there is difficulty in respect of major investment in rolling stock. British companies, I am told by the British companies there, are the hardest hit by sanctions and are mainly engaged in a holding operation. BOAC in Salisbury is doing a first-class holding operation, and so is Imperial Tobacco. They are working there and operating within the Smith régime, as they are required to do by the law. This applies to many other companies. There is no doubt that compared with companies based on foreign countries, whether in the EEC or elsewhere, British-linked firms are under greater difficulties than their competitors.
When I want to judge the prosperity of an area I tend to look at the number of tower blocks, office blocks and factories—I look for the tower cranes. A number of office blocks are appearing all along Jamieson Avenue. These are being put up not to meet any immediate demand but in the hope that when sanctions end and a settlement comes about they will prove a real investment. As those with money are unable to invest their capital abroad or, indeed to bring in capital, or capital goods, they find one way of using the money is to put it into these office blocks.
I have said that there is some anti-British feeling about but at the same

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time I found little sympathy or admiration or support for the Smith régime. Harsher things are said there about their Government than are ever said on this side about the Conservatives, but it looks as though the people will put up with the régime for the moment, and the hope of bringing it down is less than many on this side think.
I believe that the real hope of ending sanctions and reaching a settlement lies in investment and in persuasion. When the time comes to persuade the régime which is in effective control, the Africans must be involved in any negotiations that take place. We cannot have a deal between two parties and then ask a third party to do the approving. The Africans in Rhodesia are much better at organising than are the Africans in South Africa, and they made an impact on the régime at the time of the Pearce Commission. It was probably the first time that Africans throughout the whole country organised on that kind of endeavour.
I agree with the Foreign Secretary that we are aiming at a multiracial society with equal opportunity and with equality under the law, and an agreement whereby Rhodesia can return to the commonwealth of nations—though not necessarily to the British Commonwealth, because the people there are now Rhodesian, not British. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said, the opportunities in that country are probably greater than they are in any other part of the world, and it is the hope of being able to use those opportunities that makes us all wish for a settlement. Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary spoke about what things might be like in 12 months' time. When time after time we ask the Government about what they will do in 12 months' time, they tell us that it is a hypothetical question, but today the Foreign Secretary seemed deliberately to speak of having to see what the situation was like in 12 months' time. I do not believe that this is the best way of using our bargaining strength.
The concessions of which the right hon. Gentleman spoke for the relief of hardship are admirable but may be thought by some people outside to be a way of persuading some of his awkward colleagues not to put the matter to the vote tonight. It would be useful if the right
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hon. Gentleman were to use his influence with the Smith régime to get equal concessions for Rhodesian citizens who are in difficulties. In 1973 there may be the possibility of the basis of a settlement but the real strength for the future is what we and Rhodesia together could do to get the bind of society we want.
6.45 p.m.
Mr. Carol Mather: The hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Ogden) has made a frank and very refreshing speech about his visit to Rhodesia. I, too, recently made a brief and fleeting visit there and can bear out much of what the hon. Member has reported to the House. My impression was that on the whole sanctions have been counter-productive over the years because they have had the effect of hardening European attitudes, while on the other hand they have raised African expectations of some outside intervention; and as those expectations are not likely to be realised African attitudes are hardening, too. The total effect is that a peaceful agricultural country in Africa has been turned into an embattled nation with its back to the wall. That is the political side.
On the economic side Salisbury gives the superficial impression of being very prosperous. There is plenty of building going on. The hon. Member suggests that this building represents investment for the future, but it does show some confidence in that future. There are plenty of goods in the shops. There are plenty of cars on the roads. There are plenty of good second-hand cars about. But they are all either German, French, Italian or Japanese cars. I did not see any British motor cars, but perhaps they are to be found if one looks for them.
City life for the Europeans is booming. There has been an increase in manufacturing capacity as a result of the Rhodesians manufacturing many of the goods which are at present embargoed by us. This to some extent has kept world inflationary effects at bay. There is a shortage of foreign capital, as there must be in such a situation. The tobacco industry has been hit hard, and the tragedy is that that has resulted in puting out of work the African population which depends so largely on it. African unemployment is a very great problem

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because of the rate at which the African population is increasing.
As to prospects, it was reported to me that Mr. Smith's inner cabinet has had a change of heart and is interested in talking to the African leaders of the ANC. There are those on each side who wish to communicate, and one group in particular is busily engaged at present in bridge-building between the two sides.
Of course this is a very delicate operation. Both sides must take their own people with them. However, I believe that there is a regret on the part of the ANC, on the African side, that the chance was missed to obtain a settlement and that that, to a large extent, was due to a misappreciation by the Africans. They were under the impression that whatever they said in the test of acceptability, the settlement would be implemented by Her Majesty's Government. Therefore, they felt that they could vote with a clear conscience but that implementation was bound to happen in any case. To some of them it was a surprise when that did not happen.
At the same time there was a misappreciation by the Rhodesia Front Government in that it then lacked communications with the African population. Therefore, it was led into a misassessment of what the African population would say in the test of acceptability. As a result, there is a move by the Rhodesian Front cabinet to put the matter right and open communications.
We must work on the basis of the existing settlement—that is the only avenue of approach. However, I do not believe that the test of acceptability which was carried out last year can be repeated in exactly the same form. It was too blunt an instrument to use effectively and the Africans in particular were too much a prey to emotional coercion. When it comes to that stage next time I think that a different formula must be used. Although the Government can do certain things, the immediate initiative is up to the Rhodesians.
I found an atmosphere of impending tragedy hanging over Rhodesia. The Rhodesians, of whatever race, black or white, were the helpless and totally unexpected victims of the wind of change
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which swept through Africa, for which they were quite unprepared.
One cannot look too closely or too far ahead into the future of Southern Africa. One finds that totally unexpected events are likely to upset one's forecasts. Many people say that the white man is doomed in Southern Africa and that his doom is only a question of time. I do not believe that one can look ahead as far as that. I prefer Dr. Banda's more hopeful approach—he is a leader of an African nation—that there is a place for all races in the countries of Southern Africa and that they must learn to live together.
Tonight, if there is a vote, I understand that it will be a vote not on the principle of sanctions, the principle of which I am against, but on whether a change should be made tonight. My right hon. Friend put forward certain criteria for a change of policy—first, if sanctions have failed in their purpose, and, secondly, if the evasion of sanctions is so widespread that they have become intolerable. One can argue that we have already reached that point. However, I believe that there is a slim chance that the tender shoots about which my right hon. Friend spoke should be given a chance to develop.
At this moment I believe that it would be wrong to make a dramatic change of climate by ending the sanctions as of now. The situation is a delicate one. My assessment, having visited Rhodesia, and having been in general terms and in principle against sanctions, is that it would be wrong tactically and psychologically at this moment to make that specific change. Therefore, I give my right hon. Friend the benefit of the doubt—I hope for the last time—and I shall support him in the Lobby.
6.55 p.m.
Mr. Gavin Strang: It seems to be the pattern in Central African affairs that Conservative Governments appoint commissions, such as the Monckton, Devlin and Pearce Commissions, which are welcomed by Right-wing members of the Conservative Party because they contain well respected members of the Establishment—for example, judges and retired civil servants. The commissions then come face to face with

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the realities. The same Right-wing Conservatives read the commissions' reports in the hope that they can find some justification for their views. They are unable to find it and they then proceed to ignore the reports. But the hon. Member for Esher (Mr. Mather) seems to go further and appears to criticise the findings of the Pearce Report.
Much of the interest in this debate seems to centre around how many of the Right-wing Conservatives will vote against the reimposition of sanctions. It is worth noting the extent to which many of the arguments which the Right-wingers have put forward in successive debates have been invalidated by the facts and the various developments.
One such argument has always been the cost to the United Kingdom economy of the application of sanctions. I have never had much time for that argument. It is hard to believe, even under the present Government, that the British economy is in such parlous straits that trade with a quarter of a million whites is crucial to its development.
A second argument, which has been more popular, is that it is not the whites who suffer from sanctions but the black Africans. The fact is that throughout the years the African leaders have been in favour of the maintenance of sanctions. They are in a better position than we are to know what is in the interests of the Africas.
If there were any doubt in the minds of hon. Members on the Government side about whether the leaders were speaking for the Africans, the findings of the Pearce Commission should have put an end to all such doubt. The fact is that the Africans want sanctions to continue. They want the British Government to continue to accept a responsibility for decision on this issue.
Mr. Wall: I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but how does he explain the fact that the majority of African elected Members of Parliament, the majority of educated Africans and the Africans in the upper income groups accepted the Pearce settlement terms and wanted to see them put into effect?
Mr. Strang: One will always find a group of people who will be in favour of a certain proposal. I should have thought that the Pearce Commission can
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be accepted as having a better chance of ascertaining the views of the Africans as a whole than those who happen to be Members of Parliament. In my opinion the true leaders of the Africans have been locked up. That is the truth of the situation as we see it on this side of the House.
Another argument advanced by hon. Members on the Government side in saying that sanctions should be dropped has been that they are ineffective. I believe—I note with interest that some hon. Members opposite share this belief—that sanctions have had some effect. Mr. Smith, who originally said when he announced UDI that he would have no more discussions or negotiations with the British Government, was brought back to have discussions with successive British Governments. It seems to me that the application of sanctions played an important part in that.
Mr. Smith has not gone as far down the road of separate development as had been feared, and I believe that this is partly a consequence of sanctions. The residential property owners protection Bill, which has been in draft form for a long time, has not been made law. One gathers that representatives of the Rhodesian Government are now talking to representatives of the African National Congress. I take all these events to be a reflection of the fact that sanctions are having some effect and there is a strong body of white opinion in Rhodesia which wants to see them lifted.
Nevertheless, although sanctions have had some effect, we ought to see how we can make them more effective. I hope that the Minister will tell us what machinery the British Government have to hand for making sure that British firms do not break sanctions. To what extent are they able to monitor the activities of Southern African subsidiaries of large United Kingdom firms which have in the past been conducting trade with Rhodesia?
I acknowledge that it is other countries which are the worst sanctions breakers, but I think that the British Government could themselves do more to shame these countries into upholding sanctions. When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was pressed on this matter last June, he said that there was not much point in making representations to countries like

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Portugal and South Africa which had opted out of sanctions, but he went on to say:
"There are many other countries, however, which are breaking sanctions"—
countries which go to the United Nations Security Council and say that they are in favour of sanctions and will carry them out but which in fact are not doing so effectively. When the right hon. Gentleman was asked why one should not name those countries, and why one should not seek to bring pressure on them, he replied that he did not think it would be a good thing to do that,
"because sometimes it is a shipping company which has nothing to do with the country concerned, sometimes it is an industrial company over which its Government have no control, and sometimes, as in the case of American chrome, the Administration are trying to do one thing and their Parliament has rejected it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th June, 1972; Vol. c. 838, 970–1.]
It does not seem to me that those three reasons are sufficient justification for the British Government not to expose more vigorously those countries which are not implementing sanctions.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) suggested that a United Nations commissioner for sanctions be appointed. I should support that. I assume that his responsibility would be to try to make the United Nations Sanctions Committee more effective. He would be able to use the tool of publicity to expose those countries, to try to bring some pressure on them—be it Japan, France or others—in order to make sanctions more effective.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: What pressure could he or anyone exert?
Mr. Strang: For a start, the thing could be spelled out publicly and drawn to the attention of international opinion. It could well be that, as a result, some African countries would be encouraged to take more effective action in respect of trade against these countries. There are some small countries, such as Portugal, involved and it seems to me that we could have some influence. However, I take the hon. Gentleman's point that Britain alone cannot suddenly change sanctions from being ineffective
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to being more effective. Nevertheless, we could do more.
I am deeply suspicious of the Government's intentions on this issue. I say that not so much because of their failure to do more in regard to sanctions but for a variety of other reasons. I say it partly because of their apparent reluctance to make more strenuous representations to the illegal régime about the political detainees and partly also because they apparently see the proposals for a settlement which were rejected as still being on the table. How can we possibly regard those proposals as the basis for a settlement?
I suspect the Government's intentions because they are not prepared to say clearly that all negotiations on this issue in future will be tripartite negotiations, negotiations with the illegal Smith régime certainly, but also with representatives of the Africans, representatives of the ANC. In passing, I must say that I think the chances of maintaining responsible policy on the issue were not enhanced by the recent appointment to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Above all, my suspicions have been greatly deepened by the Foreign Secretary's speech this afternoon. I find it surprising that he can talk in terms of "conceding failure" and in terms of "one more year before admitting failure". I am almost certain that that was his phrase. It seemed to me to amount in effect to "Let us put them on for one more year, let us carry on half-heartedly and then, lads, we will stop making you go through the Lobby in favour of sanctions". It seems to me that that is what he is saying.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Gentleman is being a little unfair. I have never said what, in my view, would happen; I have never given any indication of what would happen next year. We require an Order in Council to renew the sanctions year by year, and that is what we are doing—no more and no less.
Mr. Strang: I am glad to have that intervention, but will the right hon. Gentleman now give an assurance that sanctions will be maintained so long as there is no settlement which is acceptable to the Africans?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have said that I thought the next initiative must come from the Rhodesians, both European and African. I think that is right. We shall have to judge what kind of initiative takes place in the coming months. I hope that what I call the tender shoots will gain a little strength.
Mr. Strang: I sincerely hope that it is the right hon. Gentleman's intention to maintain sanctions as long as they are necessary.
It is the Foreign Secretary's view, a view shared by many of my hon. Friends, that it will be possible to obtain a satisfactory agreement with the illegal regime, an agreement which will lead to the advancement of the Africans. I hold no such view. I regret to have to say that I do not think any agreement with Ian Smith will be worth the paper it is written on. He has made repeatedly clear over the years, in my view, that he is not a man who will stick to an agreement of that nature.
We must maintain sanctions partly, as I said, because they are having some effect, because they are ensuring that there is a body of white opinion which has a vested interest in bringing Mr. Smith back to the conference table, in putting a brake on any further excesses of the Rhodesia Front towards a policy of racial oppression and separate development.
It seems to me also—I should have thought this would be an argument acceptable to hon. Members on the Government side—that it is in Britain's overall interest to maintain good relations with the black African countries. It is not really possible for this country to pursue policies which support the régime in South Africa or the régime in Rhodesia while at the same time maintaining friendly and important trade relations with the black African countries. In view of the importance of these countries to Britain, I take it to be in our overall interest not to sell out the Africans on this issue.
Above all, it seems to me that we cannot isolate the Rhodesia issue from the whole problem of racial oppression in the Southern African context, that we cannot be neutral on this issue. We have a clear-cut situation where we have minority white régimes holding down the
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Africans, preventing them from advancing themselves and denying them some of the most basic and elementary human rights. We have a duty to support the Africans in their struggle to free themselves from these oppressions. We can do this only by maintaining sanctions.
7.10 p.m.
Mr. Alan Haselhurston>: I believe that an approach to this problem is the better for looking at this situation as it is rather than how we might like it to be. I often think that the emphasis that is sometimes put on words such as "rebellion", "disloyalty to the Crown", and "illegitimate" goes well beyond the technical description of the state of affairs in Rhodesia and makes up in passion for the fact that we cannot act in such a way as to affect the situation decisively.
The régime—we must face it—has lasted far longer than many people expected at the time of UDI. The signs are strong that it is likely to last for a good while longer yet. Sanctions are being widely evaded. Of this there is no doubt. Goods of many different origins are coming into Rhodesia through Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.
I, in common with other Members who have spoken—it seems to be a well-worn trail—have been in Salisbury for a short time recently, and the shops in the city of Salisbury seem to be doing as well as shops anywhere might be doing. Salisbury seems very similar in appearance to any prosperous city. I think we have every right to be suspicious that some of our continental friends are not being as zealous in their approach to sanctions as we have been, but equally we ought to recognise, with a degree of self-criticism, that they find it rather difficult to understand why some well-known British names can be seen around in Rhodesia. They must be a little suspicious whether all the legalities have been fulfilled, whereas I am sure that the legalities are being observed. Nevertheless this must raise doubts in the minds of our continental friends.
Another fact to face is that, despite seven years of UDI, the atmosphere as far as race relations are concerned in Rhodesia is still very different from the state of race relations in South Africa.

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Rhodesia developed in an entirely different way, and that still shows today despite the posture of certain people in the Rhodesia Front Party. There is also a genuine astonishment by people of British descent in Rhodesia that Britain should be acting in this sort of way towards Rhodesia. We will, no doubt, form our own views whether they are right or wrong, but there is no doubt that this hurt is felt. They feel it the more because of what has been happening recently in Uganda, as the scale upon which sanctions are being broken is quite apparent to them.
We must face these realities in trying to determine policy. It is no good hoping that some miracle lies around the corner, that by a continuation of the present situation a radically different position will be reached. It may be that some people still believe that force should be used to alter the situation. I have never be able to support that idea, and I do not support it now because I believe this could lead to a situation which could get well out of control in comparison with the operation originally envisaged.
We should observe what the situation is today, even though we do not like all aspects of that situation, and then determine what seems to be the sensible course to take. I believe that it is no longer possible to talk with the glib confidence that we had in 1965 and 1966. Having taken all those facts into account, I do not think it is right to say that this is the moment to make any fundamental change in policy regarding sanctions.
First—this point has already been made—Mr. Smith is anxious to get rid of sanctions, and that very fact must be a pressure on him to come to the conference table. Secondly, there are signs—this again has been referred to in the debate—that in the post-Pearce situation there may be scope for some kind of bilateral understanding between the Africans in Rhodesia and the Smith régime. I certainly do not believe it is right to jeopardise any chance of some understanding being reached.
I believe that it is the continuation of sanctions rather than their removal which is more likely to maintain the pressure on both sides to come together and talk and try to find a way of living together on a multiracial basis in the future.
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There is an argument that by the threat to remove sanctions we might exert rather more pressure on the situation. This must be a matter of judgment, and my judgment is that it is the continuation of sanctions which is more likely to produce talk between the two sides.
A third element in the situation is what is happening in Mozambique at present. The freedom fighters there are now causing considerably more difficulties for the Portuguese than has ever been the case. It has certainly got to the situation where the Rhodesians are extremely concerned about it. At the present time the road between Blantyre and Salisbury is no longer as reliably safe as it was, and goods are having to be moved in convoy rather than taking the risk of mines and conveying them in vehicles singly. Also there is the interruption of the rail link between those two cities. There has been more attention by the Rhodesian security forces to the Mozambique border of late, and although I do not wish to make a value judgment on the situation in Mozambique—that will be for another occasion—I believe that what is happening there must be a pressure on the Smith regime to come nearer to a settlement.
I believe that the alternatives to continuing sanctions are extremely disagreeable. If we were suddenly to say "We shall stop this policy", consider what might conceivably happen to Rhodesia. It seems to me that if we were to abandon any responsibility that we have—and by abandoning sanctions we would be doing just that—we would virtually be saying to all the people in Rhodesia, "You are now left on your own to try to find some solution to your problems", and I should have thought that must mean that there would be a confrontation at some time in the future. We would be pushing them down that path.
In such a situation the white minority might decide to put up the shutters and cling on to power for as long as they could. That is one theory. Inevitably it seems to me that, the population balance being what it is, the Africans would eventually gain majority rule, and it would not be done by peaceable means.
The other alternative is that, perhaps to the distaste and reluctance of South Africa, there may be some moving together of Rhodesia and South Africa to

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be the last bastion of the white man in Southern Africa. I do not want to encourage a course of events which will surely visit upon the Africans in Rhodesia a system of government which is odious and which certainly is nothing like the system of government which they experience at the present time.
There is also a consequence for us which I would find extremely disagreeable if we changed our policy. This is the African reaction to this country in the rest of Africa. We may as well recognise that the world of the future, in which we will be trying to make our income as a nation and to exercise influence, is one in which the African and Asian countries will be of increasing importance. It seems to me crazy that we should be asked to take policy decisions likely to alienate from us for a considerable time other countries in Africa and Asia whose friendship we now appreciate and which we shall wish in future to hold to.
At the moment, our standing is rather high in the African countries because in relation to the Pearce Commission we have clearly shown that we have kept our word. We stated that if the proposals were found to be unsatisfactory to the Africans in Rhodesia we would not implement them, and we have been true to our words. Because we have also accepted the Ugandan Asians, we have again been shown to be true to our word. It thus happens that Britain is riding high in the estimation of many countries in Africa and Asia and it would he a great tragedy if that position were to be altered by a sudden volte face in our policy towards Rhodesia.
Having said that, I recognise that the British do not like nonsenses and that because sanctions were sold to them in the beginning as a possble quick remedy they have thought of them in these terms. But sanctions were not a quick remedy. We cannot even put a year as being a date when they might be a remedy. They are being widely broken by other people. The British people observe this and it is small wonder that they are inclined to say, "Call it a day". I did not entirely agree with the remarks made by the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby: However, I think that he was right in his estimation of much of the public reaction in this country to a settlement.
Mr. Frank Judd: A number of us are following the hon. Gentleman's remarks with a great deal of sympathy and interest, but does not he agree that one of the problems in evaluating present public opinion in Britain on the issue is that there has been no decisive leadership from the body politic—not just one particular party—in order to explain to the people the importance of the policy we are following?
Mr. Haselhurst: That is true. But another reason is that the British people do not keep matters of foreign affairs to the forefront of their minds, and other things have been more prominent in their attention than this issue. If it were a matter of holding a referendum, then of course leadership would be offered. But I was responding to remarks by the hon. Member for Liverpool. West Derby in relation to what he said the reaction was now. I think that he was accurate in that sense.
Mr. Ogden: As we are neighbouring Members of Parliament, may be have it on record that on this occasion we agree?
Mr. Haselhurst: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. No doubt this will be noted in the borough of Middleton. It would not be right for us to call it a day now on a sancions policy. Looking at the situation as soberly as I am able, trying to weigh the facts as they are and not as I would wish them to be, I think that it is possible to say that the situation is not without hope.
I think that we should cling to that hope, for it might yet be possible to solve this problem with our national honour intact and also with common sense prevailing.
7.24 p.m.
Miss Joan Lestor: I agree with much of what the hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Mr. Haselhurst) said. In particular, I think that those of us who care about what happens in Southern Rhodesia should remind ourselves that we are debating this in the aftermath of the Pearce Report and in the circumstances surrounding any good will or ill will that was built up as a result of the terms which were presented.
I think that we must also remember certain things surrounding the present situation in relation to the Pearce Report and

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the settlement proposals. For example, certain conditions which were guaranteed would exist when the settlement was put forward were not upheld when the settlement was in fact put before the Africans. By this I mean the guarantee that normal political activity would continue to be allowed. That guarantee was not honoured. Intimidation and the rest undoubtedly took place.
What is important in this debate and in our consideration of what is to happen in the future is the finding of the Pearce Report that the settlement proposals were not acceptable to the Africans. This has built up a good deal of good will for the British House of Commons because many Africans believed that, irrespective of their views, the settlement would go through. We must be careful that we do not do anything in relation to sanctions that will undermine that good will.
I agree entirely with what the hon. Member for Middleton and Prestwich said: the fact that Britain has accepted the Ugandan Asians—although I do not think we could have done less—has enhanced our reputation in the eyes of many African States. If we are seen now to go back on our sanctions policy, much of that good will will be destroyed—and also we shall not be in a very strong position to condemn the racism of people like Amin in Uganda, for some of us want to go on record as condemning racism whether it comes from black people or white people or from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Unfortunately, the hon. and learned Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. Ronald Bell) is not in the Chamber, because I want to refer to what he said. He has the constituency next to mine and I well remember that when I made my maiden speech six years ago and spoke on the subject of racialism, he, in following me, said that his constituency embraced mine. He put a complete1y different point of view on the question of attitudes towards race and immigration.
I listened carefully to the hon. and learned Gentleman today. He has always opposed the policy of sanctions. He has always been in favour of doing a deal with the Smith régime, which, in the view of large numbers in this House, would sell the Africans out. He is a well-known
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critic of the immigration policy which operated in this country until fairly recently. He has never hidden his view that there are too many coloured immigrants and that if possible many of them should be repatriated or encouraged to go home, with immigration from the Commonwealth severely curtailed. He has never been backward in coming forward as a critic of immigration policy.
Having listened to the hon. and learned Gentleman and one or two others like him—not by any means a majority—and heard their criticisms of our immigration policy, I have often wondered why they are so anxious to hand over control of Southern Rhodesia to a tiny minority of people, most of whom are immigrants to Southern Rhodesia. I have always fought in my constituency for equal rights—no more, no less—for immigrants and the indigenous population, and I find it hard to take from the hon. and learned Gentleman and others who share his opinions that we should hand over governmental control of the destiny of the large majority African population in Southern Rhodesia to 250,000 whites, only about 140,000 of whom lived there before 1960. He and his friends oppose immigration to this country, yet are quite prepared to hand over the control of the African population of Southern Rhodesia to a small white population, very many of whom are immigrants. To me this has been one of the basic contradictions in the arguments of hon. Members on the Government side and of one of my hon. Friends.
We are presented with a racist situation in Rhodesia and with a racist régime, one which is moving closer to South Africa every day. In the present circumstances of race relations our views must be seen to adhere to and respect the wishes of the black majority in Rhodesia. One or two hon. Members have said, quite rightly, that sanctions must be regarded differently now from when they were first applied in 1965. Many hoped then that they would have a far greater effect on the Smith régime and would do far more to bring about its collapse. Since 1965 a great many things have changed and it is true that economic sanctions alone will not bring down the regime. Some of us have never argued that they would, but that is not a case for removing them.

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There is a much more subtle and important argument than that. I have always believed that the Africans in Rhodesia, as in South Africa, will take action themselves to ensure that they achieve equal rights. I also believe that we must consider what would be the effects of our removing sanctions on the good will that Britain has built up with the Africans. It would do a great deal of damage. It would be seen as the first step to a compromise with the Smith régime. After all that was said at the time of the Pearce Commission about involving the Africans in a settlement, after what was said by the Foreign Secretary about continuing sanctions after the commission reported, it would be seen by the Africans as going back on the guarantees and the undertakings then given.
We must also consider our own self-respect. Surely that would stop us wanting to do business with those who have shanghaied 5 million people who were entitled to, were promised and looked for our protection. Because we have been unable to break the Smith régime those 5 million have now been worked into an apartheid system within Southern Rhodesia. If we abandon sanctions therefore we abandon our moral support for them.
But apart from the question of our self-respect, I believe that the continued application of sanctions, which must be stepped up and strengthened, constitutes a campaign against a racist régime and shows a beacon for other countries which have been nothing like as vigilant in applying sanctions as they should have been. The argument that sanctions should be lifted because they are ineffective was destroyed when the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Smith produced settlement terms. It was the application of sanctions which drove Smith to the negotiating table, not a gesture of good will to the Africans, as was amply demonstrated by his proposals. He came to the negotiating table because the pressure of sanctions was damaging his economy.
The argument that sanctions must be lifted because they harm the Africans has been answered in two ways. It was answered by the Pearce Report which drew attention to and gave a great deal of prominence to many Africans who said
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that sanctions should not be lifted until their Government had demonstrated their determination to change their course. Bishop Muzorewa, who is in trouble for having said certain things and for having spoken for the Africans in Rhodesia, said:
"Africans accept sanctions as a price for their freedom and declare as our enemy any person who claims on our behalf that sanctions should be withdrawn".
It is important to listen to the bishop's words and it is important to see what is being done to people like him who express such views which are regarded as contrary to the interests of the Smith régime. The Africans want sanctions to continue, yet people in this country want them removed because they say, falsely, that they do not want to harm the Africans. The African knows that once sanctions are lifted not only is his position in jeopardy but any chance of his freedom and his political rights in Rhodesia is completely destroyed.
I do not believe that sanctions have destroyed the Smith régime but they have damaged its economy and some of that damage will not be repaired for many years. We must intensify sanctions and examine ways and means of doing so. Our rôle in applying sanctions has been fairly thorough but so it should have been. I do not believe that Britain, having negotiated sanctions and having called upon the rest of the world for support, can claim a tremendous amount of credit for having applied its own policy better than others when it has not exercised anything like sufficient verbal force against those who have been lax in applying sanctions. We have not exerted anything like enough power, particularly over our trade partners and allies, to prevent them undermining the policy.
Our lack of condemnation of our future EEC partners for their sanction breaking policy must have made the world wonder whether we were serious about that policy at all. Some of my hon. Friends disagree about the policy for Europe. If the Government are serious about their sanctions policy one of the things they should have highlighted in the EEC negotiations is what Germany, France and Italy think about sanctions. I said so to my comrades in Socialist Internationale.

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I say to my Front Bench, which is not very well occupied at the moment—with the exception of my hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Mr. Concannon)—that if there is an election and a Labour Government are returned, and if the policy of renegotiation of the terms for entry is adopted, some of us will be arguing about how our EEC partners should be applying sanctions. There has been a strange silence from the Government about the attitude of EEC countries and I believe that something could still be done on this front because it is not too late.
I have one example of where we could be much more vigilant on sanctions. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) said, a loophole has been established in the past year by America by the lifting of the embargo on imports of strategic materials, in particular of nickel and chrome. The embargo, I understand, was officially lifted at the beginning of this year. Since the arrival of the first shipments in March, 100,000 tons of minerals, 75 per cent. of which were chrome, have been imported from Southern Rhodesia. Among the ships carrying the cargo were some registered in Britain, the Netherlands and Italy. All, including the British registered ship, have been reported to the United Nations Security Council. Much more action and condemnation by the British Government are needed when that sort of thing takes place. We want much more information about who is breaking sanctions. We need a conference of people who really care about the sanctions policy to decide just how we can prevent those countries which are breaking sanctions from doing so.
To drop sanctions now would be to condone racialism and what happened when Smith declared UDI. Many of us have spent many years trying our best to bring about a situation in which the Smith régime would listen to what the majority of the Africans were saying to them. We have tried very hard over the years to bring about a situation in which we could grant independence to Southern Rhodesia on the same basis as we have granted it to all our other ex-colonies. If we now wash our hands of the five million Africans in Southern Rhodesia, all that we have tried to do in the past five years will be wasted, and
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we shall have abandoned our responsibilities for them. We shall be handing them over to a situation in which finally they will find themselves in the same position as that in which the black African in South Africa finds himself.
It is not enough simply to maintain sanctions, because by doing that we are simply maintaining a stalemate. We need to intensify sanctions. In that way and by our very loud and outspoken condemnation of their policies, we must force the Smith régime to come to terms with the African demands, which are simply the demands of any reasonable people to be allowed to control their own destiny.
7.43 p.m.
Mr. Harold Soref: Unlike the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) and the hon. Member for Liverpool. West Derby (Mr. Ogden), who made the debate worth while by their remarkable speeches showing great knowledge of Rhodesia and their sympathy for its future, the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Lestor) has shown a greater familiarity with cloud-cuckoo-land than with Rhodesia.
I should like to take up three specific points that the hon. Lady made. She suggested that we in this country had enhanced our reputation with the African States by what we had done in taking the Asian refugees. But since we have been taking them it has been announced, as recently as in yesterday's Financial Times, that from Kenya and Tanzania, which was praised by another hon. Member, there will be increasing forced exoduses of Asians having been plundered. That is an odd way of showing their admiration for this country. Moreover, President Nyerere has publicly stated in an interview in The Times that it will not be long before the Europeans are thrown out of Tanzania. That is an extraordinary example of racial harmony. It is odd that it should be given as an example of how those countries show their admiration for the United Kingdom.
When an analogy was made between the position of Asian immigrants to this country and that of European immigrants entering Rhodesia, the hon. Lady overlooked a vast difference between them. Those who come to this country come to

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a welfare State, with a knowledge that they can receive every conceivable and inconceivable benefit without a hand's turn. But the European who goes to Rhodesia knows full well that it is not a welfare State and that it is only by his hard work and sheer ability that he will make a go of things. It has been through the efforts of immigrant Europeans during the three-quarters of a century that Rhodesia has existed that work has been provided for the Africans and that the country is prosperous. It is prosperous only because of the capital created by the Europeans and the enterprise shown by them during that period.
The hon. Lady's third point concerned the purchase of chrome by the United States from Rhodesia, chrome which America needs for strategic reasons. Would the hon. Lady consider it preferable that America should buy for strategic purposes from the Soviet Union, the only alternative, when it is freely believed, with considerable evidence, that Soviet Russia was herself buying the chrome from Rhodesia and reselling it to America? In the circumstances, there is much to be said for America's buying it direct for strategic purposes at a lower price.
I am greatly concerned that those keenest on East-West trade, particularly those promoting trade with Red China and East Germany, than which there are no more cruel tyrannies in the world, are the very people who are the most ardent supporters of sanctions against Rhodesia. If they want sanctions imposed against Rhodesia because they regard it as either a racial or a political tyranny, I would point out that it is absolute heaven in comparison with those countries with which they seek to promote trade and relations.
It is only to appease the Afro-Asians and the Communists that the absurd farce of sanctions continues at the United Nations. At the General Assembly only a fortnight ago in the annual debate on colonialism, China recommended the use of
"revolutionary violence"
to frustrate
"the counter-revolutionary violence of the colonialists."
Portugal, South Africa and Israel were described as
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"stained with the blood of millions of Arabs and Africans"
and Britain was portrayed as
"an enemy of the people of Zimbabwe".
Libya claimed that London had
"implanted a racist minority régime in Zimbabwe as it had done in Palestine."
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton referred to some of the credentials of Libya. Apart from her piracy, her hijacking and her incapacity to rule her own country in an orderly manner, she has at present 400 troops in Uganda. Why should there not be action and protests against Libya? Why out of the whole world do we pick out Rhodesia? There is no reason in the context of Africa. By any reasonable standard, Rhodesia is probably the best governed, most peaceful and harmonious country in that continent. The degree of racialism in every country to the north is far greater and is increasing at such a rate that I prophesy that we in this House will be increasingly concerned with the persecution that will continue and increase north of Rhodesia, to the east and to the west, in the African continent. We shall regret the day when we interfered with Rhodesia's integrity.
If it is suggested that there was cause for the action which we took, I reply that we made a great mistake. It was revealed in the Sunday Telegraph last Sunday in Mr. Cecil King's diary that the present Leader of the Opposition stated at a luncheon at the time that it was the Labour Government's intention to impose direct rule in Rhodesia for at least 10 years. It is not surprising in those circumstances that the Rhodesians found a better way of looking after their own country. I believe that they have done so.
When the Rhodesians see that we do nothing about the genocide in Zanzibar and nothing about the ruthless tyranny in Uganda and are oblivious to what is happening in other countries in the African continent such as Sierra Leone, is it surprising that they are stubbornly determined to pursue their own lives? An hon. Member on the Opposition side suggested that the Pearce Commission consulted the black population with the result that it had found that that population held certain views. But only 6 per cent. of the black African population was consulted. I am not suggesting that the commission could have consulted more,

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it may not have been practicable to do so, but let us not deduce the unproven facts from this tiny minority which was consulted.
Like other Members I, too, have been in Rhodesia, for perhaps rather longer than they have, this year. I met many Africans whom I know and I also met Mr. Chinamano before he went to another place. The general view I found among the Africans was that they were reasonably happy—[Laughter.] I did not meet Mr. Nkomo but I did meet other members of the ANC, those people who, we are told, are in gaol and should be released and are active in the ANC. We would do well to realise that the ANC is a coalition of the former ZANU and ZAPU. The leader of ZAPU, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, who is currently in gaol—
Mr. George Cunningham: Wrongly in gaol.
Mr. Soref: I would remind the House that in 1961 that innocent said publicly in Rhodesia "I will not rest until the rivers of Zimbabwe run red with the blood of every white man, woman and child and every African who supports them." I regard that statement in a continent like Africa to be good enough reason for putting a man away. I also remind hon. Members that Mr. Todd's comforts In his substantial ranch are infinitely greater than those of any Opposition leader in any country in the African continent—all of whom were put away not in ranches but in the most uncomfortable gaols inaccessible to the International Red Cross.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Since the hon. Gentleman is on such good terms with the Smith régime, may I ask him to intercede on behalf of the children of Mr. and Mrs. Chinamano, whom he says he has seen? These children are living in their own house in the township outside Salisbury and have no adult living with them; the eldest child is 15. They have lived in those conditions for a substantial period when their parents were in detention, before Pearce went there, and they have lived in those conditions since the Pearce Commission. Their nearest relative lives about two miles away, is not allowed to live on the premises and can come and see them only
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occasionally during the day. Does not the hon. Member feel, out of mere human sentiment, that with his privileged position he might ask Mr. Smith whether anything can be done about the Chinamanos?
Mr. Soref: I have no privileged position. I would agree that if there is some suffering by a certain family in Rhodesia it is most unfortunate. I am sure that Mr. Smith would take action if the hon. Member brought it to his attention. Furthermore, this is an isolated example and it does not compare with the suffering of millions of black Africans from Zanzibar to Sierra Leone. When we consider the millions of people who were killed in the Sudan, Biafra and Nigeria, it can be seen that these were greater enormities. I have not the slightest doubt that there are injustices in Rhodesia; I am sure that there are injustices in this country. I do believe that the degree of injustice in Rhodesia under the present Government in infinitely less than it would be if it were turned over to immature people, as has happened elsewhere.
It is my contention that because we have abdicated our authority and turned over other colonies in Africa, before they were ready to people who were not fit we have this appalling situation in Africa. Nothing has made the white Rhodesians more stubborn than the events which have taken place from the Congo to Uganda. No one, whether he agrees or disagrees with the Rhodesian Front, whether he is in that party or the new political evolution there, would favour majority rule when he also has children and is determined that those children should have a future and that he should have security for the work he has put in.
It is my genuine belief after 20 or 30 visits to Rhodesia that an enormous amount has been done for the black population. The schooling, hospital and welfare facilities in Rhodesia are infinitely better than in any country to the north in the African continent which I have visited. Had Rhodesia behaved as most of the Commonwealth African countries have done, we would have had demonstrations day and night at the United Nations. Suppose what has happened in Uganda or in Zanzibar had occurred in Rhodesia. It is an unthinkable proposition.

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The danger is that in no way should we make it possible for premature majority rule in Rhodesia because it could only lead to a scrapping of democracy, civil war and dictatorship by minority rule as happens in every other African Commonwealth country.
It is suggested that the ANC and the Rhodesian Front should get together to hammer out a policy. We find in this country that the CBI and the TUC are incapable of doing this under much more sophisticated circumstances. It is a great deal to expect of people who are oriented in an utterly different manner. It is suggested that the shops in Rhodesia are crammed with Japanese, South African, German and Italian goods. They are. Let us face the economic reality that last year Rhodesia's economy grew at a real rate of 10 per cent. Inflation was kept down to 3 per cent. and this year real growth is likely to be 6 per cent. with inflation around 4 per cent. We should drop this farce of sanctions. We should recommence our trade to Rhodesia which represented something like £36 million to £38 million worth of trade.
Are we to be told that this country is to be blackmailed? Are we to be told with whom we can trade? This is an affront to the African nations. The same people who do not wish us to trade with Rhodesia, who uphold sanctions, are the very lobby in favour of trade with every tyranny—East-West trade, trade with China and trade with every international gangster.
It is suggested that it is time we faced the reality. Dean Acheson, who after all was one of the founders of the United Nations, declared that the United Nations mandatory sanctions constituted "barefaced aggression". So they were. We are certain that no independent African country could be run on a Westminster model, and I doubt whether Rhodesia can be run on that basis.
However, if what has happened in Rhodesia had been perpetrated in that country—as has been the case elsewhere—by a black man, it would have been overlooked, forgiven and forgotten. It is merely because those who control Rhodesia happen to be white that there is this absurd self-guilt, which in my opinion is completely baseless. We should be
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doing a good service to this country, as well as to Rhodesia and to British interests, by scrapping sanctions forthwith.
8.0 p.m.
Mr. George Cunningham: One of the pleasures of following the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) is that there are no serious points which might distract from one's own speech. The speech that he has just made could have been made by anyone during the 1930s in respect of Nazi Germany, and to suggest that many of us on this side are not critical of the beastly régimes in, for example, Zanzibar and Uganda is simply baseless. We are as severely critical of those régimes as of anything that has happened in Rhodesia.
Mr. John Stokes: We never hear about it.
Mr. Cunningham: People are inclined to listen to what they wish to hear.
There is something remote and pathetic about this annual ritual in which we take part. It is high time that it was recognised that it is a ritual that cannot go on for ever, unless we have something more to add to it than has been the case over the past few years. The original objective of sanctions was either to bring down the Smith régime, or to bring it to the conference table. Clearly, those were the alternatives, equally acceptable at the time of the introduction of sanctions in 1965.
Some of us said that it was a nonsensical policy at the time to rely upon sanctions that were unsupported by any credible threat of force. It always was nonsense. The Labour Government were responsible for the betrayal of the 5 million Africans in Rhodesia. In that, they were aided and abetted by the Conservative Opposition of the day.
If we are to get away from the self-deception that has marked all discussion of the Rhodesian issue over the last 10 years, it is as well for someone on the Labour side of the House to acknowledge that fact. We failed to do our duty in Rhodesia because of a lack of guts and clear thinking. It is high time we devoted some clear thinking to the problem.
As I have said, we have been bedevilled by self-deception. Let us now recognize

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that the original objective—to bring down Smith or get him to accept a new policy totally contrary to his party's ideas—was hopeless. It just will not happen now. If we argue, as I do, for a continuation of sanctions, we should do so with a different objective, a different motivation, in mind.
However, there is just such a different motivation and objective, principally that it is in our interests to avoid growing interdependence between the economy of this country and that of Rhodesia, an interdependence which, if it became reestablished, would operate only to the benefit of those persons in this country who have an economic interest in trading with Rhodesia. At present there is a deep interdependence with the Republic of South Africa in the spheres of trade and investment. Our tail is caught in a volcano. That volcano will some day blow up, and we shall suffer because so much of our economic life is tied in with that republic. At the moment we do not have, and we want to avoid reestablishing, an economic tie-in with Rhodesia.
A second reason for continuing the sanctions is that mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Lestor) in her excellent speech namely, self-respect. The Conservative Party went to the country last time with a manifesto which talked about making Britain's voice heard in the world. The Foreign Secretary does not seem to be interested in using his voice on behalf of some people who are being badly treated in Rhodesia.
If we were to say "All right; you have done something illegal; you have torn up the constitution and done all the illegal things that are possible but, nevertheless, having gone through the gestures for some years, we are going to call off the sanctions and be good friends again" we should lose all self-respect, and we should deserve the world reputation that we now have as a decadent nation that does not know what it wants to achieve, and is certainly incapable of achieving it if it ever knew.
If we go ahead with sanctions, we need something else to strengthen them. What I propose is what might be called a conservative policy, which could be pursued by either party and might have
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to be, but which would be a policy which might bring a new element into the situation, a new ray of hope for people in Rhodesia. It is perfectly clear to people in this country and in Rhodesia that salvation from a racially oppressive regime is not going to be brought about by Britain. We have proved over the years that we have not the guts for it, and we will not do it.
Who else can do it? The Africans in Rhodesia can do it, but almost certainly they will require some outside assistance. In the end, whether we want it or not, whether messy or not, effective or not, the United Nations will take an increasingly practical rôle in Rhodesia.
Before this country cuts its links with Rhodesia, which, if we continue in the present way, will inevitably come, surely it will be proper for us to hand over the technical responsibility to the United Nations. It would have been entirely wrong of us to do that in 1965. Getting Rhodesia right was our job, and it still is, but it certainly was our job in 1965 and only we could do it. But we have not done it, and it would be easier for the United Nations to do something practical in Rhodesia if it had a legal right to interfere. It does not have a legal right to interfere at the moment.
I am pleading that when the Conservative Party reaches the state when it cannot bear to go on any longer with our present policies, rather than make Rhodesia independent, or simply recognising that it is independent, we should make Rhodesia legally a United Nations trust territory. There is nothing in the charter against that. It is specifically provided for in the charter that a non-self-governing territory may be made a UN trust territory. It does not have to be a trust that originated with the charter.
The practical effect would be to give the United Nations the legal right to back up interference, which it also possesses in the case of Namibia. I do not think that anyone doubts that the interest taken by the outside world in Namibia has been that bit more effective because the United Nations has a legal right to interfere. I do not say that the interference has been effective in any strong sense, but it has been more effective, and is likely in future to be more

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supported by other nations, because the United Nations has not only a desire to intervene in Namibia, but a legal right to do so.
Before Britain goes to the point where we simply cut the umbilical cord and give up, let us tie it to something else. Let us tie it to the United Nations in order to give the United Nations—which will be carrying the baby anyway—some legal right to do more than it will otherwise be able to do.
I realise—and I realised before saying so—that that idea does not come unsupported on my own side, far less by hon. Members opposite, but I fear that some who oppose it still think that there is a better solution possible. Because I do no think that there is, I suggest that before we finally say—if we can ever be honest enough with ourselves—to the people of Rhodesia that we are unable to do any more for them, we should leave behind us a legal right in the United Nations to do something. It is modest, but we have never done anything more for Rhodesia than the modest, and this suggestion would be rather more than we have managed to do till now.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: My hon. Friend makes the contrast with Namibia and that in itself ought to put paid to this argument, because at least the British Government, perhaps reductantly, accept a legal obligation in relation to United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. But the British Government will not accept the ruling of the International Court in relation to Namibia. They would take the same dispassionate, uninterested view in Rhodesia if it were allowed to become a trust territory of the United Nations.
Mr. Cunningham: I am suggesting that sanctions should continue. I am not suggesting that making Rhodesia trust territory is any way an alternative to that. I am suggesting this as an addition to tough sanctions, which should, of course, be applied, and in order to give the United Nations that legal right to use in trying to get everyone to toughen sanctions. Let us at least leave that behind us, because if we do not leave that, we shall be leaving absolutely nothing for the 5 million people of Rhodesia.
8.11 p.m.
Mr. John Stokes: I am very glad to have been
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called, having listened to the whole of the debate, and I have promised to be brief.
I will try to place the debate and our relations with Rhodesia in the wider context of our foreign policy. This is the third or fourth debate which I have attended on this subject in the last two and a half years and I feel that the air of unreality gets greater each year. If we are not careful, debates on Rhodesia will be like debates in this House in the last century on what was called the "interminable Eastern question", when no one could remember how or why it all started.
This year, however, there are at least two changes from last year. We have witnessed General Amin's actions and cruel régime in Uganda to show us what can happen if black nationalism gains the upper hand, apart from the continuing bloodshed and massacres in other parts of Africa to which my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) has already referred. In particular, I refer to the appalling slaughter and massacres in Burundi.
Secondly, continuing our examination of our foreign policy, we have seen a determined effort by the Government to become firm friends with a great many countries, the last and the most important, of these being China. Relations with Russia and the other Iron Curtain countries are improving.
Why, then, is Mr. Smith of Rhodesia the bogy man for Foreign Office? It is difficult to know now what are the logical, or even the illogical, reasons for maintaining sanctions. Are they still a card in the Government's hand for when we once more come to the table with Mr. Smith? Is it righteous indignation, which the Government do not appear to have for any other country or is it, rather, a feeble effort to keep in with the intellectuals and progressives of this country and also with the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations?
This leads me to wonder on what principles our foreign policy is conducted. It is difficult to think of any Foreign Minister in the past who would have behaved in this fashion. Are we protecting British interests or British trade, or are we trying to act like a nanny and force a constitution on to Rhodesia when almost all our other constitutions in Africa were

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torn up almost as soon as they were promulgated? Is it to satisfy the wishes of the great majority of people in Britain who we know are sick and tired of sanctions?
I am probably the only Member in the Chamber who was this morning in his constituency and addressed an extremely large meeting on this subject. I informed my audience of my views, stating that I could not possibly vote for sanctions and would have to vote against them. I received the unanimous support of the meeting. That is the feeling of the people of England, and I hope that the Foreign Office will pay some attention to them.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, whom I greatly admire, is a realist in so many things that I wonder why he seems to have a blind spot over Rhodesia. I hope he is not being unduly influenced by any of his permanent officials. I often wonder whether any other country would behave in this manner.
So I make this late appeal to the Government. They have not been afraid to change their minds recently over economic affairs due to what I may call cruel necessity. Why should not cruel necessity cause a similar change in our policy towards Rhodesia? I know that saving face is involved. I know that the amour propre of the Government is concerned, but the Foreign Secretary is a big enough man to accept this and to swallow the Government's pride with good grace. He told us that he was prepared to do so. Why wait any longer? The unfortunate and regrettable involvement with the United Nations must be abrogated as soon as possible.
If a Labour Government had been in power, we might have expected wishy-washy action. But the man-in-the-steet—and I am constantly in touch with him—expects realism above all else from a Tory Government and a determination to stand by British interests. It is not pleasant to hear charges of double standards launched against one's own Government. I did not think that I should live to see the day when the General Amins of this world were allowed to go scot-free while Mr. Smith was still in the dock.
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If hon. Members on the Opposition side do not understand the realities of life in present-day Africa, the Foreign Office should. Some time ago, in a similar debate, I used some words of Castlereagh in which he spoke of the Holy Alliance, and which I applied to sanctions—"A piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense". I can find no historical parallels for the present absurd continuation of the situation in which we are concerning Rhodesia.
Unlike hon. Members opposite, I remember my country's past; I am proud of it, and it can still teach us many lessons. It is for this and for all the other reasons which I have mentioned that I shall have to vote against the orders today. In doing so I know that I am supported not only by the great majority of my constituents but also by the great mass of people in the country.
8.21 p.m.
Mr. Phillip Whitehead: Following the hon. Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Stokes), or indeed his hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref), is a pleasure, because one feels that one has strayed from a debate in the mid-twentieth century either into a debate at the time of Castlereagh, whose name was invoked by the hon. Member for Oldbury—unhappily, I thought—or perhaps into some strange late-night satire show in which things are not quite what they seem. Things quite clearly are not as they seem to be in the world of the hon. Members for Oldbury and Halesowen and Ormskirk.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk knows perfectly well that I and many of my hon. Friends are not backward in condemning African-controlled régimes in Africa that have strayed from the path that most of us would wish to see them follow in terms of the non-abuse of majority rule. He knows my reaction in the case of Sierra Leone in particular. It is a supreme irrelevance for Conservative Members to bring up the subject of what is happening in Uganda today in a debate on the re-imposition of sanctions on Rhodesia, because to condemn the action of the British Government in relation to the illegal régime in Rhodesia on the basis of the situation in many countries in Africa to which they have handed control when a majority in those countries assumed power is wholly wrong.

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We handed over power in Uganda, in Sierra Leone and in other African countries to the majority. I was in an African country at the time when power was handed over, and it was abundantly clear that the Government to which the then British Government conceded power represented the majority of the people at that time. Whatever may have happened since in some of those countries, however much that power may have been abused, however much we may regret the disgusting nature of the Amin régime and the way in which many of his opponents have been done to death and racial minorities have been expelled, all that appears to be totally irrelevant when we are considering the re-imposition of sanctions on Rhodesia.
Rhodesia is a British colony, taken some 80 years ago by force of arms and malpractice by British settlers, a small minority, who are still in a small minority—one in 22, as one hon. Member was honest enough to say. The African population increases every year by the number of the small white minority in Rhodesia.
Our responsibility is to all the people of Rhodesia. It is to the Africans whom we have not treated particularly well, in the time of either the previous or the present Government, in terms of the intensity with which we applied sanctions.
We should not need to have an extended debate on these orders. After the unequivocal response which the Pearce Commission brought back from Rhodesia, following the exhaustive test of opinion which it carried out, it is clear that there can be no going back to that settlement, that in honour we have no alternative but to continue with sanctions, and that their passing through Parliament today ought to be a mere formality for decent men. Instead of that we have had raised every conceivable argument, drawing parallels from elsewhere on the African continent.
In the debate on 10th November, I was pessimistic about the chances of a British Government honouring the fifth principle if a possible agreement were reached with the Smith régime in Rhodesia. It seems to me that the Pearce Report vindicates Lord Pearce's Commission and puts it quite plainly on the record that there can be no settlement
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of any sort with the Smith régime, considering what the Smith régime is doing.
The hon. Member for Ormskirk was somewhat frivolous about the plight of the Chinamano family and the many other people in detention in Rhodesia. He seemed to think that this was an isolated exception, that there was no one else in this position. Even since the Pearce Commission returned home, as he ought to know, the law in Rhodesia has been further stiffened and strengthened against precisely the expression of African majority opinion through the African National Council, which was manifested to the Pearce Commission.
In those circumstances, I think we were right—those of us on this side of the House—who said throughout that it was clear that if the fifth principle were honoured, there could be no question that a majority in Rhodesia—certainly not the twenty to one majority of Africans in that country—would welcome any settlement that could be arrived at with the Smith Government.
What have sanctions actually done? If we look at a couple of opinions from opposite sides of the political fence in this country, it is clear that there has been an effect, but that it has not been—as some hon. Members said—as dramatic and as effective in bringing the Smith régime to an awareness of the facts in southern Africa as we should have liked. The Daily Telegraph correspondent, Ian Colvin, in assessing the situation in Rhodesia the other day said that there had been short-term gains and that the morale of the white Rhodesians was still high; he also said that the picture was
"one of long-term economic success with sanctions but failure in both the medium- and short-term".
I would agree with that. Sanctions are a long-term matter; they are having a long-term effect on the Rhodesian economy. What they have not done is to achieve more than that which the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign recently called a stalemate. I want to spend just a couple of minutes examining why that should be—why this stalemate has now been reached.
It is clear that there have been influences on the various members of the Rhodesian Government, all of whom

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appear to be called Smith—I sometimes think that everybody except Mr. T. Dan Smith is now a member of the Rhodesian Cabinet. All of them have been beset: farmers, tobacco farmers, industrialists Rhodesian businessmen are worried about the long-term effects, about the shortage of capital and so on. It is a long-term matter.
What we ought to be concerned with is the effect which we could have on the position in Rhodesia itself. When my hon. Friend the Minister for Liverpool. West Derby (Mr. Ogden) tells us today that he has returned from his trip and brought snaps with him, telling us that the people are holding out pretty well and that sanctions have not had much effect, I should like him to express a little more shock that there is a BOAC office in Salisbury. I should like him to express a little more shock that Barclay's Bank is putting up a new block in Salisbury. I should like him to express a certain degree of resentment that the British Government have not taken far greater steps to see that these things, too, whatever the legal state of the sanctions, have been erased.
Mr. Ogden: I could give a long lecture about the whole subject. I tried to compact my views. I mentioned BOAC and others because that was a fact. I brought some photographs—and made no secret of my four-day visit—to be able to say "Look, that's a picture; what cannot speak cannot lie" though I can cook photographs with the best of them. I was reporting in that sense. I am not writing books; I am not an expert on Rhodesia. I am giving a firsthand impression and everyone must take it for what they think it is worth.
Mr. Whitehead: I accept it for what it is worth.
I hope that the House will now apply its mind when approving the orders, as I am sure it will, to the various ways in which sanctions can be strengthened. Much has been made of the Byrd Amendment and the import of chrome by the United States Government and of the kind of pressures that we know to exist in the gigantic capitalist cartels of the United States to get Rhodesian chrome by all possible means, in order not to have to buy Russian chrome, as was
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pointed out by the hon. Member for Ormskirk.
Union Carbide and Foote Minerals and other concerns which have had this influence on a Right-wing Congress and on a Right-wing President are not the only enormous extractive cartels with which the British Government have to deal. After all, we have recently been handing out concessions in the North Sea like smarties to other large American firms which wish to explore our United Kingdom mineral preserves. If we so wish, there are pressures which we can exert on the United States Government to reverse the Byrd Amendment.
I was saddened to hear from people who have been in touch with our representatives in New York that there has apparently been very little pressure by the Foreign Office on the United States Government since the passing of the Byrd Amendment. That is a shocking state of affairs. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will shortly make representations to the newly-strengthened Nixon régime.
Mr. Soref: I suggested that the Russians were buying chrome and reselling it to America. Does the hon. Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) suggest that pressure should be brought to bear upon the Soviet Union for acting as the entrepreneur in that deal?
Mr. Whitehead: Absolutely. I make no distinction between countries which are breaking the sanctions. Those paying lip service to them while breaking them behind the scenes should be even more deeply condemned because of the hypocrisy involved in that action.
However, that is totally irrelevant to any discussion of what the British Government may do to bring pressure to bear on those countries which have been mentioned in this debate as having breached the sanctions policy which our supposed allies claim to support. For example, Germany—and I regret this fact, since I am generally an admirer of the Social Democratic Government of Western Germany—has been breaching the sanctions policy.
The West Germans will shortly be applying for membership of the United Nations. They will find that a large body

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of opinion in the United Nations, certainly among the African members, will not be willing to admit them as being sanction-breakers in Rhodesia. The British Government should not therefore be behindhand in making that point to Herr Brandt and his Government.
As for Portugal, a number of references have been made today to the impossibility of extending the Beira patrol to cover Lourenço Marques. Hon. Members have asked what would be the situation with regard to putting people off and getting in touch with the Portuguese shore authorities. It is true that at that kind of distance and in that part of the world our military forces are over-stretched, owing to the lines of communication, and are not totally independent, as they would need to be in order to bear wholly effective pressures in time of war. That was also true of the air force presence that we maintained for a period in Zambia, which I think was always under the control of Ground Control, Salisbury.
Nevertheless, right hon. and hon. Members opposite are never heard to mention this point concerning the difficulty of maintaining a naval patrol in respect of Iceland. We are sending our gunboats off the coast of Iceland in order to protect the fishery fleet. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite approve that action. They would like those gunboats to be strengthened. That argument is never raised when discussing the possibility of obtaining a better agreement with the new Government of the Malagasy Republic and strengthening the Beira Patrol.
Many hon. Members have spoken as though events since 1965 made the condition of the Rhodesian people of supreme irrelevance to Britain, since there is no enormous pressure of public opinion in this country for the strengthening of sanctions. It is said that here is this little group of plucky settlers, who have made their own way in the world, and who can now run Rhodesia, at least for a period, without worrying overmuch about the long-term effects of sanctions wearing down the Rhodesian economy. I believe that we have a duty to those people which goes back to the time when we came to what was then Matabeleland and Mashonaland
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We have a responsibility to the African majority which was always denied by the British South Africa Company, by Rhodes and his clique and by those who founded Rhodesia. The African people of those countries have always looked to Britain because there was nowhere else to look. They have been exploited for 80 years. It is not just a matter of going back to a Garfield Todd golden age, for they have been exploited for 80 years. Beyond the trust they have in Britain, they have nowhere to look, apart from the rather nebulous presence of the United Nations.
I think of that, and of the alternative to what is being proposed in the House tonight, which is not an alternative of sitting back and watching the one in 21 Rhodesians who happen to be white and who now have power in their hands continuing to control that country into the indefinite future. The alternative, if we do not attempt to bring the white and the black people of Rhodesia to the conference table, is a bloody civil war, bringing into Rhodesia very slowly what we are now seeing along the Mozambique frontier; the pressures which have already been mentioned by some of my hon. Friends. Those pressures for everybody in Rhodesia are darker and more terrible and will reflect far greater dishonour on this country than any continuation and strengthening of sanctions possibly could.
8.36 p.m.
Mr. Christopher Woodhouse: I have been impressed by the realism with which this debate has been conducted on both sides. By "on both sides" in a debate of this kind I mean on both sides of the debate and not necessarily on both sides of the House, because it is clear that there are dissident opinions on each side. On both sides of the House a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the facts of power within the national boundaries of Rhodesia, and this Is a fact which we cannot afford to overlook.
On both sides of the House also some emphasis, perhaps not as much as is felt in our hearts, has been put on sensitivity to the feelings of our own constituents on this matter. Some Members have drawn attention to the fact that they

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believe that a majority of their constituents would wish them to support a view with which perhaps they do not necessarily agree.
I represent a constituency which manufactures motor cars, and I have been very aware during the debate that the British motor industry has been almost entirely eliminated from Rhodesia in the last few years—apparently with the exception of Jaguars, though they are not manufactured in my constituency.
Those of us who support the continuation of sanctions, particularly those who represent industrial constituencies, must recognise that we are asking many of our constituents who work in factories to exercise the same kind of self-sacrificing patience as the cotton workers of Lancashire exercised during the American Civil War. I do not believe they would refuse to do so if they fully understood the implications, but the implications must not be concealed either from ourselves or from our constituents.
I have no doubt that it is right to pass these orders if only because to reject them would put us in breach of our international obligations, which were incurred in the first instance on the initiative of the British Government—and it makes no difference from which party the members of that Government were drawn. If we wish to terminate sanctions, rejecting these orders is not the proper way to do it. The Government would first have to go to the United Nations and only then come to Parliament to terminate the sanctions.
Nevertheless, the present situation is profoundly unsatisfactory, as I think has been recognised by practically every speaker in this debate, though in many cases for different reasons. It grows more unsatisfactory from year to year. It is unsatisfactory that we are virtually the only major trading nation which is seriously respecting the United Nations resolution. It is unsatisfactory that, whereas we in this Parliament have to renew these orders year by year knowing that failure to do so would breach our international obligations, the United Nations never has to renew its resolution or to reconsider the matter at all.
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It would surely be desirable in the next 12 months to find some way of initiating a fresh public debate in the United Nations in order, first, to assess whether sanctions are achieving anything useful in order to publicise the infringement of sanctions. It seems to me quite inadequate merely to draw the attention of the United Nations secretariat to them, and to give those countries which are plainly condoning infringement a chance of explaining why they think sanctions should continue if they have no intention of enforcing them. Undoubtedly that would be a sterile debate, though I think it would be a necessary one to clear the air.
Also, the Government should take a more radical look at the matter to decide what can be done within their own competence without infringing United Nations resolutions. The Foreign Secretary has made a few marginal adjustments today which I welcome. But there is one major issue that is within the sole competence of Her Majesty's Government, and that is the claim to exercise continuing sovereignty over Rhodesia. The questions of sovereignty and sanctions are inevitably linked because sanctions were invoked in the first place to help us assert our claim to sovereignty. But the link is paradoxical because normally sanctions under the ægis of an international organisation would be invoked only against a sovereign State. Never before have they been invoked against a rebellious dependency or colony.
It might well be argued, as a matter of political fact, though no doubt this would be challenged by international lawyers, that to impose sanctions is, in effect, by itself to recognise independence. Even without going so far as that, it seems worth serious consideration—I ask for no more than consideration—whether there is any sense in continuing to claim sovereignty when one has no means whatever of making the claim effective.
We simply have not the power to reimpose our sovereignty on Rhodesia and to that extent, whether we like it or not, the unilateral declaration of independence has succeeded. We have had examples illustrating this point in this debate. My right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary listed a number of mitigations of the full onus of

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sanctions which he was introducing for the benefit of individuals who might innocently suffer from them. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) asked him whether he would take similar action in respect of a number of oppressed citizens, both European and African, in Rhodesia.
I have every sympathy with the point that the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East made. I think that what is going on in respect of human rights in Rhodesia is deplorable. But it is totally outside the power—not the jurisdiction—of Her Majesty's Government to do anything about it. They are, therefore, not cognate with the small mitigations of the impact of sanctions which the Foreign Secretary announced.
That may be a humiliating admission, but is it not an admission that will simply have to be made sooner or later? Would it not be the lesser evil—I will not put it the other way round—to admit that now, simply as an acknowledgment of fact? The pretence that we are still the sovereign Power in Rhodesia is harmful, because it leads opponents of the Smith Government, especially the Africans, to believe that it is in our power, if we choose to exercise it, to do things for their benefit which we know perfectly well we cannot do. To that extent, we are inevitably deceiving them by continuing to make the claim of sovereignty.
The pretence has the doubly unfortunate effect of making us deceitful towards those who still trust us, and ridiculous to our opponents and the rest of the world. It would be more honest to abandon this pretence by a sort of unilateral disclaimer of sovereignty.
I could not go the whole way with what was said by the hon. Member for Islington, South-West (Mr. George Cunningham). Some of his hon. Friends did not support him either. My reason for not supporting the hon. Gentleman is that his proposal would simply renew false hopes, which would be bound to be disappointing. All I am suggesting for consideration is simply an acknowledgment of fact. It would not be a diplomatic recognition of the illegal Government. It would not confer approval on the illegal constitution. It would not, by itself, affect the policy of sanctions one way or the other. It could, indeed, be accompanied by a declaration that we
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would neither confer diplomatic recognition on the Rhodesian Government nor terminate sanctions until the requisite majorities at the United Nations were ready to agree. It would, quite simply, be an acceptance of what is already a fact which we have no power to alter.
I do not ask for a definitive answer tonight, but I hope that the Government will seriously consider this course before tabling similar orders in 12 months' time.
8.47 p.m.
Mr. Frank Judd: I listened to the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse) with great interest, as I am sure all of us did, because we know the wisdom and experience which he brings to these debates and the sincerity with which he advances his case. However, I am afraid that I find his view unnecessarily defeatist on this score, and I hope to be able to show why.
Several hon. Members have referred to the extremely interesting Africa Bureau report, with some detailed analysis, which is indispensable in the context of considering how we should move forward on this critical issue. One point that that report spelt out which interested me was that we had to decide whether we were basically involved in a policy of punitive sanctions or of economic warfare.
If one was simply concerned with punishing the Rhodesian régime for having had the insolence to rebel against the Crown, it would be possible to continue with a niggling range of sanctions which would produce no results but would continue to make the people of that country uncomfortable. If, on the other hand, one wanted to see a change in the situation to defeat the current political objectives of the régime, it would be necessary to accept that we were engaged in economic warfare. Logically, therefore, one must devise the best means possible for pursuing our political activity in that economic war.
There is a negative argument which is not altogether disreputable. That argument suggests that, if we achieve nothing else by sanctions, the prevention of still greater British economic involvement in southern Africa, based as it is on a social system of white supremacy, would he advantageous. The danger in Southern Africa, so far as it concerns this country—we are looking to our own enlightened

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long-term self-interest—is that as confrontation and polarisation develop we shall find ourselves still further entrenched on the wrong side, and we shall be compelled ultimately to take still more militant steps to defend our position of economic interest on the losing and wrong side. What is sad about debates on southern Africa in the House is that too often they are dominated by a very short-term outlook on the situation in that part of the world.
Those of us who speak for the case which I shall advance care for the white population in Rhodesia and in South Africa as much as any right hon. and hon. Gentleman opposite who claims to do so. It is we who are spelling out to the white minority in that part of the African continent the only basic on which they can have a secure future, which is to come to terms with the reality that they are a minority, and that the majority will in one way or another find its rightful place in the ordering of society in southern Africa.
I briefly take up one matter advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South-West (Mr. George Cunningham). I hope he has not already gone to the United Nations to advocate his case. I am sorry that he is not in his place, because he and I normally work closely together. However, I wish to dissociate myself from his argument about putting the case to the United Nations because, whether we put the responsibility for Rhodesia with the United Nations or retain it ourselves, the effectiveness of policies which are advocated and adopted depends upon this country's commitment. If we are not prepared to commit ourselves sufficiently while we retain responsibility, there is no reason to believe that the United Nations will somehow, in a vacuum, develop a sense of commitment and purpose which was previously lacking. We are seen historically, constitutionally and in every other way to be the Power primarily involved in Rhodesia, and the United Nations will continue to look to us to set the pace if it is given responsibility.
What I fear is that, while my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South-West is clearly absolutely sincere in his approach, there are others who would
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do it as the ultimate cynical act in the whole operation. Having failed to develop the will and the purpose ourselves, we should want to pass the blame historically to the United Nations for having failed to act as it should. Unless we are prepared to set the pace, I fear that, however honourable my hon. Friend's approach may be, collectively it could prove a most dishonourable and cynical approach to the handling of the situation.
I want to put some brief, specific questions to the Government. We know that it was the effect of sanctions, however incomplete that action may have been, that brought Mr. Smith to the negotiating table. We know that other more militant pressures are developing in southern Africa—they have been referred to in the debate; Mozambique is an example—which must be worrying the Smith régime. Therefore, in the interests of all the people in Rhodesia we desperately want to bring the Rhodesian Government to the table to reach a sensible solution in the interests of the population as a whole. We therefore need to intensify the pressure.
As I understand it, the case of the Government is that we cannot intensify the pressure. because we are not in control of the situation on the ground. What specific steps have the Government taken to strengthen the effectiveness of the Beira patrol? Which fellow members of the Commonwealth, let alone the United Nations, have we approached for support in manning the Beira patrol? Have we, since the change of Government in Malagasy, reapproached the new Government of that country and asked them to make RAF bases available in order to make air operations more effective in the context of that patrol?
What steps have we taken, within the United Nations, to devise a method whereby greater world-wide public attention can be focused on sanction-breaking, wherever it occurs, so that we can mobilise world public opinion? What specific representations in all the long chain of negotiations and discussions that have been going on about the European Economic Community and its future have been made to the existing and potential new members about how they could step up their degree of commitment and involvement in enforcing sanctions? Was

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this subject discussed at the Summit, and if not, why not?
Recognising that Portugal, for a host of reasons, finds her involvement in NATO of great political importance, what specific pressures have been put by the British Government to ram home to Portugal that we are not prepared to go on seeing a country which is a member of an alliance that theoretically exists to defend freedom and democracy deliberately and openly flouting sanctions policy and undermining what we are trying to do? What specific approaches have been made to South Africa at this juncture, because South Africa is anxious about the British membership of the European Community and the loss of Commonwealth Preference which she is at present enjoying? What steps are being taken to use this as a lever in bringing pressure to bear on South Africa?
As my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) put it, what are we saying to West Germany, not only in the European Economic Community context, but as a friendly Power, about her anxiety to become a member of the United Nations and the need to see her taking a more honourable and forceful line on sanctions? Japan is falling over backwards to establish warmer relationships with Britain. What specific representations did the Prime Minister make during his visit to Japan about the flagrant breach of sanctions by Japanese economic interests? Similarly, not in a generalised sense, because we have heard this repeated so often in debate, could the Government give us chapter and verse of the representations to the United States on its breaking of sanctions, the import of chrome and of the representations to France and to Switzerland, for example?
In answer to quite valid points by hon. Members opposite about those of us who appear sometimes to spend a good deal of effort trying to interpret what is happening in black Africa, we ought to spell out clearly a challenge to black Africa and we ought to say—all of us in the House—that we do not accept double standards by black African Powers in their evaluation of events in Africa. I, for one, would be willing to advocate that black African members of the Commonwealth should join with us in considering
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the expulsion of Uganda from the Commonwealth and the cutting off of aid. We ought to suggest to the Africans that they are in a position to take specific and effective action themselves to assist in strengthening sanctions.
The OAU could prepare a list of firms and economic interests dealing with Rhodesia and could ensure that member Governments of the OAU ceased dealings with such firms. They could also take positive steps, as the African Bureau suggested, to see how they could replace—for a country like Switzerland, for example—the exports now going from Rhodesia—meat and tobacco are examples—and fill that gap and thereby ensure that Switzerland did not have to suffer too badly.
As some of us have said since the beginning of this crisis, what we are debating basically over and over again when we face the Rhodesian issue is a matter of will. What totally fails to convince the world community is the argument that we could not do more when we have not tried to do more. Basically, no one could ever pretend that this country had ever mobilised the degree of priority necessary to make a sanctions policy completely effective.
In a debate like this it is fair to introduce one further argument. Have we seriously considered the simply frightening lesson for us and for the whole world community if the sanctions policy in Rhodesia does in the end peter out or fail? The lesson is that, short of resorting to force, the international community—and here our degree of commitment is critical—is incapable of mobilising sufficient pressure, of taking sufficiently strong action to deal with a very real challenge to international order when it occurs, and that we can therefore only in future either give in or resort to violence.
It is absolutely ludicrous to believe that with all the sophistication and all the technology at our disposal we can accept a situation in which a minority of one in 21 which happens to have political control at the moment—a section little more numerous than that of the population of the city part of which I have the honour to represent in the House, some 250,000—can challenge our authority, the authority of the EEC, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. If we

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do not watch it, we shall go down in history as the most feeble and ineffective bunch of British politicians the world has seen for generations.
9.2 p.m.
Mr. Roger White: It is sad that we should be having this debate. I believe that in the fullness of time men will look back to this generation and say what a tragedy it was that educated people in London and in Salisbury could not have reached a sensible solution to one of the most serious incidents in modern times.
I say at once that I have always been a very stern opponent of sanctions against Rhodesia, not because I agreed with UDI but for just the opposite reason. I believed passionately that sanctions would drive Southern Rhodesia into South Africa, into apartheid, and all that that meant. I believed that it was wrong to punish Rhodesians, whether black or white, for the sake of a few politicians. I believed that in the long term sanctions would fail.
Seven years have passed since the imposition of sanctions. Two years ago, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) returned to the Foreign Office and started what I consider to be the most sensible negotiations we have so far had. He brought back a certain respectability to the negotiations. The clash of personalities which unfortunately had hindered progress in those years was over, and we set the Pearce Commission to work. It was a great tragedy that that commission failed. I warned my right hon. Friend that in the event of our renewing sanctions this year following the failure of the Pearce Commission I would have to vote against my own Government.
That was the view I held until six weeks ago. Since then I have visited Rhodesia, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Mr. Haselhurst) that the situation in Rhodesia is such that one can see the outward signs of affluence among the Europeans. There is no doubt that sanctions are being flouted. Every conceivable form of consumer goods is obtainable in the shops, and every type of continental motorcar is to be seen in the streets of Salisbury. The only cars from this country that I saw were a few
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clapped-out old horrors. That, of course, is the surface but unhappily, in my judgment, there is an underlying sinister feeling in Salisbury which I find disturbing.
A new generation has grown up. I was speaking to a 19-year-old student who said, "Of course, we have our President." He said that because a president was created in his time, and only a president created under the present Government of Rhodesia is understood by him and his colleagues. On the other side of the balance sheet, there is undoubtedly, as hon. Members have mentioned, the very considerable breakdown in the tobacco industry, the breakdown of the infrastructure and the consequent currency difficulties.
In the circumstances following the Pearce Commission, I gather from people to whom I have spoken in Rhodesia that there is a dialogue taking place between sensible people on both sides, both the European Rhodesians and representatives of the ANC. One of the points which has been made to me is that these talks are now very finely balanced and that if this country were suddenly to end sanctions—which I do not think it could—it would upset the negotiations which men of common sense are trying to conduct behind the scenes, and they might be wrecked, possibly for ever. In the minds of these people is not merely the question whether one is for or against sanctions but whether one is for or against a solution.
The solution, in the minds of people in Rhodesia, has to be found in Salisbury. It is felt that a dialogue has to start and has to continue in Salisbury. I am hopeful that my right hon. Friend will be able to come to the House before the next 12 months have elapsed and indicate that there has been a sign from Salisbury, from men of good will, whether they be white Rhodesians or black Rhodesians, that a sensible solution can be found.
I believe that the Government have the right to ask the House for support in continuing the sanctions. Much as it goes against the grain at times to retract one's words, I find myself in that position, tonight, having seen and spoken to people for whom I have a great regard. For those reasons I shall be in the Government Lobby tonight.
9.8 p.m.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Mr. Judd) has said much that I should have said. In any event, all of us who are regular attenders at these debates feel a little ennui in repeating what we have said before on these issues.
I have tried on several occasions to persuade the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to be more positive in his approach to sanctions. I have not yet succeeded, and I doubt that I shall tonight. Therefore, I intend to concentrate on an area in which the right hon. Gentleman might see some room for manoeuvre—that is, in the individual cases, some of which have been mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan).
I listened to the hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse), as I always do, with a good deal of interest. But I thought he was wrong in saying that there was no relationship between the new measures which the right hon. Gentleman announced today and the relief for people like the Chinamanos. It has long been the cry from hon. Members of the Government side that we may have responsibility for Southern Rhodesia but we have no power there. That is not quite correct. The régime wants to do a deal with us, and to do so it would be prepared to pay a price. It is, therefore, still within our capability to influence some of the things that go on in Rhodesia. One recognises the limitations, but there is still that influence open to us.
The Foreign Secretary has made certain amendments to the present scheme of sanctions in order to help a number of individuals—British citizens—who were affected by sanctions in a disadvantageous and possibly hurtful way. All of us feel a certain human sympathy for people caught up in these political affairs for no reason save that they happen to live on one side or other of the fence. But surely the Foreign Secretary could have used these concessions as a lever to humanise some of the actions which the Rhodesian Government have taken.
For example, the right hon. Gentleman could have made it the price of allowing a greater contribution to the elderly who are living in Rhodesia that Mr. Smith would allow the Chinamanos to come out of detention. If Mr. Smith and his régime
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still felt that the Chinamanos were a danger—no one who knows them really believes that—it could have been the price of these small concessions that they were allowed to come to this country. I know many people here who would be only too willing to welcome them and their children.
I remind the House of the position of Chinamanos. They were in detention for a considerable time—about five years, I think—before the Pearce Commission went out. They were released just before the Pearce Commission went out; Mrs. Chinamano in particular was heavily involved in the work of the ANC and Mr. Chinamano was on the executive. They were then put back into detention, and they have been in detention ever since. But the really inhuman feature of it is that the régime did absolutely nothing about the children of the Chinamanos, who were left in their home in one of the African townships outside Salisbury.
None of those children is over the age of 15. They are looked after by the eldest daughter, a 15-year-old girl. Inevitably their conduct while they have been in that position has gravely deteriorated, and all who know the family are grievously concerned about the effect upon those children of the prolonged separation from their parents. The régime now allows the youngest girl to go and stay with her parents in the compound—a prison compound—in which they are detained, and she may spend her school holidays there. Could anyone conceive of anything more inhuman than that?
When I was in Salisbury in February, I made representations not only about the Todds but about the Chinamanos to the Minister of Law and Order, but I fear that Mr. Lardner-Burke was not so sensitive on human matters as I hoped he might be, and he did not seem to think that it was any grave matter. The Foreign Secretary could have put some pressure upon him and his régime through the concessions which he has now freely and voluntarily given.
Abel Muzorewa is seriously ill. He wants to come out of Rhodesia in order to have attention which he cannot get inside Rhodesia. He wanted to go to the United States. If we are to give concessions for people to come out of Rhodesia to get medical attention here

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which they otherwise would have to get in South Africa, why cannot we say to the régime "First on the list will be Abel Muzorewa; he can come and have medical attention here"? After all, he is the man whom several hon. Members opposite have spoken of today as the responsible ANC leader who has entered into discussions with Lance Smith at the mysterious meetings arranged by Mr. Hutter. This seems to indicate that he has a particular cachet of responsibility which ought to be acknowledged in this country.
I urge that for Abel Muzorewa, for the Chinamanos and for the Garfield Todds we ought to be using the limited influence that we have in order to try to ameliorate their conditions in Rhodesia, and if their conditions cannot be ameliorated there they ought to be allowed to come to this country.
9.15 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: I heard with sympathy, as I am sure did my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what the hon. Member for York (Mr. Alexander W. Lyon) has just said. But when the hon. Gentleman said rhetorically "Could one imagine anything more inhuman?" I wish that that were so and that there were no more inhuman things in Africa than that—but, alas, there are.
I opposed sanctions—so did a number of my hon. Friends—even before they were imposed. I thought we would have learned our lesson at the time of the first great UDI in 1776. I believe that Rhodesia—we have the learned opinion of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget)—satisfies the international law and criteria for recognition as a State. I have persistently voted against sanctions and, having heard virtually every word of this debate, I see no reason to start voting for sanctions tonight.
I regret that my first speech in this new Session should be against the renewal of an order commended to the House by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, but it was my right hon. Friend who said last year, on 10th November:
"… sanctions remain in force while we see whether agreement is possible."
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We were asked to support my right hon. Friend in order that be could
"go to Salisbury with the best hope of reaching an honourable settlement"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th November, 1971; Vol. 825, c. 1090–1.]
My hon. Friends and I with some misgivings responded to that appeal. My right hon. Friend, to his great credit and also to the credit of Mr. Ian Smith, reached that honourable settlement.
Then belatedly was sent out the Pearce Commission, and its report registered the success of ignorance and intimidation. I was in Rhodesia almost immediately after that fiasco. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Esher (Mr. Mather) who was there more recently, I detected among thoughtful African nationalists an uneasy feeling that by working as they did against the settlement they might have repeated the mistake made by ZAPU and ZANU in 1962 when Rhodesia received and the white electorate endorsed in a referendum the sort of constitution of which the Foreign Secretary spoke and to which the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) also referred when he used the expression "African control of the country within a reasonable time." I think my hon, Friend the Member for Esher found, as I found, more widespread than this feeling the illusion that Her Majesty's Government could intervene and even impose their will in Rhodesia and that if the settlement was refused the British would produce yet another constitution more attractive to African nationalist opinion.
My right hon. Friend rightly said that we have little influence and no power. He spoke of the tender shoots. There may or may not be grounds for hoping that there will be a movement or a manifestation of black African opinion in favour of some such terms as those already agreed between Mr. Smith and my right hon. Friend—a movement and a manifestation of opinion which might be said to satisfy the famous fifth principle. But I feel strongly that a continuance of sanctions is more likely to increase intransigence than to reduce it and it is more likely to delay than to bring about that understanding about the future of Rhodesia which must and can only be reached between Rhodesians.

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We hear much about bishops and from bishops, whether a Skelton or Muzorewa. We hear less in this House from clergy who are not found in bishops' palaces or in the committee rooms of political movements but who have spent most of their working lives among the Africans, out in mission fields where few Europeans are ever seen and the police State very seldom sends a policeman.
Father Arthur Lewis, the British-born Rector of Rusape and Chairman of the Rhodesia Christian Group, was recently in this country. The media of opinion did not take a great deal of interest in him but he met some members of the Press and told them:
"I tried to show that persecution is not Christian. I told meetings that the settlement which matters in Rhodesia is that between the black and white people.
If the rest of the world would let us get on with it, I am sure that we can reach this kind of settlement."
I have with me a letter from another missionary, Canon Boatwright, of St. James's Mission. He gave his view on the failure of the Pearce Commission. He said that the intimidation was such that if he had been among those who were being questioned collectively he would have shouted "No" with the rest. He went on to say:
"In the district of Nyamandhlovu the Commissioners did better; in spite of the time it consumed, each African was allowed to file in and say yes or no privately, and the result was that Nyamandhlova was one of the few places where there was a definite Yes response. That some Chiefs shouted No is a real indication of the intensity of the intimidation, so lightly passed over by the Commissioners."
Then he spoke, as some hon. Members have spoken, of the undoubted effect of sanctions upon African advancement. He went on:
"Here at St. James' the failure to reach agreement leaves me soured. Our work here is chiefly educational—a Secondary school for African girls our main job—and I cannot raise funds for urgent and essential building development. For one thing we need a Laboratory for Physics and really urgently; but all appeals for the necessary £6,000 now fall on deaf ears. The country needs African women graduates and we cannot train them. A settlement would have made the money available, people would have responded."
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, if he does not mind my congratulating him, on the measures he has
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announced to alleviate the lot of innocent victims of the economic war against Rhodesia. They are belated but nevertheless welcome. I liked what he said about double standards—a phrase very much his own.
There is a Motion on the Order Paper to the effect that there should be no sanctions against Rhodesia whilst there are no sanctions against Uganda. I sympathise but do not agree. I do not want sanctions at all. Sanctions are always a failure. I want to ask my right hon. Friend a question. Is Uganda in the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee? Do we allow Uganda to sit in the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee and thus to consider these measures for the prosecution of the economic war against Rhodesia? If so, I think that would be going a little far.
Mr. George Cunningham: The hon. Gentleman cannot stop it.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I was asking for an answer from the Government, who might be more authoritative. The double standards are not just reprehensible but they have accounted for a change of opinion in this country. Of course there is a change of opinion in Africa as well. The double standards, whether it be in the Commonwealth or in the United Nations, in the face of one million dead in the Congo—President Kasavubu's own figure—the bestialities in Zanzibar and Burundi, the personal sadism of President Bokassa, who is a friend of General Amin, the Ugandan pogroms themselves, the welcome to the Ugandan team and the exclusion of the Rhodesian team from the Olympics—all these have had a profound effect upon public opinion about the sanctions against Rhodesia.
It is sometimes forgotten that there is an Asian community in Rhodesia, that it is prosperous and at peace. I well remember that in 1968, when we experienced the first stirring of what is likely to be the total exclusion in the long run of Asians from East African territories, an Indian leader in this country wrote to the Daily Telegraph and asked whether it would not be possible for Asians from East Africa to go to Rhodesia where their kith and kin—if I may be pardoned that expression—are well treated.
Sanctions have little or no support in our constituencies today. People do not

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understand the point of forfeiting what had been virtually a captive market. The trade with black Africa, which might suffer if we do not continue sanctions, was mentioned. It is about equal in money terms to our trade with Southern Africa. But in Southern Africa they are old-fashioned enough to buy our goods with their own money and that makes a difference. I was speaking only yesterday to a well-informed friend who had arrived from Kenya. I asked him what would happen in that country if we did not renew the order. He said there would be a little shouting but it would all be over with the shouting. Let us not be afraid of world opinion and abstractions like that which usually boil down to anti-British, anti-European and anti-Western feeling. Fear is a bad counsellor for Her Majesty's Ministers. The Government's fears are figments and I ask them to bring down the curtain on this tedious and futile farce.
9.27 p.m.
Mr. Ivor Richard Mr. Ivor Richard (Barons Court) rose—
Mr. Patrick Wall: On a point of order. I understood, Mr. Speaker, that we were to be allowed to go on debating until 11.30 p.m. according to the rules. Now that the Opposition Front Bench has been called to begin its speech, does that mean that the Question will not be put until the end of the allotted time, or will it be put after the Front Benches have finished?
Mr. Speaker: The Question will be put in accordance with Standing Orders. Mr. Richard.
Mr. Richard: It seemed appropriate, in view of the length of the debate on the orders so far that at this time the too Front Benches should say something. This is the longest debate on any renewal of sanctions order that we have had since 1965. At one stage the length of the debate was less than an hour and the longest debate until today was four hours and 23 minutes. Those who sat through most of the debate today, therefore, would agree that it has been a much better debate than the usual one on the renewal of the order.
For two reasons it has also been much more important. There seems to have
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been a general feeling in the House that this is perhaps an important year in which to try to reassess the whole purpose of sanctions policy and of our Rhodesian policy. I was struck in that respect—although, if he will forgive me for saying so, I did not agree with it—by the somewhat schizophrenic speech of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Sir Gilbert Longden). He struck me at one and the same time as saying that he did not like sanctions and did not believe in the Government's policy, but because he was asked to do so by the Foreign Secretary he would vote with the rest of his party in accordance with the Whips. That was political schizophrenia of a high order delivered with the elegance of manner we have come to associate with the hon. Member and I look forward to his next exercise in this fine art of political balancing.
I want to try to look coldly and objectively at the whole subject of sanctions, particularly at whether they are succeeding, where we want to go and whether we are going there fast enough or whether we are going in the wrong direction, as various hon. Members opposite have sought to suggest. We have two new Ministers in the Foreign Office, and if it is not thought presumptuous, on behalf of the Opposition I welcome them to their new offices. The Minister of State who is to reply is obviously the more appropriate Minister to do so. The right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), also now a Minister of State, made speeches on Rhodesia that I remember well. I took the trouble this afternoon to look up what he said in 1965 at the time of UDI, when his enthusiasm for the policy of sanctions was less than obvious. He said
"I gravely doubt that economic sanctions would achieve the result which the Government have in mind. … I am convinced that there is no principle at stake. But I agree that there are great interests involved and that the Government have a right to take powers to try to defend these interests."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 716–18.]
I trust that the Foreign Secretary will keep the right hon. Gentleman a very long way away from southern African affairs. To do otherwise, in view of his record and what he has said about Rhodesia, would be a gratuitous and unwarranted insult to the House and, much

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more important, to the millions of Africans who are still basically in our trust in Rhodesia.
Mr. Dick Leonard: The right hon. Gentleman might want to send in a housing commissioner.
Mr. Richard: Perhaps. My hon. Friend has much more immediate experience than I have of the right hon. Gentleman. On the face of it, for him to have anything to do with Rhodesia now would be like appointing one of the train robbers while he was serving his 30-year sentence for robbery to advise British Rail on the measures it should take to ensure the security of its high-value packages.
The Foreign Secretary's speech this afternoon could hardly be classed as robust or forthright. He was extraordinarily apologetic, both for the objectives of his policy and for the sanctions which he was telling the House, particularly hon. Members on his own side, it was necessary to pass into law again to put that policy into effect. It is really a policy of "have faith in me", and judging by the speech of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West it seems to have convinced that hon. Gentleman. It may convince some Conservative back benchers, but it is hardly a precise policy and certainly in our view it is neither inspiring nor one in which we have a great deal of confidence.
What is the objective of our policy of sanctions? What is it all about? After some seven years in which the order has been renewed successively, and sanctions have been strengthened, what are we still trying to achieve? It can be put very shortly: by our policy of sanctions we are trying to bring about, by a series of economic pressures comprehensively applied, a return to legality in Rhodesia.
It is important that we should be clear what we are trying to achieve by the policy. It follows from what I have said that as all parties in the House are agreed on the six principles as a prerequisite of independence or a return to legality, the objective of our policy of sanctions must be either to help establish a Rhodesian Government which is independent and in accordance with those six principles or to help re-establish a non-independent Rhodesia, one in which Britain's authority
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has, even if only for a short time, been reasserted, but one to which the United Kingdom would be prepared to grant independence in a measureable, short time. In other words, the objective of sanctions is to produce a negotiating position.
If I required support for that proposition it would be found in the speech of the noble Lord the Marquess of Lothian, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in another place on 2nd December, 1971. I ask the House to note these words, because I understand that they were meant to be, and were certainly taken to be, a definitive statement of Government policy. Talking then of the pre-Pearce Commission, he said:
"If the test of acceptability shows that the Rhodesian people as a whole approve the proposals, if the Rhodesians accept the requisite changes to the Constitution and Parliament then approves the granting of independence,"—
in other words those are the three prerequisites spelt out and categorised by the noble Lord—
"a new situation will have been created, paving the way"—
I ask the House to note that, particularly hon. Members opposite who are critical of Government policy, for this is what Government policy is—
"to the termination of sanctions. It will be at that point, but not until then—and we have certainly not got to that point at the moment—that a new situation will have arisen."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 2nd December, 1971; Vol. 326, c. 492–3.]
If words mean anything, even to the present Government, what the noble Lord is there saying is that sanctions are to be maintained until reaching that new situation which he has spelled out as meaning one in which a test of acceptability has been approved by the Rhodesian people as a whole, with the Rhodesian Government accepting the changes to the constitution and Parliament approving it. Not until then are sanctions to be lifted.
The only question for us to answer is whether sanctions are being helpful or unhelpful in producing a climate in which such negotiations can take place and in which they might be successful. To put it the other way, it is whether the lifting of sanctions now would be more or less likely to produce that climate. We have

1323
openly to ask ourselves two questions which flow from that proposition. Are they being effective? If they are, can they be improved? The House should remind itself in political terms of how effective sanctions have so far been.
It is worth repeating what the main, positive effects have been. First, they have forced the Rhodesian régime to negotiate with Great Britain. Secondly, they have denied an outright political victory to that régime. Thirdly, they have kept Rhodesia in a state of diplomatice isolation and they have thereby maintained the international unacceptability of the present Rhodesian Government and have strengthened internal black and white opposition to the régime. Fourthly, they have forced Rhodesia to struggle for economic survival at an ever-increasing cost. Fifthly, and I detect, as did the Foreign Secretary, some signs of this in the present situation in Rhodesia, they have now begun to force the régime into a greater degree of direct contact with the African National Council.
Those five political effects are substantial on any view of the matter. I do not believe that, had sanctions not been imposed in 1965, or, to put it more crudely, had the policy of the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion been followed, the present Rhodesian Government would in any meaningful sense still be in negotiation with the United Kingdom Government. They would have taken their independence, stolen it and kept it. Any efforts we made to try to bring about a return to legality would have been that much more difficult. If those are the political effects of sanctions, what have been the economic effects?
We heard a great deal today from various hon. Members on both sides who have recently been in Rhodesia about how the shops are full, how Salisbury looks contented, how there are certain consumer goods difficulties, but nothing of any major substance. Where we are considering renewal of an order of this sort, we should look a little below the surface and see what is the true position.
What do we know about the economic effectiveness of sanctions? We know that in 1965 the Rhodesian economy was beginning to come out of a prolonged recession which had marked the last years of the Central African Federation. The
1324
year 1965 saw an upturn in agriculture. The Rhodesians were still resting on two primary products, namely, mining and cash crops. There is no doubt that the imposition of sanctions has helped to diversify the economic base in Rhodesia with more secondary and tertiary industries.
Where can we see the effects of the sanctions which we have been imposing in the last seven years? First, they are to be seen in foreign exchange—the inability of the present Rhodesian Government to raise money openly in world markets. This has put not only their current account but their capital account under great strain. The most important effect at the moment has been to deny Rhodesia the chance to replace obsolete machinery. I believe that no less than 70 per cent. of the tractors now being used in Rhodesia are more than seven years old. Before UDI they were being replaced at the rate of 13 per cent. per annum. They are now being replaced at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum.
In 1969, 30,000 working hours were lost through tractors breaking down. Air Rhodesia cannot replace its obsolete Viscounts with Boeing 737s, while Rhodesia Railways are experiencing great difficulty replacing stock. Imports and exports, seven years after UDI, are at about the same level as before—in fact, exports have fallen. Tobacco production has declined by about 50 per cent., and the price of tobacco has gone down by no less than a third since UDI; 300 million lbs of tobacco have been stockpiled, and are begining to deteriorate. A large proportion of Rhodesian exports are accounted for by minerals.
Agriculture has not even yet regained its 1965 peak position. According to the National Farmers' Union Survey of Rhodesia, published in 1971, no less than 60 per cent. of all farmers in Rhodesia in 1970 either suffered an overall loss, or were unable to cover their combined operational and fixed costs. When I hear, against a background of that type of economic debility, the cry go up from right hon. and hon. Members opposite that sanctions are ineffective, I am bound to observe that they have not bothered to study the figures.
Can sanctions be made more effective? It is important that the House should be

1325
blunt and open on this issue. Sanctions are clearly being evaded. The House is indebted to the hon. Member for South Angus (Mr. Bruce-Gardyne) for the interesting answers that he extracted from the Foreign Secretary in June. For example, it was revealed that the EEC countries imported more tobacco from Mozambique than that country in fact grows, and that Japan imported 710,000 tons of chrome ore from South Africa, although South Africa exported only 275,000 tons to Japan.
We also discovered that West Germany imported 55,000 kilograms of chrome from South Africa, although that country exported only 39,000 kilograms to West Germany. France apparently exported 25 million dollars-worth of cars to South Africa, although South Africa imported only 9 million dollars-worth from France. It is clear from a mere glance at those figures that sanctions evasion has taken place, sanctions evasion, it is sad to report, by those countries which are supposed to be our major allies in world politics.
Mr. Peter Tapsell: Another interpretation of those figures is that the import and export figures of other countries are as inefficient and inaccurate as our own.
Mr. Richard: Indeed. However, I think that it is the same country in each case which is making the same mistake in relation to two different countries. Thus, statistically, the hon. Gentleman's point is not as valid as it may seem.
Nevertheless, it is clear that sanctions evasions have been and are taking place. Given that background, it must now be asked whether that is something which must be accepted or whether it is something about which a great deal may be done.
I was disappointed this afternoon about that part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech which dealt with sanctions evasions. The African Bureau report set out no fewer than 58 different proposals whereby sanctions could be strengthened. I cite only two. One was that we should consider legislation whereby all goods produced in Rhodesia prima facie belonged to Great Britain, so that if goods were exported from Rhodesia in violation of a United Nations sanction policy, as
1326
a nation we would be able to follow them and take civil action against the individual, or the country, or company into whose hands they eventually came. It is perfectly feasible to set up a system of international inspection of goods which it is thought might have originated from Rhodesia. It would have to be done at an international level and it could not be done by us alone.
Another course is to set up a properly staffed and financed international secretariat to look at sanctions-breaking within the United Nations itself. All these are suggestions which are not original on our part. They are all set out in great detail in the American Bureau report, and while I should not have thought that the Foreign Secretary, or the noble Lord, could say that he accepted any of these proposals, at least I would have looked for a greater willingness on the Government's part, when faced with known examples of sanctions-breaking, to stop those loopholes. I would have expected leverage to have been used and to have been used to much greater effect on our proposed EEC partners. I would have expected much greater pressure not only covertly, but openly, on the United States Government to deal with the Byrd Amendment and the importation of chrome.
Therefore, the Opposition do not accept that sanctions have not been effective in the past, or that they would not be effective in the future; nor do we accept that they could not be made more effective.
Once again we find ourselves in November passing the sanctions order. I have a suspicion that next November yet again the sanctions order will be brought before the House by whichever party is in power. I have no doubt that if the Foreign Secretary is the Foreign Secretary then, he will be saying as he said last November and the November before, "Trust me: I am going to talk to Mr. Smith". Those hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who sit behind him have been trusting him for three years, and each year we pass sanctions orders.
9.47 p.m.
The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Lord Balniel): The hon. and learned Member for Barons

1327
Court (Mr. Richard) said that this has been the longest debate on sanctions which he remembers. Certainly those who have attended it will say that it has been one of the most interesting. I have listened with great interest to the contributions made by almost every Member from both sides of the House.
Most of the contributions have been constructive and knowledgeable, but sometimes I have not been able to agree with all the arguments. For instance, the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Sir Gilbert Longden) deployed extremely effectively his argument differing from that of the Government. He appealed most persuasively to the House against the possibility of a Division taking place tonight. The same is true of the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Torquay (Sir F. Bennett). who said that if there were to be a Division he would abstain. He made a most sincere, knowledgeable and responsible speech, emphasising a point which I shall be making. about the possibility of internal initiatives between the African National Council and the Rhodesian Front bearing fruit.
I shall try to answer the questions which have been raised in the debate, but I should like to make a general point by reiterating what has been said by my light hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about our overall objective. It is to achieve a settlement and by legislation in this House to bring Rhodesia legally into the comity of nations. The goal of a legal, recognised, independent stature, sought after and achieved by so many nations in recent decades, is the goal which has been echoed, I believe, by every speaker in the debate, however strongly he might have disagreed on the issue of sanctions.
It is possible that this goal is beyond our reach. But every lesson of history, certainly the history of this country, teaches us that if our objective is honourable, if there is even a flicker of hope, we should be resolute and should go on with patience and a driving persistence to reach the goal. So much might seem distasteful and wearisome but our objective of a settlement is honourable and the prize is enormously worthwhile, which is that life for all races in Rhodesia should be worth living in terms
1328
of political freedom and opportunity and legality, and in terms of economic wellbeing. Also, it is a prize which we are trying to win not for ourselves but for the Rhodesians.
What is needed at the moment is not the making of bombastic gestures such as the extending of sanctions which could not be effectively implemented. Nor is it, as was reiterated so often in the debate, at present a change of policy—dropping sanctions—which would almost certainly cause turmoil and almost inevitably put an end to the discussions on racial co-operation which, for the first time in recent years, are just beginning.
What is needed here in this country is a recognition of a climate of opinion inside Rhodesia. What is needed there is a period of calm reflection and discussion about the future of the Rhodesian communities and their economic and political well-being, following on the decision of the Pearce Commission. The importance of a calm discussion in Rhodesia at this time is very great indeed.
After the Pearce Commission had decided that, in its opinion, the people of Rhodesia as a whole did not regard the proposals for a settlement as acceptable, Her Majesty's Government rightly left the proposals on the table, just as the previous Government had left on the table the proposals made during the "Tiger" and "Fearless" talks. Her Majesty's Government asked for a period of reflection and discussion and undertook to maintain the status quo. The Government explained at that time that there was a grave danger of losing a decisive opportunity of improving the prospects of Rhodesia as a whole. The judgment which was expressed by my right hon. Friend was sound then and it is completely valid today.
My right hon. Friend explained that as a country we have done almost everything we can to assist and that now the efforts of compromise, discussion and understanding must come from within Rhodesia itself. What was needed after the Pearce Commission and what is needed now is a period of internal reflection by the communities in Rhodesia itself, a period of internal discussion which not long ago seemed to be almost beyond reach but which is now just beginning.

1329
After the Pearce Commission had reported there was a widespread belief, I think, throughout the House that Europeans would move sharply towards a society based on a greater segregation of the races. indeed some steps—for instance, the new liquor laws which restrict the rights of Africans to drink at certain hours in the European areas—are pointers to the way in which matters could develop.
Mr. Goronwy Roberts: Have developed.
Lord Balniel: Have developed; but they are pointers also to the way in which matters could develop.
There is still, I believe, a recognition amongst the majority of Europeans that only a settlement can solve the problems which flow from Rhodesia's present isolation and economic situation. That was made clear at the Rhodesian Front conference in September. Mr. Smith argued for continuing the search for a settlement on economic and security grounds, and he received general support. Among those in power at present in Rhodesia there is still a will to find a settlement, but the dangers of a more extreme view, of a greater segregation, are very real.
On the African side also there are signs that the need for a settlement is widely felt. There has been no prolonged rejoicing amongst the Africans at the verdict of the Pearce Commission. The African National Council has tried to diminish European fears about its objectives. The policy statements of the African National Council have emphasised its desire to end the political deadlock. As the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. David Steel) said, the African National Council is perpared to take the proposals as a working document, and he also said that both it and the Chiefs are speaking of seeking a just and honourable settlement.
Some people in this country often under-estimate the remarkable degree of racial good will which exists in Rhodesia, a good will which we should like to see gradually developing into multiracial co-operation leading to a settlement. For instance, the hon. Member for Roxburgh,
1330
Selkirk and Peebles, who has just returned from Rhodesia, and who, I think, is now a prohibited immigrant, said:
"I expected much more racial tension and bitterness than exists. There is still abundant goodwill between the races and the situation is definitely rescuable".
He might be over-optimistic, but in our considerations of sanctions we must be extremely careful not to take any action tonight which will make it more difficult for the moderates in Rhodesia to continue to wield influence.
We must take into account what is going on in Rhodesia today. It would not, I think, be right to drop sanctions now. If that was done, unaccompanied by any alternative proposals for the solution of the present deadlock in Rhodesia, it would mean abandoning our hopes at the moment when there were the first real signs of a dialogue between the races in Rhodesia developing in the right direction. My hon. Friend the Member for Middleton and Prestwich (Mr. Haselhurst), who has also just returned from Rhodesia, rightly placed great emphasis on new bilateral discussions taking place between the Africans and representatives of Mr. Smith.
I want to comment on the speech made by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). He referred to the intensification of sanctions and adding new sanctions. As to adding and intensifying sanctions, I see no advantage in that. Let other countries implement existing sanctions properly, as we do. Let us not add further measures to be flouted. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to consider the words of Lord Caradon. I believe that they will carry weight with him. Lord Caradon said:
"Each measure we decide should and must be capable of effective implementation. We must resist the temptation to take decisions which can easily be flouted or circumvented. Where we have not adopted proposals put to us, some of them superficially attractive, it was because they did not stand up to the test of effectiveness … I believe we owe it to them"
—he was talking about the Africans in Rhodesia—
"not to raise hopes …"—
It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered,
That the National Theatre and Museum of London Bill may be proceeded with at this day's Sitting, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. John Stradling Thomas.]

SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Question again proposed.
Lord Balniel: After that brief interval, I will return to the speech of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East. I was surprised by the case which he developed in opening the debate. We have always been ready to consider constructively any suggestions which were practicable and likely to increase the effectiveness of existing sanctions. He suggested that we should blockade Lourenço Marques.
Apart from the question of territorial waters, such a proposal would involve economic confrontation with South Africa itself, because South Africa receives oil supplies through that port. It is worth recalling that the suggestion was specifically rejected by the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman was a member. Demands are frequently made at the United Nations for courses of action which are not practicable, because they involve economic confrontation with South Africa. The previous Government refused to contemplate such a confrontation. The effect of new types of sanctions such as were advocated by the hon. and learned Member for Barons Court would be simply to damage yet further the credibility of the United Nations sanctions. False hopes would also be raised among the Africans.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East asked us to make representations about certain individuals, and he particularly mentioned Mr. and Mrs. Chinamano and Mr. Garfield Todd. We have used what influence we have to secure improvement in the position of Africans in general. For instance, after the proposals were agreed last year, 54 detainees were released and the proposed evictions of the mission at Epworth were suspended. I am pleased to be able to inform the right hon. Gentleman that we have urged that the two individuals men-
1332
tioned should be released or should be charged. Mr. Smith has done neither of these things, and we deeply regret this.
Mr. William Molloy: Deplore it.
Lord Balniel: We deplore it. The reality is that our influence in Rhodesia is limited. Hon. Members opposite will remember that they could not stop the hanging of Africans. That is an indication of the difficulty of exerting our own wishes in Rhodesia at present.
Mr. Wall: As my right hon. Friend is on compassionate cases, may I ask whether Sir Frederick and Lady Crawford who come here for compassionate reasons will now be allowed into the country by right?
Lord Balniel: Where compassionate reasons which are valid exist those cases are put before the advisory committee and will be considered. I believe that individuals who wish to appeal against a decision which has been taken in the past have a right of appeal.
Mr. Callaghan: Before the noble Lord leaves the case of individuals, I am glad to hear that representations have been made on behalf of some of the individuals concerned.
I do not wish to appear churlish, but can I ask how long ago those representations were made? I believe that the great majority of the House would want Mr. Smith to know that it is our view that those individuals who have not been charged, who Pearce felt were not being detained for any legitimate grounds either should now be charged or the restrictions should be taken off them. Will the noble Lord renew the appeal, if it has not been done recently?
Lord Balniel: I cannot give the exact date to the right hon. Gentleman, but I will certainly inform him. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman has just spoken on behalf of the whole House and we shall be prepared to renew the appeals which we have made on behalf of those gentlemen.
Running through so many of the speeches which we have heard during the debate has been the question: for how much longer will the Government come to the House and ask for this annual

1333
renewal? There are so many variables to be judged. There is the degree to which sanctions are effectively contributing to discussions and compromises. There is the scale of evasion by other countries. In reaching any such decision, there must be a recognition by ourselves that, however distasteful these sanctions might be, an ending of them unaccompanied by alternative proposals will lead the world to conclude that an acceptable settlement can never be attained. Just as we judge the situation on its merits today, so the Government will have to weigh up the balance of advantage and disadvantage in the months which lie ahead. I will not put a calendar date on the answer to the question which has been put to me so often today. However, I will say that if we decide that sanctions contribute no useful purpose and that the scale of evasions by other members of the United Nations is unacceptable, we will not drop sanctions surreptitiously. We will come to the House openly and explain the reasons for the change of policy.
Mr. Hugh Jenkins: The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government will not contemplate the increasing of sanctions. However, he has not dealt effectively with the proposal that existing sanctions should be more effectively policed. It was suggested that the Government should go to the United Nations for the purpose of establishing a commissioner, who would have the duty of policing the effective sanctions. Will the right hon. Gentleman, before he sits
down, deal more effectively with that point?
Lord Balniel: The responsibility for implementing sanctions rests firmly on the United Nations Sanctions Committee, which considers all suggestions for improving or altering the system. The Government today are asking the House to maintain the status quo. We believe that this is a contributory method of fostering the multiracial discussions which are today taking place, following the Pearce Report. That was only six months ago, and more time is needed to move out from the emplacements of confrontation to sensible, harmonious discussions in Rhodesia. Britain has now done everything within its power to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. My belief is that any agreed settlement within Rhodesia must be somewhere very close to the proposals for a settlement of last November. The agreement now must come from within Rhodesia itself. For the people of Rhodesia, the issues are grave, since it is possibly their last chance to live in peace in Rhodesia.
We have urged restraint on all people living in Rhodesia. However great the personal reservations might be, I hope that the House will exercise the same restraint in meeting the Government's recommendation and passing the order before the House.
Question put:—
The House divided: Ayes 266, Noes 29.

Division No. 7.]

AYES

[10.10 p.m.

Adley, Robert

Buck, Antony

Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Deakins, Eric

Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

Campbell, Rt.Hn.G.(Moray & Nairn)

Dean, Paul

Ashton, Joe

Carlisle, Mark

Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

Astor, John

Carmichael, Neil

Dodds-Parker, Douglas

Atkins, Humphrey

Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

Atkinson, Norman

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Drayson, G. B.

Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

Channon, Paul

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

Balniel, Rt. Hn. Lord

Chapman, Sydney

Dunn, James A.

Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Chichester-Clark, R.

Dykes, Hugh

Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

Churchill, W. S.

Eadie, Alex

Barnett, Joel (Heywood and Royton)

Clegg, Walter

Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Cockeram, Eric

Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Cohen, Stanley

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Benyon, W.

Concannon, J. D.

Emery, Peter

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Coombs, Derek

Ewing, Harry

Bidwell, Sydney

Cormack, Patrick

Eyre, Reginald

Bishop, E. S.

Critchley, Julian

Faulds, Andrew

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S.W.)

Cronin, John

Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

Bossom, Sir Clive

Crowder, F. P.

Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Cunningham, G. (Islington, S.W.)

Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

Bowden, Andrew

Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven)

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

Davidson, Arthur

Foley, Maurice

Bryan, Sir Paul

Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

Fookes, Miss Janet

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Foot, Michael

Fortescue, Tim

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

Foster, Sir John

Longden, Sir Gilbert

Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

Fowler, Norman

Luce, R. N.

Rees, Peter (Dover)

Fox, Marcus

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Richard, Ivor

Gibson-Watt, David

McCartney, Hugh

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

McCrindle, R. A.

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Goodhew, Victor

Mackenzie, Gregor

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

McLaren, Martin

Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

Grant, George (Morpeth)

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)

Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Maurice (Farnham)

St. John-Stevas, Norman

Gray, Hamish

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Sandelson, Neville

Green, Alan

McNair-Wilson, Michael

Scott, Nicholas

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Madel, David

Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

Grylls, Michael

Marks, Kenneth

Shelton, William, (Clapham)

Gummer, J. Selwyn

Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marsden, F.

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Hamling, William

Marshall, Dr. Edmund

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Harper, Joseph

Marten, Neil

Sillars, James

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Mather, Carol

Sinclair, Sir George

Haselhurst, Alan

Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

Skinner, Dennis

Hattersley, Roy

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Havers, Sir Michael

Meacher, Michael

Spearing, Nigel

Hawkins, Paul

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Speed, Keith

Hayhoe, Barney

Mendelson, John

Sproat, Iain

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Millan, Bruce

Stanbrook, Ivor

Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Steel, David

Heffer, Eric S.

Miscampbell, Norman

Strang, Gavin

Heseltine, Michael

Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

Hicks, Robert

Moate, Roger

Sutcliffe, John

Higgins, Terence L.

Molloy, William

Tapsell, Peter

Hill, John E. B. (Norfolk, S.)

Money, Ernie

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Hooson, Emlyn

Monks, Mrs. Connie

Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

Hornby, Richard

Monro, Hector

Thomas, Rt Hn, Peter (Hendon, S.)

Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

Howe, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Morrison, Charles

Thomson, Rt. Hn. G. (Dundee, E.)

Huckfield, Leslie

Moyle, Roland

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

Murray, Ronald King

Torney, Tom

Hunt, John

Murton, Oscar

Hunter, Adam

Neave, Airey

Tuck, Raphael

Janner, Greville

Normanton, Tom

Tugendhat, Christopher

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Nott, John

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Ogden, Eric

Vickers, Dame Joan

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

O'Halloran, Michael

Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Onslow, Cranley

Walder, David (Clitheroe)

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

Oram, Bert

Walker. Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Orme, Stanley

Ward, Dame Irene

Jopling, Michael

Oswald, Thomas

Warren, Kenneth

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Page, Rt. Hn. Graham (Crosby)

Weatherill, Bernard

Judd, Frank

Palmer, Arthur

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Kaufman, Gerald

Parker, John (Dagenham)

White, Roger (Gravesend)

Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

Pavitt, Laurie

Whitehead, Phillip

Kershaw, Anthony

Pendry, Tom

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

King, Tom (Bridgwater)

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

Kirk, Peter

Prescott, John

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huylon)

Knox, David

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Lamborn, Harry

Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

Lamont, Norman

Proudfoot, Wilfred

Worsley, Marcus

Lane, David

Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

Latham, Arthur

Raison, Timothy

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Lawson, George

Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

Mr. Kenneth Clarke and

Leonard, Dick

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Mr. John Stradling Thomas.

Lester, Miss Joan

NOES

Biffen, John

Kinsey, J. R.

Stokes, John

Boscawen, Hn. Robert

Knight, Mrs. Jill

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow,Cathcart)

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Molyneaux, James

Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N.W.)

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Montgomery, Fergus

Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

Dixon, Piers

Mudd, David

Wall, Patrick

Farr, John

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Winterton, Nicholas

Fell, Anthony

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Woodnutt, Mark

Hastings, Stephen

Rost, Peter

Iremonger, T. L.

Skeet, T. H. H.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Soref, Harold

Mr. Ronald Bell and

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

Mr. John Biggs-Davison

Question accordingly agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th October, in the last session of Parliament, be approved.
Resolved,
That the Southern Rhodesia (Immigration Act 1971) Order 1972 (S.I., 1972, No. 1583), a copy of which was laid before this House on 31st October, be approved.—[Sir Alec Douglas-Home.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  NATIONAL THEATRE AND MUSEUM OF LONDON BILL
  Order for Second Reading read.
  10.23 p.m.
  The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
  I must tell the House—or what is left of the House—how relieved I am to be making a ministerial maiden speech on such an uncontroversial, bipartisan, ecumenical subject. It is very encouraging to propose a measure to enable money to be spent in a good cause. I am advised by my friends that I must make no more jokes and what The Times described in a moment of phantasy as a bird of paradise must now don subfusc: so be it. In politics it is apparently more acceptable to be a co-respondent than a wit.
  I must own to one rather odd irony, because I little thought on 9th August. when I put down the Question which enabled the figures to be enshrined in the Bill, that four months later I should be called upon to move the Second Reading of the Bill itself. Everyone, I think, is agreed that we need a worthy National Theatre, and it is at long last in sight.
  It is literally in sight in my case because as I look out of the window in my room at the Department of Education and Science I can actually see Denys Lasdun's striking and beautiful building rising half completed on the South Bank. So I shall be able to tell Members in correspondence that I am "keeping the matter under continuous review" and thus adding a third and visual dimension.
  I will pass briefly over the history of the matter. It will suffice to say that in 1904 Sir Israel Gollancz pioneered the National Theatre scheme; there was little progress until 1949, when we had the National Theatre Act and the Exchequer authorised expenditure of £1 million, which was no small sum in those days. Again very little happened, apart from changes of site, until 1969, when the sum authorised to be raised by
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  Statute was again increased, because of inflation.
  However, it is not only inflation which has altered the picture since those early days. There have been other major changes, not only because it is fortunately no longer the case in Britain that the arts are confined to the privileged few but because the whole attitude of society to the arts has altered. There is today in our society a real and deep appreciation of how much the arts can contribute to the quality of life.
  I believe that to be due partly to the movement of history but also because personalities have played their part. In this connection I would pay tribute first to Lady Lee of Asheridge, who achieved so much during that period when she was responsible for the arts, in constructive partnership with Lord Goodman, then Chairman of the Arts Council. I also pay tribute to my noble Friend Lord Eccles, who not only contributed to this sphere his intellect and taste but also extracted the cash from the Exchequer. The Arts Council grant for the year 1972–73 is at a record high level of £13·7 million, an increase of nearly one-third in two years. In the year 1971–72 the sum of £2·2 million was devoted to drama.
  The second major change since 1949, when we were in isolation after the war, is that Britain has become a centre of the tourist trade. Art for art's sake is a principle which has always appealed to me. However, one must have other considerations when public money is concerned. The tourist trade, particularly when we are about to become part of the European Community, will be even more important. We in Britain are used to the theatre. We are well endowed, not only in the provinces but more especially in London. Possibly, we do not realise how many people come to this country just to see our theatre. If Stratford is the greatest magnet to the Transatlantic tourist, it is London that attracts the short-term visitor who wishes to see English plays. If one visits New York as a short-term visitor, the chances are that by the time one has managed to get into a theatre one's holiday is over. One of the great advantages of the London theatre is that one can still obtain a seat.

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  This brings me to the third change which has occurred, and that is the creation of the National Theatre Company itself. Its standing is extremely high, but I believe that it will be much higher when we have a National Theatre as a building to house it. I believe that if we have a flourishing National Theatre in its own building it will do something to contribute to the alleviation of what my noble Friend Lord Eccles has called "the spiritual starvation of a technological society."
  I am sure that the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) would agree with me that acting is more important than a theatre. I am not of the school of thought in education that thinks one needs a skyscraper to construct a formula; but I believe that a company of such standing deserves a worthy home, and it will now be enabled to have one.
  I turn now to the figures in the Bill which, luckily for me and the House—as I am more literate than numerate—are extremely simple. In the 1969 Act the authorised sum was raised from £1 million to £3¾ million and the arrangement was that the Exchequer and the Greater London Council would each provide half of the ultimate cost; so the total figure involved was £7½ million. In addition the GLC provided the site, which was worth £2 million and is now, the GLC estimates, worth £7 million. The GLC has also generously provided car parking facilities which are very extensive and will cost another £600,000.
  Since that 1969 Act, however, inflation has had its way again, and this has been especially true in the building industry. It is estimated now that the cost of the work which was agreed in 1969–70 has risen by £1,700,000 over the £7½ million estimated at the time. The fact is that if that money is not provided the work on the theatre will simply come to a stop, and the money will run out completely during the present parliamentary Session unless the House does something about it. The GLC is unwilling to give more than an extra £350,000, so the remaining £1,350,000 has to be found by the Exchequer. Hence this Bill. I should like to assure the House not only that this sum of money is an adequate sum, but that I think it fair to describe it as generous provision for this capital cost.
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  Almost as important as the bricks and mortar—perhaps one could more accurately call it the steel and concrete—is the interior of the theatre. The construction of the National Theatre is controlled by the South Bank Theatre Board. A number of distinguished men and women serve on the Board, appointed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science. The Board has on it representatives of the Arts Council, the National Theatre Company, the Greater London Council and the Department of Education and Science; the Board is presided over by Lord Cottesloe, who himself is a former chairman of the Arts Council.
  The Board has de facto control over the construction of the Theatre. Naturally it is interested to see that the equipment, the fittings and the extras should be of the highest standard. It is also keen to have an extra auditorium, so it has asked for an additional £1,200,000 for the equipment, the furnishings and the extras.
  We fully understand, that if there are to be sophisticated productions in a theatre of this kind, if standards are to be raised and the whole thing is to be run economically and efficiently, there must be the means to do so. Unfortunately the GLC does not feel able to contribute anything to this part of the work and the Government have to limit their contribution to £600,000. The Government would have liked to give more but unfortunately it was not possible within the allocation between priorities of Government spending. However, I emphasise that it is for the board to decide on what it spends the money. It must indicate—in fact it has indicated—its priorities and on what it wishes to spend the £600,000.
  The total expenditure on the theatre authorised by the Bill is up from £3,750,000 to £5,700,000, an increase of just under £2 million. I do not wish to sound like Scrooge, especially as it is not my money, but I emphasise that the figure cannot be increased further. It is a statutory figure and it requires an Act of Parliament to put it into effect. There can he no question of supplementary estimates. Whatever is done within the theatre must be done within that estimate unless the money can be raised from

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  other sources. To raise either the figure for the capital expenditure or the figure for the equipment will require another piece of legislation.
  I now turn to the Museum of London. I must explain, although I am sure that many hon. Members know, that the Museum of London is part of the Barbican Scheme. It is intended that all that is best in the London Museum, which is now housed in Kensington Palace and the Guildhall Museum, will be put in one place in the City. Therefore, we shall have a new and better museum and we shall have within the City of London a new artistic centre which eventually will include a theatre.
  The capital cost of the project is provided by loans which will be raised by the City Corporation. The repayments and the interest will be divided equally between the City, the GLC and the Exchequer—a tripartite acceptance of the burden. Again, the museum will have to be equipped and furnished. It is highly desirable to put old exhibits into new settings. The Exchequer contribution, which was laid down in 1965, amounted to £150,000. That is raised by the Bill to £300,000. That increase is because of the rise in prices since the figures were calculated in 1964.
  It is money that will be very well spent. The public will not go into dank, dusty and dreary museums covered in brown paint but will go to attractively set out museums. I can think of museums where the whole situation was changed not by new exhibits but merely by exhibiting the existing ones in an attractive way. The Etruscan Museum in Rome, which was a jumble of shards and pot lids, became a fascinating collection in its new setting. The National Portrait Gallery was similarly transformed and it is now one of the most popular museums in London, whereas previously it was only visited by a few people.
  I suppose that in a sense this is a minor Bill. It is a little by-way whereas the main road of politics is filled with the clash of armies over prices and incomes and inflation. It is true that those are important issues. I think, however, that future generations may well not even discuss some of the issues which to us as
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  contemporaries seem so important. Perhaps they will be more affected by our modest little Bill and modest conclave this evening, and the building that will arise out of it as a permanent embellishment of the London scene, than anything that is likely to emerge from the world of telegrams and anger which dominate our discussions so often and to which we this evening are a mere modest footnote.
  10.41 p.m.
  Mr. Andrew Faulds: May I be the first to congratulate the Under-Secretary of State on his deposition from the back benches which he has graced with such nonchalant elegance for such a long time. He is generally regarded by the House—and I am sorry that so few of my colleagues are interested in this topic to be here to listen to the debate—as a Member distinguished by his lucidity, his wit and his good taste. He is an exemplar of parliamentary courtesy, a distinction which, I fear, I cannot claim to share with him.
  As we know, apocryphal stories cluster round the characters in this House. As a fellow collector, I am delighted to have heard the story of the hon. Gentleman having been seen passing through the corridors of this place bearing aloft a small embroidered velvet cushion to add to his collection of objects which belonged to our late lamented Queen Victoria, amongst which objects, I am somewhat unreliably informed, there are some garments of intimate apparel suitably ciphered with the Queen's monogram.
  I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on having received his cardinal's hat of ministerial eminence. But we are all relieved—I say this with no discourtesy to the hon. Gentleman—that this tatty Government of his will not last long enough to see him achieve the triple crown of Prime Ministerial office.—[Interruption.] As a former parliamentarian said, we will wait and see.
  Perhaps I should declare my personal interest in this measure. Many of the players who will grace the boards of the National Theatre are old friends of mine, with whom in a previous incarnation—[Interruption]—I do not like that snigger—I have appeared on the radio, on television or in the true theatre. One day if the people of Smethwick so foolishly take it into their minds, I may have to

  1345
  apply humbly and eagerly to rejoin my old friends and traipse across that stage carrying a spear, murmuring a "rhubarb" or two. I think they have too much sense to be rid of me, and hon. Members will have to put up with me here.
  We are the fortunate generation who will see the fulfilment of a dream which has fired the imaginations of earlier generations—a theatre worthy of our great dramatic writers—and they have produced a canon of work which it is possible to compare only with the works of classical Greece—and worthy of the unmatched skill of British actors. But it is only proper—and the hon. Gentleman was less than forthright about this—that I should restate the happy fact that it was a Labour Government, in the bleak days after the war, which took the crucial step of seeding the project with finance until now the roots have taken hold on the South Bank. Happily they have taken hold not too far from the spot where the Cockney groundlings and the aristocrats of Elizabeth's court clustered, in sweat and high expectation, to watch in the light of London's dull afternoons the first performance of Master Shakespeare's latest piece with its all-male cast. That would not have appealed to me. There may be those who like that sort of thing.
  Sir Stafford Cripps' £1 million in 1948 could not, in the strained circumstances of the time, be used to construct the building that was desired. All those who took part in the historic Second Reading of the National Theatre Bill of 1949 knew that they were talking in a sense in an enforced vacuum in time. Perhaps the project was not helped by the unfortunate fact that one of the speakers was ill-advised enough to quote from Shakespeare's play about a Scottish king, which everyone in the business realises should never even be named, let alone quoted from.
  Time trundled on and still no theatre took shape. Twenty years passed and again it was under a Labour Government that in 1969 the then Jennie Lee got agreement that the Government and the Greater London Council should both put forward £3,750,000, and building at last got under way. But as the present Lady Lee, our first Minister of the Arts, explained to the Second Reading Committee
  1346
  on 12th February, 1969, certain sacrifices had to be made to allow the plan to go ahead. The restaurant would not be included and a small experimental theatre had to be excluded. However, the wardrobe, dressing rooms, green room and offices would be of the highest standard.
  In that Committee, however, the hon. Gentleman, now sporting such a gay kerchief, showed remarkable prescience. He said:
  "I have one reservation about the Bill, and that is whether the sum of £7½ million will be enough. It sounds a large sum, half of which will come from the GLC and half from the Treasury, but costs are bound to rise … I wonder what will happen by 1972 or 1973 Will the money which we are voting now be sufficient?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT., Second Reading Committee, 12th February, 1969; Vol 777, c. 1515.]
  He was absolutely right, which is why two or three of us are gathered here tonight—to raise the Government's contribution.
  I must ask the hon. Gentleman whether he really believes, remembering his sagacious foresight, that this intended increase is really sufficient to do the job properly. I know that a restaurant is now an integral part of the building and that its finish in furnishing and lighting is to be to a higher standard. I know that the experimental studio theatre room is back in the building. I know that the mechanical equipment in the two auditoria is to be better than was at one time expected. But I know, too, that there will not be enough money to provide proper equipment for the small studio theatre, and the hon. Gentleman admits that more money is needed for internal furnishing than is to be made available. In bringing forward the Bill at this time, why spoil the ship for a piddling drop or two of tar? It is ludicrous. In a freer moment, I think that the hon. Gentleman would have supported my argument. Has sufficient allowance been made for the appalling inflationary consequences of the Government's policies?
  The other facet of the Bill is the raising of the moneys for the furnishing and equipping of the premises of the new Museum of London. My understanding is that this increase to £300,000 represents not munificence but meanness on the

  1347
  part of the Government. I gather that the board of governors had it from surveyors' estimates that the sum required to do the job of fitting out this museum properly is nearer £360,000 and that with inflation it may well be about £400,000-plus.
  Have the Government simply dug their heels in and, in view of the tripartite nature of the responsibility for this new museum, snapped their purse shut in the happy hope, which will not transpire, that the GLC or the City Corporation will cough up the lolly to make good the difference? If so, the Government must disabuse themselves because, on 4th February, 1965, the then Financial Secretary spelt out the Exchequer's responsibility clearly. He said:
  "In addition, the agreement provides that the Exchequer shall bear the initial cost of the furniture and equipment, and there is provision in the Bill for a sum of up to £150,000 to be made available for that purupose."
  That figure is now raised to £300,000 for this express purpose stated in the Bill. That was also the understanding of the then right hon. Member for Birmingham, Handsworth, now Lord Boyle of Handsworth, who said:
  "The Treasury is to pay more than one-third of the total capital cost, when the furniture is added to the Treasury's share of the cost of the building. …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 4th February, 1965; Vol. 705, c. 1302, 1308.]
  That is spelt out quite clearly by both of those speakers, sadly no longer with us, on Second Reading.
  The trouble may be that the phrase in the Bill
  "furnishing and equipping of the premises"
  is somewhat imprecise. Does it mean the basic provison of fitments or does it include the full presentation requirements of a modern museum in design and display? That is a very important difference.
  If the latter definition is right, the sum in the Bill is certainly insufficient. What will happen to the proper completion of the museum? Will the quality of the finish of the floors and ceilings and surfaces suffer from enforced penny-pinching, or will the totality of the museum's display be curtailed? It is intended as a history of London from before its swampy dinosaur days, through the Roman settlement, through
  1348
  the stench of its mediaeval middens, through the contrasted poverty and elegance of its Georgian development, the stink and squalor of Dickensian London and the suffering and heroism of the blitz, up to the present day, because history is something that Londoners are still making.
  Mr. Wilfred Proudfoot: And the traffic congestion?
  Mr. Faulds: Yes, the traffic is still part of the history. Is that vast canvas to be cut and the story of London's life to be truncated, say, at the end of the eighteenth century? I hope that the Minister will answer the questions about display and policy.
  Finally, I am led to believe that the new museum will serve a non-paying public because, and I believe it to be the legal advice available to the City Corporation, an amendment to the 1965 Act would be necessary before charges could be imposed. Will the Minister confirm that fact? May I add how relieved we are on the Opposition side, in common with many hon. Members on the Government side, that the ludicrous charges imposed by the hon. Gentleman's cultural boss, the Minister for the Arts, have had to be postponed yet again? It is two years since the proposal was introduced. This postponement of course is due to the Government's freeze. The greatest service the new boy could do to his Prime Minister would be to convince him that the Paymaster-General's scheme of charges should be dispensed with forthwith—as, of course, should the Paymaster General.
  I should like to express the hope that the Under-Secretary and I will be able to work together in this sphere of the arts. I am sure that will he possible if he restrains the lesser and greater lunacies of his Lordship and imposes his own good taste and judgment on the matters pertaining to his office. Good luck, "Boyo".
  10.53 p.m.
  Mr. Jeffrey Archer: May I be the first from the Government side of the House to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) on his rise to the Front Bench? Many of my hon. Friends and I have known him for some years and we

  1349
  were delighted by the appointment. I called for the resignation of his predecessor only two weeks ago, and the Prime Minister took that advice and made him a Minister of State. I hope that I shall find it easier, as I am sure I shall, to support the new Under-Secretary.
  We believe that this will be the finest theatre in the world. It will be a great opportunity for Britain. The present situation of having probably the greatest set of actors acting in the Old Vic is a farce that has existed for too long. It will be a pleasant day when we see the new theatre opened.
  The hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) stood at the Dispatch Box with great pride and instructed the House on how the Labour Government had single-handed dreamt the scheme up and made sure that it came to maturity.
  Mr. Faulds: I said no such thing.
  Mr. Archer: The hon. Gentleman led us to believe that. I happened to be on the Greater London Council when the decision was made, and the latest decision was a Greater London Council decision, first, to give the land, and, secondly, to give half the money and to ask the Government to support it with the other half. If the Greater London Council, which was then a Conservative-run council, had not made that decision, it would not have been made in the House.
  Mr. Faulds: It was a Labour Government.
  Mr. Archer: We set the example, and they followed us.
  We have on the South Bank an outstanding building in the Festival Hall and one that I do not like quite as much, the Hayward Gallery. The new building will be the third one, and it should have been the first.
  It is never the right time to give more money to something, because it will always be more expensive than it was, but we must do it, and I am delighted to see a member of the finance team on the Treasury Bench. I hope that we on this side will give the money willingly. We are so often accused of being the dinosaurs of the arts, yet whenever there is a debate on the arts there are about 15 of us and two Opposition Members present. The hon. Member for Smethwick
  1350
  is sure to appear on a radio programme tomorrow morning and say that the dinosaurs have only just got this right, and he will no doubt talk again about museum charges or something else that we have got wrong.
  Both sides of the House will be delighted to see the National Theatre. I speak for many back benchers when I say that it will give immense pleasure to the country. We lead the world in the acting profession. I look forward to the success the theatre will bring as measured by the number of visitors and all the other financial aspects, and I am pleased that this great project was initiated in the time of a Conservative Greater London Council and a Conservative Government.
  10.58 p.m.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: The struggle to contain my admiration for the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) is one in which victory has always come fairly easily to me. But on this occasion he may well prove to be a square peg in a square hole, and to that extent I welcome him to his new position. As he said, his is a job in which money must be spent, and it must not only be spent but must be got. It is always very difficult to get money out of the Treasury. As this Chamber is the one mainly concerned with money, it is very appropriate and more hopeful for the arts generally to have the Minister with the duty of obtaining that money from the Treasury here rather than in the other place. Therefore I hope that possibly in the course of time, perhaps not too long a time, the hon. Gentleman will succeed to the senior position, and that the duty of obtaining the money will fall to him. I have sufficient confidence in him to believe that he wilt struggle manfully—
  Mr. Faulds: For a brief spell.
  Mr. Jenkins: —for such time as the present Government remain in power, which may not be too long. I am sure that while he is there the hon. Gentleman will work hard.
  I should like to refresh the memory of the hon. Member for Louth (Mr. Jeffrey Archer) about the real background of the national theatre. The reason for the curious form of the Bill is to be found in the history of the matter. I should

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  also like to suggest an amendment which I hope the Minister will feel able to accept at a later stage.
  The Bill takes its rather odd form because of the sharing of responsibility between this House and the one across the water. That stems from a rather curious incident rather earlier than that which the hon. Member for Louth drew to our attention.
  When I became a member of the L.C.C. as it then was, in 1958, I went to see Sir Isaac Hayward, who was then Labour Leader of the L.C.C. and said, "Why don't we do something about the National Theatre?" He said, "Those chaps over there have put aside £1 million some years ago"—that was 1949—"but they won't release it. The £1 million is theoretically there but we cannot get hold of it." I said, "Why don't we tell them that we will bear half the cost?" He said, "That is not a bad idea. I'll tell you what we'll do. We'll put down a motion here and if we carry that unanimously I shall be able to go across the water and say that not only the Labour majority but also the Tories on the other side believe that we should build this National Theatre." This will carry more weight.
  We put the motion and carried it. He came across the water—[An HON. MEMBER: "Walked?"] At the time it was reliably reported that he could have done that had he so chosen. We decided to go across the bridge so as not to attract attention.
  When he got over here he put the proposal and after some struggle the Government of the time, which was a Conservative Government—it is often the case that there is a Government of a different political complexion on this side of the water from the party in power on the other side of the water—said, "We will release our £1 million, providing that that is the extent of our expenditure. The rest of the cost must fall upon you. Our commitment is £1 million and yours is £1 million plus the rest." This proposition was accepted by the Labour L.C.C. which got the open end of the stick.
  The rôles were reversed in 1969 and we had the situation when there was a Conservative Government across the water and a Labour Government over here. When the costs went up the Conserva-
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  tives on the other side said, "No, it will be the other way about this time, boys. So far as we are concerned the Labour Government on that side will carry the open end of the stick and we will close our end."
  That is why we have this Bill. The Conservative members of the GLC put a ceiling on their expenditure. Some hon. Members may regard this as a proper Conservative principle but I regard it as excessive when applied to the arts. We see the attitude of the two parties. They put the lid on and we therefore have this Bill because the excess of the cost is now to be carried over here.
  Mr. Jeffrey Archer: The hon. Gentleman says that in 1958 he came across the water to say that we must release our £1 million and the Labour LCC would pay for the rest. This was reversed in 1969. What did he do in the years between?
  Mr. Jenkins: The hon. Gentleman must recognise that the LCC was not master in its own house because by then it was in partnership with a Conservative Government. This is something which I hope will not continue for long because I hope that next April a Labour administration will be in power over there, and I hope that we shall have a Labour Government here soon. The other mixture is a recipe for stalemate.
  To return to the Bill. The Bill takes this form because of this background history and this is why we have the problem. It seems to be a peculiar thing, as the Minister rather suggested, to have the possibility of introducing fresh Acts to cater for a universal inflation. There is no other area of expenditure, so far as I know, in which we need a fresh Act every so often to deal with the normal course of events.
  It would be perfectly possible to transfer this expense to the ordinary annual expenditure. We have an item in the Supply Estimates of Arts Council expenditure of some £13 million and included in that is an item of £770,000 for housing the arts. I should like hon. Members to compare that—and this is a Government which is supposed to be concerned for the region—with a sum of £5 million for one theatre in London. I hope the Under-Secretary will pay attention to this because the arts outside London are starved. If we have that

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  grant on the Supply Estimates over the years, it should also be possible to include every year a provision whereby any expenditure of this sort was put under the general supervision of the Chancellor, in the sums he presents to the House every year. This would avoid the necessity of a fresh Act of Parliament if, as my hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) suggested, there is further escalation of costs in future.
  I doubt whether it is possible at this stage to make this transfer, but we should end the nonsense of having to have fresh Acts when the only change taking place is one of cost. Changes of cost should be contained in the annual budget and that should be perfectly practicable with a change in the worlding of future Bills.
  It would be possible, without a general change, to provide in this Bill for the eventuality which my hon. Friend suggested, that this might not be the final Bill on this subject, by changing the wording from:
  "for the words '(not exceeding £3,750,000)' there shall be substituted the words '(not exceeding £5,700,000)'"
  to:
  "such sums as the Secretary of State may determine".
  Mr. Patrick Cormack: What about alternatives?
  Mr. Jenkins: There could be alternatives, of course, but the carrying of fresh legislation every time there is an increase in cost is needless. Although the Under-Secretary has indicated that he feels the sum fixed is generous, there are some people on the Board of the National Theatre who do not entirely share that view, and feel that the sum allocated will barely do the job. It is possible that they may find themselves, in the final stages, very "tight" for money. In that case they may have to raise it from the Greater London Council and I hope that the council will then be under political control which makes it easier to get the money. However, it would be better if this House could make a further concession without another Act. I hope the hon. Gentleman will consider, in Committee an amendment to make that possible.
  I should like, from these back benches, to say that although I have made some
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  criticism about the past, I do not wish in any way to detract from the importance of this provision of a National Theatre. Although I have been travelling in the provinces a little lately, attending conferences of theatrical people at weekends—
  Mr. Ernle Money: I am sorry that the hon. Member was not at the conference of the Playgoers' Society in my constituency at a recent weekend. He would have been welcome.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: No, but I was at Birmingham last weekend and a feeling was expressed to me that far too much was being spent in the capital and not enough outside London. This is a fairly widespread feeling. I think it is a feeling for which there is some ground, though not quite as much as people outside London think there is.
  In this case the expenditure is entirely justified. The National Theatre will give a standing and a cachet to the British theatre as a whole, and that will be recognised not only in this country outside of London but throughout the world. It will maintain throughout the world the standing of the British theatre, which is not only one of our most important artistic assets but, economically, is far more important to the people of this country than is generally understood.
  11.11 p.m.
  Mr. Ernle Money: Like my friend the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds), I welcome the presence of my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) on the Government Front Bench. He will, I have no doubt, catch the elegance of the hon. Member for Smethwick in our debates. He will, I have no doubt, surpass his eloquence. I am sure he will bring into our debates on the arts one precious quality which is sometimes lacking, and that is sagacity.
  I was particularly pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. Jeffrey Archer)—and here I straightaway confess an interest as a member of the Greater London Council's arts committee—pay tribute to that body for what it did not only in the recent establishment of the National Theatre but also, if I can without embarrassment pay a tribute to a body of which I am a co-opted

  1355
  member, for the money which it now spends on the arts, and which has been enormously stepped up over the last few years. If any capital city has a right to be proud of spending so much on the arts we have every right to be proud of the Greater London Council's spending in this direction.
  I take three general points quickly. We are all glad that at long last the National Theatre is to be turned from the realms of aspiration into the realms of bricks and mortar, but this is not an occasion for self-congratulation or pride. We all of us, on both sides of the House, ought to be extremely ashamed of ourselves, because this project has been in being for over 20, very nearly 30, years, and it has only been the lack of courage which successive Governments have shown on this issue that an inspiration which started with George Bernard Shaw, and in which the first stone was laid by King George VI, is only now, in the 1970s coming to fruition.
  Mr. Faulds: I think the hon. Member is being historically slightly unfair to some of the earlier figures involved in this project. He is completely forgetting people like William Archer and Harley Granville-Barker, who were the begetters of this soon after the turn of the century.
  Mr. Money: I accept that, and add the name of Nugent Monk, but I was speaking in terms of this House. So far as the House is concerned, this is a development which has been considered for well over 20 years and is only now being brought to fruition. That is not something to be proud of. This is a belated act of justice to the British theatre, at a very late date.
  I turn from that to two of the issues which are of the greatest importance. Thirty years late we are turning the inspiration of which the hon. Member for Smethwick talked into bricks and mortar. Consider this in terms of achievement and in terms of money saved if this had been done 30 years ago. For comparison one can regard what is at last being achieved in Edinburgh under a Conservative Government and 14 years after it could have been done. A crucial lesson in housing the arts is this: capital expenditure
  1356
  earlier, rather than later at a vastly increased rate, is obviously sensible investment.
  I turn to a matter which has equal significance. The National Theatre exists not merely in terms of bricks and mortar. Not only have we the Old Vic which is now coming to fruition after many seasons through the new theatre, following a phoenix-like reawakening on the South Bank in the form of the National Theatre, but we have an organisation of which we can be equally proud, namely the Sadler's Wells Opera Company. I hope that one of the things we shall hear from my hon. Friend in his new job is that the Sadler's Wells Opera Company at the Coliseum Theatre will be appointed the national opera company. This would be a major break-through which could be achieved with very little expense indeed. Again this would be a belated act of justice, involving minimum expenditure, and would turn an ideal into a reality. I should be most happy to see this brought into effect.
  I turn to deal with the second part of the Bill. I share the affection of the hon. Member for Smethwick for the London Museum, and indeed many of the hon. Gentleman's museum speeches are my favourite museum pieces. I accept the hon. Gentleman's major point, that the initial outlay on the museum must be carefully found. Penny pinching at any point in the creation of the museum may well have harmful long-term effects. The matter must be balanced from all points of view. Having said this, however, achievement lies not only in terms of bricks and mortar, or lavatories, or whatever it may be, but in the general approach to the arts whether in terms of the museum or the theatre.
  I hope that we shall not become too involved purely in the buildings but will realise that what we want now will not be something merely on the lines of the Sydney Opera House, which will bring a great prestige but little so far in the way of event, but something which will extract the best from all these many varying fields. The local authorities, heaven knows, spend little enough on the arts and I hope that we shall continue to press the Government to spend more, but we must always bear in mind the ultimate benefits which come to the arts

  1357
  through the support and inspiration of the public in terms of theatre, opera or museum.
  I believe we shall never have a finer opportunity than the present one to turn this city, and indeed the country, into a real artistic bonanza.
  11.19 p.m.
  Mr. Christopher Woodhouse: I am happy to join with hon. Members on both sides of the House in welcoming our hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) on his first appearance as Minister at the Dispatch Box. I am particularly happy that the occasion should be one in which we are all of one mind.
  I have long and happy memories of the London Museum, and I also have proleptic memories of the long drawn-out saga of the National Theatre which has now been running for most of the century, even longer than the saga of the inner relief road in my constituency. I am often in doubt whether the latter will ever be brought to an end, but I hope we can rest assured that the saga of the National Theatre is about to reach its climax.
  There are one or two questions that I should like to ask my hon. Friend on both these topics. First, echoing the point made by the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds), I hope we may have an assurance that there is no question of charges to the public for the Museum of London.
  Secondly, my hon. Friend has made it clear that the financing of the National Theatre, so far as the Government are concerned, will come to a full-stop with the figure of £5,700,000. The text of the Bill says that this sum is to be for
  "the cost of erecting and equipping a national theatre".
  That seems to exclude furnishing, because furnishing is specifically mentioned in relation to the London Museum but not to the theatre. I hone that "equipping" is a term that will be interpreted generously in practice and will not be limited, as the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum implies, purely and simply to the construction of a theatre. It would be helpful to know a little more about what is meant by "equipping",
  1358
  and also about the distinction between what appears in the Clause and in the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum.
  As we are so close to a happy ending to this story, I wonder whether my hon. Friend can say when he expects the first night to take place in the National Theatre and what will be the performance.
  Mr. Cormack: Does my hon. Friend agree that a Royal Command performance of "Hadrian VII" would be appropriate?
  Mr. Woodhouse: I have another suggestion to make. I was going to remind my hon. Friend that in 1910 Bernard Shaw wrote "The Dark Lady of the Sonnets" expressly to raise money for a national theatre. Presumably the royalties are still accumulating, and these should be helpful to my hon. Friend in eking out the possibly exiguous provision by the Government and the GLC. I hope that he will give his attention to that.
  Mr. Money: Would it not be better if the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) returned to the boards in "The Devil's Disciple"?
  Mr. Woodhouse: I was about to suggest that he might play the dark lady herself.
  Without wishing to be frivolous, I should like to remind the House that, according to a well-established tradition, the dark lady was a resident in my constituency and that she lived at the Golden Cross in Oxford where she used to be visited by Shakespeare. As a result, it is rumoured in Oxford that she became the mother of the page Davenant, but we need not pursue that tonight.
  I offer one last quotation from Bernard Shaw's work which he designed—and I say this seriously—expressly for the purpose of financing a national theatre. In the introduction to "The Dark Lady of the Sonnets" he lamented
  "Alas! its appeal for a National Theatre as a monument to Shakespeare failed to touch the very stupid people who cannot see that a National Theatre is worth having for the sake of the National Soul."
  I am sure that there are no such stupid people on either side of the House

  1359
  tonight, and I have no doubt that the Bill will be warmly approved.
  11.24 p.m.
  Mr. St. John-Stevas: With permission, I should like to try to answer some of the points, some of them very important, which have been raised in this debate. First, I should like to express my appreciation to all the hon. Members who have been so extremely generous in welcoming my appointment and first appearance at this Box. The House of Commons is always very generous when the sun shines, and I have had a little burst recently. I hope that it will be as generous and kind when the clouds gather, as they inevitably will.
  I want to thank the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) for his kind remarks. I have always liked the hon. Member for Smethwick—
  Mr. Faulds: Thank you.
  Mr. St. John-Stevas: —and that shows that my judgment was correct. Anyone considering this debate might think that, with the hon. Member and myself at the Dispatch Boxes, there was little need for a National Theatre building at all.
  I must also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. Jeffrey Archer) for his kind remarks on what he called my elevation—perhaps "translation" would have been a better word. If the counselling of resignation to my predecessor resulted in his elevation to the position of Minister of State, I hope that it will not be long before he calls for my resignation and the same fate befalls me.
  I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising the point, because it has reminded me of something that I should have done at the outset. That is to pay a tribute to my predecessor, the hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. van Straubenzee), who, in his capacity of Under-Secretary at the Department of Education and Science, did such a good job for education and the arts. He has been extremely kind and helpful to me, despite his own new responsibilities at the Northern Ireland Office, in helping me over the rather difficult three days since I was appointed to this position.
  The hon. Member for Smethwick asked whether I could guarantee that the sums in the Bill would be sufficient. Yes—so far as the capital sums for the con-
  1360
  struction are concerned, at least so far as modern costing methods can ensure. The advice that the Government have received is that this should be sufficient, provided that the work proceeds at a normal pace, as it is going now. The hon. Gentleman can be reassured on that point. The equipment of course depends on a number of factors. The theatre equipment depends more on the South Bank Theatre Board than on the Government.
  As for the London Museum, we are both, in a sense, right on the figures. The hon. Member's differed rather from mine. I gave the figure of £300,000 which is the Bill, while he, I think, spoke of a figure of £360,000. The figure of £300,000 is to take into account the increase in costs of the specifications originally agreed. Probably there was some under-assessment of needs at the beginning when the decision was taken, and maybe more money will be needed, in which case, there may have to be an appeal by those in charge of the London Museum.
  Mr. Faulds: I hope that the hon. Gentleman understood my point—that during the Second Reading debate in 1965 it was clearly spelled out that the matter of furnishing and equipping was the Exchequer's responsibility. It is a bit hopeful now to speak of a public appeal to do the job which the Government undertook to do then.
  Mr. St. John-Stevas: One must distinguish between the cost of equipping the museum and the cost of display. I shall have to investigate the point raised by the hon. Gentleman, and we can correspond about it.
  I pass to the important point raised by the hon. Member for Smethwick and my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford (Mr. Woodhouse) about museum charges. I do not want to spoil the harmony of this debate by going into the question of museum charges in general because we are not discussing them. However, I should like to answer the point as best I can.
  The Museum of London will be, not a national institution, but a hybrid institution—both national and local. Therefore, it is not affected by any mandatory imposition of charges. The agreement of the three contracting parties to which I

  1361
  referred earlier is needed to impose charges, and it is a requirement that the governing body should propose to the three parties that charges should be made. Therefore, that matter will be entirely in the hands of the Museum of London.
  Mr. Faulds: It is only fitting that it should be so.
  Mr. St. John-Stevas: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is reassured on that point.
  I turn to the matter raised by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins). I thank him for greeting my appointment with modified rapture. Let me say in return that I have long admired his work in this sphere, and particularly his work on the Arts Council. He referred to the important point of the seeming disparity between an expenditure of more than £5 million on the theatre in London and the expenditure of £770,000 in the regions. There are two points to be made here. First, the theatre may be sited in London, but it is not just a London theatre; it is a national theatre which exists for the whole country.
  Mr. Wilfred Proudfoot: It is a very long walk from the North-East.
  Mr. St. John-Stevas: I am sure that if it were possible my hon. Friend would be the first one to make it.
  Secondly, the hon. Member for Putney is comparing, not like with like, but like with unlike. The figure of £770,000 is an annual recurring figure, whereas the £5 million figure is a once-and-for-all figure.
  I hope that I have put the hon. Gentleman's intervention into perspective. My noble Friend and I share his concern for the regions. Those of us who are based in London must always remember that London is not England any more than Paris is France or New York or Washington is America. I assure the hon. Gentleman that that point is very much in the mind of my noble Friend.
  I was asked whether we could make the Bill more flexible by making an Amendment allowing for changes in the cost of construction. This point should be discussed in Committee. One hon. Gentle-
  1362
  man said that he would table an amendment to this effect. I hope that he will, because it will give rise to an interesting discussion. I would however draw his attention to the fate of the Sydney Opera House which had a similar kind of open-ended commitment: at the outset it was estimated that it would cost £3½ million and it ended up by costing £27 million.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Money) made a very moving speech. He has done a great deal of work in the House and in Committees upstairs for the arts. His suggestion that the Sadlers Wells Opera should become the National Opera was very interesting. Were I responsible for this policy I should have accepted it at once. Unfortunately, I am not responsible for it. I will pass my hon. Friend's suggestion on to my noble Friend, who I am sure will give it full consideration.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford asked when the National Theatre would be opened. I could reply in that phrase beloved of the Civil Service, "as soon as may be", or say that I do not know. I can say that I hope that I am still in office when it takes place, because then I shall at least get a free seat. Although it is not possible to be definite to the hour, or to the day for that matter, I understand that it will be either at the end of 1974 or early in 1975. I hope that that good news will encourage my hon. Friend.
  This short debate has been very valuable. No one has sought to make a partisan point. Everybody who has been in the Chamber has been here for the sole reason that he is interested in the arts and wants to do all he can to improve the quality of life. We all wish the National Theatre Well. I hope that it will in due course become as famous as the Comedic Française and that, if the Foreign Office will forgive me and will not be too annoyed with me for saying so, it will surpass even the achievements of that very great theatre.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read a Second time.
  Bill committed to a Standing Committee pursuant to Standing Order No. 40 (Committal of Bills).

  NATIONAL THEATRE AND MUSEUM OF LONDON [MONEY]
  Queen's Recommendation having been signified—
  Resolved,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to raise the limits on the grants which may be made to the National Theatre and the Museum of London, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase in the expenses of the Secretary of State attributable to—

  (1) raising to £5,700,000 the limit imposed by section 1 of the National Theatre Act 1949 on the contributions which may be made under that section, and

  (2) raising to £300,000 the limit imposed by section 13 of the Museum of London Act 1965 on the grants which may be made under that section.—[Mr. St. John-Stevas.]

  ADJOURNMENT
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hawkins.]

PENSIONERS (SICKNESS ALLOWANCE)
11.39 p.m.
Mr. Eric Cockeram: I wish to draw the attention of the House to an anomaly in our social security system which was drawn to my attention by a constituent but which on further examination I find has general application. Indeed, if we add up the number of people who are affected by this anomaly at present and the number who may be affected when they come to draw their old-age pensions, it would not be an exaggeration to say that nearly a million people could be affected.
Our national social security system is paid for by the weekly stamp. Unfortunately, however, the qualification for the different aspects of social security benefit all have different systems of assessment. For unemployment benefit, for example, one has to have a card stamped up to date for one year. The old-age pension requires an assessment of the stamps on the cards over one's entire working life. The earnings-related supplement does not require any stamps on the National
1364
Insurance card. Industrial injuries benefits, similarly, are not regulated by stamps. Maternity grant and maternity allowance are without qualifications and, similarly, widow's benefit, sickness benefit and graduated pension are all different.
In short, the various social security benefits have been grafted on to a system by successive Governments, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the public are bewildered and confused and that there are anomalies in the system.
Tonight it is the anomaly affecting the sickness benefit and the old-age pension to which I particularly wish to draw attention. These two benefits are the two most widely known and most widely drawn. It is probable that no working person in Britain goes through life without benefiting from one of these benefits, if not both. The qualification for drawing weekly benefit when off work sick is somewhat complicated. I need not mention all the details but, broadly, an up-to-date National Insurance card which has been stamped regularly for the past three years qualifies a person to draw that benefit when off sick.
A man aged 64, for example, with a National Insurance card which has been regularly stamped over the past three years would be entitled, if off sick in his 64th year, to draw National Insurance benefit for sickness. Any deficiencies in his National Insurance card in earlier years, perhaps when he was in his twenties or thirties, would be disregarded; the important period is the past three years.
When we turn to the old-age pension, however, and follow the case of a man aged 65 who contemplates retiring—the principle is the same for a woman except that her qualifying age is 60—we find that the qualification is quite different from the qualification for sickness benefit. The method of assessment of the old-age pension depends on the stamps on the card over the entire working life. The number of stamps put on successive cards throughout the man's working life is totalled, that total is divided by the number of years for which he has worked, and an average number of stamps per year is ascertained. If the average is 50 or more—obviously it may be up to 52—the man is deemed to have a full qualification and is entitled to the full old-age pension. If, on the

1365
other hand, he has an average of less than 50 stamps per year on his cards, throughout his working life, when he draws his old-age pension it is a reduced pension. The extent of the reduction is on a scale which is published and available to all concerned.
This is acceptable, because clearly someone who has, perhaps, only half the possible number of stamps each year on his card should not receive the full pension a person would receive if he had stamped his card every week. If the person who had an inadequate record of stamps, an inadequate payment throughout his working life, were to draw the full old-age pension, there would be no encouragement to others to stamp their cards regularly. That is accepted as being fair.
In the case of this constituent, Mr. L. T. Archer of Wynfield, Column Road, West Kirby, Cheshire, he found that when he reached the age of 65 years, when his records were turned up, he had an average of only 49 stamps a year, one less than the qualification for a full pension. In consequence, when he came to retire—he was aged 65 years in 1969, at which time the full pension for a man with a wife aged over 60 years and qualifying for a pension was £8·10—his pension, had he drawn it, would then have been reduced to £7·80. Mr. Archer did not grumble about that because he accepted that he had not got an adequate or a complete stamp record.
Since Mr. Archer retired in 1969—indeed, since the election in 1970—there have been two increases in the old age pension. The pension now is just over a third more than it was two years ago. This constituent, if he were to retire today, would be entitled to £10·90. That would be reduced, because of his not quite complete record of stamps on his cards, to £10·48p. Mr. Archer accepts that. However, if he had been off ill prior to the age of 65 years, which I do not think he was in his last few years, he would have had full sickness benefit paid to him because his National Insurance cards had been adequately stamped over recent years. The deficiency which brought his average below 50 to 49 stamps a year arose approximately 25 years ago, shortly after the War.
1366
Mr. Archer elected to continue work. He enjoyed satisfaction from his job and he was a conscientious and hard working person. The consequence was that he had to continue stamping a card and paying a contribution not only to his pension but to his sickness benefit. He would have been entitled to receive free treatment under the National Health Service, if he had retired, without paying a stamp. However, he continued to pay a stamp, and continued to work.
Unfortunately, last year Mr. Archer had three weeks off work through sickness. To his amazement, he discovered when he sought to draw sickness benefit, which formerly had been paid to him in full, that his sickness benefit was less than the standard amount. He naturally queried that and he was told that his sickness benefit after the age of 65 years but not before was reduced because of his inadequate stamping record nearly 25 years ago.
Therefore, when Mr. Archer and anyone else in this position—it is of general application—is off sick at the age of 64 years they will get full benefit. But if they opt to continue working and to continue to stamp their cards and then are unfortunately off work for some three weeks, their sickness benefit is reduced.
Mr. Archer was naturally incensed. Not only did he make inquiries about the matter but he took his case to appeal. I pay tribute to the social security staff who handled the inquiry and the appeal. He took the matter to his local office, Hordern House, Birkenhead. The staff did all that they could to help him. Unfortunately they are bound by the regulations. Although his sickness was fully investigated, they concluded that whether it be an anomaly or not, which in my opinion it is, they had to reduce his sickness benefit.
Therefore hard-working, conscientious people who are fit and well, mentally and physically, who have served their country for many years, who elect to continue to do so by continuing to work, are being treated as second-class citizens. They are having meted out to them a standard of treatment which is not meted out to younger people. This group of people at that age are not the malingerers or the "skivers" whom we hear so much about in a number of industries today.

1367
If they were, they would have retired and drawn their pension. These are hardworking and conscientious people who elect to continue in work, often at a reduced salary, at 65. It is most unfortunate that we should penalise them by reducing their sickness benefit.
In effect, therefore, these different methods of calculating social security benefits, different methods for sickness and different methods for pension, depending on whether one is under 65 or over, produce an anomaly which penalises those who continue in work. It treats them as second-class citizens, and they draw less in pension than they would have drawn had they retired at 65. Clearly people of this age are not the malingerers or trouble makers.
I ask the Minister to look into this matter and see whether he can ensure that people of this age group—65 plus—who are off sick are able to draw the same sickness benefit that they would have drawn had they been off sick prior to pensionable age. Perhaps my hon. Friend will have to limit the number of weeks in the year during which they can draw this benefit, but that would be less of an anomaly than the present system. Alternatively, he may prefer to refer this case and others of that nature—for there are many of them—to his National Insurance Advisory Committee, a committee constituted to examine cases which need some investigation and where some recommendation or consideration might be given for some changes.
Alternatively, if he cannot do either of those things which could be beneficial, by removing this anomaly in the next few months—perhaps 12 months—I hope that he will give serious consideration to ensuring that this anomaly is not perpetuated after 1975 when, according to the Government's recent White Paper, the new social security scheme will probably come into effect. I hope that when that new scheme comes into effect we shall not perpetuate an anomaly of this nature.
11.53 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Mr. Paul Dean): I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising this general issue arising from
1368
a constituency case. I am obliged to him, too, for the generous tribute that he has paid to our staff. I shall certainly see that they hear about it.
I fully understand how my hon. Friend feels about this case. It looks unfair to him, considered as an individual case. I think that if I were in the shoes of his constituent I would probably feel exactly the same about it. However, I do not accept that this means that the people concerned are second-class citizens. I hope I shall be able to convince my hon. Friend of that.
Looked at as an individual case, I fully understand the point that my hon. Friend is making. Equally, I entirely endorse the other point he made, namely, that we want to encourage those who wish and are able to go on working to do so after the age of retirement. It is for this reason that we have in the scheme the increment system which enables people to get a higher pension as a result of postponing their retirement, and we have an earnings rule which enables people in retirement to earn a certain amount without losing their pension. As my hon. Friend knows, the earnings rule has been relaxed on a number of occasions. I hope this shows clearly that the scheme does try to assist those who go on working after normal retirement age.
I should like my hon. Friend to look at the wider picture. There are over 23 million contributors to the scheme. They are all sorts and conditions of men and women and include large numbers of dependants. Their needs and circumstances are extremely varied. In a scheme of this magnitude, it is not possible to fit exactly the needs and circumstances of each individual. The scheme has to take broad categories; it must have rules which are workable and clear; it has to try to produce a fair balance between different groups of people, between different types of benefit. That is the practical reality, and it underlies the regulations concerning sickness benefit for people over retirement age.
My hon. Friend is familiar with the rules and regulations and complexities, so I will not repeat them but will come straight to the point about sickness benefit and the reasons for it. If sickness benefit is claimed by someone who is over pension age who has not retired it is paid

1369
at the weekly rate at which the flat rate retirement pension would have been payable if he had retired at pension age. Dependency benefit for the wife is payable on a similar basis. This is done under Section 19(3) of the National Insurance Act.
This is not mean-minded bureaucracy. There are two practical reasons based upon equity between one person and another. If it were not for this rule there would be little to prevent a person with a poor contribution record over the years but a good one in the year or so before pension age from getting what would, in effect, be a full pension for five years from the age of 65 to 70 by the simple device of refraining from giving notice of retirement and claiming sickness benefit. My hon. Friend went some way to concede that this would be unfair to people who had paid a full contribution over the whole of their working lives. It would also be unfair to the man who was forced to retire at 65, possibly because of ill-health or because his job was no longer available to him.
So, although I see the point made by my hon. Friend, I hope equally that he will see my point that were we to do what he suggests it would mean that a man with a full contribution record or who was not able to go on working after retirement age would feel a grievance. Equally, there would be a real incentive, or temptation, for a man with a poor contribution record to try to work the system to improve his entitlement by remaining on sickness benefit.
There is also the point, mentioned by my hon. Friend, with regard to the graduated pension entitlement and increments. My hon. Friend asked: cannot this be taken into account in deciding sickness benefit? The graduated pension and increments are designed as an addition to the flat-rate pension when a man is retired from regular employment or is treated as such at the age of 70. It would defeat the purpose for which these benefits are intended if they could be paid with other benefits during a period when a man is not retired.
Then there is the question of contributions. In equity, it seems right that people who remain in employment at pension age should continue to pay contributions to the scheme like all other people earning. Such contributions count
1370
for increments to pension on retirement, and it does not make any difference to those increments whether the basic retirement pension is payable at a reduced rate or not. The graduated contributions, of course, count for graduated pension.
My hon. Friend asked me whether we would refer the question to the National Insurance Advisory Committee. The Committee has considered it along with other closely allied aspects of the scheme, and the present arrangements are based on a recommendation that it made in 1956 when it reported on the questions of earnings limits for benefits. The position has remained basically unaltered since then.
However, having put the other side of the case I hope I can end on a more hopeful note. Changes in the national insurance arrangements were proposed in the White Paper "Strategy for Pensions" which was published about a year ago. My hon. Friend deduced quite correctly that while at least some of the points he has raised tonight will not be removed entirely, they will be eased by the proposals in the White Paper. There are three respects in which that is so. First, obligations under the graduated pensions scheme will end. The graduated scheme will be wound up in 1975, and there will be no further graduated pensions, although rights earned up to that date will be preserved. There will then be a basic pension under the basic scheme and an earnings-related pension—a second pension, earned with a job—normally through an occupational scheme. That will help to deal with some of the points mentioned by my hon. Friend.
Second, the contributions to the basic scheme will be earnings-related, and that will mean that the lower paid, including those over pension age who are probably past their earnings peak, will pay less in contributions than they are paying now. That will go some way to meeting my hon. Friend's point. Third, the contribution conditions will be somewhat easier so that there should be fewer people getting the lower rate through an inadequate contribution record.
Mr. Cockeram: Is my hon. Friend able to give an assurance that when the Government's White Paper proposals are

1371
implemented the person of pensionable age who is off sick will not receive less in sickness benefit than he would have received prior to being of pensionable age?
Mr. Dean: I cannot go as far as that because were I to do so I would be saying that people over pension age who have a deficient contribution record should be enabled to get round this by remaining on sickness benefit, and that would raise the anomalies to which I referred earlier. It would be unfair to the person with a full contribution record or the person who had suffered from ill health or was unable to maintain himself in employment.
1372
I cannot say therefore that the new arrangements will meet that point entirely, but they will at least go some way to deal with the points my hon. Friend made. I hope, therefore, that he will feel that although I have not been able to meet him fully he has made a valuable contribution to the formulation of policy in this area by focusing attention on one aspect tonight, and I hope therefore that he feels, as I do, that the debate has been worth while.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at four minutes past Twelve o'clock.

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  Mrs. E. Locke
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NORTHERN IRELAND
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EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
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DEFENCE
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TRADE AND INDUSTRY
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ENVIRONMENT
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  Mrs. M. A. M. Hyms
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EMPLOYMENT
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NATIONAL FINANCE
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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
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SCOTLAND
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  PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT (PAY)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
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  Mutton and Lamb (Import Duty)
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CIVIL SERVICE
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HOUSE OF COMMONS
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SOCIAL SERVICES
  The Beeches, Ixworth
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  Abortions
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  Supplementary Benefits (Assessment)
WALES
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  Street Lighting, Froncysyllte
  Welsh Council (Health Advice)
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  Prices

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lichfield.

THE LORD BISHOP OF WAKEFIELD
Eric, Lord Bishop of Wakefield—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

HEATHROW AIRPORT CONDI- TIONS: METRA GROUP AND LETTERS FROM THE PUBLIC
2.57 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Metra Consulting Group is prepared to accept letters from the public giving information on conditions at Heathrow Airport; and to what address such letters should be sent.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, Metra would be pleased to receive letters from interested members of the public. Their address is Metra Consulting Group Limited, 23 Lower Belgrave Street, London, S.W.1.W, O.N.S.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Earl for that reply, which gives me much pleasure, may I ask whether there is any chance of publicity being given to this matter? Does he recall that when the noble Lord. Lord Trefgarne, asked him this question on (I think it was) October 19 he did not receive an answer, and people might have been led astray by that? May I also ask what is the latest date by which such letters should be received?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am very glad to have been able to please
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the noble Baroness. The publicity which this could have would be best served by reference to it in Hansard. I can inform the noble Baroness that, provided the interested members of the public send in their letters to the Metra Consulting Group before the date upon which they are due to report, which is at the end of the year, they will be considered.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, can the noble Earl say how many of the public travelling through Heathrow read Hansard—particularly the House of Lords Hansard? Seriously, would the noble Earl look at the question of having this address prominently displayed at major points at Heathrow, and in particular where, as a passenger, one seeks a taxi?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I will certainly consider the point. I am bound to tell the noble Lord that when this inquiry was originally set up the object was to invite consultants to make a survey and a report. This they are doing by the methods which are commonly indulged in on these occasions. We did not specifically intend to invite people to write, but we are entirely happy that they should do so.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, following upon the question of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, might I ask the Minister, although it might be slightly off the point, whether he is aware that quite obviously the people who write in B.E.A. News certainly do not read the Lords' Hansard; further, whether he is aware that the statement published in B.E.A. News of two weeks ago really gave a totally misleading impression and I think could have been subject to (what shall I say?) an order under the Trade Descriptions Act; and whether anything could be done about correct information being published in B.E.A. News?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I wondered whether the noble Baroness was going to be able to get back to B.E.A. News. I can only repeat what I told her before: that it is the responsibility of B.E.A. and that the Government could not interfere with what is published in that particular journal.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, could the noble Earl explain why,

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if he is prepared to give this information publicity—and that is the principle—he favours only those who read the Lords' Hansard?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I think that it is a very good argument for more people reading the Lords' Hansard.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, does the noble Earl realise that that is more damning of the Conservative Party than anything that has ever been said in this House before?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, this matter should not be taken out of proportion. What I said was that Metra, and indeed the Government, are entirely happy that people should write in with any comments they have to make. But, as I said originally, it was not the intention specifically to invite comment.
LORD BROUGHAM AND VAUX: My Lords, would not my noble friends agree that our six friends from the Press behind the clock might find some room in their columns of the daily newspapers to publicise this address?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend. Maybe they will do so.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, as this matter affects Heathrow, would it not be possible to give some publicity at Heathrow itself, because it is there that people are affected? If there were such publicity—not tucked away in a corner—it would be extremely helpful towards achieving the objective of my noble friend.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, that is one possibility; but I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, that in fact already 1,160 people have been interviewed and that these are passengers going in and out of Heathrow.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, would the noble Earl not agree that it is a fact that the House of Lords Hansard commands a larger circulation than the House of Commons Hansard?
EARL. FERRERS: My Lords, it might be invidious to comment upon that point.

U.N.E.S.C.O. BUDGET: BRITISH VOTE
3.2 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how the British representative voted at the recent meeting of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) on the motion to accept the budget, and how many voted in favour and how many against.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, the budget proposed by the Director-General of UNESCO at the general conference was carried with 94 votes for; 19 against, and 4 abstentions. The United Kingdom delegation voted against.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Baroness, may I ask her this question? Was this not an occasion of a disastrous confrontation between the rich and the poor nations? May I ask whether the Minister for Overseas Development, who was at this conference, said, as reported in The Times of October 25, that UNESCO had perhaps reached the limits of its usefulness as an international body? Does the noble Baroness not agree that there is an enormous field for constructive social and educational projects by UNESCO in the developing world?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I have not the exact quotation beside me, but the fact remains that the United Kingdom co-sponsored a resolution which would have provided for an increase in UNESCO's budget of 25·5 per cent. The resolution which in fact was passed represented an increase of 33·4 per cent. and we, together with United States and others who bear the major cost, proposed savings of nearly 7 million dollars.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, is it not a fact that the proposal of the United Kingdom and of Western Europe would have reduced the expenditure by UNESCO

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by nearly 7 million dollars, and the United States by nearly 15 million dollars? I want to be constructive. While I appreciate that there is a need for an examination of the staffing and structure of UNESCO, is it not desirable that this should be done by some United Nations Commission, rather than by reducing its budget on essential services?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if we examine the proposals put forward for saving the nearly 7 million dollars we see that they would in fact have resulted in a rate of growth for the next two years of 6 per cent. in the real resources made available to UNESCO, while the proposal which in fact passed, because there were no equivalent savings, would have amounted to only 5·2 per cent. in growth.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, does the noble Baroness accept that a rate of growth of 6 per cent. is extremely desirable in this type of activity? Is it not the case that the Government would be only too glad to see a rate of growth in the economy of this country of 6 per cent.? Surely, it is eminently desirable that education, scientific and cultural matters should advance more rapidly.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Yes, my Lords; but perhaps I should make clear that the growth rate for the intermediate proposal which was supported by the United Kingdom as a co-sponsor would have represented a rate of growth of the order of 6 per cent. and that in fact is higher than in most other United Nations Agencies.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, would not the noble Baroness agree that, although it is very necessary to have a larger budget in UNESCO, it would be far better if we had made a bigger contribution and had had more to say in the examination of the whole organisation, which has done some very unattractive things in its time: witness the fact that some of the books which they have distributed in the Middle East had to be withdrawn because they simply disseminated hatred?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if it is a question of the contribution made by the
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United Kingdom to a budget of 120 million dollars, which was approved by UNESCO, may I say that the United Kingdom contribution is assessed at 6·6 million dollars. On the proposal which we co-sponsored, which would have amounted to 113 million dollars, our contribution would have been 6·2 million dollars.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness (I am sure she will be responsive) whether she and Her Majesty's Government would do their utmost to prevent this conflict between the richer and the poorer nations? Is she aware that even yesterday at the meeting of UNESCO this conflict was renewed on the question of the convention for protection of historic monuments? Does she appreciate that one of the most essential things to-day is to get some co-operation between the richer and the poorer countries of the world on these issues?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I would entirely agree with the noble Lord in his last remarks, but we believe that the intermediate resolution we put forward would not only have preserved the main parts of UNESCO's expanding programme without any damaging economies; it would especially have helped the developing countries. That is why we put it forward. It is all very well to look at the total sums, but one must also do so with a certain amount of economy in mind.

GUARANTEES ON STERLING BALANCES OF OVERSEAS DEPOSITORS
3.8 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government the total sterling obligation at currently ruling exchange rate arising from guarantees to certain categories of overseas depositors of sterling.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, no obligation has

445
yet been incurred. It might help your Lordships if I were to explain the basic arrangements for implementation of the guarantee under the Sterling Area Agreements, which have remained confidential since 1968. The guarantee will be implemented if the middle sterling/United States dollar rate falls and remains throughout a period of 30 consecutive days below 2·3760 dollars (that is, 1 per cent. below 2·40 dollars, which was the parity at the time when the arrangements were concluded). The guarantee applies to sterling balances defined as eligible in the agreement with each country. It provides that a payment or credit will be made in sterling to the account of the Government or central bank concerned of the amount which makes good in dollar terms the difference between 2·40 dollars and the closing middle sterling/U.S. dollar rate in London on the last working day of the 30-day period referred to. Any such payments will be made from the exchange equalisation account.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask my noble Leader whether it is to be understood from that Answer that there is any change, in fact or in degree, in the character of the guarantee and its percentage, arising from a change from a fixed rate to a floating rate? Could he also possibly indicate the total amount of existing funds affected by this guarantee?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, the answer to the first supplementary question is, No, and I think the answer to the second supplementary question is that I would refer my noble friend to the latest published figure given in the September, 1972, issue of Economic Trends, namely, that the total amount of official sterling reserves eligible under the guarantee at the end of June was a total of £2,920 million.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, arising from that answer, would it not seem that the unbending attitude of both the previous and the present Government to the fact that a floating rate was not viable seems to have been entirely (as regards its effectiveness) disproved?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am not quite certain that I get my noble friend's point, but seeing that I have been
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speaking for 14 minutes in answer to his Question I feel that perhaps I should terminate it now.

£5 BANKNOTE DESIGN
3.12 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, on Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, they will suggest to the Bank of England that the design of the £5 note be altered.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I cannot see that there is any reason to do what the noble Lord suggests.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that brief Answer. Does he not think that on our entry into the European Community we should do everything we possibly can to ensure the best possible relations with the French people? Therefore does he not think that it is tactless to print on the back of a £5 note a picture of British gunners blowing the French Army to blazes at Waterloo, accompanied with a full-size portrait of the late Duke of Wellington, who inflicted upon France the greatest humiliation in her history?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I would agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, suggested in the first part of his supplementary question, but I would remind him and your Lordships that the Bank of England, who are responsible for this matter, intend that a portrait of an illustrious British personage should appear on the back of each denomination in the current series of bank notes. As the noble Lord rustles through his roll of £20 notes he will see that the portrait of William Shakespeare appears there, and I think it is not altogether inappropriate that a distinguished former resident in a number of Common Market capitals should appear on the £5 note.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for that Answer, and would gladly send him a portrait.
LORD BURNTWOOD: My Lords, in any event should we not remember that the Duke of Wellington was a very great Englishman indeed, in a military capacity if not in his political capacity, and that in any case the French have probably long since forgiven us for the fact that he was the author of the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, does not my noble friend recall that the Parliamentary celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Entente Cordiale took place in the Royal Gallery and many French visitors were entertained under pictures not only of the Duke of Wellington but of the Battle of Trafalgar, too. Has there been any evidence that that party has in any way impaired Franco-British relations?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I find myself in total agreement with both noble Lords.

BUSINESS: LENGTH OF SPEECHES
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I wonder whether I may presume upon your Lordships' time for one moment. As your Lordships will be aware and have been reminded by our noble Leader, the clocks are in operation, and in view of the fact that we have over 30 speakers wishing to take part in this debate I would urge that when speaking your Lordships should keep an eye on the clock.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BILL [H.L.]
3.14 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Bill be Committed to a Select Committee consisting of the following Lords viz.:—

C. Loudoun,

L. Gardiner,

B. Macleod of Borve,

L. Royle (Chairman),

B. Seear,

B. Summerskill,

L. Reigate.

That the Minutes of Evidence taken by the Select Committee on the Anti-Discrimination (No. 2) Bill [H.L.] in the last Session be referred to the Committee.
That the Committee have power—

(a) to send for persons, papers and records;

(b) to adjourn from place to place; and

(c) to report from time to time.

That the Committee have power to appoint persons with specialised knowledge for the purposes of particular enquiries, either to supply information which is not readily available, or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee's Order of Reference.
That the Minutes of Evidence taken from time to time do lie on the Table and be delivered out.—(Earl Jellicoe.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SPORT AND LEISURE
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE rose to move, That a Committee of eleven Lords be appointed to consider the demand for facilities for participation in sport and in the enjoyment of leisure out-of-doors, and to examine what impediments may exist to the fuller use of existing facilities or the development of new ones, and how they might be removed:
That the Lords following be named of the Committee:

V. Cobham (Chairman).

L. Bp. Chester,

L. Astor of Hever,

L. Byers,

L. Donaldson of Kingsbridge.

L. Dulverton,

L. Greenwood of Rossendale,

L. Redcliffe-Maud,

B. Serota,

L. Strathcona and Mount Royal,

L. Tweedsmuir.

That the Committee have power to appoint Sub-committees and to refer to such Sub-committees any of the matters referred to the Committee; and that such Sub-committees have power to appoint their own Chairman:
That the Committee and any such Subcommittee have power (a) to send for

449
persons, papers and records; and (b) to adjourn from place to place; that the Committee have leave to report from time to time; and that any such Subcommittee have leave to report to the Committee from time to time:
That the Committee have power to appoint persons with specialised knowledge for the purposes of particular enquiries, either to supply information which is not readily available, or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee's order of reference:
That the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Sport and Leisure in the last Session of Parliament, and the memoranda submitted to that Committee be referred to the Committee:
That the evidence taken before the Committee and any such Sub-committee from time to time he printed, but that no copies he delivered out except to members of the Committee and to such other persons as the Committee think fit, until further order.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. I did not say anything in moving the first Motion because the purpose of it was explained to your Lordships' House at the end of our Business yesterday evening. The purpose of this Motion is that the members of the Committee, which I think is an important Committee, have asked that it may be set up again this Session so that it may conclude the taking of evidence and writing its Report. There has been no change in the Committee, save that the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, has resigned from it and has been replaced by his noble friend Lord Greenwood of Rossendale.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT 1965 (CONTINUATION) ORDER 1972
3.17 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE rose to move, That the Draft Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, laid before the House on October 17, be approved. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my
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name on the Order Paper. The purpose of this Order is to continue in force Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. This section gives Her Majesty in Council power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in Rhodesia brought about by the Illegal Declaration of Independence. Perhaps it will be for the convenience of the House if I say now that after a decision has been taken on this Order we intend to move the Southern Rhodesia (Immigration Act 1971) Order 1972. This involves no change in existing powers or practices but is necessary because of the repeal of the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962. This will take place when the Immigration Act 1971 comes into force on January 1 next year. But of course the main purpose of this debate is to consider the renewal of the power under which existing sanctions are carried out.
My Lords, it is five months since we debated the proposals for a settlement in Rhodesia and the Report of the Pearce Commission. It was a searching debate, reflecting all the differing anxieties, convictions and experiences of your Lordships' House in this difficult and delicate problem. But at the end of the day it was agreed that we should continue our search for a settlement within Rhodesia in accord with the Five Principles. It was also agreed that the proposals so arduously achieved by my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, in agreement with Mr. Smith, should, as the term goes, "lie upon the table", so that all Rhodesians could consider their future quietly in their own time.
I made it clear, when I spoke in June, that we were convinced that it was essential to keep the existing situation, including sanctions, while we allowed time for considered thought within Rhodesia. I warned then that a solution was unlikely to emerge before the end of the year. It is said that no one is a prophet in his own country; but, alas! I am not confounded. However, I am glad to say that there have been some hopeful signs.
The African National Council has made it clear that it wants a solution. Mr. Smith is still anxious to achieve a settlement and I understand has at his Party Conference won freedom of manœuvre. There is a growing mood of compromise among Africans and Europeans in Rho

451
desia. The A.N.C. has held a number of meetings to explain its views to Europeans. A.N.C. leaders recently met a Rhodesian Minister for preliminary discussions and there is much talk of further meetings next year between all concerned. This is a start, although it is slow. In the meantime, however, November is upon us and we have to ask the House to consider whether or not it is right to continue sanctions. As we do so, I suggest that we should not forget that we have a mandatory obligation from the United Nations to observe them.
I know that sanctions arouse strong feelings, both for and against, in this House and in the country. The Leader of the House has asked me to say that if your Lordships, after due consideration, at the end of this long debate decide to reject this Order, the Government will introduce. probably to-morrow, a slightly different Order in another place and then in this House. I understand that there might be some doubt as to whether that Order could be framed in such a way as to be sufficiently distinctive in form from the Order which is before us to pass the test of Erskine May. This is a matter on which the experts who advise us and who advise another place may not be entirely of one mind. However, if it were decided by another place that a new Order could properly be laid again. I understand that this House might not wish to adopt a different stance, although obviously this would be a matter for the House as a whole to decide.
I will try, quite apart from this, to meet some of the very genuine anxieties and problems that are raised in noble Lords' minds. I realise that a number of noble Lords urge that sanctions are useless. It is said that we are the only country that carries out sanctions. We are not the only country, but I believe that we are the most thorough. There have been various proposals to strengthen sanctions. Our representative at the United Nations has instructions to consider these proposals in the Supervisory Committee, which is due to meet shortly at the United Nations. But our own view is that the most important action that can be taken by other nations is to make existing sanctions more effective. It is said that sanctions do not work. It is true that most articles in common use
452
can be bought in Rhodesia at a price—except, I believe, that great Scottish export, whisky. But the real effect of sanctions is the holding back of capital investment and foreign exchange. Therefore it seems to me that here, where lies the possibility of growth, sanctions have done their work.
It is said that sanctions isolate and unite Rhodesians and for certain people are very harsh. I confess that I find this the most powerful argument against them. Therefore, while we ask the House to support sanctions for another year, we intend to take certain measures to ease personal problems created by sanctions. These measures will not of course affect Rhodesia as a whole, but Her Majesty's Government are very concerned about our exchange control rules in respect of Southern Rhodesia as they affect education, the elderly, those with serious hardship problems and organisations such as charities. Many Quite tragic personal problems have come before us. We have therefore studied our rules and propose to make a number of small changes. designed to give some relief. These are in accord with the specific humanitarian and educational exceptions made in Security Council resolutions. I will, with permission, circulate these administrative changes in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
On June 17, 1968, the then Attorney General announced that Her Majesty's Government would keep the power to issue United Kingdom passports where there were special reasons for so doing. We propose to extend the issue of these passports in compassionate cases. We shall also grant them in what is called "the public interest" more liberally than before and this will give Rhodesians a chance to hear other ideas and to see for themselves how people of many differing backgrounds, races and creeds can live and work happily together. Perhaps I should, however, assure noble Lords that both my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and myself have seen and will always be ready to see Rhodesians, whether African or European, and of course, will be ready to help whenever we are really needed.
Then there is the question of certain Rhodesian marriages, divorces and adoptions which are regarded by the British courts are being invalid and their children therefore as illegitimate. We believe it is

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wrong that innocent people who may have nothing to do with the illegal actions of the régime should suffer in this way. It is not the intention of the Security Council resolutions to cause unnecessary hardship without any corresponding gain in terms of pressure against the régime. We will therefore submit to the Privy Council an Order under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order which will make these divorces, marriages and adoptions in Rhodesia valid in Rhodesian law and thus in United Kingdom law.
Noble Lords will remember that in the last debate it was urged that more assistance should be given to the education of Rhodesian Africans. We have also made a study of the level of aid which we give from official funds for Rhodesian African education. As a result my right honourable friend the Minister for Overseas Development intends to make an announcement in the near future.
My Lords, I hope it is the view of the whole House that even if we disagree on method we all want to achieve an honourable settlement. But we feel that for a just settlement to come about, agreement between the races within Rhodesia must come first. We must remember that we cannot impose a settlement. Since 1923, when internal self-goverment was granted to Rhodesia, our writ does not run very far, for although we have taken certain executive powers, as I tried to define in answer to a Question yesterday, we cannot assume the whole government of Rhodesia. Therefore imagine what would happen if we said that we could no longer discharge our responsibilities. There would, I suggest, be a running battle within and without Rhodesia and no doubt other nations would seek to intervene. Prosperity therefore would not return, because investment in those circumstances would be far too risky.
My Lords, we are the only nation that can give Rhodesia legal independence and international status. This can be granted only by the British Parliament on the basis of an agreed constitution, and it is the only way to avoid the turmoil that otherwise would ensue. However much we may worry personally about sanctions, in an unexpected way they act as a shield against worse to come. They provide a comparative calm so that Rhodesians can ponder their future, learn
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how to come together and perhaps decide that they can build a true multi-racial society under an agreed Constitution.
My Lords, many people in this country have given of their best to Rhodesia, and will gladly do so again. My right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has put his heart, and all his great experience and ability, into the search for a settlement. Now it is up to Rhodesians themselves. There are real signs that they too would like to end this unhappy affair, but as so many noble Lords are well aware, in the context of Africa the vital element of trust can grow only at its own pace; and while it grows, as we all hope in strength, let us ensure, so far as it is within our power, that we guard Rhodesia's peace. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1972, laid before the House on 17th October, be approved.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
Following are the administrative changes referred to by Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie:
CASH GIFTS TO RESIDENTS OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
1. United Kingdom residents wishing to send small cash gifts to relatives in Southern Rhodesia will now on application be permitted to do so up to a limit of £75 for any one donor in any two-year period. Within this same overall limit gifts to non-relatives will also be permitted but only if humanitarian reasons can be shown. The amounts authorised by the Exchange Control authorities will be counted against the normal allowance of £300 per annum, applicable to cash gifts made by United Kingdom residents to persons residing in the non-sterling area.
ALLOWANCES FOR ELDERLY SOUTHERN RHODESIAN RESIDENTS AND THOSE WITH HARDSHIP QUALIFICATIONS:
2. Residents of Southern Rhodesia over 65 years of age may now on application transfer funds from accounts restricted in this country at the rate of £30 per month for a single person, £45 for a married couple and £12 for each dependent child. The rent allowance will be £15 per month or at a higher rent if actual rent is higher. Persons under 65 years of age will only be allowed to make transfers if it can be demonstrated that specific hardship factors exist, but the new ceilings will apply. These changes have been made on humanitarian grounds because the existing level of allowances has proved inadequate to meet genuine hardship, and to enable persons above the normal retirement age to enjoy the concession without having to show that specific hardship exists.
TRAVEL ALLOWANCES FOR CERTAIN VISITORS TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
3. Foreign currency facilities will now be permitted on application to the following categories of travellers who wish to visit Southern Rhodesia.

(a) Persons over the age of 65 years visiting members of their own families who reside in Southern Rhodesia will be allowed foreign exchange facilities up to £10 per day for a maximum of £300 per person in any one year.

(b) Persons under 65 years of age visiting members of their own families who are over 65 years will be given the same rates as those stated in (a) above if they can show that an element of illness exists, the visitors have not seen their relatives for some time and they cannot be supported by their families in Southern Rhodesia whilst they are in that country; and

(c) Any person who has an urgent compassionate reason may be allowed up to £75 per visit with a maximum of £300 in any one year. This concession will not apply where an allowance is to be given under (a) or (b) above.

ALLOWANCE FOR SOUTHERN RHODESIA RESIDENTS VISITING THE UNITED KINGDOM:
4. Rhodesian residents visiting the United Kingdom will now be allowed on application to draw up to £20 per week per person from their fund restricted in this country in suspense accounts. There has been no increase in the allowance since 1966.
FUNDS TRANSFERRED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES:
5. To bring United Kingdom controls into line with Security Council Resolutions, it has been decided to allow Southern Rhodesian residents on application to make transfers for generally recognised educational purposes from accounts blocked in the United Kingdom, to any other country, subject only to any general rules which apply to transfer to the country concerned.
TRANSFER MADE TO WIVES AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA:
6. For humanitarian reasons United Kingdom residents, having dependent wives, former wives and dependent children resident in Southern Rhodesia will be permitted on application to make transfers from the United Kingdom at the rate of up to £30 per month, £12 for each dependent child and £15 for rent purposes or more if the actual rent is higher. The applicants will not be required to prove specific hardship unless they wish to transfer sums in excess of these scales when application will be considered on their merits.
TRANSFERS TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA BY CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS, MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANISATIONS:
7. Where charitable, religious, medical and educational organisations wish to transfer money for current expenditure in excess of the 1965 level, in order to continue their humanitarian works in Southern Rhodesia,
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applications will be considered on their merits. Remittances authorised will be in sterling to Rhodesian account.
LIFE ASSURANCE POLICIES:
8. Proceeds from life assurance policies related to retirement, taken out by Southern Rhodesian residents before November 11, 1965, will in future be treated by the Exchange Control Authorities as though they were pensions. Beneficiaries will be permitted on application to transfer the proceeds, including lump sums, to Southern Rhodesia, provided it can be shown that the maturity date of the policies was within 5 years (either side) of retirement from normal occupation. Provision has also been made for widows and dependent relatives (under 19 years of age) of deceased beneficiaries, and persons whose policies have matured any time since 11th November 1965 to enjoy these concessions also.
3.31 p.m.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, I rise to say that of course on this side of the House we agree with the Motion introduced by the noble Baroness with her characteristic grace and strength. I know of nobody who combines those two qualities so well. I will leave my noble friend Lord Shepherd to deal with the, I must say, rather complex constitutional issues which she raised, but I should like to say that we give a welcome to her proposals for compassionate relaxation in some ways, though I shall be very anxious to examine exactly what those proposals are, particularly in relation to passports, because we on this side have been worried about which people have been granted British passports. In this connection one wonders whether any help can be given to the hapless members of the A.N.C whose Rhodesian passports have been removed from them and who are as a result unable to travel. However, I welcome warmly what the noble Baroness has said, and we particularly look forward to the announcement about the education of Rhodesian Africans in this country.
The House knows that we on this side have always consistently held that sanctions must be retained for three reasons: mainly because we are sure that they are one of the basic reasons for Mr. Smith's increasing desire for settlement; because we feel we must keep faith with the Rhodesian Africans for whom we are responsible; and because we are in honour bound to observe the United Nations mandatory rule.
My Lords, we had a remarkable debate only three months ago which lasted until

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late on a Friday evening, with seventeen speakers, and showed the depth of feeling. It also, I think, shows that there cannot be very much new to be said on this issue. It is rather surprising, therefore, not to say interesting, to see that thirty-four Members of your Lordships' House have put themselves down to speak so soon again. When I look at the composition of the list I feel rather tempted to ask the noble Earl who is to reply, "Is this a private fight, or can anyone join in?" On the last occasion the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, pleaded with the Government to keep the Settlement on the table and to consider lifting sanctions because, he said, plenty of things could happen between August and November. Well, nothing has happened in Rhodesia to give us any cause for lifting sanctions, as the noble Baroness herself has said.
In the June debate to which the noble Baroness referred, the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, said:
"… if we are invited to renew sanctions again by Order in Council in November, not only shall I find it impossible to support Her Majesty's Government but I shall vote against it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21/6/72, col. 293–4.]
The House is familiar with the views of the noble Lord and with those of his noble friends Lord Coleraine, Lord Barnby, Lord Gridley, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, and many others. Even if we were not, we should have noticed that extraordinary letter in The Times last week which was signed by eighty-three—I do not know what to call them: rebels, backwoodsmen? They are not backwoodsmen in one sense of the term, for many of them are active Members of your Lordships' House, but backwoodsmen in the sense that they cannot see the future and the new world that is growing. They are backwoodsmen in that they are unconstructive and are looking always to an irretrievable past. I was deeply disappointed to find that among them there were even some backwoods-women.
My Lords, we on these Benches do not use the argument of guilt by association. It is as monstrous to equate all African behaviour under majority rule with General Amin's behaviour, as it would be to attempt to say that all members of the Conservative Party are like Mr. Enoch Powell. Equally, and more seriously, just because Hitler came to
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power under a democratic system, are we to condemn the system of democracy? Far better than I can myself, that letter was answered by Dr. Barkham, who was the Senior Consultant Physician at Mulago Hospital in Uganda and who has himself been expelled by General Amin. He said:
"To identify Uganda with the present actions of her 'Government' is a tragic mistake.… For however much the plight of the Asians deserves our immediate compassion and help, in the long run it is the Africans … who need all the understanding and support we can give them."
In my view, that comment shows an infinitely greater generosity of spirit than was displayed by the signatories to the other letter. We have all condemned General Amin's behaviour over the expulsion of Asians, and we very much look forward to hearing from noble Lords who want us to raise sanctions condemning the Rhodesian Land Tenure Act under which tens of thousands of Africans are uprooted from their ancestral lands, sent to remote places where there are fewer schools, poorer soil, very few social welfare benefits, and the rest of it. The social, economic and political injustices which go on in Rhodesia, the jailing and detention of people indefinitely without trial, all make it imperative that we use the few instruments in our power to maintain pressure on Mr. Smith's régime to prove to the Africans and to the world that they can still have faith in us. As Mr. Dingle Foot put it so pertinently in The Times:
"Why should racial persecution in Uganda be held to excuse racial persecution in Rhodesia?"
We must maintain sanctions, however much we dislike them—and we do—because, apart from anything else, if we did not, we should be betraying the courage and the hardiness of those Africans who came out and voted during the Pearce Commission's visit. We greatly look forward to the contribution we are to have from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce to-day. We feel tremendous admiration for all the work he did. We should like to ask what are to be the future lives of Mr. Garfield Todd and of Mr. and Mrs. Chinamanu, who were detained for carrying out the normal political activities which they were promised by the Smith régime under the Pearce Commission? The noble Lord

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himself spoke out very strongly about this, and we should like to ask the Government to go on making representations about the release of these people, as well as the other thousands who are detained, and have been so for ten years.
If we are to ask the Government to reason with the régime, we must keep such powers and strengths as we have. Many noble Lords have taken a special interest in the Tangwena people and their redoubtable Chief who, as your Lordships know, have been turned out of their land by the Smith régime quite illegitimately and against the advice of his courts. A friend writes:
"All their houses have again been burnt—thoroughly. Belongings are piled in as well and things like cooking pots are bashed or riddled with bullets. I spent a forlorn morning. A few goats, still miraculously alive despite jackals, were roaming on the steep hillside. Elsewhere there were no signs of life; no smoke and no thatched Rondavel homes—only black scars with the white ashes still fresh from the recent burnings. Almost the entire area East and North of Nyafaru has been burnt … The Chief and many of his followers are still managing to stay free, not in their homes, of course, but in the wild and mountainous country, and in spite of the fact that there are three police camps there who make continuous raids."
As he says:
"Fortunately we can always hear them coming because they make so much noise."
This valiant man has written again to the Queen—and I should like to stress to "his" Queen, as he describes her—asking
"if it is the law to burn houses and take away children."
But he adds:
"We shall never fight them. We shall not even throw a stone."
These are the people who look to us for protection. These are the people who would be betrayed if we took off sanctions and let go our strongest form of pressure on the Smith régime.
I was very glad that the noble Baroness mentioned the African National Council and Bishop Muzorewa, because this is the spirit of that very remarkable new African Party. Of course, the Smith régime is doing its best to repress it. Membership cards have been burned; their outdoor meetings have been forbidden; indoor meetings are allowed, but in some mysterious way you can never get
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all insurance is owned by Europeans. As I mentioned, the Bishop's passport has been taken away, although he needs urgent medical treatment which can only be had abroad. This is not a violent organisation. This is a Christian and non-violent organisation. I should like to quote to you the peroration of the last speech the Bishop made before he was taken ill:
"Now, brethren, again the Bible says, Where there is no vision the people perish'. I call you to catch a vision that can save our country. I call you in the name of God, 'Let us come and reason together', return to legality and take our rightful place in the community of nations."
We cannot keep our faith with these people unless we keep our remaining strengths.
Like the noble Baroness, I rejoice very much in the hopeful signs that meetings may be beginning to take place. One meeting did take place, because of the passionate desire of the Smith régime to achieve some kind of settlement before their economic ruin. But even that meeting was unable to be repeated, and Mr. Smith now says that he did not know that one of his own Cabinet Ministers had arranged it. So one's hope is tinged with a little despair. For those noble the insurance for the indoor halls, as Lords opposite who tell us that Africans suffer most under sanctions and wish to have them lifted, may I explain to them once again that Bishop Muzorewa himself has said:
"Africans accept sanctions as the price of their freedom",
and that they repudiate
"any person who claims on our behalf that sanctions should be withdrawn to alleviate suffering through lack of employment."
We have made the case so often to show that sanctions are effective—the increasing economic disarray, the lack of rolling stock and tractors—all these arguments have been deployed so often that I will not bore the House by going over them again, but I do not think they can be denied. Added to the sanctions is the increasing anxiety of the Rhodesians about their security. We know that they are deeply worried about the incursions on their Mozambiquan and Angolan frontiers. And in this connection I look forward very much to listening to my noble friend, Lord Gifford, who has just returned from a difficult and dangerous

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journey through Mozambique. I hope he will speak later. That, of course, is quite out of our province, but sanctions are not. On these Benches we have never accepted the settlement proposals. I myself am rather sad that they are still lying on the table, because they have been refused by 90 per cent. of the Rhodesian people. But we must strive for a settlement of some kind, an honourable one, and in doing this it would be folly to throw away all we have achieved in these last seven years—the political gains and the economic ones, in spite of all the sufferings and sacrifices.
In our last debate Her Majesty's Government accepted our Amendment which called not merely for keeping sanctions but for strengthening them. May I make an appeal, or suggestion perhaps, for some ways in which our sanctions could be strengthened. First, at the United Nations: could we ask for more co-operation in the patrols of Beira and indeed of Laurenco Marques? Perhaps the new Malagasy Government might co-operate, as they did before, in the R.A.F. patrols. Could we ask Her Majesty's Government, when new applications are being made at the United Nations, to emphasise, if not to make it a condition, that new members should observe the mandatory sanctions? And could we ask for a strengthening of the Sanctions Committee? Since we are to go into Europe, could we not use our influence with our partners in the E.E.C. to ensure that they apply sanctions, so that we are not at an economic disadvantage with them? And could we make quite sure that membership of E.E.C. shall be denied to Portugal so long as she contnues to be one of the greatest sanctions breakers and comforters of Mr. Smith? Above all, should we not try harder to co-operate with the Commonwealth through the Commonwealth Secretariat, which has asked us specifically to do so? At home there are many things we could do. We could bring in legislation to make goods leaving Rhodesia become invested in the Crown, so that we could then sue those who were involved; even in the United States they have managed to do this. We could make sure that any sale of goods to South Africa carried with it a prohibition against resale to Rhodesia. There are many more suggestions that one could
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make, in particular in relation to the multi-racial corporations.
My Lords, although without my spectacles I cannot see the delicious clock, I feel I must not go into any more details. The noble Baroness said that there were signs for optimism. I feel that there are, but most of all in the magnificent and unbowed spirit of the Africans, who wish for their freedom but who want it by non-violent means. They look to us. I understand the impatience and frustration of noble Lords opposite with people who break sanctions when we do not. But I beg the noble Earl to ignore the spears and daggers at his back and to continue to apply our legal sanctions, and to uphold the honour of this country in face of the rest of the world.
3.48 p.m.
LORD BEAUMONT OF WHITLEY: My Lords, I am a little appalled to follow on two such eloquent speeches which have also had the virtue of brevity. I may not be able to follow the eloquence but I certainly intend to follow the brevity, not as a measure of the importance of the subject but as a measure, perhaps, of the number of times that we have had this debate, a measure of the length of the list of speakers and a measure of the fact that the position of noble Lords on these Benches is well known. We should like, first of all, to congratulate the Government on the Orders that they are bringing before us to-day. It is true that any alternative seems to us to be unthinkable, but it appears that there are some people who are prepared to think even the unthinkable. "Unthinkable", I call it, because of our responsibility to all the people of Rhodesia, and I go so far as to say our very special responsibility to the black population. The history of so many British colonies in Africa was one of exploration and exploitation of a kind by settlers, and a reluctant takeover by the Colonial Office, under pressure from missionaries trying to protect the native people; and the fact that this pressure was successful enabled us in the 'fifties to hand hack to the people of Africa their countries, power over their own lives, with democratic constitutions, which I still unashamedly believe to be the best form of Government.
Now it is true, as has been pointed out, that many of these countries have torn up these constitutions and have gone

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back on the present that we gave them. Nevertheless, although this is sad, we can hold up our heads proudly in this country and say that we discharged our duty well to these countries and these colonies over the last thirty years. Rhodesia was the exception. Rhodesia was the exception where, as in Ulster—and there are some quite interesting parallels between the two countries—we handed over power to the settlers, while reserving to ourselves powers which we then neglected to use. I believe that we have, as a result of this position, a responsibility to the native peoples of Rhodesia which we must honour, and we must avoid the mistake which, to our shame, a Liberal Government made when it handed over power in South Africa.
The question is: can we do anything? There are some of your Lordships who would say that there is little that we can do. There are many noble Lords who say that sanctions are not working, but many of them are those who said that sanctions were not working before they brought Mr. Smith to the conference table. The argument that we are bringing hardship to the African is less effective than it was. As the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, has said, we now know what we formerly suspected, that there is a considerable body of African opinion which wishes us to continue sanctions even if it means more suffering for them. This is perhaps because they have taken the point that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, seemed to have missed—and I am sorry that he is not taking part in our debate to-day—that some suffering now may save a very great deal of suffering in the distant future. I think Lord Goodman's thesis was really based on the idea that politics is the art of the possible. There is a great deal of truth in that old saying but I, for one, would not be in politics if I did not think that along with it went the idea that politics was the art of making things possible.
We know that Mr. Smith and many of the white minority in Rhodesia desperately want a settlement with this country. We know that some sanctions are working, no matter what some people say. We know, for instance, that 60 per cent. of the farmers of Rhodesia made losses in 1970, and that that was a similar pattern
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to what has been happening over the past three or four years. We know that the foreign exchange and capital market sanctions are having a very considerable effect. Here I am sure that we welcome the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in trying to ease personal hardship for those who bear no responsibility for the situation. We on these Benches will look at these proposals with welcoming but critical eyes, and I hope that we shall have an opportunity to talk about them at some other time when we know the details. We very much welcome the announcement about more education.
We are also sometimes told that the result of continuing sanctions will be merely to bring in a more Right Wing Government, as happened in Central Africa for quite a long time, and indeed has happened again in Ulster. But I think that this is to neglect the fact that in the long run there must be an end of some kind to this series of Governments, and while it is happening more and more moderate people are released from their loyalty to that particular Government and pushed into a situation where they can mount an effective opposition. This is already beginning to happen in Rhodesia. At the same time, many of those who are really moderate are freer to express themselves, because perhaps when they were in Government they felt that they must keep the Party together, and that they must not speak out strongly for what they wanted for fear that they would not carry weight when it came to the decisive arguments. If they are excluded by the coming of a more Right Wing Government, these people can speak up very strongly. There are many people talking about Rhodesia to-day in the terms that all three Parties in this House talk about it, who not very long ago we should have regarded as far from liberal. This middle-of-the-road ground, I am sure, is working, and if there should be, which I hope there will not be, a Government further to the Right than Mr. Smith's, it will not necessarily be a total disaster.
Not only should we maintain sanctions, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, that we should in fact be considering how to enforce them more, and indeed how to increase them—and I, too, have my

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suggestions: first, that we put very strong diplomatic pressure on the American Government to plug the sanction breaking on chrome; secondly, that we try to police the whole sanction operation rather better. I understand that it is quite possible, with almost all the major exports of Rhodesia, to test these exports and identify quite clearly what country they have come from. If this was done, it would be far easier to catch sanction breakers. Thirdly, I think that we still have to think about oil sanctions very seriously, and there must come a moment when we say to ourselves, "How can we stop the sanction breakers on oil?", and, indeed, ask ourselves whether it is possible and necessary to apply oil sanctions to sanction breakers on oil. Fourthly, possibly we might give generous grants to the white Rhodesians who want to leave Rhodesia and settle elsewhere, and even to those who want to go and settle in South Africa.
We cannot shrug off our responsibility for the 96 per cent. of the population of this country for which we hold legal responsibility. This is, to use the old phrase in a slightly new sense, the white man's burden now. It is not nearly as heavy as the black man has to shoulder, and it is up to us, even at some inconvenience to ourselves and to our kith and kin, to continue to shoulder it.
3.58 p.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, before I develop the main theme of my speech, I think it would be appropriate to make some comment on the speeches which have gone before. I felt that the noble Baroness, when introducing this extension of the Rhodesia Order and making comment that those people who wished to support the continuance of sanctions were doing so in the interests of the people of Rhodesia, was not giving credence to those of us who feel that we are equally interested in the welfare, the happiness, the well-being and the good government of the people of Rhodesia continuance of sanctions. I saw at first-not continue with sanctions. That is the first point I wish to make. She also mentioned that if there was a Vote tonight and the Orders were not approved, they would be reintroduced and your Lordships would have the inconvenience of coming back to deal with them. I
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felt that that was some kind of threat. I have no idea what will be the result of this debate, but that will not prevent my continuing to speak to your Lordships from my experience and from my conscience.
There is one aspect of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, which I did not understand. I simply cannot follow the smug self-satisfaction with which some of us consider that everything we have done in our Commonwealth and Colonies has been amply justified by events. The noble Lord seemed to be very pleased. He said that we had discharged all our responsibilities to our former territories with satisfaction. What are we trying to do in Rhodesia but to bring about an orderly Constitution? But what has happened to our Constitution-making in Uganda? That has resulted in the most frightful bloodshed, horror and suffering, with people being flung into prison. I cannot entirely divorce what has happened in Uganda from what we are trying to do in Rhodesia.
This is a matter of conscience, but if there is a Division this evening I shall be bound to vote against the continuance of sanctions. I shall not take that action lightly, because I have a profound respect for my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and for noble Lords who may well disagree with some of the reasons which I shall give for the action which I propose to take in certain circumstances. But for me that is not the real point of the matter. I was in a country which was overrun when I was serving overseas as a colonial officer. I cannot forget my own suffering, but that was simply nothing to the suffering of the people when there is a breakdown of law and order. I think that to-day we are thinking of what might happen in Rhodesia, and of what we are trying to achieve for the people there. There is this issue of a stable society, and I want to consider that beyond the issue of the continuance of sanctions. I saw at firsthand the suffering of Malays and indigenous people with the breakdown of law and order. In gaol, under the Japanese, I felt, as did many of my other camp companions at the time, that we had let people down when we had treaties to defend them. That was an occasion when we were unable to honour our

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obligations to people overseas; and when one compares what happened then with our obligations in Rhodesia and Uganda one thinks twice about whether our present actions are really in the interests of all the people in Rhodesia.
For the last seven years we have had sanctions against Rhodesia, but while the part of Africa in which Rhodesia is situated has been in turmoil and confusion, Mr. Smith has maintained law and order. I shall not refer again to what has happened in Uganda and Nigeria, because that is known to everybody. But if you were to ask Africans whether they would prefer to live in Uganda, Nigeria or Rhodesia, and particularly if you were to ask Ugandans that question, they would say that they prefer to live under the Government of Mr. Smith. I think there would be no question about that. There is no point in blinking the issue which, as I see it, stands out in stark reality. In all the years when I served overseas we believed that the Commonwealth was an association of peoples, far more than it was an association of Governments.
Let me give a final example to your Lordships of another experience of mine. After recovering in England when the last war ended, I went back to Malaysia which was facing a virtual breakdown of law and order under a Communist insurrection. I talked to people at that time, when we were in process of leading people on to self-government and independence, and the consensus of what they said to me then was, "For God's sake, the British must not go! We want peace. We want to be able to trade and to sleep peacefully in our beds at night, without being intimidated with a gun." What are we talking about in the context of Rhodesia? Are we not talking about the timing of majority rule and the creation of a multi-racial society? Has not experience shown that people prefer a Government which gives them some stability, to a Government which, under local majority rule, has brought death and horrible suffering, as in the case of the peoples of Uganda? For me to-day the issue goes deep. When we are discussing sanctions, we are really talking about the future lives and well-being of all Rhodesians.
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There is one other point which I do not understand in the present context. I have heard it stated in some Government quarters that the British Government obtained a near agreement with Mr. Smith. After painful and laborious negotiations with the Rhodesian Government, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary obtained an agreement—and I leave out for the moment the fact that it was conditional upon its acceptability to the Africans. The fact remains that an agreement was obtained between Mr. Smith and my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. I presume that my right honourable friend considered it was the best agreement in respect of African interests that he could obtain at that juncture. I believe that to be so, because I have a very high opinion of the integrity, honour and character of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. I am further of the opinion, which is open to argument, that even if there are further negotiations or discussions between Mr. Smith and local African leaders in Rhodesia, the continuance of sanctions can result only in increased intransigence on the part of those African leaders who, because they feel that in some way they are supported by sanctions, will make excessive demands. If it is said that sanctions will bring Mr. Smith to the negotiating table, I must say that I consider that Mr. Smith has already been at the negotiating table.
After the agreement was reached, my right honourable friend appointed a distinguished judge, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, to head a Commission to go to Rhodesia to test its acceptability to the African population. Noble Lords are aware that there was an interval of some weeks between the reaching of the agreement and the arrival of Lord Pearce's Commission in Rhodesia. As I understand it, it was no part of Lord Pearce's duties to ascertain what activities occurred in this country or in Rhodesia prior to the arrival of his Commission. He would, one assumes, be concerned only with carrying out the test of acceptability after his arrival.
But, my Lords, what indeed occurred, both in this country and in Rhodesia, prior to the arrival of the noble Lord and his Commission? I am instructed that

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it is in order for me to quote part of a speech made by Mr. Smith on June 6, 1972, in the Rhodesian House of Assembly. He said:
"In Britain the enemies of a settlement made good use of the intervening period between the signing of the agreement and the start of the test of acceptability. Church organizations were early in the field and the British Council of Churches sent two men to Salisbury to campaign against the settlement. Those two addressed a meeting of the Christian Council of Rhodesia in Salisbury, advocating rejection of the proposals, and then proceeded to visit a number of other centres in Rhodesia where they met local churchmen. The British Council of Churches also produced a pamphlet urging that the proposals be rejected and this was distributed in the United Kingdom and in Rhodesia.
"In London an organization was formed which called itself The Rhodesian Emergency Campaign Committee' on which were represented the Anti-Apartheid Movement, International Defence and Aid, the London branches of Rhodesian terrorist movements and many others. Their stated aim was to frustrate the agreement which had been reached by the two Governments. The International Defence and Aid Fund, which is well known for its support of terrorist movements, sent out two London solicitors who played a large part in organising the ANC campaign on a day-to-day basis.…
"So here we have the remarkable situation of a number of British organizations deliberately setting out to frustrate an agreement … which by common consent was in the best interests of the Africans of Rhodesia. One can only wonder at the motives of these people. Was it genuine concern for the well-being and progress of the Africans or was it their deep-seated hatred of the Whites of Rhodesia? I will leave honourable members to answer that question for themselves".
Mr. Smith went on:
"I must make it clear at this juncture that by no means all Rhodesian churchmen opposed the settlement. Many spoke out courageously in favour, while others took a neutral position".
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that in that very same speech Mr. Smith accused the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, of a deliberate conspiracy with Her Majesty's Government to wreck the inquiry of the noble Lord, Lord Pearce?
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, I am unable to answer the noble Lord on that point. I should rather like notice of it. I recollect that what the noble Lord suggests was in fact said; but I wish to develop my argument as best I can.
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My Lords, I have let my noble friend the Minister have a copy of this speech, and I must ask the Government what their views are on what I have read out and on what took place in the Rhodesian Assembly. May I further ask the Government: was this not a quasi-judicial inquiry to be carried out by a distinguished judge? If there was in fact propaganda, as has been alleged, against a settlement, were the organisers of this propaganda against a settlement not acting in prejudice, almost in contempt, of Lord Pearce's Commission prior to its arrival? If in fact there was propaganda and activity of terrorist organisations whose main purpose was to thwart an agreement, and this took place prior to the arrival of Lord Pearce, was this not in defiance of the conditions under which the Commission had to operate, inasmuch as it would prejudice the free expression of opinion and the establishment of the truth in Rhodesia? It would seem to me much more than a normal political activity which was allowed to go on in Rhodesia during the time the Commission visited that country. I should like a considered Government reply to the points that I have raised. My view would be that it would be in order, perhaps, to use propaganda at an election. or if a referendum was being held in any country; but I feel from my own convictions that to use any form of propaganda in a country where a test of acceptability was being carried out would in the circumstances prejudice, or be likely to prejudice, a proper finding.
In conclusion, my Lords, I am against sanctions. I believe Mr. Smith wants an agreement with Africans that will give stability to Rhodesia. I do not believe that Mr. Smith is a fool. I believe he sees clearly that at some time or other he will have to come to terms with five million Africans. Any idea to the contrary would be extremely foolish, and detrimental to everybody in that country. I feel, quite frankly, that at the moment sanctions have nothing to do with the point. I consider that sanctions hinder an agreement, since they increase African nationalist intransigence. I also feel that sanctions are a cruel deception to Africans in Rhodesia because sanctions lead them to believe that they will get something better from Mr. Smith than

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was in the agreement which was so painfully negotiated between him and my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. I do not believe, my Lords, that any better terms, or markedly different terms, are obtainable than those which have been obtained already by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. Finally, my Lords, I regret to say that I do not think we have very much influence in Rhodesia at the present time. To go on shows a reluctance to face reality; and the continuance of sanctions will only increase the difficulties which in the future will face Her Majesty's Government in dealing with this protracted issue.
4.18 p.m.
LORD PEARCE: My Lords, in this long debate I have only one point to put before your Lordships, and that a short and, to me, quite conclusive one. In your Lordships' daily task you are writing history, whether you will or no, and if those who oppose this Motion have their way the page of history that you will write about Rhodesia in 1972 will be to this effect. First, that your Lordships had a Commission going the length and breadth of Rhodesia telling the people of that country, and incidentally the world, about the proposals, finding out their opinions and assuring them that if the answer was "Yes" sanctions would cease and if the answer was "No" things would continue as they were and sanctions would go on. Secondly, that in this same year your Lordships had a Report showing that the answer was "No" and accepted it. Thirdly, that in this year—in this very year—your Lordships discontinued sanctions. I need hardly assure your Lordships that I would have had nothing to do with that Commission if I had conceived the possibility that your Lordships, by such a volte-face, would have given the lie to what your Commission was saying, at your instance, in Rhodesia. My view would be the same whichever way the volte-face was—whether, the answer being "Yes", your Lordships had been pressed by those who thought the agreement was wrong because it gave too little and, in spite of the "Yes", continued sanctions; or whether, as now, the answer being "No", your Lordships are pressed to discontinue sanctions. I believe that that would be the view of every member
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of the Commission. You cannot really do it. A reputation for straight dealing is a thing of value not to be lightly jeopardised or thrown away. You can maintain it only by straight dealing.
I happen not to believe that things are as hopeless as some people make out. I believe that valuable lessons have been learned by both sides in this traumatic year and that those lessons will bear valuable fruit. It would, indeed, be sad if, at the instance of those who would oppose the Motion, the cardinal lesson to be learned by the people of Rhodesia as a whole, Africans and Europeans alike, was that they could not trust what they were told by a British Commission at your instance.
4.22 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, on June 21 last I made a substantial speech on this matter on the Amendment to an Amendment which was moved by my noble friend Lord Coleraine, and I then answered, I should imagine, all the points made so charmingly by the two noble Baronesses to-day. Out of respect to the long list of speakers I do not intend to repeat myself; I do not think it is necessary. However, there are one or two things which perhaps should be said. First, I should express my own opinion that we all owe a deep debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, and to his four or five Commissioners and assistant Commissioners who undertook this most difficult duty. I had the honour of meeting Lord Pearce and three of his assistants in Rhodesia in March last and I thought then, as I should naturally think from even reading their names, let alone from knowing their reputation, that they would do such a job extraordinarily well and diligently. Having read the whole of the Pearce Report and its supplementary documents, I would add the word "ingeniously". They were very ingenious in trying to ascertain opinions which, frankly, were not there. They were very ingenious.
My Lords, why was there not an opinion there? It was because it was quite impossible to imagine that 5 million Africans, in the state in which these people were, could possibly have an opinion about a matter which they could not read and which the overwhelming majority of them could not understand.

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That a few hundred thousand may have had an opinion may be true; but that 5 million could have an opinion could never have been true and it was beyond reason to assume that any real enlightenment could possibly come out of the work of the Pearce Commission. Nor do I accept the view, although I recognise how genuinely it is put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, to-day, that the Pearce Commission was charged by this House and by its terms of reference to go to Rhodesia and to say to the people: "If we, Pearce, say 'Yes', Britain will do this; and if we, Pearce, say 'No', Britain will do that." I do not think for one moment that that was their duty. It may have been implied by much of what they said, but it was not the reason that they were sent there. Therefore I do not accept the view that if we take a different action now we are—what was it the noble Lord said? Was it "breaking faith"?
LORD PEARCE: My Lords, I used the word "volte-face".
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, to make a volte-face is very often an extremely wise thing to do. I thought that the noble Lord used words which implied lack of trust or something of that sort; and that is far more important. I do not think he was charged with that duty and I submit to the House that that part of his argument was wholly invalid.
My Lords, may I then, having praised the Pearce Commission, praise also Mr. Smith and Sir Alec Douglas-Home. I have nothing but praise for them for having made the settlement which they arranged. It is useless to go back upon the history of this matter and to say that there should never have been a Pearce Commission and that there should never have been any test of acceptability. Sir Alec Douglas-Home himself virtually admitted that publicly when, in the Chamber in June last, he said that we must find another way if any new approach were to be made or if any new settlement were to be considered. We will not go back to this acceptability business. He himself virtually admitted—
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, I must apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. I par
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ticularly do not wish to be discourteous to him. Would he not agree that the Foreign Secretary has allowed the proposals to lie upon the table—which is very far from repudiating them, as the noble Lord is trying to imply?
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I have not quite taken that point.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, the noble Lord implied that the Foreign Secretary had decided that the Pearce proposals were no good, but in fact the Foreign Secretary has left the settlement proposals lying on the table.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, there is not much good in their lying on the table. There is not much good to anybody in that. The point I was making was that in my view the Pearce Commission was not entitled to say—the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, was entitled to say it but his point is invalid—that it was charged with the duty of committing this House to an action on a "Yes" or a "No", and that if he said "Yes", or "No", we should be breaking faith. I do not accept that.
My Lords, I was on the point of praising Sir Alec and Mr. Smith. The only way the settlement will be reached will be for the British Government to abandon sanctions. My noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir who opened this debate used these words: there would be a "running battle" and there would be "turmoil". Those were her words: a running battle and turmoil in Rhodesia. My Lords, how much in error I am sure she is! There could be trouble in Rhodesia if unemployment among the black people goes on increasing as it is now; there could be turmoil in that event. Nothing is more likely to cause turmoil and trouble in a population of that kind than unemployment and dire poverty. The cure for it is to get rid of sanctions. To keep them on is the one way to make sure that trouble is going to mount and mount. That seems to me to be the strongest argument of all. Our duty is to these people, to try to give them the best possible life that they can have. I do not think that any settlement of the Rhodesian question is possible with the assent of and the acceptability to the 5 million unless it is majority rule;

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and, my Lords, if the Rhodesians got majority rule to-morrow as part of a settlement agreed to by all—it is the only kind of agreement which would be made by all—they would abandon it next year, because the then Government of Rhodesia, being black, would want to remain in power. The only reason for having majority rule is to get into power. When you are in power you do not want elections if you can help it. I do not say that that applies to us, although one might almost begin to believe it. There are people, friends of the noble Baroness opposite, who seem to like obeying the laws that they like and disobeying the laws that they do not like, as if they did not care about the rule of Parliament or the rule of law. I am surprised to hear—
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, will forgive me for interrupting him, may I say that I think the noble Lord said that my noble friend had friends who would break the law; who have a contempt for the law. Can the noble Lord say who are those friends?
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, of course I could. I could recite them by name, but it would not be really relevant. They are very well known to the noble Lord and just as well known to every one of the noble Lords opposite. It is manifest that there is a minority in the trade union movement which keeps the laws it likes and breaks the laws it does not like. These people are defying Parliament, and I am astonished that the noble Lord should question that. I will gladly write and tell him their names and give him chapter and verse if he likes, but I will not waste time on it now if the noble Lord will forgive me.
Now may I deal with the justification, which I feel it is desirable to make very briefly, for the vote which I shall try to cast to-night, if I am still alive and all goes well? First of all, it is one of the reasons for the existence of a Second Chamber in any bicameral system that the Second House, the Upper House, shall be a revising Chamber, a Chamber which can cause the other House to think again. That is one of the great purposes of a second House and one of the most important, and there can be nothing wrong in
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asking the other House to think again. It does not raise a vote of confidence against the Government; it does not threaten the Government. It merely exercises this delaying power which is one of the most valuable things in the Constitution. It is open to the other House to think again; to think that I am a very wise man and that my noble friend Lord Colyton is wiser still. It is open to them to say that this is a nonsense and to send it back again. I then would not vote against them again. So it seems to me it is not merely an obligation on us to do our duty, if that is how we feel; it is the very reason that we are here as a Second Chamber.
My Lords, I feel I must deal with this last point because it was mentioned by the first three speakers. Though the word was not mentioned, it was implied by the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, that is, this question of honour. The noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, said that we must do what is honourable. The noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, talked about honour. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, used the same word and the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, implied it. There is nothing dishonourable about losing a battle. The only people who think that are those who have never been in a battle and do not know what it is. Whenever you go into a fight or a battle you expect either to win or to lose; you take your courage in your hands and you go in. What is damn' silly is having lost the battle not to realise that and make new dispositions. That is quite ridiculous and we have to face the fact that we have lost this battle. The object of a battle or a war is to make people change their minds. The Rhodesians have not changed their minds and in my judgment they will not do so. There is a lager mentality there, not dissimilar to the British mentality when we stood alone in 1940 and 1941. Great courage—
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he excludes all the black people in Rhodesia from the category of Rhodesians? He refers to the Rhodesians as if they were all just white people.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I do not think I said that; I certainly did not mean to imply it. I was

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at that moment talking about white Rhodesians and the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, heard me right. That is what I was talking about. They are determined to go on governing. I have not the slightest doubt that they are determined, and that they will succeed. I have not the slightest doubt that the best way for progress for the whole country, including primarily the 5 million black people, is to free them to settle their own affairs. Now it is said that they are not free to settle their own affairs because black men dare not open their mouths without being locked up. That is only partly true. It is not the only country in the world where you get locked up for saying what you think. There are quite a number of countries, with which noble Lords opposite seem to be great friends, where this happens.
The pressure of opinion among the black people, whether in Rhodesia or South Africa, is always there and is very great. It is heard and will be listened to. The only hope of a settlement is that the white men should govern and manage the Rhodesian economy and the Rhodesian State—and they are the people who can do it de facto; in some respects de jure, but certainly de facto—that they shall come and make a settlement with Britain and that they will do it after consulting the opinions of those black people, who may number some tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, who can understand what it is about and bring new proposals to us or that we take new proposals to them. That is one possibility. The third possibility is that we do what the Americans did; that is, consult no one at all and just take off the sanctions. That is the one I would prefer.
My Lords, I want to return to this question of honour. Your honour is not engaged because you have lost the battle. You are much wiser to go back to other lines, to fight your battle again, if it is a military battle or if it is a battle of words or a battle of political theories. Fight it again in some other direction or in some other part. It is said that we cannot get out of the obligation to the United Nations. I think that is quite absurd. All we have to do is just what we like—I was going to use stronger words—and the United Nations cannot do a thing about it. They can pass resolu
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tions till they are blue in the face but it does not make any difference to anybody. That is a fact. It is no good pretending that it has any effect—not upon big people or strong people. It has no more effect on us than water on a duck's back.
So I advocate that we vote against the sanctions to-night. I do not expect that it will prevail. One ought to be responsible for what may happen if it does, and I have already said that it will probably come back again from the other place and then we can let it go by. Send it back for consideration. That is the kind of duty that I think we have to perform. One last reason for this vote, my Lords. It will be a shot across the bows of the ship of State and it will warn the Foreign Secretary—a man I very dearly and greatly admire—and the Government that they cannot come back and do this again next year.
4.39 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I have listened to many speeches in this House during the years that I have been a Member of it, but I cannot remember ever having listened to a speech so forceful and so condensed as that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce. After he had spoken I felt that there was no more to be said. I am afraid, however, that that is not going to stop many of us, including myself, from saying things. Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, I am afraid that there still are things which must be said, because the force of the logic and truth in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, does not seem to have got home to the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale.
I cannot attempt to express what Lord Pearce has just done so well as he did, but I should like to put it to the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, and any of his friends who may still feel as he does—any of those 83 noble Lords who signed the letter that has been referred to and whose minds have not yet been changed—that the issue is really quite a simple one. Her Majesty's Government, through the person of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, arrived at a provisional agreement with Mr. Smith, thanks largely to the ability and skill of the noble Lord, Lord Good-

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man. That agreement was subject to the agreement of the people of Rhodesia as a whole, and it was made clear, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, has said, that if they agreed sanctions would be removed, and if they did not agree sanctions would not be removed. As the noble and learned Lord told us he undertook his important commission on that understanding.
Now that it has been shown beyond a peradventure that the people of Rhodesia as a whole reject these proposals, the Government, to their credit and to their honour, have adhered to their original policy, and the agreement has not been ratified. That surely is quite a simple issue of honour. The noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, said that there is nothing dishonourable in losing a battle. Of course there is not, and nobody would suggest that there is. There may he incompetence; there may be cowardice; but there is no dishonour simply in losing a battle. There is, however, dishonour in deserting your friends; those who rely on you, who trust you, and to whom you have a responsibility. Those are the people of Rhodesia, who have shown clearly, through the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, what it is that they want and what it is that they trust Her Majesty's Government to do.
My Lords, sanctions have had some effect, although perhaps not so much effect as we should have wished. They have, as we all agree, at least brought Mr. Smith to the negotiating table, and have persuaded him to move farther than he had ever moved before. Without sanctions we should never have had the negotiations with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and we should never have had the Commission of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, and his colleagues. The effects are slow, but they are cumulative. They are gradually building up, and we are seeing increasingly the effect they are having, particularly in the capital structure of Rhodesia. After seven years of sanctions much of their capital equipment' is wearing out. They need new aircraft, for instance, for their internal air lines. They need new equipment for their essential industries. That they are finding it ever harder to get; they know it, and it is worrying them. What is even more important to them is that they want access to
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the capital markets of the world; and that they are denied. These pressures building up on them have brought them to their present stage, and if continued, as they will be, will bring them still further towards a fruitful form of negotiation.
I should like to make one remark here in support of something mentioned by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We know that sanctions are being broken. We know of the glaring example of the export of chrome to the United States. I would urge upon Her Majesty's Government to use all the diplomatic persuasion and pressure of which they are capable to persuade the United States Government to fulfil their obligations in respect of sanctions. I would also urge them to look seriously at the possibility, by legal constitutional means in this country, of declaring chrome and such other commodities as are illegally exported from Rhodesia against the sanctions to which we and our friends are parties, as the property of (shall I say?) some holding body in this country, so that a payment for them must be made not to the Rhodesian companies and individuals, but to this body acting as trustees for them against such time as Rhodesia once more returns to legality.
Sanctions must be maintained. Of that I have no doubt, and most of your Lordships have no doubt. But we must do more than we are doing. It is no use simply letting the proposals lie on the table. It will be a long time before they are picked up; and if they are picked up again I believe the result will be as it has been up till now. What we must do is to work positively for a settlement. A settlement can be achieved only if there is the agreement of the Rhodesian people as a whole. As my noble friend reminded us, if we needed reminding, that means the black Rhodesians just as much as the white Rhodesians.
The report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, demonstrated one thing above all others; namely, that the reason why the proposed settlement was rejected was not so much because of its terms, but because of the lack of confidence of the black Africans in the white Rhodesian Government. Until there is some improvement in that situation and some form of confidence is created, there is little hope of achieving a settlement that is satisfactory to us as well as to

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them. There are various ways in which this can be achieved. It may be achieved slowly—it is bound to take a long time—but we must work towards it. One way is by certain acts of the Rhodesian Government: not big acts; not acts which go against their real philosophy, but acts which could have enormous significance. For instance, they should release Mr. and Mrs. Chinamanu and others who have been restricted because of their political views. Such an act would go some way towards creating confidence.
My Lords, while I am on the subject of those who are detained in prison—. and noble Lords will have read letters in the Press describing their conditions, which cannot give pleasure to anybody—I would remind your Lordships of the case of Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Prime Minister, a respected statesman and a fine man. It is true that he has been released from gaol with no charges made against him, but he is still detained and restricted in his movements. The effect of that restriction, which I do not think is known to many of your Lordships, is that he is allowed to move from his house, but not far enough to visit any other house, and not even far enough to travel round his own farm. He has perhaps one bright spot: the circumference which is drawn around his house and beyond which he is not allowed to go is just wide enough for him to go down to the river, where he can fish. That is the life to which this former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, this loyal Rhodesian, this fine man is condemned by this arbitrary act of the present Rhodesian Government. The removal of that restriction would in itself help to create some confidence.
A second matter, again already mentioned, is the situation of the Tangwena people. They have been evicted from their ancestral and traditional holdings: and not only that, but 110 Tangwenan children were removed from their mothers and fathers in August of this year in order to be placed, in the words of the Rhodesian Government, "in a place of safety". That kind of action cannot lead to any increase at all in confidence. But until the mistrust between black and white Rhodesians is removed there can be no possible hope of settlement; and that distrust cannot be
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removed until there is contact between the two sides and they are able to speak.
One other thing which the Pearce Commission helped to achieve was the appearance of the African National Council. To-day, there is a body which can speak for the African people. Later on I am sure it will split into many different groups, but to-day there is that one body. Some of its leaders have been restricted; some have had their passports removed; and they are not accepted by the Rhodesian Government as being able to speak for the Africans. It is essential that the leaders of the African National Council be given full freedom to travel—to travel abroad, to come to this country, to talk to us and to other people; to travel in their own country, to speak and to write. If they speak wise things, if they speak the truth, nobody need be afraid. If they speak seditiously and incite to violence, there are laws under which they can be prosecuted. There is nothing to fear from them, only the fact that they may succeed in doing something which the present Government do not wish—
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, before the noble Lord finishes, would he allow one question? I much admire his sincerity, though I do not agree with him very much. I just wonder whether he knows where chrome comes from. If we do not get it from Rhodesia we have to get it from Russia. We cannot make our entire stock of armaments, nor can the Americans, without chrome. Unless all armaments are going to be abolished we must have chrome; so we buy this from a country which locks up its opposition, but we must not buy it from another country which locks up some of the opposition. Is that the noble Lord's philosophy?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, that is not my philosophy. My philosophy is that as members of the United Nations, which is our greatest strength against attack in the world to-day, we must adhere to the sanctions of the United Nations. Your Lordships may laugh, but do you seriously think that we in this country, with its 55 million people, are any longer capable of defending ourselves as we did in the great days of the British Empire? Of course we cannot: do not let us fool ourselves. Her Majesty's Government, the Opposition and indeed all of us, have supported the United Nations,

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and helped to create it, because we believe it to be the greatest force for world peace. Now the noble Lord is saying. "Let us turn our backs on it." I would say also that of course we need chrome for armaments; but does not the noble Lord know that the stockpiles in the United States to-day, with no further imports whatsoever, are sufficient for all their requirements for the next four or five years? There is no need, for defence purposes, to buy chrome from Rhodesia.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: Not if there is a major war?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, if I may now continue, what I am suggesting is that if there is to be a settlement there must be contacts from both sides, and we must use our endeavours to promote, if not talks then at least, in the old phrase, talks about talks. This will not come simply by wishing for it. Her Majesty's Government must take the initiative and I would suggest to them that they should appoint some respected figure—there are many of them: I will not embarrass noble Lords by mentioning some of them who are already in this Chamber; and there are others outside—whose job would be primarily to do this. Of course he must not confine his activities solely to Rhodesia, because when we get down to it the key to a settlement in Rhodesia lies North and South of Rhodesia: it lies in Pretoria, in Lisbon, in Lusaka, in Dares-Salaam.
This person whom I urge Her Majesty's Government to appoint would do his best to bring the African National Council and the Rhodesian Front—openly or behind closed doors, I do not mind how—together to talk. He must also "lean upon the leaders of South Africa and Portugal (there are many ways in which he can do that, and I need not elaborate upon them), in order to get them to use their endeavours to bring about a settlement, which they wish for, particularly in South Africa, and also to "lean upon" those in Zambia, in Kenya and in Tanzania to use their influence with the leaders of the African National Council to do the same. There is not so much need to do that, because the African National Council has already announced that it is willing to meet anybody at any time in any place. In other words, my
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Lords, Her Majesty's Government must now renounce their passive attitude of letting the proposals lie on the table and seeing what happens. They must positively work, slowly, quietly and persistently, towards bringing together the black Africans in Rhodesia and the white Africans. In so doing, they will be helped, I believe, by some wise man, respected throughout Africa, whose job it would be to achieve just this.
4.56 p.m.
LORD O'NEILL OF THE MAINE: My Lords, I rise to support the Government in general and the Foreign Secretary in particular. Anything that anybody says in this noble House after listening to what the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, was able to say in four minutes is certainly a little superfluous, so I will try to be very brief. There are, in my view, many occasions in history when policies have been abandoned just as they were about to be successful. As the noble Baroness said in introducing this Order, it could well be that this policy, although it has appeared up to now to have been unsuccessful, will produce the possibility of talks and movement in the future. I always thought it was a mistake for the Government of the day who introduced sanctions to suggest that it would work in a matter of weeks. I was interested to hear Mr. Callaghan this morning on the B.B.C. "Today" programme more or less admitting that himself. Ever since this problem has been on our plates Sir Alec has shown great courage. In 1964 there was the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, which could well have been wrecked on the rocks of Rhodesia had it not been for the skill which he showed at that time. I personally believe—and I am not making this remark in any spirit of hostility to the gentlemen on the Front Bench, many of whom are my friends—that had Sir Alec won the Election in 1964 and had he been able to continue to negotiate with Mr. Smith, U.D.I. would not have been declared.
May I, for one moment, digress? In a very slim volume which I brought out this week, I retail my tiny little efforts which took place some five weeks before U.D.I. was declared. It so happened that Sir Humphrey Gibbs's son fell ill in Belfast, and Lady Gibbs came to stay with us. She realised, as did any intelligent person, that we were on the eve of

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U.D.I., and I made a suggestion to her, not in a vacuum but based on previous knowledge, that if there were to be a Royal visit to Rhodesia from, I suggested, Her Majesty the Queen Mother, possibly U.D.I. would not be declared. I based that on my knowledge of the Queen Mother's very successful visit some years before that event. I am not giving away any secrets, because I retell this in my slim volume which has been published this week. I immediately contacted the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, and put this proposition to him—not, naturally, in the name of the Governor. I wish to make it plain that Lady Gibbs said she could not speak for anybody. Nevertheless, I put this proposition in front of the Prime Minister and he gave it the most careful consideration. After a week he informed me that, on balance, they had decided that it was not possible to pursue this suggestion. Soon after that, U.D.T. was declared.
Sir Humphrey's son, when he was allowed out of hospital, spent Christmas with us. Again I made an approach, but on a slightly different angle, because by this time the Queen Mother had had a serious operation. Remembering that Dr. Malan, who formed the first Nationalist Government in South Africa, had asked the King out to recuperate, I suggested that possibly the Queen Mother might go out to Government House to recuperate. Once again this was found not to be possible. I mention this merely in passing; but—and there are so many "ifs" and "buts" in this whole unfortunate history—possibly U.D.I. might not have been declared, on both the counts of Sir Alec's personal character and courage and of the possibility of a Royal visit.
All I should like to say, in conclusion, is that once again I support the Foreign Secretary, who has had such tremendous experience in the particular field about which we are talking to-day. We cannot possibly ignore the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, who brought to our attention that in this very year we gave certain undertakings, and we should not go back on them and break our word. We should pay attention to what the noble and learned Lord had to say, and I wholeheartedly support the Government in their continuation of sanctions for at least another year.
5.3 p.m.
LORD CARADON: My Lords, it is necessary, in dealing with a subject we have often debated before, that all of us, on both sides of the House, should endeavour to exercise restraint in what we say. I believe that decisions are to be taken now which not only are of far-reaching consequence for Rhodesia and, indeed, for Africa, but are of far-reaching consequence for the future reputation and position of this country, and for the future effectiveness of the institution of the Commonwealth, and most certainly in the relationships of this country with the United Nations. I believe that what we decide now, and the course which is now set, will affect the whole prospect of British leadership in the world in coming years. Therefore I do not feel that in having a long debate, if necessary, we are in any way shirking our responsibilities or failing in our duties.
I believe that it is very necessary that we should look at the various propositions before us, and take a decision which can, I greatly hope, enable us to escape from the hesitations, errors and failures of the past. There have been many of them, and they have not been the responsibility of one Party alone. Therefore I listened with very special attention to the speech from the noble Baroness who opened our debate. My respect for her skill, if not always for her politics, is unlimited. I thought she almost excelled herself this afternoon in the skill that she showed in dealing with a very difficult situation. There were one or two things she said which gave me encouragement.
The noble Baroness did not fail to emphasise—and it should be emphasised, especially in view of what we have heard subsequently—that we have a mandatory obligation. It is not for us to decide alone exactly what should be done. In the Security Council I had the honour of moving a resolution which was accepted unanimously and which imposed upon this country, at the institution and initiative of this country, an obligation from which we cannot be released except by a positive vote requiring nine votes of the fifteen in the Security Council. I was glad that the noble Baroness did not shirk that responsibility. It is as well that we should know and be reminded of it.

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Secondly, and rightly, it must be admitted, she said that sanctions have done their work. I would not put it in the past; I would say they have started to do their work. Universally it is accepted in the Press—even in the Press of South Africa and, indeed, Rhodesia—that sanctions are having an increasing effect. The net is closing, and this is not disputed. I am glad that the noble Baroness should have said so herself. I am glad that she proposed to us that sanctions should be renewed for a year. That is what we are considering. I say that particularly in view of what we read in the newspapers yesterday that there was some suggestion that the matter might be reviewed in July. We are considering the continuation of sanctions for a year.
The noble Baroness said that it is the purpose and policy of the Government, as it has been stated elsewhere, to make existing sanctions more effective, and it is of that policy that I wish to speak for a short while this evening. I was glad that the noble Baroness emphasised that we have a British responsibility. Indeed, we have an international responsibility; but primarily it has been claimed—I have claimed repeatedly on behalf of this country in the United Nations—that we have a primary responsibility. We cannot shirk it: we cannot run away from it. As I listened to the speech of the noble Baroness, I remembered from my school days the quotation from Edmund Burke:
"Tyranny is a weed which grows in every soil,
Freedom they can have from none but you."
That is indeed the situation which we face in this Parliament—the freedom they can have from none but us. It should be our pride as well as our obligation to see that we do our duty.
Since I speak in favour of the necessity of restraint, I think it is important that we should not be provoked by statements from the other side of the House which normally we should not wish to pass, statements which are insulting to the African peoples generally. Normally we would wish to react to them because someone should be here in this House to speak on behalf of the peoples of Africa and not only on behalf of Rhodesians. Rhodesians are referred to as if only white Rhodesians counted. Therefore I would not wish to be provoked to deal
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with the insulting comments that have been made in relation to the African peoples, except to repeat that you do not justify the perpetuation of a greater evil in South Africa by the evil which we know exists to-day in Uganda. If we need any quotation at all to support what I say about the great dangers of the situation and the importance of what we are dealing with, I quote Sir Alec Douglas-Home when he was Prime Minister. He said:
"I believe the greatest danger ahead of us is that the world might be divided on racial lines. I see no other danger, not even the nuclear bomb, which could be so catastrophic as that."
I agree with him. We are dealing here with one of the great racial issues of the world and it is well that we should realise its immense importance. People who speak to us in such insulting terms about Africans are those who have been silent to condone and to approve the actions South of the Zambesi, some of them of such cruelty, such callousness, that we on this side cannot be silent when we see these things happening. A day or two ago I saw a film in these premises which gave the illustration of Africans being taken out into the desert and being dumped like rats without shelter or without sustenance. No word of protest comes from the other side of the House when we hear of those things. It is only when it is an accusation against Africans that we hear the sort of speeches we have heard already this evening.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. I am following him closely and with at least some of his remarks I find myself in very full agreement. But I must say to the noble Lord that I have listened to the whole debate this afternoon. I have listened to my noble friends. Some of my noble friends who have spoken hold different views from those I hold on this issue. But I cannot in all conscience say that they have been insulting towards black Africa.
LORD CARADON: My Lords, I am glad to accept what the noble Earl the Leader of the House says, and if I have exaggerated what I took as an insult then I very gladly withdraw.
I go on to say that there are, as has been pointed out, some encouraging in

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stances of developments which we must welcome. We have first the fact that the Constitution proposed for Rhodesia no longer need be considered. The kindest thing, perhaps, we can say about the Goodman Constitution was that it was a miscarriage. It would have divided, degraded, disenfranchised the majority of the people of Rhodesia indefinitely, for ever, permanently. At any rate, it is good that that Constitution no longer need be considered. We also know that the attempts to turn the resounding "No" into a "Yes" have utterly failed, and I am sure they will. It is good to know that sanctions are having increasing effect. It is good to know that there is a realisation, I believe an increasing realisation, on all sides that there can be a satisfactory settlement only by agreement. We also know very well that agreement and persecution are not purposes which can go ahead at the same time. And persecution, we have ample evidence, continues.
However, if I have offended against my own rule of seeking to speak with restraint, I gladly proceed now to speak, if I may, entirely constructively. As we know, there are three possible policies. We have known this all along and it is clearer than ever now that there are three possible policies in regard to Southern Africa generally—not only South Africa and Portuguese territories and South-West Africa and Rhodesia. The first policy is a policy of appeasement; that we should go to those in authority and say, "We will agree with you. Whatever you say we will accept. The justification we will put forward is that we couldn't get anything better" This is one policy. The second policy is one of violence. I have never supported it. Certainly I admire men who are prepared to go out and give their lives for the freedom of their country, and I will speak no word against them. But I believe there is a peaceful alternative, and it is our duty to work for it. It is that conviction which makes me speak with the strongest of feeling because I foresee that the violence which will occur if we fail in this effort together is something which is beyond all description.
I noted particularly what President Nyerere to say about guerrilla warfare. He said:
"Guerrilla war is brutal, horrible and destructive to innocent and guilty, victim and
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oppressor alike. We must do our utmost to avoid it."
I am sure he is right. If through the whole of Southern Africa there is to be a resort to violence, as is not tar away, I fear, then the consequences to the whole of Africa, and indeed the whole world, are beyond imagination. We must therefore work for the third policy, which we have been advocating for some years past. The third policy is mounting pressure on the régimes South of the Zambesi. Mounting pressure for what purpose? For one purpose. For African consultation; African participation. It is not for us to tell the Africans exactly how they should proceed to their full democratic system. Not at all. They can work it out for themselves. It is not for us to tell them even the timetable. Let them say what they wish. But they cannot be left out. They must participate. That is all they ask.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, might I ask the noble Lord a question with regard to the last sentence? He said he considered it was for the Africans to work out what they wanted for themselves. Does he admit that he himself was a sponsor of a campaign known as the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign, he being a sponsor and the right reverend Trevor Huddleston the other sponsor, after the agreement which was reached between the British Government and Mr. Smith? May I ask him what was the object of his Justice for Rhodesia Campaign if, as he said, it is purely for the African?
LORD CARADON: My Lords, I have often spoken for the Justice for Rhodesia Campaign. I am doing so now. We believe that there should be mounting pressure for African participation. That is what we have said; that is what Bishop Muzorewa says; that is what the Africans are saying. That is what we demand and they demand. There can be no other satisfactory answer to people who merely ask that they should have some say in the future of their country. This is what we have been advocating: it is what I have been advocating within this House and outside it. We therefore urge that there should be mounting pressure for African participation.
Now I come to a specific proposal. I have had experience for some ten years of working in and for the United Nations. I have experience of the futilities and

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the failures which there exist. I know the reasons why the sanctions policy adopted at our initiative in the United Nations has not been more successful. The Security Council sits as a Sanctions Committee once every few months. The members of the Committee have a hundred other matters on their minds, urgent questions of international affairs. They meet occasionally and then, after a short meeting, adjourn for another few months. There is a diversity of responsibility in the Secretariat itself. Many Governments are concerned; many legal complications exist. The fact is that there is no leadership, there is no coherence, there is no drive in dealing with the carrying out of this sanctions policy.
We have heard many suggestions put forward here to-night, and some of them are excellent. The African Bureau has done an admirable task, in my opinion, in carrying out a most thorough examination. I do not say that everything in their recommendations could be supported, but it is a very serious attempt. I am glad they are doing what I think this Government might have been doing. But the proposals exist. What we shall need now is someone who can take hold of this problem, give leadership to it. unity; and therefore I have a specific recommendation to make. Let there be a commissioner for United Nations sanctions, appointed by the United Nations and responsible to the Security Council. Let him give his whole mind, with an adequate staff of course, to sealing the loopholes, dealing with the evasions, proposing methods for improved execution of the sanctions policy, which all of us recognise has not been satisfactory so far.
I have taken the trouble to list, and I ask your Lordships' indulgence to allow me to suggest, what the terms of the mandate to such a United Nations commissioner might be. They are: (1) to coordinate all existing action under Security Council sanctions and resolutions; (2) to give publicity to breaches and evasions and to make representations to Governments concerned; (3) to consider, encourage and initiate proposals for making Security Council sanctions more effective and, where necessary, to make recommendations to the Security Council for further action or additional authority; (4) to prepare the plan of action accord
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ingly and to report every two months to the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council on action taken and new recommendations for the future; (5) generally to assume responsibility and leadership in positive action to achieve the purposes approved and authorised by the Security Council.
My Lords, I have two things that I wish to say. I believe it is now for us to decide whether there shall be a policy of drift, without any particular purpose in mind, ashamed to go back, afraid to go forward. I believe that, both Parties having accepted a policy, it should be our purpose, as the noble Baroness told us earlier to-day, to make it effective. I believe that the proposal I have made is entirely in that direction, and I cannot imagine that it would not be supported. I am certainly not asking for a snap decision to be given across this noble House on a proposal which I have just made, but I would most urgently ask that this proposal should be considered. hope that it will be put forward by the Government in the United Nations: and if not that, then I hope it will be supported when it is put forward, as I am sure it will be, by others.
In conclusion, I wish to stress once more the danger and the urgency of the matter. I recently had the great honour of being asked by the people of Namibia to go and help them, and I am proud to do so. I do not think there will be many more opportunities for that sort of dialogue and assistance between and black people. In different parts of the world we see a dangerous situation developing. when it will become increasingly difficult to have any understanding or cooperation between the peoples of the different races. There is not much time. Therefore I feel, with the strongest possible feelings, that our obligation in this Parliament at this time is to show that we honour the obligation which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, has preferred, and I should like to pay my respect to the noble and learned Lord and to the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, and those who worked with them, for having so signally restored the reputation of this country in Africa.
5.24 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken started his speech by saying that

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he was going to be restrained, and I should like to congratulate him on being—after he had received a little assistance from my noble friend Lord Jellicoe—restrained. The noble Lord, Lord Caradon, referred to British leadership in the world at the present time, and the thing that troubles me at the moment is that Britain is clinging to a policy which is so riddled with hypocrisy; I refer to the policy of sanctions. I am one of those who believes that it is time sanctions were brought to an end, even for that reason only, and I will expand on that point briefly.
We have had sanctions for seven years, and during that time they have not succeeded in their original object of bringing the Smith régime to its knees. In fact the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, quite freely acknowledged that fact, and he went on to make suggestions for strengthening sanctions through the United Nations. I disagree with that proposal, but I will not follow the point at the moment. Sanctions have not succeeded in bringing the Smith régime to its knees, and they never will. What they probably have done is to strengthen the Smith régime. It is well known all over the world that sanctions are honoured more in the breach than in the observance, and even the United States of America, without which the United Nations would not get very far, financially or otherwise, have themselves passed special legislation to breach sanctions; and we all know that many other African States have also breached sanctions. It has been acknowledged by some that Zambia has to break sanctions in order to live.
LORD CARADON: My Lords, may I say that Zambia, at great cost and great disadvantage to its own economy, has made marked reductions in its imports from the South and from Rhodesia, and has indeed suffered in this respect more than any other single country.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: But Zambia is breaking sanctions, my Lords.
LORD CARADON: Not at all, my Lords. Zambia has gone to the United Nations and pointed out that in certain respects, owing to communications difficulties, it is impossible to obtain its supplies from other sources and therefore it has received the understanding and the
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approval and admiration of the United Nations in the action it has taken.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, it may have got that, but in fact that is one of the absurdities and nonsenses which is a good illustration of what I was saying. It illustrates the humbug and hypocrisy—
LORD CARADON: My Lords, I will not interrupt again, but to say that it is humbug for a country, at a cost to its own economy and at considerable sacrifice, to reduce imports, with the full understanding and approval of those who passed the original resolution, is not right. It is not humbug; it is sacrifice.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, it is humbug on the part of the United Nations anyway to operate these mandatory sanctions which are supposed to be in force and then to give a let-out to a country which says, "We must have a let-out, otherwise we cannot live." Of course this is hypocrisy.
As I was saying, the fact that Britain is clinging to this policy which is surrounded by hypocrisy and humbug is one of the worst things about it. Much has been said—and I would entirely agree—to the effect that black and white living in Rhodesia have to settle their own problems. We do not live there, and it is wrong for us to say that we can impose a settlement on South Africa, or anywhere South of the Zambesi, on the people who live there, many of whom were born there. They have to sort out their problems for themselves. But the noble Lord was saying that he approves of the policy of bringing intense pressure South of the Zambesi to force the white population to let the Africans participate. Of course it does not appear to them like that. It appears that they are being forced in the end to accept majority rule, and they know what that means; they have seen it happening in other parts of Africa and they will not accept majority rule. The pressures have always been brought South of the Zambesi. and similar things done North of the Zambesi are never condemned by the people who are bringing those pressures South of the Zambesi. Black and white living in Rhodesia must settle their own problems, and I believe that if the blacks were not continually looking over their shoulders at sanctions,

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which hold out a false promise, there would be more likelihood of their participation.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, would the noble Lord explain why the Africans specifically requested that sanctions should continue, and that the Pearce Commission supported this?
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: Probably, my Lords, because they are misled and they think that sanctions can have an effect, while we know they cannot. That is another thing which illustrates my point. As I was saying, I believe that if they were not encouraged to look to sanctions to produce for them something which we know sanctions cannot produce, there would be more likely to be what my noble friend called the growing spirit of compromise. That would be the effect of removing sanctions rather than doing the opposite. Many may not agree with me, but that is my view.
I promised to be brief, and I will not detain your Lordships. I hope I have made clear my feeling that it is particularly distasteful to find Britain maintaining a policy which is so much surrounded by false promise, false assumptions and hypocrisy. I find it humiliating that Britain should be clinging to a policy of that nature. For that reason alone I shall feel forced to vote against the Order.
5.31 p.m.
LORD BOYLE OF HANDSWORTH: My Lords, I apologise sincerely for the fact that, owing to a conference, I was late for the beginning of this debate and therefore, to my great regret, missed the speech of my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie. She will know how much I regret missing her remarks. I also just missed what it is obvious, from what I have heard from all sides since arriving in the Chamber, was a quite outstanding contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce.
I have been concerned to speak in this debate for a few minutes to give three reasons why, for my part, I regard the Government's decision to continue with sanctions for a further year not as evidence of hypocrisy but as the only wise and right course they could have taken.
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First, I endorse what I understand was the clearly expressed view of the noble Lord, Lord Pearce: that for the Government not to have continued with sanctions for a further year, so soon after the appearance of the Report, would have been not only unjustified but dishonourable and would have amounted to the breaking of a promise.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, did my noble friend hear the reply of the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale?
LORD BOYLE OF HANDSWORTH: I did, my Lords, and I intend later in my remarks to refer to it. I simply wish at this stage to add to what I have said about the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, that I believe this to have been one of the finest Reports I have read. However much we may regret the circumstances, it is in my view one of the finest pieces of work of its kind that has been presented to Parliament since the war. I entirely endorse what has been said about the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, my noble friend Lord Harlech and the others who served on that Commission, and I should be most unhappy for us to appear to breach the good faith which everybody accepted when that Report was published, and when the inevitable consequences followed.
Secondly, I ask your Lordships to consider this crucial question: what is this issue fundamentally about this afternoon? Frankly, I am not a supporter of "No independence before majority rule." I have never expected African majority rule to come to-morrow, or even in a year or two. Nevertheless, I strongly feel that African majority rule must come, at least in my lifetime, and in this context I would say something which touches on the essential point of the Pearce Report namely, that the Pearce Commission made it clear that the mistrust was not just of the precise proposals but was of the whole attitude of the Smith régime.
In this context I cannot help recalling what I believe to have been one of the wisest comments about politics made in recent years, when the distinguished Professor Sir Isiah Berlin said:
"Political wisdom must consist in always trying to narrow the gap between the value which men and women put on their own

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personalities and the value put on their personalities by the society within which they live."
Here we have the crucial point. With respect to my noble friend Lord Grimston, it is no good trying to dismiss this point by reference to Africans' being misled. I have no doubt that Africans in Rhodesia simply do not believe that the Smith régime is trying to narrow that gap, and this is something we have to take as an essential factor in the situation.
The noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, to whose speech I listened with close attention, felt we had to recognise that we had lost the battle. I am not absolutely convinced of that. I understand that the noble Baroness referred to this matter in her remarks. One heard that the Smith régime was a little more inclined to make further concessions, as it were, just past the twelfth hour when the negotiations were reaching a conclusion. I do not think we shall have continuous progress, but I do not believe it is impossible, even now, that we may find that there is something worth while to play for. But even if I am proved wrong about that, and even if I felt that it was overwhelmingly probable that we would lose this battle, I should still feel it right not to accept final defeat at this precise moment. There are times when it is right to carry on as it were a rearguard action rather longer and to say that final recognition of the loss of the battle has not come yet. I say that not only for the reasons I have given but for two others. First, I cannot help thinking in this debate of the generations of service given by British people in Central Africa. I cannot help thinking of the work of missionaries and of friends one has known personally who have given their lives to improving conditions in Central Africa. We should have them very much in mind this afternoon before we too easily accept the conclusion that the battle is finally lost.
Secondly, looking forward, we must bear in mind the future of the Commonwealth. I am one of those who fully accept that, whatever doubts one may have had about the E.E.C. decision, this is something now decided by Parliament as decisively as anything could be. I still hope that we shall not make the mistake of imagining that the Commonwealth is no longer an institution of significance. Many Colonial Secretaries
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of the past (I include among them Mr. Macleod and Mr. Maudling) helped to save many parts of Africa for the Commonwealth, and we must look at this question in that context.
Thirdly, I make a brief reference to opinion at home because this, too, should not be disregarded altogether. Opinion in Britain to-day is genuinely divided on a number of issues and in rather an unfamiliar way. I agree with an article in the Economist last week which suggested that a number of members of the professional classes in this country, not all of them members of the Labour Party, are moving a little in a Left Wing direction, whilst, equally, there are many wage earners who are moving in a Right Wing direction. This situation needs to be handled, politically, with skill and wisdom and Governments must understand sympathetically both these points of view. Frankly, I believe that this would have been an extremely bad issue on which to affront many of those, including a number of younger Conservatives, who spoke up bravely for the present Government at the most recent Party Conference. I say deliberately "would have been" because I never dreamt for a moment that this would happen.
I have one constructive suggestion to make for the future—though I do not know whether other noble Lords have raised this point. I have always wondered whether even now there was not some possibility of exerting pressure for progress in Rhodesia in the sphere of education. I have always hoped that it might be possible to urge, as part of any settlement, for some increasing of opportunity in secondary and higher education, so that one automatically got more voters on to the A roll. This is a point which the Government ought surely to press, because there is no doubt that the necessary administrative strength is there, if only the political decision can be taken. I have spoken to visiting Rhodesian officials, responsible for education, about this. Furthermore, the Government in Britain have always made known their readiness to help on the financial side.
My Lords, all I would wish to say finally is that this is one of those occasions when the wise course coincides with the honourable course. I have absolutely no doubt that the right course for this

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House to-night is to support the Foreign Secretary and support the Government, and I hope that the majority will be as large as possible, because I am certain that the policy of the Government is the only wise and honourable course for this nation to pursue.
5.40 p.m.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, I, too, must apologise to the House for not being here for a short time this afternoon owing to another engagement. The Parliaments and the peoples of this Realm have certain standards. Those standards are the standards of liberty, of opportunity and of equality before the law. They have also a loyalty to the Crown as a repository of these liberties and freedoms. The Government of Rhodesia as presently constituted does not believe in any of those virtues. The supporters of the Rhodesian Government among my noble friends on this side of the House I am sure quite sincerely believe that the Rhodesian Government acts in the best interests of Rhodesia, even though it is a Government more in the tradition of the Romanovs than of the Windsors.
My Lords, let us examine this proposition. Rhodesia has a population of approximately 4½ million people, and 225,000 of these are white settler stock. They have contributed enormously to the development of that country: they provide most of the drive and most of the initiative; they have cleared the bush and created great enterprises. All this achievement, great as it is, must be preserved and expanded. Unfortunately, however, the mental process of these white settlers is cemented into an attitude of mind of the 1930s. The African outlook, on the contrary, has advanced and changed. To achieve the objective of peace in Rhodesia and its continuous prosperity, my noble friends in all parts of this side of the House—and perhaps I may be bold enough to speak for the people on the opposite side—all agree that there must be peace between all races. That means that the Europeans must come to terms with the Africans.
In Rhodesia a very responsible and liberal African National Congress has emerged, whose leader, Bishop Muzorewa, is well respected in Parliament, as well
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as by a large section of the white community over there. I know that several noble Lords will start quoting Biafra and General Amin, and General Bokassa and the war in the Congo, as arguments for supporting Smith. That seems to me to be a totally illogical-thesis: because Bucharest City Council is dominated by Russian bayonets it does not follow that Edinburgh Castle is garrisoned by Cossacks. Lagos is as far from Salisbury as Bucharest is from Edinburgh. The fact that one over-promoted Askari sergeant pushes Asians around, either to England or into the countryside of Uganda, is not an excuse for an over-promoted flying officer in a state of rebellion to push the Tangwena Africans off their tribal lands.
Sanctions brought Ian Smith to the negotiating table last year. The threat of them in various degrees brought him to "Tiger" and "Fearless". The Africans rejected Pearce and the Goodman-Home proposals thereby exercising their undoubted right under the Fifth Principle, which is, in my view, far and away the most important of all the five principles laid down by separate
Governments. Without an agreement there certainly will be a blood bath, and, as has been said of another river in another context, the Zambesi will run with blood. With an agreement there could still possibly be one, but there will at least be hope. This is not a happy prospect for Rhodesia, but sanctions are applying pressure to come to agreement, a slow and steady pressure, and therefore they must be, as the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, has suggested, hardened so that we may possibly reach a mutually acceptable agreement of some kind which will be of benefit to all Rhodesians. My Lords, I hope sincerely that we shall vote as the noble Lord, Lord Boyle of Handsworth, has said, massively for the reimposition of sanctions for the sake of Rhodesia and, perhaps even more importantly, for the sake of our own honour and our own traditions.
5.46 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, over the past years we have had so many debates and speeches on this subject of Rhodesia and sanctions that I shall try to avoid from any repetition of merits and demerits. But it is very difficult not to refer to some of the previous speeches

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even though one aims to restrain oneself by regarding the clock. Undoubtedly, to start with, this subject on which we are talking had come about through the ill-judgment of Mr. Wilson when he was Prime Minister in throwing it into the United Nations. Had it not been for the United Nations, surely our historical ability to deal with administrations of overseas countries would have produced a settlement long before now. If I refer to previous speeches, it would be natural that I should refer to my noble friend Lord Onslow who, I suspect, has a great dislike of U.D.I. I shall return to that later.
The noble Lord, Lord Caradon, on one of his infrequent appearances in this House, dealt at length with the United Nations aspect. I have already said that I have little respect for the United Nations being implicated, but the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, with his knowledge and long experience of the United Nations, gave us in rather extravagant language an idea of what may come from insufficient respect for the United Nations. Yet in spite of his great persuasiveness he has not succeeded in correcting arrears of some 40 countries nor the indebtedness which, so far as I can remember, at the last count was of the order of 70 million dollars.
May I refer now to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Walston, to whom I always listen with attention? The noble Lord referred to Lord Goodman, who had such an important part in this affair. Surely his recommendation should have been followed that the Pearce exercise should have been to learn what was best for the country as a whole. On the Pearce Report, should we be convinced, on any subject in the world, by a 5 per cent. sample? Not myself. Lord Walston made three points. The first I have just referred to. Then, on lack of capital investment, that Rhodesia was feeling discomfort. Thirdly, that there was lack of foreign investment; but surely a number of developing countries feel this. Surely an inexperienced Government would be unlikely to convince the money markets of the world. The noble Lord referred to Russia. Surely, if we dislike some Governments in Africa we dislike the oppression of Russia still more.
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An agreed settlement lies on the table. But for how long? Already seven years have elapsed. Are another seven years to pass? Had our forebears not had more sense than our present rulers the rebellious American colonies might have been in that condition into the following century. What are sanctions really supposed to bring about in the near run? Many speakers have referred to a change of Government. Any change of Government in Rhodesia will be more to the Right; everybody is agreed on that. Wreck the economy? For some that is what sanctions are intended to do. That would produce unemployment and a worse situation for the Africans we are aiming to help. Or a military solution? Britain has renounced that course. Rhodesia has the capability to resist it from any other source. Can we, of British stock, who survived the German pressure, who have seen the recent inhumanities of the ruthless Ugandan dictator, really believe that we would be willing to put ourselves under an untutored and unready black rule? Uganda has flouted the intention for Western constitutional rule on which independence was granted.
Surely this delay in putting into effect a settlement, for which we admire the Foreign Secretary's skill and patience, only delays giving to the Africans the too modest sum promised for education, though we were very grateful to hear from my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir the prospect that additional sums are to be made available now for education. But surely the agreement offered that forthwith! The Africans now are being denied it. I say this particularly because the need is for African education, the raising of African agriculture from subsistence level to cash crops. And let us remember, two-thirds of the population of Rhodesia depend on rural pursuits. I myself have taken the trouble when there to learn what is being done at the present moment, with devoted service, by white and black officials, for the improvement of agricultural education of the Africans. I wonder how many noble Lords who perhaps intend to vote tonight for continuing sanctions have taken the trouble themselves to go and see how important it is to help an agricultural country like Rhodesia.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, may I point out that one half of all the agricultural land in Rhodesia is occupied by five million blacks and one half by 250.000 whites. This is done under the Land Tenure Act, and the land the blacks occupy is the worst kind of agricultural land.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I respect the noble Baroness, but her observation is singularly strong support for my argument, to raise agriculture from subsistence level to cash crops.
My Lords, recently, at the time of the German visit, I passed Buckingham Palace, and I saw down the Mall that vista of the German flag and the Union Jack. I reflected on how many of my friends were killed in two world wars, and then I reflected on the five to six million civilians who were brutally exterminated. Compassionate forgiveness has its merits. But remember, under the Union Jack these Rhodesians served and died with our boys. To my noble friend Lord Onslow I would say that the declaration of independence does not merit absence of compassion towards the Rhodesians, if we were prepared to give it to the Germans after such hideous crimes. We are asked to continue economic warfare, to destroy the economy of Rhodesia. Economic warfare, subversive warfare, military warfare are all equally warfare, and that, it is suggested, should continue.
Theirs is an independence morally implied at the Victoria Conference and at many other conferences. Since 1923 there has been 50 years of orderly government; first, under the white Commonwealth with Great Britain at its head, and then under independence. It is one thing to make demands from 6.000 miles away in the comfortable tolerance of Westminster, but quite another thing to accept them under the immediate shadow of a Continent-wide holocaust of misrule. As has been said by previous speakers, the future of Rhodesia must, and will, be settled in Rhodesia by the Rhodesians themselves. The noble Baroness herself admitted yesterday that we have no authority to impose our will on Rhodesia except, perhaps, by adopting the cruelty of trying to destroy their economy. Many
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people question whether that is a moral procedure.
As an orthodox Conservative I am confident that the majority of Conservative voters in this country would like to see sanctions dropped. Any Government can always find reasons for any policy that they advocate, but the Government are coming to the House to ask us to support a policy which is against the wishes and views of the majority of Conservatives. I appeal to my noble Leader when he comes to speak, in concentrated words, just to tell us what it is intended in the near-run shall be accomplished by sanctions; also how long must the period of reflection remain in being. In spite of all that has been said, I must on logic and common sense go into the "Not-Content" Lobby.
6.4 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am glad to be following the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, in his speech. I think he is older than I am, but I envy the vigour, the clarity, and the depth of feeling with which he speaks. This debate has been repetitive, but it has had the value that it has been a debate. One does not have to begin one's speech by merely a courteous acknowledgement of what a previous speaker has said, but instead one can deal with his arguments in sequence.
There have been three main reasons which the opponents of sanctions have put forward for their attitude. The first—though it has been less expressed today in this House than it was in the letter to The Times by the 83—has been that in fact sanctions harm the indigenous population of Africa more than they do the white minority. Over the past decade I think one of the extraordinary facts in our relationship with the peoples of Africa and Asia has been that they were prepared to accept economic suffering for the realisation of their human equality; and that is now being expressed in Rhodesia. It was expressed in the Commission over which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, presided. And how moved we were by the speech which he gave here to-day! That Commission reported that the indigenous Africans were prepared to pay in their own worse conditions for their right of equality. This has been reflected in the speech of

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Bishop Muzorewa, chairman of the African National Council, at the United Nations Security Council in February, where he actually called for an intensification of sanctions.
The second ground for opposition which has been emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, is that in other African territories—and particularly in Uganda—the consequences of African self-government have been, despite all their claims, repression, inequality and racial antagonism. I make two comments upon that. The first is that anyone who has studied history must recognise that in the similar period when Europe was passing from empires to nation-States there were greater outrages, greater persecutions, and greater violence than there has been in Africa when it has been passing through this stage. Secondly, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, and his friends that when they condemn, as we must all condemn, the racialism in Uganda they must look in contrast to what has happened in Kenya, in Tanzania, and in Zambia. In the circumstances of those territories, their stand for racial equality is something that we should all admire.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Would he assert that true constitutional government, as was intended on granting independence, has continued in many African countries, including those which he himself named?
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I do not propose to enter into that in detail, but I think it a great mistake if we assume that the Westminster model of democracy must necessarily be adopted in all African and Asian countries in different circumstances. Even in the one-Party States, particularly in Tanzania and Zambia, an amazing degree of democracy is allowed, with Opposition candidates standing in their elections. The last word on this matter has already been quoted by my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, who quoted from Mr. Dingle Foot in The Times of yesterday—this remarkable Foot family! He asked:
"…why should racialist persecution in Kampala be held to excuse racialist persecution in Salisbury?"
Nothing need be said after that.
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The third argument that has been put forward by those who are urging the end of sanctions is that they have been ineffective. On the economic side, the expanding deficiency in the balance of payments in Rhodesia, the decimation of its tobacco industry, the severe restriction of its sugar industry, the shortage of heavy machinery not only affecting tractors for agriculture but making their railway service undependable, and, above all, the fact that they have been cut off from the world money market, thus creating a chronic shortage of foreign exchange, show that sanctions have been increasingly effective.
One can add to these economic facts two political facts: first, that sanctions have influenced the Smith régime on three separate occasions to enter into discussions with the British Government—and, indeed, if the leaks from Salisbury are now to be believed, similar pressures are now being exerted: and, secondly, that sanctions have modified the tendency in Rhodesia towards apartheid. If any evidence were needed of that, it is in the statement of Mr. Ian Smith at the Rhodesia Front Congress in September when he admitted to the Press that he had opposed demands at that Congress for the immediate introduction of segregationist measures, because of the shortage of foreign exchange and the lack of external investment.
I go on to say this at once. Despite the effectiveness of sanctions in these ways, we cannot be content with the fact that over seven years they have not succeeded in overthrowing the illegal administration in Rhodesia. But I say this to the House. The answer is not to withdraw sanctions; it is to make them globally effective. At this point I recognise that those of us who urge the continuance of sanctions have the duty to put forward methods to deal with their loopholes and with the evasions. I want here to acknowledge the research work which has been done by the African Bureau on this subject. I want to acknowledge what has been put forward in Alan Baldwin's pamphlet, published by the "Justice for Rhodesia" campaign. I want to acknowledge what has been done by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and by Liberation—formerly, the Movement for Colonial Freedom. Many of the proposals which I shall put forward are not of

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my own initiative, but are because they have made those contributions.
I want to suggest something which may seem to be very drastic. The goods which are now imported into Rhodesia, except those for humanitarian purposes, are black market goods. They are a challenge to the law of this country. They are contravening the decisions of our own Parliament and of the Security Council of the United Nations. I suggest that our Government should establish in law her sovereignty over goods which are imported into Rhodesia and exported from Rhodesia in contravention of the decisions of our Parliament; and, having done that in law, they should take every opportunity to sue for their recovery.
The Security Council of the United Nations will be meeting in January, and I make a number of suggestions which I would urge Her Majesty's Government to press upon the Security Council. The first is endorsement of the proposal which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, of the appointment of a High Commissioner to supervise the effective operation of sanctions. If there is sincerity in the United Nations' decision, it must be followed not merely by someone who is responsible for supervision, but by a staff and a secretariat who are capable of carrying it out.
The greatest contraventions of sanctions are through South Africa and Portuguese-occupied Mozambique. For other reasons than Rhodesia, I should like to see sanctions exerted against those countries as well, but I recognise that that is politically impossible. But what is politically possible—and it should be put forward to the Security Council—is that the blockade of Beira should be extended from oil to all goods which are in contravention of the present sanction decisions, and that blockade should be carried out not by British forces alone but jointly with other nations authorised by the United Nations. In addition, I suggest that it is quite inadequate that we should have this partial blockade of Beira without a blockade of Lourenco Marques. which is also in Mozambique. I would suggest to the Government that to enable such a blockade to take place there should be discussions with the new Government in Malagasy, which I think would be sympathetic to co-operation.
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The next suggestion which I ask should be submitted to the Security Council is that. by United Nations experts, there should be tests of goods from Rhodesia, through South Africa and Mozambique, at ports of arrival. This would be comparatively simple, because those goods are mostly minerals and tobacco, which are easy to detect. Next, my Lords, I suggest that sales contracts and insurance policies within the jurisdiction of member States should be required to include clauses forbidding the resale to Rhodesia or the re-export of Rhodesian goods. I follow that up with the suggestion that communications to Rhodesia should be cut—post, cables, telephone and air services—and I make an appeal to trade union organisations in this country to discourage their members from migrating to Rhodesia in present circumstances.
My Lords, I think African nations also have some responsibility. They should discriminate against known sanction-breaking countries and companies, as proposed by Julius Nyerere at the recent Rabat conference of the O.A.U.; and I should like to see all member States enacting legislation making sanction-breaking a criminal offence, as it is in Britain. This would affect shipping companies and agents as well as private companies. This is a whole series of quite practical proposals which could be put before the Security Council if this Government are sincere in making sanctions effective.
I conclude by saying this. I was a little disturbed by the report which appeared in the Press of the speech which Sir Alec Douglas-Home apparently delivered to the Bank-Benchers of his Party in the House of Commons. He indicated that, if they supported sanctions now, in July there might be some revision; and he also indicated that Britain could not maintain its sanctions if other member States of the United Nations broke them. That, as least, is the report which appeared in The Times and in other newspapers. Instead of that, I am urging that Her Majesty's Government should take the initiative in the Security Council to ensure that others do not break sanctions any more than we do.
In the speech which the noble Baroness delivered, and which I greatly appreciated, she indicated that a solution to this prob

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lem must be found by agreement within Rhodesia itself; and her advocacy was supported by our Front Bench. Surely the way to achieve this is the proposal that a Constitutional Conference should be held in Rhodesia, representative of all peoples, of all Parties and of all points of view, to work out a future Constitution for that country. It would be necessary, if such a Conference were called, that those who are now detained and imprisoned, many of them having been detained for seven years (some of them my very close friends—men of integrity and human passion) should be released, so that the indigenous African leaders as well as European representatives would have the opportunity to decide the future of their country.
6.25 p.m.
LORD MACLEOD OF FUINARY: My Lords, I have twice been in Southern Rhodesia, but as both occasions were before U.D.I. I do not intend to say much in that regard. These issues have been canvassed, rightly, on both sides by those with much more up-to-date authority to speak. Why, then, speak at all, when so many noble Lords are wishing to speak? Because, against the wider background, it seems to me essential that sanctions be retained. I therefore beg your Lordships' patience if at the outset I seem to be rather wide-ranging. For the sake of brevity I am bound to be telegraphic, which is always dangerous; and I am using quotations for the sake of accuracy. What, then, brings me to my feet? Primarily, it happens to be that for the last six months I have been addressing no fewer than 12 universities, not in a formal sense but speaking with them in a very colloquial sense, in casual comment, saying much more than I have said in discussion. These universities have been in Australia and in the United States, in England and in Scotland. Your Lordships may say that there is nothing significant about that, save that I suddenly became cumulatively aware that all were saying the same thing at one point in the conversation; namely, that they were all losing interest in democratic processes of any kind because the real power behind the throne, or the real power behind the presidencies, is not democratic legislatures any more but
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international cartels and banking complexes.
For brevity, let these quotations stand. Napoleon said:
"When a Government is dependent for money on banking, the bankers and not the leaders of the Government control the situation. Money has no motherland. Financiers are without patriotism. Their sole object is gain"
Or, a little more up to date, Nathan Rothschild said:
"Permit me to issue and control the money of a nation and I care not who makes its laws ".
Or, to come to 1970, there is Caboro Basa, about which we all know, at Mozambique, bordering on the edge of Rhodesia. The dam that is being erected there is to "make the desert blossom as the rose in order that tens of thousands of Portuguese whites can come out and further exacerbate the colour situation, where 24,000 Africans have been put off their ancestral lands and where 83,000 Africans have been put into large villages, fortified settlements such as you find in Vietnam. When it was discovered that Barclays Bank was putting up a good deal of the money for this purpose, on January 14, 1970, the students went to the annual meeting and protested to the chairman of D.C.O., and he replied to them, after the meeting:
"It is time people realised that the trade of this world is so entwined that if you were to cut yourself off for matters of principle there would be no world trade".
In the original Gaelic, that simply means that where property is concerned, to hell with principle!
There are some political historians who will be saying to me, "But has that not always been so?" I personally believe that it always has been so, but what people do not realise is that it has now come from the schools down to the market place, and everybody now knows it in these terms. I think the most significant thing that happened in the recent Presidential Election in the United States was that 46 per cent. of the electorate did not go to the polls at all. I personally believe that that 46 per cent. included a vast number of young people, and it was for that very reason. Why, the very voluble taximan who brought me from King's Cross here this very morning started a conversation when he heard what my address was, why I was going

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there and what was to be spoken about. Before I had opened my mouth on any side of the subject he was saying that Rhodesia was not a matter in the hands of democratic legislatures at all, it was in the hands of the bankers. That was the taximan speaking.
At a more serious level, up in that distant region which used to be called Scotland there is Hunstanton, where there have been vast hopes by innumerable people that something like 10,000 might be employed in steel production in that locality. What do we find? This is from South Africa:
"Britain's State-owned Steel Corporation and two West German firms are negotiating to make South Africa a major partner in West European steel production. Instead of improving and building new plants in the UK and West Germany, production will be expanded in South Africa. The British Steel stake may be as high as 125 billion dollars. This deal, if the negotiations are successful, will make Britain especially more economically dependent on South Africa. A leading Austrian steel concern has already concluded a major agreement, opening the way for establishing a powerful European-South African steel consortium."
The paper goes on to say that this will be a great blow to Scotland, and it will be a blow to the Scottish people who will at once say: "This is because we are not controlled by the Legislature at all". Indeed, we were informed that Hunterston was not to be used—not by the Government but by those people responsible for dealing with that kind of inter-banking organisation. On these grounds, it is important in a democratic Legislature that we should not seem to be shilly-shallying on this question of sanctions.
Secondly, and much shorter, as also will be my third point, the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, spoke on the League of Nations issue in a way that no other speaker could. Let us remember that the good name of the United Nations would come into even further disrepute. We all remember what happened to the League of Nations: it just faded away. It was Romain Rolland who said that this world has become a unity and for this high destiny mankind is not yet fit. It is conceivable that the United Nations as a really important issue, other than creating ambulance corps, UNESCO and ancillary movements on the fringe, might lose its place when the world
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becomes united in the way it was never united, even in the time of the League of Nations. It is most important, for the sake of the United Nations, that we should speak from a Legislature on this point.
Finally, these points have been made for the sake of Rhodesians and for the sake of Rhodesia. I merely mention them in a sentence. I am glad that comparatively few references have been made, in this House at least, comparing Amin and the possibility of a majority Government in Rhodesia. But let us not forget that Mr. Garfield Todd was a Prime Minister, was put in prison without trial and is now confined to his house without trial and without comment of any kind. Let us remember that Clinton Brock, a well-known pacifist for years, was at Cold Comfort Farm working with Didymus Mutasa, living together and giving a marvellous demonstration of power and effectiveness in peace and not in enmity. Mr. Brock is asked to leave the country and Mr. Didymus Mutasa, his close friend, his African counterpart for years in that great community, was put in prison and is still there. Let us remember that 72 per cent. of the national income goes to the European population and that 19 per cent. of it goes to the 15 million Africans. The municipal workers (and by that I mean those people who live in the towns, those whose shops sell at the same prices as the shops of other people, although they live in different districts, and who have to get up two hours before they are due at work, in order to stand in the various forms of transport—two hours every day to get to work and two hours back) are being paid £3·10 a week. This is little more than half the poverty datum line, which is £5. The least on which a family can live is £5. The average for the municipal worker is £3·10. For the sake of Rhodesians, for the sake of the United Nations, for the sake of the good name of Parliamentary democracy, I hope that we shall vote for the continuation of sanctions.
6.35 p.m.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, for a few more hours we shall be discussing one matter only, namely, whether or not in our judgment it is right to approve the Government request to renew yet again their Order for the maintenance of sanctions against

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Rhodesia. I shall be as brief as possible. We all know that sanctions were imposed by the United Nations on the pretext that there was a threat to peace. We all know equally well that there has been no disturbance to peace, either externally or internally in Rhodesia. Neither do I think that there can be any doubt that sanctions have manifestly failed in their object. My information is that by 1971 exports from Rhodesia were almost back to their pre-sanctions level. Imports fell in 1966 but increased in 1967. In 1968 they had almost reached the 1964 level and by 1971 were well above it.
It seems to many of us that the enforcement of the embargo has almost reached the point of open abandonment. The Foreign Secretary is on record as having said that we are the only nation that is enforcing sanctions. He has told us that the writ of Her Majestys Government no longer runs effectively in Rhodesia, and only yesterday my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir told me that there was now no legal Government of Rhodesia—which means that we are not. A few years ago two British economists suggested that Rhodesia's relatively diversified economy was sufficiently sophisticated and flexible to withstand sanctions. I believe this to be so. No one can deny that the hardest-hit group have been the tobacco farmers, but these people are still the staunchest supporters of U.D.I. Consequently, there is virtually no internal pressure upon the Smith Government to capitulate. Indeed, in the face of sanctions the régime has been able to invoke powers capable of stifling any meaningful opposition.
I accept that there is only one goal left for us; and that is that some means should be found whereby this country, through both Houses of the British Parliament, should be able to confer legal independence upon Rhodesia. This must surely be the object of us all. What I question seriously is whether by maintaining sanctions we are likely to achieve this object. As many of my noble friends and I stated recently in a letter to The Times—the letter about which the noble Baroness. Lady Llewelyn-Davies, was so disparaging. but it is the other side of the argument—the maintenance of sanctions does no more in our view than hold out a false promise to the black Africans, one that we know we cannot
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fulfil, a promise of an imposed solution some day, somehow.
Furthermore we shall, I believe, have forfeited (I think for the lifetime of many of us) a most valuable market. Only yesterday during Question Time, in another context, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, stressed that once a market is lost it is very difficult to get it back. Here I would agree with him entirely. Some would say, as Mr. Smith has already said, that when we look at the position between Uganda and Britain to-day and compare this with Rhodesia, British action against Rhodesia appears absolutely ludicrous. This is a matter of opinion; but may I remind your Lordships of what my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir said not very long ago? She insisted that there was only one way to try to influence affairs in Southern Africa and that was to persevere with contact and discussion. She said that she believed that people's minds could best be changed by contact and discussion rather than by boycott and isolation. How very true! What I should like to know is why contact and discussion are not carried out now. There has been more than sufficient time for the dust to settle. Mr. Smith insists that the reason no effort has been made by the Rhodesian Government to start a dialogue is that successive messages from Britain have made it plain that the British Government will not be ready to deal with the Rhodesian problem until January or March. If this is so, the stumbling block to a settlement is not the situation in Rhodesia but the situation in Britain, and I should be most grateful if my noble friend the Leader of the House would comment on this point when he winds up the debate.
Furthermore, my Lords, I suggest that it is sanctions and the renewal of sanctions that are delaying a dialogue between the African and the white man. I profoundly believe this to be true. The settlement has been left lying on the table after the failure of the Pearce Commission. Rhodesia has publicly declared that if Britain will implement those terms she will do the same; and that, as I understand it, remains the position. Let me remind your Lordships of the present Prime Minister's words. He said:
"The purpose of sanctions is to bring about a negotiation and that can be the only justification for that policy."

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If those words mean anything at all, I put it to your Lordships, has not the time now come for us to take off sanctions? I know that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary says, "No", and other noble Lords agree with him.
But, my Lords, with the greatest respect, I am bound to say that I profoundly disagree with Her Majesty's Government's present policy on this matter. I feel that it is negative and sterile. I suggest that it is high time an agreement was concluded on the basis of the proposals agreed last November, almost a year ago. Though the constitutional status of Rhodesia is of little interest to African Nationalists, it serves as a technical means by which racial politics can be introduced into almost everything. My sole objection to the renewal of this Order is that I believe that sanctions are now hindering a settlement. It is as simple as that. I have taken careful note of all that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, so effectively said earlier this afternoon. But, in my view, if we were to take off sanctions it would not be a defeat, it would merely be trying another course.
That Her Majesty's Government do not have the support of the majority of people in this country on this matter I have not the slightest doubt. I also believe that many Conservatives are gravely concerned about the Order which is before us this evening. If it was right for a Conservative majority in this House to reject the Order in 1968 I cannot for the life of me see why it should not be equally right to do so to-day. Surely it is more right when the Conservative Party happens to be in power instead of when it is in Opposition. I deeply regret that I find that I have no alternative, if I am to be true to my personal beliefs, but to oppose this renewal Order in the Division Lobby this evening, and I ask all other noble Lords, if they believe as I do that it would be right for our strong disapproval of this one aspect of Government policy to be placed upon the record, to do the same. I sincerely believe that this preposterous Order has now served its purpose, and if it were to be defeated this evening, as I believe it can be, then we should demon
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strate not only to the country but also to the world that in your Lordships House sanity still prevails.
6.45 p.m.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, may apologise, particularly to the two noble Baronesses who spoke first, that my work commitments prevented me from being here at the start of the debate. I do not wish to labour points made on this subject by other speakers and in other debates. But over the years during which the debate about sanctions has continued, some of the fundamental facts of the situation have become more clearly revealed: so clearly revealed, in fact, that those who perhaps could be accused earlier of naïvete can no longer ignore them. One fact which has been mentioned often this evening is that the black people of Rhodesia are not content, have been shown not to be content, and will not be content, to be governed by a white minority régime. After the findings and the remarkable document of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, for noble Lords opposite to proclaim that the abandoning of sanctions is in the interests of the black majority of Rhodesia, when they have expressed their view on the matter loud and clear, is either grossly arrogant or grossly hypocritical.
My Lords, I wish to talk more about another factor in the situation which has become revealed, particularly over the last year, with much greater clarity. It is this. Armed resistance by the people of Southern Africa is now no longer a prospect for the future; it is a reality which is happening in the present. In Angola there is a massive confrontation on many fronts between the popular movement for the liberation of Angola and Portuguese armed forces. I have no doubt that the liberation movement is advancing. I would recognise that few journalists have penetrated so deeply into the country as to be able to chronicle and assess that advance. But, my Lords, in Mozambique, with which we are more particularly concerned to-night, a country which shares no fewer than 650 miles of common frontier with Rhodesia, it is becoming increasingly recognised, not only by the enemies of Portugal but also by the friends of Portugal, that the

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Portuguese armed forces have been quite unable to hold hack the advance of the Mozambique Liberation Front.
It is also becoming clear that one of the reasons why the Smith régime is becoming more desperate for a settlement lies in that failure of the Portuguese forces. There was a remarkable article in the Guardian on October 27 of this year in which, after reviewing the whole situation, it was said:
"Mr. Smith is said to have told the congress of his ruling Rhodesian Front in secret session a few weeks ago that the situation in Mozambique was one of the main reasons for pushing ahead in an attempt to resolve the Anglo-Rhodesian independence dispute. Army chiefs expect the guerrilla war to intensify and Rhodesia needs money, equipment and men to keep pace."
One has seen that Mr. Smith has been to visit Dr. Caetano in Portugal, and Mr. Botha, the South African Defence Minister, has been visiting his colleague in Salisbury. The matter of the war in Mozambique is becoming crucial to any debate on the future of Southern Africa and in particular on Rhodesia. Whatever one's political position, whether one is an admirer of Mr. Smith, whether one is a Government official wishing to get trade going again or whether one is a champion of the rights of the African people, like the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, one must ask oneself this question: What is the military situation around the borders of Rhodesia? And next: Who are the people who are conducting this struggle in Mozambique? What are their principles and what are their practices? And then, when you have come to a greater understanding and a greater awareness of what is happening in that little known part of the world, you can assess what your attitude should be.
As to the overall military position, I would not ask noble Lords to accept my assessment or my claims alone. I record as a fact that in August of this year I marched with a column of the Mozambique Liberation Front from the Zambian frontier 60 miles South towards Rhodesia, to an area called Fingoe, about half way from Zambia to Rhodesia. I record as a fact that I stayed a week in that area—
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, whether
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he represents Amnesty International? Is he a member of some terrorist organisation?
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, I think that like most of your Lordships I represent myself. I was the guest, as I have been trying to explain, of the Mozambique Liberation Front, and proud to be so.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, I hate to interrupt the noble Lord again, but I was much distressed by the observation which I understood the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, to have made, in which I thought he suggested that Amnesty International was a terrorist organisation. Surely it is not. I am not a member of Amnesty International, but I should have thought that anybody who knew anything about it would not call it a terrorist organisation.
LORD GIFFORD: If the noble Lord wishes to withdraw that allegation, I should be glad to give way. I record again as fact—and I hope that noble Lords opposite will understand that this has a significance also for them—that I stayed in that area for over a week visiting villages, schools, medical posts and military bases, and that I was the guest of a people who quite plainly were in full military and political control of that district. Let us, however, not accept my assessment I was only in a small part of Mozambique.
In addition to the article that I have quoted, let us look at the assessment of a journalist who would dearly like to believe that what he was writing was not true. In the Johannesburg Star of July 1, 1972, Mr. Wilf Nussey, the editor of the Star's African News Service, having made a long visit to Mozambique, wrote this:
"The state of the war in Tete is serious and carries grave military and political dangers for all Southern Africa in the long term…Frelimo guerrillas are infiltrating across much of Tete's border of more than 400 km with Zambia and with disturbing rapidity have crossed the Zambezi River and penetrated several hundred kilometres southwards along both the Rhodesian and Malawi borders."
That report was about Tete Province, lying to the North of Rhodesia, where the liberation front has had a military presence for merely four years. The process will certainly be repeated in another province, Manica and Sofala Province,

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lying to the East of Rhodesia and containing the many crucial supply lines between Rhodesia and the port of Beira. I quote again from the Guardian article:
"Rhodesia is also afraid that guerrillas will begin mining and attacking the road and rail links to the Mozambique ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques."
It would be ironic if the guerrilla fighters of Mozambique were to start to carry out the task which the international community has failed even to attempt; that is, to plug the sanctions leak for which the Portuguese Government are responsible.
LORD GISBOROUGH: My Lords, would the noble Lord suggest that there are not also these guerrillas attacking the black nations such as Uganda and Malawi?
LORD GIFFORD: I am talking about Mozambique, and I do not intend to be side-tracked by talking about other people who may or may not be attacking Uganda, which seems to me to be irrelevant.
Let us now ask ourselves how these successes have been achieved. They have not been achieved by massive military confrontation, with casualties on every side; not by attacking or intimidating the civilians, whether black or white. They have been achieved by co-operation with the ordinary people of the area; by explaining to them that there is an alternative to the indignities and the subjugation which has been their lot up to now: by pinning down Portuguese forces in their military bases and their towns, so that they move out only at great risk or by air; by saying to the people who are then left in the vast areas where the Portuguese dare not enter: "This is our country. Let us now work together to build a new society"; and then by building that society, slowly, with high principle, so that the people of that country for the first time for centuries have one chance, which we all have here, to participate in their own future.
THE EARL OF MAR: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. is talking about Mozambique. Surely he should be talking about Rhodesia.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, I tried to explain that because of the desire of the Rhodesian Government to participate
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alongside Portugal against the Mozambique Liberation Front; because of her desire for arms and equipment for that purpose, and because of her desire therefore to have a lifting of sanctions, this is a matter which is of the greatest relevance to the debate this evening.
I now appeal to your Lordships to recognise what was my own experience as to what is the effect of that way of conducting a struggle. Through the faces of the villagers, hard though their lives may be, there shone the joy of living for the first time in freedom. As for the soldiers and the leaders of the movement, through all that they said and did there was revealed a sense of pride and determination, of purpose and of principle. In view of the many remarks which have been made on one side and the other about the possibilities or the actualities of black racialism, I think it is worth recording the enormous trouble that was taken by the movement to explain to their people that Frelimo was not fighting a racial war. Every time we arrived at a village or a detachment the Commander introduced us and explained that we were examples of the spirit of non-racialism; that Frelimo had friends who were white as well as enemies who were black. They would do everything possible to deter anyone from believing that because you are fighting against the Portuguese you. are therefore fighting against the whites. That was not their attitude, and it will never be so. The people of that area—and there are many areas like it in Mozambique—are not going to give up the freedom and the dignity which they have found. The ultimate victory, although it will be long, slow and hard, is I believe certain. When it happens, that movement will be revealed as an inspiration; not merely an inspiration to Africa, as I think it is, but also an inspiration to us all.
My Lords, there are no doubt many on the other side of the House who would wish, as does Mr. Smith, to ush those aspirations and to crush that movement; to stamp out freedom with bombs and with artillery. There are many noble Lords who would be advocating the supply of arms, money and equipment to Mr. Smith in order for him to do just that; because that is not only what he intends to do, that is what in fact he is

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trying to do already. I quote directly from notes taken from a talk with a Frelimo commander who is one of the leaders of the district close to Rhodesia:
"Many times we have been in contact with Rhodesian forces. They did not know any Portuguese. They said they were Rhodesian forces to our people. We saw helicopters and bombers coming straight from Rhodesia. Our batteries were right by the frontier. Infantry would come on foot from Rhodesia. They would capture our people who would run away and tell us they had been taken by Rhodesians."
Your Lordships may say that that is still an unconfirmed report. I have no doubt that it will be confirmed in due time. Whether it is the present policy or the intention of the Smith Government, and indeed later the South African Government, to assist the Portuguese, it is one of the major reasons why they wish for a settlement and why they wish for the policies of noble Lords opposite to prevail.
My Lords, we have been reminded several times in this debate that the British are supposed to know what it means to fight for freedom. The British are also supposed to know what it means to live in a democratic society. In the confrontation which is already starting in South Africa—starting because of the defaults of the past. for which we must bear a large measure of responsibility—there are few who would call us honourable; there are few even who would call us sensible, if we were to take the side of the oppressor against those who—left with no alternative whatever—are fighting nobly for their dignity and for their freedom.
7.0 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF WINCHESTER: My Lords, I should like to congratulate, if I may, the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir, on her interesting and encouraging speech tonight. I am sure your Lordships will agree that it is most encouraging that Her Majesty's Government are interested in having another look at the pettiness of sanctions, having a look at this business of passports and also the very unhappy question of Rhodesian divorces and marriages, together with the possible illegitimacy of Rhodesian children. At the same time, I would congratulate, though she is not here at the moment, the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies, on her interesting speech in which she so ably conveyed
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your Lordships' deep concern over this most unfortunate matter.
I make no apology for Rhodesia. I do not condone sanctions or U.D.I., nor do I condemn U.D.I.; but I am very worried. One of the questions which worries me deeply is that of the United Nations. I am deeply concerned as to whether they had the right to impose these sanctions in the first place. Let me hasten to say that I am well aware that there are in your Lordships' House a number of noble and learned Peers whose integrity I would not for a moment have the impertinence to question. I am not trying to do that. But I would put it to your Lordships that in 1922 Rhodesia became a self-governing Colony, and at that time she in fact purchased that right. Rhodesia paid the Imperial Government, as it was at that time, the sum of £2 million for the right to govern herself. I believe that is almost unique. I cannot say for a fact that it has not happened before, but I believe it to be unique.
When this matter was taken before the United Nations and the United Nations Security Council debated the imposition of sanctions, Rhodesia was not allowed to defend herself. At the same time, Ghana—who was not at that time a member of the United Nations—was allowed to appear as an observer and to speak. Ghana indeed demanded that sanctions be imposed under the terms of Article 7 of the Charter because Rhodesia was a threat to world peace, or to international peace, or possibly just a threat to the peace. In this day and age, my Lords, we live in a very troubled time, but I do not believe that Rhodesia has really proved herself to be a threat to anybody at all.
I am also deeply concerned at the result of sanctions so far. I know that some say they work and some say they do not. I am well aware that I cannot buy a bottle of Scotch whisky any more, and I am also aware of the shortage of foreign currency. I am well aware, too, of a rift—a widening rift—between the peoples of Rhodesia and the peoples of the United Kingdom. I know that this again may be questionable, but if must point out that there is this rift. There is a terrific distrust—and it is growing all the time—among the Rhodesian people. Here I am not talking about the white people but about people as a whole, the

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people I know and the sort of people that I see. I have been very concerned at the distrust, on all levels, which exists to-day. Nobody trusts anybody. Nobody trusts the British Government and nobody trusts the Rhodesian Government. The Rhodesian Government do not trust the British Government, the British Government do not trust the Rhodesian Government, and the Africans do not trust anybody either. This rift is getting wider and wider: it is getting worse.
There is in Rhodesia, as in every country, a population explosion. I am extremely concerned at the fact that, as the population expands, so more and more people go to school. So the Rhodesian Government, whether we like it or not, put money into African education—if this is what the people want to know. They do put more money into African education. But there are school-leavers every year and also every year there are university graduates. But the economy, commerce and industry, where these people should be used, have not been able to expand in the same way. As a result we have discontented, out-of work graduates—intelligent people, both black and white. It is a matter of great concern and one which I believe we must look at seriously when we are considering the renewing of this Order tonight. We must consider these people. They had nothing to do with the events which led up to U.D.I. They must be considered. They were not responsible: they were not voters—and neither was I, for that matter. They cannot be blamed and they cannot be damned merely because somebody does not like what is happening in Rhodesia or what the present Government of Rhodesia are doing at the moment. After all, I do not like what goes on in Russia, for example; I do not like what goes on in Uganda or in Zambia, but I do not go running to the United Nations or anywhere else, screaming for sanctions.
I am also deeply concerned about the rural, tribal Africans. I work among these people very frequently. I know them for what they are, and I understand them. These are the ones who form the majority of the African people. They are not members of the A.N.C., or one of the other small splinter groups which are forming all over Rhodesia at
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the moment, but they are the ones who will inevitably suffer from any decision which is made here in Westminster.
My Lords, there is, I believe, a distinct pattern emerging in Africa to-day. For example, there are—again, this is to the best of my knowledge—some 32 independent countries or States in Black Africa. Admittedly not all these are British Colonies or ex-British Colonies. Of these, 28 have become single-Party or military régimes. This is exactly what is happening all over Africa at the present time. We get a State becoming independent, with a Constitution laid on, and everybody thinks it is marvellous. It devolves into a one-Party State and then into a military régime, with various military coups happening in between. It is the tribal African, the rural African, who inevitably suffers every time. The power-hungry will always control, and the rural Africans will always remain serfs. I will not argue with those noble Lords who have visited other countries in Africa. I have no doubt they have met the Governments of these various States and have seen how they work, but do they really know what is happening to the rural African out in the reserves, who is trying to farm and earn his living? Is he any better off to-day than he was 20 years ago? That is the question we must ask ourselves. It is a question we must ask ourselves now. Will the rural African, the tribal African, who forms the majority in Rhodesia, be better off if these sanctions are held on him? Will he be better off in fact under a black Government?
When this matter was discussed a year ago, the Prime Minister said in another place that the object of sanctions was to bring the Rhodesian Government to the negotiating table. That phrase is nothing new; it was said as early as 1965. I found that Sir Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia at that time, said exactly the same words in November or December of 1965. We now have the interesting situation where the Rhodesians and the United Kingdom Government have met round the table and have signed an agreement, but Her Majesty's Government wish to impose these sanctions. The only conclusion I can come to on this matter is that it would seem that Westminster and the United Nations would like Rhodesia to take her place in

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the tragic economic mess which is Africa to-day.
7.12 p.m.
LORD HUNT: My Lords, I rise to speak with the authentic voice of white Rhodesia fresh in our minds and, like other Members of your Lordships' House, I have listened with the closest of attention to the noble Marquess, Lord Winchester. I start with the good intention to be brief because so much at this stage of the debate that needed to be said has inevitably been already said, tellingly and with sincerity. I should like to say to all those who are speaking against this Order to-night, and, perhaps because he was the first, to the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, that I respect entirely the sincerity with which they speak.
I cannot but recall, as did the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, that there was a great debate four years ago in your Lordships' House, on June 17 and 18, 1968. In speaking in that debate I prefaced my speech by saying that I intended to be brief. I had the temerity immediately to go on to address myself to the greatly revered and much loved Marquess of Salisbury, who spoke immediately before me, and to chide him for having said exactly the same thing and for having spoken, in my opinion, much too long.
In that debate this Order was before Parliament for the first time following the Security Council's unanimous resolution on May 29, 1968 to impose sanctions against Rhodesia, on the initiative of the then British Government. It was, as all your Lordships who were present will know, a memorable—indeed, historical—occasion; it was also a very melancholy occasion. And it was for most of us melancholy whether or nor because of connections some of us may or may not have had with white friends in Rhodesia.
Surely we all recognise that sanctions are a blunt and negative weapon about which no one should feel quite happy. But there are better alternatives to war. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, if he were present in the Chamber, that sanctions, whatever they may have been called in war time, are not war, and they are a far better alternative to a surrender of principle. Whether or not our debate will be as memorable this evening as that first one, as the
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noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, has said, it will be seen to be historic—we are making history. I suggest that to-day it is no less a melancholy occasion, and this is so whether because of or despite the fact that the background against which we are now discussing this question is, in essence, unchanged, both in Rhodesia and in this Parliament, from the situation four years ago. It is unchanged because there is still no settlement. In this connection it is worth recalling what the Foreign Secretary said in another place on November 10 last, when he was speaking of the forthcoming Pearce Commission. Sir Alec said:
"If the Test of Acceptability … showed that the people of Rhodesia as a whole found the agreement acceptable, Parliament would be asked to approve an independence Act and legality would be restored."
He went on,
"This would pave the way to the dropping of sanctions,…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 10/11/72; col. 1089.]
It is quite clear that Sir Alec Douglas-Home was speaking in a positive, constructive and hopeful way, expressing his hopes about the outcome of the Pearce Commission's inquiry. The operative word in that statement is that little word "if". The people of Rhodesia as a whole did not find that the proposed settlement was acceptable and, in parenthesis, with the noble Lord, Lord Boyle, I would ask: who can blame the African leaders and people for not doing so, in view of Mr. Smith's expressions of opinion about that settlement at the time, and the actions of his Government since?
So long as we as a nation purport to subscribe to international agreements, and to support the United Nations to this end, the Security Council's resolution remains mandatory upon our Government. There is no legal basis for "ratting" on our obligations now. There is no getting away from this basic point; indeed, there is a case for urging the Government to use their influence with other nations to tighten up sanctions. I personally can well understand the Government's reluctance to do this at the present time because of their desire not to close the door on a further initiative with Mr. Smith, or to do anything to exacerbate him or his Government at this particular point in time.

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To all those who argue that the situation in Rhodesia is now different: that sanctions have not worked; who point (as one noble Lord did) to the fact that the United States Government have officially breached the net; that businessmen in a number of countries whose Governments still pay lip service to the mandate are trading with Rhodesia and supplying them with the goods: that sanctions have Droved a sterile and useless exercise (which only embitters the white Rhodesians and causes hardships to the Africans); that sanctions are merely cutting off our own noses to spite our own faces; and, above all, to those who have made the perfectly valid point that Mr. Smith himself has accepted the principles, I would say that there is substance in all those points.
But this is not the whole truth. I prefer to attach more weight to other views which have been expressed: in particular the testimony that the cumulative effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy is very considerable; that it was precisely this effect that brought Mr. Smith to the point of avowed readiness to accept the basic conditions, and that he still needs recognition more than anything else for the future viability of his country. Under this pressure there has been informal contact, as we all know (whether or not Mr. Smith himself knows) between the Rhodesian Government and the African National Council. I have no doubt as to which way the scales are weighted; they are weighted towards legality and justice to the African people of Rhodesia.
To those who argue, on whatever grounds, that we should at least give notice to the United Nations of our intention to drop sanctions, not to renew sanctions after adequate notice, I would say that to give up sanctions now, or to give notice of our future intention to make such a proposition to the Security Council, would be to underwrite and perpetuate the current illegal, repressive and discriminatory Constitution under which Rhodesia is governed, the actions which already stern from that Constitution, and further actions which will no doubt follow in the future. It will remove the essential pressure and obligation required to induce Mr. Smith to attempt to nego
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tiate, to open serious discussions directly with the African National Council on those four principles (the fifth being, of course, the acceptability principle) or on any improvement of them. Far from giving any comfort to the Africans, it would cause dismay and despair to responsible African political leadership. Indeed, I am persuaded, despite what one or two other noble Lords have said to the contrary—I am persuaded by what the noble Baroness the Minister of State has said, and indeed after reading Judith Todd in The Times of two days ago—that to give up now would be to set the scene for a violent backlash by the Africans later on. The day of reckoning is bound to come.
But I also believe that willingness by the Rhodesian Government to negotiate a new Constitution directly with the African National Council could—it may be a slender hope but it could—change the whole sombre prospect. There could be a peaceful reckoning now. Mr. Smith has it in his grasp to dispel the prevailing African distrust by taking his own initiative in that direction. But, given the inside pressure of the Rhodesian National Front, only outside pressure provides a hope, a prop, for him to do so. Protracted delay, prevarication, prolongation of the status quo, could be fatal. Rhodesia, for all of whose citizens this country retains a legal responsibility, continues to be a test of Britain's integrity in the world.
I discount extraneous arguments, comparisons between Rhodesia and other African States, or comparisons between Rhodesia and other countries around the world which repress all or some of their citizens. These are extraneous, to say nothing of the total irrelevance of the red herring which the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale (if I may say so quite frankly to him in his absence), threw across our path in referring to industrial confrontation in this country. All these matters are equally irrelevant to this particular issue. But to those who speak of double standards, I would say, "Yes, I feel unhappy about this and there is something in that contention. But the difference is, surely, that Rhodesia is our legal responsibility whereas other countries are not". Let us first put our own house in order and, remembering the parable of the mote and the beam, we

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may then see a little more clearly and have cleaner consciences in condemning other people's houses.
My Lords, I reject out of hand the argument of Britain's short-term commercial advantage and interest in resuming trade with Rhodesia now. I reject too, with real reluctance, the pull in kinship and friendship with white Rhodesians, whom I knew as comrades in arms and stout-hearted friends in war-time 26 years ago. In this respect I have the greatest sympathy for the moving appeal by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, about that matter. But I reject it because those people, as I know, support the Smith régime. Neither of those two considerations, nor both of them together, should outweigh the force of legal and moral arguments for holding firm. I support and respect the Government's intention in that direction.
7.24 p.m.
LORD ST. JUST: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies, in opening for the Opposition, referred to those who signed the letter to The Times as "backwoodsmen". Well, I hope we are not all backwoodsmen, because if so I should like to know what the working Members of this House are. But I know that that was virtually a slip of the tongue. The noble Baroness then went on to say (I am not quoting her exact words) that those of us who have been Members of this House for some years had, by signing this letter, taken a retrograde step, and people like myself who sat here under the late Lord Salisbury must automatically be members of what was known as the Rhodesian Lobby. I can hurriedly say to her—. and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, will not mind my saying this—that I have never yet agreed with him on virtually anything he has said about Rhodesia. I agreed with the late Lord Salisbury at moments, but very seldom. My reasons for signing this letter have been stated by many noble Lords to-day. The fact is that I believe we have reached a moment in the history of Africa at which, so far as Rhodesia is concerned, sanctions are sterile. We are not going to advance any more or any further down this line.
If I could take the noble Baroness and various other Members back to January,
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1972, we then had a very interesting debate, not very well attended, on violence in Southern Africa. She took part in that debate. We had the late right reverend Prelate the late Bishop of Durham very forcefully taking part in that debate; but what is so extraordinary is that the noble Lord who wound up for the Government was not the Secretary of State to the Foreign Office but the Minister for Scottish Affairs—the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie. I do not know whether the Almighty in heaven had already destined her move—possibly this is so. But she probably had no idea what was involved in that debate in regard to what has happened since.
I agree with one point which the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, made, and that was when he said, "We are dealing with one of the greatest racial problems of all times." One must take the whole context of Africa in this matter. I am not going into the problems of the countries round Rhodesia; I shall not go into the problem of Uganda. This is not why I signed the letter—I can promise the noble Baroness that. But I feel that the whole context of this vast country must he taken together.
It is like the Far East in that I feel that probably when the Americans depart from the Far East it is going to produce a vacuum, and a terribly dangerous vacuum. Africa also is on the verge of being one of the great flashpoints of the world. All of us in this House, and any of us who are concerned as Parliamentarians or politicians, must keep this very much in mind.
I personally believe (as I am a humble Back-Bencher I suppose I should not say this, but I am saying it because I believe it) that if we continue the Orders for these sanctions they will work contrary to the hopes of the Government and the Foreign Secretary. First, I think they will annoy, irritate, the situation in Rhodesia. I have the greatest admiration for Sir Alec Douglas-Home. I served under him in this House when he first of all became Foreign Secretary in the Macmillan Government. He made one of the greatest speeches I have ever heard in his first deliberations as Foreign Secretary in this House. But I have the feeling that the mood of Rhodesia will

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be irritated by the continuation of these Orders. I also believe that one of the things we are all striving to avoid may happen: that Rhodesia will turn towards South Africa more and more strongly. Then, as we have heard so often in this debate to-day. we shall have the parting of the ways of white Africa and so-called black Africa. The Limpopo, or rather the Zambesi, will be the half-way mark between the two sides. This will be a desperate tragedy.
I am going to say only one other word and it is an appeal to the noble Earl my Leader, the Lord Privy Seal. If he can possibly give us an undertaking this evening that this will be the last year that these Orders will be tabled, I personally shall be perfectly content with that statement and refrain from voting. But if that undertaking cannot be given, I shall go into the Lobby against renewing sanctions.
7.30 p.m.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords, I have no intention of wearying your Lordships with arguments that have been repeatedly put before you already. There just is nothing new to say about Rhodesia, but as one who has visited that country at least once a year, and sometimes more, for the last 25 years I should like, as briefly as possible, to express a view. There is no question whatsoever in my mind that U.D.I. was a mistake: a great mistake from everyone's point of view—from the point of view of Rhodesia herself, who already had 95 per cent. of her independence, while for 25 years the sole remaining power that the United Kingdom held to safeguard African interests had never been used, or indeed seemed likely to be used.
Also we must remember the embarrassment to tour interests, both African and world-wide, caused to this country—a fact not always sufficiently realised in Rhodesia. The fantasy that a bare quarter of a million Europeans can permanently dominate a rapidly increasing and more educated population of 5 million Africans was just that—a fantasy. The fact that there were only about 100,000 Africans there in the 1890s and that these had increased 50-fold since the British took control after generations of stagnation is not something to be brushed aside or forgotten. But, alas!—
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and I really mean alas!—it is quite irrelevant. It is facts, present-day facts, with which we now have to deal. On past occasions I have voted for sanctions with heavy doubts in my mind but in the hope that they might help to bring about a change of mind on the part of friends who have taken a wrong and foolish line. Well, my Lords, sanctions have not had that effect. What they have done is to cause unemployment, mainly among the, Africans, and above all to drive Rhodesian white opinion closer to South Africa and to the Right.
Other countries, most of them members of the United Nations and therefore pledged to enforce sanctions, are breaking them and, as a result, are steadily taking over markets which are traditionally British. The latest recruit, of course, is the United States of America with her purchases of chrome and. I rather think, asbestos as well. The United Nations Sanctions Committee itself has stated that between one-third and one-quarter of Rhodesian exports are to member countries committed to sanctions, and we have increasingly to ask ourselves for how long we can "carry the can", alone.
For these reasons I have watched the working of sanctions over seven years, and every year that I have watched my belief in them has steadily decreased. There can be little doubt that the state of Rhodesia is a great deal worse than appears on the surface or in the shops. Indeed, it must be assumed that this was largely the reason for the willingness of Ian Smith to make an effort for an agreement last spring. He signed that agreement and seemed to be prepared to stick to it. After trying to balance these and many other apparently contradictory factors, I had quite definitely made up my mind to speak and vote against the continuation of sanctions. However, a further factor has arisen during the last few days. There was a speech by Sir Alec Douglas-Home; there was the speech made by my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, and even to-day there was that most notable three-minute speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce. I think they are quite unanswerable.
Quite frankly, my Lords, I have changed my mind. I do not feel that I could take on myself the responsibility

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of not taking their advice to give the present system a further chance. I do not do so very hopefully, but I cannot feel that any other course would be a responsible action. Having been told by our Foreign Secretary and by the representative of the Government speaking here, and also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, that in their view there is a chance, during the next year or two, of coming to an agreement, I cannot bring myself to vote against the Government on this Order. As I think no one should abstain on a matter as important as this, I shall vote for the Order. I shall do so with great doubt and reluctance because I think perhaps the speakers I have referred to are a little optimistic; but the world is not any the worse for a little optimism. I cannot give the Government an assurance that I will support them again if they come before your Lordships with a similar proposition, but I feel that anyone with a sense of responsibility must respond to the request that has been made to us to-day for support and a further chance of bringing to an end this sad, this tragic, quarrel between our two countries.
7.40 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I apologise for having missed so much of the debate. I had a hard, long and unexpected meeting to attend, and this has meant my missing about one-third of the speeches made so far. Reference was made earlier to a letter in The Times signed by some 85 Peers. The signatures attached to this letter occupied so much space that there was very little room for the text. I will endeavour to interpret what that letter meant by looking not only at Uganda but also at Kenya, and I believe that the Rhodesians are looking at both.
In Kenya there has been the organised dispossession of an appreciable number of white farmers, helped by United Kingdom funds. Similarly, and part of the same pattern, there has been the resettlement of Africans, not so viably in many respects but nevertheless also heavily subsidised by the British taxpayer. There has been in Kenya the partial dispossession of Asians, and we formed them into a queue. At one time I tried to estimate its length, and I thought that it was not less than 50 years long. Nobody
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on the Government Benches was prepared to say how long it was. I think that that has made a contribution to the explosion which has taken place next door. In other words, there is resentment against these communities and more rapidly the entire Asian and, I think, white community is in course of dispossession. The letter in The Times there for called attention to something which deeply moves the white Rhodesians and brings them to the inference, "We are the next to become homeless, destitute, refugees, jobless, and the United Kingdom has ensured that we shall be stateless when that occurs". Not only is that their fear. Is it not quite possible that it will happen? It is with that in mind that I understood that this letter to The Times was written.
The purpose of sanctions has been stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, whose charm, lucidity and logic are certainly no less than those of the noble Baroness whom she complimented, though I thought that her lucidity was superior. She gave very definite purpose to sanctions. They were designed, she said, to bring pressure upon Mr. Smith for a settlement. In other words, they are negotiations under duress, whether or not one approves of that term. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, seemed to indicate that we were under an obligation to fulfil a pledge conveyed through the simplification of his statement to Africans, "If you don't accept them, things will continue as at present." But things do not continue as they are, and nobody has suggested that they will—indeed, an increase in the intensity of sanctions has been suggested. In any event, nothing remains as it is, and surely it is Her Majesty's Government, and nobody else, who are accepting that sentence as meaning tying their hands behind their backs, so that they cannot vary—increase, reduce or suspend—sanctions in any way.
If I am to criticise anything in the excellent Report to which many noble Lords have referred, it is that its statement that the British Government will give up their claim to make laws for that country is a very incomplete statement. It would have been made complete had it said, "This is a claim which cannot in any case be imposed." As the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, explained, we cannot impose our law.

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That should have been said; and the fact that it has not been said is a very misleading factor. The noble Baroness did not give the purpose of this, and I will guess at the reason.
I have examined Security Council Resolution No. 217, paragraph 5 of which suggests that Her Majesty's Government and their predecessor have been acting ultra vires in conducting negotiations at all. Resolution No. 217 called
"on the Government of the United Kingdom to take all other appropriate measures which will prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end."
Has anything happened as a result of other resolutions at the United Nations to modify that demand—because we have modified it? It seems, moreover, that the terms of that resolution make immediate independence—under Resolution No. 1514 of 1960 of the General Assembly, which was not mandatory at the time—mandatory, so that immediate independence and NIBMAR, no independence before majority rule, are equally mandatory, and we are not accepting that. Thus, in my view we are already departing from what the Government hold out to be so inviolate; namely, legality. We have departed from it by not considering immediate independence under an African majority.
The resolution moreover rests on the existence of a threat to international peace. Whatever one thought might happen at the beginning, after seven years I wonder whether anybody can now seriously hold to the view that Rhodesia presents a threat to its neighbours or anyone else, either a military threat or a threat to peace and good order. I cannot believe that it does. It is only on that that the whole of the Order rests, and it seems to me that the Order is therefore out of date.
The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, suggested that we had carried out all our obligations to our colonies in the last 30 years, which is, roughly speaking, the period during which we have let them go, thereby nearly fulfilling Resolution No. 1514 of the General Assembly of 1960. I speak with some knowledge of administration in Africa in my earlier life and I question whether
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70 years of alien rule, mainly paternal, preserving living tribes segregated one from another in a kind of living museum, was any help to enable a few detribalised Africans to rule groups of from 50 to 200 of these separate tribes with any hope of success in view of the small amount of preparation that they had for the task. Thus, anything I say about the deficiencies of African rule—and I feel obliged to call attention to them—must be considered in association with my belief that we never foresaw what would happen, did not prepare them for what would happen and gave them a virtually impossible task.
Resolution No. 217 imposes mandatory sanctions. What does the United Nations dislike the most? That resolution mentions the word "illegal" six times and "minority" three times. It is clear that the United Nations is infuriated over the illegal Smith and the minority Smith régime. But it does not really dislike illegality. Illegal coups succeed illegal coups and I suppose that at the present time among the illegal régimes—illegal when they arrived but recognised a few days later—are Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana. the Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. And that is nothing like the whole list. They are illegal; so the illegal régime, which everybody mouths with a kind of condemnation when it is the Smith régime, is a thing which, so long as the faces are black, we more or less recognise overnight, again and again and again.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord and say that most of those nations to which he has been referring achieved their, as he calls it, "illegal régimes" long after we had ceased to have any responsibility for them, or when we had never had any responsibility for them at all, like Algiers.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: We have joined with the community of nations in sharing responsibility, not only for Rhodesia but for all. We recognise these illegal régimes. We need not recognise them, but it is our custom to recognise them and there is a very good reason for it. If you do not recognise supreme authority over a particular area when de facto it exists, you are on the side of the robber, the thief and the law breaker; and so far as Rhodesia goes we have been

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on that side for seven years. That is what is deplorable. Over the rest of the continent there are, I think, ten military dictatorships—the number varies so often that I do not insist on it. There the rule is "one man, no vote at all"; elsewhere it is "one man, one vote, one candidate", modified in some places by "one man, one vote, two candidates, one Party All these are the kind of things we used to refer to as "swindle democracies"—which they are. Again, I am not condemning the Africans, I am merely referring to the facts. There have been great disorders and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, asked us to agree that there had been similar disorders at an earlier time in the stage of transition in Europe. I must, with all respect to the noble Lord, with all his interest in Africa, cross swords with him on that point. We are not dealing with the dead past. You cannot raise the dead to life; hut, by taking appropriate action, we hope to reduce the number of dead in Rhodesia in the course of this transition. That is the purpose of the exercise, and not what happened a century or two ago. We hope we have learned a few lessons from the past.
My conclusion—I have been going for 13 minutes, which is too long—is to suggest that in trying to bring to heel a quarter of a million white people in Rhodesia we have invoked against them the entire world, including 200 million black people, and that, rather than sanctions, is the pressure upon them. We are driving them to a desperate situation where, for a time, they may agree to anything and then subsequently repudiate it. I would suggest that we give notice to the Security Council, thanking them for what they have done to support us and notifying them that in the next twelve months we shall not renew the sanctions because we are in the process of negotiation, a situation which was not envisaged when this resolution was passed in 1965. But in view of the fact that we cannot do that to-night and, as I understand, no associated resolution to that effect can possibly be accepted in this House, I must do what I feel is right and go into the Lobby, voting against this Order this evening on the ground that it is imprudent to continue sanctions and in the present circumstances it is also ultra vires.
7.55 p.m.
LORD GARNER: My Lords, Rhodesia is an unhappy country, and one can understand the agony of conscience in which all noble Lords have been placed in trying to find the right solution, the basic problem being that the possibility of finding a solution acceptable to all parties in Rhodesia has completely eluded us over the years. I can understand to some extent, therefore, the frustrations which have been expressed by many noble Lords about sanctions generally. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that the sanctions policy is not something to be specially proud of; nevertheless, sanctions have been working and are still working, and I should have thought that one of the strongest pieces of evidence that they are effective is the very vehemence which we have listened to from several noble Lords in this Chamber this evening, demanding their removal. Certainly, if there has been no victory from sanctions equally, I should have thought, there has been no defeat.
I myself cannot agree to the dismemberment of sanctions at this stage. It would seem to me, in effect, like removing the referee before the hell has rung. Of course, the reasons for that attitude have been expressed eloquently from a number of points of view. The most conclusive of all, I thought, was that of the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, who made it quite clear that the Government would be put in an impossible position if they were forced to go back on an undertaking, an essential part of the settlement, which was put to all the people of Rhodesia only this year. I agree very strongly also with the noble Lord, Lord Boyle of Handsworth who emphasised the Commonwealth angle to this question. There is one point I should like to make in that regard. I do not want to get involved in the arguments about Uganda, because frankly I regard them as totally irrelevant to the Rhodesian situation; but there is one relevant point and that is that the courageous action, as I regard it, which the British Government took when the Pearce Report was presented did an enormous amount to enhance the reputation and prestige of Britain throughout the world. It is not fanciful to think that a good deal of the co-operation that we have received from a number of other

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countries, notably Commonwealth countries, in coping with the difficulty of British Asians from Uganda was in large part due to the reputation we had built up in our handling of the Rhodesian question earlier in the year.
There is a third aspect which appeals to me: if the Government were to be forced to give way on sanctions at this stage, it would be divisive in this country and it would be divisive between the various parties. If I may say so, speaking as a Cross-Bencher, I often think that there should be a good deal more bipartisanship on some of the big issues that face this country, and I should certainly deplore it if the bipartisanship that does exist on Rhodesia at the moment were to be broken.
Finally, I should like to leave aside all the moral arguments, although they do appeal to me personally very strongly indeed, and just put one final argument on the basis of pure realpolitik. The opponents of sanctions, in stressing their case this evening, have been saying, in effect, "Leave everything to the white régime. It has preserved law and order in Rhodesia; it can guarantee political stability. Recognise the minority régime and all will be well". I was very surprised to hear, in the remarks that fell from the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, that in advocating the dropping of sanctions he was also advocating, as I understood it, the complete abandonment of the Fifth Principle and suggesting that we should recognise a minority régime on the basis of a settlement which the Pearce Commission has shown is not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. I find that an extraordinary proposition to advance.
But the case I want to make is that my judgment—and I agree that this is a matter of judgment—is the very reverse of that which has been presented by certain noble Lords. I believe the contrary. I believe that if one were to agree to recognise the régime on the basis of something like the present Constitution, that is a remedy of disaster. It may well be that there would be a degree of order and perhaps some progress over a very short, temporary period; but the day of retribution would certainly come, and some of the remarks we have heard from other noble Lords, Lord Gifford in parti
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cular, show what the threats and the dangers are. I think that is an ultimate consequence that we should do everything possible to avoid. With some other noble Lords, I believe, and I certainly hope passionately, that we can still find a peaceful solution to the problem' of Rhodesia, but we shall succeed in doing that only if Britain retains at least some leverage in the situation, some leverage such as is already given by our legal authority—it is only the British Parliament that can confirm legal independence—and also, I suggest, the leverage given by sanctions.
I would end with a plea to the Government. I hope that in this period for reflection which they themselves have advocated and made available they will keep a very open mind on all possible solutions to the problem. When I had a good deal to do with some of the consitutional discussions over recent years I thought that so much of the argument that at one stage was called the "numbers game" was really barren—I refer to arguments about a blocking third or a blocking quarter, and how many on this roll or on that roll. I think it may well be the case—I am talking very briefly at the moment—that the right solution for Rhodesia is something quite different, something quite apart from the 1961 or 1967 or 1969 Constitutions. I am not advocating any particular course at all, but something in the way of devolution in certain areas. I am not here advocating apartheid, but it is possible that some degree of separation of areas might be found generally acceptable.
I am not sure one need think of Rhodesia essentially as the unitary State we have always accepted it to be. A whole variety of devices could be considered which might make an eventual settlement more acceptable to one side or the other and be tolerable to all. I am making the plea that the Government keep an open mind so that they are ready to feed in any new and fruitful ideas as they arise. I would add that my hope is that one can arrive at a peaceful solution. I think one will only do that with a judicious use of the stick and the carrot, and therefore I would certainly vote in favour of the continuance of sanctions, at least for a further year.
8.3 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, in rising to make a small contribution to this debate, may I at once say that it will be a very brief intervention. Over the past few years of this unhappy story I have regularly taken part in our debates and have explained at some length my points of view, with which your Lordships are already familiar. I will not repeat them to-night. There has been a great deal of talk about legitimate and illegitimate States and that kind of thing; but we might remember, too, the origin of sanctions. Sanctions, let me say once more, are the illegitimate political bequest of a baffled British Prime Minister. Dean Acheson, the distinguished American lawyer, former Secretary of State of the United States of America, and one of those who originally drafted the United Nations Charter, in his speech to the American Bar Association in 1968 summed up the position in this way:
"It will surprise some of our fellow citizens, though hardly anyone here to-day, to be told that the United States is engaged in an international conspiracy instigated by Britain and blessed by the United Nations to overthrow the Government of a country that has done us no harm and threatens no one."
He went on to say:
"This is barefaced aggression, unprovoked and unjustified by a single legal or moral principle."
That is the judgment on sanctions of an American lawyer of international reputation. He concluded by saying, and it is very relevant to-day:
"If the rule of law means anything at all in international affairs, and unless the United Nations Charter is to be treated as so much wastepaper, sanctions are totally unlawful."
My Lords, this action was "sold" to the United States by the astute approach of a baffled Prime Minister, whose personal attempt to subordinate Rhodesia to his own wishes was rejected by these people, who were accustomed to managing their own affairs. That is how it all began. Rhodesia had governed itself peacefully and progessively for three-quarters of a century, and had enjoyed self-government for nearly half a century. It had never been governed by Britain; nor had Britain provided any police force, army, administration, finance, for Rhodesia. Rhodesians hewed their country from a primitive wilderness and transformed it into a modern civilisation
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by their own resources, their own initiative, their own enterprise and their own capital. Sanctions were designed to destroy the economy of Rhodesia and to promote internal revolution, to ensure the transfer of power to a section of the population manifestly unable and unsuitable at the moment to exercise it.
The Rhodesians appreciate the problems which they face. They are anxious to create stability by establishing conditions which will permit continued economic advance for all Rhodesians according to merit and ability; in other words, a fair deal for all. Sanctions are impeding progress in every direction, including that of African education. Rhodesia does not believe in enforced integration. She believes that people should be free to live their own lives and determine their own future, with freedom and opportunity for all within the preservation of a civilised Government. Rhodesians want Europeans and Africans to live in racial harmony according to the traditions which they each have built up for themselves. Their leader has declared that their task is to create soundly based institutions where tribalism is harnessed to and reconciled with government in the Westminster tradition, and racial competition for political power is and would be eliminated.
Obviously, the problem is a terribly difficult one, which can only be satisfactorily settled by Rhodesians in Rhodesia. They must be free, surely, to solve their own peculiar problems in their own way, so that their people—and this I emphasise—can continue to live in peace and harmony. Sanctions have pursued their destructive course and have proved utterly hostile to any acceptable solution of the Rhodesian problem. This can never be reached by force majeure. Sanctions have poisoned the atmosphere, and have been utterly hostile to the friendly and sympathetic solution of Rhodesian problems, which is the only attitude likely to effect a solution acceptable to all Rhodesians.
It is terribly true that these problems must be settled by Rhodesians themselves, with friendly advice and help from the British Government, but not by external dictation. If I may offer a personal comment from my own experience all over the world, the possession of power is fatal to success in human affairs if you ever

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use it. It should never be used as such, because you thereby destroy the hope of a friendly and mutually acceptable solution. It may give you the right to be heard as a friend, but that is all. You cannot impose it successfully; you have to win attention by inspiring collaboration. I have had personal experience of how much can be achieved by those methods all over the world. That sentiment is precisely what sanctions seem specifically designed to kill, and if not withdrawn at once they will surely poison the whole future of Southern Africa and will turn vastly needed friends into hitter enemies. I hope that we shall express our complete disapproval of this evil and disastrously ineffective policy of sanctions, and I shall have great pleasure this evening in going into the Lobby against the decision to continue them.
8.12 p.m.
LORD STAMP: My Lords, it is several years since I intervened in a debate on Rhodesia. I shall do so to-day, having been one of the signatories of the letter to The Times, though only for a few minutes as I know the lateness of the hour and we have a very long list of speakers. Once again we have to search our consciences in deciding what should be done about that country in the light of changing circumstances. Few subjects are more emotive and rouse more intense passions—largely due to the complexity of the factors involved on which everyone will lay different emphasis, and some of which many will seemingly completely ignore.
No one in a Christian country would deny the fundamental equality of man—of black or white—and few brought up on the principles of democracy disavow that of majority rule. Most, though, qualify this by insisting that the electorate must be educated, and therefore lay the greatest stress on the need for education of the Rhodesian peoples. All, or nearly all, continue to insist that majority rule is fundamental to any agreement over the future of Rhodesia. One cannot shut one's eyes, though, as many appear to do, to the state of affairs it has led to in other parts of Africa, all of which must surely colour our thinking to-day—black dictatorships leading to the repression of minorities, whether they be tribes or races; and now the iniquity of their expulsion from Uganda by President
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Amin. This point has of course been made by several noble Lords, but I feel that I must emphasise it again.
If our policy over sanctions, backed by world opinion, were yet to be successful, and, following the eventual accession of the black majority to power, the recent events in Uganda were to be repeated there, what should we or the United Nations say or do? Wash our hands of it and say that it was an internal affair and no business of ours, or that there was nothing we could do about it? If, under the terms of the granting of legal independence to Rhodesia, United Kingdom passports were given to all who claimed the right to them, how should we then cope with the possible influx of 200,00 whites, with the high level of unemployment and housing shortages still probably major factors? Compared with this, the present problem With regard to the Uganda Asians would be insignificant. Many would say that this could not possibly happen. Could it not? How many thought that at the time Uganda was granted independence?
My Lords, in my view, in the light of these considerations the whole Rhodesian problem needs re-thinking. This has become incomparably more difficult as the years have passed, with all the passions that have been aroused, the bitterness and hate that has been caused. the reactionary policies and repression that have resulted, and the entrenched positions that have been taken up, not only in Rhodesia but in this country and the United Nations. It is easy to be wise after the event, but I believe that history will record that a fundamental mistake was made at the beginning. This was to assume that a form of government based on majority rule that has taken centuries to develop in this country and still works at best very imperfectly and at worst disastrously—as in Northern Ireland—could be successfully applied "at a stroke", or even in the foreseeable future to countries in an entirely different stage of development, many with a diversity of races, tribes and religious beliefs. It would seem that to some, majority rule is an article of faith so inviolable that even if it results in the negation of the democratic ideal of freedom and justice for all, it must still be accepted without question.

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The position with regard to Rhodesia might have been very different to-day if in the early days when its Constitution following the granting of independence was being considered, more thought had been given to alternative forms of government involving less drastic changes and more safeguards. One such alternative has been nut forward by Mr. Holderness—a well-known Salisbury lawyer—the outlines of which were summarised in the Guardian of March 16, 1966. This was based on the principle of the "sharing of power". In addition to the equal sharing of the responsibility of government, the black and white peoples would have equal control over the armed forces and the police, so that both would be in a position to protect the Constitution.
Such a form of government which, if I may coin a phrase, might be referred to as "parity rule" would provide the conditions for confidence, trust and cooperation between the races, to be developed in a way that majority rule, with the dangers inherent in its "all or nothing" type of Constitution, never can do. If successful, it might even point the way eventually to a solution of the even more intractable problem of South Africa, however hopeless this may seem at present. Sooner or later justice must be done to the black people there, but I cannot ever see this being brought about through majority rule. The whites would never accept this.
The whole concept of parity rule may seem far too revolutionary and totally unrealistic to-day, but a revolution in thinking is essential if race relations in Rhodesia are not to go from bad to worse. This, in my view, is inevitable if sanctions are continued. If successful, they can lead only to continued economic hardship for the country, which in turn must inevitably lead to more discontent and more repression and more injustice. To me, there is only one hope—a fresh start, not based entirely on the approaches to a settlement of recent years, but taking into account fully the lessons that have been learnt. In this, all must play their part—the whites in the liberalisation of their Government and its policies and a great acceleration of their efforts on behalf of the black people in education, social services, and the provision of
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opportunities for advancement—all of which would be greatly facilitated and encouraged by the lifting of sanctions. The black people must accept the fact that in the long run more can be gained by making haste slowly: by compromise, rather than by insisting on their full rights, and by doing their utmost to ensure that such a compromise would gain general acceptance among their people. It is also up to black leaders in other parts of Africa to demonstrate that a multi-racial society with justice for all is possible there. In this I think that Dr. Banda, of Malawi, is pointing the way.
My Lords, all this may seem quite impracticable in the present climate and after all that has happened. It may be said that even if our country was prepared to lift sanctions the United Nations would never do so. This seems to me to be no reason for not advocating such a course if one believes it to be right, as I do, for the reasons I have given. Whatever may be the result of this and future debates, in the end a fundamentally new approach to the problem of Rhodesia will have to be made, if prosperity for all is ever to be brought to that unhappy land.
8.20 p.m.
LORD DULVERTON: My Lords, I am one of those who must apologise for having arrived late at this debate. I apologise, in particular, to the noble Baroness, Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, for having missed her opening speech due to the lack of expeditious transport between Gloucestershire and this place. I, too, am most conscious at this stage of the debate of the need to be brief and not to take up your Lordships' time further than I can avoid doing. For that reason, I shall try to proceed without embellishment to the notes that I have before me this evening.
As I understand it, the position in Rhodesia is that the British Government are still willing to consider a settlement to normalise relations with Rhodesia. However, this settlement must be formally endorsed by African representatives who can convincingly claim to speak for the majority of African opinion. The initiative for negotiating such a settlement rests fairly and squarely with the Rhodesian Government. That, as I understand it, is the position which we have now reached. In Rhodesia, opposition to

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the settlement comes in the main from four classes of people: on the Right, from well-to-do people, mostly with South African connections, who want to impose apartheid as a matter of principle almost amounting to a religious belief; also, from the white trade unions who are ruthlessly determined to prevent Africans competing for jobs with semi-skilled whites on anything like equal terms. On the Left, it conies from extremists of the ZANU and ZAPU Parties, led by Nkomo and Sithole, now interned, whose aim by all means, including intimidation, is to bring about the state of anarchy which is their best hope of achieving power; and also from African students encouraged, I am sorry to say, by certain American missionaries who insist on one man—one vote as a sine qua non for any settlement. On the other side, Rhodesians in favour of a settlement are, broadly speaking, some church leaders, individuals with social consciences of whom I happen to know many, and moderate Africans who do not regard one man—one vote as practicable at present, but who see a settlement as a step towards their recognition as at least an official opposition, with opportunities for advancement from there. There are also many farmers and businessmen who would like a settlement if only to enhance their own prosperity, but in many cases for other reasons as well.
Sanctions have certainly not had the effect of bringing about Rhodesia's collapse, predicted by Mr. Wilson, in days rather than weeks. Nevertheless, over the years they have undoubtedly had a cumulative effect. One small but visible sign of this is that Scotch whisky is now rationed to one bottle per month. But, perhaps more important than that, there are now, as we all know, serious difficulties in the sphere of foreign exchange. Thus sanctions are making those who have not hitherto been moved by principle increasingly aware of the material disadvantages of Rhodesia's present status. Those who oppose the continuance of sanctions on the grounds that they have proved of no effect are manifestly misinformed. There are also those who fear that the continuance of sanctions will make a clash between Right and Left out there inevitable. I personally do not subscribe to this view at the present
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time. Moderate people, both white and black African, are in the majority in Rhodesia. The African National Congress can fairly be said to represent about 80 per cent. of African opinion. Therefore, it is perfectly possible for the Rhodesian Government to talk to Africans without having to recognise the ZANU and ZAPU subversives. Furthermore, in the Rhodesian Front itself there are a number of members, including Mr. Ian Smith himself, who are by no means so extreme in their inclinations as some people in the United Kingdom imagine. But without some material incentive they are disinclined to make any positive effort, vis-à-vis their more extreme colleagues, to overcome the inertia of the status quo.
As we all know, there has been an encouraging development in the communication which was recently established between the African National Congress and the Minister for Internal Affairs. It was unfortunate that a leakage of this seems to have led to its having been broken off, one hopes only temporarily. But there is little doubt that, on the Government side, the incentive to hold talks stems largely from the effect of sanctions. Therefore, the object of continuing sanctions is not to bring the nation of Rhodesia to its knees, but to bring the Rhodesian Government to its senses and, to use a phrase which my noble friend Lord Barnby would understand were he in his seat, to keep Mr. Smith up in his bridle. Sanctions are not just a negative form of reprisal for the encouragement of extremists and subversion: they are, rather, a positive form of inducement to moderates to assert their moderation and thereby bring pressure upon the Rhodesian Government to negotiate a settlement acceptable to the moderate majority of African opinion. Sanctions will, I believe, also keep Africans up in their bridle, and without them at this moment efforts to achieve an ultimate settlement would fade away. If they did fade away, the result would inevitably be a move by the whites further towards apartheid and in the end, however far ahead, bloody revolution.
I confess to a deep affection and a very strong admiration for Rhodesia. There is much to admire there to-day. When I was invited to sign the letter that some of my noble friends sent off to The Times, the heart dictated that I should do so but

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the head said No, and I did not sign for reasons that I hope I have touched upon and explained. Yet I believe that there was good in the publishing of that letter, and of another letter which appears in The Times to-day subscribed to by a number of Members from another place. My reason for feeling that there was good in it is this. We cannot in this country absolve ourselves from having at times made blunders and mistakes in the sad course of the history which we all know so well.
There are those who ask why the Pearce Commission did not go out to Rhodesia until, I think it was, six weeks after Sir Alec Douglas-Home came back to this country. That is a point of contention to this day in Rhodesia, because men whose judgment I personally respect say that they could have predicted with virtual certainty that that space of six weeks would have given time, as it did, to the agitators and the extremists to stir up African opinion—and I think there is little doubt that that is what happened. My Lords, it may be extremely unpalatable for us in this House, particularly those who are at heart (as most of us are) friends of Rhodesia, to hear this, but there are those who say that the British Government caused the delay in sending out the Pearce Commission because they were really determined that a settlement should not be achieved. That is why I applaud and thank my noble friends who wrote that letter, although I did not feel able to sign it myself. I very much hope that, for reasons that I have made clear, they will not seek to-day to prevent Her Majesty's Government from renewing sanctions for yet another year. I myself feel that I must vote with the Government.
8.32 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I should like to start by paying the warmest possible tribute to the Foreign Secretary, because I feel that he showed the greatest courage, persistence and ingenuity in negotiating the abortive agreement with Mr. Smith. I think the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in this House on that occasion last summer was wholly convincing. But the Foreign Secretary really had bad luck: he was hooked on the Fifth Principle of acceptability. I do not think he could help himself; I think
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it was rotten luck. I do not think it was his fault at all, because that was undoubtedly a bull point for the people who wanted to wreck the agreement—and we have heard quite sufficient evidence in this House, if anybody doubted it, to know that that in fact is what happened. All sorts of people, from Africa, from Europe, from anywhere you like, got busy and helped to distort opinion.
My Lords, there are several points that I should like to make in this connection, and I believe they are important for the further settlement of this dispute—because there must be a settlement. First of all, it is ridiculous to get hooked on a principle. After 38 years as a diplomat I discovered that one always ran into trouble if one got hooked on a principle. You see, if you publish your principle and you then desert it, you immediately class yourself as a moral reprobate, and the people who do this have no flexibility of negotiation. The Russians do it. All right! What do we get? We get "Niet". The French do it. My Lords. they have been in a minority of one at every conference I have been to since 1920. So that is really, in my opinion, no way to conduct diplomacy; and I beseech the Foreign Office to see that we do not get caught that way again.
For instance, supposing the noble Baroness, whose diplomatic talents are really outstanding, is able to negotiate an agreement with Iceland on fish—as I earnestly hope she will do—are we going to say to the Icelander, "Ah! But we want to know whether every section of your opinion agrees with this agreement"? My Lords, it would be fatal. What about the recognition of the Soviet rape of the Baltic States? We have obviously had to recognise that. But did we say, "We want to know whether the Baltic States agree."? Of course we did not; it would have been absurd. To come nearer home, what about the Ostpolitik and the agreements with Eastern Germany? Do we think that anybody is going to say, "Ah! But we want a referendum in either part of Germany."? Of course there is going to be an election in Western Germany, and, God knows!, that is a big enough embarrassment. I hope that those agreements will go through, and I hope the Foreign Office shares that view.

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Then, my Lords, there is another point. Most referenda say, "No"; and, therefore, it is very important to ask the right question. Personally, I think the Norwegians, in their referendum, asked their people the wrong question. They said: "Do you want to go into the Common Market?" Naturally, the answer was. "No". If they had said: "Do you want to separate yourself from the main course of European development?", the answer would have been "No", and in they would have come. It is quite simple: it is necessary to be subtle in these matters. After listening to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, for whom I have the greatest possible admiration, I am inclined to think that perhaps we also asked the wrong question in Rhodesia. Anyway, I think one needs to adopt a slightly different approach to this question next time.
I do not see anything to be funny about in this. I have been through some terrible diplomatic traumas in my time. I was very much mixed up in the question of sanctions against Italy, and one of the most bitter experiences in my life was when we had to withdraw sanctions against Italy because they did not work. There was nothing else to do. You have to face these things. It requires guts. You have to do it. After the American action on chrome, which they have taken quite officially, with the approval of Congress, and after the really widespread evasion of sanctions by so many other nations—the Japanese, the Germans, the French; not officially, but their goods are everywhere in Rhodesia—I do not think it is fair to say, as a good many of your Lordships have implied, that sanctions represent any real pressure on Mr. Smith. I think we have to recognise this widespread evasion as inevitable. I do not believe that the United Nations or any other Power can, after these years, put Humpty-Dumpty together again. In my view, we must have the guts to recognise that this is not going to lead us anywhere. Especially, do not let us plunge into yet more blunders, to use the excellent phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Dulverton. I suggest, really, that the time has come to pack it up. It is traumatic. I do not like it. One does not like eating one's words, but occasionally it is safer to recognise the inevitable.
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We saw in the last war that it was militarily dangerous to reinforce a failure. I recall the famous last words of the pilot, "I think I can fly up that valley." I recall something that one of your Lordships said about Rhodesia possibly becoming a flashpoint of Africa. I want to suggest to your Lordships that the continuation of sanctions is not really likely to keep pressure on Mr. Smith. What it is likely to do is to build up extremist opinion, and perhaps increase the nearness of the flashpoint. I say this with great responsibility, and having been connected with places where flashpoints did occasionally occur.
So where do we go from here? This is the important point that has to be considered. I was very interested in something said by my noble friend Lord Walston, for whose wisdom I have always had a great admiration. He suggested that what we need is an intermediary, or some means of communication with Salisbury. I believe that what we need—and I know this is a revolutionary suggestion—is to have a permanent representative there. It would mean their having a permanent representative in London, but I do not see how this problem can be settled without our having some means of discussing the matter. It is obvious that it cannot now be done by pressure; it is obvious that political warfare and economic warfare carry us no further. All right! If you cannot war, you have to "jaw". And how do you "jaw" without representatives? Of course, there are businessmen on both sides going to and fro; and you can occasionally find an absolute genius, like the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who can do it for you. But I suggest that businessmen provide intelligence about what is happening at the other end of the line, and that it is important not to confuse intelligence with diplomacy. I see no alternative to diplomacy. I believe that to do this we have to have a top diplomat there, and to get him there we have to admit one of theirs here. That, of course, was contrary to what the United Nations said; but we have to recognise that the United Nations' gambit was "sanctions and all that". As that has failed we must try something new.
I would urge upon your Lordships that this revolutionary suggestion is perhaps one that ought to be carefully considered

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and, if at all possible, adopted. We have exchanged representatives with nations which were acutely opposed to us. We had a representative in China all through the Korean war, I think, and during all the time that Reuters' correspondent was being knocked about in his house. We have put up with a great deal. We have always had a representative in Moscow although the Russians have often behaved in a way of which we have not approved. So I think that we must do this, and I would urge that the time has come when it is rather scandalous that we do not protect British interests better. The British interests in Rhodesia ought to be protected. They are rather under fire in Africa, and it is high time, I believe, that we had the normal means of diplomatic and consular representation there.
I was greatly attracted also by what my noble friend Lord Garner said: he, too, felt that we had to find a solution. It is true that he also said that we should maintain sanctions: and there I part with him. But I think we have to do our very best to find a solution and to establish machinery to do that. But we have to recognise that if we have a representative in Salisbury and if we are going to do business through him, then the continuation of sanctions makes his position impossible. It weakens Mr. Smith's ability to make sensible concessions if he is subject to political and economic pressure. It is time to drop the stick and to try the carrot. This is very disappointing advice for the adherents of sanctions but I recall what that wise old man Confucius said to his niece: "If rape be inevitable, then relax…"
BARONESS WHITE:—"and enjoy it!"
Loan HANKEY: My Lords, I did not like to add that.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord should always be accurate.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I try to be.
I should like to conclude with an authority, more recent than Confucius, namely, Oliver Cromwell, who in his letter to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland on August 3, 1650, said:
"I beseech you in the bowels of Christ to think it possible that you may be mistaken."
8.45 p.m.
LORD STRANGE: My Lords, I think I am next on the programme. I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, on a speech which I thought full of wisdom, knowledge and humour. I have listened to a great number of speeches in this House and it is quite impossible for me to compete with them. They were all very good speeches, particularly that of the noble Marquess. It was excellent. There were fine speeches on all sides. People seem to have gone out of their way to speak so well that I cannot possibly compete; so I shall hope to be in the 6½-minute bracket. I do not think I shall get carried away.
My Lords, everything has been said. I should like to go further back and look at the question from a distance. I confess that as a child I was surrounded by politicians, Tory politicians. Two of my aunts were married to distinguished politicians and I therefore took it all as rather a joke. I remember being asked by my family about the British Empire and I said that we taught them cricket and they taught us polo. We educated their children over here and their children went back from us and taught them English and told their friends about us and said, "Rule Britannia, Beechams pills, Queen Victoria, jolly good chap!" This made for good and important relations. Apart from that, I knew that the sun, obviously for geographical reasons, did not set on the British Empire.
I did not take much more interest than that until I found about twenty years ago that Empire was a dirty word; that people did not want the British Empire. They wanted to give it away as quickly as possible. They talked about our deceiving the natives and about our loss of power to rule. That was interesting to hear and I thought that everybody, everywhere was mad. And so we came to the stage where we could not get rid of the Empire fast enough. We wanted to give it away, to give the people in it lots of votes so that they could run their places as we run ours here—although they were of different races. For their voting, they were to have pictures of people; they were to vote for pictures. Who was to draw the pictures I did not know. I never asked; but that was how I took it to be.

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My Lords, to come to a more serious point, I can remember an occasion some years ago when I was seated here in my place and the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was speaking from his place quite near me. I have a note somewhere of this occasion. Lord Attlee made an interesting speech; I was very close to him. At the end of his speech he dropped his voice and he said something which I thought was a wonderful thing to say. I went to him afterwards in the writing room, where he had the habit of sitting and signing a lot of letters. I congratulated him on his speech and I asked him this question: "That last remark in your speech—was that by any chance your farewell to Parliament?" He said that it was, so I thought I would produce it to-day. So I got hold of the Hansard of the day—we are all greatly helped and looked after in this House—and I looked up that speech; but that closing remark was not in it. Now I know that I heard it. When I made inquiries—everything can be found in the House of Lords—I was told that he had spoken in so low a tone that his voice had dropped below the microphone level. I think the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, too, may have heard what he said. Earl Attlee was a great man. It is unfortunate that that remark was not on record, and I cannot record it now, obviously, because it is not in Hansard. The reason for this omission was that when it had been inquired of him what he had said, he had replied, "Don't worry about it. Forget it!" That, of course, has robbed my speech of something which would have been a compliment to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and which should be recorded in the history of this country. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, knows what was said and that he would agree that it cannot now be repeated.
I have some notes—I am not used to speaking from notes, but I have them somewhere—of what Lord Attlee actually said about Rhodesia. It is very interesting. He was a person worth listening to. I cannot find my note so I must quote from memory, which is obviously not as satisfactory; but there it is! I have lost it. I have a hole in one of my pockets—but, wait a second, my Lords, I have it! The date was November 15, 1965, and the debate was on sanctions,
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and the noble Earl said:
"…sanctions…should be short, sharp…the sooner we are prepared to treat with these frightened people—Mr. Smith and his friends—generously, the better."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15/11/65 col. 282]
That was said then, my Lords. Lord Attlee was a man of wisdom and he said that it must be "Snap, this, this, and that!" That was seven years ago. And we are going on to-day. Now, my Lords, I shall tell you something important.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the fact is, as the noble Lord has said, that I remember those remarks, but I think Lord Attlee would also have agreed that sanctions would have to continue. They should be short and sharp to bring in results; but he would not have condoned any relinquishment of the present pressures.
LORD STRANGE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, for that intervention. It will make my speech a little longer than six minutes, but I feel honoured that a Member of the Opposition Front Bench should recognise that I am speaking. The point I was going to make is one which I found out, and I give it to your Lordships as a tip. I am considered, and I am, an old man. By the standards of earlier days I should be a very old man, but by modern standards we do not admit to that. I have found that the greatest health exercise one can have in life is to go over one's life and count up all the times one was wrong and admit to oneself, "I was wrong." That is the first test that everyone should apply to himself. If you do that, you feel a healthier and better person. You cannot make a woman do it. I have tried, and I know that you cannot. But men can; they can face up to it and say, "I was wrong."
The second thing one can learn about is not to be a sheep. That is a very important point. You must be able to say to yourself (you can say it to yourself in private, in the bathroom; you do not have to tell everyone): "I am not a sheep." My sister—I talked to her last week—has the same sense of humour that I have which is odd, perhaps. I think one might describe it as that. She said, "I am thinking of standing outside No. 10 with a placard. After a time a number of people would join me and after a bit a policeman would conduct us and we

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would go round the block shouting slogans. "I said to her," Would you write anything on your placard? "She said," I don't think that would be necessary; they would all have their placards. "Then she said," I might write something, as we are going into the Common Market. I might write, Protect our France from the French,' that would draw a crowd." We agreed that that was a good idea. Being a sheep one can be a religious sheep, I am afraid, and also a political sheep. Or one can be—we are dealing with this to-day—an ideological sheep. People have these wonderful ideas that I have never had, these marvellous ideological ideas which are difficult to understand. Many of them have been expressed to-day. Honour has come into the debate a good deal. I am not sure what "honour" is now: it was a girl's name in Victorian times.
I note, my Lords, that nine minutes have slipped by, but I am coming to the end of my speech. The end of my speech is this. I think that what Lord Attlee said in 1965 was right: sanctions have to be finished quickly. Yet they have gone on for seven years. Nobody has greater respect for Sir Alec Douglas-Home than I have; I think he is a jolly good chap. But I think he is gambling on this. I know all the members of the Conservative Front Bench, and I know how Conservatives think. I have been a Conservative myself. I know that we shall hear a wonderful speech from the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, at the end of the debate this evening. We shall all cry because it will be so marvellous and it will move us all. But seven years is a long time to gamble with. Why not take off sanctions and see what happens? After all, if there is anything funny that we do not like, we can always go to war against them. George III thought nothing of going to war against his own Colonies and hiring troops to fight. There is nothing wrong about that. And we could always put sanctions on again. But, my Lords, I come to the point of my speech. I have been touched. I know a great many people from South Africa: some even have relatives living out there. I am frightened that if we leave things as they are, Rhodesia will go and join with South Africa. I have a lot of "dope" on this, but I will not bore your Lordships with it. But I am frightened they will do
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that, and then it will be too late. Therefore I ask all noble Lords to think very carefully whether they are sheep, or whether they are men who can say now, in the light of what has happened, "We were wrong".
8.55 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, after the Machiaevellian advice from the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and the extremely entertaining interlude from the noble Lord, Lord Strange, which I am sure we have all very much enjoyed, I think we must remind ourselves that we are now approaching the end of this very long debate. I assume that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, will wind up, as it were, for The Times signatories and then we shall reach the Front Bench winding-up speeches. After that, my Lords, we have to reach a decision. I am assuming, from the remarks made by various noble Lords, that there are at any rate some who propose to divide the House. So I think that at this stage in our debate we must surely come right back to the essentials of what it is that we are being asked to decide on to-night.
With great respect to so many noble Lords who I think have made extremely interesting and in many cases very well-informed' speeches, I would say that many of those speeches are, in a sense, irrelevant to the decision which to-night we are being asked to take. I say this because anyone who heard the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, will surely recognise that that is the essence of what we have to decide to-night. It is not really whether sanctions were advised or ill-advised; whether they have been effective or not effective; nor even, possibly, whether we think their continuance will lead to a settlement or make a settlement less likely. The stark fact of the matter is, as we were reminded so overwhelmingly convincingly to my mind by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, that it is less than twelve months since the Commission of which he was Chairman and of which another Member of your Lordships' House was a member, was sent to Rhodesia to set certain propositions before the people of Rhodesia. They went with the full authority of Her Majesty's Government, and it was with that authority that they told the people

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of Rhodesia that if the proposals were accepted, sanctions would be abandoned, and that if the proposals were not accepted, sanctions would be maintained. That was something said with authority.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick, is not in the Chamber, because I thought that, from his point of view, he made, if I may say so, one of the most effective speeches in the debate. But I think the noble Lord was on extremely dangerous ground. I have not his precise words, but I have the sense of what he said. He was referring to a decision taken in this House in 1968 against the former Labour Government. He said that if this House was right to turn down sanctions then, it would be all the more right to turn down sanctions now, when the Conservative Party is in power. Surely this is a completely mistaken point of view. After all, the noble Lord is a supporter of a Government whose word was pledged. And as a supporter of that Government (this applies, if I may respectfully say so, to a number of other noble Lords) he must surely be concerned with the honour of the Government. This, I would plead with your Lordships, has very little to do at this moment of time with one's views about sanctions. Some are in favour and some are against. But the real point is that the Pearce Commission, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and less than 12 months ago, said this. And the situation in Rhodesia has not changed to a degree in which one has any justification, it seems to me, morally to abandon sanctions at this point in time. The time may come, but I submit that it is not to-night.
I would plead again with noble Lords to think carefully what they might be doing if they were to vote against their own Government in a situation of this kind. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, said, a reputation for straight dealing is not lightly to be thrown away. It could not be better put; it is so simple and so succinct. I do not think that anyone with knowledge of Africa would doubt for a moment that if here and now to-night your Lordships' House were to turn down the Motion of the Government, we should be able to escape the accusation that we were
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not dealing straight, and that we never meant what was said by the Pearce Commission, with the authority of the British Government. This seems to me to be by far the most important aspect of the debate and of the decision which we are being asked to take.
My Lords, there were other things that I should have liked to say. I will add very little more because, as I say, this point seems to me to transcend any other, and everything else is so much less relevant that I think it hardly matters: everything else is a matter of opinion as to whether sanctions were wise or unwise, whether they have worked or have not worked. This is a matter of absolute basic principle and a matter of honour. Much of what I would otherwise have said—and I will touch on it only briefly—was said by the noble Lord, Lord Dulverton. I found his speech, if I may respectfully say so, one of the most enlightening of those to which we have listened, and I have listened to not quite all, but nearly all of the speeches that have been made in this debate.
The noble Lord, to my mind, put forward the pragmatic argument, as opposed to the matter of principle, for retaining sanctions at the present time. Again, I thought he put it so well that I cannot put it better myself. He said that a continuation of sanctions is an inducement to moderates in Rhodesia—and he was speaking of both white and black Rhodesians to exert their moderation. All my advice from Rhodesia is entirely in line with what the noble Lord, Lord Dulverton, said. I no longer have quite such close acquaintance as I had some years ago. Such contacts as I have are now exclusively with white Rhodesians, and it is from them that I have had advice very similar to that given by the noble Lord, Lord Dulverton: that if one discontinues sanctions at this time, one will stop the movement towards some rapproachment which I believe is just beginning in Rhodesia. This was another point made quite briefly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce. There is movement; it is not a completely static situation. There is not simply a monolithic pro-Smith Party. Nor is the opposition to Mr. Smith exclusively from the extreme Right. As anyone who has read the reports this week about the formation of the new Rhodesia Party

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under the leadership, among others, of Adam Savory, who left Mr. Smith's Party, will appreciate, there is movement. It is not a radical movement. It is not what we on this side of the House would consider a Left-Wing Party by any means. It is what one would regard as a Right-Wing Party, but what one might call a traditionalist Party: that is to say, it may be paternalistic in its attitude; it may be turning the clock back possibly; but it is not a Party which wishes the developments in Rhodesia which tend towards apartheid. I quote from a Guardian report of yesterday, in which it says:
"The new party seeks a return to the traditional white Rhodesian way of life, with an end to petty racialism and advancement on merit guaranteed to Africans."
There is nothing revolutionary about that; but it is better than the proposals made by certain other people in Rhodesia. In particular, I think it is important that the Party wishes the reintroduction of a common voters' roll and constitutional safeguards for each race against domination by the other: and there was an echo of that in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Stamp, who went back again to the 1966 Holderness proposals.
My Lords, as I have said, at this late hour I do not wish to elaborate on this. I would only say that on the African side also, according to my information, there is a certain movement. It is not absolutely hard; it is not completely static. The leaders of the African National Council realise that they have to move also. I think that both sides are trying to find some way of not losing too much face with their own supporters, which one can quite understand, but equally to have some sort of dialogue. This is the information that I have received and, as I say, the noble Lord, Lord Dulverton, in his most interesting speech, and with his, I am sure, far greater knowledge than I possess, entirely supported this analysis of the situation. Therefore I agree with the noble Lord that, looking at it from the pragmatic point of view, apart from the overriding question of principle and honour, that also leads in the same direction. Whatever may ultimately be the opinion of your Lordships' House tonight, to my mind there is no doubt
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whatever where our duty lies, and that is to support the Government.
9.8 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I suppose that each one of us, when we came to the House to-day and saw the long list of speakers, must have had a sinking feeling in the heart and must have wondered what on earth there could be left to say that is worth saying now about this unhappy problem. Yet I think we must all agree that we have had from both sides of your Lordships' House a series of most remarkable and penetrating speeches. I daresay that when we come to debate this Motion in 1980 or 1990 it may begin to wear a little thin, but I have a suggestion that might cover that. It is obviously too late for this year, but I am sure that with good will between the usual channels it could be made effective in subsequent years. It would give variety to the discussion and tend to lessen its monotony. My suggestion is that in alternate years, beginning with next year, instead of laying an Order renewing sanctions against Rhodesia we should lay an Order reimposing the tea duties on the North American Colonies. That would be just as effective and a great deal less dangerous.
The noble Baroness who has just spoken said that the question of the merits of sanctions and whether or not they were successful was a minor matter, and that the only thing which did matter was what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, said this afternoon. Well, views may differ about that, and I happen to hold a different view from that of the noble Baroness. I think the question of the practical effect of sanctions matters most enormously, and that what we have to get into our heads, and what noble Lords opposite, especially, have got to get into their heads, and what, if he will allow me to say so, my noble friend Lord Dulverton (who made a most moderate and persuasive speech) has got to realise, is that economic sanctions mean war.
We have declared war on Rhodesia. We have carried on that war for seven years. The United Nations declared war on Rhodesia a little later, and they have carried the war on for some four, five or six years—I forget the precise number. Now what is the effect of war? The effect of war is to make a nation draw in upon itself, to stand solidly behind its

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Government. It makes it almost impossible for moderate opinion to express itself, and it produces the kind of thing that noble Lords opposite used to call "the police State". It is not so long since we were a police State. We were at war. We had censorship of the Press, internment without trial, and all the rest of it. And that is what we are forcing upon Rhodesia, with sanctions. We must get it into our heads that we are at war with Rhodesia. It was we who declared war, not they. It is they who are defending themselves, and we cannot expect them to do anything else.
My noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir made a speech this afternoon which was, as usual, charming and appealing; but this time—and I do not want to hurt her feelings—it was not entirely convincing. She said—and we have heard the argument elsewhere—that there was a chance of a settlement. She said that there was a chance of getting the two sides together and that the way to do so was to continue sanctions. I wonder whether the noble Baroness, or indeed your Lordships' House in general, really thought about what she was saying; because in fact sanctions convey a different message to each side in the dispute that is going on in Rhodesia. To the militant Rhodesian Front, sanctions say, "We must fight". To the African Nationalist they say, "We must fight. If we keep on they are going to give way". I suggest that the only possible way in which the policy advocated by my noble friend this afternoon could succeed would be if sanctions were lifted. Then we should find the moderate coming out of his shell. We have heard about him for five years; he has never yet appeared. If the war situation ceased, the moderate would come out of his shell and there would then be the chance of a real rapprochement between the two sides.
I want to give the noble Baroness and the House two examples of what I have been trying to say. First, a word about the effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian Front. The other day the railway union introduced a new colour bar by which on main-line trains no coloured or black African was allowed to be a driver, or part of the train crew. That is the effect of sanctions on the Rhodesian Front. Now a word about the effect of sanctions on African national opinion. It will not
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have escaped the notice of your Lordships that Miss Judith Todd has been appointed—God save the mark!—ambassadress of the African National Council to the United Nations; and when a moderate African, Mr. Sadomba was asked about this, and asked if it did not forebode ill for this rapprochement which my noble friend and the Foreign Secretary are working to get, he replied, "After all, we have to have our Miss Devlin, too". Does that sound very much like sanctions bringing the two sides together? I think not.
But to me there is a more important aspect of keeping on sanctions. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Garner, is here because he cast what was a somewhat unworthy imputation upon those of us who opposed sanctions. He said the violence of our opposition must mean that sanctions are beginning to bite. I do not think that was altogether worthy. We are opposed to sanctions for the reasons that I gave, and we are opposed to sanctions for another reason: I do not believe that time is on our side. A predecessor of mine in the representation in another place of the City of Kingston-upon-Hull wrote:
"Had we but world enough, and time, …"
Then, later on:
"But at my back I always hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near,
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast Eternity."
I would alter one word: for "Eternity", read "anarchy". The danger is that, unless we change our tactics, the whole of this, Southern Africa is going to be plunged into a holocaust of anarchy and bloodshed.
The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, made one of the most remarkable speeches in this debate, and I hope the effect of his speech on noble Lords on this side of the House will be to make them come into the Lobby against the continuation of sanctions. He described how he was an honoured guest of the Liberation Front in Mozambique. He did not, I note, describe that as "an illegal régime". He described how they were arming themselves; how the day of bloody reckoning was drawing nearer and nearer. I believe most firmly that unless we can get this question of sanctions out of the way, we are going to reap the whirlwind, having sown the wind of our own folly.

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Perhaps I may now turn to the point raised by the noble Baroness about our moral obligation in this matter. The House was either deeply impressed or shocked by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, had to say. I must say that I doubted the wisdom of his taking part in the debate, he being Chairman of the Commission, but I had no intention, when I saw his name on the list of speakers, of debating it with him. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, I greatly respect and admire for what he tried to do in Rhodesia. As he knows, I thought he failed; but I deeply respect him. He was good enough to tell us that because he, Lord Pearce, had travelled up and down the country of Rhodesia saying that if the agreement was not settled, was not accepted, then sanctions would continue indefinitely, and that if we went back on that we were dishonouring ourselves as a Parliament and as a House—
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to intervene for one moment? Was it not certain that the Pearce Commission were bound to tell the Africans what would be the situation if they said, "No"? The fact that they said, "No" in those circumstances makes their decision doubly convincing; and in those circumstances surely my noble and learned friend and his colleagues were entirely justified in the line they took.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am sorry to differ from my noble friend. I have differed from him before, but never more deeply than now. The Commission were given certain terms of reference—they are here on page 1 of the Report. There is not one word, not one syllable, in those terms of reference to suggest that the noble and learned Lord had authority to commit either House of Parliament or the Government to an indefinite continuation of sanctions. I would ask my noble friend whether he can assure the House that no advice, or no instruction, was given to the noble and learned Lord to take the line that he did on this point, to exceed his terms of reference—
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords—
LORD COLERAINE: May I finish, my Lords? If such instruction or advice was given, was Parliament informed? If Parliament was not informed, why not?
LORD BERNSTEIN: My Lords, is it not the fact that Her Majesty's Government implied that if the Pearce Report did not recommend certain actions they would continue their policy which they had started prior to the Labour Government coming into power? Therefore, ipso facto, I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, was quite right in saying that sanctions would continue.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am sorry to say that I said during the debate on the Report that I never thought it was a great success to have eminent lawyers dealing with an issue of this kind, and, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, I still hold to that opinion. I think the noble and learned Lord would have done much better to have stuck to his brief.
We are told, and I am sure that my noble friend is going to tell us again, that, quite apart from the effect of lifting sanctions on Rhodesia, we have to consider the effect on the outside world, on our relations with the United Nations, and so forth. I wonder whether we do not give too much consideration to that aspect of the matter. I wonder whether we really do well by pussyfooting about and trying to be liked; because that is really what this policy means.
The noble Lord, Lord Strang, wrote a book some years ago called Britain in World Affairs, a survey of the fluctuations in British power and influence from Henry VIII to Elizabeth II, and in that book he reflected at large upon the sources of power, whether they were entirely military and economic or whether you could have influence without military and economic power, and I think he said that there were cases in which you could. But I would suggest to your Lordships that if you have not got military power and if you have not got economic power and you have to rely entirely upon influence, that influence must be backed by will and not just by good intentions. I think that on this side of the House we know that mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia were a violation of the United Nations Charter. We

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know that the United Nations applies an entirely different standard to Rhodesia from the standard it applies to other countries whose sins are infinitely greater than those of Rhodesia and whose threat to the peace is far greater than anything that we could attribute to Rhodesia. Would it not be better for us now to do what the Foreign Secretary said that one day he would perhaps have to do, namely, go to the United Nations and say, "This policy has failed; this policy has become a sham, it has become a humbug; we are not going to enforce it any more"?
I would ask my noble friend to consider for a moment the relative positions of ourselves and France. We have gone pussy-footing about, trying to make ourselves agreeable to this or that black African State. France, on the other hand, has gone ahead in black Africa saying exactly what it means and doing exactly what it has said, and it has far more support in black Africa than we have. When M. Pompidou had to make a declaration about the supply of arms, submarines and aircraft by France to South Africa, he did not make it in Paris but in Dakar, and France has lost no trade through that. Indeed, France has lost the respect of nobody through that. I believe that we are losing respect as well as trade—and I do not minimise the importance of trade—by not having the will to fulfil our good intentions.
My Lords, I have really been speaking to noble Lords on this side of the House and to some on the Cross-Benches. I know that nothing I could say would influence members of the Labour or Liberal Parties. I ask noble Lords on this side to consider whether it is not their duty to vote against this Order to-night. We all have a deep respect for the Foreign Secretary and I do not think it shows any disrespect for the Prime Minister or any member of the Government to say that Sir Alec Douglas-Home holds a special position in our hearts and in the hearts of the people of this country. He is trusted as nobody else is. But we cannot shelter behind that. I respect Sir Alec, I admire him and I am well aware of his integrity, but that does not mean that I must unreservedly accept his judgment. After all, Rhodesia is only a trifle on his plate, so to speak.
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Much bigger problems confront him. We can say, "This is our view, but Sir Alec has wider sources of information; he has the Rhodesian Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to inform him"—as it informed Mr. Wilson's Government in 1965 and 1966, when it was a "question of days and not months". All the information it has given has proved to be wrong and I do not see why we should accept it now. I ask your Lordships to consider whether it is not your duty, if in your good judgment you feel that sanctions are wrong, to vote against this Order.
My noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie spoke of what might happen if the Order were rejected and said that the House might have to be summoned to-morrow. I think that some noble Lords took that as a threat, though I am sure that my noble friend did not intend it as one and I am sure, if it were intended as a threat, that your Lordships would not heed it. She made a further reference, which was rather more obscure, to some kind of conflict of opinion between the authorities in one House as against the authorities in another which might mean that the Order in fact could not be reintroduced, so that a vote against it would nullify Government policy. May I suggest to you, my Lords, that if that happened two miracles would be needed: the first miracle would be the hypothesis that my noble friend the Chief Whip and my noble friend the Leader of the House would not find some way of reintroducing the Order; and the second miracle would be that the Order is rejected to-night. I do not think it will be. I believe that it will be carried by Labour and Liberal votes. But if I am wrong, and if indeed these two miracles do come to pass, then surely we can see in that the hand of Providence, and it must mean that Providence intended that this nonsensical policy should cease.
9.37 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we in Parliament have a genuine tradition. We may not have affection, we may not have agreement, but we can have respect, and I am certain that in whatever quarter of the House we may sit we have respect for the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, because for some seven years he has been

569
consistent. He has been consistent in support of the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia.
LORD COLERAINE: No, my Lords; if the noble Lord will allow me. I have been consistent against the policy of sanctions. I have not been consistent in support of the Smith régime. I would very much rather have had a more moderate one.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am glad the noble Lord has corrected that point, but certainly in my period of time on the Benches opposite the impression I had was that consistently the noble Lord gave support and comfort to the illegal régime in Rhodesia.
My Lords, we have had a good debate. It has been calm, although occasionally it became a little electric, and on one occasion the noble Earl the Leader of the House tempered, I thought very successfully—although I feel it was not required—the speech of my noble friend Lord Caradon. It was the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, who reminded me of June, 1968, when we were debating a similar but not identical Order. On that occasion there were present in your Lordships' House some 377 noble Lords. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, for reasons best known to themselves, led their own Party into the Division Lobby. To-night I speak in support of the noble Earl on a similar but not identical Order.
Why do we come together at this moment of time? My Lords, we come together because of a decision taken by a Conservative Government well before U.D.I. or I.D.I. A Conservative Government laid down Five Principles for the independence of Rhodesia. The Fifth Principle was perhaps the most important: it was that under which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, was required to go to Rhodesia to see whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole accepted the terms that had been agreed between the British Government and the Government of Rhodesia as a possible base for a settlement. In Government one has responsibility, and I think it is for that reason to-night that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, will be asking your Lordships to support an Order that is similar to but not identical with that which they voted against in 1968.
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In this debate I think there were, among a number of notable speeches, two that put the issue quite clearly. There was the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce. The noble and learned Lord was sent out first of all to satisfy himself, and, of course, Parliament, that the people of Rhodesia understood what was the settlement and, having decided that, to ascertain whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole found it acceptable. The decision of that Commission we have already debated, and our debate was based upon one of the most brilliant and clear Reports that I think Parliament has ever been asked to consider. I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, spoke to-night. I think he had a duty to speak to-night, because we all receive a Writ of Summons, do we not? What did the noble and learned Lord say? He said that he would not have undertaken this particular mission unless he felt that Parliament, which in the end is the only means by which Rhodesia could achieve independence, would stand by not only the terms of a possible agreement but the verdict of the Commission which Parliament had set up and had authorised. And, of course, the noble Lord and his colleagues had to say to the people of Rhodesia; "If you accept these terms it means independence, which of course would pave the way to the lifting of sanctions. If you do not accept them, it would naturally follow that the status quo would remain and that the Constitution of Rhodesia would remain illegal and that sanctions would continue."
Those who question whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, was right to put the position in those terms to the people of Rhodesia need only look to the speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor winding up the debate in December. The House will remember that the Opposition moved an Amendment which was basically to take note; we did not wish to approve it, we wished to leave it to the people of Rhodesia themselves to decide, without the foreknowledge of what Parliament had decided. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that it would be wrong to send a Commission to Rhodesia to put this question to the people of Rhodesia unless there was a clear understanding by those people that

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if they accepted these terms Parliament would pass it and independence be granted. I do not believe that those who took part in that debate could in any way have misunderstood the position of Her Majesty's Government as it was put forward by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. And, my Lords, the noble Lords who have criticised to-day went into the Division Lobby in support of the Government when a Division was called.
Should sanctions continue? I believe that there are three choices. The first is to condone an illegal act—and I do not believe that this Parliament, or the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, himself, would have condoned an illegal rebellion against the Crown. Secondly, one could use force. I do not believe that this Parliament would have entertained the use of force in Africa, with all the possible repercussions that would flow from it. Therefore what was left but a form of pressure through economic sanctions? It is true that they have not worked "at a stroke". They may not have had the impact that some of us had hoped. If they had been quicker, no doubt the unsatisfactory situation that we have to-day could have been avoided. But I do not believe—and I look at the words of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in 1965—that in the view of the official Opposition there was any choice but to impose sanctions. I would hazard a guess that had there been a Conservative Government in 1965 they too would have imposed some form of economic sanctions upon Rhodesia, because what the régime in Rhodesia was doing was quite contrary to all the requirements that previous Conservative and Labour Governments had required for the granting of independence.
My Lords, if we were, as has been suggested to-day, to give up sanctions, is it really to be believed that those who support Mr. Smith, those who put pressure upon Mr. Smith, would change their course of action and belief? I have always believed that the basic problem in Southern Africa is not necessarily fear of one colour of another, but is, basically, economic. Therefore I do not believe that if we were to take off sanctions to-day we should see a sudden change of view
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by those who are in authority in Rhodesia. But if we were to take off sanctions, we should be saying to citizens of the Queen, "We must leave you. We have no further responsibility to you"; and in practice we should also be saying to Rhodesia as a whole, "Whatever may be the events in Africa, you can never look to us for protection". This is a factor that was very much in the mind of the Labour Government in the very early days of the illegal declaration of independence. I think that we should be deceiving ourselves if we believed that there would be a change for the better if sanctions were to be lifted to-night, which would be the consequence if the Order was not passed to-night. Noble Lords opposite have repeatedly said that they have not only great affection but great confidence in the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Sir Alec has been consistent in this matter he has not deviated one iota on it, and I believe that he is right.
I doubt whether on the basic issue, I could persuade any noble Lord not to vote against this Order, but there may be some who believe that the opportunity which was available in 1968 is available to the House to-night. When the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, spoke against the Order then, they maintained that the House of Commons would have an opportunity for reflection, and that if that House still wished to proceed with the Order the Conservative Opposition in your Lordships' House would permit it to go through if it was relaid. I believe that that is very much the view of the noble Lord, Lord Napier and Ettrick. It is certainly the message of an unofficial Whip that I saw moving around the Benches opposite. May I say to the noble Lord who was responsible for the unofficial Whip, "For heaven's sake! don't leave it on the cyclostyle machine"? I kept it quiet until yesterday, but I do not believe that that option is now open.
If I may say so to the noble Baroness, who made a most admirable speech, I think she made one error and I must therefore criticise her in that respect. The noble Baroness said that if this Order is defeated to-night—and my respect for Scottish ladies is a little less to-night than at the beginning of the debate, because she was then prepared to admit defeat—it is the Government's intention

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to re-lay it tomorrow. I was not quite certain whether that was a threat or an invitation. But I do not believe the present position is like that of 1968. I should like to refer your Lordships to Erskine May at page 362, and this is my only quotation. It states:
"Matters already decided during the same session—A motion or an amendment may not be brought forward which is the same, in substance, as a question which has been decided in the affirmative or negative during the current session. The rule must he fully stated as follows:
"No question or bill shall be offered in either House that is substantially the same as one on which its judgment has already been expressed in the current session."
The noble Baroness said that an Order with a slight amendment could be introduced. It is certainly clear from Erskine May that the word "substantially" has a significant part to play in any decision about whether an Order or a Bill can be re-laid in your Lordships' House. There were some 18 paragraphs in the Order of 1968, and when there are 18 paragraphs it is relatively easy to change an Order substantially. But basically the Order before us to-night consists of only one paragraph, the sole purpose of which is to extend the life of the Southern Rhodesia Act. I have taken advice on this matter, and I certainly invite the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, to respond here, and I say with the utmost sincerity that I have the gravest doubts whether, if your Lordships' House voted against this Order and it was defeated, an Order could be re-laid. If that is so, then, my Lords, the Southern Rhodesia Act would come to an end, and all that flows from it.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. If the only difficulty is that this Order is only one paragraph long and the previous Order to which he has referred was 18, I am quite positive that it would not be beyond the wit of Parliamentary draftsmen to add another 17.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has a great respect for Parliamentary draftsmen. All I can say to the noble Lord and to the House—and I have taken the best advice that is available to a Member of your Lordships' House—is that there is very considerable doubt whether this Order
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could be re-laid. Of course, there is the other place: but we know the position of Mr. Speaker. He is not in a position to give a judgment on a hypothetical question; and therefore Mr. Speaker could not give advice until your Lordships had decided to defeat this Order. I stress that, my Lords, not because I wish to hang our case, or the case of the Government, on a constitutional issue. I do so only because of the unofficial Whip and of a possible risk of misunderstanding by noble Lords that all they need to do is to vote against the Order to-night, perhaps defeat it, and everything can be put right by a new Order, as was done in 1968. I must say in all sincerity to the House that I do not believe that this is possible.
My Lords, we come back to the central issue. It is only this House, with the House of Commons, that can grant independence to the people of Rhodesia. It was the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, who said that there was no dishonour in acknowledging defeat in war. I do not accept that. There would be no dishonour, it is true, if one were defeated in war and if there were nothing else that one could do—if one had reached the end of one's ability to fight. There would be dishonour if, at this moment, because the time has been long and Parliament has perhaps become bored, we were to give up the one piece of pressure that we have upon an illegal régime, a régime that is in rebellion to the Crown. My Lords, we have one Colony to-day that is under sanction—Gibraltar. If we were to give up our support to Gibraltar, that would be dishonour. If we were to give up our support to the people of the Falklands against the Argentine, that would be dishonour. Closer to home, if we were to give up our struggle against those men of evil intent in Northern Ireland, that would be dishonour. I believe it would equally be dishonour if to-night, by this act, we were to remove the one pressure that we have on the régime in Rhodesia and cease to give continued hope to the majority of the citizens of the Crown in Rhodesia. I hope that this House will listen very much to the advice of the noble Earl, speaking with the responsibility of government, and will see that the honour of this country is in no way besmirched.
10.0 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, we heard a very remarkable disclosure from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd; that is, that he seems to be in receipt of an unofficial Whip which comes from this side of your Lordships' House. I congratulate the noble Lord on his versatility. When the noble Lord, Lord Strange, in a typical intervention in your Lordships' House, reminded us of the remark by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, when we were debating this issue seven years ago that it was his belief that to be effective sanctions should be short and sharp, I could not but reflect that we have in fact gone round this sad and rather dreary treadmill for seven years. I could not help but reflect that when sanctions were first proposed I would not have believed it to be on the cards that this House would be in the position of again considering a renewal now, seven years later.
That being so, I can well understand the reservations, the severe reservations, which certain of my noble friends have expressed in this long debate to-day. If I may say so without, I hope, sounding in the slightest way patronising towards my noble friends, they put their case both fairly and squarely. My noble friend Lord Coleraine made a speech of very great power. There were other distinguished speeches from those particular Benches, if I may so term them—from my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, from the noble Marquess. Lord Winchester, in a speech of great personal feeling and humanity, and I also have in mind the speech of my noble friend Lord Napier and Ettrick. I am glad that those speeches were balanced by other speeches of great distinction from my noble friends.
It is perhaps right that in this long debate to-day we should take stock of our position and he quite certain in our minds, as we reach a decision to-night, that sanctions are relevant to the position in which we now find ourselves. That position has of course changed greatly over the last seven years, and the question which I feel your Lordships have to consider and must decide to-night is whether a renewal of sanctions for a further year is or is not now, in November, 1972, in the interests of Rhodesia—of all the communities in Rhodesia—and in the
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interests of this country. It is right that we should take stock of that because nothing is more futile in foreign affairs than to cling, through habit, laziness or the sheer difficulty of breaking out of a given situation, to unattainable goals.
As for our aim, I believe that virtually all your Lordships are at one in agreeing that our purpose must be to bring Rhodesia, if we possibly can, back into the community of nations by granting her legal independence; and that legal independence can be granted only on terms acceptable to the British Parliament. Any solution short of that legal independence is bound to leave Rhodesia, in the international sense, high and dry, devoid of international status. Certainly that was the object of all the negotiations undertaken by this and the previous Government. And this aim was, and is, shared by Mr. Smith. That is the reason why he negotiated with us and why he still wants a settlement, as I understand it, with us.
Sanctions were, or should have been, always ancillary to this objective. Sanctions were, or should have been never an end in themselves. They were never conceived, at least by those of us on this side of the House (and here I entirely agree with what was said by my noble friend, Lord Dulverton) to bring Mr. Smith to his knees. We have always looked on them, and we still look on them, as giving us leverage towards a negotiated settlement. Sanctions should therefore be seen in relation to, and not separate from, the chances we have of granting legal independence to Rhodesia. I wish to underline this in asking your Lordships' House for the renewal of sanctions for another year, and I wish to underline that there is nothing mean or vindictive in our approach here. I think that this has been illustrated by the various easements in the application of sanctions to individuals which, in her notable speech in opening this debate, my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir explained we propose now to make on grounds of common humanity and common sense.
Be that as it may, I am convinced that there could be no question of a settlement being found on terms acceptable to the British Parliament which implied that we were going to grant Rhodesia legal

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independence on the present 1969 Constitution. It was in order to negotiate basic changes in the 1969 Constitution, the changes which would enable us fairly to ask Parliament to grant independence to Rhodesia, that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, laboured so hard and selflessly last year; and that was why my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has himself laboured so hard and selflessly in order to achieve an honourable settlement for Rhodesia, and that was why he went to Salisbury last year.
As your Lordships know, the proposals laboriously negotiated were agreed, subject to confirmation by the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The Government have never budged, have never deviated, on the need for that confirmation. Very sadly, in my view, that confirmation was not forthcoming. And may I say this to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce; that, despite what some of my noble friends have felt, I personally admired the testimony which he gave this afternoon. I found his speech one of the most telling four-minute speeches ever delivered in your Lordships' House.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, my noble friend has been so kind and patient that I hesitate to interrupt him. But would he tell us by what authority the noble and learned Lord, Lord Pearce, gave these undertakings in Rhodesia?
EARL JELLICOE: Well, my Lords, I should just like to say this. I really felt that in his remarks about the speech of the noble and learned Lord, my noble friend, who is a fair man, was being unfair to the noble and learned Lord. I am sure that he did not wish to do him an injustice, but I would remind my noble friend that, speaking in another place on November 25 last year, my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said this—and his words have already been quoted in this debate:
"If the test of acceptability proves that the Rhodesians do not want this arrangement and this Constitution, we revert to the position we were in before."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 25/11/71; col. 1150.]
That position included sanctions as an integral part. That statement by my right honourable friend was made before the noble and learned Lord left on his mission to Rhodesia. It was part of
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the whole umbrella, as it were, under which he was operating. In my judgment, at least—and I can only give my noble friend my personal judgment—Lord Pearce and his Commission were entitled to draw from the words of my right honourable friend the conclusions which they apparently did draw. But I should also like, since my noble friend put a categorical question to me in his speech, to say that no special or categorical instructions were given, either way, to the noble and learned Lord on this particular matter.
Since Pearce we have, as the Government see it, been faced with two basic alternatives. One was to wash our hands of this whole affair and to give up the attempt to bring Rhodesia back to the community of nations; the other was to persist. The Government, rightly or wrongly, have chosen the latter course. I ask my noble friends to reflect that this was a decision of a Foreign Secretary with a unique first-hand knowledge of the Commonwealth, of African and of Rhodesian developments. My noble friend Lord Coleraine implied that Rhodesia was perhaps only a trifle in my right honourable friend's in-tray. I think he was under estimating the deep personal and continuing concern which the Foreign Secretary has for this problem. In any event, the Government have taken the view that the Rhodesians, both black and white, should be given yet one further chance of resolving their differences. That is why we did not withdraw the proposals, which remained, and remain, as a basis for further discussions.
If some form of contact is to be reached between the communities in Rhodesia constructive dialogue must somehow develop. Your Lordships have heard my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir, in a speech of great distinction, describe some of the incipient signs that a dialogue may be beginning. I would agree with the noble Baroness, Lady White, that there are signs of movement. This is not a static situation, as some might suppose. I suggest that in that situation it would be quite wrong for this House or for Parliament to rush its fences. The Pearce Report has created a totally different and new situation. A great many ideas and attitudes have had to be re-thought. I do not believe that in the six months since the Report was pub-

579
lished we could have expected much more movement than we are now witnessing within Rhodesia. Let us give the status quo more time. Of course, as my right honourable friend has made clear, it could be that nothing will emerge; it could be that the races in Rhodesia will decide that their future lies in confrontation—in all probability in bloody confrontation.
LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICK: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting my noble friend, but will he just say how much more time, in his judgment, may he required?
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I do not think I can possibly say that. My noble friend has put a perfectly clear question, and he put it in his speech in the context of an assurance which he said he would like to receive from the Government: that we should not be coming back in a year's time for a renewal of this Order. I should like to tempt my noble friend into the Lobby with me—I like having him in the Lobby with me—but I think it would be quite wrong for me to give that sort of assurance, and irresponsible of me to give it at this moment, much as I should like to secure the vote of my noble friend and of his noble friends this evening.
Of course, there are signs of movement, but we really do not know at the present time how the chips are going to fall. In any event, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has made it clear that in certain circumstances—and I am very glad to repeat this assurance to my noble friend—we may well be compelled to reconsider our whole stance in this matter. But there is one thing we do know in all this uncertainty: at least, I think we do. I cannot claim to be an expert on African or Rhodesian affairs, but I am pretty certain that if we drop sanctions now the result will be not increasing dialogue but increasing discord. Europeans would have no incentive to compromise, and Africans would have no alternative but despair. I know this is a matter of judgment. My noble friends have queried whether the result would be turmoil. In my judgment and in the judgment of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, the result would be turmoil—turmoil in Africa out-
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side Rhodesia would reinforce turmoil in Rhodesia, and the goal of legal independence would then have gone for ever. So my conclusion on the substantive argument is this. In the Government's view, it would be wrong deliberately to throw away the remaining chance of legal independence for Rhodesia honourably to be granted by the British Parliament, however slender that chance may be. It would be wrong to throw away that chance in a gesture of impatient and frustrated desperation before we are quite certain that there is no hope at all—and we are not so certain at the present time, my Lords.
May I in conclusion—I see that I have been speaking for sixteen minutes: these clocks are very frightening—refer to the Parliamentary and constitutional implications of the position which we are in. I believe that I have been invited to do so by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. One thing is indisputable: it is indisputable that this House has the ultimate right to reject this Order. There is no constitutional question of whether we have a right to reject it. Of course we have. It is rather a question of whether it is right for us, in all the circumstances in a particular case, to exercise that right. My advice, and the advice of successive spokesmen from this Bench and from the Front Bench opposite, has been that this is an area, the area of subordinate legislation, in which your Lordships should tread very warily indeed.
There are those who consider the unqualified ability of your Lordships' House to throw out subordinate legislation to be anomalous. Be that as it may, the rejection of an Order approved by another place means the rejection of an Order approved by the elected Chamber. Clearly, this raises constitutional issues of considerable importance, and clearly your Lordships would wish to reflect carefully before embarking on this course. Why then, my Lords, did my noble friend Lord Carrington and I advise your Lordships to reject the Order laid by the then Government in 1968; and do different circumstances apply now? The fundamental reason why we advised rejection at the first round in 1968 was to give the Government of the day time to reflect. Rightly or wrongly, we felt that a pause for reflection was required since the 1968 Order embodied a massive extension of

581
the application of mandatory sanctions to Rhodesia, and we believed that that course which we were then invited to embark upon was a mistaken one. Noble Lords opposite may not agree with me, but I think that events have proved this to be so.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Earl, I rather regret his attempt to justify the disastrous action of the Conservatives in 1968.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, those were the reasons behind the advice given by my noble friend and myself to your Lordships on that occasion, whether it was right or wrong—and it was as difficult a decision as I have ever been involved in in my political life. I was explaining the reasons; I was not trying to justify them and, if I may say so, it was unnecessary for the noble Lord to make that point.
I suggest that in three material respects the positon we are faced with to-day is different from the position we were faced with four years ago. First, this Order, unlike the 1968 Order, involves no extension of the range of sanctions; I would be opposed to it if it did. It simply involves the extension of existing sanctions for a further year. Secondly, the time-scales now in 1972 are quite different from those with which we were faced in 1968. We were then faced with a 28-day Resolution which had been tabled for seven days. When the 1968 Order was rejected, the Government had 21 days to reflect and decide whether or not to lay a further Order. But the existing Order expires at midnight on November 15, next week. There is therefore not three weeks for reflection; there is a bare weekend. Thirdly, it would be wrong and disingenuous of me to leave your Lordships in any doubt that a pause for reflection, be it three weeks or a weekend, would in the circumstances in which we are confronted now in November, 1972, cause the Government to change its mind. Frankly it would not, and I think it is better that I should frankly state that to your Lordships' House. But should your Lordships, against my earnest advice, decide to reject this Order this evening, the Government would, as the noble Lord, Lord
582
Shepherd, has surmised, seek to lay a further Order.
That brings me to the difficulty mentioned by my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir: and when the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, comes to read her remarks he will see that she did not inaccurately state the position. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, quite correctly quoted the relevant extract from Erskine May. He asked me for confirmation that the situation, as sketched by him, was accurate. The position, as I understand it—these are difficult areas, and I am trying to put this as fairly as I can because I do not wish either to confuse your Lordships or exaggerate the difficulties here—is that the present Order is a very simple and straightforward one, unlike the massive Order before your Lordships in 1968, which was therefore easy to amend. The doubt which I share with the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and which I must put frankly to your Lordships, is whether the relevant Order could be substantially altered, and thus whether the second Order, if your Lordships decided to reject this Order, would pass the Erskine May test.
I cannot anticipate what the ruling of Mr. Speaker in another place would be on what is still a hypothetical issue. In this House it would be for your Lordships yourselves to decide whether the second Order could properly meet the Parliamentary test. My personal view (and here I differ from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd) is that it would be unlikely that your Lordships would decide to reject on procedural grounds an amended Order which another place had approved—that is, if it was accepted by Mr. Speaker—but there is certainly an element of doubt here which I have tried to put as fairly as possible, and those noble Lords who have indicated that they intend to vote against this Order as a sort of demonstration but to let a second Order through should hear in mind that they would be taking a risk here, albeit a calculated one.
In any event, I would suggest that my noble friends should ponder the other possible effects of a successful demonstration, if they succeeded in the Lobby in securing the rejection of this Order, even though that demonstration proved in the last analysis to be a Platonic one—if we then got a second Order and approved it.

583
Platonic though the gesture might be, the rejection of this Order to-night by your Lordships' House would undoubtedly have a very considerable impact abroad. It would, in the view of Her Majesty's Government—and I am choosing my words carefully here—gravely undermine the authority of the Government in working for that honourable settlement of this perplexing problem which I believe we all desire.
My Lords, may I say this in conclusion. I recognise that there are double standards at work in Africa and the United Nations, and many noble Lords have referred to them in this discussion. Of course, comparisons can be drawn which are only too odious. But we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from our primary objective. Historians may well regard the Rhodesian affair as only an episode, a painful and distracting episode, in the whole sweep of British foreign policy in this century. But it is a significant episode, a sort of litmus test. Were we now to give up, to abdicate—because that is what the dropping of sanctions at
this moment would in the Government's view mean—our action would be seen as that of a nation which, a little weary of its post-Imperial burden, threw away a chance to help to create a responsible and just society in an area of Africa which has meant so much to so many of our fellow citizens for the best part of a century. I do not know—I think none of us knows—what the future holds here, but I would urge as strenuously as I can that it would be quite wrong for us to change course now; to change course until it is clear beyond the slightest sliver of doubt that the path of co-operation and compromise in Rhodesia has finally been blocked. My Lords, that is not clear to-night, on November 9, 1972; and that is why I ask your Lordships to-night, however heavy your hearts may be on this issue, to approve the Motion, the Order, before your Lordships' House.
10.28 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 159; Not-Contents, 43.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Chichester, L. Bp.

Gowrie, E.

Ailwyn, L.

Clwyd, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

Airedale, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Grenfell, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Colwyn, L.

Grimthorpe, L.

Alport, L.

Courtown, E.

Guildford, L.Bp.

Amherst, E.

Cowley, E.

Hacking, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Cranbrook, E.

Hailes, L.

Amory, V.

Crathorne, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Amulree, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Archibald, L.

de Clifford, L.

Hale, L.

Ardwick, L.

De La Warr, E.

Helsby, L.

Arwyn, L.

De Ramsey, L.

Henderson, L.

Auckland, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Henley, L

Avebury, L.

Diamond, L.

Hereford, L.Bp.

Balogh, L.

Digby, L.

Hertford, M.

Barrington, V.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Hirshfield, L.

Bath and Wells, L.Bp.

Drumalbyn, L.

Hood, V.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Dudley, E.

Hughes, L.

Belstead, L.

Dulverton, L.

Hunt, L.

Bernstein, L.

Eccles, V.

Hurcomb, L.

Beswick, L

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Hylton, L.

Blackett, L.

Emmet of Amberley, B.

Jacques, L.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Falkland, V.

Jellicoe, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Boyle of Handsworth, L.

Falmouth, V.

Kemsley, V.

Bristol, L.Bp.

Ferrers, E.

Kinnoull, E.

Brockway, L.

Foot, L.

Lee of Asheridge, B.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Fortescue, E.

Leicester, L.Bp.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, B.

Furness, V.

Limerick, E.

Brown, L.

Gainford, L.

Listowel, E.

Caccia, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Liverpool, L.Bp.

Canterbury, L.Abp.

Gardiner, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Caradon, L.

Garner, L.

London, L.Bp.

Carnock, L.

Gamsworthy, L.

Long, V.

Carrington, L.

Clifford, L.

Lothian, M.

Chelmer, L.

Glendevon, L.

MacLeod of Fuinary, L.

Chester, L.Bp.

Goschen, V.

Mancroft, L

Molson, L.

Saint Edmundsbury and Ipswich, L.Bp.

Tanlaw, L.

Morris of Grasmere, L.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Thorneycroft, L.

Newall, L.

Sandford, L.

Thurso, V.

Northchurch, B.

Savile, L.

Tresfgarne, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Seear, B.

Trevelyan, L.

Onslow, E.

Selkirk, E.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Pearce, L.

Selsdon, L.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, B.

Platt, L.

Shackleton, L.

Vernon, L.

Polwarth, L.

Shepherd, L.

Wakefield, L.Bp.

Rathcreedan, L.

Simon, V.

Wade, L.

Rea, L.

Southwark, L.Bp.

Walston, L.

Redcliffe-Maud, L.

Stocks, B.

White, B.

Redesdale, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Windlesham, L.

Rochdale, V.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Wolverton, L.

Rochester, L.Bp.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Suffield, L.

York, L.Abp.

Sainsbury, L.

Swaythling, L.

Young, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Baldwin of Bewdley, E.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Milverton, L.

Barnby, L.

Gisborough, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L. [Teller.]

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Greenway, L.

Poltimore, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Gridley, L.

Rowallan, L.

Bolton, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

St. Just, L.

Boothby, L.

Hankey, L.

Salisbury, M.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Hatherton, L.

Saltoun, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Headfort, M.

Searsdale, V.

Clancarty, E.

Lauderdale, E.

Stamp, L.

Cole, L.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Strange, L,

Coleraine, L. [Teller.]

Loudoun, C.

Sudeley, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Lyell, L.

Vivian, L.

Effingham, E.

Lytton, E.

Winchester, M.

Ellenborough, L.

Mar, E.

Yarborough, E.

Ferrier, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Motion agreed to accordingly.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (IMMIGRATION ACT 1971) ORDER 1972
10.39 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I beg to move
that the Southern Rhodesia (Immigration Act 1971) Order 1972 laid before the House on October 31 be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Immigration Act 1971) Order 1972 laid before the House on October 31, be approved.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)

  MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES: INSURANCE OF LOANS
  MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES: INSURANCE OF LOANS