Sitting of 1 December 1971

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  SCOTLAND

    Shipping Services
    Mr. Russell Johnstonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has made concerning the unsuitability of the motor vessel "Western Isles" to operate as a relief for the "Loch Arkaig" on the Small Isles and Raasay run.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Development, Scottish Office (Mr. George Younger): I do not agree that the "Western Isles" is unsuitable for this purpose.
    Mr. Johnston: The answer which the Minister gives is not, with respect, an answer to the Question, which asks about representations. I wonder what representations he has had. Will he give me an assurance that in any future changes in the vessels serving the Small Isles, in terms of replacement of existing services, either temporarily or permanently, as will happen soon, there will be an improvement rather than a diminution in the standard and quality of the service provided?
    Mr. Younger: The question related to what representations I had made, and that, probably is the difference between us. I have asked for the Scottish Transport Group's observations on the criticism of the "Western Isles" which have been addressed to me. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I expect the Scottish Transport Group to keep to its oblige-
    414
    tions to provide an adequate service on this and other routes.
    Mr. Hugh D. Brown: On the wider issue of services to the Western Isles generally, is the Minister aware that there is widespread discontent about the Hebridean handout of £17,000 to his private enterprise friends? Is there any possibility of a public inquiry into the overall services, or must it be done only within the statutory limitation of the transport users' consultative committee?
    Mr. Younger: It would not be for me to prejudice any consideration by the T.U.C.C., but I am sure the hon. Member will know that the £17,000 is much less than the present cost to public funds of these services.

    Rents
    Mr. Ewingasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the percentage of the average income in Scotland paid in rent at the present time; and what this percentage will be after the Government proposals on housing finance are introduced.
    Mr. Younger: In 1969, the latest date for which a figure is available, it was just over 4 per cent. The percentage at some future date is not possible to estimate precisely.
    Mr. Ewing: To say the least, that answer is disappointing. One would have thought that if the Government were proposing to introduce legislation they would at least have known the impact which it would have on the people of Scotland. In view of that answer and of the state of the Scottish economy, would not the Minister accept that there is now a need to withdraw this proposed legislation?
    Mr. Younger: This will be discussed in more detail on Monday when the Bill comes forward. The hon. Gentleman might like to know that the figure of just over 4 per cent. Which I quoted in my answer, compares with a figure for England and Wales of 7·4 per cent. and for Great Britain as a whole of 6·9 per cent. In the light of these figures we cannot think that we are too badly off.
    Mr. Brewis: Can my hon. Friend say how much, on average, of housing revenue

    415
    accounts in Scotland comes from the rates? Is it about 37 per cent.?
    Mr. Younger: I think that figure is pretty accurate, but from the rates and public funds in terms of Government subsidy the average council house has something like 60 per cent. of its cost paid for.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that this involves not only council houses but other houses as well? Does he recognise that according to the specimen accounts which he gave to local authorities on 17th November the rise in rent has been substantial—about 331 per cent. every year? Given that there is an 8 or 9 per cent. rise in wages, is it not obvious that this will be a considerably higher proportion of average earnings?
    Mr. Younger: The rents of houses not owned by local authorities will be under the hon. Gentleman's own scheme of fair rents. In this case rent allowance will be given for the more needy tenants. This was not the case with the hon. Gentleman's scheme.
    Mr. Dempseyasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what constitutes a proper rents review under the Housing Acts; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Younger: This is for a local authority itself to consider, but factors which should be taken into account by a local authority in reviewing rents have been identified by learned counsel acting as reporters in their reports of four local inquiries since 1958.
    Mr. Dempsey: Is the Minister aware that the progressives were severely rapped for increasing council house rents without carrying out a proper review? Because of this irregularity, the Labour group returned to the status quo pending a review. Is the hon. Gentleman further aware that it is strange that evidence which corroborated this fact was rejected by his own commissioner at the inquiry?
    Mr. Younger: It is not for me to comment on the conclusions reached by learned counsel in his inquiry but it appears to have been his conclusion that an inquiry was justified. I hope that the town council, in keeping with its statutory responsibility, will now be able to review rents.

    Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons
    Mr. McElhoneasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will detail in the OFFICIAL REPORT which authorities in Scotland have complied with Section 3 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act, 1970.
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Gordon Campbell): Yes, Sir.
    Mr. McElhone: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that from my own knowledge only two authorities in Scotland have built houses especially for handicapped people? In accepting the figure of 108,000 adults who are substantially permanently handicapped, would he not agree that his Department should take urgent action to urge local authorities to build houses of this kind?
    Mr. Campbell: The hon. Gentleman is referring to the address I gave and answers to questions at a meeting of the Disablement Income Group, Scotland, which I helped to found six years ago. I agree that a great deal needs to be done. My office is doing a great deal, and over a year ago I sent two circulars to local authorities on this matter.
    Mr. Carmichael: Is the Secretary of State aware that because of the additional strain placed upon them by the economic situation, many local authority social work departments are over worked? Therefore, will he consider the possibility of a special survey, paid for by the Scottish Office but under the control of local authorities, to expedite the registration of the disabled and examination of their problems, so that we can have a full grasp of the extent of the problem in Scotland?
    Mr. Campbell: I am glad to say that the Government's social survey was announced by the previous Government in October, 1967, in answer to a Question put down by me when I was pressing for such a survey at that time. The survey supplied the information which provided the figure of 108,000 in Scotland. It has been a very valuable survey. Local authorities have been given all this information and have been asked to play their part.
    Following is the information:
    Five schemes, from three local authorities, for the provision of purpose-built dwellings for the disabled have been submitted since the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act, 1970, came into force: these came from Coatbridge, Eye-mouth and Inverness. Housing authorities do not require my consent to carry out adaptations to make existing houses suitable for the disabled, and I know that a great deal is being done in this way.
    Mr. James Whiteasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals have been made for the provision of an assessment unit for the chronic sick and disabled in Glasgow or any other part of Scotland.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Education, Scottish Office (Mr. Hector Monro): The Western Regional Hospital Board is consulting local interests about the possibility of establishing an assessment unit at Cowglen Hospital, Glasgow.
    Mr. White: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for that answer, since Cowglen is in my constituency and offers all the facilities that are needed.
    Mr. Monro: I hope the work will start in 1973. I accept that it is essential we should have this unit in the hon. Gentleman's constituency.

    Special Housing (Disabled Persons)
    Mr. Alexander Wilsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to encourage all local authorities in Scotland to compile a register of disabled persons, single or married, who are in need of special fitted housing.
    Mr. Younger: My right hon. Friend has already given in circulars to local authorities guidance and technical advice on the special housing needs of the disabled and the elderly, and he is encouraging authorities to obtain all relevant information about the severely disabled in their areas.
    Mr. Wilson: I am semi-satisfied with that answer. Is it not a fact that the Government should now instruct local authorities to provide special fittings in existing houses and to include in any
    418
    future housing development facilities for the disabled and the aged? Is it not time that the Government recognised that although they are empowered to give instructions to local authorities and elected representatives of local authorities on the rents they charge, they should now instruct local authorities to compile the necessary register of disablement in regard to future development?
    Mr. Younger: I would not accept all the hon. Gentleman says, but I accept the need to encourage local authorities to do all they can to provide suitable housing for the old and disabled. On the particular point made by the hon. Gentleman, I have no evidence to suggest that local authorities are not fulfilling this need, but I do not feel that the establishing of a register, although it would be helpful, is essential before work can proceed. I hope local authorities will proceed as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Douglas: Would the hon. Gentleman consider giving special assistance to local authorities through improvement grants to improve houses in which disabled people are at present residing?
    Mr. Younger: Those grants are given under special Acts and are available for improvement only. I have no evidence to suggest that local authorities find it difficult financially to undertake this work; indeed, many are carrying out large programmers of this kind.
    Mr. Ross: In view of the obvious interest in the House on this matter, will the hon. Gentleman ask the Secretary of state to make a report to the House on progress of the work under the Act?
    Mr. Younger: The right hon. Gentleman may be interested to know that since: the introduction, at the end of last year, of the statutory requirement for local authorities to identify this type of housing, I have received information about five different schemes, and I hope that more will be submitted. Local authorities do not require my consent for the special adaptation of existing houses, and I know that much has been done on that aspect, too.

    German Industry
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on his recent official

    419
    Visit to Germany for the purpose of attracting German industry to Scotland.
    Mr. Younger: It was I who visited the Federal Republic of Germany from 14th to 19th November, together with Lord Taylor of Gryfe, the Chairman, and other members of the Committee for European Investment in Scotland. The purpose of the visit was to launch the committee's campaign in West Germany and to bring to the attention of leading industrialists and bankers Scotland's potential as a modern industrial base.
    Mr. Hamilton: Did the hon. Gentleman go in a kilt? Furthermore, can he say when we shall get German-owned industry in Scotland?
    Mr. Younger: I did not consider that it would be entirely appropriate for me to go in a kilt, although I was asked many questions about kilts when I was there. As for results, those to whom we spoke were extremely interested in what we told them and, clearly, many had not thought of Scotland as a place for industrial investment. To this extent the visit was very helpful.
    Mr. Edward Taylor: Would my hon. Friend appreciate that although we must congratulate him on his energy in seeking jobs for Scotland in this way, there is a little resentment on the part of some home-based firms in Scotland that special development area grants made available to incoming industry are not available to home firms which are seeking to expand? Will he give an assurance that he is discussing this matter with his Government colleagues to prevent this discrimination against those home firms?
    Mr. Younger: I thank my hon. Friend for what he has said about my visit. We are particularly interested in a survey which is being conducted on this aspect by Mr. Robin McLellan of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. I should emphasise that home-based firms enjoy all the development area incentives.
    Mr. Lawson: Was it drawn to the hon. Gentleman's attention when in Germany that German industrialists find incentives in other countries, notably in Ireland and even Southern Ireland, which are substantially better than those in Scotland? Does not this act as a barrier to their coming to Scotland and
    420
    Does it not encourage them to go else where?
    Mr. Younger: No; this was not raised at any one of our meetings by any of those whom we saw. What interested them was the ready availability of sites and the availability of highly-skilled labour in Scotland.

    Forth Bridge (Approach Roads)
    Mr. Hunterasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to classify as trunk roads the approach roads to the Forth Road Bridge.
    Mr. Younger: I see no justification for reopening the question of the classification of these roads.
    Mr. Hunter: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that circumstances have changed since the work on these approach roads was first carried out? He will know that there have been two extensions to the A90 covering some 16 miles of motorway and that because a considerable part of the motorway which is in my constituency is considered to be a principal rather than a trunk road, Dunfermline Town Council has to bear the maintenance costs. Is he aware that the Severn Bridge, which serves Bristol and South Wales, does not put a cost burden on the local authorities since the cost of its approach roads is borne by the central Government? Will not the hon. Gentleman bring in amending legislation to alter the financial arrangements dealing with approach roads to bridges?
    Mr. Younger: I do not agree with what the hon. Gentleman has said. Extensions to the M90 do not fall within the cost of the Forth Bridge. The financial arrangements under which this bridge was constructed provided for approach roads in the total costs. There were compensating advantages to the joint board in the form of an outright Government grant of £4·65 million and a waiving of interest amounting to £1·667 million. This must be taken into account in making comparisons.
    Mr. Clark Hutchison: Will my hon. Friend look at the representations which were made quite recently by the Edinburgh Town Council, and will he let me know what he thinks about them?
    Mr. Younger: I have had a letter on this matter and will write to my hon.

    421
    Friend to let him know what answer I can give.
    Mr. Grimond: The hon. Gentleman has just turned down a request for the payment of compensation to a ferryman in my constituency on the ground that he is running a ferry between two roads which are not trunk roads but says that in the case of the Forth Bridge trunk roads were involved and he was, therefore, entitled to pay compensation to a ferry. How does the hon. Gentleman reconcile these two decisions?
    Mr. Younger: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I have written to him about this matter, but the ferryman in question was given compensation by the county council for having run the ferry for some time before the Trondra-Burra Bridge was opened. It is up to the county council to consider whether it wants to give compensation.
    Mr. Grimond: No compensation was given by the county council.

    Council Housing
    Mr. Edward Taylorasked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many houses for single persons and aged couples, respectively, were built by local authorities in Scotland in the most recent year for which figures are available; and what were the comparable figures in each of the previous 10 years.
    Mr. Younger: With permission, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT figures for one-and two-apartment houses approved in each year since 1960. These are the only relevant figures readily available.
    Mr. Taylor: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. Does he agree that many aged couples are living in houses too large for them simply because there are not sufficient small houses available? Will he encourage local authorities, particularly in the cities, to expand their activity and to build houses for elderly people?
    Mr. Younger: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. In a circular issued in July, 1970, I urged local authorities to review the need for houses of this kind and to consider their provision in co-operation with all the interests concerned. I am
    422
    now considering what further advice I might give to encourage them further.
    Following is the information:
    New houses approved, of one or two apartments, for public authorities in Scotland (local authorities, new towns and the Scottish Special Housing Association).

    1960

    4,158

    1961

    3,505

    1962

    5,663

    1963

    7,120

    1964

    6,584

    1965

    7,333

    1966

    6,908

    1967

    9,182

    1968

    6,382

    1969

    5,771

    1970

    4,665

    Unemployment
    Mr. James Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what plans he has to meet the Scottish Trades Union Congress to discuss the subject of unemployment.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: Either alone, or in company with the Prime Minister or other Ministerial colleagues, I have met delegations from the Scottish Trades Union Congress on six occasions, and unemployment has been one of the subjects discussed. I am always willing to consider representations from the Scottish T.U.C. and to have discussions when these can be helpful.
    Mr. Hamilton: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm or deny the statement made by the General Secretary of the Scottish Trades Union Congress arising from a meeting held between the Scottish C.B.I. and the S.T.U.C. that there would soon be an announcement about the steel plant at Hunterston? Can he tell us when the move forward in the economy which he forecast in October, 1970, will bear fruit? Will it be before unemployment reaches the astronomical figure of over 150,000 in Scotland?
    Mr. Campbell: I have not seen the text of the statement which was apparently made, but the Government have made it clear that they must receive the long-term investment programme proposed by the British Steel Corporation before the very important and major decision on Hunterston is taken. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and my other colleagues have done an enormous

    423
    amount in recent months to reflate the domestic economy.
    Mr. W. Baxter: When will the right hon. Gentleman make a statement about the policies which the Government will pursue in order to instil some confidence in industry in Scotland? A lot will depend on the development of our native industry to overcome the unemployment problem. Rather than running all over the world trying to encourage other people to set up industries in Scotland, the right hon. Gentleman should endeavour to develop our native industries.
    Mr. Campbell: I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the need for confidence at home, but what has been done in encouraging industry abroad to take an interest in Scotland is only one part of what is necessary to be done. I said a great deal yesterday about this matter in my speech at St. Andrews. I will send the hon. Gentleman a copy of it, because it contained a lot on the lines indicated by the hon. Gentleman. However, I could not shortly—and you approve of short answers, Mr. Speaker—do that now.
    Mr. Rankin: On a point of order. In view of the evident importance of the Secretary of State's speech, could not we all receive a copy?
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.
    Mr. Ross: Now that the right hon. Gentleman has delivered himself of his traditional St. Andrew's Day vapourings, telling us that Scotland is in an era of change, can he say when the Government will announce changes in their policies for the development areas designed to improve the employment situation? When will he announce something about Hunterston? When will he announce a settlement in relation to U.C.S.? When will he announce something about Alexandria?
    Mr. Campbell: I could not possibly deal with all those points now, but I will arrange for the right hon. Gentleman to get a copy of my speech because he has obviously got it wrong. I dealt with the question of the timing of a decision on Hunterston, which must await the submission by the British Steel Corporation of its long-term investment programme.
    424
    That is expected about the end of the year. I am naturally as keen as anyone to make progress on the other matters the right hon. Gentleman has mentioned.

    Sugar Beet
    Mr. Doigasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he proposes to take to preserve the sugar beet industry in Scotland.
    Mr. Strangasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the future of the sugar beet industry in Scotland.
    Mr. Maclennanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now make a statement about the future of the Scottish sugar beet industry.
    Mr. MacArthurasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement about the future of the sugar beet industry for Scotland.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Agriculture, Scottish Office (Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith): In July, 1969, the British Sugar Corporation announced that it would close its factory at Cupar at the end of the 1971 season and the Government of that time agreed. After a comprehensive review my right hon. Friend announced in December, 1970, that there were insufficient grounds to intervene. Since then an independent group has sought to operate the Cupar factory. It has now been announced that, in the present and foreseeable circumstances of the sugar market in the United Kingdom, the attempt has been abandoned. The Government regret that in these circumstances a Scottish sugar beet industry does not appear to be a commercial proposition.
    Mr. Doig: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that 1,000 jobs have been lost to Scotland because the Minister refused to intervene in this matter? Is he further aware that this is another example of the abuse of monopoly power—in this case a monopoly power which was controlled by the Government? It is therefore even more criminal that 1,000 jobs should have been lost as the result of a deliberate act of Government policy.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: It is the duty of the Government and of all Members to ensure that our industries in Scotland are commercially viable. I ask the hon. Gentleman to note that the decisions of the British Steel Corporation and the consortium were taken on a commercial basis.
    Mr. Strang: Since the consortium has now left the field, and since the main reason given by the Under-Secretary of State for the closure of the British Sugar Corporation's factory was the substantial cost of modernisation, will the Government consider providing financial assistance to the Corporation to modernise the plant? Would not this be compatible with their policy of encouraging nationalised industries to invest in areas of high unemployment to provide new jobs?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The hon. Gentleman should look at the reasons why the Corporation gave up, and he might even consult some of his right hon. and hon. Friends about it. It was not only a question of modernisation; there were other much deeper questions concerning the long-term commercial viability of the industry.
    Mr. MacArthur: In view of the Government's large holding in the corporation and their responsibilities in Scotland generally, will my right hon. Friend discuss with the corporation the possibility of continuing operating in Scotland until 1974 when there is likely to be room for the expansion of the sugar beet industry in Britain as a whole?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I emphasise that what is in question is the commercial viability of the industry, whether it is in the hands of the British Sugar Corporation or in private hands. I assure my hon. Friend that when the Government decided last December not to intervene with the corporation our future relationship with the Common Market was fully taken into account.
    Mr. Maclennan: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his announcement today will be greeted with dismay throughout the agriculture industry in Scotland, which is aware that when the Secretary of State announced some time ago that he had insufficient grounds for intervening he was acting out of a doctrinaire commitment
    426
    to private enterprise and a failure to use his position, through the public interest in the British Sugar Corporation, to ensure the continuance of this industry until 1974 when the commercial conditions to which the hon. Gentleman has referred will change substantially?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The hon. Gentleman should direct his question to his right hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross), who did not intervene when he was in a position to do so, because the Government do not have power to intervene in a matter like this. We undertook to review the question, and that we did most throughly.
    Sir J. Gilmore: Would not my hon. Friend agree that the figures submitted to him show that the British Sugar Corporation grossly exaggerated the amount of money necessary to keep this factory going, and that both he and the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) were, therefore, not given by the departments concerned the information which they should have had before deciding to acquiesce when the closure was made?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I cannot agree with what my hon. Friend says. I would ask him to refer to the report of the independent consultants who were appointed by the consortium and which endorsed the decision taken by the corporation in relation to the commercial circumstances of that organisation. It bore out the decision which the B.S.C. originally took. I suggest to my hon. Friend and to others in the House that they look at that report to understand what was involved.
    Dr. Miller: Will the hon. Gentleman give an undertaking, before he imports the necessary amount of sugar to make up for the loss involved here, that he will consult the recent finding by the Medical Research Councils of the undoubted connection between the ingestion of sugar and coronary heart disease?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am interested to note that the hon. Gentleman is introducing this new factor into this matter. I certainly, and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health will, I am sure, take note of it. The only point I would make is in relation to the question of imports. The health question is important, but in the short term the

    427
    obligations which we have with regard to the sugar-producing countries under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement are also important.

    Geriatric Beds (Kirkcaldy)
    Mr. Gourlayasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals he has for improving the provision of geriatric beds in the Kirkcaldy area.
    Mr. Monro: The programme of major hospital building projects to start after March, 1972, includes schemes for the provision of geriatric beds in Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy and Glenrothes.
    Mr. Gourlay: Is the Minister aware that that is a most disappointing and complacent reply? Is he further aware that in three months of this year Fife doctors made special requests for geriatric services on behalf of 270 acute cases and that of that number 132 were admitted to hospital and 43 elderly patients died before admission could be effected? Will not these figures force the Government to take action in order to alleviate the suffering and hardships of the old people in Fife?
    Mr. Monro: I assure the hon. Gentleman that I do consider this an urgent matter, and that is why the three schemes I have spoken about are in the programme.
    Mr. Gourlay: But can the hon. Gentleman say in which years these projects will be effective?
    Mr. Monro: The Dunfermline scheme is in Band II and it should start fairly shortly, in the year 1973–74. The other two schemes are in Bands III and IV.

    North Sea Oil
    Mr. Douglasasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on discussions between his Department and Scottish organisations regarding the exploitation of North Sea oil.
    Mr. Cordon Campbell: In consultation with the Department of Trade and Industry my Departments are in regular touch with all those concerned in the exploitation of North Sea oil and in the consequent developments.
    Mr. Douglas: Would the Secretary of State address his mind to two points, first, consultation with the Department
    428
    of Trade and Industry and his own economic advisers? Would he consider making a statement about cash flow and revenue and royalties coming from North Sea oil, because there is a great deal of misinformation being perpetrated about this issue?
    Secondly, would he convene a conference of interested parties—the C.B.I. and S.T.U.C.—to see what facilities we could get in Scotland, and to band together, perhaps in an industrial investment board, to ensure that we miss nothing we should be getting in terms of industrial exploitation?
    Mr. Campbell: On the first question, I will certainly consider the hon. Member's proposal, and I agree with him that there are a lot of strange, misinformed statements being made. On the second question, I understand that arrangements are being made for a conference of the kind he has suggested.
    Mr. Sproat: In view of the importance of developing Aberdeen Harbour to take maximum advantage of the terminals of North Sea oil supplies discovered, will my right hon. Friend say what is being done to encourage the Aberdeen Harbour Board and the Minister for Transport Industries to have talks about that, and can he say precisely what date has been fixed for these proposed talks?
    Mr. Campbell: My hon. Friend will have to ask the Minister that question because I do not know what arrangements have been made, but I shall certainly keep in very close touch with my right hon. Friend and, if necessary, I, or one of my colleagues will be there.
    Mr. Russell Johnston: Is the Secretary of State aware that the misstatements generally result because of the absence of official forecasts? Is he also aware that the Scottish Council is one of the organisations which have made specific proposals for the channelling of some of the revenue from oil, similar to those made by the consortium? What consideration has he given to this?
    Mr. Campbell: I am in touch with the Scottish Council about these matters. I am not sure whether the hon. Member has fully understood all that has been said by its representatives on this, but

    429
    they are concerned about the matters which have been raised, and I am myself in touch with them about all of them.
    Mr. Ronald King Murray: Would the Secretary of State also consult his right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate? Is he aware that there are difficult legal matters arising from the exploitation of the sea bed? For example, what is to happen if fishing boats are damaged through work going on under the sea, or on the sea bed, and what happens if there is a collision between a merchant ship and a rig?
    Mr. Campbell: The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that this matter is one which has been under discussion for some years, particularly at the United Nations, as a matter of international law. Certainly my right hon. and learned Friend is fully aware of these matters and keeps a watchful eye on them.

    Alcoholism
    Mr. Eadieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now make a statement on the increased trend in the incidence of alcoholism in Scotland.
    Mr. Monro: The incidence of alcoholism cannot be measured accurately. [Laughter.] But the Government are doing all they can to make the dangers known through the work of the Scottish Health Education Unit.
    Mr. Eadie: May I say that the hon. Gentleman's reply will be regarded by many in Scotland as grossly unsatisfactory—as it is that he should joke about this? Is he not aware that the majority of the medical profession in Scotland are voicing extreme concern about the high increase in the incidence of alcoholism, which they regard as a disease? Is he further aware that, for example, The Scotsman—I think it was—described it as "galloping national unhappiness" in Scotland? In the light of this will the Minister assure us that he is not completely complacent and that he will investigate it and do something to help to solve this terrible problem of alcoholism?
    Mr. Monro: The hon. Member is absolutely wrong to suggest that I took this matter lightheartedly. I take this extremely seriously indeed. It was his
    430
    hon. Friends who were laughing at what was a very steady and sensible reply. [Laughter.] The Standing Medical Advisory Committee is looking at this very carefully, as the hon. Gentleman knows, because he has been to conferences we are holding at which these matters are discussed. There is no question at all of this being taken otherwise than very seriously indeed.
    Mr. Galbraith: As my hon. Friend knows, there is propaganda in warning the public of the danger of excessive smoking. Would he consider alcoholism as in the same sort of category and, if so, would he perhaps consider the same sort of propaganda also to warn the public of the danger?
    Sir G. Nabarro: Certainly not. How ridiculous.
    Mr. Monro: I would say to my hon. Friend that the Scottish Health Education Unit is conducting a campaign to point out the serious position about alcoholism, and that we will continue.

    Ministerial Broadcast
    Mr. Sillarsasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a Ministerial broadcast to the people in Scotland on 31st December.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: Television time in Scotland is normally occupied with customary Hogmanay programmes on that date. But I made a speech at St. Andrews yesterday which was broadcast in Scotland.
    Mr. Sillars: Will the Secretary of State not at least take a very early opportunity, before the old year passes, on behalf of the Government publicly to thank and consult the shop stewards and men of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders? Is it not a fact that had these people not been so successful in their fight on behalf of the right to work the Government would be facing an even more difficult and catastrophic situation than that which they will face on 31st December?
    Mr. Campbell: While I would not accept all that the hon. Gentleman has said I would say that the co-operation of the men on the spot, led by the shop stewards, is essential for the setting up of the new company. This is going ahead on time. Let me at this stage

    431
    say that it has been a tragic loss to us that the chairman of the new company, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, Mr. Hugh Stenhouse, should have died so suddenly. He was a power-house in getting the new company going. None the less, his colleagues on the board and the chief executive are pressing ahead. The co operation of the men on the spot has so far been given, and I hope that it will continue.

    Scottish Convention
    Mr. Grimondasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when legislation for a Scottish Assembly will be introduced in accordance with the pledges of Her Majesty's Government.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: I have nothing to add to my reply of 17th March, 1971, to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang).
    Mr. Grimond: I do not have the reply in my head. Are we going forward with this farce? Is it not time the Government dropped the pretence of the ludicrous proposals of the Home Report and seriously offered instead to the people of Scotland a form of self-government?
    Mr. Campbell: I did not repeat the reply because it was rather a long one, but it made clear what the position is. Paragraph 322 of the Home Report recommended that devolution on the lines proposed—not necessarily the precise proposals—would need to have regard to the new pattern of local government following action on the Wheatley Commission Report. At present we are pressing on with all the work involved in local government reform.
    Mr. Edward Taylor: Will my right hon. Friend deny absolutely the scandalous suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman that we are not serious about a Scottish Assembly? This plan was welcomed by the party in Scotland and by the Scottish people and it requires the greatest and most serious consideration.
    Mr. Campbell: As my hon. Friend will recognise from what I have said, we intend, during the life of this Parliament, to put forward proposals based on the Convention proposal put forward by the Constitutional Committee.
    Mr. Ross: While the Secretary of State and his colleagues are having second thoughts and teetering on the brink of doing nothing at all about this, will he stop cutting down the ranks of Scottish Members of Parliament who participate in Committees of the House?
    Mr. Campbell: There is no question of that, and we debated it last week. Hon. Members are able now to serve on the Scottish Select Committee, a new Committee, in addition to Standing Committee. There is no question of teetering. We are engaged in the reform of local government, and the right hon. Gentleman must know that this is a massive task involving a great deal of consultation. Although the proposals we have put forward are generally acceptable, there are still several exceedingly difficult problems to solve, and the House will then have to consider the legislation. The Constitutional Committee recommended that this must be settled before going on to constitutional changes.

    House Improvement Grants
    Mr. David Steelasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will consider extending beyond March, 1973, the completion deadline for increased house improvement grants.
    Mr. Younger: The increased grants are available for work completed before 23rd June, 1973.
    Mr. Steel: Does the Under-Secretary of State accept that there have been some difficulties? This is new legislation and some local authorities have been a little slow in creating treatment areas. There is a danger that we may not get as much work done in this period because of the deadline proposed for the increased grants.
    Mr. Younger: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. There may be confusion because some capital expenditure programmes of local authorities are supposed to be completed by March, but the improvement grant is available until 23rd June, 1973, and I hope that local authorities will make the maximum use of it.

    Housing Accounts
    Mr. Lambieasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will supply for

    433
    each of the individual housing authorities in Scotland the deficits on housing accounts, at any suitable date, and his estimate of the number of years each authority would require to eliminate such deficits and balance its accounts, under the provisions of the Housing (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Bill.
    Mr. Younger: Part 5 of the "Rating Review", published in January, 1971, by the Scottish branch of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, contains the most recent figures of deficits on the housing accounts of most Scottish local authorities. I cannot estimate how many years it will take each authority to balance its housing revenue account under our proposals, because for each council this will depend, for example, on increases in its housing expenditure, the amount of its new subsidies and its deficit at the start of the new system.
    Mr. Lambie: I am disappointed in the Under-Secretary of State's reply. It is strange that the Government have given this information to the local authority representatives. Is the hon. Gentleman willing to congratulate the Burgh of Saltcoats on its high position in the housing deficit league? Will he admit that this efficiently-run town, with the lowest council rents in Scotland, is one of the highest in the league, and will he take the opportunity of getting off the council's back and getting on to the backs of the Tory local authorities with high rents and high deficits?
    Mr. Younger: I am afraid I cannot accept all the hon. Gentleman has said. He will understand that I should like to take advice from a wide range of opinion before congratulating Saltcoats on its housing policy. It is impossible to make forecasts of what the effect will be until all the figures I have mentioned can be established.
    Dr. Dickson Mabon: Is that quite true? The Under-Secretary of State on 17th November sent to local authorities specimen model accounts, and we should welcome a copy of these for each individual Member. Is it not true that on the basis of the model accounts, using the five assumptions in the accounts, one can discover what the position would be for each individual authority right through the years until 1975–76? If that is true,
    434
    why cannot it be done for individual authorities when hon. Members ask such a question?
    Mr. Younger: We must be clear that it is perfectly possible to make a calculation for an individual authority once we have the figures and facts on which the new system will be started, but we shall not have those until next May when the system starts. I can make available to anyone who wants it a copy of the specimen which I have sent out, but I hope everyone will realise that this is a specimen and not an actual copy. One cannot take simply one figure out of it and apply it to any other authority. It is a specimen and only for guidance. Each individual authority has to make its own calculations.

    Fishing Rights (Hunter Report)
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects to make a statement on the Hunter Report on Fishing Rights.
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he proposes to introduce legislation relating to the Hunter Report.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The Government's proposals were outlined in a White Paper (Cmnd 4821) which was laid before Parliament on 16th November. These proposals will form the basis for legislation.
    Mr. Dalyell: When can we expect the legislation?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The question of legislation will depend on the progress of other business in the House. I appreciate the desirability for early action.
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: Is my hon. Friend aware that the issue of this White Paper compares well with the dilly-dallying and dilly-dallying of the Labour Government during their term of office, although they started off by saying that this was an urgent matter? On the question of drift-net fishing for salmon, are we now accepting that salmon is a river fish in this country? Is my hon. Friend aware of the great feeling in Scotland against drift-netting still being allowed for salmon fishing in England, and what can be done about this?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he said in the first part of his supplementary question. I ask him to remember that the traditional system of fishing off the coast in England is by drift-netting, whereas in Scotland it is by fixed engines. I am glad to tell my hon. Friend that the Northumberland River Authority is having discussions with interests concerned on the introduction of a limit on the number of licences issued in the southern part of its area and is also considering other conservation measures.
    Mr. Maclennan: Is the Minister aware that the proposals in his White Paper are extremely reactionary and will open up no new salmon fishings to the Scottish public? If legislation is forthcoming, will the hon. Gentleman undertake that it will not be introduced in another place where the interests of the exclusive proprietors are more strongly represented than the interests of the people of Scotland?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: It is strange that the hon. Gentleman should be so carping when for five years his Government did absolutely nothing and in a fraction of that time we have come forward with proposals. The hon. Gentleman is totally unaware of the public response in Scotland to our proposals. What we have done in relation to angling has been welcomed by the great majority of angling clubs. What we propose is a big step forward not only for angling but for tourism and all the development this means in the rural areas of Scotland.

    West Stirlingshire
    Mr. W. Baxterasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what action he proposes to take to seek to bring industry to West Stirlingshire.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: I have been working closely with the Ministers who have direct responsibility for industry to attract firms to such areas in Scotland. We have included within the West Central Scotland Special Development Area that part of West Stirlingshire in which the unemployment problem is most serious.
    Mr. Baxter: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that until recently West Stirlingshire was looked upon as a mining
    436
    area but that there is now only one pit in operation and that throughout the county the rate of unemployment is exceedingly high? Is he aware that the area to which he refers, Kilsyth, at the moment has a male unemployment rate of 25·6 per cent., one of the highest in the country? Is it not time that something was done to encourage local industries and to attract other industries into the area? I hope that he will take immediate action to help.
    Mr. Campbell: What the hon. Gentleman said is perfectly true about Kilsyth being an area where unemployment is especially worrying. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Development had a meeting with a deputation from Kilsyth early in October to discuss these matters. This question is directly concerned with bringing industry into the area. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that local expansion is also needed.

    Medical Laboratory Technicians
    Dr. Millerasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations have been made to him on behalf of medical laboratory technicians employed in Scottish hospitals and other laboratories.
    Mr. Monro: Two representations have been received this year; both were about salaries, a revised grading structure and the representation of Staff Side interests on the Whitley Council.
    Dr. Miller: Will the hon. Gentleman not be too complacent about the relatively small number of complaints or representations which he has received, because he will get more? Will he accept from me that it is shameful that while general practitioners in Scotland are earning £7,000 a year there are technicians, without whom the Health Service could not function, taking home £15, £16 or £17 a week? Is he aware that in a recent award some were given the magnificent extra sum of £1 per year?
    Mr. Monro: I understand the hon. Gentleman's interest in this case. It is a matter for the Whitley Council which, I understand, will be considering a claim for increased salaries quite soon.
    Mr. Dalyell: What is being done about the revised grading structure?
    Mr. Monro: This will be considered by the Whitley Council.

    Guard Dogs
    Mr. Robert Hughesasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will now introduce legislation to prevent the use of uncontrolled guard dogs in Scotland.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: My right hon. Friends the Secretary of State and the Home Secretary have carefully examined the position in the light of the information made available by the police and have concluded that they would not be justified in proposing special measures of control.
    Mr. Hughes: Can the Minister tell the House how many children require to be maimed and/or killed before he feels that action is justified?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: The hon. Gentleman ought to get this into perspective. I am sure that all hon. Members regret the incidents that have occurred but it must be remembered that guard dogs are responsible for only a relatively small proportion of attacks upon people by dogs. We have fully consulted the information available and taken the advice of the police on this matter.
    Mr. Ronald King Murray: If the hon. Gentleman will not introduce such legislation will he consider the possibility of reforming the law of Scotland so as to impose an absolute liability upon dog owners for injury or damage caused by their dogs? Is he aware that is done in certain foreign countries, and dog owners cover their liability by a small premium of about £4 a year?
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: This raises an important issue which goes very much wider than the original Question. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman is aware that this is a point which should almost certainly be considered by the Scottish Law Commission in the context of its general review of the law of obligation. I am sure he would agree that that is the right place for it to be discussed and I hope the Commission will pay attention to it.

    Sport (Grants)
    Mr. John Smithasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will review his
    438
    decision in Scottish Education Department Circular 802 (IV/2) that the Scottish Education Department will not make grants for the provision of sports facilities after 10th June, 1971.
    Mr. Monro: This circular described the transitional arrangements pending the establishment of the new executive Scottish Sports Council which will be responsible for grants for sport from April, 1972. My right hon. Friend is still making grants in respect of applications received by 10th June, 1971, which satisfy the conditions of the grant scheme and I expect that his expenditure on sports grants in the current financial year will be a least as much as in 1970–71.
    Mr. Smith: Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate that as from 10th June, 1971, applications from district councils for the provision of sports facilities in their areas cannot be considered until 1st April, 1972? Why has there to be this gap when no application will be considered in the building of desirable public works which would provide employment for Scotland and improve social facilities? Is not this a hold-up caused by a bureaucratic decision?
    Mr. Monro: All the money available for district council and other schemes is fully committed this year. As soon as the Sports Council has met, which I hope will be shortly, it will be able to draw up its schemes and receive applications. I doubt whether there will be any delay in work by local authorities or voluntary sports organisations because of this decision.

    Colintraive—Rhubodach Bridge
    Sir F. Macleanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will make provision for a bridge from Colintraive to Rhubodach in his next roads programme.
    Mr. Younger: My right hon. Friend will continue to bear the case for this scheme in mind, but I cannot yet foresee when it could be authorised.
    Sir F. Maclean: As it is the Government's intention to extend the programme of public works in Scotland, is my hon. Friend aware that this scheme would not only give immediate employment, which is badly needed, but in the long

    439
    run it would also bring enormous advantages to the Isle of Bute?
    Mr. Younger: I accept that this would bring great benefits to the Isle of Bute?. This has to be fitted into the general priorities of our road schemes throughout Scotland. As it is a very expensive scheme of a major nature it would not be suitable for the current short-term programme of winter works.

    A75 Trunk Road
    Mr. Brewisasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what has been the percentage increase of traffic on the A75 trunk road since 1964, or the nearest convenient year for which statistics are available.
    Mr. Younger: Between mid-1965 and mid-1971 the average annual rate of growth of traffic on A75 varied from about 5½ per cent. west of Newton Stewart to less than 1½ per cent. between Gretna and Dumfries.
    Mr. Brewis: Is my hon. Friend aware that these percentages include a disproportionate amount of very heavy lorries which pass along the road day and night causing considerable disturbance? Will he look at the schemes for a bypass for towns like Newton Stewart and Gatehouse of Fleet, because they were planned as many as 25 years ago?
    Mr. Younger: I agree that there has been some increase in traffic but the road has had a less steep increase in traffic than the Scottish average. At the moment there is a systematic improvement of the road going on and schemes estimated to cost more than £1,100,000 are either in progress or programmed to begin in the short term.

    Schools Inspectorate
    Mr. W. H. K. Bakerasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals he has for the re organisation of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools in Scotland.
    Mr. Brewisasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what proposals he has for altering the organisation of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools in Scotland; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: As I said in the debate on Thursday, 18th November, there is no intention of effecting any major changes in the functions, strength or deployment of the inspectorate.—[Vol. 826, c. 763–4.]

    New Employment
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what recent steps have been taken in co-operation with other Departments of State to attract new employment to Scotland.
    Mr. Gordon Campbell: We have substantially improved the Local Employment Act assistance available, authorised an additional public works programme, now totalling £65 million, brought forward naval orders totalling £50 million and capital expenditure by some of the nationalised industries and provided for special assistance towards infrastructure improvement in West Central Scotland. We have created a large special development area in West Central Scotland where additional incentives are available to incoming industry and a new initiative has been launched to attract industrial investment to Scotland from Europe.
    Mr. Wolrige-Gordon: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him whether he does not feel that one of the reasons why this array of measures—on which I congratulate him—has not yet worked to our satisfaction is that there is a limit on what the Government can achieve and more should be done to enlist the assistance of private enterprise in dealing with this problem? Could more consideration also be given to using unemployed men to help clear up the environment?
    Mr. Campbell: I entirely agree about the need to enlist the help of private as well as public industry in the effort which is being made. We are also engaged in work of the kind my hon. Friend has described to improve the environment.
    Mr. Alexander Wilson: Will the right hon. Gentleman finally realise that all his grandiose plans and promises over the last 12 months have simply resulted in worsening unemployment in West Central Scotland? Will he now determine that the unemployment rate in Scotland should be reduced? Does he realise that we do not want any more plans of grandiose

    441
    promises; we want jobs in Scotland and nothing else?
    Mr. Campbell: The hon. Member knows that I am not given to making promises. [Interruption.] I am determined to do all that can be done to improve the unemployment situation which, unfortunately, exists in Scotland and which we deplore.
    Mr. Ross: While the right hon. Gentleman says that he is not given to making promises, is he aware that he made one to me in the early summer, in this House, that the employment position would improve in Scotland by the end of this year? Since that time unemployment has increased by 30,000. When are we to get different policies?
    Mr. Campbell: If the right hon. Gentleman looks up what I said he will see that I expressed the hope that employment would improve. He knows that the Government have taken enormous measures to put right a situation which the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues left us.
    Mr. Gregor Mackenzie: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that while we are anxious that he should bend his mind to the task of attracting new industry to Scotland, we are also most anxious that he should do all he can to keep the jobs that we have there at the moment? Should not the Government direct the nationalised industries in Scotland—which, after all, are the servants of the community and not the masters—to do all they can to safeguard the jobs of office workers at the British Steel Corporation's Tubes Division, Glasgow, and of railway workers in Ayrshire?
    Mr. Campbell: The hon. Gentleman knows that these are matters on which decisions are being taken by the British Steel Corporation and British Railways.

  QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS
  Sir G. Nabarro: On a point of order. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that several weeks ago I asked for your protection for the Sassenach majority in this House from the garrulous behaviour of the Scots. On every occasion that the Minister for the bureaucracy is set down to answer Questions at No. 35, he is not
  442
  reached because the Scots occupy such an inordinate length of time with their Questions. Will you now take steps to protect the Sassenach majority and, by arrangement with the Leader of the House, see to it that the Minister for the bureaucracy is moved so that he answers Questions beginning at No. 20, so that at least once every six months hon. Members may reach him?
  Mr. John D. Grant: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. There are a number of hon. Members on this side of the House who would like to see the Minister for the Civil Service given an opportunity to refute some of the tedious and ill-informed guttersniping which is heard from hon. Members opposite at the expense of civil servants.
  Mr. Lawson: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will you also keep in mind that the Secretary of State for Scotland answers for the equivalent of about seven Ministries south of the Border? Will you ensure that there is no encroachment upon Scottish time by any hon. Member who describes himself as a Sassenach but is, some of us suspect, more like a Spaniard?
  Mr. Speaker: Order. This is not a matter for the Chair. There is a serious problem here. However much I try to hurry matters along, it is difficult to get through more than 35 Questions a day. I try to restrain the length of both Questions and Answers, but I think that self-restraint is much the best. May I make one constructive suggestion? It is that the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) might give classes to hon. Members as to how to frame a supplementary question; he is always commendably brief. But the point raised by the hon. Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir G. Nabarro) is not a matter for me.

ECONOMIC MEASURES (REPORTS)
Mr. Roy Jenkins: On a point of order Mr. Speaker. In view of the widespread and continuing confusion about the imminent prospect or otherwise of Government economic measures, may I ask the Leader of the House whether he can assure us that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will make a statement tomorrow afternoon

443
endeavouring to clear up this whole matter?
The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr.William Whitelaw): I do not know whether you wish me to reply to that point of order, Mr.Speaker, or, indeed, whether you consider that it is a point of order.
Mr. Speaker: In fact, it is not a point of order. What I would normally say is that no doubt the right hon. Gentleman's point will have been noted.
Mr. Harold Wilson: Further to that point of order—[HON. MEMBERS: "It is not a point of order."] Very well, on a new point of order. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that there are abundant precedents: when the previous Administration were in office and a question of this kind was ruled out of order, a member of the Government would say, "Even so, I do not want to leave it where it is. I will answer it."
Mr. Speaker: The Chair is in some difficulty. These are not matters of order. But no doubt the point has been noted.
Mr. Roy Jenkins: Surely at the very least the Leader of the House—
The Prime Minister (Mr. Edward Heath): It is not a point of order.
Mr. Roy Jenkins: The Prime Minister must not attempt to disguise his extreme nervousness on this issue by shouting. Surely at the very least the Leader of the House can say today whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer, returning from a very important international conference, will make a statement tomorrow.
Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Rippon.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Geoffrey Rippon)rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Joel Barnett: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I can understand the Government's desire not to answer the point of order, but there is a very serious situation in the country where—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I cannot detect even the beginning of a point of order here. A question on business is not a
444
point of order. I think that the House has gone as far as it can. The Leader of the House has heard what has been said.
Mr. Thorpe: On a point of order. Can you help us, Mr. Speaker? I know that it is very difficult for you to rule on a hypothetical point—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Heffer: This is not the Reichstag.
Mr. Thorpe: I believe that it is in order to address points of order to you, Mr. Speaker, and not to below the Gangway opposite. Will you confirm that, were the Leader of the House to seek to rise and make a statement, that would not be out of order?
Mr. Speaker: Certainly that would not be out of order.
Mr. Rippon rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down. We do not want you.
Mr. Whitelaw: I have no desire at all —[Interruption.] I wish only to point out, Mr. Speaker, that I rise further to a point of order if you rule that it was one. I think that that is the correct position to take. However, having made that point, I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins), because he warned me in advance that he intended to raise this matter. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] On the right hon. Gentleman's general point, I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday. As the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate, there are good reasons why all Governments are reluctant to make statements commenting on speculative stories. Nevertheless, I shall inform my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer of this exchange.
Mr. Roy Jenkins: I, too, am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for responding, even if a little belatedly and relucantly, to a point about which I gave him notice and to which he indicated that he would respond. Wil he bear in mind that a serious issue is arising here? For instance, the editor of investors Chronicle said this morning in a radio interview that these reports came from a very high level. Will the right hon. Gentleman make sure that this matter is

445
cleared up tomorrow—[Interruption.] It is no good right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite shouting; there is a difficult, serious and important issue here, and they would do well to listen. Will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that this matter will be cleared up, if it can be, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer tomorrow? Will the right hon. Gentleman also bear in mind and convey to his right hon. Friend that, important and damaging though any premature disclosure may be, what in my view would be still more damaging to the Government's and the country's interest as a whole would be if the Government and the Prime Minister, out of pique, were now to postpone measures which they regarded as necessary and desirable?
Sir Harmar Nicholls rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. May I make a respectful suggestion to the House? Points of order on business are difficult matters for the Chair. In this case, had I been asked permission by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) to ask a Private Notice Question on business, I should have agreed. I think that that would have been the way to do it.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Geoffrey Rippon): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I would like to make a Statement about my meeting with the European Community in Brussels on 29th November.
The main purpose of this meeting, which was attended by Ministers from the other applicant countries, was to seek to settle the vital problem of fisheries. On this occasion I was accompanied by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture as well as my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland.
We made useful progress in some respects. The Community proposed that there should be, for 10 years, an interim régime based on a 6-mile limit with special areas going out to 12 miles. In addition to the Orkneys and Shetlands, it offered to consider the possibility of some other special areas for the United Kingdom.
446
I had to make it clear, however, that its proposals did not go far enough to safeguard the legitimate interests of the fishing industry and did not, in our view, provide a fair overall balance of mutual advantage. In accordance with the assurances which I have given to the House, I explained that an initial period of 10 years by itself was not sufficient; and I was disappointed that we were not able at this meeting to reach agreement on how to deal with the situation after the 10 years.
We have agreed to meet again on 11th December, when I very much hope we will settle this important and difficult problem. I believe that we have now achieved enough understanding and clarification of all the issues to make this possible.
In the course of the Ministerial meeting I took the opportunity to raise three other matters.
First, Papua and New Guinea. The House will recall that in my statement on 11th November after the previous Ministerial meeting I said that I had reminded the Community of the need to make arrangements for the territory.
The Community proposed at the meeting of Deputies on 24th November that until 1st January, 1978, the trade arrangements for Papua and New Guinea imports into Britain would remain as they were on the date of British accession with a provision for review. I thanked the Community for this proposal and explained that I had communicated it to the Australian Government. I said that I was confident that the enlarged Community would make reasonable arrangements for Papua and New Guinea when the time came to review this question.
Next, nationality. The Community had made it clear to us that it would be helpful if we were to give a definition of a United Kingdom national, since the term "nationals of Member States" and like phrases, appear frequently in the Community treaties and legislation. I accordingly gave the Community the following definition for these purposes:
"Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British subjects not possessing that citizenship or the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or territory, who, in either case, have the right of abode in the United Kingdom, and are therefore exempt from United Kingdom immigration control."

447
Finally, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. I told the House on 11th November of the Community's proposals for them. I informed the Community that I had visited the islands in order to commend the arrangements which the Community had proposed. I promised to let the Community know the decision of the respective islands as soon as possible.
Mr. Healey: While thanking the right hon. and learned Gentleman for that statement, may I concentrate on his failure to reach agreement on the fisheries matter, which I think both sides of the House regard as vital to our final entry into the E.E.C.? Will not the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that this continued failure to reach agreement on this major issue shows how unwise it was of the Government to seek the approval of the House to British entry on the terms arranged while leaving major questions totally obscure?
Secondly, does it not throw an odd light on the newly established entente cordiale that the French Foreign Minister did not bother to attend the meetings and gave his representative no authority to reach a settlement?
Is it still the case, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman informed us on 25th October, that there is a clear understanding that one of two things must happen: either there must be a satisfactory settlement, or the status quo should continue until after enlargement, at which point the British representatives would have a veto on any change in the status quo? As I understand it, that is precisely the arrangement that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just reached on Papua and New Guinea.
May I also ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether it is the case, as reported in this morning's newspapers, that he suggested that 95 per cent. of Britain's coastline should remain under British control up to 12 miles? I think that that will commend itself to the House as a very reasonable suggestion. Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say how his partners reacted to it?
Finally, can the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell us why he is optimistic about a settlement on 11th December,
448
just after representatives of the Six have been officially briefing newspapers that their offer last night was the final one and that any further concession has to come from the United Kingdom?
Mr. Rippon: I think that everyone knew, when we had our vote in the House, that it was necessary to deal with the question of the fisheries. I spoke about this at some length in my speech, as did my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture in his. I do not think that there is any real doubt about that.
The French Foreign Minister was present for the meeting with the Community, and so he was, in fact, present at the talks, but, to my regret, he had to leave early because of engagements in Paris. Certainly we missed the valuable help that he would have been able to give on this occasion, as he has so often done in the past. However, there was a French delegation there, and I have no doubt that it was left with appropriate authority in the French Government's view.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether we have to have either a satisfactory settlement or agreement on the status quo before we can sign the Treaty of Accession. That, of course, remains the position. I think that the satisfactory arrangements that we got for Papua and New Guinea show that, whatever initial arrangements may be made, it is necessary at the end of the day to have suitable provisions for an open review. It is perhaps the tendency in these negotiations to take sometimes a rather formal, legalistic, or, as some would say, theological point of view. But, with common sense, we should be able to get review procedures at the end of our negotiations which ensure that legitimate interests are protected.
The suggestion that 95 per cent. of our coastline should be protected up to 12 miles really arose out of the form of words being put about at that time. I will pot now go into all the details of the various suggestions which have been made at various times, which were really not offering any satisfactory arrangements up to six miles. We said that if we could not reach satisfactory arrangements as between six and 12 miles, the Community must offer, in terms of 12 miles only, virtually the whole coast.

449
I am sure that the reports about final offers are derived from off-the-cuff personal comments by people who do not speak with the authority either of the Commission or of the Council of Ministers. What we agreed at the end of the day was that we should have another meeting on 11th December, when I hope we shall be able to resolve this matter satisfactorily.
Mr. Wall: I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend on his defence of the interests of British fishermen. Are any high level talks or action proposed to try to clear the log jam before 11th December? On the Community's counter-proposals, is he aware that if, rightly, special protection is given to areas in the North and West, it will also be expected for the Yorkshire coast?
Mr. Rippon: Our discussions will continue through the usual channels that obtain in these negotiations. My hon. Friend asked about particular areas for which we are seeking special treatment. We are negotiating about this matter, and I would not like to make specific promises to specific stretches of the coastline at this stage.
Mr. Grimond: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman once again make it abundantly clear to our European friends that if they insist upon free fishing up to a six-mile limit they are going to destroy the fishing industries for all countries on the North Sea to no advantage whatever, and that all who consider themselves good Europeans will stick on this point? What are these special areas to which he refers?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman referred to the question of nationality. How does this definition affect, for example, Kenya Asians? I understand that their case is before the European Commission.
Mr. Rippon: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the position about fishing limits is that there are certain historic rights already between six and 12 miles and the position varies very much around the coast. We have said that the six-mile limit is important but that between six and 12 miles there is an element of flexibility. But regard must be had for the fact that certain areas—including his own constituency—have very special problems. So we said that
450
there was a case for a 12-mile limit and we said that Orkney and Shetland does not represent a sufficient area for that purpose in our view.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the Kenya Asians. All holders of United Kingdom passports from East Africa will qualify for free movement after five years' ordinary residence in the United Kingdom—that is, if they are admitted for settlement on arrival in this country.
Sir D. Walker-Smith: On the fisheries aspect, can my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that it is still the policy of the Government not to accept any settlement less favourable than that achieved in the case of Norway? On the nationality aspect, has the definition which he has propounded been definitively accepted by the Six for the purpose of Article 48 and other provisions of the Treaty dealing with the free movement of workers, or is it still subject to discussion and exploration?
Mr. Rippon: We have always made clear that we must achieve arrangements on fisheries which are broadly comparable between all the applicants. Our purpose is to achieve what we have always described as a fair balance of mutual advantage between the existing members of the Community and the new members. On the question of nationality, what I have done is to make a statement of our position to the Community. It is for the member States to state their view.
Mr. James Johnson: In view of the pledge given by the Prime Minister at Scarborough a few weeks ago to leading North Sea coast members of the fishing industry, including Colonel Dunne, of Scarborough, and Mr. Tom Turner, of Whitby, what does the right hon. and learned Gentleman intend to do about it? Does he intend to sign and then exercise a veto? In that case, how does he intend to maintain the 12-mile limit?
Mr. Rippon: What I intend to maintain is the position which I have stated in this House on numerous occasions. I have neither subtracted from it nor added to it in the course of my discussions, and I do not think I can take the matter any further now.
Mr. Temple: I offer my congratulations to my right hon. and learned Friend and to my right hon. Friend the Minister

451
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for the tenacious fight they have both put up on behalf of fishermen in England and Wales. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware of the great importance of the protection of fishery limits once these limits have been established? What plans has he for strengthening the fisheries protection squadron?
Mr. Rippon: I think it is clear that we must make an arrangement now which will cover the next 10 years. That seems a reasonable initial period. What we need to be assured about thereafter is that there will be provision for a fair review of the situation in the circumstances of the time which will have regard to economic and social as well as conservation interests. The question of strengthening the fisheries protection squadron at present is not a matter for me. It is not really a matter which arises in the negotiations. I am sure that those of my right hon. and hon. Friends responsible will have taken note of my hon. Friend's concern.
Mr. Crawshaw: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that there are many hon. Members on this side who, while accepting British entry in principle, are not prepared to accept anything which detracts from our fishing rights, and that the least we can expect is that either a favourable agreement is entered into beforehand or at least the existing arrangements continue until such time as we can exercise a power of veto?
Mr. Rippon: It is a mistake in negotiations between friends and allies to talk too much about vetoes. I do not think this situation should arise if we approach the matter on the basis of common sense. What I have said both in Brussels and this House is that British fishing interests must be adequately and satisfactorily safeguarded. That is our purpose, and we intend to pursue it.
Mr. W. H. K. Baker: Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that one newspaper report today said that the ball was now firmly in the Six's court? Will he kindly ensure that it stays there by volleying back any further return? Can he state, either in HANSARD or in a letter to me personally, those areas where agree-
452
ment in the fisheries negotiations has already been reached?
Mr. Rippon: I do not care in whose court the ball is, but I would say that it is in the long grass and I want to see some way of getting it out and seeing that the game ends satisfactorily.
Mr. Mackintosh: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that most inshore fishermen appreciate that there are traditional rights of Community fishermen to fish up to six miles and that they would not expect them to give up those rights? At the same time, 70 per cent. of the inshore fleet's catch is outside the 12-mile limit, and our fishermen have to be assured that between six and 12 miles there will in future be no extra foreign fishing in these limits. If that can be assured, particular details are not so important.
Mr. Rippon: We have never gone so far as to suggest that between six and 12 miles there should be no additional fishing by the Community. I have had some difficulty in ascertaining where exactly they want to fish where they do not fish already. This would not affect the position vis-a-vis third countries which are not members of the enlarged Community.
Mr. Baker: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. My right hon. and learned Friend did not answer the second part of my question.
Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order.
Mr. Rippon: I am sorry if I missed that point. Could my hon. Friend repeat it?
Mr. Baker: What are the areas where agreement has already been reached?
Mr. Rippon: I have indicated to the House the points where we have begun to make progress, although any agreement at that stage is provisional until we reach a satisfactory conclusion at the end of the day. But we appear to have general agreement on the length of the interim period of 10 years; we have agreement on the need to make provision for special areas between six and 12 miles; we have made considerable progress on the amendments necessary to the marketing regulations about frozen fish and the rights

453
of our producer organisations and the adjustment of withdrawal prices having regard to the remoter areas. Quite a lot has been going on, but all these matters are provisional until we reach a final settlement.
Mr. Warren: As continuing support for British entry is much qualified by the success of the outcome of the negotiations on fishing rights, may I ask my right hon. and learned Friend to use the time—as I am sure he will—between now and the next meeting to impress upon the French Government the fact that we have a much higher regard for our inshore fishing industry than the French have for theirs, which has fished out its home waters, and that we do not want an agreement with France which merely allows French fishermen to come here and take that which we have so carefully conserved?
Mr. Rippon: We must be clear that I am negotiating with the Community as a whole and that I am making our case to the Community as a whole.
Mr. McNamara: First, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman be kind enough to tell us categorically whether it is the Government's intention to sign the Treaty of Accession before or after we have agreement on fisheries?
Secondly, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman take the opportunity to deny the speculation in the Press that, if necessary in order to get agreement on fisheries, the Government would ditch Norway and the stand that Norway is making on this issue?
Thirdly, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman tell the House what arrangment he has made about the importation of frozen fish fillets and the effect that that will have on the Humber and Fleetwood fleets if Iceland is allowed to have her 50-mile limit?
Mr. Rippon: I have made it perfectly clear that we will not sign the Treaty of Accession until we reach a satisfactory settlement in this matter.
Concerning Norway, I have said that we could not settle this matter until we have a multi-national discussion and know the nature of the offer which the Community is putting forward to all applicants. I cannot bind the Norwegian
454
Government about the way that they conduct their own negotiations.
Concerning frozen fish fillets and some aspects of the marketing regulation, I have already made it clear that at this stage these are provisional agreements. We are still discussing the precise details. It might be misleading if I indicated that there had been a definite settlement on any particular issue at this stage.
Mr. Hicks: In his talks in Brussels on 11th December, will my right hon. and learned Friend bear in mind the particular vulnerability of the coastline of Devon and Cornwall not only for the landing of wet fish but for shell fish, and the necessity, therefore, from both the economic and the social point of view, to make certain that the present situation is not disturbed in any way?
Mr. Rippon: Yes, Sir. I am well aware of those matters and have brought them to the attention of the Community. I am glad to say that, concerning crustaceans the Community has shown an understanding that this is a special problem requiring special treatment.
Mr. Ross: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that during the debate on this matter the Prime Minister told us that the important matter to remember was that we had the right of veto. Will he bear in mind that more than we have the right of veto and that it is all the more important now, before we become members, to get the agreement on fishing right? Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman pledge to stand by the fishermen of Britain?
Mr. Rippon: I have already pledged to stand by the fishermen of Britain and to safeguard their interests. That is what these negotiations are about. I agree that it is important to get this matter as clear as we can before going ahead.
I do not think that there will be too much difficulty about the 10-year interim period, but I cannot say that at the end of the 10-year period there must automatically be continuation of the same arrangements. We are not asking for anything which is necessarily permanent. However, it must be clear that when we have a review it must be a genuine review in which full regard will be paid, in the circumstances obtaining at the

455
time, to the social, economic and conservation aspects of fishing.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: Will my right hon. and learned Friend bear in mind, having said that he will sign only if he gets a satisfactory settlement, that, in view of the stand which he has taken and the evidence which has been produced in support of that stand, anything less than a 12-mile limit would be looked upon as our giving way, and that would completely disillusion people in this country?
Mr. Rippon: I do not think that that is so, because that is not something for which we have ever asked.
Mr. Callaghan: Reverting to the important question of citizenship, may I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman what I hope is a simple question: what is his authority for this definition which he has given to the Community, what is the legal status of it, and from which Statute does it derive?
Mr. Rippon: It is a statement which we have made about the view we take for the purpose of accession to this treaty. I understand that these definitions vary from time to time. If there are anxieties about exact legal definitions, I will communicate with the right hon. Gentleman on the point.
Mr. Callaghan: With respect, is that sufficient to be put to the House? Surely the Chancellor has some authority for imparting his own definition of citizenship. As Parliament itself has taken the trouble to define it extremely closely in 1948 and, to some extent, again in the recent Immigration Act, is he telling us that he put this statement forward without any statutory backing at all? Is he aware that I cannot recognise this definition in any way and that he owes it not to me but to the House and millions of subjects to tell us his authority for making this definition statement?
Mr. Rippon: The authority of the Government in relation to the negotiations respecting this particular treaty and the problems which arise on the free movement of labour. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will find, on study, that it derives from similar provisions and definitions which have been made in
456
the past for similar purposes. As has been made clear before, there is nothing in the arrangements that we are making on the free movement of labour which affects definitions in the Immigration Act, 1971, or earlier legislation.
Mr. Thorpe: This is an important question. Since the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows as well as anyone in this House that law cannot be made by Government statement, may we have his confirmation that, that being the case, this has no legal effect in the courts?
Mr. Rippon: It is really for negotiation at the moment. There comes a point eventually of definition for the purposes of treaties, and the legislation stage, if necessary, comes later.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. W. Baxter: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The statement read by the right hon. and learned Gentleman said:
"The Community had made it clear to us that it would be helpful if we were to give a definition of a United Kingdom national".
In my opinion, as this is the most important question in the Minister's statement, it is a matter of great concern not only to right hon. and hon. Members of this House and the people of England, but especially the people of Scotland, where, under the Treaty of Union—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman is raising a matter of substance, not of order. I have now decided to move on to the next business. That is a matter for me, not of order.
Mr. Baxter: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I am asking for your guidance on a very important matter which is causing considerable concern in the legal profession in Scotland; namely, whether this Parliament has the right to commit Scotland in view of the conditions laid down in the Treaty of Union. I think that a definite decision should be made, but we cannot be bound by a Minister of the Crown—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Without doubt it is an important matter, but the hon. Gentleman must find other ways of pursuing it.
Mr. Marten: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As the statement contained a

457
reference to the Channel Islands and as not one supplementary question was asked about the Channel Islands, might I have permission to ask one?
Mr. Speaker: I am afraid not. I have decided to move on. We have had 22 minutes devoted to the statement and supplementary questions and answers. We have an important debate ahead of us. The decision is mine.

BILLS PRESENTED
  NATIONAL INSURANCE REGULATIONS (VALIDATION) BILL
  Secretary Sir Keith Joseph, supported by Mr. Secretary Carr, Mr. Solicitor-General, Mr. Michael Alison, and Mr. Paul Dean, presented a Bill to validate part of the National Insurance (Earnings-related Benefit) Regulations 1966: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed [Bill 37].
  EMPLOYED PERSONS (SAFETY) BILL
  Mr. Roy Hattersley, supported by Mr. Peter Archer, Mr. Ronald Brown, Mr. Norman Buchan, Mr. John Golding, Mr. Eric S. Heffer, Mr. Dick Taverne, and Mr. David Watkins presented a Bill to further the making in factories and elsewhere of arrangements for persons representing employees to participate in promoting the safety of employees, and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 4th February and to be printed [Bill 17].

  REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION BILL
  Mr. William Rodgers, supported by Mr. Joel Barnett, Mr. Robert C. Brown, Mr. Ifor Davies, Mr. Edmund Dell, Mr. William H. Edwards, Mr. James Hamilton, Mr. John Horam, Mr. James Johnson, Dr. J. Dickson Mabon, Mr. Robert Maclennan, and Mr. James Tinn presented a Bill to provide for the establishment of a public corporation with the functions of promoting or assisting the economic and social development of regions of high and persistent unemployment and of intermediate areas and of
  458
  promoting or assisting the establishment of any industrial enterprise connected therewith, and for matters relating to the corporation and its functions: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 11th February and to be printed [Bill 18].

  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (FAMILY PLANNING) AMENDMENT BILL
  Mr. Phillip Whitehead, supported by Mr. Richard Crossman, Mr. Douglas Houghton, Dr. Tom Stuttaford, Dr. David Owen, Dr. Shirley Summerskill, Mr. John Hunt, Mr. Jack Dormand, Sir George Sinclair, Mr. John Pardoe, and Mr. Laurie Pavitt presented a Bill to secure the provision, as part of the National Health Service, by local health authorities of voluntary vasectomy services on the same basis as the contraception services provided under the National Health Service (Family Planning) Act 1967: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 21st January and to be printed [Bill 19].
  TRADING REPRESENTATIONS (DISABLED PERSONS) AMENDMENT BILL
  Mr. David Reed, supported by Mr. Jack Ashley, Mr. John Astor, Mr. Lewis Carter-Jones, Sir Clive Bossom, Dr. John Cunningham, Earl of Dalkeith, Mr. Fred Evans, Mr. John Golding, Mr. Alfred Morris, Mr. Laurie Pavitt, and Mr. David Steel, presented a Bill to amend the Trading Representations (Disabled Persons) Act 1958: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 28th Januaary, and to be printed. [Bill 20.]

  EMPLOYMENT (HOLIDAY EXTENSION AND EARLY RETIREMENT) BILL
  Mr. Denis Howell, supported by Mr. Peter Archer, Mr. Eric S. Heffer, Mr. Charles Morrison, Mr. Airey Neave, Mr. John Pardoe, Mr. Reg Prentice, Mr. William Price, Mr. Merlyn Rees, Mr. Nicholas Scott, and Mr. John Silkin, presented a Bill to provide for a minimum annual holiday period for persons in employment; to provide for a minimum number of statutory annual holidays; to

  459
  specify Christmas Day and New Year's Day as annual holidays; to amend the National Insurance Act 1965 by enabling the Secretary of State to reduce the pensionable age under that Act for men and women; and for purposes connected therewith: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 18th February, and to be printed. [Bill 21.]

  TRADE DESCRIPTIONS BILL
  Mr. Tom Normanton, on behalf of Mr. John Peel, supported by Sir Donald Kaberry, Mr. John Biffen, Mr. Tom Boardman, Mr. Nicholas Winterton, Mr. McCann, Mr. Arthur Davidson, Mr. Kenneth Lomas, Mr. David Clark, and Mr. Cant, presented a Bill to require certain names and marks applied to imported goods to be accompanied by an indication of origin: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 25th February, and to be printed. [Bill 22.]
  ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BILL
  Mr. W. W. Hamilton, supported by Mrs. Joyce Butler, Dame Joan Vickers, Mr. Edward Bishop, Mrs. Elaine Kellett-Bowman, Mr. Peter Archer, Dr. Shirley Summerskill, Mr. Ronald King Murray, Miss Joan Lestor, Mr. Douglas Houghton, and Mrs. Sally Oppenheim, presented a Bill to make illegal, and provide for the prevention of, discrimination on grounds of sex; to establish an antidiscrimination board; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 28th January, and to be printed. [Bill 23.]
  STUDENT UNIONS (REGISTRATION) BILL
  Mr. Gilbert Longden, supported by Mr. Richard Hornby, Mr. John P. Mackintosh, Mr. Angus Maude, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas, Mr. David Steel, and Mr. Frederick Willey, presented a Bill to provide for the registration of student unions; and for purposes connected therewith: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 25th February, and to be printed. [Bill 24.]
  HARE COURSING (ABOLITION) BILL
  Mr. William Price, supported by Mr. Eric S. Heffer, Mr. Rafton Pounder, Mr. Kevin McNamara, Mr. Concannon, Mr. John Pardoe, Mr. Gerald Kaufman, Mr. Kenneth Lomas, Mr. Joe Ashton, Miss Janet Fookes, Mr. Peter Hardy, and Mr. Wilfred Proudfoot, presented a Bill to make hare coursing matches illegal: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday, 4th February, and to be printed. [Bill 25.]
  SALMON AND FRESHWATER FISHERIES BILL
  Mr. Haselhurst, on behalf of Mr. Simon Wingfield Digby, supported by Mr. John M. Temple, Mr. Charles Morrison, Mr. Crowder, and Mr. Ian Percival, presented a Bill to amend the law relating to the regulation and control of fishing for salmon, trout, freshwater fish and eels, the protection and conservation of fisheries for such fish, the times of fishing for and selling such fish and the enforcement of the provisions of that law; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 25th February and to be printed [Bill 26].
  NIGHT ASSEMBLIES BILL
  Mr. Jerry Wiggin, supported by Mr. Mark Woodnutt, Mr. Robert Boscawen, Mr. Michael Cocks, Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson, Mr. John M. Temple, Mr. John Gorst, and Mr. Richard Crawshaw, presented a Bill to make provision with respect to certain night time assemblies: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 21st January and to be printed [Bill 27].
  MEDICAL SERVICES (REFERRAL) BILL
  Mr. John Hunt, supported by Dr. Tom Stuttaford, Mr. David Steel, Mr. Laurie Pavitt, Mr. Edward Gardner, and Mr. Roger White, presented a Bill to prohibit, subject to certain exceptions, the charging of fees for referring or recommending persons to medical services or treatment: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 18th February and to be printed [Bill 28].
  CARRIAGE BY RAILWAY BILL
  Mr. Eric Ogden, supported by Mr. Michael McGuire, Mr. Ronald Brown, Mr. William Price, Mr. Robert Parry, Mr. Ron Lewis, Mr. James Lamond, and Mr. William Hamling, presented a Bill to amend the law relating to carriage by rail in connection with certain international conventions, and for purposes connected therewith: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time Friday 25th February and to be printed [Bill 29].
  DEFECTIVE PREMISES BILL
  Mr. Ivor Richard, supported by Mr. S. C. Silkin, Mr. David Weitzman, Mr. Dick Taverne, Mr. David Waddington, Mr. Ernle Money, Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke, Mr. Ian Pervical, and Mr. Peter Archer, presented a Bill to impose duties in connection with the provision of dwellings and otherwise to amend the law of England and Wales as to liability for injury or damage caused to persons through defects in the state of premises: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time Friday 11th February and to be printed [Bill 30].
  AFFILIATION PROCEEDINGS (AMENDMENT) BILL
  Mr. Ernle Money, on behalf of Dame Joan Vickers, supported by Dame Patricia Hornsby-Smith, Mr. Edward Gardner, Mr. Michael Meacher, Mr. Edward Bishop, Mr. Leo Abse, and Mr. Laurie Pavitt, presented a Bill to amend the law relating to proceedings for an affiliation order or for the variation, revocation or revival of such an order, and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 25th February and to be printed [Bill 31].

  NATIONAL INSURANCE (AMENDMENT) BILL
  Mr. Derek Coombs, supported by Mr. Philip Goodhart, Dr. Tom Stuttaford, Mr. Kenneth Clarke, Mr. Sydney Chapman, Mr. Robert McCrindle, and Mr. Tom Boardman, presented a Bill to amend the
  462
  provisions of the National Insurance Acts 1965 to 1969 relating to the earnings rule for retirement pensions: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 21st April and to be printed [Bill 32].

  MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS (POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES) BILL
  Mr. Neville Sandelson, supported by Mr. Leo Abse, Mr. W. T. Williams, Mrs. Lena Jeger, Dr. Shirley Summerskill, Mr. Emlyn Hooson, Mr. Michael Havers, Mrs. Peggy Fenner, Mr. Daniel Awdry, and Mr. Norman Fowler, presented a Bill to enable matrimonial relief to be granted, and declarations concerning the validity of a marriage to be made, notwithstanding that the marriage in question was entered into under a law which permits polygamy, and to make a consequential amendment in the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 21st January and to be printed [Bill 33].
  IMPORTS (MARKING OF ORIGIN) BILL
  Mr. James Lamond, supported by Mr. J. T. Price, Mr. H. Boardman, Mr. David Clark, Mr. Edward Milne. Mr. Alan Fitch, Mr. John Roper, Mr. McCann, Mr. Michael Meacher, and Mr. Joel Barnett, presented a Bill to require an indication of origin to be given in the case of certain imported goods: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 24th March and to be printed [Bill 34].
  MARRIED WOMEN (DOMICIL) BILL
  Sir George Sinclair, supported by Mr. Peter Archer, Mr. Edward Bishop, Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler, Mr. Norman Fowler, Mr. Nicholas Scott, and Mr. William Wilson, presented a Bill to amend the law with respect to domicil of married women: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 21st January and to be printed [Bill 35].

  LEGAL AID AND ADVICE (LOCAL LEGAL CENTRES) BILL
  Mr. Michael Meacher, supported by Mr. Peter Archer, Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann, Sir John Foster, Mr. Douglas

  463
  Houghton, Mr. Kenneth Marks, Mr. Ivor Richard, Mr. Nicholas Scott, and Mrs. Shirley Williams, presented a Bill to establish local legal centres in poor neighbourhoods in order to provide free legal aid and advice services: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 18th February and to be printed [Bill 36].

RHODESIA
Mr. Speaker: Before I call the right hon. Gentleman to move the Motion, I must inform the House that I have selected the Amendment in the names of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and other right hon. Gentlemen, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
"declines to approve Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesia dispute on the grounds that they fail to satisfy the Five Principles".
4.12 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): I beg to move,
That this House approves Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute; and endorses Her Majesty's Government's decision that they should be put to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment.
I shall try to deploy the case for so doing as carefully and as fairly as I can because during the whole period of these negotiations, and during our discussions and debates in the House, I have been very conscious of the fact that we are dealing with and debating other people's affairs.
Hon. Members will by now have had time to study in more detail the proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute with Britain. The main point for decision today is whether they should be placed before the Rhodesian people for their verdict.
Before I come to analyse the substance of the terms, I should like, as a background, to give the House some general observations and conclusions which I drew from the many contacts that I made during my visit to Salisbury. Many of the Africans whom I saw--groups of Africans and individual Africans—were certainly concerned about their political future, but the problem which presses on them more and more as time goes by is the search for work and the dignity that work brings with it.
I went one day, completely unannounced, to an African township to talk to those people who wished to talk to me about a settlement, and very quickly a large group of people assembled. There

465
was a lot of interest in a possible settlement. Without exception, the questions were on the same theme, particularly from the young Africans—would a settlement help to bring them work? I met a delegation of African business men from Salisbury and from African trade unionists. Their concern was with work for the Africans—would a settlement bring investment, stem, and then reverse the great unemployment growing so fast in the African tribal trust areas?
Their concern is not surprising. The birth rate in the African population is increasing very rapidly. Boys are coming into the labour market at the rate of 40,000 a year, and at present there simply is not enough capital for the expansion of agriculture or the introduction of labour-intensive industries on the scale that is needed to absorb the growing and alarming pool of surplus labour.
In that context it is possible to argue that sanctions have bitten, but only a few Europeans have suffered. It is, unhappily, the Africans who are the witnesses to any success that sanctions have had. Some rather airily detached critics of a settlement have said that Mr. Smith might be forced, in two or three years' time, to concede better terms than those available now to the British Government. I can only say that I could not be, that I would not consent to be, the one who went back to that township and advocated such a delay to the thousands of Africans who are today pleading for work and who, because there is so much competition in the labour market, have to accept wages—[Interruption.]I had thought that hon. Gentlemen opposite would be interested in the employment of Africans and their prospects.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I must be allowed to finish this part of what I want to say. Because there is such a flood of labour into the labour market, Africans are forced to accept a wage which is miserably low.
All the Africans, and the many Europeans whom I saw who are sympathetic to the plight of the Africans, testified that the priorities for the well-being of African Rhodesians were: first, capital to spend on infrastructure in the tribal
466
trust areas, to facilitate modern farming and other developments such as minerals and country industries; second, investment in labour-intensive industries in the cities—vital for the future of the Africans; third, funds for African education, directed in particular to the provision of technical training colleges in agriculture and in engineering.
I do not think that enough attention has been paid to the development section of the White Paper which contains the British offer of substantial aid which is to be matched by money from Rhodesia additional to that already voted for the development programme. That programme will be directed to three sectors in particular of Rhodesia's economic life—to the development of African tribal trust areas, to education in technical colleges, and to the general development of industry in the cities of Rhodesia.
Mr. Denis Healey rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue.
All the evidence is that many countries are only waiting for a settlement to invest heavily in Rhodesian enterprise. Such expansion would transform the prospects for the Rhodesian African and, incidentally, as his education and income increased, have a significant effect on his political status and the pace of political advance under the first principle. I cannot stress too strongly that the African's priority is for work, and work now.
There is a second broad impression which I gained. I spoke briefly last week of the deep concern of almost all those to whom I talked—African and European—with the trend which they saw towards the South African pattern of life. Until now, among the moderates, both African and European, there has been a certain fatalism as they have watched this creeping advance towards apartheid. Thus the alternative to these proposals is, in my mind, a certain and rapid move to apartheid and that, surely cannot be a thing which any hon. Member in this House wants to see. There is not yet—[Interruption.] I am trying to deal with this as objectively as I can. There is not yet the fear in Rhodesia which one finds further south, in South

467
Africa, but there is a widespread apprehension about the spread of discrimination by Ministerial decree, against which neither African nor European has any effective appeal at present.
There was no doubt whatever, therefore, as to the second priority for the African: it was a justifiable declaration of rights through which there would be restored to the individual the protection of the courts—an appeal beyond and above Ministers who today have the last word. The request for a declaration of rights, to be made justiciable, was universal from all those whom I saw on my visit to Rhodesia.
The Act which has caused most alarm and distress is, undoubtedly, the Land Tenure Act. Here, one broad qualification of the condemnation of the Act has to be made. Whatever such an Act is called whether Land Apportionment as it was when we still had reserve powers in Rhodesia, or Land Tenure as it is now—there must be a law which requires that large areas of land are reserved for African farming and ownership.
If there were today a free market in land in Rhodesia, all the good land would be bought up by those with the money, who are the Europeans, and, possibly, some Asians. I can tell hon. Members opposite who may not have been to Rhodesia lately that young South Africans, young Afrikaaners, are coming into Rhodesia and buying up any land which they can find. Unless there is a law which protects the African and reserves for him farming land, the African has no defences whatever against those who come in and buy it up.
A bad feature of the Land Tenure Act—this is where much of the trouble lies—is that it enables the Minister to prevent, for example, professional and qualified Africans—as qualified as any European—from conducting their business in white areas, and to prevent the European from conducting his business in an African area, or, for example, to do such things as to restrict admission to multi-racial schools.
If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that in the past there were restrictions under the Land Apportionment Act which we operated; for example, on Africans working in white areas. But in 1961 the whole trend was
468
towards multi-racialism and a non-racial State. The difference now is that the trend in the last five or six years has been reversed and is towards discrimination. That is the position now. The discrimination which is made is always petty, very irksome and very unfair and unjust.
That brings me to the Commission which is to examine and report upon all discriminatory legislation. It will have to pay attention to all discriminatory legislation, but pay particular attention to those matters of discrimination which I have mentioned, which cause most of the trouble in the Rhodesia of today.
There has been criticism that the Rhodesian Government are not pledged to accept all the recommendations of the Commission, whatever they may be. I cannot think that hon. Members who have considered it for a moment can really believe that any Government anywhere could be asked to accept all the recommendations of a Commission blind. But the wording of the proposals clearly carries an obligation to act and to change the law in respect of those recommendations which are made in the context of improving and fostering racial harmony.
Hon. Members opposite who criticise these arrangements should compare the Rhodesian obligations under these proposals with the absence of any commitment whatever in the case of the similar Commission proposed in the "Fearless" terms. Furthermore, under our proposals there is to be an African on the Commission, and our agreement to the composition of the Commission is required. This was not so under the "Fearless" terms, which required only consultation.
As to the political attitudes in Rhodesia, it is much more difficult to judge. One eminent churchman said to me that a few years ago when he arrived in the country he was sure that he knew all the answers to Rhodesia's problems; now he was filled with uncertainty.
The outlook of the extremists on both sides is clear. The extreme African nationalist approach—apart from adherence to N.I.B.M.A.R.—was vividly expressed to me, as I have no doubt it will be to the Commission which is to carry out the test of acceptability. It was, and for some it still is, that Britain ought to have used force, that we ought still to

469
be prepared to use force to quell the rebellion, and that they, the African nationalists, are only prepared to do what Britain ought to have done and ought to be doing now. They still want to use violence, and some of them are still prepared to advocate it.
I told them that I could understand this point of view but I could not accept it or recommend it, and that is why in terms of release from detention it is impossible for any British Government to lay down which individual should or should not be released.
Mr. John Mendelson rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to go on. I have something to say which may, possibly, convince even him.
As the House knows, 23 detainees have lately been released, and 31 are to follow shortly. There will remain in detention 62, and a tribunal, on which we shall have an observer, is to make a special review of those cases. I can tell the hon. Gentleman how the situation now as regards detention compares with the situation when the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was conducting the "Fearless" talks. There were then 133 in detention. There are now 62. There were then 318 restrictees. There are now two. This is an advance, although a great deal more has to be done. I shall return to that matter later.
At the other extreme, there are some Europeans who told me plainly that they wished to retain the right to use additional discrimination and to perpetuate minority rule. They were a small number, but they told me this quite plainly. To them I had to make it crystal clear that it was Britain's purpose not to freeze but to thaw racial relations, that there could be no agreement of any kind with a British Government on their terms. I made that absolutely clear.
For the great majority of Rhodesians, black and white, the future is seen as one of evolutionary change in which the African gradually and on merit assumes his rightful place in society and on the franchise. For that reason, with the exception of the extremists on either side—the African nationalist on one side, the extreme European on the other—there
470
was unanimity that Rhodesia must work its way back to a common roll as the only true political expression of a nation which seeks to live at peace within itself.
There is one other comment on the background to Rhodesian life which it is necessary to make before I come to the principles one by one. If a settlement which is fair can be reached, the siege mentality can be lifted. It is far too easy now in Rhodesia for an ordinary critic to be accused of rocking the boat, even further to be accused of being treasonable to his country. Many men of good will who do not now like to speak will begin to do so because there can be a fair settlement. Indeed, in recent days a good many have been gaining the courage to speak up and say what they believe the future of Rhodesia ought to be. Not before but after the Rhodesian Parliament has embodied these proposals in its law, not before but after Mr. Smith has put all his authority behind the constitutional changes—not till then does Parliament have to legislate here for independence. These exchanges which Mr. Smith has to put through his own Parliament with his own authority are very extensive indeed as far as the Constitution is concerned. When this is done, and only when this is done, will the way be clear for the lifting of sanctions.
I will now turn to test the proposals in the White Paper against each of the five principles. Principle 1 is the essence of the whole matter. Power in any country stems from Parliament, and it was clear to me, therefore, that it was in the Constitution that the major changes had to be sought and made. The Rhodesian Parliament and Constitution had to be set on a new direction and on a new course. First, it was necessary to decide the essential changes that had to be made. The income tax arrangement which governed the rate of increase in African representation had to go. It was a hopeless, unjustifiable arrangement. A new blocking mechanism against retrogression had to be installed and entrenched because the present one is totally inadequate. The express provision forbidding progress beyond parity—the creed of the Rhodesian Front Party—had to be replaced by firm provision for majority rule.
All these essentials necessary to turn the signpost in the opposite direction to that at present pursued by the Rhodesian

471
Front have been achieved, as well as the provision that at parity before the election to the common roll seats a referendum will be held among enrolled Africans as to whether or not they wish to be represented only by directly elected members.
Mr. J. Grimond: As the right hon. Gentleman says, it is important to know when the majority may expect to have a majority in Parliament in Rhodesia. When does the right hon. Gentleman expect there will be a black majority in the Rhodesian Parliament?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: If the right hon. Gentleman will allow me, I am just about to come to that point.
I think it is essential to recognise that these are major changes in the political opportunities for Africans. There will be all the difference in a few months' time, as these arrangements go through the Rhodesian Parliament, between the position as it is now and the position when this legislation is passed through the Rhodesian Parliament. They will have entirely new opportunities.
Inevitably—this is the point which the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) raised the statisticians are doing their sums as to when majority rule may be reached. Those calculations cannot be more impressive than guesswork. Our own statisticians on matters of population are not too clever here. There are too many variables. There is the question of how many Africans will register. There is the question of how many, under the new education drive, will receive secondary and technical education. Above all, it depends on the pace of the agricultural and industrial development. Under all those headings the prospect for the African advance is good.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said, I think it was just before "Fearless", that one can measure this not by the calendar or the clock but by achievement, and this is right. Achievement, I hope, will tell.
Mr. Harold Wilson: It may be quite a small point, but, to get the record right, I said that in Salisbury at the Press conference. I was picked up
472
a number of times after that. The right hon. Gentleman will also realise that the plans that we were making envisaged majority rule somewhere around 15 years from the date of signature, and the Chief Justice of Rhodesia estimated that it would be as soon as seven years that majority rule could be reached on our proposals.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for the correction as to when he used those words. As he said, they were repeated many times. On the question of 15 years, I do not remember the right hon. Gentleman or anybody in his Government saying that in public. I think the calculation is really impossible to make.
Next we have principle 2, the essential safeguard of the sanctity of principle 1 which must be taken with it. I come to the second of the principles. In the proposals there is from the start a blocking mechanism of the elected Africans alone. I repeat that: there is a blocking mechanism of the elected Africans alone. In the event of discriminatory or undesirable legislation being brought to Parliament they will undoubtedly receive reinforcement from the indirectly elected Africans. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I will say why. Hon. Members have sometimes equated indirectly elected Africans with the chiefs. In all cases since 1969 when there has been a division in the Rhodesian Lower House the indirectly elected Africans have voted with the directly elected Africans against the Rhodesian Government. In fact—I do not know whether this is known to hon. Members—the tribal election colleges contain a majority of elected councillors. So the elective process governs the situation as far as the indirectly elected Africans are concerned.
I have seen it suggested that this mechanism would depend on the chiefs. In fact, this is not the case. The chiefs have no status in this matter. After parity is reached, the 10 common roll seats will be created. Any change, any departure from that course, to be carried, would have to have the assent of at least 17 out of the 50 Africans, who by then would in all probability be all directly elected members, and such a number would be a very ample blocking vote. Some of the newspapers have suggested that the creation of these 10 common roll

473
seats is dependent on the recommendation of the Constitutional Review Commission and on a two-thirds' majority. The reverse happens to be the case. The 10 seats are created unless two-thirds of the Assembly, including 17 Africans at least, vote for some alternative which they themselves prefer.
Mr. Healey: The right hon. Gentleman will recall that this is a very important point and has been the cause of some confusion between what Mr. Smith said in Salisbury and what he is saying now. He said in Salisbury, in recommending these proposals to his own Assembly, that the passage to the 10 common roll seats would depend on the Rhodesian Parliament. Secondly, may I point out that the relevant paragraph in the right hon. Gentleman's proposals says that the Commission at that time will have to decide whether or not to recommend to proceed, and, as to whether it recommends to proceed to the 10 seats or not—I am now quoting from paragraph (k) on page 13—
"A law to give effect to any recommendation of the Commission would have to be passed in accordance with the requirements for the amendment of the Constitution."
The requirement for the amendment of the Constitution gives the whites a blocking third. Is that not the case?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: It is complicated, I agree, but a Commission will sit, and that Commission may propose certain alterations to the constitution. If it does so propose, then that alteration can only be carried by a two-thirds' majority of the House. It also has to include the assent of 17 out of the 50 Africans present in the House at that time. It is governed by Parliament, but the blocking mechanism operates in that way. I shall ask my right hon. Friend to explain that more clearly later on.
It has been said that at the first election after parity there may be equality, that the seats may be divided five and five. If the qualified voters were at that time exactly equal and proportional representation were applied, we would get that result. Proportional representation was one of the methods suggested and discussed. What is certain is that from the first election onwards the pace at which Africans will come on to the register will ensure majority rule. It
474
must be hoped that by that time the divisions would be those of political parties and not of races.
The blocking mechanism, the return to objective criteria for the increase of African representation in the House of Assembly, the accession of African members to the Parliament at each election as qualified numbers grow, the provision of the referendum when Africans can decide to be all elected, the transition through and beyond parity to 10 common roll seats—all this amounts to "unimpeded progress to majority rule" under principle 1.
Principles 2 and 4 reinforce each other. The blocking mechanism in Parliament to prevent the introduction of new, discriminatory laws should be taken with the Declaration of Rights, which allows not only new laws—this is a very important point—and new regulations to be challenged in the courts, but new regulations which might be made under the old laws. For example, new regulations made under the Land Tenure Act could be challenged in the courts.
When I left this House, right hon. Gentlemen were worried about the Epworth situation. I took this up with Mr. Smith. Any eviction, as right hon. Gentlemen know, is to be delayed until after the Commission has reported, but plans are being made—I do not know when these are likely to be announced, and I gather that they are supported by the Methodist Church—for creating an African township, and there are opportunities for this to remain an African area.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that at this moment the first of 50,000 Africans are being forcibly removed from Stapleford to make way for a wattle plantation? Does this enhance his statement?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman is wildly out with his facts. I shall check this. I know that there is a long-term forestry scheme afoot in which certain people are being moved from the hill areas but the operation does not involve anything like the numbers suggested by the right hon. Gentleman. This is an afforestation

475
scheme, similar to what is being done in many other countries—in Swaziland for example, which involved the movement of people. They were moved to good agricultural land. All these things I have listed are gains from the point of view of the Africans, and some of them are major gains.
The matter of subordinate legislation is of particular consequence in relation to the Land Tenure Act. The trouble with the present Land Tenure Act is that the division of land is too rigid; there is too much power to discriminate in the hands of the Minister and of the landlord, and particularly of the urban landlord.
The attention of the Commission, which is to review all existing legislation, is specifically drawn to those areas in which Africans, and many Europeans feel that the discrimination is particularly unwarranted and offensive in a society which should have as its standards merit and responsibility.
Under principle 3 there will be an immediate improvement in the lot of the African. If the Africans register, there will be at least four African seats added to Parliament immediately—a 25 per cent. increase. There will be an extended franchise for the lower roll. Economic help for development and education will hasten the pace of political advance.
I have dealt with the fourth principle in connection with the second.
Finally, I come to the fifth principle—the test of acceptability. It is important from every point of view that it should be thorough and seen to be fair. The terms of reference are designed to meet this and state that the Commission
"shall satisfy itself that the proposals for a settlement, as set out in Annex B to Cmnd. 4835, have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia; to ascertain by direct contact with all sections of the population whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole regard these proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence and to report to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary accordingly".
Mr. Smith has agreed that the Commission should have every facility to conduct its inquiries as it thinks best, after the members have decided how they want to proceed and whom they want to see.
In the context of normal political activity a number of questions have been
476
asked as, for example, who might be allowed to broadcast or which detainees may be released in addition to those already released.
Mr. John Mendelson rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I shall consider in a moment, when I have finished the sentence, whether I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman. It was impossible for me, and it would be impossible for anyone else to say whether an individual will be released. No such proposal was made on "Fearless"and it would be impossible to make it, but the Commission will be able to hear the opinion of anyone it wishes, and if it feels it is handicapped in its work it will say so. I have no doubt that its wishes will be met.
It has to be remembered that there are in Rhodesia unrepentant advocates of force and violence. They will be heard by the Commission, as I was able to hear them and talk to them, but it is clearly desirable that the Commission should conduct its business in an atmosphere where it can hear, and be heard, in peaceful conditions.
As the House knows, the Commission will consist of Lord Pearce, Lord Harlech and Sir Maurice Dorman, but I am considering adding to the membership. It is important to get the right people on the Commission. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] This is not a very easy task at comparatively short notice because prominent men are busy men. The Commission will have the necessary number of assistants.
Mr. John Mendelson: Anyone in this House who met Mr. Nkomo in the last few months, when he was still free before his imprisonment in 1963, will know that he told them, as he told me in Salisbury at the time, that his greatest problem was to keep up communication with his supporters and have consultations with them. Is not the absolute minimum guarantee that the Government should give that they will insist that Mr. Nkomo be released at once to take up contact with his supporters and start the process of really presenting what he wrongly called "extremist opinions" but which were merely demands for self-government by the African people? The right hon. Gentleman should give this guarantee now.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have had the advantage of seeing Mr. Nkomo rather more recently than the hon. Gentleman and having a conversation with him only a short time ago. I have no doubt that the Commission will be able to see him and hear all his views.
I have been very conscious during these last years that Britain's influence on the Rhodesian situation was running out but that we must exercise it while anything of it remained, to try to obtain the best deal we possibly could for the Rhodesian African. That is the sole reason why I assumed the responsibility of trying to find a settlement with Mr. Smith's Government. It was a heavy responsibility because one cannot but be conscious of the limitations on the "best" which is involved in compromise. In Africa perhaps more than any other place in the world one is deeply conscious of the fallibility of man.
I can only say in conscience to this House that I do not believe that better terms could have been negotiated, and I was interested that Sir Robert Tredgold, who is held in the highest opinion in all quarters of this House, has said that he regards the settlement as honourable. Sir Robert has been a liberal all his life and one of very advanced views. I can only add my honest conviction that if the proposals are accepted all the races in Rhodesia have the chance to build a new, non-racial country.
Mr. Andrew Faulds rose—
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Such—
Mr. Faulds: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? It is about Sir Robert Tredgold. It is about what he said.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Such a non-racial—
Mr. Faulds: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way? He obviously does not want to hear what Sir Robert said. He said he was astounded. That is the report in the Press.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: If the hon. Gentleman will be quiet I will reply to him. I do not think that Sir Robert Tredgold needs any interpretation by the hon. Gentleman or anyone else.
Mr. Faulds: "Astounded". It is in the Press. Does the right hon. Gentleman want to read it?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Such a non-racial community in the centre of Africa, if it could be established, cannot be over priced or over-prized. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."]
4.53 p.m.
Mr. Denis Healey: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof,
"declines to approve Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesia dispute on the grounds that they fail to satisfy the five principles."
The Foreign Secretary spent a lot of time at the beginning of his speech describing the accelerating slide into apartheid in Rhodesia in the last six years. In doing so he offered a well-merited rebuke to those of his hon. and right hon. Friends who had been asking various Governments to recognise the Smith regime over the last six years and to take off sanctions. Incidentally, among those right hon. Friends one of them is sitting next to him at the moment.
The Attorney-General (Sir Peter Rawlinson): If the right hon. Gentleman is about to speak of me, may I remind him that I wrote to him a fortnight ago and asked him for the reference and I also later spoke to him, when he did not reply to my letter. I have told him that I have the cuttings here following a Press conference which I gave, in which I said specifically that I called for the negotiations, and in which I said that Conservatives supported sanctions so that Smith should be brought to negotiate. I explained to him that the date which he announced in this House was the date of the Press conference which was reported in the local Press. He has had the courtesy neither to reply to my letter nor to give me the reference.
Hon. Members: Withdraw.
Mr. Healey: I am able to quote from an article in the Epsom and Ewell Advertiser dated 27th January, 1966. I not only have the cutting here but I got an hon. Friend of mine to check the reports in this and another local paper, and I

479
have a full list of the reports, which I have sent to the right hon. and learned Gentleman.
The Attorney-General rose—
Mr. Healey: When I have answered the question I will give way. The heading of this cutting is:
"Recognise the Smith regime."
Underneath it says:
"The Tory Member of Parliament for Epsom Division, Sir Peter Rawlinson, wants immediate official recognition of the rebel Rhodesian Government."
Hon. Members: Shame.
Mr. Healey: Similar reports appeared in other local newspapers. The local anti-apartheid movement asked to see the right hon. and learned Gentleman about these reports and the correspondence continued in the local newspapers for three or four weeks afterwards. At no point did the right hon. and learned Gentleman contest the accuracy of the reports. If he wishes to intervene, I will gladly give way.
The Attorney-General: I certainly do. The right hon. Gentleman should know that the only newspaper which published this report on 27th January was the Epsom Herald. That carried a report of a Press conference I held because of the inaccurate reports which had been circulating earlier. At that conference there was a reporter there with a tape recorder and the accurate, proper report of my views, which I had expressed before, was set out in newspapers as a result. In the reports I was saying that the time had come to negotiate, but I specifically said that Conservatives supported sanctions to bring Mr. Smith back to legality. That was the correct and proper report of my views, and the earlier reports had been corrected by that Press conference.
Sir George Sinclair: Withdraw.
Mr. Healey: As I told the House, I have here a cutting from the newspaper concerned. I accept what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said and I will seek further confirmation of these cuttings. As I said, I have done so already, and I have the actual cutting, not a photograph, but I readily accept what the
480
right hon. and learned Gentleman has said and I will—
Sir George Sinclair: Withdraw.
Mr. Healey: With great respect I have my own cutting here. I accept what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said and having confirmed the accuracy or inaccuracy of my own report—
Sir G. Sinclair: A mean gesture.
Mr. Healey: This is not a mean gesture. This is the cutting. I conditionally withdraw what I have said pending confirmation of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's statements. I do not think that I can be expected to do more than that in the light of the cutting which I have.
The main feature of the right hon. Gentleman's speech and the whole purpose of the setting in which he has put his document was that he had secured in his recent visit to Salisbury the best agreement which could be reached with the Smith régime, and an agreement which, whatever else might be said of it, gave a chance of some improvement on the existing situation. That was not the purpose of his mission as he defined it to the House before he left. What he said then was that he would not accept any agreement unless it fully satisfied the letter of the five principles, and that meant ensuring that any settlement would have to be understood by the Africans in Rhodesia and accepted by them. I think he will agree that that is a fair account of what he said.
In fact the right hon. Gentleman has settled for what he believes is the best he could get. He said so. What he has got fails to satisfy the five principles at every point. There is no sign that it is understood by the Africans in Rhodesia as a whole or that he will see that his proposals are understood. But what is certain, in the light of the views expressed to him by the Africans to whom he spoke during his visit, is that if it is understood, it will not be accepted.
However, the proposals are understood by the Europeans in Rhodesia. There is a long report in the Daily Telegraph this morning of the attempts which have been made in the last week by the Rhodesian Front to explain the proposals to its own members. The report can be

481
summarised in the following paragraph, which I quote:
"This form of explanation to the rank-and file of the ruling party has drawn the sting from the Right-wing attack. Quietly, the proposals are being 'sold' to wavering Rhodesians as a total capitulation by Britain, suitably garbed in deliberately confusing legal terminology."
I believe that in this at least the Rhodesian Front is right. That is an accurate description of the proposals, as I intend to demonstrate in going over the points which the right hon. Gentleman made today.
When the proposals were announced in the House last Thursday, many Members attacked them on the ground that they contained no guarantee that the agreement would not be violated whenever the Rhodesian Front thought right. But many of us have read the straw poll carried out in Rhodesia and quoted in The Guardian which showed that about 88 per cent. of European voters wanted permanent white rule and that of the Rhodesian Front, of which 70 per cent. of Europeans are supporters, only 11 per cent. would accept the five principles for the sake of a settlement—but would advocate its repudiation once settlement was achieved.
Many of us saw on the television Mr. Smith's reaction when he and the right hon. Gentleman left the room where the talks were held. All of us in the House saw Mr. Smith break his Oath of Allegiance to the Queen in 1965 in order to prevent the distant possibility of majority rule from coming about. We do not believe that Mr. Smith will be more scrupulous about any agreement he has made with the right hon. Gentleman. However, now that we have had a chance to study the agreement in detail, it is clear that there is no reason why Mr. Smith should seek to follow the precedent he set in 1965 because he can get everything he wants within the terms of the agreement.
Like the right hon. Gentleman, I propose to test the agreement in detail against each of the five principles in turn, and I also ask the indulgence of the House because the factors concerned are complicated in the extreme. If I make any mistakes, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will correct me, and I shall welcome any correction if he can convince me that he is right.
482
The first point which needs to be established, as the White Paper makes clear, is that the five principles were first defined by the right hon. Gentleman himself in 1963 and 1964 against the background of the 1961 constitution. Sir Edgar Whitehead had said that under the 1961 constitution African rule would be achieved by 1976—only five years from now. The purpose of the five principles was to accelerate this process to achieve certain improvements in the situation then existing under the 1961 constitution.
The situation is very different now. We have had the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. We have had the 1969 constitution. We have had the Land Tenure Act. We have a situation which the present Prime Minister has described as containing aspects of a police State and which the right hon. Gentleman has admitted involves a vast stride towards apartheid. Yet the 1969 constitution is the basis of the whole settlement which the right hon. Gentleman has asked the House to approve. I recall that the Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath), said, even before the 1969 constitution had been introduced, that once Rhodesia became a Republic the chances of an honourable settlement would be negligible. I believe that he was right, and that he is proved to have been right by the proposals put before the House last week.
Let me take the first principle, which is worth reading in full from the White Paper:
"The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed."
On 16th October, 1969—only two years ago—the right hon. Gentleman said in the House that unimpeded progress towards majority rule meant that one continues to process of bringing Africans on to the common roll. There is now no common roll. There will be no common roll until parity is reached, and un-impeded progress to majority rule is not guaranteed by the proposals.
Strictly speaking, it is impossible ever to have majority rule under the proposals because in order to determine what constitutes a majority everybody has to have a vote and those votes must count equally. That is specifically prevented by the proposals before the House, because

483
the process comes to a full stop if and when there are 110 seats in the Rhodesian Parliament. At that point, a quarter of a million Europeans are guaranteed 50 seats in perpetuity; five million Africans are guaranteed at most 60 seats. In other words, when this process comes to an end, the Europeans will continue to have 20 times as much political representation in the Rhodesian Parliament as five million Africans. This situation will not and cannot change as long as 37 of the 50 Europeans in the Rhodesian Parliament oppose a change because they constitute, at that point, a blocking one-third.
The question on which all of us would like more guidance is when parity is likely to be achieved. The right hon. Gentleman refused to give an estimate, although my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition quoted the estimate which the Labour Government had made and put to Mr. Smith at the time of the "Fearless" talks.
Mr. Bernard Braise: Is it not a fact that at no time between U.D.I. and the time when they went out of office did the Labour Government specify in the House or publicly the date by which majority rule in Rhodesia would be assured? The quotation which my right hon. Friend made showed that the then Prime Minister well understood that it was impossible in those conditions to specify a date.
Mr. Healey: My right hon. Friend stated in the House this afternoon and I know this to be true—that he had given Mr. Smith his estimate of the date, and anybody who has read Professor Palley's attempt in the Sunday Times of last week to analyse the problem would agree that it is possible to specify a series of assumptions concerning the rate of economic advance, the rate at which Africans register and the rate at which African education improves, on which one can reach conclusions about the date at which parity is likely to be achieved. I would entirely agree with any hon. Member who argued that this did not guarantee that the assumptions would, in practice, be fulfilled. But it is possible to state assumptions and then, on the basis of a mixture of assumptions, to come to various conclusions. We know what was
484
Mr. Smith's view about the time at which parity would be achieved under the 1969 constitution. He stated it as being 500 years.
The right hon. Gentleman has got agreement to some changes in the franchise to permit additional African seats, but the new income qualification is double the average income of the four best paid groups of Africans in Rhodesia at the present time. It is far above anything at which the average African can aim. Indeed, only a small number of Africans belonging to what might be called the African middle class have achieved this level of qualification today and most Africans have no hope of achieving it in the near future. Indeed, the lowest level of the income qualification as it is put in the present proposals is twice as high as the income qualification under the 1961 constitution against which the original five conditions were put.
Mr. Smith has also given some indication of his own views of when parity will be reached under the new proposals because he stated in his speech in the Rhodesian Parliament, commending the proposals to the Rhodesian Parliament, that the position of the European in Rhodesia would not be affected in the lifetime of Europeans now living, and that suggests to any ordinary person a period of decades—three, four, five or six.
I must confess that I was not personally convinced by Dr. Palley's assessment in the Sunday Times because it seemed to me that perhaps the sub-editors had been cutting it about and misplacing some of the figures, which did not fully jibe with my own understanding, and I think that perhaps it would be unwise to place too much reliance on those specific calculations at this time. My own calculation is that if the number of Africans getting four years' secondary education—which is one of the qualifications—has a compound annual increase of 20 per cent. in the first five years, with an increase at half that rate in the succeeding quinquennia, the earliest date for parity will be 2,014, which is 43 years from now, but I readily confess that it is open to all hon. Members to make their own calculations on the basis of their own assumptions. What I would say is that it is possible to make calculations and to offer them for consideration, and then to decide whether the

485
time is acceptable and whether the assumptions are reasonable.
Sir Frederic Bennett: On the question of the calculations, the right hon. Gentleman is quoting Professor Palley's article, which I also read. Has the right hon. Gentleman taken the trouble to look back to what that same distinguished individual said after "Fearless"? It was:
"Mr. Wilson's estimate of majority rule for Africans within 15 years simply does not bear scrutiny. No majority rule is possible before 1999."
Mr. Healey: I am grateful to the hon. Member. I do not see that he is making much of a point against me because I specifically dissociated myself from Dr. Palley's calculations in last week's Sunday Times.
Sir F. Bennett: The right hon. Gentleman mentioned them three times.
Mr. Healey: With great respect, I have just made my own calculations, on very favourable assumptions, and they do suggest a shorter period than Dr. Palley suggested.
Of course, there is absolutely no guarantee whatever either that the income of Africans or the educational qualifications of Africans will rise at the rate I assume from Dr. Palley's estimate, because the rate at which African incomes and education improve is entirely in the hands of the Rhodesian Front Government. Moreover—and this is a critically important point—white immigration into Rhodesia in 1970 amounted to 12,000 people, nearly all of whom would have gone straight on to the white register, and immigration well above those levels is expected by the Rhodesian Front Government to follow acceptance of the current proposals, if they are accepted.
What will be the effect of an increase of white immigration? First of all, those white immigrants will take the skilled jobs which would have gone to Africans and thereby will prevent the Africans from obtaining the employment about which the right hon. Gentleman spoke so movingly a moment ago; and also, of course, will prevent Africans from qualifying income-wise for their places on the higher roll. In the second place, any increase in African representation depends on the Africans achieving a 6 per cent. share of the white electorate. If
486
the white electorate increases at the rate of 10,000, or 20,000, a year, of course the speed at which the number of African seats is increased will steadily fall.
I think that Mr. Smith has these points very much in mind, because when he recommended the proposals to his own Parliament on 25th November he said:
"It is our carefully considered assessment that, in view of the expansion of the economy and the increase in immigration to which we can confidently look forward, no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his future in Rhodesia."
I think the House must recall that when he said "European" in that assembly he was speaking very largely to members of the Rhodesian Front Party who were responsible for U.D.I., the 1969 constitution and the Land Tenure Act, and fears for the security of their future mean no change—no substantial change—in the current situation.
When parity is reached in 40 or 50 years, or 100 years if I am right about the way in which it is possible for the Government to slow down the increase in the number of African seats, 24 Africans in an assembly of 100 will still be indirectly elected and dependent on the European Government for their wages and employment, and I do not think anybody can doubt that if pressure were put on them they would be liable to yield.
It is no good the right hon. Gentleman quoting how the indirectly elected Africans voted in the last two years, because at the moment the indirectly elected and the directly elected Africans together have only 16 seats in an assembly of 66, and therefore there is no need for the Government to put any pressure on them to vote one way or the other. But, of course, the situation will be very different indeed when we come to the implementation of the proposals which the right hon. Gentleman has put before the House.
I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General will deal with the next point. It is not clear from the White Paper as drafted whether the 10 common roll seats will ever come about, because according to the Paper as drafted the relevant paragraph, paragraph (k) on page 13, says that when parity is achieved
"an independent Commission will be appointed to ascertain whether the creation of Common Roll seats … is acceptable to the

487
people of Rhodesia and, if it is not so acceptable, whether any alternative arrangements would command general support."
The paragraph continues:
"A law to give effect to any recommendation of the Commission would have to be passed…".
and this can only mean a further recommendation to proceed with the creation of 10 common roll seats as well as a reservation for an alternative. That, with respect, is all that it can mean, but I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will deal with this point. A recommendation to vary the proposal would require an amendment to the constitution and would, therefore, be subject to the blocking one-third.
I understand from reports in the Press in Rhodesia that Mr. Smith clearly interprets this paragraph as meaning that the blocking one-third of Europeans in the Assembly at the point of parity would have the right to prevent parity from passing to the extra 10 common roll seats. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will clear this point up. I agree that there is confusion, which may well be due to the drafting, because the very next paragraph takes the creation of 10 common roll seats for granted. It cannot be taken for granted, because it is quite conceivable that the Commission's proposal to vary this recommendation would be accepted whether or not there was a blocking one-third.
I do not believe that anyone who has gone through these points, none of which has been contested from the other side of the House, can describe them as unimpeded progress. The impossibility of guaranteeing an adequate increase in the qualification of Africans; the impossibility of guaranteeing that white immigrants will not bring the whole process to an end; the impossibility of ever having majority rule properly defined as deriving from universal franchise; the uncertainty whether even the ten extra common roll seats will ever be established, cannot be described as unimpeded progress. I suppose the right hon. Gentleman might describe it as progress, but it certainly cannot be described as unimpeded progress. In fact, it is the greatest obstacle race of all time.
I come now to the second principle, safeguards against retrogressive legisla
488
tion. The right hon. Gentleman will admit that he made no attempt to involve any external authority, as the previous Government did, in a safeguard against retrogression. The safeguards depend entirely on the rules laid down in the White Paper and on the readiness of the Europeans in Rhodesia to obey them. I think the right hon. Gentleman would concede that.
If the indirectly elected Africans were pressed to support a retrogressive amendment by the sort of pressures I have mentioned, since their employment and salary depend on the European Government, only one of the elected Africans need support a retrogressive amendment for that amendment to be passed, and there are many means of persuasion open to those in authority in Rhodesia.
I am not quite clear whether the absence of an African from a vote would detract from the number of votes required. Is what is intended a majority of all the Africans present at a debate, or a majority of all Africans elected to Parliament at the time when Parliament takes a decision'? If it were the former, then the kidnapping of one M.P. could have the effect of allowing a retrogressive amendment legally to be passed through the Rhodesian Parliament.
I come now to the third principle, immediate advance in the political status of Africans. The right hon. Gentleman was quite frank this afternoon in admitting that the only immediate advance secured by these proposals is an increase in the number of African voters on the lower roll. But however many Africans are on the lower roll, they still vote for the same number of seats. Therefore, there is no effective increase in the political power of the Africans. It simply means that more people vote for the same number of M.P.s.
The only early prospect of real improvement in the status of Africans will be the addition of two directly elected Africans on the higher roll when there is the adequate 6 per cent. quota of Africans qualifying to be inscribed on the roll. Even assuming that this comes about in the near future, say, in three or four years time—and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us whether he expects this improvement to be achieved in weeks, months or years—that can be

489
cancelled when the next improvement in African representation occurs, because the next two Africans who go on will be indirectly elected and, therefore, susceptible to European pressure when they reach the House. So I do not believe that the Government can maintain that the third principle of an immediate improvement in the political status of the Africans is met.
I come now to a matter on which the right hon. Gentleman, very rightly, placed great force, progress in ending racial discrimination. As he admitted, there has been an enormous increase in racial discrimination in Rhodesia in the last ten years, particularly in the last three years. There is the 1969 constitution and the Land Tenure Act, and racial rolls have been introduced in Rhodesia for the first time. The right hon. Gentleman rests his hopes in this regard on the Declaration of Rights and on the Commission to review existing legislation. My right hon. Friend who is to wind up for the Opposition will deal in more detail with the Declaration of Rights, but in many respects it represents no advance on the 1969 constitution, of which the Foreign Secretary has so bitterly complained, since the clauses relating to freedom of conscience, expression and assembly and the clauses relating to discrimination are qualified by considerations of public morality, law and order, public safety and defence, of which the Rhodesian Front Government are the sole interpreter.
Many hon. Members on both sides of the House were deeply shocked at the recent closing down of Cold Comfort Farm. The closing down of Cold Comfort Farm or any similar establishment is still possible under paragraph 5(3)(f) of the new Declaration of Rights. Indeed, the whole apparatus of law is nullified by the discretion given to the Government to withdraw the protection of these rights if they think the safety of the realm, considerations of public morality, and so on, are threatened. Meanwhile, all the existing legislation like the Land Tenure Act and the Law and Order Maintenance Act, which Justice Treadgold, to whom the right hon. Gentleman paid a reasonable tribute, described as involving all the characteristics of a police state, remain in force.
The only way of getting rid of these appalling examples of apartheid is
490
through the procedure of a Commission of three persons who can look at the legislation but whose recommendations can be ignored if the Government decide that overriding considerations are present. Of what value is the work of this Commission when these considerations can be invoked by the Rhodesian Government?
There have been many examples of this problem in recent Rhodesian history. The last Conservative Government were responsible for setting up an African Affairs Board in Rhodesia to protect the rights of the Africans, but its recommendations were repeatedly ignored in 1957, and on one disgraceful occasion the ignoring by the local authority of a recommendation was supported by the Conservative Government in Westminster. The Constitutional Commission which was set up later to protect the constitution was ignored in 1961 when it ruled against the Land Apportionment Act. There is no protection whatever in a Commission whose recommendations the Government of the day are under no obligation to accept.
Another point of great importance—
Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler: As the right hon. Gentleman is so against this provision, would he care to explain to the House why his Government were in favour of the provisions on page 9 of the White Paper on the "Fearless" proposals, when the Commission recommended there had less power to examine the situation than the Commission which the Government are now putting forward? The right hon. Gentleman, with great respect, should read that paragraph very carefully.
Mr. Healey: The Declaration is entirely different, and there is no protecting clause for the Rhodesian Government in the "Fearless" proposal similar to that which I have quoted which gives the Rhodesian Government carte blanche to ignore recommendations of which they disapprove.
I come now to the Land Tenure Act. The right hon. Gentleman attempted to defend the Act on the ground that it protected the African's right to land. That is an extraordinary argument when the Land Tenure Act gives the European on the land 500 times as much land as the African on the land, and gives a quarter of a million Europeans on the land or

491
in the cities exactly as much land as five million Africans. I am surprised that the right hon. Gentleman attempted to defend it. Most of us who know Rhodesian problems on both sides of the House would agree that the Act must go. The Land Tenure Act is entrenched in paragraph 87 of the proposals for the 1969 constitution in the sense that a third of the Rhodesian M.P.s can veto any change in that Act.
What chance is there that there will not be a third of Rhodesian Front Members of Parliament who will veto any change in the Land Tenure Act, even if the Smith Government recommend such a change? There is no provision in the proposals before the House to change this element in the 1969 constitution this remains in force. If I am wrong, I should be grateful if the Attorney-General will correct me when he replies. But I have been through the 1969 constitution carefully and it appears to me—and I accept that I am not a lawyer—that a third of the Europeans in the Rhodesian Parliament could block any attempt to amend or repeal the Land Tenure Act if it is recommended by the Commission—and even if it is accepted by the Rhodesian Front Government.
I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman can claim that any of the first four principles are met in the letter, which was the test he set himself when he set out on his journey. I am not surprised that Mr. Smith said on television, "I think I got the better of the bargain". Nor am I surprised that, according to the Daily Telegraph, the Rhodesian Front believes that this represents a total capitulation by the British Government. There is no risk of a Rhodesian Front revolt. The Rhodesian Front does not need to break the agreement to prevent any further improvement in the position of the African in Rhodesia.
Any real improvement for the African in these proposals depends, not on the good faith of the Rhodesian Government—thank God!—but on the Rhodesian Front deliberately refraining from using opportunities given to it in these proposals to maintain the principles and objectives to which it dedicated itself and over which it betrayed its oath of allegiance to the Queen six years ago. This is the simple conclusion that any honest per-
492
son is forced to reach after reading the proposals. For this reason the fifth principle, as the right hon. Gentleman recognised, is of crucial importance.
Do these proposals give us a chance to ensure that the Africans in Rhodesia understand the meaning of the agreement? And will the machinery which the right hon. Gentleman proposes to set up be able to test whether, having understood it, they find this agreement acceptable?
In 1964, the right hon. Gentleman, who was then in authority on Rhodesian questions, suggested a referendum, in which nearly all Africans should vote, as a test of acceptability. In 1969 in this House he suggested a referendum of all Rhodesians—African and European alike—on the entrenched clauses on any change in those matters. Now he is relying instead on a Commission. I understand why, since there was no chance whatever of Smith agreeing to a referendum.
If we are to have an effective Commission it is worth looking at the precedents for using a Commission in similar circumstances. Two recent precedents are worth examining. First, the Monckton Commission on the Central African Federation. That had 26 members, of whom five were African, and two were distinguished Commonwealth figures, neither British nor African. Its work took nine months, three months of which were spent in careful travel and interviews in the three territories concerned.
There was then the Cobbold Commission, which forms a very close parallel because its function at that time was to test the acceptability of entry into the Malaysian Federation among the people of Sabah and Sarawak. The Cob-bold Commission had five members, it spent three months travelling and during its travels saw 4,000 people in 690 separate groups out of a total population of only 1,200,000. The population in Rhodesia is well over five million.
Against this background, let us look at the proposals for the test of acceptability. I readily concede that if an honest test were carried out, if this House were satisfied that all Rhodesians understood the proposals and their implications and genuinely accepted them, this would undoubtedly carry great weight even with those who criticised the proposals as unacceptable. The importance of having

493
an adequate test is even greater here than it was with the Monckton and Cobbold Commissions because, as the right hon. Gentleman made clear a week ago in the House, this is a British responsibility laid on us by the United Nations. We must carry it out, and not only must we satisfy ourselves but, if we are to be effective, we must satisfy the United Nations that it has been an honest and adequate test of acceptability. Therefore, we must carefully consider the composition of the Commission, the conditions on which it operates, the methods by which it carries out the test of acceptability and the time available.
I hope that we can have the right hon. Gentleman's assurance as to composition and as to determining the conditions under which the Commission should operate and move within the territory to carry out the test. Can we be assured that the Commission will be totally subject to the views of Her Majesty's Government and that the Smith régime will have no authority whatever to interfere with or block any proposals which Her Majesty's Government would wish to make in these three areas?
In composition the Commission must be seen by the Africans as an objective Commission in which they can have confidence. It must be so seen by the United Nations, too. After all, the Commission is to rule on one of the most important matters of racial conflict in the world today, and the United Nations is rightly concerned with matters of racial conflict.
I cannot help feeling that the choice of chairman for the Commission was unfortunate. The only connection Lord Pearce has had with Rhodesian affairs, so far as I know, was in 1968 when he dissented from the view of five Rhodesian High Court judges and his four fellow Privy Council judges in the case of an appeal against detention by the régime. According to The Times, he held that law and order should be enforced, even with technically illegal measures. He said that the principle of necessity was for the preservation of the citizen, for keeping law and order rebus sic stantibus, regardless of whose fault it was that the constitutional crisis had been created.
I am not in a position in any sense to challenge this judgment of Lord Pearce or to question its correctness in law. That
494
is not the point. But surely if the right hon. Gentleman were fully aware of the importance of finding a chairman of this Commission who could command confidence among the African people in Rhodesia, this was a most unfortunate choice.
I make no complaint whatever about the proposal to appoint Lord Harlech or about the decision to announce Sir Maurice Dorman's appointment before he had even been told about it. I gather that this was one of those slips which happens sometimes in the best regulated Governments—or perhaps I am wrong on that.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The right hon. Gentleman is wrong about whether Sir Maurice Dorman was told. I had not meant to announce any name but that of the Chairman until I had their agreement; but, as the right hon. Gentleman said, this was one of those slips that sometimes happens.
Mr. Healey: I readily withdraw that accusation. I think, however, that the right hon. Gentleman would agree that these three members will not constitute an adequate body for carrying out this test.
I wish to make some serious suggestions to him. First, that he must have on the Commission somebody with personal knowledge of Rhodesia and some skill in explaining complicated problems to the Africans in Rhodesia. I cannot think of any class of person better qualified in this regard than a distinguished churchman who has recently served in Rhodesia. I forbear to mention names, but I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman might consult the British Council of Churches to see whether they could agree on a churchman—Catholic, Methodist or Protestant—who meets the qualifications I have just mentioned.
The next addition I suggest is that there must be some representative on the Commission who is himself a black African I do not see how the Africans in Rhodesia or, indeed, the Afro-Asians in the United Nations, can be expected to have confidence in a Commission all of whose members are white and are ruling on the acceptability of proposals to five million Africans in what is at the moment, in practice, servitude to a tiny white minority.

495
I make two suggestions here, though I confess readily that hon. Members may have better ideas. I have in mind someone like Mr. Robert Gardiner, a very distinguished Ghanaian, who commands the confidence of the United Nations for his work in the United Nations Secretariat. Another possible idea would be someone like Mr. Adu, who was secretary of the East African Commission at one time and did very distinguished work in the Commonwealth Secretariat in London and who, I believe, at the moment is in private life in Ghana. The addition of some such black African would do a great deal to strengthen international as well as national confidence in the objectivity of the Commission.
Finally, there is a strong case for having some outsider who has the confidence of all races in the United Nations and the Commonwealth. I have in mind someone like Lester Pearson or Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, someone who is white but who has a very wide range of experience and who, as I say, would command general confidence in this House and outside it. I think that if three such additions were made to the Commission, at least the composition would begin to look right.
The next question to which we come is, who are to be the assessors? As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, it is a mammoth task, especially in the tribal areas, to get round, to explain and to evaluate the reaction to the proposals. It must involve people who have person knowledge of Africa if not of Rhodesia itself. I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will give us some idea of the sort of persons that it is proposed to employ.
I make one suggestion in this connection. There are hundreds of black Rhodesians in Rhodesia at the moment who have university degrees and who are doing menial jobs because there is no other work for them. The right hon. Gentleman referred to such people in his opening remarks. Is not it possible for the right hon. Gentleman to employ some of these highly qualified young Africans to do this work of assessment in their own territory? It is not just a question of evaluation. It is a question of explaining to people who have not had our educational advantages proposals which we
496
ourselves find it very difficult properly to grip, after a week of study.
The conditions in which this test will operate are again all-important. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Law and Order Maintenance Act remains in force. It is an Act about which Sir Robert Tredgold resigned because he thought that it had turned Rhodesia into a police State. If the Commission is to command any confidence in its work, it must be able to decide whether conditions exist for freedom of argument and discussion by all groups of the Rhodesian population. That must include the leading African nationalist parties, not at the moment represented in the Rhodesian Parliament but many of whose members are not in detention.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman met Mr. Chinamano and a number of other Africans. Will Mr. Chinamano be free to travel round the country, including the tribal areas, to give his own view of the proposals, to seek to explain them and to gather support for his view, or are the only people free to express their view to be the legal parties and the Rhodesian Front, backed by the apparatus of the official propaganda machine?
I come then to the detainees. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, when we discussed these problems on "Fearless" during the time that the Labour Government were in power, we insisted that there should be a full review of all the cases of detainees before the test of acceptability was completed, and that if any detainee appealed against a decision of a Rhodesian judge, his case should be reviewed by a tribunal on which the British Lord Chancellor had a representative.
What is most disappointing about the right hon. Gentleman's proposals is that, apart from the 33 detainees due for release very shortly, all the others will not have their cases even reviewed until the test of acceptability is complete. I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman can consider that that is good enough. Why cannot Mr. Nkomo be released from detention? He is not in detention on a criminal charge, like Mr. Sithole. Why cannot he have the same freedom as African politicians belonging to the legal parties to organise in the country—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]—and to express

497
his views on radio and television? If the right hon. Gentleman would care to reply, I think that the whole House would be glad to hear him. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The inability of the right hon. Gentleman to answer any of those questions as I have put them is a sorry augury for the success of the agreement.
Then there is the question of the length of time that the Commission spends on its work. We have read various stories in the Press. I suggest that a three-month period spent on travel similar to that spent by the Monckton Commission in Central Africa and the Cobbold Commission in Borneo is an absolute minimum if the test is to be carried out fully in a country with over five million inhabitants, with 75 per cent. of the Africans living in tribal areas and extremely dispersed, to whom the explaining of the proposals and their implications will itself be a major task.
One question which must have disturbed many hon. Members is, why will only the chairman and deputy chairman of the Commission be asked to sign the report? Surely this is a unique procedure. Every other commission of this nature about which I have ever read has sought to get the agreement of all its members in signing the report. If it has failed, those who have disagreed with the majority have signed a dissenting report or made reservations. Will that be possible on this occasion?
Mr. Russell Kerr: No. It is a swizzle.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: There is nothing in this point. If five members want to sign the report, they can. It is the chairman's decision, in consultation with the other members. It is just an arrangement which has been made.
Mr. Healey: We are getting on. We have had one concession, though only one, from the right hon. Gentleman. I think that that at least does something to relieve our gloom.
I raise one final point about the test of acceptability. It is said that the Commission will have its services provided by the Rhodesian Government. This is another of the matters which have concerned right hon. and hon. Members on many occasions in the past. Is the Com-
498
mission to be travelling round with a big escort of Rhodesian police, with sirens blaring? If it is, what chance is there of the Africans having the courage to give their honest, considered view to a Commission which appears to them to be an arm of the Rhodesian Government? I suggest that the Commission must at least be equipped with sufficient day-to-day nuts and bolts services to be able to be seen to operate in Rhodesia as an instrument of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and not to appear to operate as an instrument of the Smith régime.
At the end of his speech, the right hon. Gentleman sought to suggest that there was wide agreement with his proposals. I beg leave to disagree with him. It is very difficult to find among the people who have commented in or out of Parliament on these proposals so far anyone who has said that they fulfil the letter of the five principles, which was the test that the right hon. Gentleman set himself. He mentioned Sir Robert Tredgold, and his quotation was challenged by one of my hon. Friends. He must have seen the views of Lord Alport, one of his own distinguished colleagues in the past in another place, than whom there is no Conservative in Britain with a better knowledge of the Rhodesian problem. He felt that the proposals were a sell-out. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the Africans in Rhodesia regard them as a sell-out, because they told him so when they saw them, and they themselves set the terms which they would have regarded as consistent with the principles.
I am not just talking of the leaders of the nationalist parties, whom the right hon. Gentleman chooses to call "extremists". I am talking of the representatives of African business who saw him in Salisbury and who, according to The Times, insisted on the repeal of the Land Tenure Act and of the 1969 constitution as a pre-condition to any proposals obtaining acceptability from the Africans.
Mr. R. T. Paget: My right hon. Friend was saying just now that the Commission would have great difficulty in finding anyone who dared to speak. He is now telling us how everyone dares to speak and says the most uncomplimentary things. I do not

499
think that my right hon. Friend has been to Rhodesia. Certainly when I was there I never met anyone less inhibited about speaking against the Government than every African whom I met, both in the reserves and in the townships. I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary is of the same opinion.
Mr. Healey: If the right hon. Gentleman turns out to be right, I shall be very pleased. But many of the Africans to whom the right hon. Gentleman spoke on his tour had only recently been released from detention—a detention to which they had been subjected because they had had the courage to speak their minds. I think that the applause and praise of this House must go to those who, with this background of experience, nevertheless have the courage to say what they wish. However, the Commission will have to talk to Africans who do not have that sort of courage, and it is about the views of the ordinary African in the street and on the tribal reserve that this House must be concerned.
The right hon. Gentleman's final appeal is the one by which I think many people have been swayed. From time to time, many people like Mr. Peregrine Worsthorne in last week's Sunday Telegraph, have said, "Well, let us face it. These proposals do not satisfy the five principles. But they are the best that can be got. They are better than nothing. So let us make the best of a bad job and quit with as little fuss as we can manage."
More and more, those who are prepared to support these proposals, like The Times in its leader this morning, are doing so fundamentally on these grounds. They say, "Is not it better than going on as we are now? In any case, what is your alternative?" I put two points to the House. The first is that if there ever were to be a chance of an honourable settlement in Rhodesia, the right hon. Gentleman should have waited, as I think he personally wanted to wait.
A few weeks ago, the Finance Minister of Rhodesia said that Rhodesia was already scraping the bottom of the barrel, that within a year or so she would have run out of foreign reserves entirely. And it is already becoming clear that the
500
South African Government were losing the will to continue financing an illegal Government. Indeed, South Africa is herself in deep foreign exchange trouble and has had to introduce severe import restrictions.
For myself, I do not believe that there has been a chance of reaching an honourable settlement with the Smith régime since the 1969 constitution was brought into force.
What is the alternative if there is no honourable solution available? The alternative is to slog on with a policy to which we are committed both by honour and loyalty to the United Nations and by a sense of our interest in maintaining some influence among those hundreds of millions of human beings who live in the coloured part of the globe.
Let us face the global implications of this issue. Rhodesia is one of the three main islands of white racialist rule on the Continent of Africa, along with South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. It is a small territory in which the Africans outnumber the Europeans by more than 20 to one, and of the 250,000 Europeans, only just over half were born there. Indeed, the majority of Europeans there today, I think, have arrived there entirely during the period when in all other parts of the world, the history of imperialism was coming to an end—since the end of the second world war.
The big question we must ask ourselves, if we are conscious of these global issues, is this: do we want to hand over our remaining vestigial responsibilities in this territory in such a way as to involve ourselves in a long-standing collaboration with a racialist régime? If it were the Government's desire, as I suspect it is, simply to wash their hands of the issue, to get rid of it, on the ground that they are impotent or that they are indifferent to what happens in Rhodesia, it is far better to take the advice of the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), to admit that impotence and clear out. I do not believe that that is the right course to take. But the tragedy of the proposals before the House is that if they are accepted, they involve Britain entering on a long collaboration with a racialist régime; they involve Britain being morally and politically implicated in everything the Rhodesia

501
Front Government do or do not do during the whole period in which the proposals must take effect; they involve giving a formal certificate of respectability to a group of politicians in central Africa who have already betrayed their oath to the Queen and whose activity in the last six years represents a steady slide towards the extreme of apartheid, as the right hon. Gentleman admitted.
To accept these proposals does not mean simply signing a treaty with the Smith régime. It means supplying that régime with up to £50 million over the next ten years for a very wide variety of purposes over which we have no direct control whatever. It may involve giving economic support to the régime in paying the debts they inherited during the period of the illegal rule.
I should like the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say whether it is true, as some newspapers report, that there has been a private exchange of letters between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Smith concerning the economic aid which the British Government are prepared to give to the Rhodesian Government once the proposals go through in order to enable them to deal with their accumulated debts.
The proposals may involve helping the Rhodesian régime, or attempting to help them, in getting a deal from the Common Market in Brussels as an associated territory. They will certainly involve, according to the statement of the Minister of State yesterday, direct help for the Rhodesian régime in the United Nations, because we are committed to maintain sanctions by the mandatory resolution of the Security Council and we are not free to break that decision unless all the permanent members of the Security Council form part of a majority which supports the breaking of the resolution.
I should like the Attorney General to give us the answer to a question which the right hon. Gentleman dismissed the other day. Are the British Government prepared to drop sanctions willy-nilly, irrespective of a decision of the United Nations, if these proposals go through? Or are they prepared to accept their responsibilities to the Charter. If the United Nations Security Council chooses to put another resolution on sanctions, are the Government committed to Mr. Smith to veto it in order to be free to
502
remove sanctions once these proposals come into force?
If the Government go through this shabby charade, which is regarded by the majority of people who have examined it as a hypocritical sell-out of African interests, they will carry the responsibility for the next half-century in Rhodesia round their necks like an albatross, with immense damage to Britain's image and interests throughout the world. I believe that by reaching this agreement the right hon. Gentleman has betrayed the principles he himself laid down, has betrayed Britain's responsibilities for five million fellow human beings, and, saddest of all, has betrayed himself.
6 p.m.
Mr. David Lane: I have very great doubt and hesitation in supporting the Government's Motion.
Let me pay warm tribute at once to my right hon. Friend's negotiating success, in apparently reversing the trend towards apartheid which Mr. Smith had been following and in gaining important concessions. Nevertheless, the proposals are a flimsier foundation for Rhodesia's future than we should like. At best, this is not a glorious chapter in British history. Having, rightly as I believe, eschewed force, our power to discharge our responsibilities has been limited, particularly in view of the facts of geography in southern Africa. Sanctions clearly have had some effect, but they would have worked faster and the illegality would have been ended sooner if other countries had been as conscientious as Britain in applying them.
As things are, even with the concessions which my right hon. Friend and his team have won during these months of negotiation, the proposals in my judgment barely fulfil the five principles.
Progress to majority rule, for one thing, will be very slow, and I hope that the British Government will do all they can through aid and in other ways to help the economic and educational advance of the Africans in Rhodesia during the years ahead. Again, over the ending of racial discrimination there are many question marks. I hope that the Rhodesian Government will see the wisdom of taking one or two definite, practical steps beyond the strict terms of the agreement if they

503
wish to convince world opinion of their sincerity.
But it is the fifth principle that in the present context I consider most crucial. If this test of acceptability is to carry conviction, especially in Africa, the Commission must be seen to do its work objectively, thoroughly and with an absolutely free hand. I welcome what my right hon. Friend said at the beginning, and I hope that the Attorney-General will be able to fill in still more of the details.
To make sure that the membership of the Commission is demonstrably well balanced, I would strongly urge that its size should be increased to five. Again, the assessors, as has been mentioned, also must carry conviction. The Commission should take its time and by this I certainly mean months rather than weeks—and must insist on normal political activities in Rhodesia throughout this period.
Having expressed these anxieties and the importance I attach to the Commission, I have to ask myself and others, "What is the alternative to proceeding as the Government propose?" Some critics—and this was the gist of the speech of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) at the end—say that we should wait a bit longer until the pressures on the Smith Government have increased further. This is a very difficult judgment, but it seems just as possible, as things are today, that international sanctions may grow weaker and not stronger, and I cannot feel sure that we could get a better deal in six or 12 months' time.
Other critics say, "Whatever the terms, we cannot trust the Smith régime to honour any settlement at all." This seems to me a counsel of despair. I believe we have to take some risk if we are to have any hope of Rhodesia being deflected from her present course and of doors being opened to African advance.
So I believe that, on balance, we are right to put these proposals to the test of acceptability in Rhodesia, as being preferable to any alternative, on the understanding that all of us must consider the issue afresh when the Commission has reported. This is a desperately hard choice for Britain. Whatever we do or fail to do, we shall be criticised, and it
504
is vital that our case and the alternative should be effectively deployed in international discussions. For everyone here and overseas, surely the paramount consideration is this: what course—a settlement with all its uncertainties or no settlement at all—offers most hope to the five million Africans for whom we still have responsibility?
Some of my constituents, whom I greatly respect, have publicly declared that the proposed settlement will prove in retrospect as disastrous as the granting of sovereignty to South Africa earlier this century. I take a rather more optimistic view. Our hope must be that, given an acceptable settlement, the exercise of moderate influences in Rhodesia over the years and the continuing pressure of world influence outside will set Rhodesia on a different course, by which all races can look forward, as my right hon. Friend said the other day, to growing harmony and prosperity.
6.6 p.m.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The White Paper starts by referring to the fifth principle and says that the proposals are conditional on the British Government being satisfied
" … that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."
I propose to start by referring to this test of acceptability and I agree with much of what the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) has just said in that particular. I hope the Government will agree that the Commission must be credible not only to the Government but to this House and to the world—credible to the world because our own good faith and reputation are at stake credible to this House because what we are in effect doing, if the agreement goes through, is relinquishing for all time the albeit tenuous but nonetheless present and legal responsibility for five million of Her Majesty's subjects.
That is why it is of vital importance that, if this Commission goes out, whatever view we may take of the settlement, it shall be seen to be credible. So, before the test of acceptability, we have the test of the credibility of the Commission itself. I want to see plainly in my mind the conditions in which it will operate.

505
So far as we know, in the course of discussions throughout Rhodesia there will be no facilities on radio or on television for any of the African nationalist parties. There is no suggestion that censorship will be lifted, or that this subject was even raised by the Foreign Secretary. There will be a special review of the 62 remaining detainees, and, again, there is no suggestion that that review will take place before the test of acceptability—in fact, the reverse. Certainly there is no indication that Mr. Joshua Nkomo, who is perhaps the leading African politician, with a very wide body of support behind him, will be released. Indeed, if the Minister of State's remarks, as reported in New York, are correct, very much the reverse.
There is no suggestion that the test of acceptability will in any way be influenced by the work of the Commission on Discrimination which in itself will be an acid test of the good will of Mr. Smith. That will conveniently follow the test of acceptability, not precede it.
Whilst in 1964 the Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), and Lord Dilhorne believed that there could be no independence without proof of the existence of representative institutions, and they therefore pressed for a representative conference of all races and a referendum of almost all Africans, neither of those two factors seems, in the mind of the Foreign Secretary, to be relevant or needed today. They were necessary in the conditions of the 1961 Constitution. They are not thought by the right hon. Gentleman to be of such vital significance to the 1969 Constitution in the atmosphere of 1971.
Likewise, just as in 1964 the Foreign Secretary refused to accept the Chiefs indaba at Dombashawa as representative of African opinion, now half the African Members of Parliament are to be elected through the tribal system. So, to put it at its lowest, it is not a very promising start. The conditions do not bode extremely well for free and unfettered discussion throughout Rhodesia. Censorship will not be lifted and the review of detainees will not have started. Certainly, it will not have been concluded. There is no suggestion that the Commission on Discrimination will have been started, there will still be the power of internment and the apparatus of the police state, to
506
which the Prime Minister referred on 10th December, 1965, will still be there in all its panoply. Therefore, as I have said, the background is not very promising.
As the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said, we can learn from previous experience. There is some suggestion that the Government—having already made up their minds on the matter in any event and unlikely to be swayed by any considerations—will rush the matter. I hope that they will not. The Willink Commission, which had to go into the difficult and delicate problems of the regions and the federal structure in Nigeria, was a very rushed commission. I do not say in whole, but certainly in part I believe that it contributed to the subsequent problems in the Federation of Nigeria.
I and my party—probably the only party to do so—consistently opposed Central African federation from its inception. Although we were persuaded of the economic advantages which were put forward, we were convinced that if that Federation was formed in the teeth of African opposition it would be only a matter of years before it had to be dismantled. But a Labour Government disregarded those views or thought that the findings of the Bledisloe Commission in 1938 were no longer applicable.
In September, 1951, the Victoria Falls conference took place with the right hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Gordon Walker) and Mr. James Griffiths. No African represented Southern Rhodesia and at no stage was African consent a condition precedent to the grant of federation. The Tory Government followed on, agreed with that, and the London Conference took place.
When the normal review of the Constitution of the Federation took place in 1960 the Monckton Commission had to go very much further. For the first time it had to test African opinion and, in order to test African opinion, it had members of the distinction of Elspeth Huxley, Professor Jack, Members of this House and Members of another place who had experience of Africa. It received over 1,000 memoranda and 750 witnesses or groups of witnesses. At the end of the day it found that the opposition to federation, at any rate in the two Northern Territories, was widespread,

507
sincere, long-standing and almost pathological. It therefore recommended that the federation should be dismembered. It was dismembered and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia moved towards independence.
However much the Government may temporarily solve the problem by a convenient reply from the Commission, if they are going ahead with a political decision which does not have the support of even a narrow majority of the African population in Rhodesia they are storing up for themselves and for the Continent of Africa a problem the like of which will not have been seen in Southern Africa. Therefore, it is of critical importance that we learn from the Monckton experience and have a credible Commission which is unfettered and free. I want to suggest one or two particulars in which I think that might be achieved.
It is interesting that the Devlin Commission on Nyasaland, in paragraph 3 of its Report, went out of its way to say how much it had been assisted by the fact that detainees and others had the right of legal representation. It said:
"As a result of inquiries made by these advisers other witnesses were produced to testify to relevant matters; we were grateful for this as it lightened the burden of investigation put upon us."
The House might think that it sounds somewhat melodramatic, but what used to happen was that counsel would go out in the evening, and sometimes late at night, to the Church of Scotland headquarters in Nyasaland. They would there interview people who wished to give evidence before the Commission but did not feel that during the day, whilst there was a state of emergency, they wanted to be seen coming and going and running the risk of having their names taken by the security forces. Indeed, the names of those witnesses who went in were taken. Many went in with blankets over their heads, hooded, at their own request. This may be thought very melodramatic, but they were people who, had it not been for the availability of counsel, would not have been known to the Commission and would not have given evidence which was extremely valuable. Therefore, it is vital that there should be the right of representation at this inquiry.
508
If the Commission is to be credible, I believe that there should be representation on it from this House. I accept that that will involve a long period of absence, but ultimately this House must take the decision about the future of 5 million Africans. This is one of the last of our imperial responsibilities. We simply cannot hive it off to a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and whoever may be appointed his assessors. This is a matter for which this House has a very real responsibility.
If the Commission is to be credible there must be a release of all detainees, subject to this one factor: that those released must give an undertaking that they will neither indulge in nor advocate violence and that it is understood that if they do, they may run the risk, subject to suitable legal appeal, of further internment. I do not believe that we can have a civilised authoritative debate whilst many leading Africans are in prison.
I recall flying back with Dr. Banda after he came out of Gwelo gaol and saying: "I must congratulate you. You have now been through the university course which has to take place in all British colonies. You will now, of course, be the first Prime Minister of your country."
There must be equal broadcasting rights. I believe that an interim report from the Commission must be submitted to this House to say whether it is satisfied about the conditions in which it operates on behalf of this House. We want to know how it sees the task of informing African opinion on what is involved.
I believe that the Labour Government—I respect their reasons and good faith in the matter—were profoundly wrong, at the time of federation, to say that no district commissioner or officer could express any opinion on the merits of federation because this would be seen to be expressing a view for or against it. A job of political education has to be done here.
It has also to be made plain that many of those persons will find that they are out of the British Commonwealth if the proposals go through and they will want to know whether they are entitled to passports and to come to this country. What about some of those who have been loyal to this country and to the Crown? Are

509
they now to be swept aside? If we give them the right to opt for a British passport, we must see to it that we do not in this instance follow the lead of the Labour Government, backed by the majority of the Tory Party, but instead ensure that Africans or Europeans, having been given passports, do not subsequently find that they have been devalued, as with the Kenyan Asians.
There is a reference to the Commission receiving Government assistance. I think that the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) put it very concisely, and I shall not add to the argument save to say that it is very important that the interpreters who tell the Commission what various people in Rhodesia are saying should be seen to be independent, and should not be Government or police interpreters or tribal chief interpreters. They should be drawn from a panel recommended by the Churches. That will be another test of the credibility of the Commission.
If one considers the fourth principle, that of progress towards ending racial discrimination, what does one find? The Commission is to scrutinise the Land Tenure Act and it will make recommendations, but all that has to happen is for the Rhodesian Front to say that it does not accept its recommendations because it believes that there is another consideration which any Government would be obliged to regard as overriding. With any normal Government that might be reasonable, but the Government in Rhodesia have moved 100,000 Africans from their homes against their will. That was regarded as an overriding consideration.
The right hon. Gentleman has told us that the Epworth-Chishawasha moves will not take place until the Commission has reported, but he manifestly failed to get any undertaking in that regard. The White Paper says that in the right hon. Gentleman's view there were only two cases, and he and I could differ about the number of persons involved, but he conceded that there was a third, at Staple-ford, where even now many Africans are being told to prepare to leave the area in which they live so that it can be turned over to a wattle plantation. Are we really to have great faith in this Rhodesian Front which has an overriding veto and
510
which has the right to say that something is of an overriding character?
These are the people who only a few weeks ago were locked in a furious row with the Roman Catholic Church because the Church put forward the dangerous and revolutionary idea that it might have more than 6 per cent. of its pupils who were not of white skins. That proposal had the whole of the Rhodesian Front up in arms. That is the kind of test that one has to apply as to the nature of an overriding consideration when dealing with the Rhodesian Front.
Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: I understand the right hon. Gentleman's feelings about the movement of people off the land for agricultural reasons. He may not have worked, as I have, in agriculture in East Africa. I can tell him that on occasion there are many genuine reasons why people should be moved from an area. There can be unacceptably serious soil erosion, and unless the land is to be spoiled for all time certain interim action has to be taken to restore it to productive capacity.
Mr. Thorpe: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not think me offensive if I say that I understand the difficulties of a so-called liberal Tory. If this issue has proved anything, it is that there is no such animal. [An HON. MEMBER: "How many does the right hon. Gentleman represent?"I I represent two million people in this country. If we had a civilised electoral system, I should probably represent five million, and that is why the system is unlikely to be changed. I very much doubt whether the moving of the Tangwena tribe can be explained away in terms of preventing soil erosion or the need for good husbandry. The hon. Gentleman must nurse his conscience and not air it during my speech.
On the principle of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, I think that Mr. Smith is right. I think that he has got what he wanted, which was no African majority rule in his lifetime. He has got that, and I congratulate him. Whatever may have been said about the late Iain Macleod in Northern Rhodesia, the Foreign Secretary has been too unclever by half. He has been a pushover for the Rhodesian Front.
First, the qualifications for the higher roll are related to 6 per cent. of the European population, depending on what the

511
European population happens to be, but of course there will be mass immigration, so again we are to see this drawn out.
The money qualifications will be based on the value of money. It is almost inevitable that there will be a devaluation in Rhodesia after the agreement goes through and the Rhodesians want to attract money on the foreign exchanges. So again the qualifications will go down. At most, 2,000 Africans will be on the higher roll, and it will be 30 years before those on the higher roll elect as many Members of Parliament as can be elected at the moment by those on the lower roll, namely, eight.
What about guarantees against retrogressive amendments? Under the 1961 Constitution there could be no amendment of the entrenched clauses without a majority of each racial group voting separately. That was the proposal in 1961. All we have now is the Rhodesian Front saying that it does not intend to introduce or support for at least three years any retrogressive amendments of the constitution, but after the additional Africans are elected it will need only the support of back-benchers and the majority of African Members of Parliament, one of whom must be directly elected, for any amendment to the constitution to go through. That does not seem to be a solid base on which to build for the future. When I listened to the Foreign Secretary I began to think that the basis of his speech might be summed up as faith, hope and parity, and the greatest of these was hope. I wish that I had the same confidence.
What about the declaration of rights? In 1964 the Appeal Court of Rhodesia held that preventive detention was contrary to the 1961 Declaration of Human Rights. It is allowed under the 1969 constitution, and it will continue in operation as a result of this agreement. There is already a public security Bill in draft, which Mr. Lardner Burke has said will be introduced and passed through Parliament when time allows. Indeed, the Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960, against which Sir Robert Tredgold resigned, likewise will remain in force. How right the Prime Minister was to say that we were seeing the apparatus of a police state, and how little of it is being dismantled. Not only are all those provisions on the Statute Book, and not
512
only is there this flimsy hope for the future, but we are to pay for the privilege of legalising the régime. We are to pay £5 million a year, or £50 million over 10 years, with no economic control at all over that money.
I believe that sanctions were beginning to bite. I believe, too, that this country would have been entitled to go to the United Nations and say, "Do you take this seriously, or not? We are not for ever going on bearing the brunt in this, and we demand support from the rest of the world".
The most respectable argument used for Munich was that it gave us time to avert war and to have a period for preparation. All that this settlement is doing is mortgaging the future of the Africans to rid ourselves of a nagging problem. I believe it is a very sad last chapter in our imperial history.
If the Government were to say, "We want to rid ourselves of this problem; we want to throw in the towel", let them say so. If the Conservative Party wants to enjoy the same temporary euphoria which followed Munich, let it do so. But let it also realise that Mr. Smith, as a result of this agreement, has now got everything he wanted. He has got everything for which he did a U.D.I. He came to power to prevent effective partnership in his lifetime. He came to power in order to have emergency legislation to maintain that situation, and that he will do. He also has got a grant from this country to assist him in doing so.
I believe it would be churlish not to congratulate Mr. Smith and his illegal régime on what they have achieved from our Government. I only wish it were possible to congratulate our Government on having retained their own principles which they themselves enunciated. I fear that one cannot.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: I should inform the House that over 40 right hon. and hon. Members have indicated to me that they wish to catch my eye.
6.31 p.m.
Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: The Leader of the Liberal Party, the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe), has made what I regard as an over-critical and highly pessimistic speech

513
about this very difficult problem. I hope he will regard my speech as being a reasonable comment upon it.
In particular, I comment on his suggestion that a settlement on these lines would amount to "mortgaging the future of the Africans". I believe the opposite is true. The Leader of the Liberal Party was wrong, too, to suggest that the Government probably made up their minds before the terms were known. Indeed, it is an open secret that the negotiations were more than once on the verge of breakdown because of the absolute determination of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to pursue certain points which he regarded as being of fundamental importance.
I think the House will contrast the tone of the speech made by the Leader of the Liberal Party with the very exaggerated tone used by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in what I thought was an unconvincing and unconstructive speech. I would make this comment on his speech. I sincerely believe that the Labour Party, had they been in power, would have presented terms broadly like these to the House as being a considerable diplomatic triumph, in exactly the same way as they would have presented terms similar to those of the present Government for joining the Common Market. We certainly do not—
Mr. Ivor Richard rose—
Sir T. Beamish: I would prefer not to give way on this occasion.
The absurdity of the argument used by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East was best illustrated when he said that Mr. Smith went on television to claim that he had got "the best of the bargain". What did the right hon. Gentleman expect—that Mr. Smith would have said he got the worst of it? For heavens sake! I do not believe we could have hoped to get better terms. One of the reasons for this is that there is a legacy of distrust that has poisoned all previous attempts to solve this unhappy, unnecessary and damaging dispute. Over the years attitudes have hardened on both sides. This is a fact, and it is because I do not wish to be unnecessarily controversial that I shall not apportion blame.
514
Mutual confidence and understanding cannot be restored by the stroke of a pen or even by 12 months patient, quiet diplomacy which we have seen—something which is greatly to the credit of my Government. It may take many years to undo the harm that has been done. Let us try at least to speed the process of approaching this fresh situation in a mood of realism, patience and qualified optimism.
Much eloquence has been expended on the impossibility of placing any faith in the word of the Rhodesian Government. If this is to be a principle on which we conduct our foreign affairs, all I can say is that I can easily count on my fingers and toes those Governments with whom I would be prepared to enter into an agreement. It is about time we stopped having disarmament discussions with the Soviet Union, for one. I could give a great many more examples. Incidentally, it is the right hon. Member for Leeds, East who is keenest on a top level discussion with the Soviet Union about the future of the occupied countries. Apparently he places faith in the Kremlin. I certainly do not. But I am very much in favour of negotiations.
I want to speak about three things: first, the pressures which have made a settlement possible; second, the alternative if it is not accepted; third, the grounds for hope that these proposals can help Rhodesia in the way we all wish to see her take.
I have been a consistent supporter of trade sanctions, in spite of many misgivings. History did not encourage me to think they would be likely to be effective. Sanctions, if they hurt at all, are liable to bear most harshly on the poorer sections of the community, in this case the Rhodesian Africans. When I voted for sanctions I recognised these facts. It is also an inescapable fact that sanctions, with the active connivance of certain countries which pay lip service to them, are easily evaded.
For some time many have come to regard sanctions in Rhodesia's case as the symbol of our condemnation of illegality rather than as an effective weapon. I think they are wrong in this. Beneath the veneer of prosperity, sanctions have bitten very hard indeed. Sanctions have been popular with the "spivs"

515
who have been encouraged, and the middle men who have made a fat profit out of helping Rhodesia to carry on trading. Many of these people are in South Africa.
The chief impact of sanctions, however, has been on foreign exchange, causing a very severe balance of payments problem. Industry has suffered through restrictions on the import of machinery. Rhodesian Railways cannot replace their rolling stock or their engines. Exports have declined, and for all these and other reasons African unemployment, as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary emphasised, has steadily increased, and, in my opinion, if there were to be no settlement, would get considerably worse. This in turn, coupled with lack of capital investment in the tribal trust areas, has created a tense and dangerous situation, so that the Rhodesian, the British and the South African Governments are only too aware of the possibility of unrest, of which there is quite a lot beneath the surface, erupting into violence.
Apart from these pressures which Rhodesian business men have brought to their Government's notice with increasing anxiety and urgency, there is a strong and growing body of opinion which fears and dislikes what the Foreign Secretary called the "certain and rapid" trend towards apartheid if there is to be no settlement. I am not saying that any settlement would be better than nothing; certainly not. It would not be better than continued deadlock. Therefore, I must satisfy myself that this settlement is fair and the best that we can possibly get. I am not for one moment saying that it is perfect. Indeed, I share some of the criticisms that have been made of it. None the less, having carefully studied the White Paper, and having followed all of this tragic story from the beginning, I am in no doubt that the recommendations made to us are broadly consistent with the general intentions and the spirit of the five principles.
This settlement with all its imperfections is, as I have said, the best we can hope to get. It is yet another example of the best being the enemy of the good. One big alternative often put forward, and which will certainly be put forward later in this debate, is NIBMAR, but
516
that never has been a practical possibility, and anybody who recommends it knows perfectly well that that is true. If these terms were to be rejected, the prospects for the African majority in Rhodesia would be far worse, not better. The alternative to our accepting these terms, if they are acceptable in Rhodesia, is to watch Rhodesia move further and even more rapidly towards apartheid on the South African pattern with all its gross injustices and inhumanity—a system which, leaving morals aside, in the end simply will not work.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman give way?
Sir T. Beamish: I am sorry—no. I very often give way, as hon. Members know, but there are some occasions—and this is one—when many hon. Members wish to speak, and I think it better that one should without interruption deliver a carefully-thought-out speech.
Such a trend towards apartheid could, in my opinion, be reversed eventually only by bloodshed. If that is what is wanted by those who oppose this settlement—retribution for retribution's sake, through violence involving not only black and white Rhodesians but millions of people in other parts of Africa and far beyond—let them say so honestly.
What are the prospects of Rhodesia becoming a genuinely multi-racial country within a reasonable period on the basis of this proposed settlement? I confess that I am not over-sanguine, but I think that the prospects, for several reasons, are by no means dim. If it turns out that things work well, this settlement will make history. Other African countries hardly waited till the ink was dry before tearing up the constitutions on which Britain granted independence. In this case, however, I believe that there are some genuinely hopeful factors to take into account.
The first of these factors is world opinion. Rhodesia will remain in the limelight, subject to scrutiny by those nations which she hopes to regard as her friends and by those neighbours whom she regards at present, unhappily, as her potential enemies.
Second, there is the renewal of contacts at a national and personal level

517
with those nations whom white Rhodesians regard as their kith and kin. I have never believed that a country "sent to Coventry" is likely to progress in a liberal and civilised direction. Very much the reverse. That is entirely the wrong treatment. There is no greater critic of Communism in this House than I am, but I have always been in favour of the maximum trade with the Soviet Union and the maximum exchange of visits, and I believe that this approach should apply whether a totalitarian régime be of the extreme right or of the extreme left.
I am not referring here solely to British influence. The Rhodesia of 1971 is not the Rhodesia of 1965. This point has been touched upon, but I think that the size of the change is not fully realised. Here are a few facts. Three-quarters of the present white population over the age of 16 were born outside Rhodesia. Only just over half the total white population of all ages were living in Rhodesia ten years ago. Before 1965, nearly half Rhodesia's white immigrants came from Britain. Now only one-fifth do so, and an increasing number of their kith and kin are Italians, Germans, Portuguese, Scandinavians or Greeks.
The Rhodesian Government and people must come to terms with these and other changes in the population pattern. The ratio of black Rhodesians to white, which was 16 to one only a few years ago, is now 21 to one, or perhaps rather more. While the proportion of white Rhodesians over 45 is rising, the number of white Rhodesians under 45 is steadily falling.
Those are some of the facts of life which must affect the policies of the Rhodesian Government unless they are to lead the white minority headlong into self-destruction.
The third hopeful factor is that Rhodesia is extremely lucky in the African context in having a considerable number of well-trained, highly-educated and experienced civil servants, black and white, to run the country—and the more that black Africans contribute to this process, the better pleased I shall be. There is, therefore, a good prospect of Rhodesia having what many other African countries do not have, namely, an efficient administration, and this, after
518
all, is an essential prerequisite of orderly progress.
Those who cannot contemplate living under majority rule in Rhodesia have a choice: they can sell up and go elsewhere, and they have time to consider whether to do so. Those who stay must sweat it out, as the Europeans in Kenya, in Zambia and a good many other African countries have done—and, may I add, as many West Indians, Indians and Pakistanis are sweating it out in this country, putting up, in some cases, with discrimination and injustice in various guises but believing that in the course of time they will enjoy equal rights in practice as well as in law.
Whether the new settlement brings steady and smooth advance towards greater political power and responsibility for the African depends as much on the black man as on the white man. Many of us felt at the time that the refusal of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to help to work the 1961 constitution was a sad mistake, and we said so. I said so to both of them; I knew them both quite well at the time. It was a bitter disappointment to Sir Edgar Whitehead. Perhaps, with hindsight, one may say that we should have granted Rhodesia independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution, after the Central African Federation broke up. It might well have been that the advance towards majority rule would have been a great deal faster. But, as I say, that is only hindsight, and there were not many people who recommended that at the time, although there were certainly some.
Now, inevitably, the haul will be longer, and how long will partly depend, as I say, on the readiness of black Rhodesians to take maximum advantage of the prospects for advance which the new settlement undoubtedly offers.
Of course, the terms of the settlement have aroused a clamour of vituperation from certain quarters. This has come, in particular, from those directions and those people whose example and behaviour give them no moral right whatever to criticise, still less criticise in such excessive terms this genuine effort to find the best possible solution.
This is our problem and our responsibility. If we are satisfied that we have made every conceivable honest effort to

519
achieve the best attainable answer, our consciences are clear. Mine is. Let others examine their consciences when they criticise.
Let us by all means be constructively critical of the settlement. Let us continue to regard the five principles as idealistic guidelines for Rhodesia's development. Frankly, to be realistic, they are no more than that. So let us above all be realistic. Let us be constructive and sober in our judgment, and united in a determination to use every scrap of influence we have to start and keep Rhodesia on a course towards a just, multi-racial society, difficult as this is bound to be.
6.48 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Bottomley: I refute the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) that we on this side would have accepted a settlement similar to the one presented by the Foreign Secretary today. Perhaps I may refresh the hon. and gallant Gentleman's memory. At the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which he attended, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition committed the Government of the day to NIBMR, which the hon. and gallant Gentleman dislikes.
I agree very much with what was said by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane). If other countries had applied economic sanctions as Britain did, the Rhodesian problem would have been over by now. I believe that it is the application of financial sanctions which has compelled Mr. Smith to have a settlement now.
I have had a long association with Southern Rhodesia. I first went there in 1947, as a junior Minister, and I met a great Rhodesian leader, Sir Godfrey Huggins. I got into trouble for meeting him. Harold Laski wrote to Clem Attlee, who was Prime Minister at the time. I mention this because on the occasion of my last visit to Rhodesia Lord Malvern, as he then was, gave me a dinner and after it, shouting at the top of him voice, he said, and I quote:
"That bloody fool Smith has upset everything that I have tried to do."
By that he meant to enable the Europeans to have a future in Rhodesia. Mr.
520
Smith has made sure that that will not happen, and I am sorry about it.
If there is an author of the five principles, it is the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys). When I was Shadow Commonwealth Secretary at the time, we talked together about the five principles. But I can claim to be the first to make them public. As one who has lived with the five principles for a long time, I say that not one has been met in the present settlement.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has said that this is an act of faith. An act of faith with whom? Mr. Smith? I wonder whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recalls when he was Prime Minister and kindly invited me to dinner one night at No. 10 Downing Street, when Mr. Smith was the chief guest: we had just honoured the loyal toast when the Rhodesians proposed a toast to the Prime Minister of South Africa. To say the least, it was impolite and I thought it offensive.
I recall being told by Lord Butler as I left that dinner, "Do not trust that man Smith". He, too, had had dealings with him. I remember Colin Legum of the Observer warning me when I became Secretary of State not to trust "that man Smith". I pushed him aside and said that I liked to form my own judgments. It did not take long before I was able to do so. When Winston Churchill died and the Heads of State, the Prime Ministers and other leaders were invited to the funeral, I was deputed to tell the Commonwealth statesmen that the Queen was giving a lunch for all of them the next day. Smith ignored it. Smith had to be sent for, and when he came he behaved in a manner which would not be described as gentlemanly. By bitter experience, I learnt not to trust that man.
How did he treat his friends? Sir Roy Welensky himself acknowledged on one occasion that he had been double-crossed by Mr. Smith. Worst of all, how did he treat the Governor of Rhodesia, that man who served the Queen well and who, as many who have met him will know, is one of nature's gentlemen? Smith asked for emergency regulations to be signed and when the Governor asked, "It is not for a declaration of independence?", Smith said, "No, it is not". But those regulations were used

521
in effect for U.D.I. I can have no faith in that man.
I am disappointed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should say that this is an act of faith. I do not believe that faith can be kept with the Rhodesian Front. As has been said, the very declaration of independence, an illegal act, was dishonourable in itself. I can tell the House that it was from that time that I made up my mind that I would support NIBMR. I can also say that my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) and I privately agreed that if ever there were a settlement on Rhodesia on anything less than NIBMR, we would both resign from the Government.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the terms were fair and honourable. Honourable to whom? No-where in the document are there the words "majority rule". There is no suggestion that there should be immediate progress towards the removal of racial discrimination. The repressive legislation passed during the last few years remains. I will not deal with this repressive legislation, because I want to make my speech as short as I can, but many hon. Members know, from having seen some of the victims, what they have suffered.
The Commission is to be appointed by the Rhodesian Government itself. It will consider changing the race laws. It may be a Commission headed by a judge. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers it a great achievement that the Declaration of Human Rights is to be enforceable in the courts. He has more faith in Rhodesian justice than I have. The House already knows that my impression of the Chief Justice of Rhodesia is not good. However, another judge has been connected with the terms of the settlement.
Between the two visits of Lord Goodman to Rhodesia, Mr. Julian Greenfield came to this country. I refused to believe that he, as a constitutional authority, was not involved in the talks in some form or other. Mr. Julian Greenfield is the lawyer who, when a constitutional case came before the Rhodesian court, told the court—I paraphrase—"Unless you give the kind of decision required by the Government, you judges will be dismissed." The result can be imagined—the court gave a decision favourable to the régime.
522
I do not have all that confidence in either the Declaration of Human Rights or the Commission as long as the Rhodesian authorities are responsible for them.
The right hon. Gentleman claimed that the required immediate improvement in the political status of the African population had been reached. As he has said, many have found it difficult to follow the complicated procedures, but it appears to mean that if the franchise is to be given on an educational and income qualification, even with the improvement a person will have to earn £1,200 a year for two years, or own a house, or earn £800 a year and have four years of secondary education. I can tell the House that if these standards had been applied before the war, I and millions of others in this country could not have voted.
We all like to talk about the pioneers and founders of the Commonwealth and Empire. Credit must be given to Cecil Rhodes himself, who laid down a maxim which I challenge any hon. Member to contest. He said that there should be equal rights for every civilised man south of the Zambesi. He asked what a civilised man was and defined him as a man black or white having sufficient education to write his name and having some property, or who worked—in fact, who was not a loafer. On that basis, nearly every African in Rhodesia is entitled to vote.
By abandoning Rhodesia we do not disown the responsibility or solve the problem. We forfeit our right to speak in Africa, or perhaps anywhere else. It was Sir Roy Welensky who was reported in a newspaper the other day as having said:
"If it is not a fair settlement it will be settled here—by the Africans".
I believe that that is true. The Africans are now being controlled by a policy of intimidation and a system of paid informers. Broadcasting is strictly controlled by the Government and the Press is far from free. It is a police State. It is resulting in Africans who want to co-operate and be peaceful turning to violent means to achieve their objectives.
We all regret violence, which is near at home at the moment. I wonder how many know that since the troubles in Ulster began, the number of deaths in

523
Rhodesia has been double that in Ulster. Because of the censorship, we do not know about that. It is not known that hundreds of guerrillas are penetrating Rhodesia with Russian and Chinese arms. They are not co-ordinated yet, but in time they will be. We are assisting this violent movement to grow by not giving justice to the Africans.
I am genuinely concerned about the Europeans, particularly those liberal Europeans who were born in Rhodesia and know no other land. Rhodesia today is governed by a group of people who did not know that generation. I refer to the so-called President. He was a member of a reactionary movement in the borough where I now live. When I first met him he said to me: "You do not know me, but I know you. When you were Mayor of Walthamstow, I was a solicitor at the top of the road." And how reactionary he was then! He went out to Southern Rhodesia after I had been there. These are the kind of people who are in control of Rhodesia—not the liberal-minded ones who help to build up the country and for whom we should have concern. By the policy being followed today, we are making the situation precarious for Europeans of that kind and their families.
Over the years we have tried to bring a formerly dependent group of countries into a great organisation. We call it the Commonwealth. I am proud of the Commonwealth and I want it to continue. It comprises people of every race, colour and creed, from every continent, who have joined in complete equality and mutual trust to work in many areas for the benefit of all.
To accept a settlement with Rhodesia on anything less than equality is to undermine the very basis on which the Commonwealth is established. If we accept the suggestion made by the Foreign Secretary, it will be an affront to many of its members and to ourselves it will mean a lowering of our own moral standards. It makes nonsense of the work of successive Governments of this country which have done so much to uphold human dignity and promote equality in the human family. I say to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that I am disappointed that his name should be associated with it. It is a sad and ignoble way to end an Empire.
7.2 p.m.
Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler: I had not expected to be called at this moment. I was still reflecting on a final point of my speech, but I am nevertheless grateful for being called to speak.
I yield to no one in my concern for the well-being of Africans. I pay tribute to Lord Goodman and my right hon. Friend in having achieved agreement on possible terms for a settlement. That in itself is significant, even if, in the final analysis, it is not acceptable to the Rhodesian people. It is significant because it is a considerable advance over the situation which has obtained during the last four or five years in which there has been no consultation between the illegal regime and the British Government. I believe that, in this situation, any sign of movement is welcome.
I am reassured particularly, although I do not feel that the terms are ideal in any way, that the final decision whether those terms are acceptable will lie with the Rhodesian people in the first place, as a result of their views being made known to the Commission, and secondly through an act of Rhodesian Members of Parliament in the Rhodesian Parliament. I welcome in general terms the fact that we are in regular contact with the illegal regime, working to find a solution to the problem which has proved so intractable over the most recent years.
There are one or two points that bear looking at closely. First, we should consider the well-being of Africans as a whole, not only the well-being of those who have had the advantages of a good education and of practice in the political arts. We should think of many hundreds of thousands of simple African people, striving to improve their not particularly good standards of living, in villages scattered through Rhodesia.
It is with these simple ordinary country folk that I am most concerned. I believe that sanctions have hit them particularly hard. We have heard from my right hon. Friend the extent to which African unemployment has grown. I recognise, as do many others on this side of the House, that sanctions have played a part in enabling my right hon. Friend to agree with Mr. Smith on proposals for a settlement.

525
Equally, I feel that there is a period in time beyond which sanctions would cease to have an effect in enabling Mr. Smith to come to terms with us. We have reached that optimum moment now. It is possible that, after Christmas, the United States will take the decision to get its supplies of chrome from Rhodesia and, that decision having been taken, we would see a rapidly accelerating breakdown of international sanctions. I believe that, as a result of this, we are entitled to make the judgment that this is the moment at which the effect of sanctions is most likely to result in the best possible solution in the interest of African population as a whole.
I turn briefly to one or two queries in respect of the qualification whereby Africans come on to the higher roll and the lower roll. It occurs to me that, first of all, the income qualifications are pretty high. I ask the Minister, when he winds up the debate this evening, to tell us by what methods the income of Africans will be assessed. Will the assessment be made by the Rhodesian Department of Revenue? We should be told the answer to that question. We must be sure in our minds that the assessments, be they made by an African or by a European, will be made on a similar basis for both African and European. I understand that there is a possibility of an inflation provision being introduced which will apply to the income qualifications. If that is so, on what basis will the rate of inflation be assessed, and how will it be applied to changes in the income qualification for the electoral rolls?
We should have reassurances on how property values will be established. Will this be done by public valuation? Will the same valuer establish the value of property owned by both Africans and Europeans? It is important that we should have answers to these questions, and I look for assurances this evening.
I turn to aid. My right hon. Friend has been consistent over the years in saying that it would be Britain's willingness to give financial assistance for the education of Africans that would become a major factor in enabling Africans to qualify for the electoral roll. The Government have announced that £50 million will be spent over 10 years, but, if I understood my right hon. Friend aright, a proportion of that will be spent
526
on the vital work of stopping soil erosion and improving the standards of agriculture in the tribal trust areas.
I regret that the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) is not here. He referred to my remarks earlier. There is genuinely a serious problem of soil erosion which can result from the overpopulation of small areas, or even quite large areas of land. This can result from over-intensive development and is a common problem in many parts of the world where the system of agriculture is principally that of peasant farming.
I welcome the fact that my right hon. Friend has said that sums of money will be spent to enable large numbers of African farmers to settle permanently on land and to improve the standard of agriculture of the land on which they settle. This is very important, but if that sort of task is to be undertaken in the same way as it was undertaken by the British Government in the early years of the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya it will cost a great deal of money.
Similarly, if we are to give technical assistance to develop educational opportunities for engineers and so on, that, too, will cost a great deal of money. If all that assistance has to come out of the total of £50 million which the Government are to make available over a period of 10 years, it follows that there will be a considerably reduced amount of money available for secondary education. I should like to know what proportion of the total aid will be devoted to secondary education, particularly as the secondary education qualification is an important part of the various alternative qualifications to the African rolls.
7.12 p.m.
Miss Joan Lestor: Underlying the presentation of this settlement are two assumptions to which I want to devote most of my remarks. The first is that Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith and his party, can be diverted from the path of apartheid, to which the Foreign Secretary has told us they are dedicated, by the signing of a piece of paper which purports to legislate Ian Smith and his Government finally out of existence. The second assumption is that the economic development in Southern Rhodesia which undoubtedly will be enhanced by this settlement will lead to political, economic

527
and social advance for the black African. On those two assumptions the whole of the settlement rests.
Before dealing with them I want to echo what the leader of the Liberal Party and others have said about the strict principle and the importance of the test of acceptability. During the period of this test we have been told that normal political activities will be permitted. What constitutes normal political activities in a country in which the parties that appeal to the majority are banned? I am particularly concerned in another capacity with the test of acceptability. Unless African nationalist leaders are allowed to operate freely and express their political views, unless they are released from detention and restriction to participate in the great debate and argument that must take place over these principles, the test of acceptability will be meaningless. We have had no assurance on this point.
Although the right hon. Gentleman has said that 31 of the detainees have been released, they are not completely released from restriction and there has been absolutely no guarantee that they will be free to take part in opposing and campaigning on the whole question of these principles. The test of acceptability is one of the most vital principles in the whole operation and I hope that we will be enlightened further and may know why the right hon. Gentleman did not insist on these things when he negotiated the settlement.
We have been told, sadly, by the Foreign Secretary that Smith and his party are, to say the least, apartheid-minded and that if we did not have the settlement he has told us that, sadly, Southern Rhodesia would continue on the path that it has followed since U.D.I., that is unimpeded progress towards apatheid. He asked us to study these terms for a settlement, but what we ought to be studying is past history and the present realities of power. All that the right hon. Gentleman has said to-night has made it clear that he has been unable to convince Ian Smith to grant genuine African advance and Ian Smith has made it perfectly clear that he is not prepared to grant genuine African advance.
Instead Ian Smith has shown us, and nothing the right hon. Gentleman has
528
said has shown us differently, that he has agreed to make apparent concessions which will appear to offer some political advance to Africans. The right hon. Gentleman has not said that this guarantees anything, that it is even within the five principles, because they had a degree of entrenchment at the back of them. He has said that it is an act of faith. It gives us a chance, he says, but in my view it is a chance, on the basis of what he has said, that I am not prepared to take. No one can genuinely get up and say, "If we do not do this we will have apartheid", because this man and his party believe in apartheid. That is why there was U.D.I. No one can say," If he signs this piece of paper he will change his mind and we will not have apartheid." His party was determined to save Rhodesia from multi-racialism, let alone majority rule, and there has been no indication from anything said to-night that that has changed.
When the deal is completed and the independence of Southern Rhodesia legalised, apartheid in Southern Rhodesia will not be halted. It will be accelerated and Britain will have helped with this acceleration. Not only is Southern Rhodesia apartheid-minded, as we have all seen, and this has not been denied by the Foreign Secretary—the Smith régime has been marching steadily along that road—but the right hon. Gentleman has not been able to get out of Smith a single concession, a single way of repealing one of these Acts while he has been making the settlement. The apartheid will continue. If the Foreign Secretary knows his history, he will know that people who believe in apartheid are not deterred by constitutions.
The right hon. Gentleman said that we did not want Southern Rhodesia to follow the path of South Africa. I have been reading the debate of 1909, the speeches by people like Mr. Balfour, who said that the Constitution that became law in 1910 would ultimately lead to liberation and freedom for the Africans in South Africa. What happened? What is the history of South Africa? When the South African Constitution was drawn up, South Africa got self-government in 1910 and it was fully expected by all those who pushed it through that the white liberalism of the Cape would

529
be extended to the rest of the country. It took exactly 25 years before this was eroded and the British Government, which had talked about entrenched clauses and protection, stood by and was unable to do anything about it. The terrifying thing today about South Africa is that many right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite defend what has been taking place there.
The tragedy is that after the removal of the Cape coloureds from the roll in South Africa, it took 20 years to establish apartheid firmly. I do not think that apartheid is anything to laugh about, as the Foreign Secretary apparently thinks. The reason it took 20 years to establish apartheid was this—and it is the basic contradiction in the argument that if there is economic advance in Southern Rhodesia there will be economic, social and political advancement for the Africans. Economic advancement in South Africa was needed in order to provide the tool whereby apartheid could be endorsed and enhanced. Apartheid in South Africa is not weaker but stronger than it has ever been. Year after year more apartheid legislation is passed as the South African economy gets stronger. This is what will hapen in Southern Rhodesia.
An hon. Member opposite who spoke about the pattern of immigration in South Africa made a vital point against himself. We have seen what has happened in the investment and business world there. White immigration will increase in Southern Rhodesia. When some hon. Members opposite talk about political rights and other rights in Southern Rhodesia, give examples of the immigration pattern and point out how many of the white people in power in Southern Rhodesia were not born there but are immigrants, I am reminded that their criticisms of immigrants in this country are not the same when it comes to immigrants in Southern Rhodesia. It is the immigrants in Southern Rhodesia in whom power is to be vested at the expense of the indigenous population and of those who were born there. I believe in equal rights for all immigrants and non-immigrants in this country and in Southern Rhodesia, and it is very strange justice when some hon Members oppo-
530
site are contemptuous and critical of immigrants in this country but are prepared to advance a different argument in respect of white immigrants in Southern Rhodesia.
When those of us who are interested in South Africa and in the advancement of the African go there, we see different things and different people. When people say that advancement under Ian Smith, as under Vorster, will lead to freedom for and the political and economic advancement of the African, I wonder what they have seen in the apartheid State of South Africa. I have recently been there and I have seen the operation of the pass laws. I have seen how a black or brown man or woman is prosecuted under the pass laws once every 50 seconds every day of the year, and the situation is getting worse. Apartheid is being strengthened because South Africa can now afford to strengthen it.
We have seen what has happened when people like the Dean of Johannesburg condemn, as any Christian should, what is taking place there. But this is what will happen in Southern Rhodesia if the proposed deal goes through, because the deal offers nothing for the African except the removal of any hope that he had that Britain would recognise the dilemma in which she has placed him and would be prepared to save him from the white supremacy régime there.
I wonder whether the Foreign Secretary has any idea of the effect that it had on some of us to see him riding round Salisbury in a sanctions-breaking car supplied by the Smith régime. This showed insensitivity which I find very hard to understand. I should have thought that when the Foreign Secretary was discussing how he could make a deal with Smith, he would not want to be identified with the breaking of sanctions or with people who were breaking sanctions.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Would the hon. Lady tell me how I could have ridden round Salisbury in a British car?
Miss Lestor: The Foreign Secretary has made my point. When we make deals with people like Ian Smith, we are bound to live by their rules. That is what the right hon. Gentleman did, and it was not missed in Africa.
I said at the beginning of my speech that there were two assumptions on which

531
the deal was based, leaving aside the terms of acceptability. One was the belief that a man dedicated to apartheid, as the Foreign Secretary says lan Smith is, will legislate himself out of existence and back on the road to equality. The second was the assumption of economic advancement, which I believe is a nonsense and the Foreign Secretary knows it is a nonsense.
If and when this deal goes through, the British Government will have taken a decisive step towards identifying Britain with those who believe that political responsibility in Southern Rhodesia is the right of those people with white skins against the belief which, in my view, has been the basic principle of British political history since Magna Carta, namely, that every citizen has the right to an equal share in forming the character of his own society. If we in Britain deny the African that right, we shall bear the responsibility for paving the way for whatever may happen in Southern Rhodesia. I am afraid that it is our children who will suffer because of this settlement.
7.27 p.m.
Mr. Evelyn King: It is seven years since the unilateral declaration of independence and since we began to debate Rhodesia in that context, and we get near, whether we want it or not, the end of the road. It is time to assess the nature and quality of British statesmanship as conducted by more than one party in reaching the situation in which we now find ourselves.
The hon. Lady the Member for Eton and Slough (Miss Lestor) referred to the test of acceptability. If she meant, as I hope, that it was desirable that the Commission should show every sign of impartiality and should fulfil the conditions she enumerated, I wholly accept her statement. However, if she meant, as she might have meant, that those conditions should have been imposed by my right hon Friend the Foreign Secretary before he left Rhodesia, that is a different matter because, even in the context of her approach, it is normal and natural to leave the Commission to decide its own procedure. I understand that my right hon. Friend obtained an assurance from the Rhodesian Government that every facility would be given to the Commis-
532
sion. I hope that the facilities offered will include the sort of facilities which the hon. Lady has in mind. But that single, narrow point should not influence our vote tonight, because that is a matter which the Commission will decide itself.
I should like to think—and I may have said this before in speeches on Rhodesia—that there was not so great a divergence between hon. Members opposite and we on this side of the House as sometimes supposed. May we not at least agree with one another that our objective, the easing of race relations, and a generally more liberal approach, is the same, and that what we differ about is the method? There are those, I know, on the other side of the House who think that success is best attained—to use a metaphor—by banging the other side on the head. There are those on this side who think a more rational and negotiated approach is likely to have better and quicker results. That is the difference between us.
Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have spent a good deal of time tonight explaining to us where the Rhodesian Government have in the past been wrong and where they are likely to go on being wrong. If it is any consolation to anybody, I will accept all that straightaway, but this is the British Parliament, and it is no bad thing sometimes if, in a spirit of humility, we consider not only where Rhodesia went wrong but also where, in the last seven years, Britain went wrong. I think that that possibly may be a more helpful exercise. I will deal first in a little detail, and then in more general terms, with these errors.
First, in detail, rightly or wrongly we gave to Rhodesia internal independence in 1923, when no Member of this House now was present. But it was done, and I would doubt whether one could think, of Rhodesia or any other State in Africa, or indeed in the world, that it is a practicable thing to withdraw even some portion of independence, as we sought to do, once that independence has been granted. That was error number one.
Then we came to the blunder of taking the issue to the United Nations. I would argue, and I shall not spare my own side any more than the other side, my belief that it was a blunder to take this issue to the United Nations. I do not say this

533
on my own authority. Sir Lionel Heald and other distinguished lawyers have said the same thing. The United Nations acted illegally in that they declared to be a threat to peace an action of an independent State which, on their own argument, was not in fact independent. Whether or not that was legally wrong, they certainly committed another legal wrong, supported by the British Government, when they denied to that State, directly contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the right even to make its own defence before the United Nations Organisation.
These are minor wrongs, and now I come to the greater wrongs. Here I speak of what I have seen and learned when I have been in Rhodesia.
I think that most right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House would concede that the name of Great Britain, among both Africans and Europeans, almost equally, but perhaps especially so a year or two ago, did not stand high. Africans resented—it is hardly in dispute—what they thought the Labour Party had done to them. Europeans resented equally, though for quite different reasons, no doubt, the way in which Britain and this Parliament was treating Rhodesia. Why was that? The fundamental reason, and I think it is important, was that they were convinced that what we were doing was not being done, nor even being attempted, in the interests of Rhodesia itself. The constant charge was, "Great Britain is interested in obtaining votes at the United Nations; Great Britain is interested in her reputation among other African leaders, or interested in pacifying some other African personality; Great Britain has no interest in the political or economic state of Rhodesia, and it is not in the interests of us as a people that Great Britain is acting." This is a serious charge, but I state it as a view held alike by Africans and Europeans and, I sometimes think, almost more by Africans than by Europeans. And that was our first psychological blunder.
The second charge I would bring against British Parliaments and the British Government now and in the past—and here I make no particular distinction of date—is the fact is that up to about 1955 we were an African Power. We had soldiers, we had bases, we had
534
inmmense influence, throughout the Continent of Africa, from north to south. By the time this thing came to a head we had not a single solider stationed in Africa, we had not a naval base, and yet this House thought that by some extraordinary means it could dictate events in central Africa. If all that has happened has taught us nothing else, I hope it has taught us that this was a fallacy.
Nor do I apply the argument particularly to Rhodesia. It is the case that independence has been given to every State in Africa. Independence is independence. The suggestion that Britain in Tanzania, Zambia, or Rhodesia, can act as a great African Power able to dictate its will is an illusion. It is an illusion that I hope we shed for all time. It is a fundamental illusion.
One word on an allied subject. I have returned, having been fortunate enough recently to visit Africa, where I was for three or four weeks. In the time I was abroad I had the opportunity to see three Heads of Commonwealth States. It is commonly said that if the form of action which my right hon. Friend recommended to the House he pursued, then we shall incur the enmity of the Commonwealth. This statement is not untrue. I do not believe that hon. Members who take that line are yet sufficiently familiar with the second wind of change which is sweeping across Africa.—[An HON. MEMBER: "Name the State."]—I will gladly do so. I was in Cyprus and I have seen Archbishop Makarios. I put to him a question which I put to others: "If there is an agreement following my right hon. Friend's negotiations with Rhodesia", I said to him, "may I ask you whether you would feel in any sense bound to be critical of it?" He said clearly, "There are theoretical objections and I think also practical difficulties. It is not for us to urge that British troops should be stationed on former colonial soil. If agreement were reached I for one would be happy to vote what the British Government recommend without comment.
Before I went to Cyprus I was in Uganda, where I had an interview with General Amin. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It is all very well for hon. Gentlemen opposite to laugh. That is the second State whose Head I visited. It is no good the hon. Members laughing at the words of Heads of State whom they do not

535
appreciate, and regarding highly the words of Heads of State whom they happen to admire. I talked to three Heads of State, all of whom spoke to me in perfect freedom, giving expressions of opinion which I thought would be worth while now recalling.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Did the hon. Member speak to the more politically aware Foreign Secretary of President Amin who would have given a very different opinion about Uganda's reaction?
Mr. King: I think the suggestion that the Foreign Secretary and the Head of a foreign State are at loggerheads is hardly worthy of the hon. Gentleman. I must assume that a Head of State is capable of expressing his own opinion, the more so when that opinion was expressed in the presence of a number of officials of the Ministry to which the hon. Member refers.
I put to him the same question. He said, "My first duty is to my own people." He went on, "Increasingly in Africa you will find that Heads of State who in the past have been all too willing to make excursions into foreign affairs are concerned with the welfare of their own people." He went on to say, and to say with emphasis--he spoke of Pakistan and India at the end of our talk" These things are not my particular concern. If Britain comes to an agreement with Rhodesia, Uganda will have little to say. My concern is to raise the economic standards of my people." He went on to pay tribute—and this surprised me—to the work done by British district commissioners in Uganda in the past, and to the strength which the British connection had given to his country.
The third Head of State I met was Dr. Banda—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I expected that noise. Dr. Banda specifically asked me to say this in the British House of Commons. As I was his guest. I think I have the right to do so, and hon. Members may put on it what value they like. I referred first to the Continent of Africa. Dr. Banda asked for a map, ran his finger over it and said, "There is no such Continent; it does not exist. In the north are Arabs, in the south are Africans. If my grandfather were to see an African embracing an Arab he would be horrified. The Arabs sold Africans
536
into slavery." Dr. Banda went on to say that he had lived in South Africa, and he spoke of Rhodesia. He said, "Of course things that are wrong go on there, but the solution is dialogue. Brutality is found not just in South Africa or Rhodesia but in the Sudan, where Africans are driven into huts and the huts are set fire to and riddled with machine gun bullets. The world hears nothing of this. The world is obsessed with South Africa and Rhodesia." His view was that dialogue was the way to bring about changes—
Mr. Faulds: In these conversations, did Dr. Banda mention the well-listed number of politically motivated murders for which he has given orders?
Mr. King: That is not a question I would answer even if I could. If the hon. Gentleman were to ask hon. Members of his own party who have been with delegations to Malawi, I do not think they would support that charge.
Mr. James Johnson: Will the hon. Gentleman inform the House how many former Cabinet Ministers who have been exiled would be hanged on gallows in Malawi if they came back?
Mr. King: I do not follow the point of the question. What I assume the hon. Gentleman to be arguing is that States with African rulers are dictatorships. If that is the point of his argument, what is he grumbling about over Rhodesia?
To get back to something a little less controversial, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite have spent a lot of time being critical of what is happening in Rhodesia. If independence is conferred upon Rhodesia, as independence has been conferred on every other African State, that independence will be permanent. The suggestion made in speech after speech that after independence, in 1980 or 1990, Great Britain can interfere is an Alice-in-Wonderland suggestion.
I was bewildered when the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) seriously discussed what would happen in 2014. I do not claim the mantle of a prophet. Does any hon. Member know what will happen in England in 2014? I was not surprised to hear one of my hon. Friends say, "I am going to where

537
they debate better, to the House of Lords". The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition once said that a week in politics was a long time. What then of a 40-year prophecy? What has happened to the principle that no Parliament can bind a future Parliament? If that be true in Britain, and it is, it is equally true in Rhodesia. All we can hope to do is to try to get the country, for which in the past we had responsibility, off to a good start. The suggestion that we can bind that country for 30 or 40 years ahead is a piece of nonsense, as everyone knows in his heart.
The hon. Member for Eton and Slough argued, rightly, that in the last 10 years Rhodesia had moved to the right. Many of us remember Rhodesia in the days when there was a liberal tradition carried through from Garfield Todd, Whitehead and Winston Field to Ian Smith. We observe that as British pressure has increased Rhodesia has moved further and further to the right. That is exactly what any intelligent diplomat would prophesy. What we are doing now is taking Rhodesia out of the situation in which no man dare criticise the Government for fear of being thought to be disloyal. When the centre of gravity is in Rhodesia and not in London, a liberal and progressive party has the chance to emerge. It is our hope and prayer that that will happen. No one in this House can prophesy with certainty what will happen, but that is an intelligent and statesmanlike approach. I wish we had made it 10 years ago.
7.47 p.m.
Mr. John Stonehouse: It is now clear that the failure to dispatch troops to Salisbury when independence was declared was a grave miscalculation. Had we acted quickly at that time, the revolt might have collapsed like a house of cards.
When I was at the independence celebration in Zambia in 1964, I met many of the military commanders who were then being transferred to the Zambian forces who knew their counterparts in Rhodesia, men who had served in the British Army. They told me that in the event of a declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia, the troops, and certainly the officers, in Southern Rhodesia would be in two minds which
538
authority to follow. It was believed that the majority would refuse to accept orders from an illegal régime. It is a sad reflection on us when we look back on the events of 1965 that if the revolt had been conducted by 200,000 blacks in the middle of five million white, there would have been no doubt about the action which would have been taken by the United Kingdom Administration. We should have acted decisively and quickly against such a régime.
It was assumed at that time that sanctions would have such a severe effect on the Rhodesian economy that the rebel régime would be brought to heel within a short time. That has been shown to be a false hope, because sanctions have not been very effective. Politically the régime has prospered and economically the situation for the whites, but not for the blacks, is not so bad. We hear news from the United States and other countries of the gradual dismantling of the sanctions that were imposed at the suggestion of the United Kingdom.
This is a very sad day for Britain. We are now acknowledging the capitulation of the United Kingdom to a rebel régime which has acted in defiance of a Constitution and the Queen during the last six years. This is the first time since the founding of the United States of America that a rebel régime has received independence from the United Kingdom. It is over half a century since a minority régime received power from Britain; it was done legally then and everybody knows the result.
Every fair-minded Member on the Conservative benches must regret the fact that South Africa was given independence over 50 years ago. Since that time there has been a gradual development of white power there which uses the black majority as a cheap source of labour and denies the black majority any political or human rights. What is happening in Southern Rhodesia now is exactly the same as has happened in South Africa throughout the past half century. This capitulation of the United Kingdom is an historic event because it is the first time in British history that we have capitulated to a rebel régime representing only a minority in such a State.
There has been talk about an agreement between the United Kingdom and

539
Rhodesia. But it is not an agreement between the people of the United Kingdom and the people of Zimbabwe. The people of Zimbabwe have not yet been consulted, and so the Commission which is being set up will not be properly consulted. It will not even be consulted on the criteria laid down by the Foreign Secretary when he was Prime Minister in 1964. There will not be a referendum and the people will not be consulted in that way. It will be a collection of views, but it will not be an honest representation of views.
This is an agreement between a Conservative Government who are anxious to get this problem off their back because they have other things to deal with—they want to get into Europe, and so on. This has been negotiation with a tiny minority of people in Rhodesia amounting to only 200,000 people, most of whom are immigrants and very few of whom were born in Rhodesia. We are negotiating and concluding an agreement with a people whose population is the size of the population of Bournemouth, with an electorate of 80,000—only slightly larger than one of our British constituencies. It is ludicrous for us in the 1970s to expect the transfer of power in such a way to stand the test of time. What we are doing is transferring power to a State based not only on racial discrimination but also on class exploitation.
The white minority in Rhodesia uses its political power to grant to the white minority economic privileges over the exploited majority. We all know about the Land Tenure Act, which allocates over half the land area to less than 5 per cent. of the population. We also know about job discrimination which allows a white artisan who does the same job as a black man to receive on average 10 times what the black man receives. Class discrimination plays a large part in the system, and this will enhance the rule of the whites in Rhodesia because they have a vested interest to pursue.
In this situation we should not talk about giving votes to people who happen to have a high income. We should be talking of giving votes to the dispossessed people since this would be the only way to redress the wrong done against them.
540
I have been concerned for the lives and safety of the white majority in Rhodesia. In 1959, when I visited Salisbury and Bulawayo, I spoke to African leaders about the need to recognise that whites wanted to stay in Rhodesia and to help in partnership with the black majority. They accepted that and were willing to embrace the concept of racial equality by allowing whites to take their place. What they did not want was exploitation.
When I made one or two speeches to audiences on that there, I was astounded by the reaction of the ordinary people to this concept of racial amity between white and black. I was also struck by the attitude of liberal whites, including Members of Parliament in Southern Rhodesia, who told me on that visit how much they applauded this approach to the problem. By trying to bring whites and blacks together, we sought to recognise that one Rhodesia could mean that there was enough room for both.
What I regret about this farce of an agreement is that it will make the situation of the whites in Rhodesia much more dangerous in future. Reference has been made to the development of the situation in other countries in Africa Let us reflect that in countries where we have had an orderly transfer of power to the black majority—for example, in Kenya and Zambia where there were large minorities of whites—there was a great deal of foreboding before it took place. Today, however, a white person is more secure when walking the streets of Nairobi, Lusaka or Ndola at night than is a white person when walking the streets of New York, Chicago or Los Angeles.
Mr. Evelyn King: I largely accept what the hon. Gentleman says but would he concede that of all the constitutions painfully negotiated with independent Africa, not a single one has lasted five years?
Mr. Stonehouse: Yes, but the constitutions have been changed by Governments which have been elected by the majority of the people and which have the support of that majority. Nobody attempts to claim that the Government of Rhodesia reflects the majority. It may reflect a majority of the tiny minority of whites but it does not reflect the views of five million people in the population.

541
This is not an agreement which settles the future of Rhodesia. It is simply that the British Government, because they have other things on their mind, are withdrawing from their responsibilities in this area. The real agreement will have to come later between the whites who remain in Rhodesia and the African majority. The victory of the rebel Smith régime makes it more likely that agreement will be reached only after a sea of violence in which many white as well as black lives will be lost.
7.58 p.m.
Sir George Sinclair: It seems just possible that my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and his team may have broken a log jam in Rhodesia, and I congratulate them on that achievement. But it is difficult to forecast what results may follow. I share many of the doubts and worries which were expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane).
Since U.D.I. in Rhodesia there has been a sustained and steady movement towards apartheid. I believe that that has not been due to sanctions. It has been due to the policies of those who hold rule in Rhodesia.
What, then, are the factors which have led Mr. Ian Smith and his Cabinet to accept an agreement which should mean a reversal of this movement and which should set in train and sustain progress towards African majority rule?
There is little doubt in my mind that sanctions have been the major influence. Their main effects have been a reduction of external investment, a reduction of external trade, political isolation, dangerous African unemployment in the tribal areas, and a halt in the kind of immigration favoured by the Rhodesian Front. These effects and the prospects of their continuing have, I suggest, been the decisive factor.
All these factors could vanish once Rhodesia became legally independent and free from sanctions. Are there, then, other factors which will continue after sanctions and which might influence the independent Rhodesian Government to make good progress in the direction described in the agreement?
It has been argued that Mr. Ian Smith and his Government wish to go no further in the direction of apartheid. It is said
542
that they do not wish to be swamped by land-hungry Afrikaaners and to be dominated by them and eventually by the South African Government. We hear that internal security is now becoming a major worry, especially for those living and working in the rural areas. It is difficult to forecast what combination of these factors and what new ones will influence Rhodesian Governments in favour of carrying out the current proposals or of frustrating them.
What will make such a Government and their successors judge that their long-term interests lie in seeing these proposals through to African majority rule within a reasonable time? Perhaps the main and growing influence will be the African political pressures within Rhodesia and from elsewhere in the continent and other pressures from outside. These could be a major factor. But we must recognise that they could lead an independent Rhodesian Government in one of two directions: to increase the pace towards majority rule, or to attempt to slow the pace.
If Mr. Smith and his Cabinet wish to imrove the prospect that Africans will accept these proposals, I believe that they will need to give some clear indication now, before the consultation of African opinion, that they are determined to set off on the new course outlined in the proposals. Certainly some of the more irksome measures of discrimination and the announcement that the proposal to remove two African mission settlements to other areas under the Land Tenure Act should be dropped if they wish to gain credence.
I deal now with the Commission which is to test African opinion. It is essential that Africans in Rhodesia should feel that the members of the Commission will be able to understand their views and their feelings. This is important also for us in this House and for world opinion.
As announced so far, the membership of the Commission is a long way from meeting this need. But I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has said that he will try to ensure a better balance in the Commission. In view of what has happened about it, I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to announce a membership of at least five instead of four

543
to restore the balance and to give the Commission more credibility. Certainly I believe that an African should be included.
In the end, the three factors which will weigh most with Rhodesian Africans and their leaders in judging this issue are their estimates of the time that it will take to reach African majority rule, their confidence that discrimination will be abolished, especially in access to jobs of all ranges for which they may become qualified, and changes in the Land Tenure Act which will ensure their access to good land, with security of tenure.
In my view, if a Government based on the white community in Rhodesia has the will to implement these proposals fully, there is just enough in them to give some hope that Africans in Rhodesia may benefit and make reasonable progress to majority rule.
I believe that these proposals should be put to the Africans. Their answer will depend on their own assessment of whether they are likely to achieve majority rule more quickly by these proposals and by the pressures that they will hope to exert later to speed the process, or by taking the risk of rejecting the proposals and relying on their own strength and the help of the outside world.
I believe that it is better to put these proposals to Rhodesian Africans now rather than to reject them tonight. It is for that reason, in spite of all my worries and doubts, that I shall support the Government in the Division Lobby.
8.7 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: Throughout these last six years, I have been a lonely voice in my party upon this issue. Recently I have been reinforced by Lord Goodman. We are still a small minority, but I think that we happen to be the two who know most about Rhodesia.
From the beginning, I said that sanctions would be counter-effective in dealing with the Rhodesian Front and that they would hang round our necks like a dead chicken of which we should find it difficut to rid ourselves. This agreement provides us with an opportunity to get rid of that chicken, and it is a good deal better than I had expected it would be.
544
It has been attacked on various grounds. One is that it is useless to have an agreement with Mr. Smith because it is unenforceable and depends on Mr. Smith's good will. That argument is more available to the Liberal Party than it is to the Labor Party, because it applied with equal force to "Tiger" and "Fearless".
I believe that hon. Members have always been under a delusion about its enforceability. I informed the Leader of the Liberal Party that I intended to refer to him. I remember his suggesting that we should enforce our will upon Rhodesia by bombing her railway lines. I remember referring to a passage in the Rand Research on the Cost Effectiveness of Operations of War. The final one dealt with was bombing railways. It said:
"As far as we can ascertain, the cost of making the hole exceeds by 600 times the cost of filling it up again."
The right hon. Gentleman's latest suggestion is that, to be effective, a sovereign base should enforce any agreement. How one uses a sovereign base, which is separated by a thousand miles of alien soil from the sea and by 5,000 miles of alien soil from the nearest airfield, I do not know. At any rate, I should have thought that a sovereign base would have been eminently acceptable to Mr. Smith. After all, it would be a source of exchange and an admirable hostage if ever he had any difficulty with us. After all, he would only have to cut off the water supply to reduce it.
The idea that at any point we were in a position to exercise force over communications through a thousand miles of someone else's territory was always militarily fantastic. We have never been in a position to do other than negotiate. We have always been powerless.
Having put that aspect out of the way, we should look at this agreement realising that it depends upon the sincerity of Mr. Smith and his friends in Rhodesia. That is what we have to examine. I know Mr. Smith and many of his people quite well. I believe in his sincerity, within a limited context. After all, both on "Tiger" and on "Fearless" he could have had sovereignty and he could have had sanctions called off. Both were offered to him on the two occasions. If he had been prepared to behave like any other 'leader of a Government in

545
Africa and, having got his independence, torn up the constitution which gave it, nothing could have stopped him. It was because he was not prepared to do that that those two negotiations failed.
Mr. George Cunningham: He did tear up one.
Mr. Paget: It was not one which gave him his independence. Having taken his independence, he made his own constitution. But he was not prepared to make a bargain on the basis of a constitution and then tear it up, as every other African Government have done.
It may be said that I am relying on Mr. Smith's sincerity for the worst of reasons, racial arrogance. I believe that it is a tremendously powerful argument within the Rhodesian Front to say, "We are not people who behave like black Governments". The very fact that the black Governments have rejected their constitutions or have been insincere in administering them is a strong reason why the Rhodesians will not be.
Mr. Cunningham: Wait and see.
Mr. Paget: It is said, after all, that this agreement is worthless. There is nothing for him to tear up. My own analysis from a legal point of view—and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for West Ham, South (Sir Elwyn Jones) may very well tear this to pieces; I do not think that it will be very difficult for him—is that the small print is not of very much value here. What we have seen since sanctions is a march by Rhodesia towards apartheid. Now we are seeing a turning back towards multi-racialism. It is tentative, doubtful, uncertain and unclearly defined. None the less, it is forcing Mr. Smith to get through his Parliament a series of measures reversing Acts which he has passed in the last few years. That is a very formidable exercise, and it gets things moving backwards from apartheid.
I do not believe for a second that this action has been forced upon Mr. Smith by sanctions. Sanctions have served Rhodesia remarkably well. They have made her into a nation. We have tried to make a lot of nations in Africa, and we have given much aid and assistance to them to do so. All that we have produced is black neo-Colonialist Govern-
546
ments which have become military dictatorships.
Mr. Robert Hughes: Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?
Mr. Paget: No. Here, although sanctions have been much more expensive than aid, by sanctions we have created what is a very effective and viable nation with the feelings of a nation.
Sanctions have proved very successful economically. After all, the worst that can be done for an ergent nation is to give it free trade. That was the great fault of our imperial era. We imposed free trade, and the result is that in not one of the areas where we ruled did any industrial infrastructure grow up. One can grow that infrastructure only under tight protection—and sanctions were a tight protection.
This involved in Rhodesia a building up of every kind of new industry instead of almost the single industry of tobacco with which they started. Rhodesia is today a vastly more viable economic than it was six years ago. It has had a pretty steady growth rate of about 8 per cent. It has had a very manageable balance of payments. The Minister of Finance about a year ago talked about scraping the barrel. What Chancellor of the Exchequer does not talk about scraping the barrel when he is asking the country to be economical and save? It has been and still is a very manageable balance of payment.
I remember discussing with the Chamber of Commerce on the Rand the problem of Rhodesian finance. My host said, "There are six of us round the table. We can provide Rhodesia with anything she wants without it be noticeable in our balance sheets." That is an example of the small things that happen. The idea that Rhodesia was being squeezed in that way is not real.
I believe that the essence of this settlement is that it was an achievement in persuasion, and this I believe has been due greatly to the magic of Lord Goodman. I think it was an astonishing effort in honest persuasion. In earlier days, when I was talking with Mr. Smith, I had this feeling. I remember coming back and reporting to my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. Harold Wilson) when he was Prime

547
Minister. I told him what I thought was the settlement available. He replied, "If you do not think that sanctions can bite, why should Mr. Smith do this?" I told him, "Because I think he feels lonely." My right hon. Friend said, "I think I know what you mean. I think that is a perceptive observation." There has been a feeling of loneliness there, a wanting to come back into society. This has been, I think, the effective factor. It is equally the reason why the settlement will be worked sincerely. It is a wanting to get back into the gang of civilisation, to get the approval of mankind. I believe that this has been the most important factor.
I am exceedingly glad and this is one of the things I discussed with Mr. Smith six years ago—that we are providing financial aid. I suggested at that time that we might provide the cost of a secondary education. He said, "Yes—provided there are jobs for them when they are educated, and that means an economic scheme which can be geared to the outflow of educated Africans." This I believe is the essential to the growth. I also believe that it is the key to the situation.
When one talks about how many years it would take to get an African majority, I find that of no importance. No one can look that distance in advance. The important thing is that these kinds of institution reflect not numbers but power, and in Rhodesia's evolving economy—and the scope for growth in Rhodesia is enormous—it is 20 to one and not three to one, as in South Africa, where apartheid might conceivably be possible. In Rhodesia, the great burden of the expansion must be borne by the Africans and a large part of its profits gained by them. They are the only people who can do that expansion, and as their economic power in that society grows, so will their effectiveness and voice in Parliament grow, regardless of what we write in the constitution. That is how it grows and that is how it will work.
We have never seen a society which is growing in which the proletariat is not coming up. It builds up and gains its power that way. I may be right or wrong, but to this hope and chance there is only the alternative—
Mr. Philip Whitehead rose—
Mr. Paget: I cannot give way. The alternative is to go back on the road to apartheid, to an economy tightly confined, in which the squeeze is always on the black man, although it is all right for the white man—and all this for a matter of principle. I have great respect for martyrs in principle but I have less respect for people who prefer the martyrdom to be done by proxy—and the martyrdom will be done by the Africans in this case. I believe that would be quite wrong.
I shall not be able to support the Opposition Amendment. Nor shall I support the Government's Motion. If I did, I should be wishing to continue them in office, and I do not want to do that. I think they are a very bad Government. But I equally feel that in this issue they have made the best move which is available and, largely thanks to Lord Goodman, they have got a negotiation which has far better prospects than anything that I, frankly, thought possible when negotiations started.
8.21 p.m.
Mr. Michael Hamilton: I used to represent a constituency alongside that of the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). I do not think that he would necessarily appreciate it, however, if across the Floor I were to compliment him on his speech. But I can say that on both sides of the House there is genuine admiration for anyone who so consistently through the years has demonstrated such independence of spirit as his.
I do not think that the House has realised tonight that it is exactly five years ago, on 1st December, that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, then Prime Minister, flew to Gibraltar for talks on board H.M.S. "Tiger". I well remember that he went with the good wishes of the whole House. Two years later, he flew off again for talks on board H.M.S. "Fearless", and once again he went with the good wishes of the whole House. In fairness to the Labour Administration, it must be said that no one could have tried harder to reach a settlement. Equally in fairness, it must be said that no Administration

549
received such unqualified support from the Opposition of the day.
Today, after so much endeavour and disappointment, the House has before it proposals for a settlement, and this is surely a moment for which the House has been waiting for six years. The one thing that troubles me in the debate is the inability of some sections of the House to match the occasion with adequate generosity. After all, on both sides we have longed to see an end to this unhappy breach, and on both sides we have been anxious and concerned for the advancement of the Africans. But as with Europe the other day, so with Rhodesia now. When the moment comes and when the first break in the clouds appears, there are some here who say, "Yes, we subscribe to the principle of settlement and we have cherished the hope of settlement, but we have looked for better terms."
With very few exceptions today, there has been not a word of gratitude from the benches opposite for the exertions of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I have some modest knowledge not only of Salisbury, Wiltshire, which I represent, but also of Salisbury, Rhodesia. I have been out there since U.D.I. was declared. I have not met members of the Rhodesian Administration. But I remember going into the stadium in Salisbury one afternoon and seeing Mr. Smith being granted the freedom of the city. I believe that many hon. Members who have visited Rhodesia recently will agree with me that this crisis has stirred more emotion and anguish in this country than it has done within Rhodesia itself.
Mr. Maurice Foley: rose—
Mr. Hamilton: I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that Rhodesia superficially is calm and outwardly it is prosperous. I think that the hon. Gentleman will also agree with the next point I have to make. I have never forgotten that the number of Europeans in Rhodesia is fewer than in the average English county, and therefore—this is where the hon. Gentleman will also agree—I have always felt that it is unreasonable for any of us to look to the Rhodesia Government for a higher standard of statesmanship than we look for from a well-regulated county council here.
Mr. Foley: I agree, but will the hon. Gentleman still give way?
Mr. Hamilton: I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I promised to be not more than about six minutes.
It is because of this that I am certain that my right hon. Friend was right not to stand upon ceremony but to take the initiative. It could not been an easy decision for him to decide to fly out there. His judgment was vindicated and the negotiations have succeeded where other negotiations failed. These proposals go a long way to helping the Africans, and the whole House should, as I say, be grateful to my right hon. Friend for what he has achieved.
The United Nations has been mentioned. I was there myself last autumn and I am delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for City of Chester (Mr. Temple), who is among our team there now, is able to hear much of this debate and to report back there the feelings on the settlement within the House of Commons.
I believe that when hon. Members go abroad it is only then that they are able to assess the true value and influence of our own foreign service. I do not believe that the House realises what a very impressive mission we field at the United Nations. It is a dedicated and professional body led by Sir Colin Crowe, and it is right when debating this issue that we should have the mission in mind.
Rhodesia, as has been said in the debate, is the last chapter in the long history of de-colonisation. For still a few more months our mission at the United Nations will need to rely on its reserves of patience and philosophy.
The United Kingdom at the United Nations sits alphabetically between the United Arab Republic, on the one side, and the United Kingdoms of Tanzania on the other. It is hardly surprising if some tension still exists between former colonial powers—we are one—on the one hand, and the numerous Afro-Asian bloc on the other. On the one hand, we have those who are proud of their colonial record and contribution; on the other, we have those who regard colonialism as an unmitigated crime.
No settlement acceptable to this House, whether proposed by a Labour or by a

551
Conservative Government, could hope to commend itself to those who have consistently advocated force as a solution to the Rhodesian problem. Equally, no time scale for majority rule, be it lone, be it short, could hope to gain approval amongst those who have consistently cried for one man, one vote immediately.
These are the realities of the situation, and we must recognise them. We must recognise them, because the final stages in the Rhodesian story will not be easy for our mission at the United Nations, and we should spare a thought for it in New York during the coming weeks. We have a blueprint for settlement. It lies fully within the five principles. I am very happy to give it my support.
8.30 p.m.
Mr. Andrew Faulds: I hope that the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Michael Hamilton) will forgive me if I do not take up any of the points which he seemed to be trying to make in what struck me as a wash of rather wasteful verbiage. I have more important things to say to the House than to take part in an exchange of chit-chat with him.
I accept—this may be to the surprise of some of my hon. Friends—that the Foreign Secretary negotiated with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia in good faith and in the prayerful hope, because he is that sort of fellow, that the authorities in Rhodesia would turn out to be honourable and trustworthy fellows. Unfortunately—I wish he were in his place to hear me say this—the Foreign Secretary is that sort of political simpleton. Had he pondered on the characters with whom he was dealing and bothered to study their statements, he might have had the political sense to preserve his own reputation—he has done himself no good at all—and prove himself, with what is probably his last political act before retirement, a better and wiser statesman than his record so far would support.
I have no intention of wasting the time of the House or my own in analysing the implications of the agreement in terms of what may transpire if the terms agreed are actually accepted. I am not much concerned about the statistical analyses which suggest that it may be 64 years—2035 A.D.—before the African majority
552
achieves its rightful political power. Those analyses assume absolute good faith on the part of the Smith Government and their successors. That is pretty bloody unlikely, but that is what they assume.
They also assume a major increase in the output of African schools and full registration by all qualified Africans, both of which are pretty unlikely eventualities. I am not much concerned with those analyses or statistics or, indeed, with these, to me, absolutely worthless documents, because we all know that when Southern Rhodesia is granted recognition her minority settler Government will change her constitution as their selfish self-preservation and privilege demand.
The Observer, in a brilliant assessment of the agreement terms, which it titled, quite correctly, "A Dud Prospectus" said:
"Our main doubts about the proposed settlement have less to do with the legal small print than with the simple facts of human logic. It is not just that Mr. Smith is not to be trusted"—
we can say "Hear, hear" to that
"or that his party, the Rhodesia Front, came to power with a mandate to prevent majority rule. It is that no minority, anywhere, has ever voluntarily given up its power and privileges to a majority that it basically feared and distrusted."
We do not need the words of The Observer to spell out the realities of what will happen after the settler community has been recognised by an agreement shunted through the British House of Commons which is, in the final analysis, responsible for the future destiny of five million Africans, the people of Zimbabwe. We have the unequivocal words of a Mr. Howman, the so-called Minister for External Affairs of the illegal régime. In June, 1969, as reported in the Rhodesian Press, he said as regards "Fearless" and "Tiger" that
"the Rhodesian régime had intended, throughout discussions between the British and Rhodesian authorities, to alter any independence constitution it mieht have eventually negotiated with Britain."
He went on to say:
"We made these offers (concessions to British demands) always with this understanding, that we would change the constitution as we thought fit."
We have the example of the Republic of South Africa to see that it does not take

553
64 years to set up a police State and entrench a racialist régime.
I am sorry that the Foreign Secretary is not present and I should like to apologise to him later, perhaps, for saying this in his absence. Last Monday I took part, with a group of Methodist Ministers, in presenting to Sir Alec's secretary at the Foreign Office 25 pieces of symbolic silver—
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant Ferris): Order. The Foreign Secretary should not be referred to by his name of Sir Alec.
Mr. Faulds: I am sorry, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I thought that he was the Foreign Secretary. We took part in presenting to him 25 pieces of symbolic silver to add to a previous down payment of five, which had been presented to him before his departure for Salisbury—a total tally of 30 pieces of silver, which a previous betrayal earned. Is the right hon. Gentleman less worried by that symbolic gesture, by a body of Ministers of the Gospel of Christ, than he is by the support of the National Front and other idiot peripheral Fascist organisations?
Let me read to the House a letter from one of the right hon. Gentleman's supporters. Perhaps I should explain that my sister is married to a white South African who lives in Gwelo in Southern Rhodesia. The letter, from a gentleman named Guest from Pinner, reads:
"Dear Mr. Faulds,
Most of us have already celebrated 'victory for Rhodesia' and continued European rule for all time.
That is what the agreement means. You should be pleased as your sister will be safe. Just think of that and stop being a bloody fool."—
[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] It those are the sentiments which hon. Gentlemen opposite like, let me finish the letter:
"After all you don't really want her raped by a buck negro! Now, do you?"
Sir Alec is welcome to the support that he gets in letters of that sort. I prefer the company of the gentlemen whom I accompanied to the Foreign Office the other day, the gentlemen of the cloth.
Is the Foreign Secretary, is Sir Alec, really so stupid—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Member has been a Member of the House long enough to know that he cannot refer to hon. Members by name. He must, in this instance, refer either to the Foreign Secretary, or to the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire.
Mr. Faulds: Is the Foreign Secretary really so stupid, as his bland smile would sometimes suggest, as to believe that the present and any future settler Government in Southern Rhodesia will ever allow African majority rule? Or is there lurking in the wings the sinister figure of the Prime Minister, the one who is responsible for the betrayal of our trust in Southern Rhodesia and who has urged on both the Foreign Secretary and his compliant client, the aptly named Mr. Gross-Smith, a settlement on any terms, a sell-out of the Africans and the abandonment of the five principles which the Foreign Secretary first enunciated and to which subsequent Governments have heretofore honourably adhered
That is one of the few explanations which to me make sense, in view of the Prime Minister's total ignorance of Africa and African affairs, the disdain for African and Asian reaction which he so unashamedly revealed in Singapore and in his whole handling of the South African arms issue. Do the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary both really hate apartheid, as they claim? If they do, they have a funny way of showing it. How could they have been willing, indeed eager, parties to its inevitable extension north from South Africa up to the banks of the Zambesi, which is what will happen?
What an achievement on the part of the Foreign Secretary, to crown a career which started with the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich—[Interruption.] Some of us do not forget these political historical facts. The right hon. Gentleman proposes to crown that with the sell-out and betrayal of the real Rhodesians, the African majority at Salisbury. He has ratted on his own five principles—the gentleman we all, nobody more than I, used to regard as a man of honour.
Every responsible commentator and anybody with real knowledge of Africa realises that there is no doubt that the Africans of Zimbabwe will never be

555
permitted to come to power constitutionally. What the Foreign Secretary, Lord Goodman, and the other lesser figures in the drama have done is to ensure—indeed, to guarantee—that the way to majority rule now lies only through bloodshed. That is now the historical inevitability of what this House will decide tonight. That is the disastrous course that the Foreign Secretary has charted for Southern Africa.
In those circumstances I want to be absolutely honest. Those of us who care for Africa and for Africans can only regrettably and with deep distress wish the liberation movements every success in their future fight for the freedom of Zimbabwe. Regardless of the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Smith, regardless of any other settler Government which may struggle for survival, the freedom of Zimbabwe will come through the efforts of the Africans themselves, and I wish them luck.
8.42 p.m.
Mr. Peter Tapsell: The tasteless and rather vulgar comments of the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) about my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs are not worthy of comment.
Mr. Faulds: They were well merited.
Mr. Tapsell: The occasion for this debate is a melancholy one in the history of our country and of this House. We are being asked to approve terms of settlement for the independence of Rhodesia which constitute an abandonment of the declared purposes which have governed British imperial statesmanship for over a century, certainly since the publication of the Durham Report.
We are being asked to give our support in principle to a settlement which would legalise the control of a majority by a minority—the very thing which our soldiers, at our behest, are fighting and dying to prevent in Ulster. We have only twice before, at independence, handed over a majority to the control of a minority—in Zanzibar and in Aden—on both occasions with disastrous results, the full consequences of which may not yet have been seen. It is no coincidence that those are the two former colonies
556
of ours where injustice is most rife and Communism most rampant.
The truth is that in the struggle with the Rhodesia Front we have lost. It will be better for our own political health at home and for our future standing in Africa if we frankly face that fact. Let no one be in a position to say that we added hypocrisy and deceit to humiliation and defeat.
I shall nevertheless support the Government in the Lobby tonight for three reasons: first, because of the realities of power in Central Africa today; secondly, because I believe that my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Lord Goodman have negotiated the best possible terms obtainable in the circumstances; thirdly, because I believe the Africans, as provided in the terms, must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves—something which they have never had before. [An HON. MEMBER: "Fourth because of the Whips."] If the hon. Member had studied my career in the House on this issue over the last 12 years he would not make that remark.
Rhodesian Africans, for the first time, are to be given the chance to decide for themselves whether they prefer this constitutional settlement, with all its glaring imperfections and injustice, or whether they prefer the grim alternative. It is easy to be a hero by proxy. I would not presume to advise my African friends in Rhodesia whether they and their children should fight and die for their rights and freedom now, or seek peacefully to work towards a society fit for their grandchildren to live in. They must decide that harsh question for themselves. It is essential that they have the opportunity to do so in fullest measure.
The work and membership of the Pearce Commission will be crucial. Its members and its methods must not only command our confidence; they must be calculated also to command the confidence of the Rhodesian Africans. Distinguished and high-minded as are the three members of the Commission whose names have already been announced, I believe it to be essential that the membership of the Commission, in African terms, be broadened and strengthened. In my view, there should be five commissioners instead of four as at present proposed,

557
and the additional two should be of the stamp, experience, and knowledge of Africa and Africans, of men such as Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Sir Michael Blundell or Mr. Bruce Mackenzie, to name but three eminently suitable candidates for the task.
The assessors also, of whom there are to be 14, I understand, are of great importance. I do not think that they should be civil servants. We in this country have our own rather special brand of integrity. This is not always understood or even believed abroad. If the assessors are paid servants of the Crown, our enemies throughout the world will seek to discredit them, however unfairly, for that very reason. Each assessor should be his own man. There is still no shortage of such men in Britain, or in this House. Finally, on the question of the Pearce Commission, the interpreters should not be Rhodesian Government employees.
I started by saying that we had been defeated by the Rhodesia Front. Perhaps it would be truer to say that we had been defeated by history, of which the Rhodesia Front is the heir and will in course of time become the victim. The original European settlement of Rhodesia, and the manner of it, leading on to the 1923 constitution and the 1931 Land Apportionment Act, perhaps inevitably, contained the seeds of the present situation and of the disaster which almost certainly lies ahead for Central Africa.
It is not open to the Labour Party to seek to make a party issue of the problem we now face or of the solution proposed, however unsatisfactory. If there was one utterly fatal error of British statesmanship in the handling of Rhodesian affairs in this century, it was the public declaration by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. Harold Wilson) in 1965, when the feasibility of U.D.I. was being anxiously discussed by the plotters, that in no circumstances would Britain use force.
It was fatal to say so before U.D.I., which it inevitably precipitated. It was equally fatal not to use force as soon as U.D.I. occurred. There are times when power can be kept in civilised hands only by the use of force. That is something which the Labour Party still finds it extraordinarily difficult to grasp. For
558
that failure, five million Africans must pay the price.
8.48 p.m.
Mr. James Johnson: I am not usually a bitter man, but this debate began on a note which I found utterly distasteful, and it has become more and more distasteful to me as the hours have passed. I believe that this whole exercise is a cynical exercise in power politics. I detest it.
I have never before sensed so many Tory hearts bleeding for poor helpless Africans in that Continent. It has been like something in a Dickens novel. I do not accuse any Conservative Member of deliberate hypocrisy.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds), I am sorry that the Foreign Secretary is not here, because I like a man to be able to answer back when I criticise him. I have never seen him worse than he was today. He is a man for whom I have had a high regard. He talked about debating other people's affairs in Africa. The Conservative Party is a paternalistic party, always was, always will be; but when colour comes in, the Conservatives are doubly paternalistic.
But there are hon. Members on this side of the House, of whom I count myself one, who spent some years in Africa with black men attempting to help them in their independence movements, and perhaps we can claim—although we do not have any black men here today, which is the fault of our constitution, for, unlike the Vendôme in Paris, in the past, we have no one here from our former colonial territories—that we have championed them in the past. When I listened to the Foreign Secretary, I wondered what would be thought of his speech by black men, by their leaders in the detention camps, by Joshua Nkomo and others. If they had been here, they could have given vent to their feelings about the sort of pantomime which is being perpetrated and perhaps even perpetuated upon men south of the Zambesi.
To me the whole thing is distasteful. I do not care how much textbook philosophy we get from hon. Members opposite, but I do not want to be lectured by hon. Members like the hon. Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell) about my party using force. We reject the chopping and

559
chipping of Conservative philosophy. I know what black men would feel about it if they were in the Chamber.
I challenge any Minister speaking on behalf of the absent Foreign Secretary to tell me where in Africa since the war any white settlers' society, such as that of Smith and his colleagues, has ever been a party to what they would like us to believe will be a willing contract to hand over power to black men, whom they have despised in the past and whom today they regard as their serfs. I am reminded of some men who were boys at my school in Northumberland many years ago and who are now different men in Salisbury. They were decent schoolboys and when they grew up they married fine young women. I could multiply this example many times from among Welsh miners, or mechanics, or dockers from Hull, indeed some are distant members of my own family.
In England we have a sheltered, openly democratic society where people can be good Christians, even if only on the long-distance telephone. But when they go to Rhodesia, what a change there is! When I am told that white men will behave in the fashion suggested by the Foreign Secretary, I ask where they have done so and where they are doing so. They did not do so in Kenya and they did not do so in Northern Rhodesia.
They did not do so in any place of which I know except where the House of Commons, ultimately responsible for millions of black men and women and youngsters, had power to tell a governor, or a chief secretary or a chief of police, and the army, of course, what to do, and so to put the white settlers in their place. But that is not so in Salisbury, or Bulawayo or elsewhere in Rhodesia. Anyone who has been to Rhodesia knows that the political atmosphere there is totally different.
Some of the actors on this stage, some of those whose names have been bandied about by Mr. Smith, are known to people like my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley), who spoke feelingly about his face-to-face confrontations with Smith and people like him. Garfield Todd, who was bathed in accolades earlier in the debate, did not behave himself; down went Todd.
560
Then we had Edgar Whitehead, a fine, decent, liberal man; he could not satisfy the people behind him, and down he went. Then we had Winston Field; he, too, went down. If this man Smith does not perform, does not behave as the cohorts behind want him to behave, the tobacco farmers and the other farmers, the copper miners and the coal miners, he, too, will go down.
I should like hon. Gentlemen opposite to look on both sides of the Rhodesian border. There they will see Southern Rhodesia's two chief allies, countries that have held Southern Rhodesia's flanks—Mozambique and Angola. When I am asked to believe that British families—English, Scots, Irish or Welsh will behave like people out of the New Testament, I suggest that we look next door where we have Latins, the Catholic Church and the Portuguese. They have done more than any other European stock in Africa to assimilate and to mix with the indigenous population in the creation of social and political harmony.
The black man in Mozambique and Angola wants his own political party, his own Government and his own independence movement, and this in a region where they have much less chance—and less cause—to challenge apartheid than is the case in Salisbury or Cape Town. There are these movements such as FRELIMO which want independence and which, sooner rather than later, will get their own black Government. These movements are sustained and fed by movements outside, in the adjacent sites of Zambia and Tanzania.
Hon. Gentlemen may be shocked by the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick, but he is talking in absolute, geo-political terms. What he said will happen in Southern Rhodesia, will indeed happen, and the Conservative Party by its actions today, is hastening the day when it will happen.
I do not know whether the Foreign Secretary is a good jockey, but although he has got himself to the start of the course, and may even begin to canter, he will never finish this course. This is not a starter. When I hear it declared that parity can be attained by the year 2035; and that if the black Africans agree to pay annually 6 per cent. more income tax, they can have two more elected representatives next year in Parliament, I just do

561
not believe it. It is a sham, a pantomime, and if the black African leaders now in the camps were in this House they would say so.
I believe, like many of my colleagues, that sooner or later those millions of Africans will say the situation occurred in the United States, where white man faced white man—that this is their land, whether it is the gentle Shona or the more militant Matabele. We all know how in Rhodesia, it has been easier for settlers to increase there because of the more pacific nature of the local people, unlike, say, the Kikuyu in Kenya.
The writing is on the wall. One can talk about the composition of commissions and perhaps say that Malcolm MacDonald ought to be on a commission rather than some judge who has blotted his copy book on a past commission, but that does not really matter. I shall vote against this Motion tonight and if there were any black African leaders on these benches, they would happily vote alongside me.
9.0 p.m.
Mr. Harold Soref: I am sure that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) will forgive me if I do not spend too much time dealing with his remarks. He referred to the halcyon days of Sir Edgar Whitehead whom he described as a fine liberal man. He will recall that during the time Sir Edgar was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia there were 4,000 people detained in camps there as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) reminded us, compared with the few score people detained today. It is largely in view of the events during the period when Sir Edgar was Prime Minister that the changes took place which produced the Rhodesian Front Government, such was the dissatisfaction with the anarchy being created in Salisbury and the country generally. I pay tribute to the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ian Smith and Lord Goodman for making possible something which very few people thought conceivable—that is, the possibility of a peaceful settlement and the end of an unnecesary conflict with Rhodesia.
Mr. Robert Hughes: It is the beginning of the end.
Mr. Soref: I am sure that that settlement is the wish of the majority of the people in this country.
This debate has shown, as have its predecessors, that there has been this routine denigration of Rhodesia. This is the staple diet of hon. Members opposite. The hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) made the most obscene reference to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.
Mr. Faulds: Obscene?
Mr. Soref: They were disgusting and highly offensive. I would like the hon. Member, when he criticises the company that my right hon. Friend has kept, to say whether he recalls denying an article which appeared in the Sunday Telegraph on 11th May, 1969, dealing with the occasion when he attended in Khartoum a Russian-dominated gathering to spread guerrilla warfare throughout Southern Africa, together with Mr. Jack Woddis of the British Communist Party, a meeting at which the chair was taken by the head of the African Bureau of the Kremlin.
Mr. Faulds: I am grateful that you have allowed me to intervene—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I have not allowed the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Faulds: I beg your pardon, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am grateful that the hon. Gentleman has allowed me to intervene. May I put a few points to him? First, I do not entirely understand his use of the word "obscene". Perhaps he has a new definition of which the rest of us know not. Secondly, the conference I attended in Khartoum, with some pride, was the first ever get-together of the African liberation movements. It was not Russian-dominated and it had nothing to do with guerrilla activities. It was a political organisation, where all the liberation movements met for the first time. Very shortly before the death of that great man Mondlane. I do not regret my attendance and I will attend the next meeting if I am invited.
Mr. Soref: The report stated that it was to impose a unified Soviet line on guerrilla freedom fronts, to assume direction in the struggle.
Mr. Faulds rose—
Mr. Soref: I am not giving way again.
Mr. Faulds: You must.
Mr. Soref: I will not.
Mr. Faulds: On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman is quoting—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Before the hon. Gentleman raises a point of order with me, I hope he is quite sure that it really is a point of order for me.
Mr. Faulds: I hope it is. The hon. Member is quoting from some document of which I know not. I did not write it and I have never heard of it, if that is not a point of order, I am sorry, but at least I have got it in.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: For future reference for the hon. Gentleman, that is not a point of order.
Mr. William Baxter: Further to the point of order. I understood that if any document was quoted it should be placed upon the Table for other Members to refer to, to see whether it was authentic. If the hon. Member does not place the document on the Table, he is out of order.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I know what the hon. Gentleman has in mind, but that does not apply in this case because it is not a Ministerial statement.
Mr. Faulds: And he has made it up.
Mr. Soref: Did the hon. Member for Smethwick say that I had fabricated what I read? The extract is available for the Table or anyone else who cares to read it and the original in the Sunday Telegraph is available in the Library. In those circumstances I demand an apology and that the hon. Member withdraws his accusation that I fabricated the passage I read.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. Was the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) giving way to someone?
Hon. Members: No.
Mr. Soref: Yes, I was. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who?"] I was giving way to the hon. Member for Smethwick.
Mr. Frank Judd: On a point or order. How can the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) pos-
564
sibly claim that he was giving way when no Member was on his feet when the hon. Gentleman sat down?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have to deem that the hon. Gentleman had completed his speech. I shall call the next speaker.
Mr. Tapsell: Further to the point of order. Is it not fairly common practice in the House for an hon. Member to offer to give way when he is in dispute with another hon. Member and momentarily to resume his seat? is it not harsh on my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) for him to have his speech suddenly brought to a halt?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not think so. The practice of the House is clear: that one hon. Member can invite another to give way while he is on his feet, but if no one rises and the hon. Member sits down and no one is addressing the House, it is the duty of the Chair to call the next speaker.
Mr. Evelyn King: Further to the point of order. Is it not clear that what happened, however unfortunate it might have been, was that my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) believed that the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) intended to interrupt and sought to give the hon. Gentleman a chance to do so? Is it not a great injustice to my hon. Friend, who has sat in the Chamber for many hours, that through a misunderstanding he should be deprived of his rights?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have dealt with that point of order. I am extremely sorry for the hon. Gentleman whose speech has been cut short, but he must be deemed to know the rules of the House. If the House is left without anyone addressing it, it is the duty of the Chair to call the next speaker.
Mr. Braine: Further to that point of order. I have listened very carefully to what has been said. In fairness to my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref), may I say that what happened was this. It was alleged by the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) that my hon. Friend had fabricated a document from which he had quoted. This is a very serious charge indeed to make against any hon. Member. My hon. Friend

565
the Member for Ormskirk gave way to the hon. Member for Smethwick to give the hon. Member an opportunity to withdraw.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have dealt with that point and I have called the next speaker, so no point of order arises.
Mr. Braine: I wish to ask for guidance on a further point of order. The charge was hurled across the Floor of the House that my hon. Friend the Member for Ormskirk was reading from a document which he had fabricated. Is it in order for an hon. Member to make a charge of that nature? This is a fresh point of order. May we have a ruling on it?
Mr. Faulds: Further to that point of order. May I make the situation somewhat easier for all parties concerned? What I hurled across the Floor of the House was a merry quip. If the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref) will accept it in those terms and admit that I am not responsible for the misreporting of the Sunday Telegraph, I will gladly allow him to rise to his feet again.
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I am told that the document in question is in the Library.
9.09 p.m.
Mr. Brynmor John: I am sorry to have to follow the hon. Member for Ormskirk (Mr. Soref), the brevity of whose speech we so much regret, but during that speech two things emerged. The first was that we might well say, "Come back, Senator McCarthy, all is forgiven" because the smears which he hurled at my hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Faulds) would have done credit to that gentleman. The second thing which emerged was, since the hon. Member referred to Rhodesia as being an unnecessary quarrel, that, by implication, he must have been criticising his right hon. Friends, because the genesis of the quarrel was during the regime of the Conservative Government, and the quarrel was inherited by the Labour Government.
The most serious point about all this is that I detect on the Government benches a complete reversal of the Conservative Party's original role. When the Labour Government were handing over power to majority regimes in India and elsewhere
566
the cries from the benches opposite were, "We must hold power. We are giving away Empire." Yet now, when the Secretary of State is going to hand over power to a minority white regime, Members opposite are in two minds. Some of them are gleeful about it. Others, of whom the right hon. Gentleman the Foreign Secretary is one, are utterly sad and defeatist about it.
We on these benches, certainly, are trying to speak today on behalf of a segment of society, the vast majority of the people of Rhodesia, whom we fear will never have the opportunity of expressing their own point of view before their country is handed over to a minority regime. Let no one, therefore, think that the task being discharged by the House of Commons tonight is a light one. It is really how we write the final chapter of British imperialism, and whether we write it with grace and dignity, or whether we write in terms of a shabby compromise and sell out.
Three things are quite clear from the debate and from the White Paper. The first is this that the Pearce Commission as at present constituted is an unrepresentative body headed by a man who, whatever his political views, is certainly in legal and judicial terms a conservative, and who is accompanied by two other gentleman neither of whom has firsthand knowledge of Africa or is representative of African opinion; they are people who are unable to perform what at any rate must be a very difficult task.
I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) when he said that we are not paternalist. If we were to believe that the majority of the African people in Rhodesia wanted this sort of settlement we would, whatever our own views, say that it is our duty to hand them over, but the fact is that we know that this contest will be a quite unequal one, between, on the one hand, a white minority well and heavily equipped with propaganda weapons, and with the money and the ability to conduct a political campaign, and, on the other hand, an African population whose leaders are scattered, who have not access to the media, and who are quite unable by finance or propaganda to put their point of view across. So the Pearce Commission will be given a task highly difficult at the best of times but a task which is

567
made impossible by the terms of this White Paper, and a task for which it is singularly ill-equipped.
The second point which is absolutely clear beyond peradventure is that as soon as convenient Mr. Smith will go back on the terms of this agreement and will instead have a full-blown apartheid regime. He has made it abundantly clear already that he wants separate development and that he favours white supremacy in Rhodesia. Therefore, to claim, as the Foreign Secretary claimed this afternoon, that we are at last getting rid of apartheid with this agreement is to be like a person suffering from incurable cancer who, happening to have a temporary remission, believes himself completely cured; but that remission is temporary, and the halt in the march towards apartheid is temporary in Rhodesia, and if independence is conceded upon these terms, apartheid will be resumed and redoubled.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson) that the mathematical calculations of 30, 40 or 50 years are irrelevant. What is relevant about the figures is that for any young African who is conscious of the dignity of his nation, as most young Africans now are, and conscious of his wish to play a part in the affairs of his country, to be told that he will not merit being treated as a civilised human being for 30, 40 or 50 years will give him no hope, no confidence in the régime and no confidence in the integrity of this country. We are handing over in the worst of all possible worlds.
I think the Foreign Secretary will be able to persuade himself of the rightness of these terms, for two reasons. First, hon. Members opposite are profoundly tired of harassing a white minority régime with whose basic principles they do not quarrel too greatly. Secondly—and this was apparent from what the right hon. Gentleman said—very little of what constitutes majority African opinion is at variance with what we believe it to be and with the facts of the modern world. We regard the emergent urbanised African as embodying the view of the African. He is working in a town and
568
wants to get ahead. But hon. Gentlemen opposite yearn for the continuance of the tribal society, where everyone is in his place and there is a nice comfortable feeling of security. As with the Government, the Pearce Commission will only too easily be persuaded by nostalgia for comfort, order and security to take the word of the chiefs and the people in the tribal reserve and dismiss the urbanised Africans as extremists, as we have heard this afternoon. If we do that, we shall profoundly misunderstand the nature of the modern world and we shall do our own reputation a profound disservice.
We are giving international respectability to a white minority, racialist and segregationist régime. This, stripped of verbiage, is the reality behind the White Paper. In the long term the damage which will be done to this country in international affairs will be catastrophic.
I agree with the hon. Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell) that it does not take a great deal of bravery to shed blood by proxy. We none of us take lightly the job of saying to the African people that they must fight for their rights as dignified human beings. It is because we in the Labour and trade union movement have had to fight for recognition and for the degnity of the working classes that we understand more fully than hon. Gentlemen on the Government side of the House the aspirations of the African majority. Inch by inch, hurdle by hurdle, progression towards an ever-vanishing majority rule will redound to our discredit throughout the next half-century.
This is not mere selfishness. It is the duty of us all as human beings in a world which has unfortunately been dominated by race, with the imperfections of race relations in Britain, to put ourselves as far as possible on the side of humanity and progress. The prejudice which is written into the constitution and expressed on all hands will make it impossible for us as a nation to hold out the claim to be civilised and dignified human beings.
Tonight I shall oppose this proposal, and I shall continue to oppose thereafter the recognition and the making respectable of the Smith minority régime and do my best to persuade others to bring about its overthrow.
9.20 p.m.
Mr. Bernard Braine: I would not impugn the sincerity of any right hon. or hon. Member who has spoken from the Opposition benches but an independent observer might well have been confused by the speeches of some right hon. Gentlemen. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) was generally critical of the proposed settlement, as he has been all along since my right hon. Friend brought back the terms from Salisbury. He asked a great many searching questions, which is rightly his task as an Opposition Front Bench spokesman, but he ended his speech by saying that if the Commission conducted its inquiries fairly and established that there was a broad acceptance of the proposed settlement by all the communities, particularly by the Africans in Rhodesia, this would weigh heavily with the House. In other words, he was not closing the door—and I would not expect him to do so, since he was a distinguished member of a Government which sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to get an honourable settlement with Rhodesia.
On the other hand, the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough, East (Mr. Bottomley) for whom I have great respect, and a number of other hon. Gentlemen, including the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. James Johnson), with who I have been associated for many years in Commonwealth affairs, took a totally different view. They held that no settlement is possible. Indeed, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West went further and said it was not even a starter.
Let us get it quite clear that this is only a provisional agreement. It has yet to be accepted by the Rhodesian and the British Parliaments. And it will not be accepted by this Parliament unless it is clearly demonstrated that the assent of all the people, both white and black Rhodesians, has been established by the Commission. But what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has managed to secure—something which completely eluded the Leader of the Opposition—is the breaking of the log jam and the creation of an opportunity for all Rhodesians to start again. Whatever view we may have of the possibility of success, my right hon. Friend surely
570
deserves our gratitude for that and not our censure.
I appeal, therefore, to all those who have spoken against these proposals and who may yet do so to reflect carefully where their present attitude may lead. When the charge of a sell-out was hurled across the Chamber last week—and it has been suggested again today—my mind went back to similar charges being made when I was responsible under my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys) for steering the 1961 Southern Rhodesia Constitution through this House. Yet had that Constitution, which was condemned alike by the Labour Party and the white extremists in Rhodesia at the time, being given a chance to work I suggest that we would have a much happier story to tell today.
Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman is to some extent misrepresenting my position and that of my hon. Friends who have spoken as we have. We made it clear that we regret the proposals with which the Foreign Secretary has returned as a sell-out which violates the five principles on which he undertook to make agreement. When we attacked the 1961 Constitution we did so on the ground that it left it open to the white minority in Rhodesia to frustrate its objects and thus to prevent progress to majority rule within the time permitted. This is the burden of my complaint against the present Government's proposal: that if the opportunities allowed in those proposals are used by the white minority, the objectives the Government claim to have set themselves in making these proposals can be frustrated without even violating the terms of the agreement.
Mr. Braine: That may be so. But objections must be seen against the circumstances of the time. The objections made in 1961 have to be seen against the background of proposals which, for the first time, gave Africans 15 seats out of 65 in the legislature, a voting system which made it necessary for candidates of either race to pay regard to the views and interests of the other, safeguarding provisions for constitutional rights enforceable in the courts, as proposed by the Monckton Commission, and a declaration of rights which provided that no person should be subjected to a

571
condition, restriction or disability on account of race or accorded a privilege or advantage denied to others because of race.
I remember telling the House at the time that that declaration provided a new and essential element in the task of ridding Rhodesia of the fear that one racial group might act unfairly towards another and in building mutual confidence between the races. I said that I believed it would play a major role in creating a climate of opinion unfavourable to racial discrimination.
One did not expect then, any more than now, universal approval for such proposals. I remember saying that there were some who did not think they went far enough while others felt they went too far. Although I am against hon. Members quoting their own speeches, perhaps I might repeat one passage in my speech at that time. I said that.
"in Southern Rhodesia there are extremists of both races who, if I may borrow Burke's famous dictum, view moderation as a sort of treason. We cannot satisfy everyone. We have to find the point of balance in the situation and then choose a course which will command the support of the majority in the country, the moderates, which will preserve stability, encourage responsibility and provide a secure basis for further advance."—[OH-ICIAL REPORT, 22nd June, 1961; Vol. 642, c. 1712.]
We know what happened. The Labour Party voted against those proposals. That action discouraged African nationalists at the time from accepting and working the 1961 Constitution. African voters were discouraged if not intimidated from registering as voters, and they were discouraged from voting. In the general election of 1962, Sir Edgar Whitehead's Government, who had accepted that Constitution, were defeated and Rhodesia started on her long, sad journey down the road to rebellion, U.D.I., sanctions and racial discrimination.
The reason why I am mentioning these matters is that now we have my right hon. Friend's proposed settlement we see history beginning to repeat itself, albeit in different circumstances. The situation, of course, is worse. The power of Britain to influence events has weakened. We have had six years of lost opportunity. It does not lie, therefore, in the mouths of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to criticise us. The
572
situation with which we are confronted has worsened; our position has weakened. Yet it is clear from the speeches that we have heard today from the benches opposite that the Opposition have learned nothing from the past. They have failed to solve the problem themselves. They tell us that a settlement on the lines proposed by my right hon. Friend would be dishonourable and impolitic and that it will antagonise friendly Commonwealth countries, encourage our enemies and make our lives more difficult at the United Nations.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Will not it?
Mr. Braine: It may do. However, in a moment I shall ask right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite to face the logical consequence of throwing away this opportunity. If they care so much for African well-being, African security and African prosperity, let them consider the consequences of rejecting this opportunity.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Earlier in his speech, the hon. Gentleman referred to the 1961 constitution as being one under which one group could not dominate another. Does not he realise that the 1969 constitution was supposed to enshrine those principles and has apartheid written into the very ethos (-Z it? Quite apart from this business of parity, every group in the community is supposed to be pitched against the other: European against African, Masuri against Matabele, urban African against rural African. The whole thing is an apartheid constitution, and it will remain such even after these proposals.
Mr. Braine: That is precisely what I have been saying. The situation has deteriorated. This is now 1971. The opportunity was lost after U.D.I. when on two occasions the Leader of the Opposition, then Prime Minister, tried to get a settlement.
Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: It will remain so.
Mr. Braine: It will not necessarily remain so. Too little attention has been paid by the hon. Gentleman and some of his hon. Friends to the specific proposals brought back by my right hon. Friend. There is to be a Commission to look into

573
the question of racial discrimination. The White Paper says:
"There shall be included in the functions of the Commission a special duty to scrutinise the provisions of the Land Tenure Act and to consider the possible creation of an independent and permanent Land Board to preside over the long-term resolutions of the problems involved."
Mr. Judd: Read on.
Mr. Braine: There is no need for me to read on. The hon. Gentleman should have read and digested the proposals before this debate.
Mr. Judd: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Braine: I have given way sufficiently already. I do not wish to detain the House over-long.
Although my right hon. Friend's proposed settlement envisages a method of ascertaining African opinion, the party opposite is in fact saying to Africans in advance that it is a sell-out and a waste of time.
That begs the main question, which is whether my right hon. Friend's proposed settlement helps the majority of Rhodesians who are black or not. That is the question. Our purpose all along, under both Governments, has been to help the black African in what is manifestly a difficult situation. That was our purpose in 1961. It was the Labour Government's purpose after It was the purpose of sanctions, as the Leader of the Opposition made clear on 11th November, 1965. He said:
"Our purpose is not punitive. We do not approach this tragic situation in a mood of recrimination. Our purpose is to restore a situation in Rhodesia in which there can be untrammeled loyalty and allegiance to the Crown and in which there can be, within whatever rules this House lays down, a free Government of Rhodesia acting in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 359.]
That was a view which was accepted by both sides of the House. It was an honourable view. I do not quarrel with it.
So much for our purpose. But our achievement, until my right hon. Friend broke the log jam and brought back this provisional agreement, has been very different. So far, the policy of sanctions has hurt the black Africans more than the white. I do not think that anyone would quarrel with that view. It has
574
undeniably injured the economy of neighbouring Zambia.
If there is genuine concern for the interests of the Rhodesian Africans, we should consider—and no one has really bothered to turn his mind to it in the debate—what rejection of the proposals would mean. It would not mean an end to the Smith régime, so heartily detested by hon. Members opposite. It would mean a resumption of the march down the path to apartheid and eventual absorption into the Republic of South Africa. For the Rhodesian Africans, there would then be only one way out—the way of revolution and bloodshed. Is that what the Opposition want? Is that what they are seeking to achieve? But perhaps some of them say that they will face the full implications.
I understand the views of those who say that the proposed settlement is too little consistent with the five principles, but I do not agree. They take the view that unimpeded progress to majority rule is not met because of the long period and the general uncertainty as to when it will be reached. That has not always been their view. The Leader of the Opposition said:
"The time required cannot be measured by time or calendar but only by achievement."
To be fair to the right hon. Gentleman—because in an earlier intervention I may have seemed to be unfair—he was at that time talking about the possibility of majority rule being reached within a period of somewhere between seven and 15 years. But he did not, it seemed to me, attach very great importance to the time scale.
Mr. S. C. Silkin: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us what he would regard as being the maximum period which complies with the expression "unimpeded progress to majority rule"?
Mr. Braine: I am not going to tell the hon. and learned Gentleman, for the simple reason that those of us who know the African continent and love it—and I share the concern of many people here for the future of Africa and its people—are not obsessed by the idea of one man, one vote. Can he tell me where else in Africa it does apply? It is a hard sober fact that except for Ethiopia—a land peculiar in Africa for its proud tradition of continuity—no African State

575
has kept the constitution it received at independence. If Parliaments exist, in many places half the Opposition are in prison or an Opposition is non-existent. I am not commenting adversely on this. I am asking the House to face reality.
I believe that what is happening in Africa is in a sense very exciting. Here is one part of the world where the traditional economic, social and political framework of order is being torn down and replaced simultaneously. Everywhere else these processes have taken place over a long period. But it is all happening within a generation in Africa. What surprises me about Africa is not that there is so much disturbance but that there is so little. I believe that what is happening there largely gives one renewed hope in human nature. I am not disturbed by what is happening.
At the same time, it seems to me unreasonable to expect in one part of Africa certain rules and applications to obtain when they are utterly non-existent elsewhere in the continent. It seems to me that what matters where the Africans are concerned in Rhodesia is the ending of unfair racial discrimination, the acceleration of education and the chance to gain a better life and a larger share in government. Does the settlement suggested by my right hon. Friend help in that direction or not? That is the question. The answer is a matter of judgment—of judgment not merely to be exercised in this House today, but to be exercised in Rhodesia itself.
I believe that we should suspend our judgment until the opportunity has been given for the Commission to ascertain the views of the various communities. I warmly welcome the Commission which is to look at the question of racial discrimination and existing legislation. But the crux of the matter lies in the way in which the Pearce Commission tests the opinions of all races. Unlike some hon. Members, I am impressed by the names of the three members. They are men of weight who have a reputation for fair and frank speaking.
It is imperative that the utmost care should be taken to ascertain the opinion of all groups in a way which is seen to be fair by the outside world as well as by Rhodesia. That can be done only by publishing the proposals in a way
576
which all groups understand and giving freedom for political discussion and activity. By "freedom"—I recall the circumstances of 1961–62—I mean without the intimidation which accompanied the discussion at that time. The Commission will have to satisfy the British Parliament and people that the proposals are genuinely accepted. If it fails in that, there will be no settlement.
Mr. Judd: When the hon. Gentleman talks about freedom for political discussion, does he believe that the leaders of African nationalist opinion should be free to take a meaningful part in the debate before the test of opinion takes place?
Mr. Braine: The White Paper states that there will be freedom of political activity. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes indeed. On page 7 it states:
"Before and during this test of acceptability normal political activities will be permitted to the satisfaction of the Commission provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner."
Then there are the provisions for the release of detainees. I do not know what the circumstances will be in the next few weeks, but I understand that detainees will be allowed to make their views known to the Commission.
If the hon. Gentleman means that there is to be freedom for a resumption of what happened in 1962 when Africans who would otherwise have registered as voters and voted were intimidated by having their homes burned, that is not the kind of political activity which is likely to make for a peaceful and decent settlement or free expression of opinion. Surely this is a matter which should be left to the Commission. If at the end of the day that body has not done its job properly, this House will recognise the fact and there will be no settlement.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Leeds, East that the Commission must be as meticulous, as patient and as concerned as the Monckton and Cobbold Commissions were at earlier times. We should remember that the Commission's work and the discussions which it will promote will not be conducted in a vacuum. Those who watch these matters know perfectly well that already programmes in English and African languages are being beamed to Rhodesia from Moscow and Dar-es-Salaam. There

577
is a continuous stream of tendentious, misleading and in some cases lying propaganda. [Interruption.] Hon. Gentlemen should wake up. This discussion is not being conducted in a vacuum. It is all part and parcel of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the people of Africa. We should recognise the forces which are at work.
After my right hon. Friend brought this proposed settlement back from Salisbury there was a broadcast from Dar-es-Salaam alleging that it meant that there would be no schooling for African children for ever. Yet we know that one of the fundamental proposals being advanced here is an acceleration of African education, and the British taxpayer is to provide some of the means for achieving it. We can expect that propaganda to be intensified.
I should make it quite clear, because I do not wish to be misunderstood, that I would prefer that there were no settlement at all rather than that this country should be open to the charge that the implications of what is proposed were not fully understood by the people it was supposed to serve. Therefore, the test for me will be the way that the Commission conducts its job and listens patiently to every point of view in every part of Rhodesia.
In that spirit, and that spirit alone, I support my right hon. Friend's proposals and wish them success.
9.45 p.m.
Mr. Gavin Strang: The hon. Member for Essex, South-East (Mr. Braine) has described the 1961 constitution, and I do not think that any one would doubt the hopes that he had for that constitution. It is well worth remembering that the five principles originally enunciated by the Foreign Secretary were based on the 1961 constitution, and that when we speak about improving the status of Africans we are referring to that constitution.
This settlement is not only a betrayal of the five principles but, from the point of view of the Africans, is a setback from the position under the 1961 constitution because, under its provisions 15 of the members of the Legislative Assembly were directly elected Africans and, with regard to the other 50 seats, as they were on the roll, and because of the complicated cross-voting procedure,
578
they had at least 25 per cent. influence on the election of those members. Under the proposals before us there will be only eight directly elected Africans. The 50 Members of Parliament will be elected by a purely European roll. Furthermore, the non-elected Africans, the Africans elected by the electoral colleges of the chiefs and head men, will be given more say in what happens than will the directly elected Africans.
Not only is this settlement a betrayal of the five principles and a setback from the 1961 constitution, but it contains no meaningful concession whatsoever by the illegal Smith régime. If one considers the higher African roll, one sees that Africans have to register to the extent of 6 per cent. of Europeans before they get even two directly elected members in the Legislature. Who has ever heard of a roll being created which started without anyone being elected by it?
It has been estimated that in a certain period of time the Africans will get two directly elected members, and when they climb to 12 per cent. of the European roll they will get another two non-elected African members, but then they will have to go up to 18 per cent. before they get another two directly elected members. One can make all sorts of calculations about how long it will take to advance the status of the Africans, but this higher roll will be under the control of the Europeans, whom we cannot trust.
Why cannot the Foreign Secretary give us some estimate of when the Africans will achieve parity? He did not refer to European immigration. As has been said, this is a crucial factor in the Rhodesian economy. The economic plan drawn up for Rhodesia by Professor Sadie of South Africa suggests that the Rhodesians should go in for an annual net immigration of 10,000 white Europeans. Furthermore, we know the difficulties which African graduates have in obtaining jobs in Rhodesia. Between 1,000 and 2,000 African graduates have left the country because they cannot get jobs there.
Because of the Rhodesian proposals for the advancement of their economy, there is no hope that a sufficient number of Africans will get the four years secondary education and the income necessary for them to obtain parity this century.

579
The Commission on Racial Discrimination is a nonsense. We have had a commission before. It said that the Land Apportionment Act was the very essence of racialism, but what happened? The Rhodesian Government brought in an even more reactionary Act, the Land Tenure Act.
Paragraph 3 of the White Paper says that the Rhodesian Government will accept the Commission's findings
"subject only to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character".
What does the Foreign Secretary have in mind? Or was it put in simply because Mr. Smith insisted on it? Are there genuine reasons why the Rhodesian Government might not accept the findings of the Commission? I hope that the Attorney-General will give us at least one example of the kind of situation which would justify the Rhodesian Government's turning down the recommendations of the Commission.
The Declaration of Human Rights is not worth the paper on which it is written, because it does not apply to existing Rhodesian legislation. The courts will have to interpret the law as it stands in Rhodesia. For example, under the Unlawful Organisations Act an organisation such as Cold Comfort Farm could be banned if the Rhodesian Government decided that it is likely to threaten the security of the State. Thus even under the Declaration of Human Rights the Africans will have virtually no protection whatsoever.
As for this great aid which the Government are going to give to the Rhodesians, what is it to be used for? It is going to be used for projects agred between the Rhodesian and British Governments. It is going to be used to propel the Rhodesian economy along lines already suggested by Profesor Sadie. It is going to be used for technical education. It would appear that the way in which the money is used is to be decided largely by the Rhodesian Government, a Government pursuing an economic plan in which Professor Sadie said that the European population must in the long term continue to provide
"the material and administrative ability, the professional and technical men and those skills and experience which are prerequisite to the
580
employment of workers in the lower echelons of the skilled hierarchy, and which cannot simply be imparted to an economically underdeveloped people by way of a crash programme of education and instruction".
He goes on to refer to the need to have a net inflow of 10,000 Europeans.
I now want to deal with the question of the test of acceptability. In 1964 the Foreign Secretary spoke in terms of a constitutional conference and of a referendum. It seems to me that there can be only one meaningful test of opinion, and this must involve a referendum in which the Africans vote. It is nonsense to think that we can have a reactionary Tory Government doing a deal with a small group of white settlers affecting live million Africans and that the test of acceptability should be a Commission appointed by the reactionary Tory Government, serviced by the Civil Service of this white Rhodesian illegal régime. What an absurdity?
Hon. Members opposite may ask what is the alternative. The fact is that whatever our alternative is, we certainly cannot stomach what amounts to a complete sell-out. Our alternative—and it is not a particularly exciting one—can only be to maintain our responsibilities to the Africans, to the international community, and to maintain sanctions so that at least the Africans in Rhodesia know that we are on their side, so that they will not lose complete hope and so that they will have faith in Europeans as people who are prepared to work towards their advancement.
Let us face it. This is a cynical betrayal of five million Africans. The White Paper is not aimed at achieving majority rule. The proposed constitution is designed to prevent majority rule. It is a totally fraudulent document. The white régime know it and they are saying so. The Africans know it and Joshua Nkomo said it. We know it and, what is more, hon. Members opposite including the Foreign Secretary know it also.
9.54 p.m.
Lieut.-Col. Colin Mitchell: After six hours and 20 speakers, I am delighted to be the 21st, even if only for six minutes. I have sat here for the last six hours trying to retain some sense of perspective about events in an African country, 6,000 miles away, and it has not been very easy even

581
for Members like myself, steeped in the realities of tribal life, both at home and in Africa.
I support—and I need not be interrupted in the short time available—the initiative of Her Majesty's Government in these proposals for a settlement, because I believe they are eminently sensible, and I will not get involved in emotive yardsticks like "fair and honourable" as some people have done so disastrously tonight. It is a sensible solution because it is based on the inescapable facts of the situation. It offers a programme which will lead to a multi-racial Rhodesian society independent of the Union of South Africa and apartheid; and that is what we all want.
The danger in this debate, which has been obvious to us all, is that many hon. Members have been confusing ends and means. Cooperation in this matter can be pursued only for the sake of limited and specific objectives and the goal remains a responsible peaceful multi-racial Rhodesia. Hon. Members opposite who have been dismissing some of our good arguments to that end and implying that this solution is capable of being abused should, before they impugn the Smith Government's motives, try to appreciate some of the difficulties in Central and Southern Africa today. Indeed, history will show that it was a failure to understand some of the strategic and geographical factors there which accounted for the failure of our own sanctions.
Any objective consideration must lead to the conclusion that for the foreseeable future the South African Government will remain the most powerful in the area and that South Africa will remain the economic power house of Central and Southern Africa. Politically, we have noticed that South Africa is extending its contacts into what we call black Africa, but there is no doubt, militarily, that the South African Government will subdue any racial-nationalist conflict on their own borders as ruthlessly as they bring them to an end internally.
It is that factor which to my mind, as a military analyst, makes me look at the requirements in Central and Southern Africa for a peaceful solution, and compare the proposals set out by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in the
582
White Paper with what I regard as the three essentials for a peaceful solution. Those three essentials are these. First, moderate but sure progress in economic expansion and social development. The White Paper offers that. Second, reconciliation or compromise towards the divisive factor of race. The White Paper offers that. Third, political order which avoids recourse to extremes of violence. The White Paper offers that, too. For these reasons, I give it warm support.
We have known in our own experience of emergent African States and the problems of political independence the salutary lesson of the need for military régimes after periods of civil and inter-tribal warfare which have brought diminished personal freedom. My personal experience of African military leaders, including one who is now President of Uganda, is that they become estranged from the politicians whom they serve, and the results of that are obvious to us. The black Askari of the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Rhodesian police will form a nucleus of leaders in the future in Rhodesia.
I believe that independence as such—I am in no sense mocking independence—is no panacea for unemployment, low capital investment or ethnic conflict, which are the major factors in African life.
We have seen evidence in today's debate of the dangers of applying irrelevant tests. The issue is not approval or disapproval of the Smith régime. The issue before us now is approval or disapproval of an acceptance of that régime so as to advance the conditions of the African majority. The character of the régime itself is only one factor in calculating the wisdom and morality of such an acceptance, that is, an acceptance of advancement in the conditions of the African majority.
There is, therefore, no sacrifice of principle involved for anyone in the House tonight. The r·égime is not the issue—only an alliance with it in order to ensure genuine democratic advance in Rhodesia. For that reason, I welcome the settlement. It is the outcome of a brilliant negotiation by the Foreign Secretary which fully deserves the support of his fellow countrymen and all right hon. and hon. Members tonight.
It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.
Ordered,
That the Motion relating to Rhodesia may be proceeded with at this day's Sitting, though opposed, until Eleven o'clock.—[Mr. Pym.]
Question again proposed.
10.0 p.m.
Sir Elwyn Jones: The House tonight will be making a decision of major importance affecting the fate of, first, 250,000 Europeans and, secondly, 5,250,000 Africans, Her Majesty's subjects, whose well being we hold in trust, a trust imposed on us by our history and expressly imposed on us by virtue of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, under whose provisions we have accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well being of Rhodesia's inhabitants, including their political advancement. Our decision will affect our international reputation and standing. Rhodesia is a British responsibility, but it is a world concern.
By withdrawing the Rhodesian problem from the international community and entering into an agreement between the Government of this country and the rebel Ministers, we place ourselves as a country in the position of undertaking not only moral, but continuing international legal, obligations in respect of the people of Rhodesia for which we shall remain answerable. It is we who will be called to account for what results from and flows from this settlement. We should undertake that burden only if we are certain that the terms are just and equitable.
The lamentable fact is that we already face the situation that even if the House tonight approves the proposals which the Government make, those proposals are unlikely to be acceptable to world opinion, to the United Nations and the vast majority of African States, which, after all, are the most important States in this context. Reactions already reported indicate that the proposed settlement is likely to do immense harm politically and economically to this country's relations with Africa as a whole.
As the hon. Member for Horncastle (Mr. Tapsell) said in a somewhat tormented speech, this is a melancholy occasion. In reference to him, what has
584
happened to the liberal Tories? We used to hear clarion calls of principle from them. They have retired to a miserable shell in the course of the debate tonight.
The test of our fulfilment of our duty to the Africans of Rhodesia has been generally accepted in the House as compliance with the five principles, which we have debated at length today. The first principle, of unimpeded progress to majority rule, must be progress from the basis of the lawful, 1961, pre-U.D.I. constitution. Unfortunately, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds. East (Mr. Healey) pointed out, the Government's proposals are based not on the lawful constitution, but on the backward-looking Rhodesian Front constitution of 1969 which was deliberately designed by the Rhodesian Front to ensure that there should never be African majority rule in Rhodesia. That constitution expressly precludes Africans from ever attaining more than parity of representation with Europeans in the House of Assembly. It is an arrogant, racialist provision. It did not exist in the 1961 constitution and progress from that is no progress.
On paper, the settlement terms provided for parity. After parity there is to be a highly complex operation in the course of which it is theoretically possible for the Africans to emerge with a small majority, but nevertheless not a majority corresponding with their numerical strength. I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he will give an estimate as to when parity will be reached, when majority rule will he reached. There has been a great shyness on the part of the Government Front Bench about the interval of time. What interval of time do the Government think reasonable to impose on Africans before they have majority rule? My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in the debate in October, 1968, on the "Fearless" proposals gave two estimates for majority rule under those proposals—seven to 10 years or 12 to 15 years
We were assured in Salisbury by Chief Justice Beadle that our proposals would result in majority rule in seven years. Will the Attorney-General now give a specific answer to this question which has been so carefully avoided? It would seem that the delay in achieving parity and majority rule will be indefinite and

585
prolonged, likely to extend well into the next century.
The reason for that is the nature of the franchise set out on pages 18 and 19 of the White Paper. When one compares the franchise proposals with the average wages at present applying in Rhodesia it can be seen how remote achievement of parity and majority rule will be. The higher roll is the only relevant one in terms of political advance, as the lower roll will remain unaltered in number regardless of the number of enrolments. The key figures in the franchise are an annual income of 1,800 Rhodesian dollars or an annual income of 1,200 Rhodesian dollars plus four years' secondary education of the prescribed standard. In 1970 the average income of employed Africans in Rhodesia was 312 dollars a year. Incidentally, the average non-African income in 1970 was 3,104 dollars, which is a vivid picture of the unequal world which exists in Rhodesia for black and white.
Those are the figures and that is the enormous leap that the African will have to take in terms of income to qualify for the higher roll. The stages in increase of African representation are to take place not when the African community succeeds in producing certain absolute numbers of qualified electors but when it achieves a certain percentage of the number of European electors. It has been pointed out that the Smith régime has announced its intention of a deliberate policy of European immigration which will have the direct effect of postponing the emergence of additional African seats. As to the educational test of four years of secondary education, whereas four years of secondary education is provided compulsorily for every white child in Rhodesia it is provided for perhaps only 2 per cent. of black children—another illustration of the two worlds there. The number of black children reaching that level in future remains under the control of the Rhodesian Government, with their overwhelming majority of white electors, who are very unlikely to hurry things along towards their own political defeat.
The Government have pointed—and no doubt the Attorney-General will seek to do the same—to the proposals in the
586
White Paper for further expenditure on education. How much of the £50 million will be spent on education? That has been asked by the hon. Member for Norwich and by other hon. Members. We see from page 16 of the White Paper that part of the money is to go for irrigation schemes and industrial development of different kinds—no doubt all to good purposes. But how much will be spent on education?
When we were discussing these matters in Rhodesia we expressly required money to be set aside for education, and I well remember Mr. Smith and Mr. Lardner Burke telling us more than once, "We think it would be wrong to accelerate the educational advance of the Africans simply in order to improve their political status in the community".
Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. For the record, I should like to make it clear that I have the honour to represent King's Lynn, not Norwich.
Sir Elwyn Jones: I might have been disturbed on a more significant matter than that. At least the intervention had the merit of courtesy.
The £50 million is apparently to be spread over various purposes. The House is entitled to a precise answer from the Attorney-General as to how much will be spent on education.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison rose—
Sir Elwyn Jones: Not for the moment.
Shall we have any control or influence over the use of the funds? Does the phrase in the White Paper to the effect that £50 million is to be "matched appropriately" by the Rhodesians mean that they will make a pound for pound contribution? Looking at the first principle and the proposals in the White Paper, the best commentary on whether the terms establish unimpeded progress to majority rule was provided by the Financial Gazette in Rhodesia of 26th November this year. This is the leading Rhodesian right-wing journal, and it said:
"Majority rule is so far in the future that it cannot be considered a serious possibility at this stage".

587
It is no wonder that the champagne corks were popping in Salisbury when the terms of the settlement were announced.
On the second principle—guarantees against retrogression—the parliamentary safeguards provided are inadequate. There are no external safeguards in the scheme. There are no safeguards by way of referendum of the type which were in the 1961 constitution, and pressure brought to bear on only one elected African will be sufficient to enable retrogressive changes to be made.
As to the third principle, I gather that what is mainly called in aid is the increase in the number of Africans on the African lower roll. But that is of no political significance because it cannot increase the number of African seats. As to the higher roll which Africans will be able to enter, that has been hailed as a great advance. But under the 1961 constitution there were 15 directly elected African representatives and the B roll voters were able to exert an influence of up to 25 per cent. in any constituency through the cross-voting mechanism.
The settlement proposals allow for only eight directly elected African representatives, and there are no cross-voting provisions. It is a backward trend. There are no directly elected Africans in the Senate at all. As to African advancement politically, there is no hint that an African will be appointed as a Minister or given office. There is no indication in the White Paper of the opening of the middle and upper levels of Government service in Rhodesia to black Rhodesians, though by now there are plenty of black Rhodesian graduates competent to undertake high office in the public administration. At present the University of Salisbury, for instance, is producing 300 a year, but they are limited to low-level Government jobs by what Professor Miller in The Times today calls
"the unwritten rule that no black man must control or instruct a white man. That no black Rhodesian holds … any position of seniority in the Civil Service."
I see nothing in the White Paper to indicate any change in that lamentable situation.
As to the fourth principle, progress towards ending racial discrimination, the most blatant and obvious racial dis-
588
crimination is the proposed constitution itself. It is riddled through and through with discriminatory provisions. It is all very well to acclaim the Declaration of Rights, but the most important right for the African is some degree of political power to enable him to decide his own fate. That he will not get from this constitution. Not only is the proposed constitution riddled with discrimination, but the proposed commission will have no power, presumably, to deal with that. That will be outside the ambit of the much-heralded commission. So are many of the laws of Rhodesia.
With regard to the review commission, there is the remarkable condition that the Rhodesian Government are free to reject its recommendations for
"considerations that any Government would regard as overriding."
What, in the field of discrimination, will such considerations be? It is hard to conceive of what they might amount to, and, therefore, one gets no reassurance from provisions which contain that potential get-out for the Rhodesia Administration. What the Rhodesian Front Government would be likely to regard as considerations of an overriding character are hardly likely to be the same as those which the African population, or even, if I may say so, the Government here, would so regard, and in this field, and in particular on the important land issue, I fear that we are faced with a risk of a sell-out, with consequences which will be grave for the social life of Rhodesia
It is significant that one of the terms of reference of the Commission—in paragraph 3(b)—accepts the principle of protecting European land by asking the Commission to consider the rights of an African professional man to practise in a European area, and that is a pointer to what is in store and what is contemplated. As has been said by many speakers in the course of the debate, there is not even an undertaking not to evict African tenants from Epworth or Chishawasha, and one would have thought that there would have come a clarion message from the Government to the Rhodesian Front to lay off that splendid initiative by fine Christians, instead of letting it become a highly qualified additional problem in the terms of the proposed settlement.

589
It is said that there will be a new and strengthened Declaration of Rights which will be enforceable in the courts. In most respects the Declaration is not new but goes back to the 1961 and 1969 constitutions. It reflects no substantial advance in the protection of human rights, and in important respects its provisions are not enforceable in the courts. The Declaration of Human Rights in the 1961 and 1969 constitutions and the present proposals start from a lower level than would be acceptable in a European democracy. A comparison between them at the outset involves acceptance of lower norms than would be acceptable in Western democracies. I see no substantial advance in the settlement declaration over the proposals in the 1961 constitution; indeed, there is some deterioration.
The settlement declaration makes one advance on the 1969 Declaration in that it goes back to the 1961 principle of providing an appeal to the courts. The 1961 constitution also provided for further appeal to the Privy Council. That does not apply to laws in force before what is called the fixed date, that is to say, the date of the commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act of 1972, nor to laws made thereafter which survive for ten years, however much those laws may offend against the protected rights. It is no more than a partial return to what the Africans enjoyed before.
The settlement declaration, on the face of it, makes a potentially useful provision that certain limitations placed on human rights in legislation must be shown to be
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".
Fine. Unfortunately, that requirement is not applied to all limitations that are placed by legislation on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. For instance, it does not apply to the limitations placed on the protection of the right to personal liberty, which is subject to exceptions for preventive detention and confinement in the specified areas. It accepts preventive detention and racial segregation in circumstances where there is no public emergency and without any right of recourse to the courts. It provides for hearings in secret on a Minister's certificate alone, which is unappealable. There are many other fields where the
590
doctrine of reasonable justification in a democratic society does not apply. Why is that? Why should it not apply as a test right across the board? I hope that we shall have an answer to that question from the right hon. and learned Gentleman.
As to the value of recourse to the Rhodesian Appellate Division, it gives me no pleasure to say that this will give little comfort to the Africans of Rhodesia. The Africans have no faith in judges who protested loyalty to the Queen and enforced the laws of the rebel against the real Sovereign. How does the appellate court look to a man like Madzimabuto who has been in detention for many years without trial? He brought an application under the Declaration of Rights in the 1961 constitution. The Rhodesian judges denied him the remedy. He appealed to the Privy Council, which said he was entitled to his remedy. Following this, an Order in Council was made by Her Majesty which the judges of Rhodesia were bound to obey under the law which they had taken an oath to enforce.
What did those judges do? They rejected the advice of the Privy Council and the Order of Her Majesty, and Madzimabuto has been rotting in gaol and in detention ever since. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] One of the judges who was responsible for that matter is still Chief Justice and the other will be the person who will preside over the Appellate Division. These also are the judges who failed to give effect to the grant of a reprieve in the Queen's name and, despite the reprieve, three men were hanged. Some judges in Rhodesia were loyal to their oath and preferred to leave the country.
Mr. Stonehouse: Before my right hon. and learned Friend leaves that point, would he care to comment on the functions of Lord Pearce in that connection?
Sir Elwyn Jones: I have nothing but respect and admiration for Lord Pearce and his opinion in the case, although I do not agree with it, was one to which he could legitimately come. [Interruption.] He may not be a good politician, but that was not the question I was asked.
I come to the fifth principle, which in many ways is the most crucial of the lot. If the views of the people of

591
Rhodesia as a whole are to be ascertained, what are the essentials? If it is to be done by a Commission, it must be a Commission which will inspire confidence in the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Despite what I have said about the chairman, I do not think that what is proposed comes up to that test.
I trust that we shall hear from the Attorney-General his response to some of the suggestions which have been made for additional members of the Commission. It is surely imperative that there should be a black face on that Commission, somebody of the quality of Sir Hugh Wooding, former Chief Justice of Trinidad or somebody of that quality. But the awful thing is that I do not think the Rhodesian Front would allow it. This is the heart of the matter and this is the situation faced by the Government: they dare not suggest it. I put to them the challenge. Let them say tonight whether there is to be either an African face or a face which is not allegedly white on the Commission.
The next necessity is that the proper facilities should be available to enable African opinion to be formed and expressed. I submit that the Commission cannot arrive at a verdict worthy of weight and belief unless normal political life is permitted to flourish freely during the testing of acceptability. The proposals concede that there shall be normal political activity. What does that mean? I understand, for instance, that no Africans have been allowed to hold party political meetings in the tribal trust lands for years and years. Even the present African Members of Parliament have to have permission to visit their constituencies, let alone to speak at meetings—and some have difficulty in doing that.
It must not be forgotten that we are talking about a police State. This test of acceptability will be carried out in the conditions of a police State. There is not a word in the White Paper about lifting censorship. Radio and television time is to be permitted only to political parties represented in the House of Assembly, and the major African nationalist parties will be denied the opportunity to consult and to influence opinion. Therefore, there is nothing by way of reassurance in the proposals that the conditions under which this test is
592
to be carried out will be satisfactory or acceptable.
There was a great deal of force in the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) that the Commission should make a preliminary report and establish first whether conditions exist in which it can operate fairly and effectively, before starting its work. I hope that that will be done.
While sympathising readily with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney-General indeed, with anyone who has had to negotiate with the gentlemen of the Rhodesian Front—I have examined the package that they have brought back and, in my view, it fails to meet the test of compliance with the five principles.
In those circumstances, in my opinion, it is not a settlement which this country can honourably enter into or honourably recommend African and world opinion to accept. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I will unhesitatingly register our objections to it in the Division Lobby.
10.31 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Sir Peter Rawlinson): Before I deal with the various points which have been raised and the numerous questions which have been posed to me in the course of this long debate, perhaps I might make one or two general comments.
For three days, on and off, I sat with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in a room in Salisbury listening to the views of well over a hundred representatives, men and women, most of them Africans, on the future of their country and of themselves. No one could fail to be impressed and moved by what they said. Of course, they expressed their views on the situation far more vividly than anyone in this House could, but they expressed them with a degree of reality and commonsense which made those views all the more impressive.
The continuous theme running through the comments of all the various different groups was the need for some new initiative, some reasonable alternative to what they accepted to be their present hopeless situation. But they saw clearly the reality of the power identified with their present Government.

593
They sought an opportunity for moderate opinion to be released from the present political and social atmosphere, in which all criticism and opposition could be and usually was branded as unpatriotic and in which a political crisis prevented the course upon which their country was set being changed.
All, save a few extremists, hoped that our visit might lead to a break-through which would give them hope of change or at least some proposals upon which they themselves could pronounce for themselves. There were three subjects to which, in practical but in realistic terms, they came back time and time again.
First, of course, they sought a change from the 1969 constitution, which they abhorred. But they accepted that that change would have to be gradual. They wanted the change to be definite and one which would not be reversed unilaterally. Secondly, common to every single group, there was a call for a definitive and legislative statement of basic rights, justiciable before the courts, so that a remedy existed for infringement. Whatever the right hon. and learned Member for West Ham, South (Sir Elwyn Jones) says about his confidence in the courts, all these different groups called for a return to the 1961 position of having a justiciable Declaration of Rights and some remedy before the courts. The third subject to which they returned time and again was that of a fresh approach to the now two-generation-old policy and attitude towards the law on land—the Land Tenure Act, 1969—which affects so much of what they want to change in Rhodesia.
I listened to them for three days. They were speaking from their own first-hand experience over the past six years. They were speaking with the knowledge of the reality of Rhodesian conditions. No one could have failed to place great weight on their opinions. It is, therefore, difficult to accept what the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said—that there is an alternative, namely, "slogging on". They wanted to see a breakaway from slogging on and an opportunity for those they represented, the moderate, sensible, realistic people of Rhodesia who want a fair deal in the new circumstances which lie ahead.
They posed the question which we have to answer. It is whether the changes
594
proposed afford a sufficient measure of hope on which Rhodesians will be able to say whether they are acceptable or whether we should, as many hon. Members opposite have suggested, leave all Rhodesians to go on as they are, on the road to a final solution of repression and oppression, to the apartheid which would follow and to which the only alternative would be revolution.
Mr. Healey: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm the impression that many of us will have gained from his last remarks—that the Government no longer regard the fulfilment of the five principles as the test of the acceptability of the agreement but believe that there is no chance whatever of an improvement in the situation?
The Attorney-General: I have already had some exchanges with the right hon. Gentleman today and I will answer that question. But I am not much inclined, as he will understand, to give way to him after our earlier exchanges. I said when I began that I would give my personal impressions of those I saw and to whom I spoke in my right hon. Friend's presence and to whom I listened when they spoke to him, when they gave, from their first-hand experience, their views about what should be a final solution of the problem.
The constitutional changes about which they spoke, and which I will spell out for the right hon. Gentleman—he seemed in some doubt and asked me questions about them—are changes in the 1969 constitution. They include the repeal of the income tax regulator, which all of us, I would have thought would regard as a deplorable form of regulator; the repeal of the express bar on advancement beyond parity; the repeal of the ability of the Europeans to amend the special entrenched provisions of the constitution at will; and a ban on future legislation increasing racial discrimination.
The proposals before the House provide for an advance to parity and beyond, and this provision would be entrenched because to change it would need a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly but a majority, above all, of the African Members of Parliament, and it would have to be enacted before this House was called upon to do any enacting itself.
The immediate progress is illustrated by the fact that it is estimated that there

595
are sufficient Africans eligible, if they now register, to provide four more seats under the 6 per cent. regulator. There will be two at once if 5,000 Africans register, and it is estimated that there will be two more if a further 5,000 register. At present, about 12,000 Africans are eligible for registration in accordance with the franchise provisions which are set out in the proposals. Right hon. and hon. Gentleman have said that the franchise provisions are so high that they will not permit Africans to get on to the higher African roll. However, it is estimated that there are about 12,000 Africans eligible for registration, so there will be an immediate increase of 25 per cent. in the representation of the Africans.
The blocking mechanism is provided by the majority each of the European and Asian groups of Members of Parliament. It is clear from page 14 of the White Paper that there must be a majority of the total African membership, not simply of those present.
The right hon. Member for Leeds, East and other hon. Members spoke about the indirectly elected Members of Parliament. I should make it quite clear that they are not nominees of the chiefs who are paid by the Government. They are elected by an electoral college, of whom the majority in that college are themselves elected councillors. They are not, therefore, nominees of the chiefs; they are not Government pensioners, as was suggested; they are not salaried by the Government. Indeed, they were one of the groups who saw the Secretary of State and expressed very decided views about the future of the country, and, as has been noticed, they have already criticised some aspects of the proposals. But, above all, as my right hon. Friend pointed out in opening the debate, their voting record in the Assembly shows that they have always been united with the directly elected African Members of Parliament on all dissentious matters.
Under the constitution, the procedure is towards parity and, at parity, providing for a referendum among Africans. They will all be directly elected if that is the wish of the African vote. After the referendum the blocking mechanism comes into force with the two-thirds majority of Members of Parliament. That means that 17 directly-elected Africans,
596
if that is the wish of the Africans under the referendum, must vote affirmatively for any change.
I was asked about the Commission. The Commission provides for an equal number of Africans and Europeans, but its duty is to decide whether there is any alternative which is preferable to the 10 common roll seats system, which is what will happen unless it makes a recommendation which is accepted by the House of Assembly. If it does not recommend an alternative, the 10 common roll seats system comes into operation. That is only if the Commission, half of which is composed of Africans, makes such a recommendation and at least 17 African Members of Parliament approve. The Rhodesian Government must carry all these provisions into law before this House is called upon to make a decision by enacting any legislation.
Mr. S. C. Silkin: Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman able to answer the question which I put to his right hon. Friend earlier: what do the Government regard as being the acceptable maximum period for unimpeded progress towards majority rule?
The Attorney-General: The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that any estimate depends upon variables, such as the number of persons involved, economic matters, boom, and so on—in fact, all the variables which prevented the Leader of the Opposition from making estimates at the time of "Fearless" or at the time of "Tiger".
Much reference has been made to the Declaration of Rights. Those who came to see the Secretary of State attached the greatest importance to it. If it is said that it is not of any importance, why was it that the present Rhodesian Government omitted from the 1969 Constitution the fact that it was justiciable? They changed that because they knew that the fact that it was justiciable was a considerable brake upon their policies.
The present proposals re-establish the full effect of the discrimination paragraphs, replace the justiciable remedy and give the forms of rights which have been guaranteed, with the exceptions permitted in the common form code and based upon the European Convention, and which have been evolved in all declarations of rights over the last 10 years.

597
It is also effective because it shackles the power to extend discrimination under existing law by Statutory Instrument. That is of considerable importance because it means that the concept which the present Rhodesian Government have in the Land Tenure Act of being able to give powers which, thereafter, by subordinate legislation, could increase discrimination by such methods as creating African townships cannot be used. If the subsidiary legislation increases discrimination, it will fall within paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Rights. The exceptions are those which have been included in other independence constitutions. They are the exceptions which the House has accepted in the constitutions of other countries which have been granted independence.
The Declaration of Rights lays down criteria, but legislation will be ultra vires if it falls within the term "discrimination", unless it is justifiable in the interests of Rhodesia as a whole—which is what was provided in 1961—or protects equitably different people. That was in the 1961 Constitution, which was approved by this Parliament and upon which the Leader of the Opposition bargained on "Tiger" and "Fearless". It must pass the test that discrimination is not increased. There was then no proposal to improve the 1961 Declaration of Rights, and it is that Declaration of Rights which has been imported into the present proposals.
The problem is not to eliminate all discrimination, because in the whole concept of Rhodesia, with the difficulties of the Land Tenure Act and the Land Apportionment Act—to which reference has been made today there has always been discrimination so that the African could avoid European and Asian exploitation by being provided with certain areas into which the European and Asian traders and businesses could not penetrate. That was a principle of the Land Apportionment which for 50 years has been accepted by this House.—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—It was accepted in 1961. It was the basis of the negotiations of the previous Labour Administration. It is hoped that the Review Commission will review, as it is directed to review, the Land Tenure Act. But it does not bring into the Declaration of Rights a sweeping and broad barring of some-
598
thing which can be for the protection of the African community—
Mr. Thorpe: I am grateful to the Attorney-General for giving way. He has devoted some attention to the fact that no further repressive legislation could be introduced by reason of this agreement. Would he confirm that the Land Tenure Act, unless the Rhodesia men think otherwise, will remain on the Statute book, and that the 1960 Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Preventive Detention Act will remain on the Statute Book? That seems to me to be a rather good start.
The Attorney-General: The right hon. Gentleman has obviously read the White Paper. I am dealing with the Declaration of Rights which has been imported into these proposals and itself prevents the extension or increase—
Mr. Faulds: Answer the question.
The Attorney-General: Will the hon. Gentleman listen?
Mr. Faulds: Answer it.
The Attorney-General: Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Rights provides that the Rhodesia Front Government would be unable to introduce subordinate legislation on the pattern of the Land Tenure Act, and therefore that is a very considerable brake on the present extension—
Hon. Members: Answer.
Sir Elwyn Jones: It is the case that the Declaration of Rights provides for preventive detention without a state of emergency in conditions which are not justicable.
The Attorney-General: The right hon. and learned Gentleman was a Law Officer at the time and he will recall that constitutions given by this House and commended by Ministers in a Government of which the right hon. and learned Gentleman was a member provided, in the cases of Guyana and Mauritius, for preventive detention. The right hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Frederick Lee) defended it by saying that, abhorrent as it was to all, nevertheless it was necessary.
In fact, in the case of Rhodesia, the provision relating to 42 days and being brought before a tribunal gives a better safeguard than was provided in the

599
Guyana constitution to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman must have been indirectly a party.
Turning to the matter of land and the Review Commission, I want to remind the House of its purpose. It is a Commission which will include one African. The United Kingdom Government must agree all of its members. That was not the position with "Fearless". It must examine all aspects of racial discrimination. It must examine all existing laws. It must pay a special regard to the Land Tenure Act, and it must consider the creation of a multi-racial independent land board.
This is the instrument which will lead to a tackling of the problems in the broad field of discrimination. No other means was devised by right hon. and hon. Members opposite in the negotiations which they carried out, and the Commission which they suggested certainly did not have either the terms of reference or the context in which to do its work which the present proposed review Commission will have.
I come now to the test of acceptability, to which many right hon. and hon. Members have referred. I remind the House of the terms of reference. The Commission should satisfy itself that the proposals for a settlement have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia. So the first task of the men who compose the Commission is to satisfy themselves that the terms have been properly and fully explained to the population of Rhodesia.
Second, they have to ascertain by direct contact with all sections of the population whether the people of Rhodesia as a whole regard these proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence; and they are to report to the Secretary of State accordingly.
That is the task which is given to them. If they are not satisfied that the proposals have been fully and properly explained to the population of Rhodesia, they will so express their view, and if they are satisfied that the proposals have not been properly and fully explained, they cannot be satisfied that the people of Rhodesia regard these proposals as
acceptable. Such is the task which is given to them, to honourable and shrewd—I hope—men, to go out and find out the real opinion of people who live there. They have to satisfy themselves, and, if they are not satisfied, they will have to report accordingly. They will take what period of time they need to do their job to their satisfaction.
As my right hon. Friend said in opening the debate, the Commission will consist of a chairman and three or four deputy chairmen, who will all sign the report. They will be assisted by a number of assessors who have had experience of Africa, who have spent part of their lives working there. The interpreters will be supervised by experts who themselves speak the language, who are not employees of the Rhodesian Government, people such as the language experts of the multi-racial university in Rhodesia. It is not a question merely of consulting the Chiefs. The Commissioners will travel widely to village meetings and rural councils. They must satisfy themselves, and to satisfy themselves is the task which they have been given.
Among certain other points raised in the debate was one raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party. He spoke of some 50,000 Africans at Stapleford. I am informed that the number involved is something like 200, in a forest and national park area.
On each occasion since 1965, when attempts have been made to make a settlement, the position has been more difficult. All who really honestly and sincerely want to assist the people of Africa—and there are many who wish to do that—want to give at least a chance to the people of Rhodesia to make up their own minds. If they reject the proposals, so be it. But it would be criminal irresponsibility not to give the people of Rhodesia, all the people of Rhodesia, the opportunity to express their view.
Hon. Members: Shame.
Question put, That the Amendment be made:—
The House divided: Ayes 269, Noes 297.

Division No. 24.]

AYES

[11 p.m.

Abse, Leo

Allen, Scholefield

Ashley, Jack

Albu, Austen

Archer, Peter (Rowely Regis)

Ashton, Joe

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E)

Armstrong, Ernest

Atkinson, Norman

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

Ginsburg, David (Dewsbury)

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Barnes, Michael

Golding, John

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

Gourlay, Harry

Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

Barnett, Joel (Heywood and Royton)

Grant, George (Morpeth)

Moyle, Roland

Baxter, William

Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Beaney, Alan

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Murray, Ronald King

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

Oakes, Gordon

Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Ogden, Eric

Bidwell, Sydney

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

O'Halloran, Michael

Bishop, E. S.

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

O'Malley, Brian

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Hamling, William

Oram, Bert

Boardman, H. (Leigh)

Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

Orbach, Maurice

Hardy, Peter

Orme, Stanley

Booth, Albert

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Oswald, Thomas

Boltomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Hart, Rt. Hn. Judith

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

Broughton, Sir Alfred

Hattersley, Roy

Palmer, Arthur

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Heffer, Eric S.

Pardoe, John

Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Hooson, Emlyn

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Buchan, Norman

Horam, John

Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp-burn)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Pavitt, Laurie

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Pentland, Norman

Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Hughes, Mark (Durham)

Perry, Ernest G.

Cant, R. B.

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

Carmichael Neil

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Prescott, John

Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

Hunter, Adam

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

Price, William (Rugby)

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Janner, Greville

Probert, Arthur

Clark, David (Colne Valley)

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Rankin, John

Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

Cohen, Stanley

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

Concannon, J. D.

John, Brynmor

Rhodes, Geoffrey

Conlan, Bernard

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Richard, Ivor

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Cox, Thomas (Wandswotrh, C.)

Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Crawshaw, Richard

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Cronin, John

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n & R'dnor)

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

Roper, John

Cunningham, G. (Islington, S. W.)

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

Rose, Paul B.

Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven)

Kaufman, Gerald

Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

Dalyell, Tam

Kelley, Richard

Sandelson, Neville

Davidson, Arthur

Kerr, Russell

Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

Lambie, David

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Lamond, James

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

Latham, Arthur

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

Lawson, George

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

Leadbitter, Ted

Sillars, James

Deakins, Eric

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Silverman, Julius

de Freitas, Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey

Leonard, Dick

Skinner, Dennis

Delargy, Hugh

Lestor, Miss Joan

Small, William

Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

Smith, John (Lanarkshire, N.)

Dempsey, James

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Spearing, Nigel

Devlin, Miss Bernadette

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Spriggs, Leslie

Doig, Peter

Lipton, Marcus

Stallard, A. W.

Dormand, J. D.

Lomas, Kenneth

Steel, David

Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

Loughlin, Charles

Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)

Douglas-Mann, Bruce

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Stoddart, David (Swindon)

Driberg, Tom

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Duffy, A. E. P.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Strang, Gavin

Dunn, James A.

McBride, Neil

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Dunnett, Jack

McCann, John

Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

Eadie, Alex

McCartney, Hugh

Swain, Thomas

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

McElhone, Frank

Taverne, Dick

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

McGuire, Michael

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

Ellis, Tom

Mackenzie, Gregor

Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

English, Michael

Mackie, John

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Evans, Fred

Mackintosh, John P.

Tinn, James

Ewing, Harry

McManus, Frank

Torney, Tom

Faulds, Andrew

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Tuck, Raphael

Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

McNamara, J. Kevin

Urwin, T. W.

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Varley, Eric G.

Fitt, Gerard (Belfast, W.)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Wainwright, Edwin

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Marks, Kenneth

Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Marsden, F.

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Foley, Maurice

Marshall, Dr. Edmund

Wallace, George

Foot, Michael

Meacher, Michael

Watkins, David

Ford, Ben

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Weitzman, David

Forrester, John

Mendelson, John

Wellbeloved, James

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Mikardo, Ian

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Freeson, Reginald

Miller, Dr. M. S.

White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)

Galpern, Sir Myer

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Whitehead, Phillip

Garrett, W. E.

Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Gilbert, Dr. John

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

602

603

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

Mr. Joseph Harper and

Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

Woof, Robert

Mr. Tom Pendry.

NOES

Adley, Robert

Fidler, Michael

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

Le Marchant, Spencer

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)

Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

Fookes, Miss Janet

Longden, Gilbert

Astor, John

Fortescue, Tim

Loveridge, John

Atkins, Humphrey

Foster, Sir John

Luce, R. N.

Awdry, Daniel

Fowler, Norman

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

Fox, Marcus

MacArthur, Ian

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

McCrindle, R. A.

Balniel, Lord

Fry, Peter

McLaren, Martin

Batsford, Brian

Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Gardner, Edward

McMaster, Stanley

Bell, Ronald

Gibson-Watt, David

Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

McNair-Wilson, Michael

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (NewForest)

Benyon, W.

Glyn, Dr. Alan

Maddan, Martin

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Goodhart, Philip

Madel, David

Biffen, John

Gorst, John

Maginnis, John E.

Biggs-Davison, John

Gower, Raymond

Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

Blaker, Peter

Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

Marten, Neil

Boardman, Tom (Lecester, S. W.)

Gray, Hamish

Mather, Carol

Body, Richard

Green, Alan

Maude, Angus

Boscawen, Robert

Grieve, Percy

Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

Bossom, Sir Clive

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Mawby, Ray

Bowden, Andrew

Grylls, Michael

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Gummer, Selwyn

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Braine, Bernard

Gurden, Harold

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Bray, Ronald

Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Brewis, John

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeenshire, W.)

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Moate, Roger

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Hannam, John (Exeter)

Molyneaux, James

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Money, Ernie

Bryan, Paul

Haselhurst, Alan

Monks, Mrs. Connie

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N. & M.)

Hastings, Stephen

Monro, Hector

Buck, Antony

Havers, Michael

Montgomery, Fergus

Burden, F. A.

Hawkins, Paul

More, Jasper

Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

Hay, John

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Campbell, Rt. Hn. G. (Moray & Nairn)

Hayhoe, Barney

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

Carlisle, Mark

Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

Morrison, Charles (Devizes)

Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

Heseltine, Michael

Mudd, David

Channon, Paul

Hicks, Robert

Murton, Oscar

Higgins, Terence L.

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Chapman, Sydney

Hiley, Joseph

Nicholls, Sir Harmer

Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Chichester-Clark, R.

Holland, Philip

Normanton, Tom

Churchill, W. S.

Holt, Miss Mary

Nott, John

Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

Hordern, Peter

Onslow, Cranley

Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

Hornby, Richard

Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Clegg, Walter

Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

Osborn, John

Cockeram, Eric

Howell, David (Guildford)

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Cooke, Robert

Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Coombs, Derek

Hunt, John

Parkinson, Cecil (Enfield, W.)

Cooper, A. E.

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Percival, Ian

Cordle, John

Iremonger, T. L.

Peyton, Rt. Hn. John

Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Cormack, Patrick

James, David

Pink, R. Bonner

Costain, A. P.

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Pounder, Rafton

Crouch, David

Jessel, Toby

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch.

Crowder, F. P.

Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

d'Avigdor-Goldsdmid, Sir Henry

Jopling, Michael

Proudfoot, Wilfred

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

Dean, Paul

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

Raison, Timothy

Dixon, Piers

Kershaw, Anthony

Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

Kilfedder, James

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Drayson, G. B.

Kimball, Marcus

Redmond, Robert

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

Dykes, Hugh

King, Tom (Bridgwater)

Rees, Peter (Dover)

Eden, Sir John

Kinsey, J. R.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

Kirk, Peter

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Kitson, Timothy

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Knight, Mrs. Jill

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Farr, John

Knox, David

Ridsdale, Julian

Fell, Anthony

Lambton, Antony

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

Lane, David

Roberts, Michael (Carliff, N.)

604

605

Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

Rost, Peter

Sutcliffe, John

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Royle, Anthony

Tapsell, Peter

Wall, Patrick

Russell, Sir Ronald

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Ward, Dame Irene

Scott, Nicholas

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Warren, Kenneth

Sharples, Richard

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N. W.)

White, Roger (Gravesend)

Shelton, William (Clapham)

Tebbit, Norman

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Simeons, Charles

Temple, John M.

Wiggin, Jerry

Sinclair, Sir George

Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

Wilkinson, John

Skeet, T. H. H.

Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

Winterton, Nicholas

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Soref, Harold

Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Speed, Keith

Tilney, John

Woodnutt, Mark

Spence, John

Trafford, Dr. Anthony

Worsley, Marcus

Sproat, Iain

Trew, Peter

Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

Stainton, Keith

Tugendhat, Christopher

Younger, Hn. George

Stanbrook, Ivor

Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

van Straubenzee, W. R.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

Mr. Reginald Eyre and

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

Waddington, David

Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

Stokes, John

Walder, David (Clitheroe)

Main Question put:—
The House divided: Ayes 297; Noes 269.

Division No. 25.]

AYES

[11.12 p.m.

Adley, Robert

Corfield, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Cormack, Patrick

Hannam, John (Exeter)

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Costain, A. P.

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Crouch, David

Haselhurst, Alan

Archer, Jeffrey (Louth)

Crowder, F. P.

Hastings, Stephen

Astor, John

Davies, Rt. Hn. John (Knutsford)

Havers, Michael

Atkins, Humphrey

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Hawkins, Paul

Awdry, Daniel

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Maj.-Gen. James

Hay, John

Baker, Kenneth (St. Marylebone)

Dean, Paul

Hayhoe, Barney

Baker, W. H. K. (Banff)

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

Heath, Rt. Hn. Edward

Balniel, Lord

Dixon, Piers

Heseltine, Michael

Batsford, Brian

Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

Hicks, Robert

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Drayson, G. B.

Higgins, Terence L.

Bell, Ronald

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

Hiley, Joseph

Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torquay)

Dykes, Hugh

Hill, James (Southampton, Test)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gosport)

Eden, Sir John

Holland, Philip

Benyon, W.

Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)

Holt, Miss Mary

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Hordern, Peter

Biffen, John

Elliott, R. W. (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Hornby, Richard

Biggs-Davison, John

Farr, John

Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame Patricia

Blaker, Peter

Fell, Anthony

Howe, Hn. Sir Geoffrey (Reigate)

Boardman, Tom (Leicester, S. W.)

Fenner, Mrs. Peggy

Howell, David (Guildford)

Body, Richard

Fidler, Michael

Howell, Ralph (Norfolk, N.)

Boscawen, Robert

Finsberg, Geoffrey (Hampstead)

Hunt, John

Bossom, Sir Clive

Fisher, Nigel (Surbiton)

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Bowden, Andrew

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Iremonger, T. L.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. John

Fookes, Miss Janet

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Braine, Bernard

Fortescue, Tim

James, David

Bray, Ronald

Foster, Sir John

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Brewis, John

Fowler, Norman

Jessel, Toby

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Fox, Marcus

Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)

Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

Jones, Arthur (Northants, E.)

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Fry, Peter

Jopling, Michael

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Galbraith, Hn. T. G.

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Bryan, Paul

Gardner, Edward

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Buchanan-Smith, Alick (Angus, N. & M.)

Gibson-Watt, David

Kellett-Bowman, Mrs. Elaine

Buck, Antony

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, C.)

Kershaw, Anthony

Burden, F. A.

Gilmour, Sir John (Fife, E.)

Kilfedder, James

Butler, Adam (Bosworth)

Kimball, Marcus

Campbell, Rt. Hn. G. (Moray & Nairn)

Glyn, Dr. Alan

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Carlisle, Mark

Goodhart, Philip

King, Tom (Bridgwater)

Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

Goodhew, Victor

Kinsey, J. R.

Channon, Paul

Gorst, John

Kirk, Peter

Chapman, Sydney

Gower, Raymond

Kitson, Timothy

Chataway, Rt. Hn. Christopher

Grant, Anthony (Harrow, C.)

Knight, Mrs. Jill

Chichester-Clark, R.

Gray, Hamish

Knox, David

Churchill, W. S.

Green, Alan

Lambton, Antony

Clark, William (Surrey, E.)

Grieve, Percy

Lane, David

Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Clegg, Walter

Grylls, Michael

Leggs-Bourke, Sir Harry

Cockeram, Eric

Gummer, J. Selwyn

Le Marchant, Spencer

Cooke, Robert

Gurden, Harold

Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'n C'dfield)

Coombs, Derek

Hall, Miss Joan (Keighley)

Longden, Gilbert

Cooper, A. E.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Loveridge, John

Cordle, John

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Luce, R. N.

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir M.

MacArthur, Ian

Parkinson, Cecil

Stokes, John

McCrindle, R. A.

Percival, Ian

Stuttaford, Dr. Tom

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Peyton, Rt. Hn. John

Sutcliffe, John

Maclennan, Robert

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Tapsell, Peter

McMaster, Stanley

Pink, R. Bonner

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Macmillan, Maurice (Farnham)

Pounder, Rafton

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

McNair-Wilson, Michael

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Taylor, Robert (Croydon, N. W.)

Maddan, Martin

Prior, Rt. Hn. J. M. L.

Tebbit, Norman

Madel, David

Proudfoot, Wilfred

Temple, John M.

Maginnis, John E.

Pym, Rt. Hn. Francis

Thatcher, Rt. Hn. Mrs. Margaret

Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Thomas, John Stradling (Monmouth)

Marten, Neil

Raison, Timothy

Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Hendon, S.)

Mather, Carol

Ramsden, Rt. Hn. James

Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

Maude, Angus

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Tilney, John

Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

Redmond, Robert

Trafford, Dr. Anthony

Mawby, Ray

Reed, Laurance (Bolton, E.)

Trew, Peter

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Rees, Peter (Dover)

Tugendhat, Christopher

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Turton, Rt. Hn. Sir Robin

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon

Vaughan, Dr. Gerard

Mitchell, Lt.-Col. C. (Aberdeanshire, W.)

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

Vickers, Dame Joan

Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)

Ridsdale, Julian

Waddington, David

Moate, Roger

Rippon, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey

Walder, David (Clitheroe)

Molyneaux, James

Roberts, Michael (Cardiff, N.)

Walker, Rt. Hn. Peter (Worcester)

Money, Ernie

Roberts, Wyn (Conway)

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Monks, Mrs. Connie

Rost, Peter

Wall, Patrick

Monro, Hector

Royle, Anthony

Ward, Dame Irene

Montgomery, Fergus

Russell, Sir Ronald

Warren, Kenneth

More, Jasper

Scott, Nicholas

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Morgan, Geraint (Denbigh)

Sharples, Richard

White, Roger (Gravesend)

Morgan-Giles, Rear-Adm.

Shaw, Michael (Sc'b'gh & Whitby)

Whitelaw, Rt. Hn. William

Morrison, Charles

Shelton, William (Clapham)

Wiggin, Jerry

Mudd, David

Simeons, Charles

Wilkinson, John

Murton, Oscar

Sinclair, Sir George

Winterton, Nicholas

Nabarro, Sir Gerald

Skeet, T. H. H.

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

Smith, Dudley (W'wick & L'mington)

Wood, Rt. Hn. Richard

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Soref, Harold

Woodnutt, Mark

Normanton, Tom

Speed, Keith

Worsley, Marcus

Nott, John

Spence, John

Wylie, Rt. Hn. N. R.

Onslow, Cranley

Sproat, Iain

Younger, Hn. George

Oppenheim, Mrs. Sally

Stainton, Keith

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Stanbrook, Ivor

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Osborn, John

Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (Belper)

Mr. Reginald Eyre and

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Stodart, Anthony (Edinburgh, W.)

Mr. Bernard Weatherill.

NOES

Abse, Leo

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Eadie, Alex

Albu, Austen

Clark, David (Colne Valley)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Cocks, Michael (Bristol, S.)

Edwards, William (Merioneth)

Allen, Scholefield

Cohen, Stanley

Ellis, Tom

Archer, Peter (Rowley Regis)

Concannon, J. D.

English, Michael

Armstrong, Ernest

Conlan, Bernard

Evans, Fred

Ashley, Jack

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Ewing, Harry

Ashton, Joe

Cox, Thomas (Wandsworth, C.)

Faulds, Andrew

Atkinson, Norman

Crawshaw, Richard

Fisher, Mrs. Doris (B'ham, Ladywood)

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

Cronin, John

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Barnes, Michael

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Fitt, Gerard (Belfast, W.)

Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)

Crossman, Rt. Hn. Richard

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Barnett, Joel (Heywodod and Royton)

Cunningham, G. (Islington, S. W.)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Baxter, William

Cunningham, Dr. J. A. (Whitehaven)

Foley, Maurice

Beaney, Alan

Dalyell, Tam

Foot, Michael

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Davidson, Arthur

Ford, Ben

Bennett, James (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

Davies, Denzil (Llanelly)

Forrester, John

Bidwell, Sydney

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Fraser, John (Norwood)

Bishop, E. S.

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr Tydvil)

Freeson, Reginald

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Davis, Clinton (Hackney, C.)

Galpern, Sir Myer

Boardman, H. (Leigh)

Davis, Terry (Bromsgrove)

Garrett, W. E.

Booth, Albert

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Deakins, Eric

Gilbert, Dr. John

Droughton, Sir Alfred

de Freitas, Rt. Hn. Sir Geoffrey

Ginsburg, David (Dewsbury)

Brown, Bob (N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, W.)

Delargy, Hugh

Golding, John

Brown, Hugh D. (G'gow, Provan)

Dell, Rt. Hn. Edmund

Gourlay, Harry

Brown, Ronald (Shoreditch & F'bury)

Dempsey, James

Grant, George (Morpeth)

Buchan, Norman

Devlin, Miss Bernadette

Grant, John D. (Islington, E.)

Buchanan, Richard (G'gow, Sp'burn)

Doig, Peter

Griffiths, Eddie (Brightside)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Dormand, J. D.

Griffiths, Will (Exchange)

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Douglas, Dick (Stirlingshire, E.)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Campbell, I. (Dunbartonshire, W.)

Douglas-Mann, Bruce

Hamilton, William (Fife, W.)

Cant, R. B.

Driberg, Tom

Hamling, William

Carmichael, Neil

Duffy, A. E. P.

Hannan, William (G'gow, Maryhill)

Carter, Ray (Birmingh'm, Northfield)

Dunn, James A.

Hardy, Peter

Carter-Jones, Lewis (Eccles)

Dunnett, Jack

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

608

609

Hart, Rt. Hon. Judith

McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, C.)

Rose, Paul B.

Hattersley, Roy

McNamara, J. Kevin

Ross, Rt. Hn. William (Kilmarnock)

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Sandelson, Neville

Heffer, Eric S.

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-under-Lyne)

Hooson, Emlyn

Marks, Kenneth

Shore, Rt. Hn. Peter (Stepney)

Horam, John

Marsden, F.

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Marshall, Dr. Edmund

Silkin, Rt. Hn. John (Deptford)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Meacher, Michael

Silkin, Hn. S. C. (Dulwich)

Hughes, Rt. Hn. Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Mellish, Rt. Hn. Robert

Sillars, James

Hughes, Mark (Durham)

Mendelson, John

Silverman, Julius

Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N.)

Mikardo, Ian

Skinner, Dennis

Hughes, Roy (Newport)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Small, William

Hunter, Adam

Milne, Edward

Smith, John (Lanarkshire N.)

Irvine, Rt. Hn. Sir Arthur (Edge Hill)

Mitchell, R. C. (S'hampton, Itchen)

Spearing, Nigel

Janner, Greville

Morgan, Elystan (Cardiganshire)

Spriggs, Leslie

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Stallard, A. W.

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)

Steel, David

Jenkins, Rt. Hn. Roy (Stechford)

Morris, Rt. Hn. John (Aberavon)

Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)

John, Brynmor

Moyle, Ronald

Stoddart, David (Swindon)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Stonehouse, Rt. Hn. John

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Murray, Ronald King

Strang, Gavin

Johnson, Walter (Derby, S.)

Oakes, Gordon

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R.

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Ogden, Eric

Summerskili, Hn. Dr. Shirley

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

O'Halloran, Michael

Swain, Thomas

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

O'Malley, Brian

Taverne, Dick

Jones, Gwynoro (Carmarthen)

Oram, Bert

Thomas, Rt. Hn. George (Cardiff, W.)

Jones, T. Alec (Rhondda, W.)

Orbach, Maurice

Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)

Kaufman, Gerald

Orme, Stanley

Thorpe, Rt. Hn. Jeremy

Kelley, Richard

Oswald, Thomas

Tinn, James

Kerr, Russell

Owen, Dr. David (Plymouth, Sutton)

Torney, Tom

Lambie, David

Palmer, Arthur

Tuck, Raphael

Lamond, James

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Urwin, T. W.

Latham, Arthur

Pardoe, John

Varley, Eric G.

Lawson, George

Parker, John (Dagenham)

Wainwright, Edwin

Leadbitter, Ted

Parry, Robert (Liverpool, Exchange)

Walden, Brian (B'm'ham, All Saints)

Lee, Rt. Kn. Frederick

Pavitt, Laurie

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Leonard, Dick

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Wallace, George

Lestor, Miss Joan

Pendry, Tom

Watkins, David

Lever, Rt. Hn. Harold

Pentland, Norman

Weitzman, David

Lewis, Arthur (W. Ham, N.)

Perry, Ernest G.

Wellbeloved, James

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Prentice, Rt. Hn. Reg.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Lipton, Marcus

Prescott, John

White, James (Glasgow, Pollock)

Lomas, Kenneth

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Whitehead, Phillip

Loughlin, Charles

Price, William (Rugby)

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Lyon, Alexander W. (York)

Probert, Arthur

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Lyons, Edward (Bradford, E.)

Rankin, John

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Reed, D. (Sedgefield)

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

McBride, Neil

Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)

Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)

McCann, John

Rhodes, Geoffrey

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

McCartney, Hugh

Richard, Ivor

Wilson, William (Coventry. S.)

McElhone, Frank

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Woof, Robert

McGuire, Michael

Roberts, Rt. Hn. Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Mackenzie, Gregor

Robertson, John (Paisley)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Mackie, John

Roderick, Caerwyn E. (Br'c'n&R'dnor)

Mr. Joseph Harper and

Mackintosh, John P.

Rodgers, William (Stockton-on-Tees)

Mr. James Hamilton.

McManus, Frank

Roper, John

Resolved,
That this House approves Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute; and endorses Her
610
Majesty's Government's decision that they should be put to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment.

RHODESIA
  ADJOURNMENT
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Fortescue.]

AIR/SEA RESCUE
11.24 p.m.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: I am pleased to have the opportunity of raising the question of the future of the air/sea rescue service. When one considers that about 1,200 people each year drown around our coasts and many hundreds more are rescued by helicopter from cliffs and other places where they are trapped, it is not surprising that this subject attracts the interest of many right hon. and hon. Members.
I am delighted that the Under-Secretary of State is to reply, because nine days ago I led a deputation to see him on behalf of a Round Table in my constituency which has campaigned on this issue and which has attracted the support of some 50 local councils. The hon. Gentleman was kind enough not only to give us a courteous reception but also to say that he understood the problem and that it would receive his close attention. I hope that in this debate we may be able to bring that close attention—which is always a welcome Ministerial expression of intent—to a positive declaration of the action that the Government are prepared to take.
Basically, the position is that if a coastal area has the good fortune to have a Service station which has attached to it a helicopter unit, that unit is available for civilian rescue work. There is no doubt that this is greatly appreciated in the areas in question. Indeed in my own constituency some 124 calls were made on the helicopter service at R.A.F. Chivenor this year and there were 97 rescues. The rescues involve swimmers in difficulties, people who go out to sea in small boats, people on cliffs, people who need lifting to hospital, people who may be ill on an island and have to be rescued, and so on. There is no question about the valuable work done by these units.
In 1973 this R.A.F. station is to close. The question that arises is: what happens
612
then? This is not a parochial question because this R.A.F. station services not only South Wales but much of Devon and Cornwall. The suggestion is that the helicopter unit should be moved to Brawdy in South Wales, which would involve about 40 minutes' delay per day to reach the West Country which it at present serves. Whether or not we should have a national policy for air/sea rescue is a wider issue. There have been two cases in which Service stations have closed and the Government have acted. The first was the R.A.F. station at Manston where the helicopter unit was withdrawn, and the Government have retained a civilian firm for an experimental period of 18 months to carry out rescue operations.
With some of my constituents, I visited the Manston R.A.F. station a fortnight ago and saw this civilian helicopter service in action working closely with the Coastguard. While we were there the helicopter was out on two occasions. The first time, alas, the crew arrived to find that three people had drowned and it was their task to recover the bodies. On other occasions they have rescued people who, had the service not existed, clearly would have drowned. There is no doubt that it is hoped in the area that the experiment will continue.
Likewise in Aberdeen a substitute civilian service has been provided by B.E.A. I see in the Chamber the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Sproat) who may be able to tell the House how this is working. Many suggesstions about the service have been made. The hon. Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Wilkinson) has suggested that when Service stations close a back-up service should be provided by an Air Reserve of the Royal Air Force, and he has produced a valuable pamphlet on this subject. This should be an extension of the service provided by the coastguard.
Last Thursday my hon. Friend the Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Pardoe) tabled a Question on this matter, and when I tackled the Prime Minister about this he said that he was:
"prepared to examine whether we now need some broader-based permanent civilian organisation which can then gradually expand to take over the responsibilities which are being relinquished by the Royal Air Force. This does not alter the fact that the Department of

613
Trade and Industry is giving urgent consideration to cases of which it is aware such as Chivenor."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th November, 1971 Vol. 826, c. 1533.]
All I ask tonight is that the Government, which are aware of the problem and recognise the importance of having a proper air/sea rescue service round our coasts, should give urgent consideration to this matter since certain areas are not now served by Service units. Others will lose the Service units which they at present enjoy.
The Department of Trade and Industry is involved because the coastguard comes within its responsibility. The Ministry of Defence is involved because at present it carries out these responsibilities in certain parts of the country. The Home Office is involved because inland rescue comes under its responsibility. Instead of having a two-year delay between the phasing out of the R.A.F. helicopter unit and the introduction of the civilian service, as we had at Manston, the Government should have a plan so that some form of air/sea rescue may move in immediately R.A.F. stations close.
I would like, therefore, either an interdepartmental inquiry between the Ministries involved or an independent one-man commission or committee to report to the Government. There is no question about the importance of the matter. I know that the Government realise the importance of it, and if this debate has the effect of prodding them along a little faster towards solving the problem and producing a firm and concerted policy, it will have been useful.
11.31 p.m.
Mr. John Wilkinson: I am grateful for this opportunity to put forward proposals for a multi-purpose air reserve which would provide emergency services for the civilian community at large, comprehending, among other roles, air/sea rescue. I am not going to be dogmatic or stipulate any particular equipment for this reserve; that is for the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence to work out between them. It has been proved over the past few years during which the National Air Guard has been in existence that a body of volunteer pilots is available and is prepared to devote time, equipment, training and experience to
614
providing assistance to the civilian community. Among their other roles, these pilots fulfil such tasks as casualty evacuation, search, rescue and assistance to medical services.
The Government must decide that this is an opportunity to establish on a national basis such an Air Reserve. It would be founded on the main centres of population and in the coastal regions, to which the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) referred. The areas most in need are Ulster—I would like to see one established in the area of Belfast—and South Wales, because Brawdy will be too far at the extremity of that coast. If a unit were established in South Wales, it could serve Chivenor in the way that Chivenor serves South Wales. Another could be sited probably at Exeter or Bristol but that is for the staff to decide. Another would be in the Kent area if the civil experiment at Manston proves a failure. At present, at Warton in the North-West, a helicopter service is operated by the B.A.C. flight test centre, and another unit could be sited in South-Western Scotland in the Glasgow region. A centre could also be placed on that large stretch of the coast between Acklinglon in Northumberland and Leconfield in Yorkshire.
The men exist to do the work, and it would require but a small capital outlay. It needs imagination, foresight and drive from the Ministry of Defence, assisted by the Department of Trade and Industry.
11.33 p.m.
Mr. Iain Sproat: I congratulate the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) on raising this subject and thank him for his courtesy in allowing others to speak briefly.
We have a civilian air/sea rescue station at Dyce with B.E.A. helicopters, which is working extremely well. I believe its scope could be much extended, possibly with the helicopters linked to the Aberdeen mountain rescue team. I give the example of that appalling tragedy in the Cairngorms last week. The Aberdeen rescue team left Aberdeen at four o'clock in the morning. It took 21-hours in the prevailing weather conditions to reach Braemar, and it was not until nine o'clock that, with police co-operation, they reached the search area. The whole operation took almost five

615
hours, but it could take one hour with a helicopter and if the activities were linked. I do not need to emphasise the difference between one hour and five in an operation of that kind. In winter all search operations are nearly always hampered, particularly in my part of the world, by the weather.
It would be possible to link helicopters at Prestwick with the Glencoe rescue team. It is not just a local and parochial matter, though I use a parochial example.
Helicopters could obviate weather difficulties. They would simplify the transportation of heavy equipment. When people got to the search area, they would be less fatigued because they would not have been involved in a long journey by road, and they would have got there faster.
Such a system could be extended to rail disasters, to coastal search and rescue, and to travellers stranded on roads in blizzards. Mountain rescue teams are trained to cope with all these eventualities.
I do not suggest that every minor hazard should be conducted to the sound of the beat of the rotors of B.E.A. helicopters, but in each case a decision could be taken with the police, the Coastguard, the team leader of the rescue party and the pilot himself whether to use a helicopter.
This would be a logical extension of the excellent service which my hon. Friend has helped to institute, and, if he is agreeable, perhaps he could convene a meeting of the relevant authorities to see whether we can work out a suitable system in which all these activities could be linked. If he indicates that he is agreeable, I shall write to him with more details after this debate.
11.36 p.m.
Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles: Although I disagreed strongly with what the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) said earlier today, I agreed wholeheartedly with what he said in opening this short debate. Obviously, he improves as the day goes on.
The right hon. Gentleman seems to have pinned his faith on helicopters.
616
However, I believe that the really important point is communications. The radio hook-up is all important. If we think of communications as the pudding, the plums to be put in the pudding are: first, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, an independent service; then Service helicopters, if and when available; the school rescue teams which have been mentioned; and all sorts of other splendid volunteer organisations. They must be tied together by communications.
Only one of the Services, or possibly a combined Services team, can provide the communications. I hope that my hon. Friend can assure us that the Services will be able to provide the communications, with the nuts and bolts—the aircraft, the helicopters and the boats—being provided from a conglomeration of voluntary services.
11.38 p.m.
Mr. R. J. Maxwell-Hyslop: Much of the cost of an operation of this kind is involved in overheads which do not necessarily depend on the number of helicopters operated from a station. It should be possible to combine the function of operational bases of a service of this kind, though not the helicopters doing the actual rescues, with helicopter patrols for our fishery protection services. At the moment they are grossly inadequate, and they need expanding so that they exist not just theoretically but practically as well.
We could use the same bases in many cases, though not the same aircraft and personnel since they cannot do both jobs, for a much more intensified fishery protection service for our coastline and also for air/sea rescue operations, the evacuation of casualties, and all the other eventualities which have been discussed. Such a system might turn out to be an economy in the sense of spreading the overheads. I ask my hon. Friend not to comment on this suggestion but to bear it in mind when formulating the policy on this which must be formed.
We should not select any specific pinpoints for bases from which to operate the service simply because, historically, Service units have been based there. Bases should be chosen where we can get the best coverage. For example, Chivenor has many things to be said for it but, as the excellent document produced

617
by the Ilfracombe Round Table shows, it is highly marginal for covering, for instance, the necessities of Land's End. Therefore, what we want is a really adequate cover rather than an attempt to defend any particular location as the origin point of such a service. If we can achieve this with an open mind, I think we shall get the structure that we need right throughout the United Kingdom.
11.41 p.m.
Mr. David Mudd: While one accepts that the argument is on the basis of air/sea rescue, the sea aspect has been under-portrayed. It should be stressed that the Royal National Lifeboat Institution is providing around our coasts a 25-hour a day, 365-days-a-year service which is well beyond what is required of it. If one is to talk in terms of safety on the South Cornwall, North Cornwall and Devonshire coasts, this could be adequately covered by the Royal Naval air station at Culdrose as part of its helicopter pilot training service.
11.42 p.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (Mr. Anthony Grant): This has been a most valuable debate, and I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) for introducing it. I have listened carefully to everything that has been said, and I have been impressed by the various points put forward. There is nothing like a half-hour Adjournment debate for concentrating the mind. I cannot answer all the points in detail but they have all been noted carefully. However, I can outline what the Government are doing at present about air/sea rescue.
Until comparatively recently, all the air/sea rescue effort in this country was provided by aircraft of the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy. The provision of an effective air/sea rescue service is of great importance to the Services. A great deal of military flying, some of it training and some of it in the nature of the peace-time operations about which the House has often heard—maritime reconnaissance around our coasts and the protection of our air space—takes place over the sea and calls for the exercise of the highest professional skills. This flying is carried on throughout the year, often when sea conditions are bad and the sea temperature is very low. Accidents are few but
618
the possibility of them is inevitably always with us.
The lives of valuable and highly skilled aircrews, who are operating in the line of duty, may depend at any time upon the quickest possible response by the rescue service, very often in circumstances in which the only hope of rescue is by a helicopter. It is fundamental that Service crews should be able to put their full confidence in the ability of their own search and rescue service to go to their assistance if required.
Therefore, the machines are primarily for military needs, but, subject to these needs, they are made available for civil search and rescue operations. The service, as is recognised by many hon. Members, is extremely effective.
But the Ministry of Defence would be failing in its duty to the crews of Service aircraft if it did not deploy its search and rescue organisation where it can best support the large and unceasing programme of military flying in the sea areas around our coasts. Inevitably, the areas in which this military flying takes place do not coincide with the main areas of civilian marine activity.
Thus, because of the military requirements, the R.A.F. helicopter at Manston had to be withdrawn, and the Government, as recognised by the right hon. Gentleman, set up a civilian helicopter service operated by Bristow Helicopters Limited under the control of Her Majesty's Coastguard. This has done splendid work and in the five months from June, when it started to operate, to the end of October it has flown 83 sorties, rescued 20 people and brought ashore one body.
On 1st November this year the Government arranged for another civilian helicopter service to be set up. This is to give helicopter coverage well out in the North Sea, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Sproat) will recognise, beyond the range of R.A.F. single-engine helicopters, and this is done by B.E.A. helicopters from their base at Aberdeen. The normal use of these helicopters is in connection with the North Sea drilling rigs, but, should they be needed for search and rescue work, they will be made available. Both these civilian operations are designed to fill gaps in military helicopter cover. The Government keep under constant review

619
the relation between the needs of air/sea rescue and the cover provided by the military itself.
One problem area, as the right hon. Member for Devon, North has mentioned, is in Devon when the R.A.F. helicopter detachment there withdraws. Indeed, as I told the right hon. Gentleman when he brought a deputation to see me on this matter last week—it was an extremely able deputation, and I was very impressed with the work done by the Round Tablers—and as I have told my hon. Friends the Members for Torrington (Mr. Peter Mills), Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) and Honiton (Mr. Emery), my Department, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence, has for some time been examining the problems for marine search and rescue which this will cause. I am not able to announce a great Government initiative tonight and I cannot say at this stage what the results of these dicussions will be, but I can tell the right hon. Gentleman quite firmly and positively that the Government accept that adequate helicopter coverage is necessary for an efficient marine search and rescue organisation.
On the broader aspect, although the subject of this debate is air/sea rescue, the wider use of helicopters for inland as well as sea emergencies has been mentioned, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South with his experience in Scotland. This opens a very wide area indeed, but, as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, the Prime Minister told the House last week that the Government are prepared to examine whether we now need some broader-based permanent civilian organisation gradually to take over the responsibilities as they are being relinquished by the R.A.F. The Government, particularly my Department in conjunction with others, are certainly studying this matter. The study of helicopters must be made in conjunction with other search and rescue facilities. I was glad that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) pointed this out in his short speech.
The R.N.L.I. with its lifeboats and inshore rescue boats and, indeed, all other organisations, including ships at sea which play a very important part in this emer-
620
gency activity, are all involved in the vital and often hazardous work of sea rescue. They work under the general co-ordination of the Coastguard, which is the responsibility of my Department. The House should know that the service consists of 550 regular coastguards, backed by no fewer than 7,000 auxiliaries who do magnificent and dangerous work. If the work which all these organisations do, and, indeed, the service and advice which the coastguards render to people, were better known, through better publicity, I believe that more lives would be saved. It is all too rarely understood by the public that they do not need to go to the sea in ships, get into trouble and then invoke the help of the coastguards or the R.N.L.I. All they have to do is to pick up a telephone, make a call and they can get advice about conditions. This is one aspect of the work of the coastguards.
The work of the various rescue organisations is vital, and I should like to pay tribute to them because I have had the opportunity of seeing their work at first hand. It is remarkable how much work they do for very little reward, and in dangerous and hazardous circumstances.
The coastguards do a remarkable job of co-ordinating the various services, such as the R.N.L.I. and those of the R.A.F., but nothing is so perfect that it cannot be improved, and it is in that context that the Government are prepared to look carefully for a properly based organisation to deal with all aspects of rescue, be it inland or at sea. This may well take time, as such considerations involve a considerable study. We shall be prepared to consider any suggestions and recommendations that are made, and what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, South and by other hon. Members will be carefully considered.
I conclude by expressing my gratitude to the right hon. Member for Devon, North for raising this subject, and to all the services which work so well in this matter. The Government understand the problems, sympathise with the views which have been expressed, and are considering this matter with great care.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at eight minutes to Twelve o'clock.

SCOTLAND
  Bulb Scheme (North Uist)
  Bulb Scheme (North Uist)
  Health Service (Reorganisation)
  Health Service (Reorganisation)
  Employment
  Employment
  Gynaecological Beds (Stirling and Falkirk)
  Gynaecological Beds (Stirling and Falkirk)
  Council Houses, Coatbridge (Rent Inquiry)
  Council Houses, Coatbridge (Rent Inquiry)
  Health Centres
  Health Centres
  Education Authorities Bursaries (Scotland) Regulations, 1969
  Education Authorities Bursaries (Scotland) Regulations, 1969
  Police
  Police
  Autistic Children
  Autistic Children
  Unemployment (Lanarkshire)
  Unemployment (Lanarkshire)
  Assaults
  Assaults
  Merit Awards (Hospital Service)
  Merit Awards (Hospital Service)
  Oil Drilling (Planning Procedures)
  Oil Drilling (Planning Procedures)
  School Milk
  School Milk
  Tweed Bridge (Kelso)
  Tweed Bridge (Kelso)
  Killearn Hospital
  Killearn Hospital
  Hunterston Development Company
  Hunterston Development Company
  North Sea Oil
  North Sea Oil
  Wood Pigeons
  Wood Pigeons
  Agricultural Advisory Service
  Agricultural Advisory Service
  Glasgow Airport
  Glasgow Airport
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community
  Road Building (Costs)
  Road Building (Costs)
  Arran, Bute and Cumbrae
  Arran, Bute and Cumbrae
  Council Houses (Compulsory Purchase)
  Council Houses (Compulsory Purchase)
  School Milk
  School Milk
  Corsbie Hall School
  Corsbie Hall School
  North Sea Oil
  North Sea Oil
  Forth Road Bridge (Roads)
  Forth Road Bridge (Roads)
  Hospital (West Fife)
  Hospital (West Fife)
  Victoria Hospital, Kirkcaldy
  Victoria Hospital, Kirkcaldy
  Nursery Schools
  Nursery Schools
  School-Leaving Age
  School-Leaving Age
CIVIL SERVICE
  Manpower
  Manpower
  Non-Industrial Civil Servants
  Non-Industrial Civil Servants
  Civil Service Pay Research Unit
  Civil Service Pay Research Unit
ENVIRONMENT
  Hospitality Organisations (Expenditure on Tobacco)
  Hospitality Organisations (Expenditure on Tobacco)
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community
  M1 (Kegworth—Nuthall)
  M1 (Kegworth—Nuthall)
  Old Houses (Demolition)
  Old Houses (Demolition)
  Pollution Control (Departmental Staff)
  Pollution Control (Departmental Staff)
  Public Highways (Vehicle Restriction)
  Public Highways (Vehicle Restriction)
  South Hampshire (Land Release)
  South Hampshire (Land Release)
  A56 (Crawshawbooth Bypass)
  A56 (Crawshawbooth Bypass)
  Motorway Madness
  Motorway Madness
  Motorway Spur Road (North Devon)
  Motorway Spur Road (North Devon)
  Departmental Accommodation
  Departmental Accommodation
  A30 (Exeter-Launceston)
  A30 (Exeter-Launceston)
  Bus Fares (Concessions)
  Bus Fares (Concessions)
  Local Government Reform (North-East Essex)
  Local Government Reform (North-East Essex)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Employment (Scotland)
  Employment (Scotland)
  Post-War Credits
  Post-War Credits
  Invalids (Tax Relief)
  Invalids (Tax Relief)
  Stationery Office (Westminster Branch)
  Stationery Office (Westminster Branch)
  Selective Employment Tax
  Selective Employment Tax
  P.A.Y.E. System
  P.A.Y.E. System
  Purchase Tax
  Purchase Tax
TRADE AND INDUSTRY
  Factories, Scotland (Closure)
  Factories, Scotland (Closure)
  Glasgow Airport
  Glasgow Airport
  Educational and Hospital Suppliers
  Educational and Hospital Suppliers
  North Sea Oil (Contracts)
  North Sea Oil (Contracts)
  Breweries (Monopolies Commission)
  Breweries (Monopolies Commission)
  Footwear Imports
  Footwear Imports
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Graduate Teachers
  Graduate Teachers
  Directors of the Royal Greenwich Observatory and Astronomers Royal
  Directors of the Royal Greenwich Observatory and Astronomers Royal
  Career Guidance and Advice
  Career Guidance and Advice
  Women (Education and Training)
  Women (Education and Training)
  Burnham Committee (Procedure)
  Burnham Committee (Procedure)
  Independent Schools Tribunal
  Independent Schools Tribunal
  DEVON AND SOMERSET STAGHOUNDS
  DEVON AND SOMERSET STAGHOUNDS
  NORTHERN IRELAND (INTERROGATION)
  NORTHERN IRELAND (INTERROGATION)
  ASTRONOMER ROYAL (APPOINTMENT)
  ASTRONOMER ROYAL (APPOINTMENT)
  DOCTORS' AND DENTISTS' REMUNERATION
  DOCTORS' AND DENTISTS' REMUNERATION
HOUSE OF COMMONS
  Television Documentaries
  Television Documentaries
DEFENCE
  N.A.T.O. Depôt, Fairlie
  N.A.T.O. Depôt, Fairlie
EMPLOYMENT
  Equality of Sexes
  Equality of Sexes
  Equal Pay
  Equal Pay
  Redundancy Payments
  Redundancy Payments
  Older Workers
  Older Workers
  Advance Throwing Mills, Crook
  Advance Throwing Mills, Crook
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Violence against Licensees
  Violence against Licensees
  Murders (Children)
  Murders (Children)
POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
  B.B.C. Television Transmitter (Borders)
  B.B.C. Television Transmitter (Borders)
SOCIAL SERVICES
  Hospitals (Manchester)
  Hospitals (Manchester)
  Truro Constituency (Census Statistics)
  Truro Constituency (Census Statistics)
  Artificial Limbs
  Artificial Limbs
  Hospital Doctors (Extra-Duty Payment)
  Hospital Doctors (Extra-Duty Payment)
  Unemployment (Payments)
  Unemployment (Payments)
  Regional Hospital Boards (Finance)
  Regional Hospital Boards (Finance)
WALES
  Economic Growth
  Economic Growth
  European Economic Community
  European Economic Community

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Truro.
The Lord Dinevor—Took the Oath.

EXPLOSIONS AND EXPLOSION THREATS
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what has been preventing them from counting the explosions and threats of explosions referred to in their Written Answer of November 11, and what steps they are prepared to take to enable Parliament and the public to be informed of the scale of phenomena of such vital public interest.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, no statistics are collected by the Home Office about threats or warnings of explosions. These are frequent and are often hoaxes. As regards actual explosions, information in the form requested by the noble Lord is not readily available and the cost of instituting special inquiries to try to obtain it would be disproportionate.
LORD CLIFFORD OF CHUDLEIGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer and for his courtesy in the covering letter to the Written Answer, may I ask him whether it is not possible at least to count these occurrences as they are mentioned in the Press, if nothing else? Has the noble Lord any information on the number of explosions, for example, attributable to either the I.R.A. or the Angry Brigade. In view of the recently publicised extra security precautions on Ministry of Defence armouries, can he give the House any information in that regard? Moreover, as
262
it was anounced in the Press last week that the Prime Minister's father had to be given a police guard because of I.R.A. threats, may I ask how many other members of the public have been so threatened and have had to be given police protection?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the Criminal Statistics cover persons proceeded against and convicted under a number of Acts of Parliament for offences both against the person and against property. But they do not give information as to the actual number of explosions. However, I can assure noble Lords that the police are active in gathering information as to the scale of occurrences of this kind, whether threatened or actual, and as to the identity and motives of those who may be responsible. We do not believe that it is in the public interest to disclose the police assessment of these threats.

"SUNLIGHT LEMON" WASHING-UP LIQUID
2.39 p.m.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they consider that the method of packing a recently marketed detergent constitutes a danger to children, as the container front is labelled in large print "Sunlight Lemon Liquid With Real Lemon Juice" with a picture of a juicy lemon, whereas "washing up liquid" is only mentioned in small print on the back of the container.]
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the manufacturers have now agreed to add the words "For Washing Up" on the front of the container. There is also a safety first warning that the pack should be kept out of reach of children.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that highly satisfactory Answer to my very simple, innocent and non-political Question, but I should like to ask him this further question. What is to happen about the stocks of this detergent which are already on show on the shelves of supermarkets and in shops? Is the word "detergent"

263
going to be stamped upon those packages?—because if not the possibility of some child getting hold of an unmarked package still remains.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I understand that the new packs will be on sale in the shops early in the New Year. We believe that, following representations made by my Department, the manufacturers have acted responsibly in this instance in supplementing the wording on the container in the way I have indicated. Although we have sympathy with the noble Lord's Question, we have no evidence so far that children have in fact been taking this liquid. We think, therefore, that the action which has been taken and agreed upon with the manufacturers is quite satisfactory.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, this type of detergent is on the market at the moment, but I should like to ask the noble Lard what Department is informed of any new detergents that are introduced and which the ordinary customer going into a store and seeing on the shelves might buy without fully appreciating what are the contents of the pack? What notice is given by any particular Department, drawing the attention of the public to danger or otherwise in the use of these products?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has a responsibility under the Consumer Protection legislation and it is customary for manufacturers to notify my Department of the contents and formulation of new products of this sort. We agree that it is undesirable to increase the risk to children of taking harmful substances and that the labelling should not be in a manner which might encourage them to do so. For that reason my Department made representations to the manufacturers, and we believe they reacted responsibly.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, surely it would be quite simple without all these complications, for the Government to require retailers to label the stocks that they already hold "Not for drinking" in very large letters?
LORD WINDLESHAM: Yes, my Lords, that is included on this particular
264
pack. There is a safety warning covering that point printed on the reverse of the pack.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, are we not in fact particularly concerned with protecting the child who cannot read? Will not a small child who cannot read be attracted to this packet of toxic material if it has the picture of a nice juicy lemon on the outside?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, it has a picture of a juicy lemon, but immediately below the juicy lemon there is depicted a foaming sink filled with washing up.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the noble Lord said that he had no evidence that children had been taking this product. If he had such evidence, would he be prepared to take more drastic action now? And is he content to wait until the evidence is forthcoming?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, your Lordships may be interested to know how I reached this conclusion. I have been looking into the matter in the last day or two since the noble Lord's Question has been down. There is an organisation known as the Poisons Information Service. This receives details of all new products of this sort and is equipped to answer queries from doctors and hospitals when children or adults—but particularly children—have taken a particular substance which may be harmful. I find that there have been no requests from doctors, from parents or from hospitals concerning this particular product, nor are we aware of any complaints from parents, made either direct to my Department or through the safety organisations.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, arising from my noble friend's Answer, may I ask whether he is aware that in a number of cases lemonade has been sold in bottles similar to those which contain poisonous substances such as bleach? Is my noble friend satisfied that the regulations to counteract this practice are adequate?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, that goes rather wider than the Question. But I agree that the shape of the container, where it is kept in the home and the pictorial quality of the labelling, are

265
extremely important factors where young children are concerned. One cannot rely entirely on printed warnings, as the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, said, because younger children are, of course, unable to read them.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, with great respect, I cannot understand that the Minister has answered the question asked by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, as to whether he is awaiting a disaster before taking more drastic action?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, we do not consider there is any risk of disaster here. The contents have been analysed, and I understand it would be necessary for a child to drink approximately two fluid ounces of this extremely unpleasant tasting liquid—it tastes strongly of soap rather than of lemon—before he was sick.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, as one who was given by one of his clergy not this but a similar detergent instead of lemonade, perhaps with ulterior motive, and having fallen down as though dead on the floor, will the noble Lord believe that I am one member of your Lordships' House who feels very strongly in this matter and hopes that serious consideration will be given to this question.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, it is not for me to speculate on the motives of those offering drinks to the right reverend Prelate, but I can assure him that we treat these cases seriously. Action has been taken here. At the same time we must retain some perspective. The liquid itself is a natural soap product. It would require the drinking of a considerable amount before a child was upset, and even then the child would not be seriously harmed. I think the action taken here, and the continued vigilance of my Department, is adequate.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I do not want to nag the noble Lord because the tone of his answers has been so helpful. But here is a picture of the container, which says in very large type "Sunlight lemon liquid", and then a very large juicy lemon, and the only other words on the front are "with real lemon juice". Is the noble Lord aware, when
266
he says that two ounces would be necessary to cause any harm, that two fluid ounces is about the quantity of ordinary condensed lemon squash which the housewife or child puts into the glass before filling it with water? My final question to the noble Lord, who has been so helpful, is this: Can something be done to require shopkeepers to stamp the words "detergent" or "not for drinking" on the stocks already on their shelves?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, we have considered this, but have concluded that the manufacturers' undertaking to alter the pack for all further supplies which will be in the shops in the New Year is appropriate in the circumstances.
LORD FOOT: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that when, in a short time, we come to consider the Rhodesian "detergent packet" it would be appropriate to take a close look at what is described in the Question as "the small print on the back of the container"? Would the noble Lord also agree that in this case, in substitution for his words "for washing up", we might put "for white-washing up"?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I have the rare opportunity of answering all the Questions in your Lordships' House to-day. I know noble Lords are looking forward to the Rhodesian debate, and I think we should pass on to the next Question.

RACE RELATIONS BOARD
2.46 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will appoint a Committee of Inquiry into the workings of the Race Relations Board.]
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the Board themselves are reviewing their organisation and effectiveness, in the light of experience, and the Government do not consider that any special Committee of Inquiry is necessary.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I welcome that statement and having great appreciation of the dedication of the Chairman and of the members of the Board, I would ask: is it not a fact that there is a great deal of absence of confidence in the Board among the immigrant community and that the hopes of many of us who were concerned have not been fulfilled? Will the Government, therefore, seek to ensure that this inquiry by the Board itself shall be as thorough as possible?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I know very well the noble Lord's interest in the Race Relations Board; indeed, he was in many ways responsible for the legislation which set it up. The Board themselves, and the new chairman, Sir Geoffrey Wilson, have the full support of the Government. If there is any way in which we can help them to improve and make more effective their procedures, we shall certainly do so.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, in thanking the Minister for that answer, may I ask whether his attention has been drawn to the criticisms which have been voiced in Race Today, which is the journal of the Institute of Race Relations, of which an honoured Member of this House is Chairman? Without accepting all these criticisms, would the noble Lord draw the attention of the Committee of Inquiry to the need for: (a) more participation in the administration by the coloured community; (b) more training of the staff and of the conciliation officers; (c) the speeding up of the handling of cases; (d) the desirability of legal representation of the complainants, who are often without the language and, being from other countries, are confused?
LORD WINDLESHAM: Yes, my Lords. I should like to make clear that no formal Committee of Inquiry, as such, is sitting. The new Chairman and the members of the Board are themselves reviewing the effectiveness of their procedures, and both they and the Government are well aware of the criticisms in Race Today and elsewhere which have recently been put forward. It is only natural and healthy that there should be discussion and argument on matters on which it is possible to reach differing conclusions. The points the noble Lord has just mentioned are very much in the minds of the Chairman and the members of the Board.

BUSINESS
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, with the leave of the House, my noble friend Lady Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie will be making a Statement on the Common Market negotiations at a convenient moment after 3.30. I would also inform your Lordships that dinners will be available to-night.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES
2.50 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move that the First Report from the Select Committee on House of Lords Offices be now considered.
Moved, That the First Report from the Select Committee on House of Lords Offices be now considered.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
The Committee's Report was as follows:

1. APPOINTMENT OF SUB-COMMITTEES

(a) Administration. The Administration Committee was appointed as follows:

E. Listowel (Chairman),

L. Denham

M. Salisbury,

B. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe,

E. St. Aldwyn,

L. Henley,

L. Amulree,

B. Phillips,

L. Beswick,

L. Nugent of Guildford,

L. Brooke of Cumnor,

L. Strang:

L. Champion,

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

With power to co-opt further Lords.

(b) Library. The Sub-Committee on the Library was appointed as follows:

L. Amulree,

L. Chorley,

L. Carrington,

L. Reid:

L. Champion,

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

With power to co-opt further Lords and to appoint its own Chairman.

(c) Refreshment Department. The Sub-Committee on the Refreshment Department was appointed as follows:

E. St. Aldwyn,

L. Champion,

V. Goschen,

B. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe,

L. Amulree,

L. Nugent of Guildford,

L. Beswick,

L. Sainsbury,

B. Brooke of Ystradfellte,

L. Strang:

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

With power to co-opt further Lords and to appoint its own Chairman.

(d) House of Lords Estimates. The Sub-Committee on the Estimates was appointed as follows:

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

E. Listowel (Chairman),

L. Amulree,

E. St. Aldwyn,

L. Beswick:

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

(e) Works of Art:

M. Cholmondeley,

L. Henley,

L. Amulree,

V. Hood:

with the Clerk of the Parliaments.

With power to co-opt further Lords and to appoint its own Chairman.

2. PALACE OF WESTMINSTER SECURITY
A Report on Security was made to the Committee by the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod.
3. PARLIAMENT OFFICE

(a)The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee of the appointment of Mr. Michael Graham Pownall as a Clerk in the Parliament Office from the 11th October 1971.

(b)The Committee authorised the provision of wigs and gowns and accessories to be worn by those called upon to sit at the Table of the House in accordance with the Order of the House of 9th November 1971.

(c) The Committee sanctioned the regrading of certain posts in the Parliament Office and authorised the rates of pay for these posts.

4. HANSARD REPORTING STAFF

(a) The Committee authorised the continuation of the payment of attendance fees to the Hansard Editorial Staff when the House of Lords sits after 10.30 p.m.

(b) The Committee authorised an increase in the payment for transcription work done by Palantype Organisation Limited with retrospective effect from the 1st January 1971.

5. ESTIMATES
The Estimate for the House of Lords for 1972–73 was laid before the Committee and approved.
6. SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE 1971–72
The Committee were informed of the presentation of a Supplementary Estimate for the year 1971–72.
The Committee authorised the payment of expenses to be incurred in connection with Select Committees.
7. REVISED RATES OF PAY
The Committee sanctioned the application of D.E.O. (71) (Conditions of Service) No. 8
270
dated 23rd August 1971—Responsibility and Related Allowances—with effect from the 1st January 1971 to applicable staff of the House of Lords.
8. SUPERANNUATION
The Committee sanctioned the payment of the following superannuation awards under the Superannuation Act 1965:—

(a)Pension and Additional Allowance to Mr. S. C. Ireland, O.B.E., former Editor of Debates, on his final retirement on 1st January 1972.
The Committee instructed the Clerk of the Parliaments to convey to Mr. Ireland their warns appreciation of his long and valuable service.

(b)Revised Pension and Additional Allowance to Sir Kenneth L. Mackintosh, K.C.V.O., who retired on the 1st April 1971.

(c) Transfer Value to the Greater London Council in respect of the service of Mrs. Barbara Joan Matthewman, with the House of Lords, under the Superannuation (Transfers between the Civil Service and Local Government) Rules 1950 and 1955.

9. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE: GENERAL INFORMATION
The Committee recommend that the grey booklet: "Lords Spiritual and Temporal: General Information", hitherto printed for the use of the Staff of the House, be made generally available to peers in the Printed Paper Office and the Library.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now agreed to.
Moved, That the Report be agreed to.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, before we agree to the Lord Chairman's Motion, as I am sure we shall do, may I make one comment which may be considered in order either on paragraph 8, which deals with the retirement of Mr. Ireland, or paragraph 4, which deals with the late working of the Hansard staff. I understand that it is in fact 27 years ago to the day, December I, that Mr. Ireland joined the Hansard reporting team, and I think it right that we should call attention to the service which he has rendered. Noble Lords may also be interested in the fact that on the Hansard staff there are four other members each of whom has over 25 years' service, and there are two others with 24½ years' service each, so that seven out of the staff of 18 have almost 25 years' service or over. As one who has worked in the position of Government Chief Whip, I know a little about the trouble that we give to the staff, and I think we might take the opportunity of paying a tribute not only to their professional skill but also to their immense forbearance with our foibles.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I should very much like to support what the noble Lord. Lord Beswick, has said. The work of the Hansard staff is sometimes really too good to be true. They work very hard and accurately, and what we should do if they were not here I do now know. I think that Mr. Ireland has been a tower of strength and a great help to us.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, as perhaps the only one of your Lordships who has been able to write shorthand at the rate—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, for having raised this matter. I am sure that the whole House will fully support what he and the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, have said. Those of us who have known Mr. Ireland for a long time have always found him a most cooperative and helpful man. We wish him a very happy retirement, but I hope he will come and see us often.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, I was only about to say that as perhaps
272
the only one of your Lordships who has ever been able to write shorthand at the rate of 240 words a minute, I should like to pay my tribute to the excellent standard of performance which we receive from our shorthand writers in this House.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am sure that the Committee, as well as the House, will be most grateful to all the noble Lords who have spoken and whose remarks will be keenly appreciated.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ROAD TRAFFIC (FOREIGN VEHICLES) BILL [H.L.]
2.55 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (LORD SANDFORD): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. In the last Session we were debating, and later in this Session we shall again bit debating, our entry into Europe.
This afternoon I should like to invite your Lordships to consider for a moment, by way of a change, Europe's already existing entry into Britain in the form of foreign lorries, or "foreign juggernauts" as they are sometimes called. I mean the heavy foreign vehicles that arrive here overweight, unsafe, without proper documents, and being driven by one driver for far longer than our laws permit. These offences, shortcomings and abuses are serious and widespread. Recent checks at our ports of entry have revealed that almost half of these incoming foreign vehicles are without proper documents, and 60 per cent. are overweight. One particular vehicle was found to weigh 49 tons as compared to our maximum permissible weight of 32 tons. I am sure that your Lordships will readily agree that this kind of thing has got to stop. The overloading damages and hazards our roads and bridges. Many of such vehicles thus driven are both a menace to road safety and a threat to the environment of our smaller villages, towns and historic cities. Furthermore, such a state of affairs is grossly unjust and irritating in the extreme to the British road haulage industry which, of

273
course, has to abide strictly by our laws all the time.
Your Lordships will be surprised, as I was, to know that at present there are no workable procedures for dealing effectively with these foreign juggernauts. It is because this Bill will provide effective measures for dealing with them that I commend it with confidence to your Lordships. Although there is little evidence at present that foreign public service vehicles have offended in the same way as foreign incoming lorries, the Bill is designed to cover them also. The European Conference of Ministers of Transport has resolved that a "control document" will have to be carried by public service vehicles on all international journeys.
My Lords, turning to the Bill, Clause 1 provides powers for one of the Department of the Environment's examiners to prohibit a vehicle from proceeding on to a public road if that vehicle or its driver does not comply with certain requirements in respect of operators' licensing, drivers' hours, permitted dimensions and weights of vehicles, their mechanical and operational performance, and their mechanical fitness. Authorised (that is to say, specially trained) police constables and weights and measures inspectors will also have this power in relation to overweight vehicles. The foreign vehicle will normally be prohibited by a special prohibition notice from proceeding until appropriate remedial action has been taken; that is to say, until some of the weight has been off-loaded. In order to avoid congestion at the point of entry, the offending vehicle may be directed by another notice to a suitable place, and in order that the vehicle may proceed, for example, to a repair garage, so as to have the defect remedied, an exemption from the prohibition notice may also be granted for the purpose of that particular journey. That is incorporated in Clause 2. If the driver of the foreign vehicle concerned deliberately defies the prohibition or the direction notice, Clause 3 of the Bill provides that any constable in uniform will be able to detain that vehicle on having reasonable cause to suspect committal of an offence, and to arrest its driver without warrant. This power is essential because otherwise foreign drivers could defy the prohibition notice with impunity, as they do flout the law
274
at present, knowing that the normal procedure of issuing a summons would not be effective.
The power to issue the prohibition notices is designedly discretionary. This is to avoid problems which might otherwise arise from prohibiting the use of particular vehicles in circumstances which could give rise to difficulty; that is to say, loads containing perishable goods, livestock, or vehicles carrying passengers. Clause 4 gives powers to demand from the driver the documents he should be carrying. If he cannot produce these, the prohibition procedure is available and can be used.
The aim of the Bill is simply to ensure that Great Britain can enforce effectively the important laws relating to road transport which Parliament has already passed, and which apply already to foreign as well as to British commercial vehicles, but which cannot at present be effectively enforced against foreign vehicles. There are bilateral road haulage agreements which, indeed, specifically require vehicles of one country to comply with the laws of another country while in the territory of that country. If the legal user of the vehicle is resident in this country, no matter what the nationality of the driver, the normal enforcement and summons procedures will apply and will he effective. If he is not so resident, the special procedure in this Bill will operate. It is because the present enforcement procedures are inapt for foreign lorries that the Bill extends these powers to cover visiting commercial vehicles which arc deficient in documentation, or whose drivers have offended against the drivers' hours and the records requirements.
Since the means of enforcement procedure is ineffective as a deterrent against refusal to obey the prohibition notice, the power of detaining the vehicle and, if necessary, of arresting the driver is also provided in the Bill. Differences in the enforcement procedure are necessitated solely by the different circumstances that apply to foreign-registered vehicles and to drivers domiciled abroad. The enforcement powers will, I should add, be exercised mainly at the ports of entry. There will be no discrimination on the ground of nationality and of

275
course no attempt to afford special protection to our own domestic industries, both of which are specifically prohibited by the Treaty of Rome. There is, indeed, no conflict with any forthcoming obligations resulting from our joining the European Economic Community.
First of all, the transport laws and regulations applying to British and foreign vehicles are, and will be, identical; secondly, while the Bill relates to the enforcement of our traffic laws and regulations against foreign vehicles only, it must not be considered on its own, but must be compared with other existing provisions which provide for effective, albeit different, enforcement procedures against British vehicles; and, thirdly, while the enforcement provisions incorporated in the Bill are in some respects different from the enforcement provisions of our own legislation, these differences are no more than is necessitated by the different circumstances in which foreign-registered vehicles and their drivers find themselves when in this country. The European Economic Community has, at present, not yet evolved a coherent transport policy and there is nothing in the Bill which would prevent it from being consistent with our Treaty obligations by the end of the relevant transitional periods. The bilateral road haulage agreements and the quota and permit arrangements are independent of the E.E.C., and will not be directly affected when the United Kingdom enters the Community.
Before making use of the powers now being sought, foreign Governments will of course be notified of their existence and warned in advance of our intention to use them. The E.E.C. has already been informed of our proposals. Ports authorities, ferry operators and the agents of foreign hauliers in this country will also be notified. There will be a period of one month's grace, provided by Clause 7(2), during which offenders would, in general, only be warned. I anticipate that after this period and as a result of this advance notice and, maybe, following a few exemplary cases of enforcement, foreign commercial vehicles will soon come to comply, as they do not now, with British
276
laws. I trust that only a very limited number of prohibition notices, and the most sparing use of the powers of detention and arrest, will be needed.
Foreign countries do not hesitate to exercise their powers to exclude from their territories, or to detain in their ports, any of our commercial vehicles which are in breach of their national regulations. This is perfectly right and is to be expected. But it is only right, and not before time, that we also should equip ourselves with equally effective sanctions to use against any foreign commercial vehicle operators who seek to flout British requirements. It is the knowledge that they will be prohibited from proceeding which makes British hauliers carry the correct documentation, and makes them comply with foreign requirements, when travelling abroad. This Bill is designed merely to produce the same compliance with our laws by all foreign hauliers coming into this country. I hope that with that explanation I have been able to commend this Bill to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Sandford.)
3.6 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, this is a Bill which should occasion the Government no difficulty, and which should not detain the House for very long before we get on to the next extremely important debate. This is a sensible measure, which I think will become increasingly important as we enter more and more into the Common Market, with the reciprocal flow of trade which we expect to stem from it. I wonder how we have gone so long without such a measure. It certainly surprised me to learn that we were so bereft of powers of enforcement as, apparently, we have been up to now. There are just a few questions which I should like to ask the noble Lord.
First, what standard of knowledge of our Highway Code do we expect from foreign drivers, and are any tests applied to the drivers of these foreign vehicles to ensure that they know it and understand that they are expected to adhere to it? Is there any way of ascertaining whether foreign drivers have passed a

277
test equivalent to our test of competence to drive heavy goods vehicles? Will the documents, which Clause 4 states that the examiner may require a driver to produce, have to show that the vehicle has passed a test of a standard equal to ours before the examiner allows the vehicle to proceed? What steps will be taken in future to test a vehicle to ensure that it is completely up to our standard, before it leaves the port and embarks upon our roads? The noble Lord has mentioned that there are, or will be, reciprocal arrangements made with foreign countries relating to British vehicles and drivers going to the Continent. How are these conditions enforced against our drivers in Continental countries? I take it that if such conditions are enforced against our drivers, we shall ensure that similar conditions are enforced here.
The next point that I should like to inquire into is this. Will any steps be taken to acquaint foreign operators with the change in our law, when this Bill becomes an Act? I think that is an important point. In this connection, I also wonder whether something can be done to ensure that, before this Road Traffic (Foreign Vehicles) Bill becomes an Act, it will be amended to ensure that the references in it to road traffic legislation of the past will be brought up to date, in line with the consolidation Bill which is now going through the House. In that way, all the references will be to a consolidated measure, and not to Road Traffic Acts that have been passed over the years. This would make it very much easier for foreign lawyers advising operators to see exactly what is involved in our proposed changes in the law. My Lords, I think these points are important, but I am sure that this is a measure to which the House can readily agree.
3.10 p.m.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, I rise to support the points of view which have been expressed by my noble friend Lord Champion, but I am at a loss to understand the reasons why the Government should come along at this particular juncture and seek to introduce a Bill of this nature. Could this not have been done in the ordinary way, by a Statutory Instrument being introduced to cover the particular points that have been outlined
278
by the Minister in his presentation of this Bill? Or, seeing that we spent such a long time in dealing with the Road Traffic Bill, could not a form of addendum, to be attached to that Act, have been introduced and considered by both Houses of Parliament? Would that not have been just as effective as the Bill which the noble Lord has sought to introduce to the House on this occasion?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Slater, should introduce a slightly discordant note into the Second Reading debate on what is really and truly an excellent Bill. I would not presume to answer him, nor indeed the noble Lord, Lord Champion, but I would suggest to both noble Lords that at the present moment the lion's share of the cross-Channel traffic is on the side of our haulier and haulage industry, and I do not know anybody in this industry who is in any way against this particular Bill. If the traffic does increase then it will become increasingly important that visiting hauliers should comply with our steadily rising standards; and it is in this respect, I would suggest, that this Bill plays some part.
However, my Lords, in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, for answering so many unasked questions in explaining the purpose of the Bill, I would perhaps suggest to him one or two points, although in view of the importance of this afternoon's proceedings I do not ask for an answer from him this afternoon. Clause 2 deals with prohibition orders. If the prohibition order principles which apply to English hauliers in their domestic affairs are going to apply to foreign vehicles and foreign vehicle owners, how in fact are these orders going to have any teeth? Because the prohibition order that applies to a domestic haulier in this country not only stops an overweight or under-maintained vehicle from continuing on its journey at that particular time: such an order operates on a principle akin to the driving licence principle of "totting up", whereby if a vehicle operator has too many prohibition orders against him he is precluded from operating at all. Is this going to apply to the foreign haulier? How in fact can it apply to such haulier?

279
I turn now, my Lords, to Clause 3, which deals with the enforcement provisions against "Any person who drives" or "Any person who permits a vehicle to be driven". I find it very difficult to understand how one is going to enforce the regulations against a cauliflower marketeer from Marseilles or a bulb-grower from Holland who has merely sent a driver. It is quite easy to go to Lincolnshire and take proceedings against a haulier who has given instructions to a driver from Lincolnshire to drive a defective lorry to London Docks, but how in fact are you going to do it in the case of somebody somewhere in the middle of Europe?
The other question I raise also concerns enforcement. Our European friends normally have one officer at each frontier who deals with the documentation, the vehicle and the vehicle's condition, the driver's hours and so on, as well as the Customs aspect of the load. In this country a multiplicity of people are involved, and I am not aware that we have them all at the many docks or ports to which these foreign vehicles come, where we normally have only Customs and Excise. We certainly do not normally have Department of the Environment inspectors or ordinary uniformed police officers, though quite often we have our dock police or private police forces. I do not see how there can be a full enforcement of these regulations, which are set out so clearly and precisely in the Bill, without a very large increase in the number of people involved. In this country no vehicle may be stopped without there being a uniformed constable in attendance, thus allowing the Ministry of Transport inspector, or indeed the Customs and Excise officer, to make his examination; and it seems to me that there must be a duplication of, or indeed an increase in, the services rendered by these different forces.
Notwithstanding that, my Lords, I have no doubt at all that the Bill goes a long way towards giving some parity of opportunity as between the foreign haulier in this country and our own haulier, and I hope that when our questions have been satisfactorily answered, as I have no doubt that they will be, your Lordships will give full support to the Bill as it stands.
LORD NUNBURNHOLME: My Lords, I do not want to detain the House but there is one question I should like answered. I understand that these foreign vehicles will be very long. I was held up in Trafalgar Square on Tuesday for five minutes by a vehicle 60 feet long. If one is held up in Trafalgar Square, which it is quite easy to get round, what is to happen on the smaller roads? Ought we not to introduce a clause into this Bill to the effect that foreign vehicles should be allowed to use only major trunk roads, and that for the by-roads their goods should be unloaded on to smaller vehicles?
3.19 p.m.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, as I raised this matter in the debate on the Queen's Speech, I hope I may be allowed two minutes in which to thank my noble friend Lord Sandford for the speed and the efficiency with which the Government have answered my request for such a Bill. I can promise the House that I had no idea it was in their mind. My Lords, this is an excellent Bill, but I only wish we could take it a little further, because our entry into the Common Market shows how important this problem is daily becoming. I also think the disastrous pile-up "on the M.1 two or three days ago shows us what we may have to face in the future. The Bill is excellent so far as it goes, but I realise of course that there are difficulties in widening it.
I should like to reiterate, if I may—and this point has just been made by the noble Lord opposite—the plea I put forward in the debate on the gracious Speech for the well-being of the small towns of our country, which are being shaken to pieces by these enormous vehicles thundering through. I happened, in my own market town of Malmesbury, to test out last week-end whether I had been telling. your Lordships the truth on this point in my speech some three weeks ago. I found an enormous 40 ft. juggernaut trying to climb up the 15th century market cross at the end of the High Street. I went forward to remonstrate with the driver but restrained myself—and as your Lordships will know, that is a difficult operation at the best of times—when I found written down the side of the vehicle the one word "Cunard". This situation—and the noble Lord opposite has highlighted it—emphasises the need for us to

281
press on with the by-passing of our small towns on the main trade routes throughout this country. Vehicles cannot all go by the motorways; they must go through some small towns. I beg the noble Lord—I will not ask him for an answer to-day because I know we are pressed for time on more important matters—to consider reassessment of the urgency for by-passing the small towns through which these increasingly large vehicles must go.
I should like also to follow up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, about knowledge of our rules by foreign drivers. Two mornings ago I took the opportunity of having a conversation with the driver of a juggernaut parked, as they always seem to be, in Belgrave Square. He was a Belgian, Flemish-speaking, so our conversation was not an easy one because his French was about the same as mine, which is not saying much. He had had 17 years' experience and an unblemished record; he was obviously a thoroughly decent and responsible man now making his fifth visit to this country. He told me that when he came for the first time he had never heard of the Highway Code, he did not know about the routing rules of this country and which towns he could and should bypass; he did not know of bridges and roads not permissible to his vehicle, nor did he know the size and weight of his vehicle in English dimensions. Indeed, he knew no English. Yet this was a thoroughly experienced and reliable driver. So there is here obviously a gap, my Lords.
I do not think, however, that we can reciprocate too closely. I doubt, for instance, if many members of the Transport and General Workers' Union are fluent in Flemish. There is cause for further investigation, and I hope the noble Lord will encourage us in this respect. There is one further point he made on which I am afraid I shall receive a cold answer. My Belgian friend told me that on many of the roads on the Continent juggernauts are not permitted to drive on Sundays. Would that we could have that restriction in this country! But I am afraid I shall have to wait until the next Queen's speech to see whether I have as much luck as I did with the last one. Meantime, my Lords, I congratulate the Government warmly in introducing a Bill which is excellent so far as it
282
goes, and I hope we shall see its efficient results in the near future.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, sits down, would he accept my invitation to withdraw the expression he used three times in his speech, the expression "juggernaut"? To my understanding "juggernaut" means some massive piece of material, man-made or otherwise, that steamrollers its way through, and I do not consider that a 40 ft. long vehicle is in any way a juggernaut.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, if I withdraw the word juggernaut, may I substitute the word "leviathan"?
3.23 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: My Lords, I very much welcome the reception this Bill has received from your Lordships' House. We are always anxious to please noble Lords, and particularly to please my noble friend, Lord Mancroft, and to please him quickly. It is indeed surprising, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, stressed in his speech, that we have gone on for as long as we have without laws which could be effectively used to control these lorries, foreign vehicles, public service vehicles, "juggernauts" and "leviathans". I very much agree with my noble friends Lord Mancroft and Lord Lucas of Chilworth when they stress that we particularly need to do this now because we are setting increasingly high environmental standards and applying them to all sectors of our life, not least in the haulage industry. I will respond just briefly to the request that I have from my noble friend Lord Mancroft by confirming that we are driving ahead with our proposals for by-passing historic towns; and our plans at present are such that by the end of the decade, by 1980, 84 of the 105 historic towns that lie on trunk roads will have been by-passed. I think that that is a satisfactory programme, and we have every intention of seeing it through. If this is to be done, it is only reasonable to insist that foreign lorries, particularly large foreign lorries, are made to comply with our legislation.
There are a number of other questions which noble Lords asked me. There were several questions relating to the extent to which we require foreign drivers

283
and foreign vehicles to comply with our laws. There are reciprocal arrangements, bilateral arrangements with other countries, the effect of which is that the vehicles of the one should comply with the legislation of the other when they are in those countries. They exist between us and France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Roumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Yugoslavia. It is our inability to enforce any of these in this country that has led to most of the trouble. Once enforcement procedures are there, I feel confident, as I said in my original speech, that all the necessary requirements will come to be met.
This country has always maintained a liberal and progressive outlook in transport matters and we intend to bring this attitude to bear on the development of the Common European transport policy. Nothing in this Bill, which is strictly concerned with enforcement procedures, is contrary to this approach. But at present the British road haulage industry is discriminated against because it has to comply with effective enforcement of foreign laws and the effective enforcement of our own laws, whereas foreign vehicles and drivers visiting this country are not subject to this effective enforcement. The Bill merely aims to secure that visiting vehicles and their drivers should be made to comply with our laws which already apply to them and which their Governments have already agreed are to be respected and obeyed. Once it is known that we have the powers of enforcement there will be a marked improvement right across the board.
One noble Lord asked me about driving licences. Here it would not be right for us to go beyond the rules and regulations which apply to our own drivers and which give everybody five days' grace in which to produce a licence. In these circumstances it would be difficult to justify immediately imposing a prohibition notice on a foreign vehicle for apparent lack of a driving licence. That power does not exist in relation to a British driver, and in the subsequent five days it could transpire that the foreign driver did possess a valid driving licence: it he had a prohibition notice imposed upon him he would have reasonable grounds for complaint.
284
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Champion, and another noble Lord, who raised the question of consolidation. There is reference in the Bill to the consolidating Bill. References are also required to the existing Road Transport Act, in case this Bill, which is now somewhat urgent, becomes law before the Consolidation Bill itself. The Bill we are considering now is urgent, in the sense that we want to go through the procedure of giving advance warning to foreign countries, to get through the period of grace and to get through any enforcement cases that are needed before the ports become congested with the foreign passenger traffic which builds up in the holiday season. That is why we are keen to get this Bill through with some despatch and why it is possible that it may have to go on the Statute Book before the consolidating measure.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Slater, I have to say that it would not be possible in the process of consolidation to inaugurate new legislation. There is new legislation here; we are taking power to enforce existing legislation, but the powers of enforcement themselves constitute new legislation. That would require, and does require, a separate Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, drew our attention to the fact that in certain countries one officer suffices to do all that is being done by several different officers in this country. That is a point that we ought to note, and in the process of harmonising our various codes of legislation there may be something to be said for considering it. We have, for instance, considered carefully the possibility of the Customs and Excise officers being involved in this enforcement, but there is no provision under Customs law at the moment under which Customs and Excise officers could simply refuse entry to a foreign vehicle. The only relevant powers that they have are in the Customs and Excise Act 1952, under which goods that are imported, landed or unloaded contrary to a prohibition or a restriction in force or by virtue of any enactment, are liable to forfeiture. The procedures under that legislation are lengthy and cumbersome and quite inappropriate to the purpose of stopping foreign vehicles from coming into the country. I think noble Lords will agree that although these enforcement procedures are necessary it is the essence of the Bill that they

285
should be capable of being applied reasonably and with discretion. The powers of the Customs and Excise simply do not permit the exercise of that kind of discretion.
I was asked about the effect of the Bill on manpower. The fact is that by the exercise of spot checks rather than by any sort of blanket arrangements it is not expected that there will be any increase in staff as a result of the Bill; there will be merely a redeployment of existing enforcement officers. There are at present 190 traffic examiners who inspect documents and weigh vehicles. Recent port checks have shown that spot checks could be conducted with an average of three traffic examiners per port. I do not think that noble Lords need feel any great anxiety on that score. I was asked about consultation in the preparation of this legislation. I can confirm that an explanatory letter was sent to the British Delegation in Brussels on November 3 and copies of the Bill were sent on November 17. Our delegation has informed the Commission of the Government's proposals and no comments have so far been received. There is no reason to expect any adverse comments, since the Bill is purely an enforcement measure and strengthens existing legislation procedure only. There is already agreement under the reciprocal arrangements that every country has a right to see that foreign vehicles which enter it respects the current legislative codes. It is clear to other countries that the enforcement procedure and the powers we are taking under the Bill are only those necessary to the extent that we need special enforcement procedures for dealing with foreign vehicles which are different from those required to deal with our own vehicles.
My Lords, I hope that I have dealt with most of the points that have been raised. All I need do is to assure my noble friend, Lord Mancroft, that the point that he raised about Sundays is one that will be considered in due course. It does not arise under the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

BANKING AND FINANCIAL DEALINGS BILL
Brought from the Commons; read la, and to be printed.

RHODESIA: SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS
3.45 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE),THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL JELLICOE), rose to move, That this House approves Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute and endorses Her Majesty's Government's decision that they should be put to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. As I see it, the basic question confronting both Houses of Parliament at the start of this two-day debate is whether the proposals in the White Paper should now be submitted to the judgment of the Rhodesian people. A long history of painful, protracted and interrupted negotiation—conducted by more than one Government—lies behind the proposals now before the House. I am glad that one of the most distinguished and tireless of this chain of negotiators, the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, will be contributing to our debate.
Our judgment whether these proposals should properly be submitted to the test of Rhodesian opinion may turn on whether they pass the test of the Five Principles. And rightly so. The Government have always made it clear that however much they desired a settlement in the general interest, in this country's interest and in the interest of Rhodesia and the Rhodesians, they would not put their signature to an agreement which lay outside the Five Principles. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has reaffirmed this time and time again. Sir Alec is not a man to make pledges lightly or to break pledges made. Nevertheless, the Opposition, in the Amendment standing in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, claim that the proposals fail fully to meet the test of the Five Principles. I therefore deem to owe it to your Lordships to take you over this well-trodden ground rather carefully.
The First Principle is that of maintaining and guaranteeing unimpeded progress to majority rule. I submit that the proposals now before the House square fully and truly with that Principle. They point to the assurance of majority rule just as

287
clearly as the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution shut the door to it. Under that Constitution, the Africans in Rhodesia would have been expressly precluded from ever attaining more than parity of representation—and that in some remote future. Under the proposals, these crippling provisions will be repealed and replaced by arrangements whereby the Africans will proceed—and I readily concede that there is room for argument about the time scale of that progress—to parity of representation in the House of Assembly. As the White Paper makes clear, additional seats will be created the first four (provided that a sufficient number of qualified Africans register) at an early date and before the next general election which may not take place before 1975—and so on by defined and clear-cut stages matching the increase of registrations on the new higher African electoral roll until parity has been attained. At that stage, the next and crucial stage, the transition to majority rule, will be achieved by the creation of ten additional Common Roll seats at the first election after parity. Given the great imbalance between the African and European population of Rhodesia it should not be very long before the Africans, if only through sheer weight of electoral numbers, gain the majority of these ten seats.
I should like at this stage to underline two points. The first is that the ten seats of which I have been speaking will be Common Roll seats, marking an important political stage forward towards a truly multi-racial society in Rhodesia. The second point on which I wish to dwell is that progress to majority rule is guaranteed by the new proposals that African political advance will be inexorably linked to the numbers qualifying for the higher African roll. The removal of the impediment to majority rule is in its turn guaranteed by the entrenchment provisions in the proposals, the provisions to which I now turn.
The Second Principle provided, as your Lordships will recall, for guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Rhodesian Constitution. It is a major feature of the present proposals than an effective blocking mechanism against retrogressive amendment is embedded in them. That mechanism grips and protects all the vital provisions guaranteeing
288
African political advance. And it specifically embraces the point put to me last week by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, the new Declaration of Rights. This blocking mechanism is firmly in African hands. During the first three years—the vulnerable years when African representation in the House of Assembly will still be small—the Rhodesians have specifically undertaken to introduce no amendments to the specially entrenched provisions. After that period it is almost certain, provided the Africans who are qualified to register do so register, that the first two seats to be elected on the African Higher Roll will have been filled. African representation in the House will then consist of 10 directly elected, and 8 indirectly elected representatives. Any amendment to a specially entrenched provision of the Constitution would therefore require 10 affirmative African votes. In other words, even if all the indirectly elected African representatives voted in favour of an amendment, the vote of two directly elected representatives would be needed to approve such an amendment to the Constitution. But, my Lords, we should not fall, I would submit, into the assumption of looking upon the indirectly elected Africans as mere creatures of the Rhodesian regime. They have in fact voted with their directly elected colleagues on every occasion since 1970 when African interests were affected, save on one occasion when one went into the wrong lobby by mistake—something which happens in other places than Rhodesia.
Be that as it may, my Lords, the directly elected members will, until parity is reached, be in a position to block retrogressive amendments. It is true that at parity the requirement for separate racial majorities will be dropped. But this, I submit, will not weaken the blocking safeguard in any material sense. At this stage the Europeans will need to obtain the support of at least 17 of the 50 African representatives for any amendment of special entrenched provisions of the Constitution, and at this stage either these 17 Africans will all be directly elected or their status as indirectly elected representatives will have been endorsed, and thereby strengthened, by referendum among all African voters. I claim, my Lords, with equal confidence that the proposals pass the test of the Third Principle: that there will be an immediate

289
improvement in the political status of the African population. In the purely political sphere, elections for the first two African higher roll seats will be held as soon as the necessary registration and electoral formalities have been completed. The first two additional indirectly elected seats will likewise be filled as soon as the necessary registration on the African higher roll are achieved.
But, my Lords, it would be a mistake to think of African political advance as but a matter of nicely calculated electoral less or more. The advance of individuals or groups within a society, be it in Europe or in Africa, cannot be contained, or cannot be long contained, within watertight compartments. The political, the social, the economic all overlap and interplay. Thus the greater protection of basic rights of freedom embodied in the strengthened and justiciable Declaration of Rights will in itself constitute an immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. By the same token the provision of substantial extra funds for development by both the British Government and the Rhodesian Government will not only promote African economic advance, in town and country; not only provide for more technical training; not only encourage the development of administrative skills; not only nourish better and higher education—it will certainly do all those things, my Lords, but in doing those things it will also sustain and stimulate the political advance of Africans in Rhodesia.
In addition, the specifics written into the proposals all point the same way. The intention to end the state of emergency; the release of some detainees; the special review for the others; the opening up of the Rhodesian public service to Africans—the very important commitment—all these specific measures point the same way, to an immediate improvement, as laid down in the Third Principle, in the status of Africans in Rhodesia.
My Lords, I now turn to the all-important Fourth Principle: that there should be progress towards ending racial discrimination in Rhodesia, a principle which I believe lies close to the hearts of most of us. As I said, the provisions in the Declaration of Rights on discrimination are the same as those in the 1961 Declaration of Rights. They are also jus
290
ticiable and will effectively prevent any growth in discrimination. This means that any new laws or any new administrative acts flowing from old laws—and this is important in the context of Rhodesia—may be challenged in the courts on grounds of discrimination. So much for further discriminatory legislation.
So far as existing discrimination is concerned, the agreed proposals embody a firm declaration by the Rhodesian Government to make progress towards ending racial discrimination. Given the slide which we have all witnessed these past two years, the significance of that declaration should not be too lightly dismissed. I hope, too, that your Lordships will note that the proposals provide for a Commission to review the whole field of discrimination, including a particular duty to scrutinise the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. So far as the Commission is concerned, I would merely wish to underline that its terms of reference have been agreed with Her Majesty's Government; that its membership will require our agreement and that one of its members will necessarily be an African. Its findings will be published, and the Rhodesian Government have specifically undertaken to commend to their Parliament such changes as are required to give effect to its recommendations
"subject only"—
and here I quote the words of the White Paper—
"to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character."
So much for the mutual compatibility of the first Four Principles and the present proposals. I am of course aware that some have claimed that there is no such compatibility; that others suggest that the compatibility is less than absolute, or that the proposals are in other ways defective. I should like to examine, if I may, as objectively as I can, some of the main objections that I have seen, or have heard voiced.
The first set of objections relate to the First Principle. The critics claim that the rate of African advance to majority rule will be so slow that it cannot truly be regarded as unimpeded. They also claim that even at the end of the day the Africans will have only a slim majority in the House of Assembly. The pundits

291
have been very busy with their slide-rules in the Press these last few days, predicting majority rule within 20, or 40 or 60 or as much as 100 years. Quite frankly, my Lords, I prefer here my own agnostic match-box. There are too many imponderables—there are bound to be too many imponderables—for us to form a really valid judgment. There is the imponderable of the take-up by the Africans of their electoral opportunity, of the pace of registration. There is the greater imponderable of the rhythm of African economic and African educational advance, the pace-setters for African political advance. But, my Lords, given a settlement; given the resulting development aid; given the likely injection thereafter of foreign investment, my guess is that these pace-setters will set a faster pace than many expect. I recognise, of course, that at the end of the day the Africans may, at best, have a majority of only 10, or less, in a House of Assembly of 110. All I would say on this point is that, as we all know very well, in the last resort it is the fact of the majority rather than the size of the majority which counts. As a certain Statesman once said, "One is enough."
The proposals have also been criticised for their lack of an external safeguard. But, my Lords, if we look with a cool eye at this problem, we must recognise that the reality of the matter is that unless this country—our country—or some other organisation was prepared to exercise effective physical pressure, no external guarantee could be more than a scrap of paper, if the Rhodesian authorities were in the last resort determined to break their word. But the official Opposition, like my own Party—I am not quite certain where the Liberals stand here as they seem to have their South of Suez group, if I may so term it—have always renounced force as a solution to the problems of Southern Africa. In any event, even when we had an external safeguard—such as the safeguard written into the 1961 Constitution—this did not prevent the slide towards U.D.I. and what has followed since U.D.I. A second safeguard, of the type proposed by Mr. George Thomson during his visit to Salisbury in the late autumn of 1968, may have had some value but that value,
292
at least in my eyes, would be purely cosmetic.
I should like to put three other considerations to your Lordships, when you revolve in your minds this absence—this admitted absence—of an external safeguard. Is it not in the interests of the Rhodesians themselves to avoid antagonising this country and the wider world through "ratting" on the proposals to which Mr. Smith put his signature last week? If the Rhodesians have it in the back of their mind to walk back on these proposals when the shoe begins to pinch, would they have been as intractable in negotiation as they have proved these last six or seven years? And there is one further consideration here, which I would ask your Lordships to ponder. Mr. Smith may not have matters all his own way in his own Parliament. It is one thing for someone to walk back from a Constitution—in this case, the 1961 Constitution—for which he can rightly claim that he was not responsible. It is another thing for that same man to walk back from proposals to which he has recently put his signature and which, possibly in the teeth of opposition, he has carried through his own Parliament.
The criticis have also latched on Principle Four—on discrimination. I would ask them to ponder these facts. We should first recognise that although the pace of the slide has accelerated these in the past two years, as has been obvious to us all, we must in fairness concede that racial discrimination as at present practised in Rhodesia is a very different thing from racial discrimination as at present practised in South Africa. Thus the "freezing" by these proposals of discrimination in Rhodesia at its present level is not something which we should too lightly underrate. But, in any event, the proposals to which Mr. Smith and my right honourable friend have put their signatures go beyond a mere "freeze" at the present, far too high, level of discrimination. They provide for a progressive and very necessary thaw in discrimination. There are those who argue that we should have gone further and faster in this direction. To those, I would suggest that in the present conditions of Rhodesian society an attempt to erode discrimination at a stroke could very well be counter-productive. This is a highly

293
complex and highly charged field, where emotions run very high. It could possibly be the path of unwisdom to try to remove discrimination in such a way and at such a pace as to add to racial tension in Rhodesia. To do so might very well only put the multiracial clock further back.
I therefore suggest that the way forward embodied in these proposals—a justiciable Declaration of Rights and an independent Commission inquiring in depth and specifically charged with inquiring into the vital area of land tenure—represents a sensible and reasonable approach. I feel that the more so, when this provision is judged against the other provisions in the proposals; against the clear-cut intention of the Rhodesian Government specifically expressed, to make progress towards ending the racial discrimination; against the fact that there will be an African member of the Commission; against the background that the membership of the Commission will require the approval of the British Government; against the commitment to publish the Commission's findings; and against Mr. Smith's assurance that he will commend changes suggested by the Commission to the Rhodesian Parliament for its approval. I recognise that the conditions attached to that,
"subject only to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of art over-riding character",
has been held by some to make that commitment valueless. I feel that the critics here are unfair. I cannot see how any independent Government could possibly commit itself in advance to approve and sponsor any conceivable findings of a Commission reporting to it.
I do not claim that the proposals covering these first four Principles are in every respect perfect. Nor do I claim that in all respects they are what some of us, in an ideal world, myself included, would have liked to secure. But I do claim that they are consistent with the Four Principles and I do claim that they represent an immense advance on the existing position. It would have been pleasant to sweep aside in one fell swoop the 1969 Constitution and all that has gone with it. But in the Rhodesia of 1971 it would be quite unrealistic. Nevertheless, I would draw your Lordships' atten-
294
tion to the fact that four of the major and most objectionable features of that Constitution have been totally excised. The income tax regulator, which could have made a nonsense of African political advancement, which could have put a brake on it for generations or centuries to come, has gone. The express bar against the advance beyond parity has gone. The ability of the representatives of the European population of Rhodesia to amend all the provisions of the Constitution at will has gone, too. And the basic defect arising from the lack of any brake on further discriminatory legislation has been remedied.
There are others who will be following me in this debate who know Africa much better than I know it, who know Rhodesia better than I shall ever know Rhodesia and who have been more closely involved in these negotiations than I have been involved. But, at the end of the day, we have to come to a conclusion. Trying to look at this matter as dispassionately as I can, I have come to the conclusion that in the absence of any sign of early change in the power structure in Rhodesia—and there is none—the proposals now before your Lordships are as good as we can now possibly secure. Therefore the choice before us is whether we prefer the present terms to no terms at all. I am quite clear myself that if we are thinking of the welfare and prospects of the African in Rhodesia, then it would be folly for us not to walk through the door of the settlement which the Foreign Secretary and his team have opened for us and for Rhodesia. That settlement can bring a degree of African advancement, political, economic and social, which will otherwise be denied. That door opens the way to majority rule and the prospect in Southern Africa of a non-racial society.
With the end of isolation there will come, I believe, an end to that siege mentality which has afflicted Rhodesia for the past half decade or so. And with the end of that siege mentality, moderate opinion in Rhodesia will once again be able to assert itself. This is the hopeful alternative which the Government believe it would be quite wrong for us to reject. It is the only alternative which can arrest the fast downward slide in Rhodesia towards a pattern of South African apartheid. That being so, my option and vote, and I hope the option and votes of

295
my noble friends, will be for these proposals—but on one condition: that condition is quite simply the crucial test of acceptability. I would remind your Lordships that the Proposals for a Settlement (Annex B) begin with these words:
"The proposals set out below are conditional upon the British Government being satisfied that they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."
—in effect, the Fifth Principle. We can weigh this package of proposals as we may, but in the final analysis it must be for the Rhodesian people themselves to decide whether these proposals are as a package acceptable. They affect us. They certainly affect our position in the world. But they affect us a lot less than they affect the Rhodesians. And that is why the proposed arrangements for conducting the test of acceptability are of such importance. The details are clearly set out in the proposals before your Lordships' House. They provide for as fair and full a sounding of Rhodesian opinion as it is possible to devise in today's circumstances. I can assure your Lordships that we are quite determined that this test should be carried out thoroughly and impartially and it is for these reasons that the various safeguards are embodied in the proposals. Those noble Lords who may entertain doubts about the extent to which political activities would be permitted during the test should remember that this Commission will specifically have to satisfy itself that reasonable discretion and reasonable expression of opinion is being allowed.
I do not disguise the fact that the choice before some of us to-day and tomorrow is not an easy one. But, of course, easy choices in life are not for most of us. We do not usually have the luxury of an option between the totally tainted and the perfect and unpolluted. If it were so, I am sure that your Lordships' House would be able to join together in one long chorus of total, but perhaps rather boring, agreement on all issues. Nevertheless, my Lords, as I see it, the options before us in Rhodesia, since the renewal of negotiations and since the signature of these proposals, have become somewhat clearer. On the one hand, we have the harsh reality of a certain and progressive slide into all the
296
evils of apartheid, with its nagging and insistent affronts to human dignity and human freedom. On the other, we have the possibility of a real change of direction which these proposals open up for Rhodesia and for Rhodesians.
I cannot—no one can—guarantee that Rhodesia will take this chance which we have helped at the eleventh hour to create for it. It would be foolish of me to do so. But this agreement represents far more than a last rather desperate throw. If these proposals prove acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole—this is something which I do not wish to prejudge—they will open the country up to those moderating influences, internal and external, which have been denied and diminished by enforced isolation and the atmosphere of the Lager. They will create a totally new situation as time goes by in every field, political, social and economic. It was with this hope, but with no certainty of fulfilment, that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary went out to Salisbury a few weeks ago. I believe that lie has succeeded in a measure far beyond what most of us believed possible. It is with confidence, therefore, that I commend these proposals to this House. I beg to move.
Moved, That this House approves Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute and endorses Her Majesty's Government's decision that they should be put to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment.—(Earl Jellicoe.)
House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by the Lord Chancellor.

E.E.C.: FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS
4.3 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMLIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords I fear that It may not be very convenient to your Lordships, but I hope that it is your Lordships' wish that I should at this moment, the most convenient time after half-past three, repeat a Statement which has been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Chancellor

297
of the Duchy of Lancaster. The Statement is as follows:
"With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I would like to make a Statement about my meeting with the European Community in Brussels on November 29.
The main purpose of this meeting, which was attended by Ministers from the other applicant countries, was to seek to settle the vital problem of fisheries. On this occasion I was accompanied by my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture as well as my honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland.
"We made useful progress in some respects. The Community proposed that there should be, for ten years, an interim regime based on a 6-mile limit with special areas going out to 12 miles. In addition to the Orkneys and Shetlands, they offered to consider the possibility of some other special areas for the United Kingdom.
I had to make it clear, however, that their proposals did not go far enough to safeguard the legitimate interests of the fishing industry and did not, in my view, provide a fair overall balance of advantage. In accordance with the assurances which I have given to the House I explained that an initial period of ten years by itself was not sufficient; and I was disappointed that we were not able at this meeting to reach agreement on how to deal with the situation after the ten years.
"We have agreed to meet again on December 11 when I very much hope we will settle this important and difficult problem. I believe that we have now achieved enough understanding and clarification of all the issues to make this possible.
"In the course of the Ministerial meeting I took the opportunity to raise three other matters. First, Papua and New Guinea. The House will recall that in my Statement on November 11 after the previous Ministerial meeting, I said that I had reminded the Community of the need to make arrangements for the territory. The Community proposed at the meeting of Deputies on November 24 that until January 1,1978 the trade arrangements
298
for Papua and New Guinea imports into Britain would remain as they were on the date of British accession with a provision for review. I thanked the Community for this proposal and explained that I had communicated it to the Australian Government. I said that I was confident that the enlarged Community would make reasonable arrangements for Papua and New Guinea when the time came to review this question.
"Next, Nationality. The Community had made it clear to us that it would he helpful if we were to give a definition of a United Kingdom national, since the term 'nationals of Member States ', and like phrases, appear frequently in the Community Treaties and legislation. I accordingly gave the Community the following definition for these purposes:
'Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies or British subjects not possessing that citizenship or the citizenship of any other Commonwealth country or territory, who, in either case, have the right of abode in the United Kingdom, and are therefore exempt from United Kingdom immigration control.'
"Finally, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. I told the House on the 11th of November of the Community's proposals for them. I informed the Community that I had visited the islands in order to commend the arrangements which the Community had proposed. I promised to let the Community know the decision of the respective islands as soon as possible."
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
4.8 p.m.
LORD HOY: My Lords, I am sure that I may express the thanks of the whole House to the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement made in the other place. For my part, I should like to confine such questions as I want to put to the first part of the Statement, which I understand concerns the really important part of the negotiations. First of all, may we have a little more information regarding that part of the country in which the Community agreed that we might have 95 per cent. of the coastline for ourselves? Secondly, can the noble Baroness tell us

299
something about the proposals with regard to salmon fisheries? As the House knows, at the present time drift netting of salmon is banned to all our own people. We should like to know what the proposals are in regard to salmon fisheries, because they are of great importance to many parts of Britain.
I also wish to ask the noble Baroness about the position of Norway in this dispute, because it seems to me from reading the Press that we are rather drifting apart. If, at the end of the day, Norway is not going to sign the Treaty of Accession, Denmark is likely to follow suit. So it is important that we understand the position between ourselves and Norway. At the end of the day, of course, the noble Baroness is repeating—this I think we can take for granted—the statement that she made in your Lordships' House yesterday, when she said that unless the Government get a satisfactory agreement on fisheries there can be no signature to the Treaty of Accession. I assume that that position still stands.
LORD WADE: My Lords, may I join in thanking the noble Baroness for repeating this Statement with regard to fishing? Would the noble Baroness agree that this is much more than just a case of safeguarding a particular sectional interest? The whole future of the fishing industry is involved, and I hope that the British case will be presented in that way. On the very different subject of the definition of "nationals", I would say that this is much too complex a matter on which to have an "off the cuff" comment. Would the noble Barones agree that it indicates the complexities of reconciling our own immigration laws with the laws of the Community? What effect, if any, will this definition have on the right of dependants to join their parents in this country?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have spoken and I will begin by answering the last question of the noble Lord, Lord Hoy. As I said on a previous occasion, and, indeed, yesterday, we must try to get satisfactory arrangements on fisheries before signing the Treaty of Accession. As regards salmon fishing, my right honourable friend felt that it was an advance that the
300
Six acknowledge the concern that has been felt both in the United Kingdom and in the Irish Republic about what was called the "beach doctrine", and what effect it might have on salmon. I am not in a position this afternoon to give a detailed account of this. So far as Norway is concerned, what matters is that there should be a fair overall balance of advantage between all the applicant countries, and we keep in constant touch with them. The noble Lord, Lord Wade, asked me whether we were trying to keep a fair balance between all the fishing interests. I can assure him that that is the whole object of my right honourable friend's endeavours. The noble Lord also asked whether one could say who was included in the definition of a United Kingdom national, which I have just given to the House. The definition comprises all those citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who are patrial under Section 2 of the Immigration Act.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness to make clear what she means when she says that Her Majesty's Government will "try" to get agreement on this matter before there is any question of signing the Treaty? Can she give an undertaking that there will be no signature unless there is an agreement in this matter? Can she go further and give an undertaking that there will be no question of further steps being taken after this House rises, and during the Christmas Recess, which would lead to a signature without the House being aware of what is held to constitute an agreement on this matter? May I also raise a point with regard to nationals? Can the noble Baroness say what the position will be regarding citizens of Eire if (a), Eire accedes to the Community, and (b), if they do not accede to the Community?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I thought I made it perfectly clear that we would not sign the Treaty of Accession unless we had reached agreement, but it is also perfectly true that we must try to reach agreement. We are negotiating, the position is a difficult one, and that is why I used the word "try". As regards any further steps during the Christmas Recess, I may say that we are still aiming to sign the Treaty of Accession before

301
Christmas; the next meeting on fisheries is on December 11. Regarding citizens of Eire, as opposed to Ulster—citizens of Ulster will come in under the definition of United Kingdom nationals—I would point out that all countries have their own definition of "national".
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness whether she will bear in mind that no satisfactory arrangement can come out of these fishery regulations which includes a time limit of any kind—either five years or ten years. That is the most important point at issue. In the meantime, will Her Majesty's Government before December 11 bring all pressure to bear upon the Governments of the Six, and particularly the French Government, to make it clear that they have no right to ask us to join the Common Market at the cost of ruining our inshore fishing industry, which the present proposals would undoubtedly do.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, so far as the first question is concerned, it was on this matter of the time limit that my right honourable friend said that he did not feel that the arrangements so far were satisfactory. On the second question, that of bringing pressure to bear, I am sure that noble Lords in all parts of the House have seen accounts in the Press. My right honourable friend did his best to try to persuade the Six countries that we must not let this agreement founder on fisheries.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, following on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, may I ask the noble Baroness this question? Surely the test of the good faith of the Six in their desire to have us in the Community rests on this agreement about fishing rights. If they do not agree, then it means that they do not want us in the Common Market.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot accept that. These are difficult negotiations between the Six and ourselves. We have overcome many difficulties in other spheres, as indeed this House knows, having debated this matter on six whole days. The matter of fisheries is very difficult and I am sure that it is the wish of all concerned—all the appli
302
cant countries and the Six—that we should reach a happy and satisfactory agreement.
THE EARL OF DUDLEY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether the difficulties at the moment are over our rights, that is, our territorial limits, or the checks and powers which we should be able to use to prevent entry into areas in which we had established our rights?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I think I must say in answer to that question that both points are under discussion. I said in my Statement that the Community have proposed that we should have this exclusive fishing right up to six miles, and those countries of the Common Market which have to fish between six and 12 miles should continue to do so. One of the main problems is what is to happen after the ten years. It is on this question that my right honourable friend is hoping, and I believe will succeed when everyone has had time for further thought, to achieve a settlement on December 11.

RHODESIA: SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS
4.18 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER rose to move, as an Amendment to the Motion, to leave out all the words after "House" and insert: "declines to approve Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute because they do not fully meet the requirements of the Five Principles."
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper. As your Lordships know, there are many views about Rhodesia. There are those who think that we ought to have used force; there are those who think that we ought to have recognised the Smith regime as the Government of Rhodesia; there are those who think we should never have imposed sanctions; there are those who think that, even now, there should be no independence before majority rule. That last view is very much the view of the Commonwealth and at the United Nations. None of these is the view of the present Government, nor

303
were they the views of the last Government. Therefore when we heard and were told that the Foreign Secretary was going to Salisbury, we naturally accepted that, because our view has always been that this is a problem which should be settled, if possible, by amicable negotiation on the basis of the Five Principles.
Accordingly, when the Statement was made on November 9 that the Foreign Secretary was going to Rhodesia, my noble friend Lord Shepherd said (column 258 of the OFFICIAL REPORT):
"I would say at the outset that we on this side of the House support and welcome the decision made by the Foreign and Common wealth Secretary to visit Rhodesia to see whether a satisfactory settlement can be arrived at and whether Rhodesia can quickly return to legality."
At the end he said:
"… I certainly recommend that we do not say anything tomorrow that would in any way make the task of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary more difficult."
On the following day I said, at column 384:
"I agree with the Motion before the House, and I welcome the proposed visit by the right honourable gentleman the Foreign Secretary to Salisbury."
And, after further observations, I said:
"…it has of course always been the view of the Opposition, as it was when they were in Government, that this difficult Rhodesian problem was to be settled, if at all, by negotiation on the basis of the Five Principles. I believe the Foreign Secretary to be a man of integrity. He has always maintained his adherence to the Five Principles since, I think, the end of 1963 or the beginning of 1964, and I, for one, am not prepared to believe that he does not mean exactly what he has said."
After some further observations, I ended:
"…subject to those observations, this action, as I have said, accords with the policy of the Opposition, which was their policy in Government. As everyone knows, we made repeated attempts to do everything we could to secure a settlement on the basis of the Five Principles. This, I am sure, is the right course to take, and it is for those reasons that I support the Motion and welcome this proposed visit."
I hope the House will think that that was a proper attitude to take, and it is in that spirit that I wish to address some observations to your Lordships this afternoon.
We made one request. On Thursday last, my noble friend Lord Shepherd said, at col.1169 of the OFFICIAL REPORT:
304
"I presume that this will be on a Motion to' take note of' the settlement proposals and not on a Motion for approval, because there are many questions that will have to be asked and answered, and I suspect that to obtain those answers will be very difficult in the course of a normal debate."
The noble Earl the Leader of the House was good enough to say that due con sideration would he given to that pro posal, but in fact it was publicly announced within an hour that there was to be no "take note" debate, but one for approval. That means, at least in my view, that this is one of the most important debates, and one of the most important decisions to be taken by this House which I have heard since I have been a Member of this House, because we, and we alone, are responsible for 5¼ million Africans and 240.000 Europeans in the Colony of Rhodesia; and what happens to them in the future will now depend, if the Motion is accepted and if the Royal Commission make an affirmative report, on the decision arrived at by Parliament on this Motion.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords. I wonder whether I might interrupt. I apologise for breaking into the noble and learned Lord's speech at this early stage, but he referred to what I said last week, that I would take due note of the suggestion put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and then he referred to a public announcement. I am not aware of the public announcement the noble and learned Lord is referring to. All I would assure him of is that I did take due note of the suggestion put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. No decision was taken, certainly within an hour, that we should ask your Lordships to approve this; it was taken much later, and after very careful consideration, and, if I may say so, in the light of the consideration that it was my own feeling and that of my colleagues that it was putting the Rhodesian people in an impossible situation if they were going to be asked, as it were, to submit themselves to the test of acceptability or at least to submit these proposals to the test of their acceptability, if they did not know that they were acceptable to the British Parliament.
LORD GARDINER: My Lords, I entirely accept that it was for the Government to decide; as for the rest, I accept what the noble Earl says, and I may perhaps return to it later.

305
The question alone to which I desire to address my observations is whether these proposals do in fact comply with the Five Principles. It will be my submission that they do not in fact comply with any of them. I shall leave to others the question, what, if that is so, is the course which we should take. The Five Principles, which were first enunciated I think in 1964 by the present Foreign Secretary, of course related entirely to the 1961 Constitution:
"1 The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed."
No one questions for a moment that the 1961 Constitution was one leading to majority rule. The estimate of Sir Edgar Whitehead when he introduced it at the United Nations in 1962 was that it would mean majority rule in 1975.
"2 There would … have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution."
What Constitution? The 1961 Constitution, of course.
"3 There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population."
Improvement in comparison with what? Improvement, of course, in comparison with their political status under the 1961 Constitution. And, my Lords, this is why, of course, throughout our negotiations the only basis of negotiation—and this covers those negotiations on the "Tiger" and those on "Fearless"—was what changes should be made in the 1961 Constitution to fit it for an independent Constitution and to embrace features which we felt to be essential, and hoped that the Salisbury regime would agree to.
In all our discussions there was only one time when we seemed to be making no headway, and we said to Mr. Smith (this is all recorded in the documents), "Shall we break away from the 1961 Constitution and try to think out a new Constitution? There are, after all, experts in Constitutions. We could get experienced statesmen from our old dominions who have different kinds of Constitutions. They could go to Rhodesia." We even offered to consider an Act of Union of United Kingdom and Rhodesia. But Mr. Smith said, No; he would not depart at all from the basic 1961 Constitution as the basis of the discussions. He said, "If we once
306
leave that it will take a couple of years before we arrive at anything else. "This was why, throughout, our discussions were all based on the 1961 Constitution.
The main feature and the whole basis of the proposals before the House—and this does not seem to me to be wholly appreciated even by some of the Press comments—is that the 1961 Constitution is to be thrown overboard entirely and that the Constitution on which there is to be a new and sovereign State of Rhodesia is to be the 1969 Constitution with certain amendments to be made to it. This therefore is the basic document. As your Lordships know—and this is perhaps partly coming back to what the noble Earl has just said; this is not a complaint—nobody, naturally, knew anything about the proposed terms of settlement until Thursday. We did not receive the White Paper until Friday. This meant that nobody who lived out of London and had not made special arrangements would receive it until Monday.
I should like here to record my gratitude to our officials of the Printed Paper Office who are always so helpful and able to provide almost any document at a moment's notice. I am quite sure it was not their fault that they were quite unable on Monday to supply me with a copy of the basic document, which is the 1969 Constitution. I should like to thank, too, the Librarian and his staff, who also of course can draw on all the resources of the House of Commons Library. At sometime on Monday evening they produced a document called Proposals for a New Constitution; but it turned out that this was a document that Mr. Smith had used for the purposes of a General Election and was not the 1969 Constitution, which was not in fact enacted until March 2,1970. Furthermore, I should like to thank, too, the combined staffs of the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Foreign Office, who late on Monday night did produce one copy of the basic document—the 1969 Constitution. But, unfortunately, it then transpired that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not have a copy. I forebore to ask him how he arrived at the conclusion that this was the right Constitution to give Rhodesia, but naturally he had precedence, and it was not until yesterday at midday that I was able to obtain a copy of this basic document.

307
Now, my Lords, if I may come to the First Principle, under this Constitution the Senate has 10 Europeans, 10 paid Chiefs and three Members appointed by the President, and that is all. If—as with the 1961 Constitution—this Constitution is leading to majority rule, the question one then asks is, "When?" Of course it is quite impossible for anybody to name the year. We always refused to do so. Obviously, it depends upon a number of hypotheses and imponderables. At the same time, if it is to be meaningful at all we must be clear in our minds as to what is the sort of time scale. Here, the estimate of the times is, I think, between 30 and 50 years. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Alport, who knows Rhodesia so well, has on the wireless estimated that it is improbable that there would ever be majority rule under these proposals. Professor Palley, herself a Rhodesian, and I think generally recognised as being quite familiar with these intricacies, has, as I dare say your Lord ships observed from her article in the Sunday Times, taken considerable trouble to take first all those hypotheses most favourable to early African rule. This depends, of course, upon there being a big sweep forward in African education and relatively small white immigration in the years to come; and then, taking the alternative hypotheses, the conclusion at which she has arrived is that on the view most favourable to African majority rule it would not come, under these proposals, for 64 years and possibly not for 100 years.
My first question is this: Do the Government think that Professor Palley has left out any material qualification, and if so, what; and do they quarrel with her conclusions, and if so, why? I know that there is to be no other Government speaker to-day. It is my submission that these proposals are extraordinarily complex, extremely difficult to under stand; they need a lot of elucidation. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is to speak quite early in the debate. As there is to be no other Government speaker to-day, and while recognising that he is not the Government (although I think he is more or less everything else!) I am sure it would be of great help to the House if he, with his great knowledge of every
308
detail of this matter, could answer to-day the few questions which I intend to raise.
If the time scale which Professor Palley has suggested is anything like right, how realistic is it to attempt to make a law or constitution under which there can be no African majority rule for 64 years? Is not one of the few certain things in life the fact that ever since the history of the world began the rate of change has continually increased, and never more so than in the last 50 years? When I ask those of my friends who know South Africa much better than I do how long they think apartheid will last, they reply, pretty generally in agreement, "It will last for at least 10 years; it will not last for 20 years". Does anybody suppose that in 64 years Nigeria will not have nuclear weapons? If that is the sort of time scale, are we not in fact being completely illogical in thinking that this is remotely like the unimpeded progress to majority rule which was already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, being maintained or guaranteed?
As The Times put it in a leading article on November 26, speaking of the proposed voting qualifications:
"The 1969 Constitution makes provision for a built-in review of these qualifications in relation to price and income levels…This is a crucial point which needs investigation."
I find that difficult to check. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would like to say a word about it.
Something else that I have not followed is this: The proposals in the Constitution seem to me to be divisive, both between the directly elected Africans who are the educated African politicians and the relatively uneducated chiefs. But why is it also divisive as between—if I have understood it correctly—Mashona land and Matabeleland, each of which has the same number of representatives, although Mashonaland has 69 per cent. of the population of both tribes and Matabeleland has only 31 per cent.? Of course, the great difficulty is the old question of the Chiefs, and here again as The Times said:
"While the first two extra African seats might be representative in some sense, the second two, which would go to the Chiefs' and Councillors' Electoral College, a body of only about 1,500, would produce, in most people's view, stooges of the establishment."

309
Then, if I may raise a simple point, would your Lordships be good enough to look at page 19 of the White Paper. The question I asked myself was: will African women be qualified to vote? I was interested merely because I remember that we raised this matter twice with Mr. Smith, and it is all in the documents. On the first occasion he said that he and his colleagues did not think it would be suitable for African women to vote, and on the second occasion he said that they had reconsidered it and it would not be a sticking point. So I looked at page 19, at the African lower roll qualifications, and I asked myself whether it included women. It does not say any thing about the nature of the people concerned under paragraphs (a) and (b), except as to their incomes and capital. Then paragraph (c) says: "Persons over 30 years of age…" I ask this question: Are women "persons"? One might say, Well, as you have the document there, however late you got it, you must be able to tell because surely there must be a definition section in the 1969 Constitution". The answer is that there is a definition section—I think it is Section 91. This is a long Act with several Schedules, but it contains no definition of the word "person".
It transpired on further inquiry that the present qualifications are not set out in the 1969 Constitution; they are set out in what is called the "Rhodesian Electoral Law" of 1969. Visits to the Printed Paper Office, the Library and the Lord Chancellor's Office did not pro duce any copy of that document; but the Foreign Office have again been kind and at 12.16 p.m. to-day I received a copy. It contains 194 sections and four Schedules, and although I am fairly used to reading Acts of Parliament the Opposition are of course in difficulty when the Government rely so much on their basic majority that they do not give Members of your Lordships' House access to the documents, without which it is quite impossible to understand these proposals. Having looked at this I rather think that women are eligible, but perhaps the noble Lord would confirm that.
There is a further point which has been raised in, I think, the Observer as to what really happens when parity is reached, and it is a matter I do not
310
quite follow myself. What they say is this. After pointing out that there will never be more than a majority of 10 Africans altogether, and that therefore about half will in perpetuity represent 5,250,000 Africans and the other half a quarter of a million Europeans, they say:
"Nor is this the only bad feature of what is proposed. At the point where parity is eventually—if ever—reached, the Government of the day will be allowed to appoint a Com mission to determine whether any alternative arrangement to majority rule may he accept able to the country as a whole. One of the alternatives the Commission is specifically authorised to consider is whether the general desire of the country is to remain permanently at parity—the present policy of the Rhodesian Front."
If that is right, this is not a guarantee of majority rule in the sense in which the 1961 Constitution was.
Finally, if I may adopt the words of the leading article in the Guardian, I would agree with them that:
"The terms provide for a new electoral roll with higher income and educational qualifications to be open to African voters, but of every four M.Ps. to which their numbers entitle these higher African voters, two will in fact be in effect Government nominees. Only when parity is achieved…can all the African seats become directly elected. To claim that this is unimpeded progress towards majority rule is to alter the meaning of words. The Government nominees are by definition an impedance because they stand to lose their income if they vote against the Government."
I must say that it seems to me that that is right, and that it is impossible to say that under these proposals the unimpeded progress to majority rule which was enshrined in the 1961 Constitution has been maintained or guaranteed.
The Second Principle is that there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. May I remind your Lordships here of what the guarantees were under the 1961 Constitution? Apart from the special majority which had to be obtained, the entrenched clauses in the Constitution could not be changed except in two events: first, that a referendum was conducted among all and each of the four races—that is to say, the European community, the African community, the Asian community and the coloured community; and I suppose that in this sort of country the European men will always

311
feel some responsibility for the coloured community—and all four had to approve. The only alternative was if the British Government approved. Mr. Smith convinced us—at least I know he convinced me—that to carry out in practice these four community referenda would have been impracticable. For a new and improved Constitution that would have left only a prohibition by the British Government. Obviously, if we were going to alter the 1961 Constitution to be an independent one, we could not expect an independent Rhodesian Government to be subject to a prohibition by the United Kingdom. That was why through out, as the documents show, we pressed for some equivalent guarantee against retrogressive amendment.
All we have here on this matter is on page 14. Under head (5) we have an assurance:
"The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance to the British Government that they will not introduce or support in the Rhodesian Parliament any amendment of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution relating to the composition of the House of Assembly or of the specially en trenched provisions of the Electoral Act until the first two African higher roll seats have been created and filled or until three years have elapsed since the Constitutional changes provided for by these proposals have come into force, whichever is the sooner."
I gather that there is no doubt that the two seats will come sooner, and that obviously covers only a very limited time. After that, it is said, this amendment can not be carried against the elected Africans if they all vote together. I quite appreciate that; but it means that a retrogressive amendment can be carried if the Government can persuade one elected African to vote with them, or, if my mathematics are right—and I am sure Lord Goodman's are better than mine—two are not voting, one because he has been put into restriction and the other because he was unfortunately knocked down when he was on his way to vote with the other Africans. That is too slender a guarantee of any kind to be acceptable. The Sunday Times on November 28 in a leading article said—I suggest rightly:
"The second principle—the guarantee against constitutional retrogression—is not met at all".
I invite the House to say that that is right.
312
The Third Principle is that there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. This simply is not there, and it shows how confusing the whole thing is—particularly, perhaps without the documents—that the Sunday Times, critical as to how far the other four Principles have been complied with, says of this Principle that it has been complied with because of the franchise provisions. This is a complete confusion of thought. This Principle deals with what the political status of the African population was under the 1961 Constitution, and it says that there would have to be immediate improvement in that political status. The reason why the Sunday Times says that that has been met is because they say that what is now being offered is not as bad as the 1969 Constitution.
What has happened about the voting qualifications for the lower roll is that the income tax provisions of the 1969 Constitution have been removed and we have gone back to exactly their position under the 1961 Constitution, subject, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, knows, to two or three very minor qualifications: first, that the income which the African must have is, I think, 20 per cent. higher—this may be quite fair because of the alteration in the value of money—and subject also to the fact that the figures which were in pounds sterling are now in Rhodesian dollars. Substantially it is the same—entirely, I think, with one qualification, and that is that whereas previously, apart from having to have a certain income or education, there were two groups each of whom qualified as voters, one, kraal heads, and the other, ministers of religion, ministers of religion have now lost all their votes, for reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, could no doubt explain to us. That is all that has happened. The present voting qualifications on the lower roll are pro posed to be exactly what they were under the 1961 Constitution. Therefore there is no improvement of the political status of the African population under that Constitution. The improvement simply is not there.
The Fourth Principle is that there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination. As your Lord ships know, this is a point on which a great many of my noble friends are particularly concerned. No progress at all

313
is now contemplated. There is to be a Review Commission, but that is not to come about, as I understand it, until after independence. The Review Commission is to make recommendations which Parliament may or may not accept. Of course, as your Lordships will remember, under the 1961 Constitution (though this has not come back) we had a Constitutional Commission to look at Bills to see whether they contravened the Declaration of Rights. I remember that that Commission, in 1961, thought that the Land Apportionment Act, for example, was infringing the provisions of the Declaration of Rights. The Commission said of the Act:
"Discrimination and prejudice is the very essence of the Act."
The Government, however, did not pay any attention to that comment. So far as this Review Commission is concerned, all the Government say is that they will commend it to Parliament. Of course, they cannot say whether Parliament will pass it. Then there arc these words:
"subject only to considerations that any Government would…regard as…over riding…"
The question that I ought to address to the noble Marquess is: can the Government tell us what they think that that means?
Finally under this head I come to the Declaration of Rights. As I understand it, when the Foreign Secretary produced the Declaration of Rights in the other place there were what I think are called in Hansard "Cheers"; and everybody thought, "What a wonderful thing it is, when you look at this splendid looking Declaration of Rights, that the Foreign Secretary should have induced the regime to agree to insert into a Constitution such a magnificent new document, particularly as it is going to be enforceable by the courts!". But in fact the position is that this was in the 1961 Constitution, where it could be enforced by application to the courts. In the 1965 Constitution (I do not know that we need trouble about it to-day, because it did little more on independence than replace the Governor by one of their own people) they retained the Declaration of Rights, and the application to the courts. In the 1969 Con stitution—again this sort of thing: you cannot know unless you have the docu-
314
ments—the Declaration of Rights was retained, though it was written down; and instead of application to the courts the Legal Committee of the Senate was to consider whether any Bill appeared to infringe the Declaration of Rights. All that is to happen now is that the 1969 position is to be restored (still, I think, written down a bit), but there is again to be an application to the courts.
I am afraid that it is not of very much consequence to the citizens, because, though it reads frightfully well at first, when you get to paragraph 12, on page 37 of the White Paper, you find:
"Nothing contained in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of any of the following provisions of this Schedule, that is to say"—
and then it sets out practically all the paragraphs—
"paragraph 2, 5, 6, 7, other than sub-paragraph (4) thereof,8, 9, 10 or 11 to the extent that the law in question makes provision with respect to the taking, during any period of public emergency, of action for the purpose of dealing with any situation arising during that period, and nothing done by any person under the authority of any such law shall be held to be in contravention of any of the said provisions unless it is shown that the action taken exceeded anything which, having due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required for the purpose of dealing with the situation in question."
Apparently it does not apply to pass laws. Obviously, that is not likely to be very useful until the end of the period of emergency.
One looks then to see when is the period of emergency going to end. Be cause, as your Lordships know, Mr. Smith asked the Governor to sign the state of emergency declaration, and when he was asked by the Governor whether this was the prelude to a declaration of independence, Mr. Smith said, "No"; and from the day after that this emergency provision has applied in Rhodesia. So one wants to know when this state of emergency is going to end. And at page 17, at heading VII(3), you find:
"The Rhodesian Government wish to revoke the state of emergency at the earliest opportunity. In the absence of unforeseen circum stances they will do so after sanctions against Rhodesia have been lifted."
So the next question is: when are sanctions going to be lifted? In the next paragraph the White Paper says that after

315
the Rhodesian Government have passed their legislation, the British Government,
"will introduce legislation to confer independence on Rhodesia as a republic and will commend this legislation to the British Parliament. They will also terminate their economic and other sanctions when this legislation takes effect."
So we are to continue with this state of emergency at least until after independence, when we shall have no more control; and it will go then only if there are not circumstances which the Rhodesian Front have not foreseen. I cannot help feeling that with regard to this principle, too, it really cannot be said that this amounts to progress towards ending discrimination. Again I must agree with the Sunday Times, which said, in the article of the 28th:
"The fourth principle…has suffered the most obviously damaging treatment. With respect to the Land Tenure Act, which divides the country with absolute inequity between the races, a mere assurance to examine it has been accepted by Sir Alec Douglas-Home as progress towards the end of racial discrimination. Not content with this flimsy under taking, he has had to be willing explicitly to endorse the Rhodesian insistence that any action it contemplates against discrimination may be qualified by its discovery of other overriding' considerations."
There is one other point with which I wish to deal. On page 16 of the White Paper, in the middle of Chapter V on Land, there is the statement:
"With the exception of certain forest and national park areas the development of which may involve the removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights, the only two cases in which the Rhodesian Government are considering the eviction of Africans from land in the European area are Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. The Rhodesian Government have given art assurance that they will not take steps to evict African tenants or other occupants from these two areas or from other areas in which they are living until such time as the Commission referred to in paragraph III above has reported and its recommendations have been fully considered."
That is weak enough, but the point which I wish to raise, because I have no personal information about it, is that raised in an article in the Guardian, which quotes Mr. McGarry, a Catholic missionary, who says:
"The White Paper is completely wrong in saying there have only been two cases where eviction of Africans is being considered. Under the Act any land can be redesignated as Euro-
316
pean and this has been done and is being done in many cases, including the tribe of Chief Rekiyi Tangwena.
"The same threat now hangs over not just two missions but many. It is very worrying if the White Paper can be wrong in this way—it means that one has to question the whole basis of what has been agreed with the Smith regime about African land."
I should like to ask the Government what they say is the position about that.
The last Principle is:
"The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."
This is perhaps the most important of all five Principles. Rhodesia is a police State. I use that expression only be cause it was Mr. Heath's expression, and it has not changed. There is the ability to impose censorship; there are emergency powers; radio and television are in the control of the Government. and I understand that the Law and Order Maintenance Act 1960 is still in force. There are, I understand, about a thou sand Rhodesian African graduates who have left Rhodesia because they could not get work, not being employed as civil servants. Only two months ago the Government passed the Unlawful Organisations Amendment Act, the purpose of which is to provide for extra territorial jurisdiction so that anybody who goes back to Rhodesia who has done anything in any country in the world which would have been a criminal offence if he had committed it in Rhodesia can be prosecuted. So perhaps we cannot look for ward to many of them going back.
One vital question, of course, is the position of the two main Rhodesian African Parties—Mr. Nkomo's ZAPU and Mr. Sithole's ZANU. Will they, for example, have access to radio and television? If I may quote from Hansard of last Thurs day, when this point was raised, the Foreign Secretary said at column 1551, in answer to the right honourable gentle man Mr. Healey:
"Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would not be so impetuous. He is becoming more and more gullible every day and makes the most extraordinary statements. If he had listened to what I said, and thereafter reads the White Paper, he would know that normal political facilities, including broadcasting, will be allowed to the political parties in Rhodesia."

317
That of course is quite untrue. Of course I do not think for a moment that the Foreign Secretary realised it was untrue; he was merely unfamiliar with the terms of the document which he had signed. But it is quite clear from the White Paper that television and radio facilities will be available only to political Parties which are represented in Parliament, and neither of those two Parties are.
Having met Mr. Nkomo myself, I agree with the Guardian article of November 26, which stated:
"Mr. Nkomo remains the supreme African leader, as much as Kenyatta of Kenya or Kaunda of Zambia were during the struggles for independence in those countries."
I should like to ask: what is Mr. Nkomo's position going to be? He has been living at that terrible place some 300 miles from Salisbury, in tin huts under the heat of the African sun, for over seven years without any charge being made against him. I asked when I spoke recently, without receiving any reply: is it Mr. Smith's intention to keep him there for the rest of his natural life? If he is not to be let out for the Royal Com mission's purposes, I do not suppose he ever will be.
I do not know whether somebody, perhaps more properly the noble Marquess, can give us any further information about this very important Royal Commission. So far as I am aware, the sole precedent for it is the Monckton Commission. On the Monckton Commission there were, I believe, 26, including 5 Africans,11 British,3 from Canada and Australia; and it took them nine months, three months of which they spent travelling. Can we be told any more? I think we have had three names. We discussed at one time whether a Royal Commission should try to think out the perfect Constitution. The only names that we put forward were the noble Viscount, Lord Amory, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, a former Con servative Solicitor General. I do not know how far one is entitled to know what the Foreign Secretary told, not Parliament, but a meeting of Conservative Back-Benchers yesterday. According to the papers, he said that there were to be ten Commissioners. Can we perhaps hear something about this? Can the
318
Government also explain to me some thing for which there may be a precedent, but which is very new to me; that is, the provision that, however many there are, the Report is to be signed by only the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen? May I ask what happens if the other ten entirely disagree with them, and what facilities will they really have? I think there is really more public concern on this point, as to what chance the Royal Commission has of dealing with these very complicated and intricate proposals,
I think they were well summarised by a leading article in the Sunday Times which stated:
"The Pearce Commission should therefore he clear about its obligations. It cannot arrive at a credible verdict unless, in the first place, political life is permitted to flourish freely, as part of the process whereby the people form their judgment. The settlement document does not do enough to bring this about; African nationalist leaders are not assured of their political rights. Secondly, it will be the Commission's duty to explain with honest clarity what the settlement will or may mean. This is a difficult task given the complexity of the White Paper and the low degree of political sophistication in Rhodesia. No Rhodesian, white or black, can reach a verdict without much simpler and fuller elaboration of all the most carefully devised but singularly opaque proposals in the White Paper. Above all, it will surely be the basic right of every Rhodesian to have before him the range of official predictions about the date when parity and majority rule might be expected. The Commission will put itself in an impossible position if it pretends to render an account of public opinion on this document if the public is prevented from knowing what its central proposal means."
We are not therefore, at present, satisfied that the Commission as now constituted, or the circumstances in which it is going to work, complies with the Firth Principle.
My Lords, I am sorry to have been so long, but these proposals are extremely complex. In conclusion, I want only to make three observations. First of all, I never like leaving a debate once I have spoken. but I am sitting judicially to morrow and I must apologise for the fact that I am afraid I shall miss the speeches until about four o'clock. Secondly, am I right in thinking—and this, I suppose, will have to be explained to them, too—that if these proposals are accepted and go through all these 5,250,000 will cease to be British citizens, with whatever disadvantages that may have? For example. the Commonwealth Institute and its aid

319
will go. This, I suppose, will have to be made plain to them. Thirdly, will the Royal Commission be free to report, "We are sorry, but in the conditions we have found there it is quite impossible for us to ascertain whether these proposals are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." That is a point which we pressed when we were discussing this condition, and I regard it as very important.
For those reasons, I ask the House to accept this Amendment. If there are noble Lords who are sufficiently interested to want to look at the basic document—because, after all, it is the 1969 Constitution, with some amendments, which we are being asked to approve as the future Constitution of this new independent sovereign State—that may be facilitated by copies of it being made available. My Lords, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out all the words after ("House") and insert (-declines to approve Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute because they do not fully meet the requirements of the Five Principles.").—(Lord Gardiner.)
5.10 p.m.
LORD WADE: My Lords, before I comment on the Motion and the Amendment, may I say that we look forward to hearing the maiden speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, and the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. I do so not only because I am sure it will be a privilege to hear them but also because my noble friend Lord Beaumont of Whitley has particularly asked me to say that he is sorry he cannot be here to-day to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont.
My Lords, when the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, repeated the Statement last Thursday I said that I thought it would be wrong to condemn the White Paper out of hand before having read it. I do not wish to go back on that, but we have now had time to study it and, alas!, the defects have become increasingly apparent. It may be that the Foreign Secretary has achieved the best he could achieve, but that is not necessarily a conclusive commendation for the proposals. May I make one brief comment on the Amendment moved by the noble and
320
learned Lord, Lord Gardiner? It says that the proposals
"do not fully meet the requirements of the Five Principles".
It occurs to me to ask why the word "fully" should be inserted. It seems to me that it somewhat weakens the Amendment. I have happened to notice that the Opposition Amendment in another place is somewhat differently worded, in that it states that the proposals "fail to satisfy the Five Principles"—I think those are the actual words. I wonder whether there is any significance in that divergence.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I answer the noble Lord right away? We were still hopeful that the proposals did go some way, but I doubt whether anyone can believe that after hearing my noble and learned friend's speech.
LORD WADE: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. There are such important issues at stake that I do not think it would be right to pursue that point further. I should say—and this will per haps satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton—that it is our present intention on the Liberal Benches to vote for the Amendment notwithstanding any doubts we may have had about the wording. May I make one comment on the Government Motion, in case any noble Lords are in doubt as to how they should vote? It appears to me that the House is being asked to approve the whole pack age deal before hearing whether the majority of Rhodesians want it or not—and that is a very great deal to ask.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, I think he has got that wrong. The Government Motion simply asks the House to endorse the putting to the Rhodesian people of the proposals, and that, of course, does not mean that the package deal is endorsed except for the purpose ad referendum under the Fifth Principle.
LORD WADE: My Lords, the Motion reads:
"That this House approves Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute and endorses Her Majesty's Government's decision that they should be put to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment."
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With respect to the noble Lord, one of the proposals is that they should be so put.
LORD WADE: I may have taken a different view of the interpretation of this Motion, but as I read it we are asked to approve the whole package deal. One of the proposals is a suggestion that it should be put to the people of Rhodesia, but we are still being asked here and now to approve the whole package deal.
My Lords, I do not think it would be a useful operation to consider whether these proposals are honourable or dishonourable, but if the process of ascertaining the views of the people of Rhodesia were inadequate (perhaps through no fault of the Commission: per haps through lack of time or ability to get round, leading to a lack of adequate discussion) and yet the Commission came back and stated that the proposals were acceptable to the majority of the population of Rhodesia, and Parliament were asked to approve them, I think the Government and Parliament could be rightly condemned and it might be said that this action was dishonourable. For that reason, I think it is right to place considerable emphasis on the procedure for the test of acceptability. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has made a very important speech on the constitutional position, and he referred in the concluding part of his speech to this subject of the test of acceptability. I would confine my remarks mainly to this particular aspect of the matter because in several respects the proposals appear to me to be unsatisfactory.
As to the composition of the Commission, we do not yet know what it is. As I understand it, three names have so far been mentioned. The noble Earl mentioned three names last Thursday arising out of a question by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and myself. I understand there was some fluttering in the dovecotes as a result of the announcement of the three names, but I should like to say to the noble Earl that my question was asked in all innocence and because it seemed to me to be very important that the Commission should contain those with political as well as great judicial experience. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has pointed
322
out, we have a precedent in the Monckton Commission, and one is inclined to ask why that precedent is not being followed, or why so far as we are aware that precedent is not being followed.
There is another disturbing feature to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has also referred. Radio and television is to be made available only to members of those political Parties represented in the House of Assembly. To an onlooker, that seems obviously unfair, because we know that there are so many who arc not represented, or are not adequately represented, in the House of Assembly. I recognise that this Commission will have an extremely difficult task. My own view is that it would have been wiser to appoint a Preparatory Committee—I will not call it a Commission, because we already have two Com missions. I should have liked to see a Preparatory Committee preparing the ground, ascertaining what was necessary to try to find out the views of the great majority of people—where they should go, how long it would take, and so on. That would have been very helpful. I think such a Committee would take about three months preparing the ground.
With regard to this particular test of acceptability, it has often been said that this country has no power in Rhodesia although it has responsibility, and it is sometimes said that we have not even responsibility; but here is one occasion on which the responsibility is clear. This is what the White Paper says:
"The British Government will therefore appoint a Commission to ascertain directly from all the sections of the population of Rhodesia whether or not these proposals are acceptable and to report accordingly to the British Government".
It seems to me that, unless there is some secret deal (I am not suggesting that there is), it does rest with the British Government; so for once, at any rate, we have the responsibility. It is an exceptionally difficult task. The other Commission, the Monckton Commission, was set up under colonial rule. Here we have a Commission set up under a Government in a country with an illegal regime, but surely it is all the more important to make it clear that the Commission will not be influenced by the presence of this illegal régime.

323
As to the timetable, I recognise that if my views were accepted it might take longer than the Government anticipate. But surely that is a small matter when one considers the length of time that is going to elapse before these proposals are fully implemented. When one considers the timetable there is another valid criticism, and I think an important one. There is to be the independent Commission to review existing legislation, with particular regard to discrimination, and this Commission is to be set up as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed. But why should it be after the test of acceptability has been completed? If I have it wrong I hope that this will be pointed out. In effect, that means that we are saying, "Agree to this and then we will consider setting up a Commission to look into discrimination". The least I would accept is that the Commission to consider discriminatory legislation should be set up and should publish preliminary findings before a final decision is made on the test of acceptability. I think this has an important bearing on acceptability, on the degree of political activity that is going to be possible, on whether or not detention without trial should continue.
I should like to quote briefly from the Yorkshire Post—and anyone who knows the Yorkshire Post would not regard it as a paper with strong Left Wing leanings. There was an article by Derek Ingram on November 25 this year referring to Mr. Nkomo, one passage of which read:
"The area is one of the hottest and most inhospitable areas in central Africa. It is burnt yellow and full of wild game, including lion. At this time of the year the temperature rises to well over 100 degrees Farenheit in the shade. By day the corrugated iron walls of Nkomo's hut are too hot to touch."
I think we have to realise that for every one in detention there are many more not in detention who know the consequence of a frank expression of their political opinion.
Even if one takes a less pessimistic view of the whole matter than Mr. Enoch Powell. in his letter in The Times to-day, even if one regards these proposals as more than a scrap of paper, I think there are a number of imponderables that are not spelt out, and cannot be spelt out, in
324
the White Paper. For example, the aid for improved education may increase the number of voters, and it may bring about increased voting rights; but it will not necessarily increase the opportunities for promotion and the experience that comes with that opportunity.
My Lords, in July, 1967 (and I recognise that this is some years ago), I had a solitary journey. By solitary "I mean that I went on my own although I met many good people who were very kind to me. I started in Pretoria and went on to Johannesburg and to Salisbury, where I spent some little time, and then to Lusaka and Livingstone. I happened to stay at the same hotel as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, who was there on a more important mission than mine. I had a variety of experiences ranging from an evening in a Salisbury Club to an evening in less comfortable surroundings talking to a detainee. This is not an occasion for a travel talk, but I should like to recall two conversations. One was with a Minister in Mr. Smith's Government—he is not now a Minister—and I can summarise what he said, which was: "We can run this country. If anyone can do it better they are free to do so, but until then we will run it". What he implied, but did not actually say, was, "We have no intention of allowing the African population to gain the experience which would enable them to pass that test".
The other conversation was with a graduate of Salisbury University, and he was surprisingly philosophical because very often one finds graduates with chips on their shoulders—and understandably so. This was an African graduate. In this country, I imagine that he would be employed by the Minister of Agriculture on work on the development of food supplies. The qualifications he had were very valuable but he had been quite unable to get a job in Rhodesia because the kind of work he would carry out would involve living in a white area. Of course, I cannot prove that statement, but I made inquiries and it seemed to be true. In the end he said that he would have to find employment in another country. This illustrates the point that it is not just the problem of reducing the high rate of unemployment; it is also one of enabling the Africans, including the educated Africans, to gain experience

325
in readiness for the responsibility of Government. Unfortunately, I fear that this will be resisted; it will be a continual struggle against discrimination.
I do not want to be presumptuous, but I think the Churches in Rhodesia have a very important role to play, and I know they are doing so already. The other comment I would make—and it is perhaps more surprising—is that I think there is an important role for enlightened business. I had a conversation with Mr. Harper in Salisbury and he told me of his dislike for big business. It is not usual for me to commend big business, but I think the international corporations, with a world-wide outlook, have an opportunity to help in training, not only in skills but also in encouraging their employees, if they are allowed to do so, to take part in the political life of the country, although that may mean speaking against the Establishment. Britain, on her part, as I mentioned last Thursday, should provide educational facilities here, especially if the loss of opportunity from Commonwealth membership has an adverse effect on some African students.
My Lords, I think it is almost impossible to forecast the future, certainly sixty years ahead, but I am convinced that if there is not fairly rapid progress an explosive situation will arise. It is said that the Africans in Rhodesia arc docile and peace-loving. On the whole I think that is true, but nevertheless I think a breaking point will be reached if progress is not made. Therefore, coming back to the question of the Commission, the immediate task is to ensure that this test is carried out faithfully. It is an extremely difficult task, but we must try to ensure that the people as a whole in Rhodesia know what they are being asked to decide. At least let us carry out what remains of our British responsibility with a proper sense of responsibility.
5.30 p.m.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, I am slightly disconcerted by the identity of some of my supporters. I did not intend to delay your Lordships for long, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has posed a number of questions to me to which it would be discourteous for me to decline to reply, though I shall not assume the Government mantle in reply-
326
ing; nor will the Government in the slightest degree be foisted with responsibility for the accuary or otherwise of my answers. But it will entail a slightly longer time in dealing with them. May I say that I am grateful for the opportunity afforded me to address your Lordships to-night?
For many weary months, I have been labouring in extremely distasteful negotiations—distasteful for a number of reasons: not because they were hostile, not because they were unfriendly, but because they involved such a difference of approach of principle and of social morality between the two sides as to make it necessary to shelve all such considerations in our discussions and to restrict them wholly to the technical issues. I believe, and I shall commend to your Lordships, that this settlement, being the best we were able to achieve—and, I am vain enough to believe, the best that most people would have been likely to achieve; and the responsibility for this is not personal to me it would be an act of consummate folly to reject it. That is the basis on which I shall present the matter to your Lordships.
I do not feel triumphant or enthusiastic about the terms of the settlement. Although I lack anything like his dialectic and legal skill. I could have done a better job of criticising these terms than was done by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner. But, if I may venture to say so, that operation is largely irrelevant, because the issue that must be decided is: what is the alternative? The noble and learned Lord posed that issue with remarkable clarity when he mentioned the case of the unfortunate Mr. Nkomo. Quite rightly, as a man of heart and principle, the noble and learned Lord abominates—as I do, and as I am sure every Member of your Lordships' House does—the notion that a human being should be under restraint for seven years, without trial and in these circum stances. But, without unkindness to the noble and learned Lord, I will put a question to him. Over those seven years he was the highest legal officer in this great country. He had available to him the whole resources of this country. How could he have contrived to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo during that period? And what single step to advance that release was he, with all his feelings in the

327
matter, which I respect, able to achieve? My Lords, his feelings in the matter achieved nothing. The fact that we earnestly urge another régime to release a man, but fail to do so is of no benefit to that man. To reject these proposals because we have been unable to secure his release, in the knowledge that by rejecting them, we leave him still languishing in incarceration is a moral gesture that is a purely personal self-indulgence. I believe that a great deal of the opposition to these proposals consists of moral gestures that are purely personal self-indulgence.
My Lords, to return to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Wade, it was an extremely moderate and impressive speech with which I was almost totally in agreement. One of the great comforts and consolations to those who are concerned in trying to achieve this result was the knowledge that at the end the matter would be submitted to the arbitrament of the people of Rhodesia, of all the people of Rhodesia. Much thought was given to the best way to do it. I believe that the best way to do it is the way selected: for a Commission of honourable and able men to go round the country inquiring, wherever they think it necessary, whether, on balance, the people of Rhodesia consider that these proposals are substantially better than the conditions now prevailing. That is the test that ought to be applied. But the other day I noticed that Her Majesty's Opposition contemplated sending an alternative team to make the same inquiries. If I were Her Majesty's Government, I should not discourage it. I believe that if these proposals are fairly explained to the people of Rhodesia, it is extremely unlikely that they will reject them.
On the question of the availability of political voices of all shades, I would refer the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, to the terms of the White Paper which make it quite clear that the Com mission would be enabled to decide for itself what ought to happen in these matters. The White Paper says on page 7:
"Before and during this test of acceptability normal political activites will be permitted to the satisfaction of the Commission…"
If the Commision finds that it is unable to secure that all political views are ven
328
tilated and that the people in Rhodesia are unable to hear all political views, then I think, knowing the quality of the Com mission that is likely to be appointed, it will not be very long before they return to say that they cannot fulfil their task. I shall be profoundly surprised if this matter presents difficulties.
Of course, we encountered problems where the people in detention were regarded as untouchable, as unspeakable villains by the persons with whom we were negotiating. The fact that they had political aspirations different from those of their Rhodesian masters was enough to stamp them as outside the pale of human intercourse. That we did not accept this, that we found these notions horrible, did not affect the fact that we were unable to make inroads on their way of thinking. It would be hypocrisy to say that we set out on a political mission to reform Mr. Smith and his friends in their way of political thought. If we did so set out, I regret to inform your Lordships that we re turned with a total lack of success. I do not think that we have persuaded Mr. Smith to a more liberal way of thought. What we have persuaded Mr. Smith and his friends to realise is that the world will no longer accept a regime that imposes a total and inhuman despotism by a quarter of a million people over something like 5 million others. This we have achieved. I believe that the results of our activities, if accepted in good faith, if we are prepared to take certain political risks, offer the only hope for the emancipation of Rhodesia from the certainty of horrible and violent insurrection.
That is the simple choice: if you believe that it is better that Rhodesia should be exposed to bloodshed, uprisings and massacre, I venture to say this. We have not removed from Salisbury in the aeroplanes in which we came and de parted any of the cutlery! The opportunities for slaughter and massacre are as available to the Africans to-day as they were before this agreement. My belief is that this agreement brings the greatest advantage to the white Rhodesians—not for the cynical reasons that may be suggested by certain Members of the Opposition, that they have contrived to remain in power for several lifetimes; but for the more important reason that they are to be enabled to

329
relinquish their control peacefully and without the danger of violence. This is what I believe to be the greatest value of this agreement if it be put into operation.
The three questions, I think, by which this agreement must be considered are these. First, should one do business with Mr. Smith and his friends at all? I had no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that it was simply pious moralising to say, No. Who else was there to do business with? if one looked around and took the view that the Rhodesian African must look for his manumitting from either his own internal resources or from Africans outside Rhodesia, what are the realities? The present Rhodesian Government are able to marshal an army, staggeringly enough, of 70,000 men. That is the strength of the force that can be called to the Colours in Rhodesia. Rhodesia has, at least, the second best air force in Southern Africa. It has the total loyalty of the black policemen and the black soldiers who are enlisted in it.
In those circumstances, forgetting how long majority rule will take, how long will it be before the African, unarmed, peaceful, friendly and in no mood for insurrection, is able to revolt and procure his personal liberty? This is the question that I would invite those who consider these terms inadequate to ponder very carefully. What are the possibilities of assistance from outside to relieve the Rhodesian African? There again, there are no possibilities on the Portuguese frontier and none on the South African frontier. There are none on the Zambian frontier. That country is in deep financial difficulty; divided within itself; its own Opposition no more humanely treated than Mr. Smith treats his own political adversaries. Is it to be supposed that the Zambians are likely to rally forces to assist the Rhodesians? It is a fanciful—
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I think that on consideration he may wish to withdraw his remark that President Kaunda treats his Opposition as inhumanly as Mr. Smith does in Gonakudzingua.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, I will say to the noble Baroness that, on re-
330
flection, I may wish to withdraw it, but at this moment I do not.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, there should be a pause for reflection.
LORD GOODMAN: My Lords, I have endeavoured to indicate my belief as to the possibility of relief to the Rhodesian African from either source, from within or from without. It is for you to judge, my Lords. If you believe I am wrong; if you think that the Rhodesian African could revolt to-morrow, and revolt successfully, I should be the last man to deter him. I may say that the notion of bloodshed and violence appalls me. I believe that if desperate men, for the first time in confrontation with a great political Power, have arrived at a solution of a desperate matter by negotiation, by the use of words in preference to the use of arms; if we have been able to redeem Rhodesia from the spectacle of small black children and small white children shattered by bullets and bombs, I think that we shall have achieved some thing which may be memorable within this century. I believe that this is some thing on which we should certainly take the risk. That is the first point. The first question is: should we do business with Mr. Smith? My answer is, previous Governments have done so and it would, in my view, be wrong and mere self-indulgence if we did not.
The second question we have to ask is: if we do business with Mr. Smith, are these terms appropriate on which to do it? Are they the best terms that we can get? Are they the best terms we can get if we wait or do it at some later stage? And if they are the best terms that we can get, are they good enough? To my first question I have already given an answer. I believe them to be the best terms that we can get. I do not think that waiting would make any appreciable difference. It is a difficult problem and it demands a very nice balance of assessment regarding sanctions. On the one side, for instance, there is breaching of sanctions by the American action; by the fact that the Zambians purchase corn and acquire their electricity from Rhodesia, and on the whole do not take sanctions as seriously as we do. There would seem to be any number of breaches of the sanction net if you go into Rhodesia

331
and see the supplies there and the purchases they are making. That on the one side. On the other side, there is the possibility that if sanctions are working, nevertheless the Rhodesians will progress further and further into the South African sphere of influence. I would say that that danger is so much greater than the other danger, that that possibility is so much greater than the other possibility, that it is unwise to wait.
My Lords, you will remember that it is nearly eleven years since the 1961 Constitution, it is six years since U. D. I., and nothing at all has happened in this period except endless debate and endless negotiation. Hence we have to ask ourselves, if nothing better can now be achieved, is this good enough? I do not believe it is very good. I do not believe that we ought to go dancing a jig through the Lobbies in support of these recommendations. But I believe that we should support them because they are good enough to give the African and the white Rhodesian (there are many white Rhodesians totally innocent of participation in this matter, totally innocent of a desire to dominate their African colleagues, to whom we should give the most careful consideration) the opportunity of majority rule overtaking massacre. That is my belief.
If that is so, my Lords, I do not think that humane persons, persons seized with considerations of humanity and decency, should reject them out of hand because there are legalistic difficulties. This, if I may say so, is my view of the matter. I believe it is the simple issue of whether there is anything better that could be done and whether, on the whole, providing an opportunity for Rhodesia to re deem itself from this hideous situation and advance democratically towards ultimate majority rule and the domination of the country by the great number of people who will then be in citizenship in the country, is the best thing to do in this difficult situation. That is my belief.
Now, my Lords, may I venture to make this observation? The noble and learned Lord. Lord Gardiner, drew attention with considerable force to the length of time that it was going to take for majority rule—as though nothing was going to happen until that time was achieved. May I
332
give him a few more comforting facts. First, the political control of Rhodesia will, on the whole, be with the new African higher roll, but there will be enfranchised—although in a most limited sense, and voting for a few seats only—an additional 250.000 Africans who will immediately go on the lower B roll, and who, if they so desire, will attain what I regard as very important, the status of a voter and an understanding of the democratic process. If a man once goes to a poll and casts a vote he is much more likely to regard that as the ordinary routine of government than some other more violent and disagreeable matter.
Apart from that, there will be a progressive progress towards majority rule. I am told that at the moment there may be as many as 15,000 Africans eligible for immediate registration on the higher roll. That was a much more comforting figure than when we first entered into our negotiations. This will provide, at the rate of 3,000 per seat, immediately another six seats, if I am not mistaken, or something approaching six seats. Assume that it is only four seats. The position that then will prevail will be this. There are 16 seats in the House already arising from the lower roll. With four more seats that is 20 seats. With the fact that in the solid majority of Europeans is included the Asian and the coloured, both of whom rank for all purposes in Rhodesia as Europeans and, thanks to this new Constitution, what ever views Mr. Smith and his friends may have, will continue to rank as Europeans, there is already a significant minority which, if for a moment we can get away from thinking on the basis of monolithic, racial politics, is one which certainly would not be regarded as derisory within our own democratic institutions, and certainly one which it would be considered necessary to woo. That minority will be increased at the rate of 3,000 voters as time progresses.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, acquainted me with the predictions of the various wizards who have been undertaking statistical investigations in this matter. I would say only this to the noble and learned Lord. In the course of our many months of negotiation we had the benefit of the services of a number of statisticians of the most worthy character. I arrived at the conclusion very soon which, alas!, is slightly harsh

333
upon these gentry, that their conclusions were totally valueless. It would seem to me an absolute absurdity for anyone who is not in direct alliance with the Almighty to predict with precision that majority rule is coming in 64 years. If I may venture to say so, the very precision of that estimate discredits it totally from the outset. I do not know how long it will be. It is my firm and fervent belief that it will be much less than 64 years. But I can comfort the noble and learned Lord by telling him that only the other day the Rhodesian Front were estimating it at 10 years. I think that 10 years is equally fanciful; but whatever the period is, if there is an uninterrupted progress to majority rule, if the African sees with certainty that the additional seats are added and the time limit is not one which makes him despair of ever seeing it within a reasonable rate of progress, is that so awful? I venture to think not.
I venture to think that it would be better if we could have contrived to get it in 15 or 16 years or whatever it is. It is not beyond possibility that this could still happen. The nature of the boom which may descend on Rhodesia, of changes in its prosperity and the treatment of its industry—all these may bring the most revolutionary and dramatic changes in the progress in relation to these registers. But I will say to the noble and learned Lord that it would be most unfortunate to send a message out from this House to the Africans of Rhodesia that they are condemned never to have majority rule; that the whole of this plan is totally deceptive and that on the whole they have nothing to hope for.
May I venture to say a word about the noble and learned Lord's analysis? It was very unfortunate that he was not provided with the appropriate papers by the Government, because if he had been I do not think he would have made several of the points which lie did make and which totally lacked validity. It is very unfortunate that he should have made them so that the impression may become current in the world at large. For instance, the idea in relation to the blocking mechanism that you have only to have one African who has a cold or another who is knocked down and the blocking mechanism ceases to function is,
334
if I may say so, disposed of by the terms of the White Paper, which refers to the majority of the total number of Africans in the House. It is not a majority of the total number present at any moment but a majority of those eligible to have seats and to vote, and on that voting one need have no special apprehensions that if an African is deterred by a social engagement or kidnapped or is suborned so that he does not attend, that will enable the blocking mechanism to be defeated. We were not, if I may say so, so simple as that.
There are other matters which the noble and learned Lord has raised, suggesting doubts and confusion which have no validity. About the Commission before parity, I may say for my part that I predicted that unless the paragraph was read carefully, it would give rise to misunderstanding. I never thought that it would fail to be read carefully by an ex-Lord Chancellor of this country. The situation is perfectly simple. There is progress to unimpeded majority rule unless in fact the blocking mechanism is used to defeat it. All that happens is that in deference to Mr. Smith's view of the need to show his electorate that he is making the final and ultimate effort to prove to the Rhodesians that majority rule is not a good thing, the Commission will sit and sound what it believes to be Rhodesian opinion. But if the blocking mechanism actually works, so that it positively defeats the existing progress, this progress goes on and the Commission is totally irrelevant and may perhaps be regarded simply as a façade.
There is nothing in that proposal which prevents unimpeded progress towards majority rule. So far as the first proposal is concerned, if I may venture to say so, except on the rather factitious basis that it is not fast enough—and nobody really knows how fast it is—an honest effort has been made to give it reality and I would venture to say that it comes four square within Sir Alec's First Principle.
I do not intend to spend a great length of time in dealing with the other questions of what comes within the Principles. The Second Principle, which I believe to be the one of retrogression, is wholly satisfied. In order to achieve that there is a retrogression in the Constitution it is necessary to ensure that there is a

335
separate majority of both voting categories. This is of importance not only before but after majority rule. It then becomes of great importance to the Europeans to ensure that the Constitution cannot be altered to their disadvantage. Hence it requires a separate majority of Europeans as well as of Africans, but the majority of the Africans must be a genuine majority. The idea that you can write off as having no political significance, no allegiance and no loyalty to their race, the indirectly elected Africans would, I think, be rejected almost entirely by every citizen, whether black or white, except those who have manifest political interests for saying so.
As pointed out by the noble Earl in opening the debate, since the sixteen black Members of the House have sat they have voted solidly on every racial issue. They were quite indifferent, if I may say so, to the loss of their stipends. The other, slightly unfortunate, suggestion that these people are so corrupt that the suggestion that they would be deprived of public benefits would provoke them into a total betrayal of their race, has not been proved correct. That has not happened. They have not betrayed their race, what ever risks attach to their course of action. They have accepted those risks. I believe that this is a valid and effective blocking mechanism. It may well be that, in the end, some Africans will be persuaded to vote against their own interests. I would say that Africans should be urged to watch the situation with the greatest of care. Their lives and their futures, and their continued political prospects are in their own hands, but they have been given a fair chance. Incident ally, the noble Earl said something which ought to be corrected—that was the suggestion that the majority would be in creased when the additional seats were increased, because of course as each pair of additional voting Africans arrive so another pair of indirectly elected Africans arrive to rectify the situation. But in my view of the matter this is unimportant. What is important is that we have to secure an absolute majority of the Africans in the House in order to achieve this situation.
I have continued for too long, but there are one or two other things I think it necessary to say, and I want to be sure
336
that I deal with all the points made by the noble and learned Lord. Incidentally, I am gratified to tell him that women can vote. I am not quite sure of the situation. I believe they need to have independent educational qualifications, but they are entitled to adopt their husband's income qualification. But certainly they can vote. One of the conjectural elements in deciding how many Africans are eligible for registration at the moment on the higher role is the question whether or not most or many of the wives will have the necessary educational qualification. There is the rather charming complication that they are living in a polygamous society, and my belief is that one man can only have one wife registered for this purpose—which may be regarded as a gross injustice. However, to avoid the matrimonial discord that would inevitably arise, the rule is I think that, whatever the husband's consideration of the matter, it must be the first wife who is registered.
I do not know what else the noble Lord wanted me to deal with. I do not think it is appropriate for me to deal with the test of acceptability or the circum stances in which the Commissioners would be appointed. I may be prepared to say a word, and I hope rightly, on the question of the Commissioners. It was always the intention that the Commission should be a small one of three or four, assisted by a considerable number of assessors not in the full sense Commissioners, who in order to enable the inquiry to be made in a reasonable period of time were to go off in various directions to make the soundings required for the purpose of their masters. This, I think, is why there are as many as ten included as Commissioners and why the distinction has been drawn of calling the others chairman and deputy chairman. I understand that the chairman and deputy chairman were in fact to be the Commissioners, but in order to give them all the appropriate status they are all called Commissioners.
In the long months in which I have been travelling to and from Rhodesia, achieving miracles of anonymity of disguise which some of you might have regarded as nearly impossible, I arrived at certain conclusions in this matter. I arrived at the conclusion that an agreement, respectable in the sense that it maintained a valid and honourable

337
promise of the possibility of advance to majority rule, a respectable and honourable promise that there would be a honest look at racial discrimination and respectable and honest safeguards to ensure any possibility of retrogression, was an agreement that we should adopt with alacrity. When we set off on our negotiations I did not believe that we would achieve the agreement that in fact has been achieved. I do not believe it to be adequate. I do not believe that there has been a sell-out. I do not believe that we had anything to sell. We certainly did not have the African, who is in bondage to the Rhodesians to sell. But I believe there was a sell-out—not by this agreement or by this Government in negotiating the agreement, but in past years, which left us in the disagreeable position that we could negotiate no better agreement than this one. Over the years since 1921, and some people say back to the Jameson Raid, when the future of Southern Rhodesia and other parts of Africa was so hopelessly compromised, it was open to us to deal with this situation.
We must not talk of the Land Tenure Act as though it were an innovation. It first came into operation in the 1920s and was renewed in 1941. It has been there under the auspices of successive Governments of every colour, including a Liberal Government. We must not consider it as one of the novelties introduced by Mr. Smith. It is now embodied in the whole structure of Rhodesia. It would have been a near impossibility for us to deal with the Land Tenure Act in detail, unless we had stayed there for months and months and months. The only sensible thing to do was to set up an honourable Commission, including an African, and request them to look at it. If I may say so, one could read anything into the words which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, invited the noble Earl to construe.
I think that no Government could have been expected, though we asked them, to accept in advance and en bloc the findings of a Commission which they had not seen and of whose findings they had no notion. I think they have inserted the minimum possible qualifications that skilful draftsmanship could devise. I believe that these proposals are the best that we can do. And if they are the best that we can do, we should seize with gratitude
338
the opportunity of redeeming the short comings of our previous colonial activities in this territory, and hope for the future, not that people will act with dishonesty, not that people will act with breach of faith and breach of integrity, but that the white Rhodesians will realise also that this is the last opportunity to avoid disaster.
It would be wrong, my Lords, if I sat down without saying one other word, and that is to pay tribute to the colleagues with whom I worked during this period, who naturally remained anonymous because they are members of Her Majesty's Government Service. I—it may be irregular and a disgrace—have the happy fortune not to be a member of any Government, and have not to conform to regulation and discretion. I should like particularly to thank Sir Philip Adams, Philip Mansfield and Mr. Gordon Smith, whose quite remarkable draftsmanship made this what I thought was a model of clarity. It was not until the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, rose that 1 found that my expectations were not fully realised. I thought it proper to give your Lordships some account of our stewardship. Rightly or wrong, we have done our best; and, rightly or wrongly, I believe that we should seize the opportunity.
6.2 p.m.
LORD BEAUMONT: My Lords, I have often sat on the steps of the Throne in this Chamber and in the Robing Room during the darker days of the War, and I have noticed how kind and chivalrous your Lordships are towards your "maidens" when they make their speeches. I ask your Lordships to be good enough to give me that kindness to-day. I look upon this subject as one on which I can possibly contribute to the debate by drawing on my own experience when I served in Kenya at the time of my command of the King's African Rifles. I went out there in 1960, after the Mau-Mau rebellion had been put down, and I found when I took over command of the King's African Rifles a situation that was very similar to that obtaining in Rhodesia now. In consequence of the Mau-Mau rebellion there was complete white domination. There was practically no African representation. I had 150 seconded white officers;

339
there were no African officers. The African political leaders were all either in detention camps or had fled the country. Mr. Jomo Kenyatta was under arrest in that terrible place at Lodwar, where it is indeed hot. The African political Parties had been proscribed. There were glaring inequalities in the distribution of land. In short, I found that history seemed to have been interrupted in Kenya and the clock had stood still.
But I had not been there for more than about four months before the Government of the day (it is immaterial which Party it was, but in fact it was from this side of the House) decided that there should be a new initiative. They changed the Governor and sent out that remarkable man, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. Within a few months he inspired a new feeling between the black and white races, and within two years there were great changes towards Kenya's advance. There were 100 black African officers whom I made up myself. Though many of them were not really worthy of being officers in some senses, because they had not had the training, they were better than the Communist alternative, who we knew might take over the country. A new emphasis was put on Africanising the district commissioners and the police, and although we had terrible times with the ugliness of mutinies and arson, and African sometimes murdering African, the fact is that this new impetus very quickly brought the country to a self-governing democracy and to independence. I cannot help seeing, as I have said, the parallel between that situation and the one in Rhodesia to-day, where during the last six years of U.D.I. there has been this retrogressive legislation, Nkomo and Sithole are detained, ZANU and ZAPU are proscribed, and Rhodesia is standing at the crossroads wondering where she should go. She can either turn down the blind alley of apartheid or, with this wonderful negotiation that has taken place, there is the chance that she can go towards majority rule in the right spirit.
There is possibly one major difference between Kenya and Rhodesia: that whereas in Kenya there are 40 Africans to one European, so that there was never any attempt made by the rather narrow
340
minded European, in Rhodesia there are only 20 Africans to one European, so that certain Europeans have, misguidedly, tried to hang on to their hegemony, and even, as we know, took U.D.I.
I will not detain your Lordships much longer. I would say that the vital ingredient of this White Paper is the restoration of confidence between the white and the black Rhodesian. Already I read of the gradual release of detainees. I can see, and hope for, plans for the resuscitation of the African parties and, let us hope, the release very shortly of the African leaders, particularly Nkomo. I would ask your Lordships to beware of one aspect, in particular. The United Nations, which so often is African-Communist dominated, may well voice loudly that this settlement does not go fast enough or far enough. I wonder whether that is not something that needs to be looked at again. I know that we want a settlement to be reached within ten years. But do not let us have one within three years: that will produce quite the wrong thing, because it will not have secured the confidence of the two races to grow together. I can remember so often saying to my black African officers, "What shall we do next?" And they used to quote to me the Swahili proverb:
"Haraka, Haraka, Haina, Baraka"—
which your Lordships will know is the Latin, Festina lent.
I conclude, my Lords, by pursuing this point one stage further, believing that possibly the greatest assistance your Lordships can give to this settlement is to help Mr. Smith and the Rhodesian Front, who appear to have given in and turned towards a sensible future. They deserve your Lordships' support, and they need your confidence and trust. Picture the loneliness. I ask those of your Lordships who have not been to Africa, of white European communities living out there. I became very friendly with the white communities, even though I was loved by the black community—I was their hero. Those white communities are living in this vast country; and you get some idea of the size of Africa if you think that the United States, turned upside down, would fit into Africa South of the Equator. These white communities will need your encouragement, and

341
to feel that you intend to help them to give their authority quietly away to friendly Africans, and not be forced into making conditions that they do not want to give into.
I welcome this settlement. It is the result of brilliant negotiation by the Foreign Secretary. I hope to see the sun shine on a multi-racial Rhodesia, and perhaps it will lead its neighbours forward economically, even showing a viable alternative to apartheid on its Southern Border, and realise the aspirations of its founder, Cecil Rhodes—that is to say: "Equal rights for every civilised man South of the Zambesi."
6.11 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, I have the pleasant lot of being the first to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, on his maiden speech. It warmed the cockels of my heart because as a Methodist nothing is more agreeable to me than personal testimony, and that is the way the noble Lord began. If I heard the inverted commas clicking into place round the word "controversial" a little later in his speech that in no way impaired our sense of obligation to the noble Lord for the sincerity of what he had to say. It is no formality for me to add that we hope his Lordship will frequently give us the benefit of his experience, views and convictions in this House.
I intend to try to speak as a Churchman. I shall not presume—it would be intolerable and impudent—to think that I can speak representatively of all Churchmen, and I shall leave any comments about the Establishment to my noble and ecclesiastical friend who will be speaking later, as he will no doubt deal competently with matters concerning the Church of England. I have a strong conviction that what I have to say, at least in the earlier part of this short speech, will be in accord with the general ideas and increasing convictions of most non-Conformists and, I venture to think, of the vast majority of Christian people. That enables me to begin with a reference to the powerful speech—in many cases a perverse one—of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I found myself on a collision course with him on the basic principle as to whether a moral gesture is a form of self-indulgence, all the more particularly because he invoked principles
342
in the Five Principles—and they are after all moral—and commended the agreement to your Lordships in his penultimate words, on the proposition that it was honourable. He cannot have it both ways. I do not believe that there is anything short of arrogance in the assumption that this is the kind of world in which we can do what is wrong and get the best out of it because it is extremely hard to do what is right in the situation in which we cannot find a sufficient area of confidence in the future.
I am concerned this afternoon, and I invite your Lordships so to be, with the principle of the Amendment, which is in contradistinction to the welcome which is to be offered to the agreement. I believe that what is morally right can never be merely a matter of self-indulgence. I believe that it cannot finally be politically wrong. It is precisely because there is this contradistinction between morality and what is convenient or possible that I find myself completely at variance with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in his advocacy. As a Churchman, and would-be Christian, I support the Amendment, on the simple proposition that it is consonant with a moral principle which should not be abrogated. I believe that the majority of Christian people will regard the close association between this agreement and the 1969 Constitution as an immoral act. They will be inconsistent if they do not so decide because not only the Churches within Rhodesia, but also the Churches outside, when that Constitution was first set forth in general terms, went on record as saying that it was a racist Constitution. I believe that is so, and there has been ample evidence from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, this afternoon to substantiate that claim.
I am particularly interested as a Methodist in the Land Tenure Act in so far as it has affected, or tends to affect, the mission, Chishawasha. It is true that at the moment the eviction order has been halted, but there is no comfort for those who look forward to a time when this Commission will sit and will consider the overriding conditions which should apply to any decision they may make—overriding decisions which have to do with the Constitution and not the welfare of either Epworth or Chishawasha. I

343
believe that Christian people, and the Church generally, will regard this as an intolerable situation, in the same way that they will regard as intolerable the continued retention in conditions of extreme unpleasantness of honourable, sincere leaders, although, to be fair, there are some who are of a more violent disposition.
I am sure that, generally speaking, Church people, both here and in Rhodesia, will regard the prospect of uninhibited progress to majority rule as a miasma—a mirage. I should like to develop that as a theme for a few moments. I am grateful for this particular agreement, not because it is a good one, but because it has revealed two aspects of the situation which hitherto were partially hidden. The first has been freely admitted, although it was contradicted again and again when it was mooted by myself, and others; that the Rhodesian Government have been moving inexorably and certainly towards a principle of apartheid. The cat is now out of the bag—that is what they are after. That is the progress that they hope to make, not towards majority rule, but to a further implementation of the iniquitous principle of apartheid. I say this, so does the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and so does Sir Alec.
It is an acknowledged fact, and is part of the prop to the argument for this agreement, that unless we negotiate an agreement now on these terms, the conditions in Rhodesia will get progressively worse. If that is so, it links up very neatly with the other fact, which is not so much a hard fact as a hard assumption, but I commend it as being substantially true. Mr. Smith, for obvious reasons (who in a similar position would not do the same thing?) has been endeavouring to persuade us that the impact of sanctions has been minimal, that the economy in Rhodesia is buoyant and ever more hopeful. Another cat is now out of the bag—it is nothing of the sort. There is ample evidence now that sanctions have been biting much more vitally than had been assumed, and that they will go on progressively biting.
I hope that I am not a cynical man, but when I bring these two propositions together I find myself compelled to take
344
the view that the concessions which have been made have not been made in principle for the betterment of the society as a whole in Rhodesia; they have been made as concessions calculated to raise sanctions, and they have nothing of reformation and conversion about them. They are cold, calculated attempts to remove a dangerous economic situation. It seems to me that this can be verified and substantiated as we look—as we must—at the prospect that lies before the implementation of these Principles, should they be so agreed.
Nothing makes the heart so sick as hope deferred, and to think in terms of a future gives little comfort to those who suffer the most in the present. It is not a cynical comment to say that what appears to be happening is that Mr. Smith is not only buying time but using time. There is no outward and visible sign that he himself or the Rhodesian Front has enjoyed a change of heart. All the evidence points to the fact that here they have an economic situation which is uncomfortable; they are committed to a proposition which is apartheid in principle, and they are anxious to negotiate such terms as will enable them in the future to do the things they want to do by buying the present at the expense of this kind of deal.
I do not believe there is moral justification for the acceptance of these terms. They broach the Five Principles, but it is not good enough to say that they are the best that can be obtained. They may be the best that will be obtained, but they will betray the black people; they will arraign against themselves, and those who participate in them and seek to enforce them, a whole world of opinion ranging from the United Nations upwards or downwards, as one likes to think. They will be regarded as ignominious and dishonourable, and those in my judgment are categories much more important than merely to be described as moral gestures. My Lords, I hope that this Government will not proceed with this agreement. I hope we shall recognise that this particular agreement is vitiated at source, and until indeed it ceases to cumber the ground the true prospects of justice in Africa will be retarded and not advanced. For those reasons, I very much hope that this House will accept the Amendment.
6.22 p.m.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, to follow the noble Lord, Lord Soper, is a foolhardy thing, as I do not have his experience either in the pulpit or on Tower Hill. There are two advantages of making a maiden speech early in a debate. The first is that one has had to listen to little of the debate before speaking, and consequently the frantic scribbling on one's knee during other noble Lords' speeches is cut to a minimum. The other is that all one wants to say has not yet been said by another Member of your Lordships' House. I am sure that in a debate of this calibre and importance this certainly would have happened. After all. Rhodesia is our last imperial responsibility—the list of distinguished speakers testifies to this. The debate is to decide whether we are prepared to give Her Majesty's Government our blessing for the way they are bringing down the final curtain of a long and glorious play which opened with the merchant adventurers of another Queen Elizabeth.
Had Rhodesia been in the geographical position of Kenya this last act would have been very difficult. No Mr. Smith would have been allowed to declare U.D.I. Mombasa is far too good a harbour for commando carriers. I do not think any of your Lordships or any Government after that of Campbell-Bannerman would have agreed to settlement terms of this kind if the writ of the British Government had been stronger in Rhodesia. This settlement does not stand up to Cecil Rhodes's idea of equal rights for all civilised men South of the Zambesi irrespective of colour, tribe or creed. Of course, if it can be shown that all the peoples of Rhodesia—and beyond all reasonable doubt, at that—accept this settlement, then the doubts expressed here and in another place will be superfluous. To make sure that the feelings of the Africans are known, and for it to be shown that they are unpressurised opinions fairly canvassed, could not the Government include in Lord Pearce's Commission either—or perhaps both—a senior Privy Counsellor from the Opposition (rather in the way that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has been included in the Parker Commission, not only for his undoubted erudition but also to present political balance) or a judge from Canada or from India?
346
A further question that I hope the Government will answer is this. Will they consider giving to the peoples of Rhodesia the Commonwealth benefits in the form of scholarships and the like? After all, I understand clearly that even if Mr. Smith wanted Commonwealth membership, it would be vetoed by several of our Commonwealth colleagues, some of whose records of individual freedom are considerably less than impeccable. But as we want to increase the African voice in Rhodesia's affairs as quickly as possible, it would not seem sensible to deprive these Africans of any means of advancement. In the event of the almost certain devaluation of the dollar or the revaluation of sterling, or the possible long-term revaluation of the same dollar, will a situation arise of, Now I have the vote; now I don't have the vote"? Will the Commission explain to the Africans their rights and duties under this (as one newspaper called it) fiendishly complicated franchise system, which I am sure we would say is too complicated for Margate or Manchester, Bolton or Bodmin? Mr. Smith is reputed to have promised Sir Humphrey Gibbs on the day he signed the State of Emergency that U. D. I. was not about to be declared—on his honour, so the story goes. Even if this story is not true, it does not augur well for the long-term prospect of Mr. Smith or the Rhodesian Government carrying out his promise—if this story can even be noised abroad.
My Lords, in my view we have suffered a defeat. The defeat is not mortal but it leaves a nasty taste in our mouths because, in spite of Mr. Smith's cavorting with a liberty bell, the liberty bell does not ring in a great democracy with high ideals. The terms negotiated, as even the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, admitted, are not ideal. But what would we have achieved by continuing the present policy? Would the lot of the African have been advanced? At least here in these terms is a promise of something slightly better in the future. Earlier I said that we had suffered a defeat, and so we have, but the treaty that has been drawn up to end this quasi-war is in my humble opinion far better than we could have expected, given Mr. Smith's intransigence and, some would say, lack of foresight. After all, he slung out the "Fearless" agreement which differed from this one

347
in detail, not in spirit. Perhaps sanctions have worked in a small way. We can be grateful for the slight change in direction which these terms indicate. After all, the Europeans have created great things in Rhodesia and the best of these achievements must not be allowed to be squandered in a Nigerian or Congolese fashion. I hope that this slight change of direction will pull the whites away from an apartheid solution and its certain Armageddon, given the proportion of Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia. The alternatives to these terms, either if this Parliament rejects them or if the Rhodesian people as a whole reject them, offer even less hope than the flimsy hope that these proposals themselves hold out. Therefore, my Lords, in spite of the rather depressing tone of what I have had to say, I will be voting for the Government tomorrow because I think that, with a king high, they have managed with great skill to claim some of the pool from a man with a full house. I only wish that they had had four aces.
6.30 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM: My Lords, on the grounds both of custom and of truth I should like very warmly to congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, on his speech—witty and well argued, balanced and frank. Grateful I am for the historic sally at one point, as for his extremely useful suggestions, whether in regard to the Commission or to the matter of scholarships. I would also join in the congratulations expressed to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont. I hope that both Lord Onslow and Lord Beaumont will be heard often in the future, and I am sure that none of us can wish for more than that their contributions should show the sincerity, weight and clarity that has marked their contributions this afternoon. Before turning to the Motion and the Amendment before us, may I apologise at once to noble Lords for having to leave early after the completion of my speech for an unavoidable engagement outside London, and indeed for having to be kept away until late to-morrow afternoon. I am sorry that that should be so; I did not think that we should be quite so long on heavy vehicles coming across the Channel.
348
Granted, for the sake of the argument (though in itself it is a controversial point), that this was the right time to embark on negotiations with Mr. Ian Smith, let me say at the outset that I do not think anyone could have negotiated better terms at present than those which have emerged from the hard work of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the negotiations of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; nor could any chief negotiator be held in greater honour and esteem by so many. Further, I think we all were pleased—I certainly was—with the sensitive and frank and reasonable introduction (if I may say so) of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. Against that background I find it all the more difficult to adopt the view to which I have been compelled to come. But I honestly look in vain for concrete evidence of a radical change of heart on the part of the Rhodesian Government. Yet, in my opinion, without that change of heart the proposals before us are bound to be stultified. Indeed, as I shall argue, they embody many vague phrases and qualifications which are as sinister as they are plausible, so that initial uncertainties and doubts which necessarily belong to a situation as unpromising as this was, and the recent history of which is so depressing, are deepened rather than removed.
Take, for instance, that phrase from the First Principle—
"unimpeded progress to majority rule, … be maintained and guaranteed."
For that principle to be given practical effectiveness there must be guaranteed. recognisable, unimpeded African advance, economically, socially and educationally. What in fact do we find in relation to possible economic and educational development? First, a shift of emphasis between the report and the proposals. The paragraph on page 6 of the report, dealing with the Third Principle, speaks of there being
"provision for the British Government to allocate substantial sums of money for an aid programme for Rhodesia over the next ten years in order to improve educational facilities for Africans and to help with the economic development of the Tribal Trust Lands, thus increasing the job opportunities available to Africans. As a result of this aid the rate at which additional Africans will attain the

349
income and educational qualifications required for the franchise will be accelerated."
All the stress is on the Africans. But when we come to page 16 of the proposals, as distinct from that page of the report, we find that what no doubt to Mr. Smith are first things come first. The greatest importance is attached to the expansion of the economy of Rhodesia—that is, for everybody's benefit—and it states that, in particular, economic growth will be stimulated in the Tribal Trust Lands.
We next read that whatever the British Government provide will be in addition to the annual expenditure currently planned by the Rhodesian Government for African education and housing, for development projects in the Tribal Trust Lands and the African purchase areas. It might seem as if the proposal to speed up progress towards integration was already being actively implemented, but the conclusion must be precisely the opposite. Indeed, seen in the present context the proposals before us encourage the suspicion that the capital aid promised will mostly be so channelled that the separate development ideology will be followed. African areas will be developed, the present—I repeat, the present—inadequate vocational education will be encouraged, as has already been planned by the Ministry of African Education and a start made there. My point is that this will not lead, and is not designed to lead, to competitive, educational and technical competence. There will be no proper progress towards majority rule until there is wider opportunity for Africans to be integrated into the whole life of the country, urban as well as rural, and this is certainly not something which the proposals guarantee or even suggest is vital.
I will take next the matter of education. May I say at the outset that if the proposals are accepted, and there is discussion between the two Governments, I very much hope that all the Rhodesian Churches—not just my own—will be associated with the planning and execution of the educational part of the programme. I say that for a practical, down-to-earth reason: they have a considerable commitment to it, and also a long and detailed experience of African education. But I am bound to say this. There has to be agreement between the two Governments.
350
Will they be allowed to be involved? Or, more generally, suppose the discussions between the two Governments do not lead to agreement, what happens then?
Those questions aside, and turning now to Section VII(1), on page 17, we find what, out of context, would be a most admirable sentence:
"As vacancies occur in the Rhodesian Public Service they will be filled according to the criteria of merit and suitability, regardless of race."
What could be a more splendid sentiment than that? Splendid indeed!—until we remember that advancement on merit has always been in theory the official policy of the Rhodesian Government. But in practice, as distinct from theory, the colour of the applicant's face has always been a major factor in assessing suitability and merit. For instance, all candidates for commissioned rank in the police in Rhodesia have to undergo an aptitude test. European candidates with the most meagre qualifications pass without difficulty; no African candidate has yet done so. There are many young Africans with high qualifications, some of them graduates, who are having to conceal their graduate qualifications in order to obtain employment in the Public Service. As what? As messengers, because that is the only grade for which Africans are normally considered.
In addition, it is, and always has been, virtually impossible for an African to obtain an apprenticeship, owing this time to the attitude of the white trade unions. Therefore one is bound to be extremely suspicious of the wording of the last paragraph of Section VI, which speaks about "new job opportunities for Africans", and about Section VIII which I quoted and am equally suspicious about unless it is accompanied—and it has not so far been accompanied—by concrete evidence of a major change of heart. The question I ask is where, in the matter of unimpeded progress towards majority rule, is this concrete evidence? Where are the guarantees—and the word is used in the First Principle—which that First Principle declares are necessary? My point is that in view of the present practices in Rhodesia, on the one hand, and the actual phrasing of the proposals, on the other, guarantees are more than ever reclined; and we have not got them.

351
So to the Fourth Principle, racial discrimination. There must be progress towards ending racial discrimination, says the Fourth Principle. Now consider again, in the context of the actualities of the situation, the notorious Land Tenure Act. It may interest your Lordships to know that the Matabeleland Diocesan Synod in 1970 was only one of many Church Assemblies in Rhodesia which, along with many church leaders, roundly condemned this Act, as they condemned the 1969 Constitution, as violating—a word as strong as that—the teaching of the New Testament. Yet that very Act has been described to me—and here I quote a Rhodesian—as,
"the cornerstone of the policy of Mr. Smith's Party, the means whereby the creation of a non-racial society is frustrated."
The Land Tenure Act, far from being firmly gripped by these proposals, is a huge nettle left with ample opportunities for continuing to thrive—indeed, to spread over the whole garden, if it is not there already.
It is, for instance, a little odd to discover in Annex B, Appendix IV, almost as though it were an afterthought, that the independent Commission in giving special attention to the Land Tenure Act, shall consider—and I am quoting the phrase which occurs at the end of paragraph 3(a):
"any other restrictions on occupation",
as though this were some necessary triviality added for the sake of legal rounding off and completeness, whereas the fact is that the whole outlook of the Land Tenure Act is expressed in its fundamental definition of occupation on a racial basis. It is of course perfectly true that the Commission is required to "give special attention to", to "consider" the matter—fairly weak verbs in any event, as has been noticed by others. But my point is that the very position of that phrase at the end of paragraph 3(a) in Appendix IV gives me no great confidence that the depth and seriousness of this matter of the Land Tenure Act has been fully recognised and probed.
But my major difficulty here is that there have been reviews and considerations and examinations in Rhodesia before to-day. Under the 1961 Constitution, a Constitutional Council was
352
set up to inspect proposed legislation and to review existing legislation with a view to preventing or removing discrimination. What could sound more hopeful; what could sound better? But the Council's recommendations could be overridden by the issue of a certificate of urgency by the Government; and after December,1962, they unfailingly were. That is the context in which, therefore, I am bound to be suspicious of that notorious proviso in the second paragraph of Section III, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner and others—namely,
"subject only to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character."
The Rhodesian Government has already proved itself a past master at using such a clause to prevent progress. And, underlining a remark made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, in my mind I set that phrase about "overriding character" alongside phrases like, "in tile absence of unforeseen circumstances", when the state of emergency would be lifted after the end of sanctions, and phrases like, "undertake to take steps", without saying what steps or how many will be taken, and by whom. It is phrases like those that, for me, set the tone of the proposals.
If I may take up a point mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, the phrase, "any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character", is quite plainly ambiguous. It was not, I presume, "any" in the sense in which "any" is suggested to be even the most liberal and enlightened; it was "any" in the sense of any single one, when of course it could be applied to the Rhodesian Government by itself, which might wish to be called civilised but could hardly expect to be called liberal and enlightened.
Further, in this context of racial discrimination, may I voice a deep unease, which others have also expressed, about evictions? The third paragraph of Section V says:
"With the exception of certain forest and national park areas the development of which may involve the removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights, the only two cases in which the Rhodesian Government are considering the eviction of Africans from land in the European area are Epworth and Chishawasha Missions. The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance that they will not take steps to evict

353
African tenants or other occupants from these two areas …"
This is highly misleading. Why? It makes no reference to recent evictions; for example, the most deplorable hunting and hounding of the Tangwena people, whose chief it was reported, was unable to secure an interview with the Foreign Secretary; nor to the fact that inquiries such as normally precede evictions have already been made, I am told, in other mission areas besides Epworth and Chishawasha. It is perfectly true, of course, that these inquiries may not lead to evictions, but do I take it that we have a guarantee that these inquiries which have now taken place in other mission areas will not lead to evictions? And have we a guarantee that the chief of the Tangwena people will be able to see the Pearce Commission when he could not see the Foreign Secretary?
Incidentally, the reference to
"removal of a limited number of occupants without established rights",
is not all that encouraging in view of the fact that the rights of the Tangwena people, not living in a forest or national park, were established by a decision of the Rhodesian High Court. And what happened? That decision was immediately set aside by an Order in Council issued by the Government. Now it might be said that I cannot fairly protest against a measure of diplomatic silence which shrouds this rather embarrassing matter of evictions, and I grant that there is no necessity to mention them. All I say is that the treatment of this matter of evictions does not encourage in me any hope for the future. It does not increase my confidence in what the Rhodesian Government have in their mind, and it makes the vagueness and the qualifications in the proposals not only suspicious but sinister.
Finally, the Fifth Principle, "acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole". We recognise frankly that for good reasons Africans start from a position of no confidence in the Smith regime. Their experience of the policies of the Rhodesian Front, and indeed the European attitudes generally, can hardly be said to encourage them otherwise. It is against that kind of difficulty and other difficulties that I am bound to ask the question whether the task of the Pearce Commission has been recognised
354
for the appallingly difficult project it is?
Africans, as has been said to me, do not open their hearts immediately to a stranger, even if he is a Member of your Lordships' House. Moreover, the investigations will be fatally prejudiced from the start if there were any sign of influence whatever of Rhodesian Government Departments or officials and especially, in the rural areas, of District Commissioners. In that connection, would it be proper for me to suggest that, if the proposals are accepted, at least one of the members of the Commission should be, and be known to be, a churchman, and that more than one of them should have first-hand detailed knowledge and experience of conditions throughout Rhodesia? Let us recognise that this task of assessing opinion will obviously take months rather than weeks; will involve printing the proposals, for instance, in vernacular languages; may involve long hours for many people sitting under many trees; endless patience; explications; sensitivity to human wants, I find not even a hint in the proposals that this is recognised as a task of superhuman difficulty for any Commission. It sounds like a little committee of inquiry where you go and see what the water is like in the Cheviots, and a pleasant afternoon is spent by all, as it were. That is more the model, even if it is not exactly the pattern. It is far more the model than what will have to be set up if any good is to come of it.
What the proposals say on this matter of acceptability is, I think, plausible, because it puts into our minds commissions, about which we all think we know a great deal. It is as plausible as it is misleading, and it is against the sheer facts of the country. I have no evidence whatever of this Commission suggestion being thoroughly thought through. The Monckton Commission may be a parallel, but there has got to be much more thinking along these lines. What the Commission, if I may say so negatively, must not do and must not even be seen to do, is to tell the Africans what is good for them. I strongly suspect, unless a very thorough and long-term job is done, that that will be the appearance of it: "The great men are coming down; tell the Africans what to do", and that of course will be disastrous.

355
To reflect more broadly, though not for long, on this acceptability matter, there is the reference to normal political activities being permitted during this inquiry provided they are conducted, you remember, in a peaceful and democratic manner. That provision would be far more encouraging if, in the context of Rhodesian politics, words like "normal" and "democratic" had been avoided. When we hear that time will be available on radio and T. V. to political Parties represented in the House of Assembly, that phrase becomes badly tarnished, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said, when we realise that what are, in the view of many responsible observers, the most truly representative African Parties have been banned by the Rhodesian Government, and there is no Party whatever in Parliament now which has considerable African support.
As I said at the start, I have made these critical comments with no pleasure or satisfaction, and no wish whatever to belittle the efforts—the uphill efforts—which these proposals represent: the efforts of people I hold in the highest regard. But proposals and plans never, of themselves, bring any settlement, any more than a treaty between two nations prevents a war. Only people, not proposals, effect a settlement. When it comes to people—and as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, frankly admitted, he has not persuaded the Rhodesian Government to a more liberal way of thinking—I am not surprised to find in these proposals no evidence whatever of a radical change of heart expressed in the determination to implement the proposals under the vision of an integrated Rhodesia. I find not even a faint shadow of that vision here, and yet without that, these proposals might be only 10 printed sheets of folded paper. Indeed, looking for the guarantees which the Five Principles envisage, sadly I find, as I have tried to show, only evasiveness and ambiguity, sinister phrases and suspicious qualifications.
It might be said, "Let us leave it to the Rhodesian people themselves". That sounds so reasonable and so sensible, and so simple. Not so! For when we put proposals to anybody—and here may I dare to hope to mediate between the noble Lord, Lord Wade, and the noble
356
and learned Lord on the Woolsack—it is normally inferred that we are commending them. When we are not, special provision is made, and we have qualifying phrases like "without prejudice". The result is that when we are asked, without any qualification, to agree to putting these terms to the people of Rhodesia for their judgment, the implication is that we commend these proposals ex animo, and that we see them as embodying the guarantees of which the Five Principles spoke.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I hope that the right reverend Prelate is not suggesting that I made any other suggestion. Of course we are commending them, but one of the proposals is acceptability. That is all I ever said. We are commending them in exactly the same sense as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. commended them to the House, on the grounds that it would be consummate folly to reject them.
THE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for saying that. It entirely makes my point. I did discover a point of agreement between him and the noble Lord, Lord Wade, which is precisely the point the noble and learned Lord has expressed better than I could do.
Further, Mr. Smith remains the same. The Rhodesian Government are skilled in the exercise of avoiding tactics. All that may be different in the future is, as the noble Lord, Lord Wade, said, that we may be involved and be, in part, responsible for the oppression and the injustice which I dare be bound will continue. If, as I believe, that is the alternative to continuing, at least for the present, the present circumstances, then I am against it, and that is my answer to Lord Goodman's searching question as to what the alternative is. I say, rather, what is this possibility? I think it is even worse than the present conditions are.
My conclusion is that these proposals are so open-textured, to say nothing worse, that the hopes and aspirations of the African people slip through the meshes of their dialectic. For that reason, because I see little that is clear and nothing that is attractive about the state

357
of affairs which these proposals will bring about, and worse, because I do not want even in part to be responsible for what, in the framework of these proposals, may be done (and on past evidence will be done) by the Rhodesian Government, I feel bound to vote to-morrow for the Amendment.
6.58 p.m.
LORD GARNER: My Lords, first I must offer your Lordships an apology. I have become completely deaf and am due for hospitalisation as soon as I finish making my speech this evening. I am afraid, therefore, I shall be precluded from staying for the rest of the discussion, and it is likely that I shall not be so agreeably employed to-morrow, as when sitting in your Lordships' House. I must also add, in case any noble Lord wishes to interrupt me, that I shall not hear him if he does.
I should like to pay my tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, and the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, for their maiden speeches. I was particularly interested in the noble Earl's reference to continuing scholarships from Rhodesia. As the chairman of the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission, I can assure him that over the years we have had a regular series of outstanding Rhodesian candidates, both white and black, and I certainly hope that arrangements will be made for these scholarships to be continued. This is certainly no day for rejoicing and, as so many speakers have already pointed out, the proposals for a settlement presented to us are not ideal—the Lord Privy Seal himself so agreed—and not perfect, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, explained to us in very frank terms.
I have spent a number of years wrestling with all these problems, with A and B rolls and blocking thirds and blocking quarters, but I have no intention this evening of going through any matters of detail in the terms. However, I think it fair to point out that the impression emerges that there is certainly no absolute guarantee of any early majority rule. Few of the provisions in the proposals are really copper-bottomed, without a considerable let-out, and there is no effective machinery or external control to
358
prevent any breach. A second danger comes from one's assessment of the attitude of Mr. Smith. It may be that he was converted by the persuasiveness of Sir Alec Douglas-Home but, if so, it was a forced conversion, simply because he saw the necessity of a settlement. One can see no evidence—indeed, one would not expect it—of a genuine change of heart. I thought this was very much confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, himself.
I would not wish to credit Mr. Smith with the deliberate intention of wrecking the settlement once he has achieved independence. But, even so, one does not need to speculate very far on how events may not go too well, on what sort of pressures will be brought to bear on him and, particularly at an election time, on how lie might be driven into dangerous courses. But even if one can count on Mr. Smith, there is the more distant future to be thought about. Under our system, no Government are expected to bind their successors and it is extremely difficult to foresee exactly what sort of Government will be in control in, say, ten years—because parity is certainly going to take at least that number of years to be achieved—in Rhodesia, and what sort of actions might be taken during the 1980s. These are all very heavy questions.
But then, like the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, I asked myself the question: what arc the alternatives? Lord Goodman put the case so powerfully that there is very little that I need to add. But starkly, as I see it, there are three alternatives. The first is the use of armed force. I have always ruled that out, and I have not heard it even suggested to-day. The second alternative is to continue with the present policy of sanctions. Undoubtedly, sanctions have had an effect, perhaps a cumulative effect, and it is arguable that if they were continued for a further two years they might, by the end of that time, have a greater effect. But I should have thought it was equally arguable that, at the end of those two years, the bitterness in Rhodesia would have increased, the polarisation between the races would have gone on and further progress would have been made towards apartheid. In any case, as we know, it is clearly not going to be easy to secure a world-wide continuation of sanctions for a long period.

359
The third possible alternative is a negotiated settlement. When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary left for Salisbury, I was very doubtful about whether he would be able to achieve tolerable terms. I thought—and I expressed this view in your Lordships' House—that it was more likely that he would feel bound to report that no settlement was possible, because there seemed to be no real meeting of minds between ourselves and Mr. Smith's regime. In that case, the only honourable course would have been to revert to the present policy. But something has happened in Salisbury in the last few weeks. It may not be very much, but, to my surprise, the settlement sets Rhodesia on a slightly different course from her present one, and offers at least a glimmer of hope for the future. Of course, it certainly does not go as far or as fast as the African Nationalists would wish; nor does it go as far and as fast as many of us would wish, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, was frank enough to admit. But if one is going to deal with reality and reach as practical a settlement as one can, and if one is going to have negotiations, then there must inevitably be compromise on both sides, as there clearly has been on this occasion.
Moreover, despite the absence of any external control, there are two factors which one hopes will deter the Rhodesian Government from breaking the agreement in the future. The first is a fear of the reimposition of sanctions. One must not forget that, if there were to be a real breach of the agreement, Rhodesia would by then be a fully independent republic on its own and Britain would have no control. Therefore, the back-up of the United Nations would be entirely out of British hands, and Rhodesia might face the wrath of the world. So that she would no doubt take fair account of that. The second factor—and it may not be a major one—is that one would hope that Rhodesia would not wish to incur the loss of the £50 million in aid which the British Government have undertaken to provide. Therefore, after very serious heart searching and on one understanding, I should be prepared to accept these proposals as, in effect, a working document. Obviously the one understanding is that the whole package
360
is subject to the Fifth Principle. That is of vital importance and, as has been said, an extremely heavy responsibility rests on the shoulders of Lord Pearce and his colleagues.
Incidentally, I have heard a number of references to the Monckton Commission's providing a precedent for this sort of inquiry. With great respect, those references were misconceived. The Monckton Commission was a major body sent out to review the whole working of the Federation, which comprised the three territories of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and to make proposals for the future. It was a very different operation from what I understand is contemplated for this Commission, which will merely ascertain the views of the people on a proposition that is to be put before them. It does not seem to me that the parallel is very close. Nor do I think the Monckton Commission was ever specifically charged with ascertaining the precise views of the people concerned, other than any Commission obviously does.
As I see it, the Commission will be called upon to make a judgment on three aspects of the matter to make sure that the Africans first, understand; secondly, accept; and, thirdly, will work the proposals. Those are three different matters. Understanding is itself difficult enough, because the terms of the settlement are extremely complex and there are so many imponderables. Indeed, it is even hard enough to explain the highly complicated provisions in simple terms to a sophisticated questioner in this country; and one can imagine the difficulties that will arise when the Commission visits African kraals. Moreover, understanding involves some knowledge of what the alternatives are, and some appreciation of the fact that rejection of the proposals will mean a reversion to present repression, with no guarantee whatsoever of further improvement.
The second stage, as I see it, is acceptability, which places on the Commission the duty of ascertaining what the Africans really think, apart from the pressures and propaganda of the regime, on the one hand, and of African Nationalist Parties on the other.
But the third stage is almost the most important, because the proposals will

361
work only if the Africans co-operate, as of course they failed to do hitherto in connection with the 1961 Constitution. At the end of the day, the Commission will have to satisfy itself, and will have to satisfy Parliament, not only that the majority of Africans, on balance, understand and accept the proposals, but also that, in sufficient numbers, they will be willing to make them work—and that, indeed, my Lords, is a further formidable hurdle. I do not envy the Commission its task, but I certainly wish it well; and on this understanding, without rapture, quite frankly, but with a very deep concern for all that is at stake, I would be willing to give my support to the Motion.
7.11 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, in view of the fact that I am but the tenth of 35 Members of your Lordships' House who have put their names down to speak in this debate, I will endeavour to curtail what I have to say, although I should like to say, with great respect to the "usual channels", that I think Lord Sandford's vehicles might have been kept for another day.
My Lords, I believe, as I think most Members of your Lordships' House must believe, that the agreement which is before us to-day is probably the best, give or take one or two details here or there, that could have been negotiated in present circumstances. Nevertheless, I am deeply sceptical as to the wisdom of proceeding with it, and I will endeavour in a few moments to explain to your Lordships why I take this view. Before I do so, I should like to deal with one or two matters of detail, the first being the political situation in Rhodesia. I was much interested in a very small news item in this morning's Press which indicated that in a by-election for the Salisbury Parliament which is due to take place later this month the nominations closed yesterday and there was one nominee only. In other words, the Right-Wing Party in Rhodesia—that is to say, to the Right of Mr. Smith's Rhodesia Front—has apparently been convinced that this agreement is sufficiently satisfactory for them not to wish to contest this by-election.
This seems to me to be a very significant political pointer; and I would refer your Lordships to the report this morning from a Daily Telegraph reporter on the spot in which he says:
362
"…the proposals are being 'sold' to wavering Rhodesians as a total capitulation by Britain, suitably garbed in deliberately confusing legal terminology."
The report also says that they are being persuaded
"that the terms are far more favourable to White Rhodesians than a first, second or even third reading would suggest".
This situation in Rhodesian domestic policies seems to me to be one which should at least arouse one's suspicions, because, after all, the terms are being "sold" to people who are not ignorant of local conditions—far from it. They are people who know very well the provisions of the 1961 Constitution and of the 1969 Constitution, the A and B voters' rolls, blocking quarters, blocking thirds and so on. They are perfectly accustomed to these rather difficult constitutional matters; and I cannot believe that if they thought that the Africans were really going to have a very substantial advantage out of this agreement there would not have been a Right-Wing candidate in this by-elect ion.
My Lords, I will not attempt to analyse the White Paper proposals. They have already been analysed (quite brilliantly, I thought) by my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner, and a number of your Lordships who have already spoken have carried that analysis further. All that I would plead is that we should ourselves not engage in any exercise of self-deception. I was very glad indeed that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, did not do so—to the extent, at least, that he frankly admitted that this particular set of proposals, although they were the best that he and others were able to achieve, were not by any means ideal. Because if we did try to deceive ourselves, I do not believe that we should succeed in deceiving others, and we should only debase the whole currency of our political thought. To give one example of the sort of thing I have in mind, let us not become hypnotised, for instance, by the use of the word "parity", because this word does not mean at all what we in a Parliamentary democracy would understand it to mean. It means that a community of some 5½, million people will, on certain conditions and over a period which is calculated as being anything from 30 to 40 or 60 years, obtain an equivalent voice with a community of a quarter of a million people.

363
In other words, one is not equating individuals at all: one is equating one very large group with one relatively small group. Therefore, one should not comfort oneself with the word "parity" without at least being quite sure what it is that one is talking about.
But even on this concept of parity one has one's doubts as to how, or how soon, it is to be reached, because the qualifications are of education and of income. The qualification of education is four years' compulsory secondary education. I am speaking of the higher roll. Such an education is of course compulsory in Rhodesia for all white Rhodesians. I have not got the precise figure for the number of black Rhodesians who at present enjoy secondary education, but the figure given in The Times the other day by Professor Roland Oliver, who is very knowledgeable about Africa, was 2 per cent. That may be a slight underestimate, but the number is something of that order. So there is a very large gap. But one may say, "Of course, Her Majesty's Government are to spend £50 million over 10 years to improve African education, and this surely will make a great difference". Let us put that, too, into some perspective. It was in 1967 that a Rhodesian Minister said that it would take £154 million per annum and £250 million of capital expenditure to bring African education up to European standards. Of course, plainly any such desperate measure is not necessary to enable Africans to achieve voting qualifications; but I do not know that we ought really to deceive ourselves into supposing that £5 million a year, which is to be spent not only on education but also on physical development in the tribal lands. and so on, is really going to make a very significant difference to the numbers who are going to be able to qualify for the voters' roll.
Incidentally, if we are to hand over this sum of money to Rhodesia, is it necessary to hand it over to the Rhodesian Government? Is there not something to be said for establishing an education and development trust which would not be, one would hope, susceptible to the suspicion that it might be manipulating this money for electoral advantage?
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Baroness for one moment? Perhaps she would bear in mind that the missions have carried out most of the education in Rhodesia for a very long time, and are very short of money, and would easily be able to use any Government money and administer it independently and, secondly, that there is an organisation in Rhodesia which would be quite capable of channelling the money which the British Government produced into the tribal trust areas and the native purchase areas, and do so in a way completely independent of the Government.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, that is surely a very strong argument why this method should be chosen by Her Majesty's Government, and I hope that they will give most serious consideration to this matter.
Another very important question which is relevant to the whole question of balance on the voters' roll, and as to whether and how soon parity may be reached, is, of course, the question of white immigration, because parity depends on both sides. We have heard how African seats may be increased, but, of course, if you have further immigration of people of European stock they, too, will have additional seats; and therefore, pari passu the Africans would need to have an even larger number of educated and well-paid members of their community in order to keep pace with European immigration. As I understand it, there have been statements of policy about this question in Salisbury, and I believe that the figure has been mooted of 10,000 new European immigrants.
What I am suggesting is that this is one of the very important factors which is not referred to in the White Paper but which may well affect the balance of political parity in the time to come. I cannot go into the discrepancy on the estimate about how many Africans in fact will be entitled to register. I was surprised at the figure of 15,000 given by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, which is higher than the latest official figure I had heard. As the noble Lord, Lord Garner, rightly said, it will depend very much on whether Africans can be persuaded that it is worth their while to

365
register. I very much hope that they will. Imperfect as I think all these proposals are, and imperfect as I believe the Constitution to be, nevertheless I very much hope that Africans will avail themselves of such rights as are open to them.
I think we are all very much troubled about the question of discrimination. The noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, pointed out some of the apparent safeguards. The Commission is to consider this matter, and the Government are pledged to recommend their proposals to Parliament. But if we had really wanted to convince African opinion that this was a genuine new deal, surely this process should have been gone through before they were asked to express their views as to the package as a whole. They would then have had some kind of touchstone as to the genuineness of some of the rest of the proposals. But this is not to be. All this will be carried out, as I understand it, after independence, not before. Again, if I were an African and looked at the Bill of Rights—I know it is not a new one—I should feel, as any lay person would, that the parity principle is whittled away by all the small print that comes below. In any case, existing laws are not to be touched. There is already a legal foundation for an apartheid State in Rhodesia, and if existing laws are exempt under the Bill of Rights it does not seem that one can repose very much confidence in this as a safeguard. In a State which does not intend to practise discrimination no Bill of Rights is required. Where discrimination is in fact the intention, then I think this Bill of Rights is but a flimsy safeguard. The only true safeguard of liberty is adequate political representation, for which, on any calculation, the Africans will have to wait many years.
Finally, I wish to say something about my attitude to the situation as a whole, not just to the details of this particular set of proposals. I think we should seriously ask ourselves: is it wise for us to implicate ourselves in the ways proposed under this agreement with a regime of which I think most of us, at heart, deeply disapprove and which I do not believe has changed? To do so is to put ourselves on the wrong side of the big divide in African affairs. I am looking now beyond Rhodesia itself. I admit that
366
within the Rhodesian context it is arguable that, in the short term at least, the Africans will be somewhat better off under these proposals than if they were not adopted. But if we look at the position of Britain in the whole African context, are we not seriously in danger of putting ourselves on what the Africans would consider the wrong side of the ideological confrontation that is developing in the Continent of Africa?
The black Africans are more and more tending to regard the Communist regimes, whether Russian or Chinese, as their best friends, and I have a most disquieting feeling that, after Salisbury, the places in which this agreement will be most warmly welcomed are Moscow and Peking. By entering into an agreement, which I do not think any one of your Lordships has wholeheartedly commended, and about which many of us have the deepest suspicions, we are surely appearing to the world to be giving moral endorsement to a régime which admittedly we are powerless to change but of which we cannot approve. Would it not possibly have been better to admit our impotence? As I remarked at the outset of my speech, in the conviction that the particular proposals which could have been negotiated by anyone at the present time, if I really believed in what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said, that this White Paper opens up a prospect of a non-racial society of the kind of which we should approve; if I really believed, with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that the agreement opens a way to white Rhodesians to relinquish control without violence, then I should be disposed to vote to-morrow in favour of this agreement. But I do not believe either of these propositions. I wish I could. I hope that I may be proved wrong. But I believe that we should stand better in the world if we were frank and honest in our disbeliefs.
7.27 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I have great sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady White, because I find myself in the same position, rather inconvenienced, shall we say, by the previous business which delayed the House.
My Lords, I am the first speaker on these Benches since we had the two maiden speeches. Therefore, even though

367
the two noble Lords are not here and are undoubtedly eating a well-deserved dinner—I am glad to see that one of them has returned—it is my very pleasant duty to welcome them to your Lordships' House and to congratulate them on their excellent speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, interested us very much with his experiences of the King's African Rifles after the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, and he drew a parallel between the Rhodesian situation to-day and Kenya then. Certainly we must learn the lessons which Africa has to teach, and this is very much in the minds of many of your Lordships, particularly those of us who are familiar with the African scene. Then he talked about confidence and trust. As so many speeches have revealed to-day, the whole of this debate is about confidence and trust and on those will depend which way individual Members of your Lordships' House will think.
The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, referred in felicitous phrases to the final curtain coming down on our glorious imperial history; but he did not much like the look of that curtain, and he was supported in that respect by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. But he said a very important thing, that if the Rhodesians accept then our doubts are superfluous. I think we have listened to two most interesting speeches which were very relevant to our debate to-day.
My Lords, I am also the first speaker in this debate who has personal interests in Rhodesia which are well known to many of your Lordships. But, of course, there are a number of noble Lords who have joined us since I spoke last on the subject of Rhodesia, and therefore I must remind your Lordships of those interests. I have had a farm for more than 20 years in Rhodesia—Southern Rhodesia as it was better known—and I lived there for the first six of those years. In case any noble Lord should make the mistake of believing that because of that interest, even unconsciously, I might be influenced by considerations of personal profit, I would inform them that it is a curious fact that as a direct result of sanctions my farm has doubled in value. That is because it happens to be in an extremely good farming area and other people less lucky than I wish to buy farms in that
368
area. Having explained that situation I hope I may be regarded as objective in that respect.
The last speech I made on this subject was on the occasion when the Labour Government decided to send the problem to the United Nations, in December 1966. I opposed that Motion, and I say for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, that I opposed it on the grounds of Christian conscience. I have no intention of repeating that speech, but perhaps he may be interested to look it up. The reason why I have to oppose the Amendment to-day is a quite simple one—because, if passed, it would deprive the Rhodesian people of the possibility even of passing judgment on the proposed settlement. I am quite certain they must have that opportunity. There are other reasons, of course, and at the end of my speech noble Lords opposite will understand them more fully.
I have always wished that we could 'keep political controversy out of the subject of Rhodesia, but I regret to say that seldom are we able to do so. I complained about that as long ago as 1957 when, soon after returning from that country, I pointed out to noble Lords aid in the estimation of Rhodesian opinion in general the Conservative Party was linked with the European interests and against the African interests and the Labour Party was linked with the African interests and against the European interests. I have always wished that that myth could be exploded because basically I do not believe it to be true, except in the case of individual members of both Parties. But at critical moments I am afraid that we get ourselves involved in controversy. This has always bedevilled the situation in Rhodesia. I say, as I have always said, that I am 100 per cent. pro-Rhodesia as a whole—and I mean as a whole. I have always been impressed by the common sense and the essential decency of the great majority of Rhodesians, white, black, Asian and coloured. I stand by that, and this will colour my speech. It is from that point of view that I want to review the present situation, without emotion but coolly and dispassionately because I believe it is in the interests of all races in Rhodesia. That is what matters above all—not our interests, not even our honour, still less

369
our pride; not our lives but their lives. I have occasionally thought during one or two speeches that full recognition has not been given to that fact.
I do not wish to go into all the Five Principles. That has been done, and will be done ad nauseam. But I would make one or two brief comments in respect of majority rule and the calculations made as to the time factor. One could estimate it fairly accurately, back in 1961, based on that Constitution. With all the figures at my finger tips in those days, I thought, in spite of all that Sir Edgar Whitehead said, that the figure was over-optimistic and that it should have been 20 years. Ten years have now been lost. Ten years have been thrown away. Everybody is blameworthy. But do not let us go over that again. I believe that if the term of 20 or 25 years can be put into these proposals, we should be more than satisfied. I do not believe that it would, in fact, take longer than a generation.
This really brings me to the question of personal ambition. I know it must be very bitter and frustrating for the present African leaders to feel that by the time they get a majority rule they personally will no longer be leaders. But we cannot consider personalities. To-day, we must think of the long-term aspirations of the people as a whole. One of the calculations that I felt was quite extraordinary in the figures quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, in referring to Professor Palley's calculation, was the estimate of the increase in the European population after a possible settlement. This is estimated at a rate completely unknown in the past. There has been a great expansion in Rhodesia from 1947 right up to 1965; and the figures given there I thought were hopelessly unrealistic. Of course, if they are wrong it would reduce the period of 64 years to a considerable extent. That is all I wish to say about that. As regards the safeguards against retrogressive amendment, the speech of the noble and learned Lord in that respect was dealt with admirably by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.
Turning to the voting habits of the black Africans, why should the directly-elected and the indirectly-elected African Members differ? For such an assumption there is no justification at all. There has been none in the past; there will be
370
none in the future. This leads one to question also many of the other assumptions about leadership in Rhodesia. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham stated that there were no representatives in Parliament of the Africans. Of course, there are! There are eight directly-elected Africans, seven of whom represent the Centre Party. They were voted into Parliament on the African roll. With respect, the statement of the right reverend Prelate was both ignorant and ridiculous.
Let us take the leadership of Mr. Nkomo who has many followers—as has Mr. Sithole—but who has been out of politics for a long time. When I was there last March I was informed by liberal Europeans who have contact with the younger Africans in the towns and in the tribal trust lands that they do not necessarily regard Mr. Nkomo as their leader. No doubt they will throw up new leaders—and soon. The idea that the Chiefs have no following and are just "stooges" is completely ridiculous. It is not true. They have a very large following in the tribal trust lands. I would not say they have the agreement of all their followers; but they are people of substantial position who truly represent large numbers of their people. The situation is far too complex to generalise about voting habits.
I think that the least satisfactory part of the proposals is that dealing with racial discrimination and this rather unfortunate phrase of exceptions being made for "considerations of an overriding character". I am glad to see that it says that any Government would consider such a course and not just the Rhodesian Government. But those sort of considerations, to our way of thinking, usually refer to public security and I would rather see words to that effect in the document. When that is compared with what is written elsewhere, it does not seem possible that after the Commission has been out and has made recommendations, the Rhodesian Government could or would go against those recommendations in the context of this paragraph dealing with racial discrimination.
This really brings one to the question of trust. I fully appreciate that there are good and sufficient reasons why the Governments of this country, past and present, should distrust or might distrust the

371
de facto Government of Rhodesia, considering what has happened since U.D.I. and the mere fact of U.D.I. itself. But there is a long history to this question, and it goes back to the early days of the Federation. The distrust originated in Rhodesia and was against the politicians and statesmen of this country of ail' Parties. I said before, that that distrust was justified, and I have no fear of repeating that now. Therefore the cap fits both sides, and it is this basic distrust which has to be overcome. I hope very much that this agreement will succeed in overcoming it. I know the Rhodesian people; I have already expressed the opinion that I have of them, and I will give them the benefit of the doubt. It remains to be seen whether, when the test of acceptance is put to them, all the Rhodesians will support my belief that the Rhodesian Government intend to keep the spirit as well as the letter of this agreement.
My Lords, one of the most important things about this agreement is the part which sets aside £50 million for the development of the Tribal Trust Lands. Again the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham should have known better. This is one of the most important features of the agreement and is absolutely necessary. The basic problem for any Government in Rhodesia over the next 10 to 15 years is economic. If it cannot be solved, no Government will remain long or indefinitely in power. A political solution will not be possible. European industry in the big towns will never provide jobs for all the Africans. The vast majority of them live in the Tribal Trust Lands, and at the present rate of increase there will be even more than those. There must be jobs for them in the Tribal Trust Lands. This is not a question of separate development, it is a question of their livelihood in their own Trust Lands. These must be developed. My only doubt is whether the money will be sufficient, but if the Rhodesians put in an equal amount I dare says that £10 million a year will take a lot of spending. It is not only in agricultural projects but in commercial and industrial ones as well, and some Africans will have to be trained. This is basic to the whole future of Rhodesia whatever Government there is, whether
372
white or black, democratic or authoritarian. Therefore, I welcome this aspect of the proposals.
Another result of the agreement which I do not think has been touched on at all to-day is the effect on the internal political situation. For some years there has been an external enemy, whether it be ourselves or the United Nations, and this has united the European people of Rhodesia as nothing else could. When that reason for unity is withdrawn, it will be the opportunity for many Europeans to whom the noble Lord. Lord Goodman, referred, to start—well, they have started, my Lords—to create effectively and to build up a strong Opposition on a multi-racial basis. Unless this settlement is reached, there will never be any opportunity for that at all. These people are waiting for a settlement in order to get going and they are desperate that we should reach a settlement. This needs a great deal of emphasis and it has not been regarded at all. It must necessarily affect the divisions of opinion which have always existed before; only before the majority was always two to one in favour of what we would call common sense and there is no reason why it ' should not be again. But without settlement that cannot possibly happen.
My Lords, I have dealt with the positive side, but there is a negative side which is of equal importance and is crucial in our debate and in the test of acceptability to be carried out in Rhodesia. It is, of course, the alternative solution. That was dealt with by the noble Lord. Lord Goodman, and the noble Lord. Lord Garner, but not by anyone else. The question of waiting and trying again and going on with sanctions was dealt with effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Garner. It will not wash, my Lords. Things will get worse. We shall not get an agreement any different from this, certainly not better. Policies of apartheid will be continued; sanctions will not bring down the Government. I do not believe that we can wait and see. Therefore we must look ahead for 10 or 15 years, and that is what 1 want to emphasise.
It has been suggested that the worst that could happen is a slide to South African apartheid, but that, my Lords, is not the main danger. It was touched on,

373
but not I believe in detail, or even sufficiently, by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I have referred briefly to the economic problems in the Tribal Trust Lands. I was told authoritatively when I was there last March that the African population will double itself, perhaps in 10 years, certainly in 15 years. It there is no agreement and sanctions are still in force, what will those people do? Half of them will be young men. There will be no jobs for them. At that stage, with 10 million Africans or more, it will not be possible for the Europeans to maintain their law and order. There will be rioting, insurrection and bloodshed.
I realise that there are a few extremists among the Europeans in this country and among the Africans in Rhodesia who hope that this will happen—good riddance to the European population of Rhodesia! They think that then the Africans will take over and govern the country. But there will be no clearly defined African leaders if and when that insurrection takes place. There will be many small leaders but no one of stature; nobody trained and with experience of government. There will be a power struggle and then very soon a civil war between the Matabele and the Mashona. That has been so in the past, before Cecil Rhodes went there and even soon after. It will happen again. We have only to look at other parts of Africa to see what is happening there between the tribes. It will happen in Rhodesia in a state of insurrection and chaos.
It might be supposed that the Africans could settle their difficulties among themselves, but even that is not true. The Rhodesian Africans will be interfered with whether they are Matabele or Mashona. There will be interference from outside, by trained guerrillas from the North. They may not be much use now, as was pointed out, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. But if anything really broke out, they would certainly come in. They are being trained already by the Chinese in Tanzania, and the Chinese are now also infiltrating into Zambia. There will be trained and controlled bands of guerrillas with Chinese backing coming in from the North to sort out the mess. If that happens, or even if it does not, can we rely on the South African Government to sit still
374
and do nothing at all? Of course not, my Lords. They will be there, and the result will be a battleground in Rhodesia between not only the warring forces inside the country but also forces from outside, from the North and the South. The European Rhodesians will disappear completely but the poor Africans who are Rhodesian citizens will be the losers. They will not come out on top, or have control of their own country. That is the reality facing Rhodesia in the future. That is why I support this agreement, believing it to be in the interests of peace and prosperity and eventual multiracial democracy in Rhodesia.
7.49 p.m.
LORD REAY: My Lords, there seems to be agreement, even among those who oppose the proposals that we are debating, that they are about the best we could have hoped to obtain in the present circumstances. While it has weaknesses, particularly perhaps with regard to land allocation, the document brought back by Sir Alec Douglas-Home is a stronger document than we might have expected. The Rhodesians have been obliged to accept, finally, the principle of majority rule. If honestly administered, if maintained as a policy, the eventual consequences of this agreement will be majority rule. Whether it will be allowed to unfold in the proposed manner, either by the white Rhodesians or by black forces in Africa, is a matter that will be outside our control.
It is of course a matter of regret that the right we claimed to determine the manner in which Rhodesia received her independence should not have been backed by a corresponding power to ensure the consequences that we desired. But our fault lay in claiming a responsibility we had therefore no right to claim. It was a trap we laid for ourselves. The recent history of our relationship with Rhodesia can be traced logically back to our refusal to give independence on the break-up of federation; beyond that to our whole post-war Commonwealth policy when we built up in ourselves the desire to do only what the new countries of the Commonwealth wanted us to do; and beyond that to the very origins of the modern State of Rhodesia, when, in 1923, for the sake of the glory of Empire, we annexed Rhodesia to the Crown under a system

375
which gave local autonomy, while reserving to the Imperial Parliament authority in foreign policy and in native affairs. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, suggested it can be traced even beyond that time. In the years after U.D.I. I, for one, accepted the continuity of our historical claims with regard to Rhodesia, and as a member of the Liberal Party I willingly co-operated with the policy of sanctions. In retrospect, I can see that I, as perhaps others did, overestimated the opportunities that we might acquire to determine the political outcome. The agreement that we are debating today reflects the maximum impression we are ever likely to make on Rhodesia's political direction. If it is correct to conclude from the long, powerful and destructive analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, that we should have done better to give independence under the 1961 Constitution than on these terms, then I think we can only regret that we did not take that original opportunity.
From the point of view of our history as a nation, I therefore think that the most important aspect of this agreement is its deliberate failure to include any external safeguard for the agreement. I appreciate that for noble Lords on my right, who prefer that we should aim for the principle with less respect for reality, this crucial difference between the terms of this agreement and the "Fearless" terms is one to be deplored and not to be approved. But if the present Government had repeated the "Fearless" proposal for appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, we should still remain in the situation of having our authority defied and yet being in no physical position to enforce it. It is precisely because this agreement finally breaks the pattern of claiming to control a situation which we did not control that I believe that these proposals deserve support.
It may then be asked: what will this agreement have achieved, apart from enabling us to break this unsatisfactory pattern within our own history? My Lords, I think the answer is twofold. In the first place, we shall have given Rhodesia the opportunity (and that was the word the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, used) to move in a new political direction. Having faced Rhodesia in another direc-
376
tion—for that is what we shall have done—we have no power to see that she sticks to it. But she takes the risk herself of not doing so. If she prefers to risk isolation, even catastrophe, then that must be her own solemn decision. It is in giving Rhodesia this last opportunity to compromise with the powerful but still immature forces of modern Africa that we perhaps make our best contribution in these proposals and the best we could make in any proposals.
But I also think that we should not underestimate the value of bringing a greater degree of realism to the consideration of an international problem. Our own fictitious claims to be able to control this problem have been an attractive diversion for the people in Africa, who expend enormous energy in blaming us for not solving a problem that only they will solve. For this is in truth an African problem. The demand for majority rule in Rhodesia originates in Africa. Other countries in Africa need to decide for themselves what priority to give, what combinations to make, what sacrifices to put up with, in order to achieve black rule in Southern Africa. It is of course imaginable that such a policy could one day be adopted and enforced under general international agreement. But just as our own imperial dominion had too far disintegrated for the solution to be within our power, so the world has not achieved sufficient political integration for the solution to lie within the power of world organisations or combinations to-day. For the present, the outcome will be determined by local forces in which we have no part to play.
There are two questions that I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government, perhaps for answer to-morrow by the noble Marquess or by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack. The first one is to do with the question of our financial assistance to Rhodesia over the next ten years. The present proposals promise:
"…£5 million per year for a period of 10 years in capital aid and technical assistance to he applied to purposes and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government…",
with matching sums provided by the Rhodesian Government. This is more or less identical with the "Fearless" proposal.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, may I just point out that the "Fearless" proposal of £50 million was purely and solely for education; nothing else?
LORD REAY: My Lords, I accept the correction of the noble Lord, which is not material to my argument. But it is not clear from the wording which I have quoted whether we wish to be involved in agreeing on this programme only at the outset or whether we propose to be involved in it throughout its stages. I can understand that the terms of the agreement needed to avoid anything which night suggest that we did not trust Rhodesia to stick to the direction laid out for her in this agreement. At the same time, it would surely be intolerable for us to continue to make payments for purposes which had been abandoned or modified or even if, while specific programmes of education and in this case of social improvement were being continued, the main objective, African political advancement, was being frustrated in other ways. We should not only be free, therefore, to reduce or withdraw financial assistance if necessary, but also be in a position to scrutinise both particular programmes of expenditure on a running basis and also the total political drift of society. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can usefully add anything to the very little the White Paper says on this subject.
My second question concerns the implementation of the agreement. A difference between this agreement and the "Fearless" terms is that, whereas the "Fearless" terms set out that following the conclusion of the agreement, the British Government would
"take all action in their power to bring about an immediate discontinuance of the economic and other sanctions at present in force",
the present proposals state that the British Government
"will terminate their economic and other sanctions when this legislation takes effect."
I take this to mean that the British Government would ignore a mandatory United Nations resolution if one remained in force at the time. But do the Government intend first of all to approach the Security Council to invite them to drop sanctions, or do they intend to take the
378
view that the involvement of the Security Council in this matter was illegal, or at least improper, in the first place?
My Lords, I should like to conclude by saying that in order to welcome this possibility for a settlement it is not necessary for us to believe that the best future for the blacks in Rhodesia lies under the present Rhodesian Government. Within the last few years Rhodesia has shown a spontaneous tendency to move in the direction of apartheid. Apartheid is a cruel and dangerous system, which denies political life and human dignity to vast numbers of another race. But we must match our remedies to our capacity. We have created the opportunity for Rhodesia to have a new and better political future. We can do no more. Having done that, it is right that we should cooperate in the economic recovery of Rhodesia from which all races will benefit. For these reasons, I support the Motion that these proposals should be submitted to the test of acceptability to Rhodesia as a whole.
8.1 p.m.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, although it is late and we have not made much progress, I am sure the House would wish me to convey our congratulations to our two maiden speakers. The noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, spoke with deep knowledge and great sympathy of Africa and Africans, and he was magnificently brief, which he will find will make him a popular speaker in your Lordships' House. The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, gave us a most thoughtful and sincere speech, and I strongly agree with the point he made about when the 5 million Africans of Rhodesia are no longer ill the Commonweath and how he hopes that they will still be entitled to the sort of educational benefits which were available to them before. I know that we shall want to listen to both our maiden speakers often in the future.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is not in his place, because I feel that I must make some reference to what he said. When the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, opened our debate, I felt that he was perhaps less persuasive than be normally is. Indeed. I was mystified by his match boxes. We are used to the

379
Party opposite producing match boxes, but I have never heard of an agnostic match box and, indeed, would much prefer the slide rule to which he referred. Further, basing his argument for the Proposals on keeping Mr. Smith not isolated, because he would have regard to British and world opinion, did not seem to me. if I may say so, to be a very convincing argument when we think of the past.
So when the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, rose to his feet, I remembered at first the words which Lloyd-George once shouted across the Chamber in the other place to Winston Churchill when he was defending the Government in May,1940. He said:
"The right honourable Gentleman should not turn himself into an air raid shelter."
I felt at first that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, was doing that; but afterwards I felt that he turned himself much more into a Big Bertha. We know that these proposals are in a sense the noble Lord's baby, if I may so describe them, but I have never known the noble Lord so emotional, nor indeed have I ever before known him to be unfair. Of course we understand that he has to fight for his baby; but passion is no excuse for inaccuracy. To compare in the same breath Mr. Ian Smith and President Kaunda is little short of monstrous. There are over 1,000 people in restriction in Rhodesia. Both the leaders, Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Ndabaninghi Sithole have been in restriction for six or seven years. There are some members of the Opposition in prison in Zambia; some have been set free, and the two Opposition leaders, Mr. Nkumbula and Mr. Kapepwe, are free and walking about the streets. The situation simply cannot be compared, and I was shocked that the noble Lord tried to do this.
My Lords, a cat may look at a king, and perhaps I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that I found his defence of the position of the Chiefs most unconvincing. Apart from anything else, why does he think that the Rhodesian Government is so desperately anxious every time we have two directly elected Africans to have two indirectly elected Africans to, as the noble Lord himself said, "balance" them? I am afraid that these arguments do not hold water. The
380
noble Lord was not even accurate when he referred to the position of the coloured people and the Asians. He said that in every respect they ranked as Europeans. If they tried to live in the select suburbs of Salisbury they would find a very different picture.
The case has not been made out for these Proposals. I hope to show that they are a wrong approach to the whole question. They are formed on a wrong constitutional basis, and they are made at the wrong time. When last week the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, made his Statement about the Proposals, there was an atmosphere of bewilderment at the complexity of the electoral rolls and so on, and an atmosphere of astonishment that this kind of agreement could possibly be arrived at. Indeed, anything which makes my noble friend Lord Brockway refer to the present Foreign Secretary as a "saint" really is something not far short of a miracle. But I prefer to think of it as my noble friend Lord Soper described it; namely, as a mirage. Nevertheless, what caused this apparent miracle? I do not think there can be any doubt that one of the most important things which caused it was sanctions. For years we have been told, not only from Rhodesia, that sanctions were not succeeding: there has been a barrage of propaganda about them not succeeding. But this is simply not the case. The tobacco and asbestos industries there are suffering badly. There is a severe shortage of railway rolling stock, trucks, wagons and all those kind of things. Goods cannot be transported round within the country, and they cannot be exported without more stock. Last year, the balance of payments was £500,000, whereas in 1969 it was over £11 million—nearly £12 million. Their foreign exchange position is quite desperate. Indeed, I think the Guardian was right when it said that perhaps one could say that Mr. Wilson went to "Fearless" and "Tiger" too soon, and that it is sanctions which have brought Mr. Smith to this present point.
If that is true, why do the Government propose at this point to lift the sanctions? I believe, and I am sure all noble Lords on this side of the House believe, that sanctions should be lifted, if at all, very gradually; that we should have some proof that the regime really is carrying out its obligations under the proposals

381
before we try to lift any of them. The noble Lord, Lord Garner, dealt with the complicated question about how you can abandon sanctions when they are mandatory and the United Nations will have a strong voice in it. I am sorry that the United States behaved in the way that she did over lifting sanctions on Rhodesian chrome. I am bound to say that I thought the noble Marquess, when answering questions on this matter on Monday—I know that it was on behalf of his right honourable friend—was very disappointing when he appeared to dismiss this as unimportant; indeed, almost to justify it.
THE EARL OF GOWRIE: My Lords, if the noble Baroness will allow me to interrupt, the United States has not yet formally done anything about chrome.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: It has been pushed through Congress, and the President has signed it. I should have thought that that was fairly complete. And it was not denied by the noble Marquess. On the other hand, we have had another rather odd feature about sanctions, which is that noble Lords on the Benches opposite have urged that they should be lifted because they are harming the Africans. We all know the Latin tag—it is probably the only one we do know—Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. I cannot say it in Swahili, as did the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont. We know that when Governments try to urge on African peoples something which the African peoples do not want there is something funny about it; we do indeed, "fear the gifts that they bring". The African peoples of Rhodesia have never asked for sanctions to be lifted; their attitude to sanctions is, "We suffer now, let us suffer for freedom". It has only been asked for on their behalf.
What are the other reasons why Mr. Smith is trying to make this agreement at this time? I believe that great pressure has been put on him by South Africa, and to a lesser extent by Portugal. There are signs that the Portuguese are trying to adopt a rather different approach to their colonial problem, and there is no question that the South Africans are feeling the pinch economically far more than they did. They have a vast dissident black population of their own, and they
382
do not want to add another 5 million people. They do not want to have Rhodesia as an incubus clamped on them for ever. Their own economy is not as sound as it was. They do not need the more poorly educated Rhodesian whites to help them out in their search for skilled labour or for professionally skilled people. I am quite sure that the pressure has been from South Africa for Mr. Smith to settle. Much the most important reason of all is because in the end it will not make any difference to what he intended to do all the time.
Mr. Smith has hijacked Rhodesia. It is always notoriously difficult to deal with hijackers. You cannot negotiate with them because they blackmail you. Many noble Lords have referred to the evictions at the Epworth Mission, and so on. This is an example of the fact that the Government have been, I am sorry to say, taken in. They thought those were the only two places where evictions were taking place. In fact, evictions have been going on in hundreds of thousands over the past few years. I have one quotation from the Education Secretary of the Catholic Bishops' Conference in Rhodesia. He said:
"The implementation of the Government's discriminatory policies, particularly under the Land Tenure Act, has made it clear that their ideology is so incompatible with the Church's teaching that further negotiations would serve no useful purpose."
That is the view of the Catholic Church.
Many noble Lords have referred to the Tangwena people. I should like to do so, too, because I know the area well. While discussing Epworth and Chishawasha, did the Government ask for any assurance that the Tangwena people's huts would be restored to them? Did they ask for an assurance that the grass on their own tribal lands, which was burnt so that they could not thatch the flimsy shelters which they put up when their own huts were burnt, should also be restored? It is beautiful country. It is rather like the Lake District, with hills, streams and burns. Also like the Lake District, it is extremely cold and wet at times. Women, children and old people, as well as the men, have been driven out of the lands which, as the right reverend Prelate said, they have been registered as occupying since 1905. They have been driven out to the deserted mountains of Mozambique as well as to the surrounding country.

383
The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said that there had always been Land Tenure Acts ever since Rhodesia had existed as a country. But the Tangwena people were not touched under the previous Land Apportionment Act; it was only when the new Land Tenure Act was brought in that they were persecuted in this way, and with their schools closed down, and so forth. I have with me a newspaper which is written partly in the Shona language and gives us the latest news of that valiant man, Chief Rekayi, Chief of the Tangwena people. As your Lordships know, he has always had the greatest faith in the British people and in the British Queen. He managed to trek down to Salisbury a couple of weeks ago and tried to see Sir Alec. He saw the Attorney General and told him that two letters had been sent to the Government and the Queen, and the Chief wondered what the solution of his problem would be. The Attorney General said that he had no power. The Chief told him, "Either you have come to solve our problems, to stop what your children"—a reference to the Rhodesian Government—"are doing to us, or you have come to give your children licence to keep on what they are doing."
In a nutshell, my Lords, that is what this settlement is about. Here is this man of great courage, natural intelligence and profound wisdom, with powers of leadership beyond the ordinary; yet he can never qualify for a vote in Rhodesia. He is hostile to the regime, so he will not be considered as a Chief. He can never achieve money, property or a formal education. He will always, under the new proposals of the Government, be precluded from voting. Until now he has always looked to the British people and the British Queen for justice. There are hundreds of thousands more people like that. I believe that the Land Tenure Act is the absolute basis of the racial discrimination point. I do not believe there should be a settlement until the Land Tenure Act has been either abolished or substantially amended.
The noble Lord, Lord Wade, mentioned the racial discrimination Commission (that is the Rhodesian Commission) of three, and he was quite right when he said that it will be appointed only after
384
the British Pearce Commission had reported. That means probably after independence has been granted. If we have no sanctions against them now about racial discrimination, what sanctions shall we have against them after they have achieved legal independence and we have set the seal of respectability upon them? Nobody who has not been to Rhodesia can believe what the discrimination is like. I should like to tell you what the Chairman of the Rhodesian Front—Mr. Smith's Party—said last month at the Annual Party Conference. He said:
"The electorate will not much longer tolerate multi-racial swimming baths, mixed public facilities and amenities…and the non-appearance of legislation to prevent the infiltration into European areas of other races."
It is a question of good faith, as so many noble Lords have said, and against that kind of background what are we to think of the good faith? We are basing the lives of 5 million people on that.
There is one other point: the noble Lord attacked—unfairly, I think—my noble and learned friend for what he said about Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. Something appeared in The Times yesterday which I find disquieting. I hope that it has been misreported. Sir Alec Douglas-Home is reported to have said that he had:
…spoken to some Africans who had been detained, and most took the view that Britain should have used force to quell the rebellion, and should use force now. One of the reasons why these people were not being allowed to talk widely, or broadcast, was that they would preach violence."
But those people had every right to hope that the British would come to their aid originally. We have put down more than one rebellion by force in the past. There has been too much from the Party opposite of considering people who fight for their independence and who rebel, as revolutionaries and men of violence. Think how President Kenyatta was considered. Now he is one of the most stabilising influences in the whole of Africa. I think of Archbishop Makarios, and can remember people in another place saying that they would not shake hands with murder. Only a few short months afterwards there were charming pictures of him talking to the Queen. This is not the attitude with which one can deal with a situation of this kind.

385
One last word about education. The noble Lord, Lord Reay, referred to this point and talked about the £50 million, and my noble friend Lord Shepherd quite rightly corrected him. Under the "Fearless" proposals the British Government were going to give £5 million a year and the Rhodesian Government were going to match that sum, and that was exclusively for African education and technical training. This new offer which is to be "matched appropriately", whatever that may mean, by the Rhodesian Government is for education and technical development. This is very interesting because they refer to capital aid and technical assistance and the sum is to be devoted to irrigation schemes, cultivation and industrial projects. Nobody denies that irrigation schemes are needed, but we must look at this matter rather cautiously. In the great drought in 1968 the Rhodesian Government gave nearly £3 million to irrigation schemes for the European farmers, and £30,000 to the Africans. I think we should need to keep a very sharp eye on these development schemes—and of course we shall not be able to.
However, we need the whole of that £50 million for the Africans and their education itself. If every single bit of it were spent on their education, it would give them £1 for one African for the whole of one year. These are the Africans who have to attain four years' secondary education before they are allowed to vote. My Lords, this is the kind of "double think" behind the whole of this proposed settlement.
My Lords, there is so much more one could say, but not at this hour. There is just one phrase in the White Paper which I should like the noble Marquess, when he replies, to explain to us. On page 4 it is said that the
"economic, social and political advance of the Africans could take place only after a return to economic normality."
My Lords, why? And what is more, what do they mean by "economic normality"? We know what that means in Rhodesia. It means that every European earns ten times as much as every African. We also know, as my noble friend Lady White has said, that their economic plan is based on a blueprint by a South African economist called Professor Sadie, one of the main features of
386
which is an annual immigration of Europeans of 10,000. We can see what that is going to do to the 6 per cent. of the Africans. Every time they get a few more Africans on the roll, up goes the white immigration and they are back where they started.
One of the sad things about this Government for me has been the way they have lost enthusiasm for the Commonwealth. One of the saddest things about this whole Rhodesian proposal is that those 5 million Africans for whom we are responsible will lose the benefits of the Commonwealth—the security, appeals to the Privy Council and so on, and membership of the wider world which they have through the Commonwealth. But this does not appear to worry the Party opposite. The Sunday Times last Sunday described the settlement as "an ignoble end to an Empire". Mr. Peregrine Worsthorne, who is hardly a supporter of these Benches, said, there is no glory in it, and perhaps no honour". But, as usual, perhaps the last word goes to Sir Winston Churchill, who fifty years ago said:
"It will be an ill day for the native races when their fortunes are removed from the impartial and august administration of the Crown and are abandoned to the sea of self-interest of the small white population."
My Lords, not even the passion, and brilliance, and intemperate advocacy of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, can present these proposals as anything but a tragedy.
8.25 p.m.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, I should like to begin by congratulating my noble friends Lord Beaumont and Lord Onslow on their; admirable maiden speeches. Then I should like to pay my tribute to my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and to his team—particularly the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who made a brilliant speech this afternoon—on the great work they have done in giving us the chance to consider this basis of agreement. I listened, of course, with close attention, to the interesting speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe; and I do not think it will be necessary for me to defend the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, even in his absence. I do not doubt that he will read the noble Baroness's words and be

387
quite capable of defending himself. But he certainly seems to have stung the noble Baroness to give him a good deal of attention. I should have thought his motives were not so much to take care of his "special baby" as that he was moved by his great spirit of public service and his patriotism to his country.
I should like to turn to one other major point which the noble Baroness made, and that is her attack on the general character of the Smith Government and her doubt about the good faith that they may show in fulfilling the agreement if it is finally settled. I entirely agree with her that, if this agreement is finally confirmed by our Government and by the Rhodesians, the fulfilment depends to a large extent on good faith. But then, my Lords, any agreement would have. The two attempts that the noble Baroness's right honourable friend Mr. Wilson made when he was Prime Minister also would have depended on good faith.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? Does it not give him any cause for anxiety that Mr. Smith has said that he does not believe in the Five Principles, and that they have majority rule now?
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: Yes, of course, my Lords. Almost the whole of the noble Baroness's speech was directed to emphasise anxieties. We are all familiar with the odious aspects of this regime. We are all familiar with the anxieties. We are trying to make a balanced judgment. But the point I am making to the noble Baroness is that when her Party formed the Government and her Leader went to negotiate, if he had been successful in reaching agreement that agreement also would have depended on the good faith of the Rhodesian Government. One thing all of us have to admit is that we have no physical control over what happens in Rhodesia. Does the noble Baroness wish to intervene again?
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: No, my Lords.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: No; I do not think there is anything more to be said on this. I am just mak-
388
ing the point to noble Lords that any kind of agreement which is made depends on the good faith of the Rhodesian Government. That is a risk that the noble Baroness and her noble friends and right honourable friends thought was worth taking when they were in Government, and we thought it was worth taking now. That is inherent in the situation. Does the noble Baroness wish to intervene again? Please do.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: A tiny interruption, my Lords. We did have more safeguards with the "Fearless" and "Tiger" proposals.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, if the noble Baroness can tell me of one single effective, physical safeguard which she and her Government would have had over action in Rhodesia, if her right honourable friends had achieved a settlement, I am quite sure that every noble Lord here would be very interested to hear it.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, I did not say "physical safeguard". But in any case we then proposed to put sanctions on, and not to take them off.
LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD: My Lords, the noble Baroness really must talk practical sense. The fact is that when we as a nation decided that it was beyond our physical capacity, and indeed probably beyond the wish of the nation, to take physical action by force against the Rhodesians, then immediately we had lost all chance of physical control there, and any agreement that is made depends on their good faith. So let us face that 'and be honest about it. The noble Baroness is asking us to be honest; I ask her to be, too.
I listened with great attention, of course, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, analysing, with his great authority, the Five Principles, and I was naturally concerned that he concluded at the end of it that the terms of the agreement failed to conform. Naturally, I pay great attention to his view, but I am bound to say that I thought the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, dealing on legal grounds with at any rate part of this argument, made an effective reply. For myself, I

389
do not propose to deal with this point. I am sure that noble Lords would not wish me to at this time of night, nor do I have the authority. I see my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor sitting on the Woolsack and I do not doubt that he will deal with this aspect to-morrow. But I greatly sympathise with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that this is an agreement which, in the very nature of things, is far easier to attack than to support. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, will agree with that point—and it certainly got heavily knocked about by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham.
For myself, I would concede that the weakest point is the first point. I think I dealt with the second two points in the interchange that I had with the noble Baroness, but on the first point we should all have wished that progress had been clearer and faster. But this was the best they could get, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has certainly convinced us of that. As to how long it will take, I think it is worth remaking the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that this is something that nobody can tell. The statistical experts who have made predictions of 30,50 or 60 years are really crystal-gazing. It is pure necromancy. Nobody knows. I believe that this really is a reversal of the present trend and that events could go much faster. There could be an opportunity not only for the growing strength of the African voice but also an opportunity for the liberal influences in the white community to raise their voices. There are a lot of them there, but for the present they are completely silent and they have never been very good at organising themselves.
I would join with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in referring to the historical background of this in judging the Rhodesian mentality and particularly the Land Tenure Acts, which are particularly unattractive to us. As the noble Lord rightly said. they were started way back in the 1923 Constitution, and here, of course, is the basis of the general outlook of the average Rhodesian taking part in government to-day. They have felt that they were self-governing ever since 1922–23. This has made it extremely difficult for all those who have tried to deal with them.
390
I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that the negotiators went there with very little ammunition in their hands and that they succeeded in convincing Mr. Smith and his colleagues that world opinion was in a position now to damage them irretrievably. This was, I think, a great achievement, and when the noble Baroness said that in her view they were beginning to become aware of it—well, I am only too delighted to think that they were because if they were not we should have got nothing out of them. The fact is that in the main—and I am sure the noble Baroness will confirm this from her own contacts with people out there—they are strangely unaware of world opinion. It does not really matter what you say to them, it just does not go into them and it makes it mighty difficult to make any progress with them at all. I think generally everybody agrees that the terms that have been secured are the best that could have been achieved. I am sure that a great many people think that Sir Alec and his team achieved terms which were a good deal better than they had expected.
There are respectable grounds, even if they are in conflict with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, for saying that the terms conform, at any rate in principle, with the terms of the Five Principles. Thus I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that the practical issue, as I see it, that is before the British people to-day is either to settle for these terms or to continue in the present state, which I regard as being a state of stalemate, of the sanctions being applied. The sanctions have clearly embarrassed the Rhodesians, as the noble Baroness, Lady Llewellyn-Davies, said. I agree with her, and I am glad that they have—we should never have got the Rhodesians to the conference table at all otherwise. But, equally clearly, sanctions will never force them into submission. South Africa continues, I agree probably more reluctantly, to supply them with vital supplies, including oil, and an increasing amount of trade by-passes the sanctions, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, confirmed. We all hear about these things. I believe it would be realistic to assume that these trends would continue as the years go by, with the application of sanctions growing weaker and the tide in South Africa growing stronger. That would be

391
the inevitable prospect that lies before us.
Inside Rhodesia, the atmosphere of semi-siege would also continue, tending to strengthen the authority of a Right-Wing Government and to weaken the scope and influence of more liberal thinking. Worst of all, of course, it would give grounds for an authoritarian attitude to the Africans, on the justification for 'Protecting the safety of the State under conditions of a state of emergency. I notice particularly that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary referred to the danger of the growing trend towards apartheid. I believe that is undoubtedly true, and is a very real danger.
We have all agreed that there can be no doubt at all that the chief sufferers at the present time, economically, socially and politically are the Africans. On the other hand, if we make this settlement on these terms the repressive trend will have been stopped and reversed and a relaxation of the oppressive and racialist policies will have started in the right direction; and, as others have said, large sums of money can be allocated to help the education and development of Africans and to improve their employment prospects. Perhaps equally important, British influence can be restored at political and commercial levels to help to strengthen the liberalising influences in the Government. The amended Constitution can begin to work to increase the Africans' part in government. There seemed to me to be substantial gains for the benefit of the African people, and I believe these are gains which we should not lightly turn down because they fall short of any personal assessment of exactly the right kind. I took particular note of the penetrating observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady White, about the liability which would attach to an agreement with the Smith regime vis-à-vis black Africa as a whole. I accept that, but I still believe that it would be worth taking that risk in order to get the benefits which I believe are there.
The real issue is this: do we accept these terms which will bring the prospect of substantial gains to the African people or do we continue with the present stalemate of sanctions and all the negative consequences flowing from that? The
392
Amendment put down by Her Majesty's Opposition indicates that they refuse to accept this chance of benefiting the Africans but stick to the present position. I shall apply to that, not the stringent comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, but an attack which that very charitable creature, Oliver Goldsmith, once made on Burke, that they are
"Too fond of the right to pursue the expedient".
8.40 p.m.
LORD BETHELL: My Lords, I have been struck this evening by the similarity between to-day's debate and those we have had in recent months on whether or not we should join the European Economic Community. Several times in recent months we have had the experts talking about the Common Market; we have had the economists quoting their figures and giving us the benefit of their expertise; bamboozling noble Lords, presenting powerful cases, both for and against, and in most cases these experts have been so well qualified, so full of expertise that they have been able to present very good cases both for and against proposals that have been put forward by Her Majesty's Government.
In the early part of this afternoon we had the lawyers, who both presented superb cases for and against these proposals. If I were a member of a jury, or a judge, I really do not know to whom I would give the verdict on this evidence. I think that I should, in the end, find myself thrown back on to principles, away from details and back on to principles; and the only principle I can detect is that we should support these proposals, for reasons which I will now outline. Of course it is far easier to present a case against; holes can be picked in any proposal, particularly one which, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, admitted, is far from being perfect. It is far easier to criticise than to build. But at the end of the argument I find myself again and again thrown back on the question: what is the alternative?—a question which the noble and learned Lord opposite deliberately told us he would not answer this afternoon.
I can see only one alternative to accepting these proposals, and that is force; and I must say that I should have a lot more understanding of the point of view

393
of noble Lords who object to the proposals if they believed that we should use force to get rid of Mr. Smith. But it seems that we have now, after six years of come to a state where there is a consensus that we are not going to use force. I have not heard anyone suggest to-day that we should use force. A few years ago it was bandied about, mostly in the other place; it was mooted, but not any longer. We now have a consensus. What do we do if we do not accept these proposals? Continue as we are? Well, I believe that there are some advantages in that; we should, for instance, avoid bringing down upon ourselves the odium of various countries whose Governments believe that it is our duty to bring about majority rule now, and who insist that we should do this by fair means or foul, violent means or peaceful. Clearly we shall annoy them less by staying in our present position than if we resume normal relations with Mr. Smith's Government. But this is an argument of expediency and not one that particularly commends itself to me, or, I should imagine, to most noble Lords.
There are those again who have cried, "Munich!" Here I think there is a very profound misunderstanding of history and of present realities, for in 1938 force was a real possibility; there was a school of thought that strongly advocated the use of force to further the aims of our country's policy in 1938; but there is not one now. Again, in 1938 the vital interests of the United Kingdom were threatened. But are they now? Certainly Rhodesia is an important matter in foreign and Commonwealth policy, but it is not one of vital security to this country, and surely not one in which we should consider mobilising the whole resources of the nation and our Armed Forces to get rid of Mr. Smith. We perhaps should have done so in 1938 to get rid of Hitler, but I can see very little in favour of doing so to get rid of Mr. Smith.
One thing I will say in favour of the policy of the previous Government is that I think these proposals to-day show how correct the previous Government were to impose sanctions on Mr. Smith and how correct this Government were to maintain them. Otherwise, should we have had any card to play at all? Should
394
we have got anywhere in our negotiations, which have just come to what I believe is a happy conclusion? It is true the previous Government overestimated the effect of sanctions; they thought they would brim!. Mr. Smith down. They were wrong. On the other hand, I do not think we should underestimate the effect of sanctions. It cannot he very pleasant to be a white Rhodesian with a passport which is not recognised outside the southern tip of Africa; unable to travel; unable to trade, or even communicate by post, with almost all the countries of the world; unable, for instance, to take part in sport, in the Olympic Games. These are considerations which count with the electorate of Rhodesia; and were we not in a position to restore to them these privileges as normal members of the international community I do not believe that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary would have got anything like such satisfactory terms from the Rhodesian Government. The alternative was, of course, to keep them in Coventry; and this I can see very little point in maintaining.
These proposals, of course, imply no approval of the Smith regime. A number of noble Lords opposed to the proposals have based their argument on criticism of Mr. Smith's Government. This is surely preaching to the converted; there are very few Members of Parliament who have any good word to say for Mr. Smith or his Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodman said, we talk completely different languages. But this does not mean, surely, that we should not communicate, that we should remain not on speaking terms for an indefinite length of time, and that we should allow the citizens of Rhodesia to suffer as a result.
As to the proposals themselves, the details, I have one or two points to make which may be of interest as constructive suggestions. I imagine that the Government will not wish to have their hands tied on the decision on how they make up the body of Lord Pearce's Commission, but I suggest that it would have a great effect in this country and on world opinion, and in Rhodesia itself, if the Government could see fit to appoint as Commissioners one or two British subjects of African origin.

395
On another point—and here the Government cannot do anything—I would say to the Rhodesians (I do not know if they do read the reports of these debates) that I can think of no gesture that would give a more clear and convincing sign of Mr. Smith's good faith than that he should take an African into his Government. I have made inquiries about this idea, and I am told that it is not such an improbable suggestion as it may at first sight appear. There arc, for instance, African members of the Centre Party in the House of Assembly, members of a multi-racial Party, Members of Parliament who might perhaps agree to form part of a Government, dominated, it is true, by the Rhodesian Front. They might in this way advance their cause and get in a wedge, a toe in the door of multiracialism. Of course there are big gaps between the Rhodesian Front Party and the Centre Party, but I can think of no more hopeful sign than to see Mr. Smith invite a number of that Party in Parliament to join his Government.
The principle of the decision we have to make tomorrow, whether to accept the Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, is surely this: are we going to help the African Rhodesians if we continue to have nothing to do with their Government, of which, rightly, almost all of us disapprove, if we continue to have nothing to do with their country, for which we have a certain responsibility, though, paradoxically, over which we have no power, and for which we are reaping the whirlwind of our Imperial past? There are those who cry "Sellout!", but have we very much to sell any more, after years of U.D.I.? Surely not. At the moment we are in the position of being able to punish the white Rhodesians—I believe to punish them seriously. I do not believe that this punishment does not hurt: it does. But it is not a mortal wound, and it is not nearly a serious enough wound to make them withdraw and give up power. As we punish the white Rhodesians we are like a bee that cannot sting without damaging itself. I am not speaking about trade—this is a minor concern in such an important matter—I am talking about damaging ourselves morally.
396
We cannot continue to go on like this, because the price of maintaining Rhodesian isolation—of not "selling out", as those who oppose these proposals would put it—is, I believe, a more real sell-out, and an abandonment of Rhodesia to absorption by her powerful southern neighbour. It would be a disaster; one much greater than the one we shall cause by re-establishing correct—not free but correct—relations with Mr. Smith. The alternative strikes me as something suspiciously akin to moral posturing; to self-indulgence in powerless condemnations. We should do much better, surely, to recognise the political reality: that we cannot resist the evil of apartheid by imposing it, and that our only chance of helping Rhodesia, white or black, is to accept these terms.
8.52 p.m.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will appreciate the argument put forward by my noble friend Lord Bethel!, and his attempt to bring to this debate a basis of principle to his arguments, and also a constructive proposal. I must confess that I could not accept many of the things that he said, but it is refreshing and proper that at any rate one or two of the speeches in this debate in favour of the Government's point of view should be based not on expediency, as was my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford's speech, but upon principle.
This has been a rather nostalgic day so far as I am concerned. I hope my noble friend Lord Hastings will not regard it as being in any way unkind if I say that, listening to his speech, I was reminded of the many conversations one has heard from time to time in the Salisbury Club—the arguments that are put forward in defence of the point of view of those who are in a responsible position in business, in particular, in Rhodesia, for the attitude which they have taken. I would remind my noble friend Lord Hastings that no one has been less effective politically during the whole of this long controversy than precisely those well-placed and affluent people of the Salisbury Club who have failed to influence the Rhodesian Front Government, or any other part of the politics of Rhodesia, during the whole of the period of the last 10 or 15 years

397
that I have had some small knowledge of that country.
So far as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is concerned, we had a very powerful speech from him. I must say that to me it was a sad fact that all the assumptions upon which he was basing his point of view, and basing the arguments in favour of this agreement, were those which we had all believed in and made before the 1961 Constitution was evolved, and upon which the 1961 Constitution was based, and all of them have subsequently proved wrong. I do not want to get into a debate with other noble Lords on this. I would only, as briefly as I can, try to give such evidence as I can of the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
It is quite true that over these last 20 years or so we have spent a disproportionate amount of our time in Parliament, and have expended a disproportionate amount of the resources of British statesmanship, upon trying to solve the problems of a quarter of a million Europeans and 4 to 5 million Africans who live between the two great rivers of Africa, the Zambesi and the Limpopo. It now looks as though we are pretty nearly at the end of that road. The Foreign Secretary's proposals represent a decision by the British Government to get out of Southern Africa on the best terms that are possible, and this was precisely the refrain running through the whole of Lord Goodman's speech. Mr. Smith's Government will remain in office; Mr. Smith's 1969 Constitution will be the future Constitution of Rhodesia; Rhodesia will be a republic outside the Commonwealth; and it will be dependent not on Britain as its principal influence or ally, but upon the Republic of South Africa. Let us make no mistake about this; we are not pulling Rhodesia back from the road towards the South African point of view and South African influence; Rhodesia has reached the end of that road already. There may be differences for the time being in the treatment of Africans and the relations between races in Rhodesia and South Africa, but Rhodesia is as much part of the South African system of things as, if I may say so, Wales is, with all its differences, psychologically part of the United Kingdom.
398
Further, the Land Tenure Act, which, as your Lordships have heard many times during this debate, divides the land of Rhodesia half-and-half between the Africans and Europeans, will remain the law of the land. What is more, Mr. Smith will be given £50 million, which will enable him to continue to devote a very large part of his Government's money to defence and to the maintenance of civilised standards for the European population, which, so Mr. Smith has made quite clear, will be increased by immigration—no doubt from South Africa, Portugal, Greece, and from Italy (as during these recent years)—so as to frustrate as much as possible the political and economic progress of the African.
This is all a very far cry from the sort of settlement for which we had all hoped in the years before 1969. It is not a settlement at all: I repeat, it is an act of state by the British Government signifying their withdrawal from Rhodesia, as I have said on the best terms that can be obtained. This does not mean that those terms are not better than I expected when Sir Alec and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, went out such a short time ago to Salisbury to start their final negotiations: they are better. And there is no doubt, as a number of noble Lords and noble Baronesses have said in their speeches, that sanctions have had a very deep effect, albeit slow, upon the Rhodesian situation.
It is perhaps worth remarking—and I hope it is not with undue malice on my part—that all those European consumer goods that the Rhodesians have been importing during these last years, and about which we have heard so much from noble Lords who take their point of view in this House and from the Rhodesian propaganda as well—all those posh Mercedes French textiles, Scotch whisky, and the Japanese "nick-nacks"—have all helped to make sanctions really effective, because had that foreign exchange that has been spent on them been used to provide the rolling stock which the Rhodesian railways need so urgently, or the machinery for the mines, Mr. Smith might have had to give a good deal less ground during these negotiations than in fact he has had to give. But then perhaps, in those circumstances, Mr. Smith would no longer have been Prime Minister of Rhodesia, for anyone who fails to maintain civilised

399
standards for the Europeans does not have a very long political career in that part of the world. So, my Lords, Sir Alec has been able to complete a negotiation the results of which can be argued by honest men to be within the Five Principles.
Here, I entirely agree with Mr. Smith. The Five Principles are irrelevant, If the negotiation had been with a Government headed by the late Lord Malvern, by Mr. Todd, by the late Sir Edgar Whitehead or by Sir Roy Welensky himself, and had it been based upon the 1961 Constitution and gone from there to provide provision for slow but unimpeded progress towards majority rule under a regime of this sort, with guarantees against retrogressive amendment, with immediate improvement of the political status of the African and with progress towards the end of racial discrimination, then I—and, I think, a great many of your Lordships in this t'House—would have accepted that as having a reasonable chance of being carried into effect in the interests of Rhodesia as a whole, African and European alike, both in the spirit and in the letter of the agreement. As a result, I think that we should have had little objection to giving eventual independence.
If you are going to indulge in an act of faith as the culmination of a long negotiation, the first essential is to have faith and confidence in the motives of the other side; in their integrity and in their capacity to fulfil their side of the bargain. I was astonished that so many noble Lords who spoke earlier seemed to regard that aspect of the matter as being quite immaterial: so long as your own motives were good, so long as your own point of view was clean and decent and all the rest of it, then a negotiation could be carried through to a successful conclusion. Let us not forget, my Lords, that we are not considering only our own problems and convenience and political interests. We are considering also, as your Lordships know very well, the interests of Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia. But, far more than that, we are considering something which may well affect the whole of Africa, and certainly the whole of Southern Africa, for a very long time to come.
400
I must say to your Lordships—and I know that I am repeating something which you are no doubt wearied of hearing from me—that I have no faith, either in the ability of the ruling group in Rhodesia to carry out their side of the negotiation in the spirit which our negotiators had in mind or in their intention to do so. The process of twisting the complicated wording of the agreement has already begun. The noble Baroness, Lady White, read an extract from a despatch from Christopher Munnion in to-day's Daily Telegraph. On the whole, the Daily Telegraph has been a very keen supporter of a settlement in Rhodesia and of making good the breach between Mr. Smith and the Government. It has had distinguished correspondents over there, including Mr. Munnion, and, so far as I have been able to judge, Mr. Munnion has always been a very fair and accurate representative of that paper. He wrote this apropos of the by-election which did not take place because there was only one candidate—a Rhodesian Front candidate. Your Lordships will forgive me if this is rather a long extract, but it is an important one:
"Their sudden decision not to contest the seat is believed to be connected with a widespread campaign by the Rhodesia Front to explain in detail to all branches the full meaning of the settlement proposals.
"The essence of this explaining process has been that the terms are far more favourable to White Rhodesians than a first, second or third reading would suggest.
"For instance, the justiciable Declaration of Rights, which has been claimed by the British side as a major concession wrung from Mr. Smith, has a provision which, Party members are being told, will not affect any discriminatory legislation at present in force in Rhodesia.
"This is Provision Nine"—
and your Lordships will find this in the White Paper—
"which states that Rhodesian Courts shall not declare any Act or Statutory Instrument to be inconsistent with the declaration if the provision has been in force for a period of at least ten years '.
"The paragraph makes it clear that this applied to Acts or Statutory Instruments 'repealed or amended and substituted' during that period. As most of the discriminatory powers and legislation in force in Rhodesia are based on laws which have been on the statute books for much longer than ten years, there will be little change in the status quo.
"This form of explanation to the rank-and-file of the ruling party has drawn the sting from the Right-wing attack."

401
Mr. Munnion then went on with the extract which the noble Baroness quoted. Perhaps my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, who I think is to speak later, will say whether that is the interpretation which British representatives put on that provision. But my mind is quite clear: this campaign of putting across the agreement to the Rhodesia Front rank and file throughout the country is going to be in a form which is almost unrecognisable by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and unrecognisable in terms of the agreement which they believe they signed.
If the Five Principles were irrelevant to Mr. Smith a year ago, why are they binding on him and his followers to-day? The reason Mr. Smith was unwilling to sign an agreement at the time of the "Tiger" and "Fearless" negotiations, was simply that he was more frightened of the pressures of European opinion in Rhodesia than he was of sanctions. Now he is more worried by the effects of sanctions than he is by the powerful Right Wing of his Party. With the pressure of sanctions removed from him, what would prevent his driving a wagon and ox team through the whole settlement agreement and feeling that he was justified in doing so, because he would be able to claim that it was extracted from him under duress, under the pressure of the sanctions campaign? The answer to that, whatever the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, may say, is that there is nothing—and here, if I speak sharply, I do so intentionally—to prevent him from doing that, except a renegade Chief Justice, a discredited Bench of judges, and a small band of unrepresentative, though no doubt courageous, African Members of Parliament.
My Lords, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has enjoined us to be realistic. I think that is being realistic. But we must be even more realistic than that. It may well be that the best thing a British Government can do—a Government which have no longer the will, the power or the interest in Africa to produce a solution to the Rhodesian problem along British lines—is to get out and leave black and white in Africa to solve their own problems. That, my Lords, is what Sir Roy Welensky thinks, and he is probably right. But, of course, they will not
402
solve their problems in the rather gentle and friendly way which my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford was indicating or, indeed, in the way of which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, spoke; and they will certainly not do it without intervention from other quarters. When I suggested during our last debate that Chinese influence was a factor to be reckoned with in Africa, my noble friend Lord Jellicoe accused me jocularly of taking the argument to the Great Wall of China. That seemed to me, if I may say so—and I am sorry my noble friend is not here—to exemplify the light attitude to African affairs which Her Majesty's Government adopt.
On this particular occasion we are asked to endorse an act of faith in a group of people in Rhodesia in whom no one, if my noble friend Lord Bethel! is right, or very few, have any faith. We are asked to support by our vote to-morrow a settlement which may or may not be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia; which may—and will, in my view—have a profround effect for the worse upon British people and British interests throughout the rest of Africa. So far as I can make out, we are asked to commit ourselves to something which is not complete in so far as the financial provisions have not yet been formulated, and when we know nothing of the outcome of Lord Pearce's Commission or even its composition, or how it will carry out its work.
My Lords, I should like to make one small, constructive suggestion. An election campaign in Rhodesia conducted by Mr. Smith and his Government and Party while Lord Pearce is in Rhodesia would, I think, give that Commission a better insight into the mental attitudes and political mood of both Europeans and Africans than anything else; and perhaps one should not forget that that was one of the considerations which was foremost in our minds during the earlier negotiations on this subject. It is very significant, as I have said, that Mr. Munnion should report to-day the claim of the Rhodesia Front propaganda that this agreement represents a capitulation by Britain, and that it has enabled Mr. Smith to avoid an embarrassing by-election campaign in which he and his Ministers might have been forced by probing questions to go on record with their real interpretation of what the agreement

403
means. No wonder, my Lords, that there has been this insistence on secrecy during the whole of these negotiations! But I think it is time we realised that there is a very grave danger that we in this country are going to allow ourselves to be fooled. We here in this House—in both Houses, indeed—are being hustled this week to reach a binding and solemn decision on this matter. It seems to me as if the corpse of British policy in Central Africa, which has died in the most suspicious circumstances, is being hurried to the crematorium while we, the coroner's jury, are being required to bring in a verdict of death by natural causes and are being given no chance to inquire into the facts which might point to some other, more sinister cause.
My Lords, I do not intend to vote tomorrow in what I am told is a vote of confidence in this aspect of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I do not flatter myself that this will have the slightest influence on my noble friends on this side of the House, or indeed on anyone anywhere else. It may well be that the time has arrived for Britain to get out of Southern Africa with such shreds of dignity and reputation as she can muster. It may be that in these days all the idealism, the hopes and the effort which have been bestowed by the people of this country on that splendid, dangerous and exciting part of the world should be reduced to ashes and poured into the little, insignificant urn which this agreement represents, and buried safely away in the valuts of history. That may be true. But I personally do not accept that it is right and inevitable that that solution should now be accepted by the Government or by this country. On the evidence which has been given to us, it is possible that I may change my mind during the subsequent course of this controversy; but at the moment if I had any influence with any of your Lordships I would say that to-morrow we should abstain from casting a vote.
9.15 p.m.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I am aware that there are a considerable number of reasons why I should not intervene in to-day's debate. First of all, I must declare my interest in Rhodesia in that my family has property there and indeed it is only
404
right for me to say that should the proposals set forth in the White Paper be agreed to and Rhodesia achieve independence no doubt my family interests would benefit. But I hope what I have to say this evening will not be taken by your Lordships' House as speaking to my family's profit.
The second reason why I ought not speak to-night is that I very rarely, to the good fortune of this House, take part in its debates and it seems a little hard on those who attend regularly that, on an occasion when there are a great number of speakers, I should take the opportunity to weary your Lordships with my remarks. Finally, there is the very good reason that it is now seven years since I had any first-hand information about the very thorny problems concerning Rhodesia. However, for your misfortune I have decided to put away those excellent reasons and offer a few thoughts about the thorny nettle that the future of Rhodesia poses.
As for my noble friend Lord Alport, this is something of a nostalgic occasion for me, because the first time I spoke from the Front Bench was on the great debate here on the Monckton Commission Report. I remember being asked what would happen if the Government policy of maintaining the Federation failed, and having in some discomfort to dodge it as best I could by saying that we did not believe it would fail, and that the situation, if it did fail, would be too difficult and hideous to contemplate. Well, it did fail, and we are now debating one of the results of the failure of that Federation, the future of Rhodesia.
I, like other Members of your Lordships' House, have read and re-read the White Paper. I cannot pretend that I fully understand it yet, but I hope I have made a reasonable understanding of its salient points. To my mind there is a certain lack of realism in the whole manoeuvre. I disagree with my noble friend Lord Alport over one matter. I think it is a great mistake to doubt Mr. Smith's integrity at this stage of negotiations, but unless we have an external safeguard our position is really that of the House of Commons. I am aware that all Parties on both sides of the House, many of whom have had to bear the heat and burden of the responsibility for

405
our part in Rhodesian affairs, have ruled out the use of force. At the time of U.D.I. I took the view, I confess to my shame, in private, that the surgeon's knife, the quick intervention of force, was the right course. I was somewhat inhibited in saying it in public as I was then sitting on the Opposition Front Bench. I did not say it in public, but I wish that I had.
While I am in favour of the terms of the agreement, I now feel that in order to give strength and support to the terms offered we should negotiate with one of our Commonwealth partners who are neighbours of Rhodesia, an agreement to the effect that if at any time in the future, before African majority in Parliament in Rhodesia, a Rhodesian Government should renege on the terms of such an agreement, we should be entitled to station troops in that country neighbouring on Rhodesia, and face the fact that it might be necessary for us to intervene. I shall go no further than to say that we should have an agreement permitting us to do this; and it would be for the British Government to decide whether there was sufficiently clear evidence of a Rhodesian Government of the future going back on its word, and if in due course it does so then the agreement will come into effect. Does the noble Lord wish to intervene?
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I am merely questioning which are these neighbouring countries?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords I can think of Malawi and Zambia. I am aware that this is highly controversial and that I am skating on thin ice; but unless we back our proposals with some concrete external safeguards then the temptation for some future Government in Rhodesia to go back on their word could be very great. Here is the problem. Let us suppose that you own a house and also the plot of land next to it, and on that neighbouring plot there is a large leafy tree which gives you shade and comfort although it is not actually in the grounds of your house. You decide to sell this neighbouring plot to a friend and, so that you both may enjoy the benefit of its shade and comfort, you have a clear understanding with
406
him that he will not cut down the tree. This is fine, so long as your friend is your neighbour. But he has the freehold; it is his property. If for various reasons, perhaps change of employment, he decides to go and live elsewhere and, as he is entitled to do, he sells the freehold property and the person who buys it decides to cut down the tree, there is nothing that you can do to stop him. So you lose the shade and the comfort. So it is in Rhodesia without external safeguards; so it may be with some future Government there.
I am anxious not to doubt the integrity of Mr. Smith since the recent round of talks. As a result of these talks the slate in Rhodesia has been wiped clean. I disagree with my noble friend Lord Alport on this; for I believe it unwise to cast doubts on Mr. Smith's integrity. This is a new beginning. Let us be confident that he will do what he says in the way of providing opportunities for unimpeded African advancement. But we do not know that Mr. Smith will last until majority rule has been reached. A politician infinitely more distinguished than I once said that a week was a long time in politics. My Lords, we are not dealing with a week in politics but with a conservative estimate of more than a decade. A lot can happen in ten years, let alone in the 20 or 30 years which may elapse before Africans achieve majority in the House of Assembly. Without some kind of external safeguard, I am nervous that the whole edifice that we are building, of which these proposals are the foundation, may collapse.
In an ideal world there would be an international police force which could guarantee against any reneging over this agreement; but this is not an ideal world. We have no such thing and are not likely to have it. Without some outside safeguard we are not going to get the support of the world. Perhaps that does not greatly matter. One must do what one thinks is right in public and in private, and not be influenced by others. But also, as was pointed out by the noble Baroness, we should lose the support of our Commonwealth friends. I have to speak with great care here because on the last occasion when I mentioned the interests of the Commonwealth in your Lordships' Chamber I was promptly

407
sacked as President of the Royal Commonwealth Society. They cannot sack me again; but I am anxious that my many friends there should not take further action against me for what I say. Without some external safeguards we shall lose increasingly the confidence of our Commonwealth partners. I do not agree with the noble Baroness opposite that my noble friends on this side have lost their warmth of feeling and strong, belief in the Commonwealth as a world force. I am aware that I am arguing from a weak position and about something which people far more clever and able than I regard as impossible. But if that is impossible, then we must be in the forefront in making it absolutely clear that, should the Rhodesian Government, dominated by Europeans, go back on the terms of this agreement mandatory sanctions will once again be imposed and even more effectively than they have been up till now.
Like the rest of your Lordships, I have heard tales of our markets going to a few who refuse to accept the United Nations ruling. Should there be any going back by the European dominated Rhodesia on the terms of this agreement, we must make it our business to be the front runner in making things as difficult as possible for the then Rhodesian Government. If it is true, as noble Lords have said, that sanctions are beginning to bite seriously, there is that additional reason why we might have some chance of making clear to the Rhodesians that we mean business, and that we expect them to honour their word as we intend to honour ours.
My Lords, I have two other points to make which are, to my mind, of much less importance. The first is the position of the Chiefs in Rhodesia. All too often we hear them dismissed, particularly by noble Lords on the Opposition side of the House, as Government stooges. I have no first-hand evidence. I have talked to Chiefs but only on social occasions; I have never had the privilege of working with them. But I was encouraged by the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, went out of his way to pay a tribute to the integrity of the African members of the House of Assembly in Rhodesia. The noble Lord went out of his way to say that they were not stooges; that they have the interests of their fellow members very
408
much at heart, and that they were not bullied and pushed around by the European majority. I think that is equally true of the Chiefs, whom we should not regard as stooges. At any rate, my Lords, the slate is wiped clean regarding Rhodesia. Let us deal with these Chiefs in good faith. They have an enormous influence. Other noble Lords have said, with great truth, how difficult it is going to be to explain to the average African the very complicated proposals which are set out in the White Paper. The Commission has a hideously difficult task ahead of it and, like most of your Lordships, I wish it every possible success. I cannot pretend that I envy the members of the Commission their job of having to get the average African to understand and grasp what is at stake, but I think that that can best be done by working through their tribal Chiefs.
It is all very well to talk about the Westminster style of democracy which may work tolerably well in this country. But events in Africa and elsewhere show that our form of democracy is not ideal for every part of the world, or in countries which have existed and been governed by tribal systems since time immemorial. I am sure it is a good principle for us to use that system as much as we can, particularly in getting over these complicated proposals in the White Paper to the African rank and file. The people to do that are the tribal Chiefs.
My Lords, I am aware that so far I have been on thin ice, but in regard to my final point I feel that I am on very thick ice. I am unashamedly critical of my noble friends in the Government for the paucity of the aid they are giving to Rhodesia in the next ten years. It amounts to £50 million, £5 million a year for 10 years. What the application of sanctions has cost this country in the last six years is always shrouded in mystery. There have been various estimates, some as high as £100 million a year. I think that the lowest possible estimate, and possibly the most accurate one, is some £30 million. Sanctions have cost this country a vast sum of money, some £180 million, and if they are to cease, and we are saving ourselves a minimum of £30 million, surely we can afford to give more than £5 million a year to people who are our friends and who wish to advance. I was

409
distressed by what my noble friend Lord Alport said, that he thought a large part of that aid would go to Europeans. Perhaps I have not read the White Paper sufficiently closely.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, perhaps I may explain that I did not say it would go directly to the Europeans, but that it would save the Rhodesian Government having to spend money on the tribal areas on development and African education and thereby give them more money from their own resources for development and maintenance of standards.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I fully accept my noble friend's explanation. As I read the White Paper, the purpose of this £5 million a year is directly to advance the prospects of jobs and the education of Africans within the territory of Rhodesia. The more money we give them, the faster will the "A" roll go up and the sooner African majority will be achieved. I would ask my noble friends to consider whether they will not step up that figure, because by doing so the day we look forward to in Rhodesia will be advanced. Every pound more we give, the better prospect of education and material advancement for the African.
By and large over the years my forebears have stuck politically to their family motto, which apart from being a deplorable pun has not much merit. It reads in Latin, Cavendo tutus, which, freely translated, means "Safety first". I find that by and large that has been our political principle. But there is one glittering exception to this, which was created by my grandfather, when he made what is known throughout British Africa as the Devonshire Declaration—that the interests of the natives should be paramount. What he said in 1923 is what is or should be equally true for all right thinking politicians and citizens who think about these matters in this country to-day, and I am sure that it is the belief of my friends in the Government.
I can certainly vote with the Government to-morrow, possibly with some little misgiving and certainly wishing that material aid to the Africans in Rhodesia was to be greatly increased. But provided successive Rhodesian Governments, until African majority is achieved, stand by what is written in the White Paper, and provided we maintain our will to see
410
that these proposals are carried out, then I think it is fair to say that the interests of the natives really are paramount and, therefore, one is justified in voting for the Proposals to be adopted.
9.33 p.m.
LORD GORE-BOOTH: My Lords, may I begin by welcoming the two very competent and thoughtful maiden speeches we have heard to-day and express the hope that we shall hear a great deal more from the speakers. May also say what a pleasure it is to follow the noble Duke, whose servant I was for a period when in India. I have much sympathy with the basic thought which animated his speech, to which I will come back later.
I am a little surprised at the tone or certitude which has crept into the speeches in this debate, because if there is one thing I felt from the beginning of the Rhodesian question it is the grinding incertitude about what is the right thing to do. There has been a lot of talk about morality versus expediency. I do not think about it in that way at all. I like to think of your Lordships' House as composed of people guided by considerations of morality, who are faced continually in this matter not with the good versus the expedient but with two alternatives which are a terrible mixture of the good and the bad; and we have to choose, at intervals, the one or the other. I think this is partly what makes our dilemma over what to do at the moment so agonising.
May I make one further general comment? I hope we shall not get into the habit of using words like "ignoble" and "inglorious". Looked at historically, an empire comes to an end either because it is crushed in military defeat or because, as in our case, we show the good sense and the compassion to yield to the inevitable, but are inevitably left with smallish yet desperately complicated and obstinate problems. We are left not with grand finales but with problems such as Anguilla, Aden and Rhodesia. While we cannot be nostalgic about these things, at least we can refrain from being masochistic.
Perhaps it would be a good thing at this moment to ask ourselves what in fact we are trying to do, and what we have failed to do. What we are trying to do is to assist in the development of a

411
country run by a small white minority into a multi-racial society, which means (and I use the expression not in a racialist sense) domination by the African majority community. If one states it like that, one sees what a desperately difficult task this is, and perhaps our failure to solve it is not surprising. It is possible, I suppose, to argue in the context of this evening that this may not have been the right time to try to do it—I do not know. I say that only because I think, and I suggest to your Lordships, that we have to discuss this matter not in the light of what we might have liked to happen, but in the light of what has happened; that is to say, the British Government of the day have committed themselves to a particular course, and that course exists.
Perhaps I may first allude, quite shortly, to the positive elements in what is proposed. If your Lordships look at Command 4065 of 1969, paragraph 9, you will see the report of a speech by Mr. Ian Smith which speaks of "The death knell of majority rule." One may think what one likes of Mr. Smith, but he has now been present at the Resurrection. This is a political fact, and it must, however much he can dominate his own opinion, have some importance, or at least an importance that we must take seriously. It may all go wrong, but it still has a certain importance.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, with whom I have much sympathy, said that what we really need is a radical change of heart. Of course we do. But we are not going to get it, at one stroke, after one negotiation; and we may not get it at all. But I think, if I may quote back at the right reverend Prelate, that all we can say at the moment is, "One step enough for me." It is not enough, but it is one step.
This being so, I think also that I should not totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alport. who knows a great deal more about Rhodesia than I am afraid I ever shall, that there is a total unity of spirit, doctrine and procedure between Rhodesia and South Africa—in saying this I think I may have over-stated what the noble Lord said. But surely the geography of the situation is that since the breakdown of our previous efforts by the last Government, South Africa and Rhodesia have been moving on a con
412
vergent course, which would ultimately have led to a total convergence of some kind, both doctrinal and political. At least, what this operation has done is to jerk these two countries apart from their convergent course: because if there is one thing which explains the South African madness, it is that it is impossible to concede a millimetre of ground or the whole position collapses. Rhodesia is in a quite different state. Whatever Mr. Smith may mean, it is in that respect different; and that difference has now been initialled by Mr. Smith in person. That, surely, is a gain of some kind. I think the position was perhaps overstated by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, but none the less it is basically right. If the proposition is put the other way round, all right; if we do not do this, what happens is more of the same as before—sanctions hurting Rhodesia, but not fatally; deadlock between white and black and, ultimately, bloodshed. Possibly it is desirable to try an alternative which has no great appeal; but at least it is an alternative.
There is one point on which I should like to assure your Lordships, from my own experience of history and newly independent countries. If at the beginning of an independence movement you calculate statistically how long independence is going, to take, you will find ultimately that events accelerate beyond all expectation. India is an example. In the Congo the Belgians were saying in July of the year of independence that it would take twenty years for independence, but two months later the Congo was independent. This is what happens. If there is any real motion in what is proposed, it will undoubtedly accelerate. Granted the "if" is a very big one.
So, because there is this positive element in what has been done I should not find it possible to vote for the Amendment. However, there arc two points on which I have a worry and a great hestitation. The worry is the problem of the Commission. I should like to start by saying that anyone who has had any dealings with the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, can only be deeply impressed by his quiet fairness and wisdom in anything that he does. I am sure he will apply all that to this very difficult task. It was. I believe, the right reverend Prelate who emphasised what an immense

413
requirement is being put on this body of people: getting round a large country; discovering what people think and finding out whether they realise the significance of what they are thinking about. I have one suggestion to make on this. There have been some rather ill-chosen allusions—not so much in this House, but elsewhere—to the year 1938. However, there is one allusion which is apt. In that year a commission or committee went to Czechoslovakia to look at the situation there. It did nearly everything wrong. I suggest that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should be asked to brief the noble Lord, Lord Pearce, on what that committee did, because it would be a good illustration of a number of things to avoid. Subject to those cautions, one wishes the Commission well. With those good wishes goes the wish that all the time the Commission may realise that it is not being set up to prove in some way or other that these terms are acceptable, but is set up to find out whether they are acceptable; and that is quite different.
My real concern—this is where once again I join with the noble Duke—is about the impression from Government speeches that if this whole process goes wrong, if the Rhodesian Government goes back on anything that is in the White Paper, we shall sit back and say, "Well, too bad". This may not be what the Government mean, but that is the impression I have derived. I know that there cannot be external guarantees, in the sense that the reinsertion of the Privy Council, for instance, would be both unreal and unacceptable; nor are we likely ever to think again in terms of applying national force. If we are to be credible at all, and if we are to have a genuine regard for the Second Principle, there must he something in the Government's policy which says that if the Rhodesians go back on this White Paper something will happen. This is not an attempt to reoccupy a position of national authority (which we cannot do), but it is the least that we can do as responsible members of the international community. I have not sufficient knowledge of international law to be able to say whether what has been initialled by the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Smith is an international agreement, but it is sufficiently near one to be such that there should be some kind
414
of strength, some kind of authority, behind it in the present state of international society.
I should therefore like to conclude these remarks by saying that, unless the Government can produce some assurance that in the event of the Rhodesian Government's going back in this they will take some action in the international community to make things unpleasant again for Rhodesia, I shall not find it possible to vote for the Motion, either. There arc things that can be done. There can be a declaration that Article 2(7) of the United Nations' Charter does not apply, and a number of things are within the Government's power. So, my Lords, I ask very seriously, in full realisation that my vote is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively in the least important, that some assurance of this kind be given, because I am sure that that will make a great difference to the many people who are as uncertain as I am about the merits of this case.
9.46 p.m.
LORD ARDWICK: My Lords, the Government and their temporary ally, the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, have been so shrewdly modest in their claims to-day that I was almost disarmed. The claim of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, seemed to be that Sir Alec has made the best of a bad job and that something is better than nothing. Indeed, I was almost carried away by his overwhelming eloquence. I thought it was the most remarkable, the most powerful and persuasive speech I have heard in this Chamber in the past two years during which I have been a Member of your Lordships' House. But I think we have heard one more powerful speech to-night, and that was from the noble Lord, Lord Alport. He has emboldened me to go on with what I intended to say.
It is true that Sir Alec was negotiating without power, but surely not without very considerable influence. There was a passage—I hope I am not misinterpreting him—in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in which he seemed to say that he had nothing to sell. But Sir Alec did have some very important gifts to bestow upon Mr. Smith. The first was the end of sanctions: the second was the certificate of respectability, the willingness to bring back Rhodesia into formal relations with

415
Britain; and the third, arising out of that, was the prospect that capital and skilled labour would once more flow freely into Rhodesia and make their hopes of development, which have been frustrated over the past six years, at least possible of attainment. So Sir Alec did not go, as has been sugeested, into the debating chamber naked, or clad only in the armour of righteousness and the bracelets of sincerity.
Furthermore, lie had time on his side, too, because for Mr. Smith this was now, or perhaps never. The proposed agreement had to be reached at this moment in the lifetime of Mr. Heath's Government because it is going to take many months to complete, and it is doubtful, to say the least, whether the next Government would complete an agreement if they came to power when an agreement was still not in its final form. So I want to ask: Was this really, as Lord Goodman maintained, the best agreement that could have been obtained? Did Sir Alec push his advantages as far as he might have done?
A great deal of the Government's case depends on the assurances given by Mr. Smith, especially on subjects such as land tenure. I do not think it is so much a question of whether we can trust Mr. Smith. He is a creature of his Party, and behind the Party is Rhodesian white opinion—opinion determined to maintain a style of life they could not perhaps achieve elsewhere, and a style of life dependent upon cheap black labour, on social privilege and on the absence of competition for non-menial jobs. A very important question has been asked: what was the alternative? It reminds me that Signor Orlando, the Italian signatory, I believe, at Versailles, was asked by his nephew on his deathbed, "What is the most important political lesson in your life?" He replied: It is always to ask, in any critical situation, what is the alternative?" But when you are in a negotiating situation, you have to ask not only, "What is the alternative for me?" but, "What is the alternative for him?"—and what was the alternative for Mr. Smith? I think the alternative for us, faced with the kind of agreement which Mr Smith would accept, was to say: "This is not good enough. We will go away; you must think again, and you had better be
416
quick about it if you want an agreement because this Government is not going to last for ever".
Of course this agreement can be reached only if the Africans accept it. One would like to know more; perhaps to-morrow the Government can tell us more about the techniques that the Commission will use. Its task is unbelievably difficult if it is going to take more than a crude sample of the African opinion, and the names of the ten members of the Commission will be read with great interest. It is not enough to appoint men of high intellectual calibre and of undoubted integrity. There is also the question of temperament, of ability to enter sympathetically into the minds and the feelings of the black Rhodesians. So surely not all the members of this Commission should be men of conservative (with a small "c") psychology.
The section of the White Paper that I find particularly depressing is on educational and economic development. Sir Alec has always been most enlightened on this subject. I have heard him say time after time that he believes that a massive educational programme is one of the first needs of the black Rhodesians, and surely he is right. So we are to provide £50 million towards this goal. It sounds generous until we look at it a little more closely, as the noble Lord, Lord Reay, and my noble friend Lady White have done. To quote the White Paper, it is a sum of "up to" £5 million a year, and it is not exclusively for education. It is for—
"…capital aid and technical assistance to be applied to proposals and projects to be agreed with the Rhodesian Government…"
This will be matched, of course, by sums provided by the Rhodesian Government for African education, for housing, for development projects in the Tribal Trust Lands and the African purchase areas. So there will be new irrigation schemes, intensive cultivation projects, industrial projects and improvements in communications. All this is out of £10 million a year. There will be many competitors for their share of the £10 million, all of them good competitors, but it will be spread rather thinly.
My noble friend asked how much of this is to go to education. The White Paper does not tell us, but it does tell us

417
what the spread of the educational money is going to be. It is a wise spread. It will be used to improve and expand facilities for Africans in agricultural training, in technical and vocational training and teacher training, and primary, secondary and higher education. But is our gift not too small? This is, after all, something concrete, something real, that we can do for the black people of Rhodesia. We cannot give them a vote to-morrow, or for many a long year, but perhaps through education we can give them the keys to the vote: education coupled with economic development. The provision which the Government propose is not mean, but even if it was twice as much it would not be too big. I can well understand that Rhodesia, either for the reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has mentioned or because of the fact that it cannot have a very large tax base, is willing to give no more than £5 million a year. But must our generosity be restricted by their financial limitations?
Here I would applaud the maiden speech of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. He suggested that the Rhodesian Africans might be given whatever educational privileges are enjoyed by Commonwealth citizens, and I warmly support that. Since it was not they who opted to leave the Commonwealth, this would be an act of justice as well as generosity. I should like, too, to see the gift-making philanthropic foundations, with which for a brief period I was associated, change their rules so that they can make gifts to non-Commonwealth students coming from Rhodesia as well as to Commonwealth students. One of the Commonwealth bodies with which I am associated had the good sense to change their rules before Rhodesia finally went out of the Commonwealth, because they saw that the people of Rhodesia in whom they were interested were going to have more need of the body once they left the Commonwealth, than before. So they altered their rules to provide that members of the Commonwealth were those who were members at a particular date, which preceded the secession of Rhodesia.
Education, my Lords, is the most useful gift we can make to the black people of Rhodesia. They are in a social and economic prison, and we should not begrudge them the price of the golden key by which they can escape.
9.57 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I re-entered the House during my noble friend Lord Alport's speech, and I sympathised deeply with him when he, as it seemed to me, expressed his sadness at the demise or the falling away of the British Empire and its power and influence in Africa. But that has not started to-day, or even in the time of this Government or of the last one. I was one of the few in the other place who spoke and voted against the recommendations of the Monckton Commission, when Lord Alport was himself, I think, a member of the Government—or possibly he was High Commissioner. I thought it was a pity. So there is no new problem to grieve about to-day. Nor can we now recover what I looked upon in my youth as our glory. I am going to ask, even at this very late hour and at this late period in this series of transactions and negotiations, whether sanctions cannot now be abandoned or, if it is not possible to abandon them at once, whether every step will be taken to hasten their abandonment. I shall come a little later to explain, very briefly, why.
But first I should like to praise Sir Alec, praise Mr. Smith, praise Lord Goodman and the civil servants whom Lord Goodman mentioned. It seems to me that all of them have done very well by their respective countries. Those who did me the honour, or suffered the penalty, of hearing me speak for a few minutes before my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary went to Rhodesia only a fortnight ago, will remember that I said that I did not attach as much importance as a great many other people did to the Five Principles. Nevertheless, it is a good thing, in my opinion, that the Rhodesians have given lip service perhaps, given recognition to those Principles and I earnestly hope some of them will be carried out. I am therefore glad of the opportunity which will arise to-morrow of voting for this package deal, and I earnestly hope that it will be carried through with the utmost celerity.
I would remind your Lordships that no Parliament can bind its successor. Even if you divide the Members of Parliament into blacks and whites, and give each of them a minimum number of votes below which this or that must not happen,

419
the Parliament as a whole rules the country; the majority in the Parliament at any time rules the policy, and no Parliament can bind its successor. It may well be that when the older ones among us, of whom I am one, have gone to yet another place, whichever way it may be, and when, with respect, even Sir Alec Douglas-Home has gone to another place, and possibly Mr. Smith as well, then will be the time when a great decision will be called for from the Parliament in Rhodesia. The time will come when the numbers of Members of Parliament, black and white, are equal; and then will operate some scheme which is difficult to fully understand—though it seemed to be very well understood by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and more or less by his predecesor the previous Lord Chancellor—and a very difficult decision will have to be taken.
What will that Parliament then do when we have all gone? It is the assumption of Members in this House, Members in the other place, newspapermen, and a great many people throughout the land, that they will then vote for majority rule. But I wonder why they should. All the evidence which I have seen in the last ten years makes me think that majority rule is not what the peoples in Africa, white or black, want. They do not have it in South Africa; they do not have it in Rhodesia; they do not have it in any other so-called black country in Southern Africa or Central Africa. Indeed, there is not one country, from the Cape to Cairo—except possibly to a limited extent in Swaziland—where there is majority rule.
Why is that? Most of them have been given it by Britain which, in a liberal tradition, offered independence to one nation after another, or to one tribe after another, throughout Africa; and with that independence went status, possibly membership of UNO (in many cases that was so), votes for all and a Parliament in which there was a Government side and an Opposition side fully recognised. My Lords, it has taken us in this country 600 years to understand, and to work as well as we do, our Parliamentary system. It is not surprising that people cannot work it in five or six years, or even ten years. They have not been used to having an Opposition. The only thing to do
420
with an Opposition is to crack it over the head with a knob-kierie. If you have been brought up with that idea since you were little, it is very hard to change your mind. In fact every one of these countries, except to a limited extent Swaziland, has rejected the bonus we gave them, the great gift we gave them, of majority rule; and has replaced it with an arbitrary oligarchic Government, or, more likely, a dictatorship or a near-dictatorship or a single-Party State. Who knows, when the Parliament in Rhodesia reaches equality between white and black, that they will not choose an oligarchicai form of government, or a dictatorship or semi-dictatorship, or a single-Party State? Who are we to say that majority rule is best for them? It may be best for us with our tradition, but why should it be best for other people with an entirely different history and an entirely different tradition?
I do not doubt that delay in acquiring majority rule for the blacks will be a grievous disappointment to educated political men—those who are in Parliament now, those who are lawyers, doctors, surgeons, priests and teachers. It must be a great disappointment to them, if they are over thirty, forty or perhaps fifty, but not too old to be hoping that they might be not merely Members of Parliament or professional men, but Ministers or even Prime Ministers, to know that it probably will not come in their lifetime. It is a great disappointment to them, because they might have thought that Britain still had power and influence and was going to bring about this great metamorphosis. I am sorry for them and I grieve for them, in South Africa as well as in Rhodesia, because many of them are such very able and charming men, and many of them are friends of mine.
But it will be Possible, when Lord Pearce goes with his men, to ask these black men whether this settlement is acceptable, because they are identifiable; many of them are in Parliament and they can be asked what is their opinion. It will be possible to ask the whites, because they are in Parties and can be identified. But I wonder how it is going to be possible to ask the 5 million blacks? When the experts are considering the results of an opinion poll, they will have so many "Ayes", so many "Noes" and so many "Don't knows"—10 or 15 per

421
cent. It is my guess that there will be 4,950,000 "Don't knows" in Rhodesia. And why not? It is incredible to expect that the man in the back veldt, the man working on the farm, the untutored, uneducated man on the land, could understand this complicated issue, which I doubt whether 1 per cent. of your Lordships understand. So the only possible way that I can see—and I know these countries well—is to go around to village meetings or indabas, as they arc called, and consult the Chiefs and a few Headmen.
We hear from one or two, particularly on the other side of the House and in another place, that one must not consult the Chiefs because they are only the paid servants of the Government. But what are our own Members of Parliament? I was one for thirty years or more. Were we not paid by the State? Were we deemed therefore to be men without sense or judgment? Look, my Lords, at the vote that we have just had on the entrance of Britain into the Common Market. Was that taken by men whose view was falsified by their Parliamentary pay? It might have been falsified by had judgment—different on one side of the House from the other, no doubt—but it certainly was not falsified by pay. I think that was a most unworthy statement about these Chiefs. I know many Chiefs, not particularly in Rhodesia but in Lesotho. They are persons known to me, and I have had business dealings, friendly dealings and family dealings with them. They are not men of straw; they are men respected by their people.
If any view is to be taken as to the feelings of the 5 million black people, it must be through the Chiefs and the Headmen; there can be no other way. Even then, I do not suppose for a moment that Lord Pearce will be able to report that this complicated matter is acceptable. The most that he will be able to report is that he did not find any very considerable interest or any very considerable opposition, and possibly, in some cases, not only that they did not know but that they did not care. Nevertheless, one thing I am certain about is that by carrying this settlement through now as quickly as possible, and especially by getting rid of sanctions at the earliest possible moment, we shall do the whole of
422
Rhodesia, and more particularly the black men, a powerful lot of good. We shall not only be taking them a stage further on the road towards status and political influence, and one day political power, but we shall be enriching them enormously, and very soon.
Majority rule will probably be as dead as a dodo by the time it comes to be considered by the Rhodesian Parliament. That brings me to the point of emphasising the futility of outside power or outside guarantees. My noble friend the Duke of Devonshire talked about outside guarantees based upon Malawi or Zambia. I have hardly ever heard of anything so extraordinary. The only thing I would regard as more extraordinary to-day would be to vest the power in the United Nations, because they are just as ineffective. What else can we do if the Rhodesians drag their feet, if they do not implement their side of the arrangements as quickly as some of us would wish? Do we invade Rhodesia—something we did not have the will or the power to do during the last six years? Do we refer the matter to New York? Both courses would be futile. And to call in aid Zambia is most incredible. We could not mount a sufficient force in Zambia, and I do not suppose for a moment that the Zambians would wish it. The truth is that Sir Alec did not have any power, though he had some influence. I have no doubt that, of the three sources of power and influence which were mentioned by the noble Lord who last spoke from the Opposition Benches, the only valid one really was the desire of Mr. Smith and his people for recognition by the world generally, and a desire to come back into the community of nations. I do not think that sanctions were really very important. But what can we do if Rhodesia drags its feet'? Do we reintroduce sanctions? It is incredible to think of that.
I am influenced by the words "Politics is the art of the possible". I do not know who first said those words, but a middle-of-the-road statesman of our own generation, a man whom I greatly admired, and admire, Lord Butler of Saffron Walden, I think guided most of his life as a Minister by the art of the possible. Not only that, but when he wrote a biography last year he called his book, The Art of the Possible. There

423
are some politicians who are as archaic as middle-aged priests, or even pre-history priests. They believe that anything writ upon their tablets must be the Word of God, or sanctified in some way or another. Hence, the Five Principles must be sanctified, and any departure from them, even the legalistic departure observed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, in his able speech, must be a sufficient reason for voting against them. I do not take that view. I take the much more cheerful view that by voting for these proposals we shall be giving Rhodesia a way out of her diffi
424
culties and bringing her back into friendly relationship with us. And I would repeat something which I have said before—and perhaps it is none the worse for that: that the only possible way to make friends and influence people is to trade with them, to meet with them, to travel with them, to fish with them, to play bridge with them, to be friends. The sanction does not do what you want to do; and it failed this time. So, my Lords, I end, as I began, by asking Her Majesty's Government to get rid of sanctions now, or at any rate as quickly as possible, and thereby enrich the whole of the Rhodesian people.
10.16 p.m.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, it is my impression that there are millions of people in this country who are now bored and confused with the Rhodesian question. These people welcome the White Paper with open arms and are ready and happy, as I am, to congratulate Sir Alec and Mr. Smith and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, on hammering out some sort of agreement. My Lords, I personally was thrilled by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. He said what, quite frankly, I hardly dared to hope he would say. But I feel compelled to express the personal view, which I have reason to believe is widely shared, that the great bulk of the people in this country fervently desire that the breach with Rhodesia, which should never have occurred, will now be closed.
So strongly do these people feel this way that they have become impatient at the apparently endless and to them unreasonable and injudicious—and I quote a taxi driver—"Nark, nark, nark, "at every effort which has been made over the past few years to unravel this tangled skein. I cannot refrain from congratulating the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, on his monumental nark to which we listened with great attention today, but I have a feeling that it was de-narked by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and I have a mischievous feeling that if only I had been Bruce Bairnsfather I could have drawn the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, as "Old Bill", saying to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, "If you knows of a better 'ole, go to it !".
I feel that it is odd that so many people seem to be prepared—and today we have heard speech after speech on these lines, particularly from the other side of the House—to brush aside this opportunity for peace as something that we could get on without. Why should they scorn the claims of our late comrades in arms, many of whom are our own countrymen? In saying this, I am reminded of what was said by my noble friend Lord Hastings. We must remember those Rhodesians, not necessarily the followers of Mr. Smith, who perhaps at the moment are silently hoping and praying that Parliament will here and now approve the White Paper and, I think it is fair to add, accept the recommendation
426
of the noble Lord who has just sat down, that sanctions should be withdrawn now.
I think it a pity that so many people should scorn the claims of, shall we say? the silent white people in Rhodesia while at the same time failing to realise that the real interests of the backward people are not necessarily best served by putting power into the hands of a few political leaders, particularly when so many of the backward people are uneducated. I will not develop this point for it has been made so well by my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale. I think, too, that it is a pity that so much has been said to derogate from the trustworthiness of Mr. Smith and the Government of Rhodesia. Not only the right reverend Prelate but my noble friend Lord Alport and others have said things which I feel can do nothing but harm. Can it do any good to say that it is no good making an agreement with these people?
I sometimes think that some of the Churches are not without blame in this respect, and that too many Churchmen are often prepared to impute base motives to men of affairs. Too often, I think, they are unconsciously rattling sabres for others to draw and wield. I admit that we should be at a loss without the stars in the eyes of the noble Lord, Lord Soper; but, alas! much grief and disaster lie at the door of the starry-eyed? My noble friend Lord Alport complained of what I think he called the disproportionate amount of time which has been spent in Parliament on this subject over the years. This brings me back to the point I mentioned. I think he is right. It is a pity it has been so; for it has brought about this feeling among a vast number of people (in fact, among everybody who I have consulted outside my own family circle) of becoming sick and tired of this subject.
In regard to law and order, people are inclined to take the view that law and order in the lower echelons in such countries as Rhodesa mean much more than just law and order; that they mean, too, social security and a roof over the poor man's head. Claims have been made that sanctions have been successful. But what is meant by that? I thought that I detected almost a note of relish when the noble Baroness said in her speech that sanctions were biting; and similarly in

427
the case of my noble friend Lord Alport. But, as the noble Baroness said, the Africans may be accepting sanctions as one of the things they are prepared to suffer in the cause of freedom. My experience of the Rhodesians is that they would suffer in the same sort of gallant way. The shoe does pinch, but they would say, "This is what is happening and it is not going to shift me." One so-called success has been the restriction on the development of primary education in Rhodesia for six years. Another has been the production of great hardship among British subjects who have interests in Rhodesia. Of course, a proportion of our unemployment stems from the elimination of trade with Rhodesia. At this serious stage in our economic difficulties, I think that what was said by my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale would contribute to revitalising our own economy. I believe that nothing would be lost by showing our good will, accepting this White Paper and cancelling sanctions.
My noble friend Lord Hastings touched on the question of unemployment in Rhodesia. It must be remembered that this restriction on trade is pinching the Africans more seriously, possibly, than the white people. But his point was worth bearing in mind. As the years go on and the number of Africans in Rhodesia increases, there must be a development in trade and there must be improved conditions of capital supply in the rural areas.
My Lords, I have one other point to make, in conclusion. It sterns from what I said about what I believed to be the unwisdom of knocking, criticising and distrusting, and making it more difficult for the people in Rhodesia to accept the new arrangements. Destructive measures are being devised here in order to stir the brew anew. My heart goes out to the noble Lords on the Liberal Benches who find themselves associated with plans being voiced in another place to put a brake on the Common Market measures simply to torment those who are trying to solve the Rhodesian problem. I regard this as nothing more than a refinement of the obnoxious new style "demo" which has become a most undesirable feature of the political scene since the chairman of the Young Liberals was allowed to get
428
away with this anti-Springbok disturbances in 1969–70. I should like to ask the Government what is the position under the existing law regarding the promotion of demonstrations which we know. the promoters know and the police know perfectly well will lead to disorder and to violence; which, when it occurs, will interfere with the final smoothness of any settlement with Rhodesia.
My Lords, we have the Public Meeting Act 1908, the Public Order Act 1936 and the Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968. Are these Acts, and indeed the Common Law, adequate to give the Home Secretary power to choke off this kind of madness at its source? If so, I hope that such powers will be used early. With those remarks, I would conclude by saying that what is good enough for my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and for the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is good enough for me, and I shall vote against the Amendment to-morrow.
10.30 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, it has often been said that diplomacy is the art of the possible. After many years in diplomacy I think that we have to use utter realism in assessing what is possible in the present state of affairs. I sympathise deeply with the noble Lord, Lord Alport, who has rendered such great service to the countries of Central Africa. It must be extremely disappointing to him to see what has happened. But I do not believe it is any good now looking back to those past events. In my view, it was a real tragedy that the Central African Federation broke down. But there is one clear fact, and that is that Rhodesia (or Southern Rhodesia, as it was called) has governed itself in all internal matters for many years. For years we received instructions in the Diplomatic Service to tell everybody about the self-government in Rhodesia and about the inter-racial university, et cetera. I lectured in many parts of Scandinavia about it. There are great names—very distinguished names—littered about the past: Whitehead, Garfield Todd and Welensky. But I think it is time to recognise the bald fact that we cannot now, and have not for many years been able to, impose our will in this part of Africa. One noble Lord said that under this agreement we are now getting out of Africa. We got

429
out of Africa years ago. I think that it is a dangerous delusion to ignore this fact.
Then I come to sanctions. This matter is rather near to my heart, because I was closely associated with the sanctions against Italy in 1935, when I was private secretary to Mr. Anthony Eden (as he then was), now my noble friend Lord Avon. It was a heartbreaking disappointment that sanctions were not effective. But in the end we just had to be realists and face the fact. I believe that to-day we have to face the fact that sanctions have not been a great success in Rhodesia. They have probably been a nuisance; they have probably helped to create a situation in which Mr. Smith has been prepared to make this agreement with us. But I think that they will certainly not yield better results. I am reasonably sure that they have damaged our trade more than the trade of other nations, because everybody who goes to Rhodesia comes back saying they find Japanese landrovers and Mercedes cars, and equipment of all sorts from other countries being sold. There is no doubt that the United States want Rhodesian chrome and that they intend to have it. It is only fair to recognise that in the longer or shorter run—and I do not think it is the longer—sanctions are doomed.
I do not think that sanctions have in fact benefited the Africans very much. They have certainly caused a good deal of unemployment, and I imagine that the Africans have suffered more than the rest of the population. I do not think that sanctions are likely to help the Africans more than they have already done, unless we accept this agreement. So I venture to think that, on all these grounds, it is only plain realism to recognise the fact that there must be a political settlement—and now is the time for it.
My next point is that I firmly believe that the White Paper represents the best settlement we are likely to get. I was very impressed by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I do not think that anybody here is entitled to argue with his conclusion.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Why not?
LORD HANKEY: Well, my Lords, I do not think I am convinced by that. The noble Lord has been on the spot, and
430
almost nobody else in your Lordships' House has. I do not think that we are going to get any better settlement than this. I frankly realise that it is a matter of opinion—I am giving mine, that is all. I believe that the agreement reflects great credit on the Secretary of State and on the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. Obviously it can be shot at in detail, as it has been shot at to-day; but I believe that on balance it represents a pretty fair compromise. I am personally convinced that it preserves enough of the Five Principles for it to be wise for us to approve it. One of the facts of the situation which I think we have to recognise is that the Rhodesian Africans are not yet so educated as to be able to assume responsibility for a complicated industrial economy, or to make an efficient, modern and honest administration. From that it follows that it is no good making a settlement, even if sanctions were more effective, which would bite on majority rule much more quickly. It would be much more likely to end in economic and administrative collapse and would not do anybody, either African or European. very much good. Therefore I think that the Settlement Proposals set up a system of probably steady progress at the sort of tempo which will allow further education to take effect.
I thought at the time—and I still think—that it was a great mistake to remove the British representatives from Salisbury when we did. In the end a dispute like this has to be settled politically, and you must have on the spot people who can keep you in touch with the situation and tell you what is happening, develop any opportunities that offer, and generally keep you informed. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, told us of the difficulty that he had in getting hold of the 1969 Constitution and other papers. I sympathise with him. But if our representatives had been in Salisbury there would not have been any trouble. Everybody in London would have known what these documents were, and they would perhaps have been distributed to Parliament. We did not need to have an ambassador there, but at least some sort of representative could have been kept there. I hope that we shall as soon as possible send British representatives back—perhaps a chargéďaffaires or something of that sort—to watch the situation.

431
I am sorry to say this, but I think there has been a rather academic quality about some of the speeches that we have heard to-day. I think that theoretical "one man, one vote" democracy is not everything. Law and order and the rule of justice arc extremely important. We have ignored this to our peril in Northern Ireland. I think that freedom of expression, in word and writing, is important. Education and freedom of opportunity are of primary importance, and I am glad that education is looked after in this agreement.
Economic and industrial progress, if it is to be extended to the people of the country, depends upon their being able to enjoy sufficient education to man the factories and administer the administration; and it is also essential if the educational system is to be paid for. When we ruin the industrial system of Rhodesia, we also make it much harder for the people to be educated. I am glad that this is being recognised in the proposals which are now before us. Frankly, an efficient and honest Administration is absolutely essential for any worthwhile modern State, and that is only possible when a large number of the people are educated.
Having studied the situation in many parts of Africa, I believe that it will require a number of years before any large proportion of the population can be made literate to the degree that they will be able to run a modern administration in a good way. In this connection, I do not think we ought to disregard the experience of other African countries. Frankly, many of them have not distinguished themselves in ensuring to their populations these advantages which I have mentioned. I am not just shooting at the ex-British territories; I am thinking of the ex-French and ex-Belgian territories, and right across Africa. As a matter of fact, I believe that the British have done better than the others; but I do not think the situation in Africa as a whole, if one looks at it objectively, is calculated to encourage people in the position of those who at present rule Rhodesia to take big risks. I personally think, with all objectivity, that looked at on this background, the Government of Rhodesia is not too bad at all. Of course
432
it is a Police State, but when you try to mobilise the whole of the civilised world against them through UNO and when you are conducting a political war against them, what else can one expect? Of course they have to have police measures. If we had had proper police measures, we would not be in the mess we are in in Northern Ireland.
The Chinese are infiltrating quite steadily into Tanzania, and are training guerrillas.
BARONESS LLEWELYN-DAVIES OF HASTOE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? This is not the first time that this phrase about the Chinese infiltrating has been used about Tanzania and about Zambia. The Chinese have been invited there for a specific task: building a railway which the British Government would not put up the money to build. There is no question of infiltration. The Chinese are there doing a job. Maybe we would rather that we were there, in which case it is a pity that we did not offer the money and expertise in order to be there.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness about that. She will hardly suggest that there are no guerrillas being trained in Tanzania. Who is training them? I believe it is the Chinese. The fact that there are guerrillas must be of some concern to people in neighbouring parts of Africa.
If the settlement proposals are accepted, the administration will, with any luck, become better, and this will be to the advantage of the Africans. if these proposals are rejected, the alternatives are that, in the long run, there will be either chaos, which I earnestly hope no noble Lord expects the British Army to go in and sort out, or an inevitable drift to apartheid in the South African orbit. In either case, the Africans are going to suffer. I therefore agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that it would be unwise and the height of folly to reject these proposals. There is no alternative means of pressure on the Government of Rhodesia so far as I can see and no noble Lord in this debate, so far as I have heard, has produced any good, alternative way forward. Therefore, I shall vote in favour of these proposals, and recommend other noble Lords to do likewise.
10.44 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the speech which has just been delivered by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. I hope he will forgive me if I do not begin to reply immediately to the points that he has raised. I respect his record, and during the course of my speech I shall be dealing with many points that he has brought before your Lordships.
This has been a remarkable debate. It is now 51 years since I first sat in the Press Gallery of another place and listened to debates in one House or the other. I am speaking truthfully when I say that I have never heard a series of more memorable speeches than have been delivered to-day. There was the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe. It was the most convincing speech that has yet been made for the proposals for a settlement. There was then the cool, devastating analysis by my noble and learned friend, Lord Gardiner. We pass to the impressive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who has been so closely involved in these negotiations. I want to say a word to him later. We had the memorable speech from my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe. Then we had the almost terrific, overwhelming speech from the noble Lord, Lord Alport—a speech which I regret was delivered to a thin House, before even the leaders of the Government were present—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE): My Lords, I do not know what the noble Lord means. I shall be replying to the debate, and I heard every word of it.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will forgive me if I did not think him on this occasion a leader for Her Majesty's Government.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, let the noble Lord disabuse himself. I am replying on behalf of the Government in this debate. I am therefore, for this purpose, "the" leader.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am impressed. But if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will forgive me, I was thinking of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, who opened this discussion; and
434
I regret that the Front Bench of the Government, whoever sat on the Woolsack, were not present when that devastating speech was delivered.
I want to say one word, in his absence, to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman—and I hope that he will read it. I have a great respect for him. We have been associated in minority causes in this House. He made an extraordinary statement about the President of Zambia. He alleged in his speech that Mr. Kenneth Kaunda was guilty of the same (I put it moderately) harshness as Mr. Ian Smith. When my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies interrupted him, he was at least prepared to say that he would consider that remark. My Lords, I hope he will. Those of us who know Kenneth Kaunda know that there is no more tolerant or kinder person who has any authority in any African State. Does my noble friend Lord Goodman really mean that Kenneth Kaunda has been responsible for detaining political opponents for seven years, without charge or trial? Of course not. At this moment he has certain political opponents in detention. That fact I regret. But to begin to suggest that there is any comparison whatsoever between Kenneth Kaunda, who is one of the hopes of a libertarian and tolerant Africa, and Mr. Ian Smith, with his record in Rhodesia, is something which I know my noble friend Lord Goodman will be prepared to withdraw when he has given it due consideration.
My Lords, I had prepared a detailed case against these proposals, but I do not propose to deliver that speech at this late hour. I want only to concentrate on two points in the Five Principles. The first is the unimpeded progress to majority rule. The word "unimpeded" is very indefinite. There could be drops of water into a bottomless pit which were unimpeded, but it would take a long time for that pit to fill. Therefore the factor of time is enormously important. I think it will be recognised that the realisation of majority rule depends on the new African higher roll. That higher roll is to be on
"the same income, property and educational qualifications as the European roll".
Parity in the legislature is to be reached when
"the number of voters on the African higher and the European rolls will be approximately equal."

435
As I shall show, that will take a very long time, and it is only afterwards that a tedious and complicated procedure will provide is possibly in the far distance that Africans might be given, at the most, a majority in the Legislature of 10 in an assembly of 110. That is in a community where the Africans are over 5 million, and the Europeans less than a quarter of a million.
This will be a very long process, because the Europeans have appropriated the major incomes, property and education to themselves. I ask your Lordships to look at the facts. The qualifications for the new African higher and European rolls are:

(a) an income of 1,800 dollars per annum during two years before enrolment, or ownership of property valued at 3,600 dollars;

(b)if four years' secondary education of a prescribed standard is fulfilled, the income can be reduced to 1,200 dollars per annum or property of 2,400 dollars.

I am in some difficulty here, because I assume that those are Rhodesian dollars, and it is quite impossible in the present financial situation to equate those dollars with British pounds. But these conditions will undoubtedly cover all the Europeans in Rhodesia; their avarage income is £1,200 a year. They will, however, cover a mere fragment of the African population. The average wage of employed Africans in Rhodesia is £120 a year, and that figure covers only 350,000 Africans of their 5 million. A quarter of a million Europeans get nearly 30 times as much in income as 5 million Africans. My Lords, obviously it must be a very long time before equality in income and property is realised.
I pass to the educational test, four years in a secondary school at a prescribed standard. Every European child goes to a secondary school; it is compulsory. Only 2 per cent. of African children go to a secondary school. It is argued that the Government grant of £5 million a year for ten years will speed up African education. Unlike the Constitution of 1961, this amount is not to be devoted entirely to education; it is for technical and economic advance as well. But not only that—and I put this very seriously for the consideration of the Minister—the child population growth of the Africans will be greater than the provision for secondary education given under the British grant.
436
There is a second reason why this advance even towards parity will not effectively occur. The increase of African representation in the legislature will take place not when entitled Africans reach an absolute number, but when they reach certain percentages of the Europeans. Mr. Ian Smith has already made his appeal for a large European immigration of Southern Rhodesia; undoubtedly there will be a response. For many years the proportion of European immigrants is likely to be greater than the proportion of Africans reaching the higher roll.
I do not propose to compete in estimates about the time before parity is reached—30 years,40 years,60 years,—but all these factors make it unlikely that even parity will be attained before the end of this century. And only after parity is the advance to majority rule to be considered. I am not going to detail all that process; it would be very tedious and very complicated, but I think it can definitely be said that majority rule in Southern Rhodesia will not be reached until well into the next century.
So much for majority rule. The other of the Five Principles that I want to consider is the advance towards ending racial discrimination. I say quite definitely that in these proposals there is no guarantee whatsoever to end racial discrimination. Two concessions have been made. The first is that the evictions under the Land Tenure Act will be suspended until the report of the Commission appointed by the Rhodesian administration has been considered. I was glad to hear the speech which was delivered from the Benches upon which the Bishops sit. Some concession is to be made to the Catholic Church and the Anglican Church for two of their lands. But these are not the only lands of the Churches that are involved. Much more than that, the concession which has been made to the Churches does not apply to thousands of other Africans who are being evicted from their farmlands.
It is unnecessary for me to repeat what my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe said about Chief Rangwena. I regard him as symbolising in his person the tragedy of Africans now turned out of their homelands for long ages by this Land Tenure Act: their huts burned down, their cattle confiscated, living in caves and grass shelters for twelve months

437
in the mountains. In his own words, "We live like hyenas in holes in the mountains". I recall those magnificent words of his: "I was offered money to become a recognised chief. I turned it down because I did not want money. I wanted my people to have their land". These proposals before the House give no guarantee whatsoever that those who are evicted in this way will be allowed to return to the homelands which they have occupied for centuries.
The second concession is that the Rhodesian administration will appoint a Commission which should be acceptable to the British Government. This Commission is to consider the Land Tenure Act and other forms of discrimination, and its recommendations will be accepted by the Rhodesian legislature. But this is rendered nugatory by the all-embracing qualification,
"subject only to considerations that any Government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character."
That reservation could cover a multitude of sins and would deny equal rights entirely. There is also to be included a Declaration of Rights. I think the Minister will recognise that I have been concerned about this issue over very many years. I have read this Declaration three times (it is 16 pages in length, almost as long as the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations) and I do not pretend, as a layman, to understand the many reservations and qualifications that it makes. I welcome the fact that an African has the right to appeal to the courts, but I wonder how the ordinary African is going to be able to meet the costs of such an appeal.
My Lords, on Monday I read in The Times a letter written by Mr. Anthony Lester, a solicitor who over the years has made a study of human rights enactments—not merely the Declaration of the United Nations, but the conventions which have been adopted by the European Community and others and the schedules to the Constitutions of newly independent countries. As a layman, I am not prepared to endorse all that he says about this Declaration, but it is very disturbing. In some respects it endorses what the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has said in this debate. For example, Mr. Lester wrote:
438
"The Declaration will not affect any existing law—except for the benefits of earlier constitutional guarantees."
I do not want to delay the House, but I think this matter is so important that it is worth quoting what Mr. Lester wrote:
"It"—
the Declaration—
"enables the Government "—
that is, the Government of Rhodesia—
"to make exceptions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed, on a racially discriminatory basis; to prohibit racially mixed marriages; or indeed to impose any racial disability which is ' reasonably justifiable …'"—
he leaves out certain irrelevant words—
"in order to secure the protection in an equitable manner as between the various descriptions of persons affected of their respective interests'.
"It allows a Minister to authorise preventive detention for up to six weeks without judicial review. It permits police searches, seizures, and arrests without a warrant. It exempts inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment if it is authorised by an existing law. It fails to provide for legal aid for persons accused of serious crimes punishable by death or long imprisonment. In the guise of protection ', it contemplates sweeping encroachments on freedom of expression, conscience, assembly and association (including participation in trade unions)".
My Lords, I acknowledge at once that I am not able to judge the validity of all those charges; but I have read the reply of Sir Lionel Heald in to-day's Times, and I am not impressed. He does not reply to any of the detailed points that Mr. Lester made. He says that the Declaration of Principles is similar to the 1961 Constitution. That Constitution was much better than the 1969 one, but it was ten years ago. No one suggests that it is adequate to-day. He says that it is similar to Independence Constitutions in Fiji, Guiyana and other ex-colonial territories. My Lords, I have not had time to refer to them, but I was concerned in all of them, and I have the impression that the Declarations included in these ex-colonial Constitutions were much shorter and without the reservations which are now included for Rhodesia.
There is the proposal that there shall be a Commission of three to look at existing laws; but, as I have said, the Commission's recommendations could be rendered nugatory by the reservation which I have always quoted. The only provision is against new discriminatory

439
legislation, and an independent Government could ignore that.
My Lords, I make two final points. I have a terrible fear for the future. As I have listened to this debate I have felt the unreality of the whole atmosphere of this House. During the next twenty years these proposals will be utterly irrelevant. You have, on the one hand, Mr. Ian Smith and his Government and the Rhodesian Front. Mr. Ian Smith only a few months ago dismissed all the Five Principles; he said that majority rule would never be reached in his lifetime. You have the Rhodesian Front, his party, which only a few weeks ago declared for a racial discrimination in every sphere of life hardly separable from apartheid in South Africa. Does anyone in this House believe that in the last few weeks Mr. Ian Smith, his Government and the Rhodesian Front have been converted from that view to believe in racial equality and racial tolerance? My Lords, what has been happening in Rhodesia since this settlement has indicated the opposite. Mr. Smith is still speaking of the continuance of civilised control within his lifetime. By "civilised control", he means either white control or the higher African roll to which I have referred. Six weeks ago the Rhodesian Front adopted resolutions for more serious segregation and discrimination than ever. Is there anyone who is so naïve as to believe that they have fundamentally changed to a different point of view? They accepted the settlement proposals almost with their tongues in their cheeks because of the difficulties of their present economic situation and of the effect of sanctions on their foreign exchange. That is one fact that we have overlooked in all our discussions in this debate. The other fact is the climate that exists among Africans with their two major Parties banned, their leaders in detention. Even if this British-appointed Commission, consisting only of Europeans to whom Africans will be reluctant to express their opinions, finds in favour of acceptance, is there any Member of this House—and this is my reply to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and to the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, who preceded me—who will believe for a moment that for 20 years,
440
30 years or 60 years the African population is going to accept the tedious processes in these proposals?
We are asked for an alternative. I will state it. The alternative is for this Government, as it should have been for past Labour Governments, to insist on majority rule in Rhodesia before Independence is granted. That was the only possible condition under which stability could have been reached. It is argued that majority rule should not be accepted because it has not operated in neighbouring countries. In Zambia, in Tanzania, in Kenya, and even in Malawi, though I disagree with its policies, there has been a stability, a tolerance and a welcome to racial equality which there has not been in Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations demands independence for majority rule. The Commonwealth demands independence for Commonwealth rule. If we reject it then we are threatening the whole of Southern Africa with a racial conflict which we cannot contemplate. My Lords, the alternative to the Government's proposals is to stand firm for sanctions (in two years much more effective than now on the exchange position) and to stand firm for the principle that Rhodesia should not have independence before it has majority rule.
11.26 p.m.
THE EARL OF LINDSEY AND ABINGDON: My Lords, it is always difficult for a novice like myself to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, with his vast knowledge of African affairs and their leaders. I have listened with great sympathy to his speech but I must confess that I could not agree with some of his points. There is one that I should like to bring to the attention of the Government, and I am sure the noble Lord will agree with me about it. It is the question of education. I believe that this is the crux of the whole problem. I know that this has been mentioned by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Onslow in an excellent maiden speech; but will the Government consider introducing, in conjunction with the Rhodesian authorities, some form of higher education for Africans, rather on the lines of the Rhodes Scholarship, which would bring them over here where they could obtain a scholarship; and this, on their return to Rhodesia, would

441
accelerate the question of parity? I dispute with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, the timing of parity. I think that with advancement in education it would be reached before the turn of the century—at least, I hope so.
It is now almost exactly six years since I had the honour of speaking in your Lordships' House for the first time. We were then debating Rhodesia after Mr. Smith's unilateral declaration of independence. At that time I suggested that if and when the time arrived for an agreement on the dispute it would be Mr. Smith with whom Her Majesty's Government would have to negotiate. Well, my Lords, I believe that the time has now arrived, and we should call an end to this dispute once and for all. Though I have never agreed with the action of the Rhodesian Government in declaring U.D.I., I have always maintained that sanctions were not necessary. All they have done is to harden the resolve of the European population and put them into a determined frame of mind to see them through. The effect of passing sanctions over to the United Nations has been their imposition against the United Kingdom, to the advantage of our main trading competitors. I say this because about three years ago I was a member of an unofficial delegation, comprising members of both Houses of Parliament, which visited South Africa, mainly to study the effects of apartheid. I was also interested to see how sanctions were being violated by that country.
My Lords, through our meetings with politicians and businessmen it became abundantly clear that sanctions were being ignored not only by South Africa and Portugal, but also by our main European, American and Far Eastern competitors. It was interesting to note that this obnoxious system of apartheid classified a Japanese as a European and a Chinaman as a coloured. The only conclusion one could come to on this was that international trade was at work in Johannesburg, where I spent five days. To a large extent it consisted of newly formed foreign companies, set up solely to break sanctions and thus invade one of the United Kingdom's traditional trading areas.
Finally, turning to the Five Principles, which have been comprehensively discussed to-night, I would say that there is
442
one of them that I have always thought might be a fatal stumbling block—namely, unimpeded progress towards majority rule. This has been adequately covered by my noble friend the Leader of the House and by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. If what they say is true, then I am quite prepared to accept their judgment. I honestly believe that matchsticks, as opposed to the slide-rule, are the answer on this point. I cannot see how we can judge on a mathematical calculation human errors and predicaments. With these reservations, my Lords, I shall support the Government to-morrow.
11.31 p.m.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I have listened to about 25 speeches. It would be cruel to keep the House too long, but as one who was on the "Fearless" and went through all the negotiations with Mr. Ian Smith—I have with me the final Heads of the Agreement we made on that famous Friday night before we left the ship—and having talked day in and out to these gentlemen who were representing Rhodesia, Messrs. Ross, W. H. Nicholle, Howman, Clark, I.D. Smith, Lardner-Burke, E.A.T. Smith, L.G. Smith, Claypole, Oliver and Stall-wood, all I can say is that Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister, had gone further than the British Labour Movement and many people throughout the Commonwealth and certainly the United Nations would have liked him to go, because we had abandoned NIBMAR. But we had made what we thought was progress. The amazing thing was that we would agree something at 9 or 11 o'clock and then go to the wardroom and have a noggin—then next morning apparently we had no agreement whatever. There was nothing more slippery than trying to get agreement with this group of people.
I had a great deal of faith in the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. But I object to this arrogant intellectuality which floods this Chamber in its moments of radiance. I remember the great psychological moment when Mr. Smith made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965. These were his actual words:
"We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity and in the spirit of this belief we have to-day assumed our soveregin independence."

443
There is only one other man in the world who shook me more rigidly than that; that was Mr. Enoch Powell, when he said:
"When I see a rich man, I give thanks to God."
And listen to the sanctimonious, irreverent irrelevancy of this:
"Often when I am kneeling down in church"—
I can see the tears running down his cheeks—
"I think to myself how much we should thank God and the Holy Ghost for the gift of capitalism."
How daft can you get! I listened to-day to a man whom I respect, but his speech was Machiœvellian.
I have here the Heads of Agreement that we made with Mr. Smith, and it is marked "H.M.S. Fearless. October 13." I believe that there is nothing in this present document that we had not more or less got then, except that this document has gone further than my right honourable friend Mr. Harold Wilson was prepared to go. The fact is as my noble friend Lord Brockway has said. We are told that in the 1969 Declaration the proposals were repeated. First, they provide that all human rights will be subject to the need of public order and public security, as determined by the Government of the day. Secondly, they will be subject to the operation of all existing laws. For example, the Law and Order Maintenance Act 1960 still remains in effect, despite this White Paper. Sir Robert Tredgold, Rhodesia's most eminent jurist, resigned his office as a result of this law, saying that it had turned Rhodesia into a police State. I challenge the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, to tell this House whether that is changed in this agreement. It is not. Thirdly, the Declaration does net in fact provide for equality before the law as between the races. African Tribal Courts will continue in operation. The law under which they were created says that the courts will not he considered to be dependent or partial simply on the grounds that the judges have an interest in the case they are trying.
The major change as between the 1969 Declaration and the regime's proposal is this: that the Declaration is made justiciable in the courts. But this only means that they have to apply the law as it
444
stands. Let me say categorically, without any possibility of getting mixed up in semantics or law, that nothing in this White Paper and our agreement or in the Declaration of Rights would have protected the multiracial Cold Comfort Farm Society, partly because the Land Tenure Act is to remain in force, which makes it impossible for multiracial organisations to operate. I am cutting my speech by 90 per cent., otherwise I could develop that point further. We are therefore left in this honourable House with accepting a half-baked proposal that is worse than the Declaration of Human Rights.
Then there was this. Jocular, and, like Horatius at the bridge, the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, enjoyed himself. But he did not answer the case. He said: "Alt! we will have an extension in the lower roll". In the name of the heavens above! you could have another 1 million people on the lower roll and you would still get only eight members. Why did not the noble Lord make that clear to noble Lords in this House, who are experienced in all kinds of things? I have enjoyed this debate. It has been excellent, despite the speeches with which I may disagree. But whichever way I approach it, I think that 99 ·9 per cent. of the speeches are a sincere attempt to try to solve one of the most difficult problems facing us. But the noble Lord was too flippant. He should not have dealt so flippantly with the House as he did. I should have loved to have had the opportunity of taking him up when he was here.
Here is the question that we ask—and it is the 64,000 dollar question: is the Rhodesian situation better now than it would be without this White Paper and this agreement? Secondly, this House and the other place are in the illogical position of being asked to approve of it before the people back there have had a chance of considering it; and 99 per cent. of them will not understand it. That is correct. We arc rushing headlong into this agreement before we know their reactions. When Mr. Ian Smith had his referendum the vote was nearly fifty-fifty: 42,000 for, and 22,000 against. They were mostly Europeans. Do not get weak-hearted; some people are growing a little weak in the knees, saying that Smith and the hard and most ruthless of the white people have everything

445
in their hands. But they have not. The only reason an agreement has been reached is because sanctions were beginning to bite.
I am surprised at a person who talks about law (it was rather oxymoronic as a matter of fact) saying that this business is just a moral gesture. What is the matter with the world? They do not talk like that when they singing at the Cenotaph, or making pontifical speeches in dimly lit cathedrals, because it suits the mood. Put it suits the mood of a flippant House today to say, "Oh! this is only a moral gesture". On the beaches of Dunkirk—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords will forgive me, the noble Lord, Lord Goodman (I am speaking in his absence), never used the phrase, "moral gesture". He said that it was a form of moral self-indulgence.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: That is a typical example of oozing intellectuality and lack of wisdom on the part of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, if I may interrupt my noble friend, I wrote down the words as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, was saying them. He said that it was a moral gesture of pure, personal self-indulgence.
A NOBLE LORD: Withdraw!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I do not feel that I have to withdraw. I apologise for saying that the noble Lord never used the word, "gesture", but my recollection of his sense was exact.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Mine happened to be more exact. We listened to a brilliant piece of window-dressing, plausible but on the wrong hypothesis. It was a crack-pot approach; it is crackpot realism. People like myself are told that we are not realistic. Some of us saw the Chinese revolution; some of us have seen Vietnam. I do not want to sound pompous, for others, much more capable than myself, saw it too; they were not just Socialists, they were Conservatives, people who had a moral outlook and could see what was happening. They could see the bloodshed in Vietnam. Does anybody think—does my
446
noble friend Lord Brockway think—that this crack-pot kind of White Paper is going to last one generation in modern Africa? Of course not. I was challenged to-day as to what alternatives there are. There are plenty of alternatives. The House seemed to be blinded by the oratorical arpeggios of the lawyer. One of the alternatives—sanctions—was working. If we arc beginning to believe in the rule of international law, now that we have made an ignoble end to the Empire, now that we have opted out and thrown in our lot with the Common Market, there is only one other place to go to—the comity of Nations. In this tiny spaceship that we call the world we should try to build up the United Nations.
I promised to he brief, and I have been brief. What is more I have tried to be pungent and not irrelevant. And I do not want any comments from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor at this moment. My hearing is good, too, thank God! All I want to say is that this was a mistake. I do not think that the right honourable gentleman, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, or the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, are rogues or vagabonds or that they did this at all wickedly. Of course not. They are gentlemen of honour—but I think they have been taken for a ride.
11.46 p.m.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Lindsey and Abingdon, I made my maiden speech on November 15,1965, in the first Rhodesian debate after U.D.I., and I have taken part in most of the discussions on this subject during the intervening six years. I do not wish to go back over the past, but I cannot help reminding your Lordships that in my maiden speech I suggested, in col.298 of the OFFICIAL REPORT, that a non-Party political mission under Sir Alec Douglas-Home should go immediately to Rhodesia to try to settle the problem before it became too late. I still believe that if my suggestion had been accepted then, the situation could have been contained. Since 1965 I have visited Rhodesia four times and on each occasion had talks with Mr. Smith. In 1967 I brought back tentative proposals for a settlement, but was advised by the

447
then Prime Minister that he could not consider a settlement until there was African majority rule. I last met Mr. Smith in May,1970, and it was obvious from our talks that the chance of a settlement based on the Five Principles was even further away. I considered that when my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary left for Rhodesia he had little chance of success. Therefore, last week's news that an agreement under the Five Principles had been signed with Mr. Smith came as a complete surprise. To me it is a triumph for Sir Alec and his team—particularly that most competent of negotiators the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who I thought made such a brilliant speech today.
Those of your Lordships who have not had the opportunity of knowing Rhodesia and Rhodesians personally cannot fully appreciate how strong were the views held by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, and the tremendously difficult task that has been achieved. Even if your Lordships do not agree that the settlement is under the Five Principles, I hope you will be gracious enough to acknowledge Sir Alec's success in obtaining what I consider to be virtually the impossible. I realise that settlement depends on the suggested terms being accepted by the people of Rhodesia as a whole. The terms may not please all white Rhodesians, or a large number of African politicians, but if on balance the majority accepts this settlement I think we should do everything possible to end this unhappy affair and see the necessary legislation through our Parliament with the least possible delay and recrimination. I know that each of your Lordships in his own way wishes to see freedom and peace and prosperity for all races return to this part of Southern Africa, but that can be achieved only by a settlement. I, for my part, most humbly salute my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and wish him further success in the finalisation of these proposals.
11.50 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I listened with special pleasure to the two maiden speeches, in particular because both maiden speakers spoke of Kenya which was my stamping ground in my
448
experience in Africa, and I was charmed by the quotation in Swahili, which indicated that the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, spoke a superior dialect of that language to the dialect I speak. I must start by saying that the facts of life as I see them are that we are not in Rhodesia at all; we were thrown out in 1965. That, I think, is the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Alport. It is not a question of pulling out: we were thrown out six years ago and we are going back, with all the risks attendant upon it—the risks of offending the black Commonwealth. Rhodesia is independent—an independent sovereign, alien State, and it is with that, that we are negotiating. In connection with it we have no doubt responsibilities, but not the slightest possibility of exercising them under the present arrangements. That I see as the facts of life, and the choices before us seem to be three, not two. First, to preserve sanctions with no recognition. We were told in this House when we were asked to agree to sanctions that they were for a brief period, to topple a man of straw, and the brief period was specified as being very brief indeed. But it has gone on and on, and for my part I would never have agreed to vote for sanctions had it been clear to any one of us that the Smith regime were not men of straw. They were there to stay, however much we might dislike them. The preservation of this situation. I agree, is a gift to apartheid. I know that there are differences of opinion and I think that is inescapably so, and we should be happy that we are arresting it.
The second alternative is to recognise without a settlement; and that I think we must do if the settlement does not come. We must recognise the authority—the civil authority—and not to do so is morally wrong, because if you do not recognise the authority you are on the side of the law-breaker, the malefactor and the robber. A man must render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, even if Caesar is rather an objectionable bird. That is inexorable. Therefore if we do not settle in one way we must settle in another. We cannot go on not recognising it; it is very foreign to our habit. The third possibility is one we are discussing tonight, some sort of settlement; and that I think has been agreed in principle nem. con. throughout these long negotiations. We have all agreed that we should try to settle, and associate recognition

449
with the settlement. We are now faced with that settlement.
I thought the two outstanding speeches which I have heard—and I have not the stamina to hear everybody, although I have heard about half—were those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, and of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, I thought, looking at 1961 and seeing the picture worse now than it was then, indicated that in his opinion this settlement does not fall within the Five Principles. I thought he was persuasive. I agree that I do not see it falling within the Five Principles as they were seen in the year 1960, particularly by Africa, and I will indicate presently how they saw them. However, that does not deter me from agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that this is the best available solution and that it is better than I, and I suppose anyone else, would have expected.
I think now that one ought to try to see what was the cause of the U. D. I. To me it is because the Rhodesians suffered from a nightmare, which I label and give a number, 1514. It is the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1960—a recipe for immediate independence without preparation of any kind. Preparation was specifically debarred. Lack of preparation was to be regarded as no obstacle whatever. The Rhodesians have had a vision of African life since then. There are 41 independent States, and in 28 of these there have been illegal coups; in some of them several coups and counter-coups—two or three—all illegal and all promptly recognised by the O.A.U., the United Nations and ourselves. Once we see an effective Government in power it is our prudent habit to recognise it. We can do nothing else except march in and overthrow it. Of the 41 States,26 go in for what used to be called in Europe—I think the great Winston was responsible for the title—"swindle democracy": one man, one vote, and one Party to vote for. I agree it is not the swindle it looks, but it is not a Government enjoying the support and acceptability of the majority of its subjects, and if you could put the test of acceptability throughout black Africa you would find, particularly in the larger States, that more than two-thirds were not content. There are ten military dic
450
tatorships. There have been eight civil wars. Nobody can estimate the carnage and damage to life and limb, but I would suggest that there may be 3 to 10 million people who are not alive to-day who would have been alive but for these grave disturbances.
I do not wish to decry the effort of independent Africa. I personally, knowing something of it and having had to administer at a low level in Africa years ago, was horrified at the speed of the wind of change. I thought it was terrifyingly imprudent. In addition to this spectacle, the Rhodesians have had in Kenya the evidence of white farmers dispossessed, with United Kingdom subsidies, and serious discrimination against their Asian populations. These things cannot but have had the gravest effect, and to my mind they were the things which precipitated the U.D.I. The Rhodesians thought that majority rule was going to be forced upon them within about five years.
Let us turn to the present situation. The nightmare is reversed. Sixty-four years has been mentioned. That is a nightmare for the O. A. U., and it may cause savage reactions if that impression is allowed to last. May I, with all respect, question the wisdom of the two leading negotiators in the matter of keeping time? They have been such diffident timekeepers. I saw and heard Mr. Wilson on television addressing the United Nations General Assembly and saying that the independence time factor neither clock nor calendar can measure; I think I heard him say that. Sir Alec was reported in a speech in the Provinces in this country as saying it is politically impossible to name a date. The result is that first of all we get the idea of five years among white Rhodesians and now 64 years amongst black Africans, both of which are impossible. I repeat, after an interval of five or six years the suggestion that this country should work towards 25 years as being something to aim at and insist upon, with our money and help and know-how.
I earnestly support the recommendation of the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire. I had on my list £150 million instead of £50 million; that is, £15 million a year. I would propose that that is a reasonable figure for us to supply, even if it is not matched pound for pound

451
by the Rhodesians, in order that we may hasten African development. The noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies, referred to £1 per man, one African per annum, as what £50 million for education would mean in Rhodesia if it was all spent on education. I have a second recommendation in connection with that, and it is that this money should be devoted not on egalitarian principles but to produce reasonably quickly, an African elite to match the Europeans at an earlier date than would otherwise be possible. That is the process that is always gone through when people are rising from penury to prosperity. You cannot do it all at once; you have to raise the most promising and be content with that for the time being.
I would suggest that the Rhodesians watch Portugal. Portugal has a tradition in the colonial sphere almost unique among Europeans, in that they have no objection to miscegenation—they never have had. There is no prejudice in Brazil; there are a great many colours and shades, but there is no prejudice on that account. They are unique, and they work to a different principle. They raise the subject peoples to a certain level, and during the interval nobody. I think, neither Portuguese nor anybody else, has a vote of any kind. They are all part of Portugal, and after a time they give them the choice of either remaining in Portugal or breaking off. That will come, I am sure. That is the tradition of Portugal, and the Rhodesians would be wise to note that, because if Mozambique becomes independent they will be a greater threat to anything in the nature of apartheid than anything else, and they can cut Rhodesia off from the sea.
I do not like to say disparaging things about Africa, but I honestly believe we gave the African States a task which was impossible. We could not have done it ourselves in that way. It is a pity that the Colonial era did not foresee independence. In my time nobody dreamt of independence. Years ago when I talked about giving chiefs of people more authority than I was deputed to give, there was not the smallest interest in it at any level, official or otherwise. It is a last-minute affair, and it is the great misfortune that, having prepared so little, we gave independence so quickly. I am
452
reminded of Mahatma Gandhi, who devoted his life to Indian independence. On the very threshold of independence in 1947 he said to a great friend of mine, "It has come too soon after all", and that was true. I am sorry that it has. It has produced great disasters. It is a pity that we delayed so long in our preparations and then went so hurriedly in carrying out independence. I shall support the Government in this settlement. I think that the settlement that they have achieved is achieved against a background of a diminishing nightmare in Rhodesia, because the time is greater. The danger now is that that time may be so vague that it will offend everybody else in Africa. I trust that somebody will give at any rate an unofficial date, and stick to it.
12.2 a.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, it is difficult at what one can just call "an early hour", and after so many and such very good speeches, to add much to this debate. There is always the temptation to repeat the points which one was going to make and which have been made by others—in their opinion better, in one's own opinion not quite so forcefully as one would have done it oneself. I shall try, and I hope I shall succeed, in resisting those temptations.
On the general point there are one or two questions I should like to address to the Government. They are genuine questions, and I hope that I get an answer to them. We have heard from many speakers, particularly those with personal knowledge of Africa, of the overriding importance of land ownership to the Africans. That is abundantly true. We have also heard of the Land Apportionment Act, and the way that Africans feel about that. What I cannot understand is why the Africans are being asked whether they approve of this settlement before they know what is going to happen to their land. Why is it put that way round? Why cannot the first Commission become the second one? Why cannot the Commission which is going to inquire into racial discrimination in all its phases—and above all as it affects land—make its report first, and then (even though it may mean a delay of 18 months or two years, which is not too long to wait in a matter of this importance) put the test of acceptability to the

453
Africans? As it is, you are asking them to pass judgment not only, as we have heard, on a highly complicated matter which it is virtually impossible for many of them (as it is for many people in this country) really to understand, but before they have the glimmering of an answer to the overridingly important question. So I hope there may be some good explanation for that. I cannot figure one out for myself, but I hope that at the end of this debate, when one of the Government spokesmen answers, we shall have some explanation. As an alternative, I suggest that there should be an immediate undertaking to repeal the Land Apportionment Act, and all restrictive and discriminatory Acts of that kind, with the clear understanding that after the Commission has reported there may be need to re-enact certain aspects of them. That would be the logical and correct way to do it, if the intention of abolishing discrimination in all its phases is a really sincere one.
The second question that I am going to put to the Government may sound a frivolous one, but I do not mean it at all frivolously. What is the point of the Pearce Commission? What is it supposed to do? What is written here in the White Paper is that it is to ascertain African opinion. What is the best way of ascertaining opinion? If one is setting out to make a new product, to develop a new style of motor-car or television, one wants to ascertain the opinion of one's future public. One does not employ for such a purpose a distinguished Member of this House, a judge. One does not employ other distinguished statesmen or professors. One employs experts in this matter. One employs Dr. Gallup or Marplan. If the job is only to find out what Africans want, surely the best way to do it is to have a public opinion poll, or a sounding of public opinion by experts who really know how to set about this. Not that they are always right. After all, it is not so very many months ago that public opinion polls were foretelling a Labour victory, and they were not right in that. So even if you get experts on this job you cannot always get the right answer. But I suggest, in all seriousness, that if the real object is to find out what it is that the African wants, the type of Commission which is being suggested today is entirely laugh
454
able, and is loading honourable, kind, decent and public-spirited people with a job which they cannot possibly perform.
TILE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, in all fairness, the noble Lord will have to concede that Mr. Harold Wilson's last proposals—I always mix up which was "Fearless" and which was "Tiger"—certainly included a Commission of this kind for this very purpose. I think it would have been fair to concede that before the criticism was delivered.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I absolutely concede what the noble and learned Lord has said, and I was one of the not inconsiderable number of persons who consistently opposed very many of the suggestions put forward, and the plans entered into, by the late Government. That is my second question.
I now turn to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. It is unfortunate, but entirely understandable after his strenuous weeks, that he is not here at the end of the halfway point of this debate. There are many things that he said, on which noble Lords and the noble Baroness who have already spoken, have taken issue, and I shall not go over them. But it seems to me that the noble Lord approached this problem from the point of view of a negotiator. In fact, he has been described as a negotiator, and as a negotiator he did an admirable job. I am quite certain that nobody could have done a better one. But this is not a job for a negotiator. This is a job for a politician, a statesman—and that is in no way derogatory of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. As I understand it, the job of a negotiator is to come between two opposing factions and bring them as close together as he can, so that eventually there is a possibility of agreement between them. You may have employers and employees, trade unions, on opposing sides: one wants a 15 per cent. rise in wages, the other offers a 5 per cent. rise in wages. After painstaking negotiation, you get them to come together and agree on a 9¾, per cent. rise. Or you may have a large business which wants to acquire land on which to put up a factory. It is prepared to pay £10 million, but the people who are going to sell it want f15 million. After long negotiation, you get them to agree to £l2½ million.

455
That is what a negotiator does; and when he has done that he is of course absolutely right to say, in Lord Good-man's own words, "It is an act of consummate folly to reject a settlement of this sort, because I could not get you a better one." He would also be perfectly right, if I may once again quote the words which have been in dispute, to say that a member of a trade union or a member of the employers who rejected it was doing no more than "indulging in a moral gesture of pure personal self-indulgence". Those terms are absolutely justified in such circumstances. He would further be right—and again I quote the noble Lord's words—to say, "You must ask yourself the question, "Are these conditions substantially better than those which now obtain?" All those are absolutely right questions if you are negotiating as a negotiator, but not if you are negotiating as a politician and, above all, not if you are negotiating as a statesman. You have then to ask yourself entirely different questions. You have to say, not only, "Are these circumstances better than those at the present time?" but, "Are they better than they are likely to be in the future?" You must say to yourself, not only, "Will this avoid bloodshed in Rhodesia during the next few years?" hut, "Will it bring peace to the whole of Southern Africa in the decades ahead?"
You must ask yourself, further—and this is a question which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, never touched upon at all—"What is the position, throughout the whole of Southern Africa and, above all, in Rhodesia, of those liberal-minded, peace-loving people of all races who want a settlement? What is their position, having looked upon us as their friends and their champions in their struggle for peaceful freedom and justice, as they see us now give up this fight and compromise with a Government which, by its actions as well as by its words, is manifestly a racialist one?". Those are the questions which have to be asked when one is deciding whether these negotiations are good and should be accepted, or, whether, although the best that can be obtained, they are still in the long run bad; bad for the Rhodesians—white, because it will lead to eventual strife;
456
black, because it will mean a continuance of their present serf position and an eventual conflagration which will engulf them—and bad for the whole of Southern Africa because you cannot have a struggle of this kind confined to just one country.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord this question? If in fact there had been no negotiations in Rhodesia, how should we have been in a position to consider acceptability to Africans today—the very matter which we are debating in this House? We should have been faced with the continuance of sanctions for ever, it seems to me.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I am not saying that there should have been no negotiations. I do not know whether the noble Lord was here when we originally discussed the visit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; but all of us, including myself, welcomed that visit, and all of us, including myself, welcomed the opening of negotiations. The decision we have to make now is not whether the negotiations should ever have taken place—of course they should have—but whether the terms which have been brought home to us are those which are not only in the short-term interests of the Africans of Rhodesia, even if they were that, but also in the longer-term interests of the whole of Southern Africa and of this country, too. Because, my Lords, let us not forget that although we are no longer the great world Power that we were in the days of Cecil Rhodes, we are still a country of influence, an influence which far exceeds our actual physical or economic or military strength, and that influence is based upon generations of public servants like the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and others who in different ways have gone out into the colonies, into what is now the Commonwealth, and have shown to those people, and through them the rest of the world, that Britain is a country of honour and that we do not always give way to force but that we stick up for what we think is right. What is going to be the effect on those people of this action? That is a question we have to ask ourselves.
I echo what my noble friend Lady White said: we are being faced now (and we say this from time to time) with

457
a challenge in black Africa, a challenge which comes to some extent from Moscow but to a larger extent from Peking. What a gift we are giving them! I have had conversations in the past in Pretoria with Mr. Vorster, and on one occasion I remember saying to him, "The prayers I would offer every night if I were the Commissar responsible for Africa in the Kremlin, or his opposite number in Peking, to whatever gods these people pray to, are for the persistence of apartheid in South Africa and the abandonment by Great Britain of Rhodesia to the Smith régime". Possibly he prays better than we do; possibly his gods are stronger than ours—those two prayers are on the way to being answered.
But, my Lords, it is not fair to base my attack upon the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. He had a job to do and he did it brilliantly. The attack should be, and is, directed towards Her Majesty's Government, because this whole business, from its inception, alas! is redolent of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government of flouting the Commonwealth, of flouting world opinion, of considering Rhodesia solely as a problem' which exists between the colonial Power and the recalcitrant Colony.
On more than one occasion I have asked noble Lords on the Front Bench opposite at the beginning and during the course of these negotiations to be at pains to make sure that the leaders, the heads of Government in neighbouring African countries, were kept informed of what was going on in these negotiations; whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary himself could stop, preferably on his way out but otherwise on his way back, to explain to Presidents Kaunda and Kenyatta and others just what has happened but in the meantime, so that they could be brought into this as a Commonwealth exercise, there should be continual contact. I have seen nothing in any newspapers, heard nothing on any radio, which has told me of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stopping off at any of these places or of his sending any of his junior Ministers. I happened to read from a tape that the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as soon as the Secretary of State came back, went off to Washington and Canada to inform the Canadian Government and the United
458
States Government of this agreement—but not a Minister to so inform the African Governments.
That surely, my Lords, is an indication of the feeling, or lack of feeling, of the present Government of this country for Commonwealth and world opinion. This idea of mine is backed up by the fact that the Commission which is to inquire into these matters of vital importance has no member from the Commonwealth.
I do not mind what is his colour. There are distinguished jurists in the West Indies, in India and in other parts of the Commonwealth as well as in Africa. There are men of high distinction and integrity. Had we had any thought for making this a Commonwealth issue, for trying to bring them in to support what Her Majesty's Government consider to be the right solution? Surely it is only common sense to do that. If one does not want to do that, then let us go back to Marplan and Dr. Gallup and forget any form of Commission.
I now turn to the question raised by Lord Reay, a very important question, about sanctions, mandatory sanctions, and the United Nations. He asked what Her Majesty's Government proposed to do about that matter in the event of this agreement being implemented. It is completely clear what Her Majesty's Government are going to do on that—unless I read this document wrongly, in which case I hope that the noble and learned Lord will tell me so. On page 17 in paragraph 8 under the heading "Implementation", it is written that the British Government
"will…terminate their economic and other sanctions when this legislation takes effect."
They do not even consult Parliament to do that; they make no mention of Parliament—and no mention of the United Nations! They will do it! A member of the Security Council of the United Nations will take this unilateral action in defiance of mandatory resolutions of the United Nations simply by printing the words of this one sentence.
Do Her Majesty's Government realise the full implications of what they are saying here? They must realise it—yet they cannot realise it; for I do not believe Her Majesty's Government and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would

459
in this way flaunt their contempt for the United Nations and their resolutions.
But this whole affair, these whole negotiations, the way in which they have been managed and brought to their present stage, and the way it is proposed that they should go ahead, all bear out this overriding feeling that the rest of the world has nothing to do with it: that we shall do what we like and what we consider to be best in the short-term interests of our once former Colony. Our reputation, our influence and obligations, our good standing in the rest of the world, all count for nothing. I wish only that the grandfather of the noble Duke were here in charge of these affairs at this moment and that he would say once more, as the noble Duke reminded us, that the interests of the native are paramount.
12.23 a.m.
LORD VERNON: My Lords, I am about the thirtieth speaker tonight and I shall therefore concentrate on a few issues which I regard as significant. First, much of the debate this evening has taken place on whether the spirit of the settlement will be respected by Mr. Smith; but that really poses the question with which any Government negotiating with a Rhodesian Government is faced: that is, that the only way to enforce the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement is to have a military presence in that country. The previous Administration were faced with exactly the same problem and they still thought that it was worth negotiating with Mr. Smith. Much has also been said by noble Lords opposite about how ghastly are the conditions in Rhodesia. I yield to no one, my Lords, in my horror at the way of life that prevails in Rhodesia, and even more in South Africa. To me, the crux of the matter appears to be that under the settlement as proposed the lot of the Africans will in the immediate future be significantly improved, both educationally and politically, compared with what it would have been with the status quo maintained.
I think that noble Lords who vote for the Amendment have to be very clear about what is the alternative that they advocate. As I understand it, they advocate the continuation of sanctions and no
460
recognition of the regime. This would mean more harassment for the African at all levels, less land, less education, less political advancement and less justice. It has been argued by African nationalists and also, I think, by noble Lords opposite, that the Africans are only too willing to put up with all this. But, my Lords, why should they put up with it, especially when there is nothing to show that by their sacrifice they would bring majority rule any closer than the time in which they would get it under the settlement? That is where I disagree fundamentally with the noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, whose opinions I very much respect. I have always thought, and I still think, that so long as Rhodesia is supported by South Africa sanctions are bound to fail. I have made that point in a previous debate in your Lordships' House. I think Rhodesia always will be so supported. The ties between them arc not just English ties; there is a very strong Afrikaner link between the two countries and in the last resort I am sure that South Africa will never let the white Rhodesians down. Of course sanctions are a considerable irritant, but I do not think they will ever bring the Rhodesian Government to their knees.
That brings me to my next point. In a sense, I think the whole of this exercise, with the elaborate paraphernalia by which Africans first reach parity and then ultimate majority rule, is academic, because I do not think it will work out like that. The future of Rhodesia is essentially bound up with that of South Africa. To me it is inconceivable, as I think it was to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, that there will not be major political changes in the Republic before the turn of the century. When those changes come they will have their effect on Rhodesia. History, my Lords, does not stand still, and you cannot keep 50 million proud people, African and coloured, in a Republic in a permanent state of subjection. That is why I believe that what happens in Rhodesia during the next ten years is so important. I also believe that under this settlement, whatever its weaknesses—there are weaknesses; I particularly dislike what has been agreed under the Fourth Principle regarding progress towards ending racial discrimination—the African people will

461
have better opportunities during what I regard as an interim period than they would have if sanctions were continued.
When we can dispose of the Rhodesian issue, on which we have spent so much time in the last few years in your Lordships House, I hope that we shall be able to give more attention to what is happening in South Africa. We may have no legal responsibility for the Republic, but in view of our history we have a large moral responsibility, and that is where the root of the cancer lies. Until we have eradicated that, I do not feel that we are getting very far in eradicating it in Rhodesia.
In conclusion, I wish to support what was said earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Gore-Booth. In Rhodesia we are dealing with a people who have stated publicly that they do not believe in the Five Principles or in majority rule. I accept what the noble Earl the Leader of the House said earlier, that Mr. Smith personally could he reasonably expected to fulfil at least the letter of the obligation that he had entered into under the settlement. But what happens if Mr. Smith is replaced by a more Right-Winn,. Government, which repudiates the settlement? There have already been indications that this is possible, perhaps in the middle of next year. This was referred to at the week-end by the former Federal Chief Justice. We are entitled to know what is the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in that event. Unless we can have the assurance of a positive response by the Government to such a repudiation, I, for one, can regard the settlement only as a sham and I shall be unable to vote for the Motion. I hope very much that the noble Marquess or the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, when he speaks to-morrow, will be able to give us that assurance. Subject to that assurance, I wish to support the Motion.
12.33 a.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, as the last speaker this evening and before the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, speaks to the adjournment of the debate until tomorrow, I would respectfully draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that the average length of speeches has been something like 30 minutes for each noble Lord, with one of 50 minutes. Some who
462
have spoken earlier to-day are not now present in your Lordships' House. This hardly seems courteous to those noble Lords who speak late in the debate, though I do not apply that criticism to myself, because I do not consider that I have anything of particular importance to say. Nevertheless, I do not think it is in keeping with the dignity and traditions of your Lordships' House.
I have my eye on the clock and I do not wish at this stage to comment at any length on some of the speeches made this afternoon. I respect the views of noble Lords who may disagree with the views I hold. But to me the issue is now absolutely stark clear. Here I go along the road the Government have now planned. Either we seek the acceptability of African opinion on this conditional agreement and succeed in this or we fail. If we fail, the eventual result in the future is rivers of blood, European and African alike. There is no going back at this junction in our consideration of this problem. To me, it is deadly serious. In all humility, I can talk with some experience of this: Changi Prison, and a few years later the blood-letting of Europeans and natives in Malaya; the breakdown of law and order and terrorism. That, to me, is the issue which faces us this evening.
I thought it particularly depressing to listen to the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. It is no good whatever if we think of Mr. Smith in such terms as a man with whom we can do no deal and cannot trust in any of our deliberations with him. I was sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Alport. His mission in Africa seemed to be one of failure, though I could not really attribute that fact to any particular failure on the part of the noble Lord himself. With regard to the interim period in which we have to consider this conditional Agreement, it is obvious that the Commission will take some time for this opinion to be sought and to find whether it is acceptable to African opinion or otherwise. Ideally, it is most desirable that the Commission, in its task of seeking out the truth, either for these terms or against them, should operate in an atmosphere completely free from hysteria, rancour and emotionalism, simply because issues affecting race are emotive in context.

463
Perhaps I can give two examples in the last week or so where emotionalism on racial issues has been displayed in the Press, even to the extent that stories have appeared before the actual terms which were negotiated with Mr. Smith were known in this country. On the morning of November 16, the Daily Telegraph published a statement purporting to have been made by Mr. Humphry Berkeley of the Africa Bureau, which read as follows:
"It was sad that Sir Alec had started his career with a shameful surrender at Munich, and concluded it with a shameful surrender at Salisbury."
Is it not disgraceful and emotive to use such words when the conditional agreement that was brought back from Salisbury was not known in this country at the time, and could not possibly have been known to Mr. Humphry Berkeley. On the morning of November 16, when that statement was published in the Daily Telegraph, the terms were not even known to Parliament. It was only on the afternoon of that day that the statement was published by the Government, and comment was made in the Press that very evening.
An incident similar to that in date, time and publication, is attributable also in the case of Mr. Peter Hain, who, again before he could ever have seen the terms, said:
"I hope to be able to generate a militant campaign up and down this country that will make the operation at Suez look like a Sunday afternoon outing."
How on earth can all this be helpful to the Commission about to visit Salisbury? How can it possibly be conducive to a temperate and equable atmosphere in which the talks must be conducted if they are to succeed? But Messrs. Berkeley and Hain are in good company, for Mr. Malik, Russia's representative at the United Nations, derided the British-Rhodesian agreement also: and if Russia does not want an agreement to succeed, one can be sure that the agreement is not in the interests of Russia's imperial policy in Africa.
Apart from irresponsible statements and comments, which can always inflame the position, there is another matter which has always tormented me about the Rhodesia situation. We could have used force against Rhodesia, but I believe that
464
had we done so we should eventually have had a racial war that would have set the Continent of Africa alight from one end to the other; and, left with sanctions, in the long term this would hit the African more than the white Rhodesian. This seems to have happened.
The information I have received since these terms were announced in Rhodesia, from letters which I have received, is that there is far more widespread unemployment amongst the coloured Africans than was previously known. Really what worries the ordinary Africans who are natives of that country is the security of jobs rather than policies. They want to know what is going to happen in their future; they want to know whether they can seek employment and get some security of employment, and so on. It is important, therefore, that nothing should be said or done that would detract from the possibility of an agreement that would see the lifting of sanctions to help the Africans in the dire circumstances in which they have obviously been placed by the sanctions imposed on that country.
As regards the agreement, I am convinced that considerable concessions have been made by Mr. Smith. Other noble Lords have touched on this matter and at this late hour I will not comment on it further. As regards the Rhodesian Front, and apart from some of its racial policies which in the past I have disliked, I have always tried to be objective and fair in the balance. When white minorities settle in a country such as Rhodesia they make their homes there, often their children are educated there. Everything they possess is there, and they have nowhere else to go. Who can doubt the justification of their fears at the time when after U. D. I. a civil war broke out in Nigeria? We are not without blemish at a period of time when we have decided that a particular culture was ready at a particular moment for self-government. It has not always been a happy moment.
My Lords, I have really no more to say. I am so much in agreement with the powerful speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman (in the views he expressed he is so much on all-fours with my own overseas experience) that tonight I am thankful that we have had the

465
benefit of the noble Lord to advise us in these matters. In conclusion, the issue to me is clear. This conditional agreement, subject to the acceptability of African and white opinion in Rhodesia, is the last chance to avoid future apartheid or an eventual racial war with all its attendant horrors. I gladly support the Motion standing in the name of my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal and I will support him with my vote in the Government Lobby tomorrow.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN): My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned until tomorrow.
Moved, That the debate be adjourned until tomorrow.—(The Marquess of Lothian.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

SUMMER TIME BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills with Amendments, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
LOCAL EMPLOYMENT BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills with amendments, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
WRITTEN ANSWERS

  FUTURE OF FORT GEORGE
  THE EARL OF CROMARTIE THE EARL OF CROMARTIE asked Her Majesty's Government:
  Whether they will confirm that Fort George will remain a military station.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE (LORD CARRINGTON): Subject to the finding of the Defence Lands Committee, under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford, I can confirm that Fort George will remain a military station for the foreseeable future.

  BARRY BUDDON TRAINING AREA
  THE EARL OF CROMARTIE THE EARL OF CROMARTIE asked Her Majesty's Government:
  Whether they will confirm the assurance which they have recently given that Barry Buddon will remain a military training area.
  LORD CARRINGTON: Subject to the finding of the Defence Lands Committee, under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford, I can confirm that a military requirement exists for the Barry Buddon training area. It provides the only ranges of their kind in Scotland, and we plan to use them for many years to come.
  House adjourned at eighteen minutes before one o'clock, a.m.